[Senate Hearing 117-967, Part 7]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-967, Pt. 7
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2023 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE
PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 4543
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CON-
STRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR
SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
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PART 7
STRATEGIC FORCES
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APRIL 27; MAY 11, 18, 2022
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
Available via: http: //www.govinfo.gov
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
59-584 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TOM COTTON, Arkansas
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia JONI ERNST, Iowa
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia RICK SCOTT, Florida
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
MARK KELLY, Arizona TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
John D. Wason, Minority Staff Director
_________________________________________________________________
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine, Chairman DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts TOM COTTON, Arkansas
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
MARK KELLY, Arizona TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
April 27, 2022
Page
Department of Energy's Atomic Energy Defense Activities and 1
Department of Defense Nuclear Weapons Programs.
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Angus King.................................. 1
Statement of Senator Deb Fischer................................. 3
Witness Statements
Hruby, The Honorable Jill M., Administrator, National Nuclear 2
Security Administration.
Caldwell, Admiral James F., Jr., USN, Deputy Administrator for 4
Naval Reactors, National Nuclear Security Administration.
White, William, Acting Assistant Secretary of Energy for 10
Environmental Management.
Adams, The Honorable Marvin L., Deputy Administrator for Defense 22
Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration.
Wolfe, Vice Admiral Johnny R., Jr., USN, Director, Navy Strategic 35
Systems Programs.
Cotton, General Anthony J., USAF, Commander, Air Force Global 42
Strike Command.
Appendix
Special Report
Meeting Medical and Research Needs for Isotopes Derived from
Uranium-233................................................ 59
Audit Report
The Disposition of Uranium-233 at Oak Ridge National 84
Laboratory.
Chinese Academy of Sciences and U.S. Department of Energy
Cooperation in Nuclear Energy Sciences and Technologies
First Executive Committee Meeting........................ 101
May 11, 2022
United States Space Force Programs............................... 215
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Angus King.................................. 215
Statement of Senator Deb Fischer................................. 216
Witness Statements
Calvelli, Frank, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space 216
Acquisition and Integration.
Plumb, The Honorable John F., Assistant Secretary of Defense for 217
Space Policy.
Thompson, General David D., USSF, Vice Chief of Space Operations. 223
Questions for the Record......................................... 246
(iii)
May 18, 2022
Missile Defense Strategy, Policies, and Programs................. 251
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Angus King.................................. 251
Statement of Senator Deb Fischer................................. 252
Witness Statements
Honey, The Honorable David, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 252
Research and Engineering.
Plumb, The Honorable John, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 254
Space Policy.
VanHerck, General Glen, USAF, Commander, United States Northern 259
Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command.
Karbler, Lieutenant General Daniel, USA, Commanding General, 269
United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command.
Hill, Vice Admiral Jon, USN, Director, Missile Defense Agency.... 280
Questions for the Record......................................... 300
(iv)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023 AND THE FUTURE YEARS
DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 27, 2022
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES AND DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:30 p.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Angus King
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Committee Members present: King, Warren, Rosen, Kelly,
Fischer, and Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS KING
Senator King. This is a hearing on the Department of
Energy's (DOE's) atomic energy defense activity and Department
of Defense (DOD) nuclear weapons programs in review of the
Defense Authorization Request for fiscal year 2023. This is a
meeting of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Committee
on Armed Services of the United States Senate.
Senator Fischer is on her way over from the floor and will
be here shortly, but I am going to begin the hearing and we
will have a brief statement from her when she arrives.
First I want to thank all the witnesses for joining us
today. The purpose of our hearing is to examine the fiscal year
2023 budget request for the defense portion of the Department
of Energy's budget. This portion of the DOE's budget involves
primarily the National Nuclear Security Administration, or
NNSA, and the environmental cleanup of the DOE's former defense
sites.
Our NNSA witnesses will be Administrator Jill Hruby; the
Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, Dr. Marvin Adams;
and the Deputy Administrator for Office of Naval Reactors,
Admiral Frank Caldwell. For the DOE Office of Environmental
Management our witness will be Mr. Ike White, the office's
senior advisor.
The NNSA's fiscal year 2023 budget request is $21.4
billion, a 3.7 percent, or $754 million increase from the
fiscal year 2022's enacted level of $20.6 billion. The DOE
Office of Environmental Management's fiscal year 2023 request
of $6.9 billion is up 3 percent, or about $205 million from the
fiscal year 2022 enacted level of $6.7 billion.
This hearing will also examine the fiscal year 2023 budget
request for the Air Force and Navy as it relates to atomic
defense activities. For the Air Force, our witness is General
Cotton, the Commander of the Air Force Global Strike Command,
and for the Navy is Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe, Director of the
Strategic Systems Program Office.
In order to meet DOD requirements, the NNSA is the busiest
it has been since the 1980s--congratulations, Ms. Hruby--with
five major warhead programs and a number of large construction
projects. I am hopeful we can understand the challenges that
the NNSA faces in dealing with DOD needs. Likewise, I am
hopeful we can understand from our DOD witnesses what they see
as the key hurdles facing NNSA as well as unique DOD
requirements as they relate to the NNSA's modernization
programs.
Today's hearing will involve two panels. The first will
have Administrator Hruby, Admiral Caldwell, and Senior Advisor
White. The second panel will have Deputy Administrator Adams,
General Cotton, and Vice Admiral Wolfe. After short opening
statements we will proceed with questions from each Member at 5
minutes each, and as I say, when Senator Fischer arrives we
will give her a moment to make a brief opening statement.
But in the meantime, Administrator Hruby, why don't you
begin. I apologize for this awkward arrangement, but everybody
is having meetings this afternoon, and this is room we drew,
and this is the setup, understanding the circumstances.
Administrator, please proceed.
Ms. Hruby. Okay. I am waiting for a light. Yeah, it is on.
All right.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JILL M. HRUBY, ADMINISTRATOR,
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Ms. Hruby. Chairman King and Ranking Member Fischer to be,
and Members of the Subcommittee, I am honored to present the
President's fiscal year 2023 budget request for the National
Nuclear Security Administration. Thank you for your enduring
bipartisan support.
Chairman King, I have provided a written statement and
respectfully request that it be submitted for the record.
Senator King. Without objection.
Ms. Hruby. The President's fiscal year 2023 budget request
for NNSA is $21.4 billion. Informed by the 2022 Nuclear Posture
Review, this request underscores both our expanded mission and
the increasing pace required to meet program needs.
The weapons activity request is $16.5 billion, and includes
nearly equal funding for stockpile management, about $4.9
billion, and production modernization, about $4.6 billion. This
is an indication of NNSA's biggest challenge, to succeed in
parallel weapons modernization and infrastructure
revitalization.
This approach carries risk. However, it is our only
feasible path to meet requirements, and we are making steady
progress. The W88 Alt 370 for the sea leg of the triad and the
B61-12 for the air leg have achieved first production and are
on track to meet DOD schedules. The W80-4 for the long-range
standoff missile, the W87-1 for the Sentinel intercontinental
ballistic missile, and the W93 for the sea-launched ballistic
missile are in various phases of design.
On the infrastructure side, the uranium processing facility
is enclosed and projected to be complete in 2026, and the 90
percent designs are underway for our two pit production
facilities.
We continue stockpile sustainment, other production
projects, and science, including establishing a program to
strengthen stockpile digital resilience. Together these
programs will fulfill the Administration's commitment to a
safe, secure, reliable, and effective nuclear deterrent into
the future.
The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation budget request is $2.3
billion, and it aims to reduce global nuclear threats, and is
essential in today's geopolitical landscape. Lowering nuclear
risk with robust safeguards and stepping up cooperation with
governments, international organizations, and the private
sector help support the global expansion of peaceful nuclear
use while managing proliferation. We continue to strengthen our
ability to respond to nuclear and radiological incidents, and
these capabilities have proved pivotal to inform the ground
truths about nuclear threats in Ukraine. Admiral Caldwell is
here to provide detail on the naval nuclear reactor budget
request.
The key to success is a high-quality workforce, and we are
placing a high priority on attraction and retention throughout
the enterprise.
In summary, NNSA faces difficult mission requirements in a
difficult world. This budget request strikes the balance for
NNSA to be responsive and responsible.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
Senator King. Senator Fischer, I reserved time for you to
make a brief opening statement if you would like.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and my
apologies for being a few minutes late.
Overall I was very pleased to see that the budgets strongly
support nuclear modernization that has been presented and
embraced the renewal of our nuclear triad and nuclear
infrastructure conceived during President Obama's tenure over a
decade ago. However, I still have a number of concerns about
the Administration's budget request.
In particular, I am concerned about the shortfall in
funding for NNSA's budget and the impact this could have on
plutonium pit production. While additional resources alone will
not be sufficient to ensure pit production requirements are
met, I believe we must do all we can to minimize the delay in
delivering this critical capability.
Additionally, the Air Force's unfunded priorities list
included several items related to our nuclear forces and
nuclear command, control, and communications architecture,
including $63 million in unfunded requirements for the
Minuteman-III sustainment.
While we often focus heavily on modernization programs, we
cannot forget that our current nuclear forces must be sustained
and remain effective over the next decade until the
replacements are fully operational.
I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses. I thank
you all for being here. I thank you for the work that you do,
and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the hearing.
Senator King. Admiral Caldwell, please.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JAMES F. CALDWELL, JR., USN, DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR FOR NAVAL REACTORS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
Admiral Caldwell. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer,
Distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify here today.
Your consistent support for naval reactors allows my team
to provide the Navy with the unmatched power and capability of
nuclear propulsion. This gives our Navy the reliability,
agility, and firepower to carry our national security missions
around the world. Our investments in research and development
over many decades have enabled the advanced technology in
today's fleet. These investments have given the Nation a
competitive edge in the maritime environment.
Today we cannot do more of the same and expect that same
advantage in the future. Our adversaries are pursuing military
modernization programs across the spectrums of warfare aimed at
eroding our maritime preeminence. Focusing on the future is a
necessity, but that future needs to be built on the foundation
of our people, our technology, and our facilities.
My budget request for fiscal year 2023 is for $2.08 billion
and invests in three key areas of that foundation and three
priority projects.
First, the budget request supports our most important
resource, our people. The talented and dedicated people at our
D.C. headquarters and our field offices around the country are
absolutely essential to our strong, centralized management and
oversight of the important work we perform for the Nation.
Second, the budget request reflects the continuation of
increased investment in research and development. Technology
investment must be reinvigorated today to be ready for future
ships with the goals of lowering costs, reducing construction
timelines, and adding capability to our fleet.
My request also focuses on investments to modernize our
critical laboratory infrastructure and reduce our legacy
environmental liabilities. Without this we will be unable to
support fleet operations and vital research and development.
This year's request also supports the continued execution
of three national priority projects. The first is the
development of the reactor plant for the Columbia-class
ballistic missile submarine, directly supporting the Navy's
number one acquisition priority. Manufacturing the lead, life-
of-ship reactor core is well underway. This year's request will
allow my team to continue the work required for reactor plant
testing and reactor plant delivery.
The second project is the refueling overhaul of our land-
based prototype reactor in New York. Once complete, this
reactor will provide 20 more years of student training and
vital research and development.
The third project is the continued construction of the
Naval Spent Fuel Handling Facility in Idaho, which will enable
long-term, reliable processing and packaging of spent fuel from
the Navy's nuclear fleet.
In closing, your strong support enables me to carry out
Naval Reactors' mission. I respectfully urge your endorsement
of our fiscal year 2023 budget request. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Caldwell follows:]
Prepared Statement by Admiral James F. Caldwell
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and Distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today and present the President's Fiscal Year 2023 Budget for Naval
Reactors. Your strong support for the work we do ensures our nuclear
Navy can carry out vital missions around the world with agility,
endurance, and firepower. As underscored by the unprecedented events
currently playing out on the world stage, great power competition is
here to stay, therefore it is vital for the United States that we
maintain a robust naval advantage over our adversaries. Congress'
support of our past efforts has allowed the Navy to maintain these
advantages, and your partnership with the Navy is needed now, more than
ever, as we work on the current and future endeavors in naval nuclear
propulsion that are needed to protect the national security of the
United States.
I have had the pleasure of serving as the Director of Naval
Reactors for almost 7 years out of an 8-year tenure. Before that, I had
the privilege of serving in many operational and staff roles throughout
the course of my Navy career. As I reflect on these decades of service
and our Navy's global standing, I am increasingly concerned that our
competitive advantages over our near-peer rivals are diminishing. It is
vitally important for us to focus on technology investment now; failure
to do so could have catastrophic implications for our future Navy in a
future fight. Rivals are pursuing military modernization programs aimed
at achieving regional hegemony in the near-term and eroding United
States preeminence in the long-term. All domains of the maritime
environment are becoming increasingly contested, and to preserve
freedom of the seas, deter conflict, defend allies, and protect our
national interests, we must sustain and grow our naval warfighting
capabilities at an accelerated pace.
As amplified in our latest National Defense Strategy, we cannot
simply do more of what we've done in the past. New advancements and
refinements in nuclear propulsion are needed as the Navy innovates to
increase and expand our competitive advantage. Naval Reactors'
historical investment in advanced technologies has given the Nation an
enviable position in the maritime environment; further investments,
however, are necessary to maintain our technological edge well into the
future. Our ships need to retain their advantage against future threats
across multiple domains and must be affordable. We also need to be able
to design and build our propulsion plants faster to ensure the Navy
stays ahead of increasing demands, and we must do this more cost
effectively. As the CNO has conveyed in his Navigation Plan, ``there is
no time to waste--our actions in this decade will set the maritime
balance of power for the rest of the century.'' Our Nation took a new
step this past year when the President announced the AUKUS enhanced
tri-lateral security partnership, directing a period of consultation
with the objective of identifying the optimal pathway for delivering a
conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability to Australia
by the earliest achievable date. This partnership creates an
opportunity to amplify our naval power, strengthen a key ally and our
own shipbuilding capability, and build the additional industrial and
vendor base capacity our Nation needs. Through the consultation period,
Naval Reactors is also focused on strengthening our partnership with
the United Kingdom, and ensuring Australia understands and establishes
the strong foundation of capabilities necessary to properly steward
nuclear submarine technology. Given the global threats we face, it is
imperative that we ensure our closest allies remain relevant in the
undersea domain.
Our success in the future will rest on the foundation of what we
build today. Therefore, I want to highlight some of the many
contributions of our nuclear fleet. Our ballistic missile submarines
provide the most survivable leg of our nuclear triad and are essential
to our ability to deter major warfare, and provide assurance to our
allies. Our fast attack submarines operate with confidence, undetected,
safeguarding vital commercial sea-lanes, and stand ready to protect
American interests where needed. Our aircraft carriers provide our
Nation a credible, sustained ability to project combat power, deter
conflict, and protect our interests around the world.
Lead ship construction for Columbia-class is underway, which will
allow the Navy to continue the seamless execution of the sea-based
strategic deterrent mission that began over six decades ago. The USS
Ohio (SSBN 726), lead ship of today's ballistic missile submarine fleet
was commissioned over 40 years ago. This class will start to be
replaced by the Columbia-class in 2031 with lead boat delivery in
fiscal year 2028. I remain focused on ensuring the transition between
these two classes is uninterrupted--the sea based strategic deterrence
mission is too important to fail. The Columbia-class will be a bedrock
of our national security posture for decades to come and will be the
first submarine to operate for over 40 years on a single reactor core,
an incredible testimonial to the technology investment that has
occurred over the past decades.
In attack submarine shipbuilding, the Navy continues to work toward
a steady cadence of Virginia-class submarine delivery. I recently took
part in sea trials on Pre-Commissioning Units (PCU) Montana and Oregon.
This submarine class now makes up over one third of our operational
attack submarines. The Navy is also assessing improvements to
capability and lethality for future Virginia-class submarines; these
improvements will not only add capability to today's fleet but allow
the Navy to prove candidate technologies that will influence our next-
generation attack submarine. Naval Reactors is closely aligned with the
Navy on all of these efforts. Along with the technologies being
inserted for Virginia-class submarines, Naval Reactors has renewed our
focus and investment in advanced technologies which will pave the way
for improvements in speed, energy density, and stealth for the follow
on SSN(X) program. We are also focused on refueling up to seven Los
Angeles-class submarines, helping to maintain our submarine force
structure with boats that have the warfighting capability to contribute
effectively to undersea missions.
In aircraft carrier shipbuilding, USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78)
continues to make great progress and will soon be employed and
operating alongside U.S. and allied forces. This phenomenal ship is
ready to provide over a half century of naval presence around the
globe. This past year marked a significant event in the employment of
the Ford-class--Full Ship Shock Trials. The positive result of this
testing is a tribute to the precision, rigor, and execution that go
into the design, production, and delivery of the world's most capable
aircraft carrier. The second ship of the Ford-class, the John F.
Kennedy (CVN 79) continues propulsion plant testing and is on track for
delivery to the Navy in 2024. Progress also continues on construction
of Enterprise (CVN 80) and Doris Miller (CVN 81), carriers in a two-
ship buy that allows the Navy to realize important cost savings, while
maintaining a steady, predictable workload within our vital industrial
base.
naval reactors overview
This Committee's support has enabled the safe operation of the
nuclear fleet, substantial progress on our key projects, and our
continued oversight and regulation of all areas across the Naval
Nuclear Propulsion Program. Naval Reactors' budget request for fiscal
year 2023 is $2.1 billion. Your past support has allowed significant
progress on our three major Department of Energy funded projects--
Columbia-class propulsion plant development and production, the
refueling overhaul of our research and training reactor in New York,
and the construction of the Naval Spent Fuel Handling Facility in
Idaho. When I first arrived at Naval Reactors in 2015, these three
projects had not yet hit their peak funding. Over the course of the
past several years, these projects have been a major focus for the
Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. We have managed and lead the way
through many challenges, and today, I can confidently say that the
development and production of the first Columbia-class propulsion plant
is proceeding in support of lead boat construction; and the refueling
of our research and training reactor will complete within fiscal year
2023. With your support, the Program also continues to make significant
progress on construction of an incredibly important Naval Spent Fuel
Handling Facility. While we are staying focused on completing these
efforts, we are also preparing for the future with renewed emphasis on
advanced and innovative technologies.
major projects
Columbia-class Propulsion Plant
The Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine remains the Navy's
number one acquisition priority. Naval Reactors is supporting lead ship
construction and is delivering the life-of-ship reactor core and the
electric drive propulsion system for the Columbia-class program. The
fiscal year 2023 budget includes $53.9 million that will allow
continued support for lead ship propulsion plant design and safety
analysis work required for lead ship reactor testing and delivery.
S8G Prototype Refueling Overhaul
The fiscal year 2023 budget request includes $20 million toward
final execution of the refueling and overhaul of the New York land-
based prototype, which will enable an additional 20 years of Naval
Reactors' commitment to research, development, and initial operator
training. Over the course of the past three years, the project has
worked through performance and testing equipment challenges, and in
April of last year met a key milestone--installation of the new reactor
core. This reactor core, called the Technology Demonstration Core,
includes Columbia-class type fuel modules as part of testing and
demonstrating the manufacturability necessary for production and
delivery of the Columbia-class reactor core. We continue to provide
strong oversight to improve cost and schedule performance, and the
project will complete in fiscal year 2023. I look forward to providing
the final update on this multi-year project in next year's appearance
before the Committee.
Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project
Naval Reactors is constructing the Naval Spent Fuel Handling
Facility (SFHP), located at the Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho. The
facility is critical to our mission to manage naval spent nuclear fuel
and support aircraft carrier and submarine fleet requirements. The
fiscal year 2023 budget request includes $398 million for continuation
of this project through several key milestones. Economic conditions
influenced by the COVID-19 pandemic and the discovery of unexpected
bedrock conditions beneath the facility's foundations have presented
significant challenges for us. To address these challenges, we
evaluated actions necessary to ensure the overall Project milestones
remain achievable, including additional resources (e.g., extended/added
shifts, parallel and fast-tracking of work efforts) and additional
funding to mitigate impacts to current and future construction
subcontracts. Consistent with these actions, I approved a revision to
the SFHP Performance Baseline in fiscal year 2021. Funding in fiscal
year 2023 will be critical to implementing our construction sequence. I
remain committed to keeping the Committee informed of our progress, and
actions to mitigate construction challenges, as we aggressively manage
and oversee this complex and large-scale infrastructure project.
technical base funding
In addition to our three priority projects, Naval Reactors
maintains a high-performing technical base. The technical base is the
set of fundamental skills and capabilities necessary to safely and
effectively support the nuclear Navy. It includes a foundation of
specialists in nuclear materials, nuclear physics, thermal-hydraulic
testing, acoustics, electrical design, software development, system
development, refueling, and other specialized skills, along with the
associated facilities and laboratories to conduct our work. The people
and activities that make up our technical base are leveraged for our
priority projects but also perform essential work to support the
operating fleet and ensure our day-to-day technological advantage over
our competitors. Specifically, the technical base: 1) addresses
emergent needs and challenges of our nuclear fleet, 2) executes nuclear
reactor technology research and development that supports improving
today's fleet and future capabilities, and 3) modernizes critical
infrastructure and reduces the Program's legacy environmental
liabilities. This base also supports the lean yet highly effective
federal workforce that provides the oversight necessary to carry out
this important technical work safely and efficiently. These activities
provide 24-7 support to the globally deployed nuclear-powered Navy.
Attracting and retaining top talent is critical to our technical base's
ability to fulfill and mature our mission amidst a wide array of
challenges and new demands in this era of strategic competition. The
engineers and scientists at our Naval Nuclear Laboratory and nuclear
capable shipyards are national treasures, who are in high demand from
other areas of our economy. We continue to work with the leadership of
our labs and private shipyards to identify innovative means to stay
competitive in this aggressive talent market.
Program Direction
Our small but highly skilled federal workforce is critical to
execution of our responsibilities. With the fiscal year 2023 Program
Direction request, I remain highly focused on attracting, developing,
and retaining a talented and diverse workforce to oversee and manage a
wide array of work across the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program to
ensure mission success. The talented and dedicated people at our
Washington, DC headquarters and field offices are absolutely essential
to our strong centralized management and oversight of the important
work we perform for our Nation.
Building ships that have over forty years of expected life requires
staffing continuity to ensure the Nation has a workforce with the deep
technical knowledge needed to execute Naval Reactors' cradle-to-grave
responsibilities of these robust systems. I must have sufficient
Federal staffing to meet the demands of sustaining and improving
today's fleet while simultaneously growing our future capabilities. The
cumulative effect of personnel costs growing above inflationary rates
and an increase in recent senior level retirements has impeded our
ability to reach this goal and challenged our ability to maintain our
staffing levels. The market for this talent is exceptionally
competitive. Increasingly complex systems, new and innovative research
efforts, and growing cyber and other vulnerabilities require additional
expertise and new perspectives that can only be gained through reaching
our full personnel requirements. I will continue to communicate with
the Committee on our requirements and progress in reaching our related
staffing goals. In concert with our renewed focus on research and
development that I have highlighted over the last several years, we
need to find new ways to bring the Nation's top talent into Naval
Reactors and retain this talent to transition technical innovations
into our submarines and aircraft carriers. I respectfully request
Congress' support, which will allow me to recruit, select, develop, and
retain the talented workforce that was started by Admiral Hyman
Rickover many decades ago and that has proved to be crucial to the
success of the Program.
Research and Development
Our research and development strategy represents a renewed
investment in cutting-edge technologies aimed at reversing an eroding
capability gap with strategic adversaries like China and Russia.
Technology investment must be reinvigorated today to have new
technologies ready for future classes of ships and to lower costs and
reduce construction timelines. It should be noted that these
investments also enhance and improve the performance of today's fleet;
this is especially important given the increasing competition in the
global maritime environment. Our critical research and development is
conducted by the dedicated and talented teams of people at our Naval
Nuclear Laboratory sites--the Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory in
Pittsburgh, the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory and Kesselring Site in
greater Albany, and the Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho.
Our first priority is always support of today's fleet. Our labs
perform approximately 4,000 technical evaluations annually that enable
Naval Reactors to thoroughly assess and respond to emergent issues,
thereby keeping our ships mission-ready while ensuring nuclear safety.
These efforts are essential to keep our ships at-sea operating abroad
for longer periods of time, our carrier strike groups globally engaged,
and ballistic missile and attack submarines ready to respond at any
time.
Beginning with last year's fiscal year 2022 budget, Naval Reactors
has embarked on a path to identify and develop new technologies for
inclusion in the next generation of nuclear powered ships while
simultaneously delivering the enhanced capabilities to the existing
fleet mentioned earlier. We are pursuing advanced reactor core and fuel
systems, advanced manufacturing and inspection techniques, next-
generation instrumentation and control architectures and sensors, and
asymmetrical applications of emerging technologies (e.g., advanced
power conversion, artificial intelligence, data analytics, additive
manufacturing, and advanced robotics). These advancements have the
potential to deliver both greater capability and lower acquisition and
lifecycle costs, while ensuring the Navy is constantly improving our
advantage and innovating. I commit to further engagement with the
Committee on these advanced technology maturation efforts to enhance
understanding and support for the actions described above. I take great
pride in highlighting our innovative and new technologies and how we
can transition them into meeting requirements for the Fleet of
tomorrow.
I want to assure the Committee that our investments are supported
by a comprehensive and rigorous planning effort we undertake with our
partners at the Naval Nuclear Laboratory. Our annual work execution
plans are derived from this comprehensive alignment, and I personally
review and approve each plan to ensure we are making the right
investments and tradeoffs in all areas of our business.
Facilities and Infrastructure
Our Naval Nuclear Laboratory facilities and infrastructure are
essential in carrying out Naval Reactors' mission. This year's budget
request supports continuing our recapitalization of Naval Nuclear
Laboratory facilities and infrastructure systems, many of which have
supported the Program since its inception over 70 years ago.
Specifically, this budget includes a consolidation and recapitalization
of our thermal hydraulic testing capabilities that will advance
cutting-edge technologies and improve testing efficiency. Without these
recapitalization efforts, we will be unable to effectively support
nuclear fleet operations and advanced research and development efforts
at the level required by this complex technology. We are ramping up our
efforts in decontaminating and decommissioning (D&D) older facilities
that have been in existence since the start of the Program in the early
1950s. We have approximately $8 billion in environmental liabilities
requiring D&D efforts. Over one-third of this estimate is associated
with the cost to remediate and demolish inactive facilities and
infrastructure at the Naval Nuclear Laboratory sites. We continue to
retire these liabilities in an environmentally responsible and cost-
effective manner to support best use of our funding. I look forward to
future engagement with the Committee to discuss our specific actions
and tangible examples of Naval Reactors' long-term plan to reach our
goals. Through our established partnership with the Department of
Energy Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM), we are leveraging
their experience in efficient, safe, and cost-effective remediation of
environmental liabilities across the complex. I am pleased with the
collaboration on this effort with my partners in DOE-EM.
aukus
In September of last year, President Biden announced an enhanced
trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom,
and the United States (AUKUS). The three governments are engaging in an
18-month consultation period to seek an optimal pathway for delivering
a conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability to
Australia at the earliest achievable date. Naval Reactors is playing a
key leadership role in developing this plan to ensure that our nation's
preeminent expertise is applied to the nuclear-powered submarine
initiative. We are now more than six months into this consultation
period and are focused on ensuring Australia understands the full scope
of capabilities necessary to design, build, operate, and maintain a
nuclear navy, as well as properly dispose a nuclear powered ship at the
end of service. This includes an in-depth analysis of the trilateral
partners' existing regulatory frameworks, as well as the existing
educational, industrial, and technical capabilities, and capacities
needed to identify the optimal path forward. This effort involves
emphasizing to Australia the key leadership roles, labor talent, and
infrastructure investments they will need to contribute to bring this
to reality. In February, I along with a team of subject matter experts
from Naval Reactors and the United Kingdom traveled to Australia to
assess their current capability. During this trip, I met with senior
Australian Government officials. As part of our discussions, we
emphasized that obtaining a nuclear powered submarine capability is a
long road which requires steadfast commitment to the highest levels of
stewardship. While my number one priority is supporting our current and
future nuclear fleet, the AUKUS efforts are being supported by a small
cadre of experts who are responsible for ensuring the critical facets
of this consultation are completed effectively. The foundation on which
this effort is built is made up of our people, our technology, and the
facilities that support our own Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. While
Australia is funding this consultation period, Congress' support of
Naval Reactors' fiscal year 2023 budget request is vital to support our
primary mission and allow the Naval Reactors leadership team the
ability to support key activities during the consultation period.
conclusion
The Navy's ability to maintain mastery of the undersea domain and
sustain a formidable forward presence and its resultant value cannot be
simply assumed. Naval nuclear propulsion is an incredible but
unforgiving technology, and must be treated appropriately, with a
constant focus on safe operation. Naval Reactor's cradle-to-grave
responsibility to manage this technology is paramount, and I assure
this Committee that I will balance investments in today's fleet with
the requirements of a future fleet, carefully steer future cooperation
efforts, and preserve the focus on providing effective naval nuclear
propulsion for the United States Navy. I appreciate the strong support
this program receives from Congress and respectfully urge your support
for our fiscal year 2023 budget request.
Senator King. Thank you, Admiral. Mr. White, please.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM WHITE, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
ENERGY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
Mr. White. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and
Members of the Subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before
you today to represent the Department of Energy's Office of
Environmental Management (EM).
EM is focused on its commitment to clean up the
environmental legacy of the national defense programs that
helped end World War II and the Cold War. This work helps
address the government's responsibility to the communities that
played such an important role in U.S. history, and more
importantly helps position them to continue to grow and thrive
in the future.
Today EM has completed cleanup activities at 92 of 107
sites, most recently competing legacy work at the Brookhaven
National Laboratory in New York.
Even as EM has grappled with a global pandemic over the
past 2 years, we have achieved a set of impactful
accomplishments in the cleanup program. At Y-12 in Oak Ridge,
EM demolished the biology complex so that this area can be used
by NNSA for their modernization program.
Senator King. Could you get a little closer to the mic,
please?
Mr. White. Of course, sir. At Y-12 in Oakridge, EM
demolished the biology complex so that this area can be used by
the NNSA. More than 200 transuranic waste shipments were
received last year at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plan, bringing
the total to more than 13,000 shipments safely transported.
That includes shipments from Los Alamos, where the team
certified and completed 30 shipments to WIPP last year.
At the Hanford Site in Washington State, EM has begun
large-scale treatment of radioactive tank waste in the Tank
Side Cesium Removal system, another project completed ahead of
schedule and under budget. We have treated around 200,000
gallons of waste since the system came online just a few months
ago.
At Savannah River in South Carolina, EM is processing
record amounts of tank waste, helping to address one of the
largest environmental and financial liabilities there.
The EM team in Idaho recently completed its buried waste
remediation project 18 months ahead of schedule. This high-
priority cleanup project helps protect the Snake River Plain
Aquifer and meets the commitment we made to the State of Idaho.
The fiscal year 2023 budget request will enable EM to
further advance its mission, maintain national security
priorities, and support those most impacted by the
environmental legacy of the past. We will treat 1 million
gallons of radioactive tank waste at the Hanford site and
advance work to begin vitrifying this tank waste by the end of
2023. After decades of support from Congress, this
transformational accomplishment is well within sight.
As EM prepares to operate these facilities, it is also
ramping up work on Hanford's high-level waste facility so that
we are ultimately able to treat that portion of the tank waste
too.
In South Carolina, EM will accelerate waste processing and
tank closure activities, and at the Idaho National Laboratory
we are advancing towards liquid waste treatment with the
Integrated Waste Treatment Unit. The request will also allow us
to address high-risk excess contaminated facilities and
contaminated groundwater across the complex.
In addition to reducing environmental risks, the budget
request supports broader national security and scientific
research missions. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant will be
modernized and ensure that the facility is equipped to meet the
needs of legacy cleanup activities and ongoing national
security programs. As the mission is carried out, we are
committed to continuous improvement. GAO's [Government
Accountability Office] latest high-risk report acknowledged the
steps EM has taken to demonstrate this commitment, and we aim
to go even further as we plan for the future.
The cleanup program depends on the talented men and women
on the ground at our sites. That is why I am pleased the budget
request boosts support for workforce development and for
building a pipeline of talent that promotes diversity, equity,
and inclusion.
As EM makes steady cleanup progress and prepares for future
mission needs, we remain committed to those most impacted by
the environmental legacy of the past. Our sites are fortunate
to be surrounded by diverse communities and tribal nations who
are strong partners in advancing cleanup and planning for the
future.
I appreciate the Subcommittee's support for the EM mission.
I thank you for your time, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. White follows:]
Prepared Statement by William ``Ike'' White
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and Members of the
Subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today to represent
the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management
(EM).
EM's mission represents the government's strong commitment to
cleaning up the environmental legacy of the national defense programs
that helped end World War II and the Cold War. EM's vital mission does
not just address past legacy, though, it also helps to support and
enable DOE's ongoing national security and scientific research
missions.
The fiscal year 2023 budget request of $7,643,202,000 for EM
reflects the Biden Administration's strong commitment to advancing the
cleanup mission and preparing for sustained success, maintaining
national security priorities, and supporting communities most impacted
by the environmental legacy of the past.
record of results for the environment
Over the last 30 years, EM has made significant progress,
completing cleanup the environment at 92 out of a total of 107 sites.
EM's significant accomplishments to date have included completing
demolition of the Plutonium Finishing Plant, a facility that produced
two-thirds of the nation's Cold War-era plutonium at the Hanford Site
in Washington state; completing the removal of the former uranium
enrichment complex at Oak Ridge in Tennessee; opening the world's only
deep geological repository for transuranic waste generated from atomic
energy defense activities at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New
Mexico; and completing construction on the entire tank waste treatment
system at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, enabling
significant progress in how the Department tackles one of its largest
environmental and financial liabilities at that site.
new era of cleanup success
These accomplishments are enabled by the significant investments
Congress has made in the EM program and have ushered in tangible
results for communities and the environment in a safe, effective, and
responsible manner. Even as EM continues to grapple with a global
pandemic, the program achieved a set of impactful accomplishments at
sites across the country.
At the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee EM
demolished the Biology Complex. EM also advanced deactivation and
demolition work at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) with
demolition of the Radiological Lab's West Cell Bank and the Tritium
Target Preparation Facility now complete. ORNL and Y-12 house hundreds
of excess contaminated facilities that comprise the largest inventory
of high-risk buildings in the DOE complex. Collectively these efforts
are reducing risks, stabilizing facilities, and paving the way for
advancing cleanup and providing land for research and national security
missions. At the Hanford site in Washington state, EM is treating
radioactive and chemical waste from large underground tanks for the
first time ever on a large scale, and we are progressing towards
initiation of the Direct Feed Low Activity Waste (DFLAW) project that
will convert into glass or vitrify this waste for disposal. At the
Savannah River Site in Aiken, South Carolina we are now processing
record amounts of tank waste and recently broke ground on the important
Advanced Manufacturing Collaborative facility that will provide
essential space for mission work and facilitate academic, industry, and
community collaboration in state-of-the-art laboratory space. The
Advanced Manufacturing Collaborative will bring cutting edge
innovations to help meet the needs of the EM cleanup mission and create
an environment to develop a diverse and talented next generation
workforce.
The EM team in Idaho recently completed buried waste remediation
helping to protect the Snake River Aquifer. More than 200 transuranic
waste shipments were received last year at the Waste Isolation Pilot
Plan (WIPP) in New Mexico. This includes shipments from Los Alamos
National Laboratory, where the EM team certified and completed 30
shipments to WIPP last year.
Cleanup activities at the Brookhaven National Laboratory in New
York are complete with demolition of the 320-foot-tall red-and-white
High Flux Beam Reactor exhaust stack, restoring the areas skyline.
Lastly EM completed environmental remediation work at the Tonopah Test
Range in Nevada, enabling transfer of portions of that site to the
Office of Legacy Management for long-term stewardship.
steady progress planned for fiscal year 2023
The fiscal year 2023 budget request builds on these significant
achievements by positioning EM for steady and sustained progress in how
we tackle radioactive tank waste. Key investments are proposed to
continue to drive risk reduction and significant changes across EM's
portfolio of sites, as well as to continue to aid the Department's
vital science and defense missions.
Protecting the environment by addressing radioactive waste stored
in underground tanks at Hanford, Savanah River and the Idaho National
Laboratory is a top priority for EM. The budget request enables
treatment of one million gallons of tank waste through the Tank Side
Cesium Removal system and supports the commencement of vitrifying this
waste by the end of 2023 via the Direct Feed Low Activity Waste system.
After decades of support from the local community, Congress and the
workforce this transformational accomplishment is within sight.
As we prepare to begin operating Hanford's low-activity tank waste
vitrification capabilities, the budget request also invests $316.2
million to ramp up work on the Waste Treatment Plant's High Level Waste
facility to be able to tackle that portion of Hanford's tank waste
inventory. In parallel, EM continues to identify safe, effective, and
viable options for the treatment of all Hanford's tank waste, including
supplemental low activity waste. One such approach is the proposed Test
Bed Initiative (TBI) Demonstration. The proposed TBI Demonstration
would address independent recommendations and comments from the
Government Accountability Office, the National Academy of Sciences,
national laboratories, and others to further study the potential cost,
safety and environmental performance of potential treatment and
disposal alternatives. Implementation of this TBI Demonstration
technology on an industrial scale could have the potential to safely
pretreat low-activity waste from Hanford tanks, solidify the waste in
grout, and dispose of it off-site in a manner that is protective of the
workers, the public and the environment.
In addition to helping solve the challenges of Hanford tank waste,
the request will enable EM to continue meaningful cleanup progress to
place another former production reactor into interim safe storage,
transfer radioactive capsules to safer dry storage, and treat another 2
billion gallons of contaminated groundwater.
In South Carolina, the fiscal year 2023 budget request supports
full utilization of capabilities to process tank waste. The Salt Waste
Processing Facility will further accelerate the tank waste mission by
increasing the processing of to 6 million gallons in fiscal year 2023
up from an expected 3 million gallons in fiscal year 2022. As a result,
the Savannah River Site could complete the bulk of its tank waste
treatment mission in a decade.
EM actively works with other DOE organizations to assess
infrastructure needs across the Department and will continue to pursue
modernizing efforts throughout the complex, including at the Savannah
River Site to facilitate project completion.
At the same time, risk reduction work will continue at the Savannah
River Site, including work towards disposition of remaining transuranic
waste and remediating contaminated soil and groundwater.
At the Idaho National Laboratory, the request supports operations
of the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit which will ultimately treat
about 900,000 gallons of liquid waste by turning it into a granular
solid. EM also will meet another key commitment to the state of Idaho
by completing the transfer of EM-owned spent nuclear fuel to on-site
dry storage.
support for national security missions
In addition to reducing environmental risks at these and other
sites across the complex, the EM mission benefits the Department's
broader national security and scientific research missions. Nowhere is
this more evident than at Oak Ridge where the successful demolition of
the former uranium enrichment complex at the East Tennessee Technology
Park has enabled EM to begin major cleanup operations at the Oak Ridge
National Laboratory and Y-12 National Security Complex. Demolition of
the Biology Complex at the Y-12 National Security Complex involved
tearing down the six-story, 255,000 square-foot Building 9207 and the
three-story, 65,000 square-foot Building 9210. With this project
complete, EM will transfer the 18-acre area to the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) later this year. The area is the planned
location for the future Lithium Processing Facility.
Today, EM is in the midst of a significant infrastructure and
modernization campaign at WIPP. Last year EM began mining the West
Access Drifts and completed construction of the Salt Reduction
Building. The Salt Reduction Building is a key component of the Safety
Significant Containment Ventilation System (SSCVS) to improve air
quality in the underground portion of the site. Along with providing
for continued WIPP operations, as well as waste characterization and
transportation programs, the budget request supports the continued
infrastructure recapitalization projects, as well as mine modernization
activities and safety upgrades in fiscal year 2023. Shipments of legacy
transuranic waste to WIPP will progress from sites across the DOE
complex, including the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico,
where deactivation and decommissioning of NNSA's Ion Beam Facility will
be initiated in fiscal year 2023.
At the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the removal of the
Livermore Pool Type Reactor was completed. This marks a significant
cleanup milestone and demonstrates EM's strong cooperation with its
NNSA and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers partners while setting the stage
to begin demolition of Building 280 later this year.
In addition, EM is pursuing a world-class technology development
program to accelerate the overall cleanup mission, increase efficiency,
and protect human health and environment. EM is leveraging the
expertise of the Savannah River National Laboratory and the Network of
National Laboratories for Environmental Management and Stewardship to
develop innovative solutions in the fields of environmental cleanup,
national security and science and energy security that will benefit EM,
the NNSA and other DOE missions.
diverse and talented workforce
The talented and dedicated men and women across EM are the
program's greatest assets. While significant progress continues across
the DOE complex, the EM mission will span several decades at some
sites. With that in mind, EM is taking steps to ensure a successful and
sustainable program that will enable mission completion. EM is
investing to support workforce development and build a workforce that
promotes diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility. These
principles are fundamental to EM because they enable every aspect of
the cleanup mission.
The budget request provides resources to build a diverse pipeline
of talent and support high-quality jobs in environmental cleanup. For
example, the $56 million request in fiscal year 2023 supports EM's
Minority Serving Institutions Partnership Program, which is designed to
help build and maintain a well-trained, technically skilled, and
diverse workforce. By partnering with Minority Serving Institutions and
Historically Black Colleges and Universities, this program promotes the
education and development of EM's next generation workforce in STEM-
related disciplines.
support for impacted communities
As EM makes steady cleanup progress and prepares for future mission
needs, EM remains committed to addressing the responsibilities the
Department has to the communities most directly impacted by the
environmental legacy of the past. The fiscal year 2023 request
represents a significant investment in helping the communities that
played such an important role in U.S. history continue to grow and
thrive in the future. The EM mission itself is aligned with broader
environmental justice goals that lead to a vibrant future in all
communities. This year, the EM Los Alamos Field Office was selected as
one of five DOE pilot programs for the cross-cutting Justice40
Initiative. At its core, the Justice40 Initiative is a whole-of-
government effort to lift communities by delivering at least 40 percent
of the overall benefits from certain federal investments, including the
remediation and reduction of legacy pollution, to disadvantaged
communities.
The budget request further boosts support for the Tribal Nations,
Alaska Native communities, and communities around EM sites ensuring
they are safe, providing opportunities for local input into cleanup
priorities and helping build a vibrant future. The request includes
Payment in Lieu of Taxes funding for communities near Hanford and
Savannah River to support schools, roads and other local priorities. In
addition, $40 million is provided to establish a new Community Capacity
Building initiative. This grant program will provide assistance to
those communities around EM sites and will be developed in consultation
with community stakeholders to address their needs.
conclusion
The fiscal year 2023 budget request is the latest sign of this
Administration's strong support for EM's vital mission. As the mission
is carried out, EM is committed to continuous improvement and making
further advancements to ensure that cleanup activities are conducted in
a safe, efficient, and cost-effective manner.
EM will continue to work in a collaborative manner with workers,
unions, Tribal Nations, states, local communities, and Congress on
opportunities to achieve shared goals of protecting the environment and
preparing for future cleanup success.
Senator King. Thank you. We will have 5-minute rounds, and
we will ask a few questions. We will probably have more than
one round. We have a second panel.
Ms. Hruby, the budget request is about a 3 percent
increase, but as I mentioned in my opening statement you are as
busy as the agency has been in 40 years. Is 3 percent enough to
meet the demands of the recapitalization, the Savannah River
cleanup? I mean, we have got a whole host of problems. Is this
amount sufficient?
Ms. Hruby. Yes, Senator King, thanks for that question. We
think this is a budget that we can execute and that will keep
us on track for requirements, on our requirements. It is true
that it would be nice to complete our construction projects and
have them ready to go for the rest of our war head
modernization programs, but we simply cannot go any faster than
we are currently going on those construction projects and have
acceptable risk and get the products that we want.
So we think this is the right budget. It was fully informed
by the Nuclear Posture Review, and it does, in fact, underscore
the expanded mission and the accelerated pace. It comes on top
of budget increases over the last several years that have been
significant.
However, as I said in my opening statement, the parallel
approach we are taking for modernization and infrastructure
revitalization carries some persistent risks and includes
things like single points of failure in our production complex,
supply chain issues in construction projects, and workforce
recruitment and retention across the complex. So we feel like
this is a practical, accelerated budget, but it will carry risk
because we are moving as fast as we can.
Senator King. Let me change the subject a minute to
nonproliferation. One of the things that is not discussed much
with regard to the Ukraine war is that Ukraine gave up its
nuclear weapons in exchange for a guarantee of territorial
integrity, which was signed by Russia. What has what has
happened in Ukraine done to the whole theory and practice of
nonproliferation? If you were Kim in North Korea, would you
give up your nuclear weapons, having seen what has happened in
Ukraine?
Ms. Hruby. Senator King, this is an important question. The
Ukraine guarantees, you know, people will look at around the
world. I am confident of that. At the same time, we will do
everything we can in NNSA to uphold the nonproliferation regime
that we have today. We will reach out, and we are reaching out
to our allies and partners as particularly the allies that we
have a guarantee with, to make sure they understand how strong
our commitment to that guarantee is. We will continue to
support activities in the nonproliferation area. But we must
step it up in our ability to convince people around the world
that nuclear weapons are not the best approach and hopefully
not take the wrong lessons from Ukraine.
Senator King. Well, I hope you are right, but I think it is
of significant concern.
Pit production. Are we facing a pit gap? In other words, is
it likely that we are going to be able to meet the needs or are
we going to be, in 5 years, talking about some emergency
program to fill in the gap to meet the needs for the newly
deployed weapons?
Ms. Hruby. We think--look, we are not going to be able to
make 80 pits per year by 2030.
Senator King. Is 80 a magic number? Is 80 the number that
we project we will need?
Ms. Hruby. That is a good question. We are working really
closely right now with the Department of Defense, NNSA and the
Department of Defense, to look at the outyear requirements and
to see how we can satisfy the program of record in ways that we
are all comfortable with, that mean a safe, secure, reliable,
and effective weapon program, nuclear weapons in the United
States. We believe there will be a path through that, but we
are still working closely together to define the details of
that.
Senator King. I would rather you say we know there is a
path, rather than say ``we believe.''
Ms. Hruby. I would rather say that as well, but, you know,
I am being honest with you, that we are still in the process of
sorting that all out in the Nuclear Weapons Council.
Senator King. Well, to the extent you refine the estimates
and realize there is a problem, let us know sooner rather than
later so we can attend to this problem now rather than 5 years
from now.
Ms. Hruby. Let me just say another word about this. We are
establishing pit production as a hedge against plutonium aging
and pit aging. Our pits are not, today, at any kind of an aging
cliff. We can reuse pits. We just do not like that plan because
we may have to take them out before the end of the life of the
weapon system. But right now we are not at the cliff of aging
program. We just would like to put new pits in because we want
the weapons to stay in the stockpile for 30 years, and we do
not have the 30-year confidence we would like to have.
Senator King. Thank you. That is helpful.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Hruby, this year's budget talks about minimizing the
delay in pit production and repeatedly emphasizes achieving the
necessary rate of 80 pits per year, quote, ``as close to 2030
as possible.'' Yet your letter to this Committee on your
unfunded priorities states that additional resources would
allow NNSA to begin additional activities at the Savannah River
plutonium processing facility. Would the additional resources
referred to in your letter help minimize the delay in pit
production?
Ms. Hruby. Senator Fischer, thank you for that question.
The answer is yes. We would like to bring money forward from
out years on the Savannah River pit production facility to do
some early buys--glove boxes, nuclear-quality piping, other
shortages that we are seeing in the supply chain. We would also
like to build a training facility at Savannah River to get the
workers ready to get to rate production once construction is
complete. So we would like to try to accelerate how fast we can
go with construction, once our design is complete, and how fast
we can get to rate production after the construction is
complete. That is what the unfunded request letter is about, is
the money that we would like to pull forward into the 2023
budget request from our future years request.
Senator Fischer. In our discussion this morning you said we
are looking at a 2032 to 2035 time frame for achieving the 80
pits per year rate that I believe we need to have, and it also
will likely be another 2 years before we have a good idea of
how to get there. I think I need to be clear. The additional
resources you are referring to make achieving full production
by 2032 more likely. Is that correct?
Ms. Hruby. Yes.
Senator Fischer. So are in a position now, would you say,
to be able to shape events so that we can reach that desired
outcome of 2032, if we take the correct steps now?
Ms. Hruby. That is what we think. I just want to foot-stomp
that we did get the money that we need to complete the 90
percent design, so a significant amount of money, $700 million.
This additional request would allow us to position ourselves to
make sure once we are done with the design we can go as fast as
possible.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Earlier today we also discussed the
goal of having nuclear infrastructure that is truly responsive
to the changing security landscape that we are facing. When we
talk about a responsive nuclear enterprise we usually think of
facilities and production capabilities. But do you think that
our processes are set up to allow us to move quickly? Do we
need to take a fresh look at things, like the Phase X process,
to see if we can go faster, where we can go faster?
Ms. Hruby. Yes, thank you, Senator Fischer, for that
question. Our processes are set up to ensure we get to the end
state we want, and that is important. They are not set up to go
fast. I do think we have to begin to look at how we can move
faster without undermining the intent of staying, you know, on
schedule and on budget and get what we want and how we can
manage the risk with changing those processes and moving
faster.
Senator Fischer. One thing we have seen on this Committee,
when it comes to the Department of Defense, is that over the
last several decades they have structured their processes I
think to minimize risk. Now as we see our security environment
changing, I believe we need to prioritize speed and also
innovation, but that sometimes means that we develop new
approaches instead of relying on legacy development processes
that are already in place.
Do you think that the NNSA faces a similar challenge?
Ms. Hruby. Absolutely, and for probably largely the same
reasons. So we will look for ways to learn from what the DOD is
finding. We will look for ways to make our processes more
streamlined. We have had some success on smaller construction
projects where we cut out pieces of the processes. We saved a
lot of money. We have gone faster. So we are doing some
experiments on lower-risk systems, but we have to carry that
forward. I appreciate the question.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Senator Rosen.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman King, Ranking
Member Fischer, for holding this hearing. It is very important.
I would like to thank each of the witnesses for testifying
today. Thank you for the service to our country.
I want to talk a little bit about the long-term funding
strategy for the Nevada National Security Site, because since
its inception, NNSS--I do not know which one is easier to say,
Nevada National Security Site or NNSS. It is a tongue-twister.
But it has relied on its large and remote area to conduct
missions for the nation's nuclear weapons and nonproliferation
programs as well as other elements of our national security
community.
It is larger than all other NNSA sites combined, and it is
an equivalent size to the state of Rhode Island. NNSS has a
vast amount of infrastructure, a vast amount of infrastructure
to maintain, and I am delighted that you and Secretary Granholm
each visited the site recently. We welcome the excitement and
the attention that your visits have brought to the important
and really unique work that we are doing there.
However, over the past few decades NNSS has faced unstable
and unpredictable program funding. It is leaving the site with
degraded infrastructure, despite being a facility of national
importance responsible for the certification of our nuclear
stockpile.
I am pleased to hear the programmatic situation is now
changing in a positive direction, but I remain concerned that
we address this infrastructure funding issue so that NNSS can
continue to be a center of excellence for the enterprise.
Administrator Hruby, are you considering innovative
approaches to assure that NNSS infrastructure is supported,
recapitalized, including base funding to guide future
investment planning?
Ms. Hruby. Yes, Senator Rosen, it is nice to see you and
thanks for your continued interest and support of the Nevada
National Security Site. I will say that the Secretary's visit
and my visit were actually separate visits but a week apart. I
think I influenced her by calling in every day saying, ``Oh, it
was a great visit to Nevada.''
Senator Rosen. It is a great site, is it not?
Ms. Hruby. It is a great site, and I have been there many,
many times, but I have not been there for a few years. I will
tell you I was very impressed by the progress that has been
made in Nevada, in the infrastructure and in the collaboration
with the laboratories to do experiments there underground.
So to answer your question, I think we have a really great
plan for the Nevada National Security Site, and the plan, from
my perspective, looks like get our infrastructure to a state
that is really bringing important contributions and is a good
place for people to work, and then fund those new capabilities
to do important experiments for us going forward. So we are
spending a lot of time and money now on construction. That will
lead to a new demand in Nevada that will bring that base
funding that you are looking for.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you. I want to build on that
because the Nevada National Security Site oversees our
Stockpile Stewardship Program, principally at the U1a facility,
the underground lab where the science is conducting subcritical
experiments to verify the reliability and effectiveness of our
nuclear stockpile. As you were just there, U1a is undergoing
major construction.
Could you provide us--I know we are not in a classified
setting, but as much as you can--provide us an update on the
upgrades and how these advancements really are going to make a
difference for those subcritical experiments that are really
going to improve our stewardship program?
Ms. Hruby. Sure. I would be happy to. There is this
program, another acronym mouthful, called Enhanced Capability
for Subcritical Experiments, ECSE, that includes upgrades to
the U1a tunnel complex, which is the tunnels that we do science
experiments in. It also includes new tools, especially the sort
of centerpieces, a radiography tool that allows us to watch
implosion, also critical, of course.
This ties back to Senator King's question in an interesting
way. We need to understand how plutonium ages. This facility,
with the radiography, will allow us to watch implosion in real
materials, realistic geometries, which we have not been able to
do before.
If we believe that we can get a good, excellent estimate of
plutonium lifetime it allows us all kinds of--actually pit
lifetimes--it allows us all kinds of options going forward, and
we do not have to use head strategy of making sure we can make
pits while we study aging.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you. My time is up. I am going
to submit some questions for the record about the Remote
Sensing Lab that is also part of the Nevada National Security
Site and plays a critical role to our community as well.
Thank you so much.
Senator King. Senator Tuberville.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
panel, for being here today and your time.
Mr. White, are you familiar with Uranium-233?
Mr. White. Yes, sir.
Senator Tuberville. Yeah, I figured you were. Your office
was tasked with downblending Uranium-233 in 2001. As you may
know, the U.S. pioneered thorium reactor technology in the
1960s. These reactors cannot melt down and actually consumes
nuclear waste and do not rely on high-assay low-enriched
uranium, which all the Department of Energy's next-generation
reactors rely on.
Mr. White, what is the chief problem with the HALEU? Do you
know? It comes from Russia. Correct?
Mr. White. Yes, sir.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you very much.
Not only is 233 proven to create safe and clean power, its
grandchildren isotopes are also valuable to fighting cancer. A
May 2008 DOE report found that the destruction of Uranium-233
threatened the supply of these lifesaving treatments. The DOE's
2010 audit report said that destroying Uranium-233 would blunt
scientific research and weaken National Security
Administration's test readiness program.
Mr. White, how many kilograms of this Uranium-233 remain to
be blended? Do you know?
Mr. White. I do not know that exact number off the top of
my head, but I will be happy to take that for the record and
get it back to you.
Senator Tuberville. I will give it to you real quick--450
that we have left, which is worth millions and millions of
dollars. Do you know how much it costs us to downblend this U-
233?
Mr. White. Our budget request for this year is for $55
million.
Senator Tuberville. Fifty-five million. Correct. Fifty-five
million to destroy something that is worth hundreds of millions
of dollars, that we also can use for other things.
Do you find it odd that your agency is tasked with
destroying something while, at the same time, the DOE gave this
technology to China? I mean, it is kind of odd. Does it not
seem odd to you?
Mr. White. The Environmental Management Program has a
number of conversations with other programs across the
Department as we look at whether facilities or material are
excess and ready for disposition. Those conversations are often
very difficult, and from an environmental management
perspective what we really look at is once other programs have
decided they no longer need the material, how we would
prioritize the disposition of the material or the facilities
within the scope of the larger cleanup program.
But the material that you are talking about at Oak Ridge,
this is a high priority from a disposition perspective for the
Environmental Management Program for a number of different
reasons. The material, as it is currently stored at Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, is one of the more significant safety and
security risks that we have at Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
It is also material that is very expensive to safely store
and secure. The laboratory spends over $50 million a year to
safely store and secure this material, and it is being stored
in some of the oldest operating facilities that we have in the
Department of Energy, so the cost of continuing to store the
material in these facilities is going to go up over time.
