    [Senate Hearing 117-967, Part 7]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                     S. Hrg. 117-967, Pt. 7

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
                       REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL
                       YEAR 2023 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE
                       PROGRAM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 4543

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023 FOR MILITARY
          ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CON-
          STRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
          ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR
          SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                     PART 7

                                STRATEGIC FORCES

                                   __________

                           APRIL 27; MAY 11, 18, 2022

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

                     Available via: http: //www.govinfo.gov

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                    __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    59-584 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2025

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman	JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma

    JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire		ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York		DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut		TOM COTTON, Arkansas
    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii			MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
    TIM KAINE, Virginia			JONI ERNST, Iowa
    ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine		THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
    ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts		DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
    GARY C. PETERS, Michigan		KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
    JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia		RICK SCOTT, Florida
    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois		MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
    JACKY ROSEN, Nevada			JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
    MARK KELLY, Arizona                  	TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama

    		    Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
      		John D. Wason, Minority Staff Director

    _________________________________________________________________

                        Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

     ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine, Chairman	DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
     ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts	TOM COTTON, Arkansas
     JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia		MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
     TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois	        DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
     JACKY ROSEN, Nevada		        KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
     MARK KELLY, Arizona 			TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama

                                      (ii)

                             C O N T E N T S

    _________________________________________________________________

                                 April 27, 2022

                                                                       Page
    Department of Energy's Atomic Energy Defense Activities and           1
      Department of Defense Nuclear Weapons Programs.

                               Member Statements

    Statement of Senator Angus King..................................     1

    Statement of Senator Deb Fischer.................................     3

                               Witness Statements

    Hruby, The Honorable Jill M., Administrator, National Nuclear         2
      Security Administration.

    Caldwell, Admiral James F., Jr., USN, Deputy Administrator for        4
      Naval Reactors, National Nuclear Security Administration.

    White, William, Acting Assistant Secretary of Energy for             10
      Environmental Management.

    Adams, The Honorable Marvin L., Deputy Administrator for Defense     22
      Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration.

    Wolfe, Vice Admiral Johnny R., Jr., USN, Director, Navy Strategic    35
      Systems Programs.

    Cotton, General Anthony J., USAF, Commander, Air Force Global        42
      Strike Command.

    Appendix
      Special Report
      Meeting Medical and Research Needs for Isotopes Derived from
          Uranium-233................................................    59

      Audit Report
          The Disposition of Uranium-233 at Oak Ridge National           84
      Laboratory.

      Chinese Academy of Sciences and U.S. Department of Energy
          Cooperation in Nuclear Energy Sciences and Technologies
            First Executive Committee Meeting........................   101

                                  May 11, 2022

    United States Space Force Programs...............................   215

                               Member Statements

    Statement of Senator Angus King..................................   215

    Statement of Senator Deb Fischer.................................   216

                               Witness Statements

    Calvelli, Frank, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space     216
      Acquisition and Integration.

    Plumb, The Honorable John F., Assistant Secretary of Defense for    217
      Space Policy.

    Thompson, General David D., USSF, Vice Chief of Space Operations.   223

    Questions for the Record.........................................   246

                                     (iii)

                                  May 18, 2022

    Missile Defense Strategy, Policies, and Programs.................   251

                               Member Statements

    Statement of Senator Angus King..................................   251

    Statement of Senator Deb Fischer.................................   252

                               Witness Statements

    Honey, The Honorable David, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for   252
      Research and Engineering.

    Plumb, The Honorable John, Assistant Secretary of Defense for       254
      Space Policy.

    VanHerck, General Glen, USAF, Commander, United States Northern     259
      Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command.

    Karbler, Lieutenant General Daniel, USA, Commanding General,        269
      United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command.

    Hill, Vice Admiral Jon, USN, Director, Missile Defense Agency....   280

    Questions for the Record.........................................   300

                                      (iv)

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
     REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023 AND THE FUTURE YEARS
                                DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, APRIL 27, 2022

                      United States Senate,
              Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

    DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES AND DEPARTMENT
                      OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:30 p.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Angus King
    (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: King, Warren, Rosen, Kelly,
    Fischer, and Tuberville.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS KING

        Senator King. This is a hearing on the Department of
    Energy's (DOE's) atomic energy defense activity and Department
    of Defense (DOD) nuclear weapons programs in review of the
    Defense Authorization Request for fiscal year 2023. This is a
    meeting of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Committee
    on Armed Services of the United States Senate.
        Senator Fischer is on her way over from the floor and will
    be here shortly, but I am going to begin the hearing and we
    will have a brief statement from her when she arrives.
        First I want to thank all the witnesses for joining us
    today. The purpose of our hearing is to examine the fiscal year
    2023 budget request for the defense portion of the Department
    of Energy's budget. This portion of the DOE's budget involves
    primarily the National Nuclear Security Administration, or
    NNSA, and the environmental cleanup of the DOE's former defense
    sites.
        Our NNSA witnesses will be Administrator Jill Hruby; the
    Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, Dr. Marvin Adams;
    and the Deputy Administrator for Office of Naval Reactors,
    Admiral Frank Caldwell. For the DOE Office of Environmental
    Management our witness will be Mr. Ike White, the office's
    senior advisor.
        The NNSA's fiscal year 2023 budget request is $21.4
    billion, a 3.7 percent, or $754 million increase from the
    fiscal year 2022's enacted level of $20.6 billion. The DOE
    Office of Environmental Management's fiscal year 2023 request
    of $6.9 billion is up 3 percent, or about $205 million from the
    fiscal year 2022 enacted level of $6.7 billion.
        This hearing will also examine the fiscal year 2023 budget
    request for the Air Force and Navy as it relates to atomic
    defense activities. For the Air Force, our witness is General
    Cotton, the Commander of the Air Force Global Strike Command,
    and for the Navy is Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe, Director of the
    Strategic Systems Program Office.
        In order to meet DOD requirements, the NNSA is the busiest
    it has been since the 1980s--congratulations, Ms. Hruby--with
    five major warhead programs and a number of large construction
    projects. I am hopeful we can understand the challenges that
    the NNSA faces in dealing with DOD needs. Likewise, I am
    hopeful we can understand from our DOD witnesses what they see
    as the key hurdles facing NNSA as well as unique DOD
    requirements as they relate to the NNSA's modernization
    programs.
        Today's hearing will involve two panels. The first will
    have Administrator Hruby, Admiral Caldwell, and Senior Advisor
    White. The second panel will have Deputy Administrator Adams,
    General Cotton, and Vice Admiral Wolfe. After short opening
    statements we will proceed with questions from each Member at 5
    minutes each, and as I say, when Senator Fischer arrives we
    will give her a moment to make a brief opening statement.
        But in the meantime, Administrator Hruby, why don't you
    begin. I apologize for this awkward arrangement, but everybody
    is having meetings this afternoon, and this is room we drew,
    and this is the setup, understanding the circumstances.
        Administrator, please proceed.
        Ms. Hruby. Okay. I am waiting for a light. Yeah, it is on.
    All right.

       STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JILL M. HRUBY, ADMINISTRATOR,
                NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

        Ms. Hruby. Chairman King and Ranking Member Fischer to be,
    and Members of the Subcommittee, I am honored to present the
    President's fiscal year 2023 budget request for the National
    Nuclear Security Administration. Thank you for your enduring
    bipartisan support.
        Chairman King, I have provided a written statement and
    respectfully request that it be submitted for the record.
        Senator King. Without objection.
        Ms. Hruby. The President's fiscal year 2023 budget request
    for NNSA is $21.4 billion. Informed by the 2022 Nuclear Posture
    Review, this request underscores both our expanded mission and
    the increasing pace required to meet program needs.
        The weapons activity request is $16.5 billion, and includes
    nearly equal funding for stockpile management, about $4.9
    billion, and production modernization, about $4.6 billion. This
    is an indication of NNSA's biggest challenge, to succeed in
    parallel weapons modernization and infrastructure
    revitalization.
        This approach carries risk. However, it is our only
    feasible path to meet requirements, and we are making steady
    progress. The W88 Alt 370 for the sea leg of the triad and the
    B61-12 for the air leg have achieved first production and are
    on track to meet DOD schedules. The W80-4 for the long-range
    standoff missile, the W87-1 for the Sentinel intercontinental
    ballistic missile, and the W93 for the sea-launched ballistic
    missile are in various phases of design.
        On the infrastructure side, the uranium processing facility
    is enclosed and projected to be complete in 2026, and the 90
    percent designs are underway for our two pit production
    facilities.
        We continue stockpile sustainment, other production
    projects, and science, including establishing a program to
    strengthen stockpile digital resilience. Together these
    programs will fulfill the Administration's commitment to a
    safe, secure, reliable, and effective nuclear deterrent into
    the future.
        The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation budget request is $2.3
    billion, and it aims to reduce global nuclear threats, and is
    essential in today's geopolitical landscape. Lowering nuclear
    risk with robust safeguards and stepping up cooperation with
    governments, international organizations, and the private
    sector help support the global expansion of peaceful nuclear
    use while managing proliferation. We continue to strengthen our
    ability to respond to nuclear and radiological incidents, and
    these capabilities have proved pivotal to inform the ground
    truths about nuclear threats in Ukraine. Admiral Caldwell is
    here to provide detail on the naval nuclear reactor budget
    request.
        The key to success is a high-quality workforce, and we are
    placing a high priority on attraction and retention throughout
    the enterprise.
        In summary, NNSA faces difficult mission requirements in a
    difficult world. This budget request strikes the balance for
    NNSA to be responsive and responsible.
        Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
        Senator King. Senator Fischer, I reserved time for you to
    make a brief opening statement if you would like.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER

        Senator Fischer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and my
    apologies for being a few minutes late.
        Overall I was very pleased to see that the budgets strongly
    support nuclear modernization that has been presented and
    embraced the renewal of our nuclear triad and nuclear
    infrastructure conceived during President Obama's tenure over a
    decade ago. However, I still have a number of concerns about
    the Administration's budget request.
        In particular, I am concerned about the shortfall in
    funding for NNSA's budget and the impact this could have on
    plutonium pit production. While additional resources alone will
    not be sufficient to ensure pit production requirements are
    met, I believe we must do all we can to minimize the delay in
    delivering this critical capability.
        Additionally, the Air Force's unfunded priorities list
    included several items related to our nuclear forces and
    nuclear command, control, and communications architecture,
    including $63 million in unfunded requirements for the
    Minuteman-III sustainment.
        While we often focus heavily on modernization programs, we
    cannot forget that our current nuclear forces must be sustained
    and remain effective over the next decade until the
    replacements are fully operational.
        I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses. I thank
    you all for being here. I thank you for the work that you do,
    and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the hearing.
        Senator King. Admiral Caldwell, please.

       STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JAMES F. CALDWELL, JR., USN, DEPUTY
      ADMINISTRATOR FOR NAVAL REACTORS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
                             ADMINISTRATION

        Admiral Caldwell. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer,
    Distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify here today.
        Your consistent support for naval reactors allows my team
    to provide the Navy with the unmatched power and capability of
    nuclear propulsion. This gives our Navy the reliability,
    agility, and firepower to carry our national security missions
    around the world. Our investments in research and development
    over many decades have enabled the advanced technology in
    today's fleet. These investments have given the Nation a
    competitive edge in the maritime environment.
        Today we cannot do more of the same and expect that same
    advantage in the future. Our adversaries are pursuing military
    modernization programs across the spectrums of warfare aimed at
    eroding our maritime preeminence. Focusing on the future is a
    necessity, but that future needs to be built on the foundation
    of our people, our technology, and our facilities.
        My budget request for fiscal year 2023 is for $2.08 billion
    and invests in three key areas of that foundation and three
    priority projects.
        First, the budget request supports our most important
    resource, our people. The talented and dedicated people at our
    D.C. headquarters and our field offices around the country are
    absolutely essential to our strong, centralized management and
    oversight of the important work we perform for the Nation.
        Second, the budget request reflects the continuation of
    increased investment in research and development. Technology
    investment must be reinvigorated today to be ready for future
    ships with the goals of lowering costs, reducing construction
    timelines, and adding capability to our fleet.
        My request also focuses on investments to modernize our
    critical laboratory infrastructure and reduce our legacy
    environmental liabilities. Without this we will be unable to
    support fleet operations and vital research and development.
        This year's request also supports the continued execution
    of three national priority projects. The first is the
    development of the reactor plant for the Columbia-class
    ballistic missile submarine, directly supporting the Navy's
    number one acquisition priority. Manufacturing the lead, life-
    of-ship reactor core is well underway. This year's request will
    allow my team to continue the work required for reactor plant
    testing and reactor plant delivery.
        The second project is the refueling overhaul of our land-
    based prototype reactor in New York. Once complete, this
    reactor will provide 20 more years of student training and
    vital research and development.
        The third project is the continued construction of the
    Naval Spent Fuel Handling Facility in Idaho, which will enable
    long-term, reliable processing and packaging of spent fuel from
    the Navy's nuclear fleet.
        In closing, your strong support enables me to carry out
    Naval Reactors' mission. I respectfully urge your endorsement
    of our fiscal year 2023 budget request. Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Caldwell follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Admiral James F. Caldwell
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and Distinguished Members of
    the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
    today and present the President's Fiscal Year 2023 Budget for Naval
    Reactors. Your strong support for the work we do ensures our nuclear
    Navy can carry out vital missions around the world with agility,
    endurance, and firepower. As underscored by the unprecedented events
    currently playing out on the world stage, great power competition is
    here to stay, therefore it is vital for the United States that we
    maintain a robust naval advantage over our adversaries. Congress'
    support of our past efforts has allowed the Navy to maintain these
    advantages, and your partnership with the Navy is needed now, more than
    ever, as we work on the current and future endeavors in naval nuclear
    propulsion that are needed to protect the national security of the
    United States.
        I have had the pleasure of serving as the Director of Naval
    Reactors for almost 7 years out of an 8-year tenure. Before that, I had
    the privilege of serving in many operational and staff roles throughout
    the course of my Navy career. As I reflect on these decades of service
    and our Navy's global standing, I am increasingly concerned that our
    competitive advantages over our near-peer rivals are diminishing. It is
    vitally important for us to focus on technology investment now; failure
    to do so could have catastrophic implications for our future Navy in a
    future fight. Rivals are pursuing military modernization programs aimed
    at achieving regional hegemony in the near-term and eroding United
    States preeminence in the long-term. All domains of the maritime
    environment are becoming increasingly contested, and to preserve
    freedom of the seas, deter conflict, defend allies, and protect our
    national interests, we must sustain and grow our naval warfighting
    capabilities at an accelerated pace.
        As amplified in our latest National Defense Strategy, we cannot
    simply do more of what we've done in the past. New advancements and
    refinements in nuclear propulsion are needed as the Navy innovates to
    increase and expand our competitive advantage. Naval Reactors'
    historical investment in advanced technologies has given the Nation an
    enviable position in the maritime environment; further investments,
    however, are necessary to maintain our technological edge well into the
    future. Our ships need to retain their advantage against future threats
    across multiple domains and must be affordable. We also need to be able
    to design and build our propulsion plants faster to ensure the Navy
    stays ahead of increasing demands, and we must do this more cost
    effectively. As the CNO has conveyed in his Navigation Plan, ``there is
    no time to waste--our actions in this decade will set the maritime
    balance of power for the rest of the century.'' Our Nation took a new
    step this past year when the President announced the AUKUS enhanced
    tri-lateral security partnership, directing a period of consultation
    with the objective of identifying the optimal pathway for delivering a
    conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability to Australia
    by the earliest achievable date. This partnership creates an
    opportunity to amplify our naval power, strengthen a key ally and our
    own shipbuilding capability, and build the additional industrial and
    vendor base capacity our Nation needs. Through the consultation period,
    Naval Reactors is also focused on strengthening our partnership with
    the United Kingdom, and ensuring Australia understands and establishes
    the strong foundation of capabilities necessary to properly steward
    nuclear submarine technology. Given the global threats we face, it is
    imperative that we ensure our closest allies remain relevant in the
    undersea domain.
        Our success in the future will rest on the foundation of what we
    build today. Therefore, I want to highlight some of the many
    contributions of our nuclear fleet. Our ballistic missile submarines
    provide the most survivable leg of our nuclear triad and are essential
    to our ability to deter major warfare, and provide assurance to our
    allies. Our fast attack submarines operate with confidence, undetected,
    safeguarding vital commercial sea-lanes, and stand ready to protect
    American interests where needed. Our aircraft carriers provide our
    Nation a credible, sustained ability to project combat power, deter
    conflict, and protect our interests around the world.
        Lead ship construction for Columbia-class is underway, which will
    allow the Navy to continue the seamless execution of the sea-based
    strategic deterrent mission that began over six decades ago. The USS
    Ohio (SSBN 726), lead ship of today's ballistic missile submarine fleet
    was commissioned over 40 years ago. This class will start to be
    replaced by the Columbia-class in 2031 with lead boat delivery in
    fiscal year 2028. I remain focused on ensuring the transition between
    these two classes is uninterrupted--the sea based strategic deterrence
    mission is too important to fail. The Columbia-class will be a bedrock
    of our national security posture for decades to come and will be the
    first submarine to operate for over 40 years on a single reactor core,
    an incredible testimonial to the technology investment that has
    occurred over the past decades.
        In attack submarine shipbuilding, the Navy continues to work toward
    a steady cadence of Virginia-class submarine delivery. I recently took
    part in sea trials on Pre-Commissioning Units (PCU) Montana and Oregon.
    This submarine class now makes up over one third of our operational
    attack submarines. The Navy is also assessing improvements to
    capability and lethality for future Virginia-class submarines; these
    improvements will not only add capability to today's fleet but allow
    the Navy to prove candidate technologies that will influence our next-
    generation attack submarine. Naval Reactors is closely aligned with the
    Navy on all of these efforts. Along with the technologies being
    inserted for Virginia-class submarines, Naval Reactors has renewed our
    focus and investment in advanced technologies which will pave the way
    for improvements in speed, energy density, and stealth for the follow
    on SSN(X) program. We are also focused on refueling up to seven Los
    Angeles-class submarines, helping to maintain our submarine force
    structure with boats that have the warfighting capability to contribute
    effectively to undersea missions.
        In aircraft carrier shipbuilding, USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78)
    continues to make great progress and will soon be employed and
    operating alongside U.S. and allied forces. This phenomenal ship is
    ready to provide over a half century of naval presence around the
    globe. This past year marked a significant event in the employment of
    the Ford-class--Full Ship Shock Trials. The positive result of this
    testing is a tribute to the precision, rigor, and execution that go
    into the design, production, and delivery of the world's most capable
    aircraft carrier. The second ship of the Ford-class, the John F.
    Kennedy (CVN 79) continues propulsion plant testing and is on track for
    delivery to the Navy in 2024. Progress also continues on construction
    of Enterprise (CVN 80) and Doris Miller (CVN 81), carriers in a two-
    ship buy that allows the Navy to realize important cost savings, while
    maintaining a steady, predictable workload within our vital industrial
    base.
                            naval reactors overview
        This Committee's support has enabled the safe operation of the
    nuclear fleet, substantial progress on our key projects, and our
    continued oversight and regulation of all areas across the Naval
    Nuclear Propulsion Program. Naval Reactors' budget request for fiscal
    year 2023 is $2.1 billion. Your past support has allowed significant
    progress on our three major Department of Energy funded projects--
    Columbia-class propulsion plant development and production, the
    refueling overhaul of our research and training reactor in New York,
    and the construction of the Naval Spent Fuel Handling Facility in
    Idaho. When I first arrived at Naval Reactors in 2015, these three
    projects had not yet hit their peak funding. Over the course of the
    past several years, these projects have been a major focus for the
    Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. We have managed and lead the way
    through many challenges, and today, I can confidently say that the
    development and production of the first Columbia-class propulsion plant
    is proceeding in support of lead boat construction; and the refueling
    of our research and training reactor will complete within fiscal year
    2023. With your support, the Program also continues to make significant
    progress on construction of an incredibly important Naval Spent Fuel
    Handling Facility. While we are staying focused on completing these
    efforts, we are also preparing for the future with renewed emphasis on
    advanced and innovative technologies.
                                 major projects
    Columbia-class Propulsion Plant
        The Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine remains the Navy's
    number one acquisition priority. Naval Reactors is supporting lead ship
    construction and is delivering the life-of-ship reactor core and the
    electric drive propulsion system for the Columbia-class program. The
    fiscal year 2023 budget includes $53.9 million that will allow
    continued support for lead ship propulsion plant design and safety
    analysis work required for lead ship reactor testing and delivery.
    S8G Prototype Refueling Overhaul
        The fiscal year 2023 budget request includes $20 million toward
    final execution of the refueling and overhaul of the New York land-
    based prototype, which will enable an additional 20 years of Naval
    Reactors' commitment to research, development, and initial operator
    training. Over the course of the past three years, the project has
    worked through performance and testing equipment challenges, and in
    April of last year met a key milestone--installation of the new reactor
    core. This reactor core, called the Technology Demonstration Core,
    includes Columbia-class type fuel modules as part of testing and
    demonstrating the manufacturability necessary for production and
    delivery of the Columbia-class reactor core. We continue to provide
    strong oversight to improve cost and schedule performance, and the
    project will complete in fiscal year 2023. I look forward to providing
    the final update on this multi-year project in next year's appearance
    before the Committee.
    Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project
        Naval Reactors is constructing the Naval Spent Fuel Handling
    Facility (SFHP), located at the Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho. The
    facility is critical to our mission to manage naval spent nuclear fuel
    and support aircraft carrier and submarine fleet requirements. The
    fiscal year 2023 budget request includes $398 million for continuation
    of this project through several key milestones. Economic conditions
    influenced by the COVID-19 pandemic and the discovery of unexpected
    bedrock conditions beneath the facility's foundations have presented
    significant challenges for us. To address these challenges, we
    evaluated actions necessary to ensure the overall Project milestones
    remain achievable, including additional resources (e.g., extended/added
    shifts, parallel and fast-tracking of work efforts) and additional
    funding to mitigate impacts to current and future construction
    subcontracts. Consistent with these actions, I approved a revision to
    the SFHP Performance Baseline in fiscal year 2021. Funding in fiscal
    year 2023 will be critical to implementing our construction sequence. I
    remain committed to keeping the Committee informed of our progress, and
    actions to mitigate construction challenges, as we aggressively manage
    and oversee this complex and large-scale infrastructure project.
                             technical base funding
        In addition to our three priority projects, Naval Reactors
    maintains a high-performing technical base. The technical base is the
    set of fundamental skills and capabilities necessary to safely and
    effectively support the nuclear Navy. It includes a foundation of
    specialists in nuclear materials, nuclear physics, thermal-hydraulic
    testing, acoustics, electrical design, software development, system
    development, refueling, and other specialized skills, along with the
    associated facilities and laboratories to conduct our work. The people
    and activities that make up our technical base are leveraged for our
    priority projects but also perform essential work to support the
    operating fleet and ensure our day-to-day technological advantage over
    our competitors. Specifically, the technical base: 1) addresses
    emergent needs and challenges of our nuclear fleet, 2) executes nuclear
    reactor technology research and development that supports improving
    today's fleet and future capabilities, and 3) modernizes critical
    infrastructure and reduces the Program's legacy environmental
    liabilities. This base also supports the lean yet highly effective
    federal workforce that provides the oversight necessary to carry out
    this important technical work safely and efficiently. These activities
    provide 24-7 support to the globally deployed nuclear-powered Navy.
    Attracting and retaining top talent is critical to our technical base's
    ability to fulfill and mature our mission amidst a wide array of
    challenges and new demands in this era of strategic competition. The
    engineers and scientists at our Naval Nuclear Laboratory and nuclear
    capable shipyards are national treasures, who are in high demand from
    other areas of our economy. We continue to work with the leadership of
    our labs and private shipyards to identify innovative means to stay
    competitive in this aggressive talent market.
    Program Direction
        Our small but highly skilled federal workforce is critical to
    execution of our responsibilities. With the fiscal year 2023 Program
    Direction request, I remain highly focused on attracting, developing,
    and retaining a talented and diverse workforce to oversee and manage a
    wide array of work across the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program to
    ensure mission success. The talented and dedicated people at our
    Washington, DC headquarters and field offices are absolutely essential
    to our strong centralized management and oversight of the important
    work we perform for our Nation.
        Building ships that have over forty years of expected life requires
    staffing continuity to ensure the Nation has a workforce with the deep
    technical knowledge needed to execute Naval Reactors' cradle-to-grave
    responsibilities of these robust systems. I must have sufficient
    Federal staffing to meet the demands of sustaining and improving
    today's fleet while simultaneously growing our future capabilities. The
    cumulative effect of personnel costs growing above inflationary rates
    and an increase in recent senior level retirements has impeded our
    ability to reach this goal and challenged our ability to maintain our
    staffing levels. The market for this talent is exceptionally
    competitive. Increasingly complex systems, new and innovative research
    efforts, and growing cyber and other vulnerabilities require additional
    expertise and new perspectives that can only be gained through reaching
    our full personnel requirements. I will continue to communicate with
    the Committee on our requirements and progress in reaching our related
    staffing goals. In concert with our renewed focus on research and
    development that I have highlighted over the last several years, we
    need to find new ways to bring the Nation's top talent into Naval
    Reactors and retain this talent to transition technical innovations
    into our submarines and aircraft carriers. I respectfully request
    Congress' support, which will allow me to recruit, select, develop, and
    retain the talented workforce that was started by Admiral Hyman
    Rickover many decades ago and that has proved to be crucial to the
    success of the Program.
    Research and Development
        Our research and development strategy represents a renewed
    investment in cutting-edge technologies aimed at reversing an eroding
    capability gap with strategic adversaries like China and Russia.
    Technology investment must be reinvigorated today to have new
    technologies ready for future classes of ships and to lower costs and
    reduce construction timelines. It should be noted that these
    investments also enhance and improve the performance of today's fleet;
    this is especially important given the increasing competition in the
    global maritime environment. Our critical research and development is
    conducted by the dedicated and talented teams of people at our Naval
    Nuclear Laboratory sites--the Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory in
    Pittsburgh, the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory and Kesselring Site in
    greater Albany, and the Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho.
        Our first priority is always support of today's fleet. Our labs
    perform approximately 4,000 technical evaluations annually that enable
    Naval Reactors to thoroughly assess and respond to emergent issues,
    thereby keeping our ships mission-ready while ensuring nuclear safety.
    These efforts are essential to keep our ships at-sea operating abroad
    for longer periods of time, our carrier strike groups globally engaged,
    and ballistic missile and attack submarines ready to respond at any
    time.
        Beginning with last year's fiscal year 2022 budget, Naval Reactors
    has embarked on a path to identify and develop new technologies for
    inclusion in the next generation of nuclear powered ships while
    simultaneously delivering the enhanced capabilities to the existing
    fleet mentioned earlier. We are pursuing advanced reactor core and fuel
    systems, advanced manufacturing and inspection techniques, next-
    generation instrumentation and control architectures and sensors, and
    asymmetrical applications of emerging technologies (e.g., advanced
    power conversion, artificial intelligence, data analytics, additive
    manufacturing, and advanced robotics). These advancements have the
    potential to deliver both greater capability and lower acquisition and
    lifecycle costs, while ensuring the Navy is constantly improving our
    advantage and innovating. I commit to further engagement with the
    Committee on these advanced technology maturation efforts to enhance
    understanding and support for the actions described above. I take great
    pride in highlighting our innovative and new technologies and how we
    can transition them into meeting requirements for the Fleet of
    tomorrow.
        I want to assure the Committee that our investments are supported
    by a comprehensive and rigorous planning effort we undertake with our
    partners at the Naval Nuclear Laboratory. Our annual work execution
    plans are derived from this comprehensive alignment, and I personally
    review and approve each plan to ensure we are making the right
    investments and tradeoffs in all areas of our business.
    Facilities and Infrastructure
        Our Naval Nuclear Laboratory facilities and infrastructure are
    essential in carrying out Naval Reactors' mission. This year's budget
    request supports continuing our recapitalization of Naval Nuclear
    Laboratory facilities and infrastructure systems, many of which have
    supported the Program since its inception over 70 years ago.
    Specifically, this budget includes a consolidation and recapitalization
    of our thermal hydraulic testing capabilities that will advance
    cutting-edge technologies and improve testing efficiency. Without these
    recapitalization efforts, we will be unable to effectively support
    nuclear fleet operations and advanced research and development efforts
    at the level required by this complex technology. We are ramping up our
    efforts in decontaminating and decommissioning (D&D) older facilities
    that have been in existence since the start of the Program in the early
    1950s. We have approximately $8 billion in environmental liabilities
    requiring D&D efforts. Over one-third of this estimate is associated
    with the cost to remediate and demolish inactive facilities and
    infrastructure at the Naval Nuclear Laboratory sites. We continue to
    retire these liabilities in an environmentally responsible and cost-
    effective manner to support best use of our funding. I look forward to
    future engagement with the Committee to discuss our specific actions
    and tangible examples of Naval Reactors' long-term plan to reach our
    goals. Through our established partnership with the Department of
    Energy Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM), we are leveraging
    their experience in efficient, safe, and cost-effective remediation of
    environmental liabilities across the complex. I am pleased with the
    collaboration on this effort with my partners in DOE-EM.
                                     aukus
        In September of last year, President Biden announced an enhanced
    trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom,
    and the United States (AUKUS). The three governments are engaging in an
    18-month consultation period to seek an optimal pathway for delivering
    a conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability to
    Australia at the earliest achievable date. Naval Reactors is playing a
    key leadership role in developing this plan to ensure that our nation's
    preeminent expertise is applied to the nuclear-powered submarine
    initiative. We are now more than six months into this consultation
    period and are focused on ensuring Australia understands the full scope
    of capabilities necessary to design, build, operate, and maintain a
    nuclear navy, as well as properly dispose a nuclear powered ship at the
    end of service. This includes an in-depth analysis of the trilateral
    partners' existing regulatory frameworks, as well as the existing
    educational, industrial, and technical capabilities, and capacities
    needed to identify the optimal path forward. This effort involves
    emphasizing to Australia the key leadership roles, labor talent, and
    infrastructure investments they will need to contribute to bring this
    to reality. In February, I along with a team of subject matter experts
    from Naval Reactors and the United Kingdom traveled to Australia to
    assess their current capability. During this trip, I met with senior
    Australian Government officials. As part of our discussions, we
    emphasized that obtaining a nuclear powered submarine capability is a
    long road which requires steadfast commitment to the highest levels of
    stewardship. While my number one priority is supporting our current and
    future nuclear fleet, the AUKUS efforts are being supported by a small
    cadre of experts who are responsible for ensuring the critical facets
    of this consultation are completed effectively. The foundation on which
    this effort is built is made up of our people, our technology, and the
    facilities that support our own Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. While
    Australia is funding this consultation period, Congress' support of
    Naval Reactors' fiscal year 2023 budget request is vital to support our
    primary mission and allow the Naval Reactors leadership team the
    ability to support key activities during the consultation period.
                                   conclusion
        The Navy's ability to maintain mastery of the undersea domain and
    sustain a formidable forward presence and its resultant value cannot be
    simply assumed. Naval nuclear propulsion is an incredible but
    unforgiving technology, and must be treated appropriately, with a
    constant focus on safe operation. Naval Reactor's cradle-to-grave
    responsibility to manage this technology is paramount, and I assure
    this Committee that I will balance investments in today's fleet with
    the requirements of a future fleet, carefully steer future cooperation
    efforts, and preserve the focus on providing effective naval nuclear
    propulsion for the United States Navy. I appreciate the strong support
    this program receives from Congress and respectfully urge your support
    for our fiscal year 2023 budget request.

        Senator King. Thank you, Admiral. Mr. White, please.

       STATEMENT OF WILLIAM WHITE, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
                  ENERGY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

        Mr. White. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and
    Members of the Subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before
    you today to represent the Department of Energy's Office of
    Environmental Management (EM).
        EM is focused on its commitment to clean up the
    environmental legacy of the national defense programs that
    helped end World War II and the Cold War. This work helps
    address the government's responsibility to the communities that
    played such an important role in U.S. history, and more
    importantly helps position them to continue to grow and thrive
    in the future.
        Today EM has completed cleanup activities at 92 of 107
    sites, most recently competing legacy work at the Brookhaven
    National Laboratory in New York.
        Even as EM has grappled with a global pandemic over the
    past 2 years, we have achieved a set of impactful
    accomplishments in the cleanup program. At Y-12 in Oak Ridge,
    EM demolished the biology complex so that this area can be used
    by NNSA for their modernization program.
        Senator King. Could you get a little closer to the mic,
    please?
        Mr. White. Of course, sir. At Y-12 in Oakridge, EM
    demolished the biology complex so that this area can be used by
    the NNSA. More than 200 transuranic waste shipments were
    received last year at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plan, bringing
    the total to more than 13,000 shipments safely transported.
    That includes shipments from Los Alamos, where the team
    certified and completed 30 shipments to WIPP last year.
        At the Hanford Site in Washington State, EM has begun
    large-scale treatment of radioactive tank waste in the Tank
    Side Cesium Removal system, another project completed ahead of
    schedule and under budget. We have treated around 200,000
    gallons of waste since the system came online just a few months
    ago.
        At Savannah River in South Carolina, EM is processing
    record amounts of tank waste, helping to address one of the
    largest environmental and financial liabilities there.
        The EM team in Idaho recently completed its buried waste
    remediation project 18 months ahead of schedule. This high-
    priority cleanup project helps protect the Snake River Plain
    Aquifer and meets the commitment we made to the State of Idaho.
        The fiscal year 2023 budget request will enable EM to
    further advance its mission, maintain national security
    priorities, and support those most impacted by the
    environmental legacy of the past. We will treat 1 million
    gallons of radioactive tank waste at the Hanford site and
    advance work to begin vitrifying this tank waste by the end of
    2023. After decades of support from Congress, this
    transformational accomplishment is well within sight.
        As EM prepares to operate these facilities, it is also
    ramping up work on Hanford's high-level waste facility so that
    we are ultimately able to treat that portion of the tank waste
    too.
        In South Carolina, EM will accelerate waste processing and
    tank closure activities, and at the Idaho National Laboratory
    we are advancing towards liquid waste treatment with the
    Integrated Waste Treatment Unit. The request will also allow us
    to address high-risk excess contaminated facilities and
    contaminated groundwater across the complex.
        In addition to reducing environmental risks, the budget
    request supports broader national security and scientific
    research missions. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant will be
    modernized and ensure that the facility is equipped to meet the
    needs of legacy cleanup activities and ongoing national
    security programs. As the mission is carried out, we are
    committed to continuous improvement. GAO's [Government
    Accountability Office] latest high-risk report acknowledged the
    steps EM has taken to demonstrate this commitment, and we aim
    to go even further as we plan for the future.
        The cleanup program depends on the talented men and women
    on the ground at our sites. That is why I am pleased the budget
    request boosts support for workforce development and for
    building a pipeline of talent that promotes diversity, equity,
    and inclusion.
        As EM makes steady cleanup progress and prepares for future
    mission needs, we remain committed to those most impacted by
    the environmental legacy of the past. Our sites are fortunate
    to be surrounded by diverse communities and tribal nations who
    are strong partners in advancing cleanup and planning for the
    future.
        I appreciate the Subcommittee's support for the EM mission.
    I thank you for your time, and I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. White follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by William ``Ike'' White
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and Members of the
    Subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today to represent
    the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management
    (EM).
        EM's mission represents the government's strong commitment to
    cleaning up the environmental legacy of the national defense programs
    that helped end World War II and the Cold War. EM's vital mission does
    not just address past legacy, though, it also helps to support and
    enable DOE's ongoing national security and scientific research
    missions.
        The fiscal year 2023 budget request of $7,643,202,000 for EM
    reflects the Biden Administration's strong commitment to advancing the
    cleanup mission and preparing for sustained success, maintaining
    national security priorities, and supporting communities most impacted
    by the environmental legacy of the past.
                     record of results for the environment
        Over the last 30 years, EM has made significant progress,
    completing cleanup the environment at 92 out of a total of 107 sites.
    EM's significant accomplishments to date have included completing
    demolition of the Plutonium Finishing Plant, a facility that produced
    two-thirds of the nation's Cold War-era plutonium at the Hanford Site
    in Washington state; completing the removal of the former uranium
    enrichment complex at Oak Ridge in Tennessee; opening the world's only
    deep geological repository for transuranic waste generated from atomic
    energy defense activities at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New
    Mexico; and completing construction on the entire tank waste treatment
    system at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, enabling
    significant progress in how the Department tackles one of its largest
    environmental and financial liabilities at that site.
                           new era of cleanup success
        These accomplishments are enabled by the significant investments
    Congress has made in the EM program and have ushered in tangible
    results for communities and the environment in a safe, effective, and
    responsible manner. Even as EM continues to grapple with a global
    pandemic, the program achieved a set of impactful accomplishments at
    sites across the country.
        At the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee EM
    demolished the Biology Complex. EM also advanced deactivation and
    demolition work at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) with
    demolition of the Radiological Lab's West Cell Bank and the Tritium
    Target Preparation Facility now complete. ORNL and Y-12 house hundreds
    of excess contaminated facilities that comprise the largest inventory
    of high-risk buildings in the DOE complex. Collectively these efforts
    are reducing risks, stabilizing facilities, and paving the way for
    advancing cleanup and providing land for research and national security
    missions. At the Hanford site in Washington state, EM is treating
    radioactive and chemical waste from large underground tanks for the
    first time ever on a large scale, and we are progressing towards
    initiation of the Direct Feed Low Activity Waste (DFLAW) project that
    will convert into glass or vitrify this waste for disposal. At the
    Savannah River Site in Aiken, South Carolina we are now processing
    record amounts of tank waste and recently broke ground on the important
    Advanced Manufacturing Collaborative facility that will provide
    essential space for mission work and facilitate academic, industry, and
    community collaboration in state-of-the-art laboratory space. The
    Advanced Manufacturing Collaborative will bring cutting edge
    innovations to help meet the needs of the EM cleanup mission and create
    an environment to develop a diverse and talented next generation
    workforce.
        The EM team in Idaho recently completed buried waste remediation
    helping to protect the Snake River Aquifer. More than 200 transuranic
    waste shipments were received last year at the Waste Isolation Pilot
    Plan (WIPP) in New Mexico. This includes shipments from Los Alamos
    National Laboratory, where the EM team certified and completed 30
    shipments to WIPP last year.
        Cleanup activities at the Brookhaven National Laboratory in New
    York are complete with demolition of the 320-foot-tall red-and-white
    High Flux Beam Reactor exhaust stack, restoring the areas skyline.
    Lastly EM completed environmental remediation work at the Tonopah Test
    Range in Nevada, enabling transfer of portions of that site to the
    Office of Legacy Management for long-term stewardship.
                  steady progress planned for fiscal year 2023
        The fiscal year 2023 budget request builds on these significant
    achievements by positioning EM for steady and sustained progress in how
    we tackle radioactive tank waste. Key investments are proposed to
    continue to drive risk reduction and significant changes across EM's
    portfolio of sites, as well as to continue to aid the Department's
    vital science and defense missions.
        Protecting the environment by addressing radioactive waste stored
    in underground tanks at Hanford, Savanah River and the Idaho National
    Laboratory is a top priority for EM. The budget request enables
    treatment of one million gallons of tank waste through the Tank Side
    Cesium Removal system and supports the commencement of vitrifying this
    waste by the end of 2023 via the Direct Feed Low Activity Waste system.
    After decades of support from the local community, Congress and the
    workforce this transformational accomplishment is within sight.
        As we prepare to begin operating Hanford's low-activity tank waste
    vitrification capabilities, the budget request also invests $316.2
    million to ramp up work on the Waste Treatment Plant's High Level Waste
    facility to be able to tackle that portion of Hanford's tank waste
    inventory. In parallel, EM continues to identify safe, effective, and
    viable options for the treatment of all Hanford's tank waste, including
    supplemental low activity waste. One such approach is the proposed Test
    Bed Initiative (TBI) Demonstration. The proposed TBI Demonstration
    would address independent recommendations and comments from the
    Government Accountability Office, the National Academy of Sciences,
    national laboratories, and others to further study the potential cost,
    safety and environmental performance of potential treatment and
    disposal alternatives. Implementation of this TBI Demonstration
    technology on an industrial scale could have the potential to safely
    pretreat low-activity waste from Hanford tanks, solidify the waste in
    grout, and dispose of it off-site in a manner that is protective of the
    workers, the public and the environment.
        In addition to helping solve the challenges of Hanford tank waste,
    the request will enable EM to continue meaningful cleanup progress to
    place another former production reactor into interim safe storage,
    transfer radioactive capsules to safer dry storage, and treat another 2
    billion gallons of contaminated groundwater.
        In South Carolina, the fiscal year 2023 budget request supports
    full utilization of capabilities to process tank waste. The Salt Waste
    Processing Facility will further accelerate the tank waste mission by
    increasing the processing of to 6 million gallons in fiscal year 2023
    up from an expected 3 million gallons in fiscal year 2022. As a result,
    the Savannah River Site could complete the bulk of its tank waste
    treatment mission in a decade.
        EM actively works with other DOE organizations to assess
    infrastructure needs across the Department and will continue to pursue
    modernizing efforts throughout the complex, including at the Savannah
    River Site to facilitate project completion.
        At the same time, risk reduction work will continue at the Savannah
    River Site, including work towards disposition of remaining transuranic
    waste and remediating contaminated soil and groundwater.
        At the Idaho National Laboratory, the request supports operations
    of the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit which will ultimately treat
    about 900,000 gallons of liquid waste by turning it into a granular
    solid. EM also will meet another key commitment to the state of Idaho
    by completing the transfer of EM-owned spent nuclear fuel to on-site
    dry storage.
                     support for national security missions
        In addition to reducing environmental risks at these and other
    sites across the complex, the EM mission benefits the Department's
    broader national security and scientific research missions. Nowhere is
    this more evident than at Oak Ridge where the successful demolition of
    the former uranium enrichment complex at the East Tennessee Technology
    Park has enabled EM to begin major cleanup operations at the Oak Ridge
    National Laboratory and Y-12 National Security Complex. Demolition of
    the Biology Complex at the Y-12 National Security Complex involved
    tearing down the six-story, 255,000 square-foot Building 9207 and the
    three-story, 65,000 square-foot Building 9210. With this project
    complete, EM will transfer the 18-acre area to the National Nuclear
    Security Administration (NNSA) later this year. The area is the planned
    location for the future Lithium Processing Facility.
        Today, EM is in the midst of a significant infrastructure and
    modernization campaign at WIPP. Last year EM began mining the West
    Access Drifts and completed construction of the Salt Reduction
    Building. The Salt Reduction Building is a key component of the Safety
    Significant Containment Ventilation System (SSCVS) to improve air
    quality in the underground portion of the site. Along with providing
    for continued WIPP operations, as well as waste characterization and
    transportation programs, the budget request supports the continued
    infrastructure recapitalization projects, as well as mine modernization
    activities and safety upgrades in fiscal year 2023. Shipments of legacy
    transuranic waste to WIPP will progress from sites across the DOE
    complex, including the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico,
    where deactivation and decommissioning of NNSA's Ion Beam Facility will
    be initiated in fiscal year 2023.
        At the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the removal of the
    Livermore Pool Type Reactor was completed. This marks a significant
    cleanup milestone and demonstrates EM's strong cooperation with its
    NNSA and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers partners while setting the stage
    to begin demolition of Building 280 later this year.
        In addition, EM is pursuing a world-class technology development
    program to accelerate the overall cleanup mission, increase efficiency,
    and protect human health and environment. EM is leveraging the
    expertise of the Savannah River National Laboratory and the Network of
    National Laboratories for Environmental Management and Stewardship to
    develop innovative solutions in the fields of environmental cleanup,
    national security and science and energy security that will benefit EM,
    the NNSA and other DOE missions.
                         diverse and talented workforce
        The talented and dedicated men and women across EM are the
    program's greatest assets. While significant progress continues across
    the DOE complex, the EM mission will span several decades at some
    sites. With that in mind, EM is taking steps to ensure a successful and
    sustainable program that will enable mission completion. EM is
    investing to support workforce development and build a workforce that
    promotes diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility. These
    principles are fundamental to EM because they enable every aspect of
    the cleanup mission.
        The budget request provides resources to build a diverse pipeline
    of talent and support high-quality jobs in environmental cleanup. For
    example, the $56 million request in fiscal year 2023 supports EM's
    Minority Serving Institutions Partnership Program, which is designed to
    help build and maintain a well-trained, technically skilled, and
    diverse workforce. By partnering with Minority Serving Institutions and
    Historically Black Colleges and Universities, this program promotes the
    education and development of EM's next generation workforce in STEM-
    related disciplines.
                        support for impacted communities
        As EM makes steady cleanup progress and prepares for future mission
    needs, EM remains committed to addressing the responsibilities the
    Department has to the communities most directly impacted by the
    environmental legacy of the past. The fiscal year 2023 request
    represents a significant investment in helping the communities that
    played such an important role in U.S. history continue to grow and
    thrive in the future. The EM mission itself is aligned with broader
    environmental justice goals that lead to a vibrant future in all
    communities. This year, the EM Los Alamos Field Office was selected as
    one of five DOE pilot programs for the cross-cutting Justice40
    Initiative. At its core, the Justice40 Initiative is a whole-of-
    government effort to lift communities by delivering at least 40 percent
    of the overall benefits from certain federal investments, including the
    remediation and reduction of legacy pollution, to disadvantaged
    communities.
        The budget request further boosts support for the Tribal Nations,
    Alaska Native communities, and communities around EM sites ensuring
    they are safe, providing opportunities for local input into cleanup
    priorities and helping build a vibrant future. The request includes
    Payment in Lieu of Taxes funding for communities near Hanford and
    Savannah River to support schools, roads and other local priorities. In
    addition, $40 million is provided to establish a new Community Capacity
    Building initiative. This grant program will provide assistance to
    those communities around EM sites and will be developed in consultation
    with community stakeholders to address their needs.
                                   conclusion
        The fiscal year 2023 budget request is the latest sign of this
    Administration's strong support for EM's vital mission. As the mission
    is carried out, EM is committed to continuous improvement and making
    further advancements to ensure that cleanup activities are conducted in
    a safe, efficient, and cost-effective manner.
        EM will continue to work in a collaborative manner with workers,
    unions, Tribal Nations, states, local communities, and Congress on
    opportunities to achieve shared goals of protecting the environment and
    preparing for future cleanup success.

        Senator King. Thank you. We will have 5-minute rounds, and
    we will ask a few questions. We will probably have more than
    one round. We have a second panel.
        Ms. Hruby, the budget request is about a 3 percent
    increase, but as I mentioned in my opening statement you are as
    busy as the agency has been in 40 years. Is 3 percent enough to
    meet the demands of the recapitalization, the Savannah River
    cleanup? I mean, we have got a whole host of problems. Is this
    amount sufficient?
        Ms. Hruby. Yes, Senator King, thanks for that question. We
    think this is a budget that we can execute and that will keep
    us on track for requirements, on our requirements. It is true
    that it would be nice to complete our construction projects and
    have them ready to go for the rest of our war head
    modernization programs, but we simply cannot go any faster than
    we are currently going on those construction projects and have
    acceptable risk and get the products that we want.
        So we think this is the right budget. It was fully informed
    by the Nuclear Posture Review, and it does, in fact, underscore
    the expanded mission and the accelerated pace. It comes on top
    of budget increases over the last several years that have been
    significant.
        However, as I said in my opening statement, the parallel
    approach we are taking for modernization and infrastructure
    revitalization carries some persistent risks and includes
    things like single points of failure in our production complex,
    supply chain issues in construction projects, and workforce
    recruitment and retention across the complex. So we feel like
    this is a practical, accelerated budget, but it will carry risk
    because we are moving as fast as we can.
        Senator King. Let me change the subject a minute to
    nonproliferation. One of the things that is not discussed much
    with regard to the Ukraine war is that Ukraine gave up its
    nuclear weapons in exchange for a guarantee of territorial
    integrity, which was signed by Russia. What has what has
    happened in Ukraine done to the whole theory and practice of
    nonproliferation? If you were Kim in North Korea, would you
    give up your nuclear weapons, having seen what has happened in
    Ukraine?
        Ms. Hruby. Senator King, this is an important question. The
    Ukraine guarantees, you know, people will look at around the
    world. I am confident of that. At the same time, we will do
    everything we can in NNSA to uphold the nonproliferation regime
    that we have today. We will reach out, and we are reaching out
    to our allies and partners as particularly the allies that we
    have a guarantee with, to make sure they understand how strong
    our commitment to that guarantee is. We will continue to
    support activities in the nonproliferation area. But we must
    step it up in our ability to convince people around the world
    that nuclear weapons are not the best approach and hopefully
    not take the wrong lessons from Ukraine.
        Senator King. Well, I hope you are right, but I think it is
    of significant concern.
        Pit production. Are we facing a pit gap? In other words, is
    it likely that we are going to be able to meet the needs or are
    we going to be, in 5 years, talking about some emergency
    program to fill in the gap to meet the needs for the newly
    deployed weapons?
        Ms. Hruby. We think--look, we are not going to be able to
    make 80 pits per year by 2030.
        Senator King. Is 80 a magic number? Is 80 the number that
    we project we will need?
        Ms. Hruby. That is a good question. We are working really
    closely right now with the Department of Defense, NNSA and the
    Department of Defense, to look at the outyear requirements and
    to see how we can satisfy the program of record in ways that we
    are all comfortable with, that mean a safe, secure, reliable,
    and effective weapon program, nuclear weapons in the United
    States. We believe there will be a path through that, but we
    are still working closely together to define the details of
    that.
        Senator King. I would rather you say we know there is a
    path, rather than say ``we believe.''
        Ms. Hruby. I would rather say that as well, but, you know,
    I am being honest with you, that we are still in the process of
    sorting that all out in the Nuclear Weapons Council.
        Senator King. Well, to the extent you refine the estimates
    and realize there is a problem, let us know sooner rather than
    later so we can attend to this problem now rather than 5 years
    from now.
        Ms. Hruby. Let me just say another word about this. We are
    establishing pit production as a hedge against plutonium aging
    and pit aging. Our pits are not, today, at any kind of an aging
    cliff. We can reuse pits. We just do not like that plan because
    we may have to take them out before the end of the life of the
    weapon system. But right now we are not at the cliff of aging
    program. We just would like to put new pits in because we want
    the weapons to stay in the stockpile for 30 years, and we do
    not have the 30-year confidence we would like to have.
        Senator King. Thank you. That is helpful.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ms. Hruby, this year's budget talks about minimizing the
    delay in pit production and repeatedly emphasizes achieving the
    necessary rate of 80 pits per year, quote, ``as close to 2030
    as possible.'' Yet your letter to this Committee on your
    unfunded priorities states that additional resources would
    allow NNSA to begin additional activities at the Savannah River
    plutonium processing facility. Would the additional resources
    referred to in your letter help minimize the delay in pit
    production?
        Ms. Hruby. Senator Fischer, thank you for that question.
    The answer is yes. We would like to bring money forward from
    out years on the Savannah River pit production facility to do
    some early buys--glove boxes, nuclear-quality piping, other
    shortages that we are seeing in the supply chain. We would also
    like to build a training facility at Savannah River to get the
    workers ready to get to rate production once construction is
    complete. So we would like to try to accelerate how fast we can
    go with construction, once our design is complete, and how fast
    we can get to rate production after the construction is
    complete. That is what the unfunded request letter is about, is
    the money that we would like to pull forward into the 2023
    budget request from our future years request.
        Senator Fischer. In our discussion this morning you said we
    are looking at a 2032 to 2035 time frame for achieving the 80
    pits per year rate that I believe we need to have, and it also
    will likely be another 2 years before we have a good idea of
    how to get there. I think I need to be clear. The additional
    resources you are referring to make achieving full production
    by 2032 more likely. Is that correct?
        Ms. Hruby. Yes.
        Senator Fischer. So are in a position now, would you say,
    to be able to shape events so that we can reach that desired
    outcome of 2032, if we take the correct steps now?
        Ms. Hruby. That is what we think. I just want to foot-stomp
    that we did get the money that we need to complete the 90
    percent design, so a significant amount of money, $700 million.
    This additional request would allow us to position ourselves to
    make sure once we are done with the design we can go as fast as
    possible.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. Earlier today we also discussed the
    goal of having nuclear infrastructure that is truly responsive
    to the changing security landscape that we are facing. When we
    talk about a responsive nuclear enterprise we usually think of
    facilities and production capabilities. But do you think that
    our processes are set up to allow us to move quickly? Do we
    need to take a fresh look at things, like the Phase X process,
    to see if we can go faster, where we can go faster?
        Ms. Hruby. Yes, thank you, Senator Fischer, for that
    question. Our processes are set up to ensure we get to the end
    state we want, and that is important. They are not set up to go
    fast. I do think we have to begin to look at how we can move
    faster without undermining the intent of staying, you know, on
    schedule and on budget and get what we want and how we can
    manage the risk with changing those processes and moving
    faster.
        Senator Fischer. One thing we have seen on this Committee,
    when it comes to the Department of Defense, is that over the
    last several decades they have structured their processes I
    think to minimize risk. Now as we see our security environment
    changing, I believe we need to prioritize speed and also
    innovation, but that sometimes means that we develop new
    approaches instead of relying on legacy development processes
    that are already in place.
        Do you think that the NNSA faces a similar challenge?
        Ms. Hruby. Absolutely, and for probably largely the same
    reasons. So we will look for ways to learn from what the DOD is
    finding. We will look for ways to make our processes more
    streamlined. We have had some success on smaller construction
    projects where we cut out pieces of the processes. We saved a
    lot of money. We have gone faster. So we are doing some
    experiments on lower-risk systems, but we have to carry that
    forward. I appreciate the question.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Senator Rosen.
        Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman King, Ranking
    Member Fischer, for holding this hearing. It is very important.
    I would like to thank each of the witnesses for testifying
    today. Thank you for the service to our country.
        I want to talk a little bit about the long-term funding
    strategy for the Nevada National Security Site, because since
    its inception, NNSS--I do not know which one is easier to say,
    Nevada National Security Site or NNSS. It is a tongue-twister.
    But it has relied on its large and remote area to conduct
    missions for the nation's nuclear weapons and nonproliferation
    programs as well as other elements of our national security
    community.
        It is larger than all other NNSA sites combined, and it is
    an equivalent size to the state of Rhode Island. NNSS has a
    vast amount of infrastructure, a vast amount of infrastructure
    to maintain, and I am delighted that you and Secretary Granholm
    each visited the site recently. We welcome the excitement and
    the attention that your visits have brought to the important
    and really unique work that we are doing there.
        However, over the past few decades NNSS has faced unstable
    and unpredictable program funding. It is leaving the site with
    degraded infrastructure, despite being a facility of national
    importance responsible for the certification of our nuclear
    stockpile.
        I am pleased to hear the programmatic situation is now
    changing in a positive direction, but I remain concerned that
    we address this infrastructure funding issue so that NNSS can
    continue to be a center of excellence for the enterprise.
        Administrator Hruby, are you considering innovative
    approaches to assure that NNSS infrastructure is supported,
    recapitalized, including base funding to guide future
    investment planning?
        Ms. Hruby. Yes, Senator Rosen, it is nice to see you and
    thanks for your continued interest and support of the Nevada
    National Security Site. I will say that the Secretary's visit
    and my visit were actually separate visits but a week apart. I
    think I influenced her by calling in every day saying, ``Oh, it
    was a great visit to Nevada.''
        Senator Rosen. It is a great site, is it not?
        Ms. Hruby. It is a great site, and I have been there many,
    many times, but I have not been there for a few years. I will
    tell you I was very impressed by the progress that has been
    made in Nevada, in the infrastructure and in the collaboration
    with the laboratories to do experiments there underground.
        So to answer your question, I think we have a really great
    plan for the Nevada National Security Site, and the plan, from
    my perspective, looks like get our infrastructure to a state
    that is really bringing important contributions and is a good
    place for people to work, and then fund those new capabilities
    to do important experiments for us going forward. So we are
    spending a lot of time and money now on construction. That will
    lead to a new demand in Nevada that will bring that base
    funding that you are looking for.
        Senator Rosen. Well, thank you. I want to build on that
    because the Nevada National Security Site oversees our
    Stockpile Stewardship Program, principally at the U1a facility,
    the underground lab where the science is conducting subcritical
    experiments to verify the reliability and effectiveness of our
    nuclear stockpile. As you were just there, U1a is undergoing
    major construction.
        Could you provide us--I know we are not in a classified
    setting, but as much as you can--provide us an update on the
    upgrades and how these advancements really are going to make a
    difference for those subcritical experiments that are really
    going to improve our stewardship program?
        Ms. Hruby. Sure. I would be happy to. There is this
    program, another acronym mouthful, called Enhanced Capability
    for Subcritical Experiments, ECSE, that includes upgrades to
    the U1a tunnel complex, which is the tunnels that we do science
    experiments in. It also includes new tools, especially the sort
    of centerpieces, a radiography tool that allows us to watch
    implosion, also critical, of course.
        This ties back to Senator King's question in an interesting
    way. We need to understand how plutonium ages. This facility,
    with the radiography, will allow us to watch implosion in real
    materials, realistic geometries, which we have not been able to
    do before.
        If we believe that we can get a good, excellent estimate of
    plutonium lifetime it allows us all kinds of--actually pit
    lifetimes--it allows us all kinds of options going forward, and
    we do not have to use head strategy of making sure we can make
    pits while we study aging.
        Senator Rosen. Well, thank you. My time is up. I am going
    to submit some questions for the record about the Remote
    Sensing Lab that is also part of the Nevada National Security
    Site and plays a critical role to our community as well.
        Thank you so much.
        Senator King. Senator Tuberville.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
    panel, for being here today and your time.
        Mr. White, are you familiar with Uranium-233?
        Mr. White. Yes, sir.
        Senator Tuberville. Yeah, I figured you were. Your office
    was tasked with downblending Uranium-233 in 2001. As you may
    know, the U.S. pioneered thorium reactor technology in the
    1960s. These reactors cannot melt down and actually consumes
    nuclear waste and do not rely on high-assay low-enriched
    uranium, which all the Department of Energy's next-generation
    reactors rely on.
        Mr. White, what is the chief problem with the HALEU? Do you
    know? It comes from Russia. Correct?
        Mr. White. Yes, sir.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you very much.
        Not only is 233 proven to create safe and clean power, its
    grandchildren isotopes are also valuable to fighting cancer. A
    May 2008 DOE report found that the destruction of Uranium-233
    threatened the supply of these lifesaving treatments. The DOE's
    2010 audit report said that destroying Uranium-233 would blunt
    scientific research and weaken National Security
    Administration's test readiness program.
        Mr. White, how many kilograms of this Uranium-233 remain to
    be blended? Do you know?
        Mr. White. I do not know that exact number off the top of
    my head, but I will be happy to take that for the record and
    get it back to you.
        Senator Tuberville. I will give it to you real quick--450
    that we have left, which is worth millions and millions of
    dollars. Do you know how much it costs us to downblend this U-
    233?
        Mr. White. Our budget request for this year is for $55
    million.
        Senator Tuberville. Fifty-five million. Correct. Fifty-five
    million to destroy something that is worth hundreds of millions
    of dollars, that we also can use for other things.
        Do you find it odd that your agency is tasked with
    destroying something while, at the same time, the DOE gave this
    technology to China? I mean, it is kind of odd. Does it not
    seem odd to you?
        Mr. White. The Environmental Management Program has a
    number of conversations with other programs across the
    Department as we look at whether facilities or material are
    excess and ready for disposition. Those conversations are often
    very difficult, and from an environmental management
    perspective what we really look at is once other programs have
    decided they no longer need the material, how we would
    prioritize the disposition of the material or the facilities
    within the scope of the larger cleanup program.
        But the material that you are talking about at Oak Ridge,
    this is a high priority from a disposition perspective for the
    Environmental Management Program for a number of different
    reasons. The material, as it is currently stored at Oak Ridge
    National Laboratory, is one of the more significant safety and
    security risks that we have at Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
        It is also material that is very expensive to safely store
    and secure. The laboratory spends over $50 million a year to
    safely store and secure this material, and it is being stored
    in some of the oldest operating facilities that we have in the
    Department of Energy, so the cost of continuing to store the
    material in these facilities is going to go up over time.
        At the moment we also have a very unique opportunity,
    working with a public-private partnership, to make use of some
    of the benefits that you just described. We have a partnership
    that allows our contractor, Isotek, to extract the thorium from
    the material. That is provided to another company, TerraPower,
    which uses the thorium to extract isotopes for lifesaving
    cancer research. In the process some of the cost of our
    disposition activity is covered by that agreement between
    Isotek and TerraPower.
        Senator Tuberville. Yeah. I would hope that we would really
    look at this to make sure that while we are destroying
    something that in the future we are not going to have to turn
    around and try to either buy it from China, buy it from Russia,
    or whatever, at the end of the day. I know it is probably
    dangerous, and we do store it in Tennessee. I am sure we could
    find a better place, that if they are not wanting it there,
    heck, we will take it in Alabama and put it in the Redstone
    Arsenal and protect it with our lives.
        But I just hate that we are destroying something, that we
    are paying to have destroyed, that we might use in the future.
        Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit these for the record.
    I have got a 2008 Department of Energy Audit Special Report, a
    2010 Department of Energy Audit Report, and a 2012 Summary
    Meeting Report between the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the
    U.S. Department of Energy. I would like to submit these for the
    record.
        Senator King. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [The 2008 Department of Energy Audit Special Report, 2010
    Department of Energy Audit Report, and 2012 Summary Meeting
    Report between the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the U.S.
    Department of Energy can be found in the Appendix.]

