    [Senate Hearing 117-967, Part 1]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                    ------
                                                       S. Hrg. 117-967, Pt. 1

                   DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
     REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023 AND THE FUTURE YEARS
                                DEFENSE PROGRAM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 4543

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
       MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
                                    PURPOSES

                                   ----------

                                     PART 1

                 U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND AND U.S. SPACE COMMAND

         U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. CYBER COMMAND POSTURE

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE

                               AIR FORCE POSTURE

                                  ARMY POSTURE

                                  NAVY POSTURE

    THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATIONON
                        ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

                                   ----------

                  MARCH 8; APRIL 5, 7; MAY 3, 5, 12, 19, 2022

          GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR
          FISCAL YEAR 2023 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM_Part 1

          U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND AND U.S. SPACE COMMAND b U.S. SPECIAL
       OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. CYBER COMMAND POSTUREb DEPARTMENT OF
       DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE b AIR FORCE POSTURE b ARMY POSTURE b NAVY
       POSTURE b THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
               ADMINISTRATIONON ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

                                                     S. Hrg. 117-967, Pt. 1

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
     REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023 AND THE FUTURE YEARS
                                DEFENSE PROGRAM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 4543

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
       MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
                                    PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                     PART 1

                 U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND AND U.S. SPACE COMMAND

         U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. CYBER COMMAND POSTURE

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE

                               AIR FORCE POSTURE

                                  ARMY POSTURE

                                  NAVY POSTURE

    THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATIONON
                        ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

                                   __________

                  MARCH 8; APRIL 5, 7; MAY 3, 5, 12, 19, 2022

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

                    Available via: http: // www.govinfo.gov

                                _______

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
     59-798              WASHINGTON : 2025

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

     JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman        JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire             ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York           DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut           TOM COTTON, Arkansas
    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii                   MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
    TIM KAINE, Virginia                       JONI ERNST, Iowa
    ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine                 THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
    ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts           DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
    GARY C. PETERS, Michigan                  KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
    JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia            RICK SCOTT, Florida
    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois                 MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
    JACKY ROSEN, Nevada                       JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
    MARK KELLY, Arizona                       TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama

                     Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
                     John D. Wason, Minority Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                             C O N T E N T S

                                 march 8, 2022

                                                                       Page

    United States Strategic Command and United States Space Command..     1

                               Member Statements

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................     1

    Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................     3

                               Witness Statements

    Richard, Admiral Charles, USN, Commander, United States Strategic
      Command                                                             3

    Dickinson, General James, USA, Commander, United States Space
      Command                                                            16

    Questions for the Record.........................................    69

                                 april 5, 2022

    United States Special Operations Command and United States Cyber
      Command Posture                                                    77

                               Member Statements

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................    77

    Statement of Senator James Inhofe................................    79

                               Witness Statements

    Maier, The Honorable Christopher, Maier, Assistant Secretary of      80
      Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.

    Clarke, General Richard, USA, Commander, United States Special       86
      Operations Command.

    Nakasone, General Paul, USA, Commander, United States Cyber          94
      Command/Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central
      Security Service.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   129

                                 april 7, 2022

    Department of Defense Budget Posture.............................   137

                               Member Statements

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   137

    Statement of Senator James Inhofe................................   139

                               Witness Statements

    Austin, The Honorable Lloyd III, Secretary of Defense............   141

    Milley, General Mark, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.   151

    Questions for the Record.........................................   202

                                     (iii)

                                  may 3, 2022

                                                                       Page

    Air Force Posture................................................   231

                               Member Statements

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   231

    Statement of Senator James Inhofe................................   233

                               Witness Statements

    Kendall, The Honorable Frank, III, Secretary of the Air Force....   234

    Brown, General Charles, Chief of Staff of the Air Force..........   236

    Raymond, General John, USSF, Chief of Space Operations...........   237

    Questions for the Record.........................................   289

                                  may 5, 2022

    Army Posture.....................................................   323

                               Member Statements

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   323

    Statement of Senator James Inhofe................................   325

                               Witness Statements

    Wormuth, The Honorable Christine, Secretary of the Army..........   325

    McConville, General James, Chief of Staff of the Army............   327

    Questions for the Record.........................................   369

                                  may 12, 2022

    Navy Posture.....................................................   389

                               Member Statements

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   389

    Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   391

                               Witness Statements

    Del Toro, Carlos, Secretary of the Navy, Department of the Navy..   391

    Gilday, Admiral Michael M., Chief of Naval Operations, Department   402
      of the Navy.

    Berger, General David H., Commandant of the Marine Corps,           413
      Department of the Navy.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   467

                                      (iv)

                                  may 19, 2022

                                                                       Page

    The Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security              505
      Administration on Atomic Energy Defense Activities.

                               Member Statements

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   505

    Statement of Senator James Inhofe................................   506

                               Witness Statements

    Granholm, The Honorable Jennifer, Secretary of Energy............   509

    Hruby, The Honorable Jill, Administrator, National Nuclear          510
      Security Administration.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   547

                                      (v)

      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR
             FISCAL YEAR 2023 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, MARCH 8, 2022

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

        UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND AND UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
    SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Rosen,
    Kelly, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Cramer,
    Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, and Tuberville.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. Let me call this hearing to order.
        Good morning. The Committee meets today to receive
    testimony from Admiral Charles Richard, Commander of U.S.
    Strategic Command, or STRATCOM, and General James Dickinson,
    Commander of U.S. Space Command, or SPACECOM. Admiral Richard,
    General Dickinson, I want to thank you for your service to our
    Nation, and I would like to extend my thanks to the men and
    women serving under your commands.
        Maintaining our nuclear deterrent and preserving our
    ability to operate in space are fundamental to our long-term
    strategic competition with Russia and China.
        There is a reason we have asked the commanders of STRATCOM
    and SPACECOM to testify together. Until 2019, Space Command was
    part of Strategic Command. Now, as SPACECOM stands up as an
    independent command, I would like to know what gaps or seams
    remain exposed during this transition and how they can be
    addressed.
        Much has changed since our last hearing in 2021. Russia's
    ongoing, unprovoked, and illegal invasion of Ukraine has shaken
    the international order that has maintained nuclear stability
    for the better part of a century. Vladimir Putin's behavior has
    been reckless to a dangerous degree. Just prior to its
    invasion, Russia conducted a large out-of-cycle nuclear
    exercise, and the Kremlin has since made a series of escalatory
    statements. Normally, Russia conducts its nuclear exercises in
    the fall and the United States conducts ours afterwards in a
    stable, predictable fashion. Not so this year. More than ever,
    our nuclear deterrent, the bedrock of our national defense, is
    being relied upon as we witness the realities of a European
    conflict involving a nuclear armed nation.
        In the past year, we have also seen China develop three
    missile fields in hardened silos throughout the country. This
    development, along with China's completion of its nuclear triad
    and modernization of its nuclear command, control, and
    communications fundamentally change the nature of Beijing's
    nuclear doctrine. We need to understand why China is
    undertaking this expansion, what it means for stability in the
    Indo-Pacific region, and how we should adjust our own nuclear
    deterrence to protect our Nation and uphold the fundamental
    extended commitment to our allies.
        Similarly, over the past year we gained a clearer picture
    of the threat we face in space, which has become a contested
    domain. In any future conflict, China will quickly extend its
    capabilities into space in a seamless fashion. Russia, for its
    part, acted recklessly in November by destroying a satellite in
    space while building up forces on the Ukrainian border. During
    today's hearing we will discuss these threats and the nature of
    conflict we can expect in space in the years to come.
        In particular, General Dickinson, I would like to make sure
    that SPACECOM is fulfilling the space and ground functions you
    inherited from STRATCOM with respect to missile warning and
    nuclear command, control, and communications. Ensuring we can
    accurately warn both Strategic and Northern Commands, and our
    senior leadership, of a missile attack on the Homeland is of
    the utmost importance.
        SPACECOM is also responsible for integrating and tasking
    both ground and space sensors for better space situational
    awareness, essentially becoming DOD's [Department of Defense]
    ``sensor command.'' General Dickinson, I ask that you share
    your vision on how to integrate this myriad number of sensors,
    which range from radars on the ground and at sea to sensors
    aboard satellites.
        General, I would also like to know the progress your
    command is making during its stand-up and how you are finding
    and retaining personnel with the specialized skill sets
    associated with SPACECOM operations.
        Admiral Richard, your command is undergoing an intense
    period of modernization that began with the ratification of the
    New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty]. This will be the
    third modernization cycle since 1960, as parts of each leg of
    our triad age out. I am interested in hearing about the
    progress of modernizing the entire triad and the implications
    of altering that plan, especially with respect to our near-peer
    competitors.
        In addition, I would like to know your views on the efforts
    by the National Nuclear Security Administration to re-
    capitalize its uranium and plutonium handling infrastructure.
    Some of these facilities date back to the Manhattan Project and
    are single points of failure in supporting your mission. It is
    essential that we understand what impacts this may have on your
    operations.
        Thank you again for appearing today and I look forward to
    your testimonies.
        Ranking Member Inhofe cannot be here today. We anticipate
    he will return next week. But I would ask that his opening
    statement be submitted to the record, and without objection, so
    ordered.
        [The prepared statement of Senator James M. Inhofe
    follows]

                 Prepared Opening Statement by James M. Inhofe
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to welcome our witnesses and
    thank them for their long service in defense of our Nation.
        Admiral Richard, General Dickinson, almost a year ago, each of you
    appeared before this Committee and offered dire warnings about the need
    to deter two peer adversaries.
        You cautioned us that Russia remains a pacing threat as it expands
    its nuclear forces, outlined the pacing challenge of a rising China and
    its massive military modernization effort, and advised us that Russia
    and China have already weaponized space.
        If we have learned anything over the past year, it's that as
    worrying as your prior warnings were, the reality of what our Nation is
    facing is much, much worse.
        China is expanding its nuclear, missile, and space capabilities
    faster than any country in history. Its investments are shifting the
    balance of power in the Pacific--but China is also building its
    capabilities to extend its reach across the globe.
        Putin's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and his reckless threats of
    escalation have shattered Europe's security, and, for the first time in
    decades, forced Americans to face the possibility that nuclear weapons
    could be used in anger.
        Meeting the challenge of Russian and Chinese aggression across all
    domains means we must invest in the capabilities required to deter
    these threats, and we need to be realistic about the level of resources
    needed to make that happen.
        The administration's first budget request failed to seriously
    address these threats, and now we're looking at inflation that will
    cripple our buying power further--even after Congress acted to increase
    the budget.
        This trend cannot continue if we intend to compete with two peer
    countries that are clearly focused on overturning the U.S.-led global
    order.
        Both of you are responsible for missions with zero margin for
    failure. Unfortunately, chronic underinvestment has left us with an
    undersized, aging nuclear deterrent and a space architecture that lacks
    the resilience needed to prevail in a multi-domain conflict.
        Moving forward, we need to accelerate efforts to right-size our
    forces to meet the strategic deterrence and space warfighting
    requirements of the coming decades.
        I look forward to your testimony. Mr. Chairman.

        Chairman Reed. I would also note for my colleagues that
    there will be a classified briefing immediately following this
    session in SVC-217 to continue our discussion.
        With that let me recognize Admiral Richard.

    STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CHARLES RICHARD, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES
                           STRATEGIC COMMAND