At the moment we also have a very unique opportunity,
working with a public-private partnership, to make use of some
of the benefits that you just described. We have a partnership
that allows our contractor, Isotek, to extract the thorium from
the material. That is provided to another company, TerraPower,
which uses the thorium to extract isotopes for lifesaving
cancer research. In the process some of the cost of our
disposition activity is covered by that agreement between
Isotek and TerraPower.
Senator Tuberville. Yeah. I would hope that we would really
look at this to make sure that while we are destroying
something that in the future we are not going to have to turn
around and try to either buy it from China, buy it from Russia,
or whatever, at the end of the day. I know it is probably
dangerous, and we do store it in Tennessee. I am sure we could
find a better place, that if they are not wanting it there,
heck, we will take it in Alabama and put it in the Redstone
Arsenal and protect it with our lives.
But I just hate that we are destroying something, that we
are paying to have destroyed, that we might use in the future.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit these for the record.
I have got a 2008 Department of Energy Audit Special Report, a
2010 Department of Energy Audit Report, and a 2012 Summary
Meeting Report between the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the
U.S. Department of Energy. I would like to submit these for the
record.
Senator King. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
[The 2008 Department of Energy Audit Special Report, 2010
Department of Energy Audit Report, and 2012 Summary Meeting
Report between the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the U.S.
Department of Energy can be found in the Appendix.]
Senator Tuberville. Thank you very much.
Senator King. Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
our witnesses for appearing here today.
So we are modernizing our nuclear weapons program including
constructing new plutonium pits which produce the radioactive
raw material that we need for nuclear weapons. Resuming pit
production is a huge undertaking for NNSA, and I have been a
critic of some of NNSA's work because the agency has a pretty
lousy record of waste and mismanagement that has cost taxpayers
billions of dollars over the years.
Back in 2015, Congress set a requirement of producing 80
plutonium pits per year by 2030, and we are not off to a great
start on that. The estimated budget for this work, at just one
pit production site, doubled over the course of just a couple
of months.
So, Ms. Hruby, what is the best current estimate for what
80 pits per year will cost?
Ms. Hruby. Thank you, Senator Warren. I know this is a
topic that you care a lot about. We are, I think as you know,
in the process of completing the 90 percent design of the
Savannah River production facility and the Los Alamos pit
production project. Until those are done we will not have a
cost estimate that we can stand behind. It is true there are
always numbers floating around out there, but our processes are
such that we are really trying to get a firm estimate and then
come in on costs. So it would be premature for me to give you a
number for that.
Senator Warren. Premature? So NNSA budget estimates put the
figure at $15 billion, I have seen press reports at $18
billion, and you cannot even tell me what neighborhood this is
in?
Ms. Hruby. I can tell you neighborhoods that it is in, and
it is going to be--if I give a number then I am going to be
held to it, so with that caveat we do think it is going to be
more than $10 billion.
Senator Warren. Well, I just got to say, that is a lot of
money.
Ms. Hruby. I understand. It is a lot of money.
Senator Warren. Whether it is $10 billion or $15 billion or
$18 billion. But even this astonishing number is probably not
enough to build these pits.
You know, when NNSA's Deputy Administrator was before the
Committee a few weeks ago he said the 2030 goal is likely
unachievable, and I am going to read you what he said. He said,
``We can't get to 2030 by throwing more money at it,'' unquote.
So let's talk about why things are going so poorly. Last
year the Department of Energy's cost estimating shop conducted
an independent review of the Los Alamos facility's pit
production plant. They found, quote, ``There are significant
risks in staffing, program management, production activities,
supporting infrastructure, waste management, and other program
requirements,'' unquote. You know, the biggest problem is there
was not a single integrated plan in place to manage costs and
schedule and performance.
Ms. Hruby, is there now a single integrated program
management plan for pit production at Los Alamos?
Ms. Hruby. Yes.
Senator Warren. Yes. That is the good news, right? Yes,
there is, and I appreciate that. This was the answer I wanted
you to give. Yes, there is a plan in place. And I appreciate
that NNSA is trying to address the problems with pit
production. But there are no guarantees that this program will
ever be successful, no matter how much money we spend. In fact,
the pit production program has been drawing comparisons to a
previous program called the Mixed Oxides Fuel Fabrication
Facility, or MOX, which was designed to dispose of surplus
weapons-grade plutonium. MOX was always technologically dubious
and was finally cancelled after wasting $8 billion.
Here is my question, Ms. Hruby. Are you confident that we
are not going to end up sinking billions of dollars, maybe tens
of billions of dollars, into pit production before finally
pulling the plug, like we did with MOX?
Ms. Hruby. Yes, Senator, I am. Let me just say about this.
This is a very important programmatic objective. We cannot
fail.
Senator Warren. Well, I have to say I do not share your
confidence that this is going to work. As I told Dr. Adams last
month, I remain very concerned about this program. I think we
need to seriously assess whether our goals whether the timeline
we are all working on is realistic. NNSA cannot keep wasting
billions of dollars of taxpayer money. This just has to stop.
So thank you.
Ms. Hruby. Thank you.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Thank you, Senator Warren.
Let's have our second panel join us please.
[Pause.]
Senator King. Welcome to our second panel. Dr. Adams, will
you begin?
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARVIN L. ADAMS, DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Adams. Yes. Thank you. Chairman King, Ranking Member
Fischer, and----
Senator King. Please get a little closer to the mic.
Mr. Adams. Will do. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer,
and Distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to discuss the President's fiscal year 2023
budget for NNSA. I thank the Committee and the Senate for your
support during my recent confirmation process. I am honored to
serve as Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, and I am
committed to working closely with you and others in Congress,
along with our partners in DOD, to advance the nuclear security
mission.
The fiscal year 2023 budget request for weapons activities
is $16.5 billion, which is about 3.6 percent more than what was
enacted in fiscal year 2022. This request, informed by the 2022
Nuclear Posture Review, will enable NNSA to keep our nuclear
weapons stockpile safe, secure, and effective.
NNSA is simultaneously executing five warhead modernization
programs. Two are in production and three are following closely
behind. Drivers for these programs include technical issues
with warheads, changes in DOD delivery platforms, and emerging
capability gaps.
Warhead modernization requires reinstatement or replacement
of lost manufacturing capabilities. With support from current
and past administrations and Congresses, NNSA is modernizing
and recapitalizing the production complex while simultaneous
using both old and new infrastructure to manufacture modernized
warheads.
Our highest infrastructure priority is reconstitution
plutonium pit production capabilities. We are executing a two-
site plan to produce plutonium pits at Los Alamos National
Laboratory and the Savannah River site. We assess that this is
the best way to reliably produce at least 80 war-reserved pits
per year as soon as possible.
NNSA is also modernizing capabilities to process uranium
and lithium to produce tritium, to manufacture and produce
trusted rad-hard electronics, and to manufacture non-nuclear
components.
As we focus on the time-urgent delivery of modernized
warheads and an infrastructure that is modernized as well as we
must also develop and nurture capabilities to meet future
challenges. Continued investments maintain NNSA experimental
and computational capabilities that address important stockpile
questions, and importantly, that attract outstanding scientists
and engineers, and let them develop into the experienced
experts that the stockpile needs.
For example, ongoing investments support major experimental
facilities at all three NNSA laboratories, it supports the
enhanced capabilities for subcritical experiments projects at
the Nevada National Security Site, supports exoscale computing
that is coming, to be housed at Lawrence Livermore National
Lab, and much more.
I am confident that with support of Congress and in
partnership with DOD our dedicated workforce will meet these
unprecedented challenges that we face to maintain, modernize,
and sustain our nuclear deterrent into the future.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify. I look forward
to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of The Honorable Jill Hruby
and The Honorable Marvin L. Adams follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by The Honorable Jill Hruby and The Honorable
Marvin L. Adams
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to present the President's
Fiscal Year 2023 Budget for the Department of Energy's (DOE) National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). NNSA greatly appreciates the
Committee's bipartisan support for our nuclear security mission and for
the talented and dedicated workforce responsible for carrying it out
every day.
The Department meets its enduring national security mission by
maintaining and modernizing the nuclear weapons stockpile so that it is
always safe, secure, reliable, and effective; by reducing global
nuclear threats; and by providing the U.S. Navy's nuclear-powered
submarines and aircraft carriers with militarily effective propulsion
systems. NNSA remains uniquely qualified to fulfill these tasks on
behalf of the American people and in support of our allies and
partners.
The NNSA Fiscal Year 2023 budget request is informed by the 2022
Nuclear Posture Review and reflects today's increasingly complex
geopolitical environment. Importantly, the budget request provides full
support for the significant nuclear weapons design and production
required to modernize all three legs of the nuclear triad. Once
complete, this effort will provide the U.S. with a safer, more secure,
and more reliable stockpile that, together with the Department of
Defense modernization programs, will provide the U.S. with a modern
nuclear deterrent capable of responding to a wider array of challenges.
The fiscal year 2023 budget request also includes continued funding for
the NNSA infrastructure revitalization program needed to produce the
weapons and materials for the planned program of record and create an
enterprise that is more resilient and flexible. Funding for research,
technology, and engineering needed for stockpile certification and
innovation activities is maintained in the request.
At the same time, the fiscal year 2023 budget request recognizes we
must press ahead with our nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear
counterterrorism and counterproliferation efforts as a complementary
approach to respond to geopolitical realities. These programs continue
efforts to implement and support robust security and safeguards for
nuclear materials; shift commercial, research, and medical industries
away from highly radioactive materials and technologies; and develop
technologies for early detection of proliferent activity. This request
recognizes the increased efforts required as nuclear power expands
around the world in response to climate change, and as Russia, China,
and North Korea continue to diversify and expand their nuclear
arsenals.
The NNSA budget request provides the support needed for Naval
Reactors to continue work designing, producing, operating, and
maintaining the nuclear propulsion plants for U.S. nuclear submarines
and aircraft carriers. The request also fully supports three critical
initiatives: the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine reactor
systems development; construction of the Naval Spent Fuel Handling
Facility; and the refueling and overhaul of the land-based reactor for
continued training and technology testing.
In today's multipolar and more aggressive geopolitical environment,
it is imperative that NNSA is both responsive to needs and acts
responsibly to avoid escalation or arms racing while preparing for an
uncertain future. Our budget request reflects this balance, and our
work has never been more critical to global stability.
nnsa's accomplishments in 2021
Last year, NNSA achieved several key milestones across the nuclear
security enterprise despite the unprecedented circumstances COVID-19
presented.
Life Extension and Weapons Modernization Programs: In 2021, NNSA
completed first production units (FPU) for the W88 Alteration (Alt) 370
and the B61-12 Life Extension programs. Both refurbished weapons have
increased safety and reliability.
Large Line-Item Construction: NNSA has three large line-item
construction projects for nuclear materials underway: two projects
associated with plutonium pit production--one at Los Alamos National
Laboratory and one at the Savannah River Site--and one project
associated with uranium processing at the Y-12 National Security
Complex.
The Los Alamos Plutonium Pit Production Project (LAP4) received
Critical Decision (CD)-1 approval in April 2021. The Savannah River
Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) received CD-1 approval in June
2021. CD-1 approval marks completion of a project's definition phase
and the conceptual design as part of DOE's Order 413.3B process for the
acquisition of capital assets. Clearing the CD-1 process allows NNSA to
establish 90 percent design and associated cost estimation during the
subsequent CD-2 effort.
The Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) consisting of seven
subprojects has completed three projects on schedule and under budget,
and the final four are underway. During 2021, significant construction
activity continued and led to the successful full enclosure of all
buildings in April 2022, setting the stage for equipment installation.
National Ignition Facility (NIF): In August, the National Ignition
Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory achieved a
breakthrough with an experiment that yielded more than 1.3 megajoules
of energy and resulted in a burning plasma state for the first time in
any fusion research facility. Burning plasma research is needed for
high fidelity modeling of nuclear weapons and is one of the milestones
needed to achieve self-sustaining energy production.
Secure Transportation: The Office of Secure Transportation
accomplished 100 percent of its assigned missions safely and securely
with no mission degradation despite operational challenges present from
COVID-19.
Infrastructure Innovation: NNSA purchased the LeMond Carbon
Facility in Oak Ridge, TN to replace facilities at Y-12 built in the
1940s used for process development. Use of NNSA's purchase authority
for acquisitions allows us to accelerate delivery of modern facilities
without the need for new construction.
To support our climate goals, NNSA placed lease orders with the
General Services Administration to replace gas-powered cars with
approximately 50 zero-emissions vehicles, nearly doubling the size of
electric-powered cars in NNSA's fleet.
Nuclear Material Disposal and Reduction: NNSA converted an
additional 91 kilograms of plutonium to an oxide form, for a cumulative
total of 1,187 kilograms, in preparation for final disposition,
continued downblending excess plutonium, and completed construction of
a characterization and storage pad for the first shipment of
downblended plutonium from the Savannah River Site to the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant. Additionally, the Secretaries of Energy and
Health and Humans Services jointly certified that global supplies of
molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) produced without the use of highly enriched
uranium (HEU) can meet the needs of patients in the U.S. This critical
milestone in nonproliferation efforts also triggered a congressionally
mandated ban on exports of HEU for foreign medical isotope production.
Global Material Security: NNSA conducted over 75 cyber engagements
with international partners to enhance security of nuclear facilities
and materials. Partnerships were also started with several domestic
advanced reactor vendors for `security-by-design' activities to enhance
the security of the systems for both domestic and international use.
NNSA replaced 50 devices (39 domestically and 11 internationally) that
use high-activity radioactive sources with non-radioisotopic
alternative technologies and secured 48 buildings (28 domestically and
20 internationally) with high priority radioactive sources. In
addition, since the start of 2021, NNSA has signed new counter
radioactive material smuggling arrangements with Estonia Ministry of
Interior, Ukraine Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ukraine State Security
Service, Mexico National Commission for Nuclear Security and
Safeguards, Niger High Atomic Energy Authority, and Morocco
Gendarmerie.
Counterterrorism: NNSA's Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST)
conducted dozens of operations, including preventative radiological/
nuclear detection support to the Presidential Inauguration,
Presidential Address to a Joint Session of Congress, New Year's Eve
celebrations in Las Vegas and New York City, Super Bowl LV, the Fourth
of July celebration on the National Mall, and the 76th Session of the
United Nations General Assembly. Additionally, NNSA conducted 50
virtual workshops with U.S. public information officers, law
enforcement, first responders, and technical experts concerning
radiological counterterrorism to build capacity and improve crisis and
risk communication.
Workforce Development: NNSA achieved its highest federal workforce
level since 2013 with a total of 1,825 federal employees onboard. To
help develop the next-generation workforce, NNSA awarded 13 Minority
Serving Institution Partnership Program grants for a total of 24
consortia grants to reach tens of thousands of students in STEM
disciplines.
nnsa's fiscal year 2023 budget request
The President's Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request for NNSA is $21.4
billion, an increase of $1.0 billion, or 5.1 percent, over the fiscal
year 2022 enacted level. \1\ This funding request reflects the expanded
mission in NNSA and need for accelerated delivery of the modernization
and infrastructure programs. The three NNSA missions--the nuclear
deterrent, nuclear security and nonproliferation, and naval nuclear
propulsion--have key deliverables in fiscal year 2023. In addition, the
capabilities to position NNSA to be successful in the future must be
nurtured. We are grateful for the sustained, bipartisan commitment by
Congress and multiple administrations and ask for continued support.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Funding does not reflect the mandated transfer of $92.75
million in fiscal year 2022 to the Office of Nuclear Energy for
operation of the Advanced Test Reactor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
weapons activities appropriation
The fiscal year 2023 budget request for the Weapons Activities
account is $16.5 billion, an increase of $566 million, or 3.7 percent
over the fiscal year 2022 enacted levels. The request will be
supplemented with prior year balances of $396 million. This budget
request represents the Administration's continued strong commitment to
a safe, secure, reliable, and effective nuclear deterrent backed by
resilient, flexible infrastructure along with cutting edge science,
cyber security, and physical protection.
NNSA is fully aware that delivering the deterrent and capabilities
our Nation needs to respond to the current environment requires a
faster pace and a more complete modernization of weapons than over the
last several decades. That is why we are re-establishing production
capabilities lost in the 1990s and overhauling both our physical
infrastructure and human capital to retain technical advantages and
build resilience into our enterprise. NNSA is looking forward to
overcoming obstacles and building on the successes of the previous
year.
The fiscal year 2023 request reflects the need to advance the
weapons modernization programs and production capacity at an
accelerated pace. The Weapons Activities account includes:
Stockpile Management: Maintenance and modernization of
nuclear weapons and production operations to sustain confidence in the
safety, security, reliability, and military effectiveness of the
stockpile without resuming nuclear explosive testing and associated
activities.
Production and Infrastructure Modernization: Investment
in NNSA's infrastructure to rebuild capabilities lost in the 1990s and
revitalize and expand the capacity of other elements to support
stockpile modernization and science. These projects range from
significant line-item construction for Plutonium and Uranium related
activities to minor construction of offices and light labs to
operational infrastructure such as electrical and networking utilities.
Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering:
Continued development of state-of-the-art scientific, engineering, and
manufacturing capabilities to enable continuous improvement in design,
certification, and production of the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile
and to stay ahead of the threat.
Transportation, Nuclear, and Cyber Security: Keeping pace
with evolving threats and sustaining transportation, cyber and physical
security across the nuclear security enterprise to improve resilience.
NNSA restructured the Weapons Activities budget in fiscal year 2021
to enable better alignment of portfolios with resources. This allowed
improved prioritization within portfolios that have multiple programs
and interdependencies. Further refinements are proposed in fiscal year
2023 to align programmatic construction with the portfolio each project
supports. Comparisons throughout the Weapons Activities portfolio
assume this alignment in the fiscal year 2022 enacted levels as well.
Stockpile Management
The fiscal year 2023 Stockpile Management budget request is $4.9
billion, an increase of $291 million, or 6.3 percent, over the fiscal
year 2022 enacted level. This portfolio covers the maintenance of a
safe, secure, reliable, and militarily effective nuclear weapons
stockpile. Activities include life extension programs (LEP) and other
weapons modernization activities; surveillance, minor alterations and
limited life component exchanges; providing the safe dismantlement of
nuclear weapons and components; and providing sustainment of needed
manufacturing capabilities and capacities. The fiscal year 2023 request
also includes funding for Nuclear Enterprise Assurance (NEA) to
prevent, detect, and mitigate subversion risks to the nuclear weapons
stockpile and associated design, production, and testing capabilities.
W88 Alteration (Alt) 370: NNSA expects the W88 Alt 370 program to
enter Phase 6.6, Full-Scale Production, in July 2022. Production is
currently on schedule to meet Department of Defense (DOD) deployment
schedules.
B61-12 LEP: NNSA expects the B61-12 LEP to enter Phase 6.6, Full-
Scale Production, in June 2022. The B61-12 LEP consolidates multiple
variants of the B61 gravity bomb and improves the safety and security
of the weapon. Production is currently on schedule to meet DOD
deployment schedules.
W80-4 LEP: NNSA is continuing Phase 6.3 activities, Development
Engineering, and plans to enter Phase 6.4, Production Engineering, in
fiscal year 2023. The W80-4 FPU date is currently being re-evaluated
due to COVID-19 impacts, slower than planned hiring and increased
attrition, and component technical challenges. The updated FPU schedule
will be developed by mid-2022. NNSA's revised schedule is expected to
support the U.S. Air Force's (USAF) schedule for Long Range Standoff
missile initial operating capability.
W87-1 Modification Program: The W87-1 will replace the aging W78
warhead using a modification of the existing W87-0 design. The W87-1
will deploy new technologies that improve safety and security, address
obsolete designs and materials, and simplify warhead manufacturability.
The fiscal year 2023 budget request supports NNSA's commitment for a
planned FPU in fiscal year 2030 to meet DOD's scheduled deployment of
the Sentinel missile. The request supports Phase 6.3, Development
Engineering, activities including joint testing with USAF Sentinel
missile and Mk21A reentry vehicle program and conducting the Conceptual
Design Review. NNSA plans to enter Phase 6.3 in fiscal year 2022.
W93/Mk7: In February 2022, the NWC voted to authorize the W93's
entry into Phase 2, Feasibility Study and Design Options. NNSA's fiscal
year 2023 funding request will support the Phase 2 activities including
further examination of design concepts from Phase 1, and down-selection
to desired weapon design(s) to be subsequently developed in Phase 2A,
Design Definition and Cost Study, planned for fiscal year 2026. All the
W93's key nuclear components will be based on currently deployed and
previously tested nuclear designs, as well as extensive stockpile
component and materials experience. It will not require additional
nuclear explosive testing to certify. The W93 is vital for continuing
our longstanding cooperation with the UK, which is modernizing its
nuclear forces. The U.S.'s W93 program is a separate but parallel
program critical to the UK's replacement warhead (RW) for its submarine
launched ballistic missile. As an allied but independent nuclear power
that contributes to NATO's nuclear deterrent posture, the UK's nuclear
deterrent is critical to U.S. national security.
Within Stockpile Management, the fiscal year 2023 budget request
includes $1.3 billion for Stockpile Sustainment, an increase of $141
million, or 11.9 percent above the fiscal year 2022 enacted level. This
program is responsible for producing and replacing limited-life
components such as neutron generators and gas transfer systems;
conducting maintenance, surveillance, and evaluations to assess weapon
reliability and detect any potential concerns; and analyzing
information compiled during the annual assessment process.
The request for Stockpile Management also includes $631 million for
Production Operations, an increase of $62 million, or 10.9 percent,
above the fiscal year 2022 enacted level. Included in this request is
funding to support continued growth of base capabilities, both in
staffing and equipment, required to support increased LEP workload as
certain programs reach full-scale production rates.
Production Modernization
The fiscal year 2023 Production Modernization budget request is
$4.64 billion, an increase of $484 million, or 11.6 percent, over the
fiscal year 2022 enacted level. This funding focuses on production
capabilities for nuclear weapons components including primaries, canned
subassemblies, radiation cases and non-nuclear components needed to
sustain the nuclear weapons stockpile near-to long-term.
Primary Capability Modernization: NNSA's most intensive
recapitalization effort is reconstitution of plutonium pit production
fabrication capabilities. NNSA is required to produce no fewer than 80
pits per year (ppy) during 2030. NNSA has outlined a two-site approach
for producing 80 ppy utilizing Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to
produce 30 ppy and the Savannah River Site (SRS) to produce 50 ppy. The
two-site approach will provide the required capacity while enhancing
resiliency and flexibility. At this time, the production of 30 ppy at
LANL during 2026 remains on schedule with some technical challenges
remaining. However, the production of 50 ppy at SRS during 2030 is not
achievable. The Secretary of Energy and the Nuclear Weapons Council
have both notified Congress regarding the inability to produce 80 ppy
in 2030. However, NNSA remains committed to achieving 80 ppy as close
to 2030 as possible. The fiscal year 2023 budget request funds pit
production and associated efforts with a 26 percent increase compared
to fiscal year 2022. NNSA continues to work with DOD to develop a plan
to maintain the required stockpile until pit production capabilities
are fully established.
The fiscal year 2023 request for LANL Plutonium Modernization will
support equipment installation, continue decontamination and demolition
work, and mature project design for the LAP4. This includes adding
equipment in Plutonium Facility 4 (PF-4) to support 30 ppy in 2026,
construction of a training facility to support workforce development,
and construction of a higher capacity entrance control facility.
The fiscal year 2023 funds for SRPPF will be used to continue the
CD-2 work to establish a 90 percent design. CD-2 is forecast for
completion in early fiscal year 2024. Additionally, the request
supports early site preparation including removal of unnecessary walls
and building systems originally installed for the Mixed Oxide Fuel
Fabrication Facility.
Secondary Capability Modernization: NNSA is also modernizing its
uranium, lithium, and tritium processing efforts necessary to fabricate
nuclear weapon secondaries. NNSA's uranium strategy aims to relocate
enriched uranium processing capabilities into the UPF and other
enduring facilities to reduce mission dependency on Building 9212,
which is over 75 years old. This will be accomplished by completing
construction of UPF to provide new floor space for high hazard
operations; extending the operational lifetime of buildings 9215, 9204-
2E, and 9995 into the 2040s; introducing new processes to increase
safety and efficiency in the new facilities; and supplying the current
stockpile with purified enriched uranium metal.
UPF will provide for the long-term viability, safety, and security
of enriched uranium processing capability in the United States while
significantly improving worker and public safety. The construction is
well underway with a peak production workforce of 3,000 people in
fiscal years 2022 and 2023. Ongoing supply chain issues and delays
associated with the COVID-19 pandemic are projected to result in a
delay of about 8 months beyond the scheduled completion date of
December 2025. A comprehensive annual cost update is being conducted
for the UPF project completion to better understand factors that could
potentially affect total costs. Overall, UPF is 70 percent complete
with the first three non-nuclear infrastructure subprojects completed
under budget and on schedule.
Additionally, in fiscal year 2021, NNSA initiated the Depleted
Uranium (DU) Modernization Program to meet growing mission
requirements. This effort will reconstitute lapsed DU alloying and
component manufacturing capabilities at Y-12; invest in key new
technologies to improve efficiency and reduce lifecycle costs; and
increase the reliability and capacity. The DU Modernization Program
request for fiscal year 2023 is $170 million.
The U.S. no longer maintains a full lithium purification capability
and relies on direct recycling as the main source of lithium for
nuclear weapons systems. NNSA's Lithium Strategy will increase the
supply of lithium by recycling components from dismantled systems,
sustain and recapitalize existing infrastructure through a transition
period, and design and construct a Lithium Processing Facility (LPF) to
house processing capabilities by 2031. LPF will replace capabilities
performed in Y-12's buildings 9204-2 and 9202 and will include
recovery, purification, and component fabrication operations. While
current capabilities can provide a sufficient lithium supply through
2035, operations take place in an aging facility with significant
infrastructure challenges. LPF will alleviate those issues and reduce
risk while providing capacity to meet material demands beyond 2035.
The fiscal year 2023 budget request for the Tritium and Domestic
Uranium Enrichment is $580 million, an increase of $64 million, or 12.4
percent above the fiscal year 2022 enacted level. For Domestic Uranium
Enrichment the fiscal year 2023 budget request supports HEU down-
blending to extend the need date for LEU for tritium production to
2044, enrichment technology development, and acquisition activities to
meet future enriched uranium needs. HEU downblending began in fiscal
year 2019 and will continue through fiscal year 2025. NNSA is currently
conducting an analysis of alternatives, which is expected to conclude
in the mid-2020s that will inform a final down-select of an enrichment
options. Other NNSA programs such as reactor fuel and naval propulsion
fuel are also supported by this effort.
The Tritium Modernization Program's mission is to establish and
operate a domestic source of tritium to meet national security
requirements, which includes recycling tritium gas to maintain required
inventories and sustaining reliable supply chain infrastructure and
equipment. Since 2003, NNSA's tritium production has met all
production, delivery, and schedule requirements. Because NNSA is
currently ramping up production levels at the Tennessee Valley
Authority to meet future delivery requirements, the requested budget
has been increased. NNSA is also in the early phases of constructing
the Tritium Finishing Facility (TFF), which will replace a 1950s-era
facility. TFF will house the finishing, packing, and shipping of gas
reservoirs to meet mission requirements. This major infrastructure
modernization initiative will fulfill a critical mission need and
enable the program to meet contemporary safety standards. The facility
will house functions to receive, inspect, finish, package, and ship
reservoirs. Construction of the site preparation subproject is
scheduled to start in fiscal year 2024.
Non-Nuclear Component Modernization: Non-nuclear components (NNCs)
include a wide array of parts that weaponize the nuclear explosive
package. Examples are gas transfer systems, neutron generators,
microelectronics, and power sources. Non-nuclear components make up
more than half the cost of weapon modernization due to the number,
complexity, and their qualification in extreme environments over the
warhead lifecycle. Therefore, delivering non-nuclear components
requires an extensive foundation of capabilities for the design,
development, qualification, production, and surveillance of these
components. The fiscal year 2023 request includes funding to provide
equipment for increased manufacturing capacity at the Kansas City
National Security Campus; reconstitute thermal spray capability for
weapon modernization; recapitalize radiation and major environmental
test facilities at Sandia National Laboratories used to design and
qualify NNCs; and tools and equipment at the Microsystems Engineering,
Science and Applications (MESA) Complex at Sandia, which serves as the
only approved source of trusted, strategically radiation hardened
microelectronics.
Infrastructure and Operations
NNSA has been taking significant steps to modernize and
recapitalize its infrastructure to meet expanding demands, reduce
mission and safety risk, and draw down its deferred maintenance
backlog. A well-organized, well-maintained, and modern infrastructure
system is the bedrock of a flexible and resilient nuclear enterprise.
Almost 60 percent of NNSA facilities were beyond their 40-year life
expectancy at the end of fiscal year 2021 with some dating back to the
Manhattan Project. Our modernization and recapitalization efforts will
provide for the safety of our workforce, the communities around our
facilities, and our environment. NNSA can address this challenge only
with sustained, predictable, and timely funding.
The fiscal year 2023 budget request for Infrastructure and
Operations is $2.63 billion, an increase of $144 million or 5.8 percent
over the fiscal year 2022 enacted amount. This increase will enable
NNSA to build on the Infrastructure Modernization Initiative, including
adopting new practices that will streamline construction practices to
save time and money on low-risk, non-nuclear, construction projects.
Deferred maintenance has been a key focus of both NNSA and
Congress. At the end of fiscal year 2021, NNSA had $6.1 billion of
deferred maintenance and an enterprise-wide replacement plant value of
$121.5 billion. While this ratio may seem high, construction of new
facilities and associated demolition of legacy facilities will have a
substantial role in reducing NNSA infrastructure challenges.
Approximately 90 percent of NNSA deferred maintenance is associated
with facilities that are approaching or have surpassed their intended
design life. NNSA is integrating its infrastructure modernization work
with the Department's Office of Environmental Management supported
effort to demolish high-risk excess facilities at the Y-12 National
Security Complex, Lawrence Livermore National Lab and Los Alamos
National Lab. NNSA is using this intentional approach to prioritize
investments based on mission risk while underscoring the need for
sustained commitment to move beyond legacy infrastructure. The fiscal
year 2023 budget request includes increases in Mission Enabling
Construction accounts so that NNSA can address mission needs, achieve
operational efficiencies, and reduce risks to safety, security, the
environment, and program.
For years, NNSA has used a prioritization methodology for
recapitalization investments that factors in sustainability and
resilience along with safety and mission risk. In fiscal year 2023,
NNSA is increasing its emphasis on climate resiliency projects through
the Energy Resilient Infrastructure and Climate Adaptation (ERICA)
initiative. ERICA is part of NNSA's multifaceted approach to address
climate adaptation and resilience using directand indirect-funded
infrastructure programs and alternative financing. For example, the
planned Building 848 Net Zero Energy Upgrade project at Sandia will
move the facility to being 100 percent powered by on-site generated
electricity while also improving its operations, indoor air quality,
and thermal comfort.
NNSA uses data-driven, risk informed tools and initiatives to
improve decision making, accelerate the delivery, and reduce the cost
of commercial-like construction projects. For example, in fiscal year
2019 NNSA established the Enhanced Minor Construction & Commercial
Standards (EMC2) pilot, which is challenging the paradigm for how NNSA
executes low-risk, non-complex construction projects to accelerate
delivery and reduce costs. There are 10 projects in the pilot,
including the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's Emergency
Operations Center (EOC) which is the first pilot project to be
completed earlier this year. Using the EMC2 approach, the Livermore EOC
was completed 13 months after receiving full construction funding in
January 2021. In the first four pilot projects currently underway,
estimated cost savings range from approximately 12 to 31 percent. An
additional six EMC2 projects are projected to result in estimated cost
savings of 17 to 38 percent.
Stockpile Research, Technology and Engineering
For Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering, the fiscal
year 2023 budget request is $2.89 billion, a decrease of $83 million,
or 2.8 percent below the fiscal year 2022 enacted level. The decrease
results from the use of carryover balances to continue construction of
the U1a Complex Enhancement Project at the Nevada National Security
Site (NNSS). After adjusting for this reduction, the Stockpile
Research, Technology, and Engineering request is stable from fiscal
year 2022 enacted.
This portfolio provides the scientific foundation for science-based
stockpile activities, including the capabilities, tools, and components
needed to assess the active stockpile and to certify warhead
modernization programs without the need for underground nuclear
testing. NNSA's unparalleled science and technical capabilities, and
commitment to their constant improvement, helps cultivate the knowledge
and expertise to maintain confidence in the stockpile. The major
activities in the Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering
portfolio are:
Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments (ECSE): ECSE will
produce experimental data in underground tunnels at the NNSS that will
enable high fidelity assessment of the current stockpile and
certification of the future stockpile without the need to return to
underground nuclear-explosive testing. ECSE experiments are designed to
remain subcritical throughout the experiment to adhere to the U.S.
policy of ``zero yield.''
Stockpile Responsiveness Program (SRP): SRP is responsible for
exercising and enhancing capabilities across the entire nuclear weapons
development and production process to improve the responsiveness of the
United States to future threats, technology trends, and international
developments not addressed by existing life extension programs. For
example, SRP is investing in efforts to address issues in design for
manufacturability, digital engineering, component, and system
prototyping and testing.
Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) Program: The ICF Program supports
the assessment and certification of the nuclear weapon stockpile by
providing the facilities, scientific expertise, and experimental
capability necessary to acquire data at the extreme conditions of
nuclear weapon operation. The ICF program also supports research on
thermonuclear fusion with the goal of reaching fusion ignition and
eventually high fusion yield in the laboratory. The fiscal year 2023
request supports ICF research and facilities, enabling access to
experimental data that underpin the safety, security, and effectiveness
of the nuclear stockpile and continued progress toward the capabilities
necessary to meet long-term stewardship needs.
NNSA Exascale Computing Initiative: The Exascale Computing
Initiative (ECI) will provide NNSA with next-generation simulation
capabilities to support weapons design, science-based stockpile
stewardship, and stockpile certification activities. The fiscal year
2023 budget request will continue funding maturation of next-generation
simulation and computing technologies and enables NNSA to meet its
exascale system initial operation capability in fiscal year 2023,
including transition of the next-generation, validated weapons codes to
next-generation classified computing.
Academic Programs: The challenges of sustaining the nuclear
deterrent long-term demand a strong and diverse base of national
expertise and educational opportunities in specialized technical areas
that uniquely contribute to stockpile stewardship. NNSA's Academic
Programs are designed to cultivate, attract, and retain such a
workforce. Funding in this area supports the Administration's Executive
Order on Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved
Communities through the Federal Government, Academic Alliances and
existing partnerships with Minority Serving Institutions, and an
increase in student engagement and internship opportunities.
Secure Transportation Asset
Secure Transportation Asset (STA) supports the safe, secure
transport of the Nation's nuclear weapons, weapon components, and
special nuclear material throughout the nuclear security enterprise to
meet nuclear security requirements. Nuclear weapon life extension
programs, limited-life component exchanges, surveillance,
dismantlement, nonproliferation activities, and experimental programs
rely on STA to ensure safe, secure, and on-schedule transport. The
fiscal year 2023 budget request for STA is $344 million, an increase of
$13.7 million, or 4.1 percent, above the fiscal year 2022 enacted
amount to increase the Federal Agent workforce to a level necessary to
keep pace with the growing program deliverables.
The Office of Secure Transportation's (OST) priorities for fiscal
year 2023 include modernization and sustainment of transportation
assets. This includes the Safeguards Transporter (SGT) life extension
program to secure its service until replacement by the Mobile Guardian
Transporter (MGT), as well as the entry into service of procured 737-
700 aircraft. The first MGT Production Unit is planned for completion
in fiscal year 2026 and initial rate production is set to commence in
fiscal year 2027. Currently, aircraft are undergoing heavy maintenance
checks, painting to NNSA standards, and a major modification from a
passenger jet to a FlexCombi that is configurable to carry various
loads of personnel and cargo.
OST also remains focused on recruiting, stabilizing, training, and
retaining the Federal Agent and staff workforce necessary to support
mission requirements. OST has committed to a stable human resources
strategy to achieve an optimal agent force. OST has increased staffing
numbers by optimizing position qualifications and managing risk
associated with the Human Reliability Program. Although COVID-19
impacted key milestones and deliverables, OST successfully accomplished
every assigned mission for the previous year.
Defense Nuclear Security
Defense Nuclear Security's fiscal year 2023 budget request is
$882.3 million, an increase of $38.2 million, or 4.5 percent over the
fiscal year 2022 enacted level. The Office of Defense Nuclear
Security's (DNS) primary mission is protecting the facilities, people,
and assets critical to achieving NNSA's important national security
missions. The need for increasing security due to growth across
enterprise from projects such as LAP4 and UPF, along with additional
resources required to sustain core security, has resulted in increased
program requirements for DNS. Support for the request is vital for the
protection of the enterprise, its people, and its sensitive material
and information. DNS remains focused on improving physical security
infrastructure with several new projects and the development and
deployment of new systems. Progress is also being made in countering
unmanned aircraft systems. The first such platform was deployed at LANL
in December 2017. Deployment at other facilities is expected to be
completed in late fiscal year 2022.
Cybersecurity and Emerging Issues
The fiscal year 2023 budget request for information technology and
cybersecurity is $445.7 million, $39.1 million, or 9.6 percent, over
the fiscal year 2022 enacted amount. This request funds ongoing
operations and invests in improvements across NNSA to modernize both
classified and unclassified systems, improves information management
and data governance, implements critical aspects of a zero-trust
architecture in our networks and systems, and allows for the execution
of a robust cybersecurity program. As an example, NNSA recently
recapitalized its deployed cyber sensor platform, significantly
improving the ability to detect and respond to malicious activity.
Maintaining a strong cybersecurity program is a critical defense
mechanism and a powerful deterrence tool. To strengthen oversight of
the cyber program, the budget request includes a recategorization of
certain Cybersecurity program investments into the Information
Technology program. As a result, the request more clearly reflects
investments in cybersecurity tools and services provided to the
enterprise, maintains core cyber operations at the labs, plants, and
sites, and improves management and transparency of these funds.
NNSA also recently completed an enterprise-wide cybersecurity
assessment, in conjunction with the Institute for Defense Analyses,
aimed at evaluating the overall cybersecurity posture and developing a
set of recommendations to improve the program. That review calls for
increased investment in information technology and cyber infrastructure
to better meet current and emerging challenges, as well as outlines
strategies related to workforce development issues. NNSA has already
started acting on the findings and will continue to do so with the
fiscal year 2023 requested budget.
defense nuclear nonproliferation appropriation
The fiscal year 2023 budget request for the Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation account is $2.3 billion, an increase of $274 million,
or 13.2 percent, over the fiscal year 2022 enacted level. When the use
of prior year balances is considered, the proposed funding level for
the account increases by $397 million, or 19.2 percent. The use of
prior year balances will allow DNN programs to supplement new budget
authority across its programs.
This account funds all activities in the offices of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation, Emergency Operations, and Counterterrorism and
Counterproliferation. Within these offices, this appropriation funds
six nonproliferation programs, a counterterrorism and
counterproliferation program, and an incident response program as part
of a whole-of-government approach. Together these efforts provide
policy and technical leadership to prevent or limit the spread of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the related materials,
technology, and expertise as well as to detect and respond to nuclear
terrorism or proliferation events.
Nonproliferation Efforts
For decades, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) has developed
and implemented policy and technical solutions to eliminate
proliferation sensitive material and limit or prevent the spread of
materials, technology, and expertise necessary for nuclear and
radiological weapons. By working with governments, international
organizations, and private sector partners around the world these
efforts reduce the reliance on radioactive material in commercial and
research industries; better secure nuclear and radioactive material;
develop capabilities to interdict material outside of regulatory
control; and maintain a robust response capability for nuclear and
radiological incidents at home and abroad.
The fiscal year 2023 budget request will allow the Office of
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation to better confront current and
anticipated proliferation challenges including the growing nuclear
programs and strategic competition with Russia and China, the impacts
of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, risks related to the North
Korean and Iranian nuclear programs, and disruptive technologies that
lower the barrier to proliferation. Through these efforts DNN aims to
restore American leadership in nonproliferation solutions and cutting-
edge technology required to address future threats.
The Material Management and Minimization (M3) program fiscal year
2023 budget request is $451 million, an increase of $108 million, or
31.5 percent, over the fiscal year 2022 enacted level. M3 programs
reduce and, when possible, eliminate weapons-usable nuclear material
around the world. The fiscal year 2023 budget request supports the
conversion or shutdown of research reactors and isotope production
facilities that use HEU, the use of non-HEU-based Mo-99 production, the
removal and disposal of weapons-usable nuclear material, and the
removal of plutonium from the state of South Carolina. Additionally, to
date, nearly 7,270 kilograms of weapons-usable nuclear material from 48
countries and Taiwan have been removed or confirmed disposed, while 108
civilian research reactors and isotope production facilities have
stopped using weapons-grade material in their work.
The Global Material Security program fiscal year 2023 budget
request is $504 million, a decrease of $27.4 million, or 5.1 percent,
below the fiscal year 2022 enacted level. The fiscal year 2023 request
supports program efforts to prevent terrorists and other actors from
obtaining nuclear and radioactive material for use in an improvised
nuclear device by working with domestic and global partners. This
includes improving the security of vulnerable materials and sites,
promoting the adoption of alternative technologies that do not rely on
radioactive sources, and increasing capacity to detect, disrupt and
interdict illicit trafficking operations. Working through the RadSecure
100 Initiative, NNSA will accelerate and expand permanent risk
reduction, security enhancements, and response integration with local
law enforcement in the top 100 major metropolitan areas of the United
States. To date, NNSA has replaced approximately 130 cesium-137 based
blood irradiators with alternative technologies. The program remains on
track to replace nearly all the estimated 400 such devices in the
United States by 2027 as mandated in the fiscal year 2019 NDAA. In
addition, NNSA is partnering with domestic advanced nuclear reactor
vendors in `security-by-design' activities to enhance the security of
their systems for domestic and international use. Finally, NNSA
continues to build additional partnerships with bilateral and
multilateral partners focused on counter nuclear smuggling. To date,
NNSA partners with 84 countries in this area and continues to expand
cooperation with existing and new partners to expand global counter
nuclear smuggling capabilities.
The Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) program fiscal year
2023 budget request is $208 million, an increase of $23 million, or
12.4 percent, above the fiscal year 2022 enacted level. The increased
funding request supports two increasingly important activities: (1)
policy and technology development activities for peaceful uses of
nuclear energy along with support for the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), and (2) policy and technology development for potential
arms control agreements that extend to new types of strategic weapons
as well as tactical nuclear weapons.
By focusing on ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear energy, NPAC
programs strengthen nonproliferation regimes through the development
and implementation of effective technologies and policies. This is
especially important as nuclear energy programs expand internationally
in response to clean energy implementation to address climate change.
New nuclear safeguards and monitoring and verification technologies are
needed to secure materials and to detect proliferation activities
early. NPAC works to mature technologies and transfer them to the
International Atomic Energy Agency and partner countries to implement.
The U.S. also supplies IAEA with U.S. subject matter experts, training,
and equipment advice and procurement aid. In fiscal year 2022 and
fiscal year 2023 NPAC is helping establish the nonproliferation
enrichment testing and training platform. This platform will be turned
over to the IAEA for commissioning and operation in fiscal year 2024.
On the policy side, NPAC supports the development and implementation of
Section 123 agreements and the careful regulation of nuclear technology
exports utilizing Part 810 Authorizations.
Approximately $30 million funds increasing nuclear weapons
verification activities. This will improve U.S. technical policy and
readiness for future arms control agreements and associated
verification technology. New investment in the Arms Control Advancement
Initiative will strengthen NNSA's capacity to address future nuclear
warhead monitoring and verification requirements through advanced
technology development, robust modeling and measurements, and sustained
expert engagement to maintain a pipeline of experts to helps advance
arms control objectives over time.
The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN
R&D) program fiscal year 2023 budget request is $720 million, a
decrease of $9 million, or 1.2 percent, below the fiscal year 2022
enacted level. DNN R&D is the key component for the innovation of
United States' technical capabilities to detect nuclear detonations;
foreign nuclear weapons programs' activities; and the presence,
movement, or diversion of special nuclear materials. The program also
sustains and develops foundational nonproliferation technical
competencies that ensure the technical agility needed to support a
broad spectrum of U.S. nonproliferation missions and anticipate
threats. Consistent with the growing nonproliferation challenges, this
funding request for DNN R&D programs will expand activities that
advance the development of next-generation nuclear arms control
monitoring and verification technology and expertise symbiotic with the
NPAC efforts.
The Nonproliferation Construction program fiscal year 2023 budget
request is $72 million, a decrease of $84 million, or 54 percent, below
the fiscal year 2022 enacted level. This decrease is due to the
awarding of the long-lead procurement contracts for gloveboxes,
emergency generators and HEPA filters under CD-3A Phase 2 in fiscal
year 2022 and the expected fiscal year 2023 completion of design work
for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) project required for CD-2/
3, Approval of Performance Baseline and Start of Construction. The
fiscal year 2023 budget request supports the implementation of the
dilute and dispose strategy, by continuing design for the SPD project.
The SPD project will add additional glovebox capacity at the SRS to
accelerate plutonium dilution and aid in the removal of plutonium from
South Carolina.
NNSA is requesting the establishment of a Bioassurance Program in
fiscal year 2023. The budget request is $20 million. As the COVID-19
pandemic has shown, the United States needs better capabilities to
anticipate, respond to, and mitigate threats to the bioeconomy. NNSA
proposes to establish a national security bioassurance program to
perform activities to anticipate and detect threats and scale response
solutions to support the security of the future bioeconomy and monitor
and thwart malpractice in this area. This funding supports foundational
work at DOE/NNSA laboratories including the anticipation of
destabilizing threats through modeling, identifying threat signatures
and developing detection technologies, and rapidly developing and
validating safeguards and threat mitigation approaches. NNSA will
integrate its high-security work with the Department's Office of
Science supported ``open'' science work and other government agencies,
providing the full spectrum of capabilities essential for a
bioassurance program informed by national security expertise drawn from
parallel and analogous work on nuclear threats, risks, export controls
and licensing, nonproliferation, detection, and verification.
Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response
The fiscal year 2023 request for the Nuclear Counterterrorism and
Incident Response (NCTIR) program is $439 million, an increase of $68
million, or 18.4 percent, over the fiscal year 2022 enacted amount. The
NCTIR program supports two subprograms: Counterterrorism and
Counterproliferation (CTCP) and Emergency Operations (EO).
CTCP is responsible for countering nuclear terrorism and nuclear
proliferation, responding to nuclear incidents and accidents worldwide,
advancing nuclear forensic capabilities, and building domestic and
international partner capacity concerning emergency preparedness and
response. CTCP's unique scientific and operational capabilities make it
an integral part of the U.S. Government's layered defense against
nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation.
CTCP manages the NEST, NNSA's multi-mission emergency response
capability comprised of on-call technical specialists who are trained
and equipped to respond to nuclear incidents and accidents worldwide.
NEST's missions include both national security and public health and
safety disciplines.
NNSA, in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), supports regional counter-WMD teams in 14 major U.S. cities as
part of the ``Capability Forward'' initiative. CTCP provides
technology, equipment, and training in support of these teams to
enhance regional capabilities to defeat nuclear and radiological
devices, accelerating life-saving responses to a WMD event.
The fiscal year 2023 budget request addresses critical shortfalls
in CTCP's capabilities to execute DOE's Primary Mission Essential
Function (PMEF)-2, Respond to Nuclear Incidents. In coordination with
interagency efforts to identify and address WMD response gaps,
increased funding addresses staffing needs, ensures operational
integration and full-spectrum training and exercises in accordance with
interagency objectives, and supports technology development and
infrastructure requirements.
Additional programmatic funding will also invest in new incident
response expertise and technology; continue NEST equipment
recapitalization efforts with planned procurement for replacement of
diagnostic equipment and detection systems required for the public
health and safety, counter-WMD, and nuclear weapon accident response
mission areas; and bolster CTCP efforts to counter nuclear
proliferation through applied analysis, concept development, predictive
modeling, and testing.
CTCP also contributes to the interagency National Technical Nuclear
Forensics mission, a central pillar of the U.S. strategy to deter
hostile states from providing nuclear material to terrorists. CTCP's
fiscal year 2023 budget request includes $43 million for this effort,
including training and exercises for responders; procurement,
maintenance, logistics, and technical integration of equipment;
readiness to deploy pre- and post-detonation response and device
assessment teams; and laboratory analysis of nuclear or radiological
material.
EO provides both the structure and processes to ensure a
comprehensive and integrated approach to all-hazards emergency
management, thus improving readiness and effectiveness of the DOE
Emergency Management System on a programmatic and performance level
regardless of the nature of the emergency impacting the DOE/NNSA
enterprise or its equities anywhere in the world. The fiscal year 2023
budget request supports Continuity of Operations, Continuity of
Government, and Enduring Constitutional Government programs to advance
the National Continuity Policy and ensure the continued performance and
delivery of essential services under any circumstances. The fiscal year
2023 budget request also provides for 24/7/365 Consolidated Emergency
Operations Center communications and coordination support to the DOE/
NNSA Emergency Management Enterprise and Departmental Senior
Leadership. The request also includes funding for investments in
communications equipment and classified communications system
improvements to support emergency operations and continuity
infrastructure improvements.
naval reactors appropriation
Advancing Naval Nuclear Propulsion
With over 40 percent of the Navy's major combatants being nuclear-
powered, this technology remains critical to our national security
posture. It provides the nation's submarines and aircraft carriers with
unmatched mobility, flexibility, responsiveness, and endurance. The
ability to maintain robust fleet capabilities on long-term missions is
essential for the security of global trade and the security of our
allies. The Office of Naval Reactors is the foundation of this national
achievement in global security. Cutting edge advancements across all
aspects of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, from reactor plant
development and design to the disposition of spent fuel, gives the U.S.
Navy a decisive edge in naval warfare and enhances the security and
reliability of the sea-leg of our nuclear triad.
The fiscal year 2023 budget request for Naval Reactors is $2.08
billion, an increase of $163 million, or 8.5 percent, above the fiscal
year 2022 enacted level. \2\ The budget request supports the continued
safe and reliable operation of the nuclear-powered fleet, and it
supports investment in technology development to deliver improvements
in propulsion plant performance, manufacturability, and affordability--
for current and future warships. Funding also supports requirements for
the office's three major projects: Columbia-class ballistic missile
submarine reactor systems development; construction of the Naval Spent
Fuel Handling Facility in Idaho; and the refueling and overhaul of the
S8G Prototype land-based reactor in New York for continued sailor
training and technology testing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Funding does not reflect the mandated transfer of $92.75
million in fiscal year 2022 to the Office of Nuclear Energy for
operation of the Advanced Test Reactor
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Consistent, sustained funding is vital for the support of these
projects and will allow Naval Reactors to meet current and future force
needs. Close coordination with the Navy led to the start of
construction of the Columbia-class lead ship in fiscal year 2021. The
S8G Refueling Overhaul is expected to reach completion in fiscal year
2023. The Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization project at the Naval
Reactors Facility in Idaho is making significant progress with an
estimated completion in fiscal year 2026.
AUKUS
On September 15, 2021, Australia, the UK, and the U.S. announced
the creation of an enhanced trilateral security partnership (AUKUS),
focused on peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region. The three
governments are currently six months into an 18-month consultation
period to establish the most efficient path forward for the delivery of
a nuclear-powered, conventional, submarine capability to Australia as
expeditiously as possible. As part of the international working group
developing nonproliferation and safeguards aspects of the AUKUS
program, NNSA will provide technical advice to the interagency and our
AUKUS partners on the full suite of requirements that underpin nuclear
stewardship to implement strong safeguards measures and achieve the
AUKUS objectives.
This cooperation is fully consistent with our obligations under the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT does not prohibit naval
nuclear propulsion. In our role in this trilateral partnership, we
intend to implement the strongest possible nonproliferation standards
to maintain the strength and integrity of the nuclear nonproliferation
regime. Australia is not seeking, and the U.S. and UK are not and will
not assist in any acquisition of nuclear weapons. Additionally,
Australia has committed not to enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel
in the context of AUKUS.
federal salaries and expenses appropriation
The fiscal year 2023 budget request for Federal Salaries and
Expenses (FSE) is $496 million, an increase of $32 million, or 7
percent, above the fiscal year 2022 enacted level. The increase in this
account will support an additional 132 Federal Full-time Equivalents
(FTE) above the fiscal year 2022 enacted level, bringing the total to
1,958. FSE increases will also support increased space and occupancy
needs, travel costs, support service contractors, training, and other
related expenses.
The NNSA Federal workforce is critical to the success of the
Nation's nuclear security enterprise. NNSA's expanding mission
requirements and pressing modernization and recapitalization needs
require recruiting, training, and retaining a skilled Federal workforce
with the appropriate capabilities to meet mission requirements and
deliver on our objectives. This workforce represents some of the top
minds on nuclear issues, consisting of a diverse team of scientists,
engineers, project and program managers, foreign affairs specialists,
and support staff that perform program and project management and
conduct appropriate oversight of national security missions. NNSA's
Federal workforce is distributed across the enterprise and can be found
in eight states and Washington, DC.
NNSA currently faces two significant hurdles in achieving full
staffing: retirement and private sector competition. As of fiscal year
2021 17.3 percent of NNSA FTE Federal staff are eligible to retire, a
number that is expected to rise to 35.4 percent by fiscal year 2027.
Additionally, in fiscal year 2021 the annual FSE attrition rate was
10.7 percent, higher than the average attrition rate of 8.9 percent
over the past 13 years. NNSA also faces competition from the private
sector for top talent in technical fields.
Combating these trends requires an aggressive, external hiring
strategy. NNSA has utilized a renewed focus on virtual recruitment
events that support hiring across the nuclear security enterprise in
support of all program areas. In October 2021, NNSA initiated a pilot
program for expedited hiring within 15 business days, from the time the
program office selected a candidate to the time Human Resources
provided an entry on duty date. NNSA is applying lessons learned from
this pilot program to continue progress on a streamlined hiring effort.
Finally, NNSA has expanded the effort to enlarge fellowship program
candidate pools and employ available alternative hiring authorities to
compress the hiring timeline for qualified candidates and increase the
overall hiring rate.
NNSA's recruitment and hiring efforts will support mission and
growth requirements and will continue to support the Administration's
goals of promoting racial and economic equity as a way to foster
scientific breakthroughs, research and development excellence, and
enhanced national security.
conclusion
NNSA's enduring responsibility is providing the United States with
a nuclear weapons stockpile and naval nuclear propulsion systems that
are the best in the world while simultaneously promoting
nonproliferation and counterterrorism efforts to reduce overall nuclear
risk. The President's fiscal year 2023 budget, informed by the 2022
Nuclear Posture Review, supports our efforts to keep the nuclear
deterrent and naval nuclear propulsion systems safe, secure, reliable,
and militarily effective. Recognizing the increasingly volatile
geopolitical environment, NNSA must also stay resolute in sustaining
and evolving our nuclear security, non-proliferation, and
counterterrorism efforts to help offset and stay ahead of nuclear
risks.
NNSA has a unique responsibility to provide an effective nuclear
deterrent in a timely manner to protect our Nation and our allies. The
fiscal year 2023 budget request funds the five life extension and
modernization programs that support all three legs of the triad. In
fiscal year 2023 the requested budget also supports significant
investments in new production facilities for uranium processing and
plutonium pit manufacturing at the fastest responsible pace. The budget
request contains close to equal funding for stockpile management and
production modernization, a true indication of the intent to accelerate
activities by working on weapon design and production in parallel with
infrastructure revitalization. The science and engineering support for
the weapons program stays strong to allow for the continued development
of capabilities to design and certify the stockpile without testing and
to stay ahead of threats.
The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation budget request sustains our
efforts to reduce nuclear risk by eliminating, minimizing, and securing
nuclear and radiological materials. In addition, the DNN portfolio
request recognizes the changing world by increasing support for policy
and technology development aimed at the increased proliferation risks
associated with the increase in nuclear energy around the world,
preparing for an increasingly complex arms control and global stability
environment, and by initiating a bioassurance program. Similarly, the
increased budget request for the counterterrorism and
counterproliferation program is responsive to the changing threat
environment.