        Senator Tuberville. Thank you very much.
        Senator King. Senator Warren.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
    our witnesses for appearing here today.
        So we are modernizing our nuclear weapons program including
    constructing new plutonium pits which produce the radioactive
    raw material that we need for nuclear weapons. Resuming pit
    production is a huge undertaking for NNSA, and I have been a
    critic of some of NNSA's work because the agency has a pretty
    lousy record of waste and mismanagement that has cost taxpayers
    billions of dollars over the years.
        Back in 2015, Congress set a requirement of producing 80
    plutonium pits per year by 2030, and we are not off to a great
    start on that. The estimated budget for this work, at just one
    pit production site, doubled over the course of just a couple
    of months.
        So, Ms. Hruby, what is the best current estimate for what
    80 pits per year will cost?
        Ms. Hruby. Thank you, Senator Warren. I know this is a
    topic that you care a lot about. We are, I think as you know,
    in the process of completing the 90 percent design of the
    Savannah River production facility and the Los Alamos pit
    production project. Until those are done we will not have a
    cost estimate that we can stand behind. It is true there are
    always numbers floating around out there, but our processes are
    such that we are really trying to get a firm estimate and then
    come in on costs. So it would be premature for me to give you a
    number for that.
        Senator Warren. Premature? So NNSA budget estimates put the
    figure at $15 billion, I have seen press reports at $18
    billion, and you cannot even tell me what neighborhood this is
    in?
        Ms. Hruby. I can tell you neighborhoods that it is in, and
    it is going to be--if I give a number then I am going to be
    held to it, so with that caveat we do think it is going to be
    more than $10 billion.
        Senator Warren. Well, I just got to say, that is a lot of
    money.
        Ms. Hruby. I understand. It is a lot of money.
        Senator Warren. Whether it is $10 billion or $15 billion or
    $18 billion. But even this astonishing number is probably not
    enough to build these pits.
        You know, when NNSA's Deputy Administrator was before the
    Committee a few weeks ago he said the 2030 goal is likely
    unachievable, and I am going to read you what he said. He said,
    ``We can't get to 2030 by throwing more money at it,'' unquote.
        So let's talk about why things are going so poorly. Last
    year the Department of Energy's cost estimating shop conducted
    an independent review of the Los Alamos facility's pit
    production plant. They found, quote, ``There are significant
    risks in staffing, program management, production activities,
    supporting infrastructure, waste management, and other program
    requirements,'' unquote. You know, the biggest problem is there
    was not a single integrated plan in place to manage costs and
    schedule and performance.
        Ms. Hruby, is there now a single integrated program
    management plan for pit production at Los Alamos?
        Ms. Hruby. Yes.
        Senator Warren. Yes. That is the good news, right? Yes,
    there is, and I appreciate that. This was the answer I wanted
    you to give. Yes, there is a plan in place. And I appreciate
    that NNSA is trying to address the problems with pit
    production. But there are no guarantees that this program will
    ever be successful, no matter how much money we spend. In fact,
    the pit production program has been drawing comparisons to a
    previous program called the Mixed Oxides Fuel Fabrication
    Facility, or MOX, which was designed to dispose of surplus
    weapons-grade plutonium. MOX was always technologically dubious
    and was finally cancelled after wasting $8 billion.
        Here is my question, Ms. Hruby. Are you confident that we
    are not going to end up sinking billions of dollars, maybe tens
    of billions of dollars, into pit production before finally
    pulling the plug, like we did with MOX?
        Ms. Hruby. Yes, Senator, I am. Let me just say about this.
    This is a very important programmatic objective. We cannot
    fail.
        Senator Warren. Well, I have to say I do not share your
    confidence that this is going to work. As I told Dr. Adams last
    month, I remain very concerned about this program. I think we
    need to seriously assess whether our goals whether the timeline
    we are all working on is realistic. NNSA cannot keep wasting
    billions of dollars of taxpayer money. This just has to stop.
    So thank you.
        Ms. Hruby. Thank you.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Thank you, Senator Warren.
        Let's have our second panel join us please.
        [Pause.]
        Senator King. Welcome to our second panel. Dr. Adams, will
    you begin?

          STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARVIN L. ADAMS, DEPUTY
     ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
                             ADMINISTRATION

        Mr. Adams. Yes. Thank you. Chairman King, Ranking Member
    Fischer, and----
        Senator King. Please get a little closer to the mic.
        Mr. Adams. Will do. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer,
    and Distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
    the opportunity to discuss the President's fiscal year 2023
    budget for NNSA. I thank the Committee and the Senate for your
    support during my recent confirmation process. I am honored to
    serve as Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, and I am
    committed to working closely with you and others in Congress,
    along with our partners in DOD, to advance the nuclear security
    mission.
        The fiscal year 2023 budget request for weapons activities
    is $16.5 billion, which is about 3.6 percent more than what was
    enacted in fiscal year 2022. This request, informed by the 2022
    Nuclear Posture Review, will enable NNSA to keep our nuclear
    weapons stockpile safe, secure, and effective.
        NNSA is simultaneously executing five warhead modernization
    programs. Two are in production and three are following closely
    behind. Drivers for these programs include technical issues
    with warheads, changes in DOD delivery platforms, and emerging
    capability gaps.
        Warhead modernization requires reinstatement or replacement
    of lost manufacturing capabilities. With support from current
    and past administrations and Congresses, NNSA is modernizing
    and recapitalizing the production complex while simultaneous
    using both old and new infrastructure to manufacture modernized
    warheads.
        Our highest infrastructure priority is reconstitution
    plutonium pit production capabilities. We are executing a two-
    site plan to produce plutonium pits at Los Alamos National
    Laboratory and the Savannah River site. We assess that this is
    the best way to reliably produce at least 80 war-reserved pits
    per year as soon as possible.
        NNSA is also modernizing capabilities to process uranium
    and lithium to produce tritium, to manufacture and produce
    trusted rad-hard electronics, and to manufacture non-nuclear
    components.
        As we focus on the time-urgent delivery of modernized
    warheads and an infrastructure that is modernized as well as we
    must also develop and nurture capabilities to meet future
    challenges. Continued investments maintain NNSA experimental
    and computational capabilities that address important stockpile
    questions, and importantly, that attract outstanding scientists
    and engineers, and let them develop into the experienced
    experts that the stockpile needs.
        For example, ongoing investments support major experimental
    facilities at all three NNSA laboratories, it supports the
    enhanced capabilities for subcritical experiments projects at
    the Nevada National Security Site, supports exoscale computing
    that is coming, to be housed at Lawrence Livermore National
    Lab, and much more.
        I am confident that with support of Congress and in
    partnership with DOD our dedicated workforce will meet these
    unprecedented challenges that we face to maintain, modernize,
    and sustain our nuclear deterrent into the future.
        Thank you for this opportunity to testify. I look forward
    to your questions.
        [The joint prepared statement of The Honorable Jill Hruby
    and The Honorable Marvin L. Adams follows:]

    Joint Prepared Statement by The Honorable Jill Hruby and The Honorable
                                Marvin L. Adams
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and Members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to present the President's
    Fiscal Year 2023 Budget for the Department of Energy's (DOE) National
    Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). NNSA greatly appreciates the
    Committee's bipartisan support for our nuclear security mission and for
    the talented and dedicated workforce responsible for carrying it out
    every day.
        The Department meets its enduring national security mission by
    maintaining and modernizing the nuclear weapons stockpile so that it is
    always safe, secure, reliable, and effective; by reducing global
    nuclear threats; and by providing the U.S. Navy's nuclear-powered
    submarines and aircraft carriers with militarily effective propulsion
    systems. NNSA remains uniquely qualified to fulfill these tasks on
    behalf of the American people and in support of our allies and
    partners.
        The NNSA Fiscal Year 2023 budget request is informed by the 2022
    Nuclear Posture Review and reflects today's increasingly complex
    geopolitical environment. Importantly, the budget request provides full
    support for the significant nuclear weapons design and production
    required to modernize all three legs of the nuclear triad. Once
    complete, this effort will provide the U.S. with a safer, more secure,
    and more reliable stockpile that, together with the Department of
    Defense modernization programs, will provide the U.S. with a modern
    nuclear deterrent capable of responding to a wider array of challenges.
    The fiscal year 2023 budget request also includes continued funding for
    the NNSA infrastructure revitalization program needed to produce the
    weapons and materials for the planned program of record and create an
    enterprise that is more resilient and flexible. Funding for research,
    technology, and engineering needed for stockpile certification and
    innovation activities is maintained in the request.
        At the same time, the fiscal year 2023 budget request recognizes we
    must press ahead with our nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear
    counterterrorism and counterproliferation efforts as a complementary
    approach to respond to geopolitical realities. These programs continue
    efforts to implement and support robust security and safeguards for
    nuclear materials; shift commercial, research, and medical industries
    away from highly radioactive materials and technologies; and develop
    technologies for early detection of proliferent activity. This request
    recognizes the increased efforts required as nuclear power expands
    around the world in response to climate change, and as Russia, China,
    and North Korea continue to diversify and expand their nuclear
    arsenals.
        The NNSA budget request provides the support needed for Naval
    Reactors to continue work designing, producing, operating, and
    maintaining the nuclear propulsion plants for U.S. nuclear submarines
    and aircraft carriers. The request also fully supports three critical
    initiatives: the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine reactor
    systems development; construction of the Naval Spent Fuel Handling
    Facility; and the refueling and overhaul of the land-based reactor for
    continued training and technology testing.
        In today's multipolar and more aggressive geopolitical environment,
    it is imperative that NNSA is both responsive to needs and acts
    responsibly to avoid escalation or arms racing while preparing for an
    uncertain future. Our budget request reflects this balance, and our
    work has never been more critical to global stability.
                         nnsa's accomplishments in 2021
        Last year, NNSA achieved several key milestones across the nuclear
    security enterprise despite the unprecedented circumstances COVID-19
    presented.
        Life Extension and Weapons Modernization Programs: In 2021, NNSA
    completed first production units (FPU) for the W88 Alteration (Alt) 370
    and the B61-12 Life Extension programs. Both refurbished weapons have
    increased safety and reliability.
        Large Line-Item Construction: NNSA has three large line-item
    construction projects for nuclear materials underway: two projects
    associated with plutonium pit production--one at Los Alamos National
    Laboratory and one at the Savannah River Site--and one project
    associated with uranium processing at the Y-12 National Security
    Complex.
        The Los Alamos Plutonium Pit Production Project (LAP4) received
    Critical Decision (CD)-1 approval in April 2021. The Savannah River
    Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) received CD-1 approval in June
    2021. CD-1 approval marks completion of a project's definition phase
    and the conceptual design as part of DOE's Order 413.3B process for the
    acquisition of capital assets. Clearing the CD-1 process allows NNSA to
    establish 90 percent design and associated cost estimation during the
    subsequent CD-2 effort.
        The Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) consisting of seven
    subprojects has completed three projects on schedule and under budget,
    and the final four are underway. During 2021, significant construction
    activity continued and led to the successful full enclosure of all
    buildings in April 2022, setting the stage for equipment installation.
        National Ignition Facility (NIF): In August, the National Ignition
    Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory achieved a
    breakthrough with an experiment that yielded more than 1.3 megajoules
    of energy and resulted in a burning plasma state for the first time in
    any fusion research facility. Burning plasma research is needed for
    high fidelity modeling of nuclear weapons and is one of the milestones
    needed to achieve self-sustaining energy production.
        Secure Transportation: The Office of Secure Transportation
    accomplished 100 percent of its assigned missions safely and securely
    with no mission degradation despite operational challenges present from
    COVID-19.
        Infrastructure Innovation: NNSA purchased the LeMond Carbon
    Facility in Oak Ridge, TN to replace facilities at Y-12 built in the
    1940s used for process development. Use of NNSA's purchase authority
    for acquisitions allows us to accelerate delivery of modern facilities
    without the need for new construction.
        To support our climate goals, NNSA placed lease orders with the
    General Services Administration to replace gas-powered cars with
    approximately 50 zero-emissions vehicles, nearly doubling the size of
    electric-powered cars in NNSA's fleet.
        Nuclear Material Disposal and Reduction: NNSA converted an
    additional 91 kilograms of plutonium to an oxide form, for a cumulative
    total of 1,187 kilograms, in preparation for final disposition,
    continued downblending excess plutonium, and completed construction of
    a characterization and storage pad for the first shipment of
    downblended plutonium from the Savannah River Site to the Waste
    Isolation Pilot Plant. Additionally, the Secretaries of Energy and
    Health and Humans Services jointly certified that global supplies of
    molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) produced without the use of highly enriched
    uranium (HEU) can meet the needs of patients in the U.S. This critical
    milestone in nonproliferation efforts also triggered a congressionally
    mandated ban on exports of HEU for foreign medical isotope production.
        Global Material Security: NNSA conducted over 75 cyber engagements
    with international partners to enhance security of nuclear facilities
    and materials. Partnerships were also started with several domestic
    advanced reactor vendors for `security-by-design' activities to enhance
    the security of the systems for both domestic and international use.
    NNSA replaced 50 devices (39 domestically and 11 internationally) that
    use high-activity radioactive sources with non-radioisotopic
    alternative technologies and secured 48 buildings (28 domestically and
    20 internationally) with high priority radioactive sources. In
    addition, since the start of 2021, NNSA has signed new counter
    radioactive material smuggling arrangements with Estonia Ministry of
    Interior, Ukraine Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ukraine State Security
    Service, Mexico National Commission for Nuclear Security and
    Safeguards, Niger High Atomic Energy Authority, and Morocco
    Gendarmerie.
        Counterterrorism: NNSA's Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST)
    conducted dozens of operations, including preventative radiological/
    nuclear detection support to the Presidential Inauguration,
    Presidential Address to a Joint Session of Congress, New Year's Eve
    celebrations in Las Vegas and New York City, Super Bowl LV, the Fourth
    of July celebration on the National Mall, and the 76th Session of the
    United Nations General Assembly. Additionally, NNSA conducted 50
    virtual workshops with U.S. public information officers, law
    enforcement, first responders, and technical experts concerning
    radiological counterterrorism to build capacity and improve crisis and
    risk communication.
        Workforce Development: NNSA achieved its highest federal workforce
    level since 2013 with a total of 1,825 federal employees onboard. To
    help develop the next-generation workforce, NNSA awarded 13 Minority
    Serving Institution Partnership Program grants for a total of 24
    consortia grants to reach tens of thousands of students in STEM
    disciplines.
                     nnsa's fiscal year 2023 budget request
        The President's Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request for NNSA is $21.4
    billion, an increase of $1.0 billion, or 5.1 percent, over the fiscal
    year 2022 enacted level. \1\ This funding request reflects the expanded
    mission in NNSA and need for accelerated delivery of the modernization
    and infrastructure programs. The three NNSA missions--the nuclear
    deterrent, nuclear security and nonproliferation, and naval nuclear
    propulsion--have key deliverables in fiscal year 2023. In addition, the
    capabilities to position NNSA to be successful in the future must be
    nurtured. We are grateful for the sustained, bipartisan commitment by
    Congress and multiple administrations and ask for continued support.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Funding does not reflect the mandated transfer of $92.75
    million in fiscal year 2022 to the Office of Nuclear Energy for
    operation of the Advanced Test Reactor.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        weapons activities appropriation
        The fiscal year 2023 budget request for the Weapons Activities
    account is $16.5 billion, an increase of $566 million, or 3.7 percent
    over the fiscal year 2022 enacted levels. The request will be
    supplemented with prior year balances of $396 million. This budget
    request represents the Administration's continued strong commitment to
    a safe, secure, reliable, and effective nuclear deterrent backed by
    resilient, flexible infrastructure along with cutting edge science,
    cyber security, and physical protection.
        NNSA is fully aware that delivering the deterrent and capabilities
    our Nation needs to respond to the current environment requires a
    faster pace and a more complete modernization of weapons than over the
    last several decades. That is why we are re-establishing production
    capabilities lost in the 1990s and overhauling both our physical
    infrastructure and human capital to retain technical advantages and
    build resilience into our enterprise. NNSA is looking forward to
    overcoming obstacles and building on the successes of the previous
    year.
        The fiscal year 2023 request reflects the need to advance the
    weapons modernization programs and production capacity at an
    accelerated pace. The Weapons Activities account includes:
          Stockpile Management: Maintenance and modernization of
    nuclear weapons and production operations to sustain confidence in the
    safety, security, reliability, and military effectiveness of the
    stockpile without resuming nuclear explosive testing and associated
    activities.
          Production and Infrastructure Modernization: Investment
    in NNSA's infrastructure to rebuild capabilities lost in the 1990s and
    revitalize and expand the capacity of other elements to support
    stockpile modernization and science. These projects range from
    significant line-item construction for Plutonium and Uranium related
    activities to minor construction of offices and light labs to
    operational infrastructure such as electrical and networking utilities.
          Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering:
    Continued development of state-of-the-art scientific, engineering, and
    manufacturing capabilities to enable continuous improvement in design,
    certification, and production of the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile
    and to stay ahead of the threat.
          Transportation, Nuclear, and Cyber Security: Keeping pace
    with evolving threats and sustaining transportation, cyber and physical
    security across the nuclear security enterprise to improve resilience.
        NNSA restructured the Weapons Activities budget in fiscal year 2021
    to enable better alignment of portfolios with resources. This allowed
    improved prioritization within portfolios that have multiple programs
    and interdependencies. Further refinements are proposed in fiscal year
    2023 to align programmatic construction with the portfolio each project
    supports. Comparisons throughout the Weapons Activities portfolio
    assume this alignment in the fiscal year 2022 enacted levels as well.
    Stockpile Management
        The fiscal year 2023 Stockpile Management budget request is $4.9
    billion, an increase of $291 million, or 6.3 percent, over the fiscal
    year 2022 enacted level. This portfolio covers the maintenance of a
    safe, secure, reliable, and militarily effective nuclear weapons
    stockpile. Activities include life extension programs (LEP) and other
    weapons modernization activities; surveillance, minor alterations and
    limited life component exchanges; providing the safe dismantlement of
    nuclear weapons and components; and providing sustainment of needed
    manufacturing capabilities and capacities. The fiscal year 2023 request
    also includes funding for Nuclear Enterprise Assurance (NEA) to
    prevent, detect, and mitigate subversion risks to the nuclear weapons
    stockpile and associated design, production, and testing capabilities.
        W88 Alteration (Alt) 370: NNSA expects the W88 Alt 370 program to
    enter Phase 6.6, Full-Scale Production, in July 2022. Production is
    currently on schedule to meet Department of Defense (DOD) deployment
    schedules.
        B61-12 LEP: NNSA expects the B61-12 LEP to enter Phase 6.6, Full-
    Scale Production, in June 2022. The B61-12 LEP consolidates multiple
    variants of the B61 gravity bomb and improves the safety and security
    of the weapon. Production is currently on schedule to meet DOD
    deployment schedules.
        W80-4 LEP: NNSA is continuing Phase 6.3 activities, Development
    Engineering, and plans to enter Phase 6.4, Production Engineering, in
    fiscal year 2023. The W80-4 FPU date is currently being re-evaluated
    due to COVID-19 impacts, slower than planned hiring and increased
    attrition, and component technical challenges. The updated FPU schedule
    will be developed by mid-2022. NNSA's revised schedule is expected to
    support the U.S. Air Force's (USAF) schedule for Long Range Standoff
    missile initial operating capability.
        W87-1 Modification Program: The W87-1 will replace the aging W78
    warhead using a modification of the existing W87-0 design. The W87-1
    will deploy new technologies that improve safety and security, address
    obsolete designs and materials, and simplify warhead manufacturability.
    The fiscal year 2023 budget request supports NNSA's commitment for a
    planned FPU in fiscal year 2030 to meet DOD's scheduled deployment of
    the Sentinel missile. The request supports Phase 6.3, Development
    Engineering, activities including joint testing with USAF Sentinel
    missile and Mk21A reentry vehicle program and conducting the Conceptual
    Design Review. NNSA plans to enter Phase 6.3 in fiscal year 2022.
        W93/Mk7: In February 2022, the NWC voted to authorize the W93's
    entry into Phase 2, Feasibility Study and Design Options. NNSA's fiscal
    year 2023 funding request will support the Phase 2 activities including
    further examination of design concepts from Phase 1, and down-selection
    to desired weapon design(s) to be subsequently developed in Phase 2A,
    Design Definition and Cost Study, planned for fiscal year 2026. All the
    W93's key nuclear components will be based on currently deployed and
    previously tested nuclear designs, as well as extensive stockpile
    component and materials experience. It will not require additional
    nuclear explosive testing to certify. The W93 is vital for continuing
    our longstanding cooperation with the UK, which is modernizing its
    nuclear forces. The U.S.'s W93 program is a separate but parallel
    program critical to the UK's replacement warhead (RW) for its submarine
    launched ballistic missile. As an allied but independent nuclear power
    that contributes to NATO's nuclear deterrent posture, the UK's nuclear
    deterrent is critical to U.S. national security.
        Within Stockpile Management, the fiscal year 2023 budget request
    includes $1.3 billion for Stockpile Sustainment, an increase of $141
    million, or 11.9 percent above the fiscal year 2022 enacted level. This
    program is responsible for producing and replacing limited-life
    components such as neutron generators and gas transfer systems;
    conducting maintenance, surveillance, and evaluations to assess weapon
    reliability and detect any potential concerns; and analyzing
    information compiled during the annual assessment process.
        The request for Stockpile Management also includes $631 million for
    Production Operations, an increase of $62 million, or 10.9 percent,
    above the fiscal year 2022 enacted level. Included in this request is
    funding to support continued growth of base capabilities, both in
    staffing and equipment, required to support increased LEP workload as
    certain programs reach full-scale production rates.
    Production Modernization
        The fiscal year 2023 Production Modernization budget request is
    $4.64 billion, an increase of $484 million, or 11.6 percent, over the
    fiscal year 2022 enacted level. This funding focuses on production
    capabilities for nuclear weapons components including primaries, canned
    subassemblies, radiation cases and non-nuclear components needed to
    sustain the nuclear weapons stockpile near-to long-term.
        Primary Capability Modernization: NNSA's most intensive
    recapitalization effort is reconstitution of plutonium pit production
    fabrication capabilities. NNSA is required to produce no fewer than 80
    pits per year (ppy) during 2030. NNSA has outlined a two-site approach
    for producing 80 ppy utilizing Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to
    produce 30 ppy and the Savannah River Site (SRS) to produce 50 ppy. The
    two-site approach will provide the required capacity while enhancing
    resiliency and flexibility. At this time, the production of 30 ppy at
    LANL during 2026 remains on schedule with some technical challenges
    remaining. However, the production of 50 ppy at SRS during 2030 is not
    achievable. The Secretary of Energy and the Nuclear Weapons Council
    have both notified Congress regarding the inability to produce 80 ppy
    in 2030. However, NNSA remains committed to achieving 80 ppy as close
    to 2030 as possible. The fiscal year 2023 budget request funds pit
    production and associated efforts with a 26 percent increase compared
    to fiscal year 2022. NNSA continues to work with DOD to develop a plan
    to maintain the required stockpile until pit production capabilities
    are fully established.
        The fiscal year 2023 request for LANL Plutonium Modernization will
    support equipment installation, continue decontamination and demolition
    work, and mature project design for the LAP4. This includes adding
    equipment in Plutonium Facility 4 (PF-4) to support 30 ppy in 2026,
    construction of a training facility to support workforce development,
    and construction of a higher capacity entrance control facility.
        The fiscal year 2023 funds for SRPPF will be used to continue the
    CD-2 work to establish a 90 percent design. CD-2 is forecast for
    completion in early fiscal year 2024. Additionally, the request
    supports early site preparation including removal of unnecessary walls
    and building systems originally installed for the Mixed Oxide Fuel
    Fabrication Facility.
        Secondary Capability Modernization: NNSA is also modernizing its
    uranium, lithium, and tritium processing efforts necessary to fabricate
    nuclear weapon secondaries. NNSA's uranium strategy aims to relocate
    enriched uranium processing capabilities into the UPF and other
    enduring facilities to reduce mission dependency on Building 9212,
    which is over 75 years old. This will be accomplished by completing
    construction of UPF to provide new floor space for high hazard
    operations; extending the operational lifetime of buildings 9215, 9204-
    2E, and 9995 into the 2040s; introducing new processes to increase
    safety and efficiency in the new facilities; and supplying the current
    stockpile with purified enriched uranium metal.
        UPF will provide for the long-term viability, safety, and security
    of enriched uranium processing capability in the United States while
    significantly improving worker and public safety. The construction is
    well underway with a peak production workforce of 3,000 people in
    fiscal years 2022 and 2023. Ongoing supply chain issues and delays
    associated with the COVID-19 pandemic are projected to result in a
    delay of about 8 months beyond the scheduled completion date of
    December 2025. A comprehensive annual cost update is being conducted
    for the UPF project completion to better understand factors that could
    potentially affect total costs. Overall, UPF is 70 percent complete
    with the first three non-nuclear infrastructure subprojects completed
    under budget and on schedule.
        Additionally, in fiscal year 2021, NNSA initiated the Depleted
    Uranium (DU) Modernization Program to meet growing mission
    requirements. This effort will reconstitute lapsed DU alloying and
    component manufacturing capabilities at Y-12; invest in key new
    technologies to improve efficiency and reduce lifecycle costs; and
    increase the reliability and capacity. The DU Modernization Program
    request for fiscal year 2023 is $170 million.
        The U.S. no longer maintains a full lithium purification capability
    and relies on direct recycling as the main source of lithium for
    nuclear weapons systems. NNSA's Lithium Strategy will increase the
    supply of lithium by recycling components from dismantled systems,
    sustain and recapitalize existing infrastructure through a transition
    period, and design and construct a Lithium Processing Facility (LPF) to
    house processing capabilities by 2031. LPF will replace capabilities
    performed in Y-12's buildings 9204-2 and 9202 and will include
    recovery, purification, and component fabrication operations. While
    current capabilities can provide a sufficient lithium supply through
    2035, operations take place in an aging facility with significant
    infrastructure challenges. LPF will alleviate those issues and reduce
    risk while providing capacity to meet material demands beyond 2035.
        The fiscal year 2023 budget request for the Tritium and Domestic
    Uranium Enrichment is $580 million, an increase of $64 million, or 12.4
    percent above the fiscal year 2022 enacted level. For Domestic Uranium
    Enrichment the fiscal year 2023 budget request supports HEU down-
    blending to extend the need date for LEU for tritium production to
    2044, enrichment technology development, and acquisition activities to
    meet future enriched uranium needs. HEU downblending began in fiscal
    year 2019 and will continue through fiscal year 2025. NNSA is currently
    conducting an analysis of alternatives, which is expected to conclude
    in the mid-2020s that will inform a final down-select of an enrichment
    options. Other NNSA programs such as reactor fuel and naval propulsion
    fuel are also supported by this effort.
        The Tritium Modernization Program's mission is to establish and
    operate a domestic source of tritium to meet national security
    requirements, which includes recycling tritium gas to maintain required
    inventories and sustaining reliable supply chain infrastructure and
    equipment. Since 2003, NNSA's tritium production has met all
    production, delivery, and schedule requirements. Because NNSA is
    currently ramping up production levels at the Tennessee Valley
    Authority to meet future delivery requirements, the requested budget
    has been increased. NNSA is also in the early phases of constructing
    the Tritium Finishing Facility (TFF), which will replace a 1950s-era
    facility. TFF will house the finishing, packing, and shipping of gas
    reservoirs to meet mission requirements. This major infrastructure
    modernization initiative will fulfill a critical mission need and
    enable the program to meet contemporary safety standards. The facility
    will house functions to receive, inspect, finish, package, and ship
    reservoirs. Construction of the site preparation subproject is
    scheduled to start in fiscal year 2024.
        Non-Nuclear Component Modernization: Non-nuclear components (NNCs)
    include a wide array of parts that weaponize the nuclear explosive
    package. Examples are gas transfer systems, neutron generators,
    microelectronics, and power sources. Non-nuclear components make up
    more than half the cost of weapon modernization due to the number,
    complexity, and their qualification in extreme environments over the
    warhead lifecycle. Therefore, delivering non-nuclear components
    requires an extensive foundation of capabilities for the design,
    development, qualification, production, and surveillance of these
    components. The fiscal year 2023 request includes funding to provide
    equipment for increased manufacturing capacity at the Kansas City
    National Security Campus; reconstitute thermal spray capability for
    weapon modernization; recapitalize radiation and major environmental
    test facilities at Sandia National Laboratories used to design and
    qualify NNCs; and tools and equipment at the Microsystems Engineering,
    Science and Applications (MESA) Complex at Sandia, which serves as the
    only approved source of trusted, strategically radiation hardened
    microelectronics.
    Infrastructure and Operations
        NNSA has been taking significant steps to modernize and
    recapitalize its infrastructure to meet expanding demands, reduce
    mission and safety risk, and draw down its deferred maintenance
    backlog. A well-organized, well-maintained, and modern infrastructure
    system is the bedrock of a flexible and resilient nuclear enterprise.
    Almost 60 percent of NNSA facilities were beyond their 40-year life
    expectancy at the end of fiscal year 2021 with some dating back to the
    Manhattan Project. Our modernization and recapitalization efforts will
    provide for the safety of our workforce, the communities around our
    facilities, and our environment. NNSA can address this challenge only
    with sustained, predictable, and timely funding.
        The fiscal year 2023 budget request for Infrastructure and
    Operations is $2.63 billion, an increase of $144 million or 5.8 percent
    over the fiscal year 2022 enacted amount. This increase will enable
    NNSA to build on the Infrastructure Modernization Initiative, including
    adopting new practices that will streamline construction practices to
    save time and money on low-risk, non-nuclear, construction projects.
        Deferred maintenance has been a key focus of both NNSA and
    Congress. At the end of fiscal year 2021, NNSA had $6.1 billion of
    deferred maintenance and an enterprise-wide replacement plant value of
    $121.5 billion. While this ratio may seem high, construction of new
    facilities and associated demolition of legacy facilities will have a
    substantial role in reducing NNSA infrastructure challenges.
    Approximately 90 percent of NNSA deferred maintenance is associated
    with facilities that are approaching or have surpassed their intended
    design life. NNSA is integrating its infrastructure modernization work
    with the Department's Office of Environmental Management supported
    effort to demolish high-risk excess facilities at the Y-12 National
    Security Complex, Lawrence Livermore National Lab and Los Alamos
    National Lab. NNSA is using this intentional approach to prioritize
    investments based on mission risk while underscoring the need for
    sustained commitment to move beyond legacy infrastructure. The fiscal
    year 2023 budget request includes increases in Mission Enabling
    Construction accounts so that NNSA can address mission needs, achieve
    operational efficiencies, and reduce risks to safety, security, the
    environment, and program.
        For years, NNSA has used a prioritization methodology for
    recapitalization investments that factors in sustainability and
    resilience along with safety and mission risk. In fiscal year 2023,
    NNSA is increasing its emphasis on climate resiliency projects through
    the Energy Resilient Infrastructure and Climate Adaptation (ERICA)
    initiative. ERICA is part of NNSA's multifaceted approach to address
    climate adaptation and resilience using directand indirect-funded
    infrastructure programs and alternative financing. For example, the
    planned Building 848 Net Zero Energy Upgrade project at Sandia will
    move the facility to being 100 percent powered by on-site generated
    electricity while also improving its operations, indoor air quality,
    and thermal comfort.
        NNSA uses data-driven, risk informed tools and initiatives to
    improve decision making, accelerate the delivery, and reduce the cost
    of commercial-like construction projects. For example, in fiscal year
    2019 NNSA established the Enhanced Minor Construction & Commercial
    Standards (EMC2) pilot, which is challenging the paradigm for how NNSA
    executes low-risk, non-complex construction projects to accelerate
    delivery and reduce costs. There are 10 projects in the pilot,
    including the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's Emergency
    Operations Center (EOC) which is the first pilot project to be
    completed earlier this year. Using the EMC2 approach, the Livermore EOC
    was completed 13 months after receiving full construction funding in
    January 2021. In the first four pilot projects currently underway,
    estimated cost savings range from approximately 12 to 31 percent. An
    additional six EMC2 projects are projected to result in estimated cost
    savings of 17 to 38 percent.
    Stockpile Research, Technology and Engineering
        For Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering, the fiscal
    year 2023 budget request is $2.89 billion, a decrease of $83 million,
    or 2.8 percent below the fiscal year 2022 enacted level. The decrease
    results from the use of carryover balances to continue construction of
    the U1a Complex Enhancement Project at the Nevada National Security
    Site (NNSS). After adjusting for this reduction, the Stockpile
    Research, Technology, and Engineering request is stable from fiscal
    year 2022 enacted.
        This portfolio provides the scientific foundation for science-based
    stockpile activities, including the capabilities, tools, and components
    needed to assess the active stockpile and to certify warhead
    modernization programs without the need for underground nuclear
    testing. NNSA's unparalleled science and technical capabilities, and
    commitment to their constant improvement, helps cultivate the knowledge
    and expertise to maintain confidence in the stockpile. The major
    activities in the Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering
    portfolio are:
        Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments (ECSE): ECSE will
    produce experimental data in underground tunnels at the NNSS that will
    enable high fidelity assessment of the current stockpile and
    certification of the future stockpile without the need to return to
    underground nuclear-explosive testing. ECSE experiments are designed to
    remain subcritical throughout the experiment to adhere to the U.S.
    policy of ``zero yield.''
        Stockpile Responsiveness Program (SRP): SRP is responsible for
    exercising and enhancing capabilities across the entire nuclear weapons
    development and production process to improve the responsiveness of the
    United States to future threats, technology trends, and international
    developments not addressed by existing life extension programs. For
    example, SRP is investing in efforts to address issues in design for
    manufacturability, digital engineering, component, and system
    prototyping and testing.
        Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) Program: The ICF Program supports
    the assessment and certification of the nuclear weapon stockpile by
    providing the facilities, scientific expertise, and experimental
    capability necessary to acquire data at the extreme conditions of
    nuclear weapon operation. The ICF program also supports research on
    thermonuclear fusion with the goal of reaching fusion ignition and
    eventually high fusion yield in the laboratory. The fiscal year 2023
    request supports ICF research and facilities, enabling access to
    experimental data that underpin the safety, security, and effectiveness
    of the nuclear stockpile and continued progress toward the capabilities
    necessary to meet long-term stewardship needs.
        NNSA Exascale Computing Initiative: The Exascale Computing
    Initiative (ECI) will provide NNSA with next-generation simulation
    capabilities to support weapons design, science-based stockpile
    stewardship, and stockpile certification activities. The fiscal year
    2023 budget request will continue funding maturation of next-generation
    simulation and computing technologies and enables NNSA to meet its
    exascale system initial operation capability in fiscal year 2023,
    including transition of the next-generation, validated weapons codes to
    next-generation classified computing.
        Academic Programs: The challenges of sustaining the nuclear
    deterrent long-term demand a strong and diverse base of national
    expertise and educational opportunities in specialized technical areas
    that uniquely contribute to stockpile stewardship. NNSA's Academic
    Programs are designed to cultivate, attract, and retain such a
    workforce. Funding in this area supports the Administration's Executive
    Order on Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved
    Communities through the Federal Government, Academic Alliances and
    existing partnerships with Minority Serving Institutions, and an
    increase in student engagement and internship opportunities.
    Secure Transportation Asset
        Secure Transportation Asset (STA) supports the safe, secure
    transport of the Nation's nuclear weapons, weapon components, and
    special nuclear material throughout the nuclear security enterprise to
    meet nuclear security requirements. Nuclear weapon life extension
    programs, limited-life component exchanges, surveillance,
    dismantlement, nonproliferation activities, and experimental programs
    rely on STA to ensure safe, secure, and on-schedule transport. The
    fiscal year 2023 budget request for STA is $344 million, an increase of
    $13.7 million, or 4.1 percent, above the fiscal year 2022 enacted
    amount to increase the Federal Agent workforce to a level necessary to
    keep pace with the growing program deliverables.
        The Office of Secure Transportation's (OST) priorities for fiscal
    year 2023 include modernization and sustainment of transportation
    assets. This includes the Safeguards Transporter (SGT) life extension
    program to secure its service until replacement by the Mobile Guardian
    Transporter (MGT), as well as the entry into service of procured 737-
    700 aircraft. The first MGT Production Unit is planned for completion
    in fiscal year 2026 and initial rate production is set to commence in
    fiscal year 2027. Currently, aircraft are undergoing heavy maintenance
    checks, painting to NNSA standards, and a major modification from a
    passenger jet to a FlexCombi that is configurable to carry various
    loads of personnel and cargo.
        OST also remains focused on recruiting, stabilizing, training, and
    retaining the Federal Agent and staff workforce necessary to support
    mission requirements. OST has committed to a stable human resources
    strategy to achieve an optimal agent force. OST has increased staffing
    numbers by optimizing position qualifications and managing risk
    associated with the Human Reliability Program. Although COVID-19
    impacted key milestones and deliverables, OST successfully accomplished
    every assigned mission for the previous year.
    Defense Nuclear Security
        Defense Nuclear Security's fiscal year 2023 budget request is
    $882.3 million, an increase of $38.2 million, or 4.5 percent over the
    fiscal year 2022 enacted level. The Office of Defense Nuclear
    Security's (DNS) primary mission is protecting the facilities, people,
    and assets critical to achieving NNSA's important national security
    missions. The need for increasing security due to growth across
    enterprise from projects such as LAP4 and UPF, along with additional
    resources required to sustain core security, has resulted in increased
    program requirements for DNS. Support for the request is vital for the
    protection of the enterprise, its people, and its sensitive material
    and information. DNS remains focused on improving physical security
    infrastructure with several new projects and the development and
    deployment of new systems. Progress is also being made in countering
    unmanned aircraft systems. The first such platform was deployed at LANL
    in December 2017. Deployment at other facilities is expected to be
    completed in late fiscal year 2022.
    Cybersecurity and Emerging Issues
        The fiscal year 2023 budget request for information technology and
    cybersecurity is $445.7 million, $39.1 million, or 9.6 percent, over
    the fiscal year 2022 enacted amount. This request funds ongoing
    operations and invests in improvements across NNSA to modernize both
    classified and unclassified systems, improves information management
    and data governance, implements critical aspects of a zero-trust
    architecture in our networks and systems, and allows for the execution
    of a robust cybersecurity program. As an example, NNSA recently
    recapitalized its deployed cyber sensor platform, significantly
    improving the ability to detect and respond to malicious activity.
        Maintaining a strong cybersecurity program is a critical defense
    mechanism and a powerful deterrence tool. To strengthen oversight of
    the cyber program, the budget request includes a recategorization of
    certain Cybersecurity program investments into the Information
    Technology program. As a result, the request more clearly reflects
    investments in cybersecurity tools and services provided to the
    enterprise, maintains core cyber operations at the labs, plants, and
    sites, and improves management and transparency of these funds.
        NNSA also recently completed an enterprise-wide cybersecurity
    assessment, in conjunction with the Institute for Defense Analyses,
    aimed at evaluating the overall cybersecurity posture and developing a
    set of recommendations to improve the program. That review calls for
    increased investment in information technology and cyber infrastructure
    to better meet current and emerging challenges, as well as outlines
    strategies related to workforce development issues. NNSA has already
    started acting on the findings and will continue to do so with the
    fiscal year 2023 requested budget.
                 defense nuclear nonproliferation appropriation
        The fiscal year 2023 budget request for the Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation account is $2.3 billion, an increase of $274 million,
    or 13.2 percent, over the fiscal year 2022 enacted level. When the use
    of prior year balances is considered, the proposed funding level for
    the account increases by $397 million, or 19.2 percent. The use of
    prior year balances will allow DNN programs to supplement new budget
    authority across its programs.
        This account funds all activities in the offices of Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation, Emergency Operations, and Counterterrorism and
    Counterproliferation. Within these offices, this appropriation funds
    six nonproliferation programs, a counterterrorism and
    counterproliferation program, and an incident response program as part
    of a whole-of-government approach. Together these efforts provide
    policy and technical leadership to prevent or limit the spread of
    weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the related materials,
    technology, and expertise as well as to detect and respond to nuclear
    terrorism or proliferation events.
    Nonproliferation Efforts
        For decades, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) has developed
    and implemented policy and technical solutions to eliminate
    proliferation sensitive material and limit or prevent the spread of
    materials, technology, and expertise necessary for nuclear and
    radiological weapons. By working with governments, international
    organizations, and private sector partners around the world these
    efforts reduce the reliance on radioactive material in commercial and
    research industries; better secure nuclear and radioactive material;
    develop capabilities to interdict material outside of regulatory
    control; and maintain a robust response capability for nuclear and
    radiological incidents at home and abroad.
        The fiscal year 2023 budget request will allow the Office of
    Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation to better confront current and
    anticipated proliferation challenges including the growing nuclear
    programs and strategic competition with Russia and China, the impacts
    of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, risks related to the North
    Korean and Iranian nuclear programs, and disruptive technologies that
    lower the barrier to proliferation. Through these efforts DNN aims to
    restore American leadership in nonproliferation solutions and cutting-
    edge technology required to address future threats.
        The Material Management and Minimization (M3) program fiscal year
    2023 budget request is $451 million, an increase of $108 million, or
    31.5 percent, over the fiscal year 2022 enacted level. M3 programs
    reduce and, when possible, eliminate weapons-usable nuclear material
    around the world. The fiscal year 2023 budget request supports the
    conversion or shutdown of research reactors and isotope production
    facilities that use HEU, the use of non-HEU-based Mo-99 production, the
    removal and disposal of weapons-usable nuclear material, and the
    removal of plutonium from the state of South Carolina. Additionally, to
    date, nearly 7,270 kilograms of weapons-usable nuclear material from 48
    countries and Taiwan have been removed or confirmed disposed, while 108
    civilian research reactors and isotope production facilities have
    stopped using weapons-grade material in their work.
        The Global Material Security program fiscal year 2023 budget
    request is $504 million, a decrease of $27.4 million, or 5.1 percent,
    below the fiscal year 2022 enacted level. The fiscal year 2023 request
    supports program efforts to prevent terrorists and other actors from
    obtaining nuclear and radioactive material for use in an improvised
    nuclear device by working with domestic and global partners. This
    includes improving the security of vulnerable materials and sites,
    promoting the adoption of alternative technologies that do not rely on
    radioactive sources, and increasing capacity to detect, disrupt and
    interdict illicit trafficking operations. Working through the RadSecure
    100 Initiative, NNSA will accelerate and expand permanent risk
    reduction, security enhancements, and response integration with local
    law enforcement in the top 100 major metropolitan areas of the United
    States. To date, NNSA has replaced approximately 130 cesium-137 based
    blood irradiators with alternative technologies. The program remains on
    track to replace nearly all the estimated 400 such devices in the
    United States by 2027 as mandated in the fiscal year 2019 NDAA. In
    addition, NNSA is partnering with domestic advanced nuclear reactor
    vendors in `security-by-design' activities to enhance the security of
    their systems for domestic and international use. Finally, NNSA
    continues to build additional partnerships with bilateral and
    multilateral partners focused on counter nuclear smuggling. To date,
    NNSA partners with 84 countries in this area and continues to expand
    cooperation with existing and new partners to expand global counter
    nuclear smuggling capabilities.
        The Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) program fiscal year
    2023 budget request is $208 million, an increase of $23 million, or
    12.4 percent, above the fiscal year 2022 enacted level. The increased
    funding request supports two increasingly important activities: (1)
    policy and technology development activities for peaceful uses of
    nuclear energy along with support for the International Atomic Energy
    Agency (IAEA), and (2) policy and technology development for potential
    arms control agreements that extend to new types of strategic weapons
    as well as tactical nuclear weapons.
        By focusing on ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear energy, NPAC
    programs strengthen nonproliferation regimes through the development
    and implementation of effective technologies and policies. This is
    especially important as nuclear energy programs expand internationally
    in response to clean energy implementation to address climate change.
    New nuclear safeguards and monitoring and verification technologies are
    needed to secure materials and to detect proliferation activities
    early. NPAC works to mature technologies and transfer them to the
    International Atomic Energy Agency and partner countries to implement.
    The U.S. also supplies IAEA with U.S. subject matter experts, training,
    and equipment advice and procurement aid. In fiscal year 2022 and
    fiscal year 2023 NPAC is helping establish the nonproliferation
    enrichment testing and training platform. This platform will be turned
    over to the IAEA for commissioning and operation in fiscal year 2024.
    On the policy side, NPAC supports the development and implementation of
    Section 123 agreements and the careful regulation of nuclear technology
    exports utilizing Part 810 Authorizations.
        Approximately $30 million funds increasing nuclear weapons
    verification activities. This will improve U.S. technical policy and
    readiness for future arms control agreements and associated
    verification technology. New investment in the Arms Control Advancement
    Initiative will strengthen NNSA's capacity to address future nuclear
    warhead monitoring and verification requirements through advanced
    technology development, robust modeling and measurements, and sustained
    expert engagement to maintain a pipeline of experts to helps advance
    arms control objectives over time.
        The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN
    R&D) program fiscal year 2023 budget request is $720 million, a
    decrease of $9 million, or 1.2 percent, below the fiscal year 2022
    enacted level. DNN R&D is the key component for the innovation of
    United States' technical capabilities to detect nuclear detonations;
    foreign nuclear weapons programs' activities; and the presence,
    movement, or diversion of special nuclear materials. The program also
    sustains and develops foundational nonproliferation technical
    competencies that ensure the technical agility needed to support a
    broad spectrum of U.S. nonproliferation missions and anticipate
    threats. Consistent with the growing nonproliferation challenges, this
    funding request for DNN R&D programs will expand activities that
    advance the development of next-generation nuclear arms control
    monitoring and verification technology and expertise symbiotic with the
    NPAC efforts.
        The Nonproliferation Construction program fiscal year 2023 budget
    request is $72 million, a decrease of $84 million, or 54 percent, below
    the fiscal year 2022 enacted level. This decrease is due to the
    awarding of the long-lead procurement contracts for gloveboxes,
    emergency generators and HEPA filters under CD-3A Phase 2 in fiscal
    year 2022 and the expected fiscal year 2023 completion of design work
    for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) project required for CD-2/
    3, Approval of Performance Baseline and Start of Construction. The
    fiscal year 2023 budget request supports the implementation of the
    dilute and dispose strategy, by continuing design for the SPD project.
    The SPD project will add additional glovebox capacity at the SRS to
    accelerate plutonium dilution and aid in the removal of plutonium from
    South Carolina.
        NNSA is requesting the establishment of a Bioassurance Program in
    fiscal year 2023. The budget request is $20 million. As the COVID-19
    pandemic has shown, the United States needs better capabilities to
    anticipate, respond to, and mitigate threats to the bioeconomy. NNSA
    proposes to establish a national security bioassurance program to
    perform activities to anticipate and detect threats and scale response
    solutions to support the security of the future bioeconomy and monitor
    and thwart malpractice in this area. This funding supports foundational
    work at DOE/NNSA laboratories including the anticipation of
    destabilizing threats through modeling, identifying threat signatures
    and developing detection technologies, and rapidly developing and
    validating safeguards and threat mitigation approaches. NNSA will
    integrate its high-security work with the Department's Office of
    Science supported ``open'' science work and other government agencies,
    providing the full spectrum of capabilities essential for a
    bioassurance program informed by national security expertise drawn from
    parallel and analogous work on nuclear threats, risks, export controls
    and licensing, nonproliferation, detection, and verification.
    Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response
        The fiscal year 2023 request for the Nuclear Counterterrorism and
    Incident Response (NCTIR) program is $439 million, an increase of $68
    million, or 18.4 percent, over the fiscal year 2022 enacted amount. The
    NCTIR program supports two subprograms: Counterterrorism and
    Counterproliferation (CTCP) and Emergency Operations (EO).
        CTCP is responsible for countering nuclear terrorism and nuclear
    proliferation, responding to nuclear incidents and accidents worldwide,
    advancing nuclear forensic capabilities, and building domestic and
    international partner capacity concerning emergency preparedness and
    response. CTCP's unique scientific and operational capabilities make it
    an integral part of the U.S. Government's layered defense against
    nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation.
        CTCP manages the NEST, NNSA's multi-mission emergency response
    capability comprised of on-call technical specialists who are trained
    and equipped to respond to nuclear incidents and accidents worldwide.
    NEST's missions include both national security and public health and
    safety disciplines.
        NNSA, in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
    (FBI), supports regional counter-WMD teams in 14 major U.S. cities as
    part of the ``Capability Forward'' initiative. CTCP provides
    technology, equipment, and training in support of these teams to
    enhance regional capabilities to defeat nuclear and radiological
    devices, accelerating life-saving responses to a WMD event.
        The fiscal year 2023 budget request addresses critical shortfalls
    in CTCP's capabilities to execute DOE's Primary Mission Essential
    Function (PMEF)-2, Respond to Nuclear Incidents. In coordination with
    interagency efforts to identify and address WMD response gaps,
    increased funding addresses staffing needs, ensures operational
    integration and full-spectrum training and exercises in accordance with
    interagency objectives, and supports technology development and
    infrastructure requirements.
        Additional programmatic funding will also invest in new incident
    response expertise and technology; continue NEST equipment
    recapitalization efforts with planned procurement for replacement of
    diagnostic equipment and detection systems required for the public
    health and safety, counter-WMD, and nuclear weapon accident response
    mission areas; and bolster CTCP efforts to counter nuclear
    proliferation through applied analysis, concept development, predictive
    modeling, and testing.
        CTCP also contributes to the interagency National Technical Nuclear
    Forensics mission, a central pillar of the U.S. strategy to deter
    hostile states from providing nuclear material to terrorists. CTCP's
    fiscal year 2023 budget request includes $43 million for this effort,
    including training and exercises for responders; procurement,
    maintenance, logistics, and technical integration of equipment;
    readiness to deploy pre- and post-detonation response and device
    assessment teams; and laboratory analysis of nuclear or radiological
    material.
        EO provides both the structure and processes to ensure a
    comprehensive and integrated approach to all-hazards emergency
    management, thus improving readiness and effectiveness of the DOE
    Emergency Management System on a programmatic and performance level
    regardless of the nature of the emergency impacting the DOE/NNSA
    enterprise or its equities anywhere in the world. The fiscal year 2023
    budget request supports Continuity of Operations, Continuity of
    Government, and Enduring Constitutional Government programs to advance
    the National Continuity Policy and ensure the continued performance and
    delivery of essential services under any circumstances. The fiscal year
    2023 budget request also provides for 24/7/365 Consolidated Emergency
    Operations Center communications and coordination support to the DOE/
    NNSA Emergency Management Enterprise and Departmental Senior
    Leadership. The request also includes funding for investments in
    communications equipment and classified communications system
    improvements to support emergency operations and continuity
    infrastructure improvements.
                          naval reactors appropriation
    Advancing Naval Nuclear Propulsion
        With over 40 percent of the Navy's major combatants being nuclear-
    powered, this technology remains critical to our national security
    posture. It provides the nation's submarines and aircraft carriers with
    unmatched mobility, flexibility, responsiveness, and endurance. The
    ability to maintain robust fleet capabilities on long-term missions is
    essential for the security of global trade and the security of our
    allies. The Office of Naval Reactors is the foundation of this national
    achievement in global security. Cutting edge advancements across all
    aspects of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, from reactor plant
    development and design to the disposition of spent fuel, gives the U.S.
    Navy a decisive edge in naval warfare and enhances the security and
    reliability of the sea-leg of our nuclear triad.
        The fiscal year 2023 budget request for Naval Reactors is $2.08
    billion, an increase of $163 million, or 8.5 percent, above the fiscal
    year 2022 enacted level. \2\ The budget request supports the continued
    safe and reliable operation of the nuclear-powered fleet, and it
    supports investment in technology development to deliver improvements
    in propulsion plant performance, manufacturability, and affordability--
    for current and future warships. Funding also supports requirements for
    the office's three major projects: Columbia-class ballistic missile
    submarine reactor systems development; construction of the Naval Spent
    Fuel Handling Facility in Idaho; and the refueling and overhaul of the
    S8G Prototype land-based reactor in New York for continued sailor
    training and technology testing.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Funding does not reflect the mandated transfer of $92.75
    million in fiscal year 2022 to the Office of Nuclear Energy for
    operation of the Advanced Test Reactor
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Consistent, sustained funding is vital for the support of these
    projects and will allow Naval Reactors to meet current and future force
    needs. Close coordination with the Navy led to the start of
    construction of the Columbia-class lead ship in fiscal year 2021. The
    S8G Refueling Overhaul is expected to reach completion in fiscal year
    2023. The Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization project at the Naval
    Reactors Facility in Idaho is making significant progress with an
    estimated completion in fiscal year 2026.
    AUKUS
        On September 15, 2021, Australia, the UK, and the U.S. announced
    the creation of an enhanced trilateral security partnership (AUKUS),
    focused on peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region. The three
    governments are currently six months into an 18-month consultation
    period to establish the most efficient path forward for the delivery of
    a nuclear-powered, conventional, submarine capability to Australia as
    expeditiously as possible. As part of the international working group
    developing nonproliferation and safeguards aspects of the AUKUS
    program, NNSA will provide technical advice to the interagency and our
    AUKUS partners on the full suite of requirements that underpin nuclear
    stewardship to implement strong safeguards measures and achieve the
    AUKUS objectives.
        This cooperation is fully consistent with our obligations under the
    Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT does not prohibit naval
    nuclear propulsion. In our role in this trilateral partnership, we
    intend to implement the strongest possible nonproliferation standards
    to maintain the strength and integrity of the nuclear nonproliferation
    regime. Australia is not seeking, and the U.S. and UK are not and will
    not assist in any acquisition of nuclear weapons. Additionally,
    Australia has committed not to enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel
    in the context of AUKUS.
                  federal salaries and expenses appropriation
        The fiscal year 2023 budget request for Federal Salaries and
    Expenses (FSE) is $496 million, an increase of $32 million, or 7
    percent, above the fiscal year 2022 enacted level. The increase in this
    account will support an additional 132 Federal Full-time Equivalents
    (FTE) above the fiscal year 2022 enacted level, bringing the total to
    1,958. FSE increases will also support increased space and occupancy
    needs, travel costs, support service contractors, training, and other
    related expenses.
        The NNSA Federal workforce is critical to the success of the
    Nation's nuclear security enterprise. NNSA's expanding mission
    requirements and pressing modernization and recapitalization needs
    require recruiting, training, and retaining a skilled Federal workforce
    with the appropriate capabilities to meet mission requirements and
    deliver on our objectives. This workforce represents some of the top
    minds on nuclear issues, consisting of a diverse team of scientists,
    engineers, project and program managers, foreign affairs specialists,
    and support staff that perform program and project management and
    conduct appropriate oversight of national security missions. NNSA's
    Federal workforce is distributed across the enterprise and can be found
    in eight states and Washington, DC.
        NNSA currently faces two significant hurdles in achieving full
    staffing: retirement and private sector competition. As of fiscal year
    2021 17.3 percent of NNSA FTE Federal staff are eligible to retire, a
    number that is expected to rise to 35.4 percent by fiscal year 2027.
    Additionally, in fiscal year 2021 the annual FSE attrition rate was
    10.7 percent, higher than the average attrition rate of 8.9 percent
    over the past 13 years. NNSA also faces competition from the private
    sector for top talent in technical fields.
        Combating these trends requires an aggressive, external hiring
    strategy. NNSA has utilized a renewed focus on virtual recruitment
    events that support hiring across the nuclear security enterprise in
    support of all program areas. In October 2021, NNSA initiated a pilot
    program for expedited hiring within 15 business days, from the time the
    program office selected a candidate to the time Human Resources
    provided an entry on duty date. NNSA is applying lessons learned from
    this pilot program to continue progress on a streamlined hiring effort.
    Finally, NNSA has expanded the effort to enlarge fellowship program
    candidate pools and employ available alternative hiring authorities to
    compress the hiring timeline for qualified candidates and increase the
    overall hiring rate.
        NNSA's recruitment and hiring efforts will support mission and
    growth requirements and will continue to support the Administration's
    goals of promoting racial and economic equity as a way to foster
    scientific breakthroughs, research and development excellence, and
    enhanced national security.
                                   conclusion
        NNSA's enduring responsibility is providing the United States with
    a nuclear weapons stockpile and naval nuclear propulsion systems that
    are the best in the world while simultaneously promoting
    nonproliferation and counterterrorism efforts to reduce overall nuclear
    risk. The President's fiscal year 2023 budget, informed by the 2022
    Nuclear Posture Review, supports our efforts to keep the nuclear
    deterrent and naval nuclear propulsion systems safe, secure, reliable,
    and militarily effective. Recognizing the increasingly volatile
    geopolitical environment, NNSA must also stay resolute in sustaining
    and evolving our nuclear security, non-proliferation, and
    counterterrorism efforts to help offset and stay ahead of nuclear
    risks.
        NNSA has a unique responsibility to provide an effective nuclear
    deterrent in a timely manner to protect our Nation and our allies. The
    fiscal year 2023 budget request funds the five life extension and
    modernization programs that support all three legs of the triad. In
    fiscal year 2023 the requested budget also supports significant
    investments in new production facilities for uranium processing and
    plutonium pit manufacturing at the fastest responsible pace. The budget
    request contains close to equal funding for stockpile management and
    production modernization, a true indication of the intent to accelerate
    activities by working on weapon design and production in parallel with
    infrastructure revitalization. The science and engineering support for
    the weapons program stays strong to allow for the continued development
    of capabilities to design and certify the stockpile without testing and
    to stay ahead of threats.
        The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation budget request sustains our
    efforts to reduce nuclear risk by eliminating, minimizing, and securing
    nuclear and radiological materials. In addition, the DNN portfolio
    request recognizes the changing world by increasing support for policy
    and technology development aimed at the increased proliferation risks
    associated with the increase in nuclear energy around the world,
    preparing for an increasingly complex arms control and global stability
    environment, and by initiating a bioassurance program. Similarly, the
    increased budget request for the counterterrorism and
    counterproliferation program is responsive to the changing threat
    environment.
        The Naval Reactors budget request recognizes the excellent
    stewardship provided over the years and continues to support the high
    priority needs to replace aging tools, build a new spent fuel handling
    facility, and support the Columbia-class production schedule.
        The challenges NNSA faces ahead are steep and we are mindful of the
    resources entrusted to it. For fiscal year 2023, NNSA scrubbed prior
    year balances and used available funds to offset some of the increased
    budget needs. NNSA, in partnership with Congress and our colleagues in
    the Departments of Energy and Defense, is steadfast in our commitment
    to fulfill vital national security mission and deliver our goals. We
    greatly appreciate your support.