        Admiral Richard. Chairman Reed, distinguished Committee
    Members, I am pleased to testify today with my fellow combatant
    commander, General Dickinson.
        Before I begin, given the ongoing and historically
    significant crisis that is happening in Ukraine right now, I am
    going to need to defer all questions regarding Russia and a
    number of questions related to our own forces to the closed
    session.
        I want to thank Secretary Austin, Chairman Milley for their
    continued support to the strategic deterrence and strategic
    defense of the Nation as well as their overall leadership under
    some very trying conditions.
        Ladies and gentlemen, right up front I want to assure you
    that the 150,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, guardians,
    civilians of U.S. Strategic Command, as always, are ready to
    execute our strategic deterrence mission.
        Chairman Milley rightly stated, we are witnessing one of
    the largest shifts in global geostrategic power the world has
    ever witnessed. Today we face two nuclear-capable near-peers
    who have the capability to unilaterally escalate to any level
    of violence, in any domain, worldwide, with any instrument of
    national power, at any time, and we have never faced a
    situation before like that in our history.
        Last fall, I formally reported to the Secretary of Defense
    the PRC's [People's Republic of China] strategic breakout.
    Their expansion and modernization in 2021 alone is
    breathtaking, and the concern I expressed in my testimony last
    April has now become a reality. I had previously emphasized our
    need to be able to deter two adversaries at the same time. That
    need is now an imperative.
        I have said this before and I think it is worth repeating.
    Every operational plan in the Department of Defense and every
    other capability we have rests on an assumption that strategic
    deterrence is holding, and in particular that nuclear
    deterrence is holding. If strategic or nuclear deterrence
    fails, no other plan and no other capability in the Department
    of Defense is going to work as designed. The Nation's nuclear
    forces underpin integrated deterrence and enable the U.S., our
    allies, and our partners to confront aggressive and coercive
    behavior.
        The strategic security environment is now a three-party
    nuclear near-peer reality. Today's nuclear force is the minimum
    required to achieve our national strategy. Right now I am
    executing my strategic deterrence mission under historic
    stress, crisis levels of deterrence, crisis deterrence dynamics
    that we have only seen a couple of times in our Nation's
    history, and I am doing it with submarines built in the 1980s
    and 1990s, and air-launched cruise missile built in the 1980s,
    intercontinental ballistic missiles built in the 1970s, a
    bomber built in the 1960s, part of our nuclear command and
    control that predates the internet, and a nuclear weapons
    complex that dates back to the Manhattan era.
        We must modernize the nuclear triad, the NC3, the nuclear
    weapons complex, and supporting infrastructure to meet
    presidential objectives. While modernization must be the
    priority, please make no mistake. STRATCOM's forces are ready
    today.
        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Charles A. Richard
    follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Admiral Charles A. Richard
                                  introduction
        United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is the global
    combatant command (CCMD) responsible for Strategic Deterrence, Nuclear
    Operations, Global Strike, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations,
    Analysis and Targeting, and Missile Threat Assessment. In addition, the
    January 2021 Unified Campaign Plan (UCP) designated the Commander,
    USSTRATCOM (CDRUSSTRATCOM) as the Nuclear Command, Control, and
    Communications (NC3) Enterprise Operations lead. It takes a team of
    dedicated individuals to execute our mission set, and I am honored and
    privileged to lead the 150,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
    guardians, and civilians dedicated to the DOD's highest priority
    mission.
        I want to thank Secretary Austin and Chairman Milley for their
    leadership and continued support to the strategic defense of this
    Nation. USSTRATCOM is committed to Secretary Austin's integrated
    deterrence initiative and remains dedicated to his priorities of
    defending the Nation, taking care of our people, and succeeding through
    teamwork. I also want to thank Congress for your continued support to
    ensure USSTRATCOM is equipped with the resources necessary to maintain
    strategic deterrence on behalf of the Nation, our allies, and our
    partners.
        Since my last testimony, there should be no doubt we are contending
    with a rapidly changing and dynamic strategic security environment
    where potential adversary actions challenge us in ways we have not
    experienced in over 30 years. In September 2021, I formally declared
    the strategic breakout of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to the
    Secretary of Defense. A strategic breakout denotes the rapid
    qualitative and quantitative expansion of military capabilities that
    enables a shift in strategy and requires the DOD to make immediate and
    significant planning and/or capability shifts. The PRC continues the
    breathtaking expansion of its strategic and nuclear forces with opaque
    intentions as to their use. The recent test of an intercontinental
    ballistic missile (ICBM)-launched hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) with
    fractional orbital bombardment (FOB) is just one example of these
    growing capabilities. Meanwhile, Russia conducted the invasion of
    Ukraine backing its actions with the coercive potential of the world's
    largest nuclear arsenal. The strategic security environment is now a
    three-party nuclear-peer reality, where the PRC and Russia are
    stressing and undermining international law, rules-based order, and
    norms in every domain. Never before has this Nation simultaneously
    faced two nuclear-capable near-peers, who must be deterred differently.
        I applaud Secretary Austin for his vision of integrated deterrence
    across the Joint Force, our allies and partners as the foundation of
    the National Defense Strategy. Every operational plan in the DOD, and
    every other capability we have, rests on the assumption that strategic
    deterrence, and in particular nuclear deterrence, will hold. If
    strategic or nuclear deterrence fails, integrated deterrence and no
    other plan or capability in the DOD will work as designed. The Nation's
    nuclear forces underpin integrated deterrence and enable the U.S., our
    allies and partners to prevent and, if necessary, confront aggression
    around the globe using all instruments of national power.
        Our operational requirements exist to execute Presidential
    directives and decisions we make today will have lasting strategic
    impacts on our ability to do so. Maintaining and strengthening
    deterrence for the long-term requires a modern infrastructure and
    industrial base able to develop credible capabilities necessary for a
    more challenging security environment. While the command is ready to
    execute its mission today, we must make threat-informed decisions
    regarding our nuclear capabilities to provide strategic deterrence well
    into the future.
                          strategic threat environment
        Chairman Milley rightly stated that we are experiencing one of the
    largest shifts in global geostrategic power the world has ever
    witnessed. Today, both the PRC and Russia have the capability to
    unilaterally escalate a conflict to any level of violence, in any
    domain, worldwide, with any instrument of national power, and at any
    time. USSTRATCOM measures the risk of strategic deterrence failure
    every day considering this reality. The DOD can no longer have the
    luxury of assuming the risk is always low, particularly during a
    crisis. Potential adversaries, as they have for years, have the
    capability to threaten to inflict catastrophic effects on the U.S.
    Homeland, and on our allies and partners to achieve their national
    objectives.
        Our potential adversaries continue to rapidly advance the
    capability to conduct these attacks. Their growing capabilities will
    pose a danger to U.S. They will continue to expand and diversify their
    nuclear forces over the next decade and the PRC, in particular, will
    increase the role of nuclear weapons in its defense strategies. The
    range of their new systems complement growing nuclear stockpiles, and
    includes the development and modernization of survivable nuclear
    triads, counter-intervention, and power projection capabilities
    intended to deter and deny our regional influence.
        The Nation faces significant risk as our potential adversaries
    develop and deploy emerging technologies, such as anti-satellite,
    hypersonic, and FOB capabilities. They are also pursuing leadership in
    key technologies with significant military potential including,
    artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous systems, advanced computing,
    quantum information sciences, biotechnology, and advanced materials and
    manufacturing. USSTRATCOM supports Secretary Austin's call for measures
    to protect critical U.S. capabilities, technologies, and operations as
    the Nation also faces risks from the threat of foreign theft of U.S.
    technology, penetration of U.S. information and weapons systems, supply
    chain disruptions, and cyberespionage campaigns designed to erase
    United States advantages. Cyber threats from the PRC, Russia, and the
    Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) are determined and
    unrelenting. Even now, Russia threatens cyberattacks against the United
    States as tensions over Ukraine increase. To that end, USSTRATCOM
    implemented a new construct to operationally harden NC3 systems against
    cyber threats to improve force readiness during competition and crisis.
    We must mitigate these threats for future programs to field new
    uncompromised capabilities.
                           people's republic of china
        We should carefully consider the PRC's actions rather than their
    rhetoric. The breathtaking expansion of land-, sea-, and air-based
    nuclear delivery platforms, command and control survivability, novel
    and asymmetric weapons, and supporting infrastructure is inconsistent
    with a minimum deterrent posture. When I testified last year, I warned
    that the PRC was capable of executing any plausible nuclear strategy. I
    am fully convinced the recent strategic breakout points towards an
    emboldened PRC that possesses the capability to employ any coercive
    nuclear strategy today.
        Just three months after my April 2021 testimony, commercial
    satellite imagery revealed three new nuclear missile fields in western
    China, each with approximately 120 missile silos. With this discovery,
    it is clear the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) will soon
    achieve a robust ICBM capability. The new silos can be equipped with
    the solid-fueled, road-mobile CSS-10 Mod 2 capable of reaching the
    continental United States (CONUS). This is in addition to the fixed
    ICBM arsenal of CSS-4 Mod 2 and multiple independently targetable
    reentry vehicle (MIRV) equipped CSS-4 Mod 3 ICBMs. While only a
    developmental concept in 2019, the PRC has already fielded the road-
    mobile, MIRV-capable, CSS-20 with launch options including silo or
    rail-mobile basing. Counting both conventional and nuclear-armed
    missiles, the PLARF employs over 900 theater-range intermediate and
    medium-range ballistic missiles (IRBM / MRBM), some of which are
    capable of doing catastrophic damage to United States, Allied, and
    partner forces in the region. Combined, this formidable arsenal is
    cause for concern.
        Further advancements in the last year include ground-based, large
    phased array radars and at least one geostationary satellite capable of
    detecting ballistic missile launches. These capabilities, plus a
    rapidly expanding silo-based ICBM force, indicate the PRC increased the
    peacetime readiness of its nuclear forces and seeking a Launch-on-
    Warning posture, all while the PLARF now rotates it's nuclear and
    conventional brigades to ``high alert duty'' posture for unspecified
    periods. Enhancing the survivability of its sea-based deterrent, the
    third generation JL-3 submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM)
    allows the People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN) now six JIN-class
    ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) to target CONUS from a protected
    bastion within the South China Sea.
        The PRC's pursuit of an ICBM delivered HGV with FOB capability is a
    technological achievement with serious implications for strategic
    stability. On 27 July 2021, the PRC's first HGV FOB test resulted in
    40,000 kilometers distance flown and over 100 minutes of flight time--
    the greatest distance and longest flight time of any land attack weapon
    system of any nation to date. The PRC is investing heavily in HGV and
    directed energy weapons technology for global strike and defeat of
    missile-defense systems, anti-satellite, anti-missile, and anti-
    unmanned aircraft system capabilities.
        The PRC is increasing its capacity to produce and enrich plutonium
    by constructing fast breeder reactors and reprocessing facilities,
    which may be used to support a growth in China's nuclear weapons
    stockpile. While the PRC may use a portion of this infrastructure for
    civilian nuclear technology programs, it is highly likely some
    infrastructure will support their expanding nuclear weapons program.
    This accelerated nuclear expansion may enable the People's Liberation
    Army (PLA) to field over 700 nuclear warheads by 2027. The PRC likely
    intends to have at least 1,000 warheads by 2030, greatly exceeding
    previous DOD estimates. Unlike the United States, the growth of the
    PRC's nuclear arsenal is not constrained by any treaty limits.
        Finally, the PLA continues to develop and field precision strike
    nuclear delivery systems. The dual-capable DF-26 IRBM can range
    critically important ports, airfields and bases in the western Pacific
    with conventional and nuclear payloads. Survivable road-mobile
    transporter erector launchers can deliver the DF-31A ICBM at ranges in
    excess of 11,000 kilometers. The PLA's H-6N air-to-air refueling-
    capable bomber, which can carry the nuclear air-launched ballistic
    missile (ALBM), is entering its second year of operational service. The
    2020 Annual Report to Congress, released in November 2021, surmises
    that the PRC may be building a new conventional- and nuclear-capable
    stealth strategic bomber with global reach in addition to medium and
    long-range stealth bombers. These nuclear-related advancements are
    additive to the PRC's ongoing conventional modernization and expansion
    efforts, where they already have a substantive overmatch in regional-
    and theater-class weapons and capabilities.
    Russia
        Russia is in its second decade of investing substantial resources
    to expand their strategic and non-strategic nuclear capabilities. In a
    recent statement, President Vladimir Putin recounted that in 2000
    Russian nuclear deterrent forces were only 12 percent modernized. By
    late 2020, President Putin stated that 86 percent of Russia's nuclear
    forces had been modernized, including components from all legs of their
    strategic nuclear triad, and promised to increase modernization to 89
    percent by the end of 2021. Nuclear weapons are an integral part of
    Russia's national security strategy and Moscow appears to utilize them
    to demonstrate political stake, deter outside actors, and support
    resolutions acceptable to Russia. In June 2020, Russia publicly
    revealed its official nuclear deterrence strategy for the first time,
    describing threats and conditions for the use of nuclear weapons.
    Within this strategy, Russia acknowledges it could use nuclear weapons
    first, including in response to conventional attacks that threaten the
    ``existence of the state.''
        Russia made extensive efforts to update their ICBM force with
    single and multiple warhead missiles, including the developmental silo-
    based SS-X-29 Sarmat heavy ICBM with the capacity to carry ten or more
    warheads on each missile; the deployed, more capable silo-based variant
    of the SS-27; and the silo-based or road-mobile ``KEDR'' ICBM to be
    fielded by 2030. To support the expansion and modernization of the sea-
    leg of its triad, Russia plans to complete the production of ten
    Dolgorukiy-class SSBNs and deploy them equally across the Northern and
    Pacific Fleets by 2028. These SSBNs will carry the new SS-N-32 Bulava
    SLBM, enhancing Russia's strategic reach while retiring the older Delta
    IV SSBNs.
        Russia also continues to invest in strategic air capabilities,
    fitting its heavy bombers with a new advanced nuclear cruise missile.
    On 12 January 2021, Russia accepted delivery of the first of ten brand-
    new Tu-160M strategic bombers with updated NV-70M radar and NK-32-02
    engines. An accomplishment not seen since the Cold War, restarting the
    Tu-160M production line required cooperative efforts between the
    Kremlin and the Russian industrial base. The opening of new
    manufacturing and production lines further illustrates Russia's ability
    to rapidly increase its industrial production capacity to support its
    strategic forces.
        In my last testimony, I highlighted Russia's novel and advanced
    weapon delivery systems, many of which are capable of hypersonic speeds
    and flight path adjustments designed to avoid United States missile
    defense systems. They pursue these capabilities despite the United
    States clearly relying on its strategic nuclear forces to deter any
    large attack by Russian nuclear weapons. The Avangard HGV, Tsirkon
    hypersonic anti-ship and land-attack missile, and Kinzahl ALBM are
    operationally fielded now. Meanwhile work continues on the Skyfall
    nuclear-powered intercontinental cruise missile and the nuclear-armed
    Poseidon autonomous underwater vehicle. All provide Russia with an even
    more diverse and flexible nuclear force while posing a challenge for
    us. Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu asserted that hypersonic weapons
    will make up the core of Russia's non-nuclear deterrence capability in
    the future. Russia is not limiting itself to these new systems and
    claims to have already completed serious research and technological
    groundwork on pieces of equipment that have no counterpart in the
    world. They continue to develop additional strategic systems with new
    hypersonic warheads to expand the range of threats against the United
    States, our allies and partners.
        Russia's stockpile of approximately 1,000 to 2,000 non-treaty
    accountable nuclear weapons is anticipated to grow. These weapons fall
    entirely outside of the United States-Russia New Strategic Arms
    Reduction Treaty (START) and provide Russia with a diverse stockpile of
    theater and tactical weapons systems employable by naval, air, and
    ground forces. In a conventional conflict, if Russia perceives an
    irreparable imbalance of forces, it may escalate to non-treaty
    accountable nuclear weapons use.
        In October 2019, Russia conducted their largest strategic nuclear
    exercise since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The exercise was
    notable for the size and scope of the nuclear forces involved and
    strategic messaging. President Putin participates in these exercises,
    indicating a high-level of readiness across Russia's strategic nuclear
    forces and intending to serve as a visible message to the United States
    and NATO. These major strategic exercises include command and control
    operations with participation of the entire nuclear triad; an ICBM
    combat training launch; and long-range aviation cruise missile
    launches. More importantly, Russia rescheduled and completed the
    strategic exercise to coincide with the invasion of Ukraine in February
    2022.
    DPRK
        The DPRK remains a strategic security challenge as it continues to
    conduct activities that threaten regional stability and defy
    international norms. The DPRK previously tested ICBM-class missiles
    designed to reach the United States, and they have a large arsenal of
    theater-class missiles.
        The recent missile launches demonstrate their ongoing desire to
    develop a credible missile threat. USSTRATCOM supports the Department's
    efforts with regional partners to reduce military tensions and
    encourages diplomatic efforts to pursue the DPRK's denuclearization. At
    the same time, USSTRATCOM will continue to contribute to the extended
    deterrence commitments of the Republic of Korea and Japan.