The Naval Reactors budget request recognizes the excellent
stewardship provided over the years and continues to support the high
priority needs to replace aging tools, build a new spent fuel handling
facility, and support the Columbia-class production schedule.
The challenges NNSA faces ahead are steep and we are mindful of the
resources entrusted to it. For fiscal year 2023, NNSA scrubbed prior
year balances and used available funds to offset some of the increased
budget needs. NNSA, in partnership with Congress and our colleagues in
the Departments of Energy and Defense, is steadfast in our commitment
to fulfill vital national security mission and deliver our goals. We
greatly appreciate your support.
Senator King. Thank you, Dr. Adams.
Admiral Wolfe, please.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JOHNNY R. WOLFE, JR., USN, DIRECTOR,
NAVY STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS
Admiral Wolfe. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer,
Distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify on the Department of the Navy's fiscal
year 2023 budget priorities for nuclear forces. I respectfully
request that my written statement be accepted for the record.
Senator King. Without objection.
Admiral Wolfe. For over 6 decades, the Navy has provided
unwavering support to the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad.
Since I briefed this Committee last year, I would like to share
with you some of SSP's accomplishments that build on this
remarkable history.
In an effort to deliver a reliable and credible strategic
weapon system to the fleet we have successfully completed a
demonstration and shakedown operation onboard the USS Wyoming,
certifying this Ohio-class submarine to return to alert patrol
after a midlife refueling overhaul, demonstrating to the world
the continued performance and reliability of this platform and
the Trident II D5LE strategic weapon system.
In coordination with our partners at NNSA, the W93/Mk7
program continues, and the W88/Mk5 ALT370 program has achieved
initial operating capability, further demonstrating our
commitment to responsible stewardship of our nuclear stockpile.
Although not nuclear but of particular interest to this
Committee, I am incredibly proud of the milestones our
hypersonics team, responsible for the Conventional Prompt
Strike Program has achieved. These milestones include
successful experiments to demonstrate the maturity of the
common hypersonic glide-body technology; three static fire
tests of the Navy-developed 34\1/2\-inch missile booster; and a
successful sounding rocket campaign, demonstrating that our
advanced communications capability is sufficiently mature to
field our navy platforms.
The Navy continues to manage the Nuclear Strategic Weapons
System across three main mission priorities: sustaining the
current weapon system through Ohio end of life, developing the
strategic weapon systems of the future for sea-based strategic
deterrence on Columbia through 2084, and safeguarding our
special relationship with the United Kingdom embodied in the
Polaris Sales Agreement.
First and foremost, we must maintain the current D5LE
missile inventory and provide the necessary operational support
to sustain Ohio-class submarines and today's strategic weapon
system through its end of life in the early 2040s. This is
being accomplished through an update to all of our sub systems.
All of our life extension efforts remain on track, and our
current program will support the deployment of all existing
warheads. We must recapitalize all of our supporting Navy
nuclear deterrence mission infrastructure to support and
sustain nuclear weapons and SSBN operations.
Secondly, we must continue to ensure the transition between
Ohio-class and Columbia-class submarine stays on schedule. For
SSP, this requires a seamless transition of the current D5LE
weapon system and missile inventory onto the new Columbia-
class.
We have already started the work on the next variant of
Trident and its corresponding weapon system, D5LE2. D5LE2 will
yield multiple benefits in missile performance while providing
flexibility in the system to meet future warfighter
requirements. To achieve these requirements, we must design,
develop, produce, and test this next-generation Trident over
the coming decade, with the first flight test in 2033.
Finally, one of the greatest advantages the United States
has is its alliances and partnerships. As the U.S. Project
Officer for the Polaris Sales Agreement, we will continue to
support the UK's sovereign deterrent for today's Vanguard-class
submarines and their successor, the Dreadnought-class. For
decades U.S. policy has recognized that the independent British
nuclear deterrent adds to NATO, and indeed global, stability.
Nuclear modernization will take time to complete, so
sustained resourcing and enterprise effort is absolutely
essential. It is only through your continued support that the
Department's top modernization program priorities can be
achieved and the Navy can deliver reliable sea-based strategic
deterrence to 2084.
As the 14th director, it is my highest honor to represent
the men and women of SSP. My number one priority is to assure
that these men and women are poised to execute this mission
with the same level of success, passion, and rigor as they have
since our program was founded.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of
the team that makes deterrence of major power conflict their
life's work, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Wolfe follows:]
Prepared Statement by Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe
introduction
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and Distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the
sustainment and recapitalization of the sea-based leg of the nuclear
triad. It is an honor to represent the Navy's Strategic Systems
Programs (SSP) and the contributions the Navy provides to our national
and global security through Sea Based Strategic Deterrence.
As Admiral Richard, Commander, US Strategic Command, testified
before this Committee just last month, ``Every operational plan in the
DOD, and every other capability we have rests on the assumption that
strategic deterrence, and in particular nuclear deterrence, will hold.
If strategic or nuclear deterrence fails, integrated deterrence and no
other plan or capability in the DOD will work as designed. The Nation's
nuclear forces underpin integrated deterrence and enable the U.S., our
Allies and partners to prevent, and if necessary, confront aggression
around the globe using all instruments of national power.'' Nuclear
weapons remain the most powerful and destructive weapons known to
humanity. As long as nuclear weapons exist, we have a special charge to
be responsible custodians of our nuclear capabilities and work with a
sense of urgency to create a security environment that would allow for
their elimination. SSP takes this charge very seriously.
SSP's core mission comprises two fundamental lines of effort: the
safety and security of our Nation's strategic assets entrusted to the
Navy; and the design, development, production, and sustainment of the
Navy's Strategic Weapons System (SWS). We strive to maintain a culture
of excellence, underpinned by rigorous self-assessment, to achieve the
highest standards of performance and integrity for personnel supporting
the strategic deterrent mission. We focus unremittingly on our
tremendous responsibility for the custody and accountability of our
Nation's nuclear assets. The men and women of SSP, our sailors, our
marines, our navy masters at arms, our coast guardsmen, and our
industry partners remain dedicated to supporting the strategic
deterrence mission, to responding to the emerging needs of our
warfighter, and to protecting and safeguarding our Nation's assets with
which we are entrusted. We certainly could not do this without the
support from this Committee.
The Nation's nuclear triad consists of intercontinental ballistic
missiles, heavy bombers, and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)
equipped with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). These
platforms and their associated weapons systems are essential to the
very foundation of our Nation's security and survival. The
Administration's recently concluded Nuclear Posture Review affirms the
following roles for nuclear weapons: deter against strategic attacks,
assure allies and partners, and achieve U.S. objectives if deterrence
fails. While the U.S. nuclear arsenal remains safe, secure and
effective, most U.S. nuclear deterrent systems--including the SSBN
fleet--are operating beyond their original design life, increasing
concerns about mission effectiveness, reliability and availability.
Replacement programs are ongoing, but there is little or no margin
between the end of useful life of existing programs and the fielding of
their replacements.
The U.S. Navy provides the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad
with the interdependent Ohio-class SSBNs and the Trident II D5 SWS. The
SSBN fleet is responsible for more than 70 percent of the Nation's
operationally deployed nuclear warheads that are subject to the New
START Treaty. As the Navy carefully manages the approach to end of life
of Ohio-class SSBNs, addressing the viability of the SWS throughout the
life of the Columbia-class SSBNs remains a top priority. Columbia-class
SSBNs will ensure the effectiveness and availability of the nation's
Sea Based Strategic Deterrent through the 2080s. The currently deployed
Trident II D5LE missiles will support initial load-outs on Columbia,
but modernization of the D5LE SWS, via D5LE2, is required to support
later Columbia-class missile inventory and seamlessly sustain
USSTRATCOM requirements. D5LE2 will ensure the SWS will be flexible and
adaptable in order to maintain demonstrated performance and
survivability despite the dynamic threat environment.
As the fourteenth Director, it is my highest honor to serve as the
program manager, technical authority, safety and security lead,
regulatory lead, and U.S. Project Officer under the Polaris Sales
Agreement (PSA) for the Naval Nuclear Weapons Program. Most
importantly, I am honored to represent the men and women of SSP,
comprising approximately 1,500 sailors, 1,000 marines, 300 coast
guardsmen, 1,400 civilians, and thousands of contractor personnel. It
is my most critical goal to ensure they are poised to execute the
mission with the same level of success, passion, and rigor both today
and tomorrow as they have since our program's inception in 1955.
sws sustainment on ohio-class ssbn and procurement for columbia-class
ssbn
The fragile relationship between sustainment of our legacy systems
and the development and production of their replacements is an ever-
present factor in the calculus of effectively deterring adversaries.
The Navy's highest priority acquisition program is the Columbia-class
submarine. The Ohio-class SSBNs will begin decommissioning in the late
2020s, and the Columbia-class must be ready to begin patrols no later
than early fiscal year 2031. Recapitalizing our SSBNs is a significant
investment that only happens every other generation, making it
critically important that we do it right and on time. Delays to the
Navy's SSBN modernization plan are not an option. The continued
assurance of our sea-based strategic deterrent requires not only a next
class of ballistic missile submarines, but equally critical, a credible
SWS--to include not just the weapon system itself, but the
infrastructure and the people as well. The Navy is taking the necessary
steps to ensure that the next generation deterrent is designed, built,
delivered, and tested on time and provides flexibility and adaptability
in a dynamic threat environment.
To lower development costs and leverage the proven reliability of
the Trident II D5 SWS, the Columbia-class SSBN will enter service with
the same functionality and performance of the currently deployed
Trident II D5 SWS, including the life extended Trident II D5 missile,
which resides on today's Ohio-class submarines. Maintaining a common
SWS during the transition between existing and successor submarine
platforms allows the Navy to leverage a mature material and knowledge
enterprise, thus reducing programmatic costs and risks. Life extended
missiles will be shared with both the Ohio- and Columbia-class
submarines in the U.S. and, under the auspices of the PSA, with the
United Kingdom (UK) Vanguard-class and Dreadnought-class submarines
into the 2040s.
trident ii d5 life extension and life extension 2
The Trident II D5 SWS capability has been deployed on the Ohio-
class ballistic missile submarines for nearly three decades and is
planned to be deployed more than 55 years. This demand to maintain
demonstrated high performance while extending the service life past
initial design requirements required a missile life extension effort in
order to support the Ohio-class submarine service life and, in concert
with the Shipboard Modernization Program for shipboard systems, to
serve as the initial SWS for the Columbia-class SSBN. The D5 Life
Extension (D5LE) will ensure an effective and credible SWS on both the
Ohio-class and Columbia-class SSBNs into the 2040s.
As the Navy carefully manages the approach to end of life of our
Ohio-class SSBNs, we must address the viability of the SWS throughout
the life of the Columbia-class SSBNs. A minimum of twelve Columbia-
class SSBNs will replace today's 14 Ohio SSBNs and beginning in fiscal
year 2030, D5LE missiles will support initial load-outs on Columbia
(Hulls 1-8). Production of additional D5LE missiles is not practical
due to obsolete parts and the lack of a robust industrial base. The
Trident II D5 Life Extension 2 (D5LE2) program is required to modernize
the SWS to support Columbia-class missile inventory starting in fiscal
year 2039 (targeting Initial Fleet Introduction--or, IFI--on Columbia
Hull 9). It will be incorporated on all follow on Hulls as well as
Hulls 1-8 during their Extended Refit Period from fiscal year 2039 to
2049 to continue to meet USSTRATCOM requirements. D5LE2 will ensure the
weapon system maintains demonstrated performance and remains survivable
while facing a dynamic threat environment driven by two near peer
competitors until Columbia end of life.
D5LE2 is a hybrid of pull-through cost-effective technology (e.g.,
solid rocket motors, ignitors) and redesigned and updated components
(e.g., avionics, guidance, system architecture). D5LE2 is structured to
maintain today's unmatched reliability and demonstrated performance,
while unlocking untapped system potential to efficiently respond to
emerging needs and to maintain a credible Sea Based Strategic
Deterrent.
As directed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture review, SSP executed system
architecture studies in fiscal year 2020 to 2022 to evaluate solutions
to problems associated with emerging threats, supportability, and
adaptability required to address challenges in a dynamic threat
environment. Additionally, activities focused on missile and guidance
technology to determine the effective composition of redesign,
remanufacture, and pull-through of highly reliable components. This
ensures longer-lead, unique SLBM subsystems are mature for a
Preliminary Design Review in fiscal year 2028, Critical Design Review
in fiscal year 2032, first flight off a pad in fiscal year 2033, Low
Rate Initial Production (LRIP) in fiscal year 2034 and flight testing
off a manned platform in fiscal year 2036. fiscal year 2023 activities
continue the refinement of systems studies and critical Missile and
Guidance Technology work while beginning focused subsystem redesign and
industrial base development activities for the D5LE2 program.
Unlike SLBM programs of the past, D5LE2 does not have the benefit
of a healthy industrial base that comes from maintaining production and
continuous development. These efforts will be critical to
reconstituting the SLBM industrial base to restart production on
critical components whose production lines were shut down over the last
decade and to build a workforce to design and develop subsystems to
meet unique nuclear weapons surety requirements. In short, full support
of D5LE2 today is vital to achieving 2039 IFI and to embarking on a
path that maintains an SLBM deterrent capability through the service
life of the Columbia-class SSBN.
warhead and reentry body activities
The Navy is also working in partnership with the Department of
Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to refurbish
our existing reentry systems and develop new reentry systems in
response to USSTRATCOM requirements. As the threat environment the
nuclear enterprise faces continues to evolve, it is critical that the
Navy designs, develops, and deploys programs that meet the needs of the
Warfighter. The Trident II D5 missile is capable of carrying two types
of warhead families today, the W76 and the W88. The W93/Mk7 warhead
will be designed for use on both the D5LE and D5LE2 missiles and,
through the Polaris Sales Agreement and Mutual Defense Agreement, will
support the United Kingdom's sovereign Replacement Warhead program. In
2019, NNSA completed the W76-1 Life Extension Program (W76-1/Mk4A),
marking the U.S. stockpile's first full-scale warhead refurbishment
program. The Navy continues to work on modernizing integrated
aeroshells that house these warheads through the Mk4B program with the
inclusion of a Shape Stable Nose Tip, which reduces reentry variability
and improves performance margins.
The W88/Mk5 warhead continues to undergo its refurbishment program
(ALT370) on a revised timeline based on capacitor component issues that
did not meet reliability requirements. The Navy and NNSA coordinated on
tightly coupled schedules for the fleet, the nuclear enterprise weapons
complex, and production of affected non-nuclear components to execute
an 18-month delay to the original schedule that was approved by the
Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC). This program reached the First
Production Unit milestone on schedule in 2021 and achieved Initial
Operational Capability in January 2022. I am confident that our teams
will continue to work together to manage and deliver this program, as
we have historically addressed refurbishment challenges with a mission-
focused attitude and rigor. The Navy will continue to prioritize
meeting our Warfighters' requirements and minimizing disruption to the
operational fleet to ensure that the sea-based leg of the triad
continues to fulfill its deterrence mission. However, the setback this
program faced illustrates the need to support investments in our
nuclear security enterprise and reduce the pervasive risk to our
nuclear modernization programs.
In 2021, the Navy entered Phase 1 of the joint DOD--DOE Nuclear
Weapons Lifecycle Process with NNSA for the W93/Mk7. This effort will
address evolving ballistic missile warhead modernization requirements;
improve operational effectiveness for USSTRATCOM; and mitigate
technical, operational, and programmatic risk in the sea-based leg of
the nuclear triad while simultaneously reinvigorating the atrophied
industrial base and modernizing a Cold War era stockpile. W93/Mk7 will
provide flexibility and adaptability to meet future warfighter needs.
With the near simultaneous age out of the deployed stockpile in the
2040s, the W93/Mk7 will help address production concerns in the weapons
complex and ensure an uninterrupted at-sea deterrent for the sea-based
leg of the nuclear triad. In fiscal year 2022, the W93/Mk7 program
received NWC authorization to proceed into Phase 2, Feasibility Study
and Design Options, which will further refine and mature the design of
the W93/Mk7 program in a manner that provides an affordable, credible,
safe, and secure weapon to the Warfighter. Even with the addition of
the W93/Mk7 to the stockpile, we will not increase the deployed
stockpile. The Navy will work in close coordination with the Department
of Defense, NNSA, the NWC, and the Congress as this effort matures, but
we cannot continue to life extend our leftover Cold War era weapons and
systems and successfully carry out our national strategy.
industrial base and infrastructure
To borrow again from Admiral Richard's remarks, ``maintaining and
strengthening deterrence for the long term requires a modern
infrastructure and industrial base able to develop credible
capabilities necessary for a more challenging security environment.''
The Nation requires a fully modernized nuclear force and supporting
infrastructure to execute our national strategy. Our modernization
needs cannot succeed without investing in the research and development
(R&D), critical skills, and facilities needed to produce, sustain, and
certify our nuclear systems. Ensuring robust defense and aerospace
industrial base capabilities--such as radiation-hardened electronics,
strategic inertial instrumentation, and solid rocket motors--remains an
important priority in conjunction with R&D investment. SSP has placed
particular emphasis on the solid rocket motor industry and its sub-tier
suppliers and appreciates the support of the Congress to allow for the
continuous production of these vital components. Essential to the
nuclear deterrent is a national aeroshell production capability. The
Navy has not delivered an integrated aeroshell since the 1980s and
needs to reinvigorate a production capability that only resides in a
small cadre of highly skilled experts in an exceptionally niche
industry. Aeroshell investment supports the Navy but will also be cost-
effectively leveraged by our colleagues in the Air Force--and also our
strategic partners in the United Kingdom as they pursue their
independent reentry program endeavors. Finally, R&D investment is
critical to today's nuclear modernization needs to ensure that we
advance necessary technology ahead of design needs and to train our
workforce during the early years of development. If the Nation does not
continue to address these concerns, no amount of money will be able to
adequately mitigate the risks associated with key stockpile and
infrastructure losses.
From an infrastructure perspective, our program is entering
unprecedented times. Existing facilities are reaching their 30-year
recapitalization windows while we simultaneously face weapons systems
modernization periods in order to meet future requirements. Investing
in facility sustainment and modernization is required for cradle-to-
grave operations. Appropriate Military Construction (MILCON) and
Facility Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (FSRM) resourcing
is critical to the Navy maintaining a credible deterrence posture to
include providing more than 70 percent of the Nation's operationally
deployed nuclear warheads. We will make smart investments to address
through-put constraints and build in surge capacity to address
requirements presented by new and emerging threats. The Navy relies on
a limited footprint to process missiles and outfit the SSBNs.
Maintaining and sustaining facilities is critical to meeting USSTRATCOM
and Fleet mission requirements. Our nation, and the Navy, will continue
to prioritize and resource the sustainment and modernization of its
nuclear infrastructure enterprise to provide an effective and flexible
deterrent now and into the future.
As the Navy executes the modernization and replacement of the SSBN
and associated SLBM leg of the nuclear triad, DOD and NNSA's
infrastructure must be prepared to respond in tandem to the evolving
needs of the Nation. Of most importance, we must have an effective,
resilient, and responsive plutonium pit production capability. This
capability can address age-related risks, support planned
refurbishments, as well as prepare for future uncertainty.
Additionally, tritium, lithium, and uranium, and high explosives and
energetics, among other strategic materials, are vital to ensuring the
Navy can continue to meet its strategic deterrent requirements. Efforts
to sustain and modernize deterrent forces must continue. Our strategic
forces underpin every military operation around the world, and we
cannot afford to delay given the increasing threats facing our nation.
workforce
History reminds us that the swift, successful creation and
execution of the Fleet Ballistic Missile program in the 1950s was truly
a result of national commitment, congressional support, and a cadre of
hand-selected scientists, engineers, and inspirational leaders. Though
process will always underpin our efforts, our dedicated predecessors--
civilians, military, and industry partners alike--responded to the
national need with focused determination and drove this program with a
vision. People are as fundamental to our nuclear deterrent as the SWS
itself. Today, SSP and its industry partners are focused on inspiring,
growing, and retaining a generation of workforce that did not live
through the darkest days of the Cold War. Connecting a new workforce to
this fundamental global security mission remains an important task
shared among the entire nuclear enterprise. A capable, credible, and
affordable strategic deterrent for our Nation for the next 60 years
requires not only technical, policy, management, and financial acumen--
it requires passion and a commitment to making this our life's work.
SSP has made significant strides in recent years to honor our past,
innovate our present, and ensure our future workforce is connected to
the fundamental global security mission. In order to create the ideal
workforce and workplace, SSP developed the SSP Human Capital Operating
Plan (HCOP) in fiscal year 2019. The HCOP is a five-year plan aligning
human capital initiatives to SSP's strategic goals. SSP is now in the
fourth year of the HCOP execution and is realizing valuable change from
these efforts. The five goals and associated successes are outlined
below.
Goal 1--Recruitment and Retention: create and implement effective
strategies to recruit and retain highly qualified candidates and
employees, internal and external, sufficient to ensure that SSP
fulfills its mission requirements. Accomplishments toward this end
include: developing a comprehensive Talent Pipeline Strategy;
Standardizing SSP-enterprise Exit & Stay Interview processes;
Established HR Data Analytics position and integrated efforts across HR
functions;
Goal 2--Talent Development and Sustainment: support, develop, and
strengthen the workforce to continually evolve and successfully execute
the mission. Accomplishments toward this end include: developing
Science & Technology Subject Matter Expert (S&T SME) career tracks;
conducting a staffing study to assess current and future competencies
and capacities; implementing robust mentorship programs; Established
Career Development Counseling Program; and Developing an SSP Academy.
Goal 3--Leadership Development: strengthen enterprise leadership at
all levels through robust leadership development programs and clear
assignment and execution of authority, accountability, and
responsibility. Accomplishments toward this end include: Implementing
robust coaching programs for leaders and developmental employees;
delivering supervisory training for hybrid work environments;
continuously promoting internal leadership programs; and Developing an
HR Management for Supervisors course
Goal 4--Culture: clearly define and communicate SSP culture and
values. Reinforce and assess the organizational culture as necessary
for continuous improvement at every level. Accomplishments toward this
end include: Developing an improved employee recognition and awards
process; delivering on-going health and wellness activities;
establishing a `We Heard You' campaign to communicate SSP's responses
to feedback; defining SSP Culture and Values (Director's Intent) and
developing SSP Culture Videos.
Goal 5--Diversity and Inclusion: create and implement effective
strategies to cultivate a diverse and inclusive work environment that
promotes employee engagement and the exchange of different ideas,
philosophies, and perspectives. Accomplishments toward this end
include: Conducting barrier analysis; establishing Diversity and
Inclusion Council; increasing use of Individuals with Disabilities
Recruitment Program; and connecting a Leadership Learning Series with
Special Emphasis Program.
polaris sales agreement: support to the uk
Development of the future SWS not only addresses known U.S. risks,
it also supports the UK's critical need to recapitalize its deterrent
and, given the UK deterrent's contribution and commitment to NATO, this
recapitalization is essential to our NATO partners' overall defense
posture. A critical component of the Columbia-class Program is the
procurement of a Common Missile Compartment (CMC) with the UK under the
auspices of the Polaris Sales Agreement. Our partnership with the UK
supports production of the CMC in both U.S. and UK build yards.
Ensuring that the Columbia-class program remains on schedule supports
not only our Nation's operational requirements, but also the ability of
the UK, one of our most important allies, to maintain its Continuous-
at-Sea Deterrent. Similar to the U.S. Navy, the Royal Navy is
recapitalizing its four aging Vanguard-class ballistic missile
submarines (SSBNs) with the Dreadnought-class SSBN. The CMC will
support today's Trident II D5 SWS, which the U.S. Navy sells to the
Royal Navy for deployment aboard its Vanguard-class SSBNs, and that
will be deployed as the initial loadout on both Columbia and the UK
Dreadnought-class SSBNs. For decades, U.S. policy has recognized that
the independent UK nuclear deterrent adds to joint efforts to deter
aggression and attack against NATO and thereby positively contributes
to global stability. Under the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement and the
1963 Polaris Sales Agreement, the United States Navy has provided
decades of support and material, consistent with international law, to
the UK deterrent program. Without this assistance, the cost and
schedule risk to maintain the UK's independent deterrent would rise
significantly, thus creating additional challenges for the UK in
sustaining its nuclear contribution to NATO alongside the United
States.
conclusion
Our Nation's sea-based strategic deterrent has been a critical
component of our national security since the 1950s and must continue to
assure our allies and partners and to deter potential adversaries well
into the future. SSP ensures a safe, secure, effective, flexible, and
tailorable strategic deterrent, with a steadfast focus on the proper
stewardship, custody, and accountability of the nuclear assets
entrusted to the Navy. Sustaining and modernizing the sea-based
strategic deterrent capability is a vital national security
requirement. I am privileged to represent this unique organization as
we work to serve the best interests of our great Nation. I thank the
Committee for the opportunity to speak with you about the sea-based leg
of the nuclear triad and the vital role it plays in our national and
global security.
Senator King. Thank you, Admiral. General Cotton?
STATEMENT OF GENERAL ANTHONY J. COTTON, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR
FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND
General Cotton. Good afternoon, Chairman King, Ranking
Member Fischer, and Distinguished Committee Members. Thank you
for the opportunity to be here today and represent the 32,000
men and women of Air Force Global Strike Command.
I would like to express our gratitude for your incredible
support as we modernize the ICBM [intercontinental ballistic
missile] and bomber legs of the nuclear triad and remain on
pace and on time with all of our efforts. As a force provider
of strategic and long-range strike, I am proud of the
excellence and efforts of our personnel as we deliver safe,
secure, reliable nuclear deterrence to this nation.
Today's global environment does not allow for a diminished
strategic deterrence. China has modernized at breathtaking
speeds, and we expect them to have over 1,000 nuclear warheads
by 2030, nested within a modern triad. As the Commander of
STRATCOM has asserted, they have achieved strategic breakout.
Meanwhile, Russia has recapitalized over 80 percent of their
nuclear forces and are developing new weapons capabilities as
we speak.
While near-peer competitors garner significant attention,
we must not lose sight of the actions of other potential
adversaries. North Korea continues to conduct missile tests,
invest in hypersonic glide vehicle technologies, manufacture
physical materials, and operate a sophisticated cyberattack
capability as they maintain the requisite infrastructure to
conduct nuclear weapons testing. Make no mistake: we are locked
in an age of long-term strategic competition, informed now by
two nuclear-capable peers and the advent of non-nuclear
strategic weapon systems.
Throughout all of this, our strategic deterrence continues
to hold, as the cornerstone of national security. As the air
and leg force provider to STRATCOM, I am constantly balancing
the sustainment of legacy equipment with the acquisition of new
weapon systems, ensuring deterrence remains credible throughout
modernization. To maintain this balance as we build an enduring
deterrent for decades to come, we rely upon many partnerships
inside and outside the Department of Defense, including our
partners in the Department of Energy, the National Nuclear
Security Administration, and the Department of Navy.
I must always be ready to present credible and viable
forces, and for this reason we maintain constant readiness 24
hours a day. From our missile crews on alert and our bomber
crews accomplishing global bomber task force missions, we
remain ready to hold our nation's adversaries at bay.
To guarantee continued deterrence into the future, it is
imperative that we remain on schedule as we bring new weapon
systems online within the triad. I am happy to share we
continue to make tremendous progress across our portfolios. We
are moving forward from legacy sustainment to modernization and
further into operationalizing our new systems.
The scope and scale of this modernization effort cannot be
overstated. We must be diligent to remain on track as we evolve
through all these phases. Any schedule or cost delays would
have a cascading effect on the entirety of our modernization
efforts and, in turn, on the credibility of our deterrence
force.
I know you understand the historic situation we find
ourselves in as we modernize this nation's nuclear triad, and I
am confident for the future, as long as we continue to receive
the support and funding necessary to remain on schedule. We
have a strong foundation of dedicated people, we have thorough
and deliberate plans in place, and we have the systems and
development necessary to safeguard our Nation for years to
come.
We are grateful for our partnership with Congress and
especially for the continual support of the defense Committees.
Air Force Global Strike Command remains committed to sustaining
our bombers and ICBM forces as we bring Sentinel and a B-21
Raider online.
We also remain focused in investing and developing the
people of our force with great care, to the enduring legacy of
our mission. Our heritage inspires us into the way forward, and
we will always be ready to provide convention or nuclear
strategic long-range strike anytime, anywhere.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of General Cotton follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by General Anthony J. Cotton
introduction
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and Distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the
sustainment and modernization of the air and land-based legs of the
nuclear triad. It is an honor to represent the Air Force Global Strike
Command (AFGSC) and the contributions the Air Force delivers to our
national and global security through Air and Land Based Strategic
Deterrence.
On behalf of the 32,000 men and women of AFGSC, I would like to
offer my sincere thanks to Congress for your longstanding support and
commitment to ensuring our total force service s have the resources
needed to provide credible deterrence and ultimately defend the Nation.
I would also like to take the opportunity to commend our airmen, known
as strikers, who have persevered with professionalism and dedication
during a global pandemic and shifting geopolitical landscape. Our
command's Strikers, including our civilian workforce and total force
personnel, are always ready to respond while ensuring the cornerstone
of our national security remains safe, secure, and reliable.
Strategic security is rapidly evolving and increasing in complexity
across the geopolitical landscape. Our nation's reality now includes
potentially facing two nuclear peers in the coming years. We must
continue to posture our strategic capabilities for the dynamic
challenges we face today and in the years to come. China has
accelerated its military growth and is rapidly expanding its nuclear
capabilities. Simultaneously, Russia has spent the last 14 years
recapitalizing its nuclear forces and continues to invest in new
technologies. In this context, maintaining a safe, secure and reliable
nuclear posture continues to be of paramount importance to the Nation
and AFGSC.
As Commander of AFGSC, my four lines of effort focus on our people,
our mission, modernizing our force and proactive engagement. These four
areas are essential as we transition into an era of great power
competition. We move firmly into the future by developing and equipping
them to execute the mission even in ambiguity. We must provide them
with the weapon systems needed to compete in this era and the
communities necessary to support them and their families. This will
include increasing the quality of life of our personnel. We must build
relationships with leaders and policymakers across local, State and
international communities to do this.
threats
The current global context is dynamic and unprecedented, marked by
the reemergence of long-term strategic competition with Russia and now
China. Both possess capabilities and intent to advance their interests
at the expense of the U.S. and our allies. AFGSC remains committed to
providing a safe, secure and reliable deterrent even as our Nation
faces challenges in a multipolar world. China continues rapid nuclear
expansion as it constructs hundreds of intercontinental ballistic
missile silos, operationalizes a nuclear bomber, and fields a third
generation SSBN fleet. In addition to this, China is also developing
fractional-orbit bombardment systems and long-range anti-aircraft
missiles demonstrating increasing strategic conventional capabilities.
Russia similarly continues provocations, including the development
of anti-satellite weapons, hypersonic technologies, and malign
cyberspace activities. Russia conducted a reckless and irresponsible
direct-ascent anti-satellite missile test on 15 November 2021.Russia
has also violated international rules and norms with their recent
invasion of Ukraine, and its willingness and capacity to conduct
offensive malicious cyber activities threatening the networks of U.S.,
ally and partner nations. Furthermore, Russia possesses approximately
2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons, which are not covered or limited
by New START, and cites U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty among its supposed justifications for developing five new
nuclear weapon delivery capabilities, including two unique hypersonic
weapons. AFGSC will not waver in our focused contributions to
integrated deterrence, ensuring two-thirds of the triad continues to
underpin the capabilities our Nation brings to bear.
people
Our Strikers are the foundation of AFGSC and our greatest asset.
The core of our competitive advantage will always come from our people.
We have several ongoing initiatives that safeguard our airmen and their
families to help build community and support resiliency. Furthermore,
AFGSC has implemented several initiatives to help attract, recruit,
develop, and retain a high-performing and diverse force. Our
installation-level Pathways to Inclusion Councils have collaborated
with local communities to bring resources to our Strikers. These
resources, combined with our diversity, equity, inclusion, and
accessibility programs, buildupon and create initiatives that bolster
opportunity for everyone. For example, Ellsworth AFB improved
accommodations for those with physical disabilities, increasing
employment and installation access opportunities. The Kirtland AFB
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) and the Violence
Prevention Integrator established a Violence Prevention Board tasked
with educational oversight and victim advocacy. Another initiative
within the command nominates and trains individuals as ``Mental Health
Heroes'' for the base community charged with reducing mental health
stigmas and encouraging help-seeking behaviors within organizations.
We have many quality of life initiatives across the Command,
ranging from childcare to education. We share the Department of the Air
Force's commitment for quality and affordable childcare. Even as we
face challenges of availability, staffing, and capacity, we are taking
measures to improve access to childcare for our airmen and their
families. We continue to explore expanding capacity through alternative
means, including the Family Child Care program, which provides greater
flexibility in scheduling childcare for military families. We also seek
to provide additional educational opportunities for our personnel
throughout their career. Our School Liaison Program continues to work
with community stakeholders to increase awareness and support
initiatives for military families in their communities. Through
Education Community Partnerships, AFGSC installations are improving
educational support programs by leveraging the installation resources
at local schools. Engagement with State officials and community
stakeholders has resulted in positive legislative outcomes in education
for military families including:
Advanced enrollment and registration,
Homeschool student participation in public school
activities and athletics,
Post-secondary in-State tuition rates approved for
military member and dependents, and
Purple Star Programs recognizing military-friendly
schools.
To ensure we remain the world's premier long-range precision strike
team, we continue to provide professional strategic deterrence
education, leadership training, and opportunities to produce well-
prepared and critical thinking leaders at every level. The Command
works with academic and industry partners to buildupon the leadership
education efforts of the broader Air Force. The Command's Senior
Leaders Course, in partnership with the Air University Leadership
Development Course Command Module, prepares incoming squadron command
teams for the challenges of command and further develops them into
successful Air Force leaders. Our Senior Leader Development Program
targets commanders and senior headquarters' staff by providing them
with an understanding of successful leadership traits and equipping
them with the tools to improve their personal leadership skills.
Our leadership development efforts reach airmen of all experience
levels as we provide several major programs and initiatives that
provide airmen the opportunity for continued development and growth in
Nuclear Deterrence Education and Nuclear Command, Control and
Communications (NC3). For those who require a first nuclear deterrence
education ``touchpoint,'' our Strategic Deterrence Basic Course and our
Nuclear 150 Course orient personnel with little or no experience with
the nuclear deterrence mission.
We have also developed a congruent NC3 150 course designed
specifically to educate our airmen with little to no exposure to the
NC3 mission. We provide Nuclear and NC3 200, 300, and 400 level courses
for our mid-range and more advanced airmen. The Air Force Institute of
Technology's Strategic Force College at Kirtland AFB and Barksdale AFB
host these courses, providing our Strikers progressive educational
experiences supporting the Air Force's nuclear deterrence and NC3
missions. We have graduated over 3,000 students from Nuclear and NC3
Courses, and over 2,500 students from the Strategic Deterrence Basic
Course.
Our command deliberately develops airmen through the internship
programs known as Striker Pathfinder, Striker Titan, Striker
Trailblazer and Striker Airman Coders. Striker Pathfinder provides
officers an in-depth view of strategic studies from various academic
institutions such as Harvard University, Missouri State University,
AFIT and more. This program exposes officers to a wide variety of staff
functions and provides unique developmental opportunities at National
Labs, units across the USAF and USN, and the National Capital Region
for exposure to strategic level and national leadership, academic
forums, and allied foreign nations for exposure to the broader
implications of the AFGSC mission.
Striker Titan is an enlisted professional development program
allowing NCOs to see a broad perspective of the Air Force's long-range
precision nuclear and conventional strike capabilities, how other
agencies integrate into the mission, and strategic/nuclear educational
opportunities. Titans receive leadership development and mentorship
through assigned Chief Master Sergeant mentors at their bases and
regularly interface with the Command Chief. They receive similar
exposure as Striker Pathfinder, traveling widely and seeing firsthand
the scope of the nuclear enterprise.
Striker Trailblazer provides civilian members with a 1-year
deliberate developmental opportunity consisting of strategic
deterrence, leadership education, professional development, and
experiential TDYs. The Trailblazers remain assigned to their current
duty location, and receive developmental education accomplished through
periodic learning opportunities every 5 weeks. At the end of the
program, Striker Trailblazers gain a solid foundation and understanding
of the nuclear enterprise, ultimately promoting effective advocacy for
the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise.
We formed Striker Airmen Coders to recognize the innovation of our
airmen and provide them with opportunities to gain state-of-the-art
technical skills in areas such as software coding, data analytics, and
artificial intelligence through the online Air Force Digital
University. Last, we have collaborated with the United States Navy
(USN) to form the Striker Trident Exchange program, targeting nuclear
operators at the O-3 level. The program aims to provide a greater
breadth and depth of experience for future planners and leaders in the
nuclear deterrence mission. These rigorous programs allow our interns
to gain a broad perspective on senior leader decisionmaking and provide
them the opportunity to accomplish developmental and experiential
education.
Fostering a culture of diversity, equity, inclusion and
accessibility for all Strikers ensures we retain the best, brightest,
and most talented airmen. We are on the right path moving forward, but
we know there is always more work to do. In 2021, AFGSC secured
training resources for diversity and inclusion through numerous
universities and forums. In addition, we instituted Barrier Analysis
Working Groups (BAWGs) to identify and eliminate existing barriers and
to create opportunities within the civilian and military workforce
regardless of race, ethnic background, gender and disabilities.
The Command has taken the negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic
and molded them into positive outcomes. Our Strikers are innovative and
found ways to ensure our mission continued seamlessly in the face of
challenges. The Missile Wings adopted a squadron deployment construct
where each missile squadron deploys to the field 1 week at a time. When
COVID-19 prevented travel, our team stood up a Mobile Training Team to
conduct and complete annual assessments. Resiliency within our Wings
remains a focus as we navigate our return to normalcy following COVID.
However, we must ensure we introduce and integrate airmen assessed
during the pandemic to pre-COVID in-person processes. We will continue
leveraging technology to ensure mission accomplishment as we transition
from remote work to increasingly in-person operations. Our Strikers
have revised how we operate as needed to ensure we emerged from this
pandemic more flexible and adaptable than before.
mission
Most AFGSC Strikers serve within two numbered Air Forces, 8th AF
and 20th AF. The 8th houses our bomber aircraft, and the 20th AF is the
home of our Minuteman III ICBM forces, including the future Sentinel
community. Both numbered Air Forces also have the all-important support
aspects that keep our missions running smoothly. The Strikers of 20th
Air Force continue to operate and maintain the Minuteman III and defend
the nation--providing strategic deterrence and standing ready to
respond at a moment's notice. For more than 50 years, the Minuteman III
has been on nuclear alert 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and 365 days a
year. Strikers met the evolving challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic
head-on and maintained the highest readiness levels across the entire
Department of Defense (DOD). Minuteman III maintainers keep this aging
weapon system on 24/7 alert, performing 599 major maintenance actions,
covering 17.2-million miles traveled across gravel roads and
interstates in Montana, North Dakota, Colorado, Nebraska and Wyoming.
Defenders and helicopter aircrew continue to secure the weapon
system across an Area of Responsibility geographically larger than
South Carolina. In coordination with our teammates at the Department of
Energy and the numerous local law enforcement agencies, our airmen
conducted 292 safe, secure, and effective weapons convoys.
Additionally, the 576th Flight Test Squadron conducted nine operational
tests on the Minuteman III weapon system in 2021, including two
operational test launches from Vandenberg Space Force Base. Every
minute of every day, the men and women of 20th AF keep watch over the
United States, ensuring we are always ready to defend the Nation and
our allies.
Current operations in 8th Air Force are equally high-paced. In
2021, AFGSC bombers successfully executed ten deployments, 18 CONUS-to-
CONUS missions, and seven cross-combatant command missions. We
accomplished this in concert with the divestiture of 17 B-1Bs and the
maintenance stand-downs of B-1 and B-2 platforms in the summer and fall
of 2021. Missions were flown during all 12 months, and our bombers
integrated with 29 NATO allied countries, five European partner
nations, and seven Middle Eastern partners. We also conducted our first
ever bomber deployment to Norway while B-1s became the first American
bomber to land in India in over 75 years.
Bomber Task Forces (BTF) missions are currently integrating the 4-
Bin Force Generation Model and the Agile Combat Employment (ACE)
concept to achieve Combatant Commander and Chief of Staff of the Air
Force (CSAF) objectives. After 30 years of continuous combat
deployments to the Middle East, adopting the 4-Bin Model enables the
Air Force to present combat-ready forces in a predictable and
sustainable manner that supports the 2022 National Defense Strategy. In
addition, with the global footprint reduction, adversarial
technological advances in intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance and all-domain long-range fires have placed traditional
air bases at significantly increased risk. ACE provides a proactive and
reactive operational scheme of maneuver executed within threat
timelines to increase survivability while generating combat power.
AFGSC is partnering with our overseas major commands to accomplish
multiple site surveys of airfields and air bases around the world to
determine their suitability to support bomber operations. During Fiscal
Year 2022, the Command will serve five potential operating locations on
four separate continents to enable ACE. Ongoing planning between
Combatant Commands will allow bombers more flexibility with smaller
deployment footprints.
Given the magnitude of their mission to secure two-thirds of the
Nation's nuclear triad, twenty-five percent of all Air Force Security
Forces are assigned to AFGSC. At present, AFGSC has 53 Joint
Lightweight Tactical Vehicles (JLTV) awaiting installation of mission
support equipment with delivery to AFGSC installations in early Fiscal
Year 2023. The arrival of the new JLTVs will address the current
fleet's shortfalls and will enhance the security of AFGSC's strategic
resources. In a parallel move, AFGSC recognized the need for a mixed
fleet of armored vehicles to sufficiently support the unique operating
environments and varying mission sets across AFGSC. The addition of a
lighter tactical suite of vehicles allows commanders the ability to
tailor their responses to an incident while ensuring the safety of
Defenders across AFGSC. Our Nation charges us to maintain a safe,
secure, and reliable nuclear triad. The importance of this mission
cannot be overstated, so we must modernize our strategic forces while
we conduct our daily operations.
balancing sustainment & modernization
We are at a pivotal moment in U.S. history facing a critical
choice: modernize our nuclear force or allow our Nation to lose its
strategic advantage. Our conventional and nuclear platforms are as
relevant as ever, but lifecycles dictate the need to modernize and
ensure we continue to be effective and lethal. Over the next decade,
delays in modernization program timelines and programs that do not meet
expectations will put our Nation's security at risk. Moreover, there
are no allied bomber forces or allied ICBM forces to rely upon--the
free world's ability to hold potential adversaries at bay with two-
thirds of the triad rests on our shoulders.
AFGSC is currently undertaking one of the largest nuclear
modernization efforts in our Nation's history. However, we must balance
our modernization efforts with maintaining the lethality and
effectiveness of our current conventional and nuclear forces until
replacements can arrive. Until Sentinel and B-21 are fully
operationally capable, Minuteman III, B-1, and B-2 sustainment must
continue. This balance between no-fail sustainment and on-cost, on-
schedule modernization is the primary focus of my headquarters.
Minuteman III remains an effective deterrent in the near term as we
begin preparations for its replacement, Sentinel. Sentinel bed-down
preparations have commenced this year with the Re-entry Vehicle
Maintenance Facility and the Stage Processing Facility MILCON projects
at Vandenberg Space Force Base to support Sentinel flight tests. Since
2017, Sentinel has consistently met all acquisition milestones as we
approach the first flight test in the next 16 to 18 months.
AFGSC continually updates the Bomber Roadmap, reflecting current
conditions, ensuring continued support to operational plans while
transitioning from a three-bomber fleet to a two-bomber fleet of B-52s
and B-21s. The effective and on-time modernization of the B-52 while we
sustain a sufficient number of B-1s and B-2s will be critical until an
adequate number of B-21s are available. Continued B-52 effectiveness
and lethality are dependent upon the completion of the Commercial
Engine Replacement (CERP) and the Radar Modernization programs.
B-52 CERP is a top priority and replaces the aging and obsolete
TF33-PW-103 (TF33) engines with Rolls Royce F130 turbofans. Legacy TF33
engines, fabricated six decades ago, do not meet current environmental
emissions regulations and standards. Retrofitting modern engines on the
B-52 embraces the tenets of an aggressive, clean energy transformation
posture by tremendously reducing the carbon and noise footprints of the
aircraft. Furthermore, a newer engine significantly reduces the
emissions of unburned hydrocarbons, carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxides,
and smoke numbers. In addition to the air pollutants emitted by the
TF33 engine, its noise pollution fails to meet International Civil
Aviation Organization standards.
Without re-engining the B-52, we put the backbone of our bomber
forces at risk. The costs of sustaining the current engine are
enormous, and there are no further options for finding parts due to
vendors that are no longer in the business of producing parts for this
70+ year-old aircraft. We cannot sustain the TF33 engine for the
expected future life of the B-52, which makes our CERP modernization
effort much more critical. CERP is transitioning from Middle Tier
Acquisition to a Major Capability Acquisition this year. It will
complete Preliminary Design Review and issue a Development Request for
Proposal, with a milestone B target date of May 2023.
Concurrently, the B-52 Radar Modernization program will
dramatically improve B-52 lethality. The system will exponentially
increase B-52 radar reliability, provide more precise navigation
solutions, offer the ability to detect and track moving targets, and
perform all-weather self-targeting. The radar program reached Milestone
B in June 2021 and will complete the first install in 2023.
We are committed to protecting requirements and funding stability
on the baseline acquisition program for both the Sentinel and the B-21
Raider. Since the B-21 program's inception, the top-level key system
attributes and key performance parameters have remained unchanged. The
Air Force awarded the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD)
contract in 2016. Since then, the B-21 program has remained under
acquisition program baseline (APB) target costs and within its APB
target schedule for both the start of production and required assets
available for initial operational capability. The next major milestones
for the program are the first flight and the beginning of low rate
initial production. Leveraging modular systems and open standards, as
we have done with the B-21 will enable us to have a technology that
matures naturally through continuous upgrades.
In the calendar year 2021, the Acting Secretary of the Air Force
confirmed Ellsworth AFB as the first B-21 Main Operating Base.
Ellsworth has not hosted a stealth or nuclear mission since the early
1990's when the B-1B was still nuclear capable. Military construction
at Ellsworth is on the critical path to B-21 nuclear certification. The
Air Force needs the facilities and workforce at Ellsworth to support
the nuclear deterrence mission and meet USSTRATCOM requirements. The
Air Force will work to integrate the capabilities that underpin nuclear
certification into future budget requests.
Last calendar year, the Joint Staff approved an enduring Capability
Development Document (CDD) for the B-21. This enduring CDD paves the
way for a proactive and streamlined B-21 modernization process, which
starts in parallel to EMD, to mature and then rapidly integrate
advanced capabilities at the earliest opportunity. The enduring CDD
coupled with B-21's open architecture design, built-in growth margin,
and the Air Force's decision to procure technical data rights during
EMD will keep this platform relevant, affordable and adaptable as the
threat picture and mission set evolve. The initial B-1 divestiture of
17 B-1s was completed on 23 September 2021, a week ahead of the
congressional deadline. All divested aircraft selected for storage are
now in the 309th Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group following
standard practices. Other locations and agencies supporting various B-1
test and evaluation programs received the remaining divested aircraft.
Safe and secure nuclear storage and maintenance are the cornerstone
of Air Force nuclear generation capabilities and remain a high priority
for the greater nuclear modernization effort. However, AFGSC operations
currently rely on 1960's and 1970's era Weapons Storage Areas (WSAs)
that have exceeded their designed service lives. With the on-going B-
21, Sentinel, LRSO, and B61-12 programs, these new and modern weapon
systems drive a need to diversify our assets and locations. To meet
this need, the command is working to recapitalize our weapons storage
and maintenance capacity by consolidating weapons storage, maintenance,
and generation operations at select installations into newly
constructed Weapons Generation Facilities (WGFs). WGFs eliminate
exposure of nuclear assets to outside environmental elements and
external observation, thus significantly increasing both maintenance
capability and security. In addition, the WGF's design ultimately
provides greater security features and operational flexibility than all
current WSAs.
The first WGF construction project is underway at F.E. Warren Air
Force Base, followed by construction at Malmstrom and Barksdale Air
Force Bases. The command synchronized the B-21 WGF construction with
the B-21 fielding locations and timelines to provide certified
facilities to support B-21 full operational capability target dates.
Conceptually, the ICBM and bomber WGFs are similar, consisting of a
hardened facility envelope containing all storage, maintenance, and
generation functions. Recapitalizing the WGFs for the safety and
security of weapons remains a pressing priority for the Air Force, as
the aging infrastructure is operating well beyond designed life and
outside of modern safety and security requirements. While many factors
influence WGF costs, every effort is underway to ensure efficient and
fiscally responsible facilities that will deliver increased capability
for maintenance, storage, and generation of our Nation's nuclear
arsenal.
The UH-1N Replacement Program was born out of the Air Force Common
Vertical Lift Support Platform. The CSAF signed the UH-1N Replacement
Program Capabilities Production Document on 3 May 2016, and the VCJCS
signed the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Memo on 22 Jun
2016. Congressional and OSD guidance was for full and open competition
``utilizing the robust American helicopter industry.'' As a result, the
USAF awarded the contract to Boeing-Leonardo in 2018 to provide up to
84 MH-139A helicopters at a program cost of $2.38B, resulting in a
$1.7B savings to the taxpayer compared to the program's initial
Independent Cost Estimate. The USAF received the first four MH-139A Air
Vehicles between December 2019 and March 2020.
The MH-139A is a military commercial derivative aircraft and
airworthiness certification relies heavily on civil certifications
issued by the FAA. The program has faced some challenges recently,
including delays for elements of the FAA certification known as
Supplemental Type Certifications (STC). STC delays directly affected
the completion of the initial Developmental Test and Evaluation, which
is a prerequisite to the arrival of aircraft to Malmstrom AFB, the
first operational base, now projected to be the end of Fiscal Year
2023. However, Initial Operational Test and Evaluation will continue
into Fiscal Year 2024, which will allow for Full-Rate Production,
Required Assets Available and Initial Operational Capability in Fiscal
Year 2025.
AFGSC continues to transition from a legacy to a modern NC3
enterprise. The Air Force has begun recapitalizing the aging E-4B with
the Survivable Airborne Operations Center (SAOC) program. The E-4B is a
vital link in the National Military Command System, providing NC3 and
C2 of the triad. To fund the program through the FYDP, the SAOC program
has received funding from the OSD Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation for $5.36 billion. AFGSC authored an Air Force validated
SAOC Capabilities Development Document that gained JROC validation in
March 2022.
The Air Force continues to refine the SAOC acquisition strategy,
leveraging modernization opportunities, open system architecture, and
digital engineering to reduce overall program costs. The SAOC will
achieve Full Operational Capability in the early to mid-2030's. While
AFGSC leads one of the Nation's largest nuclear modernization efforts
in decades, we must also maintain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear
triad. As the Air Component to USSTRATCOM, and as stewards of two-
thirds of the nuclear triad, we must employ a specific and strategic
approach to modernize our capabilities in the face of 21st century
global competition. Our command is committed to delivering improved
weapon systems as efficiently and affordably as possible by pursuing
mature technologies, stabilizing requirements, and owning the technical
baseline of our weapons systems--a formula that has proven successful
in our acquisition efforts thus far.
nuclear weapons stockpile
While today's stockpile is safe, secure and effective, we cannot
allow the reliability or performance of the bedrock of our national
security to degrade. We are at a point where we are modernizing
delivery platforms, weapons, and supporting infrastructure
simultaneously, and our ability to properly modernize hinges not only
on DOD program execution, but also on our partners at the Department of
Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).
The NNSA plays a critical role in modernizing the nuclear security
enterprise, including the recapitalization of our pit production
infrastructure. Prioritizing essential NNSA infrastructure and
modernization programs of record is a national imperative and
fundamental to safeguarding our deterrent force. Any delay in stockpile
modernization will have a cascading effect on the schedule. NNSA is
cognizant of the fact that a faster, more comprehensive overhaul is
necessary to maintain schedule alignment. Significant investments are
being undertaken in recapitalizing infrastructure to build resiliency
and re-establishing production capabilities lost in the post-cold war
period and require sustained funding from Congress to complete in a
timely manner.
As we shift attention from life extension efforts to modernizing
our remaining weapons, we must identify and overcome any obstacles that
could delay program execution. Understanding stockpile modernization
programs take many years to fully execute, it is critical that we find
avenues to reduce these timelines. Failure to do so will increase the
operational risk to Sentinel and other major modernization efforts,
putting our nuclear deterrent force at risk.
wind farm encroachment
As our country expands its energy resilience through the
development of various alternative energy sources, the dramatic growth
in the wind energy sector has created unanticipated challenges for ICBM
security. Since the deployment of Minuteman III, a 1,200-foot easement
around all missile launch and alert facilities has helped keep
structures at a minimum safe distance from private and commercial
encroachment. However, when we fielded Minuteman III 50 years ago, we
did not foresee wind turbines would 1 day share the same operational
space as our ICBMs. Unfortunately, some wind turbines create a
significant mission impact on helicopter and security operations. At
present, existing wind turbines at 46 launch and missile alert
facilities across our three missile wings affect flight safety and
security operations.
Helicopter operations form an integral part of day-to-day security
operations and security incident response within the ICBM complexes.
Wind turbines near these facilities interfere with security operations
by restricting helicopter approach avenues, limiting turning radius,
severely affecting air-to-ground security response integration, and
creating hazards for infiltration and exfiltration of responding
forces. These activities are all necessary components that ensure the
security of ICBM operations and vital national assets. The construction
of wind turbines within a two nautical mile radius of launch and alert
facilities poses a tremendous risk to helicopter and security
operations, is exacerbated by the weather, time of day, and lighting
conditions, places aircrew and facility personnel at greater risk, and
extends security response time in critical situations.
We fully support renewable energy initiatives to ensure energy
security for our Nation. AFGSC works closely with DOD's Military
Aviation and the Installation Assurance Siting Clearinghouse and is
engaged with multiple energy developers as we look for collaborative
solutions to existing and proposed wind turbine projects. In addition,
Strikers at our ICBM wings and 20th Air Force have met with local
legislators and spoken with wind energy developers to explain the risks
to our mission and people imposed by the construction of wind farms
within a two nautical mile radius of these launch and alert facilities.
conclusion
Today we face competitors who have the ability to escalate conflict
across the globe in any domain and at any time. We as a Nation have not
faced this reality at any point in history, and our approach must be
continually adapted as the strategic environment evolves. We appreciate
our partnership with the defense Committees and across the entire
defense enterprise to ensure the continued protection of our Homeland.
AFGSC is the home of nuclear and conventional long-range precision
strike for the United States and the free world. We continue to sustain
legacy systems while modernizing our force to meet the challenges
inherent in an increasingly complex global security environment. Our
airmen, the very core of our mission, ensure we provide safe, secure
and lethal combat-ready forces to the Combatant Commanders. It is
because of our people, we are always ready to provide long-range
conventional or nuclear precision strike anytime, anywhere.
Senator King. Thank you all, and I want to address a
question to our general and our admiral, and advise you that
what we are looking for at this Committee is your best military
judgment, not an answer that is tailored to the desires of any
particular administration.
Two changes in the Nuclear Posture Review. One is the
elimination of the sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM), and the
other is the elimination of the B-83-1, the heavy gravity bomb.
Admiral, let's talk about Ukraine and the threat that we
are all aware of, of Putin using tactical nuclear weapons. Are
we making a mistake by cancelling the sea-launched cruise
missile, which gives us a comparable tactical weapon in
response to potential use? I worry that we could be in a
situation where it is mutually assured destruction or no
response. Give me your thoughts on the cancellation of the sea-
launched cruise missile.
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, Senator, thanks for the question. So
here is what would say. Sir, I would tell you that in my
position I do not advise on requirements to USSTRATCOM [United
States Strategic Command] nor do I advise OSD on policy, or the
Administration. As the acquisition lead, my job actually is to
execute any program that the Administration and the
Department----
Senator King. Yeah, you are the customer. I want to know
what you think you need.