        Senator King. Thank you, Dr. Adams.
        Admiral Wolfe, please.

    STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JOHNNY R. WOLFE, JR., USN, DIRECTOR,
                    NAVY STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS

        Admiral Wolfe. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer,
    Distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify on the Department of the Navy's fiscal
    year 2023 budget priorities for nuclear forces. I respectfully
    request that my written statement be accepted for the record.
        Senator King. Without objection.
        Admiral Wolfe. For over 6 decades, the Navy has provided
    unwavering support to the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad.
    Since I briefed this Committee last year, I would like to share
    with you some of SSP's accomplishments that build on this
    remarkable history.
        In an effort to deliver a reliable and credible strategic
    weapon system to the fleet we have successfully completed a
    demonstration and shakedown operation onboard the USS Wyoming,
    certifying this Ohio-class submarine to return to alert patrol
    after a midlife refueling overhaul, demonstrating to the world
    the continued performance and reliability of this platform and
    the Trident II D5LE strategic weapon system.
        In coordination with our partners at NNSA, the W93/Mk7
    program continues, and the W88/Mk5 ALT370 program has achieved
    initial operating capability, further demonstrating our
    commitment to responsible stewardship of our nuclear stockpile.
    Although not nuclear but of particular interest to this
    Committee, I am incredibly proud of the milestones our
    hypersonics team, responsible for the Conventional Prompt
    Strike Program has achieved. These milestones include
    successful experiments to demonstrate the maturity of the
    common hypersonic glide-body technology; three static fire
    tests of the Navy-developed 34\1/2\-inch missile booster; and a
    successful sounding rocket campaign, demonstrating that our
    advanced communications capability is sufficiently mature to
    field our navy platforms.
        The Navy continues to manage the Nuclear Strategic Weapons
    System across three main mission priorities: sustaining the
    current weapon system through Ohio end of life, developing the
    strategic weapon systems of the future for sea-based strategic
    deterrence on Columbia through 2084, and safeguarding our
    special relationship with the United Kingdom embodied in the
    Polaris Sales Agreement.
        First and foremost, we must maintain the current D5LE
    missile inventory and provide the necessary operational support
    to sustain Ohio-class submarines and today's strategic weapon
    system through its end of life in the early 2040s. This is
    being accomplished through an update to all of our sub systems.
    All of our life extension efforts remain on track, and our
    current program will support the deployment of all existing
    warheads. We must recapitalize all of our supporting Navy
    nuclear deterrence mission infrastructure to support and
    sustain nuclear weapons and SSBN operations.
        Secondly, we must continue to ensure the transition between
    Ohio-class and Columbia-class submarine stays on schedule. For
    SSP, this requires a seamless transition of the current D5LE
    weapon system and missile inventory onto the new Columbia-
    class.
        We have already started the work on the next variant of
    Trident and its corresponding weapon system, D5LE2. D5LE2 will
    yield multiple benefits in missile performance while providing
    flexibility in the system to meet future warfighter
    requirements. To achieve these requirements, we must design,
    develop, produce, and test this next-generation Trident over
    the coming decade, with the first flight test in 2033.
        Finally, one of the greatest advantages the United States
    has is its alliances and partnerships. As the U.S. Project
    Officer for the Polaris Sales Agreement, we will continue to
    support the UK's sovereign deterrent for today's Vanguard-class
    submarines and their successor, the Dreadnought-class. For
    decades U.S. policy has recognized that the independent British
    nuclear deterrent adds to NATO, and indeed global, stability.
        Nuclear modernization will take time to complete, so
    sustained resourcing and enterprise effort is absolutely
    essential. It is only through your continued support that the
    Department's top modernization program priorities can be
    achieved and the Navy can deliver reliable sea-based strategic
    deterrence to 2084.
        As the 14th director, it is my highest honor to represent
    the men and women of SSP. My number one priority is to assure
    that these men and women are poised to execute this mission
    with the same level of success, passion, and rigor as they have
    since our program was founded.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of
    the team that makes deterrence of major power conflict their
    life's work, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Wolfe follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe
                                  introduction
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and Distinguished Members of
    the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the
    sustainment and recapitalization of the sea-based leg of the nuclear
    triad. It is an honor to represent the Navy's Strategic Systems
    Programs (SSP) and the contributions the Navy provides to our national
    and global security through Sea Based Strategic Deterrence.
        As Admiral Richard, Commander, US Strategic Command, testified
    before this Committee just last month, ``Every operational plan in the
    DOD, and every other capability we have rests on the assumption that
    strategic deterrence, and in particular nuclear deterrence, will hold.
    If strategic or nuclear deterrence fails, integrated deterrence and no
    other plan or capability in the DOD will work as designed. The Nation's
    nuclear forces underpin integrated deterrence and enable the U.S., our
    Allies and partners to prevent, and if necessary, confront aggression
    around the globe using all instruments of national power.'' Nuclear
    weapons remain the most powerful and destructive weapons known to
    humanity. As long as nuclear weapons exist, we have a special charge to
    be responsible custodians of our nuclear capabilities and work with a
    sense of urgency to create a security environment that would allow for
    their elimination. SSP takes this charge very seriously.
        SSP's core mission comprises two fundamental lines of effort: the
    safety and security of our Nation's strategic assets entrusted to the
    Navy; and the design, development, production, and sustainment of the
    Navy's Strategic Weapons System (SWS). We strive to maintain a culture
    of excellence, underpinned by rigorous self-assessment, to achieve the
    highest standards of performance and integrity for personnel supporting
    the strategic deterrent mission. We focus unremittingly on our
    tremendous responsibility for the custody and accountability of our
    Nation's nuclear assets. The men and women of SSP, our sailors, our
    marines, our navy masters at arms, our coast guardsmen, and our
    industry partners remain dedicated to supporting the strategic
    deterrence mission, to responding to the emerging needs of our
    warfighter, and to protecting and safeguarding our Nation's assets with
    which we are entrusted. We certainly could not do this without the
    support from this Committee.
        The Nation's nuclear triad consists of intercontinental ballistic
    missiles, heavy bombers, and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)
    equipped with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). These
    platforms and their associated weapons systems are essential to the
    very foundation of our Nation's security and survival. The
    Administration's recently concluded Nuclear Posture Review affirms the
    following roles for nuclear weapons: deter against strategic attacks,
    assure allies and partners, and achieve U.S. objectives if deterrence
    fails. While the U.S. nuclear arsenal remains safe, secure and
    effective, most U.S. nuclear deterrent systems--including the SSBN
    fleet--are operating beyond their original design life, increasing
    concerns about mission effectiveness, reliability and availability.
    Replacement programs are ongoing, but there is little or no margin
    between the end of useful life of existing programs and the fielding of
    their replacements.
        The U.S. Navy provides the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad
    with the interdependent Ohio-class SSBNs and the Trident II D5 SWS. The
    SSBN fleet is responsible for more than 70 percent of the Nation's
    operationally deployed nuclear warheads that are subject to the New
    START Treaty. As the Navy carefully manages the approach to end of life
    of Ohio-class SSBNs, addressing the viability of the SWS throughout the
    life of the Columbia-class SSBNs remains a top priority. Columbia-class
    SSBNs will ensure the effectiveness and availability of the nation's
    Sea Based Strategic Deterrent through the 2080s. The currently deployed
    Trident II D5LE missiles will support initial load-outs on Columbia,
    but modernization of the D5LE SWS, via D5LE2, is required to support
    later Columbia-class missile inventory and seamlessly sustain
    USSTRATCOM requirements. D5LE2 will ensure the SWS will be flexible and
    adaptable in order to maintain demonstrated performance and
    survivability despite the dynamic threat environment.
        As the fourteenth Director, it is my highest honor to serve as the
    program manager, technical authority, safety and security lead,
    regulatory lead, and U.S. Project Officer under the Polaris Sales
    Agreement (PSA) for the Naval Nuclear Weapons Program. Most
    importantly, I am honored to represent the men and women of SSP,
    comprising approximately 1,500 sailors, 1,000 marines, 300 coast
    guardsmen, 1,400 civilians, and thousands of contractor personnel. It
    is my most critical goal to ensure they are poised to execute the
    mission with the same level of success, passion, and rigor both today
    and tomorrow as they have since our program's inception in 1955.
     sws sustainment on ohio-class ssbn and procurement for columbia-class
                                      ssbn
        The fragile relationship between sustainment of our legacy systems
    and the development and production of their replacements is an ever-
    present factor in the calculus of effectively deterring adversaries.
    The Navy's highest priority acquisition program is the Columbia-class
    submarine. The Ohio-class SSBNs will begin decommissioning in the late
    2020s, and the Columbia-class must be ready to begin patrols no later
    than early fiscal year 2031. Recapitalizing our SSBNs is a significant
    investment that only happens every other generation, making it
    critically important that we do it right and on time. Delays to the
    Navy's SSBN modernization plan are not an option. The continued
    assurance of our sea-based strategic deterrent requires not only a next
    class of ballistic missile submarines, but equally critical, a credible
    SWS--to include not just the weapon system itself, but the
    infrastructure and the people as well. The Navy is taking the necessary
    steps to ensure that the next generation deterrent is designed, built,
    delivered, and tested on time and provides flexibility and adaptability
    in a dynamic threat environment.
        To lower development costs and leverage the proven reliability of
    the Trident II D5 SWS, the Columbia-class SSBN will enter service with
    the same functionality and performance of the currently deployed
    Trident II D5 SWS, including the life extended Trident II D5 missile,
    which resides on today's Ohio-class submarines. Maintaining a common
    SWS during the transition between existing and successor submarine
    platforms allows the Navy to leverage a mature material and knowledge
    enterprise, thus reducing programmatic costs and risks. Life extended
    missiles will be shared with both the Ohio- and Columbia-class
    submarines in the U.S. and, under the auspices of the PSA, with the
    United Kingdom (UK) Vanguard-class and Dreadnought-class submarines
    into the 2040s.
               trident ii d5 life extension and life extension 2
        The Trident II D5 SWS capability has been deployed on the Ohio-
    class ballistic missile submarines for nearly three decades and is
    planned to be deployed more than 55 years. This demand to maintain
    demonstrated high performance while extending the service life past
    initial design requirements required a missile life extension effort in
    order to support the Ohio-class submarine service life and, in concert
    with the Shipboard Modernization Program for shipboard systems, to
    serve as the initial SWS for the Columbia-class SSBN. The D5 Life
    Extension (D5LE) will ensure an effective and credible SWS on both the
    Ohio-class and Columbia-class SSBNs into the 2040s.
        As the Navy carefully manages the approach to end of life of our
    Ohio-class SSBNs, we must address the viability of the SWS throughout
    the life of the Columbia-class SSBNs. A minimum of twelve Columbia-
    class SSBNs will replace today's 14 Ohio SSBNs and beginning in fiscal
    year 2030, D5LE missiles will support initial load-outs on Columbia
    (Hulls 1-8). Production of additional D5LE missiles is not practical
    due to obsolete parts and the lack of a robust industrial base. The
    Trident II D5 Life Extension 2 (D5LE2) program is required to modernize
    the SWS to support Columbia-class missile inventory starting in fiscal
    year 2039 (targeting Initial Fleet Introduction--or, IFI--on Columbia
    Hull 9). It will be incorporated on all follow on Hulls as well as
    Hulls 1-8 during their Extended Refit Period from fiscal year 2039 to
    2049 to continue to meet USSTRATCOM requirements. D5LE2 will ensure the
    weapon system maintains demonstrated performance and remains survivable
    while facing a dynamic threat environment driven by two near peer
    competitors until Columbia end of life.
        D5LE2 is a hybrid of pull-through cost-effective technology (e.g.,
    solid rocket motors, ignitors) and redesigned and updated components
    (e.g., avionics, guidance, system architecture). D5LE2 is structured to
    maintain today's unmatched reliability and demonstrated performance,
    while unlocking untapped system potential to efficiently respond to
    emerging needs and to maintain a credible Sea Based Strategic
    Deterrent.
        As directed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture review, SSP executed system
    architecture studies in fiscal year 2020 to 2022 to evaluate solutions
    to problems associated with emerging threats, supportability, and
    adaptability required to address challenges in a dynamic threat
    environment. Additionally, activities focused on missile and guidance
    technology to determine the effective composition of redesign,
    remanufacture, and pull-through of highly reliable components. This
    ensures longer-lead, unique SLBM subsystems are mature for a
    Preliminary Design Review in fiscal year 2028, Critical Design Review
    in fiscal year 2032, first flight off a pad in fiscal year 2033, Low
    Rate Initial Production (LRIP) in fiscal year 2034 and flight testing
    off a manned platform in fiscal year 2036. fiscal year 2023 activities
    continue the refinement of systems studies and critical Missile and
    Guidance Technology work while beginning focused subsystem redesign and
    industrial base development activities for the D5LE2 program.
        Unlike SLBM programs of the past, D5LE2 does not have the benefit
    of a healthy industrial base that comes from maintaining production and
    continuous development. These efforts will be critical to
    reconstituting the SLBM industrial base to restart production on
    critical components whose production lines were shut down over the last
    decade and to build a workforce to design and develop subsystems to
    meet unique nuclear weapons surety requirements. In short, full support
    of D5LE2 today is vital to achieving 2039 IFI and to embarking on a
    path that maintains an SLBM deterrent capability through the service
    life of the Columbia-class SSBN.
                      warhead and reentry body activities
        The Navy is also working in partnership with the Department of
    Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to refurbish
    our existing reentry systems and develop new reentry systems in
    response to USSTRATCOM requirements. As the threat environment the
    nuclear enterprise faces continues to evolve, it is critical that the
    Navy designs, develops, and deploys programs that meet the needs of the
    Warfighter. The Trident II D5 missile is capable of carrying two types
    of warhead families today, the W76 and the W88. The W93/Mk7 warhead
    will be designed for use on both the D5LE and D5LE2 missiles and,
    through the Polaris Sales Agreement and Mutual Defense Agreement, will
    support the United Kingdom's sovereign Replacement Warhead program. In
    2019, NNSA completed the W76-1 Life Extension Program (W76-1/Mk4A),
    marking the U.S. stockpile's first full-scale warhead refurbishment
    program. The Navy continues to work on modernizing integrated
    aeroshells that house these warheads through the Mk4B program with the
    inclusion of a Shape Stable Nose Tip, which reduces reentry variability
    and improves performance margins.
        The W88/Mk5 warhead continues to undergo its refurbishment program
    (ALT370) on a revised timeline based on capacitor component issues that
    did not meet reliability requirements. The Navy and NNSA coordinated on
    tightly coupled schedules for the fleet, the nuclear enterprise weapons
    complex, and production of affected non-nuclear components to execute
    an 18-month delay to the original schedule that was approved by the
    Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC). This program reached the First
    Production Unit milestone on schedule in 2021 and achieved Initial
    Operational Capability in January 2022. I am confident that our teams
    will continue to work together to manage and deliver this program, as
    we have historically addressed refurbishment challenges with a mission-
    focused attitude and rigor. The Navy will continue to prioritize
    meeting our Warfighters' requirements and minimizing disruption to the
    operational fleet to ensure that the sea-based leg of the triad
    continues to fulfill its deterrence mission. However, the setback this
    program faced illustrates the need to support investments in our
    nuclear security enterprise and reduce the pervasive risk to our
    nuclear modernization programs.
        In 2021, the Navy entered Phase 1 of the joint DOD--DOE Nuclear
    Weapons Lifecycle Process with NNSA for the W93/Mk7. This effort will
    address evolving ballistic missile warhead modernization requirements;
    improve operational effectiveness for USSTRATCOM; and mitigate
    technical, operational, and programmatic risk in the sea-based leg of
    the nuclear triad while simultaneously reinvigorating the atrophied
    industrial base and modernizing a Cold War era stockpile. W93/Mk7 will
    provide flexibility and adaptability to meet future warfighter needs.
    With the near simultaneous age out of the deployed stockpile in the
    2040s, the W93/Mk7 will help address production concerns in the weapons
    complex and ensure an uninterrupted at-sea deterrent for the sea-based
    leg of the nuclear triad. In fiscal year 2022, the W93/Mk7 program
    received NWC authorization to proceed into Phase 2, Feasibility Study
    and Design Options, which will further refine and mature the design of
    the W93/Mk7 program in a manner that provides an affordable, credible,
    safe, and secure weapon to the Warfighter. Even with the addition of
    the W93/Mk7 to the stockpile, we will not increase the deployed
    stockpile. The Navy will work in close coordination with the Department
    of Defense, NNSA, the NWC, and the Congress as this effort matures, but
    we cannot continue to life extend our leftover Cold War era weapons and
    systems and successfully carry out our national strategy.
                       industrial base and infrastructure
        To borrow again from Admiral Richard's remarks, ``maintaining and
    strengthening deterrence for the long term requires a modern
    infrastructure and industrial base able to develop credible
    capabilities necessary for a more challenging security environment.''
    The Nation requires a fully modernized nuclear force and supporting
    infrastructure to execute our national strategy. Our modernization
    needs cannot succeed without investing in the research and development
    (R&D), critical skills, and facilities needed to produce, sustain, and
    certify our nuclear systems. Ensuring robust defense and aerospace
    industrial base capabilities--such as radiation-hardened electronics,
    strategic inertial instrumentation, and solid rocket motors--remains an
    important priority in conjunction with R&D investment. SSP has placed
    particular emphasis on the solid rocket motor industry and its sub-tier
    suppliers and appreciates the support of the Congress to allow for the
    continuous production of these vital components. Essential to the
    nuclear deterrent is a national aeroshell production capability. The
    Navy has not delivered an integrated aeroshell since the 1980s and
    needs to reinvigorate a production capability that only resides in a
    small cadre of highly skilled experts in an exceptionally niche
    industry. Aeroshell investment supports the Navy but will also be cost-
    effectively leveraged by our colleagues in the Air Force--and also our
    strategic partners in the United Kingdom as they pursue their
    independent reentry program endeavors. Finally, R&D investment is
    critical to today's nuclear modernization needs to ensure that we
    advance necessary technology ahead of design needs and to train our
    workforce during the early years of development. If the Nation does not
    continue to address these concerns, no amount of money will be able to
    adequately mitigate the risks associated with key stockpile and
    infrastructure losses.
        From an infrastructure perspective, our program is entering
    unprecedented times. Existing facilities are reaching their 30-year
    recapitalization windows while we simultaneously face weapons systems
    modernization periods in order to meet future requirements. Investing
    in facility sustainment and modernization is required for cradle-to-
    grave operations. Appropriate Military Construction (MILCON) and
    Facility Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (FSRM) resourcing
    is critical to the Navy maintaining a credible deterrence posture to
    include providing more than 70 percent of the Nation's operationally
    deployed nuclear warheads. We will make smart investments to address
    through-put constraints and build in surge capacity to address
    requirements presented by new and emerging threats. The Navy relies on
    a limited footprint to process missiles and outfit the SSBNs.
    Maintaining and sustaining facilities is critical to meeting USSTRATCOM
    and Fleet mission requirements. Our nation, and the Navy, will continue
    to prioritize and resource the sustainment and modernization of its
    nuclear infrastructure enterprise to provide an effective and flexible
    deterrent now and into the future.
        As the Navy executes the modernization and replacement of the SSBN
    and associated SLBM leg of the nuclear triad, DOD and NNSA's
    infrastructure must be prepared to respond in tandem to the evolving
    needs of the Nation. Of most importance, we must have an effective,
    resilient, and responsive plutonium pit production capability. This
    capability can address age-related risks, support planned
    refurbishments, as well as prepare for future uncertainty.
    Additionally, tritium, lithium, and uranium, and high explosives and
    energetics, among other strategic materials, are vital to ensuring the
    Navy can continue to meet its strategic deterrent requirements. Efforts
    to sustain and modernize deterrent forces must continue. Our strategic
    forces underpin every military operation around the world, and we
    cannot afford to delay given the increasing threats facing our nation.
                                   workforce
        History reminds us that the swift, successful creation and
    execution of the Fleet Ballistic Missile program in the 1950s was truly
    a result of national commitment, congressional support, and a cadre of
    hand-selected scientists, engineers, and inspirational leaders. Though
    process will always underpin our efforts, our dedicated predecessors--
    civilians, military, and industry partners alike--responded to the
    national need with focused determination and drove this program with a
    vision. People are as fundamental to our nuclear deterrent as the SWS
    itself. Today, SSP and its industry partners are focused on inspiring,
    growing, and retaining a generation of workforce that did not live
    through the darkest days of the Cold War. Connecting a new workforce to
    this fundamental global security mission remains an important task
    shared among the entire nuclear enterprise. A capable, credible, and
    affordable strategic deterrent for our Nation for the next 60 years
    requires not only technical, policy, management, and financial acumen--
    it requires passion and a commitment to making this our life's work.
        SSP has made significant strides in recent years to honor our past,
    innovate our present, and ensure our future workforce is connected to
    the fundamental global security mission. In order to create the ideal
    workforce and workplace, SSP developed the SSP Human Capital Operating
    Plan (HCOP) in fiscal year 2019. The HCOP is a five-year plan aligning
    human capital initiatives to SSP's strategic goals. SSP is now in the
    fourth year of the HCOP execution and is realizing valuable change from
    these efforts. The five goals and associated successes are outlined
    below.
        Goal 1--Recruitment and Retention: create and implement effective
    strategies to recruit and retain highly qualified candidates and
    employees, internal and external, sufficient to ensure that SSP
    fulfills its mission requirements. Accomplishments toward this end
    include: developing a comprehensive Talent Pipeline Strategy;
    Standardizing SSP-enterprise Exit & Stay Interview processes;
    Established HR Data Analytics position and integrated efforts across HR
    functions;
        Goal 2--Talent Development and Sustainment: support, develop, and
    strengthen the workforce to continually evolve and successfully execute
    the mission. Accomplishments toward this end include: developing
    Science & Technology Subject Matter Expert (S&T SME) career tracks;
    conducting a staffing study to assess current and future competencies
    and capacities; implementing robust mentorship programs; Established
    Career Development Counseling Program; and Developing an SSP Academy.
        Goal 3--Leadership Development: strengthen enterprise leadership at
    all levels through robust leadership development programs and clear
    assignment and execution of authority, accountability, and
    responsibility. Accomplishments toward this end include: Implementing
    robust coaching programs for leaders and developmental employees;
    delivering supervisory training for hybrid work environments;
    continuously promoting internal leadership programs; and Developing an
    HR Management for Supervisors course
        Goal 4--Culture: clearly define and communicate SSP culture and
    values. Reinforce and assess the organizational culture as necessary
    for continuous improvement at every level. Accomplishments toward this
    end include: Developing an improved employee recognition and awards
    process; delivering on-going health and wellness activities;
    establishing a `We Heard You' campaign to communicate SSP's responses
    to feedback; defining SSP Culture and Values (Director's Intent) and
    developing SSP Culture Videos.
        Goal 5--Diversity and Inclusion: create and implement effective
    strategies to cultivate a diverse and inclusive work environment that
    promotes employee engagement and the exchange of different ideas,
    philosophies, and perspectives. Accomplishments toward this end
    include: Conducting barrier analysis; establishing Diversity and
    Inclusion Council; increasing use of Individuals with Disabilities
    Recruitment Program; and connecting a Leadership Learning Series with
    Special Emphasis Program.
                   polaris sales agreement: support to the uk
        Development of the future SWS not only addresses known U.S. risks,
    it also supports the UK's critical need to recapitalize its deterrent
    and, given the UK deterrent's contribution and commitment to NATO, this
    recapitalization is essential to our NATO partners' overall defense
    posture. A critical component of the Columbia-class Program is the
    procurement of a Common Missile Compartment (CMC) with the UK under the
    auspices of the Polaris Sales Agreement. Our partnership with the UK
    supports production of the CMC in both U.S. and UK build yards.
    Ensuring that the Columbia-class program remains on schedule supports
    not only our Nation's operational requirements, but also the ability of
    the UK, one of our most important allies, to maintain its Continuous-
    at-Sea Deterrent. Similar to the U.S. Navy, the Royal Navy is
    recapitalizing its four aging Vanguard-class ballistic missile
    submarines (SSBNs) with the Dreadnought-class SSBN. The CMC will
    support today's Trident II D5 SWS, which the U.S. Navy sells to the
    Royal Navy for deployment aboard its Vanguard-class SSBNs, and that
    will be deployed as the initial loadout on both Columbia and the UK
    Dreadnought-class SSBNs. For decades, U.S. policy has recognized that
    the independent UK nuclear deterrent adds to joint efforts to deter
    aggression and attack against NATO and thereby positively contributes
    to global stability. Under the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement and the
    1963 Polaris Sales Agreement, the United States Navy has provided
    decades of support and material, consistent with international law, to
    the UK deterrent program. Without this assistance, the cost and
    schedule risk to maintain the UK's independent deterrent would rise
    significantly, thus creating additional challenges for the UK in
    sustaining its nuclear contribution to NATO alongside the United
    States.
                                   conclusion
        Our Nation's sea-based strategic deterrent has been a critical
    component of our national security since the 1950s and must continue to
    assure our allies and partners and to deter potential adversaries well
    into the future. SSP ensures a safe, secure, effective, flexible, and
    tailorable strategic deterrent, with a steadfast focus on the proper
    stewardship, custody, and accountability of the nuclear assets
    entrusted to the Navy. Sustaining and modernizing the sea-based
    strategic deterrent capability is a vital national security
    requirement. I am privileged to represent this unique organization as
    we work to serve the best interests of our great Nation. I thank the
    Committee for the opportunity to speak with you about the sea-based leg
    of the nuclear triad and the vital role it plays in our national and
    global security.

        Senator King. Thank you, Admiral. General Cotton?

     STATEMENT OF GENERAL ANTHONY J. COTTON, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR
                      FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND

        General Cotton. Good afternoon, Chairman King, Ranking
    Member Fischer, and Distinguished Committee Members. Thank you
    for the opportunity to be here today and represent the 32,000
    men and women of Air Force Global Strike Command.
        I would like to express our gratitude for your incredible
    support as we modernize the ICBM [intercontinental ballistic
    missile] and bomber legs of the nuclear triad and remain on
    pace and on time with all of our efforts. As a force provider
    of strategic and long-range strike, I am proud of the
    excellence and efforts of our personnel as we deliver safe,
    secure, reliable nuclear deterrence to this nation.
        Today's global environment does not allow for a diminished
    strategic deterrence. China has modernized at breathtaking
    speeds, and we expect them to have over 1,000 nuclear warheads
    by 2030, nested within a modern triad. As the Commander of
    STRATCOM has asserted, they have achieved strategic breakout.
    Meanwhile, Russia has recapitalized over 80 percent of their
    nuclear forces and are developing new weapons capabilities as
    we speak.
        While near-peer competitors garner significant attention,
    we must not lose sight of the actions of other potential
    adversaries. North Korea continues to conduct missile tests,
    invest in hypersonic glide vehicle technologies, manufacture
    physical materials, and operate a sophisticated cyberattack
    capability as they maintain the requisite infrastructure to
    conduct nuclear weapons testing. Make no mistake: we are locked
    in an age of long-term strategic competition, informed now by
    two nuclear-capable peers and the advent of non-nuclear
    strategic weapon systems.
        Throughout all of this, our strategic deterrence continues
    to hold, as the cornerstone of national security. As the air
    and leg force provider to STRATCOM, I am constantly balancing
    the sustainment of legacy equipment with the acquisition of new
    weapon systems, ensuring deterrence remains credible throughout
    modernization. To maintain this balance as we build an enduring
    deterrent for decades to come, we rely upon many partnerships
    inside and outside the Department of Defense, including our
    partners in the Department of Energy, the National Nuclear
    Security Administration, and the Department of Navy.
        I must always be ready to present credible and viable
    forces, and for this reason we maintain constant readiness 24
    hours a day. From our missile crews on alert and our bomber
    crews accomplishing global bomber task force missions, we
    remain ready to hold our nation's adversaries at bay.
        To guarantee continued deterrence into the future, it is
    imperative that we remain on schedule as we bring new weapon
    systems online within the triad. I am happy to share we
    continue to make tremendous progress across our portfolios. We
    are moving forward from legacy sustainment to modernization and
    further into operationalizing our new systems.
        The scope and scale of this modernization effort cannot be
    overstated. We must be diligent to remain on track as we evolve
    through all these phases. Any schedule or cost delays would
    have a cascading effect on the entirety of our modernization
    efforts and, in turn, on the credibility of our deterrence
    force.
        I know you understand the historic situation we find
    ourselves in as we modernize this nation's nuclear triad, and I
    am confident for the future, as long as we continue to receive
    the support and funding necessary to remain on schedule. We
    have a strong foundation of dedicated people, we have thorough
    and deliberate plans in place, and we have the systems and
    development necessary to safeguard our Nation for years to
    come.
        We are grateful for our partnership with Congress and
    especially for the continual support of the defense Committees.
    Air Force Global Strike Command remains committed to sustaining
    our bombers and ICBM forces as we bring Sentinel and a B-21
    Raider online.
        We also remain focused in investing and developing the
    people of our force with great care, to the enduring legacy of
    our mission. Our heritage inspires us into the way forward, and
    we will always be ready to provide convention or nuclear
    strategic long-range strike anytime, anywhere.
        I look forward to your questions. Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of General Cotton follows:]

             Joint Prepared Statement by General Anthony J. Cotton
                                  introduction
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and Distinguished Members of
    the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the
    sustainment and modernization of the air and land-based legs of the
    nuclear triad. It is an honor to represent the Air Force Global Strike
    Command (AFGSC) and the contributions the Air Force delivers to our
    national and global security through Air and Land Based Strategic
    Deterrence.
        On behalf of the 32,000 men and women of AFGSC, I would like to
    offer my sincere thanks to Congress for your longstanding support and
    commitment to ensuring our total force service s have the resources
    needed to provide credible deterrence and ultimately defend the Nation.
    I would also like to take the opportunity to commend our airmen, known
    as strikers, who have persevered with professionalism and dedication
    during a global pandemic and shifting geopolitical landscape. Our
    command's Strikers, including our civilian workforce and total force
    personnel, are always ready to respond while ensuring the cornerstone
    of our national security remains safe, secure, and reliable.
        Strategic security is rapidly evolving and increasing in complexity
    across the geopolitical landscape. Our nation's reality now includes
    potentially facing two nuclear peers in the coming years. We must
    continue to posture our strategic capabilities for the dynamic
    challenges we face today and in the years to come. China has
    accelerated its military growth and is rapidly expanding its nuclear
    capabilities. Simultaneously, Russia has spent the last 14 years
    recapitalizing its nuclear forces and continues to invest in new
    technologies. In this context, maintaining a safe, secure and reliable
    nuclear posture continues to be of paramount importance to the Nation
    and AFGSC.
        As Commander of AFGSC, my four lines of effort focus on our people,
    our mission, modernizing our force and proactive engagement. These four
    areas are essential as we transition into an era of great power
    competition. We move firmly into the future by developing and equipping
    them to execute the mission even in ambiguity. We must provide them
    with the weapon systems needed to compete in this era and the
    communities necessary to support them and their families. This will
    include increasing the quality of life of our personnel. We must build
    relationships with leaders and policymakers across local, State and
    international communities to do this.
                                    threats
        The current global context is dynamic and unprecedented, marked by
    the reemergence of long-term strategic competition with Russia and now
    China. Both possess capabilities and intent to advance their interests
    at the expense of the U.S. and our allies. AFGSC remains committed to
    providing a safe, secure and reliable deterrent even as our Nation
    faces challenges in a multipolar world. China continues rapid nuclear
    expansion as it constructs hundreds of intercontinental ballistic
    missile silos, operationalizes a nuclear bomber, and fields a third
    generation SSBN fleet. In addition to this, China is also developing
    fractional-orbit bombardment systems and long-range anti-aircraft
    missiles demonstrating increasing strategic conventional capabilities.
        Russia similarly continues provocations, including the development
    of anti-satellite weapons, hypersonic technologies, and malign
    cyberspace activities. Russia conducted a reckless and irresponsible
    direct-ascent anti-satellite missile test on 15 November 2021.Russia
    has also violated international rules and norms with their recent
    invasion of Ukraine, and its willingness and capacity to conduct
    offensive malicious cyber activities threatening the networks of U.S.,
    ally and partner nations. Furthermore, Russia possesses approximately
    2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons, which are not covered or limited
    by New START, and cites U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
    Treaty among its supposed justifications for developing five new
    nuclear weapon delivery capabilities, including two unique hypersonic
    weapons. AFGSC will not waver in our focused contributions to
    integrated deterrence, ensuring two-thirds of the triad continues to
    underpin the capabilities our Nation brings to bear.
                                     people
        Our Strikers are the foundation of AFGSC and our greatest asset.
    The core of our competitive advantage will always come from our people.
    We have several ongoing initiatives that safeguard our airmen and their
    families to help build community and support resiliency. Furthermore,
    AFGSC has implemented several initiatives to help attract, recruit,
    develop, and retain a high-performing and diverse force. Our
    installation-level Pathways to Inclusion Councils have collaborated
    with local communities to bring resources to our Strikers. These
    resources, combined with our diversity, equity, inclusion, and
    accessibility programs, buildupon and create initiatives that bolster
    opportunity for everyone. For example, Ellsworth AFB improved
    accommodations for those with physical disabilities, increasing
    employment and installation access opportunities. The Kirtland AFB
    Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) and the Violence
    Prevention Integrator established a Violence Prevention Board tasked
    with educational oversight and victim advocacy. Another initiative
    within the command nominates and trains individuals as ``Mental Health
    Heroes'' for the base community charged with reducing mental health
    stigmas and encouraging help-seeking behaviors within organizations.
        We have many quality of life initiatives across the Command,
    ranging from childcare to education. We share the Department of the Air
    Force's commitment for quality and affordable childcare. Even as we
    face challenges of availability, staffing, and capacity, we are taking
    measures to improve access to childcare for our airmen and their
    families. We continue to explore expanding capacity through alternative
    means, including the Family Child Care program, which provides greater
    flexibility in scheduling childcare for military families. We also seek
    to provide additional educational opportunities for our personnel
    throughout their career. Our School Liaison Program continues to work
    with community stakeholders to increase awareness and support
    initiatives for military families in their communities. Through
    Education Community Partnerships, AFGSC installations are improving
    educational support programs by leveraging the installation resources
    at local schools. Engagement with State officials and community
    stakeholders has resulted in positive legislative outcomes in education
    for military families including:
          Advanced enrollment and registration,
          Homeschool student participation in public school
    activities and athletics,
          Post-secondary in-State tuition rates approved for
    military member and dependents, and
          Purple Star Programs recognizing military-friendly
    schools.
        To ensure we remain the world's premier long-range precision strike
    team, we continue to provide professional strategic deterrence
    education, leadership training, and opportunities to produce well-
    prepared and critical thinking leaders at every level. The Command
    works with academic and industry partners to buildupon the leadership
    education efforts of the broader Air Force. The Command's Senior
    Leaders Course, in partnership with the Air University Leadership
    Development Course Command Module, prepares incoming squadron command
    teams for the challenges of command and further develops them into
    successful Air Force leaders. Our Senior Leader Development Program
    targets commanders and senior headquarters' staff by providing them
    with an understanding of successful leadership traits and equipping
    them with the tools to improve their personal leadership skills.
        Our leadership development efforts reach airmen of all experience
    levels as we provide several major programs and initiatives that
    provide airmen the opportunity for continued development and growth in
    Nuclear Deterrence Education and Nuclear Command, Control and
    Communications (NC3). For those who require a first nuclear deterrence
    education ``touchpoint,'' our Strategic Deterrence Basic Course and our
    Nuclear 150 Course orient personnel with little or no experience with
    the nuclear deterrence mission.
        We have also developed a congruent NC3 150 course designed
    specifically to educate our airmen with little to no exposure to the
    NC3 mission. We provide Nuclear and NC3 200, 300, and 400 level courses
    for our mid-range and more advanced airmen. The Air Force Institute of
    Technology's Strategic Force College at Kirtland AFB and Barksdale AFB
    host these courses, providing our Strikers progressive educational
    experiences supporting the Air Force's nuclear deterrence and NC3
    missions. We have graduated over 3,000 students from Nuclear and NC3
    Courses, and over 2,500 students from the Strategic Deterrence Basic
    Course.
        Our command deliberately develops airmen through the internship
    programs known as Striker Pathfinder, Striker Titan, Striker
    Trailblazer and Striker Airman Coders. Striker Pathfinder provides
    officers an in-depth view of strategic studies from various academic
    institutions such as Harvard University, Missouri State University,
    AFIT and more. This program exposes officers to a wide variety of staff
    functions and provides unique developmental opportunities at National
    Labs, units across the USAF and USN, and the National Capital Region
    for exposure to strategic level and national leadership, academic
    forums, and allied foreign nations for exposure to the broader
    implications of the AFGSC mission.
        Striker Titan is an enlisted professional development program
    allowing NCOs to see a broad perspective of the Air Force's long-range
    precision nuclear and conventional strike capabilities, how other
    agencies integrate into the mission, and strategic/nuclear educational
    opportunities. Titans receive leadership development and mentorship
    through assigned Chief Master Sergeant mentors at their bases and
    regularly interface with the Command Chief. They receive similar
    exposure as Striker Pathfinder, traveling widely and seeing firsthand
    the scope of the nuclear enterprise.
        Striker Trailblazer provides civilian members with a 1-year
    deliberate developmental opportunity consisting of strategic
    deterrence, leadership education, professional development, and
    experiential TDYs. The Trailblazers remain assigned to their current
    duty location, and receive developmental education accomplished through
    periodic learning opportunities every 5 weeks. At the end of the
    program, Striker Trailblazers gain a solid foundation and understanding
    of the nuclear enterprise, ultimately promoting effective advocacy for
    the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise.
        We formed Striker Airmen Coders to recognize the innovation of our
    airmen and provide them with opportunities to gain state-of-the-art
    technical skills in areas such as software coding, data analytics, and
    artificial intelligence through the online Air Force Digital
    University. Last, we have collaborated with the United States Navy
    (USN) to form the Striker Trident Exchange program, targeting nuclear
    operators at the O-3 level. The program aims to provide a greater
    breadth and depth of experience for future planners and leaders in the
    nuclear deterrence mission. These rigorous programs allow our interns
    to gain a broad perspective on senior leader decisionmaking and provide
    them the opportunity to accomplish developmental and experiential
    education.
        Fostering a culture of diversity, equity, inclusion and
    accessibility for all Strikers ensures we retain the best, brightest,
    and most talented airmen. We are on the right path moving forward, but
    we know there is always more work to do. In 2021, AFGSC secured
    training resources for diversity and inclusion through numerous
    universities and forums. In addition, we instituted Barrier Analysis
    Working Groups (BAWGs) to identify and eliminate existing barriers and
    to create opportunities within the civilian and military workforce
    regardless of race, ethnic background, gender and disabilities.
        The Command has taken the negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic
    and molded them into positive outcomes. Our Strikers are innovative and
    found ways to ensure our mission continued seamlessly in the face of
    challenges. The Missile Wings adopted a squadron deployment construct
    where each missile squadron deploys to the field 1 week at a time. When
    COVID-19 prevented travel, our team stood up a Mobile Training Team to
    conduct and complete annual assessments. Resiliency within our Wings
    remains a focus as we navigate our return to normalcy following COVID.
    However, we must ensure we introduce and integrate airmen assessed
    during the pandemic to pre-COVID in-person processes. We will continue
    leveraging technology to ensure mission accomplishment as we transition
    from remote work to increasingly in-person operations. Our Strikers
    have revised how we operate as needed to ensure we emerged from this
    pandemic more flexible and adaptable than before.
                                    mission
        Most AFGSC Strikers serve within two numbered Air Forces, 8th AF
    and 20th AF. The 8th houses our bomber aircraft, and the 20th AF is the
    home of our Minuteman III ICBM forces, including the future Sentinel
    community. Both numbered Air Forces also have the all-important support
    aspects that keep our missions running smoothly. The Strikers of 20th
    Air Force continue to operate and maintain the Minuteman III and defend
    the nation--providing strategic deterrence and standing ready to
    respond at a moment's notice. For more than 50 years, the Minuteman III
    has been on nuclear alert 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and 365 days a
    year. Strikers met the evolving challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic
    head-on and maintained the highest readiness levels across the entire
    Department of Defense (DOD). Minuteman III maintainers keep this aging
    weapon system on 24/7 alert, performing 599 major maintenance actions,
    covering 17.2-million miles traveled across gravel roads and
    interstates in Montana, North Dakota, Colorado, Nebraska and Wyoming.
        Defenders and helicopter aircrew continue to secure the weapon
    system across an Area of Responsibility geographically larger than
    South Carolina. In coordination with our teammates at the Department of
    Energy and the numerous local law enforcement agencies, our airmen
    conducted 292 safe, secure, and effective weapons convoys.
    Additionally, the 576th Flight Test Squadron conducted nine operational
    tests on the Minuteman III weapon system in 2021, including two
    operational test launches from Vandenberg Space Force Base. Every
    minute of every day, the men and women of 20th AF keep watch over the
    United States, ensuring we are always ready to defend the Nation and
    our allies.
        Current operations in 8th Air Force are equally high-paced. In
    2021, AFGSC bombers successfully executed ten deployments, 18 CONUS-to-
    CONUS missions, and seven cross-combatant command missions. We
    accomplished this in concert with the divestiture of 17 B-1Bs and the
    maintenance stand-downs of B-1 and B-2 platforms in the summer and fall
    of 2021. Missions were flown during all 12 months, and our bombers
    integrated with 29 NATO allied countries, five European partner
    nations, and seven Middle Eastern partners. We also conducted our first
    ever bomber deployment to Norway while B-1s became the first American
    bomber to land in India in over 75 years.
        Bomber Task Forces (BTF) missions are currently integrating the 4-
    Bin Force Generation Model and the Agile Combat Employment (ACE)
    concept to achieve Combatant Commander and Chief of Staff of the Air
    Force (CSAF) objectives. After 30 years of continuous combat
    deployments to the Middle East, adopting the 4-Bin Model enables the
    Air Force to present combat-ready forces in a predictable and
    sustainable manner that supports the 2022 National Defense Strategy. In
    addition, with the global footprint reduction, adversarial
    technological advances in intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance and all-domain long-range fires have placed traditional
    air bases at significantly increased risk. ACE provides a proactive and
    reactive operational scheme of maneuver executed within threat
    timelines to increase survivability while generating combat power.
    AFGSC is partnering with our overseas major commands to accomplish
    multiple site surveys of airfields and air bases around the world to
    determine their suitability to support bomber operations. During Fiscal
    Year 2022, the Command will serve five potential operating locations on
    four separate continents to enable ACE. Ongoing planning between
    Combatant Commands will allow bombers more flexibility with smaller
    deployment footprints.
        Given the magnitude of their mission to secure two-thirds of the
    Nation's nuclear triad, twenty-five percent of all Air Force Security
    Forces are assigned to AFGSC. At present, AFGSC has 53 Joint
    Lightweight Tactical Vehicles (JLTV) awaiting installation of mission
    support equipment with delivery to AFGSC installations in early Fiscal
    Year 2023. The arrival of the new JLTVs will address the current
    fleet's shortfalls and will enhance the security of AFGSC's strategic
    resources. In a parallel move, AFGSC recognized the need for a mixed
    fleet of armored vehicles to sufficiently support the unique operating
    environments and varying mission sets across AFGSC. The addition of a
    lighter tactical suite of vehicles allows commanders the ability to
    tailor their responses to an incident while ensuring the safety of
    Defenders across AFGSC. Our Nation charges us to maintain a safe,
    secure, and reliable nuclear triad. The importance of this mission
    cannot be overstated, so we must modernize our strategic forces while
    we conduct our daily operations.
                     balancing sustainment & modernization
        We are at a pivotal moment in U.S. history facing a critical
    choice: modernize our nuclear force or allow our Nation to lose its
    strategic advantage. Our conventional and nuclear platforms are as
    relevant as ever, but lifecycles dictate the need to modernize and
    ensure we continue to be effective and lethal. Over the next decade,
    delays in modernization program timelines and programs that do not meet
    expectations will put our Nation's security at risk. Moreover, there
    are no allied bomber forces or allied ICBM forces to rely upon--the
    free world's ability to hold potential adversaries at bay with two-
    thirds of the triad rests on our shoulders.
        AFGSC is currently undertaking one of the largest nuclear
    modernization efforts in our Nation's history. However, we must balance
    our modernization efforts with maintaining the lethality and
    effectiveness of our current conventional and nuclear forces until
    replacements can arrive. Until Sentinel and B-21 are fully
    operationally capable, Minuteman III, B-1, and B-2 sustainment must
    continue. This balance between no-fail sustainment and on-cost, on-
    schedule modernization is the primary focus of my headquarters.
    Minuteman III remains an effective deterrent in the near term as we
    begin preparations for its replacement, Sentinel. Sentinel bed-down
    preparations have commenced this year with the Re-entry Vehicle
    Maintenance Facility and the Stage Processing Facility MILCON projects
    at Vandenberg Space Force Base to support Sentinel flight tests. Since
    2017, Sentinel has consistently met all acquisition milestones as we
    approach the first flight test in the next 16 to 18 months.
        AFGSC continually updates the Bomber Roadmap, reflecting current
    conditions, ensuring continued support to operational plans while
    transitioning from a three-bomber fleet to a two-bomber fleet of B-52s
    and B-21s. The effective and on-time modernization of the B-52 while we
    sustain a sufficient number of B-1s and B-2s will be critical until an
    adequate number of B-21s are available. Continued B-52 effectiveness
    and lethality are dependent upon the completion of the Commercial
    Engine Replacement (CERP) and the Radar Modernization programs.
        B-52 CERP is a top priority and replaces the aging and obsolete
    TF33-PW-103 (TF33) engines with Rolls Royce F130 turbofans. Legacy TF33
    engines, fabricated six decades ago, do not meet current environmental
    emissions regulations and standards. Retrofitting modern engines on the
    B-52 embraces the tenets of an aggressive, clean energy transformation
    posture by tremendously reducing the carbon and noise footprints of the
    aircraft. Furthermore, a newer engine significantly reduces the
    emissions of unburned hydrocarbons, carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxides,
    and smoke numbers. In addition to the air pollutants emitted by the
    TF33 engine, its noise pollution fails to meet International Civil
    Aviation Organization standards.
        Without re-engining the B-52, we put the backbone of our bomber
    forces at risk. The costs of sustaining the current engine are
    enormous, and there are no further options for finding parts due to
    vendors that are no longer in the business of producing parts for this
    70+ year-old aircraft. We cannot sustain the TF33 engine for the
    expected future life of the B-52, which makes our CERP modernization
    effort much more critical. CERP is transitioning from Middle Tier
    Acquisition to a Major Capability Acquisition this year. It will
    complete Preliminary Design Review and issue a Development Request for
    Proposal, with a milestone B target date of May 2023.
        Concurrently, the B-52 Radar Modernization program will
    dramatically improve B-52 lethality. The system will exponentially
    increase B-52 radar reliability, provide more precise navigation
    solutions, offer the ability to detect and track moving targets, and
    perform all-weather self-targeting. The radar program reached Milestone
    B in June 2021 and will complete the first install in 2023.
        We are committed to protecting requirements and funding stability
    on the baseline acquisition program for both the Sentinel and the B-21
    Raider. Since the B-21 program's inception, the top-level key system
    attributes and key performance parameters have remained unchanged. The
    Air Force awarded the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD)
    contract in 2016. Since then, the B-21 program has remained under
    acquisition program baseline (APB) target costs and within its APB
    target schedule for both the start of production and required assets
    available for initial operational capability. The next major milestones
    for the program are the first flight and the beginning of low rate
    initial production. Leveraging modular systems and open standards, as
    we have done with the B-21 will enable us to have a technology that
    matures naturally through continuous upgrades.
        In the calendar year 2021, the Acting Secretary of the Air Force
    confirmed Ellsworth AFB as the first B-21 Main Operating Base.
    Ellsworth has not hosted a stealth or nuclear mission since the early
    1990's when the B-1B was still nuclear capable. Military construction
    at Ellsworth is on the critical path to B-21 nuclear certification. The
    Air Force needs the facilities and workforce at Ellsworth to support
    the nuclear deterrence mission and meet USSTRATCOM requirements. The
    Air Force will work to integrate the capabilities that underpin nuclear
    certification into future budget requests.
        Last calendar year, the Joint Staff approved an enduring Capability
    Development Document (CDD) for the B-21. This enduring CDD paves the
    way for a proactive and streamlined B-21 modernization process, which
    starts in parallel to EMD, to mature and then rapidly integrate
    advanced capabilities at the earliest opportunity. The enduring CDD
    coupled with B-21's open architecture design, built-in growth margin,
    and the Air Force's decision to procure technical data rights during
    EMD will keep this platform relevant, affordable and adaptable as the
    threat picture and mission set evolve. The initial B-1 divestiture of
    17 B-1s was completed on 23 September 2021, a week ahead of the
    congressional deadline. All divested aircraft selected for storage are
    now in the 309th Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group following
    standard practices. Other locations and agencies supporting various B-1
    test and evaluation programs received the remaining divested aircraft.
        Safe and secure nuclear storage and maintenance are the cornerstone
    of Air Force nuclear generation capabilities and remain a high priority
    for the greater nuclear modernization effort. However, AFGSC operations
    currently rely on 1960's and 1970's era Weapons Storage Areas (WSAs)
    that have exceeded their designed service lives. With the on-going B-
    21, Sentinel, LRSO, and B61-12 programs, these new and modern weapon
    systems drive a need to diversify our assets and locations. To meet
    this need, the command is working to recapitalize our weapons storage
    and maintenance capacity by consolidating weapons storage, maintenance,
    and generation operations at select installations into newly
    constructed Weapons Generation Facilities (WGFs). WGFs eliminate
    exposure of nuclear assets to outside environmental elements and
    external observation, thus significantly increasing both maintenance
    capability and security. In addition, the WGF's design ultimately
    provides greater security features and operational flexibility than all
    current WSAs.
        The first WGF construction project is underway at F.E. Warren Air
    Force Base, followed by construction at Malmstrom and Barksdale Air
    Force Bases. The command synchronized the B-21 WGF construction with
    the B-21 fielding locations and timelines to provide certified
    facilities to support B-21 full operational capability target dates.
    Conceptually, the ICBM and bomber WGFs are similar, consisting of a
    hardened facility envelope containing all storage, maintenance, and
    generation functions. Recapitalizing the WGFs for the safety and
    security of weapons remains a pressing priority for the Air Force, as
    the aging infrastructure is operating well beyond designed life and
    outside of modern safety and security requirements. While many factors
    influence WGF costs, every effort is underway to ensure efficient and
    fiscally responsible facilities that will deliver increased capability
    for maintenance, storage, and generation of our Nation's nuclear
    arsenal.
        The UH-1N Replacement Program was born out of the Air Force Common
    Vertical Lift Support Platform. The CSAF signed the UH-1N Replacement
    Program Capabilities Production Document on 3 May 2016, and the VCJCS
    signed the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Memo on 22 Jun
    2016. Congressional and OSD guidance was for full and open competition
    ``utilizing the robust American helicopter industry.'' As a result, the
    USAF awarded the contract to Boeing-Leonardo in 2018 to provide up to
    84 MH-139A helicopters at a program cost of $2.38B, resulting in a
    $1.7B savings to the taxpayer compared to the program's initial
    Independent Cost Estimate. The USAF received the first four MH-139A Air
    Vehicles between December 2019 and March 2020.
        The MH-139A is a military commercial derivative aircraft and
    airworthiness certification relies heavily on civil certifications
    issued by the FAA. The program has faced some challenges recently,
    including delays for elements of the FAA certification known as
    Supplemental Type Certifications (STC). STC delays directly affected
    the completion of the initial Developmental Test and Evaluation, which
    is a prerequisite to the arrival of aircraft to Malmstrom AFB, the
    first operational base, now projected to be the end of Fiscal Year
    2023. However, Initial Operational Test and Evaluation will continue
    into Fiscal Year 2024, which will allow for Full-Rate Production,
    Required Assets Available and Initial Operational Capability in Fiscal
    Year 2025.
        AFGSC continues to transition from a legacy to a modern NC3
    enterprise. The Air Force has begun recapitalizing the aging E-4B with
    the Survivable Airborne Operations Center (SAOC) program. The E-4B is a
    vital link in the National Military Command System, providing NC3 and
    C2 of the triad. To fund the program through the FYDP, the SAOC program
    has received funding from the OSD Cost Assessment and Program
    Evaluation for $5.36 billion. AFGSC authored an Air Force validated
    SAOC Capabilities Development Document that gained JROC validation in
    March 2022.
        The Air Force continues to refine the SAOC acquisition strategy,
    leveraging modernization opportunities, open system architecture, and
    digital engineering to reduce overall program costs. The SAOC will
    achieve Full Operational Capability in the early to mid-2030's. While
    AFGSC leads one of the Nation's largest nuclear modernization efforts
    in decades, we must also maintain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear
    triad. As the Air Component to USSTRATCOM, and as stewards of two-
    thirds of the nuclear triad, we must employ a specific and strategic
    approach to modernize our capabilities in the face of 21st century
    global competition. Our command is committed to delivering improved
    weapon systems as efficiently and affordably as possible by pursuing
    mature technologies, stabilizing requirements, and owning the technical
    baseline of our weapons systems--a formula that has proven successful
    in our acquisition efforts thus far.
                           nuclear weapons stockpile
        While today's stockpile is safe, secure and effective, we cannot
    allow the reliability or performance of the bedrock of our national
    security to degrade. We are at a point where we are modernizing
    delivery platforms, weapons, and supporting infrastructure
    simultaneously, and our ability to properly modernize hinges not only
    on DOD program execution, but also on our partners at the Department of
    Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).
        The NNSA plays a critical role in modernizing the nuclear security
    enterprise, including the recapitalization of our pit production
    infrastructure. Prioritizing essential NNSA infrastructure and
    modernization programs of record is a national imperative and
    fundamental to safeguarding our deterrent force. Any delay in stockpile
    modernization will have a cascading effect on the schedule. NNSA is
    cognizant of the fact that a faster, more comprehensive overhaul is
    necessary to maintain schedule alignment. Significant investments are
    being undertaken in recapitalizing infrastructure to build resiliency
    and re-establishing production capabilities lost in the post-cold war
    period and require sustained funding from Congress to complete in a
    timely manner.
        As we shift attention from life extension efforts to modernizing
    our remaining weapons, we must identify and overcome any obstacles that
    could delay program execution. Understanding stockpile modernization
    programs take many years to fully execute, it is critical that we find
    avenues to reduce these timelines. Failure to do so will increase the
    operational risk to Sentinel and other major modernization efforts,
    putting our nuclear deterrent force at risk.
                             wind farm encroachment
        As our country expands its energy resilience through the
    development of various alternative energy sources, the dramatic growth
    in the wind energy sector has created unanticipated challenges for ICBM
    security. Since the deployment of Minuteman III, a 1,200-foot easement
    around all missile launch and alert facilities has helped keep
    structures at a minimum safe distance from private and commercial
    encroachment. However, when we fielded Minuteman III 50 years ago, we
    did not foresee wind turbines would 1 day share the same operational
    space as our ICBMs. Unfortunately, some wind turbines create a
    significant mission impact on helicopter and security operations. At
    present, existing wind turbines at 46 launch and missile alert
    facilities across our three missile wings affect flight safety and
    security operations.
        Helicopter operations form an integral part of day-to-day security
    operations and security incident response within the ICBM complexes.
    Wind turbines near these facilities interfere with security operations
    by restricting helicopter approach avenues, limiting turning radius,
    severely affecting air-to-ground security response integration, and
    creating hazards for infiltration and exfiltration of responding
    forces. These activities are all necessary components that ensure the
    security of ICBM operations and vital national assets. The construction
    of wind turbines within a two nautical mile radius of launch and alert
    facilities poses a tremendous risk to helicopter and security
    operations, is exacerbated by the weather, time of day, and lighting
    conditions, places aircrew and facility personnel at greater risk, and
    extends security response time in critical situations.
        We fully support renewable energy initiatives to ensure energy
    security for our Nation. AFGSC works closely with DOD's Military
    Aviation and the Installation Assurance Siting Clearinghouse and is
    engaged with multiple energy developers as we look for collaborative
    solutions to existing and proposed wind turbine projects. In addition,
    Strikers at our ICBM wings and 20th Air Force have met with local
    legislators and spoken with wind energy developers to explain the risks
    to our mission and people imposed by the construction of wind farms
    within a two nautical mile radius of these launch and alert facilities.
                                   conclusion
        Today we face competitors who have the ability to escalate conflict
    across the globe in any domain and at any time. We as a Nation have not
    faced this reality at any point in history, and our approach must be
    continually adapted as the strategic environment evolves. We appreciate
    our partnership with the defense Committees and across the entire
    defense enterprise to ensure the continued protection of our Homeland.
        AFGSC is the home of nuclear and conventional long-range precision
    strike for the United States and the free world. We continue to sustain
    legacy systems while modernizing our force to meet the challenges
    inherent in an increasingly complex global security environment. Our
    airmen, the very core of our mission, ensure we provide safe, secure
    and lethal combat-ready forces to the Combatant Commanders. It is
    because of our people, we are always ready to provide long-range
    conventional or nuclear precision strike anytime, anywhere.