                             integrated deterrence
        While deterrence is not a new concept, the emerging security
    environment necessitates integrated deterrence to leverage all elements
    of national power, while enabling the Joint Force to synchronize
    actions across domains and time on an unprecedented scope and scale.
    Yet, the foundation of the Nation's strategic deterrent is unchanged: a
    powerful and ready nuclear force, a survivable NC3 system, and a
    responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. Absent this foundation, the
    credibility of integrated deterrence will not work.
        Sustaining and strengthening our Nation's deterrence is imperative.
    Our potential adversaries employ coercion or threat of force as a means
    to challenge U.S. security commitments and undermine the existing
    international order. To confront aggressive and coercive behaviors of
    nuclear-capable near-peers, the Nation must leverage all elements of
    national power with our nuclear enterprise at its foundation.
    Integrated deterrence orients the DOD toward stability and cooperation,
    and clearly communicates the folly and cost of aggression and that
    diplomacy is always the best option.
        Alliances and partnerships remain our greatest strength and are
    enabled by our credible extended assurance and deterrence. Our policies
    and postures must enable our allies to contribute to collective
    defenses even in the face of adversary nuclear coercion. We share with
    our allies and partners a collective of like-minded states who believe
    a free and open world should be the foundation of the international
    order. Our alliances are only as strong as the guarantee of extended
    deterrence and assurance backed by credible U.S. nuclear forces, which
    are essential to integrated deterrence.
                        what we need to do--our mission
        Fundamentally, strategic deterrence relies on credible capabilities
    backed by a safe, secure, reliable, and effective nuclear enterprise.
    We no longer face a singular operational problem set but must consider
    two nuclear-capable near-peers simultaneously. The attributes provided
    by all three legs of the triad, forward-deployed regional capabilities,
    a robust NC3, and a weapons complex able to adapt to future threats
    offers the President flexible options and enhances the credibility of
    deterrence. Our strategic capability and capacity must evolve with the
    threat to achieve our National strategy. USSTRATCOM encourages
    Congress, the Department, and the Service s to continue their decades-
    long support for these vital national security capabilities.
    Land-Based Triad Component
        The Minuteman III (MM III) ICBM force has stood on continuous alert
    every hour of every day for the past 50 years, ready to deliver a
    responsive and highly reliable strategic deterrent capability--and our
    potential adversaries know it. MM III represents half of the Nation's
    day-to-day available deterrent and its geographic dispersion presents
    an intractable targeting challenge. I previously testified that without
    the Nation's ICBMs the PRC becomes a strategic nuclear peer. The
    discovery of three new ICBM missile fields in the last year
    demonstrates the value the PRC places on land-based forces. If we
    choose not to continue investing in the land-based leg of our triad,
    the PRC will soon have a superior, modernized nuclear force with
    elevated day-to-day readiness.
      Requirement for MM III Sustainment
        The MM III is well beyond its intended 10-year design life, yet
    still provides a high availability rate, testifying to its robust
    design, past modernization efforts, and the dedication of the airmen of
    the U.S. Air Force. Exhaustive Air Force analysis decisively
    demonstrated that another MM III life extension is more costly than
    recapitalization, and the debate has moved well beyond funding. We
    cannot continue to rely on an aging ICBM force with end-of-life
    challenges and the inability to pace the threat. We must complete
    Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) recapitalization on time and
    avoid the ``sunset mentality'' prevalent when replacing old systems.
      Requirement for Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
        GBSD is the program of record to recapitalize the ICBM force and is
    critical for maintaining a strong deterrent posture. GBSD will be able
    to pace the threat and is integral to our strategy to navigate the
    three-party nuclear-capable peer reality. Its development, procurement,
    and deployment are the best approach to ensure the land-based leg of
    the triad remains effective and affordable. GBSD preserves the MM-III's
    key attributes while improving operational effectiveness against a
    rapidly developing threat. USSTRATCOM encourages continued
    Congressional support for the Air Force's ongoing GBSD strategy--pursue
    mature, low-risk technologies; design modularity; advanced cyber
    security; open system architecture; and state-of-the-art model-based
    systems engineering.
    Sea-Based Triad Component
        The Navy's Ohio-class SSBN fleet, paired with the Trident II D5
    Strategic Weapon System (SWS), combines a highly effective, survivable,
    worldwide launch capability with continuous and virtually undetectable
    strategic deterrent patrols. Since their first deployment, early in the
    Cold War, we have relied on our SSBN fleet for a resilient, reliable,
    and survivable deterrent.
      Requirement for Trident Sustainment and Modernization
        No single Navy submarine has served longer than 37 years, yet the
    entire Ohio-class SSBN fleet has been life extended to an unprecedented
    42 years. USSTRATCOM requires Ohio-class sustainment and modernization
    until completely replaced in 2042 by the Columbia-class SSBN. Ohio-
    class sustainment is critical to ensure operational availability of the
    submarine force to minimize significant transition risk throughout the
    Columbia-class deployment timeline. The Columbia-class SSBN remains a
    high priority strategic deterrent program for USSTRATCOM. The program
    of record delivers twelve SSBNs, the absolute minimum required to meet
    at-sea requirements, especially during triad recapitalization and
    future intensive fleet maintenance periods. Continued Congressional
    support for the Columbia program is vital to strategic deterrence. It
    must deliver on time to avoid a triad capability gap.
        To guarantee uninterrupted SSBN capability, we must continue
    investing in our SSBN SWS programs. The Navy previously life extended
    the Trident II D5 weapon system (D5LE) to outfit the Ohio-class through
    retirement and deployment of the first eight Columbia-class SSBNs. A
    second D5 life extension (D5LE2) is required to ensure a viable SSBN
    deterrent through the 2080s. D5LE2 will continue reliable, high
    performing D5LE design elements and components in order to mitigate
    cost and technical risk. Additionally, D5LE2 meets current D5
    demonstrated performance while offering added flexibility to support
    future missions and payloads in response to advancing threat
    environments.
      Anti-Submarine Warfare
        Anti-submarine warfare threats continue to evolve rapidly as
    potential adversaries continuously look for new and innovative ways to
    gain an advantage in the undersea domain.
        The Navy's Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) provides
    vital information concerning submarine and surface ship operations, and
    acoustic characteristics of interest. It allows U.S. forces to maintain
    favorable tactical and strategic positions while supporting deterrent
    patrol operations. Surveillance performed by IUSS directly contributes
    to the theater anti-submarine warfare commander's maritime defense of
    the Homeland. Advances in Russian submarine stealth and detectability
    makes IUSS recapitalization a national imperative.
        While our submarines are formidable weapon systems, we must address
    potential adversary's undersea security advances to ensure our current
    and future SSBN fleet remains effective and viable well into the
    future. Evolving submarine quieting, acoustic arrays, and processing
    capabilities challenge our acoustic superiority and subsequently, SSBN
    survivability. Advanced modifications of large vertical arrays,
    advanced materials science and coatings, and other efforts within the
    Acoustic Superiority Program are vital. Funding for these emerging
    passive long-range detection/wide area search programs secure our SSBN
    fleet advantages through the Ohio to Columbia transition.
    Air-Based Triad Component
        The bomber fleet is our most flexible and visible leg of the triad.
    We are the only nation with the capability to provide bombers in
    support of our allies and partners, enabling the U.S. to signal our
    resolve while providing a flexible option to de-escalate a conflict or
    crisis. Bombers support both strategic deterrent and conventional
    employment options, and execute global strike, nuclear, and
    conventional deterrent mission sets around the globe to achieve
    National objectives. USSTRATCOM executed 127 Bomber Task Force (BTF)
    missions over the past year. BTFs remain the iconic example of dynamic
    force employment across the entire Joint Force and potential
    adversaries watch these missions closely. We strongly encourage
    continued Congressional support for full funding of the bomber fleet.
      B-52H Sustainment
        The B-52H is a 60-year-old platform with plans to remain in service
    for another 30 years. Achieving this unparalleled milestone carries
    maintenance and operational challenges, which require dedicated
    technical and funding resources. Critical B-52 modernization upgrades
    include the Commercial Engine Replacement Program (CERP), Radar
    Modernization Plan (RMP), and survivable NC3. These improvements are
    necessary to keep the B-52 flying and able to pace the evolving threat.
    The Air Force recently selected Rolls-Royce to execute CERP to replace
    the B-52's 1960s-era TF-33 engines, enabling longer unrefueled range
    with lower emissions while solving supply chain issues afflicting the
    current engines. The B-52's very low frequency (VLF) and extremely high
    frequency (EHF) modernization programs will provide mission critical,
    beyond-line-of-sight strategic connectivity, and must field on time to
    meet USSTRATCOM's operational requirements.
      B-2 Sustainment
        The B-2 fleet remains the world's only low-observable bomber, able
    to penetrate denied environments while employing a wide variety of
    munitions against high-value strategic targets. The DOD must protect
    this unique operational advantage as the Air Force transitions from the
    B-2 to the B-21. The Air Force can only achieve a successful transition
    with full funding for the B-2 sustainment and modernization programs
    until the B-21 completes development and certification, both
    conventional and nuclear missions. A carefully synchronized transition
    is necessary to mitigate operational risk associated with executing the
    triad-wide multi-platform recapitalization.
      Requirement for B-21
        The B-21 Raider will support the nuclear triad with a visible
    deterrent capability and provide strategic and operational flexibility
    across a wide range of military objectives. The program is on track to
    meet USSTRATCOM operational requirements, with five test aircraft
    currently in development and the first operational aircraft scheduled
    for delivery in the mid-2020s. USSTRATCOM supports fully funding the
    Air Force's B-21 strategy to prevent operational shortfalls in the
    bomber force.
      Air-Delivered Weapons / Long Range Standoff
        The air-delivered weapons portfolio consists of the Air Launched
    Cruise Missile (ALCM), the B83 gravity bomb, and the B61 family of
    weapons providing the right mix of standoff and direct attack munitions
    to meet near-term operational requirements. The long range standoff
    (LRSO) weapon will replace the ALCM as our Nation's only air-delivered
    standoff nuclear capability. It will provide the President with
    flexible and scalable options, and is capable of penetrating and
    surviving against advanced air defenses--a key attribute and critical
    component in all USSTRATCOM operational plans. Without LRSO, B-2 and B-
    21 bombers will have no option but to fly directly over targets to drop
    gravity-delivered weapons unnecessarily increasing risk to the mission
    and the lives of Air Force bomber aircrews.
        The LRSO complements the ICBM and SSBN programs as they transition
    from legacy to modernized weapon systems. The LRSO on-time delivery is
    important to sustaining strategic stability, as potential adversaries
    will exploit gaps resulting from technical problems or production
    delays. Finally, fielding LRSO is cost-effective. Using gravity weapons
    to deliver similar effects would require ten-times the current bomber
    allocation and four times the current tanker allocation, with more
    gravity weapons, or employment of additional triad elements. LRSO full
    funding is absolutely imperative to reduce operational risks we face
    during triad recapitalization.
      Tanker Support
        A robust tanker fleet is essential to sustaining global reach for
    all USSTRATCOM mission sets. While the KC-135 and KC-10 force has done
    the yeoman's work for decades, the Air Force's effort to revitalize the
    tanker fleet is timely. The likelihood of future concurrent mission
    sets between strategic, theater, and homeland defense is high,
    requiring continued tanker modernization and expansion efforts.
    USSTRATCOM fully endorses and supports the Air Force's effort to
    modernize and sustain the tanker fleet.
    Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications
        NC3 provides the critical assured communications link between the
    President and our nuclear forces. On-going NC3 Enterprise Center (NEC)
    modernization efforts bridge the gap between legacy and future systems
    to ensure this critical link does not fail. While aging capabilities
    provide the nuclear triad with sufficient viable assured strategic
    communications; today, sustainment issues increasingly compromise the
    reliability of these stalwart systems. Modernizing our NC3 systems is
    key to ensuring the nuclear capability of the Nation remains fully
    positioned to provide an assured response if called upon. Our NEC Next
    Generation capabilities must pace adversary emerging and future
    technological developments.
      NC3 Next Generation / Modernization
        Potential adversaries continue to rapidly research, develop, and
    field emerging technologies and weapon systems. We are at a point where
    end-of-life limitations and the cumulative effects of underinvestment
    in our nuclear deterrent and supporting infrastructure leave us with no
    operational margin. The Nation simply cannot attempt to indefinitely
    life-extend leftover Cold War weapon systems and successfully support
    our National strategy. Pacing the threat requires dedicated and
    sustained funding for the entire nuclear enterprise and NC3 Next
    Generation modernization must be a priority.
        The DOD operates, maintains, and defends the current NC3 enterprise
    every single day from cyber threats. In coordination with the Services,
    USSTRATCOM led an enterprise-wide approach to harden the current
    architecture until complete fielding of the NC3 Next Generation. As an
    example, the Air Force is leading the effort to modernize the NC3 data
    pathways for the Strategic Automated Command and Control System
    (SACCS), replacing legacy telephony to sustainable and secure modern
    technology with upgraded at-risk cryptographic devices.
        The NEC and DOD stakeholders fielded the NC3 Next Generation
    Increment 1 capabilities, including the Family of Advanced Beyond Line
    of Sight Terminals (FAB-T) to replace antiquated survivable satellite
    communications equipment. The NEC, the National Security Agency (NSA),
    and the Services also began replacing outdated encryption equipment
    with newer, upgraded capabilities. The NC3 Enterprise continues segment
    upgrades to legacy telecommunications capability from analog to digital
    working closely with the Defense Information Systems Agency. This
    conversion is the first step to standardize our enterprise-wide
    terrestrial communications highway. Additionally, the NEC collaborated
    with U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) to execute a cybersecurity pilot
    program to provide real-time, persistent monitoring across various NC3
    networks to detect, characterize, and mitigate adversary network
    actions.
        The NEC, Navy, and Air Force completed the first step in a digital
    high frequency (HF) demonstration to enable advanced beyond line-of-
    sight communication between our command centers and operational forces.
    USSTRATCOM developed, installed, and deployed a mobile communications
    suite providing an alternative communications capability supporting
    continuity of operations and force direction. This new capability will
    enable USSTRATCOM to rapidly create requirements and field systems in
    the future.
        The NEC is undertaking several efforts to more rapidly develop and
    deliver NC3 enterprise capabilities. The NEC established a digital
    modeling and engineering environment (DMEE), a collaborative platform
    in the standard development of and test engineering specifications for
    the NC3 enterprise. The NEC and the University of Nebraska-Lincoln,
    through a Partnership Intermediary Agreement (PIA), established the
    Nebraska Defense Research Corporation (NDRC). The PIA fosters
    collaboration between commercial entities, defense industry, academia,
    Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs), and other
    government agencies. The NDRC is already prototyping of future NC3 Next
    Generation Incremental capabilities. All of these efforts are currently
    ongoing and will posture delivery of NC3 Next Generation Increments and
    provide increased operational margin within our NC3 Enterprise.
      NC3 Cybersecurity, Technological Improvements, and AI / Machine
            Learning (ML)
        USSTRATCOM continues to realize the benefits from the investment in
    our world class Command and Control Facility, the DOD's newest NC3
    command center. Confidence in our ability to protect, defend, and
    execute the nuclear deterrent mission in the face of advanced cyber
    threats remain high. The relative isolation and the redundancies of the
    systems comprising the Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS),
    combined with ongoing cybersecurity enhancements, ensure our ability to
    respond under adverse cyber conditions. To preserve our critical
    information and command and control advantages, USSTRATCOM is investing
    in cybersecurity protections that exceeds the DOD baseline standard
    while looking for opportunities to improve that posture.
        Near-term efforts to enhance cybersecurity of the NC3 enterprise
    include: the establishment of quarterly cybersecurity reporting for all
    NC3 information technology (IT) systems; ongoing efforts with
    USSTRATCOM system program managers to correct cybersecurity shortfalls;
    piloting of a persistent cyber sensing and monitoring capability for
    NC3 IT systems; and the development and execution of Defensive Cyber
    Operations (DCO) Internal Defensive Measures (IDM) to harden and defend
    the NC3 cyber terrain. As the threat evolves; however, the DOD must
    continue to fund and rapidly implement required cybersecurity
    capabilities. CyberSecurity Service Provider (persistent cyber
    defense); persistent sensing and monitoring across the NC3 enterprise;
    and cryptographic modernization will ensure the confidentiality of our
    information and decision making capabilities. A responsive cyber
    Command and Control construct will enable the rapid dissemination of
    defensive cyber operations orders, facilitate action, and enable
    follow-up reporting. These efforts will ensure continued readiness of
    the nuclear deterrent mission and set conditions for the success of our
    conventional forces.
        Deep learning and advanced data management concepts are also
    fueling new demands for infrastructure that can scale to capacity on
    demand. Acting on the guidance of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and
    recommendations from the National Security Commission on AI, USSTRATCOM
    implemented the Command Data and AI Center (CDAI) to solve the
    command's most intractable problems through the application of advanced
    AI/ML methods. The command is recruiting a highly skilled workforce to
    build and maintain a resilient and scalable cloud and on-premise
    infrastructure to provide the capabilities to maintain information
    advantage over our potential adversaries.
        We will do this in ways consistent with the DOD Ethical Principles
    for Artificial Intelligence, while continuing to lead in developing
    best practices for the development and application of AI and ML