Admiral Wolfe. Actually I am not the customer, sir.
USSTRATCOM is the customer. I am the acquisition leg that once
STRATCOM requests their requirements and once policy decides
what it is we are going to execute, I actually execute those
programs as they Navy's acquisition lead and technical lead on
how we would meet those requirements.
Senator King. So you do not want to express an opinion on
the cancellation of this weapon system.
Admiral Wolfe. Sir, my personal opinion would not be
something that I would want to share, because again, that is
not my role in the United States Navy of advising either one of
those organizations on either policy or requirements.
Senator King. General Cotton, are you going to give me the
same answer on the B-83-1, or do you have a military opinion as
to whether we need a bunker-buster of that nature?
General Cotton. Senator King, what I would tell you, as the
Joint Forces Air Component Commander to STRATCOM----
Senator King. Could you speak up a little, General?
General Cotton. As the Joint Forces Air Component Commander
to the Commander of STRATCOM, what I would like to do is, I
would be able to present him with a portfolio of weapon systems
of which he can choose. So if that is not in the portfolio,
then that is one weapon system that he would be able to choose
for planning purposes.
Senator King. I think we are going to have to have a
different set of generals and admirals.
[Laughter.]
I understand. I am not criticizing you all but I am trying
to get at an important policy question, and if you are not the
right people to answer then we will have to have another
hearing to try to get at that question.
Admiral Wolfe, how are we doing on the development of the
Columbia-class? For example, have they solved the missile
encasement issue, the welding issue that was slowing things
down some time ago?
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. I would tell you the Columbia
program is moving forward. They remain on schedule. To your
specific question about the welding issues that we saw early on
with the missile tubes, they have made progress. Those tubes
are coming out as we predicted. The amount of rework that is
required on those tubes continues to go down, and Admiral Scott
Pappano, who is PEO SSBN, continues to push that program
forward. Yes, sir.
Senator King. General Cotton, a similar question. You are
going to be engaged in an enormous project in developing the
new ground-based deterrent. Give me a picture of where that
project stands, what the progress is, and what the calendar
looks like.
General Cotton. Thanks for the question, Chairman. I am
happy to say that GBSD [ground based strategic deterrent], now
known as Sentinel for the weapon system, is in a really, really
good place. So I will say it is a mega-project. It is a mega-
project. So I do not want to overstate the fact that what we
are talking about is not just the replacement of a missile. We
are talking about the replacement of the entire weapon system,
the Minuteman weapon system.
The good news is F.E. Warren is the first base that we have
already started to break ground in regards of what we are doing
for F.E. Warren, Francis E. Warren in Cheyenne, Wyoming.
Everything is on time, on schedule. I am not concerned of what
we are seeing right now in regard to the program. The prime
contractor is doing a tremendous job in regard to using digital
engineering, as far as using open mission systems, as far as
digital twins, that they are actually using from the B-21
program as well, and being able to carve out some of the best
practices seen there.
So I think we are in a really, really good place, sir.
Senator King. Are original budget--not original, but are
recent budget estimates holding up?
General Cotton. It is, sir. So it is on time and on
schedule and on budget at this point. I am very happy about
that.
Senator King. Thank you, General. Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
thank all of you gentlemen for the work that you do each and
every day, and please thank those that work with you on this.
You keep our country safe and you keep our allies safe and
secure as well.
I am going to give it a shot, what the chairman tried to
do. Admiral, I think we know that Admiral Richard, the
combatant commander at STRATCOM, has been very forthright in
speaking about a deterrence gap and being able to provide his
job of providing the President with options that would be at
his disposal to counter or to address the threats that we face
as a country. He has been supportive of the option of SLCM. You
are aware of that, sir, right?
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, ma'am, I am aware of that.
Senator Fischer. I will not put you in a bad spot. General
Cotton, I will save that for you. You and I had a conversation
this morning and I think you answered the chairman in saying
that those options are valuable for any commander in chief to
have at their disposal in making wise decisions on the defense
of our security. Would you agree with that?
General Cotton. Yes, ma'am, I would.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you. Admiral Richard talks
about that deterrence gap and assurance gap, and General
Cotton, this morning you were visiting with me about our
deterrent and stressing how important it was to have a credible
deterrent. I appreciate your emphasis on that, because that
really boils it down to being able to have those options for
our commander in chief so that he or she can make wise
decisions. So I am going to steal that ``credible deterrent''
from you for the rest of my time here in the United States
Senate.
General, you know that I am an advocate for recapitalizing
our E-4B fleet, and I was very glad to see the Air Force's
budget significant resources to developing a replacement. This
is an issue that has been studied well over a decade, and the
challenges of maintaining an outdated airframe are only getting
harder as time passes.
Can you talk about the Air Force's plan to replace the E-4B
with the Survivable Airborne Operations Center (SAOC) and give
your perspective on how important it is that we replace that
system?
General Cotton. Senator Fischer, that you for the question.
It is absolutely critical. As you know, the National Airborne
Operations Center, of which the E-4B, the airframe is an older
airframe, of which we only have four. Based out of Omaha,
Nebraska, now at Lincoln, Nebraska, until the runway is
completed. Incredible men and women that fly that mission every
single day.
I am happy to say I think we are in a pretty good place on
where we are going to move forward in regard to SAOC, its
replacement. I know that it has just recently went through a
JROC [Joint Requirements Oversight Council], as we had kind of
restudied what the requirements are. I am happy with the
adjustments to the requirements. I think the final product of
what we are going to see as far as fleet size is going to be
very manageable for the President, for the Secretary, as well
as the Chairman, moving forward. So I think we are in a very
good place in regard of what we are going to see for the SEOC,
ma'am.
Senator Fischer. Great. It is a good mission that we have
there at Offutt. When the runway is completed there at Offutt I
know that in the future that is an opportunity that we have to
expand that mission right there at Offutt Air Force Base as
well. So I look forward to working with you on that.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, the $63 million for
Minuteman-III sustainment on the Air Force's list of unfunded
mandates, that $63 million. Can you talk about the importance
of sustaining the Minuteman-III, both the system and the
facilities, and how that helps reduce risk associated with
transitioning to the Sentinel?
General Cotton. Thank you for the question, Senator. What
is very unique is where we are with the nuclear portfolio.
Where we are with the nuclear portfolio is we are going to have
to maintain our legacy systems until we transition into the
new. So that being said, I need to make sure that I have a
safe, secure, effective, and credible legacy weapon system as
we transition into Sentinel, and that is what the sustainment
request is in regard of making sure that we sustain our legacy
system, known as the Minuteman-III. We just celebrated its 50-
plus years on alert.
So by able to do that, we are safeguarding, as a bedrock
the for the nation, for our allies and our partners to
understand that they have a credible deterrent, one that is
still safe, secure, and effective, until we get to the full
transition of GBSD Sentinel in the 2036 time frame.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Dr. Adams, not so long ago I visited Oak
Ridge and I came away with two impressions. The people are
fantastic. The facilities are pretty tired, and we using, I
understand, manufacturing capabilities that literally go back
to the 1940s. As we move into these major, new projects and the
upgrade across the nuclear enterprise, are there plans afoot,
and are there activities underway to modernize the
manufacturing process at places like Oak Ridge and Los Alamos?
Mr. Adams. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman King, for the
question. The short answer is yes, we are working on that. The
more nuanced answer is we have processes that we know work.
They are qualified. They are proven. They produce the product
that we know we need. In many cases that product was a warhead
that was tested underground.
If you change a process to one that, by all measures, looks
better, there is a stringent quality standard and certification
standard that has to be met, and we have to convince ourselves
and skeptical observers that this thing will still work if it
we make it a different way.
We are doing that, though. We are doing that work to
convince ourselves that these things will still work when we
make them different ways that are more efficient and that will
ultimately give us a greater capacity.
Senator King. This is one of the collateral effects of not
being able to test. We have to be sure, as you say, that what
we are doing, even though it may be a more modern manufacturing
capability, will produce equivalent quality results, and that
is the direction you are moving in.
Mr. Adams. That is the direction we are going.
Senator King. General Cotton, in the fiscal year 2021
National Defense Authorization Act we required that the new B-
21 be capable of hosting a long-range standoff missile to
replace the 1980s cruise missile. Is that still in the planning
stages? Is that part of a requirement that you accept as part
of the B-21 process?
General Cotton. So as you mention, as LRSO comes online, of
which you mentioned, for the air launch cruise missile
replacement, it will be a threshold weapon on the B-52 as well
as, since we are going to a two-bomber fleet, as well as have
its capability on the B-21 down the road as well.
Senator King. I have had several classified meetings on the
status of the B-21 process. In an unclassified setting can you
give me a bird's eye view? Are we still making good progress,
still on budget, and do you feel confident about that process?
General Cotton. Sir, I think it is a model acquisition
program for the Department. What we are doing and where it is,
it is on time. I would love to host you to a couple of
facilities so you can kick the tires yourself and see what is
happening in regard to its development. I am very satisfied
with where we on the progress of the B-21 program. It is on
time and on budget.
Senator King. One additional question on the B-21 and that
is, to what extent are we developing good estimates, solid
recognition of sustainment costs? As you know, one of the
problems with the F-35 has turned out to be very high
sustainment costs into the indefinite future. Is that a factor
in the design and manufacture and contractual relations that
are part of the B-21?
General Cotton. Absolutely, sir. So we looked to see what
kind of did not work there and tried to eliminate all of those
for the B-21 program. One is the fact that the modern
technologies that we are seeing in the development of this
platform, even when compared to how the B-2 was designed,
everything is kind of captured in the new, modern ways of how
our acquisition partners are developing this platform. So we
took all of that into consideration so we would not restage
into the past. So that was all taken into consideration for the
B-21 program, and I am very satisfied that we will not replow
that ground, on what you are talking about with the other
weapon systems.
Senator King. With the concurrence of my co-chair I am
going to cede myself an extra minute. Senator Fischer, you will
get it too, yes.
Question for both the admiral and the general, and that is,
intellectual property with regard to the B-21 and the Columbia.
To what extent will the Department of Defense own the
intellectual property so that in the future we can 3D print or
otherwise acquire parts rather than having to go through the
OEM process? I foresee a day, and hope there is a day when
every depot, every hangar, every military facility has its own
3D printing capability, which would be an enormous availability
boost. So are we buying the intellectual property on those two
programs to the extent that we will be able to create our own
parts without having to go back through the manufacturer?
General?
General Cotton. Chairman King, I am glad you asked that
question. That is what makes us very, very proud of the B-21
program. We own the baseline. We own the baseline. So what that
does for us, it gives us open architecture. It allows us,
understanding that we are designing a weapon system that is
going to last for decades, that you can, by having open
architecture and owning the baseline, that you do not have to
kind of re-haggle, if you will, to do some improvements as the
weapon system progresses in its timeline.
So I am happy to say that yes, we do own the operational
baseline for the B-21.
Senator King. Excellent. Thank you. Admiral, how about
Columbia?
Admiral Wolfe. Sir, although I do not know to the level of
how much IP is actually owned, because again, that is not in my
portfolio, but let me answer it in a different way because I
think your question about are we able to get the data that we
need to 3D print and do some of that stuff, I would tell you
already in the United States Navy and in the Submarine Service
we are to the point where we are starting to use 3D printing
and we are starting to understand what is available to all of
our depot facilities and even to our individual platforms to be
able to do that type of real-time maintenance that I think you
are really getting at.
So I would like to take a question for the record on the
actual amount of IP that we are going to own for Columbia. But
we are getting after that in many areas.
Senator King. I think that ought to be the standard for
whenever we are buying something, we get the IP along with the
platform.
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. I would tell you, in the strategic
program that I do manage, back to what General Cotton said, it
is the same way. We do own the technical baseline. As a matter
of fact, in our program we are the systems integrator. So we do
not have a separate entity that does all of the system
integration for the entire system. That is the U.S. Navy and
that is our program.
Senator King. Good. Thank you. Thank you very much. Senator
Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Cotton,
earlier today we spoke about the importance of modernizing the
B-52, in particular the CERP [Commercial Engine Replacement],
the engine replacement, and the radar modernization programs.
It is my understanding the Air Force has changed its
acquisition structure for the re-engineering effort. How
confident are you that we will be able to complete that project
on time?
General Cotton. Ma'am, I am very confident. Thank you for
the question. What is unique about the program is what I am
seeing from the prime. As you know, we have just let that
contract for the engine replacement for the B-52, the Civilian
Engine Replacement Program, known as CERP, and Rolls-Royce was
awarded that contract.
The integration efforts that we are already beginning to
see with our contractor, Boeing, on being able to integrate
that engine as well as the other upgrades that will come along
with that engine upgrade is short of fantastic. You probably
have even seen on the news where we were able to take a bird
from the boneyard. They actually split it in half, from nose to
tail, and kept the left side of the jet. It is in a warehouse
in Tinker right now, where they can form-fit as they do
integration with--no kidding--a jet. So that is the innovative
thinking that they are thinking through, because even using 3D
technology on your computer does not replace having an airman
or a maintainer kind of say, ``Hey, engineer, that is probably
not the right place to put that component, because now I do not
have access to it,'' as they are doing the integration piece.
So I am very, very satisfied in what I am seeing with the CERP
program.
You also mentioned the radar modernization program. Radar
modernization program is also going to be very, very
instrumental for the B-52 as it gets at some of our faults that
we see in our radar systems currently and upgrades the radar
system there.
I would like to talk a little bit about CERP, if you do not
mind, on what it brings to the fight.
Senator Fischer. Can I first ask you a question about the
radar system that you are modernizing?
General Cotton. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. I do not know if you can discuss it in an
unclassified setting, but can you share the mean time between
failure for the current radar system?
General Cotton. Yes. It should around 300 and it is sitting
around 46 right now.
Senator Fischer. Okay, and then if you want to just do
briefly on CERP so I can ask the admiral and Mr. Adams
questions as well.
General Cotton. Well, part of the two-bomber fleet that we
are going to have here in the United States Air Force with the
B-21 and the B-52, the B-52 is going to be a formidable
standoff, long-range strike weapon through 2050, and I am very
confident, as much as folks talk about the B-52 and its age,
once we do this upgrade she is going to be a very formidable
weapon system through 2050.
I am really looking forward. I just need to make sure that
the funding stays steady so we can get that done, because the
limiting factor for the B-52 is its current engines that are
sitting on it right now. So we must replace the engines on the
B-52. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Fischer. Good. It is important to know that we not
only stay on schedule but the funding, like you said, is steady
and we do not see the peaks and valley. Thank you.
Admiral Wolfe, thank you for everything that you, as I said
earlier, that you do and that your team does. I would like to
revisit some of our discussion yesterday about your life
extension efforts with the LE2, for the Trident missile. Can
you talk about how reductions to the program increase long-term
risk and make your ability to meet the delivery date more
challenging?
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, Senator. Thank you for the question. I
will expand a little bit to our discussion from yesterday.
Every time we do not get budgeted to our request we have a
very tight timeline. We understand the technologies that not
only we need to re-invigorate today to make sure that our
system and LE2 gets to where we need to get but there are also
technologies that we need to develop. Because as we all talked
about, our strategic competitors have changed--we have gone
from one to two--how we look at these systems, some of the
requirements that we talked about.
Every time that we take a decrement it causes us to either
give up on a technology, which means we are going to rely on
something that is not going to be cutting edge because we have
got to maintain schedule, because we are very tight in making
sure that we continue to support our portion of the triad, or
we push that, when then reduces the amount of time we have to
really develop that technology, develop the workforce to
understand that.
So the most important thing to us is keeping the stability
so that we can stay on schedule, we can develop the
technologies to meet not just today's requirement but where we
need to be in the future as we continue to watch things evolve.
Senator Fischer. We certainly do not want to underfund
these programs and have it end up like a lot of modernization
programs that we are looking at right now, where there is no
room. There is no room for delay, and we all know that things
can happen that would put production into delaying situation,
and I certainly do not want it to be because we have not funded
at the proper levels. So thank you.
Mr. Adams, we have focused primarily on plutonium pit
production over the last few years. Can you update on NNSA's
other challenges with respect to strategic materials and
discuss what you see as the next major challenge after pit
production?
Mr. Adams. Thank you for the question, Senator Fischer. I
do not know that I would say ``after'' because we have to do
these things simultaneously. So the lithium facility at Y-12
comes to mind. Of course, we have to finish the uranium
processing facility. There is a tritium facility that is needed
at Savannah River. There are high-explosive facilities that are
needed at Pantex. All of these things are underway. They are
all in flight now, and we have to have all of them in order to
do the modernization work that we are asked to do, and deliver
the warheads that DOD needs.
Senator Fischer. When we look at the expansion, I believe
it is production at the TVA's Watts Bar Unit 2. Is that
expansion going to be sufficient to meet our long-term needs?
Mr. Adams. Thank you for that question. That is where we
make our tritium. It is actually Watts Bar Unit 1 and Unit 2
now. We have both of those going. We put 1,792 tritium-
producing, burnable absorber rods in each core. We can go up to
that much at this point, and that will meet the needs of the
program for tritium as long as there are not serious
interruptions.
We have a good thing going. We have demonstrated all the
way through the extraction at Savannah River and the placement
of the tritium into gas transfer systems. My view is that that
program is doing a great job right now. We could use more
margin, and our team is now looking at putting more burnable
absorber rods in each of those cores in Unit 1 and Unit 2. We
are looking at licensing amendments that would allow that in
case we need it later.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Senator King. I want to thank all of our witnesses. This
has been a very informative hearing. I appreciate the testimony
both from our first panel and our second panel, the answer to
our questions. Thank you very much. We looking forward to
continuing to work with you on these important topics.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6:01 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]
APPENDIX
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023 AND THE FUTURE YEARS
DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 11, 2022
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES SPACE FORCE PROGRAMS
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:37 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Angus
King (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators King, Kelly, Fischer,
Cotton, Rounds, Cramer, and Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS KING
Senator King. I call this hearing of the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services to
order.
I want to thank our witnesses for joining us today before
this Subcommittee and thank you for your service.
The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the fiscal
year 2023 budget of the Space Force, a separate title 10
service, which was recently authorized in the fiscal year 2020
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). For fiscal year
2023, the Space Force budget is $24.5 billion, a $7.1 billion
or 40 percent increase over fiscal year 2022. Of the $7.1
billion, however, $3 billion is for interservice transfers, as
the Space Force assumes satellites and people from the Army and
Navy, and the remaining $4.1 billion is for programmatic
growth, still a 20 percent increase over fiscal year 2022.
I will be looking to hear what is and transferred into the
Space Force, especially with the transfer of uniformed Army and
Navy personnel.
The administration has submitted a proposal for a new
personnel system that would treat the Space Force guardians as
either full- or part-time components. The Reserves would fall
into the part-time component, and I want to know more about
this, given competing proposals for a Space National Guard.
Finally, since the Space Force is a title 10 service, its
purpose is to train and equip guardians to defend our assets in
space, which is now a warfighting domain, given the action of
Russia and China against our satellites. I want to know how our
policy is developing to defend our space assets and, if
necessary, ensure a near-peer adversary space system cannot be
used to help a system attack on our forces on the ground or at
sea during a conflict.
Again, let me thank our witnesses for agreeing to appear
today, and after opening statements, we will have a 5-minute
round of questions to the witnesses.
Senator Fischer?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King.
I join you in welcoming our witnesses. Thank you all for
being here with us today and for the work that you do on behalf
of this Nation.
Dr. Plumb, it is good to see you again. I understand you
will be testifying before this panel again next week. Three
times in a row, that has to be some kind of record. We
appreciate your service, sir, and we look forward to hearing
from you and the other witnesses today about the continued
evolution of the Department's national security space
enterprise.
It has been 2\1/2\ years since the founding of the Space
Force. We welcome the panel's views on what progress has been
made, particularly toward developing an acquisition system that
delivers capabilities on a timeline that is responsive to the
needs of our warfighters and paces the actions of our
adversaries. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Thank you.
Our witnesses today are Mr. Frank Calvelli, Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics; Dr. John Plumb, welcome back, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Space Policy; and General David D. Thompson, Vice
Chief of Space Operations, United States Space Force.
So, Mr. Frank Calvelli?
STATEMENT OF FRANK CALVELLI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR
FORCE FOR SPACE ACQUISITION AND INTEGRATION
Mr. Calvelli. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, it is an honor to
appear before you to discuss the future of Space Acquisition.
Thank you for asking me to testify. I am excited to join the
Department and for this important work to come as we optimize
Space Acquisition.
As you know, we must do more, and quickly, to accelerate
and improve Space Acquisition. Our adversaries are catching up,
or in some cases, exceeding our capabilities. Strong
partnerships between the Department, Congress, and the
commercial industry are critical to outpace China and other
adversaries.
As I step into this new role, I would like to share with
you my initial goals and priorities. These include: one,
driving speed into our acquisitions in order to deliver new
capabilities faster, to outpace our adversaries, and maintain
the technological advantage we get as a Nation from space; two,
making our space architectures are resilient so that it can be
counted on during times of crisis and conflict; three,
integrating our space architecture with other warfighting
domains to give our warfighters a strategic edge; four, driving
program management discipline across our acquisitions in order
to ensure that we deliver new capabilities on schedule, on
cost, and meeting requirements; and five, ensuring that our
space and ground systems come together as a system and that our
ground systems are more readily available before launch to take
advantage of the new capabilities that we just put into space.
I look forward to working with you over the coming months
to continue the strong partnership between the Department and
the Congress to optimize and strengthen Space Acquisition
processes and outcomes. I look forward to your questions. Thank
you.
Senator King. Dr. Plumb?
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN F. PLUMB, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY
Mr. Plumb. Thank you, Chairman King, Ranking Member
Fischer, Members of the Subcommittee.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify today and get my
frequent-flyer miles.
As the first-ever Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
Policy, I am committed to continuing DOD'S close partnership
with Congress on advancing national security space interests.
Space plays a critical role in American security, prosperity,
and way of life. It enables and supports the entire Joint
Force. It helps protect servicemembers in harm's way and it
enables them to execute their mission and defend the Nation.
Space provides indication and warning of emerging threats
and attacks. It delivers the GPS [Global Positioning System]
signals supporting rapid and precise global power projection.
It generates intelligence to allow national decision-makers to
anticipate risks and de-escalate crisis, and it enables those
same decision-makers to command-and-control forces globally.
In the tremendous growth of commercial space, largely due
to U.S. business innovation, it is fueling an increasing
important part of the U.S. economy. The growth of the U.S.
Space Industrial Base affords DOD new opportunities to leverage
commercial advancements to support national security.
Space has, once again, captured the imagination of a new
generation of Americans. This will inspire more students to
pursue careers in the STEM disciplines and that will pay
dividends to our national economy and national security in the
future.
Looking at the threat environment, China and Russia both
seek to increase their military use of space and to exploit the
perceived United States overreliance on space-based systems.
China remains our pacing challenge, as Secretary Austin has
said. They are developing and fielding a wartime space
architecture. China has dramatically increased their quantity
and quality of space and counterspace systems, increasing
ground- and space-based antisatellite weapons to target United
States and allied satellites.
Russia maintains a large network of reconnaissance,
communication, and navigation satellites, and they are also
developing, testing, and fielding counterspace weapons,
including ground-based and on-orbit capabilities to target
United States and allied satellites. These threats require the
U.S. to consider new approaches to ensuring our use of space,
including developing more proliferated and, therefore, more
resilient constellations.
To that end, the President's fiscal year 2023 budget
request seeks $27.6 billion for DOD space capabilities,
including $4.7 billion to fund the transition to a new
resilient missile-warning and missile-track architecture; $1.8
billion to procure two GPS III follow-on satellites and to
continue testing and integration of military GPS-user
equipment; $1.6 billion for secure, survivable, and jam-
resistant SATCOM; and $1.6 billion to procure six National
Security Space Launch vehicles.
In November, Russia conducted an irresponsible, destructive
test of a direct-ascent ASAT [antisatellite weapon] missile,
creating more than 1,500 pieces of trackable debris, hundreds
of thousands of smaller pieces that threaten safe space
operations in low-earth orbit.
In contrast, the Department is committed to promoting norms
of responsible behavior in space to ensure the space domain
remains secure, stable, and accessible. The Deputy Secretary of
Defense stated in December at the National Space Council
meeting, the Department would like to see all nations agree to
refrain from antisatellite weapons testing that create debris.
At Vandenberg last month, Vice President Harris announced a
U.S. commitment that the U.S. will not conduct destructive,
direct-ascent ASAT missile testing. These types of tests
jeopardize the long-term sustainability and safety of space for
all. This includes human spaceflight programs and all
commercial satellite operators. Ending destructive, direct-
ascent ASAT missile tests is, therefore, in our national
security interests and in our national economic interest. The
U.S. has demonstrated a leadership with this commitment and
encourages all nations to support responsible space behaviors.
In conclusion, the threats facing the U.S. in space, and
from space, continue to grow in both, quantity and quality.
Countering those threats requires that we continue this
longstanding bipartisan cooperation between DOD and the
Congress. I am committed to sustaining those efforts and I am
honored to work with this Committee to do so.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Plumb follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. John F. Plumb
introduction
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, Members of the Subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the United States
Space Force and associated programs.
As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, I am
responsible for the overall supervision of the policy of the Department
of Defense (DOD) for space warfighting, as well as interagency
coordination and international engagement on space policy and strategy.
In addition to space, my policy portfolio includes those other
strategic capabilities essential to integrated deterrence: cyberspace
operations, nuclear weapons, missile defense, and countering weapons of
mass destruction. I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before
you as the first person confirmed to this new position, and I welcome
the opportunity to address space policy, space security, and the role
of space in DOD's approach to integrated deterrence. I am committed to
continuing the close partnership between DOD and Congress on advancing
our national security space interests.
importance of space
Space plays a critical role in American security, prosperity, and
way of life.
Space contributes to our national security by enabling and
supporting the entire Joint Force: our servicemembers on land, at sea,
and in the air rely on space every single day to defend the Nation.
Space capabilities provide indications and warning of emerging threats
and attacks. Space systems deliver the positioning, navigation, and
timing (PNT) signals that support rapid and precise global power
projection. Space systems generate intelligence on operationally
relevant timelines and allow national decision makers to anticipate
risks and de-escalate crises, and space also enables those same
decision makers to command and control forces in multiple theaters
around the globe.
Russia's unprovoked further invasion of Ukraine provides a timely
example of the role of space in shaping the information environment.
United States Government, allied, and commercial satellites tracked
Russian military movements in the lead-up to the invasion, aiding
senior decision makers and helping facilitate our early coordination
with allies and partners. Satellites have continued to track the
activities of Russian forces during the conflict and are contributing
to the international effort to hold Russia accountable for its
unprovoked invasion, while supporting the Ukrainian people in their
fight against brutal Russian aggression.
DOD's space capabilities provide value well beyond national
security. The Department's Global Positioning System (GPS)
constellation provides precise PNT signals that are used in an untold
number of ways in both the civil and private sector. Examples include:
routing cell phone data; synchronizing weather radars; timestamping
financial transactions; geographical information systems (GIS); and
driving from point A to point B in your car without getting lost. U.S.
military satellites help support space-based environmental monitoring,
including weather forecasting and climate change modeling. Our Overhead
Persistent Infrared (OPIR) constellations are designed to provide
missile warning and tracking capabilities, but also support crews on
the ground fighting wildfires and help scientists track the impacts of
climate change. DOD's space surveillance network supports the
Department's space domain awareness mission but also provides
foundational data that enables the safety of space operations and
supports the global space situational awareness needs of all space
operators.
The explosive growth of commercial space, which has been successful
due in large part to the remarkable innovation of U.S. businesses, is
fueling an increasingly important part of the U.S. economy. That same
growth presents DOD with new opportunities to leverage commercial
technological advancements to support national security needs.
Moreover, space is once again capturing the imagination of a new
generation of Americans. This can inspire more students to pursue
careers in STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics)
disciplines, paying dividends to our national economy and national
security in the future.
A striking way to highlight the importance of space to U.S.
national security can be found by reviewing the four Defense priorities
of the 2022 National Defense Strategy. All four priorities require and
rely on the ability of the United States to operate in space, both in
peacetime and during conflict:
1. Defending the Homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain
threat posed by the People's Republic of China (PRC).
2. Deterring strategic attacks against the United States, our
Allies, and our partners.
3. Deterring aggression--while being prepared to prevail in
conflict when necessary--prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-
Pacific, then the Russia challenge in Europe.
4. Building a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem.
the threat environment
In recent years, as the PRC and Russia have integrated space into
their respective national and warfighting strategies. The threats
facing the United States in space and from space have changed
fundamentally and continue to grow in both quantity and capability.
As Secretary Austin has made clear, China is the Department's
pacing challenge. This holds true in space as it does in other domains.
The United States developed most of our current space architecture in
an era when space was perceived more or less as a sanctuary. In
contrast, over the past decade China has dramatically increased the
quantity and quality of its space and counterspace systems in order to
develop and field a wartime space architecture. China is working to
match or exceed United States capabilities in space to gain military,
economic, and reputational benefits: it is integrating space services
and satellite communications into its weapons and command-and-control
systems; its counterspace capabilities pose a growing threat to United
States and allied space systems and would be integral to potential
military campaigns by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). China's
wartime space architecture requires the United States to consider new
approaches to ensuring our own use of space, including developing more
proliferated--and therefore more resilient--constellations of our own.
Russia also remains a key space competitor, maintaining a large
network of reconnaissance, communications, and navigation satellites.
Russia will continue to integrate space services into weapons and
command-and-control systems, allowing quicker identification, tracking,
and targeting of United States forces during a conflict. In recent
years, Russia has focused on developing its civil and commercial space
capabilities, and it is able to employ its civil and commercial remote
sensing satellites to supplement its military-dedicated capabilities.
Russia continues to train its military space elements and is
developing, testing, and fielding counterspace weapons to target
u.s. and allied satellites.
PRC and Russian military doctrines indicate that both countries
view space as critical to modern warfare. They both consider the use of
counterspace weapons as a means of reducing U.S. military effectiveness
and a means for winning future wars. They both seek to leverage the
space domain to gain informational, operational, and logistical
advantages. And they both increasingly seek ways to expand their
capabilities in space and to exploit the perceived U.S over-reliance on
vulnerable space-based systems.
As China and Russia improve their respective space and counterspace
capabilities, both nations are integrating space scenarios into their
military exercises. They continue to develop the means to deny others
the use of space through employment of malicious cyberspace activities,
including cyber attacks, against ground sites supporting space
operations; both have developed sensor networks for tracking and
targeting others' satellites; and both have extensive inventories of
jamming capabilities to disrupt satellite communications. Russia and
China have developed directed energy weapons to blind intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites, and they continue
the development, testing, and proliferation of direct-ascent and on-
orbit antisatellite weapons to hold at risk United States and allied
space assets.
Space, Integrated Deterrence, and the President's Budget Request
Deterrence requires actions to reduce a competitor's perception of the
benefits of aggression relative to restraint. Deterrence also requires
credible capability and will to impose costs that would outweigh the
benefits of aggression. Ultimately, deterrence is premised on altering
a competitor's perceptions of the net benefits and costs of aggression.
Assured space capabilities, and the ability to prevent hostile uses
of space, are vital components of integrated deterrence across all
domains and through all levels of competition, crisis, and conflict
that the Department will leverage and continue to strengthen. In this
regard, our fiscal year 2023 budget request would:
Strengthen mission assurance and reduce the benefits of
attacks in space by accelerating the transition to diverse,
proliferated, and protected space architectures that will demonstrate
our growing ability to maintain mission capable status in a degraded
state and under sustained attack.
Bolster our ability to fight through disruption by
improving defensive capabilities and increasing options for
reconstitution, thereby reducing the benefits of aggression in space.
Expand and modernize our ability to deliver advanced
capabilities to enable joint and combined operations across domains,
and support national leadership decisions with assured missile warning,
missile tracking, and secure nuclear command and control.
Sustain our information advantages by improving our
ability to integrate, defend, and reconstitute our ISR and decision
systems on operationally relevant timelines to achieve our objectives,
notwithstanding aggressive interference and deception.
Advance and expand our architectures of: space-based
sensors that provide indications and warning of threats to space
systems; ISR capabilities that provide persistent, global information;
and multi-function terrestrial sensors that provide additional
opportunities to strengthen space domain awareness.
More specifically, DOD's fiscal year 2023 national security space
budget request seeks $27.6 billion in vital space capabilities,
resilient architectures, and enhanced space command and control to
support our terrestrial forces and keep space safe for military,
civilian, and commercial operations. These investments include:
Missile Warning: $4.7 billion would fund transition to
new, resilient missile warning and missile tracking architectures,
completion of the Next Generation OPIR Polar capability, and
development of the associated enterprise ground portfolio that will
track an increased range of threats, including hypersonic and
maneuverable weapons.
GPS Enterprise: $1.8 billion for PNT would fund
procurement of two GPS III follow-on satellites and continues testing
and lead platform integration of Military GPS User Equipment (MGUE)
Increment 1 receivers capable of using our most protected, jamming-
resistant GPS M-Code signals.
Satellite Communications (SATCOM): $1.6 billion would
fund development of secure, survivable, and jamming-resistant SATCOM
capabilities.
Launch Enterprise: $1.6 billion would fund six national
security space launch vehicles for assured access to space across all
of the orbits that we use.
norms and tenets of responsible behavior
In previous hearings, this Subcommittee has helped increase
visibility of the importance of norms and responsible behavior in space
as an element of ensuring a safe operating environment and reducing the
risks of misunderstandings and miscalculations that could lead to
conflict and escalation. In collaboration with the Department of State,
the Department is committed to promoting standards and norms of
responsible behavior in space to shape the operating environment and
ensure that the space domain remains secure, stable, and accessible.
As a defense organization and one of the single largest space
operators in the world, the Department has taken an important step
toward these objectives by sharing tenets that describe our
longstanding operational practices in space. We hope this step will set
an example and help develop a shared understanding among nations of
what constitutes safe and responsible behaviors for all military space
operators, and help reduce the risks of misunderstanding and
inadvertent escalation.
In July 2021, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin signed a memorandum
to DOD leadership that outlines guidance for DOD space operations in
the form of five key ``Tenets of Responsible Behavior in Space.'' That
guidance provides a clear and transparent statement of how Department
of Defense Components will operate in space under normal circumstances.
These Tenets of Responsible Behavior provide that our space operators,
unless otherwise directed, will:
Operate in, from, to, and through space with due regard
to others and in a professional manner;
Limit the generation of long-lived debris;
Avoid the creation of harmful interference;
Maintain safe separation and safe trajectory; and
Communicate and make notifications to enhance the safety
and stability of the domain.
U.S. Space Force guardians, and military servicemembers from across
the Joint Force who use space or deliver effects in space, operate
consistent with these tenets. Furthermore, at the Secretary's
direction, the U.S. Space Command continues to develop guidance
regarding specific behaviors for DOD operations in the space area of
responsibility that will continue to advance these tenets.
On November 15, 2021, when Russia conducted a destructive test of a
direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missile against an orbital target,
the world saw clearly that not all nations adhere to the same sense of
responsibility for their actions in space. That test created more than
1,500 pieces of trackable debris (greater than 10 cm) and hundreds of
thousands of smaller pieces that pose a threat to the safe operation of
satellites in low Earth orbit, including to astronauts on the
International Space Station and on a growing number of other platforms.
The threats that such irresponsible behavior present for the interests
of all space operators are one reason why the Deputy Secretary of
Defense stated at the December 1, 2021, National Space Council meeting
that the Department ``would like to see all nations agree to refrain
from anti-satellite weapons testing that creates debris.''
The United States Government took an important step toward that
broad goal on April 18, 2022, at Vandenberg Space Force Base, when Vice
President Harris announced a U.S. commitment to not conduct destructive
direct-ascent ASAT missile testing. This non-legally binding commitment
is focused on stopping the single most impactful and threatening
behavior to the space domain at the present time: the destructive
testing of direct-ascent ASAT missiles, which degrades the space
operating environment. Destructive direct-ascent ASAT missile testing
jeopardizes the long-term sustainability of space and imperils the
exploration and use of space by all nations. Destructive direct-ascent
ASAT missile tests place not just U.S. Government satellites at risk--
civil and national security programs alike--but place commercial
satellites at risk as well. At the dawn of this new era of rapidly
increasing commercial access to and use of space, in order to protect
the economic benefits the United States derives from space now and in
the future, ending destructive direct-ascent ASAT missile tests is more
important than ever.
This commitment, a unilateral statement of restraint in the space
domain that is in our national interest as well as in the interest of
all spacefaring nations, demonstrates that we are renewing U.S.
leadership on the world stage. We are going to lead by example, but we
will be working in partnership with the Department of State to
encourage other nations to consider making similar commitments over the
coming weeks and months.
allies and partners in combined space operations
U.S. allies and partners provide an asymmetric strategic advantage
that our adversaries cannot hope to match. The United States and its
partners in the Combined Space Operations (CSpO) initiative--Australia,
Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom--are
increasingly focused on ensuring freedom of access in space, and
recognize the role that space plays in our security and in our ability
to deter aggression. On February 22, 2022, the CSpO partners published
the ``Combined Space Operations Vision 2031,'' which addresses the
overarching need to encourage responsible use of space, recognizing the
challenges to space sustainability, the threats presented by
technological advances, and the increasingly comprehensive and
aggressive counterspace programs of other nation states.
The CSpO Vision 2031 describes a common mission to generate and
improve cooperation, coordination, and interoperability to sustain
freedom of action in space, optimize resources, enhance mission
assurance and resilience, and prevent conflict. It sets forth common
objectives focused on:
Preventing conflict extending to or originating in space
while promoting security and stability in all domains;
Achieving unity of effort through information sharing
across multiple classification levels and real-time synchronized
networked operations centers operated by a workforce with common
training;
Establishing and maintaining a robust, responsive, and
interoperable space infrastructure enabling continued space effects in
the face of adverse action or changes to the space domain; and
Defending and protecting our national interests and the
space domain.
As our competitors continue to advance their capabilities and
capacity to use space and hold U.S. space systems at risk, space
partnerships like those we are developing through CSpO will
fundamentally strengthen deterrence.
conclusion
The security environment in the space domain is undergoing
significant changes. Those changes can increase opacity and risk of
miscalculation during a crisis or conflict. The risk of inadvertent
escalation is high in the space domain due to the lack of clear norms
of behavior, unclear escalation thresholds, complex domain
interactions, and the rapid introduction of new capabilities, including
adversarial counterspace capabilities. The Department remains committed
to strengthening our space mission assurance, denying hostile uses of
space, advancing international norms for responsible behavior in space,
and maintaining our strategic advantages in space, including through
our increasingly robust international space partnerships with our
longstanding allies and partners. The Vice President's announcement of
a non-legally binding U.S. commitment to not conduct destructive
direct-ascent ASAT missile testing, and our investments to accelerate
resilience in our space architectures as facilitated by DOD's fiscal
year 2023 national security space budget request, provide clear
examples of this overarching commitment.
The United States and our allies and partners are ready for the
challenge. Here at home, U.S. advances in our approach to space
security over the past decade are a result of persistent, bipartisan
effort and close cooperation between the Executive and Legislative
branches of our government. I am committed to sustaining those efforts
and honored to work with the Congress, our DOD civilians and Military
servicemembers, my interagency colleagues, U.S. industry, and our
international allies and partners in a common cause to secure the
advantages of space for our national interests.
Senator King. General Thompson?
STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID D. THOMPSON, USSF, VICE CHIEF OF
SPACE OPERATIONS
General Thompson. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer,
and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to testify today.
It is an honor to appear before you on behalf of the
Secretary of the Air Force, the Honorable Frank Kendall, the
Chief of Space Operations, General Jay Raymond, and the 14,000
guardians around the world executing our space missions today.
U.S. military success and great power competition depends
on access to and freedom to operate in space, while denying the
same to our adversaries. In 2019, Congress established the
Space Force to organize, train, equip, and present forces to
deter hostile action and protect U.S. interests in space and to
secure the domain for stable, peaceful use.
Space capabilities are a cornerstone of integrated
deterrence, not just in space, but in every domain and those
space capabilities that we operate underpin every aspect of our
national security. At the same time, our space systems and use
of the domain remain under threat by competitor nations.
China remains our pacing challenge. In 2021, the PRC
continued to accelerate the integration of space capabilities
into its military operations, especially space-based
surveillance, intelligence, and reconnaissance, which puts the
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, we protect and support
at great risk. Additionally, Russia's overarching strategy
remains to challenge the United States in space; that is
unchanged for decades. It is continuing to improve its military
space capabilities as well. Both nations are also developing
and deploying an array of kinetic and non-kinetic counterspace
weapons that threaten U.S. systems in every orbital regime, on
the ground, and in cyberspace.
In response to these challenges, and in keeping with the
reasons the Space Force was established, we continue to make
substantial progress in the design, development, and fielding
of space capabilities that maintain our freedom to operate in
space. We advance recruiting, training, and educating the
workforce that is demanded to operate in such a highly
technical domain, and in putting in place the intelligence,
analytic, and test foundations that ensure success of our
forces in future conflict.
The President's fiscal year 2023 budget request for the
Space Force does this in several ways. As examples, it
initiates the first major transformation to a resilient force
structure with a proliferated missile-warning, missile-tracking
architecture, which is also capable of tracking hypersonic and
maneuvering vehicles. It enhances our awareness of all
activities in space and the ability to command and control
forces in this increasingly dynamic domain. It begins the
build-out of an operational test and training infrastructure
that will generate the military readiness appropriate to the
challenges we face, and it allows us to assume full authority
for the preparation, training, and management of the 14,000
guardians, who are Space Force's greatest asset and its primary
instrument.
I look forward to discussing these and many other aspects
of our request in more detail with you in today's hearing and
as we partner in the coming months. Your support and enactment
of the fiscal year 2023 defense authorization bill will enable
the Space Force to remain the world's leader in space and to
continue to preserve freedom of action for the Nation.
Thank you for your continued advocacy and support. We are
eager to work with your committee to build a strategy and make
the investments needed to secure our Nation's vital interests.
[The joint prepared statement by The Honorable Frank
Calvelli and General David D. Thompson follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by The Honorable Frank Calvelli and General
David D. Thompson
introduction
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, Distinguished Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the
Secretary of the Air Force, the Honorable Frank J. Kendall III, the
Chief of Space Operations, General John W. ``Jay'' Raymond, and the
airmen and guardians tasked with organizing, training and equipping
forces to advance American interests in space. In its third year of
existence, the Space Force continues to make tremendous progress in
addressing national security challenges and threats of the space
domain, and in building out the blueprint of a 21st century, mission-
focused military service.
Space remains vital to our security and our way of life. U.S.
military success in great power competition depends on access and
freedom to operate in space. Over the past two decades, the space
domain has shifted from a benign to a contested environment. Our
adversaries are increasingly disruptive and hostile. To better protect
our national interests, in December 2019 the Space Force was
established with an explicit mandate to: (1) provide the United States
freedom of operation in, from, and to space, and (2) conduct prompt and
sustained space operations. Today, and every day, our guardians
accomplish these tasks for the Nation ensuring unprecedented space
capabilities for warfighters, allies, and civilians.
The Space Force provides the joint force and our allies and
partners essential services vital to effective military operations.
Unique services such as missile warning; positioning, navigation and
timing; communications; and space-enabled tracking and targeting, make
our Armed Forces the most flexible and lethal on the planet. These
services, also make the United States a valued security partner. The
Space Force delivers unmatched capability in these missions today and
is developing the next generation of capabilities to meet requirements
in the future.
Space Force capabilities and readiness contribute to integrated
deterrence, strategic campaigning, and building an enduring advantage.
We believe integrated deterrence starts in space. The Space Force must
deliver resilient space capabilities and contribute to protecting
terrestrial forces from adversary space capabilities that are an
increasingly effective element of their combat operations.
Given growing strategic competition, it is imperative that the
Space Force has the resources to modernize our forces to ensure freedom
of action in, from, and to space. The President's Fiscal Year 2023
Budget Request for the Space Force initiates a necessary
transformation, beginning with fielding a resilient missile warning and
tracking architecture to detect and maintain custody of emergent
hypersonic and maneuverable missile technologies, while making
survivability under attack a key attribute of the design.
the space environment
Foreign Space Threats
Space capabilities underpinning our national security remain
threatened by adversary nations. Our competitors enjoy growing access
to increasingly affordable space services and technology, multiplying
threats beyond traditional space powers. Expanded intelligence for
space will be vital to staying abreast of current and future threats.
The People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia continue to improve
their military space and counterspace capabilities. Correspondingly,
their overarching strategy remains to challenge the U.S. in space.
These countries are developing and deploying an array of kinetic and
non-kinetic counterspace weapons that threaten U.S. space systems in
all orbital regimes and their associated ground systems. They are also
developing and deploying space-based Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR) systems that will be able to observe U.S. and
Allied forces in all domains and all regions of the globe.
The PRC is the pacing challenge in the space domain, possessing on-
orbit military capabilities rivaling those of the United States, and is
pursuing a diverse counterspace weapons development program. The PRC
calls space a critical domain in strategic competition, and they are
now a spacefaring superpower who has launched more satellites into
orbit than any country other than the United States. The PRC's growing
commercial space sector enhances their industrial base and drives
foreign dependency on Chinese technology. The People's Liberation Army
(PLA) has developed robust and capable space services--ISR,
communications, weather, and navigation constellations--that give PLA
forces the integrated information needed to threaten U.S. joint
operations in all domains. An example of the type of threat we must be
able to defeat occurred in the summer of 2021 when the PRC launched a
missile that deployed a hypersonic glide vehicle that circled the globe
and flew back to hit a target in China. This test effectively
demonstrates possession of the technologies needed for an unwarned,
maneuvering fractional orbital bombardment system. We are actively
working on systems to combat threats like this.
Russia remains dangerous with substantial space capacity, advanced
technical and scientific capabilities, and a commitment to develop a
broad array of counterspace weaponry. For example, Russia has seven
prototypes in orbit that are capable of destroying other satellites. As
demonstrated this past November, Russia's ground-based ``Nudol''
missile is designed to destroy Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites. That
Nudol test destroyed a defunct Russian satellite, creating more than
1,500 pieces of debris, and threatening the International Space Station
and other satellites in LEO.
Standards of Responsible Behavior
All nations share in the benefits, and costs, of human activity in
space. Long-standing U.S. space policy promotes the long-term safety,
security, stability, and sustainability of the space domain. The United
States continues to partner with like-minded spacefaring nations in
championing Norms of Responsible Behavior under the leadership of the
National Space Council. Recently, Vice President Kamala Harris, who
chairs the National Space Council, set a new international standard
when she stated the U.S. commits not to conduct destructive direct-
ascent anti-satellite missile testing. Likewise, we must continue to
lead and advocate for responsible space behavior while developing
systems that protect and counter our adversary's capabilities. The
Space Force supports the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
Policy, U.S. Space Command, and other Department of Defense (DOD)
components as they develop guidance regarding the Tenets of Responsible
Behavior in Space for DOD operations. The Space Force is also engaging
allies and partners on the importance of responsible behavior via
initiatives like the Combined Space Operations forum and conducting
international space wargames.
space force year three
Following the first two years of our existence, where the Space
Force first blueprinted the design for a 21st century military service
and aggressively built out the multi-year plan in detail, we are
delivering on the expectations set by our Nation's leaders.
Force Design
The Space Force utilizes the Space Warfighting Analysis Center
(SWAC) to develop force design processes to assess the fielding of
space systems through the lens of operational need and requirements
satisfaction, vulnerability and performance under attack, and cost.
This process postures us for the first time to make architecture and
programmatic decisions based on a clear understanding of warfighter
needs, enabling concepts, budget, threat projections, while accounting
for technology constraints and opportunities.
The missile warning/missile tracking mission trailblazed this
process and successfully informed our fiscal year 2023 budget
submission. On-going force design efforts include Space Data Transport,
Tactical ISR and space-based support to active missile defense, with
Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) and Space Domain Awareness to
follow. These activities also serve to build out the analytic base
required to support additional force design, and modeling and
simulation in support of testing and training.
The SWAC's ability to use a ``clean-slate'' approach--without pre-
conceived ties to previous acquisition strategies or programs and
without any preference to a particular mission set or function within
the Space Force, allows the SWAC to act objectively on behalf of the
Service, joint warfighters, and the entire national security space
enterprise.
Integrator for Joint Space Requirements
Through the SWAC's leadership in the new force design process, the
Space Force has laid the foundation to succeed in their role as the DOD
lead for integrating joint space requirements. In this role the Space
Force engages Combatant Commands (CCMDs), the other Services,
Intelligence Community (IC), U.S. Government (USG) agencies, industry,
and Allies to understand, document and inform requirements satisfaction
(validated through Joint Requirements Oversight Council), programming
and budgeting, and acquisition strategies. The Space Force is working
with the Joint Staff to fully codify this role and is currently
exploring development of an implementation plan to execute this role
that will facilitate consolidation of space requirements from across
the Joint Force, identify capability gaps, advocate for DOD space
requirements at joint forums and inform budget decisions.
Guardian Training and Education
In August 2021, General Raymond activated the Space Training and
Readiness Command (STARCOM) to focus on service responsibilities to
recruit, train, educate, and develop ALL Guardians, military and
civilian. Space-centered training has been incorporated into all Space
Force military accessions training programs and we have created space-
focused programs at Air University (AU). These initial steps strive to
create independent, space-focused education programs for all Guardians
and the Joint Force. In September 2021, the Space Force published the
Guardian Ideal, Space Force Values, and the Guardian Commitment. All
three are foundational to the new Space Force team-centric culture and
will guide how we recruit, train, develop, and employ Guardians as a
part of our interconnected high-performing teams.
The Space Force is developing Science, Technology, Engineering, and
Mathematics (STEM) focused officer-candidate development and Advanced
Academic Degree (AAD) opportunities for all Guardians via the
University Partnership Program (UPP). USSF partnerships with select
STEM focused universities facilitates Guardian acquisition of technical
degrees most needed by the USSF. Guardians pursuing AADs at these
schools have the opportunity to conduct research projects mutually
beneficial to the school and USSF. In fiscal year 2021, UPP began with
11 universities that are top suppliers of talent to U.S. aerospace and
defense industries. The program will expand to at least 13 schools in
fiscal year 2022. UPP universities have Reserve Officers' Training
Corps (ROTC) Detachments that consistently commission the most cadets,
and are amongst the top engineering schools in the country.
Space Operational Testing and Training Infrastructure
The National Space Test and Training Complex (NSTTC), a core
element of the Space Force's Operational Test and Training
Infrastructure (OTTI), is foundational to testing and evaluating space
warfighting systems, as well as providing Guardians with a threat-
representative training platform.
Currently, there is no national capability for enterprise-level
testing and training of our space assets and infrastructure.
Consequently, our ability to establish, assess, and maintain readiness
in an increasingly contested intellectual and increasingly congested
physical space environment is minimal. NSTTC will provide a multi-
venue, operationally-relevant environment for the testing, training,
and evaluation of both material investments and non-material processes
to inform current and emerging warfighting requirements and
capabilities.
Space as a Digital Service
For most in the joint force, the space domain is experienced
digitally via the data and services provided by space systems. Because
of the highly technical nature, the Space Force requires a workforce
that has the digital fluency to rapidly turn data into useful insights
to accelerate innovation of operational and business activities.
Digital aptitude remains essential to help lead the transformation to
becoming an interconnected, innovative, digitally-dominant force in
order to deter and defeat threats to space operations. To achieve this
goal, the Space Force has provided Digital University access to all
Guardians, which incorporates curated digital content designed to
establish a foundational level of fluency on modern digital topics.
The Space Force remains on the forefront of digital transformation
to meet demand for existing and emerging needs. The President's fiscal
year 2023 budget request reflects this commitment. For example, the
Space Force intends to continue building a cadre of organic software
coders (``Supracoders'') to streamline software development and promote
the adoption of software technology that will prove instrumental to
Space Force operations, testing, and training. We plan to train 90 in
fiscal year 2023, bringing the total number in the force to more than
200.
Unit/Mission Transfers
In accordance with existing statute and congressional intent, the
DOD intends to transfer fully mission-capable space operational units,
support equipment, property, and related resources to the Space Force
with no mission degradation or adverse personnel actions. Across the
FYDP, the Space Force will accept the transfer of 15 global units, 319
military billets, 259 civilian billets, and $2.5 billion in budgetary
resources.
Specific to 2022, the Space Force intends to incorporate the Navy
Narrowband Satellite System and Army Wideband Payload Operations, upon
certification to the defense appropriation committees. To ensure
mission continuity, the DOD is offering civilians and military
personnel assigned to such units the opportunity to volunteer to
transfer with the unit to the Space Force. The Space Force has
established a selection board, including service liaisons, to oversee
individual personnel transfers.
Looking forward, and in accordance with Title 10, United States
Code, Section 9086, the DOD will transfer the Space Development Agency
(SDA) no later than October 01 2022. In the coming months, the SDA
plans to transfer offices and operations centers in the National
Capital Region and other areas around the country, along with 36
military and 67 civilian personnel billets and associated budgetary
resources.
Space Force End Strength
Sufficient end strength is critical to implementing the long-term
vision of the DOD and consolidating all of the Armed Forces space
missions and forces into the Space Force. The fiscal year 2022 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)--authorized military end strength for
the Space Force is 8,400 and includes 319 servicemembers projected to
be realigned from the Army and Navy units. Prior to fiscal year 2023,
Space Force end strength was included in U.S. Air Force military
personnel appropriations. The Space Force will have a separate end
strength appropriation starting with the fiscal year 2023 President's
Budget.
space acquisition
The Department of the Air Force, in partnership with the United
States Space Force, is forging a new paradigm for how we acquire
national security space systems. To realize our vision for space
acquisition, we are implementing changes in all aspects of how we
conduct business. The Department of the Air Force pursued a unity of
effort approach to acquisition with the Secretary of the Air Force
instituting the office of Space Acquisition and Integration and the
activation of Space Systems Command. These changes realign our
structure to lead and advance integrated acquisition efforts. Through
that integration role, the Department and the Space Force are pursuing
a flexible approach to Space Acquisition. This strategy will enable us
to not only meet warfighter requirements, but also meet the pacing
challenges required to project global power, and incentivize the
civilian space industry. We are utilizing forums such as the Program
Integration Council (PIC) and the Space Acquisition Council (SAC), to
achieve synergistic efforts, while tapping into emerging technical
advancements necessary for us to remain technology leaders and more
importantly, maintain U.S. space superiority.
By leveraging the PIC to unite senior leaders from the Space
Systems Command (SSC), Space Rapid Capabilities Office, Department of
the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office, Space Development Agency,
National Reconnaissance Office, Missile Defense Agency, United States
Space Command, Space Operations Center, and the Air Force Research
Laboratory, we have improved communication and coordination necessary
to align efforts and achieve synergy across the National Security Space
enterprise.
The Space Force, in partnership with the Missile Warning/Missile
Tracking/Missile Defense Enterprise community, built upon the Overhead
Persistent Infrared (OPIR) Enterprise Architecture Strategy delivered
to Congress in October 2020 to formalize Missile Warning and Missile
Tracking force design and acquisition strategies. This ensures OPIR
capabilities meet warfighter needs. New resilient Missile Warning/
Missile Tracking space and ground architectures will transform the
DOD's legacy missile warning force design. This distributed multi-orbit
architecture will address emerging missile threats, and be protected,
survivable, and reconstituted. The Department is heavily investing in
fiscal year 2023, requesting $1.029 billion for this mission area.
On January 27 2022, the SAC reviewed the Space Force Chief Strategy
and Resourcing Officer's Missile Warning, Tracking, and Defense
requirements allocation and associated recommendations for an
Integration Plan proposed by Space Systems Command, the Space
Development Agency, and Missile Defense Agency. The Integration Plan
includes a governance concept with a combined program office that will
enable coordinated capability development across the mission areas. In
addition, Space Systems Command has the charge to execute system of
systems integration to deliver an end-to-end, sensor-to-shooter
capability.