        Senator King. Thank you all, and I want to address a
    question to our general and our admiral, and advise you that
    what we are looking for at this Committee is your best military
    judgment, not an answer that is tailored to the desires of any
    particular administration.
        Two changes in the Nuclear Posture Review. One is the
    elimination of the sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM), and the
    other is the elimination of the B-83-1, the heavy gravity bomb.
        Admiral, let's talk about Ukraine and the threat that we
    are all aware of, of Putin using tactical nuclear weapons. Are
    we making a mistake by cancelling the sea-launched cruise
    missile, which gives us a comparable tactical weapon in
    response to potential use? I worry that we could be in a
    situation where it is mutually assured destruction or no
    response. Give me your thoughts on the cancellation of the sea-
    launched cruise missile.
        Admiral Wolfe. Yes, Senator, thanks for the question. So
    here is what would say. Sir, I would tell you that in my
    position I do not advise on requirements to USSTRATCOM [United
    States Strategic Command] nor do I advise OSD on policy, or the
    Administration. As the acquisition lead, my job actually is to
    execute any program that the Administration and the
    Department----
        Senator King. Yeah, you are the customer. I want to know
    what you think you need.
        Admiral Wolfe. Actually I am not the customer, sir.
    USSTRATCOM is the customer. I am the acquisition leg that once
    STRATCOM requests their requirements and once policy decides
    what it is we are going to execute, I actually execute those
    programs as they Navy's acquisition lead and technical lead on
    how we would meet those requirements.
        Senator King. So you do not want to express an opinion on
    the cancellation of this weapon system.
        Admiral Wolfe. Sir, my personal opinion would not be
    something that I would want to share, because again, that is
    not my role in the United States Navy of advising either one of
    those organizations on either policy or requirements.
        Senator King. General Cotton, are you going to give me the
    same answer on the B-83-1, or do you have a military opinion as
    to whether we need a bunker-buster of that nature?
        General Cotton. Senator King, what I would tell you, as the
    Joint Forces Air Component Commander to STRATCOM----
        Senator King. Could you speak up a little, General?
        General Cotton. As the Joint Forces Air Component Commander
    to the Commander of STRATCOM, what I would like to do is, I
    would be able to present him with a portfolio of weapon systems
    of which he can choose. So if that is not in the portfolio,
    then that is one weapon system that he would be able to choose
    for planning purposes.
        Senator King. I think we are going to have to have a
    different set of generals and admirals.
        [Laughter.]
        I understand. I am not criticizing you all but I am trying
    to get at an important policy question, and if you are not the
    right people to answer then we will have to have another
    hearing to try to get at that question.
        Admiral Wolfe, how are we doing on the development of the
    Columbia-class? For example, have they solved the missile
    encasement issue, the welding issue that was slowing things
    down some time ago?
        Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. I would tell you the Columbia
    program is moving forward. They remain on schedule. To your
    specific question about the welding issues that we saw early on
    with the missile tubes, they have made progress. Those tubes
    are coming out as we predicted. The amount of rework that is
    required on those tubes continues to go down, and Admiral Scott
    Pappano, who is PEO SSBN, continues to push that program
    forward. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. General Cotton, a similar question. You are
    going to be engaged in an enormous project in developing the
    new ground-based deterrent. Give me a picture of where that
    project stands, what the progress is, and what the calendar
    looks like.
        General Cotton. Thanks for the question, Chairman. I am
    happy to say that GBSD [ground based strategic deterrent], now
    known as Sentinel for the weapon system, is in a really, really
    good place. So I will say it is a mega-project. It is a mega-
    project. So I do not want to overstate the fact that what we
    are talking about is not just the replacement of a missile. We
    are talking about the replacement of the entire weapon system,
    the Minuteman weapon system.
        The good news is F.E. Warren is the first base that we have
    already started to break ground in regards of what we are doing
    for F.E. Warren, Francis E. Warren in Cheyenne, Wyoming.
    Everything is on time, on schedule. I am not concerned of what
    we are seeing right now in regard to the program. The prime
    contractor is doing a tremendous job in regard to using digital
    engineering, as far as using open mission systems, as far as
    digital twins, that they are actually using from the B-21
    program as well, and being able to carve out some of the best
    practices seen there.
        So I think we are in a really, really good place, sir.
        Senator King. Are original budget--not original, but are
    recent budget estimates holding up?
        General Cotton. It is, sir. So it is on time and on
    schedule and on budget at this point. I am very happy about
    that.
        Senator King. Thank you, General. Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
    thank all of you gentlemen for the work that you do each and
    every day, and please thank those that work with you on this.
    You keep our country safe and you keep our allies safe and
    secure as well.
        I am going to give it a shot, what the chairman tried to
    do. Admiral, I think we know that Admiral Richard, the
    combatant commander at STRATCOM, has been very forthright in
    speaking about a deterrence gap and being able to provide his
    job of providing the President with options that would be at
    his disposal to counter or to address the threats that we face
    as a country. He has been supportive of the option of SLCM. You
    are aware of that, sir, right?
        Admiral Wolfe. Yes, ma'am, I am aware of that.
        Senator Fischer. I will not put you in a bad spot. General
    Cotton, I will save that for you. You and I had a conversation
    this morning and I think you answered the chairman in saying
    that those options are valuable for any commander in chief to
    have at their disposal in making wise decisions on the defense
    of our security. Would you agree with that?
        General Cotton. Yes, ma'am, I would.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you. Admiral Richard talks
    about that deterrence gap and assurance gap, and General
    Cotton, this morning you were visiting with me about our
    deterrent and stressing how important it was to have a credible
    deterrent. I appreciate your emphasis on that, because that
    really boils it down to being able to have those options for
    our commander in chief so that he or she can make wise
    decisions. So I am going to steal that ``credible deterrent''
    from you for the rest of my time here in the United States
    Senate.
        General, you know that I am an advocate for recapitalizing
    our E-4B fleet, and I was very glad to see the Air Force's
    budget significant resources to developing a replacement. This
    is an issue that has been studied well over a decade, and the
    challenges of maintaining an outdated airframe are only getting
    harder as time passes.
        Can you talk about the Air Force's plan to replace the E-4B
    with the Survivable Airborne Operations Center (SAOC) and give
    your perspective on how important it is that we replace that
    system?
        General Cotton. Senator Fischer, that you for the question.
    It is absolutely critical. As you know, the National Airborne
    Operations Center, of which the E-4B, the airframe is an older
    airframe, of which we only have four. Based out of Omaha,
    Nebraska, now at Lincoln, Nebraska, until the runway is
    completed. Incredible men and women that fly that mission every
    single day.
        I am happy to say I think we are in a pretty good place on
    where we are going to move forward in regard to SAOC, its
    replacement. I know that it has just recently went through a
    JROC [Joint Requirements Oversight Council], as we had kind of
    restudied what the requirements are. I am happy with the
    adjustments to the requirements. I think the final product of
    what we are going to see as far as fleet size is going to be
    very manageable for the President, for the Secretary, as well
    as the Chairman, moving forward. So I think we are in a very
    good place in regard of what we are going to see for the SEOC,
    ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. Great. It is a good mission that we have
    there at Offutt. When the runway is completed there at Offutt I
    know that in the future that is an opportunity that we have to
    expand that mission right there at Offutt Air Force Base as
    well. So I look forward to working with you on that.
        As I mentioned in my opening statement, the $63 million for
    Minuteman-III sustainment on the Air Force's list of unfunded
    mandates, that $63 million. Can you talk about the importance
    of sustaining the Minuteman-III, both the system and the
    facilities, and how that helps reduce risk associated with
    transitioning to the Sentinel?
        General Cotton. Thank you for the question, Senator. What
    is very unique is where we are with the nuclear portfolio.
    Where we are with the nuclear portfolio is we are going to have
    to maintain our legacy systems until we transition into the
    new. So that being said, I need to make sure that I have a
    safe, secure, effective, and credible legacy weapon system as
    we transition into Sentinel, and that is what the sustainment
    request is in regard of making sure that we sustain our legacy
    system, known as the Minuteman-III. We just celebrated its 50-
    plus years on alert.
        So by able to do that, we are safeguarding, as a bedrock
    the for the nation, for our allies and our partners to
    understand that they have a credible deterrent, one that is
    still safe, secure, and effective, until we get to the full
    transition of GBSD Sentinel in the 2036 time frame.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Dr. Adams, not so long ago I visited Oak
    Ridge and I came away with two impressions. The people are
    fantastic. The facilities are pretty tired, and we using, I
    understand, manufacturing capabilities that literally go back
    to the 1940s. As we move into these major, new projects and the
    upgrade across the nuclear enterprise, are there plans afoot,
    and are there activities underway to modernize the
    manufacturing process at places like Oak Ridge and Los Alamos?
        Mr. Adams. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman King, for the
    question. The short answer is yes, we are working on that. The
    more nuanced answer is we have processes that we know work.
    They are qualified. They are proven. They produce the product
    that we know we need. In many cases that product was a warhead
    that was tested underground.
        If you change a process to one that, by all measures, looks
    better, there is a stringent quality standard and certification
    standard that has to be met, and we have to convince ourselves
    and skeptical observers that this thing will still work if it
    we make it a different way.
        We are doing that, though. We are doing that work to
    convince ourselves that these things will still work when we
    make them different ways that are more efficient and that will
    ultimately give us a greater capacity.
        Senator King. This is one of the collateral effects of not
    being able to test. We have to be sure, as you say, that what
    we are doing, even though it may be a more modern manufacturing
    capability, will produce equivalent quality results, and that
    is the direction you are moving in.
        Mr. Adams. That is the direction we are going.
        Senator King. General Cotton, in the fiscal year 2021
    National Defense Authorization Act we required that the new B-
    21 be capable of hosting a long-range standoff missile to
    replace the 1980s cruise missile. Is that still in the planning
    stages? Is that part of a requirement that you accept as part
    of the B-21 process?
        General Cotton. So as you mention, as LRSO comes online, of
    which you mentioned, for the air launch cruise missile
    replacement, it will be a threshold weapon on the B-52 as well
    as, since we are going to a two-bomber fleet, as well as have
    its capability on the B-21 down the road as well.
        Senator King. I have had several classified meetings on the
    status of the B-21 process. In an unclassified setting can you
    give me a bird's eye view? Are we still making good progress,
    still on budget, and do you feel confident about that process?
        General Cotton. Sir, I think it is a model acquisition
    program for the Department. What we are doing and where it is,
    it is on time. I would love to host you to a couple of
    facilities so you can kick the tires yourself and see what is
    happening in regard to its development. I am very satisfied
    with where we on the progress of the B-21 program. It is on
    time and on budget.
        Senator King. One additional question on the B-21 and that
    is, to what extent are we developing good estimates, solid
    recognition of sustainment costs? As you know, one of the
    problems with the F-35 has turned out to be very high
    sustainment costs into the indefinite future. Is that a factor
    in the design and manufacture and contractual relations that
    are part of the B-21?
        General Cotton. Absolutely, sir. So we looked to see what
    kind of did not work there and tried to eliminate all of those
    for the B-21 program. One is the fact that the modern
    technologies that we are seeing in the development of this
    platform, even when compared to how the B-2 was designed,
    everything is kind of captured in the new, modern ways of how
    our acquisition partners are developing this platform. So we
    took all of that into consideration so we would not restage
    into the past. So that was all taken into consideration for the
    B-21 program, and I am very satisfied that we will not replow
    that ground, on what you are talking about with the other
    weapon systems.
        Senator King. With the concurrence of my co-chair I am
    going to cede myself an extra minute. Senator Fischer, you will
    get it too, yes.
        Question for both the admiral and the general, and that is,
    intellectual property with regard to the B-21 and the Columbia.
    To what extent will the Department of Defense own the
    intellectual property so that in the future we can 3D print or
    otherwise acquire parts rather than having to go through the
    OEM process? I foresee a day, and hope there is a day when
    every depot, every hangar, every military facility has its own
    3D printing capability, which would be an enormous availability
    boost. So are we buying the intellectual property on those two
    programs to the extent that we will be able to create our own
    parts without having to go back through the manufacturer?
    General?
        General Cotton. Chairman King, I am glad you asked that
    question. That is what makes us very, very proud of the B-21
    program. We own the baseline. We own the baseline. So what that
    does for us, it gives us open architecture. It allows us,
    understanding that we are designing a weapon system that is
    going to last for decades, that you can, by having open
    architecture and owning the baseline, that you do not have to
    kind of re-haggle, if you will, to do some improvements as the
    weapon system progresses in its timeline.
        So I am happy to say that yes, we do own the operational
    baseline for the B-21.
        Senator King. Excellent. Thank you. Admiral, how about
    Columbia?
        Admiral Wolfe. Sir, although I do not know to the level of
    how much IP is actually owned, because again, that is not in my
    portfolio, but let me answer it in a different way because I
    think your question about are we able to get the data that we
    need to 3D print and do some of that stuff, I would tell you
    already in the United States Navy and in the Submarine Service
    we are to the point where we are starting to use 3D printing
    and we are starting to understand what is available to all of
    our depot facilities and even to our individual platforms to be
    able to do that type of real-time maintenance that I think you
    are really getting at.
        So I would like to take a question for the record on the
    actual amount of IP that we are going to own for Columbia. But
    we are getting after that in many areas.
        Senator King. I think that ought to be the standard for
    whenever we are buying something, we get the IP along with the
    platform.
        Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. I would tell you, in the strategic
    program that I do manage, back to what General Cotton said, it
    is the same way. We do own the technical baseline. As a matter
    of fact, in our program we are the systems integrator. So we do
    not have a separate entity that does all of the system
    integration for the entire system. That is the U.S. Navy and
    that is our program.
        Senator King. Good. Thank you. Thank you very much. Senator
    Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Cotton,
    earlier today we spoke about the importance of modernizing the
    B-52, in particular the CERP [Commercial Engine Replacement],
    the engine replacement, and the radar modernization programs.
    It is my understanding the Air Force has changed its
    acquisition structure for the re-engineering effort. How
    confident are you that we will be able to complete that project
    on time?
        General Cotton. Ma'am, I am very confident. Thank you for
    the question. What is unique about the program is what I am
    seeing from the prime. As you know, we have just let that
    contract for the engine replacement for the B-52, the Civilian
    Engine Replacement Program, known as CERP, and Rolls-Royce was
    awarded that contract.
        The integration efforts that we are already beginning to
    see with our contractor, Boeing, on being able to integrate
    that engine as well as the other upgrades that will come along
    with that engine upgrade is short of fantastic. You probably
    have even seen on the news where we were able to take a bird
    from the boneyard. They actually split it in half, from nose to
    tail, and kept the left side of the jet. It is in a warehouse
    in Tinker right now, where they can form-fit as they do
    integration with--no kidding--a jet. So that is the innovative
    thinking that they are thinking through, because even using 3D
    technology on your computer does not replace having an airman
    or a maintainer kind of say, ``Hey, engineer, that is probably
    not the right place to put that component, because now I do not
    have access to it,'' as they are doing the integration piece.
    So I am very, very satisfied in what I am seeing with the CERP
    program.
        You also mentioned the radar modernization program. Radar
    modernization program is also going to be very, very
    instrumental for the B-52 as it gets at some of our faults that
    we see in our radar systems currently and upgrades the radar
    system there.
        I would like to talk a little bit about CERP, if you do not
    mind, on what it brings to the fight.
        Senator Fischer. Can I first ask you a question about the
    radar system that you are modernizing?
        General Cotton. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. I do not know if you can discuss it in an
    unclassified setting, but can you share the mean time between
    failure for the current radar system?
        General Cotton. Yes. It should around 300 and it is sitting
    around 46 right now.
        Senator Fischer. Okay, and then if you want to just do
    briefly on CERP so I can ask the admiral and Mr. Adams
    questions as well.
        General Cotton. Well, part of the two-bomber fleet that we
    are going to have here in the United States Air Force with the
    B-21 and the B-52, the B-52 is going to be a formidable
    standoff, long-range strike weapon through 2050, and I am very
    confident, as much as folks talk about the B-52 and its age,
    once we do this upgrade she is going to be a very formidable
    weapon system through 2050.
        I am really looking forward. I just need to make sure that
    the funding stays steady so we can get that done, because the
    limiting factor for the B-52 is its current engines that are
    sitting on it right now. So we must replace the engines on the
    B-52. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Fischer. Good. It is important to know that we not
    only stay on schedule but the funding, like you said, is steady
    and we do not see the peaks and valley. Thank you.
        Admiral Wolfe, thank you for everything that you, as I said
    earlier, that you do and that your team does. I would like to
    revisit some of our discussion yesterday about your life
    extension efforts with the LE2, for the Trident missile. Can
    you talk about how reductions to the program increase long-term
    risk and make your ability to meet the delivery date more
    challenging?
        Admiral Wolfe. Yes, Senator. Thank you for the question. I
    will expand a little bit to our discussion from yesterday.
        Every time we do not get budgeted to our request we have a
    very tight timeline. We understand the technologies that not
    only we need to re-invigorate today to make sure that our
    system and LE2 gets to where we need to get but there are also
    technologies that we need to develop. Because as we all talked
    about, our strategic competitors have changed--we have gone
    from one to two--how we look at these systems, some of the
    requirements that we talked about.
        Every time that we take a decrement it causes us to either
    give up on a technology, which means we are going to rely on
    something that is not going to be cutting edge because we have
    got to maintain schedule, because we are very tight in making
    sure that we continue to support our portion of the triad, or
    we push that, when then reduces the amount of time we have to
    really develop that technology, develop the workforce to
    understand that.
        So the most important thing to us is keeping the stability
    so that we can stay on schedule, we can develop the
    technologies to meet not just today's requirement but where we
    need to be in the future as we continue to watch things evolve.
        Senator Fischer. We certainly do not want to underfund
    these programs and have it end up like a lot of modernization
    programs that we are looking at right now, where there is no
    room. There is no room for delay, and we all know that things
    can happen that would put production into delaying situation,
    and I certainly do not want it to be because we have not funded
    at the proper levels. So thank you.
        Mr. Adams, we have focused primarily on plutonium pit
    production over the last few years. Can you update on NNSA's
    other challenges with respect to strategic materials and
    discuss what you see as the next major challenge after pit
    production?
        Mr. Adams. Thank you for the question, Senator Fischer. I
    do not know that I would say ``after'' because we have to do
    these things simultaneously. So the lithium facility at Y-12
    comes to mind. Of course, we have to finish the uranium
    processing facility. There is a tritium facility that is needed
    at Savannah River. There are high-explosive facilities that are
    needed at Pantex. All of these things are underway. They are
    all in flight now, and we have to have all of them in order to
    do the modernization work that we are asked to do, and deliver
    the warheads that DOD needs.
        Senator Fischer. When we look at the expansion, I believe
    it is production at the TVA's Watts Bar Unit 2. Is that
    expansion going to be sufficient to meet our long-term needs?
        Mr. Adams. Thank you for that question. That is where we
    make our tritium. It is actually Watts Bar Unit 1 and Unit 2
    now. We have both of those going. We put 1,792 tritium-
    producing, burnable absorber rods in each core. We can go up to
    that much at this point, and that will meet the needs of the
    program for tritium as long as there are not serious
    interruptions.
        We have a good thing going. We have demonstrated all the
    way through the extraction at Savannah River and the placement
    of the tritium into gas transfer systems. My view is that that
    program is doing a great job right now. We could use more
    margin, and our team is now looking at putting more burnable
    absorber rods in each of those cores in Unit 1 and Unit 2. We
    are looking at licensing amendments that would allow that in
    case we need it later.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
    Chair.
        Senator King. I want to thank all of our witnesses. This
    has been a very informative hearing. I appreciate the testimony
    both from our first panel and our second panel, the answer to
    our questions. Thank you very much. We looking forward to
    continuing to work with you on these important topics.
        The hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 6:01 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]

                                APPENDIX

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
     REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023 AND THE FUTURE YEARS
                                DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, MAY 11, 2022

                          United States Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                       UNITED STATES SPACE FORCE PROGRAMS

        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:37 p.m. in
    room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Angus
    King (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators King, Kelly, Fischer,
    Cotton, Rounds, Cramer, and Tuberville.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS KING

        Senator King. I call this hearing of the Strategic Forces
    Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services to
    order.
        I want to thank our witnesses for joining us today before
    this Subcommittee and thank you for your service.
        The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the fiscal
    year 2023 budget of the Space Force, a separate title 10
    service, which was recently authorized in the fiscal year 2020
    National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). For fiscal year
    2023, the Space Force budget is $24.5 billion, a $7.1 billion
    or 40 percent increase over fiscal year 2022. Of the $7.1
    billion, however, $3 billion is for interservice transfers, as
    the Space Force assumes satellites and people from the Army and
    Navy, and the remaining $4.1 billion is for programmatic
    growth, still a 20 percent increase over fiscal year 2022.
        I will be looking to hear what is and transferred into the
    Space Force, especially with the transfer of uniformed Army and
    Navy personnel.
        The administration has submitted a proposal for a new
    personnel system that would treat the Space Force guardians as
    either full- or part-time components. The Reserves would fall
    into the part-time component, and I want to know more about
    this, given competing proposals for a Space National Guard.
        Finally, since the Space Force is a title 10 service, its
    purpose is to train and equip guardians to defend our assets in
    space, which is now a warfighting domain, given the action of
    Russia and China against our satellites. I want to know how our
    policy is developing to defend our space assets and, if
    necessary, ensure a near-peer adversary space system cannot be
    used to help a system attack on our forces on the ground or at
    sea during a conflict.
        Again, let me thank our witnesses for agreeing to appear
    today, and after opening statements, we will have a 5-minute
    round of questions to the witnesses.
        Senator Fischer?

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King.
        I join you in welcoming our witnesses. Thank you all for
    being here with us today and for the work that you do on behalf
    of this Nation.
        Dr. Plumb, it is good to see you again. I understand you
    will be testifying before this panel again next week. Three
    times in a row, that has to be some kind of record. We
    appreciate your service, sir, and we look forward to hearing
    from you and the other witnesses today about the continued
    evolution of the Department's national security space
    enterprise.
        It has been 2\1/2\ years since the founding of the Space
    Force. We welcome the panel's views on what progress has been
    made, particularly toward developing an acquisition system that
    delivers capabilities on a timeline that is responsive to the
    needs of our warfighters and paces the actions of our
    adversaries. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Our witnesses today are Mr. Frank Calvelli, Assistant
    Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and
    Logistics; Dr. John Plumb, welcome back, Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Space Policy; and General David D. Thompson, Vice
    Chief of Space Operations, United States Space Force.
        So, Mr. Frank Calvelli?

      STATEMENT OF FRANK CALVELLI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR
              FORCE FOR SPACE ACQUISITION AND INTEGRATION

        Mr. Calvelli. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and
    distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, it is an honor to
    appear before you to discuss the future of Space Acquisition.
    Thank you for asking me to testify. I am excited to join the
    Department and for this important work to come as we optimize
    Space Acquisition.
        As you know, we must do more, and quickly, to accelerate
    and improve Space Acquisition. Our adversaries are catching up,
    or in some cases, exceeding our capabilities. Strong
    partnerships between the Department, Congress, and the
    commercial industry are critical to outpace China and other
    adversaries.
        As I step into this new role, I would like to share with
    you my initial goals and priorities. These include: one,
    driving speed into our acquisitions in order to deliver new
    capabilities faster, to outpace our adversaries, and maintain
    the technological advantage we get as a Nation from space; two,
    making our space architectures are resilient so that it can be
    counted on during times of crisis and conflict; three,
    integrating our space architecture with other warfighting
    domains to give our warfighters a strategic edge; four, driving
    program management discipline across our acquisitions in order
    to ensure that we deliver new capabilities on schedule, on
    cost, and meeting requirements; and five, ensuring that our
    space and ground systems come together as a system and that our
    ground systems are more readily available before launch to take
    advantage of the new capabilities that we just put into space.
        I look forward to working with you over the coming months
    to continue the strong partnership between the Department and
    the Congress to optimize and strengthen Space Acquisition
    processes and outcomes. I look forward to your questions. Thank
    you.
        Senator King. Dr. Plumb?

     STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN F. PLUMB, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
                      OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY

        Mr. Plumb. Thank you, Chairman King, Ranking Member
    Fischer, Members of the Subcommittee.
        I appreciate the opportunity to testify today and get my
    frequent-flyer miles.
        As the first-ever Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
    Policy, I am committed to continuing DOD'S close partnership
    with Congress on advancing national security space interests.
    Space plays a critical role in American security, prosperity,
    and way of life. It enables and supports the entire Joint
    Force. It helps protect servicemembers in harm's way and it
    enables them to execute their mission and defend the Nation.
        Space provides indication and warning of emerging threats
    and attacks. It delivers the GPS [Global Positioning System]
    signals supporting rapid and precise global power projection.
    It generates intelligence to allow national decision-makers to
    anticipate risks and de-escalate crisis, and it enables those
    same decision-makers to command-and-control forces globally.
        In the tremendous growth of commercial space, largely due
    to U.S. business innovation, it is fueling an increasing
    important part of the U.S. economy. The growth of the U.S.
    Space Industrial Base affords DOD new opportunities to leverage
    commercial advancements to support national security.
        Space has, once again, captured the imagination of a new
    generation of Americans. This will inspire more students to
    pursue careers in the STEM disciplines and that will pay
    dividends to our national economy and national security in the
    future.
        Looking at the threat environment, China and Russia both
    seek to increase their military use of space and to exploit the
    perceived United States overreliance on space-based systems.
        China remains our pacing challenge, as Secretary Austin has
    said. They are developing and fielding a wartime space
    architecture. China has dramatically increased their quantity
    and quality of space and counterspace systems, increasing
    ground- and space-based antisatellite weapons to target United
    States and allied satellites.
        Russia maintains a large network of reconnaissance,
    communication, and navigation satellites, and they are also
    developing, testing, and fielding counterspace weapons,
    including ground-based and on-orbit capabilities to target
    United States and allied satellites. These threats require the
    U.S. to consider new approaches to ensuring our use of space,
    including developing more proliferated and, therefore, more
    resilient constellations.
        To that end, the President's fiscal year 2023 budget
    request seeks $27.6 billion for DOD space capabilities,
    including $4.7 billion to fund the transition to a new
    resilient missile-warning and missile-track architecture; $1.8
    billion to procure two GPS III follow-on satellites and to
    continue testing and integration of military GPS-user
    equipment; $1.6 billion for secure, survivable, and jam-
    resistant SATCOM; and $1.6 billion to procure six National
    Security Space Launch vehicles.
        In November, Russia conducted an irresponsible, destructive
    test of a direct-ascent ASAT [antisatellite weapon] missile,
    creating more than 1,500 pieces of trackable debris, hundreds
    of thousands of smaller pieces that threaten safe space
    operations in low-earth orbit.
        In contrast, the Department is committed to promoting norms
    of responsible behavior in space to ensure the space domain
    remains secure, stable, and accessible. The Deputy Secretary of
    Defense stated in December at the National Space Council
    meeting, the Department would like to see all nations agree to
    refrain from antisatellite weapons testing that create debris.
        At Vandenberg last month, Vice President Harris announced a
    U.S. commitment that the U.S. will not conduct destructive,
    direct-ascent ASAT missile testing. These types of tests
    jeopardize the long-term sustainability and safety of space for
    all. This includes human spaceflight programs and all
    commercial satellite operators. Ending destructive, direct-
    ascent ASAT missile tests is, therefore, in our national
    security interests and in our national economic interest. The
    U.S. has demonstrated a leadership with this commitment and
    encourages all nations to support responsible space behaviors.
        In conclusion, the threats facing the U.S. in space, and
    from space, continue to grow in both, quantity and quality.
    Countering those threats requires that we continue this
    longstanding bipartisan cooperation between DOD and the
    Congress. I am committed to sustaining those efforts and I am
    honored to work with this Committee to do so.
        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The statement of Mr. Plumb follows:]

                    Prepared Statement by Dr. John F. Plumb
                                  introduction
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, Members of the Subcommittee,
    thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the United States
    Space Force and associated programs.
        As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, I am
    responsible for the overall supervision of the policy of the Department
    of Defense (DOD) for space warfighting, as well as interagency
    coordination and international engagement on space policy and strategy.
    In addition to space, my policy portfolio includes those other
    strategic capabilities essential to integrated deterrence: cyberspace
    operations, nuclear weapons, missile defense, and countering weapons of
    mass destruction. I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before
    you as the first person confirmed to this new position, and I welcome
    the opportunity to address space policy, space security, and the role
    of space in DOD's approach to integrated deterrence. I am committed to
    continuing the close partnership between DOD and Congress on advancing
    our national security space interests.
                              importance of space
        Space plays a critical role in American security, prosperity, and
    way of life.
        Space contributes to our national security by enabling and
    supporting the entire Joint Force: our servicemembers on land, at sea,
    and in the air rely on space every single day to defend the Nation.
    Space capabilities provide indications and warning of emerging threats
    and attacks. Space systems deliver the positioning, navigation, and
    timing (PNT) signals that support rapid and precise global power
    projection. Space systems generate intelligence on operationally
    relevant timelines and allow national decision makers to anticipate
    risks and de-escalate crises, and space also enables those same
    decision makers to command and control forces in multiple theaters
    around the globe.
        Russia's unprovoked further invasion of Ukraine provides a timely
    example of the role of space in shaping the information environment.
    United States Government, allied, and commercial satellites tracked
    Russian military movements in the lead-up to the invasion, aiding
    senior decision makers and helping facilitate our early coordination
    with allies and partners. Satellites have continued to track the
    activities of Russian forces during the conflict and are contributing
    to the international effort to hold Russia accountable for its
    unprovoked invasion, while supporting the Ukrainian people in their
    fight against brutal Russian aggression.
        DOD's space capabilities provide value well beyond national
    security. The Department's Global Positioning System (GPS)
    constellation provides precise PNT signals that are used in an untold
    number of ways in both the civil and private sector. Examples include:
    routing cell phone data; synchronizing weather radars; timestamping
    financial transactions; geographical information systems (GIS); and
    driving from point A to point B in your car without getting lost. U.S.
    military satellites help support space-based environmental monitoring,
    including weather forecasting and climate change modeling. Our Overhead
    Persistent Infrared (OPIR) constellations are designed to provide
    missile warning and tracking capabilities, but also support crews on
    the ground fighting wildfires and help scientists track the impacts of
    climate change. DOD's space surveillance network supports the
    Department's space domain awareness mission but also provides
    foundational data that enables the safety of space operations and
    supports the global space situational awareness needs of all space
    operators.
        The explosive growth of commercial space, which has been successful
    due in large part to the remarkable innovation of U.S. businesses, is
    fueling an increasingly important part of the U.S. economy. That same
    growth presents DOD with new opportunities to leverage commercial
    technological advancements to support national security needs.
    Moreover, space is once again capturing the imagination of a new
    generation of Americans. This can inspire more students to pursue
    careers in STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics)
    disciplines, paying dividends to our national economy and national
    security in the future.
        A striking way to highlight the importance of space to U.S.
    national security can be found by reviewing the four Defense priorities
    of the 2022 National Defense Strategy. All four priorities require and
    rely on the ability of the United States to operate in space, both in
    peacetime and during conflict:

        1.  Defending the Homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain
    threat posed by the People's Republic of China (PRC).
        2.  Deterring strategic attacks against the United States, our
    Allies, and our partners.
        3.  Deterring aggression--while being prepared to prevail in
    conflict when necessary--prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-
    Pacific, then the Russia challenge in Europe.
        4.  Building a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem.
                             the threat environment
        In recent years, as the PRC and Russia have integrated space into
    their respective national and warfighting strategies. The threats
    facing the United States in space and from space have changed
    fundamentally and continue to grow in both quantity and capability.
        As Secretary Austin has made clear, China is the Department's
    pacing challenge. This holds true in space as it does in other domains.
    The United States developed most of our current space architecture in
    an era when space was perceived more or less as a sanctuary. In
    contrast, over the past decade China has dramatically increased the
    quantity and quality of its space and counterspace systems in order to
    develop and field a wartime space architecture. China is working to
    match or exceed United States capabilities in space to gain military,
    economic, and reputational benefits: it is integrating space services
    and satellite communications into its weapons and command-and-control
    systems; its counterspace capabilities pose a growing threat to United
    States and allied space systems and would be integral to potential
    military campaigns by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). China's
    wartime space architecture requires the United States to consider new
    approaches to ensuring our own use of space, including developing more
    proliferated--and therefore more resilient--constellations of our own.
        Russia also remains a key space competitor, maintaining a large
    network of reconnaissance, communications, and navigation satellites.
    Russia will continue to integrate space services into weapons and
    command-and-control systems, allowing quicker identification, tracking,
    and targeting of United States forces during a conflict. In recent
    years, Russia has focused on developing its civil and commercial space
    capabilities, and it is able to employ its civil and commercial remote
    sensing satellites to supplement its military-dedicated capabilities.
    Russia continues to train its military space elements and is
    developing, testing, and fielding counterspace weapons to target
                          u.s. and allied satellites.
        PRC and Russian military doctrines indicate that both countries
    view space as critical to modern warfare. They both consider the use of
    counterspace weapons as a means of reducing U.S. military effectiveness
    and a means for winning future wars. They both seek to leverage the
    space domain to gain informational, operational, and logistical
    advantages. And they both increasingly seek ways to expand their
    capabilities in space and to exploit the perceived U.S over-reliance on
    vulnerable space-based systems.
        As China and Russia improve their respective space and counterspace
    capabilities, both nations are integrating space scenarios into their
    military exercises. They continue to develop the means to deny others
    the use of space through employment of malicious cyberspace activities,
    including cyber attacks, against ground sites supporting space
    operations; both have developed sensor networks for tracking and
    targeting others' satellites; and both have extensive inventories of
    jamming capabilities to disrupt satellite communications. Russia and
    China have developed directed energy weapons to blind intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites, and they continue
    the development, testing, and proliferation of direct-ascent and on-
    orbit antisatellite weapons to hold at risk United States and allied
    space assets.
        Space, Integrated Deterrence, and the President's Budget Request
    Deterrence requires actions to reduce a competitor's perception of the
    benefits of aggression relative to restraint. Deterrence also requires
    credible capability and will to impose costs that would outweigh the
    benefits of aggression. Ultimately, deterrence is premised on altering
    a competitor's perceptions of the net benefits and costs of aggression.
        Assured space capabilities, and the ability to prevent hostile uses
    of space, are vital components of integrated deterrence across all
    domains and through all levels of competition, crisis, and conflict
    that the Department will leverage and continue to strengthen. In this
    regard, our fiscal year 2023 budget request would:

          Strengthen mission assurance and reduce the benefits of
    attacks in space by accelerating the transition to diverse,
    proliferated, and protected space architectures that will demonstrate
    our growing ability to maintain mission capable status in a degraded
    state and under sustained attack.

          Bolster our ability to fight through disruption by
    improving defensive capabilities and increasing options for
    reconstitution, thereby reducing the benefits of aggression in space.

          Expand and modernize our ability to deliver advanced
    capabilities to enable joint and combined operations across domains,
    and support national leadership decisions with assured missile warning,
    missile tracking, and secure nuclear command and control.

          Sustain our information advantages by improving our
    ability to integrate, defend, and reconstitute our ISR and decision
    systems on operationally relevant timelines to achieve our objectives,
    notwithstanding aggressive interference and deception.

          Advance and expand our architectures of: space-based
    sensors that provide indications and warning of threats to space
    systems; ISR capabilities that provide persistent, global information;
    and multi-function terrestrial sensors that provide additional
    opportunities to strengthen space domain awareness.

        More specifically, DOD's fiscal year 2023 national security space
    budget request seeks $27.6 billion in vital space capabilities,
    resilient architectures, and enhanced space command and control to
    support our terrestrial forces and keep space safe for military,
    civilian, and commercial operations. These investments include:
          Missile Warning: $4.7 billion would fund transition to
    new, resilient missile warning and missile tracking architectures,
    completion of the Next Generation OPIR Polar capability, and
    development of the associated enterprise ground portfolio that will
    track an increased range of threats, including hypersonic and
    maneuverable weapons.
          GPS Enterprise: $1.8 billion for PNT would fund
    procurement of two GPS III follow-on satellites and continues testing
    and lead platform integration of Military GPS User Equipment (MGUE)
    Increment 1 receivers capable of using our most protected, jamming-
    resistant GPS M-Code signals.
          Satellite Communications (SATCOM): $1.6 billion would
    fund development of secure, survivable, and jamming-resistant SATCOM
    capabilities.
          Launch Enterprise: $1.6 billion would fund six national
    security space launch vehicles for assured access to space across all
    of the orbits that we use.
                    norms and tenets of responsible behavior
        In previous hearings, this Subcommittee has helped increase
    visibility of the importance of norms and responsible behavior in space
    as an element of ensuring a safe operating environment and reducing the
    risks of misunderstandings and miscalculations that could lead to
    conflict and escalation. In collaboration with the Department of State,
    the Department is committed to promoting standards and norms of
    responsible behavior in space to shape the operating environment and
    ensure that the space domain remains secure, stable, and accessible.
        As a defense organization and one of the single largest space
    operators in the world, the Department has taken an important step
    toward these objectives by sharing tenets that describe our
    longstanding operational practices in space. We hope this step will set
    an example and help develop a shared understanding among nations of
    what constitutes safe and responsible behaviors for all military space
    operators, and help reduce the risks of misunderstanding and
    inadvertent escalation.
        In July 2021, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin signed a memorandum
    to DOD leadership that outlines guidance for DOD space operations in
    the form of five key ``Tenets of Responsible Behavior in Space.'' That
    guidance provides a clear and transparent statement of how Department
    of Defense Components will operate in space under normal circumstances.
    These Tenets of Responsible Behavior provide that our space operators,
    unless otherwise directed, will:

          Operate in, from, to, and through space with due regard
    to others and in a professional manner;

          Limit the generation of long-lived debris;

          Avoid the creation of harmful interference;

          Maintain safe separation and safe trajectory; and

          Communicate and make notifications to enhance the safety
    and stability of the domain.

        U.S. Space Force guardians, and military servicemembers from across
    the Joint Force who use space or deliver effects in space, operate
    consistent with these tenets. Furthermore, at the Secretary's
    direction, the U.S. Space Command continues to develop guidance
    regarding specific behaviors for DOD operations in the space area of
    responsibility that will continue to advance these tenets.
        On November 15, 2021, when Russia conducted a destructive test of a
    direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missile against an orbital target,
    the world saw clearly that not all nations adhere to the same sense of
    responsibility for their actions in space. That test created more than
    1,500 pieces of trackable debris (greater than 10 cm) and hundreds of
    thousands of smaller pieces that pose a threat to the safe operation of
    satellites in low Earth orbit, including to astronauts on the
    International Space Station and on a growing number of other platforms.
    The threats that such irresponsible behavior present for the interests
    of all space operators are one reason why the Deputy Secretary of
    Defense stated at the December 1, 2021, National Space Council meeting
    that the Department ``would like to see all nations agree to refrain
    from anti-satellite weapons testing that creates debris.''
        The United States Government took an important step toward that
    broad goal on April 18, 2022, at Vandenberg Space Force Base, when Vice
    President Harris announced a U.S. commitment to not conduct destructive
    direct-ascent ASAT missile testing. This non-legally binding commitment
    is focused on stopping the single most impactful and threatening
    behavior to the space domain at the present time: the destructive
    testing of direct-ascent ASAT missiles, which degrades the space
    operating environment. Destructive direct-ascent ASAT missile testing
    jeopardizes the long-term sustainability of space and imperils the
    exploration and use of space by all nations. Destructive direct-ascent
    ASAT missile tests place not just U.S. Government satellites at risk--
    civil and national security programs alike--but place commercial
    satellites at risk as well. At the dawn of this new era of rapidly
    increasing commercial access to and use of space, in order to protect
    the economic benefits the United States derives from space now and in
    the future, ending destructive direct-ascent ASAT missile tests is more
    important than ever.
        This commitment, a unilateral statement of restraint in the space
    domain that is in our national interest as well as in the interest of
    all spacefaring nations, demonstrates that we are renewing U.S.
    leadership on the world stage. We are going to lead by example, but we
    will be working in partnership with the Department of State to
    encourage other nations to consider making similar commitments over the
    coming weeks and months.
                allies and partners in combined space operations
        U.S. allies and partners provide an asymmetric strategic advantage
    that our adversaries cannot hope to match. The United States and its
    partners in the Combined Space Operations (CSpO) initiative--Australia,
    Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom--are
    increasingly focused on ensuring freedom of access in space, and
    recognize the role that space plays in our security and in our ability
    to deter aggression. On February 22, 2022, the CSpO partners published
    the ``Combined Space Operations Vision 2031,'' which addresses the
    overarching need to encourage responsible use of space, recognizing the
    challenges to space sustainability, the threats presented by
    technological advances, and the increasingly comprehensive and
    aggressive counterspace programs of other nation states.
        The CSpO Vision 2031 describes a common mission to generate and
    improve cooperation, coordination, and interoperability to sustain
    freedom of action in space, optimize resources, enhance mission
    assurance and resilience, and prevent conflict. It sets forth common
    objectives focused on:

          Preventing conflict extending to or originating in space
    while promoting security and stability in all domains;

          Achieving unity of effort through information sharing
    across multiple classification levels and real-time synchronized
    networked operations centers operated by a workforce with common
    training;

          Establishing and maintaining a robust, responsive, and
    interoperable space infrastructure enabling continued space effects in
    the face of adverse action or changes to the space domain; and

          Defending and protecting our national interests and the
    space domain.

        As our competitors continue to advance their capabilities and
    capacity to use space and hold U.S. space systems at risk, space
    partnerships like those we are developing through CSpO will
    fundamentally strengthen deterrence.
                                   conclusion
        The security environment in the space domain is undergoing
    significant changes. Those changes can increase opacity and risk of
    miscalculation during a crisis or conflict. The risk of inadvertent
    escalation is high in the space domain due to the lack of clear norms
    of behavior, unclear escalation thresholds, complex domain
    interactions, and the rapid introduction of new capabilities, including
    adversarial counterspace capabilities. The Department remains committed
    to strengthening our space mission assurance, denying hostile uses of
    space, advancing international norms for responsible behavior in space,
    and maintaining our strategic advantages in space, including through
    our increasingly robust international space partnerships with our
    longstanding allies and partners. The Vice President's announcement of
    a non-legally binding U.S. commitment to not conduct destructive
    direct-ascent ASAT missile testing, and our investments to accelerate
    resilience in our space architectures as facilitated by DOD's fiscal
    year 2023 national security space budget request, provide clear
    examples of this overarching commitment.
        The United States and our allies and partners are ready for the
    challenge. Here at home, U.S. advances in our approach to space
    security over the past decade are a result of persistent, bipartisan
    effort and close cooperation between the Executive and Legislative
    branches of our government. I am committed to sustaining those efforts
    and honored to work with the Congress, our DOD civilians and Military
    servicemembers, my interagency colleagues, U.S. industry, and our
    international allies and partners in a common cause to secure the
    advantages of space for our national interests.

        Senator King. General Thompson?

      STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID D. THOMPSON, USSF, VICE CHIEF OF
                            SPACE OPERATIONS

        General Thompson. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer,
    and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
    the opportunity to testify today.
        It is an honor to appear before you on behalf of the
    Secretary of the Air Force, the Honorable Frank Kendall, the
    Chief of Space Operations, General Jay Raymond, and the 14,000
    guardians around the world executing our space missions today.
        U.S. military success and great power competition depends
    on access to and freedom to operate in space, while denying the
    same to our adversaries. In 2019, Congress established the
    Space Force to organize, train, equip, and present forces to
    deter hostile action and protect U.S. interests in space and to
    secure the domain for stable, peaceful use.
        Space capabilities are a cornerstone of integrated
    deterrence, not just in space, but in every domain and those
    space capabilities that we operate underpin every aspect of our
    national security. At the same time, our space systems and use
    of the domain remain under threat by competitor nations.
        China remains our pacing challenge. In 2021, the PRC
    continued to accelerate the integration of space capabilities
    into its military operations, especially space-based
    surveillance, intelligence, and reconnaissance, which puts the
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, we protect and support
    at great risk. Additionally, Russia's overarching strategy
    remains to challenge the United States in space; that is
    unchanged for decades. It is continuing to improve its military
    space capabilities as well. Both nations are also developing
    and deploying an array of kinetic and non-kinetic counterspace
    weapons that threaten U.S. systems in every orbital regime, on
    the ground, and in cyberspace.
        In response to these challenges, and in keeping with the
    reasons the Space Force was established, we continue to make
    substantial progress in the design, development, and fielding
    of space capabilities that maintain our freedom to operate in
    space. We advance recruiting, training, and educating the
    workforce that is demanded to operate in such a highly
    technical domain, and in putting in place the intelligence,
    analytic, and test foundations that ensure success of our
    forces in future conflict.
        The President's fiscal year 2023 budget request for the
    Space Force does this in several ways. As examples, it
    initiates the first major transformation to a resilient force
    structure with a proliferated missile-warning, missile-tracking
    architecture, which is also capable of tracking hypersonic and
    maneuvering vehicles. It enhances our awareness of all
    activities in space and the ability to command and control
    forces in this increasingly dynamic domain. It begins the
    build-out of an operational test and training infrastructure
    that will generate the military readiness appropriate to the
    challenges we face, and it allows us to assume full authority
    for the preparation, training, and management of the 14,000
    guardians, who are Space Force's greatest asset and its primary
    instrument.
        I look forward to discussing these and many other aspects
    of our request in more detail with you in today's hearing and
    as we partner in the coming months. Your support and enactment
    of the fiscal year 2023 defense authorization bill will enable
    the Space Force to remain the world's leader in space and to
    continue to preserve freedom of action for the Nation.
        Thank you for your continued advocacy and support. We are
    eager to work with your committee to build a strategy and make
    the investments needed to secure our Nation's vital interests.
        [The joint prepared statement by The Honorable Frank
    Calvelli and General David D. Thompson follows:]

     Joint Prepared Statement by The Honorable Frank Calvelli and General
                               David D. Thompson
                                  introduction
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, Distinguished Members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the
    Secretary of the Air Force, the Honorable Frank J. Kendall III, the
    Chief of Space Operations, General John W. ``Jay'' Raymond, and the
    airmen and guardians tasked with organizing, training and equipping
    forces to advance American interests in space. In its third year of
    existence, the Space Force continues to make tremendous progress in
    addressing national security challenges and threats of the space
    domain, and in building out the blueprint of a 21st century, mission-
    focused military service.
        Space remains vital to our security and our way of life. U.S.
    military success in great power competition depends on access and
    freedom to operate in space. Over the past two decades, the space
    domain has shifted from a benign to a contested environment. Our
    adversaries are increasingly disruptive and hostile. To better protect
    our national interests, in December 2019 the Space Force was
    established with an explicit mandate to: (1) provide the United States
    freedom of operation in, from, and to space, and (2) conduct prompt and
    sustained space operations. Today, and every day, our guardians
    accomplish these tasks for the Nation ensuring unprecedented space
    capabilities for warfighters, allies, and civilians.
        The Space Force provides the joint force and our allies and
    partners essential services vital to effective military operations.
    Unique services such as missile warning; positioning, navigation and
    timing; communications; and space-enabled tracking and targeting, make
    our Armed Forces the most flexible and lethal on the planet. These
    services, also make the United States a valued security partner. The
    Space Force delivers unmatched capability in these missions today and
    is developing the next generation of capabilities to meet requirements
    in the future.
        Space Force capabilities and readiness contribute to integrated
    deterrence, strategic campaigning, and building an enduring advantage.
    We believe integrated deterrence starts in space. The Space Force must
    deliver resilient space capabilities and contribute to protecting
    terrestrial forces from adversary space capabilities that are an
    increasingly effective element of their combat operations.
        Given growing strategic competition, it is imperative that the
    Space Force has the resources to modernize our forces to ensure freedom
    of action in, from, and to space. The President's Fiscal Year 2023
    Budget Request for the Space Force initiates a necessary
    transformation, beginning with fielding a resilient missile warning and
    tracking architecture to detect and maintain custody of emergent
    hypersonic and maneuverable missile technologies, while making
    survivability under attack a key attribute of the design.
                             the space environment
    Foreign Space Threats
        Space capabilities underpinning our national security remain
    threatened by adversary nations. Our competitors enjoy growing access
    to increasingly affordable space services and technology, multiplying
    threats beyond traditional space powers. Expanded intelligence for
    space will be vital to staying abreast of current and future threats.
        The People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia continue to improve
    their military space and counterspace capabilities. Correspondingly,
    their overarching strategy remains to challenge the U.S. in space.
    These countries are developing and deploying an array of kinetic and
    non-kinetic counterspace weapons that threaten U.S. space systems in
    all orbital regimes and their associated ground systems. They are also
    developing and deploying space-based Intelligence, Surveillance and
    Reconnaissance (ISR) systems that will be able to observe U.S. and
    Allied forces in all domains and all regions of the globe.
        The PRC is the pacing challenge in the space domain, possessing on-
    orbit military capabilities rivaling those of the United States, and is
    pursuing a diverse counterspace weapons development program. The PRC
    calls space a critical domain in strategic competition, and they are
    now a spacefaring superpower who has launched more satellites into
    orbit than any country other than the United States. The PRC's growing
    commercial space sector enhances their industrial base and drives
    foreign dependency on Chinese technology. The People's Liberation Army
    (PLA) has developed robust and capable space services--ISR,
    communications, weather, and navigation constellations--that give PLA
    forces the integrated information needed to threaten U.S. joint
    operations in all domains. An example of the type of threat we must be
    able to defeat occurred in the summer of 2021 when the PRC launched a
    missile that deployed a hypersonic glide vehicle that circled the globe
    and flew back to hit a target in China. This test effectively
    demonstrates possession of the technologies needed for an unwarned,
    maneuvering fractional orbital bombardment system. We are actively
    working on systems to combat threats like this.
        Russia remains dangerous with substantial space capacity, advanced
    technical and scientific capabilities, and a commitment to develop a
    broad array of counterspace weaponry. For example, Russia has seven
    prototypes in orbit that are capable of destroying other satellites. As
    demonstrated this past November, Russia's ground-based ``Nudol''
    missile is designed to destroy Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites. That
    Nudol test destroyed a defunct Russian satellite, creating more than
    1,500 pieces of debris, and threatening the International Space Station
    and other satellites in LEO.
    Standards of Responsible Behavior
        All nations share in the benefits, and costs, of human activity in
    space. Long-standing U.S. space policy promotes the long-term safety,
    security, stability, and sustainability of the space domain. The United
    States continues to partner with like-minded spacefaring nations in
    championing Norms of Responsible Behavior under the leadership of the
    National Space Council. Recently, Vice President Kamala Harris, who
    chairs the National Space Council, set a new international standard
    when she stated the U.S. commits not to conduct destructive direct-
    ascent anti-satellite missile testing. Likewise, we must continue to
    lead and advocate for responsible space behavior while developing
    systems that protect and counter our adversary's capabilities. The
    Space Force supports the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
    Policy, U.S. Space Command, and other Department of Defense (DOD)
    components as they develop guidance regarding the Tenets of Responsible
    Behavior in Space for DOD operations. The Space Force is also engaging
    allies and partners on the importance of responsible behavior via
    initiatives like the Combined Space Operations forum and conducting
    international space wargames.
                             space force year three
        Following the first two years of our existence, where the Space
    Force first blueprinted the design for a 21st century military service
    and aggressively built out the multi-year plan in detail, we are
    delivering on the expectations set by our Nation's leaders.
    Force Design
        The Space Force utilizes the Space Warfighting Analysis Center
    (SWAC) to develop force design processes to assess the fielding of
    space systems through the lens of operational need and requirements
    satisfaction, vulnerability and performance under attack, and cost.
    This process postures us for the first time to make architecture and
    programmatic decisions based on a clear understanding of warfighter
    needs, enabling concepts, budget, threat projections, while accounting
    for technology constraints and opportunities.
        The missile warning/missile tracking mission trailblazed this
    process and successfully informed our fiscal year 2023 budget
    submission. On-going force design efforts include Space Data Transport,
    Tactical ISR and space-based support to active missile defense, with
    Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) and Space Domain Awareness to
    follow. These activities also serve to build out the analytic base
    required to support additional force design, and modeling and
    simulation in support of testing and training.
        The SWAC's ability to use a ``clean-slate'' approach--without pre-
    conceived ties to previous acquisition strategies or programs and
    without any preference to a particular mission set or function within
    the Space Force, allows the SWAC to act objectively on behalf of the
    Service, joint warfighters, and the entire national security space
    enterprise.
    Integrator for Joint Space Requirements
        Through the SWAC's leadership in the new force design process, the
    Space Force has laid the foundation to succeed in their role as the DOD
    lead for integrating joint space requirements. In this role the Space
    Force engages Combatant Commands (CCMDs), the other Services,
    Intelligence Community (IC), U.S. Government (USG) agencies, industry,
    and Allies to understand, document and inform requirements satisfaction
    (validated through Joint Requirements Oversight Council), programming
    and budgeting, and acquisition strategies. The Space Force is working
    with the Joint Staff to fully codify this role and is currently
    exploring development of an implementation plan to execute this role
    that will facilitate consolidation of space requirements from across
    the Joint Force, identify capability gaps, advocate for DOD space
    requirements at joint forums and inform budget decisions.
    Guardian Training and Education
        In August 2021, General Raymond activated the Space Training and
    Readiness Command (STARCOM) to focus on service responsibilities to
    recruit, train, educate, and develop ALL Guardians, military and
    civilian. Space-centered training has been incorporated into all Space
    Force military accessions training programs and we have created space-
    focused programs at Air University (AU). These initial steps strive to
    create independent, space-focused education programs for all Guardians
    and the Joint Force. In September 2021, the Space Force published the
    Guardian Ideal, Space Force Values, and the Guardian Commitment. All
    three are foundational to the new Space Force team-centric culture and
    will guide how we recruit, train, develop, and employ Guardians as a
    part of our interconnected high-performing teams.
        The Space Force is developing Science, Technology, Engineering, and
    Mathematics (STEM) focused officer-candidate development and Advanced
    Academic Degree (AAD) opportunities for all Guardians via the
    University Partnership Program (UPP). USSF partnerships with select
    STEM focused universities facilitates Guardian acquisition of technical
    degrees most needed by the USSF. Guardians pursuing AADs at these
    schools have the opportunity to conduct research projects mutually
    beneficial to the school and USSF. In fiscal year 2021, UPP began with
    11 universities that are top suppliers of talent to U.S. aerospace and
    defense industries. The program will expand to at least 13 schools in
    fiscal year 2022. UPP universities have Reserve Officers' Training
    Corps (ROTC) Detachments that consistently commission the most cadets,
    and are amongst the top engineering schools in the country.
    Space Operational Testing and Training Infrastructure
        The National Space Test and Training Complex (NSTTC), a core
    element of the Space Force's Operational Test and Training
    Infrastructure (OTTI), is foundational to testing and evaluating space
    warfighting systems, as well as providing Guardians with a threat-
    representative training platform.
        Currently, there is no national capability for enterprise-level
    testing and training of our space assets and infrastructure.
    Consequently, our ability to establish, assess, and maintain readiness
    in an increasingly contested intellectual and increasingly congested
    physical space environment is minimal. NSTTC will provide a multi-
    venue, operationally-relevant environment for the testing, training,
    and evaluation of both material investments and non-material processes
    to inform current and emerging warfighting requirements and
    capabilities.
    Space as a Digital Service
        For most in the joint force, the space domain is experienced
    digitally via the data and services provided by space systems. Because
    of the highly technical nature, the Space Force requires a workforce
    that has the digital fluency to rapidly turn data into useful insights
    to accelerate innovation of operational and business activities.
    Digital aptitude remains essential to help lead the transformation to
    becoming an interconnected, innovative, digitally-dominant force in
    order to deter and defeat threats to space operations. To achieve this
    goal, the Space Force has provided Digital University access to all
    Guardians, which incorporates curated digital content designed to
    establish a foundational level of fluency on modern digital topics.
        The Space Force remains on the forefront of digital transformation
    to meet demand for existing and emerging needs. The President's fiscal
    year 2023 budget request reflects this commitment. For example, the
    Space Force intends to continue building a cadre of organic software
    coders (``Supracoders'') to streamline software development and promote
    the adoption of software technology that will prove instrumental to
    Space Force operations, testing, and training. We plan to train 90 in
    fiscal year 2023, bringing the total number in the force to more than
    200.
    Unit/Mission Transfers
        In accordance with existing statute and congressional intent, the
    DOD intends to transfer fully mission-capable space operational units,
    support equipment, property, and related resources to the Space Force
    with no mission degradation or adverse personnel actions. Across the
    FYDP, the Space Force will accept the transfer of 15 global units, 319
    military billets, 259 civilian billets, and $2.5 billion in budgetary
    resources.
        Specific to 2022, the Space Force intends to incorporate the Navy
    Narrowband Satellite System and Army Wideband Payload Operations, upon
    certification to the defense appropriation committees. To ensure
    mission continuity, the DOD is offering civilians and military
    personnel assigned to such units the opportunity to volunteer to
    transfer with the unit to the Space Force. The Space Force has
    established a selection board, including service liaisons, to oversee
    individual personnel transfers.
        Looking forward, and in accordance with Title 10, United States
    Code, Section 9086, the DOD will transfer the Space Development Agency
    (SDA) no later than October 01 2022. In the coming months, the SDA
    plans to transfer offices and operations centers in the National
    Capital Region and other areas around the country, along with 36
    military and 67 civilian personnel billets and associated budgetary
    resources.
    Space Force End Strength
        Sufficient end strength is critical to implementing the long-term
    vision of the DOD and consolidating all of the Armed Forces space
    missions and forces into the Space Force. The fiscal year 2022 National
    Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)--authorized military end strength for
    the Space Force is 8,400 and includes 319 servicemembers projected to
    be realigned from the Army and Navy units. Prior to fiscal year 2023,
    Space Force end strength was included in U.S. Air Force military
    personnel appropriations. The Space Force will have a separate end
    strength appropriation starting with the fiscal year 2023 President's
    Budget.
                               space acquisition
        The Department of the Air Force, in partnership with the United
    States Space Force, is forging a new paradigm for how we acquire
    national security space systems. To realize our vision for space
    acquisition, we are implementing changes in all aspects of how we
    conduct business. The Department of the Air Force pursued a unity of
    effort approach to acquisition with the Secretary of the Air Force
    instituting the office of Space Acquisition and Integration and the
    activation of Space Systems Command. These changes realign our
    structure to lead and advance integrated acquisition efforts. Through
    that integration role, the Department and the Space Force are pursuing
    a flexible approach to Space Acquisition. This strategy will enable us
    to not only meet warfighter requirements, but also meet the pacing
    challenges required to project global power, and incentivize the
    civilian space industry. We are utilizing forums such as the Program
    Integration Council (PIC) and the Space Acquisition Council (SAC), to
    achieve synergistic efforts, while tapping into emerging technical
    advancements necessary for us to remain technology leaders and more
    importantly, maintain U.S. space superiority.
        By leveraging the PIC to unite senior leaders from the Space
    Systems Command (SSC), Space Rapid Capabilities Office, Department of
    the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office, Space Development Agency,
    National Reconnaissance Office, Missile Defense Agency, United States
    Space Command, Space Operations Center, and the Air Force Research
    Laboratory, we have improved communication and coordination necessary
    to align efforts and achieve synergy across the National Security Space
    enterprise.
        The Space Force, in partnership with the Missile Warning/Missile
    Tracking/Missile Defense Enterprise community, built upon the Overhead
    Persistent Infrared (OPIR) Enterprise Architecture Strategy delivered
    to Congress in October 2020 to formalize Missile Warning and Missile
    Tracking force design and acquisition strategies. This ensures OPIR
    capabilities meet warfighter needs. New resilient Missile Warning/
    Missile Tracking space and ground architectures will transform the
    DOD's legacy missile warning force design. This distributed multi-orbit
    architecture will address emerging missile threats, and be protected,
    survivable, and reconstituted. The Department is heavily investing in
    fiscal year 2023, requesting $1.029 billion for this mission area.
        On January 27 2022, the SAC reviewed the Space Force Chief Strategy
    and Resourcing Officer's Missile Warning, Tracking, and Defense
    requirements allocation and associated recommendations for an
    Integration Plan proposed by Space Systems Command, the Space
    Development Agency, and Missile Defense Agency. The Integration Plan
    includes a governance concept with a combined program office that will
    enable coordinated capability development across the mission areas. In
    addition, Space Systems Command has the charge to execute system of
    systems integration to deliver an end-to-end, sensor-to-shooter
    capability.
        The Department is also heavily investing in mission areas such as
    strategic communications and space domain awareness. For Enhanced
    Strategic SATCOM, the Space Force is pursuing a competitive acquisition
    strategy for the space segment through rapid prototyping, which is
    maturing the industrial base, driving innovationand controlling costs.
    The Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability provides all-weather, ground-
    based radars to detect, track, and maintain custody of deep space
    objects around the clock, and recently was authorized to proceed on
    Middle Tier Acquisition (MTA) Rapid Prototyping pathway for its first
    site. Fiscal year 2023 is an important investment year for the design
    and development for Operational Leave-behind Capability by fiscal year
    2025.
        National Security Space Launch (NSSL) has an unprecedented record
    of mission success, maintaining a 100% mission success track record
    while continuing to lower the cost of mission assurance. Since 2013,
    the Department has saved over seven billion dollars in NSSL
    procurements due to block buys and competitive acquisition strategies,
    which has allowed reallocation to other capabilities for the
    warfighter. The fiscal year 2023 priority is to complete certification
    of the Vulcan and Falcon Heavy launch systems to ensure we can meet all
    reference orbits and maintain assured access to space. Additionally, we
    are meeting Congressional intent to stop using the Russian RD-180. The
    USSF has four remaining Atlas V launch services that use the RD-180
    engines, which are all launching over the next 18 months. That will end
    our dependency on foreign made engines.
        At the same time, we have remained focused on acquisition advances.
    Space Systems Command continued to improve GPS for the warfighter by
    awarding contracts for three more GPS IIIF satellites. This new
    generation provides regional military protection capability, an M-code
    signal that can be concentrated on a particular region, and provides
    over 140x times greater anti-jamming measures over legacy signals.
    These advancements ensure our military personnel can access critical
    PNT data in contested environments.
        We appreciate Congress` support in providing authorities needed to
    deliver capabilities at the speed of relevance for the warfighter.
    Using MTA authorities, we are rapidly identifying, prototyping, and
    fielding innovative solutions for some of the most pressing challenges
    we face. Nine programs currently utilize MTAs, but we are also
    increasing flexibility through non-traditional approaches, such as the
    Space Enterprise Consortium (SpEC) Other Transaction Authority (OTA)
    agreements. Authorities like these are paramount to improving
    engagement with our commercial partners. A thriving commercial sector
    presents increased opportunity for the Department to leverage
    commercial space services, for DOD to provide a demand signal to
    stimulate commercial sector innovation, and to further build and
    diversify the industrial base and incubates capabilties that may meet
    future requirements.
        In order to rapidly increase the resiliency and move at the speed
    of relevance, we are leveraging our partnerships with industry,
    academia, allies, and our international partners around the globe.
    These partnerships are essential for ensuring we are harnessing
    emergent technologies into the space enterprise. SSC`s Front Door is
    designed to be a single focal point for strategic commercial
    partnerships and to establish a diversified and enduring marketplace
    for the Joint Force to purchase and receive essential services. Through
    activities such as Pitch Days, similar to commercial investment pitch
    competitions, it is now easier for start-ups and other non-traditional
    companies to bring their commercial solutions to the Department. This
    is just one innovative example of how the Department of the Air Force
    will exceed the pace of demand and become increasingly more agile than
    our Nation`s adversaries.
        We will also be leveraging lessons learned from the Space
    Development Agency as we begin the formal transfer of that organization
    into the Space Force at the beginning of Fiscal Year 2023. This
    transition will enhance the Department`s ability to integrate
    innovative acquisition approaches and deliver new satellites and ground
    system prototypes into the operational baseline for the Space Force.
        Technology and pacing threats are evolving at an ever-increasing
    rate. Achieving enduring advantages means the Space Force must undergo
    a transformation from current legacy systems to the architectures
    needed to be competitive. The Space Force is leveraging technology to
    deliver game-changing space capabilities.and solidify an ecosystem
    through our University Research Consortium. Quantum technologies,
    counter-hypersonics, and artificial intelligence/machine learning are
    several of the emerging technologies that are necessary to integrate
    into the Space Force architectures to stay ahead of potential
    adversaries.
                                   conclusion
        In conclusion, the Department of the Air Force and United States
    Space Force stand ready to provide forces and capabilities that protect
    and defend U.S. interests in space. As General Raymond has stated:
    ``America's Space Force will be Semper Supra, always above. We are
    moving swiftly to establish a lean, innovative Service and a rapid,
    agile acquisition process ready to meet the challenges of today and the
    future. We stand ready to protect and deter, and to fight and win in
    freedom's high frontier.'' \1\ We would like to thank the Congress for
    your leadership and support.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ John W. ``Jay'' Raymond, (Gen, SPACE FORCE), Chief of Space
    Operations, ``Chief of Space Operations Planning Guidance,'' November
    2020.