    technologies to ensure their use is safe, secure, reliable, and
    consistent with our values. In an effort to ``go faster,'' USSTRATCOM
    completed a 90-day pilot to assess opportunities to leverage commercial
    industry and use of non-traditional unclassified data sources to solve
    some of our most challenging problems. I strongly endorse Deputy
    Secretary of Defense Hicks's AI and ML initiatives in this critical
    focus area.
        USSTRATCOM continues to collaborate with USCYBERCOM, the Services,
    and agencies to leverage technologies in development, security, and
    operations (DevSecOps), code delivery, cloud computing, and data
    analytics to accelerate the development and delivery of new
    capabilities. Initiatives in these areas will jumpstart development of
    frameworks and governance necessary to pace the threat. Likewise, these
    new areas require stable, consistent, and on-time funding.
    Nuclear Weapons and Supporting Infrastructure
        The Nation faces a confluence where triad delivery platforms,
    weapons, and infrastructure must modernize simultaneously. As with DOD
    programs, the Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear
    Security Administration (NNSA) fill a vital role providing the weapons
    and components required to maintain the Nation's strategic deterrent
    mission. The NNSA's programs of record must be prioritized and executed
    on schedule to ensure the DOD retains a credible and modern triad. The
    NNSA's ability to sustain the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile is
    underpinned by a resilient and responsive production infrastructure and
    robust science and technology programs. All of these elements are
    critical to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective deterrent force.
    The objective is to restore the weapons complex to a resilient,
    responsive and modern condition; capable of sustaining the health of
    the Nation's stockpile and keeping pace with the evolving threat
    environment.
      Nuclear Weapons and Stockpile Challenges
        While today's stockpile is safe, secure and militarily effective, I
    am increasingly concerned with reliability and performance degradations
    in the majority of our systems. We must execute stockpile modernization
    programs on time to reverse this trend. In compliance with national
    policy, the NNSA has done an excellent job reducing the weapons
    stockpile. As we shift focus beyond life extension to modernizing our
    remaining weapons, we must overcome obstacles that delay program
    execution. Failure to do so results in accumulation of operational risk
    from continued deferral of necessary modernization programs and aging
    weapons in the stockpile decades longer than intended. For example,
    both the B61 life extension and W88 alteration programs were delayed
    24-months and are now late-to-need. The W80-4 program is a just-in-time
    modernization for airborne standoff capability, and any program delay
    incurs operational impacts.
        Stockpile modernization programs take 10 to 15 years to execute.
    Without a concerted effort to reduce these timelines, today's issues
    will continue to manifest as the Nation undertakes more complex
    ballistic missile modernization programs. Specifically, W87-1 is the
    ``pathfinder'' weapons program for modernizing our land- and sea-based
    ballistic missile systems and will develop the infrastructure and
    technology processes needed in the future. Any W87-1 program delays
    will cascade through each follow-on program, beginning with the W93/
    Mk7. W93/Mk7 must deploy on time to reduce our over-reliance on a
    single SSBN warhead type, avoid future simultaneous SLBM modernization
    and support the United Kingdom's modernization to its deterrent force.
      Weapons Complex Infrastructure
        The DOE, NNSA, and DOD work closely to ensure the nuclear weapons
    infrastructure complex is postured to ensure the stockpile remains
    safe, secure, and militarily effective. However, today's Manhattan
    Project-era infrastructure is in poor condition, challenging NNSA's
    ability to successfully meet basic sustainment needs. Long-term
    deferred infrastructure investments have significant impacts, and there
    are heightened concerns with every major site providing critical
    stockpile capabilities to include uranium, tritium, high explosives,
    lithium, radiation-hardened electronics, testing, experimentation, and
    weapon assembly/disassembly. Infrastructure modernization must be
    accomplished to prevent delays in fielding required capabilities.
    Prioritizing crucial NNSA infrastructure modernization programs is the
    best and only option to pace projected threats and sustain strategic
    deterrence.
        In 2021, it became clear the production complex would not meet the
    Nation's plutonium pit production requirements, necessitating pursuit
    of less optimal approaches to meet stockpile modernization programs in
    the 2030s. Pit production shortfall is a leading indicator of how our
    current infrastructure is unable to execute the needed and planned
    stockpile modernization strategy. The atrophied condition of the
    infrastructure, coupled with delays in fielding necessary state of the
    art capabilities, significantly increases operational risk in
    sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
      Science, Technology, and Engineering Base
        The science, technology and engineering (ST&E) base is essential
    for nuclear weapon and production complex modernization. Our ability to
    attract and retain the best and brightest scientists, engineers,
    program managers and technicians to work in the strategic deterrence
    mission set rests on ST&E efforts. In 2021, ST&E programs continued to
    advance our understanding of nuclear weapons. For example, the National
    Ignition Facility (NIF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
    (LLNL) made a major technological advance, to expand the range of
    experiments directly relevant to stockpile modernization. This
    achievement will enable high fidelity testing to address challenging
    nuclear survivability requirements in the future.
        The ability of NNSA to backstop an aging stockpile and
    infrastructure with advanced science and technology programs has
    enabled the Nation to sustain the deterrent well beyond projected
    lifetimes. As our potential adversaries rapidly advance their nuclear
    programs; however, this edge in science and technology is beginning to
    erode. The Nation must aggressively sustain and advance these critical
    resources to improve our understanding of nuclear weapons performance
    and mature technologies to allow us to confidently move forward with
    stockpile and production modernization programs. I have formally
    reported this to the Secretary of Defense.
    Nuclear Weapons Security / Force Protection
        Nuclear weapons security remains a top USSTRATCOM priority and I am
    encouraged by the Department's continuing efforts to enhance and
    improve our security posture and capabilities. The security systems
    that protect our nuclear weapons must evolve as potential adversaries
    seek to exploit vulnerabilities. We must remain committed to protecting
    the investments in and fielding of the capabilities required to
    maintain the high security standards this mission demands and continue
    to adapt as the threat evolves.
      MH-139A Grey Wolf Replacement Helicopter
        The Air Force continues to make progress toward replacing the aging
    UH-1N helicopter fleet with the MH-139A Grey Wolf. The Grey Wolf will
    close our UH-1N limitations in speed, range, endurance, payload and
    survivability, and provide a rapid lethal response to address security
    vulnerabilities. We look forward to the Air Force completing Grey Wolf
    FAA certifications and getting aircraft ``on the ramp'' as we move
    toward full operational capability across all three ICBM wings in
    fiscal year 2028.
      Countering Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems
        USSTRATCOM requires an effective integrated set of Countering Small
    Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-sUAS) capabilities to defend strategic
    locations and assets across the threat spectrum in a rapidly advancing
    and technically challenging environment. As technology advances, so
    must our access and authorization to use both kinetic and non-kinetic
    capabilities in C-sUAS engagements to protect our nuclear assets. I
    strongly support the Services' efforts to develop and field effective
    protection systems and encourage continuing Congressional support as we
    deploy C-sUAS capabilities to reduce the threat.
      Countering Underwater Unmanned Vehicles
        USSTRATCOM requires an integrated Counter-Unmanned Underwater
    Vehicle (C-UUV) capability for protection of strategic naval assets.
    The underwater environment has become an uncontested entry point for
    UUV systems, threatening our strategic assets. The effectiveness of
    traditional undersea detection and protection methods must be enhanced
    and new capabilities developed to ensure we retain strategic advantage
    in response to this emerging threat. It is imperative we seek and
    employ non-traditional layered protection measures to maintain the
    safety and security of our waterfronts and strategic assets.
      Weapons Generation Facilities
        The future Weapons Generation Facilities (WGF) are a DOD program
    priority and will consolidate weapon maintenance and storage functions
    to support ICBM and bomber missions. These functions reside in 1960s
    and 1970s era Weapons Storage Areas (WSA) that exceed their intended
    service lives. Emerging threats expose WSA vulnerabilities, driving the
    need for a cost effective approach to restore weapon security and
    storage; however, the uncertainty of consistent stable funding, supply
    chain concerns, and pandemic repercussions affect overall confidence in
    construction schedules.
    Conventional Hypersonic Weapons
        Hypersonic weapons development remains a top USSTRATCOM priority.
    Hypersonic weapons will provide a highly responsive, non-nuclear global
    strike capability against distant, defended, and/or time-critical
    threats when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not
    preferred. Conventional hypersonic weapons will enhance our overall
    strategic deterrence posture by providing the President additional
    strike options to rapidly project power and hold high-value targets at
    risk without crossing the nuclear threshold. USSTRATCOM will be ready
    to command and control hypersonic weapons the day they are fielded, as
    these weapons directly contributes to the Command's Strategic
    Deterrence and Global Strike missions. We appreciate and encourage
    continued Congressional funding as we quickly develop, procure, and
    field this enhancement to our strategic deterrence portfolio.
               joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (jemso)
        USSTRATCOM and the Joint Force are critically dependent on the EMS.
    Across the competition continuum, the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS)
    will be congested, contested, and constrained. Potential adversaries
    are pursuing technology to deny our ability to use the EMS successfully
    across our range of missions and operations, to include targeting
    critical NC3 architecture. To ensure freedom of maneuver in the EMS, we
    must continue to develop and integrate EMSO across the DOD and with
    select allies.
        USSTRATCOM is implementing operational aspects of the DOD EMS
    Superiority Strategy (EMSSS) I-Plan Goal 5, Establishing Effective EMS
    Governance, in coordination with DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO),
    OUSD, Joint Staff, Combat Support Agencies, CCMDs, and Services. To
    support this goal, USSTRATCOM will establish a 2-Star Direct Report
    Organization called the Joint EMS Operations Center (JEC). The JEC will
    enable execution of proposed amended UCP responsibilities for JEMSO
    operational lead reporting directly to CDRUSSTRATCOM and we intend to
    achieve IOC this year.
        USSTRATCOM is leading the development of JEMSO Cells (JEMSOC)
    across the Joint Force to support joint planning, coordination, and
    control of the EMS. The USSTRATCOM JEMSO staff in lockstep with DOD
    CIO, is driving the requirements for a JEMSOC Electromagnetic Battle
    Management (EMBM) system to achieve EMS superiority.
        USSTRATCOM's Joint Electromagnetic Warfare Center (JEWC)
    established the first-ever Joint EMS Information Analysis and Fusion
    capability to provide spectrum-specific data for electromagnetic battle
    management and CCMD JEMSO cells. Our task is to raise the aggregate
    readiness of the Joint Force to prevail in a complex EMS that has
    become key terrain in nearly every military action we undertake.
                                missile defense
        Missile defense (MD) remains an essential element of our strategic
    deterrence approach, raising the stakes of rogue actors and regional
    adversaries and denying the benefit of attack against our protected
    assets as part of an integrated deterrence framework, both for the
    Homeland and for the regional CCMDs. The active missile defense mission
    begins with launch detection, attribution, warning, and tracking, all
    of which face significant challenges as potential adversaries develop
    and deploy hypersonic systems, increase ballistic, cruise missile
    availability, and lethality. Technology developments continue at an
    unrelenting pace and employment techniques--operating at lower
    altitudes, higher speeds, and with greater maneuverability--continue to
    challenge our missile defense systems. We must develop and deploy
    additional missile defense systems with advanced capabilities into the
    existing architecture to address the rapidly changing threat
    environment. USSTRATCOM is engaging with CCMDs, the Services, and
    agencies to advocate for and deliver global integrated missile defense
    capabilities and capacity in an operationally relevant timeframe.
        As we move beyond legacy interceptor-based ``hit-to-kill''
    technologies, we must expand our approach to active defenses and
    appreciate the funding of such critical sensors as the Hypersonic and
    Ballistic Missile Space Tracking Sensor (HBTSS) and the Space
    Development Agency's Tranche 1 MD Tracking Layer. As the Department
    develops capabilities that complement our existing Ground-Based
    Interceptor (GBI) systems and regionally-focused systems such as,
    Aegis, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and Patriot, we
    must examine novel, cost effective options to adapt and overcome
    emerging threats. Finally, we should consider modifications to existing
    systems to defend against emerging threats, while remaining fiscally
    responsible--for example, fully integrating existing space- and
    terrestrial-based sensors in an attempt to identify and track
    ballistic, maneuvering, hypersonic, and cruise missile threats, as well
    as unmanned aerial systems.
        USSTRATCOM continues to work with our allies and partners to
    further integrate our capabilities to meet common threats. Led by the
    Joint Force Component Command-Integrated Missile Defense, the 24-nation
    missile defense policy campaign, NIMBLE TITAN 20, culminated with a
    senior leader event in Amsterdam in November 2021and was successfully
    completed despite the limitations of the on-going pandemic. We have
    begun planning our next campaign, NIMBLE TITAN 23, to deepen the
    exchange of MD policy views and insights and collectively explore
    operational concepts in this challenging environment.
                           our people & partnerships
        It has been 30 years since this Nation has had to seriously
    consider the implications of competition through crisis and possible
    conflict with a nuclear-armed opponent let alone two nuclear-capable
    near-peers. USSTRATCOM holds the bulk of the last remaining strategic
    and operational deterrence expertise in the DOD. Thus, our people and
    partnerships are a vital element to the national strategic deterrence
    mission. Even against the challenges of the continuing pandemic, the
    personnel of USSTRATCOM remain operationally resilient. Because of our
    people, we continued the mission during this unforeseen crisis.
      People
        The Command remains committed to improving our workforce and our
    competitive advantage. We are growing our intellectual and deterrence
    theory capital through industry and academic partnerships such as
    USSTRATCOM's Strategic Fellows and Deterrence Education Programs. We
    continue to pursue Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion in line with DOD
    guidance through Human Capital initiatives. The Command emphasizes and
    distributes Service and agency focused resources to provide greater
    visibility to individuals within the Command. We offer opportunities
    for our military and civilian workforce to pursue additional diversity
    leadership training and certificates, opportunities to participate in
    Heritage Councils to help celebrate DOD-recognized special observances,
    and Directorate-level diversity councils to promote healthy culture and
    provide direct feedback on workforce and personnel guidance and
    processes. Additionally, we provide and monitor active feedback
    mechanisms to report on health and culture within the Command and
    provide tools to address diversity issues.
      Academic Endeavors
        This Nation faces an intellectual challenge, requiring us to
    leverage the intellectual capacity of the U.S., our allies and
    partners. USSTRATCOM is making a concerted effort to reinvigorate
    research in strategic deterrence. Since the establishment of the
    Academic Alliance in 2014, over 70 academic institutions and industry
    partners have focused on USSTRATCOM's challenging mission set while
    building the next generation of national security professionals.
    Although the Alliance is currently developing the deterrence-focused
    curricula, it is only a fraction of what is needed to reinvigorate
    research and analysis for deterrence concepts. In August 2021, I
    further challenged the Academic Alliance, FFRDCs, and think tanks to
    provide new ideas on strategic deterrence in the 21st century by
    establishing USSTRATCOM's first ever analytic agenda. The response from
    these institutions is so promising that I am integrating some of the
    concepts and ideas into USSTRATCOM plans and operations.
        While this is a good start to understanding deterrence in the 21st
    century, good will, and the Academic Alliance will only take the
    Department and our Nation's capacity to think through deterrence
    challenges so far. USSTRATCOM collaborates with the National Strategic
    Research Institute (NSRI) and the University of Nebraska to research
    key topics in my analytic agenda. This initiative only scratches the
    surface to truly understand the implications of strategic deterrence in
    the 21st century and requires additional engagement with our academic
    partners.
      Wargames
        Exercises, wargames, tabletop exercises (TTX), and rehearsals of
    concept continue to refine how we demonstrate joint capacity,
    capability, and interoperability across the globe. Last year,
    USSSTRATCOM conducted over 360 nuclear command, control, and
    communications-focused exercises and wargame events focused on
    coordination with other CCMDs and the interagency, integrating advanced
    weapons, and improving processes and procedures to leverage every
    advantage from our nuclear enterprise.
                                   conclusion
        Potential adversary actions are challenging us in ways we have not
    experienced in over 30 years. USSTRATCOM will continue to deter
    strategic attack and employ forces as directed by the President to
    guarantee the security of the Nation, our allies, and our partners. We
    must remember deterrence is not a static concept--it evolves--and the
    current evolution of the world's strategic security environment will
    result in three nuclear-capable near-peers. The PRC and Russia actively
    seek to change the international rules-based order, while the United
    States, with our allies and partners, seek to defend it. Our military
    can contribute to an integrated whole-of-government approach only if we
    make clear-eyed and threat-informed decisions regarding the
    capabilities needed to protect and defend the Nation. The Nation's
    nuclear force is the backstop of integrated deterrence. Today, we stand
    ready to execute our assigned missions. Failure to pace the threat from
    potential adversary technological advances today may inhibit our
    ability to do so in the future. To execute a National strategy
    resistant to adversarial coercion, we need modern, effective, and
    reliable capabilities. Above all else, USSTRATCOM will continue to
    provide strategic deterrence, underwriting every U.S. military
    operation around the world and deterring great power conflict. Peace is
    our Profession . . .