The Department is also heavily investing in mission areas such as
strategic communications and space domain awareness. For Enhanced
Strategic SATCOM, the Space Force is pursuing a competitive acquisition
strategy for the space segment through rapid prototyping, which is
maturing the industrial base, driving innovationand controlling costs.
The Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability provides all-weather, ground-
based radars to detect, track, and maintain custody of deep space
objects around the clock, and recently was authorized to proceed on
Middle Tier Acquisition (MTA) Rapid Prototyping pathway for its first
site. Fiscal year 2023 is an important investment year for the design
and development for Operational Leave-behind Capability by fiscal year
2025.
National Security Space Launch (NSSL) has an unprecedented record
of mission success, maintaining a 100% mission success track record
while continuing to lower the cost of mission assurance. Since 2013,
the Department has saved over seven billion dollars in NSSL
procurements due to block buys and competitive acquisition strategies,
which has allowed reallocation to other capabilities for the
warfighter. The fiscal year 2023 priority is to complete certification
of the Vulcan and Falcon Heavy launch systems to ensure we can meet all
reference orbits and maintain assured access to space. Additionally, we
are meeting Congressional intent to stop using the Russian RD-180. The
USSF has four remaining Atlas V launch services that use the RD-180
engines, which are all launching over the next 18 months. That will end
our dependency on foreign made engines.
At the same time, we have remained focused on acquisition advances.
Space Systems Command continued to improve GPS for the warfighter by
awarding contracts for three more GPS IIIF satellites. This new
generation provides regional military protection capability, an M-code
signal that can be concentrated on a particular region, and provides
over 140x times greater anti-jamming measures over legacy signals.
These advancements ensure our military personnel can access critical
PNT data in contested environments.
We appreciate Congress` support in providing authorities needed to
deliver capabilities at the speed of relevance for the warfighter.
Using MTA authorities, we are rapidly identifying, prototyping, and
fielding innovative solutions for some of the most pressing challenges
we face. Nine programs currently utilize MTAs, but we are also
increasing flexibility through non-traditional approaches, such as the
Space Enterprise Consortium (SpEC) Other Transaction Authority (OTA)
agreements. Authorities like these are paramount to improving
engagement with our commercial partners. A thriving commercial sector
presents increased opportunity for the Department to leverage
commercial space services, for DOD to provide a demand signal to
stimulate commercial sector innovation, and to further build and
diversify the industrial base and incubates capabilties that may meet
future requirements.
In order to rapidly increase the resiliency and move at the speed
of relevance, we are leveraging our partnerships with industry,
academia, allies, and our international partners around the globe.
These partnerships are essential for ensuring we are harnessing
emergent technologies into the space enterprise. SSC`s Front Door is
designed to be a single focal point for strategic commercial
partnerships and to establish a diversified and enduring marketplace
for the Joint Force to purchase and receive essential services. Through
activities such as Pitch Days, similar to commercial investment pitch
competitions, it is now easier for start-ups and other non-traditional
companies to bring their commercial solutions to the Department. This
is just one innovative example of how the Department of the Air Force
will exceed the pace of demand and become increasingly more agile than
our Nation`s adversaries.
We will also be leveraging lessons learned from the Space
Development Agency as we begin the formal transfer of that organization
into the Space Force at the beginning of Fiscal Year 2023. This
transition will enhance the Department`s ability to integrate
innovative acquisition approaches and deliver new satellites and ground
system prototypes into the operational baseline for the Space Force.
Technology and pacing threats are evolving at an ever-increasing
rate. Achieving enduring advantages means the Space Force must undergo
a transformation from current legacy systems to the architectures
needed to be competitive. The Space Force is leveraging technology to
deliver game-changing space capabilities.and solidify an ecosystem
through our University Research Consortium. Quantum technologies,
counter-hypersonics, and artificial intelligence/machine learning are
several of the emerging technologies that are necessary to integrate
into the Space Force architectures to stay ahead of potential
adversaries.
conclusion
In conclusion, the Department of the Air Force and United States
Space Force stand ready to provide forces and capabilities that protect
and defend U.S. interests in space. As General Raymond has stated:
``America's Space Force will be Semper Supra, always above. We are
moving swiftly to establish a lean, innovative Service and a rapid,
agile acquisition process ready to meet the challenges of today and the
future. We stand ready to protect and deter, and to fight and win in
freedom's high frontier.'' \1\ We would like to thank the Congress for
your leadership and support.
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\1\ John W. ``Jay'' Raymond, (Gen, SPACE FORCE), Chief of Space
Operations, ``Chief of Space Operations Planning Guidance,'' November
2020.
Senator King. Thank you.
The first point I want to make is that we are in the
process now of putting together the National Defense
Authorization Act for this year, literally in a matter of--the
paperwork is moving, so we are talking about in a matter of
weeks.
To the extent any of you, or the Secretary, has, or the
Commanding General have suggestions or needs or thoughts about
authorities or modifications to current statute, as it, as you
have grown into this new force, please let us know as soon as
possible so that we might consider those as amendments or as
proposals in this year's National Defense Act. So, I hope you
will consider that an open invitation. The other way to put it
is: Don't complain next summer when you didn't get what you
want if you don't tell us what you need.
Dr. Plumb, Section 1602 of the 2022 Act requires the
Secretary of Defense to designate the Chief of Space Operations
as the force design architect for the space systems by March of
this year, 2022. This is important. We give the same
designation to the Chief of Naval Operations for the fleet at
sea and the Chief of the Air Force for planes in the air.
During our Air Force posture hearing, Senator Reed asked the
Chief of Space Operations whether this designation had
occurred, and he said it was still residing in the Office of
Secretary of Defense Space Policy.
Why has this not occurred and when will it occur?
Mr. Plumb. Thank you, Senator.
I have spoken with General Raymond about that, and I have
spoken with your staff about this. So, I was really alerted to
this just last week. I immediately took it to my office, so my
office is now responsible for it. I have initiated
conversations with OGC, Office of General Counsel, on getting
this right. I will get that done. It is a little bit new
because it has all space in it, but we will get that
designation done.
I will point out that, I think functionally speaking, and
General Thompson may want to weigh in, but that functionally
speaking, I believe the CSO [Chief of Space Operations] is the
Force's architect at this point, but that is not the same as
formalizing it as you have asked. So, I will do that. It will
take a little bit of time to get it through the building.
Senator King. Well, I hope a little bit of time is measured
in weeks and not months.
Mr. Plumb. Yes, sir.
Senator King. Thank you.
This is a somewhat difficult situation because we are
talking about some things that are public and a lot of things
that aren't and we have to be careful in our discussion. But as
your testimony indicates, we know that both, China and Russia:
(A) are establishing a major presence in space; (B) are
establishing a capability to hold our satellites and our space
assets at risk.
Insofar as you can testify in an open session, please
outline our strategy, if you will, for protecting our assets
and dealing with what is now a highly contested domain, which
wasn't the case until pretty recently.
General?
General Thompson. Senator, I will outline that, I will say,
in three primary points today. The first element of the
strategy is to fully and deeply understand all of the
activities in the domain: what objects are out there; the
things that they do; their capabilities; whether or not they
pose a threat to us, our capabilities and our assets; the
capabilities, techniques, tactics, doctrine that might be used
in their employment; and to be able to ensure that we have
indications and warnings should an attack be coming. A lot of
the investment in our budget and the work we have been doing to
date creates the space domain awareness infrastructure and
architecture that we need to do that.
The second thing is, many of the space systems that are on
orbit today and will be for years to come, were not designed to
operate in a domain like this and under threat; however, there
are things that we can and are doing to them to increase their
ability to be defended and to contribute to their own defense,
things like: ensuring that additional fuel remains onboard in
case we need to maneuver; looking at ways to make them more
difficult targets to track and, ultimately, to attack; and
let's just say in this setting, other systems, other
capabilities and other tactics that will make them more
difficult to attack and destroy, should an adversary attempt to
do so.
The third major component of our strategy is to create
those resilient architectures going forward that are much
harder, that are survivable by design and less vulnerable in
terms of protection. The primary mechanism by which we do that,
and we intend to do that, is rather than architectures today
that consist of a relatively small number of very capable, very
sophisticated satellites, building architectures with larger
numbers of less capable, less expensive satellites, that in
aggregate, give us the same capability. In fact, in this
budget, our request for the missile-warning, missile-tracking
architecture that we have proposed is the first major step for
the architectures in that regard.
So, in this setting, those are the three major points of
making us more defendable and more resilient in space.
Senator King. Thank you. Excellent.
Senator Fischer?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Thompson, I appreciate the Space Force's effort to
pivot towards proliferated satellite architectures. The
resilient missile-warning, missile-tracking program that I
discussed with General Raymond at the full committee hearing
last week, is but one example of that.
I agree with the conceptional advantages distributed
architectures provide, but how ready is the industrial base to
meet production needs associated with those much larger
constellations?
General Thompson. Madam Senator, I would say that it is
probably as ready as it has been in the last several decades
and for several reasons. One is, we maintain some sort of
capability in terms of the production of our current satellites
and some of the investments in technology and prototyping, but
a great portion of the industrial base is expanding because of
commercial investment.
While there are some specific aspects of military and
national security space systems that don't lend themselves to
commercial investment, a vast majority of the operating
techniques, the subsystems used would apply both, to commercial
investment and to military national security investment, as
well. So, while there are some very specific niche capabilities
that we have pursued and we have maintained with competition in
various aspects, and I think the investment we are seeing in
commercial space has served all of us well in creating a more
robust and more capable industrial base to address our space
needs.
Senator Fischer. Do you see limitations or bottlenecks on
certain things like refrigeration units, for example?
General Thompson. I would say there are a few very boutique
capabilities for which we probably have a few bottlenecks. Some
of the sophisticated sensors that we use, the sensor elements
and those aspects of them, we do, but generally speaking, when
you think about the subsystems onboard a spacecraft, whether it
is power subsystems, propulsion subsystems, attitude control,
generally speaking, there are not bottlenecks in that regard,
but there are for some of the very specialized capabilities and
specialized technologies, there are a few.
Senator Fischer. You don't find that a limitation?
General Thompson. I would say it is, but I cannot point
specifically today to any space system whose development is
being held up due to the lack of the readiness of a capability
or a provider for those capabilities.
Senator Fischer. When the Space Force is looking at
architecture or design, is there a process through which it
takes industrial base limitations into account so that we don't
produce plans are a technically sound, but not feasible?
General Thompson. Yes, ma'am, there is.
Really, what happens is, and it is part of a longstanding
process, but part of our new process, one of the new processes
that we created in our Space Warfighting Analysis Center was to
bring in industry early and any Force-design activity that we
are performing, providing them with our requirements, our
design concepts, the results of our analysis as to how, in
fact, we intend to accomplish missions, provide them with all
of that data and ask them to provide input directly, or come
back later after the fact. That is one point in time in which
we can have the conversation about whether the technology is
there.
But the second point is when we then take those designs and
hand them over to Mr. Calvelli and the Acquisition team, that
is where they truly begin the extensive review of all the
expected technologies, and as part of the system acquisition
process, determine whether the technology is available, whether
it is ready, whether there is risk-reduction and prototyping
work that needs to be required, and assess the risks and effort
required to either, deliver the system or come back and say,
unfortunately, the technology is probably too risky to pursue
at that point.
Senator Fischer. Did you have anything, Mr. Secretary, you
wanted to add to that?
Mr. Calvelli. No, I think General Thompson nailed it really
well.
You are right, ma'am, you don't want to start down an
acquisition that you can't execute because of the supply chain
or technology issues, so you have to take a really close look
up front and make sure whatever you are going to decide to put
out in that request proposal and then put under contract is
actually something you can achieve.
Senator Fischer. You know, we have to meet the needs of
combatant commanders at STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command],
especially, and there has been, I would say, some questions
raised on the ability to meet those needs and what is needed as
a resource to do that. Thank you.
Senator King. Senator Cotton?
Senator Cotton. Thank you, Gentlemen.
Mr. Secretary, from where I sit on this committee and the
Intelligence Committee, it seems like the NRO [National
Reconnaissance Office] has been slightly more successful in
delivering space capabilities in a timely and efficient
fashion.
Can you talk to us a little bit about your experiences
there and what your plans are to help replicate that success in
the Department.
Mr. Calvelli. Yes, thank you, Senator.
The NRO has a culture of programmatic discipline. It is
inherent in its DNA. We expect our program managers to
understand, technically, their programs, to understand their
contracts, and to deliver on cost, on schedule, and meeting the
requirements.
From my position where I was at as the deputy there and
working with the director, we also sort of oversaw and made
sure that culture continued, and we managed our programs. We
managed our program element officers and our program managers
to deliver. I mean, so that became just part of the culture
over the last decade or so that, you know, it is really
important that you hit your plan.
The other thing is, you know, we really learned some things
about making sure that when we put proposals out there that we
really get realistic cost proposals back and realistic
schedules, especially in a competitive environment. That is
really key to ensure that you have that, so you know that
whatever they are delivering to you is actually going to be
executable. When you review proposals to make sure that you put
in place the right contract strategy, the right contract
incentives that are going to incentivize success.
Senator Cotton. Okay. General Thompson, what do you think
about that?
General Thompson. Mr. Senator, I agree. I have got some
experience, not on the acquisition side, but in the operational
side of the NRO, and it really is that aspect of discipline in
the execution of a program from start to finish and the
tendency not to decide that each successive article needs to
improve in capability, but rather, to provide consistent and
expectations up front and throughout the schedule that makes it
important.
Senator Cotton. Okay. One interesting note from the war in
Ukraine is that most people assess that Ukraine's
communications or internet access would be cut off in the first
days, really the first hours of the war. That did not happen,
and it still has not happened. I think that is, in part, based
on satellite-based internet.
What lessons have we learned about what we can do, should
we ever face a similar conflict with Russia and China, where
they are trying to deny us that?
Mr. Calvelli. Well, I think the one lesson that I have seen
is that by adding and integrating commercial capabilities, that
you are going to diversify your architecture and make it much
more resilient, and so that has really been a great piece of
the puzzle to actually watch happen how a commercial technology
and commercial capability has added resiliency along the way.
General Thompson. I would add to that that, I think what we
are seeing as a result of their ability to be prevented from
using space capabilities is also a reflection of these new
proliferated architectures that are very difficult to deny
overall. You may be able to deny a piece of it, but you can't
eliminate the capability at large.
As we look, we are beginning a new Force design activity to
look at the future of space-based communications and data
relay, not only bringing in commercial capability, but
absolutely, that proliferated architecture that makes a network
that is very difficult to defeat in total, is another element
of what I think we are learning from Ukraine.
Senator Cotton. All right. Mr. Plumb, any thoughts on that?
Mr. Plumb. Yes, Senator. I would just add, I think it is a
really good example of resilience means different things for
different constellations and functions. So, for ISR
[intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] or for,
actually, for missile-warning, missile-track, that is a
proliferated set of orbits with IR [infrared] sensors. But
SATCOM, in particular, on your question, there is a lot of
commercial capacity. There is more coming in using that as a
totally different approach to get to the same end, which is
resiliency. It is really important.
Senator Cotton. All right. Thank you.
General Thompson, the budget brief highlights a $36 million
investment in climate initiatives. Can you tell me a little bit
more about that?
General Thompson. Yes, sir, two things. First of all, it is
really a matter of understanding our base infrastructure, the
facilities, the power infrastructure. Most of our space
capabilities are operated from home station. They operate 24/7.
They have to operate in peacetime and wartime, and most of that
is focused on ensuring that the power systems and the means by
which our bases operate under all conditions can be sustained,
regardless of peacetime, conflict, climate conditions, and
things like that. That is part of it.
The second aspect is, we do own part of the weather and
meteorological mission for the Department of Defense and the
Nation, and part of that investment includes our space-based
environmental monitoring and some of the tools and techniques
that we use to do that, as well.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Thank you.
Senator King. Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, first of all, thank you for your continued
service to our country.
Mr. Calvelli, massive amounts of data are sent and received
through space every second. In order to maintain our
technological edge, integration of artificial intelligence and
quantum computing will be necessary to process all of this data
in a timely manner. What are your thoughts on how we acquire
this type of capability?
General Thompson, to the extent that you can in this open
session, can you describe and assess what our adversaries,
specifically China, are doing in these areas.
Mr. Calvelli?
Mr. Calvelli. I think one of the challenges on the AI
[artificial intelligence] front is making sure that our data is
accessible by algorithms down the road, and so, we have had a
lot of history of closed architectures. What you really want to
do is make sure your ground systems are open, that your data is
exposed through application programming interfaces, and that
future algorithms, whether that be machine-learning algorithms
or AI algorithms can actually access the data. I think that is
going to be one of the biggest keys to getting the data
accessed.
As far as quantum computing goes, we are really, as a
Nation, I believe, in the research and development stage of
that and I think that the Nation needs to continue that. I
honestly don't know from what sort of, the role of the services
in that area. But I do believe that we need to, as a country,
really spend money and foster the ability for this Nation to
develop quantum techniques. It is going to drive a whole road
of encryption down and high-speed processing that I think we
want to stay the leader as a Nation.
Senator Rounds. If I could, just to clarify, because when
we talk about this, I think people kind of pull everything
together on it, AI is here, and it is being integrated now; is
that fair to say?
Mr. Calvelli. Yes, I agree.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
General Thompson?
General Thompson. Senator, just a few comments in regard of
Russia and China, and I will say, primarily China, but it
applies to Russia, as well. I would argue that while the
creativity and ingenuity and energy in our academic and
commercial sector is tremendous, and in many cases, our
asymmetric advantage, the Chinese, for sure, have a plan and an
expectation to lead the world in AI by 2030. They have made
that public. They are making great advances; in some cases, on
their own, in some cases because many of their scientists and
engineers study in American universities. So, they have a plan
to outpace us in that regard and they are certainly capable
adversaries. So, I would say this is absolutely an area of
competition that we need to expect and be attentive to in the
years to come.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, General.
I just want to follow-up on that because I think the next
step on this is talking about the other areas. We have been
competing against our adversaries in air, land, sea,
cyberspace, and now we see them most certainly challenging us
in space. Both China and Russia have conducted antisatellite
operations and have weaponized space. I mean weaponized space
in an attempt to deter and counter U.S. effectiveness in space.
To the level that you can in this open forum, can you
describe the threats our adversaries are posing to us in space,
and do you have the authorities and resources needed to be able
to respond to these threats?
The reason why I bring it up, once again, is as the
Chairman of the Committee has indicated, if we need to make
policy changes to respond, now is the time to get that out or
we are going to end up waiting another year.
General Thompson. In terms of their capabilities, in fact,
we have become much better at declassifying and communicating
those capabilities in an unclassified sense. I said in my
opening statement that they can threaten us kinetically and
non-kinetically in every domain.
As you mentioned, the Russians conducted a destructive
antisatellite missile test in November 2021. The Chinese did
that in 2007. They have been rapidly fielding capabilities ever
since. Both have on-orbit capabilities that attack our
satellites directly. Both also have multiple ways to attack us
through cyberspace, laser dazzling and RF [radio frequency],
and so I would say, absolutely, they can threaten us in every
regime and by every means available.
Senator Rounds. What would be your response, General, to
those who say that space is not or should not be thought of as
a warfighting domain?
General Thompson. Senator, I would say that, first of all,
Russia and China have voted, and they have already decided that
it is. Our primary purpose as a Space Force is to make sure
that we can deter them from making it a true domain of conflict
in the direct sense, and if not, should they go to that, it is
our job to ensure that we can continue to operate effectively
in space regardless.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Now I want to call on the only person in this
room who has ever been to space, Senator Kelly.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I do miss it.
Senator King. Especially around here.
[Laughter.]
Senator Kelly. I wasn't going to say that. No, but it is
great to have the opportunity to serve again in a different
role.
General Thompson, I have a question about Space National
Guard and this topic came up in last week's Air Force posture
hearing. I understand that currently, the National Guard's
space capability is organized in 17 units, across seven states,
in Guam, and is made up of nearly 1,500 airmen, or 15 percent
of the Space Force.
As General Raymond mentioned last week, the National Guard
has been involved in the space mission for 25 years. When asked
about the prospect of a Space National Guard last week, General
Raymond indicated that there are two ways to ensure that we
maintain that capability. One was to either have a separate
Space National Guard and the other was to take the capabilities
from the Guard and move them into one combined, Active Duty and
Reserve component.
Now, that second option assumes that current Air National
Guard members will transfer to the Space Force under a mixed,
full-time, part-time Active component model. This ignores the
fact that many folks who joined the Air National Guard, they
did so because of geographic stability that it offers the
members and their families, as well as the opportunities
sometimes to serve their state.
General Thompson, what are your thoughts on the advantages
of establishing a Space National Guard, and to your knowledge,
is the Department of the Air Force assuming that those nearly
1,500 guardsmen would transfer into a combined, Active Duty and
Reserve component, if we did take that approach?
General Thompson. Senator, you certainly characterized the
current state and situation very well. The Guard has served
effectively in the Air Guard beside Space Forces of, at the
time, the United States Air Force for decades. We cannot do
without the capability and missions that they provide today
moving into the future.
If, in fact, we do not create a Space National Guard, and
as you stated, the administration has come out with a statement
of policy to say that we do not want to create a Space Guard,
we do have to do that assessment in, ultimately, planning and
preparation to move those forces. We are doing an assessment
right now of that. We do not make the assumption that any
number of Guardmembers will make that transition; that option
would certainly be presented to that if it came to that point.
We are making no assumptions about whether those members would
accept or desire that transfer or not. We are certainly, as
part of our assessment, determining what would be required to
replace those members, by Space Force members, the numbers it
would take, the training time it would take, the training
resources it would take, and the corresponding degradation in
mission as we bring those units back up to full status.
So, there are some that think that a large number of
Guardmembers may transition. There are others that don't
believe that is the case. In our current assessment, we are not
making the assumption that a large number of Guardmembers would
transition.
Senator Kelly. When do you think you will have this
evaluation analysis done?
General Thompson. It is ongoing at this time. We anticipate
that it will be done in time to support the next budget
request.
Senator Kelly. Okay. Thank you.
Another quick question, General, in my remaining time about
space debris. My understanding is that the Space Surveillance
Network is currently tracking over 25,000 objects.
Does that mean that you have state vector on 25,000 objects
and how small can you currently track something?
General Thompson. Yes, sir. The updated number is now
approaching 40,000 objects----
Senator Kelly. Forty.
General Thompson.--and that is correct. We have what we
call ``custody,'' which is a state vector that is updated
routinely. We reliably track objects down to about 10 square
centimeters in radar cross-section. If you made a fist, the
size of your fist or perhaps a tennis ball, that is the size of
the object we can track reliably.
I will say even conservative estimates say there are
probably at least 10 times as many other objects that are
smaller than that in space that we cannot track.
Senator Kelly. So, that 40,000 number, presumably would go
up, not necessarily because there are more debris objects
populating LEO [Low Earth Orbit], but just that you are finding
more; is that accurate?
General Thompson. It could if, in fact, we had more
advanced sensors that had the reliable ability to track smaller
and smaller objects.
Senator Kelly. How often do you find yourself, you know,
looking for something and despite having the state vector, you
can no longer find it?
General Thompson. Senator, I would say that we encounter
hundreds to thousands of objects a day that we need to go back
and decide what the state vector is, and that is because they
are in odd orbits. They are on the edge of being large enough
or small enough, and in some cases, because of their size and
shape, operate unlike most of the objects in orbit, which is to
say, not in a Keplerian manner, as you understand it.
Senator Kelly. All right. Well, let's work together to
continue to refine this, because as these number of objects go
up, I think we are going to need, you know, better capability
because it just puts our assets and those of our allies at
risk.
General Thompson. Yes, sir.
Referring back to the last question, this is a perfect
application for AI, artificial intelligence and machine
learning, as well, to help us with that problem.
Senator Kelly. All right. Thank you, General.
Senator King. Senator Tuberville?
Senator Tuberville. Thank you very much.
Just to follow-up on that, if one satellite is destroyed,
how many pieces, basically, on average, would come from one
average satellite?
General Thompson. Senator, it depends on method. When the
Chinese destroyed their test satellite in 2007----
Senator Tuberville. Completely destroyed, right?
General Thompson. Completely destroyed.
They created over 3,700 pieces of debris that we could
track, and, again, there are large, perhaps 10 times as many
smaller pieces we cannot.
The Russians----
Senator Tuberville. Which was last year, right, Russia?
General Thompson. The Russians, last year, created more
than 1,500 pieces of debris of that we are currently tracking.
So, that depends on, in many cases, exactly what you are
talking about, thousands of pieces of debris with a kinetic
destruction.
Senator Tuberville. So that is going to be a huge, huge
problem in the future, correct, if they continue to test
missiles?
General Thompson. Sir, I would say, yes, that is right. In
fact, that is one of the reasons for the tenets for
responsibility of behavior that were released by the Secretary
of Defense last year, and the statement made by the
administration about destructive ASAT testing.
Senator Tuberville. Now, they are there forever, right?
General Thompson. Not quite forever, but for years to
decades, certainly, depending on the orbital regime.
Senator Tuberville. Our lifetime?
General Thompson. Yes, sir.
Senator Tuberville. Yeah. This is kind of for all of you,
you know, very simple: What would you say is the most
successful aspect of the National Security Space Launch
program, what is the most successful thing that we have done?
Mr. Plumb. Thank you, Senator.
I think that the ability to do, one, make sure we have the
two providers and do these things in block-buys, it seems to be
driving down costs, we were just talking about this before the
hearing, and it provides some stability to those contractors.
So, I think it looks like a success from where I sit.
Senator Tuberville. Is the cost going down or up as we
speak?
I know in your purview----
Mr. Plumb. I feel like my acquisition colleague should
answer that, if that is all right, sir?
General Thompson. Sir, I know what I would say is that over
the life of the program, based on the previous approach to
launch and what we pursue today in the National Security Space
Launch program, we believe we have saved over $7 billion in
terms of what we would have paid using the past program.
I will tell you, based on the current growth in the
commercial launch industry in recent years, the addition of
that competition is helping to drive costs down and may very
well drive them further down in the future.
Senator Tuberville. We couldn't make it without the
commercial people, could we? Or it would be very expensive?
General Thompson. No question, it would be more expensive
without commercial providers.
Mr. Calvelli. Yes, I would add to that by saying having two
distinct companies providing launch services, I think, is great
for the Nation; the more the merrier.
Senator Tuberville. Yes.
General Thompson. Senator, if I may?
Senator Tuberville. Yes. Go ahead.
General Thompson. So, the Major ``DT'' Thompson was the
investigating officer on the last National Security Space
Launch accident in 1999. I will tell you, one launch at a time,
for almost 100 national security launches and more missions:
success. Every one of those launches is the most important
factor of the National Security Space Launch program for 22
years.
Senator Tuberville. Mr. Calvelli, as a transition from the
single launch procurement awards to block-buys reduced the
price of space launch? Has it reduced it?
Mr. Calvelli. So, I don't know specifically on NSSL
[National Security Space Launch], but my understanding, in
general of space, when you do things in a block, it does help
you to reduce the costs, yes.
Senator Tuberville. General?
General Thompson. Yes, Senator, absolutely.
Senator Tuberville. Absolutely. As the Department considers
the next launch procurement contract, what new requirements
will be included to ensure the United States beats China and
Russian efforts to impact our space capabilities?
Either one--anybody?
General Thompson. Yes, Senator. In terms of new
requirements from an operational sense, right now, the answer
is not many significantly in this specific sector. We still
have the same sorts of reference missions and payload designs
that we need in this phase.
Where, I will tell you the new opportunities and new
requirements are in a couple of areas. The first is in smaller
and responsive launch to deal with things like the potential
rapid replenishment of capabilities is one area of potential
growth. The second is, as we see a lot of interest and energy
in on-orbit servicing and maneuver, and so, an approach that
not only launches the satellites to orbit or perhaps moves them
around in orbit, refuels, and replenishes them; those are a
couple of areas of what I will call the space launch enterprise
that are growing, specifically related to National Security
Space Launch in phase 3, very similar in terms of the
requirements for the next phase.
Senator Tuberville. Yeah, thank you.
I was excited about seeing the IG [inspector general]
report yesterday moving a little bit closer possibly to get
Space Command to Redstone Arsenal and, you know, we are
military friendly and look forward to that possibly happening.
Thank you, all. Thank you very much.
Senator King. Thank you for that advertisement for the
State of Alabama.
[Laughter.]
Senator King. Senator Cramer?
Senator Cramer. There is nothing wrong with advocating for
the hometown----
[Laughter.]
Senator Cramer.--as long as there aren't too many of you.
No, it is all good.
Thanks, you guys, for being here for your service. Thanks
for this morning's briefing, as well. It was really important,
and it was interesting, you know, at least the parts that I
understood, and I was encouraged, so thank you.
Secretary Calvelli and General Thompson, I want to talk a
little bit about one of my favorite topics under your direct
command and that is, of course, the PARCS [Perimeter
Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System] Radar
Facility at Cavalier. I did ask General Raymond and General
Brown about this last week, and you might have heard that or
watched it; if not, I am going to ask you the same question
anyway.
I noticed that it is not funded for in the budget, the
modernization. I brought it up because I am concerned, because
this year's budget documents say that this radar has a, quote,
high risk and equipment failures will cause unacceptable
mission downtime. I don't want that to happen, and I don't
think you want that to happen. It is a 50-year-old radar that
is doing important work. I know there is an analog-to-digital
modernization effort that the Program Office is looking at, and
General Raymond told us the Space Force would address the PARCS
issue in the coming budget years.
I just want to make sure that you are aware of the
precarious situation that Cavalier seems to be in, and do you
agree that this important 50-year technology needs a complete
overhaul, if not this year, soon, to each of you?
If you want to speak to the PARCS Radar in general, that
would be fine.
General Thompson. Yes, sir.
Senator, I will absolutely say, first of all, it does fill
a critical role in our missile-warning enterprise today. Part
of the assessment, and we need to sustain it for that role into
the future, part of what we are looking at in that regard, as
well, is as we look at advancing threats, as we look at
hyperglide vehicles, as we look at fractional, orbital
bombardment systems, and the ability to basically fly around
the South Pole to be able to attack the United States, we are
in the process of understanding what the future of missile-
warning and missile-defense architecture needs to look like and
the role that PARCS may play in that. We are still doing that
assessment. But, certainly, in the near term, it must be
sustained.
The other thing I will say, and it is to some of the
discussion I had with Senator Kelly, it plays a vital role in
space surveillance today, as well, and we need to ensure that
that capability remains.
Senator Cramer. All right. Thank you.
I want to spend a little time now on SDA [Space Development
Agency], because I know we are at that moment here in a few
months where it gets rolled in when we set up Space Force. Of
course, one of the goals was, and you all are doing well at it,
is streamlining acquisition, obviously, speeding up R&D
[research and development], all of those important things that
you are here to talk about. But SDA, when we stood that up in
2021, it really, we are noting the importance of this and of
developing, preserving, really, an independent culture, which I
think is best for innovation.
So, now, once it gets rolled in, maybe you guys can help me
understand your commitment that SDA will preserve at least some
of its independence and autonomy, while it also does important
work for you and the Joint Force, of course. If you have a
sense of how that might be managed, that would be helpful.
Mr. Calvelli. Yeah, actually, you are thinking along the
same way I am. I am excited about SDA coming onboard. I think
they are doing some really neat stuff with their proliferated
LEO system and Tranche 1 for their communication satellites. I
think it is going to add new capabilities quickly because they
are doing things on 2-year centers. I think it is going to add
resiliency to the architecture. I like their culture. I am
looking forward to them coming onboard and I don't see any
major changes in terms of how they do business or their
culture.
Senator Cramer. That is great. Thank you. Thank you for
that.
Continuing along that topic, then, for a moment in the
culture of innovation and rapid acquisition, MTA [Middle Tier
Acquisition], Military Acquisition Pathway was designed to
facilitate rapid prototyping and fielding the new threat-driven
capabilities and time frames not met by the traditional
requirements process.
Do you support granting SDA Middle Tier Acquisition
authority so that they can continue to move fast, then?
Mr. Calvelli. Yeah, from what I have seen, you know, I
think on the Space Force side, there is about eight or nine
programs that are used in 804 authorities. It has allowed them
to go a little bit quicker.
We talked earlier about the fact that speed is really what
this Nation needs, and so, yes, I would support them having 804
authorities.
Senator Cramer. Well, maybe, and since you are on such a
roll, and I am tracking with you, maybe talk a little bit more
about the procurement enterprise and the reorganization and how
you see that playing out, so we can, I always like to say, move
at the speed of China, but I am not sure if that is the right
way to put it or not, but I just know we need to be fast.
Mr. Calvelli. Yes, so I am still getting my are arms around
it. So, clearly, you know, and under my portfolio now is Space
Systems Command, then you have SDA coming onboard on October 1,
and then you have got Space RCO. You know, all three are unique
in their own way and all three have sort of their own unique
characteristics. I am not a big proponent of reorgs; I just
think they are boring, they are messy, and they get nothing
accomplished. So, I am looking forward to actually having these
three separate elements in the portfolio and making sure they
have the authorities, responsibilities, and we have the right
things in place to go ahead and gain that speed and take
advantage of each one's distinct strengths.
Senator Cramer. Well, Secretary Plumb, I am out of time,
but I was going to ask you, basically, the same question about
cyber, and probably the role of commercial and integration of
all of that, if you have a quick answer or just as a thought,
that would be helpful.
Mr. Plumb. Senator, I think that the cyber piece here, if
that is what you are asking, is really important. While I don't
think we fully have our hands around it, defense, in-depth for
satellite architecture is hard, for ground stations, it is
hard. I am in a lot of meetings about this, where we have to
break through this idea that there is just a defensive
perimeter, and people know this now, but getting to this is a
journey.
Senator Cramer. Well, be open with us as to how we can
help, whether it is a policy issue or an oversight issue,
because we need, you know, we need that culture cultivated.
But, thank you for sharing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Thank you. We will have the second round.
Senator Fischer?
A very practical question. I have heard the word ``GPS''
mentioned maybe six or eight times so far this afternoon. What
if you are in an F-35 in conflict situation 35,000 feet about
the Pacific and GPS goes off, what is that pilot able to do?
General?
General Thompson. Senator, I need to be careful, because I
am neither a pilot, nor that familiar with the F-35, but I will
tell you absolutely there are concerns with many of our systems
today and their inability to navigate effectively over the long
term with GPS denial.
Now, obviously, we do train. In fact, before I left the Air
Force and transitioned to Space Force, we do train our pilots
and their systems in a GPS-denied environment and how to
respond. Their ability to aviate and fly safely is generally
assured, but, obviously, there is likely to be a mission
impact.
But, it does absolutely go to your point that while GPS is
the world standard, it is perhaps, fair to say we have come to
rely on it solely and exclusively and too heavily, and
certainly within the Department, there are activities ongoing
to augment it, to supplement it, to provide additional means of
being able to navigate and position and conduct missions.
Senator King. I would think it would be a high priority. I
remember several years ago hearing that Annapolis was going
back to teaching celestial navigation, but I understand they
really aren't. They are talking about it, but they haven't
really done it.
But somebody has got to be thinking about this because in a
conflict, if I am the adversary, the first thing I am going to
do is try to knock out GPS in order to blind us.
General Thompson. Senator, inside all of the services,
especially inside, the Army is probably leading right now. The
Navy is not far behind. But the Air Force, as well, they are
looking at a host of technologies and methodologies for
positioning and navigation.
The one that you specifically referred to, in fact, they
are developing techniques for celestial navigation
automatically, without a navigator, a human navigator,
required.
Senator King. There has got to be a way to automate a
sextant.
General Thompson. Yes, sir, absolutely.
Frankly, to be able to do it in daylight when the human eye
can't see stars. There is technology in that regard.
Many years ago, onboard navigation and inertial navigation
systems were the way we conducted business in the 1950s and
1960s before GPS was rampant. It is time to reinvest in those
technologies and those capabilities, I think, to advance them.
There is even techniques that allow systems to measure the
magnetic field of the earth and based on the variations in the
earth's magnetic field, figure out where you are. Terrain
mapping. There are a lot of ways to solve this problem and I
would say probably inside the Department of Defense, I think we
finally have enough people who have woken up to the fact that
GPS is the world standard, will remain the world standard for a
long time, but we have to be prepared for those who wish to
deny us GPS and operation to be able to fight through and
defend.
Senator King. Thank you. I appreciate that and I hope that
that is an urgent consideration.
Dr. Plumb, in your testimony, you said something, touched
on international discussions, international negotiations. How
is that going? Is that real? Is there any interest? I mean,
this strikes me as an area where we could have a space version
of UNCLOS [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea],
not that we couldn't get that through the Senate, but----
[Laughter.]
Mr. Plumb. That is--I will leave that joke on the table.
Senator King. Yeah.
Mr. Plumb. But, Senator, actually, the United Nations open
in a working group is just meeting. I will point out that
Canada has joined us in their commitment to not conduct
destructive ASAT testing, which is one small piece of this.
There are several other like-minded nations in support.
Our goal there is, you know, a fewfold. One is to go with
an open mind and welcome ideas on ways to increase transparency
and ensure a stable space environment. The fact that these
discussions are ongoing in looking at a way to build both,
norms and hopefully keep debris-mitigation standards in force.
Right now, we have UN [United Nations] mitigation guidelines,
but not everyone follows them. There is quite a bit going on.
We are right at the beginning of it, but I think there is
value and there is momentum. I do think the vice president's
announcement gave us a little bit of a kickstart, which helps,
too.
Senator King. Final question: Is there systematic
coordination, and by that, I mean an organized council or some
body that does the coordination between Space Force, NRO, NASA
[National Aeronautics and Space Administration]? I mean, I just
worry that we are, there may well be duplication and overlap in
terms of launch and satellite development.
I would hate to, I mean, I know from the Intelligence
Committee, we spend a lot of money with NRO on satellites and I
would hope that there would be coordination so that we are not
duplicating.
Mr. Calvelli. Actually, there is. From my time at the NRO,
there actually used to be, and I think there still is,
quarterly meetings with NRO, NASA, and the Air Force to, and
now the Space Force, just to make sure that they do coordinate
and understand what each one is working on. So there is
actually a pretty tight relationship across all three of those
organizations.
Inside the Space Force, there is the Space Acquisition
Council that this committee put in place that helps to
integrate across all of the services across the Pentagon for
space features and then SSC [Space Systems Command] and other
teams have a lower-level council called the Program Integration
Council, does the same, as well.
So, there is actually, sir, a lot of teamwork going on
across the community for space.
Senator King. Good. Thank you.
Senator Fischer?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Plumb, section 1609 of last year's NDAA required the
Department to review the classification level of space programs
to determine whether they could be reduced or declassified. It
is my understanding that you are leading this effort. Can you
update us on the status, please?
Mr. Plumb. Yes. Thank you, Senator, for this opportunity.
So, I have been looking at that. My team has been looking
at it and looking at it with General Raymond's staff. That is
an enormous tasking. It is far beyond any 90-day deadline.
I think, fundamentally, the place I am going on this, and I
am speaking for myself here, not the Department yet, is that
probably all of those things, the hundreds and hundreds of
things that are classified for the Space Force are probably
appropriately classified. The fundamental question is, does the
classification guide need to be redone, which is sort of a
follow-on task.
So, I will be working with you and this committee, as well
as on the House side, to try to find the right way forward to
make this scope correctly. If that is the test that we need to
get addressed, then we need to get to that.
Senator Fischer. Are there any efforts being made to
declassify threat information that we receive?
Mr. Plumb. So that, of course, is not that 1609 piece, but
it is important. I will note that DNI Haines annual threat
assessment that just, I think she was on the Hill yesterday on
it, it is stamped February, but I just saw a copy of it
yesterday, so it does go farther than I think previous things
on both, as General Thompson has been pointing out, as well.
You know, China and Russia both have on-orbit and ground-
based antisatellite systems targeting United States and allied
satellites. I think that is a new statement.
So, there is some effort there. You could argue whether we
could do more, but, you know, all of these things, we have to
be careful about what would we, you know, what is the
intelligence gain and loss on any of these issues.
Senator Fischer. Yeah, you know----
General Thompson. Senator?
Senator Fischer. Oh, go ahead.
General Thompson. Senator Fischer, if I may?
The Defense Intelligence Agency just released a very
extensive, unclassified report about competition in space. I
have not seen that level of communication on, in an
unclassified sense into adversary threat systems in a long
time. It is a very good product and I think it has taken us a
long way where we need to go in terms of communicating those
threats.
Senator Fischer. Okay. I think it is extremely important,
without putting any of our people or our systems or our ways
that we find information in jeopardy, to be able to get some
kind of information out to the public, but also to certain
think tanks who assume that they understand what is taking
place in classified briefings and they don't even sometimes
come close to what is discussed in those briefings and they
make statements and generalizations and they take positions on
false information.
But I think it would be especially helpful, as I said, for
the public to understand threats that this country faces and I
do believe our people would be very, very supportive of
programs that are in place, or that are being put in place, to
protect this country. Thank you.
Senator King. Senator Tuberville?
Senator Tuberville. I want to ask one crazy question here.
Is there, with the need of speed in the future, is there any
thought of nuclear power in space?
Mr. Plumb. Absolutely, there is. NASA, I think, has a large
portion lead. If DOD is working on it, I haven't uncovered that
piece yet. But, roughly, there is a lot of advantage to some
form of nuclear propulsion, long-duration missions, including
manned missions, you know, a larger power source. These are
being looked at, but space nuclear propulsion is an expensive
thing to look at and do safely, and in practice, but it is
being worked. I think NASA has the lead.
General Thompson. Yes, Senator.
Recent national space policy has reinvigorated to look at
nuclear power for electrical power generation and for nuclear
propulsion; in fact, the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency has a nuclear propulsion prototyping activity going on.
But in terms of NASA, NASA is looking at potential nuclear
power for use for moon-basing. We are absolutely looking at it
for propulsion and power generation on orbit going forward.
Senator Tuberville. If we are going to do any planet-
hopping, you know, getting there a lot quicker is going to make
it, in the future, you know, Star Trek and all that stuff.
I have one company, and my NSA told me about it, EOS
Defense Systems, they have a low-cost method of removing space
debris. Have you ever heard of them out of Huntsville?
General Thompson. Senator, I have not, specifically.
I will tell you that our space works, our innovative engine
for space activities in a project called Orbital Prime, just
put out a call to research activities and proposals, recently
awarded 125 different initiative contracts to go forward. It is
very possible, I don't know for sure, it is very possible they
are one of those companies. But it is specifically focused on
that young, innovative, early companies looking for ways to
help us with the debris problem. It is very possible they are
part of that, but, unfortunately, I can't tell you for sure
that is the case.
Senator Tuberville. That is a good idea, you know,
commercially doing it, making money out of it. We can send
those names to Russia and China so they can clean up their mess
as we go.
So, thank you all very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Senator Cramer, any additional questions?
Senator Cramer. None from me, thank you.
Senator King. Thank you.
Well, thank you very much. It has been a very informative
hearing. I appreciate your testimony today and as I said, I
want to reiterate what both, Senator Fischer and I and Senator
Rounds mentioned: Any thoughts, ideas, suggestions, desires, in
terms of the National Defense Act, get them to us in very short
order.
Thank you very much. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:40 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky S. Rosen
space national guard
1. Senator Rosen. General Thompson, last week General Raymond
testified before the SASC that the Air National Guard has been
performing Space missions for over 27 years and ``he cannot do his job
without them.'' He then stated there are only two options to
effectively and efficiently continue those Space missions. He said and
I quote, ``Best way is one of two. Either have a separate Space
National Guard or take the capabilities in the Guard and move them into
this one component.'' In your best military advice what is the most
effective and efficient way to not lose this critical space capability?
Gerneral Thompson. As General Raymond stated in his testimony,
space professionals in the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve are
critical to the Space Force. USSF cannot execute our missions today
without their operational capability.
The Department of the Air Force developed a new approach to
military talent management and submitted a legislative proposal to
establish and implement the Space Component. The proposal, if enacted
into law, will merge existing regular Space and Air Force Reserve space
professionals into a new component that provides the Space Force with a
system that offers options for full and part time service, expands the
continuum of service, and strengthens recruiting and retention in the
long term.
As documented in the Statement of Administration Policy for H.R.
4350--National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, the
Administration opposes establishing a separate Space National Guard.
The Department of the Air Force continues to work within the
Administration on alternatives that are efficient, effective and
appropriate for space units and personnel.
2. Senator Rosen. General Thompson, what is the estimated cost to
establish a Space National Guard? What is the estimated cost to move
those missions into the proposed USSF Single Component? Will you lose
any critical space capability if those moves come to fruition?
Gerneral Thompson. Section 913 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 directed the Department to
prepare a report that included a discussion on the costs of
establishing a Space National Guard. Coordination of that report
continues.
The DAF is working on a plan that would rebuild the space missions
currently performed by the Air National Guard within the Space
Component by fiscal year 2025, which will include estimated costs.
commercial technologies
3. Senator Rosen. Secretary Calvelli, DIU has invested in the
commercial technology Orbital Outpost to study, prototype, and rapidly
field for DOD and Intelligence Community (IC) space-related missions.
Yet two years since DIU invested in Orbital Outpost, this technology
still has not been on-ramped through the DOD or the IC. What actions
are you taking to ensure commercial technologies that we have already
invested in, such as Orbital Outpost, are adopted by the DOD and IC??
Secretary Calvelli. The rapid growth of the commercial space sector
provides a significant opportunity for the DOD to utilize innovative
commercial capabilities and production processes to deliver critical
space capabilities. Each mission area must be evaluated to determine
the risks involved in order to achieve the proper balance between
government and commercial capabilities. Being brand new to the position
and to the DOD, I intend to take a balanced, risk-informed approach to
incorporating commercial space capabilities that leverages the agility,
innovation, and value of commercial systems without compromising
critical national security missions.
advancing threats
4. Senator Rosen. General Thompson, the Space Force now has a seat
on the Joint Chiefs, which is critical given space power is a
foundational support to the entire Joint Force. However, China and
Russia continue to advance their technology and capabilities in space
that degrades the United States's ability to support our Joint Force
Team. These advancing threats will significantly impact our way of
life, how we deter conflict, and how we project force as a Nation.
Given current policy restrictions, what is the Space Force doing to
develop flexible, responsive, reusable, and multi-domain systems that
can meet current and projected threats that seek to deny our advantage
in space?
Gerneral Thompson. As the Space Force prepares for future conflict
with China as a pacing threat, we are designing a next-generation
enterprise architecture that balances performance, resiliency, cost,
technology readiness/manufacturability, and speed of delivery in order
to field capabilities that address the full-scale of evolving threats
in the next 5 to 10 years. The major feature of this approach is the
replacement of small numbers of very large, very capable satellites
with larger numbers of smaller, lower cost satellites in proliferated
and distributed constellations.
This approach aligns with the 2022 National Defense Strategy, which
outlines the need to build enduring advantage by accelerating force
development and modernizing space capabilities with an eye towards
future near-peer fights.
5. Senator Rosen. General Thompson, the Space Force's number one
unfunded priority is $326 million for classified programs. In the
appropriate setting, can you please share with the Committee additional
specific details on this request and the urgent capabilities that this
funding would provide?
Gerneral Thompson. Yes, we are coordinating a time to provide this
brief.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan S. Sullivan
cobra dane
6. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Plumb and General Thompson, as our
missile defense architecture ages, we must prioritize capability
modernization to meet combatant commander requirements and adequately
defend the homeland. As such, I commend Space Force's commitment to
allocate $77 million through 2027, including $18.6 million in 2023, to
sustain and modernize the COBRA DANE radar system located in Shemya
Island, Alaska. This system, and others like it, are critical to our
ballistic missile defense and supporting our Space Domain Awareness.
What other Space Force investments are necessary to further modernize
our aging domain awareness infrastructure?
Secretary Plumb. In addition to radar infrastructure, investments
in modern data analytics tools and software are key to maintaining
DOD's space domain awareness mission. My understanding is that the
Space Force has developed an aggressive plan to decommission the
decades-old Space Defense Operations Center (or SPADOC) software by
January 2023. This aging software would be replaced by a new, scalable
system that is better able to ingest radar data and track the rapidly
growing number of man-made space objects. Additionally, the Department
is assessing investments that may be needed to better integrate and
fuse sensor data from non-DOD sources to increase the robustness of
Space Domain Awareness.
The Space Force has also requested more than $4.7 billion in fiscal
year 2023 to begin deployment of a new, space-based missile warning and
missile tracking architecture, which is directly related to the missile
defense mission.
Gerneral Thompson. First, adversary advances in the areas of
hypersonics and maneuvering warheads mean we must radically modernize
our missile warning/missile tracking (MW/MT) infrastructure. The key
element of the new architecture is a space-based, proliferated hybrid
constellation of sensors that will provide global, launch to impact
track of these weapons and be resilient in the face of attack. This MW/
MT constellation features prominently in the Space Force portion of the
'23 President's Budget.
With regard to Space Domain Awareness, the Space Force continues to
rely on its global suite of ground and space-based sensors and is
fielding the new Deep Space Advanced Radar Concept, which will track
sophisticated threats in and around geosynchronous orbit. In addition,
the Space Force will continue to assess and use data from commercial
and allied sensors to enhance the SDA mission.
Finally, terrestrial and space weather sensing is critical to
provide the surface, cloud, and atmosphere forecast U.S. expeditionary
troops require for operations, training, and tactical planning. USSF is
investing in the Weather System Follow-on Microwave program to enhance
real-time weather observations while preparing to sunset the legacy and
dying Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP).
arctic communications
7. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Calvelli and General Thompson, in
2021, the Air Force invested $50 million to test polar satellites in
low Earth orbit. These satellites will be closer to Earth, resulting in
reduced launch costs and faster data transmission. Throughout 2021, the
Air Force sponsored launches of dozens of satellites, tested laser
links for communications between the satellites, and installed cold-
hardened ground terminals across the Arctic region. If this system
works as planned, US Forces will enjoy reliable Arctic communications
for missions ranging from search and rescue to complex training
exercises. It will also enable the civilian populace to obtain adequate
Internet access essential to participation in the modern economy. Could
you provide more detail on how these low-earth orbit satellites enhance
joint force communications in the Arctic?
Secretary Calvelli. The Department's investments in ISR, domain
awareness, and communications broadly are important for homeland
defense priorities and are particularly central to our ability to
operate in the Arctic region. Low-earth orbit constellations enhance
joint force communications in the Arctic by dramatically improving the
capacity, latency, and robustness of our communications in this very
challenging operating region. Using a portion of the $50M investment in
2021, we deployed and tested OneWeb satellite communications terminals
at Thule Air Base in Greenland. Previously, the entire base population
of several hundred airmen and guardians were sharing a very limited
communications link that provided about 2 percent of the throughput of
a typical home internet connection. OneWeb Low Earth Orbit satellites
and terminals have resulted in a 50X improvement in throughput at the
site, while also reducing communications latency by a factor of 5.
Gerneral Thompson. Building on Secretary Calvelli's comments: This
investment has allowed the guardians and airmen at Thule to begin
utilizing data-intensive services that were previously unavailable
while also benefiting from dramatically improved morale network
performance, including communications with family members around the
globe. By expanding low earth orbit communications from multiple
vendors to the Arctic region, we are gaining a powerful tool to ensure
robust communications for the joint force in all theaters, particularly
the challenging Arctic environment.
8. Senator Sullivan. General Thompson, in an Arctic Strategy brief
provided to my staff on May 10, 2022, Air and Space Force
representatives mentioned an Arctic Communications Roadmap Study that
is expected to be released shortly. Could you go into more detail on
this study and when we should expect to see it?
Gerneral Thompson. The Air Force and Space Force jointly developed
a comprehensive set of Department-wide solutions expected to improve
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance to support emerging Arctic missions. The roadmap also
identifies multi-domain investment opportunities capable of providing
diverse communication options for the Armed Forces. The Arctic
Communications Roadmap has been approved and will be provided
through appropriate channels shortly following the QFR release.
acquisitions
9. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Calvelli, what are today's top
acquisition challenges that threaten the development, deployment, and
sustainment of space systems to guarantee users the benefits of space
capabilities?
Secretary Calvelli. Space acquisition plays a pivotal role in
outpacing our strategic competitors. Challenges include: speed of
delivery; discipline in program execution; stovepiped architectures;
and ensuring ground systems are ready before launch. Exercising program
management discipline is critical to ensure we deliver new capabilities
on schedule, on cost and meeting requirements. This needs to be done to
maintain our technological advantage. Architectures need to be agile,
resilient and integrated in order to ensure synchronization and take
advantage of our partners across the services, interagency and
international. We must also increase our ability to leverage commercial
capabilities.
10. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Calvelli, in detail, how do you
recommend we address your top acquisition challenges?
Secretary Calvelli. Your continued support for acquisition
flexibility will remain critical as we seek to deliver space
capabilities that keep us ahead of our threats, as well as your
continued help in providing on-time authorization and funding so that
we in turn can execute and deliver capabilities to outmatch our
adversaries.
clear space force station tours
11. Senator Sullivan. General Thompson, the community surrounding
Clear Space Force Station is eager to host guardians and their families
if Air Force policies permit accompanied tours. I understand that the
Space Force has the authority to implement two or three year
accompanied tours for guardians assigned to Clear SFS. Do you and
General Raymond need any additional authorities to implement such a
policy?
Gerneral Thompson. Unfortunately Clear SFS will likely remain an
unaccompanied tour for the near future due to the lack of quality of
life and family-related programs, and resources on station or in the
surrounding area. Twelve Active Duty guardians, 105 National Guard
personnel, and more than 20 airmen are currently assigned to Clear.
a. Anderson is the closest town, population <200 per 2020 census
(86 mi away) with very limited services available
b. Nenana is the next closest town, population <400 per 2020
census (820 mi away) with very limited services available
c. Fairbanks is the closest metro area, approximately a 2 hour
drive
Exceptions to policy could be granted (with a waiver from OSD), but
would require thorough vetting to ensure the member could find housing
in Anderson or Nenana, while understanding the limited community and
family support services within the within the normal commuting distance
of 50 miles.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023 AND
THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 18, 2022
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
MISSILE DEFENSE STRATEGY, POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:30 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Angus
King (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Committee Members present: King, Kelly, Fischer, Rounds,
Sullivan, and Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS KING
Senator King.--budget submission for the Missile Defense
Agency and missile defense policies in preparation for fiscal
year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The
Department of Defense (DOD) has submitted to the Congress a
Missile Defense Review (MDR) and Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
along with the National Defense Strategy (NDS).
While this overall document is classified and we await an
[laughter] unclassified version, and await, and await an
unclassified version--we would like to have that, by the way--
it continues the policy of defending the homeland and deterring
attacks against the United States while assuring our allies,
through a Regional Missile Defense Strategy. I would note it
also continues the policy of reliance on our nuclear deterrent
to protect against large and sophisticated attacks against our
Homeland from intercontinental ballistic missiles, air-launched
ballistic missiles, or sea-launched ballistic missile threats
from near-peer adversaries such as Russia and China.
Missile defense has two new aspects that we hope to examine
in today's hearing. First and foremost is the defense against
hypersonic missiles, which do not follow a ballistic
trajectory. Second is the requirement to protect Guam against
any threats that China might pose. This is a daunting task that
requires integration of missile defense systems from the Army,
Navy, and Missile Defense Agency, and one I hope we will learn
more about in today's hearing.
The President's Budget submission for the Missile Defense
Agency is $9.6 billion, a decrease from the fiscal year 2022
enacted level of $10.3 billion. I would like to know how the
fiscal year 2023 budget request continues your effort for
Homeland and regional missile defense as well as defense
against new threats such as hypersonic missiles.
Again, let me thank today's witnesses for agreeing to
appear. After opening statements we will have rounds of 5-
minute questions for the witnesses.
Senator Fischer?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to
all of our witnesses today. We appreciate you appearing before
us today and we look forward to hearing from each of you.
Overall, the budget request for fiscal year 2023 is a
significant improvement over what the Administration proposed
last year, and contains robust funding for the Next-Generation
Interceptor program as well as for the defense of Guam.