        Senator King. Thank you.
        The first point I want to make is that we are in the
    process now of putting together the National Defense
    Authorization Act for this year, literally in a matter of--the
    paperwork is moving, so we are talking about in a matter of
    weeks.
        To the extent any of you, or the Secretary, has, or the
    Commanding General have suggestions or needs or thoughts about
    authorities or modifications to current statute, as it, as you
    have grown into this new force, please let us know as soon as
    possible so that we might consider those as amendments or as
    proposals in this year's National Defense Act. So, I hope you
    will consider that an open invitation. The other way to put it
    is: Don't complain next summer when you didn't get what you
    want if you don't tell us what you need.
        Dr. Plumb, Section 1602 of the 2022 Act requires the
    Secretary of Defense to designate the Chief of Space Operations
    as the force design architect for the space systems by March of
    this year, 2022. This is important. We give the same
    designation to the Chief of Naval Operations for the fleet at
    sea and the Chief of the Air Force for planes in the air.
    During our Air Force posture hearing, Senator Reed asked the
    Chief of Space Operations whether this designation had
    occurred, and he said it was still residing in the Office of
    Secretary of Defense Space Policy.
        Why has this not occurred and when will it occur?
        Mr. Plumb. Thank you, Senator.
        I have spoken with General Raymond about that, and I have
    spoken with your staff about this. So, I was really alerted to
    this just last week. I immediately took it to my office, so my
    office is now responsible for it. I have initiated
    conversations with OGC, Office of General Counsel, on getting
    this right. I will get that done. It is a little bit new
    because it has all space in it, but we will get that
    designation done.
        I will point out that, I think functionally speaking, and
    General Thompson may want to weigh in, but that functionally
    speaking, I believe the CSO [Chief of Space Operations] is the
    Force's architect at this point, but that is not the same as
    formalizing it as you have asked. So, I will do that. It will
    take a little bit of time to get it through the building.
        Senator King. Well, I hope a little bit of time is measured
    in weeks and not months.
        Mr. Plumb. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        This is a somewhat difficult situation because we are
    talking about some things that are public and a lot of things
    that aren't and we have to be careful in our discussion. But as
    your testimony indicates, we know that both, China and Russia:
    (A) are establishing a major presence in space; (B) are
    establishing a capability to hold our satellites and our space
    assets at risk.
        Insofar as you can testify in an open session, please
    outline our strategy, if you will, for protecting our assets
    and dealing with what is now a highly contested domain, which
    wasn't the case until pretty recently.
        General?
        General Thompson. Senator, I will outline that, I will say,
    in three primary points today. The first element of the
    strategy is to fully and deeply understand all of the
    activities in the domain: what objects are out there; the
    things that they do; their capabilities; whether or not they
    pose a threat to us, our capabilities and our assets; the
    capabilities, techniques, tactics, doctrine that might be used
    in their employment; and to be able to ensure that we have
    indications and warnings should an attack be coming. A lot of
    the investment in our budget and the work we have been doing to
    date creates the space domain awareness infrastructure and
    architecture that we need to do that.
        The second thing is, many of the space systems that are on
    orbit today and will be for years to come, were not designed to
    operate in a domain like this and under threat; however, there
    are things that we can and are doing to them to increase their
    ability to be defended and to contribute to their own defense,
    things like: ensuring that additional fuel remains onboard in
    case we need to maneuver; looking at ways to make them more
    difficult targets to track and, ultimately, to attack; and
    let's just say in this setting, other systems, other
    capabilities and other tactics that will make them more
    difficult to attack and destroy, should an adversary attempt to
    do so.
        The third major component of our strategy is to create
    those resilient architectures going forward that are much
    harder, that are survivable by design and less vulnerable in
    terms of protection. The primary mechanism by which we do that,
    and we intend to do that, is rather than architectures today
    that consist of a relatively small number of very capable, very
    sophisticated satellites, building architectures with larger
    numbers of less capable, less expensive satellites, that in
    aggregate, give us the same capability. In fact, in this
    budget, our request for the missile-warning, missile-tracking
    architecture that we have proposed is the first major step for
    the architectures in that regard.
        So, in this setting, those are the three major points of
    making us more defendable and more resilient in space.
        Senator King. Thank you. Excellent.
        Senator Fischer?
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Thompson, I appreciate the Space Force's effort to
    pivot towards proliferated satellite architectures. The
    resilient missile-warning, missile-tracking program that I
    discussed with General Raymond at the full committee hearing
    last week, is but one example of that.
        I agree with the conceptional advantages distributed
    architectures provide, but how ready is the industrial base to
    meet production needs associated with those much larger
    constellations?
        General Thompson. Madam Senator, I would say that it is
    probably as ready as it has been in the last several decades
    and for several reasons. One is, we maintain some sort of
    capability in terms of the production of our current satellites
    and some of the investments in technology and prototyping, but
    a great portion of the industrial base is expanding because of
    commercial investment.
        While there are some specific aspects of military and
    national security space systems that don't lend themselves to
    commercial investment, a vast majority of the operating
    techniques, the subsystems used would apply both, to commercial
    investment and to military national security investment, as
    well. So, while there are some very specific niche capabilities
    that we have pursued and we have maintained with competition in
    various aspects, and I think the investment we are seeing in
    commercial space has served all of us well in creating a more
    robust and more capable industrial base to address our space
    needs.
        Senator Fischer. Do you see limitations or bottlenecks on
    certain things like refrigeration units, for example?
        General Thompson. I would say there are a few very boutique
    capabilities for which we probably have a few bottlenecks. Some
    of the sophisticated sensors that we use, the sensor elements
    and those aspects of them, we do, but generally speaking, when
    you think about the subsystems onboard a spacecraft, whether it
    is power subsystems, propulsion subsystems, attitude control,
    generally speaking, there are not bottlenecks in that regard,
    but there are for some of the very specialized capabilities and
    specialized technologies, there are a few.
        Senator Fischer. You don't find that a limitation?
        General Thompson. I would say it is, but I cannot point
    specifically today to any space system whose development is
    being held up due to the lack of the readiness of a capability
    or a provider for those capabilities.
        Senator Fischer. When the Space Force is looking at
    architecture or design, is there a process through which it
    takes industrial base limitations into account so that we don't
    produce plans are a technically sound, but not feasible?
        General Thompson. Yes, ma'am, there is.
        Really, what happens is, and it is part of a longstanding
    process, but part of our new process, one of the new processes
    that we created in our Space Warfighting Analysis Center was to
    bring in industry early and any Force-design activity that we
    are performing, providing them with our requirements, our
    design concepts, the results of our analysis as to how, in
    fact, we intend to accomplish missions, provide them with all
    of that data and ask them to provide input directly, or come
    back later after the fact. That is one point in time in which
    we can have the conversation about whether the technology is
    there.
        But the second point is when we then take those designs and
    hand them over to Mr. Calvelli and the Acquisition team, that
    is where they truly begin the extensive review of all the
    expected technologies, and as part of the system acquisition
    process, determine whether the technology is available, whether
    it is ready, whether there is risk-reduction and prototyping
    work that needs to be required, and assess the risks and effort
    required to either, deliver the system or come back and say,
    unfortunately, the technology is probably too risky to pursue
    at that point.
        Senator Fischer. Did you have anything, Mr. Secretary, you
    wanted to add to that?
        Mr. Calvelli. No, I think General Thompson nailed it really
    well.
        You are right, ma'am, you don't want to start down an
    acquisition that you can't execute because of the supply chain
    or technology issues, so you have to take a really close look
    up front and make sure whatever you are going to decide to put
    out in that request proposal and then put under contract is
    actually something you can achieve.
        Senator Fischer. You know, we have to meet the needs of
    combatant commanders at STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command],
    especially, and there has been, I would say, some questions
    raised on the ability to meet those needs and what is needed as
    a resource to do that. Thank you.
        Senator King. Senator Cotton?
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, Gentlemen.
        Mr. Secretary, from where I sit on this committee and the
    Intelligence Committee, it seems like the NRO [National
    Reconnaissance Office] has been slightly more successful in
    delivering space capabilities in a timely and efficient
    fashion.
        Can you talk to us a little bit about your experiences
    there and what your plans are to help replicate that success in
    the Department.
        Mr. Calvelli. Yes, thank you, Senator.
        The NRO has a culture of programmatic discipline. It is
    inherent in its DNA. We expect our program managers to
    understand, technically, their programs, to understand their
    contracts, and to deliver on cost, on schedule, and meeting the
    requirements.
        From my position where I was at as the deputy there and
    working with the director, we also sort of oversaw and made
    sure that culture continued, and we managed our programs. We
    managed our program element officers and our program managers
    to deliver. I mean, so that became just part of the culture
    over the last decade or so that, you know, it is really
    important that you hit your plan.
        The other thing is, you know, we really learned some things
    about making sure that when we put proposals out there that we
    really get realistic cost proposals back and realistic
    schedules, especially in a competitive environment. That is
    really key to ensure that you have that, so you know that
    whatever they are delivering to you is actually going to be
    executable. When you review proposals to make sure that you put
    in place the right contract strategy, the right contract
    incentives that are going to incentivize success.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. General Thompson, what do you think
    about that?
        General Thompson. Mr. Senator, I agree. I have got some
    experience, not on the acquisition side, but in the operational
    side of the NRO, and it really is that aspect of discipline in
    the execution of a program from start to finish and the
    tendency not to decide that each successive article needs to
    improve in capability, but rather, to provide consistent and
    expectations up front and throughout the schedule that makes it
    important.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. One interesting note from the war in
    Ukraine is that most people assess that Ukraine's
    communications or internet access would be cut off in the first
    days, really the first hours of the war. That did not happen,
    and it still has not happened. I think that is, in part, based
    on satellite-based internet.
        What lessons have we learned about what we can do, should
    we ever face a similar conflict with Russia and China, where
    they are trying to deny us that?
        Mr. Calvelli. Well, I think the one lesson that I have seen
    is that by adding and integrating commercial capabilities, that
    you are going to diversify your architecture and make it much
    more resilient, and so that has really been a great piece of
    the puzzle to actually watch happen how a commercial technology
    and commercial capability has added resiliency along the way.
        General Thompson. I would add to that that, I think what we
    are seeing as a result of their ability to be prevented from
    using space capabilities is also a reflection of these new
    proliferated architectures that are very difficult to deny
    overall. You may be able to deny a piece of it, but you can't
    eliminate the capability at large.
        As we look, we are beginning a new Force design activity to
    look at the future of space-based communications and data
    relay, not only bringing in commercial capability, but
    absolutely, that proliferated architecture that makes a network
    that is very difficult to defeat in total, is another element
    of what I think we are learning from Ukraine.
        Senator Cotton. All right. Mr. Plumb, any thoughts on that?
        Mr. Plumb. Yes, Senator. I would just add, I think it is a
    really good example of resilience means different things for
    different constellations and functions. So, for ISR
    [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] or for,
    actually, for missile-warning, missile-track, that is a
    proliferated set of orbits with IR [infrared] sensors. But
    SATCOM, in particular, on your question, there is a lot of
    commercial capacity. There is more coming in using that as a
    totally different approach to get to the same end, which is
    resiliency. It is really important.
        Senator Cotton. All right. Thank you.
        General Thompson, the budget brief highlights a $36 million
    investment in climate initiatives. Can you tell me a little bit
    more about that?
        General Thompson. Yes, sir, two things. First of all, it is
    really a matter of understanding our base infrastructure, the
    facilities, the power infrastructure. Most of our space
    capabilities are operated from home station. They operate 24/7.
    They have to operate in peacetime and wartime, and most of that
    is focused on ensuring that the power systems and the means by
    which our bases operate under all conditions can be sustained,
    regardless of peacetime, conflict, climate conditions, and
    things like that. That is part of it.
        The second aspect is, we do own part of the weather and
    meteorological mission for the Department of Defense and the
    Nation, and part of that investment includes our space-based
    environmental monitoring and some of the tools and techniques
    that we use to do that, as well.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. Thank you.
        Senator King. Senator Rounds?
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, first of all, thank you for your continued
    service to our country.
        Mr. Calvelli, massive amounts of data are sent and received
    through space every second. In order to maintain our
    technological edge, integration of artificial intelligence and
    quantum computing will be necessary to process all of this data
    in a timely manner. What are your thoughts on how we acquire
    this type of capability?
        General Thompson, to the extent that you can in this open
    session, can you describe and assess what our adversaries,
    specifically China, are doing in these areas.
        Mr. Calvelli?
        Mr. Calvelli. I think one of the challenges on the AI
    [artificial intelligence] front is making sure that our data is
    accessible by algorithms down the road, and so, we have had a
    lot of history of closed architectures. What you really want to
    do is make sure your ground systems are open, that your data is
    exposed through application programming interfaces, and that
    future algorithms, whether that be machine-learning algorithms
    or AI algorithms can actually access the data. I think that is
    going to be one of the biggest keys to getting the data
    accessed.
        As far as quantum computing goes, we are really, as a
    Nation, I believe, in the research and development stage of
    that and I think that the Nation needs to continue that. I
    honestly don't know from what sort of, the role of the services
    in that area. But I do believe that we need to, as a country,
    really spend money and foster the ability for this Nation to
    develop quantum techniques. It is going to drive a whole road
    of encryption down and high-speed processing that I think we
    want to stay the leader as a Nation.
        Senator Rounds. If I could, just to clarify, because when
    we talk about this, I think people kind of pull everything
    together on it, AI is here, and it is being integrated now; is
    that fair to say?
        Mr. Calvelli. Yes, I agree.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        General Thompson?
        General Thompson. Senator, just a few comments in regard of
    Russia and China, and I will say, primarily China, but it
    applies to Russia, as well. I would argue that while the
    creativity and ingenuity and energy in our academic and
    commercial sector is tremendous, and in many cases, our
    asymmetric advantage, the Chinese, for sure, have a plan and an
    expectation to lead the world in AI by 2030. They have made
    that public. They are making great advances; in some cases, on
    their own, in some cases because many of their scientists and
    engineers study in American universities. So, they have a plan
    to outpace us in that regard and they are certainly capable
    adversaries. So, I would say this is absolutely an area of
    competition that we need to expect and be attentive to in the
    years to come.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, General.
        I just want to follow-up on that because I think the next
    step on this is talking about the other areas. We have been
    competing against our adversaries in air, land, sea,
    cyberspace, and now we see them most certainly challenging us
    in space. Both China and Russia have conducted antisatellite
    operations and have weaponized space. I mean weaponized space
    in an attempt to deter and counter U.S. effectiveness in space.
        To the level that you can in this open forum, can you
    describe the threats our adversaries are posing to us in space,
    and do you have the authorities and resources needed to be able
    to respond to these threats?
        The reason why I bring it up, once again, is as the
    Chairman of the Committee has indicated, if we need to make
    policy changes to respond, now is the time to get that out or
    we are going to end up waiting another year.
        General Thompson. In terms of their capabilities, in fact,
    we have become much better at declassifying and communicating
    those capabilities in an unclassified sense. I said in my
    opening statement that they can threaten us kinetically and
    non-kinetically in every domain.
        As you mentioned, the Russians conducted a destructive
    antisatellite missile test in November 2021. The Chinese did
    that in 2007. They have been rapidly fielding capabilities ever
    since. Both have on-orbit capabilities that attack our
    satellites directly. Both also have multiple ways to attack us
    through cyberspace, laser dazzling and RF [radio frequency],
    and so I would say, absolutely, they can threaten us in every
    regime and by every means available.
        Senator Rounds. What would be your response, General, to
    those who say that space is not or should not be thought of as
    a warfighting domain?
        General Thompson. Senator, I would say that, first of all,
    Russia and China have voted, and they have already decided that
    it is. Our primary purpose as a Space Force is to make sure
    that we can deter them from making it a true domain of conflict
    in the direct sense, and if not, should they go to that, it is
    our job to ensure that we can continue to operate effectively
    in space regardless.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Now I want to call on the only person in this
    room who has ever been to space, Senator Kelly.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I do miss it.
        Senator King. Especially around here.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Kelly. I wasn't going to say that. No, but it is
    great to have the opportunity to serve again in a different
    role.
        General Thompson, I have a question about Space National
    Guard and this topic came up in last week's Air Force posture
    hearing. I understand that currently, the National Guard's
    space capability is organized in 17 units, across seven states,
    in Guam, and is made up of nearly 1,500 airmen, or 15 percent
    of the Space Force.
        As General Raymond mentioned last week, the National Guard
    has been involved in the space mission for 25 years. When asked
    about the prospect of a Space National Guard last week, General
    Raymond indicated that there are two ways to ensure that we
    maintain that capability. One was to either have a separate
    Space National Guard and the other was to take the capabilities
    from the Guard and move them into one combined, Active Duty and
    Reserve component.
        Now, that second option assumes that current Air National
    Guard members will transfer to the Space Force under a mixed,
    full-time, part-time Active component model. This ignores the
    fact that many folks who joined the Air National Guard, they
    did so because of geographic stability that it offers the
    members and their families, as well as the opportunities
    sometimes to serve their state.
        General Thompson, what are your thoughts on the advantages
    of establishing a Space National Guard, and to your knowledge,
    is the Department of the Air Force assuming that those nearly
    1,500 guardsmen would transfer into a combined, Active Duty and
    Reserve component, if we did take that approach?
        General Thompson. Senator, you certainly characterized the
    current state and situation very well. The Guard has served
    effectively in the Air Guard beside Space Forces of, at the
    time, the United States Air Force for decades. We cannot do
    without the capability and missions that they provide today
    moving into the future.
        If, in fact, we do not create a Space National Guard, and
    as you stated, the administration has come out with a statement
    of policy to say that we do not want to create a Space Guard,
    we do have to do that assessment in, ultimately, planning and
    preparation to move those forces. We are doing an assessment
    right now of that. We do not make the assumption that any
    number of Guardmembers will make that transition; that option
    would certainly be presented to that if it came to that point.
    We are making no assumptions about whether those members would
    accept or desire that transfer or not. We are certainly, as
    part of our assessment, determining what would be required to
    replace those members, by Space Force members, the numbers it
    would take, the training time it would take, the training
    resources it would take, and the corresponding degradation in
    mission as we bring those units back up to full status.
        So, there are some that think that a large number of
    Guardmembers may transition. There are others that don't
    believe that is the case. In our current assessment, we are not
    making the assumption that a large number of Guardmembers would
    transition.
        Senator Kelly. When do you think you will have this
    evaluation analysis done?
        General Thompson. It is ongoing at this time. We anticipate
    that it will be done in time to support the next budget
    request.
        Senator Kelly. Okay. Thank you.
        Another quick question, General, in my remaining time about
    space debris. My understanding is that the Space Surveillance
    Network is currently tracking over 25,000 objects.
        Does that mean that you have state vector on 25,000 objects
    and how small can you currently track something?
        General Thompson. Yes, sir. The updated number is now
    approaching 40,000 objects----
        Senator Kelly. Forty.
        General Thompson.--and that is correct. We have what we
    call ``custody,'' which is a state vector that is updated
    routinely. We reliably track objects down to about 10 square
    centimeters in radar cross-section. If you made a fist, the
    size of your fist or perhaps a tennis ball, that is the size of
    the object we can track reliably.
        I will say even conservative estimates say there are
    probably at least 10 times as many other objects that are
    smaller than that in space that we cannot track.
        Senator Kelly. So, that 40,000 number, presumably would go
    up, not necessarily because there are more debris objects
    populating LEO [Low Earth Orbit], but just that you are finding
    more; is that accurate?
        General Thompson. It could if, in fact, we had more
    advanced sensors that had the reliable ability to track smaller
    and smaller objects.
        Senator Kelly. How often do you find yourself, you know,
    looking for something and despite having the state vector, you
    can no longer find it?
        General Thompson. Senator, I would say that we encounter
    hundreds to thousands of objects a day that we need to go back
    and decide what the state vector is, and that is because they
    are in odd orbits. They are on the edge of being large enough
    or small enough, and in some cases, because of their size and
    shape, operate unlike most of the objects in orbit, which is to
    say, not in a Keplerian manner, as you understand it.
        Senator Kelly. All right. Well, let's work together to
    continue to refine this, because as these number of objects go
    up, I think we are going to need, you know, better capability
    because it just puts our assets and those of our allies at
    risk.
        General Thompson. Yes, sir.
        Referring back to the last question, this is a perfect
    application for AI, artificial intelligence and machine
    learning, as well, to help us with that problem.
        Senator Kelly. All right. Thank you, General.
        Senator King. Senator Tuberville?
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you very much.
        Just to follow-up on that, if one satellite is destroyed,
    how many pieces, basically, on average, would come from one
    average satellite?
        General Thompson. Senator, it depends on method. When the
    Chinese destroyed their test satellite in 2007----
        Senator Tuberville. Completely destroyed, right?
        General Thompson. Completely destroyed.
        They created over 3,700 pieces of debris that we could
    track, and, again, there are large, perhaps 10 times as many
    smaller pieces we cannot.
        The Russians----
        Senator Tuberville. Which was last year, right, Russia?
        General Thompson. The Russians, last year, created more
    than 1,500 pieces of debris of that we are currently tracking.
        So, that depends on, in many cases, exactly what you are
    talking about, thousands of pieces of debris with a kinetic
    destruction.
        Senator Tuberville. So that is going to be a huge, huge
    problem in the future, correct, if they continue to test
    missiles?
        General Thompson. Sir, I would say, yes, that is right. In
    fact, that is one of the reasons for the tenets for
    responsibility of behavior that were released by the Secretary
    of Defense last year, and the statement made by the
    administration about destructive ASAT testing.
        Senator Tuberville. Now, they are there forever, right?
        General Thompson. Not quite forever, but for years to
    decades, certainly, depending on the orbital regime.
        Senator Tuberville. Our lifetime?
        General Thompson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Tuberville. Yeah. This is kind of for all of you,
    you know, very simple: What would you say is the most
    successful aspect of the National Security Space Launch
    program, what is the most successful thing that we have done?
        Mr. Plumb. Thank you, Senator.
        I think that the ability to do, one, make sure we have the
    two providers and do these things in block-buys, it seems to be
    driving down costs, we were just talking about this before the
    hearing, and it provides some stability to those contractors.
    So, I think it looks like a success from where I sit.
        Senator Tuberville. Is the cost going down or up as we
    speak?
        I know in your purview----
        Mr. Plumb. I feel like my acquisition colleague should
    answer that, if that is all right, sir?
        General Thompson. Sir, I know what I would say is that over
    the life of the program, based on the previous approach to
    launch and what we pursue today in the National Security Space
    Launch program, we believe we have saved over $7 billion in
    terms of what we would have paid using the past program.
        I will tell you, based on the current growth in the
    commercial launch industry in recent years, the addition of
    that competition is helping to drive costs down and may very
    well drive them further down in the future.
        Senator Tuberville. We couldn't make it without the
    commercial people, could we? Or it would be very expensive?
        General Thompson. No question, it would be more expensive
    without commercial providers.
        Mr. Calvelli. Yes, I would add to that by saying having two
    distinct companies providing launch services, I think, is great
    for the Nation; the more the merrier.
        Senator Tuberville. Yes.
        General Thompson. Senator, if I may?
        Senator Tuberville. Yes. Go ahead.
        General Thompson. So, the Major ``DT'' Thompson was the
    investigating officer on the last National Security Space
    Launch accident in 1999. I will tell you, one launch at a time,
    for almost 100 national security launches and more missions:
    success. Every one of those launches is the most important
    factor of the National Security Space Launch program for 22
    years.
        Senator Tuberville. Mr. Calvelli, as a transition from the
    single launch procurement awards to block-buys reduced the
    price of space launch? Has it reduced it?
        Mr. Calvelli. So, I don't know specifically on NSSL
    [National Security Space Launch], but my understanding, in
    general of space, when you do things in a block, it does help
    you to reduce the costs, yes.
        Senator Tuberville. General?
        General Thompson. Yes, Senator, absolutely.
        Senator Tuberville. Absolutely. As the Department considers
    the next launch procurement contract, what new requirements
    will be included to ensure the United States beats China and
    Russian efforts to impact our space capabilities?
        Either one--anybody?
        General Thompson. Yes, Senator. In terms of new
    requirements from an operational sense, right now, the answer
    is not many significantly in this specific sector. We still
    have the same sorts of reference missions and payload designs
    that we need in this phase.
        Where, I will tell you the new opportunities and new
    requirements are in a couple of areas. The first is in smaller
    and responsive launch to deal with things like the potential
    rapid replenishment of capabilities is one area of potential
    growth. The second is, as we see a lot of interest and energy
    in on-orbit servicing and maneuver, and so, an approach that
    not only launches the satellites to orbit or perhaps moves them
    around in orbit, refuels, and replenishes them; those are a
    couple of areas of what I will call the space launch enterprise
    that are growing, specifically related to National Security
    Space Launch in phase 3, very similar in terms of the
    requirements for the next phase.
        Senator Tuberville. Yeah, thank you.
        I was excited about seeing the IG [inspector general]
    report yesterday moving a little bit closer possibly to get
    Space Command to Redstone Arsenal and, you know, we are
    military friendly and look forward to that possibly happening.
        Thank you, all. Thank you very much.
        Senator King. Thank you for that advertisement for the
    State of Alabama.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator King. Senator Cramer?
        Senator Cramer. There is nothing wrong with advocating for
    the hometown----
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Cramer.--as long as there aren't too many of you.
    No, it is all good.
        Thanks, you guys, for being here for your service. Thanks
    for this morning's briefing, as well. It was really important,
    and it was interesting, you know, at least the parts that I
    understood, and I was encouraged, so thank you.
        Secretary Calvelli and General Thompson, I want to talk a
    little bit about one of my favorite topics under your direct
    command and that is, of course, the PARCS [Perimeter
    Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System] Radar
    Facility at Cavalier. I did ask General Raymond and General
    Brown about this last week, and you might have heard that or
    watched it; if not, I am going to ask you the same question
    anyway.
        I noticed that it is not funded for in the budget, the
    modernization. I brought it up because I am concerned, because
    this year's budget documents say that this radar has a, quote,
    high risk and equipment failures will cause unacceptable
    mission downtime. I don't want that to happen, and I don't
    think you want that to happen. It is a 50-year-old radar that
    is doing important work. I know there is an analog-to-digital
    modernization effort that the Program Office is looking at, and
    General Raymond told us the Space Force would address the PARCS
    issue in the coming budget years.
        I just want to make sure that you are aware of the
    precarious situation that Cavalier seems to be in, and do you
    agree that this important 50-year technology needs a complete
    overhaul, if not this year, soon, to each of you?
        If you want to speak to the PARCS Radar in general, that
    would be fine.
        General Thompson. Yes, sir.
        Senator, I will absolutely say, first of all, it does fill
    a critical role in our missile-warning enterprise today. Part
    of the assessment, and we need to sustain it for that role into
    the future, part of what we are looking at in that regard, as
    well, is as we look at advancing threats, as we look at
    hyperglide vehicles, as we look at fractional, orbital
    bombardment systems, and the ability to basically fly around
    the South Pole to be able to attack the United States, we are
    in the process of understanding what the future of missile-
    warning and missile-defense architecture needs to look like and
    the role that PARCS may play in that. We are still doing that
    assessment. But, certainly, in the near term, it must be
    sustained.
        The other thing I will say, and it is to some of the
    discussion I had with Senator Kelly, it plays a vital role in
    space surveillance today, as well, and we need to ensure that
    that capability remains.
        Senator Cramer. All right. Thank you.
        I want to spend a little time now on SDA [Space Development
    Agency], because I know we are at that moment here in a few
    months where it gets rolled in when we set up Space Force. Of
    course, one of the goals was, and you all are doing well at it,
    is streamlining acquisition, obviously, speeding up R&D
    [research and development], all of those important things that
    you are here to talk about. But SDA, when we stood that up in
    2021, it really, we are noting the importance of this and of
    developing, preserving, really, an independent culture, which I
    think is best for innovation.
        So, now, once it gets rolled in, maybe you guys can help me
    understand your commitment that SDA will preserve at least some
    of its independence and autonomy, while it also does important
    work for you and the Joint Force, of course. If you have a
    sense of how that might be managed, that would be helpful.
        Mr. Calvelli. Yeah, actually, you are thinking along the
    same way I am. I am excited about SDA coming onboard. I think
    they are doing some really neat stuff with their proliferated
    LEO system and Tranche 1 for their communication satellites. I
    think it is going to add new capabilities quickly because they
    are doing things on 2-year centers. I think it is going to add
    resiliency to the architecture. I like their culture. I am
    looking forward to them coming onboard and I don't see any
    major changes in terms of how they do business or their
    culture.
        Senator Cramer. That is great. Thank you. Thank you for
    that.
        Continuing along that topic, then, for a moment in the
    culture of innovation and rapid acquisition, MTA [Middle Tier
    Acquisition], Military Acquisition Pathway was designed to
    facilitate rapid prototyping and fielding the new threat-driven
    capabilities and time frames not met by the traditional
    requirements process.
        Do you support granting SDA Middle Tier Acquisition
    authority so that they can continue to move fast, then?
        Mr. Calvelli. Yeah, from what I have seen, you know, I
    think on the Space Force side, there is about eight or nine
    programs that are used in 804 authorities. It has allowed them
    to go a little bit quicker.
        We talked earlier about the fact that speed is really what
    this Nation needs, and so, yes, I would support them having 804
    authorities.
        Senator Cramer. Well, maybe, and since you are on such a
    roll, and I am tracking with you, maybe talk a little bit more
    about the procurement enterprise and the reorganization and how
    you see that playing out, so we can, I always like to say, move
    at the speed of China, but I am not sure if that is the right
    way to put it or not, but I just know we need to be fast.
        Mr. Calvelli. Yes, so I am still getting my are arms around
    it. So, clearly, you know, and under my portfolio now is Space
    Systems Command, then you have SDA coming onboard on October 1,
    and then you have got Space RCO. You know, all three are unique
    in their own way and all three have sort of their own unique
    characteristics. I am not a big proponent of reorgs; I just
    think they are boring, they are messy, and they get nothing
    accomplished. So, I am looking forward to actually having these
    three separate elements in the portfolio and making sure they
    have the authorities, responsibilities, and we have the right
    things in place to go ahead and gain that speed and take
    advantage of each one's distinct strengths.
        Senator Cramer. Well, Secretary Plumb, I am out of time,
    but I was going to ask you, basically, the same question about
    cyber, and probably the role of commercial and integration of
    all of that, if you have a quick answer or just as a thought,
    that would be helpful.
        Mr. Plumb. Senator, I think that the cyber piece here, if
    that is what you are asking, is really important. While I don't
    think we fully have our hands around it, defense, in-depth for
    satellite architecture is hard, for ground stations, it is
    hard. I am in a lot of meetings about this, where we have to
    break through this idea that there is just a defensive
    perimeter, and people know this now, but getting to this is a
    journey.
        Senator Cramer. Well, be open with us as to how we can
    help, whether it is a policy issue or an oversight issue,
    because we need, you know, we need that culture cultivated.
        But, thank you for sharing.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Thank you. We will have the second round.
        Senator Fischer?
        A very practical question. I have heard the word ``GPS''
    mentioned maybe six or eight times so far this afternoon. What
    if you are in an F-35 in conflict situation 35,000 feet about
    the Pacific and GPS goes off, what is that pilot able to do?
        General?
        General Thompson. Senator, I need to be careful, because I
    am neither a pilot, nor that familiar with the F-35, but I will
    tell you absolutely there are concerns with many of our systems
    today and their inability to navigate effectively over the long
    term with GPS denial.
        Now, obviously, we do train. In fact, before I left the Air
    Force and transitioned to Space Force, we do train our pilots
    and their systems in a GPS-denied environment and how to
    respond. Their ability to aviate and fly safely is generally
    assured, but, obviously, there is likely to be a mission
    impact.
        But, it does absolutely go to your point that while GPS is
    the world standard, it is perhaps, fair to say we have come to
    rely on it solely and exclusively and too heavily, and
    certainly within the Department, there are activities ongoing
    to augment it, to supplement it, to provide additional means of
    being able to navigate and position and conduct missions.
        Senator King. I would think it would be a high priority. I
    remember several years ago hearing that Annapolis was going
    back to teaching celestial navigation, but I understand they
    really aren't. They are talking about it, but they haven't
    really done it.
        But somebody has got to be thinking about this because in a
    conflict, if I am the adversary, the first thing I am going to
    do is try to knock out GPS in order to blind us.
        General Thompson. Senator, inside all of the services,
    especially inside, the Army is probably leading right now. The
    Navy is not far behind. But the Air Force, as well, they are
    looking at a host of technologies and methodologies for
    positioning and navigation.
        The one that you specifically referred to, in fact, they
    are developing techniques for celestial navigation
    automatically, without a navigator, a human navigator,
    required.
        Senator King. There has got to be a way to automate a
    sextant.
        General Thompson. Yes, sir, absolutely.
        Frankly, to be able to do it in daylight when the human eye
    can't see stars. There is technology in that regard.
        Many years ago, onboard navigation and inertial navigation
    systems were the way we conducted business in the 1950s and
    1960s before GPS was rampant. It is time to reinvest in those
    technologies and those capabilities, I think, to advance them.
        There is even techniques that allow systems to measure the
    magnetic field of the earth and based on the variations in the
    earth's magnetic field, figure out where you are. Terrain
    mapping. There are a lot of ways to solve this problem and I
    would say probably inside the Department of Defense, I think we
    finally have enough people who have woken up to the fact that
    GPS is the world standard, will remain the world standard for a
    long time, but we have to be prepared for those who wish to
    deny us GPS and operation to be able to fight through and
    defend.
        Senator King. Thank you. I appreciate that and I hope that
    that is an urgent consideration.
        Dr. Plumb, in your testimony, you said something, touched
    on international discussions, international negotiations. How
    is that going? Is that real? Is there any interest? I mean,
    this strikes me as an area where we could have a space version
    of UNCLOS [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea],
    not that we couldn't get that through the Senate, but----
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Plumb. That is--I will leave that joke on the table.
        Senator King. Yeah.
        Mr. Plumb. But, Senator, actually, the United Nations open
    in a working group is just meeting. I will point out that
    Canada has joined us in their commitment to not conduct
    destructive ASAT testing, which is one small piece of this.
    There are several other like-minded nations in support.
        Our goal there is, you know, a fewfold. One is to go with
    an open mind and welcome ideas on ways to increase transparency
    and ensure a stable space environment. The fact that these
    discussions are ongoing in looking at a way to build both,
    norms and hopefully keep debris-mitigation standards in force.
    Right now, we have UN [United Nations] mitigation guidelines,
    but not everyone follows them. There is quite a bit going on.
        We are right at the beginning of it, but I think there is
    value and there is momentum. I do think the vice president's
    announcement gave us a little bit of a kickstart, which helps,
    too.
        Senator King. Final question: Is there systematic
    coordination, and by that, I mean an organized council or some
    body that does the coordination between Space Force, NRO, NASA
    [National Aeronautics and Space Administration]? I mean, I just
    worry that we are, there may well be duplication and overlap in
    terms of launch and satellite development.
        I would hate to, I mean, I know from the Intelligence
    Committee, we spend a lot of money with NRO on satellites and I
    would hope that there would be coordination so that we are not
    duplicating.
        Mr. Calvelli. Actually, there is. From my time at the NRO,
    there actually used to be, and I think there still is,
    quarterly meetings with NRO, NASA, and the Air Force to, and
    now the Space Force, just to make sure that they do coordinate
    and understand what each one is working on. So there is
    actually a pretty tight relationship across all three of those
    organizations.
        Inside the Space Force, there is the Space Acquisition
    Council that this committee put in place that helps to
    integrate across all of the services across the Pentagon for
    space features and then SSC [Space Systems Command] and other
    teams have a lower-level council called the Program Integration
    Council, does the same, as well.
        So, there is actually, sir, a lot of teamwork going on
    across the community for space.
        Senator King. Good. Thank you.
        Senator Fischer?
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Dr. Plumb, section 1609 of last year's NDAA required the
    Department to review the classification level of space programs
    to determine whether they could be reduced or declassified. It
    is my understanding that you are leading this effort. Can you
    update us on the status, please?
        Mr. Plumb. Yes. Thank you, Senator, for this opportunity.
        So, I have been looking at that. My team has been looking
    at it and looking at it with General Raymond's staff. That is
    an enormous tasking. It is far beyond any 90-day deadline.
        I think, fundamentally, the place I am going on this, and I
    am speaking for myself here, not the Department yet, is that
    probably all of those things, the hundreds and hundreds of
    things that are classified for the Space Force are probably
    appropriately classified. The fundamental question is, does the
    classification guide need to be redone, which is sort of a
    follow-on task.
        So, I will be working with you and this committee, as well
    as on the House side, to try to find the right way forward to
    make this scope correctly. If that is the test that we need to
    get addressed, then we need to get to that.
        Senator Fischer. Are there any efforts being made to
    declassify threat information that we receive?
        Mr. Plumb. So that, of course, is not that 1609 piece, but
    it is important. I will note that DNI Haines annual threat
    assessment that just, I think she was on the Hill yesterday on
    it, it is stamped February, but I just saw a copy of it
    yesterday, so it does go farther than I think previous things
    on both, as General Thompson has been pointing out, as well.
        You know, China and Russia both have on-orbit and ground-
    based antisatellite systems targeting United States and allied
    satellites. I think that is a new statement.
        So, there is some effort there. You could argue whether we
    could do more, but, you know, all of these things, we have to
    be careful about what would we, you know, what is the
    intelligence gain and loss on any of these issues.
        Senator Fischer. Yeah, you know----
        General Thompson. Senator?
        Senator Fischer. Oh, go ahead.
        General Thompson. Senator Fischer, if I may?
        The Defense Intelligence Agency just released a very
    extensive, unclassified report about competition in space. I
    have not seen that level of communication on, in an
    unclassified sense into adversary threat systems in a long
    time. It is a very good product and I think it has taken us a
    long way where we need to go in terms of communicating those
    threats.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. I think it is extremely important,
    without putting any of our people or our systems or our ways
    that we find information in jeopardy, to be able to get some
    kind of information out to the public, but also to certain
    think tanks who assume that they understand what is taking
    place in classified briefings and they don't even sometimes
    come close to what is discussed in those briefings and they
    make statements and generalizations and they take positions on
    false information.
        But I think it would be especially helpful, as I said, for
    the public to understand threats that this country faces and I
    do believe our people would be very, very supportive of
    programs that are in place, or that are being put in place, to
    protect this country. Thank you.
        Senator King. Senator Tuberville?
        Senator Tuberville. I want to ask one crazy question here.
    Is there, with the need of speed in the future, is there any
    thought of nuclear power in space?
        Mr. Plumb. Absolutely, there is. NASA, I think, has a large
    portion lead. If DOD is working on it, I haven't uncovered that
    piece yet. But, roughly, there is a lot of advantage to some
    form of nuclear propulsion, long-duration missions, including
    manned missions, you know, a larger power source. These are
    being looked at, but space nuclear propulsion is an expensive
    thing to look at and do safely, and in practice, but it is
    being worked. I think NASA has the lead.
        General Thompson. Yes, Senator.
        Recent national space policy has reinvigorated to look at
    nuclear power for electrical power generation and for nuclear
    propulsion; in fact, the Defense Advanced Research Projects
    Agency has a nuclear propulsion prototyping activity going on.
        But in terms of NASA, NASA is looking at potential nuclear
    power for use for moon-basing. We are absolutely looking at it
    for propulsion and power generation on orbit going forward.
        Senator Tuberville. If we are going to do any planet-
    hopping, you know, getting there a lot quicker is going to make
    it, in the future, you know, Star Trek and all that stuff.
        I have one company, and my NSA told me about it, EOS
    Defense Systems, they have a low-cost method of removing space
    debris. Have you ever heard of them out of Huntsville?
        General Thompson. Senator, I have not, specifically.
        I will tell you that our space works, our innovative engine
    for space activities in a project called Orbital Prime, just
    put out a call to research activities and proposals, recently
    awarded 125 different initiative contracts to go forward. It is
    very possible, I don't know for sure, it is very possible they
    are one of those companies. But it is specifically focused on
    that young, innovative, early companies looking for ways to
    help us with the debris problem. It is very possible they are
    part of that, but, unfortunately, I can't tell you for sure
    that is the case.
        Senator Tuberville. That is a good idea, you know,
    commercially doing it, making money out of it. We can send
    those names to Russia and China so they can clean up their mess
    as we go.
        So, thank you all very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Senator Cramer, any additional questions?
        Senator Cramer. None from me, thank you.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Well, thank you very much. It has been a very informative
    hearing. I appreciate your testimony today and as I said, I
    want to reiterate what both, Senator Fischer and I and Senator
    Rounds mentioned: Any thoughts, ideas, suggestions, desires, in
    terms of the National Defense Act, get them to us in very short
    order.
        Thank you very much. This hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 5:40 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky S. Rosen
                              space national guard
        1. Senator Rosen. General Thompson, last week General Raymond
    testified before the SASC that the Air National Guard has been
    performing Space missions for over 27 years and ``he cannot do his job
    without them.'' He then stated there are only two options to
    effectively and efficiently continue those Space missions. He said and
    I quote, ``Best way is one of two. Either have a separate Space
    National Guard or take the capabilities in the Guard and move them into
    this one component.'' In your best military advice what is the most
    effective and efficient way to not lose this critical space capability?
        Gerneral Thompson. As General Raymond stated in his testimony,
    space professionals in the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve are
    critical to the Space Force. USSF cannot execute our missions today
    without their operational capability.
        The Department of the Air Force developed a new approach to
    military talent management and submitted a legislative proposal to
    establish and implement the Space Component. The proposal, if enacted
    into law, will merge existing regular Space and Air Force Reserve space
    professionals into a new component that provides the Space Force with a
    system that offers options for full and part time service, expands the
    continuum of service, and strengthens recruiting and retention in the
    long term.
        As documented in the Statement of Administration Policy for H.R.
    4350--National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, the
    Administration opposes establishing a separate Space National Guard.
    The Department of the Air Force continues to work within the
    Administration on alternatives that are efficient, effective and
    appropriate for space units and personnel.

        2. Senator Rosen. General Thompson, what is the estimated cost to
    establish a Space National Guard? What is the estimated cost to move
    those missions into the proposed USSF Single Component? Will you lose
    any critical space capability if those moves come to fruition?
        Gerneral Thompson. Section 913 of the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 directed the Department to
    prepare a report that included a discussion on the costs of
    establishing a Space National Guard. Coordination of that report
    continues.
        The DAF is working on a plan that would rebuild the space missions
    currently performed by the Air National Guard within the Space
    Component by fiscal year 2025, which will include estimated costs.
                            commercial technologies
        3. Senator Rosen. Secretary Calvelli, DIU has invested in the
    commercial technology Orbital Outpost to study, prototype, and rapidly
    field for DOD and Intelligence Community (IC) space-related missions.
    Yet two years since DIU invested in Orbital Outpost, this technology
    still has not been on-ramped through the DOD or the IC. What actions
    are you taking to ensure commercial technologies that we have already
    invested in, such as Orbital Outpost, are adopted by the DOD and IC??
        Secretary Calvelli. The rapid growth of the commercial space sector
    provides a significant opportunity for the DOD to utilize innovative
    commercial capabilities and production processes to deliver critical
    space capabilities. Each mission area must be evaluated to determine
    the risks involved in order to achieve the proper balance between
    government and commercial capabilities. Being brand new to the position
    and to the DOD, I intend to take a balanced, risk-informed approach to
    incorporating commercial space capabilities that leverages the agility,
    innovation, and value of commercial systems without compromising
    critical national security missions.
                               advancing threats
        4. Senator Rosen. General Thompson, the Space Force now has a seat
    on the Joint Chiefs, which is critical given space power is a
    foundational support to the entire Joint Force. However, China and
    Russia continue to advance their technology and capabilities in space
    that degrades the United States's ability to support our Joint Force
    Team. These advancing threats will significantly impact our way of
    life, how we deter conflict, and how we project force as a Nation.
    Given current policy restrictions, what is the Space Force doing to
    develop flexible, responsive, reusable, and multi-domain systems that
    can meet current and projected threats that seek to deny our advantage
    in space?
        Gerneral Thompson. As the Space Force prepares for future conflict
    with China as a pacing threat, we are designing a next-generation
    enterprise architecture that balances performance, resiliency, cost,
    technology readiness/manufacturability, and speed of delivery in order
    to field capabilities that address the full-scale of evolving threats
    in the next 5 to 10 years. The major feature of this approach is the
    replacement of small numbers of very large, very capable satellites
    with larger numbers of smaller, lower cost satellites in proliferated
    and distributed constellations.
        This approach aligns with the 2022 National Defense Strategy, which
    outlines the need to build enduring advantage by accelerating force
    development and modernizing space capabilities with an eye towards
    future near-peer fights.

        5. Senator Rosen. General Thompson, the Space Force's number one
    unfunded priority is $326 million for classified programs. In the
    appropriate setting, can you please share with the Committee additional
    specific details on this request and the urgent capabilities that this
    funding would provide?
        Gerneral Thompson. Yes, we are coordinating a time to provide this
    brief.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Dan S. Sullivan
                                   cobra dane
        6. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Plumb and General Thompson, as our
    missile defense architecture ages, we must prioritize capability
    modernization to meet combatant commander requirements and adequately
    defend the homeland. As such, I commend Space Force's commitment to
    allocate $77 million through 2027, including $18.6 million in 2023, to
    sustain and modernize the COBRA DANE radar system located in Shemya
    Island, Alaska. This system, and others like it, are critical to our
    ballistic missile defense and supporting our Space Domain Awareness.
    What other Space Force investments are necessary to further modernize
    our aging domain awareness infrastructure?
        Secretary Plumb. In addition to radar infrastructure, investments
    in modern data analytics tools and software are key to maintaining
    DOD's space domain awareness mission. My understanding is that the
    Space Force has developed an aggressive plan to decommission the
    decades-old Space Defense Operations Center (or SPADOC) software by
    January 2023. This aging software would be replaced by a new, scalable
    system that is better able to ingest radar data and track the rapidly
    growing number of man-made space objects. Additionally, the Department
    is assessing investments that may be needed to better integrate and
    fuse sensor data from non-DOD sources to increase the robustness of
    Space Domain Awareness.
        The Space Force has also requested more than $4.7 billion in fiscal
    year 2023 to begin deployment of a new, space-based missile warning and
    missile tracking architecture, which is directly related to the missile
    defense mission.
        Gerneral Thompson. First, adversary advances in the areas of
    hypersonics and maneuvering warheads mean we must radically modernize
    our missile warning/missile tracking (MW/MT) infrastructure. The key
    element of the new architecture is a space-based, proliferated hybrid
    constellation of sensors that will provide global, launch to impact
    track of these weapons and be resilient in the face of attack. This MW/
    MT constellation features prominently in the Space Force portion of the
    '23 President's Budget.
        With regard to Space Domain Awareness, the Space Force continues to
    rely on its global suite of ground and space-based sensors and is
    fielding the new Deep Space Advanced Radar Concept, which will track
    sophisticated threats in and around geosynchronous orbit. In addition,
    the Space Force will continue to assess and use data from commercial
    and allied sensors to enhance the SDA mission.
        Finally, terrestrial and space weather sensing is critical to
    provide the surface, cloud, and atmosphere forecast U.S. expeditionary
    troops require for operations, training, and tactical planning. USSF is
    investing in the Weather System Follow-on Microwave program to enhance
    real-time weather observations while preparing to sunset the legacy and
    dying Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP).
                             arctic communications
        7. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Calvelli and General Thompson, in
    2021, the Air Force invested $50 million to test polar satellites in
    low Earth orbit. These satellites will be closer to Earth, resulting in
    reduced launch costs and faster data transmission. Throughout 2021, the
    Air Force sponsored launches of dozens of satellites, tested laser
    links for communications between the satellites, and installed cold-
    hardened ground terminals across the Arctic region. If this system
    works as planned, US Forces will enjoy reliable Arctic communications
    for missions ranging from search and rescue to complex training
    exercises. It will also enable the civilian populace to obtain adequate
    Internet access essential to participation in the modern economy. Could
    you provide more detail on how these low-earth orbit satellites enhance
    joint force communications in the Arctic?
        Secretary Calvelli. The Department's investments in ISR, domain
    awareness, and communications broadly are important for homeland
    defense priorities and are particularly central to our ability to
    operate in the Arctic region. Low-earth orbit constellations enhance
    joint force communications in the Arctic by dramatically improving the
    capacity, latency, and robustness of our communications in this very
    challenging operating region. Using a portion of the $50M investment in
    2021, we deployed and tested OneWeb satellite communications terminals
    at Thule Air Base in Greenland. Previously, the entire base population
    of several hundred airmen and guardians were sharing a very limited
    communications link that provided about 2 percent of the throughput of
    a typical home internet connection. OneWeb Low Earth Orbit satellites
    and terminals have resulted in a 50X improvement in throughput at the
    site, while also reducing communications latency by a factor of 5.
        Gerneral Thompson. Building on Secretary Calvelli's comments: This
    investment has allowed the guardians and airmen at Thule to begin
    utilizing data-intensive services that were previously unavailable
    while also benefiting from dramatically improved morale network
    performance, including communications with family members around the
    globe. By expanding low earth orbit communications from multiple
    vendors to the Arctic region, we are gaining a powerful tool to ensure
    robust communications for the joint force in all theaters, particularly
    the challenging Arctic environment.

        8. Senator Sullivan. General Thompson, in an Arctic Strategy brief
    provided to my staff on May 10, 2022, Air and Space Force
    representatives mentioned an Arctic Communications Roadmap Study that
    is expected to be released shortly. Could you go into more detail on
    this study and when we should expect to see it?
        Gerneral Thompson. The Air Force and Space Force jointly developed
    a comprehensive set of Department-wide solutions expected to improve
    Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, Surveillance and
    Reconnaissance to support emerging Arctic missions. The roadmap also
    identifies multi-domain investment opportunities capable of providing
    diverse communication options for the Armed Forces. The Arctic
        Communications Roadmap has been approved and will be provided
    through appropriate channels shortly following the QFR release.
                                  acquisitions
        9. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Calvelli, what are today's top
    acquisition challenges that threaten the development, deployment, and
    sustainment of space systems to guarantee users the benefits of space
    capabilities?
        Secretary Calvelli. Space acquisition plays a pivotal role in
    outpacing our strategic competitors. Challenges include: speed of
    delivery; discipline in program execution; stovepiped architectures;
    and ensuring ground systems are ready before launch. Exercising program
    management discipline is critical to ensure we deliver new capabilities
    on schedule, on cost and meeting requirements. This needs to be done to
    maintain our technological advantage. Architectures need to be agile,
    resilient and integrated in order to ensure synchronization and take
    advantage of our partners across the services, interagency and
    international. We must also increase our ability to leverage commercial
    capabilities.

        10. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Calvelli, in detail, how do you
    recommend we address your top acquisition challenges?
        Secretary Calvelli. Your continued support for acquisition
    flexibility will remain critical as we seek to deliver space
    capabilities that keep us ahead of our threats, as well as your
    continued help in providing on-time authorization and funding so that
    we in turn can execute and deliver capabilities to outmatch our
    adversaries.
                        clear space force station tours
        11. Senator Sullivan. General Thompson, the community surrounding
    Clear Space Force Station is eager to host guardians and their families
    if Air Force policies permit accompanied tours. I understand that the
    Space Force has the authority to implement two or three year
    accompanied tours for guardians assigned to Clear SFS. Do you and
    General Raymond need any additional authorities to implement such a
    policy?
        Gerneral Thompson. Unfortunately Clear SFS will likely remain an
    unaccompanied tour for the near future due to the lack of quality of
    life and family-related programs, and resources on station or in the
    surrounding area. Twelve Active Duty guardians, 105 National Guard
    personnel, and more than 20 airmen are currently assigned to Clear.
        a.  Anderson is the closest town, population <200 per 2020 census
    (86 mi away) with very limited services available
        b.  Nenana is the next closest town, population <400 per 2020
    census (820 mi away) with very limited services available
        c.  Fairbanks is the closest metro area, approximately a 2 hour
    drive
        Exceptions to policy could be granted (with a waiver from OSD), but
    would require thorough vetting to ensure the member could find housing
    in Anderson or Nenana, while understanding the limited community and
    family support services within the within the normal commuting distance
    of 50 miles.

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023 AND
                        THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, MAY 18, 2022

                          United States Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                MISSILE DEFENSE STRATEGY, POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS

        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:30 p.m. in
    room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Angus
    King (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: King, Kelly, Fischer, Rounds,
    Sullivan, and Tuberville.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS KING

        Senator King.--budget submission for the Missile Defense
    Agency and missile defense policies in preparation for fiscal
    year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The
    Department of Defense (DOD) has submitted to the Congress a
    Missile Defense Review (MDR) and Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
    along with the National Defense Strategy (NDS).
        While this overall document is classified and we await an
    [laughter] unclassified version, and await, and await an
    unclassified version--we would like to have that, by the way--
    it continues the policy of defending the homeland and deterring
    attacks against the United States while assuring our allies,
    through a Regional Missile Defense Strategy. I would note it
    also continues the policy of reliance on our nuclear deterrent
    to protect against large and sophisticated attacks against our
    Homeland from intercontinental ballistic missiles, air-launched
    ballistic missiles, or sea-launched ballistic missile threats
    from near-peer adversaries such as Russia and China.
        Missile defense has two new aspects that we hope to examine
    in today's hearing. First and foremost is the defense against
    hypersonic missiles, which do not follow a ballistic
    trajectory. Second is the requirement to protect Guam against
    any threats that China might pose. This is a daunting task that
    requires integration of missile defense systems from the Army,
    Navy, and Missile Defense Agency, and one I hope we will learn
    more about in today's hearing.
        The President's Budget submission for the Missile Defense
    Agency is $9.6 billion, a decrease from the fiscal year 2022
    enacted level of $10.3 billion. I would like to know how the
    fiscal year 2023 budget request continues your effort for
    Homeland and regional missile defense as well as defense
    against new threats such as hypersonic missiles.
        Again, let me thank today's witnesses for agreeing to
    appear. After opening statements we will have rounds of 5-
    minute questions for the witnesses.
        Senator Fischer?