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral. General
    Dickinson, please.

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES DICKINSON, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES
                             SPACE COMMAND

        General Dickinson. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, and
    thank you, Chairman Reed and members of the Senate Armed
    Services Committee. As always, I am honored today to represent
    the approximately 18,000 men and women of the United States
    Space Command. We are a joint and diverse team of professionals
    who value the honorable service of everyone within our ranks.
        Today we are not only in full support of our joint forces
    globally and NATO in Europe but we remain hard at work building
    the command toward full operational capability. We are steadily
    building the capability and capacity in our headquarters, and
    its composition reflects our joint, combined, and partnered
    approach to executing our critical mission. As of this month we
    have over 1,000 members assigned to our headquarters, including
    civilians, contractors, Active Duty personnel from all
    services, representatives from the interagency, and
    servicemembers from the National Guard and Reserves.
        We also recognize the vital importance of our allies and
    partners through the contributions of an assigned international
    general office and two international liaison officers on our
    staff. We are pleased to have all of them on our team.
        Responding to the threats to the U.S. and allied interests
    in space demands the teamwork and expertise of every one of our
    people. We are prepared to execute our unified command plan
    missions and responsibilities, yet acknowledge that the
    challenges from our competitors in the domain are substantial
    and, in fact, growing.
        China remains our pacing challenge. Current PLA [People's
    Liberation Army] development is directed towards creating a
    joint, versatile, professional, and lethal force capability of
    power projection globally, and the space layer is critical to
    their efforts. In 2021, the PRC increased on-orbit assets by 27
    percent. This increase brings their on-orbit satellite total
    from just over 100 satellites 10 years ago to more than 500
    satellites today. Their recent counter-space capability
    demonstrations include the DN-1 and the DN-2 direct descent
    anti-satellite tests and a hypersonic glide vehicle test.
        In October of 2021, the PRC launched their SJ-21 satellite,
    described as a, quote, ``space debris mitigation,'' end quote,
    satellite. In January, the SJ-21 docked with a defunct PRC
    satellite and moved it to an entirely different orbit. This
    activity demonstrated potential dual-use capability in SJ-21
    interaction with other satellites and builds on the previous
    demonstrations in late 2016 of potential dual-use capability
    that we saw in the SJ-17.
        Over the past 2 weeks we have witnessed Russian aggression
    in Europe on a significant scale. Space is not a sanctuary from
    similar behavior. Russia is actively working to regain its
    prestige as a space power. The destructive direct ascent test
    just this last November is an example of their activity. Space
    is no longer a sanctuary, and U.S. Space Command stands ready
    to protect and defend the space assets of the United States and
    our partners and allies.
        U.S. Space Command is committed to deterring the use of any
    space capabilities for nefarious purposes within the framework
    of the Department of Defense Integrated Deterrence Strategy.
    Key to all of this is U.S. and allied space superiority
    informed through space domain awareness, or SDA, capabilities.
    SDA helps us analyze, not just identify, what is occurring in
    space, which when combined with the information from our
    intelligence agency helps develop an understanding of why
    things are happening, characterize intent, and provide decision
    advantages to our leaders. Our SDA capabilities are part of a
    broader resilience space architecture that enables command and
    control and provides the tools to sustain freedom of action in
    the space domain.
        Within this broader resilience space architecture, SDA
    remains my top mission priority for U.S. Space Command. SDA
    provides the backbone of U.S. Space Command's strategy for
    accomplishing our mission. That strategy sets the conditions to
    understand and attribute activities in space. This enables our
    mission to deter first, and when called upon, to defend space
    capabilities and to deliver combat power for the United States
    and our allies.
        Our strategy has three main areas of focus: first,
    countering competitive influence; second, strengthening
    relationships and attracting new partners; and third, building
    and maintaining a competitive edge. With continued support from
    Congress, U.S. Space Command will do all of that and more. U.S.
    Space Command is postured to protect and defend the space
    domain while ensuring continuous space effects are delivered to
    our joint and combined force.
        I assure you, here today, that U.S. Space Command is ready.
    So on behalf of the most critical resource in our command, the
    soldiers, marines, sailors, airmen, guardians, civilians, and
    families of the command, thank you, Chairman Reed and members
    of this Committee, for your support of our mission to conduct
    operations in, from, and to space.
        I submit my statement for the record, and I look forward to
    your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General James H. Dickinson
    follows:]