While I am happy to see the Department finalize its plan
for defending Guam and dedicate significant resources to do so,
I cannot help but feel that this effort is already behind. The
last two INDOPACOM commanders sought support for this project,
and this subcommittee proposed to begin funding it 2 years ago,
an effort that was ultimately rejected in favor of further
study. In the time that has passed, the threat has only gotten
worse.
Additionally, I continue to be concerned about the overall
level of funding for missile defense proposed in this year's
budget proposal. Compared to the fiscal year 2022 appropriation
the Missile Defense Agency's budget would decline by over $700
million, a reduction of over 7 percent, at a time when threats
are growing and the Department's purchasing power is being
eroded by the effects of inflation.
I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses about
these issues and about how the fiscal year 2023 request would
impact their mission.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Thank you. Our witnesses today are the
Honorable Dr. David Honey, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering; Honorable John F. Plumb,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy; General Glen
VanHerck, Commander, U.S. Northern Command and North American
Aerospace Defense Command; Lieutenant General Daniel Karbler,
Commanding General, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense
Command; and Vice Admiral Jon Hill, Director, Missile Defense
Agency.
Secretary Honey, please.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAVID HONEY, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
Mr. Honey. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and
distinguished members of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee,
thank you for the honor to appear before you today and to
provide testimony on behalf of the Department of Defense for
the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on missile defense.
I am pleased and appreciate the opportunity to discuss this
important topic.
In a rapidly evolving threat environment, U.S. adversaries
are developing more lethal weapons by advancing technology in
areas such as ballistic, hypersonic, and cruises missiles that
threaten the safety and security of the United States and our
allies. In support of the National Defense Strategy priorities,
the Department of Defense created the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to set the
strategy for technology and innovation while addressing the
needs of the joint force. Directed energy, a defense-specific
technology, is a key critical technology area we are developing
to counter a wide variety of current and emerging threats with
the goal of rapid response and engagement at the speed of
light.
This is a joint effort that is being largely supported and
carried out by the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering, the Missile Defense Agency, the Air
Force, the Army, and the Navy. The scope of the effort spans
countering cruise missiles in the near term, hypersonic
missiles in the near and medium term, and ballistic missiles in
the long term.
To address the threat of adversaries' cruise missiles, a
number of key technologies and capabilities crucial for
countering cruise missiles will be demonstrated over the next 2
years. The OUSD(R&E) High Energy Laser Scaling Initiative, also
known as HELSI, is funding industry to develop and deliver
high-energy laser technology for cross-domain applications
across the Department.
The Department is also developing high-power microwave
weapons for a wide range of missions, including countering
drones, cruise missiles, and hypersonic missiles. There is the
Microwave Technology Testbed at MDA, the Remote Electromagnetic
Disruption of Critical Advanced Threat, also known as REDCAT,
at the Navy, and the Counter-Electronic High-Power Microwave
Extended-Range Air Base Air Defense, CHIMERA, at the Air Force.
Lastly, countering hypersonic and ballistic missiles will
require substantially more laser power. Therefore, under the
HELSI effort, R&E [Research & Engineering] will begin scaling
laser powers in fiscal year 2023, and is examining
opportunities to accelerate the scaling significantly. This
combined with improved beam control systems will allow
capabilities against hypersonic and ballistic missiles to be
developed by the services and Missile Defense Agency.
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, Members of the
Subcommittee, the R&E is committed to setting the technology
and innovation strategy to advance defense-specific
technologies, such as directed energy, and deliver these
critical capabilities to the warfighter. We will continue to
support these joint efforts to increase readiness as well as
the capability and capacity of fielded homeland and regional
missile defense systems while investing in advanced technology
that offer new ways to counter a diverse set of threats.
Thank you again for the invitation to testify and I look
forward to answering the committee's questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Honey follows:]
Prepared Statement by Honorable David A. Honey
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, thank you for the honor to appear
before you today and provide testimony on behalf of the Department of
Defense for the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Missile
Defense. I am pleased and appreciate the opportunity to discuss this
important topic.
In a rapidly evolving threat environment, U.S. adversaries are
developing more lethal weapons by advancing technology in areas such as
ballistic, hypersonic and cruises missiles that threaten the safety and
security of the United States and our allies. In support of the
National Defense Strategy priorities, the Department of Defense created
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering to set the strategy for technology and innovation while
addressing the needs of the joint force. Directed Energy, a defense-
specific technology, is a key critical technology area we are
developing to counter a wide variety of current and emerging threats
with the goal of rapid response and engagement at the speed of light.
This is a joint effort that is being largely supported and carried
out by the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering (OUSD(R&E), the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the Air
Force, the Army, and the Navy. The scope of the effort spans countering
cruise missiles in the near term, hypersonic missiles in the near and
medium term, and ballistic missiles in the long term.
To address the threat of adversaries' cruise missiles, a number of
key technologies and capabilities crucial for countering cruise
missiles will be demonstrated over the next two years. The OUSD(R&E)
High Energy Laser Scaling Initiative (HELSI) is funding industry to
develop and deliver high energy laser technology for cross-domain
applications across the Department.
The Department is also developing High Power Microwave (HPM)
weapons for a wide range of missions including countering drones,
cruise missiles, and hypersonic missiles. There is the Microwave
Technology Testbed at MDA, the Remote Electromagnetic Disruption of
Critical Advanced Threat (REDCAT) at the Navy, and the Counter-
Electronic High-Power Microwave Extended-Range Air Base Air Defense
(CHIMERA) at the Air Force.
Lastly, countering hypersonic and ballistic missiles will require
substantially more laser power. Therefore, under the HELSI effort,
OUSD(R&E) will begin scaling laser powers in Fiscal Year 2023, and is
examining opportunities to accelerate the scaling significantly. This
combined with improved beam control systems will allow capabilities
against hypersonic and ballistic missiles to be developed by the
Services and MDA.
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, Members of the Subcommittee,
the OUSD(R&E) is committed to setting the technology and innovation
strategy to advance defense-specific technologies, such as directed
energy, and deliver these critical capabilities to the warfighter. We
will continue to support these joint efforts to increase readiness as
well as the capability and capacity of fielded homeland and regional
missile defense systems while investing in advanced technology that
offer new ways to counter diverse sets of threats.
Thank you again for the invitation to testify and I look forward to
answering the committee's questions. Thank you.
Senator King. Dr. Plumb?
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN PLUMB, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY
Mr. Plumb. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and
members of the committee, thank you for inviting me again to
testify today, today on missile defense strategy policies and
programs.
The missile threat continues to evolve, and as Secretary
Austin has stated, China is the Department's pacing threat.
China has advanced its missile capabilities over the last 20
years to counter the United States and the Indo-Pacific and to
intimidate and threaten its neighbors, including Taiwan.
Russia is developing, testing, and deploying new missile
that pose challenges for United States missile warning, and
Ukraine, Russia has launched well over 1,500 missiles as part
of an unprovoked campaign that has caused the deaths of
thousands.
North Korea continues to improve, expand, and diversify its
missile capabilities, posing an increasing risk to the United
States Homeland, our forces, allies, and partners. North Korea
has accelerated its missile testing in recent months, including
the launch of long-range missiles.
Iran maintains a large and growing inventory of regional
missiles as well as uncrewed aerial system, UAS, which it uses
both directly and via proxy groups to strike its neighbors.
Iran's nascent space program could shorten its pathway to a
future long-range missile capability.
In light of these threats, the Department reassessed its
missile defense policy, including inputs from interagency
stakeholders, allies, and partners, in the 2022 Missile Defense
Review, the MDR. As you have noted, the classified MDR was
provided to Congress in late March.
Missile defenses contribute to deterrence in many ways.
They provide resilience, they complicate adversary attack plans
and reduce adversary confidence, they raise the threshold for
potential conflict, they help assure our allies and partners,
and they limit damage from missile attacks, which in turn
provides additional decision space for senior leadership.
The Department's top priority is to defend the homeland and
deter attacks against the United States. The President's Budget
Request includes significant investments in homeland missile
defense, including $2.8 billion to develop the Next-Generation
Interceptor and for the service life extension of our GBIs;
$4.7 billion to fund the transition to a resilient missile
warning and missile track satellite architecture--and it is
important to note that this is not part of the MDA budget. This
is $4.7 billion for the Space Force--$278 million for new,
over-the-horizon radars to enhance our ability to detect cruise
missile attacks on the Homeland; and $892 mission to field
missile defense capabilities to augment the THAAD [Terminal
High-Altitude Area Defense] battery on Guam. Guam, like all
United States territories, is unequivocally part of the United
States Homeland, and a missile strike against Guam is a direct
attack against the United States.
For regional defense the Department is also strengthening
our missile defenses to counter regional threats that include
hypersonic threats. The President's budget request invests
heavily in regional ballistic cruise and hypersonic missile
defenses, including $3 billion for Army ballistic and cruise
missile defense programs, including the procurement of 252 more
Patriot Interceptors; $2 billion for Aegis BMD [ballistic
missile defense], including procurement of 57 more SM3
missiles; $335 million for THAAD development, procurement, and
testing; $1.3 billion for hypersonic missile tracking and
defense; and $825 million for counter-UAS solutions.
The sobering reality of the tragic events in Ukraine, in
which Russia has used and continues to use a broad array of
missiles to attack, and in my opinion terrorize, civilian
populations highlights the extent to which our adversaries are
prepared to use missiles in a conflict. Missile defenses are
critical for defending the U.S. Homeland and for defending our
deployed forces and our allies and partners. The Department and
the Administration remain committed to improving them.
I look forward to working with the Congress to advance this
shared goal, and I thank you and look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Plumb follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. John Plumb
introduction
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify before you today on
the Department's missile defense strategy, policies, and programs.
As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, I am
responsible for the overall supervision of Department of Defense (DOD)
policy pertaining to strategic capabilities essential for integrated
deterrence including space, cyber, missile defense, nuclear weapons,
and countering weapons of mass destruction.
I am honored to appear alongside General Glen VanHerck, Commander,
United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD), Vice Admiral Jon Hill, Director of the Missile
Defense Agency (MDA), Lieutenant General Daniel Karbler, Commander of
the U.S. Army's Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC), and Dr. David
Honey, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
(DUSD R&E).
Adversary advances in missile technologies, the marked increase in
deployed systems, and the documented use of missiles in conflicts
around the world show that missiles have become a common and expected
facet of modern warfare. This makes our missile defeat and missile
defense efforts more important than ever.
In this testimony I will examine how the missile threat has
evolved; provide an update on U.S. missile defense policy as informed
by the 2022 Missile Defense Review (MDR); and discuss the path forward
to address growing missile threats in the Department's fiscal year 2023
budget.
Missile Threat Evolution
Offensive missiles are increasingly weapons of choice for Russia,
China, North Korea, and Iran, for use in conflict and to coerce and
intimidate their neighbors both in peacetime and crisis.
People's Republic of China (PRC): As Secretary Austin has
stated, China is the Department's pacing threat. China has dramatically
advanced its development of conventional and nuclear armed ballistic
and hypersonic missile technologies and capabilities over the last
twenty years, through intense and focused investment, development,
testing, and deployments. China is using increasingly sophisticated and
proliferated space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) and improved command and control (C2) systems, to drive better
precision and accuracy of its missiles. Many of China's systems are
intended to deter and counter United States forward presence, force
projection, and operations, especially in the Western Pacific region
and give China the ability to further intimidate and threaten its
neighbors, including Taiwan.
Russia: Over the last ten years, Russia has prioritized
modernization of its intercontinental range missile systems. Russia is
developing, testing, and deploying new, diversified capabilities that
pose new challenges to United States missile warning systems. Russia's
regional missile arsenal underpins its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD)
strategies that are designed to undermine NATO's ability to project
force in response to crisis or conflict. Russia has developed and
fielded a suite of advanced precision-strike missiles that it has
employed with devastating operational and tactical effect in conflict
including in Ukraine and Syria. In Ukraine, we have witnessed Russia
employ over 1,500 missiles of all types, often targeting civilians and
civilian infrastructure, as part of its unprovoked campaign that has
caused the deaths of thousands of innocent men, women, and children.
North Korea: North Korea continues to improve, expand,
and diversify its conventional and nuclear missile capabilities, posing
an increasing risk to the United States Homeland and United States
forces, allies, and partners in the region. Most of North Korea's
ballistic missiles have an assessed capability to carry nuclear
payloads. North Korea has accelerated its missile testing in recent
months that included the launch of a long-range missile.
Iran: Iran maintains a large and growing regional missile
and UAS capability, which it leverages via its regional proxy groups to
coerce and threaten its neighbors, and ensure regime survival. Iran's
proxy wars in Yemen against Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates
(UAE), and in Gaza and Lebanon against Israel, further demonstrate its
willingness to use missiles and UAS capabilities to strike targets of
any type including civilian populations. Iran's nascent space program
could shorten its pathway to a future long-range missile capability.
Non-State Actors: Non-state actors also pose a threat to
U.S. regional interests, including our allies and partners. On today's
battlefields, non-state actors are employing increasingly complex
offensive UAS, rocket, and missile capabilities. State sponsors are
proliferating technology and weapons systems to non-state groups, which
have used them indiscriminately against innocent civilians. The recent
attack on an oil facility in Saudi Arabia is just one example of this
emerging threat.
United States Missile Defense Policy Update
The Department reassessed its missile defense policy as part of the
2022 MDR, which DOD provided in full to Congress in classified format
on March 28 as an integrated element of the 2022 National Defense
Strategy (NDS).
It is important to underscore the fully integrated approach that
DOD took to conducting the 2022 MDR as part of the development of the
NDS and alongside the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). This approach
ensured tight linkages between these key elements of our strategy and
our allocation of related resources. The NDS establishes four
priorities for the Department:
1. Defending the homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain
threat posed by the PRC.
2. Deterring strategic attacks against the United States, our
allies, and our partners.
3. Deterring aggression--while being prepared to prevail in
conflict when necessary--prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-
Pacific region, then the Russia challenge in Europe.
4. Building a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem.
The 2022 MDR was developed over a nearly year-long process. It
incorporates inputs from civilian and military stakeholders throughout
the Department and across the interagency, and takes into account
viewpoints solicited during extensive consultations with our allies and
partners.
Missile defenses represent a key element within an integrated
deterrence framework that weaves together all instruments of national
power. It does this by:
providing resilience to our deterrence and defense
posture through both active (e.g., kinetic and non-kinetic intercept
systems) and passive (e.g., redundancy, hardening, dispersal) means of
defense;
complicating adversary attack plans and reducing
confidence of attack success;
raising the threshold for potential conflict;
offering leverage for diplomatic efforts and assuring
allies and partners;
providing military options that may be less escalatory
than employing offensive systems;
and limiting damage from attacks, thus expanding the
decision making space for senior leaders.
Missile defenses and nuclear capabilities remain complementary.
U.S. nuclear weapons present the credible threat of a robust response
and overwhelming cost imposition, while missile defenses contribute to
deterrence by denial. If deterrence fails, missile defenses can
potentially mitigate effects from an attack.
As the scale and complexity of the missile threat increases, the
Department recognizes that to stay ahead we need to implement a
comprehensive missile defeat approach which includes missile defense
but is complemented by the credible threat of direct cost imposition
through nuclear and non-nuclear means. Missile defeat encompasses a
range of activities in all domains designed to counter the development,
acquisition, proliferation, potential and actual use of adversary
offensive missiles of all types, and to limit damage from such use.
Homeland Defense
Our missile defense policy guided the development of the Fiscal
Year 2023 Missile Defeat and Defense budget submission. In line with
the NDS, our top priority is to defend the homeland and deter attacks
against the United States. To achieve this strategic objective, the
President's
Budget requested $2.8 billion to fully fund efforts to improve the
capability and reliability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
system. These efforts include the development of the Next Generation
Interceptor (NGI) to augment the existing the Ground-based Interceptor
(GBI). The GMD system offers an important measure of protection for the
United States. GMD also contributes to reassuring our allies and
partners that the United States will not be coerced by threats to the
homeland from states like North Korea.
The United States of course maintains the right to defend itself
against attacks from any source, but GMD is neither intended for, nor
capable of, defeating the large and sophisticated intercontinental
ballistic missile, air-launched ballistic missile, or sea-launched
ballistic missile threats to the United States Homeland from Russia or
China. The United States relies on strategic deterrence to address
these threats.
The Department is taking necessary action in our fiscal year 2023
budget to enhance our domain awareness and warning capabilities. . The
President's Budget Request funds a number of defensive measures
including $278 million for new over-the-horizon radars to improve our
ability to detect and decrease the risks from cruise missile strikes
against U.S. critical assets. The President's Budget Request also
includes $4.7 billion to fund the transition to a new, resilient
missile warning and missile tracking architecture that will both
improve our capability to warn against and track new types of missile
threats while also improving our resilience against growing counter-
space threats.
Guam, like all United States territories, is unequivocally part of
the United States Homeland, and a missile strike against Guam would be
a direct attack against the United States. After assessing the
increased missile threat to Guam, the Department requested $892 million
in its fiscal year 2023 budget for the Missile Defense Agency, the
Army, and the Navy to develop and field missile defense capabilities to
augment the existing Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
battery currently emplaced on the island. This will contribute to the
overall defense of Guam and bolster United States military posture in
the Indo-Pacific region.
Regional Defense
The Department evaluated the regional missile threat to our
deployed forces and allies and partners, and concluded that we must
strengthen our regional missile defenses to counter all missile
threats--including hypersonic threats--regardless of origin. The United
States must continue to develop defenses against regional hypersonic
missile threats, to include building a persistent and resilient sensor
network to characterize and track all hypersonic threats, improve
attribution, and enable engagement. The President's Budget request
makes significant investments in regional ballistic, cruise, and
hypersonic missile defense capabilities to accomplish these objectives.
The transition to a resilient missile warning and missile tracking
architecture supports missile defense of the homeland as well as
regional missile defenses.
United States deployed forces, allies, and partners face the
proliferation of lower-tier threats, such as rockets and armed UAS. Our
adversaries will continue to seek ways to use these relatively
inexpensive, flexible, and expendable systems. The Department is
working to field technical and integrated counter-UAS solutions to
ensure we can collectively meet the range of threats and appropriately
hedge against future advancements.
Strengthening International Cooperation with Allies and Partners
The United States is committed to working with NATO and our other
allies and partners to maintain a credible level of regional defensive
capability against all missile threats from any adversary. This means
we must continue to look for new ways to protect our collective forces,
preserve our freedom of maneuver, and strengthen our security
commitments. Over the next year, we intend to focus on:
Identifying opportunities to coordinate on national
missile defense policies;
Aligning operational planning to maximize U.S., ally and
partner capabilities;
Capturing lessons learned from both real and simulated
events such as exercises;
Sharing information on air and missile threats;
Developing and exchanging missile defense visions;
Improving information protection efforts; and
Supporting ally and partner missile defense modernization
and capability development.
We view the missile defense capabilities of our allies and partners
as indispensable contributions to our shared defense and integrated
deterrence interests.
conclusion
The sobering reality of the tragic events in Ukraine, in which
Russia has used a broad array of missiles to attack and, in my opinion,
terrorize civilian populations, highlights the extent to which
adversaries are prepared to employ missiles in conflict. The centrality
of missile attacks as a component of Russia's aggression in Ukraine is
not an isolated occurrence--the use of missiles is becoming
increasingly commonplace in conflicts worldwide.
Missile defenses are a critical capability for defending the U.S.
Homeland, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners. Missile
defenses are also an important contribution to the Department's broader
integrated deterrence framework. The United States remains committed to
improving our homeland and regional missile defenses as we work to
deter conflict, and to prevail in conflict if deterrence fails. I look
forward to working with the Congress to advance this shared goal.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I look forward to
your questions.
Senator King. General VanHerck?
STATEMENT OF GENERAL GLEN VANHERCK, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE
COMMAND
General VanHerck. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is my honor to
represent the men and women of the United States Northern
Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command as we
defend Canada and the United States. I appreciate the
opportunity to testify alongside Dr. Honey, Dr. Plumb, Vice
Admiral Hill, and Lieutenant General Karbler.
NORTHCOM and NORAD face the most dynamic and strategically
complex environment in our respective histories. Strategy
competitors have openly declared their intent to hold our
homeland at risk in an effort to advance their own interests
and limit our options and ability to respond.
North Korea continues to test nuclear-capable ballistic
missiles with increased range and lethality, while Russia and
China have fielded and continue to invest heavily in advanced
long-range cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles, and delivery
platforms. As we have seen throughout Russia's unprovoked and
irresponsible invasion of Ukraine, Russia has fielded large
numbers of long-range cruise missiles, including hypersonic
missiles, that can cause enormous damage to infrastructure,
create strategic effects with conventional warheads.
These conventional precision strike capabilities and
advanced delivery platforms are designed specifically to hold
critical infrastructure in the homeland at risk below the
nuclear threshold, in order to disrupt and delay our ability to
project power globally while attempting to undermine our will
to intervene in a regional crisis overseas.
In my view, missile defense of the homeland starts with a
strategic deterrent, to include the options and survivability
provided by a reliable and effective nuclear triad. But as I
testified before the full committee, I am concerned that
deterrence by cost imposition does not adequately account for
the conventional capabilities our competitors have already
fielded. This over reliance increases the risk of
miscalculation and escalation because it limits our national
leaders' options in crisis and conflict.
To account for the full range of our competitors' nuclear
and conventional capabilities, it is necessary to balance
deterrence by cost imposition with deterrence by denial, an
integrated deterrence that employs all elements of national
influence. This integrated approach leverages both military and
non-military capabilities in order to provide our leaders with
a wide range of timely deterrence options.
To be clear, we must continually demonstrate to potential
aggressors that an attack on the homeland will result in
failure. We do that by demonstrating reliable and effective
capabilities that cause potential adversaries to doubt their
chances of an effective attack on the homeland. This is why I
continue to support Vice Admiral Hill's plan to field the Next-
Generation Interceptor by 2028, or sooner if possible.
Deterrence by denial also includes demonstrating homeland
readiness, responsiveness, and resiliency along a range of
kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities to defend the homeland.
NORTHCOM's support to civil authorities and our security
cooperation relationships with allies and partners are critical
to integrated deterrence, as is NORAD's mission to provide
threat warning and attack assessment and defend the approaches
to North America. In this strategy environment, we cannot wait
for our competitors to act. It is vital that we get ahead of
our competitors' decision-making and provide our national
leaders with timely and informed options needed to achieve
favorable outcomes.
With that necessity in mind, NORTHCOM and NORAD are focused
on four strategic principles in our homeland defense design,
starting with all-domain awareness, from under sea, on orbit,
and everything in between, to include the cyber domain. Simply
put, we have to be able to see the threats in order to deter
and, if required, defeat them.
I want to thank the subcommittee for your support of the
over-the-horizon radars on my fiscal year 2022 unfunded
priorities list. Over-the-horizon radar will significantly
improve my ability to detect and track threats in the air,
maritime, and space domains. I ask for your continued support
in authorizing the funding requested for over-the-horizon radar
in the fiscal year 2023 President's budget.
All-domain awareness is required to achieve information
dominance, which is the use of advanced capabilities like
machine learning and artificial intelligence to quickly
analyze, process, and deliver data to decision-makers at the
speed of relevance. By doing so, we will increase senior leader
decision space and enable decision superiority over
competitors.
Finally, today's problems are global and all-domain, and
they demand globally integrated strategies, plans, and actions.
Missile threats to the homeland inherently originate beyond my
area of responsibility, so it is vital that we have the ability
to detect potential threats and share data rapidly between
commands, agencies, allies, and partners around the world.
These strategic priorities are vital elements of our ability to
execute a layered defense in the execution of the National
Defense Strategy and integrated deterrence.
I will end by thanking the committee for all you have done
to support our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and
guardians as they defend the homeland. Thanks for the
opportunity to appear and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General VanHerck follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Glen D. VanHerck
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee: thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am
proud to lead the men and women of United States Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) as we
defend the United States and Canada in an increasingly complicated and
dynamic strategic environment. Our commands continue to face multiple
simultaneous challenges from capable, highly advanced competitors who
have openly declared their intent to hold our homelands at risk in an
effort to advance their own strategic interests.
Today, strategic competitors, rogue nations, and non-state actors
possess the capability to strike institutions and critical
infrastructure in the United States and Canada. These threats, along
with the realities of modern global competition, drive USNORTHCOM and
NORAD to think globally and seek innovative capabilities that increase
senior leader decision space and help to expand the range of available
options for deterring in competition, de-escalating in crisis, and--if
necessary--defeating in conflict.
As the U.S. combatant command responsible for homeland defense, for
providing defense support of civil authorities, and security
cooperation with allies and partners in our area of responsibility,
USNORTHCOM is facing the most dynamic and strategically complex set of
challenges in the history of the command. Together with NORAD, the
distinct, complementary United States-Canada bi-national command
responsible for aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime
warning for the United States and Canada, our commands are taking
decisive institutional and operational measures to defend our
homelands.
defending the homelands
In my testimony before the Committee last year, I described a
rapidly evolving geostrategic environment in which our competitors were
continuing to take increasingly aggressive steps to gain the upper hand
in the military, intelligence, economic, and diplomatic arenas. For
decades, the United States has been accustomed to choosing when and
where the Nation will employ the military lever of influence and
project power around the globe from a homeland that was assumed to be
secure. Our competitors have studied this operating model for the last
30 years and have developed strategies and capabilities intended to
offset our military advantage and disrupt our force flows.
Quite bluntly, my ability to conduct the missions assigned to
USNORTHCOM and NORAD has eroded and continues to erode. Our country is
under attack every day in the information space and cyber domain.
Competitors are spreading disinformation, actively sowing division and
fanning the flames of internal discord with the intent to undermine the
foundation of our nation, our democracy, and democracies around the
world. These competitors are also constantly seeking to exploit
security vulnerabilities and policy gaps, especially in the cyber
domain. They are preparing for potential crisis or conflict with the
intent to limit decision space for our senior leaders by holding
national critical infrastructure at risk, disrupting and delaying our
ability to project power from the homeland, and undermining our will to
intervene in a regional crisis.
The threat to North America is complex. Over the last year, our
competitors have accelerated their fielding of kinetic and non-kinetic
capabilities specifically designed to threaten our homeland. Of equal
or greater concern is their relentless, coordinated effort to weaken
the institutions and alliances at the core of our strength and
influence while expanding their own influence internationally. Today,
our competitors hold our homeland at risk in multiple domains and are
working constantly to exploit perceived vulnerabilities.
Russia and China continue to aggressively pursue and field advanced
offensive cyber and space capabilities, cruise missiles, hypersonic
weapons, and delivery platforms designed to evade detection and strike
targets in our homeland from multiple vectors of attack and in all
domains. USNORTHCOM and NORAD's ability to defend against modern
threats requires improved all-domain awareness, updated capabilities,
and policies and strategies that reflect the current strategic
environment and the advanced capabilities of our competitors.
Meanwhile, I require access to ready and trained forces to operate
throughout the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility, including the Arctic,
to respond in crisis and quickly execute homeland defense campaign
plans.
My mission to provide timely and accurate threat warning and attack
assessment requires increased domain awareness and breaking down
information stovepipes that restrict the flow of needed information to
decision makers in the United States and Canada. The ability to detect
a threat, whether from a cyber-actor or a cruise missile, is a
prerequisite to defeating the threat. Timely and accurate detection,
tracking, and assessment of potential threats provides critical
decision space and time to national leaders, while an inability to do
so limits available response options.
Lack of domain awareness contributes to increased risk of
miscalculation, unnecessary escalation, and potential for strategic
deterrence failure. Maintaining our strategic advantage begins with
improving domain awareness globally, including in the approaches to
North America. Incorporating artificial intelligence and machine
learning into existing capabilities will allow users to pull needed
information from existing data sets and share that data with leaders at
all levels to expand their decision space and options necessary to
achieve desirable outcomes.
To ensure our ability to compete in the current strategic
environment, DOD plans, force structure, and logistics must evolve
beyond 9/11-era threats and outdated assumptions regarding competitor
capabilities, strategies, and ambitions. In order to deter modern
competitors, we must make clear that we have the capability to fight in
and from the homeland. Further, policy determinations are needed
regarding what key infrastructure is to be defended, and from what
threats, in order to develop realistic assessments and plans for the
defense of critical infrastructure that fully account for advancing
competitor capabilities and strategies.
In order to defend the homeland in this complex strategic
environment, USNORTHCOM and NORAD have shifted our efforts to left-of-
conflict strategies, emphasizing integrated deterrence in competition,
and dramatically improving our ability to provide leaders with needed
decision space on a day-to-day basis. To be successful in competition,
DOD must develop and implement globally integrated plans, strategies,
operations, and exercises that incorporate all levers of influence, to
include the essential contributions of our international allies and
partners.
competitors and threats
Russia
Russia is the primary military threat to the Homeland, and their
focus on targeting the homeland has provided the model other
competitors are beginning to follow. First, Russia has invested
significant resources to modernize all three legs of its nuclear triad
in an effort to ensure its ability to deliver unacceptable damage on
our homeland during a conflict. In December 2019, Russia fielded the
world's first intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) equipped with
a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) payload. These weapons are designed to
glide at extremely high speeds and maneuver at low altitudes in order
to complicate our ability to detect and track. In the next few years,
Russia seeks to field a new heavy-lift ICBM that President Putin claims
will be able to deliver nuclear warheads to North America from both
northern and southern trajectories. Weapons such as these are designed
to circumvent the ground-based radars utilized by USNORTHCOM and NORAD
to detect and characterize an inbound threat, and challenge my ability
to provide threat warning and attack assessment. The impact is the loss
of critical decision space for national-level decision makers regarding
continuity of government and the preservation of retaliatory
capabilities, resulting in an increase in the potential for strategic
deterrence failure.
Over the last 15 years, Russia has also executed a systematic
program to develop offensive capabilities below the nuclear threshold
that Russian leaders believe will constrain United States options in an
escalating crisis. Their capabilities include very capable cyber
capabilities like those demonstrated by Russia-based actors during last
year's ransomware attack on the Colonial Pipeline. Russia has also
invested in counter-space capabilities like the direct-ascent anti-
satellite weapon that Russia recklessly tested in November 2021.
To augment these non-lethal capabilities, Russia has fielded a new
family of advanced air-, sea-, and ground-based cruise missiles to
threaten critical civilian and military infrastructure. The AS-23a air-
launched cruise missile, for instance, features an extended range that
enables Russian bombers flying well outside NORAD radar coverage--and
in some cases from inside Russian airspace--to threaten targets
throughout North America. This capability challenges my ability to
detect an attack and mount an effective defense. In the maritime
domain, Russia has fielded the first two of their nine planned
Severodvinsk-class guided missile submarines, which are designed to
deploy undetected within cruise missile range of our coastlines to
threaten critical infrastructure during an escalating crisis. This
challenge will be compounded in the next few years as the Russian Navy
adds the Tsirkon hypersonic cruise missile to the Severodvinsk's
arsenal. All of the Russian cruise missile capabilities present a
significant domain awareness challenge. Additionally, these advanced
cruise missiles and their supporting platforms will limit national
leadership decision space and my ability to provide threat warning and
attack assessment, which directly influences my ability to support
continuity of government operations and provide support to USSTRATCOM
missions. Again, the potential consequence is an increased risk of
strategic deterrence failure.
China
China is our pacing threat and a long-term geostrategic challenge.
China is increasingly exerting its economic and military clout around
the globe as its leaders pursue a national goal of supplanting the
rules-based international order with an approach that is more aligned
with China's national interests. Like Russia, China has begun to
develop new capabilities to hold our homeland at risk in multiple
domains in an attempt to complicate our decision making and to disrupt,
delay, and degrade force flow in crisis and destroy our will in
conflict.
China has maintained the ability to strike our homeland with
strategic nuclear weapons since the early 1980s, but today its nuclear
capabilities are growing rapidly in quantity and sophistication.
China's Fractional Orbital Bombardment System test in July 2021
delivered a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) and demonstrated the
weapon's ability to survive reentry and perform high-speed and
maneuvering glide after orbiting around the globe--a feat Russia never
attempted before fielding their own HGV-equipped ICBMs two years ago.
When fielded, China's ICBM-class HGV will be able to evade current
ground and space-based early warning capabilities due to its low-
altitude approach and ability to maneuver midcourse, which compounds
the detection and warning challenges I already face from Russia's
Avangard HGV and advanced cruise missiles.
In the coming years China will augment its homeland-threatening
cyber capabilities with a growing long-range conventional strike
capability of its own. In October 2019, China unveiled its first bomber
capable of air-to-air refueling, the H-6N, which will be able to
threaten targets in Alaska with air-launched ballistic or cruise
missiles. Later this decade, China seeks to field its Type 095 guided
missile submarine, which will feature improved quieting technologies
and a probable land-attack cruise missile capability. While China's
intent for employing its long-range conventional strike capabilities is
not fully known, these weapons will offer Beijing the option of
deploying strike platforms within range of our critical infrastructure
during a conflict, adding a new layer of complication to our leaders'
crisis decision-making.
North Korea and Iran
North Korea's successful flight testing of an ICBM capable of
reaching the continental United States and detonation of a
thermonuclear weapon underscores its leaders' determination to develop
capabilities to threaten our homeland and constrain our options in
crisis and conflict. In October 2020, North Korea unveiled a new ICBM
that is probably even more capable than the weapons it last tested in
2017. Moreover, North Korea's launch last October of a submarine-based
ballistic missile suggests Kim Jong Un may soon resume flight testing
his most capable weapon systems, including a new ICBM design.
Iran maintains asymmetric capabilities to threaten our homeland in
the cyber domain. In 2022, Iranian officials have threatened to carry
out terror operations inside the United States and elsewhere around the
world, in addition to its persistent support of threats by terrorist
organizations like Lebanese Hezbollah. While Iran has announced a self-
imposed range limit of 2,000 kilometers on its fielded ballistic
missile force, its persistent advancement of ballistic missile
technologies probably could increase its missile range outside of the
region.
Violent Extremist Organizations
While the strategic capabilities of our peer competitors are the
most pressing concern for USNORTHCOM and NORAD, violent extremist
organizations such as ISIS and al Qaeda remain committed to attacking
the United States and our allies. The Taliban's takeover in Afghanistan
will likely provide new opportunities for groups like al Qaeda to plot
against the West, while homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) challenge
our law enforcement partners by using simple attack methods that
continue to present the most likely international terrorist threat to
the Homeland. Violent extremist groups continue to hone their tactics
in response to a shifting operational environment and have maintained
their focus on attacking civil aviation and U.S. military personnel and
installations.
Transnational Criminal Organizations
Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) continue to inflict
enormous damage and create instability through corruption, violence,
and illicit trafficking. International criminal syndicates have flooded
the United States with illegal drugs that contributed to the deaths of
over 100,000 U.S. citizens in the 12-month period from April 2020 to
April 2021, while harming people and weakening institutions throughout
the Western Hemisphere. As TCOs battle over territory and brazenly
undermine the rule of law, they create obvious opportunities for
exploitation by strategic competitors seeking to broaden their global
coercive strategies and increase influence and presence in the Western
Hemisphere.
Mitigating the harm done by TCOs is a national security imperative
for the United States and our international partners that requires an
overarching whole-of-government policy and plan for interagency action
that takes into consideration the vast resources and widespread
influence wielded by the TCOs and their international criminal
confederates. USNORTHCOM's ability to counter malign influence in our
region is complicated by the destabilizing influence of TCOs in our
area of responsibility, and national policy and DOD planning must take
that reality into account.
integrated deterrence
Strategic deterrence remains the foundation of homeland defense,
and I believe it is absolutely necessary to maintain a reliable and
effective nuclear triad. However, reliance on deterrence by cost
imposition is currently over-weighted and significantly increases the
risk of miscalculation by limiting our national leaders' options
following an attack. Given our competitors' advanced conventional
capabilities, it is vitally important to move toward a model of
integrated deterrence that employs all elements of national influence,
leverages alliances and partnerships, and provides leaders with a wide
range of timely deterrence options.
Integrated deterrence fuses traditional deterrence by cost
imposition--in which an adversary is deterred by fear of costs that
outweigh the benefit of an attack--with deterrence by denial, which
causes a potential adversary to doubt the likelihood of a successful
attack. Imposing costs on an aggressor that outweigh the potential
benefits of an attack, demonstrating resiliency, and displaying a range
of kinetic and non-kinetic response capabilities are all elements of
deterrence by denial. This approach dramatically expands the military,
diplomatic, and economic options available to national leaders in
competition, crisis, and conflict and helps to avoid miscalculation and
unnecessary escalation.
Integrated deterrence also involves competing in the information
space under a strategic framework, while working with allies and
partners to counter competitors' malign influence in the USNORTHCOM
area of responsibility and beyond. Building the capacity to compete in
the information environment reduces the risk of instability and
strategic miscalculation that can stem from disinformation and other
influence operations.
Demonstrations of resiliency, hardening, and the ability to recover
from damage to communities and infrastructure also generate a deterrent
effect. USNORTHCOM's defense support of civil authorities (DSCA)
mission in the aftermath of wildfires, hurricanes, floods, and other
contingencies in communities across the United States routinely
showcases the ability of USNORTHCOM and the interagency community to
respond quickly and effectively to natural and manmade disasters.
USNORTHCOM's track record of supporting coordinated responses and
rapid recovery is the direct result of ongoing interagency planning,
coordination, and exercises that ensures our readiness to support our
partners at a moment's notice. To be clear, DSCA is a homeland defense
mission, and USNORTHCOM's visible support to civil authorities remains
a critical focus for the command, especially as environmental change
contributes to more frequent and intense fires and damaging storms.
Finally, we must continue to foster the partnerships and alliances
that provide the United States and our international partners with what
is perhaps our most distinct asymmetric advantage. NORAD is an obvious
example of the enormous benefit to shared security and regional
stability generated by international cooperation. In addition, it must
be noted that our relationships with NATO, the FIVE EYES community, and
our regional defense and security cooperation partners in Canada,
Mexico, and The Bahamas have a profound deterrent effect for the common
benefit of all. USNORTHCOM and NORAD continue to foster these valuable
alliances and partnerships.
homeland defense design
Homeland defense starts well outside the USNORTHCOM area of
responsibility and necessarily involves our fellow combatant commands
as well as our international allies and partners. Deterring and
defending against advanced competitors that have the capability to hold
the homeland at persistent risk requires an approach that emphasizes
increased decision space and leverages all elements of national power
over cost-prohibitive and narrowly focused kinetic defenses. DOD's
ability to deter and defend against advanced global threats requires a
shift from regional approaches to a global perspective that accounts
for the realities of the modern strategic environment.
I believe it is necessary to accept near-term risk in order to
compete against advanced, globally focused peers well into the future.
Leaders must make difficult choices today in order to avoid impossible
dilemmas tomorrow--to include divesting legacy systems and capabilities
that consume significant personnel and fiscal resources and are of
little to no use in today's strategic environment.
Therefore, a homeland defense enterprise that is capable of
deterring and defeating threats is essential to a globally integrated
forward fight and supporting broader national strategic objectives. The
ability of the United States to deter in competition, de-escalate in
crisis, and defeat in conflict is dependent on our collective ability
to detect and track potential threats and friendly forces anywhere in
the world, while delivering data to decision makers as rapidly as
possible. This provides leaders with the time and informed options
needed to achieve a favorable outcomes for the United States. That
reality is the basis for the central principles of USNORTHCOM and NORAD
homeland defense design: all-domain awareness, information dominance,
decision superiority, and global integration.
Domain Awareness can be achieved through an integrated network of
sensors from the seafloor to space, including cyberspace, in order to
detect, track, and deter potential threats. I need improved domain
awareness to increase warning time and provide leaders at all levels
with as many options as possible to deter or defend against an attack.
Global all-domain awareness will generate a significant deterrent
effect by making it clear that we can see potential aggressors wherever
they are, which inherently casts doubt on their ability to achieve
their objectives.
I am grateful to the Committee for your support of the over-the-
horizon radar (OTHR) that was included on USNORTHCOM's unfunded
priority list for Fiscal Year 2022. OTHR is a proven technology that
will provide persistent surveillance of the distant northern approaches
to the United States and mitigate the limitations of the Cold War-era
North Warning System, while contributing to broader domain awareness
challenges including space domain awareness. The ability to detect air-
breathing and spaceborne threats in the approaches to Canada and the
United States will be significantly enhanced by fielding OTHR as soon
as possible. It is also vital to move quickly toward advanced space-
based sensors capable of detecting hypersonic weapons, including
hypersonic cruise missiles, and other advanced systems designed to
evade detection. Modernizing and expanding the Integrated Undersea
Surveillance System (IUSS) is equally important as Russia and China
continue to field highly advanced guided missile submarines.
While some new domain awareness platforms will be required, it is
possible to make exponential improvements in our nation's ability to
detect and track potential threats by improving the ways data is
collected, processed, and shared. As I testified last year, the
technology already exists to apply artificial intelligence and machine
learning to collect and rapidly distribute information gathered from
sensors around the globe. Current processes rely on human analysts to
comb through enormous volumes of data, and it can take days or weeks to
process, exploit, and distribute critical information--if it is ever
processed at all. We will always need expert human analysts in the
loop, but I need the ability to tap into that technology to
dramatically speed the delivery of information to leaders at all levels
who need it.
Success in competition, crisis, and conflict depends on effectively
distributing and integrating the data collected from domain awareness
capabilities to establish information dominance over competitors and
adversaries. To unlock the full value and potential of our intelligence
and sensor networks, information must be integrated, appropriately
classified, and rapidly shared to allow commands, agencies, allies, and
partners to collaborate globally in real time and across all domains.
The potential for this capability has already been demonstrated in
USNORTHCOM's Global Information Dominance Experiments (GIDE), which
provided combatant commanders, intelligence and operations directors,
and other participants at multiple sites with a shared, customizable,
and near real-time data set. The data gathered by existing global
sensors provided leaders, analysts, and operators with the information
needed to make assessments and recommended courses of action that were
coordinated across multiple commands in a matter of hours. Speeding the
flow of information to senior civilian decision makers and commanders
enabled significantly more options to achieve desired outcomes.
Decision superiority means increasing decision space and options to
provide senior leaders. The ultimate goal of decision superiority is to
provide multiple paths to avoid conflict through the application of all
available elements of national power, rather than emphasizing options
that are only available after a conflict has already begun. To
successfully defend the homeland, we must provide leaders with
pertinent information and as much time as possible to deter and de-
escalate before a situation escalates out of control.
Finally, I believe it is critical for the entire defense enterprise
to shift its culture and vision toward global all-domain integration.
Too often, DOD posture development, communications, planning,
exercises, and operations are stovepiped and isolated in ways that do
not reflect the reality that all challenges are global and all-domain
in nature. The Department increasingly understands that competitors
would likely intend to strike the Homeland in an effort to prevent
flowing U.S. forces toward a regional crisis or conflict. And, in the
event that the United States and our allies become engaged in a
regional crisis or conflict, other competitors would likely exploit
that opportunity to their own advantage--which could quickly lead to
simultaneous crises in multiple theaters.
Global challenges cannot be overcome with a hodgepodge of isolated
regional plans. Success in competition, crisis, or conflict is
increasingly dependent on moving past outdated parochial approaches in
favor of greater focus on competition rather than restricting options
and absorbing unnecessary costs by continuing to over-emphasize crisis
and conflict. With that in mind, USNORTHCOM, our fellow combatant
commands, the Services, and our Canadian partners have demonstrated the
immediate impact of improved information sharing and collaboration
between commands and allies in all phases of competition, crisis, and
conflict.
The current regional approach to plans, strategies, and force
design is outdated and more influenced by bureaucratic inertia than the
realities of the modern strategic environment. The same is true of
stagnant acquisition practices and cumbersome civilian hiring rules
that only impede progress and hinder the Department's ability to move
at the speed of relevance necessary to compete in today's environment.
risk mitigation
Risk mitigation must be a shared whole-of-government responsibility
focused on broad nodes, enterprises, and capabilities rather than
attempting to establish a priority-ranked list of specific sites or
facilities to be protected. Mitigating the risk associated with an
attack on the United States requires policy determinations about what
must be defended from kinetic and non-kinetic attack. Those policy
decisions, in turn, allow USNORTHCOM, NORAD, and our mission partners
to determine the best ways to protect priority assets and resources.
Importantly, risk mitigation is the responsibility of the DOD, as
well as a number of other interagency partners at the federal, state,
and local levels. Risk mitigation requires a dedicated policy framework
and deliberate interagency planning and coordination. Notably, the
deterrent effect of resiliency and effective consequence management
requires far fewer resources and less expense than direct defense
systems.
Ballistic missile defense (BMD): Defending the United States
against intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threats from rogue
nations remains a critical priority for USNORTHCOM and an important
component of integrated deterrence. While current BMD capability and
capacity is sufficient to defeat a limited ballistic missile attack
from a rogue nation, North Korea's ongoing development of increasingly
complex and capable strategic weapons requires the Next Generation
Interceptor to be fielded on time or early, and for the Long Range
Discriminating Radar in Alaska to achieve full operational capacity on
schedule.
The ballistic missile defense system is not capable of intercepting
hypersonic glide vehicles; I cannot defend, nor am I tasked to defend,
against a hypersonic glide vehicle attack. It is imperative that the
Department of Defense develop and field an integrated space-based
domain awareness network capable of detecting and tracking ICBMs,
hypersonic weapons, and cruise missiles as quickly as possible. I
require the ability to detect, track, and assess potential missile
threats of all types to immediately determine whether an attack is
underway and provide national leaders with as much time and as many
options as possible.
Cruise Missile Defense: Russia has the capability today to hold
targets in the United States and Canada at risk with long-range air-
and submarine-launched conventional cruise missiles. These highly
precise and stealthy systems highlight the need for policy
determinations regarding what must be defended along with continued
demonstrations of resiliency and hardening. It is also necessary to
quickly improve domain awareness by fielding sensors such as OTHR and
the integrated undersea surveillance system (IUSS)--and by integrating
and sharing the collected data with global stakeholders. To
successfully deter aggression and defend the homeland, we must be able
to detect and track the submarines, aircraft, and surface ships that
carry weapons systems capable of striking the homeland before they
depart from their home stations. We also need to improve our capability
to defeat those launch platforms before they are within range of their
targets.
It is vital that we accept risk today in order to compete against
highly advanced and determined peers in the near future. As an example,
the military Services must be allowed to retire aging platforms,
especially those that cannot survive in combat against highly advanced
and lethal capabilities already fielded and proliferated by our peer
competitors. The Department must re-invest the savings from those
divestments to resilient domain awareness and other capabilities
necessary to increase the decision space that will provide national
leaders with options to deter, de-escalate, and defeat threats. Those
difficult choices are critical to integrated deterrence today and
avoiding the unthinkable tomorrow.
the arctic
The Arctic demonstrates how regional challenges increasingly take
on global implications that require a global framework. The Unified
Command Plan designates the Commander of USNORTHCOM as the DOD's
Advocate for Arctic Capabilities in recognition of the fact that the
region encompasses a vast geographic area overlapping the areas of
responsibility of three separate geographic combatant commands and
includes eight sovereign nations with inherent interest in the region.
It is critical that USNORTHCOM, our fellow geographic combatant
commands, the U.S. interagency, and our fellow Arctic nations continue
our shared efforts to ensure the Arctic remains peaceful, stable,
prosperous, and cooperative. This is especially true in light of the
increasing potential for resource competition and opportunities for
commercial enterprise, both of which must be balanced with the inherent
rights of Arctic states to control their territorial waters and
resources within their Exclusive Economic Zones.
Diminished Arctic ice has led to increased access to sea lanes,
longer shipping seasons, and expanded access to subsurface minerals and
proteins, although environmental changes are also increasing
operational hazards and introducing new uncertainties. Those changes,
in turn, now require clear communication and coordination among Arctic
allies, partners, and competitors. A continued rules-based
international order in the Arctic has served the international
community well for decades, and forums like the Arctic Council are
critical to emphasizing the value of the Arctic as a cooperative region
where countries consistently work together to solve shared challenges.
Rising competition near the United States and Canada is of
significant concern for USNORTHCOM and NORAD. The Arctic strategies
published by DOD and each of the military Services demonstrate the
shared understanding of the need to adapt policy, capabilities, and
resourcing to meet the challenges and requirements associated with
operating in the Arctic. However, the Services and the Department must
accelerate implementation of those strategies or risk falling further
behind rapidly advancing competitor capabilities, which jeopardizes
USNORTHCOM and NORAD's ability to execute the commands' missions in the
high north.
Likewise, Canada remains our essential partner in the NORAD mission
and in ensuring NORAD's capability and capacity to deter aggression and
defend the United States and Canada from airborne and maritime threats.
That contribution includes investment in modernizing sensors,
infrastructure, and platforms that ensure NORAD's ability to
successfully conduct aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime
warning. Those capabilities are vital to homeland defense and to our
nations' capability to project forces forward in support of operations
overseas, including meeting NATO commitments.
I am excited by the opportunities for building partnerships in the
Arctic and the continued shared effort to maintain the stability and
security of the entire region. The upcoming Arctic Security Forces
Roundtable, to be held in Alaska in May 2022, will provide the United
States with a rare opportunity to host an international forum focused
specifically on Arctic security and military cooperation. USNORTHCOM
and NORAD have important roles at the Arctic Security Forces
Roundtable, and I am looking forward to joining Arctic military
counterparts to make this a productive and forward-thinking event.
Likewise, the newly established DOD regional center, the Ted
Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies, in Anchorage will provide
an important venue for academic, diplomatic, and military Arctic
experts to address key challenges in the region, in alignment with DOD
strategic guidance. None of those challenges, from mitigating the
operational impacts of climate change to avoiding miscalculation
resulting from undue militarization of the Arctic, can be overcome
unilaterally. USNORTHCOM will continue to leverage the strength of our
regional alliances and partnerships to enhance regional security
cooperation and support a secure and stable Arctic.
defense support of civil authorities (dsca)
USNORTHCOM's defense support of other federal agencies during the
COVID-19 pandemic, hurricanes, wildfires, and Operation ALLIES WELCOME
has tested the command in unexpected ways over the past year. While our
DSCA mission can be time- and resource- intensive, USNORTHCOM support
to our interagency partners continues to strengthen relationships,
validate plans, and demonstrate the ability of the U.S. interagency
enterprise to respond quickly and effectively to contingencies. In
addition to supporting American citizens in need, these missions
provide a visible deterrent effect by demonstrating flexible response
options and effectively executing plans to mitigate and recover from
the effects of disaster and other emergencies.
In 2021 and 2022, USNORTHCOM continued DOD's COVID-19 support by
deploying military medical providers to civilian medical facilities
around the country. Building on existing pandemic response plans and
quickly adapting to lessons learned during the pandemic, USNORTHCOM's
support to the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Department
of Health and Human Services provided much-needed relief to hospitals
overwhelmed by COVID-19 caseloads.
USNORTHCOM is also proud to work alongside the Department of
Homeland Security and the Department of State throughout the Operation
ALLIES WELCOME mission to evacuate, house, and resettle tens of
thousands of Afghan partners and their families following the collapse
of the Afghan government. With the support of the military departments,
USNORTHCOM has been responsible for providing safety and security,
shelter, food, and other essential services for Afghans who contributed
to the United States mission in Afghanistan as they await resettlement
in the United States.
security cooperation
Global alliances and partnerships provide the United States with a
critical asymmetric advantage over our competitors. USNORTHCOM's
military-to-military partnerships with Canada, Mexico, and The Bahamas
remain critically important, and those ties continue to pay significant
dividends as we work toward improving regional security, strengthening
military ties with regional partners, and expanding interoperability.
These efforts contribute to improved shared domain awareness and domain
control, while strengthening the institutions that support our common
strategic objectives. By working together toward these objectives,
USNORTHCOM is supporting our partners' important contributions to
regional security while emphasizing our shared prioritization of the
rule of law, human rights, and denying our competitors the opportunity
to expand their presence and malign influence.
The Mexican Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA) and
Secretariat of the Navy (SEMAR), are steadfast security partners and
remain a bulwark against encroaching competitor presence and influence
in Central and South America. USNORTHCOM was proud to host the annual
United States-Mexico Bilateral Military Cooperation Roundtable in
August 2021, during which key military leaders from USNORTHCOM, SEDENA,
and SEMAR refined our shared efforts toward improved domain awareness,
domain control, and institutional strengthening. In September 2021, I
was also honored to personally attend the Mexico Aerospace Fair--
commonly known as FAMEX--to demonstrate USNORTHCOM's commitment to the
security relationship with our Mexican military partners and to join
the Secretaries of SEMAR and SEDENA in reaffirming Mexico's vital
contributions to the security of our region and our shared commitment
to countering common threats.
Our partnership with The Bahamas remains critical. USNORTHCOM and
The Bahamas' Bilateral Security Cooperation Framework provides a
distinct and important venue for developing and implementing mutual
objectives that contribute to regional security. Due to The Bahamas'
geographic location along the United States southern approaches, domain
awareness and domain control are in the vital national interests of
both the United States and The Bahamas. In October 2021, I met with the
new Bahamian government and my Royal Bahamas Defence Force counterpart
in Nassau for the activation of a maritime surveillance radar donated
by DOD that has already significantly improved our collective ability
to detect and monitor traffic in the approaches to The Bahamas and the
United States. China has expanded economic investment and visible
diplomatic presence in The Bahamas and has highlighted the lack of a
confirmed United States ambassador in an ongoing information campaign
to boost Chinese influence while weakening that of the United States.
conclusion
The global strategic environment will remain complex and
extraordinarily dynamic for the foreseeable future. Our competitors
already possess the capability to strike the homeland with kinetic and
non-kinetic means, and they will take full advantage of slow responses,
technological shortfalls, and policies that do not reflect the
realities of the modern era.
USNORTHCOM and NORAD, in concert with our interagency colleagues,
will continue our unending mission to defend our homelands and protect
our citizens from threats in all domains, institutions, culture, and
process. However, our commands' ability to effectively deter threats to
the homeland will increasingly rely on improved domain awareness and
providing leaders with the time and options necessary for success. Just
as important, it is critical for military leaders and civilian
policymakers to acknowledge that all regional challenges have global
implications and present potential risk to the U.S. Homeland. Our
competitors have demonstrated their intent to leverage any opportunity
to advance their own interests--often to the detriment of our own.
Defense of the Homeland and continental defense remains the
absolute priority for both USNORTHCOM and NORAD, and our commands'
constant vigilance will be a key element of the integrated deterrence
that safeguards our citizens and advances our vital national interests.
It is my profound honor to lead all of the proud United States and
Canadian military and civilian personnel of USNORTHCOM and NORAD as
they stand our never-ending watch over our nations. I look forward to
working with all of our vital partners as we continue to advance those
efforts in the defense of our nations. We Have the Watch.
Senator King. Thank you, General.
General Karbler?
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL DANIEL KARBLER, USA, COMMANDING
GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND
lLieutenant General Karbler. Chairman King, Ranking Member
Fischer, distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am
honored to again testify before you representing an incredible
People First organization of more than 3,000 soldiers and
civilians across 10 time zones and 22 locations. These amazing
professionals provide space, high-altitude, and missile defense
forces and capabilities to Army and joint warfighters. Let me
express my sincere appreciation for your continued support of
our people and their families.
My role remains unchanged from previous testimony. I serve
as the Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for
Integrated Missile Defense. As the Army's proponent for Air and
Missile Defense, or AMD, I provide U.S. Northern Command, the
soldiers who stand ready to defend our Nation from
intercontinental ballistic missile attacks. I serve as the
Army's Service Component Commander to both U.S. Strategic
Command and U.S. Space Command, and I serve as the Army's AMD
enterprise integrator.
We have witnessed significant changes over the past year,
to include the largest employment of offensive missile systems
in Europe since World War II in Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
Like Russia, other potential adversaries across the globe are
developing, fielding, and normalizing the use of increasingly
diverse, robust, and lethal offensive missile systems in an
attempt to gain coercive power and strategic advantage over the
United States and our allies and partners.
It has never been more imperative that we strengthen our
capabilities to deny our adversaries the benefits of using
these weapons. We will accomplish this through continued
investment and sustainment of combat-ready, integrated, and
lethal AMD forces. Space capabilities, combined with our allies
and partners, will also prove essential in ensuring our
nation's security.