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to
    all of our witnesses today. We appreciate you appearing before
    us today and we look forward to hearing from each of you.
        Overall, the budget request for fiscal year 2023 is a
    significant improvement over what the Administration proposed
    last year, and contains robust funding for the Next-Generation
    Interceptor program as well as for the defense of Guam.
        While I am happy to see the Department finalize its plan
    for defending Guam and dedicate significant resources to do so,
    I cannot help but feel that this effort is already behind. The
    last two INDOPACOM commanders sought support for this project,
    and this subcommittee proposed to begin funding it 2 years ago,
    an effort that was ultimately rejected in favor of further
    study. In the time that has passed, the threat has only gotten
    worse.
        Additionally, I continue to be concerned about the overall
    level of funding for missile defense proposed in this year's
    budget proposal. Compared to the fiscal year 2022 appropriation
    the Missile Defense Agency's budget would decline by over $700
    million, a reduction of over 7 percent, at a time when threats
    are growing and the Department's purchasing power is being
    eroded by the effects of inflation.
        I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses about
    these issues and about how the fiscal year 2023 request would
    impact their mission.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Thank you. Our witnesses today are the
    Honorable Dr. David Honey, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
    for Research and Engineering; Honorable John F. Plumb,
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy; General Glen
    VanHerck, Commander, U.S. Northern Command and North American
    Aerospace Defense Command; Lieutenant General Daniel Karbler,
    Commanding General, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense
    Command; and Vice Admiral Jon Hill, Director, Missile Defense
    Agency.
        Secretary Honey, please.

    STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAVID HONEY, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY
                OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING

        Mr. Honey. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and
    distinguished members of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee,
    thank you for the honor to appear before you today and to
    provide testimony on behalf of the Department of Defense for
    the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on missile defense.
    I am pleased and appreciate the opportunity to discuss this
    important topic.
        In a rapidly evolving threat environment, U.S. adversaries
    are developing more lethal weapons by advancing technology in
    areas such as ballistic, hypersonic, and cruises missiles that
    threaten the safety and security of the United States and our
    allies. In support of the National Defense Strategy priorities,
    the Department of Defense created the Office of the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to set the
    strategy for technology and innovation while addressing the
    needs of the joint force. Directed energy, a defense-specific
    technology, is a key critical technology area we are developing
    to counter a wide variety of current and emerging threats with
    the goal of rapid response and engagement at the speed of
    light.
        This is a joint effort that is being largely supported and
    carried out by the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
    Research and Engineering, the Missile Defense Agency, the Air
    Force, the Army, and the Navy. The scope of the effort spans
    countering cruise missiles in the near term, hypersonic
    missiles in the near and medium term, and ballistic missiles in
    the long term.
        To address the threat of adversaries' cruise missiles, a
    number of key technologies and capabilities crucial for
    countering cruise missiles will be demonstrated over the next 2
    years. The OUSD(R&E) High Energy Laser Scaling Initiative, also
    known as HELSI, is funding industry to develop and deliver
    high-energy laser technology for cross-domain applications
    across the Department.
        The Department is also developing high-power microwave
    weapons for a wide range of missions, including countering
    drones, cruise missiles, and hypersonic missiles. There is the
    Microwave Technology Testbed at MDA, the Remote Electromagnetic
    Disruption of Critical Advanced Threat, also known as REDCAT,
    at the Navy, and the Counter-Electronic High-Power Microwave
    Extended-Range Air Base Air Defense, CHIMERA, at the Air Force.
        Lastly, countering hypersonic and ballistic missiles will
    require substantially more laser power. Therefore, under the
    HELSI effort, R&E [Research & Engineering] will begin scaling
    laser powers in fiscal year 2023, and is examining
    opportunities to accelerate the scaling significantly. This
    combined with improved beam control systems will allow
    capabilities against hypersonic and ballistic missiles to be
    developed by the services and Missile Defense Agency.
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, Members of the
    Subcommittee, the R&E is committed to setting the technology
    and innovation strategy to advance defense-specific
    technologies, such as directed energy, and deliver these
    critical capabilities to the warfighter. We will continue to
    support these joint efforts to increase readiness as well as
    the capability and capacity of fielded homeland and regional
    missile defense systems while investing in advanced technology
    that offer new ways to counter a diverse set of threats.
        Thank you again for the invitation to testify and I look
    forward to answering the committee's questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Honey follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Honorable David A. Honey
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
    the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, thank you for the honor to appear
    before you today and provide testimony on behalf of the Department of
    Defense for the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Missile
    Defense. I am pleased and appreciate the opportunity to discuss this
    important topic.
        In a rapidly evolving threat environment, U.S. adversaries are
    developing more lethal weapons by advancing technology in areas such as
    ballistic, hypersonic and cruises missiles that threaten the safety and
    security of the United States and our allies. In support of the
    National Defense Strategy priorities, the Department of Defense created
    the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
    Engineering to set the strategy for technology and innovation while
    addressing the needs of the joint force. Directed Energy, a defense-
    specific technology, is a key critical technology area we are
    developing to counter a wide variety of current and emerging threats
    with the goal of rapid response and engagement at the speed of light.
        This is a joint effort that is being largely supported and carried
    out by the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and
    Engineering (OUSD(R&E), the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the Air
    Force, the Army, and the Navy. The scope of the effort spans countering
    cruise missiles in the near term, hypersonic missiles in the near and
    medium term, and ballistic missiles in the long term.
        To address the threat of adversaries' cruise missiles, a number of
    key technologies and capabilities crucial for countering cruise
    missiles will be demonstrated over the next two years. The OUSD(R&E)
    High Energy Laser Scaling Initiative (HELSI) is funding industry to
    develop and deliver high energy laser technology for cross-domain
    applications across the Department.
        The Department is also developing High Power Microwave (HPM)
    weapons for a wide range of missions including countering drones,
    cruise missiles, and hypersonic missiles. There is the Microwave
    Technology Testbed at MDA, the Remote Electromagnetic Disruption of
    Critical Advanced Threat (REDCAT) at the Navy, and the Counter-
    Electronic High-Power Microwave Extended-Range Air Base Air Defense
    (CHIMERA) at the Air Force.
        Lastly, countering hypersonic and ballistic missiles will require
    substantially more laser power. Therefore, under the HELSI effort,
    OUSD(R&E) will begin scaling laser powers in Fiscal Year 2023, and is
    examining opportunities to accelerate the scaling significantly. This
    combined with improved beam control systems will allow capabilities
    against hypersonic and ballistic missiles to be developed by the
    Services and MDA.
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, Members of the Subcommittee,
    the OUSD(R&E) is committed to setting the technology and innovation
    strategy to advance defense-specific technologies, such as directed
    energy, and deliver these critical capabilities to the warfighter. We
    will continue to support these joint efforts to increase readiness as
    well as the capability and capacity of fielded homeland and regional
    missile defense systems while investing in advanced technology that
    offer new ways to counter diverse sets of threats.
        Thank you again for the invitation to testify and I look forward to
    answering the committee's questions. Thank you.

        Senator King. Dr. Plumb?

     STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN PLUMB, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
                        DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY

        Mr. Plumb. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and
    members of the committee, thank you for inviting me again to
    testify today, today on missile defense strategy policies and
    programs.
        The missile threat continues to evolve, and as Secretary
    Austin has stated, China is the Department's pacing threat.
    China has advanced its missile capabilities over the last 20
    years to counter the United States and the Indo-Pacific and to
    intimidate and threaten its neighbors, including Taiwan.
        Russia is developing, testing, and deploying new missile
    that pose challenges for United States missile warning, and
    Ukraine, Russia has launched well over 1,500 missiles as part
    of an unprovoked campaign that has caused the deaths of
    thousands.
        North Korea continues to improve, expand, and diversify its
    missile capabilities, posing an increasing risk to the United
    States Homeland, our forces, allies, and partners. North Korea
    has accelerated its missile testing in recent months, including
    the launch of long-range missiles.
        Iran maintains a large and growing inventory of regional
    missiles as well as uncrewed aerial system, UAS, which it uses
    both directly and via proxy groups to strike its neighbors.
    Iran's nascent space program could shorten its pathway to a
    future long-range missile capability.
        In light of these threats, the Department reassessed its
    missile defense policy, including inputs from interagency
    stakeholders, allies, and partners, in the 2022 Missile Defense
    Review, the MDR. As you have noted, the classified MDR was
    provided to Congress in late March.
        Missile defenses contribute to deterrence in many ways.
    They provide resilience, they complicate adversary attack plans
    and reduce adversary confidence, they raise the threshold for
    potential conflict, they help assure our allies and partners,
    and they limit damage from missile attacks, which in turn
    provides additional decision space for senior leadership.
        The Department's top priority is to defend the homeland and
    deter attacks against the United States. The President's Budget
    Request includes significant investments in homeland missile
    defense, including $2.8 billion to develop the Next-Generation
    Interceptor and for the service life extension of our GBIs;
    $4.7 billion to fund the transition to a resilient missile
    warning and missile track satellite architecture--and it is
    important to note that this is not part of the MDA budget. This
    is $4.7 billion for the Space Force--$278 million for new,
    over-the-horizon radars to enhance our ability to detect cruise
    missile attacks on the Homeland; and $892 mission to field
    missile defense capabilities to augment the THAAD [Terminal
    High-Altitude Area Defense] battery on Guam. Guam, like all
    United States territories, is unequivocally part of the United
    States Homeland, and a missile strike against Guam is a direct
    attack against the United States.
        For regional defense the Department is also strengthening
    our missile defenses to counter regional threats that include
    hypersonic threats. The President's budget request invests
    heavily in regional ballistic cruise and hypersonic missile
    defenses, including $3 billion for Army ballistic and cruise
    missile defense programs, including the procurement of 252 more
    Patriot Interceptors; $2 billion for Aegis BMD [ballistic
    missile defense], including procurement of 57 more SM3
    missiles; $335 million for THAAD development, procurement, and
    testing; $1.3 billion for hypersonic missile tracking and
    defense; and $825 million for counter-UAS solutions.
        The sobering reality of the tragic events in Ukraine, in
    which Russia has used and continues to use a broad array of
    missiles to attack, and in my opinion terrorize, civilian
    populations highlights the extent to which our adversaries are
    prepared to use missiles in a conflict. Missile defenses are
    critical for defending the U.S. Homeland and for defending our
    deployed forces and our allies and partners. The Department and
    the Administration remain committed to improving them.
        I look forward to working with the Congress to advance this
    shared goal, and I thank you and look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Plumb follows:]

                      Prepared Statement by Dr. John Plumb
                                  introduction
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
    the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify before you today on
    the Department's missile defense strategy, policies, and programs.
        As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, I am
    responsible for the overall supervision of Department of Defense (DOD)
    policy pertaining to strategic capabilities essential for integrated
    deterrence including space, cyber, missile defense, nuclear weapons,
    and countering weapons of mass destruction.
        I am honored to appear alongside General Glen VanHerck, Commander,
    United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace
    Defense Command (NORAD), Vice Admiral Jon Hill, Director of the Missile
    Defense Agency (MDA), Lieutenant General Daniel Karbler, Commander of
    the U.S. Army's Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC), and Dr. David
    Honey, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
    (DUSD R&E).
        Adversary advances in missile technologies, the marked increase in
    deployed systems, and the documented use of missiles in conflicts
    around the world show that missiles have become a common and expected
    facet of modern warfare. This makes our missile defeat and missile
    defense efforts more important than ever.
        In this testimony I will examine how the missile threat has
    evolved; provide an update on U.S. missile defense policy as informed
    by the 2022 Missile Defense Review (MDR); and discuss the path forward
    to address growing missile threats in the Department's fiscal year 2023
    budget.
    Missile Threat Evolution
        Offensive missiles are increasingly weapons of choice for Russia,
    China, North Korea, and Iran, for use in conflict and to coerce and
    intimidate their neighbors both in peacetime and crisis.
          People's Republic of China (PRC): As Secretary Austin has
    stated, China is the Department's pacing threat. China has dramatically
    advanced its development of conventional and nuclear armed ballistic
    and hypersonic missile technologies and capabilities over the last
    twenty years, through intense and focused investment, development,
    testing, and deployments. China is using increasingly sophisticated and
    proliferated space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    (ISR) and improved command and control (C2) systems, to drive better
    precision and accuracy of its missiles. Many of China's systems are
    intended to deter and counter United States forward presence, force
    projection, and operations, especially in the Western Pacific region
    and give China the ability to further intimidate and threaten its
    neighbors, including Taiwan.
          Russia: Over the last ten years, Russia has prioritized
    modernization of its intercontinental range missile systems. Russia is
    developing, testing, and deploying new, diversified capabilities that
    pose new challenges to United States missile warning systems. Russia's
    regional missile arsenal underpins its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD)
    strategies that are designed to undermine NATO's ability to project
    force in response to crisis or conflict. Russia has developed and
    fielded a suite of advanced precision-strike missiles that it has
    employed with devastating operational and tactical effect in conflict
    including in Ukraine and Syria. In Ukraine, we have witnessed Russia
    employ over 1,500 missiles of all types, often targeting civilians and
    civilian infrastructure, as part of its unprovoked campaign that has
    caused the deaths of thousands of innocent men, women, and children.
          North Korea: North Korea continues to improve, expand,
    and diversify its conventional and nuclear missile capabilities, posing
    an increasing risk to the United States Homeland and United States
    forces, allies, and partners in the region. Most of North Korea's
    ballistic missiles have an assessed capability to carry nuclear
    payloads. North Korea has accelerated its missile testing in recent
    months that included the launch of a long-range missile.
          Iran: Iran maintains a large and growing regional missile
    and UAS capability, which it leverages via its regional proxy groups to
    coerce and threaten its neighbors, and ensure regime survival. Iran's
    proxy wars in Yemen against Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates
    (UAE), and in Gaza and Lebanon against Israel, further demonstrate its
    willingness to use missiles and UAS capabilities to strike targets of
    any type including civilian populations. Iran's nascent space program
    could shorten its pathway to a future long-range missile capability.
          Non-State Actors: Non-state actors also pose a threat to
    U.S. regional interests, including our allies and partners. On today's
    battlefields, non-state actors are employing increasingly complex
    offensive UAS, rocket, and missile capabilities. State sponsors are
    proliferating technology and weapons systems to non-state groups, which
    have used them indiscriminately against innocent civilians. The recent
    attack on an oil facility in Saudi Arabia is just one example of this
    emerging threat.
    United States Missile Defense Policy Update
        The Department reassessed its missile defense policy as part of the
    2022 MDR, which DOD provided in full to Congress in classified format
    on March 28 as an integrated element of the 2022 National Defense
    Strategy (NDS).
        It is important to underscore the fully integrated approach that
    DOD took to conducting the 2022 MDR as part of the development of the
    NDS and alongside the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). This approach
    ensured tight linkages between these key elements of our strategy and
    our allocation of related resources. The NDS establishes four
    priorities for the Department:

        1.  Defending the homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain
    threat posed by the PRC.
        2.  Deterring strategic attacks against the United States, our
    allies, and our partners.
        3.  Deterring aggression--while being prepared to prevail in
    conflict when necessary--prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-
    Pacific region, then the Russia challenge in Europe.
        4.  Building a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem.

        The 2022 MDR was developed over a nearly year-long process. It
    incorporates inputs from civilian and military stakeholders throughout
    the Department and across the interagency, and takes into account
    viewpoints solicited during extensive consultations with our allies and
    partners.
        Missile defenses represent a key element within an integrated
    deterrence framework that weaves together all instruments of national
    power. It does this by:

          providing resilience to our deterrence and defense
    posture through both active (e.g., kinetic and non-kinetic intercept
    systems) and passive (e.g., redundancy, hardening, dispersal) means of
    defense;
          complicating adversary attack plans and reducing
    confidence of attack success;
          raising the threshold for potential conflict;
          offering leverage for diplomatic efforts and assuring
    allies and partners;
          providing military options that may be less escalatory
    than employing offensive systems;
          and limiting damage from attacks, thus expanding the
    decision making space for senior leaders.

        Missile defenses and nuclear capabilities remain complementary.
    U.S. nuclear weapons present the credible threat of a robust response
    and overwhelming cost imposition, while missile defenses contribute to
    deterrence by denial. If deterrence fails, missile defenses can
    potentially mitigate effects from an attack.
        As the scale and complexity of the missile threat increases, the
    Department recognizes that to stay ahead we need to implement a
    comprehensive missile defeat approach which includes missile defense
    but is complemented by the credible threat of direct cost imposition
    through nuclear and non-nuclear means. Missile defeat encompasses a
    range of activities in all domains designed to counter the development,
    acquisition, proliferation, potential and actual use of adversary
    offensive missiles of all types, and to limit damage from such use.
    Homeland Defense
        Our missile defense policy guided the development of the Fiscal
    Year 2023 Missile Defeat and Defense budget submission. In line with
    the NDS, our top priority is to defend the homeland and deter attacks
    against the United States. To achieve this strategic objective, the
    President's
        Budget requested $2.8 billion to fully fund efforts to improve the
    capability and reliability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
    system. These efforts include the development of the Next Generation
    Interceptor (NGI) to augment the existing the Ground-based Interceptor
    (GBI). The GMD system offers an important measure of protection for the
    United States. GMD also contributes to reassuring our allies and
    partners that the United States will not be coerced by threats to the
    homeland from states like North Korea.
        The United States of course maintains the right to defend itself
    against attacks from any source, but GMD is neither intended for, nor
    capable of, defeating the large and sophisticated intercontinental
    ballistic missile, air-launched ballistic missile, or sea-launched
    ballistic missile threats to the United States Homeland from Russia or
    China. The United States relies on strategic deterrence to address
    these threats.
        The Department is taking necessary action in our fiscal year 2023
    budget to enhance our domain awareness and warning capabilities. . The
    President's Budget Request funds a number of defensive measures
    including $278 million for new over-the-horizon radars to improve our
    ability to detect and decrease the risks from cruise missile strikes
    against U.S. critical assets. The President's Budget Request also
    includes $4.7 billion to fund the transition to a new, resilient
    missile warning and missile tracking architecture that will both
    improve our capability to warn against and track new types of missile
    threats while also improving our resilience against growing counter-
    space threats.
        Guam, like all United States territories, is unequivocally part of
    the United States Homeland, and a missile strike against Guam would be
    a direct attack against the United States. After assessing the
    increased missile threat to Guam, the Department requested $892 million
    in its fiscal year 2023 budget for the Missile Defense Agency, the
    Army, and the Navy to develop and field missile defense capabilities to
    augment the existing Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
    battery currently emplaced on the island. This will contribute to the
    overall defense of Guam and bolster United States military posture in
    the Indo-Pacific region.
    Regional Defense
        The Department evaluated the regional missile threat to our
    deployed forces and allies and partners, and concluded that we must
    strengthen our regional missile defenses to counter all missile
    threats--including hypersonic threats--regardless of origin. The United
    States must continue to develop defenses against regional hypersonic
    missile threats, to include building a persistent and resilient sensor
    network to characterize and track all hypersonic threats, improve
    attribution, and enable engagement. The President's Budget request
    makes significant investments in regional ballistic, cruise, and
    hypersonic missile defense capabilities to accomplish these objectives.
    The transition to a resilient missile warning and missile tracking
    architecture supports missile defense of the homeland as well as
    regional missile defenses.
        United States deployed forces, allies, and partners face the
    proliferation of lower-tier threats, such as rockets and armed UAS. Our
    adversaries will continue to seek ways to use these relatively
    inexpensive, flexible, and expendable systems. The Department is
    working to field technical and integrated counter-UAS solutions to
    ensure we can collectively meet the range of threats and appropriately
    hedge against future advancements.
    Strengthening International Cooperation with Allies and Partners
        The United States is committed to working with NATO and our other
    allies and partners to maintain a credible level of regional defensive
    capability against all missile threats from any adversary. This means
    we must continue to look for new ways to protect our collective forces,
    preserve our freedom of maneuver, and strengthen our security
    commitments. Over the next year, we intend to focus on:

          Identifying opportunities to coordinate on national
    missile defense policies;
          Aligning operational planning to maximize U.S., ally and
    partner capabilities;
          Capturing lessons learned from both real and simulated
    events such as exercises;
          Sharing information on air and missile threats;
          Developing and exchanging missile defense visions;
          Improving information protection efforts; and
          Supporting ally and partner missile defense modernization
    and capability development.

        We view the missile defense capabilities of our allies and partners
    as indispensable contributions to our shared defense and integrated
    deterrence interests.
                                   conclusion
        The sobering reality of the tragic events in Ukraine, in which
    Russia has used a broad array of missiles to attack and, in my opinion,
    terrorize civilian populations, highlights the extent to which
    adversaries are prepared to employ missiles in conflict. The centrality
    of missile attacks as a component of Russia's aggression in Ukraine is
    not an isolated occurrence--the use of missiles is becoming
    increasingly commonplace in conflicts worldwide.
        Missile defenses are a critical capability for defending the U.S.
    Homeland, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners. Missile
    defenses are also an important contribution to the Department's broader
    integrated deterrence framework. The United States remains committed to
    improving our homeland and regional missile defenses as we work to
    deter conflict, and to prevail in conflict if deterrence fails. I look
    forward to working with the Congress to advance this shared goal.
        Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I look forward to
    your questions.

        Senator King. General VanHerck?

      STATEMENT OF GENERAL GLEN VANHERCK, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
     STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE
                                COMMAND

        General VanHerck. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer,
    distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is my honor to
    represent the men and women of the United States Northern
    Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command as we
    defend Canada and the United States. I appreciate the
    opportunity to testify alongside Dr. Honey, Dr. Plumb, Vice
    Admiral Hill, and Lieutenant General Karbler.
        NORTHCOM and NORAD face the most dynamic and strategically
    complex environment in our respective histories. Strategy
    competitors have openly declared their intent to hold our
    homeland at risk in an effort to advance their own interests
    and limit our options and ability to respond.
        North Korea continues to test nuclear-capable ballistic
    missiles with increased range and lethality, while Russia and
    China have fielded and continue to invest heavily in advanced
    long-range cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles, and delivery
    platforms. As we have seen throughout Russia's unprovoked and
    irresponsible invasion of Ukraine, Russia has fielded large
    numbers of long-range cruise missiles, including hypersonic
    missiles, that can cause enormous damage to infrastructure,
    create strategic effects with conventional warheads.
        These conventional precision strike capabilities and
    advanced delivery platforms are designed specifically to hold
    critical infrastructure in the homeland at risk below the
    nuclear threshold, in order to disrupt and delay our ability to
    project power globally while attempting to undermine our will
    to intervene in a regional crisis overseas.
        In my view, missile defense of the homeland starts with a
    strategic deterrent, to include the options and survivability
    provided by a reliable and effective nuclear triad. But as I
    testified before the full committee, I am concerned that
    deterrence by cost imposition does not adequately account for
    the conventional capabilities our competitors have already
    fielded. This over reliance increases the risk of
    miscalculation and escalation because it limits our national
    leaders' options in crisis and conflict.
        To account for the full range of our competitors' nuclear
    and conventional capabilities, it is necessary to balance
    deterrence by cost imposition with deterrence by denial, an
    integrated deterrence that employs all elements of national
    influence. This integrated approach leverages both military and
    non-military capabilities in order to provide our leaders with
    a wide range of timely deterrence options.
        To be clear, we must continually demonstrate to potential
    aggressors that an attack on the homeland will result in
    failure. We do that by demonstrating reliable and effective
    capabilities that cause potential adversaries to doubt their
    chances of an effective attack on the homeland. This is why I
    continue to support Vice Admiral Hill's plan to field the Next-
    Generation Interceptor by 2028, or sooner if possible.
        Deterrence by denial also includes demonstrating homeland
    readiness, responsiveness, and resiliency along a range of
    kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities to defend the homeland.
    NORTHCOM's support to civil authorities and our security
    cooperation relationships with allies and partners are critical
    to integrated deterrence, as is NORAD's mission to provide
    threat warning and attack assessment and defend the approaches
    to North America. In this strategy environment, we cannot wait
    for our competitors to act. It is vital that we get ahead of
    our competitors' decision-making and provide our national
    leaders with timely and informed options needed to achieve
    favorable outcomes.
        With that necessity in mind, NORTHCOM and NORAD are focused
    on four strategic principles in our homeland defense design,
    starting with all-domain awareness, from under sea, on orbit,
    and everything in between, to include the cyber domain. Simply
    put, we have to be able to see the threats in order to deter
    and, if required, defeat them.
        I want to thank the subcommittee for your support of the
    over-the-horizon radars on my fiscal year 2022 unfunded
    priorities list. Over-the-horizon radar will significantly
    improve my ability to detect and track threats in the air,
    maritime, and space domains. I ask for your continued support
    in authorizing the funding requested for over-the-horizon radar
    in the fiscal year 2023 President's budget.
        All-domain awareness is required to achieve information
    dominance, which is the use of advanced capabilities like
    machine learning and artificial intelligence to quickly
    analyze, process, and deliver data to decision-makers at the
    speed of relevance. By doing so, we will increase senior leader
    decision space and enable decision superiority over
    competitors.
        Finally, today's problems are global and all-domain, and
    they demand globally integrated strategies, plans, and actions.
    Missile threats to the homeland inherently originate beyond my
    area of responsibility, so it is vital that we have the ability
    to detect potential threats and share data rapidly between
    commands, agencies, allies, and partners around the world.
    These strategic priorities are vital elements of our ability to
    execute a layered defense in the execution of the National
    Defense Strategy and integrated deterrence.
        I will end by thanking the committee for all you have done
    to support our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and
    guardians as they defend the homeland. Thanks for the
    opportunity to appear and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General VanHerck follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by General Glen D. VanHerck
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
    the Subcommittee: thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am
    proud to lead the men and women of United States Northern Command
    (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) as we
    defend the United States and Canada in an increasingly complicated and
    dynamic strategic environment. Our commands continue to face multiple
    simultaneous challenges from capable, highly advanced competitors who
    have openly declared their intent to hold our homelands at risk in an
    effort to advance their own strategic interests.
        Today, strategic competitors, rogue nations, and non-state actors
    possess the capability to strike institutions and critical
    infrastructure in the United States and Canada. These threats, along
    with the realities of modern global competition, drive USNORTHCOM and
    NORAD to think globally and seek innovative capabilities that increase
    senior leader decision space and help to expand the range of available
    options for deterring in competition, de-escalating in crisis, and--if
    necessary--defeating in conflict.
        As the U.S. combatant command responsible for homeland defense, for
    providing defense support of civil authorities, and security
    cooperation with allies and partners in our area of responsibility,
    USNORTHCOM is facing the most dynamic and strategically complex set of
    challenges in the history of the command. Together with NORAD, the
    distinct, complementary United States-Canada bi-national command
    responsible for aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime
    warning for the United States and Canada, our commands are taking
    decisive institutional and operational measures to defend our
    homelands.
                            defending the homelands
        In my testimony before the Committee last year, I described a
    rapidly evolving geostrategic environment in which our competitors were
    continuing to take increasingly aggressive steps to gain the upper hand
    in the military, intelligence, economic, and diplomatic arenas. For
    decades, the United States has been accustomed to choosing when and
    where the Nation will employ the military lever of influence and
    project power around the globe from a homeland that was assumed to be
    secure. Our competitors have studied this operating model for the last
    30 years and have developed strategies and capabilities intended to
    offset our military advantage and disrupt our force flows.
        Quite bluntly, my ability to conduct the missions assigned to
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD has eroded and continues to erode. Our country is
    under attack every day in the information space and cyber domain.
    Competitors are spreading disinformation, actively sowing division and
    fanning the flames of internal discord with the intent to undermine the
    foundation of our nation, our democracy, and democracies around the
    world. These competitors are also constantly seeking to exploit
    security vulnerabilities and policy gaps, especially in the cyber
    domain. They are preparing for potential crisis or conflict with the
    intent to limit decision space for our senior leaders by holding
    national critical infrastructure at risk, disrupting and delaying our
    ability to project power from the homeland, and undermining our will to
    intervene in a regional crisis.
        The threat to North America is complex. Over the last year, our
    competitors have accelerated their fielding of kinetic and non-kinetic
    capabilities specifically designed to threaten our homeland. Of equal
    or greater concern is their relentless, coordinated effort to weaken
    the institutions and alliances at the core of our strength and
    influence while expanding their own influence internationally. Today,
    our competitors hold our homeland at risk in multiple domains and are
    working constantly to exploit perceived vulnerabilities.
        Russia and China continue to aggressively pursue and field advanced
    offensive cyber and space capabilities, cruise missiles, hypersonic
    weapons, and delivery platforms designed to evade detection and strike
    targets in our homeland from multiple vectors of attack and in all
    domains. USNORTHCOM and NORAD's ability to defend against modern
    threats requires improved all-domain awareness, updated capabilities,
    and policies and strategies that reflect the current strategic
    environment and the advanced capabilities of our competitors.
    Meanwhile, I require access to ready and trained forces to operate
    throughout the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility, including the Arctic,
    to respond in crisis and quickly execute homeland defense campaign
    plans.
        My mission to provide timely and accurate threat warning and attack
    assessment requires increased domain awareness and breaking down
    information stovepipes that restrict the flow of needed information to
    decision makers in the United States and Canada. The ability to detect
    a threat, whether from a cyber-actor or a cruise missile, is a
    prerequisite to defeating the threat. Timely and accurate detection,
    tracking, and assessment of potential threats provides critical
    decision space and time to national leaders, while an inability to do
    so limits available response options.
        Lack of domain awareness contributes to increased risk of
    miscalculation, unnecessary escalation, and potential for strategic
    deterrence failure. Maintaining our strategic advantage begins with
    improving domain awareness globally, including in the approaches to
    North America. Incorporating artificial intelligence and machine
    learning into existing capabilities will allow users to pull needed
    information from existing data sets and share that data with leaders at
    all levels to expand their decision space and options necessary to
    achieve desirable outcomes.
        To ensure our ability to compete in the current strategic
    environment, DOD plans, force structure, and logistics must evolve
    beyond 9/11-era threats and outdated assumptions regarding competitor
    capabilities, strategies, and ambitions. In order to deter modern
    competitors, we must make clear that we have the capability to fight in
    and from the homeland. Further, policy determinations are needed
    regarding what key infrastructure is to be defended, and from what
    threats, in order to develop realistic assessments and plans for the
    defense of critical infrastructure that fully account for advancing
    competitor capabilities and strategies.
        In order to defend the homeland in this complex strategic
    environment, USNORTHCOM and NORAD have shifted our efforts to left-of-
    conflict strategies, emphasizing integrated deterrence in competition,
    and dramatically improving our ability to provide leaders with needed
    decision space on a day-to-day basis. To be successful in competition,
    DOD must develop and implement globally integrated plans, strategies,
    operations, and exercises that incorporate all levers of influence, to
    include the essential contributions of our international allies and
    partners.
                            competitors and threats
    Russia
        Russia is the primary military threat to the Homeland, and their
    focus on targeting the homeland has provided the model other
    competitors are beginning to follow. First, Russia has invested
    significant resources to modernize all three legs of its nuclear triad
    in an effort to ensure its ability to deliver unacceptable damage on
    our homeland during a conflict. In December 2019, Russia fielded the
    world's first intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) equipped with
    a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) payload. These weapons are designed to
    glide at extremely high speeds and maneuver at low altitudes in order
    to complicate our ability to detect and track. In the next few years,
    Russia seeks to field a new heavy-lift ICBM that President Putin claims
    will be able to deliver nuclear warheads to North America from both
    northern and southern trajectories. Weapons such as these are designed
    to circumvent the ground-based radars utilized by USNORTHCOM and NORAD
    to detect and characterize an inbound threat, and challenge my ability
    to provide threat warning and attack assessment. The impact is the loss
    of critical decision space for national-level decision makers regarding
    continuity of government and the preservation of retaliatory
    capabilities, resulting in an increase in the potential for strategic
    deterrence failure.
        Over the last 15 years, Russia has also executed a systematic
    program to develop offensive capabilities below the nuclear threshold
    that Russian leaders believe will constrain United States options in an
    escalating crisis. Their capabilities include very capable cyber
    capabilities like those demonstrated by Russia-based actors during last
    year's ransomware attack on the Colonial Pipeline. Russia has also
    invested in counter-space capabilities like the direct-ascent anti-
    satellite weapon that Russia recklessly tested in November 2021.
        To augment these non-lethal capabilities, Russia has fielded a new
    family of advanced air-, sea-, and ground-based cruise missiles to
    threaten critical civilian and military infrastructure. The AS-23a air-
    launched cruise missile, for instance, features an extended range that
    enables Russian bombers flying well outside NORAD radar coverage--and
    in some cases from inside Russian airspace--to threaten targets
    throughout North America. This capability challenges my ability to
    detect an attack and mount an effective defense. In the maritime
    domain, Russia has fielded the first two of their nine planned
    Severodvinsk-class guided missile submarines, which are designed to
    deploy undetected within cruise missile range of our coastlines to
    threaten critical infrastructure during an escalating crisis. This
    challenge will be compounded in the next few years as the Russian Navy
    adds the Tsirkon hypersonic cruise missile to the Severodvinsk's
    arsenal. All of the Russian cruise missile capabilities present a
    significant domain awareness challenge. Additionally, these advanced
    cruise missiles and their supporting platforms will limit national
    leadership decision space and my ability to provide threat warning and
    attack assessment, which directly influences my ability to support
    continuity of government operations and provide support to USSTRATCOM
    missions. Again, the potential consequence is an increased risk of
    strategic deterrence failure.
    China
        China is our pacing threat and a long-term geostrategic challenge.
    China is increasingly exerting its economic and military clout around
    the globe as its leaders pursue a national goal of supplanting the
    rules-based international order with an approach that is more aligned
    with China's national interests. Like Russia, China has begun to
    develop new capabilities to hold our homeland at risk in multiple
    domains in an attempt to complicate our decision making and to disrupt,
    delay, and degrade force flow in crisis and destroy our will in
    conflict.
        China has maintained the ability to strike our homeland with
    strategic nuclear weapons since the early 1980s, but today its nuclear
    capabilities are growing rapidly in quantity and sophistication.
    China's Fractional Orbital Bombardment System test in July 2021
    delivered a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) and demonstrated the
    weapon's ability to survive reentry and perform high-speed and
    maneuvering glide after orbiting around the globe--a feat Russia never
    attempted before fielding their own HGV-equipped ICBMs two years ago.
    When fielded, China's ICBM-class HGV will be able to evade current
    ground and space-based early warning capabilities due to its low-
    altitude approach and ability to maneuver midcourse, which compounds
    the detection and warning challenges I already face from Russia's
    Avangard HGV and advanced cruise missiles.
        In the coming years China will augment its homeland-threatening
    cyber capabilities with a growing long-range conventional strike
    capability of its own. In October 2019, China unveiled its first bomber
    capable of air-to-air refueling, the H-6N, which will be able to
    threaten targets in Alaska with air-launched ballistic or cruise
    missiles. Later this decade, China seeks to field its Type 095 guided
    missile submarine, which will feature improved quieting technologies
    and a probable land-attack cruise missile capability. While China's
    intent for employing its long-range conventional strike capabilities is
    not fully known, these weapons will offer Beijing the option of
    deploying strike platforms within range of our critical infrastructure
    during a conflict, adding a new layer of complication to our leaders'
    crisis decision-making.
    North Korea and Iran
        North Korea's successful flight testing of an ICBM capable of
    reaching the continental United States and detonation of a
    thermonuclear weapon underscores its leaders' determination to develop
    capabilities to threaten our homeland and constrain our options in
    crisis and conflict. In October 2020, North Korea unveiled a new ICBM
    that is probably even more capable than the weapons it last tested in
    2017. Moreover, North Korea's launch last October of a submarine-based
    ballistic missile suggests Kim Jong Un may soon resume flight testing
    his most capable weapon systems, including a new ICBM design.
        Iran maintains asymmetric capabilities to threaten our homeland in
    the cyber domain. In 2022, Iranian officials have threatened to carry
    out terror operations inside the United States and elsewhere around the
    world, in addition to its persistent support of threats by terrorist
    organizations like Lebanese Hezbollah. While Iran has announced a self-
    imposed range limit of 2,000 kilometers on its fielded ballistic
    missile force, its persistent advancement of ballistic missile
    technologies probably could increase its missile range outside of the
    region.
    Violent Extremist Organizations
        While the strategic capabilities of our peer competitors are the
    most pressing concern for USNORTHCOM and NORAD, violent extremist
    organizations such as ISIS and al Qaeda remain committed to attacking
    the United States and our allies. The Taliban's takeover in Afghanistan
    will likely provide new opportunities for groups like al Qaeda to plot
    against the West, while homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) challenge
    our law enforcement partners by using simple attack methods that
    continue to present the most likely international terrorist threat to
    the Homeland. Violent extremist groups continue to hone their tactics
    in response to a shifting operational environment and have maintained
    their focus on attacking civil aviation and U.S. military personnel and
    installations.
    Transnational Criminal Organizations
        Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) continue to inflict
    enormous damage and create instability through corruption, violence,
    and illicit trafficking. International criminal syndicates have flooded
    the United States with illegal drugs that contributed to the deaths of
    over 100,000 U.S. citizens in the 12-month period from April 2020 to
    April 2021, while harming people and weakening institutions throughout
    the Western Hemisphere. As TCOs battle over territory and brazenly
    undermine the rule of law, they create obvious opportunities for
    exploitation by strategic competitors seeking to broaden their global
    coercive strategies and increase influence and presence in the Western
    Hemisphere.
        Mitigating the harm done by TCOs is a national security imperative
    for the United States and our international partners that requires an
    overarching whole-of-government policy and plan for interagency action
    that takes into consideration the vast resources and widespread
    influence wielded by the TCOs and their international criminal
    confederates. USNORTHCOM's ability to counter malign influence in our
    region is complicated by the destabilizing influence of TCOs in our
    area of responsibility, and national policy and DOD planning must take
    that reality into account.
                             integrated deterrence
        Strategic deterrence remains the foundation of homeland defense,
    and I believe it is absolutely necessary to maintain a reliable and
    effective nuclear triad. However, reliance on deterrence by cost
    imposition is currently over-weighted and significantly increases the
    risk of miscalculation by limiting our national leaders' options
    following an attack. Given our competitors' advanced conventional
    capabilities, it is vitally important to move toward a model of
    integrated deterrence that employs all elements of national influence,
    leverages alliances and partnerships, and provides leaders with a wide
    range of timely deterrence options.
        Integrated deterrence fuses traditional deterrence by cost
    imposition--in which an adversary is deterred by fear of costs that
    outweigh the benefit of an attack--with deterrence by denial, which
    causes a potential adversary to doubt the likelihood of a successful
    attack. Imposing costs on an aggressor that outweigh the potential
    benefits of an attack, demonstrating resiliency, and displaying a range
    of kinetic and non-kinetic response capabilities are all elements of
    deterrence by denial. This approach dramatically expands the military,
    diplomatic, and economic options available to national leaders in
    competition, crisis, and conflict and helps to avoid miscalculation and
    unnecessary escalation.
        Integrated deterrence also involves competing in the information
    space under a strategic framework, while working with allies and
    partners to counter competitors' malign influence in the USNORTHCOM
    area of responsibility and beyond. Building the capacity to compete in
    the information environment reduces the risk of instability and
    strategic miscalculation that can stem from disinformation and other
    influence operations.
        Demonstrations of resiliency, hardening, and the ability to recover
    from damage to communities and infrastructure also generate a deterrent
    effect. USNORTHCOM's defense support of civil authorities (DSCA)
    mission in the aftermath of wildfires, hurricanes, floods, and other
    contingencies in communities across the United States routinely
    showcases the ability of USNORTHCOM and the interagency community to
    respond quickly and effectively to natural and manmade disasters.
        USNORTHCOM's track record of supporting coordinated responses and
    rapid recovery is the direct result of ongoing interagency planning,
    coordination, and exercises that ensures our readiness to support our
    partners at a moment's notice. To be clear, DSCA is a homeland defense
    mission, and USNORTHCOM's visible support to civil authorities remains
    a critical focus for the command, especially as environmental change
    contributes to more frequent and intense fires and damaging storms.
        Finally, we must continue to foster the partnerships and alliances
    that provide the United States and our international partners with what
    is perhaps our most distinct asymmetric advantage. NORAD is an obvious
    example of the enormous benefit to shared security and regional
    stability generated by international cooperation. In addition, it must
    be noted that our relationships with NATO, the FIVE EYES community, and
    our regional defense and security cooperation partners in Canada,
    Mexico, and The Bahamas have a profound deterrent effect for the common
    benefit of all. USNORTHCOM and NORAD continue to foster these valuable
    alliances and partnerships.
                            homeland defense design
        Homeland defense starts well outside the USNORTHCOM area of
    responsibility and necessarily involves our fellow combatant commands
    as well as our international allies and partners. Deterring and
    defending against advanced competitors that have the capability to hold
    the homeland at persistent risk requires an approach that emphasizes
    increased decision space and leverages all elements of national power
    over cost-prohibitive and narrowly focused kinetic defenses. DOD's
    ability to deter and defend against advanced global threats requires a
    shift from regional approaches to a global perspective that accounts
    for the realities of the modern strategic environment.
        I believe it is necessary to accept near-term risk in order to
    compete against advanced, globally focused peers well into the future.
    Leaders must make difficult choices today in order to avoid impossible
    dilemmas tomorrow--to include divesting legacy systems and capabilities
    that consume significant personnel and fiscal resources and are of
    little to no use in today's strategic environment.
        Therefore, a homeland defense enterprise that is capable of
    deterring and defeating threats is essential to a globally integrated
    forward fight and supporting broader national strategic objectives. The
    ability of the United States to deter in competition, de-escalate in
    crisis, and defeat in conflict is dependent on our collective ability
    to detect and track potential threats and friendly forces anywhere in
    the world, while delivering data to decision makers as rapidly as
    possible. This provides leaders with the time and informed options
    needed to achieve a favorable outcomes for the United States. That
    reality is the basis for the central principles of USNORTHCOM and NORAD
    homeland defense design: all-domain awareness, information dominance,
    decision superiority, and global integration.
        Domain Awareness can be achieved through an integrated network of
    sensors from the seafloor to space, including cyberspace, in order to
    detect, track, and deter potential threats. I need improved domain
    awareness to increase warning time and provide leaders at all levels
    with as many options as possible to deter or defend against an attack.
    Global all-domain awareness will generate a significant deterrent
    effect by making it clear that we can see potential aggressors wherever
    they are, which inherently casts doubt on their ability to achieve
    their objectives.
        I am grateful to the Committee for your support of the over-the-
    horizon radar (OTHR) that was included on USNORTHCOM's unfunded
    priority list for Fiscal Year 2022. OTHR is a proven technology that
    will provide persistent surveillance of the distant northern approaches
    to the United States and mitigate the limitations of the Cold War-era
    North Warning System, while contributing to broader domain awareness
    challenges including space domain awareness. The ability to detect air-
    breathing and spaceborne threats in the approaches to Canada and the
    United States will be significantly enhanced by fielding OTHR as soon
    as possible. It is also vital to move quickly toward advanced space-
    based sensors capable of detecting hypersonic weapons, including
    hypersonic cruise missiles, and other advanced systems designed to
    evade detection. Modernizing and expanding the Integrated Undersea
    Surveillance System (IUSS) is equally important as Russia and China
    continue to field highly advanced guided missile submarines.
        While some new domain awareness platforms will be required, it is
    possible to make exponential improvements in our nation's ability to
    detect and track potential threats by improving the ways data is
    collected, processed, and shared. As I testified last year, the
    technology already exists to apply artificial intelligence and machine
    learning to collect and rapidly distribute information gathered from
    sensors around the globe. Current processes rely on human analysts to
    comb through enormous volumes of data, and it can take days or weeks to
    process, exploit, and distribute critical information--if it is ever
    processed at all. We will always need expert human analysts in the
    loop, but I need the ability to tap into that technology to
    dramatically speed the delivery of information to leaders at all levels
    who need it.
        Success in competition, crisis, and conflict depends on effectively
    distributing and integrating the data collected from domain awareness
    capabilities to establish information dominance over competitors and
    adversaries. To unlock the full value and potential of our intelligence
    and sensor networks, information must be integrated, appropriately
    classified, and rapidly shared to allow commands, agencies, allies, and
    partners to collaborate globally in real time and across all domains.
        The potential for this capability has already been demonstrated in
    USNORTHCOM's Global Information Dominance Experiments (GIDE), which
    provided combatant commanders, intelligence and operations directors,
    and other participants at multiple sites with a shared, customizable,
    and near real-time data set. The data gathered by existing global
    sensors provided leaders, analysts, and operators with the information
    needed to make assessments and recommended courses of action that were
    coordinated across multiple commands in a matter of hours. Speeding the
    flow of information to senior civilian decision makers and commanders
    enabled significantly more options to achieve desired outcomes.
        Decision superiority means increasing decision space and options to
    provide senior leaders. The ultimate goal of decision superiority is to
    provide multiple paths to avoid conflict through the application of all
    available elements of national power, rather than emphasizing options
    that are only available after a conflict has already begun. To
    successfully defend the homeland, we must provide leaders with
    pertinent information and as much time as possible to deter and de-
    escalate before a situation escalates out of control.
        Finally, I believe it is critical for the entire defense enterprise
    to shift its culture and vision toward global all-domain integration.
    Too often, DOD posture development, communications, planning,
    exercises, and operations are stovepiped and isolated in ways that do
    not reflect the reality that all challenges are global and all-domain
    in nature. The Department increasingly understands that competitors
    would likely intend to strike the Homeland in an effort to prevent
    flowing U.S. forces toward a regional crisis or conflict. And, in the
    event that the United States and our allies become engaged in a
    regional crisis or conflict, other competitors would likely exploit
    that opportunity to their own advantage--which could quickly lead to
    simultaneous crises in multiple theaters.
        Global challenges cannot be overcome with a hodgepodge of isolated
    regional plans. Success in competition, crisis, or conflict is
    increasingly dependent on moving past outdated parochial approaches in
    favor of greater focus on competition rather than restricting options
    and absorbing unnecessary costs by continuing to over-emphasize crisis
    and conflict. With that in mind, USNORTHCOM, our fellow combatant
    commands, the Services, and our Canadian partners have demonstrated the
    immediate impact of improved information sharing and collaboration
    between commands and allies in all phases of competition, crisis, and
    conflict.
        The current regional approach to plans, strategies, and force
    design is outdated and more influenced by bureaucratic inertia than the
    realities of the modern strategic environment. The same is true of
    stagnant acquisition practices and cumbersome civilian hiring rules
    that only impede progress and hinder the Department's ability to move
    at the speed of relevance necessary to compete in today's environment.
                                risk mitigation
        Risk mitigation must be a shared whole-of-government responsibility
    focused on broad nodes, enterprises, and capabilities rather than
    attempting to establish a priority-ranked list of specific sites or
    facilities to be protected. Mitigating the risk associated with an
    attack on the United States requires policy determinations about what
    must be defended from kinetic and non-kinetic attack. Those policy
    decisions, in turn, allow USNORTHCOM, NORAD, and our mission partners
    to determine the best ways to protect priority assets and resources.
        Importantly, risk mitigation is the responsibility of the DOD, as
    well as a number of other interagency partners at the federal, state,
    and local levels. Risk mitigation requires a dedicated policy framework
    and deliberate interagency planning and coordination. Notably, the
    deterrent effect of resiliency and effective consequence management
    requires far fewer resources and less expense than direct defense
    systems.
        Ballistic missile defense (BMD): Defending the United States
    against intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threats from rogue
    nations remains a critical priority for USNORTHCOM and an important
    component of integrated deterrence. While current BMD capability and
    capacity is sufficient to defeat a limited ballistic missile attack
    from a rogue nation, North Korea's ongoing development of increasingly
    complex and capable strategic weapons requires the Next Generation
    Interceptor to be fielded on time or early, and for the Long Range
    Discriminating Radar in Alaska to achieve full operational capacity on
    schedule.
        The ballistic missile defense system is not capable of intercepting
    hypersonic glide vehicles; I cannot defend, nor am I tasked to defend,
    against a hypersonic glide vehicle attack. It is imperative that the
    Department of Defense develop and field an integrated space-based
    domain awareness network capable of detecting and tracking ICBMs,
    hypersonic weapons, and cruise missiles as quickly as possible. I
    require the ability to detect, track, and assess potential missile
    threats of all types to immediately determine whether an attack is
    underway and provide national leaders with as much time and as many
    options as possible.
        Cruise Missile Defense: Russia has the capability today to hold
    targets in the United States and Canada at risk with long-range air-
    and submarine-launched conventional cruise missiles. These highly
    precise and stealthy systems highlight the need for policy
    determinations regarding what must be defended along with continued
    demonstrations of resiliency and hardening. It is also necessary to
    quickly improve domain awareness by fielding sensors such as OTHR and
    the integrated undersea surveillance system (IUSS)--and by integrating
    and sharing the collected data with global stakeholders. To
    successfully deter aggression and defend the homeland, we must be able
    to detect and track the submarines, aircraft, and surface ships that
    carry weapons systems capable of striking the homeland before they
    depart from their home stations. We also need to improve our capability
    to defeat those launch platforms before they are within range of their
    targets.
        It is vital that we accept risk today in order to compete against
    highly advanced and determined peers in the near future. As an example,
    the military Services must be allowed to retire aging platforms,
    especially those that cannot survive in combat against highly advanced
    and lethal capabilities already fielded and proliferated by our peer
    competitors. The Department must re-invest the savings from those
    divestments to resilient domain awareness and other capabilities
    necessary to increase the decision space that will provide national
    leaders with options to deter, de-escalate, and defeat threats. Those
    difficult choices are critical to integrated deterrence today and
    avoiding the unthinkable tomorrow.
                                   the arctic
        The Arctic demonstrates how regional challenges increasingly take
    on global implications that require a global framework. The Unified
    Command Plan designates the Commander of USNORTHCOM as the DOD's
    Advocate for Arctic Capabilities in recognition of the fact that the
    region encompasses a vast geographic area overlapping the areas of
    responsibility of three separate geographic combatant commands and
    includes eight sovereign nations with inherent interest in the region.
    It is critical that USNORTHCOM, our fellow geographic combatant
    commands, the U.S. interagency, and our fellow Arctic nations continue
    our shared efforts to ensure the Arctic remains peaceful, stable,
    prosperous, and cooperative. This is especially true in light of the
    increasing potential for resource competition and opportunities for
    commercial enterprise, both of which must be balanced with the inherent
    rights of Arctic states to control their territorial waters and
    resources within their Exclusive Economic Zones.
        Diminished Arctic ice has led to increased access to sea lanes,
    longer shipping seasons, and expanded access to subsurface minerals and
    proteins, although environmental changes are also increasing
    operational hazards and introducing new uncertainties. Those changes,
    in turn, now require clear communication and coordination among Arctic
    allies, partners, and competitors. A continued rules-based
    international order in the Arctic has served the international
    community well for decades, and forums like the Arctic Council are
    critical to emphasizing the value of the Arctic as a cooperative region
    where countries consistently work together to solve shared challenges.
        Rising competition near the United States and Canada is of
    significant concern for USNORTHCOM and NORAD. The Arctic strategies
    published by DOD and each of the military Services demonstrate the
    shared understanding of the need to adapt policy, capabilities, and
    resourcing to meet the challenges and requirements associated with
    operating in the Arctic. However, the Services and the Department must
    accelerate implementation of those strategies or risk falling further
    behind rapidly advancing competitor capabilities, which jeopardizes
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD's ability to execute the commands' missions in the
    high north.
        Likewise, Canada remains our essential partner in the NORAD mission
    and in ensuring NORAD's capability and capacity to deter aggression and
    defend the United States and Canada from airborne and maritime threats.
    That contribution includes investment in modernizing sensors,
    infrastructure, and platforms that ensure NORAD's ability to
    successfully conduct aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime
    warning. Those capabilities are vital to homeland defense and to our
    nations' capability to project forces forward in support of operations
    overseas, including meeting NATO commitments.
        I am excited by the opportunities for building partnerships in the
    Arctic and the continued shared effort to maintain the stability and
    security of the entire region. The upcoming Arctic Security Forces
    Roundtable, to be held in Alaska in May 2022, will provide the United
    States with a rare opportunity to host an international forum focused
    specifically on Arctic security and military cooperation. USNORTHCOM
    and NORAD have important roles at the Arctic Security Forces
    Roundtable, and I am looking forward to joining Arctic military
    counterparts to make this a productive and forward-thinking event.
        Likewise, the newly established DOD regional center, the Ted
    Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies, in Anchorage will provide
    an important venue for academic, diplomatic, and military Arctic
    experts to address key challenges in the region, in alignment with DOD
    strategic guidance. None of those challenges, from mitigating the
    operational impacts of climate change to avoiding miscalculation
    resulting from undue militarization of the Arctic, can be overcome
    unilaterally. USNORTHCOM will continue to leverage the strength of our
    regional alliances and partnerships to enhance regional security
    cooperation and support a secure and stable Arctic.
                  defense support of civil authorities (dsca)
        USNORTHCOM's defense support of other federal agencies during the
    COVID-19 pandemic, hurricanes, wildfires, and Operation ALLIES WELCOME
    has tested the command in unexpected ways over the past year. While our
    DSCA mission can be time- and resource- intensive, USNORTHCOM support
    to our interagency partners continues to strengthen relationships,
    validate plans, and demonstrate the ability of the U.S. interagency
    enterprise to respond quickly and effectively to contingencies. In
    addition to supporting American citizens in need, these missions
    provide a visible deterrent effect by demonstrating flexible response
    options and effectively executing plans to mitigate and recover from
    the effects of disaster and other emergencies.
        In 2021 and 2022, USNORTHCOM continued DOD's COVID-19 support by
    deploying military medical providers to civilian medical facilities
    around the country. Building on existing pandemic response plans and
    quickly adapting to lessons learned during the pandemic, USNORTHCOM's
    support to the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Department
    of Health and Human Services provided much-needed relief to hospitals
    overwhelmed by COVID-19 caseloads.
        USNORTHCOM is also proud to work alongside the Department of
    Homeland Security and the Department of State throughout the Operation
    ALLIES WELCOME mission to evacuate, house, and resettle tens of
    thousands of Afghan partners and their families following the collapse
    of the Afghan government. With the support of the military departments,
    USNORTHCOM has been responsible for providing safety and security,
    shelter, food, and other essential services for Afghans who contributed
    to the United States mission in Afghanistan as they await resettlement
    in the United States.
                              security cooperation
        Global alliances and partnerships provide the United States with a
    critical asymmetric advantage over our competitors. USNORTHCOM's
    military-to-military partnerships with Canada, Mexico, and The Bahamas
    remain critically important, and those ties continue to pay significant
    dividends as we work toward improving regional security, strengthening
    military ties with regional partners, and expanding interoperability.
    These efforts contribute to improved shared domain awareness and domain
    control, while strengthening the institutions that support our common
    strategic objectives. By working together toward these objectives,
    USNORTHCOM is supporting our partners' important contributions to
    regional security while emphasizing our shared prioritization of the
    rule of law, human rights, and denying our competitors the opportunity
    to expand their presence and malign influence.
        The Mexican Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA) and
    Secretariat of the Navy (SEMAR), are steadfast security partners and
    remain a bulwark against encroaching competitor presence and influence
    in Central and South America. USNORTHCOM was proud to host the annual
    United States-Mexico Bilateral Military Cooperation Roundtable in
    August 2021, during which key military leaders from USNORTHCOM, SEDENA,
    and SEMAR refined our shared efforts toward improved domain awareness,
    domain control, and institutional strengthening. In September 2021, I
    was also honored to personally attend the Mexico Aerospace Fair--
    commonly known as FAMEX--to demonstrate USNORTHCOM's commitment to the
    security relationship with our Mexican military partners and to join
    the Secretaries of SEMAR and SEDENA in reaffirming Mexico's vital
    contributions to the security of our region and our shared commitment
    to countering common threats.
        Our partnership with The Bahamas remains critical. USNORTHCOM and
    The Bahamas' Bilateral Security Cooperation Framework provides a
    distinct and important venue for developing and implementing mutual
    objectives that contribute to regional security. Due to The Bahamas'
    geographic location along the United States southern approaches, domain
    awareness and domain control are in the vital national interests of
    both the United States and The Bahamas. In October 2021, I met with the
    new Bahamian government and my Royal Bahamas Defence Force counterpart
    in Nassau for the activation of a maritime surveillance radar donated
    by DOD that has already significantly improved our collective ability
    to detect and monitor traffic in the approaches to The Bahamas and the
    United States. China has expanded economic investment and visible
    diplomatic presence in The Bahamas and has highlighted the lack of a
    confirmed United States ambassador in an ongoing information campaign
    to boost Chinese influence while weakening that of the United States.
                                   conclusion
        The global strategic environment will remain complex and
    extraordinarily dynamic for the foreseeable future. Our competitors
    already possess the capability to strike the homeland with kinetic and
    non-kinetic means, and they will take full advantage of slow responses,
    technological shortfalls, and policies that do not reflect the
    realities of the modern era.
        USNORTHCOM and NORAD, in concert with our interagency colleagues,
    will continue our unending mission to defend our homelands and protect
    our citizens from threats in all domains, institutions, culture, and
    process. However, our commands' ability to effectively deter threats to
    the homeland will increasingly rely on improved domain awareness and
    providing leaders with the time and options necessary for success. Just
    as important, it is critical for military leaders and civilian
    policymakers to acknowledge that all regional challenges have global
    implications and present potential risk to the U.S. Homeland. Our
    competitors have demonstrated their intent to leverage any opportunity
    to advance their own interests--often to the detriment of our own.
        Defense of the Homeland and continental defense remains the
    absolute priority for both USNORTHCOM and NORAD, and our commands'
    constant vigilance will be a key element of the integrated deterrence
    that safeguards our citizens and advances our vital national interests.
    It is my profound honor to lead all of the proud United States and
    Canadian military and civilian personnel of USNORTHCOM and NORAD as
    they stand our never-ending watch over our nations. I look forward to
    working with all of our vital partners as we continue to advance those
    efforts in the defense of our nations. We Have the Watch.

        Senator King. Thank you, General.
        General Karbler?

    STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL DANIEL KARBLER, USA, COMMANDING
     GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND

        lLieutenant General Karbler. Chairman King, Ranking Member
    Fischer, distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am
    honored to again testify before you representing an incredible
    People First organization of more than 3,000 soldiers and
    civilians across 10 time zones and 22 locations. These amazing
    professionals provide space, high-altitude, and missile defense
    forces and capabilities to Army and joint warfighters. Let me
    express my sincere appreciation for your continued support of
    our people and their families.
        My role remains unchanged from previous testimony. I serve
    as the Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for
    Integrated Missile Defense. As the Army's proponent for Air and
    Missile Defense, or AMD, I provide U.S. Northern Command, the
    soldiers who stand ready to defend our Nation from
    intercontinental ballistic missile attacks. I serve as the
    Army's Service Component Commander to both U.S. Strategic
    Command and U.S. Space Command, and I serve as the Army's AMD
    enterprise integrator.
        We have witnessed significant changes over the past year,
    to include the largest employment of offensive missile systems
    in Europe since World War II in Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
    Like Russia, other potential adversaries across the globe are
    developing, fielding, and normalizing the use of increasingly
    diverse, robust, and lethal offensive missile systems in an
    attempt to gain coercive power and strategic advantage over the
    United States and our allies and partners.
        It has never been more imperative that we strengthen our
    capabilities to deny our adversaries the benefits of using
    these weapons. We will accomplish this through continued
    investment and sustainment of combat-ready, integrated, and
    lethal AMD forces. Space capabilities, combined with our allies
    and partners, will also prove essential in ensuring our
    nation's security.
        To address the challenges of the ever-changing landscape we
    continue to implement new ways of accomplishing our mission and
    enhancing our capabilities. To briefly outline a few
    enhancements, our space and missile defense soldiers and
    civilians have completed an upgrade to our Joint Tactical
    Ground Stations at our four global theater missile warning
    company locations. These upgrades include our missile warning,
    missile defense cueing, and battlespace characterization in
    support of multidomain operations.
        We have relocated two European-based United States Patriot
    batteries to Poland and one to Slovakia. This defense
    relocation reinforces our Nation's commitment to article 5 and
    proactively counters any potential threats to U.S. and allied
    forces in NATO's [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] eastern
    region.
        During a joint March 2022 exercise, an air defense
    battalion under the European-based 10th Army Air and Missile
    Defense Command successfully deployed four Maneuver-Short Range
    Air Defense Stryker-based platforms throughout NATO's eastern
    region, a move of over 1,500 miles which culminated in a
    successful live fire in Estonia. Support to testing and
    exercises remains a priority.
        Earlier this year, Air Defense Artillery soldiers
    participated in THAAD Flight Test-21, where two Patriot
    Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhanced interceptors
    were integrated with THAAD software to successfully intercept
    two short-range ballistic missiles. This integration enables
    earlier interceptor launch and results in increased defended
    area or battlespace.
        Our soldiers also recently completed Phase 1 of the
    Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System
    initial operational test and evaluation, in full support of the
    Army's number one AMD modernization effort.
        Let me close by again highlighting our most important
    asset, our people, who remain committed to accomplishing our
    no-fail national security mission. Despite the challenges of
    the COVID-19 pandemic, our professionals continue to provide
    space and missile defense capabilities to support combatant
    commanders. It is our people who make us strong. It is our
    people who make winning possible. I consider it an honor and a
    privilege to lead and serve alongside them and request the
    continued support of Congress to sustain our ability to
    recruit, develop, retain, and resource such a highly qualified
    and mission-ready team. When you put people first, winning
    happens.
        I look forward to addressing your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General Karbler follows:]

           Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General Daniel L. Karbler
                                  introduction
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
    the Subcommittee, thank you for your continued support of our Service
    Members, Civilians, and Families and your continued support of the
    Army, U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), U.S. Space Command
    (USSPACECOM), Department of Defense (DOD), and the space and missile
    defense community. Thank you also for inviting me to highlight the
    importance of space and missile defense capabilities and ongoing
    enhancements that enable the defense of our Nation, forward stationed
    and deployed forces, allies, and partners.
        Today, with my assigned roles, I bring both an Army and a joint
    perspective on effective space and missile defense capabilities. Within
    the Army and joint communities, my responsibilities encompass several
    mission areas.
        As commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
    (USASMDC), I serve as the Army's force modernization proponent and
    operational integrator for space, missile defense, and high altitude
    capabilities. In short, USASMDC provides trained and ready space and
    missile defense forces and capabilities to the warfighter and Nation.
    With regard to missile defense, I am the Army Service Component
    Commander responsible for planning, integrating, coordinating, and
    providing Army missile defense forces and capabilities in support of
    USSTRATCOM missions. Additionally, I am a supporting commander to the
    Commander, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), for the Ground-based
    Midcourse Defense (GMD) System. In the space mission area, I am the
    Army Service Component Commander to USSPACECOM, providing trained and
    ready Army space warfighters and capabilities to compete, fight, and
    win in the space domain.
        As the Army's air and missile defense (AMD) enterprise integrator,
    I synchronize the balanced execution of the Army's AMD posture across
    the functions of force planning and sourcing requirements, combat and
    materiel development, AMD acquisition, and life cycle management. I
    coordinate with the AMD community of interest to balance priorities,
    inform resourcing decisions, and pursue innovative approaches in order
    to fulfill our AMD mission requirements.
        Finally, as Commander of USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component
    Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD), I am responsible for
    providing operational-level global missile defense expertise in support
    of USSTRATCOM's Unified Command Plan (UCP)-assigned global missile
    defense operations support mission. In the missile defense arena, this
    includes plans integration, operations support, asset allocation
    recommendations, and support to missile defense capability development
    on behalf of combatant commanders (CCDRs). These efforts deter
    adversaries, assure allies, and defend U.S. deployed forces, allies,
    and partners against missile attacks.
        The world has changed greatly since my testimony last year. We have
    witnessed the largest use of offensive missile systems in Europe since
    World War II in an unprovoked invasion of a sovereign nation by the
    Russian Federation in Ukraine. Like Russia, other potential adversaries
    globally are developing and fielding increasingly more diverse, robust,
    and lethal offensive missile systems in an attempt to gain coercive
    power and strategic advantage over the Nation and our allies and
    partners. It has never been more imperative that we deny them the
    benefits of using these weapons. We will accomplish this through
    continued investment and sustainment of combat ready, integrated,
    capable, and lethal AMD. Space capabilities, combined with our allies'
    and partners' abilities as part of a comprehensive approach to
    integrated deterrence, will also prove essential in ensuring our
    Nation's security.
                                  people first
        USASMDC and JFCC IMD, both comprised of multi-component soldiers,
    airmen, sailors, marines, guardians, and dedicated civilians and
    contractors, cannot carry out our wide-ranging, no-fail national
    security missions without the commitment of our greatest asset--our
    people. We prioritize ``People First'' as we recruit, train, and
    develop Army space and missile defense professionals. Six values are
    embedded in our People First mandate: communication, recognition,
    trust, teamwork, transparency, and empowerment. Despite the many
    challenges introduced by the COVID-19 pandemic, our professionals
    continue to provide space and missile defense capabilities that support
    combatant command (CCMD) plans and operations. It is our people who
    make us strong; it is our people who make winning possible.
      recent contributions and upgrades to army space and missile defense
                                  capabilities
        The people of USASMDC and JFCC IMD continue to learn new ways to
    operate, accomplish our missions, enhance capabilities, and support
    global theaters. Throughout the last several months, we have realized
    essential space and missile defense operational, capability, and
    training successes, a few of which follow.

          We recently completed an upgrade of our Joint Tactical
    Ground Stations (JTAGS) configuration at our four theater missile
    warning company locations. This upgrade provided a significant
    improvement in our missile warning, missile defense cueing, and
    battlespace characterization capabilities in support of Multi-Domain
    Operations (MDO). It also enabled us to keep pace with rapidly growing,
    complex, and capable threat systems.
          In March 2022, the Army relocated two European-based
    Patriot missile defense batteries to Poland. This defensive relocation
    served to reinforce our Nation's commitment to article 5 and
    proactively counter any potential threats to U.S. and allied forces in
    the eastern NATO region.
          During a March 2022 joint exercise, a subordinate air
    defense regiment under the European-based 10th Army Air and Missile
    Defense Command successfully deployed four Maneuver-Short Range Air
    Defense (M-SHORAD) Stryker-based platforms to the eastern NATO region.
    This deployment demonstrated the Army's newest short range air defense
    system's ability to defend maneuver forces against unmanned aerial
    systems (UAS), rotary-wing, and fixed-wing air threats.
          Our Army Space Training Division (ASTD) served as the
    lead proponent for equipping Army divisions and training centers with
    essential training aid devices that enable organizations to train in a
    degraded and disrupted space operations environment. With fielding
    completed, ASTD will lead future efforts on life cycle replacement of
    these devices.
          The USASMDC Technical Center leveraged commercial
    synthetic aperture radar imaging of current interest locations and,
    using artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms, provided
    key operational data to tactical warfighting organizations.
          Support to significant testing and exercises remains a
    priority. Earlier this year, Air Defense Artillery (ADA) soldiers
    participated in the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Flight
    Test-21, where two Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile
    Segment Enhanced (MSE) interceptors were integrated with THAAD software
    to successfully intercept a short range ballistic missile. This
    integration enables earlier interceptor launch and results in a longer
    fly-out time, which increases the defended area or battlespace. Our ADA
    soldiers also recently participated in the initial operational test and
    evaluation of the successful Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle
    Command System (IBCS) test. During this event, IBCS maintained
    continuous tracking of two cruise missile targets by fusing together
    data from multiple sensors while degraded by electronic attack.
    Finally, we continue to deploy Army space professionals to numerous
    joint and partner nation exercises and wargames.
          In addition to exercise support, operational deployments
    to CCMDs continue. Our 1st Space Brigade rotated an Army Space Control
    Crew to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), an Army Space Support
    Team to both U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and U.S. European Command
    (USEUCOM), and Space Control Planning Teams to USEUCOM and USSPACECOM.
          Our Force Tracking Mission Management Center continues to
    support global operations in the USCENTCOM, U.S. Africa Command, and
    other CCMD geographic areas of responsibility. The Center provided
    vital management and dissemination of friendly force tracking data to
    theater commands.

                  u.s. army space and missile defense command
        To accomplish our vision of providing space, missile defense, and
    high-altitude forces and capabilities to support joint and combined
    warfighting readiness in all domains, USASMDC is organizationally
    aligned to accomplish three major tasks. These include: providing
    forces and capabilities for current operations; preparing forces and
    capabilities for the future fight; and researching and developing Army
    technologies to provide future advancements in space, air, and missile
    defense capabilities.
        The command aligns its activities to these priorities:

          Accomplish our mission as a People First team of
    empowered, innovative, ready, and resilient professionals.
          Provide trained and ready forces for space, missile
    defense, and high-altitude missions.
          Conduct integrated planning and synchronized operations
    in the execution of our space and missile defense missions.
          Prepare for future conflict.
            providing forces and capabilities for current operations
        In accordance with Title 10 responsibilities, USASMDC is a force
    provider of missile defense capabilities. Our first major task is to
    provide trained and ready missile defense forces and capabilities to
    CCDRs. USASMDC soldiers serving in the Homeland and in remote and
    austere forward-deployed locations operate the GMD and AN/TPY-2
    Forward-Based Mode (FBM) radars. Highlights of the capabilities
    provided to current operations and readiness by our missile defense
    professionals include:
        Support to Homeland Missile Defense: Soldiers from the 100th
    Missile Defense Brigade (MDB), headquartered in Colorado Springs,
    Colorado, and 49th Missile Defense Battalion, headquartered at Fort
    Greely, Alaska, stand ready to defend our Nation from intercontinental
    ballistic missile (ICBM) attack 24/7/365. In support of USNORTHCOM,
    Army National Guard and Active component soldiers operate the GMD Fire
    Control Systems located at the Fire Direction Center in Alaska; Missile
    Defense Element in Colorado; a detachment that oversees operations at
    Vandenberg Space Force Base, California; and a detachment that secures
    GMD sensor infrastructure at Fort Drum, New York. At the Fort Greely
    Missile Defense Complex, 49th Missile Defense Battalion military police
    secure interceptors and command and control (C2) facilities from
    physical threats. These security soldiers perform their duties in some
    of the most austere conditions in the United States, with winter
    temperatures plummeting to 50 degrees below zero and fewer than 4 hours
    of sunlight in the winter months.
        1st Space Brigade Soldiers provide CCDRs certified AN/TPY-2 FBM
    missile defense batteries that support strategic and regional missions.
    These batteries are globally located in five strategic, yet remote and
    austere locations, where they provide ballistic missile search, track,
    and discrimination operations in support of both homeland and regional
    defense. These soldiers continuously demonstrate our Nation's
    commitment to defend deployed forces, allies, and partners from
    ballistic missile attacks.
        Support to Global Missile Defense Test and Development: Soldiers
    from the 100th MDB and 49th Missile Defense Battalion participate in
    GMD test activities and work with Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
    developers on enhancements to the GMD. The MDA's testing regime,
    conducted through a series of ground-based and operational flight
    tests, emphasizes operational realism during test design and execution.
    This realism enables system operators to sustain and improve their
    proficiency and validate the system's operational employment.
        Space Support to Missile Early Warning: Space-enabled capabilities
    are essential for missile defense operations. They provide and enable
    communications; positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT);
    intelligence; and surveillance to meet the demands of modern warfare.
    In support of joint force commanders, USASMDC continues to provide
    missile warning within the USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, and USINDOPACOM theaters
    of operations. The 1st Space Brigade's forward stationed JTAGS theater
    missile warning companies are essential for USSPACECOM's assured
    missile warning mission. They are operated by USASMDC soldiers who
    monitor launch activity and other events observed by infrared sensor
    platforms and quickly provide information to members of the AMD and
    operational communities. The JTAGS forward stationing reduces the risk
    of solely relying on long-haul communications and ensures the
    resilience of USSPACECOM's comprehensive missile warning system.
             preparing forces and capabilities for the future fight
        USASMDC's second major task is to develop future missile defense
    forces and mature current capabilities. The Space and Missile Defense
    Center of Excellence (SMD CoE) is the Army's force modernization
    proponent responsible for managing change to Army doctrine,
    organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel,
    facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) requirements for space, strategic
    missile defense, and high-altitude capabilities. The SMD CoE trains and
    educates agile, adaptive, and ready soldiers and leaders; executes life
    cycle management for Army space operations officers; develops Army
    Space soldiers; and enables informed decision making.
        To carry out its mission, the SMD CoE executes practices
    established by U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and Army Futures
    Command to meet force management and Army modernization enterprise
    responsibilities. These functions include performing concept
    development, capabilities determination, and capabilities integration
    relative to DOTMLPF-P for process change, integration, and transition
    for materiel development.
        Specifically, in the training arena, SMD CoE conducts the Army's
    institutional soldier qualification training and education for space
    and GMD mission areas. The SMD School writes, coordinates, and
    publishes Army doctrine for space and GMD while also integrating space
    training and education in curriculum across all Army proponent schools,
    operational unit home stations, and pre-deployment training events.
    These efforts prepare soldiers across all warfighting functions to
    integrate Army and joint space and missile defense capabilities and
    effects in the conduct of MDO.
                 research and development of army technologies
        USASMDC's third major task is to provide critical technologies to
    address future needs that will enhance warfighter effectiveness.
    USASMDC's Technical Center supports joint warfighters by providing
    science, technology, and test and evaluation expertise to enable
    warfighter dominance both today and in the future. The Technical Center
    contributes to warfighter and joint force success in four major areas:
    directed energy (DE); tactical responsive space and high altitude; test
    and evaluation; and hypersonic and strategic weapons.
        Directed Energy: The Technical Center is the Army lead for high-
    energy laser technology development. High-energy lasers complement
    kinetic systems in addressing rocket, artillery, and mortar threats;
    UAS; and cruise missiles. Additionally, the Technical Center is
    exploring high-power microwave technology for use in interdicting a
    multitude of improvised threats. As systems are fielded, the Technical
    Center will continue developing new and improved DE technologies for
    insertion into weapon systems to maintain warfighter dominance.
        Tactical Responsive Space and High Altitude: As the Army lead for
    space and high-altitude research, development, and engineering, the
    Technical Center identifies, develops, demonstrates, and integrates
    technologies in the areas of responsive space, space superiority, and
    high altitude. Working with other Army, DOD, and industry partners, the
    Technical Center focuses on persistent beyond line-of-sight
    communications for forces in remote areas; functionally effective
    resolution imagery; solutions for assured PNT; ground C2 systems; and
    direct downlink of tactical data feeds.
        Test and Evaluation: As an invaluable part of the Army test and
    evaluation enterprise, the Technical Center supports developmental and
    operational AMD defense testing with a suite of low-cost ballistic
    missile targets, transportable and configurable launchers, and test
    execution and evaluation. These ballistic missile targets are critical
    to threat-representative, operationally realistic testing of high-
    priority Army systems such as Patriot, THAAD, and IBCS, with future
    testing planned for the Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor
    (LTAMDS).
        Hypersonic and Strategic Weapons: Since completing the Nation's
    first successful hypersonic weapon test in 2011, the Technical Center
    has continued supporting hypersonic testing for the Army, Navy, and Air
    Force, from test planning and design through mission execution and
    post-flight analysis. Additionally, the Technical Center is continuing
    to develop capabilities that enable rapid systems development and
    fielding through integration and interoperability testing, sensor and
    C2 design, flight test analysis, verification and validation, and
    warfighter training within an independent laboratory infrastructure.
        Missile Defense Testing Assets and Range: The Technical Center also
    oversees the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Test Site (RTS) at U.S.
    Army Garrison-Kwajalein Atoll, Republic of the Marshall Islands. The
    RTS is a vital national asset that provides live-fire developmental and
    operational flight testing of offensive and defensive missile,
    hypersonic, and space systems; equatorial satellite launch capability;
    space object tracking and characterization; and atmospheric science
    research. This unique range and test facility, located 2,300 miles
    west-southwest of Hawaii, provides test support to MDA, NASA, the U.S.
    Air Force, and other agencies.
        The RTS supports developmental and operational testing of both
    homeland and regional missile defense systems, as well offensive
    ballistic missile testing for the Air Force Global Strike Command.
    Hypersonic system testing has become a significant element of near-term
    test planning at RTS. In concert with its testing mission and using a
    suite of the world's most sophisticated radar systems, to include the
    U.S. Space Force's Space Fence, RTS also supports space object
    identification and space domain awareness missions in support of
    USSPACECOM. This mission includes space object tracking and
    characterization, providing critical orbital information on new foreign
    launches and high-resolution images in support of space situational
    awareness.
        army contributions to the nation's missile defense capabilities
        The DOD will adopt a new strategic course in 2022, with a new
    National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, Nuclear Posture
    Review, and Missile Defense Review. The Army will establish its
    corresponding strategy nested in Office of the Secretary of Defense
    (OSD) guidance. USASMDC will update the Army Air and Missile Defense
    2028 vision document to meet these directives and enable MDO. To
    achieve an AMD force capable of supporting the Army of 2030, we must
    continue modernizing and developing AMD capabilities, building
    sufficient AMD capacity for MDO, and ensuring AMD forces are trained
    and ready. We must also ensure that our capabilities and associated C2
    systems are resilient and interoperable with joint and allied forces.
    Accomplishing these essential tasks will allow us to provide deterrence
    through deployments and forward stationing and enable a more robust,
    comprehensive defense by coordinating and integrating with our allies
    and partners.
        Army AMD is undergoing its most significant modernization program
    in the last four decades, as it is one of the Army's six modernization
    priorities receiving substantially increased investment. The AMD Cross
    Functional Team (CFT) serves as the Army's modernization lead and works
    closely with the other Services, Joint Staff, and MDA toward joint
    integrated AMD (IAMD) capabilities. The Program Executive Office
    Missiles and Space is the Army's materiel developer for these
    capabilities and works closely with AMD CFT and U.S. Army Aviation and
    Missile Command. A summary of the Army's AMD strategic direction and
    major programs follows.
        Air and Missile Defense Readiness: Multiple factors--including the
    enduring demand from CCDRs, the transition to great power competition
    and its associated complex threat set, and the overdue and critical
    need to modernize the Army's AMD force--have all converged to impact
    Army AMD force readiness. High operational demand of missile defense
    forces to support joint warfighters continues stressing Army AMD force
    readiness, modernization, and soldier welfare. Enduring high
    operational tempo and limited deployment predictability negatively
    impact soldier readiness and family well-being. Currently, twice as
    many ADA soldiers are dwell restricted as compared to the overall Army.
    In an effort to improve soldier predictability and readiness, the Army
    has established a new unit life cycle modernization model known as the
    Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model (ReARMM). It is
    critical that the ADA Branch leverage ReARMM to inform the Joint Staff
    and OSD on force availability and improve deployment predictability for
    AMD soldiers.
        Mission Command: Closely linked to AMD readiness is the ability to
    provide low density, high demand AMD mission command elements. These
    elements are pivotal to laying the foundation for and creating an
    environment that supports integration of Army AMD forces into joint and
    combined C2 architectures. During the past few years, the Army has
    activated an additional active component ADA brigade headquarters in
    USINDOPACOM and rotated a National Guard ADA brigade headquarters to
    USEUCOM. Also in the USEUCOM theater, the Army will soon stand up an
    active component ADA brigade headquarters.
        Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System: The IBCS
    program is a top Army AMD modernization priority that integrates
    current and future AMD sensors and weapons into a common integrated
    fire control capability, allowing warfighters to fully integrate AMD
    capabilities across all echelons. The IBCS is the direct replacement
    for mission command nodes in the Patriot weapon system, headquarters
    elements, and airspace management cells. It also allows rapid
    convergence of sensors, shooters, and mission command components on an
    integrated fire control network. Once fully fielded, IBCS will provide
    a game-changing capability that allows appropriate tailoring and
    scaling of AMD forces to meet the given threat. The quantity and mix of
    capabilities can be dynamically retasked into a formation with an
    inherent, integrated mission command system to build tiered and layered
    defenses. In addition, IBCS open architecture enables rapid integration
    of legacy and developmental sensors and shooters that provide
    capabilities to defeat emerging threats in MDO. This year, the IBCS
    program entered low-rate initial production and began initial
    operational testing and evaluation.
        The IBCS program will field common mission command nodes for Army
    AMD forces to defend against manned aircraft, UAS, air-to-ground
    missiles, tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and rockets,
    artillery, and mortar (RAM) attacks. Ultimately, IBCS will operate with
    air surveillance and fire control capabilities across the Army, Air
    Force, and Navy, and with joint and multinational AMD forces at all
    echelons, thereby enhancing AMD force lethality. By dismantling the
    current system-centric mission command paradigm, it will dramatically
    increase systems capability and facilitate open industry competition in
    support of the AMD community. The IBCS is one of the Army's
    contributions to Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control,
    currently in development between the Army and Air Force; continued
    experimentation to link with C2 systems for Army and joint fires is
    ongoing. Additional efforts are currently underway to support IBCS
    interoperability with MDA's Ballistic Missile Defense System, exploring
    the feasibility and potential benefits of integrating IBCS with MDA's
    Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC)
    program.
        Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System: THAAD is a key
    component of the ballistic missile defense system-of-systems
    architecture and designed for area defense against short, medium, and
    intermediate range ballistic missiles. It is a mobile and globally
    transportable, low density, high demand asset that has a unique endo-
    and exoatmospheric intercept capability using proven hit-to-kill
    technology. There are currently seven operational THAAD batteries, two
    of which are forward stationed in Guam and the Republic of Korea in
    response to the North Korean nuclear and missile threat. Development
    efforts associated with United States Forces Korea Joint Emergent
    Operational Need (JUONS) improved Patriot and THAAD interoperability,
    as successfully demonstrated in a recent THAAD/Patriot MSE
    developmental and operational test where THAAD software used two MSE
    interceptors to engage a ballistic missile target. As directed in the
    2019 Missile Defense Review, the Army, in conjunction with OSD and MDA,
    reassessed the THAAD requirement to eight batteries.
        Patriot/Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement:
    The Army Patriot force remains the cornerstone of AMD protection for
    our deployed forces, friends, and allies. The PAC-3 MSE is a high
    velocity, hit-to-kill, surface-to-air missile capable of intercepting
    and destroying tactical ballistic missiles and air-breathing threats.
    The PAC-3 MSE, a follow-on variant of the PAC-3, is in full-rate
    production and the latest generation hit-to-kill PAC-3 interceptor in
    the Patriot force to meet global capability requirements. The PAC-3 MSE
    fills the engagement gap between THAAD and PAC-3 missiles while also
    defeating advanced threats earlier, at greater range, and with
    increased lethality. The PAC-3 MSE's improved capability is achieved
    through a higher performance solid rocket motor, modified lethality
    enhancer, more responsive control surfaces, upgraded guidance software,
    and insensitive munitions improvements.
        Patriot must continually modernize through software and hardware
    upgrades to address obsolescence and evolving threats, and to best
    utilize extended battlespace performance afforded by the PAC-3 MSE
    interceptor. Modernization efforts provide combat identification
    enhancements, address upper-tier debris mitigation, improve PAC3 MSE
    interceptor performance, and enable increased Army and joint
    interoperability. The Army leverages the program's stable funding
    profile to reduce price risk to the government through firm fixed price
    contracting and value engineering initiatives. In doing so, the Army
    mitigates obsolescence and counters emerging threats through hardware
    and software improvements. In addition to the integration efforts with
    the LTAMDS radar and IBCS, the Army supports the MDA-led integration of
    PAC-3 MSE interceptors and launchers into the THAAD weapon system.
    These new integrated capabilities expand battlespace by leveraging the
    THAAD AN/TPY-2 and Patriot radars together to detect threat targets at
    greater ranges. They will be pure fleeted across all Patriot battalions
    beginning in Fiscal Year 2023. In addition, to overmatch the near-term
    evolving threat, the Army is continuously improving Patriot while
    moving toward an IBCS architecture that enables kill-chain
    contributions from a wider spectrum of Army and joint sensors and
    weapon components.
        Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor: Replacing the current
    Patriot radar, LTAMDS will provide networked sensing capabilities in
    lower tier missile defense battlespace and enable full capability of
    the PAC-3 MSE. The LTAMDS significantly improves legacy Patriot radar
    by providing expanded range and 360-degree coverage combined with the
    benefits of a networked sensor on the Army IAMD integrated fire control
    network. This modern technology will reduce current Patriot radar
    operations and sustainment costs by offsetting system equipment
    requirements and enhancing reliability and maintainability. Recent
    program successes include approval of an updated acquisition strategy
    that enables rapid prototyping and major capability acquisition, as
    well as approval of the LTAMDS PNT strategy. The Army plans to begin
    testing LTAMDS prototypes with IBCS and the Patriot family of
    interceptors, with the objective of fielding four sensors under urgent
    materiel release to a Patriot battalion by the end of 2023.
        Indirect Fire Protection Capability: Indirect Fire Protection
    Capability (IFPC) is a ground-based weapon system designed to acquire,
    track, engage, and defeat cruise missile, UAS, and RAM threats. The
    Army's IFPC must integrate with IBCS as its C2 to enable an MDO-ready
    Army by 2030. In accordance with the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense
    Authorization Act, the Army completed acceptance and fielding of two
    Iron Dome system batteries as an interim cruise missile defense
    capability. This past February, the Army supported Operation Iron
    Island, an Army executive order requirement that served as an
    opportunity to gain awareness of the system in an operational
    environment.
        The Army is currently executing a competitive acquisition strategy
    to develop and field an enduring IFPC capability integrated with IBCS.
    IFPC Increment 2 will be an industry built solution for a launcher, and
    interceptor, and an all-up-round-magazine. This weapon platform will
    integrate with IBCS fire control with Sentinel as the primary organic
    sensor. In September 2021, the Army announced the award of a rapid
    prototype agreement with an industry partner for development and
    delivery of 16 launchers and 60 interceptors for IFPC Increment 2.
        Army Long-Range Persistent Surveillance: The Army Long Range
    Persistent Surveillance (ALPS) passive sensor provides continuous, 360
    degree, long range surveillance against fixed-and rotary-wing aircraft,
    UAS, and cruise missile threats and has demonstrated the ability to
    integrate into joint and Army C2 systems, including IBCS. In response
    to multiple CCDR requirements, ALPS completed a USCENTCOM deployment
    last year and is currently being fielded in the USEUCOM and USINDOPACOM
    theaters.
        Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Technological advances and
    the proliferation of commercial and tactical UAS in both reconnaissance
    and attack capabilities have matured to the point where they present a
    significant threat to Army operations from both state and nonstate
    actors. To address these threats, the Army continues to serve, at the
    direction of the Secretary of Defense, as the executive agent for
    countering UASs, having established the Joint Counter-Small UAS (C-
    sUAS) Office (JCO). Key JCO focus areas include developing joint
    requirements and materiel solutions, as well as joint training and
    doctrine. The JCO continues to work across DOD to synchronize and
    coordinate the development of C-sUAS technologies that meet Service-
    specific and joint requirements. Development efforts such as high-power
    microwave and DE are critical to ensuring the Army maintains pace with
    both commercial and state developed UASs. In response to a warfighter
    JUONS, the Army recently deployed over 500 man portable, fixed site,
    and mobile C-sUAS systems and continues adapting to changing theater
    UAS threats. The Army is now focused on providing critical C-sUAS
    capabilities to divisions in the operational force while growing
    protection of vital fixed and semi-fixed sites. For instance, in
    support of the Immediate Response Force in Europe, the Army has
    provided the 82nd Airborne Division kinetic and non-kinetic C-sUAS
    capabilities, allowing the division to detect, track, and defeat sUAS.
        Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense: In response to identified
    operational needs, M-SHORAD will provide maneuver forces a dedicated,
    Stryker-based air defense capability against fixed-wing, rotary-wing,
    and UAS threats. In Fiscal Year 2018, the Army approved and began
    developing initial M-SHORAD systems that integrate existing Army
    capabilities into Stryker combat vehicles. The program successfully
    delivered four first unit equipped systems to an artillery regiment in
    April 2021 and remains on track to deliver four M-SHORAD battalions by
    Fiscal Year 2024. The Army also continues maturing high energy laser
    and electronic warfare technologies to increase M-SHORAD capabilities
    in support of the maneuver force. Ultimately, M-SHORAD battalions will
    contain a mix of complementary DE and kinetic intercept systems to
    protect the maneuver force.
      joint functional component command for integrated missile defense--
                 integrating and synchronizing missile defense
        The Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile
    Defense (JFCC IMD) is USSTRATCOM's integrating element for global
    missile defense. USSTRATCOM formed JFCC IMD to execute its UCP-assigned
    missile defense responsibilities, enabling the headquarters to focus on
    integration and advocacy. Established in 2005 and headquartered at
    Schriever Space Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado, JFCC IMD is
    manned by a cohesive team of subject matter experts from the Army,
    Navy, Air Force, Space Force, and Marine Corps, as well as Government
    Civilian and Contractor personnel.
        The JFCC IMD is the recognized subject matter expert across the
    missile defense enterprise in matters of global missile defense
    operational support, policy, plans, intelligence, communications,
    training and education, and operational risk assessment. The command's
    principal mission is to integrate these transregional missile defense
    functions across the joint and combined warfighting force. On behalf of
    USSTRATCOM and other CCDRs, JFCC IMD champions warfighter priorities
    and operational needs. These include continued development of a robust
    missile defense sensor network, integrated discrimination capabilities,
    redundant and resilient C2 networks with enhanced cybersecurity
    defenses, and improved means of intercept for all missile and hybrid
    threats.
        The JFCC IMD works across DOD and alongside allies and key partners
    to improve integration of existing capabilities, maximizing efficiency
    and effectiveness in global missile defense missions. Integration is
    the essential force multiplier--a critically important mission enabler
    that JFCC IMD directly supports. As a functional component command of
    USSTRATCOM, JFCC IMD supports designated UCP responsibilities along
    four lines of effort:
          Synchronizing global missile defense planning, global
    force management, and missile defense security cooperation activities.
          Conducting global missile defense operations support, to
    include asset management, alternate execution authority, federated
    intelligence support, and network monitoring and protection.
          Executing above element, joint, and combined global
    missile defense training and education, exercises, and experimentation.
          Advocating for, and recommending acceptance of, global
    missile defense capabilities, conducting analyses and assessments of
    current and future capabilities, and supporting tests.
        To accomplish these efforts, JFCC IMD maintains close collaborative
    relationships with CCDRs, MDA, OSD, the Joint Staff, Services,
    intelligence community, and our allies and partners. The JFCC IMD
    continually seeks to enhance deployed forces' capabilities while
    gaining operational experience and confidence in our collective ability
    to defend the Nation, deployed forces, allies, and partners. Some key
    efforts to enhance missile defense planning and capabilities for both
    homeland and regional architectures follow.
        Expansion and Integration of the Missile Defense Architecture: In
    response to the evolving strategic environment, JFCC IMD continues to
    bolster homeland and regional missile defense capabilities and further
    the global missile defense mission through advancement of new
    capabilities. These advancements include the Aegis Ashore site in
    Poland; continued development of the Standard Missile-3 Block IIA; the
    Long Range Discrimination Radar, Clear Space Force Station, Alaska;
    Space-based Kill Assessment; MDA's Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking
    Space Sensor; Space Development Agency's Tranche 1 Tracking Layer; the
    Next Generation Interceptor for homeland defense; and the Glide Phase
    Interceptor for regional hypersonic defense. Given the challenges
    associated with integrating these capabilities into a global
    architecture, JFCC IMD, in support of USSTRATCOM, provides essential
    collaboration with CCDRs to assess and address transregional gaps in
    the areas of planning, policy, capabilities development, and
    operations.
        Integrated Missile Defense Asset Management: The JFCC IMD, in
    coordination with USSTRATCOM and CCDRs, manages missile defense
    operational readiness posture, coordinates global missile defense
    system maintenance, and supports MDA and Service tests. The asset
    management process allows JFCC IMD to continually assess system
    readiness to defend against missile attacks and recommend adjustments
    to optimize overall missile defense architecture.
        Cybersecurity of the Missile Defense System: The JFCC IMD, in
    coordination with USSTRATCOM and MDA, conducts the cybersecurity
    service provider mission for missile defense architecture to ensure
    cyber defenses and operations are planned and executed across the
    globe. Working with key stakeholders, JFCC IMD enhances the cyber
    defense posture of the missile defense operational architecture against
    malicious activity. The JFCC IMD also collaborates with mission
    partners to incorporate realistic cybersecurity testing in support of
    the warfighter capability acceptance process. Additionally, JFCC IMD
    works closely with the Joint Staff, CCMDs, and MDA to educate, train,
    and exercise cybersecurity protocols to ensure the highest levels of
    global missile defense readiness.
        Global Force Management: USSTRATCOM, as the designated Joint
    Functional Manager for Missile Defense, relies upon JFCC IMD to
    evaluate and recommend to the Joint Staff risk-informed sourcing of
    missile defense requirements. Due to the low density and high demand
    nature of missile defense assets, all sourcing decisions have a direct
    and significant impact on other CCDRs' campaign and contingency plans.
    The JFCC IMD continues refining this approach, ensuring integrated
    capabilities are appropriately postured to counter transregional
    threats in accordance with the current National Defense Strategy,
    Missile Defense Review, and Department steady-state priorities. This
    globally integrated approach serves as the baseline for risk-based
    recommendations to the global force management process, enabling senior
    leaders to make informed decisions.
        Allied and Partner Missile Defense Integration: Given that we will
    never have enough active defense capacity, integrating our allies and
    partners into a common and mutually supportive architecture is a
    critical warfighter priority. We must move beyond merely enabling the
    independent ``burden sharing'' of allies and partners to an environment
    of mutual trust and information sharing that empowers truly integrated
    planning and operations enabled by combined force development,
    simulation, experimentation, testing, and exercise. We must acknowledge
    that future major conflicts should not be fought alone and that our
    greatest strategic advantage is the power of our alliances and
    partnerships. We should not hamstring this historic advantage with
    continued policies and practices that hinder collective action.
        The Nimble Titan Campaign of Experimentation, a biennial series of
    multinational missile defense experiments, is one venue aimed at
    promoting this increased cooperation. This event brings together
    subject matter experts from allied and partner nations to explore the
    national policy and military interfaces and dynamics involved in
    collaborative coalition and alliance missile defense planning. Meeting
    this intent is necessary to developing regional defense designs, C2
    relationships, and collective, bilateral, and multilateral policy.
    Nimble Titan fosters greater confidence in combined missile defenses
    and provides a means to advance U.S. efforts in collaboration,
    interoperability, and operational integration with our allies and
    partners.
        Joint Missile Defense Training and Education: Even with ongoing
    challenges posed by COVID-19, JFCC IMD, in coordination with
    USSTRATCOM, the Joint Staff, Services, and CCMDs, continues developing
    comprehensive and innovative training programs to close gaps between
    Service, joint, and regional missile defense training and education.
    The JFCC IMD's Joint Ballistic Missile Defense Training and Education
    Center offers 18 mission-focused resident, online, and mobile training
    team courses including orientation, asset management, C2BMC situational
    awareness, and general and flag officer seminar training. During 2021,
    JFCC IMD instructors executed 169 courses that trained more than 4,100
    students worldwide. Enhancing collective advantage, JFCC IMD also
    provides training courses to allies and partners through both military
    to military and Foreign Military Sales training venues. Additional
    foreign training opportunities are anticipated as the COVID-19 pandemic
    wanes globally.
        Warfighter Inputs to Capability Development: The JFCC IMD helps
    streamline and accelerate MDA's efforts to provide integrated kill
    chain capabilities (sense, C2, and effect) to warfighters as quickly as
    possible to meet increased threat developments. As multiple reviews
    have identified, the Nation must streamline requirement generation and
    reform acquisition and fiscal processes and cultures to enable MDA and
    the Services to quickly develop, test, and deliver effective, reliable,
    and sustainable missile defense capabilities. Our adversaries are not
    waiting, so we must change our typical ways with innovation,
    adaptability, risk acceptance, and speed. The JFCC IMD collaborates
    with CCDRs, MDA, and the Services, as well as their respective test
    agencies, to leverage emerging technologies to enhance existing
    systems, explore innovative operational concepts, and prioritize
    maturing technological advancements with the most promising near-term
    potential. To that end, JFCC IMD continues optimizing the collaboration
    inherent in the warfighter involvement process as an operational
    proponent for required missile defense capabilities and performance
    enhancements.
        Sustaining our competitive advantage through innovation and
    expedience depends on well-resourced and operationally relevant test
    campaigns, as well as high fidelity modeling and simulation
    infrastructure and forward looking wargaming to challenge assumptions
    regarding our future missile defense readiness and posture. In testing
    over the past year, JFCC IMD supported demonstration of the selectable
    2-and 3-stage GMD interceptor, which will improve the effective
    engagement and defeat zone of incoming threats; several data
    collections of hypersonic vehicle flight tests to characterize sensor
    performance; and test planning for an upcoming operational flight test
    to demonstrate the Long Range Discrimination Radar's capabilities.
        Comprehensive Missile Defeat: As I have highlighted, adversary
    offensive missile and hybrid systems are increasingly complex and
    challenging in their delivery means and scale. As such, an optimal
    missile defense requires both defensive and offensive capabilities to
    defeat potential threats. By sustaining a capability to not only attack
    the adversary's ability to launch missiles but also destroy them after
    launch, a comprehensive approach can lower overall costs and reduce
    risk of failure. Creating this comprehensive posture--involving the
    integration of both defensive and offensive capabilities -will require
    balancing a variety of approaches within our capability set.
        Importantly, as we continue developing innovative capabilities, it
    is imperative that we implement integrated deterrence as the framework
    that weaves together all instruments of national power. These actions
    include diplomacy at the forefront and advancing cross-domain
    deterrence together with the capabilities and actions of allies and
    partners to ensure the costs and risks of adversary aggression remain
    disproportionate to any conceivable benefit. These capabilities must
    include conventional kinetic, DE, cyber, and electromagnetic attack as
    part of a comprehensive approach. Each individual approach provides
    opportunities to reduce the burden on active defenses; however, none
    alone is a ``silver bullet'' to defeating the threat. As such, our
    future offensive materiel solutions will likely be a mix of guns,
    missiles, electronic warfare, cyber, space, and DE weapons. To this
    end, we must understand how each of these systems complement one
    another and strive for a balance that allows prelaunch attack
    operations and offense-defense integration, and then organize to
    operationalize these capabilities and maximize their contributions to
    missile defense.
        In summary, JFCC IMD continues to expand our Nation's global
    missile defense architecture and explore developing capabilities to
    maintain operational advantage against current and future threats. We
    maintain our competitive edge through integrated planning and
    operational support, development of warfighters through education and
    training, expansion of collective capabilities in collaboration with
    our allies and partners, and rapid delivery of innovative and impactful
    capabilities to warfighters that enhance national security.
                                   conclusion
        Chairman King and Ranking Member Fischer, as members of the joint
    missile defense community, the Army and USSTRATCOM continue pursuing
    enhancements to the Nation's IAMD systems, from tactical to strategic
    levels of warfare. As outlined here, USASMDC and JFCC IMD perform a
    broad set of critical national security missions. These missions
    include providing professional warfighters and capabilities to support
    current operations, ensuring they are prepared for tomorrow's fight,
    and developing the new technologies required to achieve and maintain
    technological advantage against our adversaries. Our trained and ready
    soldiers, operating GMD elements in Colorado, Alaska, New York, and
    California, and from remote, globally deployed locations, remain ready
    to defend the homeland against ICBM attack. As a force provider to
    CCDRs, we provide essential regional sensor capabilities, ballistic
    missile early warning, and space-enabled communications. Our regional
    forces continue to leverage allied collaboration and planning efforts
    in developing integrated and interoperable defenses against various
    threat sets. USSTRATCOM, through JFCC IMD, continues to integrate
    missile defense capabilities to counter global missile threats and
    protect our Nation, deployed forces, and allies and partners.
        While operational, doctrinal, and materiel developments are
    essential, our most important assets are the thousands of soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, marines, guardians, civilians, and contractors who
    deploy and employ our IAMD systems. As recognized by Department
    leadership, the strength behind our outstanding workforce is their
    families. Their contributions and sacrifices are foundational to the
    dedication and performance of our workforce--the role and support of
    our families empowers mission accomplishment.
        I appreciate the opportunity to address missile defense matters and
    look forward to addressing your questions.

        Senator King. Thank you, General.
        Admiral Hill?

      STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JON HILL, USN, DIRECTOR, MISSILE
                             DEFENSE AGENCY

        Vice Admiral Hill. Good afternoon, Chairman King, Ranking
    Member Fischer, distinguished members of the subcommittee. It
    is a great honor to be here with some incredible key
    partnerships here to testify before you today.
        I would like to first start by recognizing and thanking
    those who operate from abroad and here at home, operating the
    Integrated Missile Defense System, and then, of course, my
    Missile Defense Agency team, comprised of military, civilian,
    and contractor workforces that ensure that the warfighters can
    operate those systems.
        Our fiscal year 2023 budget was mentioned as $9.6 billion
    to continue the mission of protecting the homeland, our
    forward-deployed forces, our friends, and allies.
        A little bit back on the threat. Everyone has mentioned it.
    I want to put a finer point on it. When you think about
    advanced ballistic missiles, long-range cruise missiles,
    hypersonic missiles, what that really means, down at the
    warfighter level, is heavy maneuver, large numbers, at high
    speed, with 360-degree attack. That is a challenge.
        Rather than walking through all of the elements of the
    Integrated Missile Defense System that we have deployed
    globally and operated by our services, I want to focus in on
    what I see as the three top priorities for President's budget
    2023.
        Priority one is the no-fail mission of defend the homeland
    against ballistic attacks from the rogue nations. I want to
    thank Congress for the great support on the service life
    extension program. We are making great progress. We are on
    track, ahead of schedule. We have got the first round that we
    refurbished back in the hole now, number two is inbound, and
    rounds three, four, and five are being processed now. That is
    going to extend the reliability of our in-service fleet----
        Senator King. I would prefer you not use the term
    ``inbound'' in this room. It makes me a little nervous.
        [Laughter.]
        Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. I will scratch that from the
    script.
        Then I would like to switch on over to Next-Generation
    Interceptor. As was mentioned earlier, we are at light speed
    working very closely with General VanHerck and his team to
    ensure that the two contractors that we put in place last year
    about this time, March of 2021, are tracking to get to first in
    placement around the 2028 time frame. Right now both are
    performing so well that they are anticipating, and our team
    believes that we are tracking towards 2027. That is incredible.
    That means flight testing earlier. That means ground testing
    earlier. That means we have a better sense of where we are as
    we move forward to upgrade the numbers of interceptors and the
    capability that we will be bringing forward.
        Priority two--and the reason it is priority two is not just
    because it is a territory with U.S. citizens living on it. It
    will be one of the most difficult things we do as an agency,
    and that is the defense of Guam. We have a current architecture
    with a ship stationed up forward and we have a THAAD battery on
    the island. We have a clear set of operational requirements
    from INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command]. We finalized the
    architecture in President's budget 2023. The Department did
    provide funds in fiscal year 2022 to accelerate, and then
    Congress added a plus-up for us to do that.
        Our plan is to leverage mature systems to expand so that we
    have emerging capabilities tied in, and I think the most
    important thing that we will bring to the table is a single
    command and control structure. Critically important for the
    Pacific Defense Initiative, so we are staying very close to
    INDOPACOM as we move through this development.
        Priority three, really driven by the threat, and that is
    the hypersonic missile defense that has been mentioned by
    everybody. We are leveraging our existing sensors today to get
    indications and warnings, so we are not starting at zero. Our
    command and control battle management deployed globally has the
    ability to pull in the space assets that are available, the
    land-based assets, the sea-based assets, to get us track on
    hypersonics when they fly through the field of view. Our
    command and control battle management system, C2BMC, is running
    a prototype today that provides indications and warning to
    INDOPACOM.
        Where we are going in fiscal year 2023 is we will have our
    first two Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensors,
    HBTSS, in space, operating in an inclination to where we can
    collect data from testing we do in the INDOPACOM region. We are
    going to get fire control data where we can leverage our
    weapons.
        What we have deployed today for hypersonic defense, with
    the sea base, is the sea-based terminal capability. I mentioned
    that already. That has been deployed for a while. We are on
    Increment 2 of that capability and moving out towards Increment
    3. When I say that, that means we are expanding the threat set
    to take on a larger number of those hypersonic threats.
        Where we need to go is away from the terminal area. You
    have to defend there but it is the most difficult place to
    engage because you really do not know where a terminal is going
    to be, because it is maneuvering and it is high speed. So we
    are moving to get to a layered defense capability, and in the
    President's Budget 2023 we are going forward with the Glide
    Phase Interceptor. We have three companies on board now, and we
    will be down-selecting to two later this year.
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, Members of the
    Subcommittee, MDA continues to increase readiness, resiliency,
    and cybersecurity and the capability and capacity of homeland
    and regional defenses while investing in advanced technology.
    We are committed to attracting and building a strong, talented,
    future workforce, and our capabilities-based approach and
    unique acquisition authorities enable MDA to deliver by,
    through, and with the services to the combatant commands to
    meet their requirements.
        I appreciate your continued support for the Missile Defense
    Agency, the people, and the missile defense mission. I look
    forward to answering your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Hill follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Vice Admiral Jon A. Hill
        Good morning, Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and
    distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. The Missile Defense Agency
    (MDA) budget request of $9.628 billion for fiscal year 2023 enables the
    continued execution of the MDA mission to design, develop and deploy a
    layered Missile Defense System (MDS) to defend the United States and
    its deployed forces, allies, and friends from increasingly diverse
    missile threats. MDA's proposed investments for fiscal year 2023
    reflect missile defense guidance issued in the classified 2022 Missile
    Defense Review, which was provided to Congress on March 28, 2022, along
    with the 2022 National Defense Strategy, and are aligned with the
    February 1, 2022 ``USD(R&E) Technology Vision for an Era of
    Competition.''
        Potential U.S. adversaries are developing more advanced ballistic,
    hypersonic, and cruise missile systems, increasingly making them more
    mobile, survivable, reliable, accurate, and capable of achieving longer
    ranges. Current and future missile threats pose the growing technical
    challenges of high velocity, heavy maneuver, large numbers, and the
    exploitation of combination attacks involving unmanned aerial vehicles.
    MDA continues to collaborate with Combatant Commanders and the Services
    to support current and future needs for missile defense capabilities.
    The Department periodically re-examines missile defense roles,
    responsibilities and authorities. For example, the Joint Staff is
    implementing its Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Capability
    Portfolio Management Review (CPMR) to continuously review threats,
    identify capability gaps, and make cost/risk tradeoff recommendations.
    I support this effort. I also consider the Warfighter Involvement
    Process, or WIP, currently led by U.S. Strategic Command and the Joint
    Functional Component Commander for Integrated Missile Defense, to be
    essential, as it is currently constituted, to the U.S. missile defense
    enterprise. I believe the existing missile defense governance process,
    including the WIP, is unique and necessary for the voices of the
    Combatant Commands and the Services to be heard. The current governance
    process, combined with MDA's capabilities-based approach and unique
    acquisition authorities, are essential in supporting the Warfighter
    given the rapidly evolving threat environment.
    delivering by, through and with the services to meet combatant command
                                  requirements
        MDA is developing, delivering, sustaining, and improving
    affordable, proven, and leading-edge capabilities to counter
    increasingly advanced ballistic missiles and an expanding set of
    hypersonic and cruise missiles.
    Space and Terrestrial Sensors
        We can improve sensor tracking and discrimination capabilities by
    leveraging the global persistence and proximity of space sensors. The
    Spacebased Kill Assessment (SKA) network of infrared sensors hosted on
    commercial satellites is planned to deliver hit and kill assessment
    capabilities for homeland defense. On-orbit SKA sensors have already
    participated successfully in a variety of flight tests and engineering
    activities and provide situational awareness to U.S. Northern Command
    (USNORTHCOM) during regular exercises. We will complete SKA hit
    assessment integration using a Command and Control, Battle Management
    and Communications (C2BMC) operational interface into the MDS in fiscal
    year 2024 and continue developing a follow-on kill assessment as part
    of the post-intercept assessment capability.
        MDA continues to collaborate with the U.S. Space Force (USSF),
    including the Space Development Agency, and industry to develop a
    Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) capability to
    detect and track boosting ballistic missiles and hypersonic glide
    vehicles. In fiscal year 2023, we will complete development and
    implementation of ground systems to support satellite operations and
    testing and deliver two prototype satellites developed by two separate
    companies in support of a planned fiscal year 2023 launch to conduct
    on-orbit demonstrations. I also would like to recognize the critical
    contributions made by the two Space Tracking and Surveillance System
    (STSS) satellites launched in September 2009. After lasting eight years
    past their design life, both space vehicles were decommissioned earlier
    this year. STSS satellites served as an important testbed for HBTSS
    risk reduction activities, which included demonstrations that we can
    close the MDS fire control loop from space.
        MDA also continues to develop, deploy, and sustain a robust, cyber-
    secure and networked ground- and sea-based radar architecture. We
    completed Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) construction and
    Initial Fielding in 2021 at Clear Space Force Station (SFS), Alaska.
    The LRDR is the most advanced ground-based radar in the world. In
    fiscal year 2023, we will develop software for tracking and
    discrimination improvements, refining space intelligence data, and
    enhancing modeling and simulation. Following operational acceptance in
    fiscal year 2023, LRDR will support the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
    (GMD) capability against Pacific theater long-range missile threats
    with persistent long-range midcourse discrimination and precision
    tracking and hit assessment. LRDR also will support Space Domain
    Awareness (SDA).
        The Sea Based X-band (SBX) radar supports homeland defense
    operations, MDS testing and data collection, and it provides SDA and
    precision midcourse tracking and discrimination capabilities. The SBX
    will continue at-sea deployment into fiscal year 2023 while conducting
    selected radar and vessel maintenance, software and hardware upgrades,
    and testing. Fabrication of the SBX replacement radome continues on
    schedule for installation in fiscal year 2025.
        MDA continues to support the USSF in sustaining and updating the
    Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWRs) at Clear SFS, Alaska; Cape Cod
    SFS, Massachusetts; Royal Air Force Fylingdales, United Kingdom; Thule
    Air Base, Greenland; and Beale AFB, California. UEWRs support missile
    defense of the Homeland and detection of ballistic missile attacks and
    conduct general space surveillance and satellite tracking.
        MDA is providing affordable software upgrades to Aegis Integrated
    Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) destroyers equipped with the SPY-1 radar
    to support the USSF SDA mission. The Aegis SDA capability is fully
    compatible with deployed U.S. Navy operations and has appropriate
    safeguards to ensure full Aegis IAMD warfighting capability is
    available. In April and September 2021, we worked in partnership with
    the USSF, Navy, and industry to demonstrate the first-ever SDA
    capability from operational Navy destroyers, where the USSF tasked
    Aegis Baseline 9 Destroyers via C2BMC to detect, track, and report
    resident space objects. In fiscal year 2023, we will continue to
    develop, test, and deliver this upgrade to the Navy. Twenty-nine Aegis
    ships are scheduled to be upgraded with this capability by fiscal year
    2024.
        MDA also is working with the U.S. Navy to refurbish existing
    shipboard SPY-1 radar arrays to provide increased radar sensitivity and
    discrimination improvements. We also plan to integrate missile defense
    capability with delivery of the Navy's Air and Missile Defense Radar,
    the SPY-6, for enhanced engagement capability and increased raid
    capacity.
        MDA is upgrading, sustaining, and supporting operation of 12 AN/
    TPY-2 radars, including five Forward Based Mode radars in Japan,
    Israel, Turkey, and United States Central Command. We have seven
    Terminal Mode radars in CONUS locations or forward-deployed with U.S.
    Army Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries in U.S.
    Indo-Pacific Command. AN/TPY-2 radar 13 production is on schedule with
    planned delivery as a Terminal Mode radar in second quarter fiscal year
    2025 for service with THAAD Battery 8. MDA continues supporting two
    THAAD Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases that include seven AN/TPY-2
    radars in production for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) along with
    two operational radars in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
        Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications
        C2BMC integrates the MDS and provides Combatant Commanders with
    global, persistent, space-based infrared, land-, and sea-sensor
    acquisition, tracking, cueing, discrimination, and fire-control quality
    data to support U.S. and coalition-partner missile defense and SDA
    operations. C2BMC interfaces with Service, NATO, and international
    systems and provides decision makers a common operating missile defense
    picture. C2BMC also operates an advanced prototype processing node that
    tracks and reports hypersonic threats in response to U.S. Indo-Pacific
    Command operational need.
        Funding in fiscal year 2023 sustains the C2BMC planner, situational
    awareness, battle management capabilities, global missile defense
    network, and SDA in Combatant Command user nodes. The most recent C2BMC
    upgrade integrates LRDR and the updated BMDS Overhead Persistent
    Infrared Architecture into the MDS, providing situational awareness and
    tracking capability for hypersonic threats. This spiral significantly
    expands SDA capabilities for U.S. Space Command with LRDR, provides
    additional SDA coverage using the Aegis SPY-1 radar, and integrates on-
    orbit SKA sensors into the MDS. It also integrates the U.S. Army's IAMD
    Battle Command System into the MDS.
    Homeland Defense
        The GMD system protects the U.S. Homeland from rogue state
    ballistic missile attacks, and we are focused on delivering new
    capabilities to address the limited but increasingly advanced North
    Korean Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) threat. In September
    2021, we demonstrated the capability to select a 2-stage or 3-stage
    burn of a Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) booster, which enables an
    earlier release of the kill vehicle to greatly expand the engagement
    area and time to counter the inbound threat. In fiscal year 2023, we
    will execute an intercept flight test demonstrating this capability and
    the latest incremental improvements of the entire kill chain to defeat
    an advanced threat-representative ICBM target equipped with
    countermeasures.
        MDA continues to upgrade the ground system infrastructure,
    communications network, fire control system, and missile fields to
    improve the reliability, capability, and cybersecurity resiliency of
    the GMD weapon system and support acceptance of the Next Generation
    Interceptor (NGI). The entire GMD weapon system is currently undergoing
    a Service Life Extension Program to improve GBI reliability and
    availability. With these ongoing efforts, we anticipate the existing
    GBI fleet will be extended beyond 2030.
        NGI development and fielding will improve the interceptor fleet,
    with deliveries starting as early as 2028. The Department awarded two
    NGI contracts in March 2021, and our competing Industry prime
    contractors are advancing through the design development process with
    full technical rigor to deliver this new capability as soon as
    possible. Both designs feature multiple kill vehicle payloads to reduce
    the number of interceptors required to defeat a single ballistic
    missile threat to our Nation. Our fiscal year 2023 request will
    continue to mature critical technologies for the NGI booster, payload,
    and sensors.
    Regional Defense
        Globally deployed ship-based and land-based Aegis BMD capabilities
    are critical to the Nation's integrated defense of our deployed forces,
    allies, and partners against short- to intermediate-range missile
    threats. In fiscal year 2023, we will continue to meet the quickly
    advancing threat through improvements to the Aegis BMD capability,
    including procuring and delivering Standard Missile (SM)-3 Block IB and
    Block IIA missiles, improving Sea-Based Terminal (SBT) defense,
    advancing weapon system and missile reliability, and enhancing Aegis
    BMD engagement capacity and lethality. We will continue developing
    Aegis BMD weapon system software to enhance functionality and leverage
    more-capable radars, artificial intelligence, and national technical
    means.
        MDA continues to support protection of NATO's European territory
    and forces against the ballistic missile threat from the Middle East.
    Aegis Ashore in Romania is operational, and we plan to complete
    construction on Aegis Ashore Poland in 2023. Both sites are designed to
    launch the SM-3 Block IB and Block IIA. This past year, installation of
    select combat system equipment occurred in parallel with construction
    activity, and U.S Navy sailors moved into the residential building at
    Naval Support Facility Redzikowo.
        We are planning to conduct in fiscal year 2022 an Aegis Weapon
    System flight test experiment (FEM-01), which will be an exo-
    atmospheric engagement to demonstrate an Aegis ship firing an SM-3
    Block IIA against a Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) target. We
    also plan to execute an Aegis intercept flight test campaign with Japan
    (JFTM-07) in which we will demonstrate the newest BMD engagement
    capability of the Japan (J7) Aegis BMD configuration with SM-3 Block
    IIA against an MRBM. We will also demonstrate Aegis ship-to-ship
    engage-on-remote in a simulated engagement, an IAMD capability using
    SM-2 surface-to-air defense missiles, and an organic engagement of an
    SRBM with SM-3 Block IB Threat Upgrade interceptor.
        The THAAD weapon system is globally transportable and ground-based
    and is highly effective against short-, medium- and intermediate-range
    missile threats inside and outside the atmosphere in the terminal phase
    of flight. MDA currently supports forward-deployment of two batteries
    stationed in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility and
    continues to cooperate with UAE and KSA in support of operational FMS
    THAAD batteries. The UAE THAAD weapon system successfully intercepted
    ballistic missiles launched at the UAE in January 2022, marking the
    first operational use of the U.S.-built system. In fiscal year 2023 we
    will continue THAAD development and interceptor procurement,
    obsolescence mitigation efforts, production and training support, the
    THAAD Stockpile Reliability Program, and modifications to meet growing
    cybersecurity threats.
        MDA is providing a more robust IAMD capability, one that integrates
    THAAD, Army Patriot, and at-sea Aegis ships into a seamless network.
    THAAD/Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) integration improves the area
    defended by a THAAD battery without the requirement of a dedicated
    Patriot battery and increases engagement opportunities while conserving
    THAAD interceptors. In February 2022, THAAD demonstrated control of MSE
    interceptors in a simulated SRBM non-intercept flight test (TH CTV-
    01a). TH CTV-01a verified that the latest THAAD software could allow
    the THAAD weapon system to compute an MSE firing solution, communicate
    with an M903 Launcher, and control an MSE interceptor in flight. In
    THAAD Flight Test (FTT)-21, a combined developmental and operational
    test conducted in March 2022, we used the latest THAAD software to fire
    two MSE interceptors to engage the SRBM target. In fiscal year 2023, we
    plan to conduct the first THAAD demonstration of concurrent control of
    THAAD and MSE interceptors against multiple MRBM targets.
        In fiscal year 2022, MDA will begin engineering and planning a
    survivable and operationally effective IAMD architecture to defend Guam
    from ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missile threats. Defense of Guam
    IAMD architecture would leverage proven missile defense capabilities,
    allow for expansion of emerging capabilities, and provide a single
    command and control structure. Our fiscal year 2023 funding request
    allows continued development, to include engineering and planning
    activities, environmental impacts studies, procurement on long lead
    items, and integration between Army and Navy assets. All early design
    and integration activities will support a range of architecture
    options, pending upcoming Departmental decisions.
        We are investing in defensive capabilities to counter regional
    hypersonic missile threats by upgrading sensors and C2BMC for early
    warning, identification, and tracking of regional and strategic
    hypersonic threats from space (e.g., HBTSS). We also are leveraging
    existing systems where possible (including proven engage-on-remote and
    launch-on-remote capabilities) and pursuing a Glide Phase Intercept
    (GPI) demonstration. We are working closely with the Navy to develop,
    field, and upgrade the SBT capability to counter regional maneuvering
    and hypersonic threats in the terminal phase of flight. The SBT program
    already provides an initial terminal defensive capability to counter
    hypersonic threats, and additional improvements are scheduled for 2024.
    Today, the SM-6 missile is the only weapon in the country's arsenal
    capable of engaging highly-maneuverable hypersonic threats. In fiscal
    year 2023, Aegis SBT will demonstrate a simulated engagement against a
    hypersonic target (FTX-40) and in fiscal year 2024 will demonstrate a
    salvo engagement firing two SM-6 Block IA Upgraded guided missiles
    against a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle target (FTM-43). Complementing this
    terminal capability, in fiscal year 2023, MDA will continue to develop
    and plan a GPI demonstration and leverage the Aegis Weapon System to
    provide the U.S. Warfighter increasingly capable regional defensive
    capabilities.
        We will continue to work with North American Aerospace Defense
    Command (NORAD) and USNORTHCOM to develop system architecture for
    cruise missile defense (CMD) of the Homeland. I agree with the NORAD/
    USNORTHCOM Commander that modern threats require improved all-domain
    awareness, updated capabilities, and policies and strategies that
    reflect the current strategic environment and the advanced capabilities
    of our competitors. We have been able to make good progress on enhanced
    indications and warning and will continue to develop the systems
    architecture and conduct a demonstration of CMD capabilities using the
    Joint Tactical Integrated Fire Control (JTIFC) capability. JTIFC
    enhances integrated fire control capabilities across the Services by
    connecting existing sensors, command and control systems, and weapons
    at the tactical level through real-time sensor networks. I also share
    the NORAD/USNORTHCOM Commander's desire to have an Over-The-Horizon
    radar fielded as soon as possible to support All Domain Awareness and
    agree with his assessment that the air and cruise missile threat to the
    Homeland is a top priority.
        We are continuing our cooperative missile defense relationship with
    Israel to help our partner develop systems to strengthen its missile
    defenses and increase interoperability with U.S. forces. Our two
    nations continue to cooperate on engineering, development, co-
    production, testing, and fielding of the Arrow Weapon System, the
    David's Sling Weapon System, and co-production for the Iron Dome
    Defense System. I would like to highlight our cooperative demonstration
    of interoperability in the successful flight test of the Arrow Weapon
    System and Arrow-3 interceptor conducted on January 18, 2022. In fiscal
    year 2023, MDA will continue co-development, testing, and co-production
    with Israel.
                  developing technology for future competition
        With mission focus on warfighting outcomes, MDA is investing in
    innovative and disruptive technologies to provide leap-ahead
    capabilities to address the emergence of new and more advanced threats.
    We must continue to sustain, modernize, and expand missile defenses by
    pursuing rapid, yet measured, development of advanced missile defense
    concepts and technologies for homeland and regional defense. We will
    continue to develop mission-aligned disruptive technologies, solutions,
    and transition opportunities for future ballistic and hypersonic
    defense architectures, investing in the technology development
    necessary for the next increment of capability, including externally
    and internally-cooled seeker window technology, axial upper stage
    throttling and maneuvering capability, robust and resilient materials
    for hypersonic flight, secured mesh communications, and novel guidance
    and control capability.
        MDA continually assesses emerging and disruptive technology for
    potential applications to missile defense utilization that are
    producible, reliable, and cost-effective. We are pursuing efforts in
    directed energy, artificial intelligence, machine learning, nanosat
    technology, Left-through-Right of Launch Integration, cybersecurity,
    and quantum science. Keys to this assessment have been our insight into
    the missile defense industrial base and our development of testbeds
    that allow us to exercise and demonstrate capabilities and test new
    concepts, algorithms, simulations, and software. We are also expanding
    technology opportunities through cooperative, collaborative engagements
    with our DOD partners, laboratories, allies, industry, and
    universities.
                                   conclusion
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, Members of the Subcommittee,
    we will continue to increase the readiness, resiliency, cybersecurity
    as well as the capability and capacity of fielded homeland and regional
    missile defense systems while investing in mission-focused advanced
    technology. We are committed to attracting and building a strong,
    talented future workforce to meet the mission challenges of tomorrow. I
    would like to recognize and thank the men and women who serve in our
    Armed Forces at home and abroad and who operate the integrated Missile
    Defense System with the support of our dedicated civilian and
    contractor workforce. I appreciate your continued support for MDA and
    the missile defense mission, and I look forward to answering the
    committee's questions. Thank you.