                Prepared Statement by General James H. Dickinson
                                  introduction
        Space is vital to our modern way of life and our people remain our
    most critical asset. China and Russia are developing new space and
    counterspace capabilities to achieve national goals and deny the United
    States, our allies and our partners the advantages from space. United
    States Space Command (USSPACECOM) is focused on providing support to
    warfighters from space as well as defending the space domain as a
    necessary part of our national security, especially in light of the
    rapid evolution of the threats we face, and the importance of deterring
    potential adversaries from challenging or attacking U.S., allies', and
    partners' space systems.
        In August 2021, I informed the Secretary of Defense and publicly
    announced that USSPACECOM had reached Initial Operational Capability
    (IOC). My IOC declaration represents a measured assessment that
    USSPACECOM is able to execute key Unified Command Plan-assigned tasks,
    including normalizing USSPACECOM's command and control of Operation
    Olympic Defender; successfully demonstrating at combatant command-level
    exercises our warfighting acumen; and adding to the Command's space
    data sharing agreements that now total more than 100. Today we are
    capable of delivering strategic effects, providing the National Command
    Authority with space domain options for achieving national objectives.
    We are ready to address threats and take advantage of opportunities
    across the spectrum from competition to conflict.
        However, there is much more work to be done to build capacity as
    USSPACECOM continues driving toward Full Operational Capability (FOC).
    We are increasing our capacity within the framework of the President's
    Interim National Security Strategic Guidance and the U.S. Space
    Priorities Framework. In line with this guidance, the Unified Command
    Plan, and the Secretary of Defense's approach to Integrated Deterrence,
    we are implementing USSPACECOM's strategy. Our strategy sets the
    conditions to deter, and to win when compelled to fight. It does this
    in three ways: (1) Countering Competitor Influence; (2) Strengthening
    Relationships and Attracting New Partners; and (3) Building and
    Maintaining a Competitive Advantage. My focus on these three efforts
    within our strategy will achieve our desired end state: a team of
    professionals, Active, Guard, Reserve, civilians and contractors, who
    outthink and outmaneuver our adversaries, operate with our allies and
    partners, and when necessary, win through space combat power.
                        countering competitor influence
        The challenges to maintaining a safe, secure and sustainable space
    domain are increasing. On November 15, 2021, Russia tested a ground-
    based Direct Ascent Anti-Satellite (DA-ASAT) missile and successfully
    intercepted and destroyed one of its own defunct satellites. While
    Russian aggression remains visible on the global stage, we must also
    keep our eye on the pacing challenge - the People's Republic of China
    (PRC). Both the PRC and Russia continue to develop and test
    sophisticated anti-satellite weapons to hold U.S. and allied and
    partner space assets at risk. In 2007 the PRC, similarly, conducted
    their own destructive ASAT test. These debris-creating events
    threatened the lives of those onboard the International Space Station
    (ISS), and other commercial and space-faring nations' satellites in low
    Earth orbit. Additionally, the PRC conducted the first fractional
    orbital launch of an ICBM with a hypersonic glide vehicle from China on
    July 27, 2021. This demonstrated the greatest distance flown (824,850
    miles) and longest flight time (8100+ minutes) of any PRC land attack
    weapons system to date.
        These events demonstrate how the PRC and Russia have tested
    counterspace weapons across multiple domains as a way to blunt United
    States influence, deter, and counter a possible U.S. response during
    conflict or crisis, and across the board reduce U.S. and allied
    military effectiveness in the future. Our competitors are also
    developing and proliferating satellites and satellite attack
    capabilities to hold our space and strategic capabilities at risk.
    These counterspace capabilities include cyber, electronic warfare (EW),
    directed-energy weapons, anti-satellite missiles, and space-based
    weapons, which enables our competitors to achieve a range of effects.
    These effects range from degrading space services temporarily to
    damaging or destroying satellites permanently in and through space that
    jeopardize our capabilities in other domains.
        To negate the growing EW and cyber threat, we are partnering with
    the U.S. Intelligence Community to explore a testbed to assess new jam
    and spoof resistant waveforms for all satellite telemetry, tracking,
    and command. The PRC has operational ground-based missiles in their
    fielded forces intended to destroy spacecraft in low-Earth orbit, and
    ground-based lasers likely created to blind or damage sensitive space-
    based optical sensors on satellites in low Earth orbit. Our competitors
    have counterspace capabilities and operational military doctrines that
    extend warfighting to space. They are continuing to modernize their
    space attack capabilities. Today, space is a warfighting domain because
    our competitors have made it so.
        Consequently, the number one need for the Command is to enhance our
    understanding of the congested and complex space operational
    environment, to include what is occurring and when, and the intent
    behind those engaged in such actions. This critical task requires a
    deep understanding of space objects and capabilities regardless of
    their national origin. This is why my priority request to Congress is
    to authorize and fund Space Domain Awareness (SDA) programs that enable
    us to monitor the domain effectively and provide combat-relevant
    indicators and warning of potential threats to U.S. Government, allied,
    and partner space systems. SDA encompasses identifying, characterizing
    and understanding objects to enable real-time assessments of
    potentially threatening activities in space and developing appropriate
    options for a response. Through SDA, USSPACECOM can better protect and
    defend our vital space assets when there may be only minutes to
    respond.
        Our SDA capabilities will be part of a broader, resilient space
    architecture that enables command and control and provides the tools to
    sustain freedom of action in the space domain. Within this broader,
    resilient space architecture, SDA remains my top priority. Our space
    posture must not be predicated on a static defense. Domain awareness
    enables us to observe, orient, decide, and act. SDA is foundational to
    effective and proactive maneuver; this is essential to ensuring
    proliferated architectures are resilient architectures. This Command
    depends on the SDA capabilities fielded by all of the military Services
    as well as the commercial sector.
    The Pacing Challenge--The People's Republic of China
        The PRC poses a major security challenge and remains a long-term
    strategic competitor to the U.S. Its government views the international
    environment and the PRC's relationship with the U.S. as increasingly
    contentious. The PRC continues its decades-long military modernization
    campaign in order to build what it terms a ``world-class military'' by
    the end of 2049. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders characterize
    their long-term military modernization program as essential to
    achieving great-power status. In 2020, the CCP's People's Liberation
    Army (PLA) added a new 2027 milestone to accelerate the integrated
    development of ``mechanized,'' ``informatized,'' and
    ``intelligentized'' armed forces to provide CCP leadership more
    credible military options. The PLA believes the fundamental precepts
    for modern ``informationized'' and future ``intelligentized'' warfare--
    including their use and advancement of machine learning and artificial
    intelligence (ML/AI)--include space superiority, the ability to control
    the information sphere, and denying adversaries the same.
        In the next 5-10 years the PLA's Strategic Support Force (SSF) will
    field a range of counterspace weapons with a mature space and
    counterspace infrastructure to directly challenge United States' space
    superiority and threaten the United States in all orbital regimes. PLA
    modernization focuses on improvements in long-range precision strike,
    cyberspace, electronic warfare, counterspace, and a modern, effective
    nuclear deterrent that collectively make the PLA a combat-capable
    global joint force. To enable this transformation, the PRC's Central
    Military Commission established the SSF in 2015 to integrate
    cyberspace, space, information operations, psychological warfare, and
    EW capabilities into joint military operations. The SSF's space
    activities focus primarily on satellite launches and operations to
    support PLA intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR);
    navigation; and communication requirements. An increasingly capable and
    lethal PLA joint force will almost certainly be able to hold U.S. and
    allied forces at greater risk.
        The PRC's rapidly growing space program is second only to the
    United States in the number of operational satellites it maintains. The
    PRC completed 55 launches throughout the year, surpassing the United
    States' 51 launches. At the end of 2021 the PRC had 508 assets on-
    orbit, an increase of 27 percent from the end of 2020. In the last 5
    years the PRC has placed over 350 satellites into orbit.
        The PLA owns and operates about half of the PRC's ISR systems,
    which support monitoring and tracking of U.S. and allied forces
    worldwide, especially throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Moreover, the
    PLA is making improvements to existing systems, including space launch
    vehicles and satellite navigation constellations. To that end, China's
    Beidou navigation system is now globally operational. Operated
    collectively, these capabilities provide their military the ability to
    command and control their forces globally, enhance their situational
    awareness, and monitor and track force movements.
        The PRC has developed robust and capable space services, including
    space-based ISR. Today, the PRC's ISR satellites are capable of
    providing electro-optical and synthetic aperture radar imagery, as well
    as electronic intelligence and signals intelligence data. From
    September 2020 to September 2021, China placed 26 Yaogan-series Earth
    observation satellites into orbit, bringing the number of orbiting
    Yaogan-series satellites to 84. Beijing claims the Yaogan-series
    satellites are for remote sensing and electromagnetic environment
    detection services; however, these satellites could also be used for
    reconnaissance.
        The PRC actively seeks space superiority through space attack
    systems and is developing a broad complement of jamming and cyberspace
    capabilities, directed energy weapons, on-orbit capabilities, and DA-
    ASAT missiles that can achieve a range of effects. PLA analysis of U.S.
    and allied military operations states that ``destroying or capturing
    satellites and other sensors'' would make it difficult for the PRC's
    opponent to use precision guided weapons. Moreover, PLA writings on
    doctrine and strategy suggest that reconnaissance, communications,
    navigation, and early warning satellites could be among the targets to
    attack, a strategy designed to ``blind and deafen the enemy.'' Notable
    PRC counterspace programs include their DA-ASAT. In 2021, the PRC
    continued development and testing activities to advance the DN-1 and
    DN-2 DA-ASAT weapons to further refine their space attack capabilities.
    Other potential counterspace capabilities include Shijian-17 and
    Shijian-21, which are satellites with robotic arm technology. Space-
    based robotic arm technology could be used in a future system for
    grappling and disabling other satellites. The PRC also has multiple
    ground-based laser systems of varying power levels that could blind or
    irreversibly damage satellites. On July 16, 2021, the PRC conducted a
    suborbital test of a reusable space vehicle that can land in a similar
    fashion as an airplane. The PRC's space plane could carry a payload
    designed to disable or capture a satellite while in orbit. In October
    2021, the PRC launched the SJ-21, which the PRC Ministry of Defense
    described as a space debris mitigation technology, but its dual-use
    capability could have military applications.
    Russia seeks to degrade U.S. space capabilities in order to prevail in
            future conflicts
        Russia is an advanced and persistent threat to the United States,
    and its military is designed to maintain Russia's influence over the
    states within its sphere of theater and strategic influence. In 2021,
    Russia conducted a kinetic, DA-ASAT weapons test, exhibiting unsafe and
    irresponsible behavior in space. Further emphasizing our need for
    adequate space domain awareness capabilities, the November 15, 2021
    Russian DA-ASAT missile demonstration created nearly 1500 additional
    pieces of trackable space debris we must now monitor to ensure the safe
    operation of satellites and the ISS in that orbital regime. In
    partnership with the other combatant commands, their assigned component
    commands, the services (U.S. Army, U.S. Navy), and the Missile Defense
    Agency, USSPACECOM was able to rapidly characterize the nature and
    extent of the Russian DA-ASAT weapon and notify civil and commercial
    partners via standing reporting agreements for the safety of human life
    and satellites in low earth orbit. After admitting to the test, Russia
    received condemnation from the United States and our allies and
    partners in the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the
    Republic of Korea, Japan, the North Atlantic Council, the European
    Union, and the European Space Agency.
        Russia believes space is integral to winning modern wars, and it
    consequently reorganized the Russian 15th Aero Force in 2015 to
    incorporate space operations and counterspace capabilities. This new
    force is the Russian military command that conducts space launches and
    operates the ballistic missile early warning system, the satellite
    control network, and the space surveillance network. Russia's defense
    minister stated that the change was prompted ``by a shift in the center
    of gravity . . . toward aerospace sphere'' and to counter the U.S.
    Conventional Prompt Strike doctrine. Moscow concluded that gaining and
    maintaining space superiority has a decisive effect on the outcome of
    future conflicts and is developing space attack systems to hold U.S.
    and allied space assets at risk.
        Russia considers the U.S.'s dependency on space that enables our
    military and economic power as an exploitable vulnerability. As a
    result, Moscow has developed a suite of counterspace capabilities
    including electronic warfare and directed energy weapons that can deny,
    degrade, and disrupt communications, navigation, and space-based ISR.
    These counterspace capabilities enable Russia to deny, damage, and
    defeat U.S. space-based systems in order to reduce U.S. military
    effectiveness and control conflict escalation if deterrence fails.
    Russia has several ground-based, low-power lasers designed to blind
    U.S. missile warning and imagery satellites temporarily, as well as
    high-power lasers developed to damage other U.S. satellites
    permanently.
    PRC-Russia Space Cooperation
        The PRC and Russia rapidly increased their space cooperation
    throughout 2021. In March, the PRC and Russia signed a memorandum of
    understanding to coordinate their moon exploration programs within the
    framework of a future PRC-Russian-led International Lunar Research
    Station. According to the China National Space Administration, the
    facility is intended for ``multi-discipline and multipurpose scientific
    research activities, including exploration and use of the moon, moon-
    based observation, fundamental research experiments, and technology
    verification with the capability of long-term, unmanned operation with
    the prospect of subsequent human presence.''
        Russia possesses valuable experience from previous space program
    missions and operations. However, shortfalls in funding, qualified
    personnel, and other resource inadequacies have hampered continued
    Russian progress. Meanwhile, Beijing has a space program with ample
    financial and personnel resources, but lacks Russia's decades of
    operational space experience. Beijing and Moscow might try to combine
    their respective strengths on joint projects in some areas, especially
    as their relations with Western space partners wane and their common
    aversion of the United States drives them together. Consequently, while
    the PRC and Russia cooperate, the U.S. must continue to work with our
    allies and partners to protect our collective interests in space
    throughout all phases of strategic competition.
                 building and maintaining competitive advantage
    Improving the Ability to Provide Domain Safety, Security, and
            Sustainability
        The PRC and Russia recognize the advantages afforded by our space
    systems and seek to change the dynamic by developing or refining their
    own space and counterspace capabilities. USSPACECOM is entrusted to
    protect and defend our nation's most critical space assets. The UCP
    assigns me the responsibility to ``protect and defend U.S. and, as
    directed, allied, partner, and critical commercial space operational
    capabilities.'' Executing this responsibility requires acknowledging
    the space operating environment changed and that we cannot operate as
    in the past. Thus, in partnership with the Missile Defense Agency and
    the other combatant commands and services, USSPACECOM is actively
    integrating non-traditional sensors such as the Army-Navy Transportable
    Radar Surveillance-2, Sea-Based X-Band Radar, and Aegis radar platforms
    under our Global Sensor Management umbrella to provide improved domain
    awareness. With respect to a potential conflict in space, the strongest
    tool for deterrence is our competitors' knowledge that the U.S.
    possesses both the means and resolve to protect and defend its space
    systems. A key component of reaching FOC for USSPACECOM is maturing
    Combined and Joint force solutions and appropriately posturing scalable
    combat capabilities to detect, attribute and respond to threats to
    U.S., allied, and partner space systems. This further enables a
    credible deterrence posture to preserve the full-range of options for
    the President and guarantee U.S. and allied freedom to operate in
    space.
        Non-kinetic, reversible solutions--to include space electronic
    warfare and cyberspace capabilities are critical in achieving space
    superiority and controlling conflict escalations. They directly affect
    our ability to deter malign behavior, and to complicate our
    competitors' ability to threaten our space assets. Of particular
    importance, non-kinetic engagements do not create debris. Layered, non-
    kinetic effects are a critical force multiplier that directly affect
    the success of joint and allied forces.
        Scalable joint warfighting options--and the underlying policies
    that allow for the strategic messaging of these capabilities--are
    inherent across the competition spectrum. USSPACECOM in collaboration
    with our mission partners, continues to pursue increased resources and
    capabilities to provide space domain awareness for warning, assessment,
    and attribution; to provide space domain environmental monitoring,
    missile warning and tracking; and to protect and defend U.S., allied,
    partnered, and commercial space capabilities. In full compliance with
    our international legal obligations and commitments, the U.S. needs to
    develop and field resilient capabilities necessary to shape the
    strategic environment and advance our ability to protect and defend our
    nation. Such capabilities are essential to accomplishing the full range
    of my UCP responsibilities effectively, from deterring conflict to
    winning that conflict if necessary.
    Maintenance and Hardening of Critical Infrastructure
        Our Area of Responsibility (AoR) begins 100km above the surface of
    the earth, and extends outward from the planet indefinitely. Our
    operating domain, however, extends around the globe itself, and
    encompasses all three elements of our space systems: the on-orbit
    asset, the link, and the ground segment. Of particular concern is our