To address the challenges of the ever-changing landscape we
continue to implement new ways of accomplishing our mission and
enhancing our capabilities. To briefly outline a few
enhancements, our space and missile defense soldiers and
civilians have completed an upgrade to our Joint Tactical
Ground Stations at our four global theater missile warning
company locations. These upgrades include our missile warning,
missile defense cueing, and battlespace characterization in
support of multidomain operations.
We have relocated two European-based United States Patriot
batteries to Poland and one to Slovakia. This defense
relocation reinforces our Nation's commitment to article 5 and
proactively counters any potential threats to U.S. and allied
forces in NATO's [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] eastern
region.
During a joint March 2022 exercise, an air defense
battalion under the European-based 10th Army Air and Missile
Defense Command successfully deployed four Maneuver-Short Range
Air Defense Stryker-based platforms throughout NATO's eastern
region, a move of over 1,500 miles which culminated in a
successful live fire in Estonia. Support to testing and
exercises remains a priority.
Earlier this year, Air Defense Artillery soldiers
participated in THAAD Flight Test-21, where two Patriot
Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhanced interceptors
were integrated with THAAD software to successfully intercept
two short-range ballistic missiles. This integration enables
earlier interceptor launch and results in increased defended
area or battlespace.
Our soldiers also recently completed Phase 1 of the
Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System
initial operational test and evaluation, in full support of the
Army's number one AMD modernization effort.
Let me close by again highlighting our most important
asset, our people, who remain committed to accomplishing our
no-fail national security mission. Despite the challenges of
the COVID-19 pandemic, our professionals continue to provide
space and missile defense capabilities to support combatant
commanders. It is our people who make us strong. It is our
people who make winning possible. I consider it an honor and a
privilege to lead and serve alongside them and request the
continued support of Congress to sustain our ability to
recruit, develop, retain, and resource such a highly qualified
and mission-ready team. When you put people first, winning
happens.
I look forward to addressing your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Karbler follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General Daniel L. Karbler
introduction
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for your continued support of our Service
Members, Civilians, and Families and your continued support of the
Army, U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), U.S. Space Command
(USSPACECOM), Department of Defense (DOD), and the space and missile
defense community. Thank you also for inviting me to highlight the
importance of space and missile defense capabilities and ongoing
enhancements that enable the defense of our Nation, forward stationed
and deployed forces, allies, and partners.
Today, with my assigned roles, I bring both an Army and a joint
perspective on effective space and missile defense capabilities. Within
the Army and joint communities, my responsibilities encompass several
mission areas.
As commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
(USASMDC), I serve as the Army's force modernization proponent and
operational integrator for space, missile defense, and high altitude
capabilities. In short, USASMDC provides trained and ready space and
missile defense forces and capabilities to the warfighter and Nation.
With regard to missile defense, I am the Army Service Component
Commander responsible for planning, integrating, coordinating, and
providing Army missile defense forces and capabilities in support of
USSTRATCOM missions. Additionally, I am a supporting commander to the
Commander, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), for the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense (GMD) System. In the space mission area, I am the
Army Service Component Commander to USSPACECOM, providing trained and
ready Army space warfighters and capabilities to compete, fight, and
win in the space domain.
As the Army's air and missile defense (AMD) enterprise integrator,
I synchronize the balanced execution of the Army's AMD posture across
the functions of force planning and sourcing requirements, combat and
materiel development, AMD acquisition, and life cycle management. I
coordinate with the AMD community of interest to balance priorities,
inform resourcing decisions, and pursue innovative approaches in order
to fulfill our AMD mission requirements.
Finally, as Commander of USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component
Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD), I am responsible for
providing operational-level global missile defense expertise in support
of USSTRATCOM's Unified Command Plan (UCP)-assigned global missile
defense operations support mission. In the missile defense arena, this
includes plans integration, operations support, asset allocation
recommendations, and support to missile defense capability development
on behalf of combatant commanders (CCDRs). These efforts deter
adversaries, assure allies, and defend U.S. deployed forces, allies,
and partners against missile attacks.
The world has changed greatly since my testimony last year. We have
witnessed the largest use of offensive missile systems in Europe since
World War II in an unprovoked invasion of a sovereign nation by the
Russian Federation in Ukraine. Like Russia, other potential adversaries
globally are developing and fielding increasingly more diverse, robust,
and lethal offensive missile systems in an attempt to gain coercive
power and strategic advantage over the Nation and our allies and
partners. It has never been more imperative that we deny them the
benefits of using these weapons. We will accomplish this through
continued investment and sustainment of combat ready, integrated,
capable, and lethal AMD. Space capabilities, combined with our allies'
and partners' abilities as part of a comprehensive approach to
integrated deterrence, will also prove essential in ensuring our
Nation's security.
people first
USASMDC and JFCC IMD, both comprised of multi-component soldiers,
airmen, sailors, marines, guardians, and dedicated civilians and
contractors, cannot carry out our wide-ranging, no-fail national
security missions without the commitment of our greatest asset--our
people. We prioritize ``People First'' as we recruit, train, and
develop Army space and missile defense professionals. Six values are
embedded in our People First mandate: communication, recognition,
trust, teamwork, transparency, and empowerment. Despite the many
challenges introduced by the COVID-19 pandemic, our professionals
continue to provide space and missile defense capabilities that support
combatant command (CCMD) plans and operations. It is our people who
make us strong; it is our people who make winning possible.
recent contributions and upgrades to army space and missile defense
capabilities
The people of USASMDC and JFCC IMD continue to learn new ways to
operate, accomplish our missions, enhance capabilities, and support
global theaters. Throughout the last several months, we have realized
essential space and missile defense operational, capability, and
training successes, a few of which follow.
We recently completed an upgrade of our Joint Tactical
Ground Stations (JTAGS) configuration at our four theater missile
warning company locations. This upgrade provided a significant
improvement in our missile warning, missile defense cueing, and
battlespace characterization capabilities in support of Multi-Domain
Operations (MDO). It also enabled us to keep pace with rapidly growing,
complex, and capable threat systems.
In March 2022, the Army relocated two European-based
Patriot missile defense batteries to Poland. This defensive relocation
served to reinforce our Nation's commitment to article 5 and
proactively counter any potential threats to U.S. and allied forces in
the eastern NATO region.
During a March 2022 joint exercise, a subordinate air
defense regiment under the European-based 10th Army Air and Missile
Defense Command successfully deployed four Maneuver-Short Range Air
Defense (M-SHORAD) Stryker-based platforms to the eastern NATO region.
This deployment demonstrated the Army's newest short range air defense
system's ability to defend maneuver forces against unmanned aerial
systems (UAS), rotary-wing, and fixed-wing air threats.
Our Army Space Training Division (ASTD) served as the
lead proponent for equipping Army divisions and training centers with
essential training aid devices that enable organizations to train in a
degraded and disrupted space operations environment. With fielding
completed, ASTD will lead future efforts on life cycle replacement of
these devices.
The USASMDC Technical Center leveraged commercial
synthetic aperture radar imaging of current interest locations and,
using artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms, provided
key operational data to tactical warfighting organizations.
Support to significant testing and exercises remains a
priority. Earlier this year, Air Defense Artillery (ADA) soldiers
participated in the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Flight
Test-21, where two Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile
Segment Enhanced (MSE) interceptors were integrated with THAAD software
to successfully intercept a short range ballistic missile. This
integration enables earlier interceptor launch and results in a longer
fly-out time, which increases the defended area or battlespace. Our ADA
soldiers also recently participated in the initial operational test and
evaluation of the successful Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle
Command System (IBCS) test. During this event, IBCS maintained
continuous tracking of two cruise missile targets by fusing together
data from multiple sensors while degraded by electronic attack.
Finally, we continue to deploy Army space professionals to numerous
joint and partner nation exercises and wargames.
In addition to exercise support, operational deployments
to CCMDs continue. Our 1st Space Brigade rotated an Army Space Control
Crew to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), an Army Space Support
Team to both U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and U.S. European Command
(USEUCOM), and Space Control Planning Teams to USEUCOM and USSPACECOM.
Our Force Tracking Mission Management Center continues to
support global operations in the USCENTCOM, U.S. Africa Command, and
other CCMD geographic areas of responsibility. The Center provided
vital management and dissemination of friendly force tracking data to
theater commands.
u.s. army space and missile defense command
To accomplish our vision of providing space, missile defense, and
high-altitude forces and capabilities to support joint and combined
warfighting readiness in all domains, USASMDC is organizationally
aligned to accomplish three major tasks. These include: providing
forces and capabilities for current operations; preparing forces and
capabilities for the future fight; and researching and developing Army
technologies to provide future advancements in space, air, and missile
defense capabilities.
The command aligns its activities to these priorities:
Accomplish our mission as a People First team of
empowered, innovative, ready, and resilient professionals.
Provide trained and ready forces for space, missile
defense, and high-altitude missions.
Conduct integrated planning and synchronized operations
in the execution of our space and missile defense missions.
Prepare for future conflict.
providing forces and capabilities for current operations
In accordance with Title 10 responsibilities, USASMDC is a force
provider of missile defense capabilities. Our first major task is to
provide trained and ready missile defense forces and capabilities to
CCDRs. USASMDC soldiers serving in the Homeland and in remote and
austere forward-deployed locations operate the GMD and AN/TPY-2
Forward-Based Mode (FBM) radars. Highlights of the capabilities
provided to current operations and readiness by our missile defense
professionals include:
Support to Homeland Missile Defense: Soldiers from the 100th
Missile Defense Brigade (MDB), headquartered in Colorado Springs,
Colorado, and 49th Missile Defense Battalion, headquartered at Fort
Greely, Alaska, stand ready to defend our Nation from intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) attack 24/7/365. In support of USNORTHCOM,
Army National Guard and Active component soldiers operate the GMD Fire
Control Systems located at the Fire Direction Center in Alaska; Missile
Defense Element in Colorado; a detachment that oversees operations at
Vandenberg Space Force Base, California; and a detachment that secures
GMD sensor infrastructure at Fort Drum, New York. At the Fort Greely
Missile Defense Complex, 49th Missile Defense Battalion military police
secure interceptors and command and control (C2) facilities from
physical threats. These security soldiers perform their duties in some
of the most austere conditions in the United States, with winter
temperatures plummeting to 50 degrees below zero and fewer than 4 hours
of sunlight in the winter months.
1st Space Brigade Soldiers provide CCDRs certified AN/TPY-2 FBM
missile defense batteries that support strategic and regional missions.
These batteries are globally located in five strategic, yet remote and
austere locations, where they provide ballistic missile search, track,
and discrimination operations in support of both homeland and regional
defense. These soldiers continuously demonstrate our Nation's
commitment to defend deployed forces, allies, and partners from
ballistic missile attacks.
Support to Global Missile Defense Test and Development: Soldiers
from the 100th MDB and 49th Missile Defense Battalion participate in
GMD test activities and work with Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
developers on enhancements to the GMD. The MDA's testing regime,
conducted through a series of ground-based and operational flight
tests, emphasizes operational realism during test design and execution.
This realism enables system operators to sustain and improve their
proficiency and validate the system's operational employment.
Space Support to Missile Early Warning: Space-enabled capabilities
are essential for missile defense operations. They provide and enable
communications; positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT);
intelligence; and surveillance to meet the demands of modern warfare.
In support of joint force commanders, USASMDC continues to provide
missile warning within the USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, and USINDOPACOM theaters
of operations. The 1st Space Brigade's forward stationed JTAGS theater
missile warning companies are essential for USSPACECOM's assured
missile warning mission. They are operated by USASMDC soldiers who
monitor launch activity and other events observed by infrared sensor
platforms and quickly provide information to members of the AMD and
operational communities. The JTAGS forward stationing reduces the risk
of solely relying on long-haul communications and ensures the
resilience of USSPACECOM's comprehensive missile warning system.
preparing forces and capabilities for the future fight
USASMDC's second major task is to develop future missile defense
forces and mature current capabilities. The Space and Missile Defense
Center of Excellence (SMD CoE) is the Army's force modernization
proponent responsible for managing change to Army doctrine,
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel,
facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) requirements for space, strategic
missile defense, and high-altitude capabilities. The SMD CoE trains and
educates agile, adaptive, and ready soldiers and leaders; executes life
cycle management for Army space operations officers; develops Army
Space soldiers; and enables informed decision making.
To carry out its mission, the SMD CoE executes practices
established by U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and Army Futures
Command to meet force management and Army modernization enterprise
responsibilities. These functions include performing concept
development, capabilities determination, and capabilities integration
relative to DOTMLPF-P for process change, integration, and transition
for materiel development.
Specifically, in the training arena, SMD CoE conducts the Army's
institutional soldier qualification training and education for space
and GMD mission areas. The SMD School writes, coordinates, and
publishes Army doctrine for space and GMD while also integrating space
training and education in curriculum across all Army proponent schools,
operational unit home stations, and pre-deployment training events.
These efforts prepare soldiers across all warfighting functions to
integrate Army and joint space and missile defense capabilities and
effects in the conduct of MDO.
research and development of army technologies
USASMDC's third major task is to provide critical technologies to
address future needs that will enhance warfighter effectiveness.
USASMDC's Technical Center supports joint warfighters by providing
science, technology, and test and evaluation expertise to enable
warfighter dominance both today and in the future. The Technical Center
contributes to warfighter and joint force success in four major areas:
directed energy (DE); tactical responsive space and high altitude; test
and evaluation; and hypersonic and strategic weapons.
Directed Energy: The Technical Center is the Army lead for high-
energy laser technology development. High-energy lasers complement
kinetic systems in addressing rocket, artillery, and mortar threats;
UAS; and cruise missiles. Additionally, the Technical Center is
exploring high-power microwave technology for use in interdicting a
multitude of improvised threats. As systems are fielded, the Technical
Center will continue developing new and improved DE technologies for
insertion into weapon systems to maintain warfighter dominance.
Tactical Responsive Space and High Altitude: As the Army lead for
space and high-altitude research, development, and engineering, the
Technical Center identifies, develops, demonstrates, and integrates
technologies in the areas of responsive space, space superiority, and
high altitude. Working with other Army, DOD, and industry partners, the
Technical Center focuses on persistent beyond line-of-sight
communications for forces in remote areas; functionally effective
resolution imagery; solutions for assured PNT; ground C2 systems; and
direct downlink of tactical data feeds.
Test and Evaluation: As an invaluable part of the Army test and
evaluation enterprise, the Technical Center supports developmental and
operational AMD defense testing with a suite of low-cost ballistic
missile targets, transportable and configurable launchers, and test
execution and evaluation. These ballistic missile targets are critical
to threat-representative, operationally realistic testing of high-
priority Army systems such as Patriot, THAAD, and IBCS, with future
testing planned for the Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor
(LTAMDS).
Hypersonic and Strategic Weapons: Since completing the Nation's
first successful hypersonic weapon test in 2011, the Technical Center
has continued supporting hypersonic testing for the Army, Navy, and Air
Force, from test planning and design through mission execution and
post-flight analysis. Additionally, the Technical Center is continuing
to develop capabilities that enable rapid systems development and
fielding through integration and interoperability testing, sensor and
C2 design, flight test analysis, verification and validation, and
warfighter training within an independent laboratory infrastructure.
Missile Defense Testing Assets and Range: The Technical Center also
oversees the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Test Site (RTS) at U.S.
Army Garrison-Kwajalein Atoll, Republic of the Marshall Islands. The
RTS is a vital national asset that provides live-fire developmental and
operational flight testing of offensive and defensive missile,
hypersonic, and space systems; equatorial satellite launch capability;
space object tracking and characterization; and atmospheric science
research. This unique range and test facility, located 2,300 miles
west-southwest of Hawaii, provides test support to MDA, NASA, the U.S.
Air Force, and other agencies.
The RTS supports developmental and operational testing of both
homeland and regional missile defense systems, as well offensive
ballistic missile testing for the Air Force Global Strike Command.
Hypersonic system testing has become a significant element of near-term
test planning at RTS. In concert with its testing mission and using a
suite of the world's most sophisticated radar systems, to include the
U.S. Space Force's Space Fence, RTS also supports space object
identification and space domain awareness missions in support of
USSPACECOM. This mission includes space object tracking and
characterization, providing critical orbital information on new foreign
launches and high-resolution images in support of space situational
awareness.
army contributions to the nation's missile defense capabilities
The DOD will adopt a new strategic course in 2022, with a new
National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, Nuclear Posture
Review, and Missile Defense Review. The Army will establish its
corresponding strategy nested in Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) guidance. USASMDC will update the Army Air and Missile Defense
2028 vision document to meet these directives and enable MDO. To
achieve an AMD force capable of supporting the Army of 2030, we must
continue modernizing and developing AMD capabilities, building
sufficient AMD capacity for MDO, and ensuring AMD forces are trained
and ready. We must also ensure that our capabilities and associated C2
systems are resilient and interoperable with joint and allied forces.
Accomplishing these essential tasks will allow us to provide deterrence
through deployments and forward stationing and enable a more robust,
comprehensive defense by coordinating and integrating with our allies
and partners.
Army AMD is undergoing its most significant modernization program
in the last four decades, as it is one of the Army's six modernization
priorities receiving substantially increased investment. The AMD Cross
Functional Team (CFT) serves as the Army's modernization lead and works
closely with the other Services, Joint Staff, and MDA toward joint
integrated AMD (IAMD) capabilities. The Program Executive Office
Missiles and Space is the Army's materiel developer for these
capabilities and works closely with AMD CFT and U.S. Army Aviation and
Missile Command. A summary of the Army's AMD strategic direction and
major programs follows.
Air and Missile Defense Readiness: Multiple factors--including the
enduring demand from CCDRs, the transition to great power competition
and its associated complex threat set, and the overdue and critical
need to modernize the Army's AMD force--have all converged to impact
Army AMD force readiness. High operational demand of missile defense
forces to support joint warfighters continues stressing Army AMD force
readiness, modernization, and soldier welfare. Enduring high
operational tempo and limited deployment predictability negatively
impact soldier readiness and family well-being. Currently, twice as
many ADA soldiers are dwell restricted as compared to the overall Army.
In an effort to improve soldier predictability and readiness, the Army
has established a new unit life cycle modernization model known as the
Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model (ReARMM). It is
critical that the ADA Branch leverage ReARMM to inform the Joint Staff
and OSD on force availability and improve deployment predictability for
AMD soldiers.
Mission Command: Closely linked to AMD readiness is the ability to
provide low density, high demand AMD mission command elements. These
elements are pivotal to laying the foundation for and creating an
environment that supports integration of Army AMD forces into joint and
combined C2 architectures. During the past few years, the Army has
activated an additional active component ADA brigade headquarters in
USINDOPACOM and rotated a National Guard ADA brigade headquarters to
USEUCOM. Also in the USEUCOM theater, the Army will soon stand up an
active component ADA brigade headquarters.
Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System: The IBCS
program is a top Army AMD modernization priority that integrates
current and future AMD sensors and weapons into a common integrated
fire control capability, allowing warfighters to fully integrate AMD
capabilities across all echelons. The IBCS is the direct replacement
for mission command nodes in the Patriot weapon system, headquarters
elements, and airspace management cells. It also allows rapid
convergence of sensors, shooters, and mission command components on an
integrated fire control network. Once fully fielded, IBCS will provide
a game-changing capability that allows appropriate tailoring and
scaling of AMD forces to meet the given threat. The quantity and mix of
capabilities can be dynamically retasked into a formation with an
inherent, integrated mission command system to build tiered and layered
defenses. In addition, IBCS open architecture enables rapid integration
of legacy and developmental sensors and shooters that provide
capabilities to defeat emerging threats in MDO. This year, the IBCS
program entered low-rate initial production and began initial
operational testing and evaluation.
The IBCS program will field common mission command nodes for Army
AMD forces to defend against manned aircraft, UAS, air-to-ground
missiles, tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and rockets,
artillery, and mortar (RAM) attacks. Ultimately, IBCS will operate with
air surveillance and fire control capabilities across the Army, Air
Force, and Navy, and with joint and multinational AMD forces at all
echelons, thereby enhancing AMD force lethality. By dismantling the
current system-centric mission command paradigm, it will dramatically
increase systems capability and facilitate open industry competition in
support of the AMD community. The IBCS is one of the Army's
contributions to Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control,
currently in development between the Army and Air Force; continued
experimentation to link with C2 systems for Army and joint fires is
ongoing. Additional efforts are currently underway to support IBCS
interoperability with MDA's Ballistic Missile Defense System, exploring
the feasibility and potential benefits of integrating IBCS with MDA's
Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC)
program.
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System: THAAD is a key
component of the ballistic missile defense system-of-systems
architecture and designed for area defense against short, medium, and
intermediate range ballistic missiles. It is a mobile and globally
transportable, low density, high demand asset that has a unique endo-
and exoatmospheric intercept capability using proven hit-to-kill
technology. There are currently seven operational THAAD batteries, two
of which are forward stationed in Guam and the Republic of Korea in
response to the North Korean nuclear and missile threat. Development
efforts associated with United States Forces Korea Joint Emergent
Operational Need (JUONS) improved Patriot and THAAD interoperability,
as successfully demonstrated in a recent THAAD/Patriot MSE
developmental and operational test where THAAD software used two MSE
interceptors to engage a ballistic missile target. As directed in the
2019 Missile Defense Review, the Army, in conjunction with OSD and MDA,
reassessed the THAAD requirement to eight batteries.
Patriot/Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement:
The Army Patriot force remains the cornerstone of AMD protection for
our deployed forces, friends, and allies. The PAC-3 MSE is a high
velocity, hit-to-kill, surface-to-air missile capable of intercepting
and destroying tactical ballistic missiles and air-breathing threats.
The PAC-3 MSE, a follow-on variant of the PAC-3, is in full-rate
production and the latest generation hit-to-kill PAC-3 interceptor in
the Patriot force to meet global capability requirements. The PAC-3 MSE
fills the engagement gap between THAAD and PAC-3 missiles while also
defeating advanced threats earlier, at greater range, and with
increased lethality. The PAC-3 MSE's improved capability is achieved
through a higher performance solid rocket motor, modified lethality
enhancer, more responsive control surfaces, upgraded guidance software,
and insensitive munitions improvements.
Patriot must continually modernize through software and hardware
upgrades to address obsolescence and evolving threats, and to best
utilize extended battlespace performance afforded by the PAC-3 MSE
interceptor. Modernization efforts provide combat identification
enhancements, address upper-tier debris mitigation, improve PAC3 MSE
interceptor performance, and enable increased Army and joint
interoperability. The Army leverages the program's stable funding
profile to reduce price risk to the government through firm fixed price
contracting and value engineering initiatives. In doing so, the Army
mitigates obsolescence and counters emerging threats through hardware
and software improvements. In addition to the integration efforts with
the LTAMDS radar and IBCS, the Army supports the MDA-led integration of
PAC-3 MSE interceptors and launchers into the THAAD weapon system.
These new integrated capabilities expand battlespace by leveraging the
THAAD AN/TPY-2 and Patriot radars together to detect threat targets at
greater ranges. They will be pure fleeted across all Patriot battalions
beginning in Fiscal Year 2023. In addition, to overmatch the near-term
evolving threat, the Army is continuously improving Patriot while
moving toward an IBCS architecture that enables kill-chain
contributions from a wider spectrum of Army and joint sensors and
weapon components.
Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor: Replacing the current
Patriot radar, LTAMDS will provide networked sensing capabilities in
lower tier missile defense battlespace and enable full capability of
the PAC-3 MSE. The LTAMDS significantly improves legacy Patriot radar
by providing expanded range and 360-degree coverage combined with the
benefits of a networked sensor on the Army IAMD integrated fire control
network. This modern technology will reduce current Patriot radar
operations and sustainment costs by offsetting system equipment
requirements and enhancing reliability and maintainability. Recent
program successes include approval of an updated acquisition strategy
that enables rapid prototyping and major capability acquisition, as
well as approval of the LTAMDS PNT strategy. The Army plans to begin
testing LTAMDS prototypes with IBCS and the Patriot family of
interceptors, with the objective of fielding four sensors under urgent
materiel release to a Patriot battalion by the end of 2023.
Indirect Fire Protection Capability: Indirect Fire Protection
Capability (IFPC) is a ground-based weapon system designed to acquire,
track, engage, and defeat cruise missile, UAS, and RAM threats. The
Army's IFPC must integrate with IBCS as its C2 to enable an MDO-ready
Army by 2030. In accordance with the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense
Authorization Act, the Army completed acceptance and fielding of two
Iron Dome system batteries as an interim cruise missile defense
capability. This past February, the Army supported Operation Iron
Island, an Army executive order requirement that served as an
opportunity to gain awareness of the system in an operational
environment.
The Army is currently executing a competitive acquisition strategy
to develop and field an enduring IFPC capability integrated with IBCS.
IFPC Increment 2 will be an industry built solution for a launcher, and
interceptor, and an all-up-round-magazine. This weapon platform will
integrate with IBCS fire control with Sentinel as the primary organic
sensor. In September 2021, the Army announced the award of a rapid
prototype agreement with an industry partner for development and
delivery of 16 launchers and 60 interceptors for IFPC Increment 2.
Army Long-Range Persistent Surveillance: The Army Long Range
Persistent Surveillance (ALPS) passive sensor provides continuous, 360
degree, long range surveillance against fixed-and rotary-wing aircraft,
UAS, and cruise missile threats and has demonstrated the ability to
integrate into joint and Army C2 systems, including IBCS. In response
to multiple CCDR requirements, ALPS completed a USCENTCOM deployment
last year and is currently being fielded in the USEUCOM and USINDOPACOM
theaters.
Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Technological advances and
the proliferation of commercial and tactical UAS in both reconnaissance
and attack capabilities have matured to the point where they present a
significant threat to Army operations from both state and nonstate
actors. To address these threats, the Army continues to serve, at the
direction of the Secretary of Defense, as the executive agent for
countering UASs, having established the Joint Counter-Small UAS (C-
sUAS) Office (JCO). Key JCO focus areas include developing joint
requirements and materiel solutions, as well as joint training and
doctrine. The JCO continues to work across DOD to synchronize and
coordinate the development of C-sUAS technologies that meet Service-
specific and joint requirements. Development efforts such as high-power
microwave and DE are critical to ensuring the Army maintains pace with
both commercial and state developed UASs. In response to a warfighter
JUONS, the Army recently deployed over 500 man portable, fixed site,
and mobile C-sUAS systems and continues adapting to changing theater
UAS threats. The Army is now focused on providing critical C-sUAS
capabilities to divisions in the operational force while growing
protection of vital fixed and semi-fixed sites. For instance, in
support of the Immediate Response Force in Europe, the Army has
provided the 82nd Airborne Division kinetic and non-kinetic C-sUAS
capabilities, allowing the division to detect, track, and defeat sUAS.
Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense: In response to identified
operational needs, M-SHORAD will provide maneuver forces a dedicated,
Stryker-based air defense capability against fixed-wing, rotary-wing,
and UAS threats. In Fiscal Year 2018, the Army approved and began
developing initial M-SHORAD systems that integrate existing Army
capabilities into Stryker combat vehicles. The program successfully
delivered four first unit equipped systems to an artillery regiment in
April 2021 and remains on track to deliver four M-SHORAD battalions by
Fiscal Year 2024. The Army also continues maturing high energy laser
and electronic warfare technologies to increase M-SHORAD capabilities
in support of the maneuver force. Ultimately, M-SHORAD battalions will
contain a mix of complementary DE and kinetic intercept systems to
protect the maneuver force.
joint functional component command for integrated missile defense--
integrating and synchronizing missile defense
The Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile
Defense (JFCC IMD) is USSTRATCOM's integrating element for global
missile defense. USSTRATCOM formed JFCC IMD to execute its UCP-assigned
missile defense responsibilities, enabling the headquarters to focus on
integration and advocacy. Established in 2005 and headquartered at
Schriever Space Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado, JFCC IMD is
manned by a cohesive team of subject matter experts from the Army,
Navy, Air Force, Space Force, and Marine Corps, as well as Government
Civilian and Contractor personnel.
The JFCC IMD is the recognized subject matter expert across the
missile defense enterprise in matters of global missile defense
operational support, policy, plans, intelligence, communications,
training and education, and operational risk assessment. The command's
principal mission is to integrate these transregional missile defense
functions across the joint and combined warfighting force. On behalf of
USSTRATCOM and other CCDRs, JFCC IMD champions warfighter priorities
and operational needs. These include continued development of a robust
missile defense sensor network, integrated discrimination capabilities,
redundant and resilient C2 networks with enhanced cybersecurity
defenses, and improved means of intercept for all missile and hybrid
threats.
The JFCC IMD works across DOD and alongside allies and key partners
to improve integration of existing capabilities, maximizing efficiency
and effectiveness in global missile defense missions. Integration is
the essential force multiplier--a critically important mission enabler
that JFCC IMD directly supports. As a functional component command of
USSTRATCOM, JFCC IMD supports designated UCP responsibilities along
four lines of effort:
Synchronizing global missile defense planning, global
force management, and missile defense security cooperation activities.
Conducting global missile defense operations support, to
include asset management, alternate execution authority, federated
intelligence support, and network monitoring and protection.
Executing above element, joint, and combined global
missile defense training and education, exercises, and experimentation.
Advocating for, and recommending acceptance of, global
missile defense capabilities, conducting analyses and assessments of
current and future capabilities, and supporting tests.
To accomplish these efforts, JFCC IMD maintains close collaborative
relationships with CCDRs, MDA, OSD, the Joint Staff, Services,
intelligence community, and our allies and partners. The JFCC IMD
continually seeks to enhance deployed forces' capabilities while
gaining operational experience and confidence in our collective ability
to defend the Nation, deployed forces, allies, and partners. Some key
efforts to enhance missile defense planning and capabilities for both
homeland and regional architectures follow.
Expansion and Integration of the Missile Defense Architecture: In
response to the evolving strategic environment, JFCC IMD continues to
bolster homeland and regional missile defense capabilities and further
the global missile defense mission through advancement of new
capabilities. These advancements include the Aegis Ashore site in
Poland; continued development of the Standard Missile-3 Block IIA; the
Long Range Discrimination Radar, Clear Space Force Station, Alaska;
Space-based Kill Assessment; MDA's Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking
Space Sensor; Space Development Agency's Tranche 1 Tracking Layer; the
Next Generation Interceptor for homeland defense; and the Glide Phase
Interceptor for regional hypersonic defense. Given the challenges
associated with integrating these capabilities into a global
architecture, JFCC IMD, in support of USSTRATCOM, provides essential
collaboration with CCDRs to assess and address transregional gaps in
the areas of planning, policy, capabilities development, and
operations.
Integrated Missile Defense Asset Management: The JFCC IMD, in
coordination with USSTRATCOM and CCDRs, manages missile defense
operational readiness posture, coordinates global missile defense
system maintenance, and supports MDA and Service tests. The asset
management process allows JFCC IMD to continually assess system
readiness to defend against missile attacks and recommend adjustments
to optimize overall missile defense architecture.
Cybersecurity of the Missile Defense System: The JFCC IMD, in
coordination with USSTRATCOM and MDA, conducts the cybersecurity
service provider mission for missile defense architecture to ensure
cyber defenses and operations are planned and executed across the
globe. Working with key stakeholders, JFCC IMD enhances the cyber
defense posture of the missile defense operational architecture against
malicious activity. The JFCC IMD also collaborates with mission
partners to incorporate realistic cybersecurity testing in support of
the warfighter capability acceptance process. Additionally, JFCC IMD
works closely with the Joint Staff, CCMDs, and MDA to educate, train,
and exercise cybersecurity protocols to ensure the highest levels of
global missile defense readiness.
Global Force Management: USSTRATCOM, as the designated Joint
Functional Manager for Missile Defense, relies upon JFCC IMD to
evaluate and recommend to the Joint Staff risk-informed sourcing of
missile defense requirements. Due to the low density and high demand
nature of missile defense assets, all sourcing decisions have a direct
and significant impact on other CCDRs' campaign and contingency plans.
The JFCC IMD continues refining this approach, ensuring integrated
capabilities are appropriately postured to counter transregional
threats in accordance with the current National Defense Strategy,
Missile Defense Review, and Department steady-state priorities. This
globally integrated approach serves as the baseline for risk-based
recommendations to the global force management process, enabling senior
leaders to make informed decisions.
Allied and Partner Missile Defense Integration: Given that we will
never have enough active defense capacity, integrating our allies and
partners into a common and mutually supportive architecture is a
critical warfighter priority. We must move beyond merely enabling the
independent ``burden sharing'' of allies and partners to an environment
of mutual trust and information sharing that empowers truly integrated
planning and operations enabled by combined force development,
simulation, experimentation, testing, and exercise. We must acknowledge
that future major conflicts should not be fought alone and that our
greatest strategic advantage is the power of our alliances and
partnerships. We should not hamstring this historic advantage with
continued policies and practices that hinder collective action.
The Nimble Titan Campaign of Experimentation, a biennial series of
multinational missile defense experiments, is one venue aimed at
promoting this increased cooperation. This event brings together
subject matter experts from allied and partner nations to explore the
national policy and military interfaces and dynamics involved in
collaborative coalition and alliance missile defense planning. Meeting
this intent is necessary to developing regional defense designs, C2
relationships, and collective, bilateral, and multilateral policy.
Nimble Titan fosters greater confidence in combined missile defenses
and provides a means to advance U.S. efforts in collaboration,
interoperability, and operational integration with our allies and
partners.
Joint Missile Defense Training and Education: Even with ongoing
challenges posed by COVID-19, JFCC IMD, in coordination with
USSTRATCOM, the Joint Staff, Services, and CCMDs, continues developing
comprehensive and innovative training programs to close gaps between
Service, joint, and regional missile defense training and education.
The JFCC IMD's Joint Ballistic Missile Defense Training and Education
Center offers 18 mission-focused resident, online, and mobile training
team courses including orientation, asset management, C2BMC situational
awareness, and general and flag officer seminar training. During 2021,
JFCC IMD instructors executed 169 courses that trained more than 4,100
students worldwide. Enhancing collective advantage, JFCC IMD also
provides training courses to allies and partners through both military
to military and Foreign Military Sales training venues. Additional
foreign training opportunities are anticipated as the COVID-19 pandemic
wanes globally.
Warfighter Inputs to Capability Development: The JFCC IMD helps
streamline and accelerate MDA's efforts to provide integrated kill
chain capabilities (sense, C2, and effect) to warfighters as quickly as
possible to meet increased threat developments. As multiple reviews
have identified, the Nation must streamline requirement generation and
reform acquisition and fiscal processes and cultures to enable MDA and
the Services to quickly develop, test, and deliver effective, reliable,
and sustainable missile defense capabilities. Our adversaries are not
waiting, so we must change our typical ways with innovation,
adaptability, risk acceptance, and speed. The JFCC IMD collaborates
with CCDRs, MDA, and the Services, as well as their respective test
agencies, to leverage emerging technologies to enhance existing
systems, explore innovative operational concepts, and prioritize
maturing technological advancements with the most promising near-term
potential. To that end, JFCC IMD continues optimizing the collaboration
inherent in the warfighter involvement process as an operational
proponent for required missile defense capabilities and performance
enhancements.
Sustaining our competitive advantage through innovation and
expedience depends on well-resourced and operationally relevant test
campaigns, as well as high fidelity modeling and simulation
infrastructure and forward looking wargaming to challenge assumptions
regarding our future missile defense readiness and posture. In testing
over the past year, JFCC IMD supported demonstration of the selectable
2-and 3-stage GMD interceptor, which will improve the effective
engagement and defeat zone of incoming threats; several data
collections of hypersonic vehicle flight tests to characterize sensor
performance; and test planning for an upcoming operational flight test
to demonstrate the Long Range Discrimination Radar's capabilities.
Comprehensive Missile Defeat: As I have highlighted, adversary
offensive missile and hybrid systems are increasingly complex and
challenging in their delivery means and scale. As such, an optimal
missile defense requires both defensive and offensive capabilities to
defeat potential threats. By sustaining a capability to not only attack
the adversary's ability to launch missiles but also destroy them after
launch, a comprehensive approach can lower overall costs and reduce
risk of failure. Creating this comprehensive posture--involving the
integration of both defensive and offensive capabilities -will require
balancing a variety of approaches within our capability set.
Importantly, as we continue developing innovative capabilities, it
is imperative that we implement integrated deterrence as the framework
that weaves together all instruments of national power. These actions
include diplomacy at the forefront and advancing cross-domain
deterrence together with the capabilities and actions of allies and
partners to ensure the costs and risks of adversary aggression remain
disproportionate to any conceivable benefit. These capabilities must
include conventional kinetic, DE, cyber, and electromagnetic attack as
part of a comprehensive approach. Each individual approach provides
opportunities to reduce the burden on active defenses; however, none
alone is a ``silver bullet'' to defeating the threat. As such, our
future offensive materiel solutions will likely be a mix of guns,
missiles, electronic warfare, cyber, space, and DE weapons. To this
end, we must understand how each of these systems complement one
another and strive for a balance that allows prelaunch attack
operations and offense-defense integration, and then organize to
operationalize these capabilities and maximize their contributions to
missile defense.
In summary, JFCC IMD continues to expand our Nation's global
missile defense architecture and explore developing capabilities to
maintain operational advantage against current and future threats. We
maintain our competitive edge through integrated planning and
operational support, development of warfighters through education and
training, expansion of collective capabilities in collaboration with
our allies and partners, and rapid delivery of innovative and impactful
capabilities to warfighters that enhance national security.
conclusion
Chairman King and Ranking Member Fischer, as members of the joint
missile defense community, the Army and USSTRATCOM continue pursuing
enhancements to the Nation's IAMD systems, from tactical to strategic
levels of warfare. As outlined here, USASMDC and JFCC IMD perform a
broad set of critical national security missions. These missions
include providing professional warfighters and capabilities to support
current operations, ensuring they are prepared for tomorrow's fight,
and developing the new technologies required to achieve and maintain
technological advantage against our adversaries. Our trained and ready
soldiers, operating GMD elements in Colorado, Alaska, New York, and
California, and from remote, globally deployed locations, remain ready
to defend the homeland against ICBM attack. As a force provider to
CCDRs, we provide essential regional sensor capabilities, ballistic
missile early warning, and space-enabled communications. Our regional
forces continue to leverage allied collaboration and planning efforts
in developing integrated and interoperable defenses against various
threat sets. USSTRATCOM, through JFCC IMD, continues to integrate
missile defense capabilities to counter global missile threats and
protect our Nation, deployed forces, and allies and partners.
While operational, doctrinal, and materiel developments are
essential, our most important assets are the thousands of soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, guardians, civilians, and contractors who
deploy and employ our IAMD systems. As recognized by Department
leadership, the strength behind our outstanding workforce is their
families. Their contributions and sacrifices are foundational to the
dedication and performance of our workforce--the role and support of
our families empowers mission accomplishment.
I appreciate the opportunity to address missile defense matters and
look forward to addressing your questions.
Senator King. Thank you, General.
Admiral Hill?
STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JON HILL, USN, DIRECTOR, MISSILE
DEFENSE AGENCY
Vice Admiral Hill. Good afternoon, Chairman King, Ranking
Member Fischer, distinguished members of the subcommittee. It
is a great honor to be here with some incredible key
partnerships here to testify before you today.
I would like to first start by recognizing and thanking
those who operate from abroad and here at home, operating the
Integrated Missile Defense System, and then, of course, my
Missile Defense Agency team, comprised of military, civilian,
and contractor workforces that ensure that the warfighters can
operate those systems.
Our fiscal year 2023 budget was mentioned as $9.6 billion
to continue the mission of protecting the homeland, our
forward-deployed forces, our friends, and allies.
A little bit back on the threat. Everyone has mentioned it.
I want to put a finer point on it. When you think about
advanced ballistic missiles, long-range cruise missiles,
hypersonic missiles, what that really means, down at the
warfighter level, is heavy maneuver, large numbers, at high
speed, with 360-degree attack. That is a challenge.
Rather than walking through all of the elements of the
Integrated Missile Defense System that we have deployed
globally and operated by our services, I want to focus in on
what I see as the three top priorities for President's budget
2023.
Priority one is the no-fail mission of defend the homeland
against ballistic attacks from the rogue nations. I want to
thank Congress for the great support on the service life
extension program. We are making great progress. We are on
track, ahead of schedule. We have got the first round that we
refurbished back in the hole now, number two is inbound, and
rounds three, four, and five are being processed now. That is
going to extend the reliability of our in-service fleet----
Senator King. I would prefer you not use the term
``inbound'' in this room. It makes me a little nervous.
[Laughter.]
Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. I will scratch that from the
script.
Then I would like to switch on over to Next-Generation
Interceptor. As was mentioned earlier, we are at light speed
working very closely with General VanHerck and his team to
ensure that the two contractors that we put in place last year
about this time, March of 2021, are tracking to get to first in
placement around the 2028 time frame. Right now both are
performing so well that they are anticipating, and our team
believes that we are tracking towards 2027. That is incredible.
That means flight testing earlier. That means ground testing
earlier. That means we have a better sense of where we are as
we move forward to upgrade the numbers of interceptors and the
capability that we will be bringing forward.
Priority two--and the reason it is priority two is not just
because it is a territory with U.S. citizens living on it. It
will be one of the most difficult things we do as an agency,
and that is the defense of Guam. We have a current architecture
with a ship stationed up forward and we have a THAAD battery on
the island. We have a clear set of operational requirements
from INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command]. We finalized the
architecture in President's budget 2023. The Department did
provide funds in fiscal year 2022 to accelerate, and then
Congress added a plus-up for us to do that.
Our plan is to leverage mature systems to expand so that we
have emerging capabilities tied in, and I think the most
important thing that we will bring to the table is a single
command and control structure. Critically important for the
Pacific Defense Initiative, so we are staying very close to
INDOPACOM as we move through this development.
Priority three, really driven by the threat, and that is
the hypersonic missile defense that has been mentioned by
everybody. We are leveraging our existing sensors today to get
indications and warnings, so we are not starting at zero. Our
command and control battle management deployed globally has the
ability to pull in the space assets that are available, the
land-based assets, the sea-based assets, to get us track on
hypersonics when they fly through the field of view. Our
command and control battle management system, C2BMC, is running
a prototype today that provides indications and warning to
INDOPACOM.
Where we are going in fiscal year 2023 is we will have our
first two Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensors,
HBTSS, in space, operating in an inclination to where we can
collect data from testing we do in the INDOPACOM region. We are
going to get fire control data where we can leverage our
weapons.
What we have deployed today for hypersonic defense, with
the sea base, is the sea-based terminal capability. I mentioned
that already. That has been deployed for a while. We are on
Increment 2 of that capability and moving out towards Increment
3. When I say that, that means we are expanding the threat set
to take on a larger number of those hypersonic threats.
Where we need to go is away from the terminal area. You
have to defend there but it is the most difficult place to
engage because you really do not know where a terminal is going
to be, because it is maneuvering and it is high speed. So we
are moving to get to a layered defense capability, and in the
President's Budget 2023 we are going forward with the Glide
Phase Interceptor. We have three companies on board now, and we
will be down-selecting to two later this year.
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, Members of the
Subcommittee, MDA continues to increase readiness, resiliency,
and cybersecurity and the capability and capacity of homeland
and regional defenses while investing in advanced technology.
We are committed to attracting and building a strong, talented,
future workforce, and our capabilities-based approach and
unique acquisition authorities enable MDA to deliver by,
through, and with the services to the combatant commands to
meet their requirements.
I appreciate your continued support for the Missile Defense
Agency, the people, and the missile defense mission. I look
forward to answering your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Hill follows:]
Prepared Statement by Vice Admiral Jon A. Hill
Good morning, Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. The Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) budget request of $9.628 billion for fiscal year 2023 enables the
continued execution of the MDA mission to design, develop and deploy a
layered Missile Defense System (MDS) to defend the United States and
its deployed forces, allies, and friends from increasingly diverse
missile threats. MDA's proposed investments for fiscal year 2023
reflect missile defense guidance issued in the classified 2022 Missile
Defense Review, which was provided to Congress on March 28, 2022, along
with the 2022 National Defense Strategy, and are aligned with the
February 1, 2022 ``USD(R&E) Technology Vision for an Era of
Competition.''
Potential U.S. adversaries are developing more advanced ballistic,
hypersonic, and cruise missile systems, increasingly making them more
mobile, survivable, reliable, accurate, and capable of achieving longer
ranges. Current and future missile threats pose the growing technical
challenges of high velocity, heavy maneuver, large numbers, and the
exploitation of combination attacks involving unmanned aerial vehicles.
MDA continues to collaborate with Combatant Commanders and the Services
to support current and future needs for missile defense capabilities.
The Department periodically re-examines missile defense roles,
responsibilities and authorities. For example, the Joint Staff is
implementing its Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Capability
Portfolio Management Review (CPMR) to continuously review threats,
identify capability gaps, and make cost/risk tradeoff recommendations.
I support this effort. I also consider the Warfighter Involvement
Process, or WIP, currently led by U.S. Strategic Command and the Joint
Functional Component Commander for Integrated Missile Defense, to be
essential, as it is currently constituted, to the U.S. missile defense
enterprise. I believe the existing missile defense governance process,
including the WIP, is unique and necessary for the voices of the
Combatant Commands and the Services to be heard. The current governance
process, combined with MDA's capabilities-based approach and unique
acquisition authorities, are essential in supporting the Warfighter
given the rapidly evolving threat environment.
delivering by, through and with the services to meet combatant command
requirements
MDA is developing, delivering, sustaining, and improving
affordable, proven, and leading-edge capabilities to counter
increasingly advanced ballistic missiles and an expanding set of
hypersonic and cruise missiles.
Space and Terrestrial Sensors
We can improve sensor tracking and discrimination capabilities by
leveraging the global persistence and proximity of space sensors. The
Spacebased Kill Assessment (SKA) network of infrared sensors hosted on
commercial satellites is planned to deliver hit and kill assessment
capabilities for homeland defense. On-orbit SKA sensors have already
participated successfully in a variety of flight tests and engineering
activities and provide situational awareness to U.S. Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM) during regular exercises. We will complete SKA hit
assessment integration using a Command and Control, Battle Management
and Communications (C2BMC) operational interface into the MDS in fiscal
year 2024 and continue developing a follow-on kill assessment as part
of the post-intercept assessment capability.
MDA continues to collaborate with the U.S. Space Force (USSF),
including the Space Development Agency, and industry to develop a
Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) capability to
detect and track boosting ballistic missiles and hypersonic glide
vehicles. In fiscal year 2023, we will complete development and
implementation of ground systems to support satellite operations and
testing and deliver two prototype satellites developed by two separate
companies in support of a planned fiscal year 2023 launch to conduct
on-orbit demonstrations. I also would like to recognize the critical
contributions made by the two Space Tracking and Surveillance System
(STSS) satellites launched in September 2009. After lasting eight years
past their design life, both space vehicles were decommissioned earlier
this year. STSS satellites served as an important testbed for HBTSS
risk reduction activities, which included demonstrations that we can
close the MDS fire control loop from space.
MDA also continues to develop, deploy, and sustain a robust, cyber-
secure and networked ground- and sea-based radar architecture. We
completed Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) construction and
Initial Fielding in 2021 at Clear Space Force Station (SFS), Alaska.
The LRDR is the most advanced ground-based radar in the world. In
fiscal year 2023, we will develop software for tracking and
discrimination improvements, refining space intelligence data, and
enhancing modeling and simulation. Following operational acceptance in
fiscal year 2023, LRDR will support the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
(GMD) capability against Pacific theater long-range missile threats
with persistent long-range midcourse discrimination and precision
tracking and hit assessment. LRDR also will support Space Domain
Awareness (SDA).
The Sea Based X-band (SBX) radar supports homeland defense
operations, MDS testing and data collection, and it provides SDA and
precision midcourse tracking and discrimination capabilities. The SBX
will continue at-sea deployment into fiscal year 2023 while conducting
selected radar and vessel maintenance, software and hardware upgrades,
and testing. Fabrication of the SBX replacement radome continues on
schedule for installation in fiscal year 2025.
MDA continues to support the USSF in sustaining and updating the
Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWRs) at Clear SFS, Alaska; Cape Cod
SFS, Massachusetts; Royal Air Force Fylingdales, United Kingdom; Thule
Air Base, Greenland; and Beale AFB, California. UEWRs support missile
defense of the Homeland and detection of ballistic missile attacks and
conduct general space surveillance and satellite tracking.
MDA is providing affordable software upgrades to Aegis Integrated
Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) destroyers equipped with the SPY-1 radar
to support the USSF SDA mission. The Aegis SDA capability is fully
compatible with deployed U.S. Navy operations and has appropriate
safeguards to ensure full Aegis IAMD warfighting capability is
available. In April and September 2021, we worked in partnership with
the USSF, Navy, and industry to demonstrate the first-ever SDA
capability from operational Navy destroyers, where the USSF tasked
Aegis Baseline 9 Destroyers via C2BMC to detect, track, and report
resident space objects. In fiscal year 2023, we will continue to
develop, test, and deliver this upgrade to the Navy. Twenty-nine Aegis
ships are scheduled to be upgraded with this capability by fiscal year
2024.
MDA also is working with the U.S. Navy to refurbish existing
shipboard SPY-1 radar arrays to provide increased radar sensitivity and
discrimination improvements. We also plan to integrate missile defense
capability with delivery of the Navy's Air and Missile Defense Radar,
the SPY-6, for enhanced engagement capability and increased raid
capacity.
MDA is upgrading, sustaining, and supporting operation of 12 AN/
TPY-2 radars, including five Forward Based Mode radars in Japan,
Israel, Turkey, and United States Central Command. We have seven
Terminal Mode radars in CONUS locations or forward-deployed with U.S.
Army Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries in U.S.
Indo-Pacific Command. AN/TPY-2 radar 13 production is on schedule with
planned delivery as a Terminal Mode radar in second quarter fiscal year
2025 for service with THAAD Battery 8. MDA continues supporting two
THAAD Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases that include seven AN/TPY-2
radars in production for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) along with
two operational radars in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications
C2BMC integrates the MDS and provides Combatant Commanders with
global, persistent, space-based infrared, land-, and sea-sensor
acquisition, tracking, cueing, discrimination, and fire-control quality
data to support U.S. and coalition-partner missile defense and SDA
operations. C2BMC interfaces with Service, NATO, and international
systems and provides decision makers a common operating missile defense
picture. C2BMC also operates an advanced prototype processing node that
tracks and reports hypersonic threats in response to U.S. Indo-Pacific
Command operational need.
Funding in fiscal year 2023 sustains the C2BMC planner, situational
awareness, battle management capabilities, global missile defense
network, and SDA in Combatant Command user nodes. The most recent C2BMC
upgrade integrates LRDR and the updated BMDS Overhead Persistent
Infrared Architecture into the MDS, providing situational awareness and
tracking capability for hypersonic threats. This spiral significantly
expands SDA capabilities for U.S. Space Command with LRDR, provides
additional SDA coverage using the Aegis SPY-1 radar, and integrates on-
orbit SKA sensors into the MDS. It also integrates the U.S. Army's IAMD
Battle Command System into the MDS.
Homeland Defense
The GMD system protects the U.S. Homeland from rogue state
ballistic missile attacks, and we are focused on delivering new
capabilities to address the limited but increasingly advanced North
Korean Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) threat. In September
2021, we demonstrated the capability to select a 2-stage or 3-stage
burn of a Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) booster, which enables an
earlier release of the kill vehicle to greatly expand the engagement
area and time to counter the inbound threat. In fiscal year 2023, we
will execute an intercept flight test demonstrating this capability and
the latest incremental improvements of the entire kill chain to defeat
an advanced threat-representative ICBM target equipped with
countermeasures.
MDA continues to upgrade the ground system infrastructure,
communications network, fire control system, and missile fields to
improve the reliability, capability, and cybersecurity resiliency of
the GMD weapon system and support acceptance of the Next Generation
Interceptor (NGI). The entire GMD weapon system is currently undergoing
a Service Life Extension Program to improve GBI reliability and
availability. With these ongoing efforts, we anticipate the existing
GBI fleet will be extended beyond 2030.
NGI development and fielding will improve the interceptor fleet,
with deliveries starting as early as 2028. The Department awarded two
NGI contracts in March 2021, and our competing Industry prime
contractors are advancing through the design development process with
full technical rigor to deliver this new capability as soon as
possible. Both designs feature multiple kill vehicle payloads to reduce
the number of interceptors required to defeat a single ballistic
missile threat to our Nation. Our fiscal year 2023 request will
continue to mature critical technologies for the NGI booster, payload,
and sensors.
Regional Defense
Globally deployed ship-based and land-based Aegis BMD capabilities
are critical to the Nation's integrated defense of our deployed forces,
allies, and partners against short- to intermediate-range missile
threats. In fiscal year 2023, we will continue to meet the quickly
advancing threat through improvements to the Aegis BMD capability,
including procuring and delivering Standard Missile (SM)-3 Block IB and
Block IIA missiles, improving Sea-Based Terminal (SBT) defense,
advancing weapon system and missile reliability, and enhancing Aegis
BMD engagement capacity and lethality. We will continue developing
Aegis BMD weapon system software to enhance functionality and leverage
more-capable radars, artificial intelligence, and national technical
means.
MDA continues to support protection of NATO's European territory
and forces against the ballistic missile threat from the Middle East.
Aegis Ashore in Romania is operational, and we plan to complete
construction on Aegis Ashore Poland in 2023. Both sites are designed to
launch the SM-3 Block IB and Block IIA. This past year, installation of
select combat system equipment occurred in parallel with construction
activity, and U.S Navy sailors moved into the residential building at
Naval Support Facility Redzikowo.
We are planning to conduct in fiscal year 2022 an Aegis Weapon
System flight test experiment (FEM-01), which will be an exo-
atmospheric engagement to demonstrate an Aegis ship firing an SM-3
Block IIA against a Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) target. We
also plan to execute an Aegis intercept flight test campaign with Japan
(JFTM-07) in which we will demonstrate the newest BMD engagement
capability of the Japan (J7) Aegis BMD configuration with SM-3 Block
IIA against an MRBM. We will also demonstrate Aegis ship-to-ship
engage-on-remote in a simulated engagement, an IAMD capability using
SM-2 surface-to-air defense missiles, and an organic engagement of an
SRBM with SM-3 Block IB Threat Upgrade interceptor.
The THAAD weapon system is globally transportable and ground-based
and is highly effective against short-, medium- and intermediate-range
missile threats inside and outside the atmosphere in the terminal phase
of flight. MDA currently supports forward-deployment of two batteries
stationed in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility and
continues to cooperate with UAE and KSA in support of operational FMS
THAAD batteries. The UAE THAAD weapon system successfully intercepted
ballistic missiles launched at the UAE in January 2022, marking the
first operational use of the U.S.-built system. In fiscal year 2023 we
will continue THAAD development and interceptor procurement,
obsolescence mitigation efforts, production and training support, the
THAAD Stockpile Reliability Program, and modifications to meet growing
cybersecurity threats.
MDA is providing a more robust IAMD capability, one that integrates
THAAD, Army Patriot, and at-sea Aegis ships into a seamless network.
THAAD/Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) integration improves the area
defended by a THAAD battery without the requirement of a dedicated
Patriot battery and increases engagement opportunities while conserving
THAAD interceptors. In February 2022, THAAD demonstrated control of MSE
interceptors in a simulated SRBM non-intercept flight test (TH CTV-
01a). TH CTV-01a verified that the latest THAAD software could allow
the THAAD weapon system to compute an MSE firing solution, communicate
with an M903 Launcher, and control an MSE interceptor in flight. In
THAAD Flight Test (FTT)-21, a combined developmental and operational
test conducted in March 2022, we used the latest THAAD software to fire
two MSE interceptors to engage the SRBM target. In fiscal year 2023, we
plan to conduct the first THAAD demonstration of concurrent control of
THAAD and MSE interceptors against multiple MRBM targets.
In fiscal year 2022, MDA will begin engineering and planning a
survivable and operationally effective IAMD architecture to defend Guam
from ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missile threats. Defense of Guam
IAMD architecture would leverage proven missile defense capabilities,
allow for expansion of emerging capabilities, and provide a single
command and control structure. Our fiscal year 2023 funding request
allows continued development, to include engineering and planning
activities, environmental impacts studies, procurement on long lead
items, and integration between Army and Navy assets. All early design
and integration activities will support a range of architecture
options, pending upcoming Departmental decisions.