        Senator King. Thank you, Admiral, and thanks to all of you
    for your extraordinary service and work.
        I want to start with some budget questions, and I do not
    think we are seeing the full picture when we talk about the
    Missile Defense Agency budget. Dr. Plumb, are there not other
    missile-related expenditures in other parts of the budget? I
    think you touched on this. I want apples to apples from last
    year to this year on the whole missile defense enterprise.
        Mr. Plumb. Yes, sir. I do not think I can give you the
    specific numbers. I will say, at least for the $4.7 billion for
    the transition, the first piece of funding to transition to a
    robust, proliferated, low-earth orbit missile warning and
    missile track architecture, including an architecture that can
    observe hypersonic weapons, that is $4.7 billion more than it
    was in the budget the previous year. That is a new thing.
        My colleague here, Secretary Honey, was just talking about
    the directed energy funding. That funding is no longer part of
    MDA's budget. At least most of it is now with R&E, so there is
    a bucket of money there.
        Senator King. It would be helpful for me, Dr. Honey, for
    the record, not right now, but for the record of this hearing
    if you could give us a sort of apples to apples with all the
    pieces of the budget last year and this year. Can you supply
    that?
        Mr. Honey. Yes. We will take that for the record, sir.

        Mr. Honey. The missile defense funds for directed energy
    are allocated across the Department of Defense (DOD). In 2019,
    the Department made a decision to consolidate directed energy
    S&T efforts (BA 6.1, 6.2, & 6.3) within the Office of the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (OUSD(R&E))
    in the Directed Energy-Joint Transition Office (DE-JTO). This
    office works on technologies which will be used in all of the
    Services/Agencies developmental programs. This office is within
    the OUSD(R&E) Deputy Chief Technology Officer (DCTO) for
    Critical Technologies (CT). It also issued a Directed Energy
    Roadmap to best utilize resources and leverage existing
    programs across the Department.
        The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) collaborates closely with
    OUSD(R&E)/CT and the military services on directed energy
    capability development efforts, to include missile defense.
        The directed energy budgets for the military services, MDA,
    and the OUSD(R&E) are shown in the chart below. The OUSD(R&E)
    budget funds key high energy laser technology necessary for
    missile defense. The total for fiscal year 2022 is $305.6
    million and the total for fiscal year 2023 is $439.7 million.
    Additional classified details can be provided upon request.

                   Directed Energy Missile Defense Budget ($M)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                        2022         2023
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Military Services.............................      124.2          265
    MDA...........................................       52.5           15
    OUSD R&E......................................      128.9        159.7
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Total.....................................      305.6        439.7
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Senator King. Thank you. I appreciate that.
        Hypersonic defense. Well, I guess, let me just back up. I
    am disturbed by the fact that the President's Budget proposes a
    cut at a time when we all know that we are facing a new threat
    and an important one. So perhaps what you are telling me is
    that there is money in other places to deal with a threat by
    things like directed energy. Is that correct?
        Mr. Honey. Yes, Senator. That is correct. We do have funds
    elsewhere that are developing directed energy solutions for
    that particular threat.
        Senator King. Okay. Well that is what I hope you can supply
    it for the record, as you suggested you would.
        What have we learned from Ukraine? I will direct this to
    any of the witnesses, but I would think the guys with the
    uniforms on might have some thoughts. General Karbler, what
    have we learned?
        lLieutenant General Karbler. Sir, a couple of lessons that
    I have taken personally from Ukraine and that we are applying
    within the air and missile defense community. First, as I said
    in my opening statement, we see adversaries normalizing the use
    of ballistic missiles. If you went back about 10 years, force-
    on-force ballistic missile use just was not as prevalent, and
    now we see Russia, as well as other adversaries, using
    ballistic missiles.
        Senator King. Conventional air defense does not work.
        lLieutenant General Karbler. No, sir. You need ballistic
    missile defense in order to be able to counter that, and with
    that, we recognize also that it cannot just be an active
    defense solution. We have got to be able to integrate offensive
    capabilities to take out those missiles when we are on a tail
    or when aircraft is on a runway or in a hangar. So the
    offensive-defense integration is key, as well as then the
    layered missile defense. So everything from THAAD to Patriot
    to----
        Senator King. Is it not true that most of the damage done
    in Ukraine has been done by artillery and missiles, not by
    conventional aircraft dropping bombs?
        lLieutenant General Karbler. Yes, sir, and so that layered
    defense would allow us from Army capabilities, THAAD, and
    Patriot to counter ballistic missiles as well as cruise
    missiles and even our counter-rocket artillery and mortar, our
    C-RAM systems that we have to get after those particular
    artillery pieces.
        Senator King. The question that I have gotten from a
    variety of people is why have we not provided the Ukrainians
    with Iron Dome or something like Iron Dome?
        lLieutenant General Karbler. Sir, the reason that we put a
    Patriot battery into Slovakia was because the Slovakians
    provided an S-300 system into Ukraine.
        Senator King. That is a rough equivalent?
        lLieutenant General Karbler. It is a rough equivalent to
    Patriot. As far as the United States providing Iron Dome into
    Ukraine, any involvement of any United States air defense
    forces in Ukraine would have to be a policy discussion.
        Senator King. I understand.
        General VanHerck, the Arctic. Give me 30 seconds on the
    importance of the Arctic in terms of this process. It seems to
    me that has opened up a whole new level of strategic
    competition.
        General VanHerck. Senator, that is exactly right. So
    environmental change in the Arctic is creating opportunities
    and vulnerabilities--access to resources that did not exist
    years ago, longer shipping seasons, economic prosperity. But
    what we are seeing is those norms and rules and international
    laws that have served us well since the end of World War II are
    under challenge, in the Arctic and elsewhere around the globe.
        Senator King. Would it help if we ceded to UNCLOS [United
    Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea]?
        General VanHerck. Senator, I support the succession to
    UNCLOS as soon as we can if we can make that happen.
        Senator King. Thank you. Thank you very much, General.
    Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Hill, I
    understand the Missile Defense Agency plans to deploy two
    satellites equipped with Hypersonic Ballistic Tracking Space
    Sensor. What is the Department's plan for this capability
    beyond these two prototypes?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Senator, thank you. Great question. Just
    to kind of go back, what Hypersonic Ballistic Tracking Space
    Sensor does, it is really two functions. The B stands for
    ballistic targets, and that handles some of the changes that we
    are seeing in the ballistic flights today, and kind of think of
    changes in propulsion, which challenge our sensors today. So we
    are going to meet that challenge with HBTSS.
        But what it really does is it gives us fire control quality
    data on hyperglide vehicles, and when I say fire control I am
    not talking about putting out fires. What I am talking about is
    very discrete positional and velocity differences so that we
    can get a very firm track and put a weapon on it. The weapons
    are very sensitive to having a very firm track, and we get that
    fire control data from HBTSS.
        Now to your larger question of how does it fit into the
    broader architecture, we are very close with the Space Force.
    They are working that architecture. It is not complete yet.
    What we will do in 2023, by having those first two in air--they
    are built by two different companies. They will be
    interoperable. They are interoperable on the ground today--we
    will track different flight tests that we do, and we will prove
    that we have that data so we have the confidence to then
    proliferate.
        We will work that closely with the Space Force over the
    next year to determine where they go, and there is flexibility
    in the sensor. It does not have to be limited to a LEO [low
    earth orbit] constellation. We can go with MEO [medium earth
    orbit], and so there is lots of flexibility, low-earth and
    medium-earth orbit. So we are working that with the Space Force
    and we will be part of that broader architecture. Thank you,
    ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. I know that there are other programs under
    development that are related to the missile warning and
    tracking, but are any of these other capabilities comparable in
    terms of being able to provide that fire control quality data
    that you need?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Ma'am, it really is unique to HBTSS for
    the hyperglides. Space capability is so important, not just
    because we are going to catch the global maneuver, but we use
    it for indications of warning. It is what kicks off an
    engagement today. General Karbler talked a little bit about
    that. When we see the flash then it will go through the face of
    a radar, and that is how we get a track, if we can see the
    track on the ground. For hypersonics, since they are very hard
    to see, they will normally maneuver outside the field of view
    of a ground-based radar or a sea-based radar, so you would need
    that sort of constellation in place to get to the fire control
    data.
        Now when I look at the capabilities that are in the
    architecture today they are very complementary. The wide field
    of view, we kind of think of that as surveillance, so when we
    say ``track'' with a wide field of view that is going to
    contain those tracks, and then they cue the HBTSS to go and get
    that very fine precision track that we need to place a weapon
    on target.
        Senator Fischer. How long do you think you are going to be
    collecting all this data on these prototypes before we are ever
    going to see any kind of plan for what the future is going to
    be, for what we are going to need in the future?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, ma'am. If we get this right in
    terms of defining the architecture, and based on the data we
    have, we can make decisions as early as possible.
        Senator Fischer. What does that mean, as early as possible?
    You know, I get really nervous when I hear dates like 2028 for
    something, and we are pleased that it is 2027.
        Senator King. Eisenhower retook Europe in 11 months.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Fischer. Shush. How are we going to----
        Vice Admiral Hill. Do not think of it as----
        Senator Fischer.--condense the time period, and maybe have
    to accept more risk?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Perhaps, but I think right now we are
    not starting from zero. You know, in the storytelling of
    putting two up in March of 2023, there is work that is being
    done now in that architecture. So decisions can be made early
    for that proliferation and planning for that, and making sure
    that we have the industry lined up to execute.
        Senator Fischer. At the hearing last year I asked about the
    status of implementing Section 1684 of the fiscal year 2017
    NDAA, which requires the Department to designate a single
    entity as the lead acquisition organization for defending the
    homeland from cruise missiles. General VanHerck and Admiral
    Hill, you both made clear at the time your support for making
    this designation.
        Dr. Plumb, welcome back again. When can we expect the
    Department to finally resolve this?
        Mr. Plumb. Thank you, Senator Fischer. As you are probably
    aware, both the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary have
    committed to moving this forward. I am hesitant to give you a
    specific date but I think it is in the near future, and the
    Joint Staff is working on that, is my understanding.
        Senator Fischer. I would just like to note another thing I
    am worried about is lack of action. So it would be nice to see
    things move forward at a quicker pace.
        Mr. Plumb. I am pushing on it.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. General VanHerck, in your
    funded priorities list it includes $50 million for cruise
    missile defense demonstration involving an elevated sensor. Can
    you describe that project and how it would contribute to pacing
    the growing cruise missile threat to the homeland?
        General VanHerck. Senator, that is an opportunity to
    basically go all the way from the domain awareness sensor
    through a joint tactical fire control system--Admiral Hill
    talked about that earlier--to the actual execution and
    demonstration from a sea-based missile system to engage a
    cruise missile. It would help us reduce risk and move forward
    in the near term if we got that $50 million to demonstrate
    three separate engagements of capability.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Senator Tuberville.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you very much. Thanks for being
    here.
        I want to follow up a little bit on what Senator King was
    saying earlier. General Karbler, in my former job of coaching I
    used to watch teams on the field, on film. Sometimes you think
    a lot more of them, sometimes you think less, and then all of a
    sudden you get them in a real game and you found out what they
    were.
        Russia's missiles in the last 90 days, we have seen them in
    action. Can you give a coach's perspective and evaluation of
    what they have done, how they have done it? Has it been good,
    bad, indifferent?
        lLieutenant General Karbler. Sir, I will give you a coach's
    perspective.
        Senator Tuberville. Okay.
        lLieutenant General Karbler. The offensive line is not
    coordinated with the quarterback, who is not handing the ball
    off to the running back, and the wide receivers are jumping
    offsides.
        What do I mean by that? We have seen him employ his missile
    systems and artillery disconnected from any kind of ground
    maneuver. Anybody that understands combined armed maneuvers
    knows that you need to employ both in concert with each other
    to accomplish whatever your campaign objectives are, and we see
    him not doing that, which is whether it is the missile
    efficacy, whether it is the incompetence of the ground forces
    inability to move, logistics challenges, et cetera.
        From a coach's perspective, none. None of the players on
    the offensive have come together and moved the ball down the
    field.
        Senator Tuberville. There are missiles that they have
    launched, what percentage of them have worked? Do we have any
    idea?
        General VanHerck. I can talk about that.
        Senator Tuberville. Go ahead.
        General VanHerck. Probably should not talk about it in an
    unclassified session, but I will tell you originally we thought
    they were not working at a rate that was as good as ours, but
    what I would say is they are on par with our capabilities. Not
    all of them, specifically their cruise missiles. They have had
    challenges with some of their hypersonic missiles as far as
    accuracy. But I would not take away, from a strategic
    perspective, that Russia's cruise missiles or hypersonic
    missiles, their strategic capabilities have severely
    underperformed, okay? I just want to make that clear.
        Senator Tuberville. They make their own?
        General VanHerck. My understanding is the internally, not
    the military makes them but they have companies, contractors
    within Russia that make them as well. You may know more, Jon.
        Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. I think that explains it
    pretty well.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. General VanHerck, you talked
    about the homeland. We have got a lot of work to do defending
    the homeland with hypersonics in China and ballistic missiles.
    My understanding is that we have a majority of our F-22s and
    35s in Alaska. Do we have a defense system up there that will
    protect them?
        General VanHerck. Senator, it depends on what we are
    protecting them from. I am confident in the ground-based
    interceptors that are there. From ballistic missiles, yes, we
    do have that capability. With regards to cruise missiles,
    hypersonic cruise missiles that are actually currently coastal
    defense cruise missiles in Russia, I have significant concerns
    about my ability to defend those assets. Not only F-22s,
    Senator. You have significant portions of our ballistic missile
    and our threat warning capabilities in Alaska. Cobra Dane is
    out there at Eareckson Air Station. We have the radar and we
    are building our long-range discriminating radar as well. I was
    just there, by the way. Very impressive.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. This is to anybody. You
    know, fixed interceptor sites, we are talking about trucking
    missiles in Guam, 42 trucks carrying missiles around. You know,
    that does not seem logical to me. The MDA is the lead architect
    and it looks like that we are going to have to find somebody to
    man and train them.
        Can anybody talk about that, about Guam and the missile
    system that we are putting on Guam?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. I can give you some insight
    there. First it was a pretty extensive Department-wide study.
    We did look at a number of fixed-site options, and then in the
    end, just given the kind of capability that we need on the
    island and the flexibility there we did go with mobile across
    the board, so the sensors will be mobile. The command and
    control, there is an option to be mobile. We are working that
    very closely with Admiral Aquilino now. When it comes to the
    launching systems, those are mobile.
        I think the goodness that comes out of that is the
    investments that we make there, it is not a big engineering
    leap to get to that, and we have the existing Army mobile
    launchers. But the launchers that carry SM-3 and SM-6, the work
    that needs to be done to move those or have them in a mobile
    launcher is pretty straightforward, and so we think we can
    accomplish that. It does give the combatant commander options
    on where he can move those downstream, so we will initially
    site them in an area and then if we need to move them we will
    move them.
        Senator Tuberville. We once had an Iron Dome in Guam. We do
    not anymore. Is that correct?
        Vice Admiral Hill. I will turn that over to General
    Karbler.
        lLieutenant General Karbler. Sir, we exercised Iron Dome.
    We have two Iron Dome batteries. We sent one out to Guam to
    exercise, to make sure it was deployable and that the soldiers
    could operate it. But Iron Dome is not our ultimate solution
    for cruise missile defense.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Senator Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
    you all for your service to our country.
        Dr. Plumb, it seems like this is the 11th or perhaps the
    12th time that you have appeared before either the full
    committee or a subcommittee over the last few weeks, and it has
    been mainly concerning nuclear weapons and space. You are also
    the DOD principal cyber advisor, so I would like to ask you how
    challenging it is to serve as the OSD [Office of the Secretary
    of Defense] lead for space policy, nuclear weapons, countering
    the WMDs [weapons of mass destruction], missile defense,
    electromagnetic warfare, and cybersecurity, which are six
    significant roles. Do you have sufficient resources to execute
    your responsibilities?
        Mr. Plumb. Thanks for that question, Senator. It is a
    sizeable portfolio. It is pretty fun, frankly. It is a good
    suite of strategic capabilities, and I think they marry up
    quite well. Space layers through all of them, cyber through all
    of them, and they are all what I would consider strategic
    layers to integrated deterrence.
        As far as the resources needed, the office is far more than
    just me. I have my DASD ships. I have the Office of the
    Principal Cyber Advisor.
        But since you have given the opportunity here I will just
    say policy, in general, could use more manpower, or I guess I
    should just say civilians. We need more manpower resources. I
    think the growth in space, the growth in cyber, those two
    alone, and when you think that, for instance, the cyber offices
    are still basically staffed at the level they were 5, 6 years
    ago, that seems like the wrong answer.
        Senator Rounds. Can you talk a little bit about the
    cybersecurity element of the both space and missile defense
    responsibilities and describe what you and your cybersecurity
    team bring to the table in this particular area.
        Mr. Plumb. That is a very important question. Cybersecurity
    of our own forces I think sometimes is confused with just
    cybersecurity, for instance, of the SIPRNet [Secure Internet
    Protocol Router Network] or of JWST [James Webb Space
    Telescope] or even maybe the NIPRNet [Non-Secure Internet
    Protocol Router Network]. But for the weapons systems
    themselves, absolutely essential. Making sure we take that into
    our space systems defense in-depth, is the thing I like to say
    at these hearings that is really important, not just a
    perimeter. I have had several discussions with Admiral Hill
    here on missile defense cybersecurity as well, and all of these
    things are an ongoing issue that nothing is going to be solve
    overnight, and it is never going to be fully solved. You have
    to keep improving and keep looking for what the adversary could
    possibly do and figure out ways to keep that in check.
        Senator Rounds. Yes. A number of us on this committee have
    fought very hard to maintain key area of the DOD spectrum. As
    the lead for electromagnetic warfare can you tell this
    committee how important it is to be closely involved in the
    decision-making process when the Federal Government decides to
    conduct auctions for key DOD spectrum bands?
        Mr. Plumb. Yes, absolutely essential. Actually, my Ph.D.
    involved global positioning system, and so that specific issue
    which I think you are referencing is absolutely essential for
    DOD to be able to protect its ability to operate abroad.
        Senator Rounds. When one agency or department of the
    Federal Government arbitrarily decides to auction spectrum, it
    would appear that DOD should be directly involved in the
    discussions, specifically to those areas of sale. Fair enough
    to say?
        Mr. Plumb. I agree, sir.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Admiral Hill, the United States
    has consistently provided missile defense capabilities in
    conjunction with Israel. It has been a good partnership both
    ways. Can you explain to this committee the importance of our
    relationship with Israel, specifically when it comes to missile
    defense for the United States and our allies and partners?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, sir, Senator. Thanks for that
    question. We have a very strong partnership, documented in an
    MOU [Memorandum Of Understanding], and you that half a billion
    dollars of the MDA budget goes to Israel. We work the full set
    of layered defense with Israel, from Iron Dome up to David's
    Sling up to the variants of Arrow to include their latest
    elevated sensor, the work that they do connecting all those and
    the networking of that. We also work with them on their target
    systems, and we sit side-by-side and help them engineer through
    what they need to do to execute a test.
        Senator Rounds. Is it fair enough to say it is a good
    partnership with information flowing both ways?
        Vice Admiral Hill. It is a strong partnership, and I would
    say it is beyond what you would normally see because we are
    side-by-side. There is not just the flow of information and the
    learning, there is definitely, you know, our people that just
    walk away from that having a better sense of tiered, layered
    defense in a really constrained area, with very short reaction
    times.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. I am about out of time but I am
    going to try to get in one more question, and this is for
    General Karbler. You mentioned relocating two Patriot batteries
    to Poland in March. It was a necessary move, in our opinion,
    and I think you did the right thing. The question I have is how
    much more flexibility do you have to relocate missile defense
    capabilities when needed, what flexibilities should you have,
    and what is the state of the industrial base should we need to
    surge missile defense capabilities?
        lLieutenant General Karbler. Yes, Senator. The Army Air
    Missile Defense Forces are the highest operational tempo of any
    Army forces that we have, so any deployment of them does stress
    the force. We are constantly looking at our air missile defense
    posture globally. We have battalions out in INDOPACOM, we have
    got the battalion in Germany, and then we have got battalions
    that support CENTCOM.
        It does stress the force, and in talking with the Chief of
    Staff of the Army about this just last week he understands it,
    and the Secretary of the Army as well. They have committed to a
    16 Patriot battalion as well as an 8 THAAD battery and 4
    additional maneuver SHORAD battalions, so we are growing the
    Air Defense Force in recognition of the optempo stress that is
    put on our soldiers.
        Senator, with respect to the industrial base capability, I
    would really have to defer that to the PEO [program executive
    office] Missiles and Space, the acquisition side. But I would
    tell you from my experience if I went back to Desert Storm,
    when we had very, very few Patriot interceptors to do ballistic
    missile defense, and the industry ramped up very quickly and
    was able to get those Patriot interceptors out to the Patriot--
    I was in Israel--to the Patriot units in Israel as well as the
    Patriot units that were in Saudi Arabia.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Thank you. We will have a second round of
    questions for those who have additional questions.
        I think it was Admiral Hill, you used the term ``fire
    control data'' with regard to hypersonics. I wrote in my notes
    ``fire what?'' What are we firing? As you know, we have talked
    about this, I am gravely concerned about the strategic change
    in the whole scene of battle that hypersonics represent. I know
    we are working on it and we are talking about. I want a sense
    of urgency.
        Tell me, Admiral, if you are the commander of an aircraft
    carrier 800 miles from China and they send a hypersonic missile
    your way, you have got about 9 minutes to figure out what to
    do. I want to know how close we are to having a defense. I
    guess the second question is, is North Korea developing
    hypersonic capability, because if they are that is where we
    need to be focusing, not on hitting a bullet with a bullet over
    the North Pole.
        Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, sir, Senator. Thanks for that
    question. We often talk about hypersonics and assume we are at
    zero. We are not at zero. I mentioned earlier that we have a
    command and control battle management capability that takes the
    space sensors that we have today, the land-based sensors and
    the sea-based sensors. What is really key about sea-based is
    that is where the defensive capability resides today.
        When a carrier strike group goes forward, to use your
    example, they have some number of destroyers with them, and on
    those destroyers today the sea-based terminal capability is on
    those ships. We did that based on a request from the CNO [Chief
    of Naval Operations], because he was concerned about the
    carrier-killer missile. You have heard plenty about that in the
    white press. It looks ballistic, so we have an ability with SM-
    3 in the upper tier to take out that threat, and then we have,
    in the lower tier, sea-based terminal which is really a
    capability that we insert into the SM-6 missile that the Navy
    produces. The Navy is producing those in number. MDA is
    providing the software package and the work in the combat
    system to control that missile. We have the capability to take
    on the advanced maneuvering threat in terminal.
        I will say terminal is not sufficient. As I mentioned
    earlier, it is the most difficult place to engage--high
    maneuver, high speed, and again, you do not know where a
    terminal is. Generally, in the sea base, it is going to be
    after the carrier so the destroyers will operate in close
    quarters and ensure that they provide that protection.
        Now because it is not good enough, the investments we are
    making in the President's budget 2023 is towards the glide-
    phase interceptor. When you think about having a layered
    defense against the glide vehicle that then dips down and comes
    in and does the maneuver, we have the ability to stop that at
    the glide phase. The most vulnerable place----
        Senator King. We want the ability. You said we have the
    ability.
        Vice Admiral Hill. We have three contractors in play right
    now to deliver that capability. We are moving towards a demo
    over the next few years, so we will down-select this year to
    two and we will continue to move through, and then we will
    deliver that demo, conduct an exercise with that.
        Senator King. Is North Korea developing hypersonics?
        Vice Admiral Hill. They claim to have developed
    hypersonics. If you go look at the outer mold line you might be
    fooled and think that it is. But in terms of what we have seen,
    in terms of data, I am entirely confident that they have that
    capability today. But the fact that they are testing it ought
    to be of concern.
        Senator King. Director Honey, you mentioned directed energy
    in your testimony, I believe. That strikes me as a promising--
    and I know there are technical problems, but give me an update
    on where we are in developing directed energy, microwave or
    laser.
        Mr. Honey. Both classes of directed energy systems, lasers
    and high-power microwaves, have seen significant developments
    and achievements over the past several years. What I am most
    impressed with is the fact that we now have high-energy laser
    systems, 130-kilowatt class systems, that are being deployed on
    ships for operational testing, and we have a modular package
    that will be able to be deployed on Army ground vehicles as
    well as ships. These will be going into, as I said, operational
    testing around the world this coming year, and out of that we
    will be able to gain tremendous insights on lethality data to
    see how those systems will be useful in the future.
        They are mainly aimed at dazzling as well as cruise missile
    defense, and we also have significant developments in higher-
    power system and lasers that we think will be very important in
    the upcoming few years.
        Senator King. Do you have sufficient resources to
    accelerate this process?
        Mr. Honey. Yes. We have sufficient resources and also the
    folks leading the efforts have much better insights today than
    they did in the past. Just through understanding where to
    smartly take risks they have been able to accelerate
    development significantly.
        Senator King. Admiral, if you were the commander of that
    aircraft carrier I would want this guy to be supplying you with
    some weapons.
        Vice Admiral Hill. Thank you, sir. I would want everything
    that is available, and will take the power that you have now
    and put it on the ships if we could.
        Senator King. Thank you. Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Admiral Hill, it is my understand that the
    Department intends to award a production contract for 20 Next-
    Generation Interceptor rounds following the critical design
    review, and these interceptors will be deployed to the
    unoccupied silos at Fort Greely. But what is the plan to
    modernize the current fleet of 44 ground-based interceptors?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, ma'am. Thanks for the question. I
    think the best way to answer it is to just kind of clarify that
    we have about three classes of the ground-based interceptors
    that are in service today. You have the oldest part of the
    fleet, you have got the midgrade fleet, and you have got the
    newest ones. I know that General VanHerck takes that into
    account when he is working his shot doctrine.
        We are not real concerned about the new ones. They have a
    long life and their reliability will carry them into the 2030s.
    Our plan is to reach a decision in production around the 2024
    time frame. When you get to the preliminary design review and
    start thinking about production there are options there because
    we do have the missile field that is ready to take those first
    20. We will likely make a decision to fill those first 20, but
    the Nation has the option to start replacing some of the older
    ones. That is why I think it is very important to have the two
    contractors in play.
        That is the other option we have here. You can keep them
    beyond the CDR and you can have a double production house,
    depending on where the threat goes, and if you need numbers we
    can build the numbers by having two contractors carry through
    critical design review.
        Senator Fischer. You said you are likely to have a decision
    made soon. When would you expect that?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, ma'am. I could not remember where
    the actual place on the chart was but it is in 2024 where we
    will make a production decision. Part of that discussion would
    be are you going to fill the missile fields or are you going to
    replace what you have or are you just going to keep building so
    that you can fully replace the existing inventory. Those are
    decisions that we have to make within the Department.
        Senator Fischer. Are you comfortable with that?
        Vice Admiral Hill. I am comfortable that we have two
    contractors in play and that those options will be there to
    build out, fill that missile field, and then replace if we make
    a decision to do so.
        Senator Fischer. Is this something that you are discussing
    with NGI teams?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, ma'am, absolutely, and I mentioned
    a little bit earlier, actually General VanHerck mentioned the
    2028 time frame for the contractors, and we are moving ahead of
    that schedule right now. We are going to learn a lot more as we
    come through development. We will come through ground testing.
    We will do individual component-level tests, and we will work
    our way to flight tests. This is a fly-it-before-you-buy-it
    program, so we are going to do an intercept and salvo test
    before we go to full production.
        Senator Fischer. General VanHerck, given what you have seen
    of the threat that is out there do you believe that 20
    interceptors are going to be sufficient, or do you need some
    sort of capability to replace the 44 GBIs that are deployed
    currently?
        General VanHerck. Senator my assessment is when you factor
    in service life extension, which will give us significant
    reliability and data and information that will help me with my
    shot doctrine, and give me additional capacity, when you factor
    in the Next-Generation Interceptor and its capabilities, along
    with long-range discriminating radar, all of that, I will be
    comfortable when it is delivered in the 2027 to 2028 time
    frame.
        It is a policy question going forward. Do we need to
    continue to develop and field additional capability and
    capacity as the threat develops additional capability and
    capacity? I remain concerned about my ability to stay up with
    that capacity especially.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Admiral Hill, the general just,
    I think, made an argument there against some of what we hear
    sometimes that we do not need to replace systems, that we just
    need to continue to do life extension programs. I know that
    seems to be the current plan, likely to be the plan for the
    future. But how long do you think that can continue? Do you
    have the same concerns that the general expressed?
        Vice Admiral Hill. I do. We read the same intelligence
    estimates, and they are always, you know, low confidence,
    medium confidence. But you can kind of get a sense, based on
    their testing and how they have progressed over the years.
        I would say there is a big difference between the GBIs that
    we have in service today versus what Next-Generation
    Interceptor brings. In this unclassified environment I will
    tell you that a unitary missile, think of that as a singular
    kill vehicle, versus a Next-Generation Interceptor with
    multiple kill vehicles on it, that is a huge lift in terms of
    how we take on the threat, because the threat will continue to
    evolve to have maneuvering warheads and multiple maneuvering
    warheads.
        We need to the Next-Generation Interceptor. We can SLEP all
    day long those unitary missiles, and we can drive their
    lifetime to the right pretty far. But at the end of the day,
    you really need the upgrade that Next-Generation Interceptor
    brings because it is going to operate in a really tough space,
    but it does have multiple kill vehicles, which gives us a lot
    more flexibility.
        Senator Fischer. We have to have the resources that meet
    the threats that are coming too, that we get from intelligence.
    Correct?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Senator King. Senator Tuberville, are you all set?
        Senator Tuberville. I have one question. Thank you.
    Secretary Honey, you talked about high-energy lasers. I have
    had the unfortunate--I have watched one work on the ground,
    from an MRAP [mine resistant ambush protected] low-energy. It
    was not really high-energy but it works pretty good.
        Eventually, you know, you said putting them on ships and
    possibly in satellites. How in the world are we going to find
    the energy for a high-energy laser, you know, to really
    function the way we really want it? Are we on the R&D [research
    and development]--how is the R&D on that, as we speak?
        Mr. Honey. The R&D has come a long way, and that is a very
    good question about these particular systems because of the
    history behind them. Where we have seen the biggest
    improvements has been in the conversion efficiency of energy to
    actual useful output from the lasers as well as improvements in
    the beam control so that we do not have to have such a massive
    blast in order to have the weapons effects that we want.
        There has been just a tremendous amount of work that has
    been done by the Department in these areas, but we are now
    seeing the payoff of those results today.
        Senator Tuberville. Do you see nuclear being used, energy?
        Mr. Honey. I am sorry?
        Senator Tuberville. Nuclear, to power higher energy,
    possibly?
        Mr. Honey. No, I do not see that right now as necessary.
    There could be, you know, always the possibility.
        Senator Tuberville. I am talking about for the future. You
    know, we are talking about Star Trek and all of that, you know,
    satellites that have these long beams.
        Mr. Honey. Right now, at least for the systems that we are
    looking at, the conventional power sources that we have look to
    be sufficient.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Senator Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to
    follow up on Senator Tuberville's line of questioning, because
    it seems to me that where we are talking here about what a lot
    of people that would watch this would say they are talking
    about something really close to Star Wars or Star Trek in terms
    of basically shooting one missile with another missile, hitting
    one missile that is capable of 5,000-plus miles an hour with
    another missile or an interceptor that can do the same thing,
    or using a weapon of directed energy, like a phaser or a laser
    in the future.
        We are talking about that right now being deployed in some
    specific areas today, and yet, at the same time, I think back.
    I just received a note that General VanHerck, your team has
    actually been looking at cold weather and the fact that you
    have got teams that have to survive in cold weather, and we
    have got Arctic issues and so forth. We need the basic
    research. I know South Dakota School of Mines and Technology
    has been doing work on cold weather operations and so forth. I
    look at that and we have got a part of the world right now that
    is going to become very active in terms of protecting our
    country, and that is the Arctic.
        I am just curious, General VanHerck. What do you see in
    terms of the challenges of operating in the Arctic, and what
    are the things that we are not thinking about right now that we
    have just assumed we have been doing all along, and yet we have
    got equipment, we have got material, manpower, and so forth?
    What do we have to expect that we should be doing right now to
    make sure that within the Arctic we have done our due diligence
    and we have not taken anything for granted in terms of being
    able to operate?
        General VanHerck. That is a great question, Senator. We
    just completed an exercise in the Arctic, Arctic Edge, where we
    brought joint, and even combined with other countries to the
    Arctic to operate. I will tell you, there are significant
    lessons learned about the harsh environment where our
    equipment--I will not go into details but let us just say some
    strategic equipment that we place into the Arctic does not
    function because we have not equipped it to operate, and over
    the last 20 years we have been focused on a different
    environment as we developed equipment.
        Research and development is crucial to continuing to ensure
    we buy down risk to potential future operations in the Arctic.
    It does not just go to weapon system as well. It goes to human
    performance factors--medical capabilities, medical equipment,
    as you sustain yourself in a harsh environment like that long
    term. We have to look at the equipment we wear and the
    capabilities that we are going to utilize to sustain life in
    that environment.
        What we find is that you can operate in that environment
    less than about 50 percent of what you would in another
    environment. I appreciate what your School of Mines is doing,
    advancing a lot of the research and capabilities to look at
    that. That is something I am asking for in our Defense Planning
    Guidance is to at least move the ball down the field and
    continue that research and development for ensuring the
    capabilities are there but also capabilities that support the
    human life as we sustain in the Arctic environment.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. To follow up on your question, Senator
    Rounds, I recently learned that two-thirds of the ice in the
    Arctic Ocean has disappeared in the last 40 years. A stunning
    fact.
        I want to ask one more question.
        Senator Rounds. If I may say, if I could, and yet at the
    same time you have a problem in that unless you have got the
    right kind of oil you are not going to operate very well in the
    Arctic conditions anyway because your machinery does not work.
        Senator King. Because it freezes.
        Senator Rounds. Just because it freezes.
        Senator King. I would say Maine and South Dakota rather
    than Alabama might be able to work on that.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Rounds. That has a lot to do with it, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. A question from Senator Hirono. General
    VanHerck, for fiscal year 2023 the Administration has not
    funded the development of the long-range radar in Hawaii to
    detect incoming threats from North Korea or China. Do our
    current radar and ground-based interceptors provide adequate
    protection of Hawaii?
        General VanHerck. Senator, I am comfortable with my
    capability to defend Hawaii against ballistic missiles from a
    rogue actor such as North Korea today. As capabilities continue
    to develop, as capacity increases by potential rogue actors,
    then I may be potentially challenged to defend Hawaii. What we
    are really talking about is a Hawaii radar would contribute to
    an underlayer significant that would give additional capability
    and capacity. That is a policy decision that we go down there,
    but today I am comfortable where we are.
        Senator King. Thank you. Thank you all very much for your
    responses today, for your testimony, and for your service. It
    has been a very illuminating hearing. I appreciate you joining
    us.
        The hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 5:38 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

               Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth A. Warren
                     ground-based midcourse defense system
        1. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Hill, and Deputy Under Secretary
    Honey, I am very concerned that twenty years into the program the GMD
    system's tests still have not been realistic by the standards of the
    Pentagon's own testing agency, especially with regard to the use of
    countermeasures the adversary might employ to defeat the defense. JASON
    was commissioned to look at this issue in 2012 and recommended a ``red
    team'' responsible for producing countermeasures and challenging the
    system, rather than the MDA itself. Has this not been taken up? If not,
    why not?
        Vice Admiral Hill. The 2010 JASON Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
    Discrimination report recommended the creation of a countermeasure test
    program through an independent agency, with the purpose of challenging
    the countermeasures efforts of the MDA.
        The Department of Defense (DOD) has not created a countermeasures
    test program through an independent agency. However, MDA has embraced
    the spirit of the JASON recommendation by increasing emphasis on
    developing threat countermeasures challenges and developing Missile
    Defense System (MDS) countermeasures mitigation capabilities.
        Existing independent DOD organizations are involved in MDS test
    planning to ensure MDA is appropriately challenged regarding
    countermeasures testing. By adhering to DOD standards with the use of
    independent Operational Test Authorities, and oversight from the
    Director, Developmental Test and Evaluation and the Director,
    Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), MDA ensures the credibility of
    all flight tests, including intercept tests with countermeasures.
        With support from Intelligence Community, Federally Funded Research
    and Development Centers, and University Affiliated Research Centers,
    MDA has identified and characterized a broad portfolio of
    countermeasures challenges. These relationships with external entities
    have allowed MDA to address additional countermeasures challenges.
        Altogether, these efforts have allowed MDA to address the spirit of
    the JASON report recommendation while executing a phased implementation
    plan to field incremental countermeasures mitigation improvements.
        Deputy Under Secretary Honey did not respond in time for printing.
    When received, answer will be retained in Committee files.

        2. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Hill, MDA has not yet completed an
    independent technology assessment of the three Glide Phase Interceptor
    (GPI) systems to determine their technological maturity. Yet MDA
    continues to place GPI on its Unfunded Priorities List. MDA requested
    $225 million for hypersonic defense (which includes GPI) in its fiscal
    year 2023 base budget and requested an additional $293 million for
    hypersonic defense in its fiscal year 2023 Unfunded Priorities List.
    Congress has plussed up the hypersonic defense account in every year
    since fiscal year 2019. Why does MDA continue to place GPI on the
    Unfunded Priority List, and why have previous plus ups failed to
    provide MDA with the resources it purports to need to advance GPI?
        Vice Admiral Hill. The Department and MDA appreciate the
    congressional Plus Ups provided since Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 that
    support multiple activities to counter hypersonic threats to include
    Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) initial requirements development and
    engineering studies, other technology maturation, engineering enablers,
    upgrading existing systems and collecting data on offensive hypersonic
    flight tests. The President's Budget 2023 request for GPI represented
    the Department's prioritization of available budget with program
    technical and programmatic risk for development of key GPI Critical
    Technology Elements (CTEs). The MDA Fiscal Year 202023 Unfunded
    Priorities List GPI item provides funding to reduce program technical
    and schedule risk for additional GPI CTEs. MDA recently completed
    technology assessment of the three Industry GPI candidate concepts to
    determine technological maturity and has continued the development
    effort for two of these missile concepts to move to a System
    Requirements Review in fourth quarter Fiscal Year 202022 and progress
    further toward a capability demonstration in the early 2030's.

        3. Senator Warren. Deputy Undersecretary Honey, the GMD program has
    cost more than $40 billion already. An enormous amount of money was
    spent on the EKV program, which has produced a system with a very poor
    record; the RKV program wasted $1.2 billion trying to fix the kill
    vehicle. What specific steps are being taken to make sure that the Next
    Generation Interceptor does not follow the same problematic development
    processes that the GBI and RKV followed?
        Mr. Honey. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has incorporated a
    number of lessons learned into the acquisition and development program
    for Next Generation Interceptor. These include:
          Development of Next Generation Interceptor as an All-Up-
    Round (AUR) with the Government requirements at the AUR level.
          Requirements traced to United States Northern Command
    (USNORTHCOM) Operational needs and validated through the Joint
    Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC).
          Requirements include threshold and objective values
    (coordinated through USNORTHCOM and JROC) to provide industry design
    flexibility.
          Establishment of a contractor proposed and MDA accepted
    Development Evaluation Framework identifying the design-specific
    Critical Technology Elements including Technology Readiness Level
    maturation plans through Preliminary Design Review (PDR), Critical
    Design Review (CDR), Qualification Testing and Flight Testing.
          Defined Knowledge Points to incentivize risk reduction
    earlier in the program.
          Competition with two contractors through CDR.
          Fly before you buy requiring two successful intercept
    tests prior to initial production decision.
          Contract options (after CDR) enabling performance-
    informed decisions to authorize contractor team to proceed into the
    next development/production phase.
          Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and
    Program Execution conduct an independent cost estimate of the Next
    Generation Interceptor program which established the funding requested
    in the annual President's Budget.
          Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Research &
    Engineering) will execute an Independent Technical Risk Assessment
    supporting each major milestone (Contract Award, System Requirements
    Review, PDR, CDR, etc.).

        4. Senator Warren. General Van Herck, Vice Admiral Jon Hill, Russia
    is apparently deploying entire new nuclear-armed weapon systems
    specifically because they can defeat missile defenses, and China is
    also developing systems to evade or overwhelm missile defenses. Are
    there circumstances you could envision under which you would decide it
    is no longer in the U.S. interest to deploy the U.S. Ground-Based
    Midcourse Defense system? What factors would you consider?
        General Van Herck. Thanks for the follow up question. I too am
    concerned about trends from both Russia and China to hold the Homeland
    at risk across multiple domains. In the context of your question, the
    current Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is not designed nor
    is it employed to defeat strategic missile threats from China and
    Russia. The nuclear deterrent is the primary means to address this
    threat. As directed by policy, today I remain confident in my ability
    to defend the Homeland from a rogue actor such as North Korea. I remain
    concerned about my ability, specifically regarding future capacity and
    capability, to provide ballistic missile defense as the threats
    continue to adapt and evolve. This is why it is crucial to field the
    Next Generation Interceptor on time or early and continue with ongoing
    service life extension programs. I defer to OSD regarding policy to
    address future threats.
        Vice Admiral Hill. The Ground Based Midcourse Defense system (GMD)
    is the foundation of United States Homeland defense against long-range
    ballistic missiles from rogue states like North Korea and Iran. As
    North Korean ballistic missile threats to the United States Homeland
    continue to evolve, the United States is committed to continuing to
    improve the GMD system, including the development of the Next
    Generation Interceptor (NGI), to augment and potentially replace the
    current Ground Based Interceptors (GBI).
        The presence of GMD also serves as an important deterrent to other
    nations considering the development of long range ballistic missiles,
    as it greatly increases the cost and decreases the likelihood of
    credibly threatening the U.S. Homeland.
        Though the United States maintains the right to defend itself from
    attacks from any source, GMD is neither intended for, nor capable of,
    defeating the large number of sophisticated Intercontinental Ballistic
    Missile, air and sea launched ballistic missile threats from Russia and
    the People's Republic of China.
        Defer to Commander Northern Command and the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Policy (OSD-Policy) for further response.
                                 cost estimates
        5. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Hill, GAO's most recent report
    shows billions of dollars in unaccounted costs, with estimates missing
    about half of the total costs of actually operating these systems, and
    63% of flight test costs. Despite it being DOD policy, we also lack
    independent cost assessments for these programs. This hurts planning
    and makes it more likely we will have to cancel other costly programs
    down the line. The Missile Defense Agency agreed with the GAO that they
    need to have these cost estimates. When does MDA expect to have
    independent cost estimates for its major programs, and which programs
    will MDA have independent cost estimates for?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Since President's Budget (PB) 2019, MDA has
    reported the complete Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) budget in the
    annual test reports to Congress. This IMTP submitted with each PB, is
    signed by the:
          MDA Director;
          Director, Operational Test and Evaluation;
          Deputy Director, Developmental Test, Evaluation, and
    Assessment;
          Commanding General, Joint Functional Component Command
    for Integrated Missile Defense (representing the combatant commands);
          Commanding General, U.S. Army Test and Evaluation
    Command;
          Commander, Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation
    Center;
          Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force; and
          Commander, Joint Interoperability Test Command.
        The associated supplemental budget reports include the total cost,
    schedule and budget information for flight, ground, and cyber testing
    and test infrastructure. Since 2017, MDA has also provided the Agency's
    cost for executed flight tests in a semiannual report and will continue
    this detailed reporting in September 2022.
        DOD Policy requires Independent Cost Estimates (ICEs) for all Major
    Defense Acquisition Programs. The Office of Secretary of Defense, Cost
    Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) and MDA follow this policy and
    work together to complete required ICEs. The MDA programs which have an
    ICE include Next Generation Interceptor (NGI), Standard Missile-3 (SM-
    3) Block IIA, SM-3 Block IB, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
    (THAAD), and Aegis Ashore Poland. MDA annually requests CAPE to perform
    ICEs for upcoming major milestone events. For Fiscal Year 202023, MDA
    is requesting OSD CAPE to conduct ICEs or updates for: Aegis SM-3 Block
    IIA, NGI, Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications, and
    THAAD. MDA is also requesting CAPE to review the Joint Cost Estimates
    (JCEs) for Army Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY)-2, THAAD
    and Long Range Discriminating Radar.
        DOD Policy also requires MDA to report in the annual Missile
    Defense Acquisition Report (MDAR) all operations and support (O&S)
    costs for which MDA is responsible, and a description of the O&S
    functions and costs for which a military department is responsible.
    However, MDA reported to GAO that we are actively working to obtain
    Services O&S cost estimates, and began reporting available JCEs in the
    PB 2023 MDAR submission to Congress. As we receive additional Service
    cost estimate information, we will report these costs in future MDAR
    submissions.
                         missile defense agency testing
        6. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Hill, according to the GAO, MDA has
    continually been unable to satisfy its annual test plan. The Committee
    understands that an independent assessment has been completed on the
    agency's process for developing and executing the annual test plan and
    is awaiting Departmental comment. Are there actionable steps provided
    in this assessment that will help MDA achieve their test plan thereby
    collecting more information on the system's capabilities?
        Vice Admiral Hill. The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)
    conducted an independent assessment of MDA's flight test planning and
    execution processes which was completed in February 2022. IDA provided
    the final assessment to MDA in March 2022. The Agency is in the process
    of implementing recommendations from the study. Areas for MDA process
    improvements include:
          Develop a taxonomy to monitor causes of flight test
    accelerations, deletions, and delays
          Develop a single-source traceable end-to-end mapping of
    assessment objectives to tests that address them and fulfill the Phased
    Implementation Plan requirements
          Develop and maintain an overall data collection strategy
          Coordinate with the Missile Defense System (MDS)
    Operational Test Agency (OTA) Team to better align the Operational Test
    Readiness Reviews and MDA Flight Test Concept of Operations (CONOPS)
    for earlier engagement in detailed flight test planning
        MDA is conducting technical interchange meetings with all
    stakeholders to increase awareness and set the conditions for
    implementing these process improvements. Implementation is planned to
    be synchronized with development of the Integrated Master Test Plan
    (IMTP) version (v) 25.0.

        7. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Hill--For the past four years, GAO
    has reported on MDA's inability to complete planned annual system-level
    cybersecurity tests since 2017. Considering this cyber testing deficit,
    what steps is MDA currently taking to ensure that cybersecurity testing
    deficiencies from prior years are addressed, to conduct operational
    system-level cybersecurity testing on all deployed systems, and to
    address DOT&E identified cybersecurity limitations, vulnerabilities,
    and recommendations?
        Vice Admiral Hill. MDA completed operational cyber testing in July
    2019, including Cooperative Vulnerability and Penetration Assessments
    (CVPA) and Adversarial Assessments (AA), on currently fielded MDA/MDS
    systems. MDA has not fielded a new increment since then. Due to impacts
    driven by the COVID-19 pandemic, MDA re-planned Increment 6B.1 testing
    for the United States Northern Command and United States Indo-Pacific
    Command. The Agency is following the IMTP and the MDA Cyber Test CONOPS
    by executing CVPA and AA testing on all MDA elements in the Increment
    6B.1 architecture. MDA follows the IMTP and conducts operational cyber
    testing on all MDA systems prior to fielding.
        MDA maintains a comprehensive cyber test and assessment program by
    leading and supporting cyber initiatives across multiple DOD offices.
    MDA leads and/or supports numerous cyber test and assessment
    initiatives covering the cradle to grave cyber lifecycle starting with
    product development and ending with operations and maintenance with a
    constant feedback loop for continuous improvement. These efforts cover
    partnership and oversight from numerous offices under the DOD umbrella.
    The following are examples:

          Pre Fielding
          o  Developmental cyber testing prior to full release to the
    Government
              Includes Cooperative Vulnerability Identification
    and Adversarial Cyber Development Test and Evaluation testing
                Authority and oversight--Office of Developmental
    Test, Evaluation, and Assessments--DOD Cybersecurity Test and
    Evaluation Guidebook
          o  Rigorous cyber compliance implementation and testing under
    Risk Management Framework
              Authority and oversight--National Institute of
    Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-37, 800-53, 800-30,
    and 800-137
          o  Operational Cyber Testing
              Includes CVPA and AA testing conducted prior to
    fielding to the Warfighter
                Authority and oversight--DOT&E Title 10 Authorities
          o  MDA Cybersecurity Assessments
              Vulnerability Assessments--assessment of Research,
    Development, Test, and Evaluation enclaves supports risk-based
    authorization to connect decisions and supply chain risk decision
                Authority and oversight--MDA Director and
    Authorizing Official

          Post Fielding
          o  Cyber Protection Teams in the Combatant Commands
              Authority and oversight--Joint Force Headquarters
    Commanders-DOD Information Network (DODIN)
              Combatant Commands requests for support
          o  DOD's Mission Assurance Construct
              Physical and electronic cyber testing and assessment
    of fielded systems
          o  Strategic system assessments coordinated through Joint Staff
    Direction
              Authority and oversight--Defense Threat Reduction
    Agency under DOD Instruction 3020.45
          o  Command Cyber Operational Readiness Inspection
              Authority and oversight--DODIN Readiness and
    Security Inspections under Defense Information Systems Agency
          o  United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) Operations
              OPLAN 8600--Directing DODIN Operations and Defensive
    Cyberspace Operations--Internal Defensive Measures
              Commanders Estimate and Mission Relevant Terrain
    Cyber
              Annex N (Operational Risk Assessments)
              Cyber Task Orders
                Authority and oversight--USCYBERCOM and Joint Staff
          o  Strategic Cybersecurity Program
              Assessments of Strategic Weapons Systems
              Includes Missile Defense System
                Authority and oversight--Joint Staff Joint Staff
    Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum, directing the National
    Security Agency to conduct assessments
          o  MDA Cybersecurity Assessments
              Cybersecurity Vulnerability Tests--supports risk-
    based authorization decisions
              Tier II Cybersecurity Service Provider monitoring
    (24x7x365)
              Authority and oversight--MDA Director and
    Authorizing Official
          o  Persistent Cyber Assessments
              Completed a DOT&E funded Persistent Cyber Assessment
    of the unclassified MDA Enterprise unclassified network boundary--2,332
    hours of effort spent evaluating the boundary with no significant cyber
    vulnerabilities identified
              Currently conducting an MDA funded Persistent Cyber
    Assessment of the classified MDA Enterprise boundary
              Currently conducting an MDA funded Persistent Cyber
    Assessment of the MDA Enterprise boundaries with the Threat Systems
    Management Office and DOT&E participation
              MDA is organized to support Persistent Cyber
    Assessments of fielded systems based on Combatant Command requests and
    risk acceptance
        MDA works closely with DOT&E and the MDA OTA Team in support of
    cyber testing through the IMTP, ongoing leadership dialog, and
    processes. DOT&E is included throughout cyber testing, from development
    of test requirements through test execution. Cyber test findings and
    observation reports are presented to the Failure Review, Analysis, and
    Corrective Action System (FRACAS) for consideration as a Boarded
    Discrepancy Report (BDR) in order to track remediation for future
    increment builds. BDRs are taken into account during the generation of
    the Cyber Test Objective Memorandum (CTOM) and are criteria used during
    test planning. In addition, The MDS OTA Team is part of the tri-chair
    on the MDS Data Analysis working group where cyber concerns are
    addressed and responded to by MDA. MDS OTA generates issue sheets which
    are addressed thru the MDS Data Analysis Working Group. DOT&E and the
    MDS OTA Team are stakeholders across the operational cyber test phases
    for operational cyber test planning and execution to include CTOM,
    Integrated Cyber Test Team planning, and execution. Test observations
    also can lead to Technical Cyber risks that are assessed and presented
    to the MDA Risk Working Group. Many findings and correlating
    recommendations that are observed from the CVPA are fixed prior to the
    AA if feasible by the program. Verification of Fixes (VoF) is a
    standard test process that occurs out of test execution and test
    planning. VoF ensures fixes implemented from previous findings have
    been remediated before advancing to next phases of operational testing.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky S. Rosen
                            iranian missile threats
        8. Senator Rosen. Admiral Hill, Iranian-aligned militia groups are
    increasingly targeting United States installations and service members
    in Iraq and Syria via rocket and drone attacks. Iran continues to be
    the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism and a threat to United
    States and allied interests via its ballistic missile program and
    support for terrorist proxies like Hezbollah, Hamas, KH, AAH, and many
    others. Can you update us on Iran's progress toward developing an ICBM?
    When do you assess Iran will be capable of fielding an ICBM, and what
    threat would that pose to the United States Homeland?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Recommend the Committee contact Defense
    Intelligence Agency for authoritative intelligence.

        9. Senator Rosen. Admiral Hill, can you describe the missile
    threats that Iranian-aligned militia groups in the Middle East pose to
    United States troops and our allies?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Recommend the Committee contact Defense
    Intelligence Agency for authoritative intelligence.

        10. Senator Rosen. Admiral Hill, do we have the assets in the
    Middle East, specifically outside the Green Zone in Baghdad, to protect
    United States and Coalition Forces in Iraq and Syria from rocket and
    drone attacks emanating from Iranian-aligned militia groups?
        Vice Admiral Hill. I defer to my colleagues from Central Command
    (CENTCOM) to respond to this question on tactical counter-Unmanned
    Aircraft Systems threats facing our personnel and critical assets in
    the Middle East.

        11. Senator Rosen. Admiral Hill, CENTCOM Commander General Michael
    Kurilla has called Israel's incorporation into CENTCOM, ``the area with
    some of the greatest opportunity: working toward an integrated air and
    missile defense.'' He told this Committee, ``I think the addition of
    Israel . . . will help with that. We are collectively stronger
    together, and there are areas where each one brings unique
    capabilities.'' In your assessment, how would an integrated air and
    missile defense architecture to counter Iranian air and missile threats
    improve collective security in the Middle East?
        Vice Admiral Hill. The United States has a long history of working
    with Israel and other partners in the Middle East to counter air and
    missile threats. There may be future opportunities to explore enhanced
    Integrated Air and Missile Defense cooperation along these lines, but I
    would defer to OSD-Policy for further inquiries on that issue. In
    general, the integration of multiple sensors and layered shooters
    increases the effectiveness of any integrated air and missile defense
    architecture.

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