    ground segment. Our satellites cannot fly and provide mission critical
    information to our joint forces without fully-operational mission
    control and relay stations on the ground. Similarly, our Missile
    Warning mission relies heavily on ground-based radar systems. None of
    these missions would be possible without the talent our people bring
    along with proper facilities and infrastructure.
        The facilities and infrastructure supporting USSPACECOM assets were
    not built when the command stood up; they were inherited, with many of
    the facilities and infrastructure reaching ages well beyond 60 years.
    It is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain the necessary power,
    heating, and cooling for our assets, let alone the resiliency,
    redundancy, survivability, and endurance required for our critical
    space missions. I am thankful for Congress's continued support to
    ensure these facilities can evolve to support USSPACECOM's no-fail
    missions.
        Commercial space systems are an essential component of U.S.
    critical infrastructure and vital to our national security. USSPACECOM,
    through the Department of Defense, will work with interagency partners
    and commercial space system stakeholders through the Critical
    Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council framework to improve the
    security, resilience, and cybersecurity of commercial space systems.
    Cyber Integration
        Digital superiority ensures that USSPACECOM and its subordinate
    components have resilient, reliable, and secure systems to command and
    control its forces worldwide, throughout all phases of conflict and in
    all domains. Countries like the PRC and Russia continually advance
    their agendas by launching persistent cyberspace attacks against both
    government resources and our defense industrial base. There is no space
    operation that does not rely on cyberspace. These two domains are
    inseparably linked - a failure with cybersecurity will almost certainly
    result in a failure in space. Therefore, current and future
    cybersecurity efforts must have the ability to secure and defend both
    our intellectual property and the products of those advancements--
    namely space mission systems. As a result, cybersecurity funding is
    critical to maintaining dominance, not only in the space domain, but
    all domains.
        We must maintain laser focus on implementing ``zero trust
    architecture,'' to shift toward a more comprehensive IT security model
    allowing us to restrict access controls to networks, applications, and
    environments without sacrificing mission capability and performance. It
    will also allow us to capitalize on industry advancements in ML/AI to
    cyber-harden current and future systems. This hardening will improve
    our cyberspace - secure and defend posture - which will increase our
    decision-making speed against time-sensitive asymmetric threats across
    all domains. Moreover, our close coordination with, and the coherence,
    speed, and agility of National Security Agency/U.S. Cyber Command
    integration is critical to our ability to operate freely in space. To
    facilitate this, I embedded a Joint Integrated Space Team (JIST) at
    U.S. Cyber Command to help synchronize our planning efforts. Future
    years will require a steadfast resourcing approach to accomplish these
    objectives in order to ensure the U.S. can compete and mitigate
    evolving and expanding cybersecurity threats posed by our competitors.
        Maintaining digital superiority is an enormous part of our ability
    to outthink and outmaneuver our adversaries, and if necessary, prevail
    through sustained & comprehensive military space power. To this end, we
    optimized the command to leverage our architecture, data streams, and
    ML/AI applications fully. We aligned our information-related
    capabilities, with our Joint Cyber Center to more efficiently and
    effectively provide the command with information assurance while also
    enabling our efforts to achieve and sustain information advantage
    throughout the continuum of competition. As part of our internal
    realignment, we established a Data Council that synchronizes the
    Command's data enterprise to focus our requirements, prioritize data as
    a strategic asset, in order for the Command to achieve decision
    advantage. By harnessing current and emerging technologies, leveraging
    commercial innovations, and applying interoperable and secure data, we
    created an integrated platform for success. Continuous innovation for
    competitive advantage and investing in game-changing technologies
    enables both digital and space superiority.
    Cyber Resources
        USSPACECOM is pursuing a number of initiatives centered on
    integrative platforms that maximize artificial intelligence, modeling,
    and simulation to inform space domain awareness, planning development
    and assessments, requirements development and leadership support. In
    short, this entails achieving decision dominance for digital
    superiority and establishing a campaign analysis capability to inform
    operations, planning, and requirements. Specifically, through this
    modeling and simulation initiative, the Command will develop a cutting-
    edge lab environment to identify, analyze, and assess capabilities and
    requirements informing key warfighting processes and decisions through
    digital engineering tools. These tools will include visualization,
    analysis model management, model interoperability, workflow,
    collaboration, and customization of modeling techniques to help execute
    the Command's unified command plan responsibilities. To help reach FOC
    for this capability, USSPACECOM needs an integrated platform with fully
    trained modeling, simulation, and analysis personnel, with in-place
    hardware and software tools, with resources required to provide high
    performance computing across all classification levels. This lab will
    help USSPACECOM perform unbiased and timely assessments.
    Exercises
        USSPACECOM has successfully demonstrated our capabilities and
    processes through coalition-integrated global exercises such as GLOBAL
    LIGHTNING 21 and PACIFIC SENTRY 21. We do this through a multi-service,
    multi-domain, and globally integrated approach to national security
    objectives, nested within the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's
    Joint All-Domain operations directive.
        In 2022 and 2023, we will move from baselining the Joint Force's
    understanding of space capabilities to achieving a credible, globally-
    integrated deterrence posture for joint and combined space operations
    appropriate to contend with space threats that are growing in both
    scope and lethality. In particular, USSPACECOM will conduct exercises
    that integrate with coalition partners, multiple combatant commands,
    and the Joint force. Examples of these exercises include SPACE THUNDER
    22, SPACE LIGHTNING 22 and SPACE CHALLENGE 22. In these exercises we
    will train with our Joint force, allies, and partners to protect and
    defend our space assets while providing effects in, from, and to space.
    Additionally in these exercises, USSPACECOM and its components will
    continue to develop and test capabilities to protect and defend on-
    orbit assets and provide support to terrestrial forces. In future
    exercises, USSPACECOM will continue to integrate holistically across
    regions and domains to protect and defend U.S. and allied space
    interests globally.
    Personnel
        USSPACECOM is a joint organization comprised of representatives
    from all military branches, Active and Reserve, the National Guard,
    Government civilians, and contractors. Currently, we have 45 percent of
    our authorized end strength in place, augmented by 50 Reserve and Guard
    personnel, and a 300-person contractor force to fill in the skill and
    capacity gaps.
    Facilities
        As our workforce grows, so too do our requirements for dedicated
    facilities capable of hosting our command and control suites while
    providing the required level of physical and cyber security to protect
    our personnel and mission. I am proud to tell you that over the past
    year we have made significant progress thanks to strong Congressional
    support. Specifically, Combined Force Space Component Command moved
    into their new headquarters at Vandenberg Space Force Base. We will
    break ground on the new Combined Space Operations Facility at Schriever
    Space Force Base which will house the Joint Task Force Space Defense
    and the National Space Defense Center. Numerous other efforts to
    renovate and provide modernized facilities to the women and men of US
    Space Command have also been accomplished. I look forward to your
    continued steadfast support as progress continues on the Combined Space
    Operations Facility over the coming years.
               strengthen relationships and attract new partners
    USSPACECOM's Role in Developing Tenets of Responsible Behavior in Space
        Interim National Security Strategy guidance calls for the U.S. to
    lead ``in promoting shared norms and forge new agreements on . . .
    space.'' As the United States Space Priorities Framework states, ``As
    space activities evolve, the norms, rules, and principles that guide
    outer space activities also must evolve. The United States will lead in
    the responsible, peaceful, and sustainable exploration and use of outer
    space.''
        In this regard, U.S. national security space operations will
    continue to comply with applicable international law and demonstrate
    leadership in both the responsible use of space and stewardship of the
    space environment. To accomplish this, USSPACECOM is also working with
    key stakeholders across the Department of Defense to develop specific
    DoD behaviors that further define the Secretary of Defense's five
    Tenets of Responsible Behavior in Space. The intent of these behaviors
    is that all Department of Defense space operators will follow them
    under normal circumstances and throughout competition in order to
    enhance the security, safety, stability, and long-term sustainability
    of the space domain and reduce the risk of miscalculation and
    escalation.
        USSPACECOM's efforts will enable Department leadership to inform
    broader U.S. positions regarding specific actions in space for upcoming
    interagency, commercial, and international engagements. As the
    Secretary of Defense has stated, ``it is incumbent on the Department of
    Defense to continue space leadership through demonstrating and
    acknowledging responsible behavior in space.''
    USSPACECOM is strengthening alliances and attracting new partners,
            while improving coalition capabilities and space domain
            awareness
        Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships provide a critical
    asymmetric advantage that our adversaries cannot match, contributing to
    our collective space security. Our partners bolster U.S. operational
    reach and increase our strategic flexibility in all domains.
    USSPACECOM's alliances and partnerships are a key strategic edge in the
    competitive environment of space. Strengthening and expanding our
    relationships into mature space defense partnerships allows for burden-
    sharing that can decrease costs, accelerate coalition development,
    increase information sharing, and leverage partner capabilities to
    maintain a safe, secure, and sustainable space environment. To this
    end, we continue to expand our network of partner nations,
    international organizations, and commercial entities that bring
    situational awareness, mutual support, and technological innovation to
    the space enterprise. In the past year alone, we welcomed a General
    Officer from the United Kingdom as our Deputy Director of Strategy,
    Plans, and Policy, and added liaison officers from both France and the
    United Kingdom, and we have plans for more from several allied nations.
    Moreover, our allies and partners continue to prioritize the space
    domain, exemplified by both Germany and the United Kingdom establishing
    their own Space Commands in 2021.
        Throughout 2021, USSPACECOM expanded space related data sharing
    agreements, including new partnerships with Colombia, Greece, and
    Ukraine. To date, USSPACECOM has agreements with 30 nations and two
    intergovernmental organizations. Last year, I also met with the Indian
    Chief of Defense and Chief of Defense Staff to discuss our relationship
    on space operations, exercises, and information sharing. Additionally,
    USSPACECOM established a security cooperation program that assists
    partner nations in developing space capabilities and capacities.
    Coordination between USSOUTHCOM and USSPACECOM delivered tangible
    growth and development of the Brazilian, Chilean, Colombian, and
    Peruvian military space capabilities and produced strategic
    opportunities for the United States to counter problematic PRC
    influence and access in Latin America. USSPACECOM also reinforced and
    expanded partnerships through direct cooperation with more than 20
    international partners through the Global Sentinel campaign series.
    Global Sentinel improves multinational collaboration in the domain to
    support shared space domain awareness, and posture core international
    space operations expertise for future combined missions.
        Lastly, through the Command's Defense Personnel Exchange Program,
    we expanded agreements to support exchange and liaison personnel
    assignments with Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan and United
    Kingdom.
    Global Integration with other combatant commands
        USSPACECOM continues to advance space integration with the other
    combatant commands and establish normalized relationships to
    coordinate, integrate, and synchronize operations extending beyond
    earthbound geographic areas of responsibility. To facilitate
    cooperation, interoperability, and unity of effort, USSPACECOM created
    Joint Integrated Space Teams (JIST) comprised of space professionals
    and intelligence planners working within every combatant command
    headquarters. These teams have evolved from a plans-focused effort to
    include operational integration, intelligence collaboration, and
    exercise support. These multi-functional JISTs provide space expertise
    to each combatant command's campaign plan and operation plans
    development, bolster security cooperation with space engagement
    activities, and integrate space capabilities to strengthen exercise
    planning activities. Additionally, JISTs coordinate, integrate, and de-
    conflict global space operations in direct support of each combatant
    commander. To solidify this integration further, we also engaged in
    Warfighter Talks with United States Cyber Command and United States
    Space Force in 2021.
         integrating commercial interagency, and academic organizations
        USSPACECOM continues to support NASA's Commercial Crew Program for
    contingency rescue operations for crewed flights to and from the
    International Space Station as part of our Human Space Flight Support
    role. USSPACECOM is committed to assuring the safe exploration of space
    and is supporting NASA's planned lunar missions by providing crew and
    spacecraft recovery for the upcoming Artemis program and associated
    training events. To that end, USSPACECOM's space domain awareness
    capabilities also help support NASA's planetary defense mission to
    ensure we maintain space as a source of American innovation and
    opportunity.
        USSPACECOM also has partnerships with four academic institutions
    and over 100 commercial satellite owners, operators, and service
    providers. By providing advanced information and services to space-
    faring partners, we display American leadership in the space domain,
    promote transparency in the responsible and professional use of space,
    and support the eventual transition of civil and commercial spaceflight
    safety services to the Department of Commerce.
        To address new challenges for space traffic coordination, from
    proliferated low earth orbit mega-constellations to intentional debris-
    causing events, we fully support the Department of Commerce's immediate
    establishment of a space traffic management capability. This includes
    space situational awareness - understanding the proximity of space
    objects to other satellites, and warning of potential conjunctions.
    This partnership with Commerce will allow USSPACECOM to focus on the
    inherently military functions of our space domain awareness mission,
    especially characterizing objects and actions on orbit to identify
    potential threats.
        Additionally, the Command must improve its ability to tap into
    research and development, both through our government resources and our
    FFRDC partners in particular. Ongoing efforts within the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense Research and Engineering modernization strategies
    as well as work within the service laboratories, the Space Development
    Agency, Missile Defense Agency, Strategic Capability Office, Rapid
    Capability Offices, NASA, National Laboratories, and many others are
    absolutely essential to meet our critical challenges in maintaining our
    technological lead. We need to increase collaboration with the domestic
    and international commercial space industry in order to leverage their
    technological advancements, entrepreneurial innovation and investments
    to enable new and emerging capabilities at a decreased cost and an
    accelerated pace to counter threats to U.S., ally, and partner
    capabilities. We also need to improve our ability to develop rapid
    commercial space launch capabilities from multiple locations and
    integrate commercial space capabilities that provide both near and far-
    term advantages.
                                   conclusion
        USSPACECOM preserves U.S. freedom of action and provides the
    National Command Authority strategic options in the increasingly
    competitive space domain. The Command strives to attain FOC as soon as
    possible and continues to accelerate the pace of its operations to
    deter aggression; defeat adversaries; deliver space power; and defend
    U.S., allied, and partner interests. To do so, we must begin with the
    first task of increasing our space domain awareness, and request
    Congress's support to ensure we have the best possible capabilities to
    sense and evaluate the critical and increasingly complicated space
    environment. The Command achieved IOC last year, and has developed our
    roadmap and strategies for getting to FOC, deepening our relationships,
    and continuing to provide the most advanced space capabilities in the
    world. On behalf of the most critical asset in our command, the
    soldiers, marines, sailors, airmen, guardians, civilians, and families
    of USSPACECOM, thank you for your support in our mission to conduct
    operations in, from, and to space in order to ensure there is never a
    day without space.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Dickinson, and
    Admiral Richard, I concur with your assessment that we should
    reserve questions regarding Ukraine and Russia to the closed
    session, so I will do that.
        But let me begin with a question regarding the
    modernization of the triad and also the capabilities at the
    National Nuclear Security Administration. You have said in the
    past that we are at a point of no return, so can you please
    elaborate a bit, particularly with respect to Minuteman-III
    ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missile] and the pit
    production capability at NNSA [National Nuclear Security
    Administration].
        Admiral Richard. Chairman, one, I am pleased to report,
    based on what services and agencies are reporting, that the
    overall recapitalization of the triad is on track. No margin is
    left, but right now all of those programs are proceeding the
    way that is necessary for them to deliver capability on time to
    meet my requirements.
        The weapons complex is a different story, and we have
    crossed one of those points of no return that I referred to
    previously in that we now know we will not get 80 pits per year
    by 2030, as is statutorily required, and even unlimited money
    at this point will not buy that back.
        So there is active work underway inside the Nuclear Weapons
    Council to understand exactly how much of a delay we are going
    to have, how much of it can be addressed by funding. The
    fundamental question we have to answer to Congress is to
    certify NNSA's budget.
        I want to make another point here, which is we are not
    mitigating this problem. We have shot all the mitigation to get
    us to this point. It is the fourth time the Nation has tried to
    recapitalize its pit production infrastructure. Now the
    question becomes how much damage have we done and what are the