We are investing in defensive capabilities to counter regional
hypersonic missile threats by upgrading sensors and C2BMC for early
warning, identification, and tracking of regional and strategic
hypersonic threats from space (e.g., HBTSS). We also are leveraging
existing systems where possible (including proven engage-on-remote and
launch-on-remote capabilities) and pursuing a Glide Phase Intercept
(GPI) demonstration. We are working closely with the Navy to develop,
field, and upgrade the SBT capability to counter regional maneuvering
and hypersonic threats in the terminal phase of flight. The SBT program
already provides an initial terminal defensive capability to counter
hypersonic threats, and additional improvements are scheduled for 2024.
Today, the SM-6 missile is the only weapon in the country's arsenal
capable of engaging highly-maneuverable hypersonic threats. In fiscal
year 2023, Aegis SBT will demonstrate a simulated engagement against a
hypersonic target (FTX-40) and in fiscal year 2024 will demonstrate a
salvo engagement firing two SM-6 Block IA Upgraded guided missiles
against a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle target (FTM-43). Complementing this
terminal capability, in fiscal year 2023, MDA will continue to develop
and plan a GPI demonstration and leverage the Aegis Weapon System to
provide the U.S. Warfighter increasingly capable regional defensive
capabilities.
We will continue to work with North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD) and USNORTHCOM to develop system architecture for
cruise missile defense (CMD) of the Homeland. I agree with the NORAD/
USNORTHCOM Commander that modern threats require improved all-domain
awareness, updated capabilities, and policies and strategies that
reflect the current strategic environment and the advanced capabilities
of our competitors. We have been able to make good progress on enhanced
indications and warning and will continue to develop the systems
architecture and conduct a demonstration of CMD capabilities using the
Joint Tactical Integrated Fire Control (JTIFC) capability. JTIFC
enhances integrated fire control capabilities across the Services by
connecting existing sensors, command and control systems, and weapons
at the tactical level through real-time sensor networks. I also share
the NORAD/USNORTHCOM Commander's desire to have an Over-The-Horizon
radar fielded as soon as possible to support All Domain Awareness and
agree with his assessment that the air and cruise missile threat to the
Homeland is a top priority.
We are continuing our cooperative missile defense relationship with
Israel to help our partner develop systems to strengthen its missile
defenses and increase interoperability with U.S. forces. Our two
nations continue to cooperate on engineering, development, co-
production, testing, and fielding of the Arrow Weapon System, the
David's Sling Weapon System, and co-production for the Iron Dome
Defense System. I would like to highlight our cooperative demonstration
of interoperability in the successful flight test of the Arrow Weapon
System and Arrow-3 interceptor conducted on January 18, 2022. In fiscal
year 2023, MDA will continue co-development, testing, and co-production
with Israel.
developing technology for future competition
With mission focus on warfighting outcomes, MDA is investing in
innovative and disruptive technologies to provide leap-ahead
capabilities to address the emergence of new and more advanced threats.
We must continue to sustain, modernize, and expand missile defenses by
pursuing rapid, yet measured, development of advanced missile defense
concepts and technologies for homeland and regional defense. We will
continue to develop mission-aligned disruptive technologies, solutions,
and transition opportunities for future ballistic and hypersonic
defense architectures, investing in the technology development
necessary for the next increment of capability, including externally
and internally-cooled seeker window technology, axial upper stage
throttling and maneuvering capability, robust and resilient materials
for hypersonic flight, secured mesh communications, and novel guidance
and control capability.
MDA continually assesses emerging and disruptive technology for
potential applications to missile defense utilization that are
producible, reliable, and cost-effective. We are pursuing efforts in
directed energy, artificial intelligence, machine learning, nanosat
technology, Left-through-Right of Launch Integration, cybersecurity,
and quantum science. Keys to this assessment have been our insight into
the missile defense industrial base and our development of testbeds
that allow us to exercise and demonstrate capabilities and test new
concepts, algorithms, simulations, and software. We are also expanding
technology opportunities through cooperative, collaborative engagements
with our DOD partners, laboratories, allies, industry, and
universities.
conclusion
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, Members of the Subcommittee,
we will continue to increase the readiness, resiliency, cybersecurity
as well as the capability and capacity of fielded homeland and regional
missile defense systems while investing in mission-focused advanced
technology. We are committed to attracting and building a strong,
talented future workforce to meet the mission challenges of tomorrow. I
would like to recognize and thank the men and women who serve in our
Armed Forces at home and abroad and who operate the integrated Missile
Defense System with the support of our dedicated civilian and
contractor workforce. I appreciate your continued support for MDA and
the missile defense mission, and I look forward to answering the
committee's questions. Thank you.
Senator King. Thank you, Admiral, and thanks to all of you
for your extraordinary service and work.
I want to start with some budget questions, and I do not
think we are seeing the full picture when we talk about the
Missile Defense Agency budget. Dr. Plumb, are there not other
missile-related expenditures in other parts of the budget? I
think you touched on this. I want apples to apples from last
year to this year on the whole missile defense enterprise.
Mr. Plumb. Yes, sir. I do not think I can give you the
specific numbers. I will say, at least for the $4.7 billion for
the transition, the first piece of funding to transition to a
robust, proliferated, low-earth orbit missile warning and
missile track architecture, including an architecture that can
observe hypersonic weapons, that is $4.7 billion more than it
was in the budget the previous year. That is a new thing.
My colleague here, Secretary Honey, was just talking about
the directed energy funding. That funding is no longer part of
MDA's budget. At least most of it is now with R&E, so there is
a bucket of money there.
Senator King. It would be helpful for me, Dr. Honey, for
the record, not right now, but for the record of this hearing
if you could give us a sort of apples to apples with all the
pieces of the budget last year and this year. Can you supply
that?
Mr. Honey. Yes. We will take that for the record, sir.
Mr. Honey. The missile defense funds for directed energy
are allocated across the Department of Defense (DOD). In 2019,
the Department made a decision to consolidate directed energy
S&T efforts (BA 6.1, 6.2, & 6.3) within the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (OUSD(R&E))
in the Directed Energy-Joint Transition Office (DE-JTO). This
office works on technologies which will be used in all of the
Services/Agencies developmental programs. This office is within
the OUSD(R&E) Deputy Chief Technology Officer (DCTO) for
Critical Technologies (CT). It also issued a Directed Energy
Roadmap to best utilize resources and leverage existing
programs across the Department.
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) collaborates closely with
OUSD(R&E)/CT and the military services on directed energy
capability development efforts, to include missile defense.
The directed energy budgets for the military services, MDA,
and the OUSD(R&E) are shown in the chart below. The OUSD(R&E)
budget funds key high energy laser technology necessary for
missile defense. The total for fiscal year 2022 is $305.6
million and the total for fiscal year 2023 is $439.7 million.
Additional classified details can be provided upon request.
Directed Energy Missile Defense Budget ($M)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year
2022 2023
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Military Services............................. 124.2 265
MDA........................................... 52.5 15
OUSD R&E...................................... 128.9 159.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total..................................... 305.6 439.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator King. Thank you. I appreciate that.
Hypersonic defense. Well, I guess, let me just back up. I
am disturbed by the fact that the President's Budget proposes a
cut at a time when we all know that we are facing a new threat
and an important one. So perhaps what you are telling me is
that there is money in other places to deal with a threat by
things like directed energy. Is that correct?
Mr. Honey. Yes, Senator. That is correct. We do have funds
elsewhere that are developing directed energy solutions for
that particular threat.
Senator King. Okay. Well that is what I hope you can supply
it for the record, as you suggested you would.
What have we learned from Ukraine? I will direct this to
any of the witnesses, but I would think the guys with the
uniforms on might have some thoughts. General Karbler, what
have we learned?
lLieutenant General Karbler. Sir, a couple of lessons that
I have taken personally from Ukraine and that we are applying
within the air and missile defense community. First, as I said
in my opening statement, we see adversaries normalizing the use
of ballistic missiles. If you went back about 10 years, force-
on-force ballistic missile use just was not as prevalent, and
now we see Russia, as well as other adversaries, using
ballistic missiles.
Senator King. Conventional air defense does not work.
lLieutenant General Karbler. No, sir. You need ballistic
missile defense in order to be able to counter that, and with
that, we recognize also that it cannot just be an active
defense solution. We have got to be able to integrate offensive
capabilities to take out those missiles when we are on a tail
or when aircraft is on a runway or in a hangar. So the
offensive-defense integration is key, as well as then the
layered missile defense. So everything from THAAD to Patriot
to----
Senator King. Is it not true that most of the damage done
in Ukraine has been done by artillery and missiles, not by
conventional aircraft dropping bombs?
lLieutenant General Karbler. Yes, sir, and so that layered
defense would allow us from Army capabilities, THAAD, and
Patriot to counter ballistic missiles as well as cruise
missiles and even our counter-rocket artillery and mortar, our
C-RAM systems that we have to get after those particular
artillery pieces.
Senator King. The question that I have gotten from a
variety of people is why have we not provided the Ukrainians
with Iron Dome or something like Iron Dome?
lLieutenant General Karbler. Sir, the reason that we put a
Patriot battery into Slovakia was because the Slovakians
provided an S-300 system into Ukraine.
Senator King. That is a rough equivalent?
lLieutenant General Karbler. It is a rough equivalent to
Patriot. As far as the United States providing Iron Dome into
Ukraine, any involvement of any United States air defense
forces in Ukraine would have to be a policy discussion.
Senator King. I understand.
General VanHerck, the Arctic. Give me 30 seconds on the
importance of the Arctic in terms of this process. It seems to
me that has opened up a whole new level of strategic
competition.
General VanHerck. Senator, that is exactly right. So
environmental change in the Arctic is creating opportunities
and vulnerabilities--access to resources that did not exist
years ago, longer shipping seasons, economic prosperity. But
what we are seeing is those norms and rules and international
laws that have served us well since the end of World War II are
under challenge, in the Arctic and elsewhere around the globe.
Senator King. Would it help if we ceded to UNCLOS [United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea]?
General VanHerck. Senator, I support the succession to
UNCLOS as soon as we can if we can make that happen.
Senator King. Thank you. Thank you very much, General.
Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Hill, I
understand the Missile Defense Agency plans to deploy two
satellites equipped with Hypersonic Ballistic Tracking Space
Sensor. What is the Department's plan for this capability
beyond these two prototypes?
Vice Admiral Hill. Senator, thank you. Great question. Just
to kind of go back, what Hypersonic Ballistic Tracking Space
Sensor does, it is really two functions. The B stands for
ballistic targets, and that handles some of the changes that we
are seeing in the ballistic flights today, and kind of think of
changes in propulsion, which challenge our sensors today. So we
are going to meet that challenge with HBTSS.
But what it really does is it gives us fire control quality
data on hyperglide vehicles, and when I say fire control I am
not talking about putting out fires. What I am talking about is
very discrete positional and velocity differences so that we
can get a very firm track and put a weapon on it. The weapons
are very sensitive to having a very firm track, and we get that
fire control data from HBTSS.
Now to your larger question of how does it fit into the
broader architecture, we are very close with the Space Force.
They are working that architecture. It is not complete yet.
What we will do in 2023, by having those first two in air--they
are built by two different companies. They will be
interoperable. They are interoperable on the ground today--we
will track different flight tests that we do, and we will prove
that we have that data so we have the confidence to then
proliferate.
We will work that closely with the Space Force over the
next year to determine where they go, and there is flexibility
in the sensor. It does not have to be limited to a LEO [low
earth orbit] constellation. We can go with MEO [medium earth
orbit], and so there is lots of flexibility, low-earth and
medium-earth orbit. So we are working that with the Space Force
and we will be part of that broader architecture. Thank you,
ma'am.
Senator Fischer. I know that there are other programs under
development that are related to the missile warning and
tracking, but are any of these other capabilities comparable in
terms of being able to provide that fire control quality data
that you need?
Vice Admiral Hill. Ma'am, it really is unique to HBTSS for
the hyperglides. Space capability is so important, not just
because we are going to catch the global maneuver, but we use
it for indications of warning. It is what kicks off an
engagement today. General Karbler talked a little bit about
that. When we see the flash then it will go through the face of
a radar, and that is how we get a track, if we can see the
track on the ground. For hypersonics, since they are very hard
to see, they will normally maneuver outside the field of view
of a ground-based radar or a sea-based radar, so you would need
that sort of constellation in place to get to the fire control
data.
Now when I look at the capabilities that are in the
architecture today they are very complementary. The wide field
of view, we kind of think of that as surveillance, so when we
say ``track'' with a wide field of view that is going to
contain those tracks, and then they cue the HBTSS to go and get
that very fine precision track that we need to place a weapon
on target.
Senator Fischer. How long do you think you are going to be
collecting all this data on these prototypes before we are ever
going to see any kind of plan for what the future is going to
be, for what we are going to need in the future?
Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, ma'am. If we get this right in
terms of defining the architecture, and based on the data we
have, we can make decisions as early as possible.
Senator Fischer. What does that mean, as early as possible?
You know, I get really nervous when I hear dates like 2028 for
something, and we are pleased that it is 2027.
Senator King. Eisenhower retook Europe in 11 months.
[Laughter.]
Senator Fischer. Shush. How are we going to----
Vice Admiral Hill. Do not think of it as----
Senator Fischer.--condense the time period, and maybe have
to accept more risk?
Vice Admiral Hill. Perhaps, but I think right now we are
not starting from zero. You know, in the storytelling of
putting two up in March of 2023, there is work that is being
done now in that architecture. So decisions can be made early
for that proliferation and planning for that, and making sure
that we have the industry lined up to execute.
Senator Fischer. At the hearing last year I asked about the
status of implementing Section 1684 of the fiscal year 2017
NDAA, which requires the Department to designate a single
entity as the lead acquisition organization for defending the
homeland from cruise missiles. General VanHerck and Admiral
Hill, you both made clear at the time your support for making
this designation.
Dr. Plumb, welcome back again. When can we expect the
Department to finally resolve this?
Mr. Plumb. Thank you, Senator Fischer. As you are probably
aware, both the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary have
committed to moving this forward. I am hesitant to give you a
specific date but I think it is in the near future, and the
Joint Staff is working on that, is my understanding.
Senator Fischer. I would just like to note another thing I
am worried about is lack of action. So it would be nice to see
things move forward at a quicker pace.
Mr. Plumb. I am pushing on it.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. General VanHerck, in your
funded priorities list it includes $50 million for cruise
missile defense demonstration involving an elevated sensor. Can
you describe that project and how it would contribute to pacing
the growing cruise missile threat to the homeland?
General VanHerck. Senator, that is an opportunity to
basically go all the way from the domain awareness sensor
through a joint tactical fire control system--Admiral Hill
talked about that earlier--to the actual execution and
demonstration from a sea-based missile system to engage a
cruise missile. It would help us reduce risk and move forward
in the near term if we got that $50 million to demonstrate
three separate engagements of capability.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Senator Tuberville.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you very much. Thanks for being
here.
I want to follow up a little bit on what Senator King was
saying earlier. General Karbler, in my former job of coaching I
used to watch teams on the field, on film. Sometimes you think
a lot more of them, sometimes you think less, and then all of a
sudden you get them in a real game and you found out what they
were.
Russia's missiles in the last 90 days, we have seen them in
action. Can you give a coach's perspective and evaluation of
what they have done, how they have done it? Has it been good,
bad, indifferent?
lLieutenant General Karbler. Sir, I will give you a coach's
perspective.
Senator Tuberville. Okay.
lLieutenant General Karbler. The offensive line is not
coordinated with the quarterback, who is not handing the ball
off to the running back, and the wide receivers are jumping
offsides.
What do I mean by that? We have seen him employ his missile
systems and artillery disconnected from any kind of ground
maneuver. Anybody that understands combined armed maneuvers
knows that you need to employ both in concert with each other
to accomplish whatever your campaign objectives are, and we see
him not doing that, which is whether it is the missile
efficacy, whether it is the incompetence of the ground forces
inability to move, logistics challenges, et cetera.
From a coach's perspective, none. None of the players on
the offensive have come together and moved the ball down the
field.
Senator Tuberville. There are missiles that they have
launched, what percentage of them have worked? Do we have any
idea?
General VanHerck. I can talk about that.
Senator Tuberville. Go ahead.
General VanHerck. Probably should not talk about it in an
unclassified session, but I will tell you originally we thought
they were not working at a rate that was as good as ours, but
what I would say is they are on par with our capabilities. Not
all of them, specifically their cruise missiles. They have had
challenges with some of their hypersonic missiles as far as
accuracy. But I would not take away, from a strategic
perspective, that Russia's cruise missiles or hypersonic
missiles, their strategic capabilities have severely
underperformed, okay? I just want to make that clear.
Senator Tuberville. They make their own?
General VanHerck. My understanding is the internally, not
the military makes them but they have companies, contractors
within Russia that make them as well. You may know more, Jon.
Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. I think that explains it
pretty well.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. General VanHerck, you talked
about the homeland. We have got a lot of work to do defending
the homeland with hypersonics in China and ballistic missiles.
My understanding is that we have a majority of our F-22s and
35s in Alaska. Do we have a defense system up there that will
protect them?
General VanHerck. Senator, it depends on what we are
protecting them from. I am confident in the ground-based
interceptors that are there. From ballistic missiles, yes, we
do have that capability. With regards to cruise missiles,
hypersonic cruise missiles that are actually currently coastal
defense cruise missiles in Russia, I have significant concerns
about my ability to defend those assets. Not only F-22s,
Senator. You have significant portions of our ballistic missile
and our threat warning capabilities in Alaska. Cobra Dane is
out there at Eareckson Air Station. We have the radar and we
are building our long-range discriminating radar as well. I was
just there, by the way. Very impressive.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. This is to anybody. You
know, fixed interceptor sites, we are talking about trucking
missiles in Guam, 42 trucks carrying missiles around. You know,
that does not seem logical to me. The MDA is the lead architect
and it looks like that we are going to have to find somebody to
man and train them.
Can anybody talk about that, about Guam and the missile
system that we are putting on Guam?
Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. I can give you some insight
there. First it was a pretty extensive Department-wide study.
We did look at a number of fixed-site options, and then in the
end, just given the kind of capability that we need on the
island and the flexibility there we did go with mobile across
the board, so the sensors will be mobile. The command and
control, there is an option to be mobile. We are working that
very closely with Admiral Aquilino now. When it comes to the
launching systems, those are mobile.
I think the goodness that comes out of that is the
investments that we make there, it is not a big engineering
leap to get to that, and we have the existing Army mobile
launchers. But the launchers that carry SM-3 and SM-6, the work
that needs to be done to move those or have them in a mobile
launcher is pretty straightforward, and so we think we can
accomplish that. It does give the combatant commander options
on where he can move those downstream, so we will initially
site them in an area and then if we need to move them we will
move them.
Senator Tuberville. We once had an Iron Dome in Guam. We do
not anymore. Is that correct?
Vice Admiral Hill. I will turn that over to General
Karbler.
lLieutenant General Karbler. Sir, we exercised Iron Dome.
We have two Iron Dome batteries. We sent one out to Guam to
exercise, to make sure it was deployable and that the soldiers
could operate it. But Iron Dome is not our ultimate solution
for cruise missile defense.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
you all for your service to our country.
Dr. Plumb, it seems like this is the 11th or perhaps the
12th time that you have appeared before either the full
committee or a subcommittee over the last few weeks, and it has
been mainly concerning nuclear weapons and space. You are also
the DOD principal cyber advisor, so I would like to ask you how
challenging it is to serve as the OSD [Office of the Secretary
of Defense] lead for space policy, nuclear weapons, countering
the WMDs [weapons of mass destruction], missile defense,
electromagnetic warfare, and cybersecurity, which are six
significant roles. Do you have sufficient resources to execute
your responsibilities?
Mr. Plumb. Thanks for that question, Senator. It is a
sizeable portfolio. It is pretty fun, frankly. It is a good
suite of strategic capabilities, and I think they marry up
quite well. Space layers through all of them, cyber through all
of them, and they are all what I would consider strategic
layers to integrated deterrence.
As far as the resources needed, the office is far more than
just me. I have my DASD ships. I have the Office of the
Principal Cyber Advisor.
But since you have given the opportunity here I will just
say policy, in general, could use more manpower, or I guess I
should just say civilians. We need more manpower resources. I
think the growth in space, the growth in cyber, those two
alone, and when you think that, for instance, the cyber offices
are still basically staffed at the level they were 5, 6 years
ago, that seems like the wrong answer.
Senator Rounds. Can you talk a little bit about the
cybersecurity element of the both space and missile defense
responsibilities and describe what you and your cybersecurity
team bring to the table in this particular area.
Mr. Plumb. That is a very important question. Cybersecurity
of our own forces I think sometimes is confused with just
cybersecurity, for instance, of the SIPRNet [Secure Internet
Protocol Router Network] or of JWST [James Webb Space
Telescope] or even maybe the NIPRNet [Non-Secure Internet
Protocol Router Network]. But for the weapons systems
themselves, absolutely essential. Making sure we take that into
our space systems defense in-depth, is the thing I like to say
at these hearings that is really important, not just a
perimeter. I have had several discussions with Admiral Hill
here on missile defense cybersecurity as well, and all of these
things are an ongoing issue that nothing is going to be solve
overnight, and it is never going to be fully solved. You have
to keep improving and keep looking for what the adversary could
possibly do and figure out ways to keep that in check.
Senator Rounds. Yes. A number of us on this committee have
fought very hard to maintain key area of the DOD spectrum. As
the lead for electromagnetic warfare can you tell this
committee how important it is to be closely involved in the
decision-making process when the Federal Government decides to
conduct auctions for key DOD spectrum bands?
Mr. Plumb. Yes, absolutely essential. Actually, my Ph.D.
involved global positioning system, and so that specific issue
which I think you are referencing is absolutely essential for
DOD to be able to protect its ability to operate abroad.
Senator Rounds. When one agency or department of the
Federal Government arbitrarily decides to auction spectrum, it
would appear that DOD should be directly involved in the
discussions, specifically to those areas of sale. Fair enough
to say?
Mr. Plumb. I agree, sir.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Admiral Hill, the United States
has consistently provided missile defense capabilities in
conjunction with Israel. It has been a good partnership both
ways. Can you explain to this committee the importance of our
relationship with Israel, specifically when it comes to missile
defense for the United States and our allies and partners?
Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, sir, Senator. Thanks for that
question. We have a very strong partnership, documented in an
MOU [Memorandum Of Understanding], and you that half a billion
dollars of the MDA budget goes to Israel. We work the full set
of layered defense with Israel, from Iron Dome up to David's
Sling up to the variants of Arrow to include their latest
elevated sensor, the work that they do connecting all those and
the networking of that. We also work with them on their target
systems, and we sit side-by-side and help them engineer through
what they need to do to execute a test.
Senator Rounds. Is it fair enough to say it is a good
partnership with information flowing both ways?
Vice Admiral Hill. It is a strong partnership, and I would
say it is beyond what you would normally see because we are
side-by-side. There is not just the flow of information and the
learning, there is definitely, you know, our people that just
walk away from that having a better sense of tiered, layered
defense in a really constrained area, with very short reaction
times.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. I am about out of time but I am
going to try to get in one more question, and this is for
General Karbler. You mentioned relocating two Patriot batteries
to Poland in March. It was a necessary move, in our opinion,
and I think you did the right thing. The question I have is how
much more flexibility do you have to relocate missile defense
capabilities when needed, what flexibilities should you have,
and what is the state of the industrial base should we need to
surge missile defense capabilities?
lLieutenant General Karbler. Yes, Senator. The Army Air
Missile Defense Forces are the highest operational tempo of any
Army forces that we have, so any deployment of them does stress
the force. We are constantly looking at our air missile defense
posture globally. We have battalions out in INDOPACOM, we have
got the battalion in Germany, and then we have got battalions
that support CENTCOM.
It does stress the force, and in talking with the Chief of
Staff of the Army about this just last week he understands it,
and the Secretary of the Army as well. They have committed to a
16 Patriot battalion as well as an 8 THAAD battery and 4
additional maneuver SHORAD battalions, so we are growing the
Air Defense Force in recognition of the optempo stress that is
put on our soldiers.
Senator, with respect to the industrial base capability, I
would really have to defer that to the PEO [program executive
office] Missiles and Space, the acquisition side. But I would
tell you from my experience if I went back to Desert Storm,
when we had very, very few Patriot interceptors to do ballistic
missile defense, and the industry ramped up very quickly and
was able to get those Patriot interceptors out to the Patriot--
I was in Israel--to the Patriot units in Israel as well as the
Patriot units that were in Saudi Arabia.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Thank you. We will have a second round of
questions for those who have additional questions.
I think it was Admiral Hill, you used the term ``fire
control data'' with regard to hypersonics. I wrote in my notes
``fire what?'' What are we firing? As you know, we have talked
about this, I am gravely concerned about the strategic change
in the whole scene of battle that hypersonics represent. I know
we are working on it and we are talking about. I want a sense
of urgency.
Tell me, Admiral, if you are the commander of an aircraft
carrier 800 miles from China and they send a hypersonic missile
your way, you have got about 9 minutes to figure out what to
do. I want to know how close we are to having a defense. I
guess the second question is, is North Korea developing
hypersonic capability, because if they are that is where we
need to be focusing, not on hitting a bullet with a bullet over
the North Pole.
Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, sir, Senator. Thanks for that
question. We often talk about hypersonics and assume we are at
zero. We are not at zero. I mentioned earlier that we have a
command and control battle management capability that takes the
space sensors that we have today, the land-based sensors and
the sea-based sensors. What is really key about sea-based is
that is where the defensive capability resides today.
When a carrier strike group goes forward, to use your
example, they have some number of destroyers with them, and on
those destroyers today the sea-based terminal capability is on
those ships. We did that based on a request from the CNO [Chief
of Naval Operations], because he was concerned about the
carrier-killer missile. You have heard plenty about that in the
white press. It looks ballistic, so we have an ability with SM-
3 in the upper tier to take out that threat, and then we have,
in the lower tier, sea-based terminal which is really a
capability that we insert into the SM-6 missile that the Navy
produces. The Navy is producing those in number. MDA is
providing the software package and the work in the combat
system to control that missile. We have the capability to take
on the advanced maneuvering threat in terminal.
I will say terminal is not sufficient. As I mentioned
earlier, it is the most difficult place to engage--high
maneuver, high speed, and again, you do not know where a
terminal is. Generally, in the sea base, it is going to be
after the carrier so the destroyers will operate in close
quarters and ensure that they provide that protection.
Now because it is not good enough, the investments we are
making in the President's budget 2023 is towards the glide-
phase interceptor. When you think about having a layered
defense against the glide vehicle that then dips down and comes
in and does the maneuver, we have the ability to stop that at
the glide phase. The most vulnerable place----
Senator King. We want the ability. You said we have the
ability.
Vice Admiral Hill. We have three contractors in play right
now to deliver that capability. We are moving towards a demo
over the next few years, so we will down-select this year to
two and we will continue to move through, and then we will
deliver that demo, conduct an exercise with that.
Senator King. Is North Korea developing hypersonics?
Vice Admiral Hill. They claim to have developed
hypersonics. If you go look at the outer mold line you might be
fooled and think that it is. But in terms of what we have seen,
in terms of data, I am entirely confident that they have that
capability today. But the fact that they are testing it ought
to be of concern.
Senator King. Director Honey, you mentioned directed energy
in your testimony, I believe. That strikes me as a promising--
and I know there are technical problems, but give me an update
on where we are in developing directed energy, microwave or
laser.
Mr. Honey. Both classes of directed energy systems, lasers
and high-power microwaves, have seen significant developments
and achievements over the past several years. What I am most
impressed with is the fact that we now have high-energy laser
systems, 130-kilowatt class systems, that are being deployed on
ships for operational testing, and we have a modular package
that will be able to be deployed on Army ground vehicles as
well as ships. These will be going into, as I said, operational
testing around the world this coming year, and out of that we
will be able to gain tremendous insights on lethality data to
see how those systems will be useful in the future.
They are mainly aimed at dazzling as well as cruise missile
defense, and we also have significant developments in higher-
power system and lasers that we think will be very important in
the upcoming few years.
Senator King. Do you have sufficient resources to
accelerate this process?
Mr. Honey. Yes. We have sufficient resources and also the
folks leading the efforts have much better insights today than
they did in the past. Just through understanding where to
smartly take risks they have been able to accelerate
development significantly.
Senator King. Admiral, if you were the commander of that
aircraft carrier I would want this guy to be supplying you with
some weapons.
Vice Admiral Hill. Thank you, sir. I would want everything
that is available, and will take the power that you have now
and put it on the ships if we could.
Senator King. Thank you. Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Admiral Hill, it is my understand that the
Department intends to award a production contract for 20 Next-
Generation Interceptor rounds following the critical design
review, and these interceptors will be deployed to the
unoccupied silos at Fort Greely. But what is the plan to
modernize the current fleet of 44 ground-based interceptors?
Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, ma'am. Thanks for the question. I
think the best way to answer it is to just kind of clarify that
we have about three classes of the ground-based interceptors
that are in service today. You have the oldest part of the
fleet, you have got the midgrade fleet, and you have got the
newest ones. I know that General VanHerck takes that into
account when he is working his shot doctrine.
We are not real concerned about the new ones. They have a
long life and their reliability will carry them into the 2030s.
Our plan is to reach a decision in production around the 2024
time frame. When you get to the preliminary design review and
start thinking about production there are options there because
we do have the missile field that is ready to take those first
20. We will likely make a decision to fill those first 20, but
the Nation has the option to start replacing some of the older
ones. That is why I think it is very important to have the two
contractors in play.
That is the other option we have here. You can keep them
beyond the CDR and you can have a double production house,
depending on where the threat goes, and if you need numbers we
can build the numbers by having two contractors carry through
critical design review.
Senator Fischer. You said you are likely to have a decision
made soon. When would you expect that?
Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, ma'am. I could not remember where
the actual place on the chart was but it is in 2024 where we
will make a production decision. Part of that discussion would
be are you going to fill the missile fields or are you going to
replace what you have or are you just going to keep building so
that you can fully replace the existing inventory. Those are
decisions that we have to make within the Department.
Senator Fischer. Are you comfortable with that?
Vice Admiral Hill. I am comfortable that we have two
contractors in play and that those options will be there to
build out, fill that missile field, and then replace if we make
a decision to do so.
Senator Fischer. Is this something that you are discussing
with NGI teams?
Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, ma'am, absolutely, and I mentioned
a little bit earlier, actually General VanHerck mentioned the
2028 time frame for the contractors, and we are moving ahead of
that schedule right now. We are going to learn a lot more as we
come through development. We will come through ground testing.
We will do individual component-level tests, and we will work
our way to flight tests. This is a fly-it-before-you-buy-it
program, so we are going to do an intercept and salvo test
before we go to full production.
Senator Fischer. General VanHerck, given what you have seen
of the threat that is out there do you believe that 20
interceptors are going to be sufficient, or do you need some
sort of capability to replace the 44 GBIs that are deployed
currently?
General VanHerck. Senator my assessment is when you factor
in service life extension, which will give us significant
reliability and data and information that will help me with my
shot doctrine, and give me additional capacity, when you factor
in the Next-Generation Interceptor and its capabilities, along
with long-range discriminating radar, all of that, I will be
comfortable when it is delivered in the 2027 to 2028 time
frame.
It is a policy question going forward. Do we need to
continue to develop and field additional capability and
capacity as the threat develops additional capability and
capacity? I remain concerned about my ability to stay up with
that capacity especially.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Admiral Hill, the general just,
I think, made an argument there against some of what we hear
sometimes that we do not need to replace systems, that we just
need to continue to do life extension programs. I know that
seems to be the current plan, likely to be the plan for the
future. But how long do you think that can continue? Do you
have the same concerns that the general expressed?
Vice Admiral Hill. I do. We read the same intelligence
estimates, and they are always, you know, low confidence,
medium confidence. But you can kind of get a sense, based on
their testing and how they have progressed over the years.
I would say there is a big difference between the GBIs that
we have in service today versus what Next-Generation
Interceptor brings. In this unclassified environment I will
tell you that a unitary missile, think of that as a singular
kill vehicle, versus a Next-Generation Interceptor with
multiple kill vehicles on it, that is a huge lift in terms of
how we take on the threat, because the threat will continue to
evolve to have maneuvering warheads and multiple maneuvering
warheads.
We need to the Next-Generation Interceptor. We can SLEP all
day long those unitary missiles, and we can drive their
lifetime to the right pretty far. But at the end of the day,
you really need the upgrade that Next-Generation Interceptor
brings because it is going to operate in a really tough space,
but it does have multiple kill vehicles, which gives us a lot
more flexibility.
Senator Fischer. We have to have the resources that meet
the threats that are coming too, that we get from intelligence.
Correct?
Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Senator King. Senator Tuberville, are you all set?
Senator Tuberville. I have one question. Thank you.
Secretary Honey, you talked about high-energy lasers. I have
had the unfortunate--I have watched one work on the ground,
from an MRAP [mine resistant ambush protected] low-energy. It
was not really high-energy but it works pretty good.
Eventually, you know, you said putting them on ships and
possibly in satellites. How in the world are we going to find
the energy for a high-energy laser, you know, to really
function the way we really want it? Are we on the R&D [research
and development]--how is the R&D on that, as we speak?
Mr. Honey. The R&D has come a long way, and that is a very
good question about these particular systems because of the
history behind them. Where we have seen the biggest
improvements has been in the conversion efficiency of energy to
actual useful output from the lasers as well as improvements in
the beam control so that we do not have to have such a massive
blast in order to have the weapons effects that we want.
There has been just a tremendous amount of work that has
been done by the Department in these areas, but we are now
seeing the payoff of those results today.
Senator Tuberville. Do you see nuclear being used, energy?
Mr. Honey. I am sorry?
Senator Tuberville. Nuclear, to power higher energy,
possibly?
Mr. Honey. No, I do not see that right now as necessary.
There could be, you know, always the possibility.
Senator Tuberville. I am talking about for the future. You
know, we are talking about Star Trek and all of that, you know,
satellites that have these long beams.
Mr. Honey. Right now, at least for the systems that we are
looking at, the conventional power sources that we have look to
be sufficient.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to
follow up on Senator Tuberville's line of questioning, because
it seems to me that where we are talking here about what a lot
of people that would watch this would say they are talking
about something really close to Star Wars or Star Trek in terms
of basically shooting one missile with another missile, hitting
one missile that is capable of 5,000-plus miles an hour with
another missile or an interceptor that can do the same thing,
or using a weapon of directed energy, like a phaser or a laser
in the future.
We are talking about that right now being deployed in some
specific areas today, and yet, at the same time, I think back.
I just received a note that General VanHerck, your team has
actually been looking at cold weather and the fact that you
have got teams that have to survive in cold weather, and we
have got Arctic issues and so forth. We need the basic
research. I know South Dakota School of Mines and Technology
has been doing work on cold weather operations and so forth. I
look at that and we have got a part of the world right now that
is going to become very active in terms of protecting our
country, and that is the Arctic.
I am just curious, General VanHerck. What do you see in
terms of the challenges of operating in the Arctic, and what
are the things that we are not thinking about right now that we
have just assumed we have been doing all along, and yet we have
got equipment, we have got material, manpower, and so forth?
What do we have to expect that we should be doing right now to
make sure that within the Arctic we have done our due diligence
and we have not taken anything for granted in terms of being
able to operate?
General VanHerck. That is a great question, Senator. We
just completed an exercise in the Arctic, Arctic Edge, where we
brought joint, and even combined with other countries to the
Arctic to operate. I will tell you, there are significant
lessons learned about the harsh environment where our
equipment--I will not go into details but let us just say some
strategic equipment that we place into the Arctic does not
function because we have not equipped it to operate, and over
the last 20 years we have been focused on a different
environment as we developed equipment.
Research and development is crucial to continuing to ensure
we buy down risk to potential future operations in the Arctic.
It does not just go to weapon system as well. It goes to human
performance factors--medical capabilities, medical equipment,
as you sustain yourself in a harsh environment like that long
term. We have to look at the equipment we wear and the
capabilities that we are going to utilize to sustain life in
that environment.
What we find is that you can operate in that environment
less than about 50 percent of what you would in another
environment. I appreciate what your School of Mines is doing,
advancing a lot of the research and capabilities to look at
that. That is something I am asking for in our Defense Planning
Guidance is to at least move the ball down the field and
continue that research and development for ensuring the
capabilities are there but also capabilities that support the
human life as we sustain in the Arctic environment.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. To follow up on your question, Senator
Rounds, I recently learned that two-thirds of the ice in the
Arctic Ocean has disappeared in the last 40 years. A stunning
fact.
I want to ask one more question.
Senator Rounds. If I may say, if I could, and yet at the
same time you have a problem in that unless you have got the
right kind of oil you are not going to operate very well in the
Arctic conditions anyway because your machinery does not work.
Senator King. Because it freezes.
Senator Rounds. Just because it freezes.
Senator King. I would say Maine and South Dakota rather
than Alabama might be able to work on that.
[Laughter.]
Senator Rounds. That has a lot to do with it, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. A question from Senator Hirono. General
VanHerck, for fiscal year 2023 the Administration has not
funded the development of the long-range radar in Hawaii to
detect incoming threats from North Korea or China. Do our
current radar and ground-based interceptors provide adequate
protection of Hawaii?
General VanHerck. Senator, I am comfortable with my
capability to defend Hawaii against ballistic missiles from a
rogue actor such as North Korea today. As capabilities continue
to develop, as capacity increases by potential rogue actors,
then I may be potentially challenged to defend Hawaii. What we
are really talking about is a Hawaii radar would contribute to
an underlayer significant that would give additional capability
and capacity. That is a policy decision that we go down there,
but today I am comfortable where we are.
Senator King. Thank you. Thank you all very much for your
responses today, for your testimony, and for your service. It
has been a very illuminating hearing. I appreciate you joining
us.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:38 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth A. Warren
ground-based midcourse defense system
1. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Hill, and Deputy Under Secretary
Honey, I am very concerned that twenty years into the program the GMD
system's tests still have not been realistic by the standards of the
Pentagon's own testing agency, especially with regard to the use of
countermeasures the adversary might employ to defeat the defense. JASON
was commissioned to look at this issue in 2012 and recommended a ``red
team'' responsible for producing countermeasures and challenging the
system, rather than the MDA itself. Has this not been taken up? If not,
why not?
Vice Admiral Hill. The 2010 JASON Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
Discrimination report recommended the creation of a countermeasure test
program through an independent agency, with the purpose of challenging
the countermeasures efforts of the MDA.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has not created a countermeasures
test program through an independent agency. However, MDA has embraced
the spirit of the JASON recommendation by increasing emphasis on
developing threat countermeasures challenges and developing Missile
Defense System (MDS) countermeasures mitigation capabilities.
Existing independent DOD organizations are involved in MDS test
planning to ensure MDA is appropriately challenged regarding
countermeasures testing. By adhering to DOD standards with the use of
independent Operational Test Authorities, and oversight from the
Director, Developmental Test and Evaluation and the Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), MDA ensures the credibility of
all flight tests, including intercept tests with countermeasures.
With support from Intelligence Community, Federally Funded Research
and Development Centers, and University Affiliated Research Centers,
MDA has identified and characterized a broad portfolio of
countermeasures challenges. These relationships with external entities
have allowed MDA to address additional countermeasures challenges.
Altogether, these efforts have allowed MDA to address the spirit of
the JASON report recommendation while executing a phased implementation
plan to field incremental countermeasures mitigation improvements.
Deputy Under Secretary Honey did not respond in time for printing.
When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.
2. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Hill, MDA has not yet completed an
independent technology assessment of the three Glide Phase Interceptor
(GPI) systems to determine their technological maturity. Yet MDA
continues to place GPI on its Unfunded Priorities List. MDA requested
$225 million for hypersonic defense (which includes GPI) in its fiscal
year 2023 base budget and requested an additional $293 million for
hypersonic defense in its fiscal year 2023 Unfunded Priorities List.
Congress has plussed up the hypersonic defense account in every year
since fiscal year 2019. Why does MDA continue to place GPI on the
Unfunded Priority List, and why have previous plus ups failed to
provide MDA with the resources it purports to need to advance GPI?
Vice Admiral Hill. The Department and MDA appreciate the
congressional Plus Ups provided since Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 that
support multiple activities to counter hypersonic threats to include
Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) initial requirements development and
engineering studies, other technology maturation, engineering enablers,
upgrading existing systems and collecting data on offensive hypersonic
flight tests. The President's Budget 2023 request for GPI represented
the Department's prioritization of available budget with program
technical and programmatic risk for development of key GPI Critical
Technology Elements (CTEs). The MDA Fiscal Year 202023 Unfunded
Priorities List GPI item provides funding to reduce program technical
and schedule risk for additional GPI CTEs. MDA recently completed
technology assessment of the three Industry GPI candidate concepts to
determine technological maturity and has continued the development
effort for two of these missile concepts to move to a System
Requirements Review in fourth quarter Fiscal Year 202022 and progress
further toward a capability demonstration in the early 2030's.
3. Senator Warren. Deputy Undersecretary Honey, the GMD program has
cost more than $40 billion already. An enormous amount of money was
spent on the EKV program, which has produced a system with a very poor
record; the RKV program wasted $1.2 billion trying to fix the kill
vehicle. What specific steps are being taken to make sure that the Next
Generation Interceptor does not follow the same problematic development
processes that the GBI and RKV followed?
Mr. Honey. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has incorporated a
number of lessons learned into the acquisition and development program
for Next Generation Interceptor. These include:
Development of Next Generation Interceptor as an All-Up-
Round (AUR) with the Government requirements at the AUR level.
Requirements traced to United States Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM) Operational needs and validated through the Joint
Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC).
Requirements include threshold and objective values
(coordinated through USNORTHCOM and JROC) to provide industry design
flexibility.
Establishment of a contractor proposed and MDA accepted
Development Evaluation Framework identifying the design-specific
Critical Technology Elements including Technology Readiness Level
maturation plans through Preliminary Design Review (PDR), Critical
Design Review (CDR), Qualification Testing and Flight Testing.
Defined Knowledge Points to incentivize risk reduction
earlier in the program.
Competition with two contractors through CDR.
Fly before you buy requiring two successful intercept
tests prior to initial production decision.
Contract options (after CDR) enabling performance-
informed decisions to authorize contractor team to proceed into the
next development/production phase.
Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and
Program Execution conduct an independent cost estimate of the Next
Generation Interceptor program which established the funding requested
in the annual President's Budget.
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Research &
Engineering) will execute an Independent Technical Risk Assessment
supporting each major milestone (Contract Award, System Requirements
Review, PDR, CDR, etc.).
4. Senator Warren. General Van Herck, Vice Admiral Jon Hill, Russia
is apparently deploying entire new nuclear-armed weapon systems
specifically because they can defeat missile defenses, and China is
also developing systems to evade or overwhelm missile defenses. Are
there circumstances you could envision under which you would decide it
is no longer in the U.S. interest to deploy the U.S. Ground-Based
Midcourse Defense system? What factors would you consider?
General Van Herck. Thanks for the follow up question. I too am
concerned about trends from both Russia and China to hold the Homeland
at risk across multiple domains. In the context of your question, the
current Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is not designed nor
is it employed to defeat strategic missile threats from China and
Russia. The nuclear deterrent is the primary means to address this
threat. As directed by policy, today I remain confident in my ability
to defend the Homeland from a rogue actor such as North Korea. I remain
concerned about my ability, specifically regarding future capacity and
capability, to provide ballistic missile defense as the threats
continue to adapt and evolve. This is why it is crucial to field the
Next Generation Interceptor on time or early and continue with ongoing
service life extension programs. I defer to OSD regarding policy to
address future threats.
Vice Admiral Hill. The Ground Based Midcourse Defense system (GMD)
is the foundation of United States Homeland defense against long-range
ballistic missiles from rogue states like North Korea and Iran. As
North Korean ballistic missile threats to the United States Homeland
continue to evolve, the United States is committed to continuing to
improve the GMD system, including the development of the Next
Generation Interceptor (NGI), to augment and potentially replace the
current Ground Based Interceptors (GBI).
The presence of GMD also serves as an important deterrent to other
nations considering the development of long range ballistic missiles,
as it greatly increases the cost and decreases the likelihood of
credibly threatening the U.S. Homeland.
Though the United States maintains the right to defend itself from
attacks from any source, GMD is neither intended for, nor capable of,
defeating the large number of sophisticated Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile, air and sea launched ballistic missile threats from Russia and
the People's Republic of China.
Defer to Commander Northern Command and the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy (OSD-Policy) for further response.
cost estimates
5. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Hill, GAO's most recent report
shows billions of dollars in unaccounted costs, with estimates missing
about half of the total costs of actually operating these systems, and
63% of flight test costs. Despite it being DOD policy, we also lack
independent cost assessments for these programs. This hurts planning
and makes it more likely we will have to cancel other costly programs
down the line. The Missile Defense Agency agreed with the GAO that they
need to have these cost estimates. When does MDA expect to have
independent cost estimates for its major programs, and which programs
will MDA have independent cost estimates for?
Vice Admiral Hill. Since President's Budget (PB) 2019, MDA has
reported the complete Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) budget in the
annual test reports to Congress. This IMTP submitted with each PB, is
signed by the:
MDA Director;
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation;
Deputy Director, Developmental Test, Evaluation, and
Assessment;
Commanding General, Joint Functional Component Command
for Integrated Missile Defense (representing the combatant commands);
Commanding General, U.S. Army Test and Evaluation
Command;
Commander, Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation
Center;
Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force; and
Commander, Joint Interoperability Test Command.
The associated supplemental budget reports include the total cost,
schedule and budget information for flight, ground, and cyber testing
and test infrastructure. Since 2017, MDA has also provided the Agency's
cost for executed flight tests in a semiannual report and will continue
this detailed reporting in September 2022.
DOD Policy requires Independent Cost Estimates (ICEs) for all Major
Defense Acquisition Programs. The Office of Secretary of Defense, Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) and MDA follow this policy and
work together to complete required ICEs. The MDA programs which have an
ICE include Next Generation Interceptor (NGI), Standard Missile-3 (SM-
3) Block IIA, SM-3 Block IB, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD), and Aegis Ashore Poland. MDA annually requests CAPE to perform
ICEs for upcoming major milestone events. For Fiscal Year 202023, MDA
is requesting OSD CAPE to conduct ICEs or updates for: Aegis SM-3 Block
IIA, NGI, Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications, and
THAAD. MDA is also requesting CAPE to review the Joint Cost Estimates
(JCEs) for Army Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY)-2, THAAD
and Long Range Discriminating Radar.
DOD Policy also requires MDA to report in the annual Missile
Defense Acquisition Report (MDAR) all operations and support (O&S)
costs for which MDA is responsible, and a description of the O&S
functions and costs for which a military department is responsible.
However, MDA reported to GAO that we are actively working to obtain
Services O&S cost estimates, and began reporting available JCEs in the
PB 2023 MDAR submission to Congress. As we receive additional Service
cost estimate information, we will report these costs in future MDAR
submissions.
missile defense agency testing
6. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Hill, according to the GAO, MDA has
continually been unable to satisfy its annual test plan. The Committee
understands that an independent assessment has been completed on the
agency's process for developing and executing the annual test plan and
is awaiting Departmental comment. Are there actionable steps provided
in this assessment that will help MDA achieve their test plan thereby
collecting more information on the system's capabilities?
Vice Admiral Hill. The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)
conducted an independent assessment of MDA's flight test planning and
execution processes which was completed in February 2022. IDA provided
the final assessment to MDA in March 2022. The Agency is in the process
of implementing recommendations from the study. Areas for MDA process
improvements include:
Develop a taxonomy to monitor causes of flight test
accelerations, deletions, and delays
Develop a single-source traceable end-to-end mapping of
assessment objectives to tests that address them and fulfill the Phased
Implementation Plan requirements
Develop and maintain an overall data collection strategy
Coordinate with the Missile Defense System (MDS)
Operational Test Agency (OTA) Team to better align the Operational Test
Readiness Reviews and MDA Flight Test Concept of Operations (CONOPS)
for earlier engagement in detailed flight test planning
MDA is conducting technical interchange meetings with all
stakeholders to increase awareness and set the conditions for
implementing these process improvements. Implementation is planned to
be synchronized with development of the Integrated Master Test Plan
(IMTP) version (v) 25.0.
7. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Hill--For the past four years, GAO
has reported on MDA's inability to complete planned annual system-level
cybersecurity tests since 2017. Considering this cyber testing deficit,
what steps is MDA currently taking to ensure that cybersecurity testing
deficiencies from prior years are addressed, to conduct operational
system-level cybersecurity testing on all deployed systems, and to
address DOT&E identified cybersecurity limitations, vulnerabilities,
and recommendations?
Vice Admiral Hill. MDA completed operational cyber testing in July
2019, including Cooperative Vulnerability and Penetration Assessments
(CVPA) and Adversarial Assessments (AA), on currently fielded MDA/MDS
systems. MDA has not fielded a new increment since then. Due to impacts
driven by the COVID-19 pandemic, MDA re-planned Increment 6B.1 testing
for the United States Northern Command and United States Indo-Pacific
Command. The Agency is following the IMTP and the MDA Cyber Test CONOPS
by executing CVPA and AA testing on all MDA elements in the Increment
6B.1 architecture. MDA follows the IMTP and conducts operational cyber
testing on all MDA systems prior to fielding.
MDA maintains a comprehensive cyber test and assessment program by
leading and supporting cyber initiatives across multiple DOD offices.
MDA leads and/or supports numerous cyber test and assessment
initiatives covering the cradle to grave cyber lifecycle starting with
product development and ending with operations and maintenance with a
constant feedback loop for continuous improvement. These efforts cover
partnership and oversight from numerous offices under the DOD umbrella.
The following are examples:
Pre Fielding
o Developmental cyber testing prior to full release to the
Government
Includes Cooperative Vulnerability Identification
and Adversarial Cyber Development Test and Evaluation testing
Authority and oversight--Office of Developmental
Test, Evaluation, and Assessments--DOD Cybersecurity Test and
Evaluation Guidebook
o Rigorous cyber compliance implementation and testing under
Risk Management Framework
Authority and oversight--National Institute of
Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-37, 800-53, 800-30,
and 800-137
o Operational Cyber Testing
Includes CVPA and AA testing conducted prior to
fielding to the Warfighter
Authority and oversight--DOT&E Title 10 Authorities
o MDA Cybersecurity Assessments
Vulnerability Assessments--assessment of Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation enclaves supports risk-based
authorization to connect decisions and supply chain risk decision
Authority and oversight--MDA Director and
Authorizing Official
Post Fielding
o Cyber Protection Teams in the Combatant Commands
Authority and oversight--Joint Force Headquarters
Commanders-DOD Information Network (DODIN)
Combatant Commands requests for support
o DOD's Mission Assurance Construct
Physical and electronic cyber testing and assessment
of fielded systems
o Strategic system assessments coordinated through Joint Staff
Direction
Authority and oversight--Defense Threat Reduction
Agency under DOD Instruction 3020.45
o Command Cyber Operational Readiness Inspection
Authority and oversight--DODIN Readiness and
Security Inspections under Defense Information Systems Agency
o United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) Operations
OPLAN 8600--Directing DODIN Operations and Defensive
Cyberspace Operations--Internal Defensive Measures
Commanders Estimate and Mission Relevant Terrain
Cyber
Annex N (Operational Risk Assessments)
Cyber Task Orders
Authority and oversight--USCYBERCOM and Joint Staff
o Strategic Cybersecurity Program
Assessments of Strategic Weapons Systems
Includes Missile Defense System
Authority and oversight--Joint Staff Joint Staff
Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum, directing the National
Security Agency to conduct assessments
o MDA Cybersecurity Assessments
Cybersecurity Vulnerability Tests--supports risk-
based authorization decisions
Tier II Cybersecurity Service Provider monitoring
(24x7x365)
Authority and oversight--MDA Director and
Authorizing Official
o Persistent Cyber Assessments
Completed a DOT&E funded Persistent Cyber Assessment
of the unclassified MDA Enterprise unclassified network boundary--2,332
hours of effort spent evaluating the boundary with no significant cyber
vulnerabilities identified
Currently conducting an MDA funded Persistent Cyber
Assessment of the classified MDA Enterprise boundary
Currently conducting an MDA funded Persistent Cyber
Assessment of the MDA Enterprise boundaries with the Threat Systems
Management Office and DOT&E participation
MDA is organized to support Persistent Cyber
Assessments of fielded systems based on Combatant Command requests and
risk acceptance
MDA works closely with DOT&E and the MDA OTA Team in support of
cyber testing through the IMTP, ongoing leadership dialog, and
processes. DOT&E is included throughout cyber testing, from development
of test requirements through test execution. Cyber test findings and
observation reports are presented to the Failure Review, Analysis, and
Corrective Action System (FRACAS) for consideration as a Boarded
Discrepancy Report (BDR) in order to track remediation for future
increment builds. BDRs are taken into account during the generation of
the Cyber Test Objective Memorandum (CTOM) and are criteria used during
test planning. In addition, The MDS OTA Team is part of the tri-chair
on the MDS Data Analysis working group where cyber concerns are
addressed and responded to by MDA. MDS OTA generates issue sheets which
are addressed thru the MDS Data Analysis Working Group. DOT&E and the
MDS OTA Team are stakeholders across the operational cyber test phases
for operational cyber test planning and execution to include CTOM,
Integrated Cyber Test Team planning, and execution. Test observations
also can lead to Technical Cyber risks that are assessed and presented
to the MDA Risk Working Group. Many findings and correlating
recommendations that are observed from the CVPA are fixed prior to the
AA if feasible by the program. Verification of Fixes (VoF) is a
standard test process that occurs out of test execution and test
planning. VoF ensures fixes implemented from previous findings have
been remediated before advancing to next phases of operational testing.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky S. Rosen
iranian missile threats
8. Senator Rosen. Admiral Hill, Iranian-aligned militia groups are
increasingly targeting United States installations and service members
in Iraq and Syria via rocket and drone attacks. Iran continues to be
the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism and a threat to United
States and allied interests via its ballistic missile program and
support for terrorist proxies like Hezbollah, Hamas, KH, AAH, and many
others. Can you update us on Iran's progress toward developing an ICBM?
When do you assess Iran will be capable of fielding an ICBM, and what
threat would that pose to the United States Homeland?
Vice Admiral Hill. Recommend the Committee contact Defense
Intelligence Agency for authoritative intelligence.
9. Senator Rosen. Admiral Hill, can you describe the missile
threats that Iranian-aligned militia groups in the Middle East pose to
United States troops and our allies?
Vice Admiral Hill. Recommend the Committee contact Defense
Intelligence Agency for authoritative intelligence.
10. Senator Rosen. Admiral Hill, do we have the assets in the
Middle East, specifically outside the Green Zone in Baghdad, to protect
United States and Coalition Forces in Iraq and Syria from rocket and
drone attacks emanating from Iranian-aligned militia groups?
Vice Admiral Hill. I defer to my colleagues from Central Command
(CENTCOM) to respond to this question on tactical counter-Unmanned
Aircraft Systems threats facing our personnel and critical assets in
the Middle East.
11. Senator Rosen. Admiral Hill, CENTCOM Commander General Michael
Kurilla has called Israel's incorporation into CENTCOM, ``the area with
some of the greatest opportunity: working toward an integrated air and
missile defense.'' He told this Committee, ``I think the addition of
Israel . . . will help with that. We are collectively stronger
together, and there are areas where each one brings unique
capabilities.'' In your assessment, how would an integrated air and
missile defense architecture to counter Iranian air and missile threats
improve collective security in the Middle East?
Vice Admiral Hill. The United States has a long history of working
with Israel and other partners in the Middle East to counter air and
missile threats. There may be future opportunities to explore enhanced
Integrated Air and Missile Defense cooperation along these lines, but I
would defer to OSD-Policy for further inquiries on that issue. In
general, the integration of multiple sensors and layered shooters
increases the effectiveness of any integrated air and missile defense
architecture.
[all]