    consequences of that, and we are working to better understand
    that, sir.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral. Also, we are
    working on a Nuclear Posture Review. I know you are deeply
    involved that. A key element is our declaratory policy, what is
    our intention in terms of use, in terms of our strategy. What
    is your assessment of our extended deterrence commitment to our
    allies, particularly in light of current hostilities, and any
    perception of changes in the declaratory policy?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, what I will offer is that I have
    testified to this committee and others as to my recommendations
    with regard to possible changes to declaratory policy. Those
    have not changed. That was a part of my input into the Nuclear
    Posture Review. As you know, that ultimately will be decided by
    the President.
        We received very clear feedback from the allies in terms of
    their opinion and the harmful effects on extended deterrence
    and assurance that changes would have. That is one factor of
    many to be considered.
        I do think right now we are getting a very vivid example,
    real-world, of the importance of extended deterrence and
    assurance, that if we want our allies to assist us in standing
    up to aggression we have to provide that assurance to them such
    that they are in a position go after our mutual goals.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Admiral.
        General Dickinson, in some respects you have been promoted
    to Sensor Command as well as Space Command, because one of your
    first major tasks is to link sensors both in space, on the
    earth, and below the seas. Can you give us an idea of what it
    will take to perform this integration and where you might be
    now?
        General Dickinson. Thank you, Chairman. So we have made a
    lot of progress over the last 2, 2\1/2\ years with identifying
    and incorporating sensors that we traditionally did not use for
    space domain awareness, missile warning, or missile defense in
    the global perspective. We have really identified radars such
    as TPY-2s around the world as well as BMD [ballistic missile
    defense], ships afloat, and Aegis Ashore sites as well. Our
    goal is to link these sensors together from a terrestrial
    perspective.
        We add to those. We add the UEWRs [Upgraded Early Warning
    Radar] that we have traditionally used for NC3 [Nuclear
    Command, Control & Communications] around the world for early
    warning and brought all those terrestrial capabilities to bear,
    if you will, in terms of understanding what we see in the space
    domain.
        In addition to that, we are linking our space-based assets
    in addition to that, bringing them into a common operating
    picture. We still have work to be done with regards to that,
    but we have made some good progress over the last 2 years, 2\1/
    2\ years, and we are working towards that, the ultimate piece,
    where we have one operating picture that has those sensors
    fused into it. That really kind of pulls in some of the work
    that the Department of the Air Force is doing with JADC2 and
    some of those ABMS [Advanced Battlefield Management System]
    efforts that are going on right now.
        As you can imagine, Chairman, that has a massive data
    burden, if you will, that has to be properly synthesized,
    properly organized, making sure that it is cyber protected so
    that you have a database and you have information that is
    authoritative and available at the speed of relevance.
        Chairman Reed. The backbone of this is constant,
    uninterrupted, encrypted communication between all your assets.
    Is that one way to look at it?
        General Dickinson. That is one way to look at it, yes,
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Are we getting there?
        General Dickinson. We are getting there. We are getting
    there, and like I said, those are sensors, many of those
    sensors, TPY-2s, BMD, Aegis BMD ships, those sensors
    traditionally were not required or expected to have a
    capability looking up in the space domain, but what we are
    finding out is those exquisite radars do have capability. What
    capability we need to add to that we are identifying those gaps
    in requirements now at U.S. Space Command, and then putting
    that demand signal back onto those specific assets.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
        Senator Wicker, please.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
    General Dickinson and Admiral Richard, thank you very much for
    your service on a very, very vital part of our national defense
    strategy.
        Admiral Richard, the United States is currently engaged in
    negotiations with Iran on the Iran nuclear deal. Can you tell
    me, are you being consulted about those negotiations?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, I am not, and that is
    appropriate. My forces do not play a role in terms of where
    that treaty and our overall desire to avoid Iran from getting a
    nuclear weapon.
        Senator Wicker. So your experience in making our nuclear
    policy work is not deemed important to those who are
    negotiating how we go forward with Iran?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, as you know I do not enter into
    treaties or agreements. That is a Department of State function.
    What I do is provide technical expertise. For example, I had my
    deputy commander as a part of the New START negotiation team so
    that that team had immediate access to any operational
    implications of what they were doing. While I am certainly
    available to do the same thing for those negotiations,
    currently that is not needed.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. Well, I may not get an answer to this
    question but it is a question that is on the minds of Americans
    today. We are told, with relative certainty, that the talks are
    going on and that Russia is a part of the nuclear discussions
    between the United States and Iran about reentering this
    nuclear deal.
        Let me just say, Russia is led by the dictatorship and the
    kleptocracy of Vladimir Putin, a serial international war
    criminal. It is astonishing to me that they would be anywhere
    near the negotiating room in a process that might lead us to
    making concessions to Iran that we would not otherwise have
    made. You probably do not want to comment on that, I guess,
    Admiral.
        Admiral Richard. Senator, what I would look forward to
    commenting in the closed session, is an overall assessment of
    threats to the Nation and how we are going to defend and deter
    against those.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. Let me leave it at that, but I would
    simply say, Mr. Chairman, and to my colleagues and to my fellow
    Americans that it is highly troubling, I think to most
    Americans, that Vladimir Putin would have anything at all to
    say about any decision the United States would make about what
    is best for our people and our national security, considering
    the fact that he is, without a doubt, a serial war criminal.
        The distinguished ranking member of this committee, Mr.
    Chairman, has suggested a question or two, which I would like
    to submit on his behalf.
        Russia has a nuclear arsenal larger and more modern than
    the United States, and currently threatened nuclear escalation
    during the invasion of Ukraine. Admiral Richard, we have heard
    for a long time how critical it is that we rebuild our Nation's
    nuclear deterrent, but we are still years away from fielding
    any new systems. How important is it that we accelerate the
    U.S. nuclear modernization plan as quickly as possible?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, I would offer three points on
    that, and again can go into more detail in the closed session.
    It is very clear that the absolute minimum that we need to do
    is to recapitalize the triad, the nuclear command and control,
    and the nuclear weapons complex.
        But there are two other questions we need to be asking
    ourselves along the way with that. The threats are changing in
    a way that we have not seen in 30 years. We do not know the
    endpoints of where either of those other two are going, either
    in capability or capacity. We are just now starting to work out
    what three-party stability looks like, what three-party
    deterrence dynamics works out.
        On top of that, we are learning a number of lessons in real
    time on how actual crisis deterrence works. It is different
    from steady-state deterrence that most of us have experience
    in.
        Those two questions, I think, need to be asked much more
    frequently than we have needed to in the past, followed with
    what is the capability, capacity, and posture we require from
    our strategic forces moving forward.
        Senator Wicker. Mr. Chairman, if you would indulge me for
    another moment with regard to a question that the ranking
    member has asked repeatedly and which deserves to be asked
    today.
        Admiral Richard, you have testified that you do not believe
    it is in the national interest of the United States to change
    our policy with regard to no-first-use or sole purpose nuclear
    declaratory policy. Would you explain why that has been, and is
    it still your position?
        Admiral Richard. Well, Senator, I have testified to that
    and my position is unchanged. That, of course, will be decided
    along with a number of other factors and we will see what the
    answer is in the Nuclear Posture Review. But fundamentally I
    can go into a lot longer answer, but is, one, your adversaries
    will not believe you so it does not enhance deterrence in any
    way, but your allies will believe you and it is highly
    corrosive to your extended deterrence and assurance
    commitments.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
        Senator Gillibrand, please.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General
    Dickinson, I am concerned that our lack of international
    agreements barring conventional weapons in space has led to a
    space arms race that threatens our civil and commercial systems
    in space. How much of a role is SPACECOM playing in developing
    international norms about the use of weapons in space?
        General Dickinson. Thank you, Senator, for the question. In
    my job as the SPACECOM Commander I work very closely with the
    Department of Defense, and in particular the policy folks in
    the Department of Defense in terms of working through those
    types of issues. What I have been charged to do, by the
    Secretary of Defense back in July, was he gave me a memo that
    outlined the five tenets of responsible behavior for the
    Department of Defense. Right now we are working through how we
    implement that within the department.
        But to your point is that with those tenets become our base
    plate, if you will, that we talk with the Department of
    Defense, and then subsequently they would start talking with
    Department of State.
        So we have kind of an indirect role that we start kind of
    from the combatant command up through the department in that
    regard. But those tenets of responsible behavior, there are
    five of them, and I think they are very good in terms of
    outlining what we would expect not only for the Department of
    Defense in terms of responsible behavior but for our allies and
    partners. We have had a lot of good discussions on that in
    several different forms.
        Senator Gillibrand. Given the lack of codified norms in
    space, what, in your view, constitutes an armed attack in the
    domain and how would you deal with a proportionate response?
        General Dickinson. Well, Senator, I would say that, you
    know, these tenets, I think, outline kind of what we would
    think as responsible behavior in space, and as we look through
    that, how do we make sure that we are able to understand that.
    I think the first thing we have to look at is how well can we
    understand what is happening in the space domain.
        As I mentioned in my opening remarks, my number one
    priority for the command, or top priorities is to be able to
    increase my space domain awareness so I can interpret and
    understand what those norms of behavior or those tenets are in
    space.
        Senator Gillibrand. The ``valley of death'' in acquisition
    references the transition from innovative, small-scale projects
    to full-scale funded programs, which is often stunted with
    budget challenges, risk mitigation, and integration problems
    leading to immense waste. Innovative technology and the ability
    to quickly field the warfighter in space is critical to
    matching China's competencies.
        In your view, is the use of other transaction agreements or
    OTAs by the DOD being effectively implemented, and do we need
    more emphasis on non-Federal acquisition regulation contracting
    solutions?
        General Dickinson. So Senator, in my role right now I am a
    customer, if you will, for the United States Space Force and
    some other agencies, and I would categorize myself as a
    demanding customer. I think we have to move very quickly in
    terms of building new and better capabilities for the space
    domain. I know that the Space Force and the Department of the
    Air Force are looking right now in terms of how do they
    streamline those processes in order to deliver capabilities to
    me on a much faster timeline.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Admiral Richard, JADC2, over
    the past several years DOD has worked on developing JADC2
    architecture to speed sensor to shooter responses and integrate
    communications across the services. In your view, how should
    DOD prioritize competing communications requirements for its
    future work, and what role, if any, will artificial
    intelligence play in future non-nuclear command and control
    decision-making systems?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, I would like to point out that,
    one, I am responsible for nuclear command and control from an
    operations requirements and systems integration piece, and in
    that responsibility I am very familiar with what JADC2 is doing
    in conventional command and control, and in fact was very
    pleased that a subset of what JADC2 is doing is for nuclear
    command and control. The two systems have to be overlapped to a
    great extent, so that we can have integration.
        So we are headed in the right path to make sure we take
    full advantage of the investments we are making in conventional
    command and control, while recognizing that certain portions of
    nuclear command and control have to serve at a higher standard
    than we ask regular command and control, and making sure we
    identify those and meet those requirements.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Gillibrand.
        Senator Tuberville, please.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for
    being here today with all the problems going on.
        General Dickinson, Space Command is designated a
    geopolitical command. How do you plan to synchronize efforts
    with other geographic commands in a time of conflict? I mean, I
    am sure you have worked on that?
        General Dickinson. Thank you, Senator. Absolutely. We do
    that every day. In particular, we have exercised it through
    many different exercises over the last couple of years. I think
    we have had five major exercises.
        But to your point, we do that each and every day, and the
    way we do that is when the U.S. Space Command was stood up in
    2019, we identified a gap, if you will, within each of the
    combatant commands in terms of space expertise. One of the
    first things we did as we stood up was we immediately started
    putting what we call joint integrated space teams, or JISTs,
    within each of the combatant commands, and we kind of started
    that with INDOPACOM, EUCOM, CENTCOM, and we are working through
    the other 10 combatant commands now.
        But these elements, at the beginning we thought would have
    a planning-only function within these commands. What we found
    out, through day-to-day operations and through exercises and
    real-world events, is that it is more than just planning. It is
    planning. It is operations. It is intelligence. It is the
    integration of those capabilities within each of the combatant
    commands that provides that regional combatant commander space
    expertise and the ability to leverage the space domain in order
    to meet their requirements for their either day-to-day
    operations or their op plans.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Pretty complex, especially
    being new.
        Admiral, last year you said, quote, ``For the first time in
    history the Nation is facing two potential strategic peer,
    nuclear-capable adversaries at the same time.'' But our nuclear
    posture, my understanding, has been not about two threats. So
    in your best military advice, should the U.S. consider changes
    to the size of its nuclear force in order to account for having
    now two peer threats?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, first, I have already repostured
    it, and I will be happy to give you some details of what we
    have done in the closed session. The answer is yes. We do not
    necessarily have to match weapon for weapon, right. The key is
    do you have enough capability to execute your strategy. But it
    is clear what we have today is the absolute minimum, and we are
    going to have to ask ourselves what additional capability,
    capacity, and posture do we need to do, based on where the
    threat is going. It is not all strategic. There is a
    significant class of theater threats that we are going to have
    to rethink potentially how we deter that.
        You have to deter them all the time. I do not get the
    luxury of having a priority to one and lesser to the other. You
    have to do them all at the same time. We are learning a number
    of lessons in crisis dynamics, because we have had so few times
    in our history we have been in that, that those will need to be
    applied too, sir.
        Senator Tuberville. How does the hypersonic missile, now
    that we are seeing online, how does that change us in terms of
    your thoughts on the time frame of a threat, how quick we have
    to respond?
        Admiral Richard. I look at hypersonics in two ways. One is
    the threat that it presents to us, and that fundamentally is a
    warning problem. In fact, the chairman mentioned seams opening
    up with the establishment of Space Command. Actually, it has
    worked the exact opposite of that. We mentioned the sensor
    commander, which is what I like to call it. Technically in DOD
    it is sensor manager, but sensor commander sounds better.
        The way Jim is integrating across missile defense, missile
    warning, and space situational awareness, he is producing a
    better outcome than what we had in the past, and I am actually
    getting a better service because of his efforts in that. That
    is defensive.
        Offensive, I will be ready to put online the first day any
    service makes it available a hypersonic capability. I have work
    for it right now. We have had requirements dating back to 2016
    and earlier, and I will put that to good use the first day any
    service makes it available in defense of the Nation.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Now that we do have
    hypersonics, just from my information, I am sure were changing
    protocol for our President, because it takes a pretty good
    while to get all the factors done to get to a point where a
    President can make a decision. Please tell me we are changing
    those protocols to answer a first attack.
        Admiral Richard. Senator, one, I think it will be important
    that as a hypersonic capability comes into the Department of
    Defense that we not label it as strategic or theater or
    tactical. We already have examples of platform. My bombers are
    an example. I can use it strategically down one command and
    control decision path that you talked about. I can use them
    conventionally down another. I can give them to a geographic
    combatant commander for that commander's use. I think we are
    going to want an equivalent, flexible, command and control
    structure for hypersonics.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville.
        Senator King, please.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before beginning my
    questions I wanted to respond to Senator Wicker. We have a
    national interest in Iran not obtaining a nuclear weapon.
    Russia has a national interest in Iran not obtaining a nuclear
    weapon. If, in this particular case, we have an identity of
    interest it would seem to me to make sense to have both parties
    at the table. We are not negotiating with Russia. We are
    negotiating with Iran. If they can add weight to those
    negotiations, as they did in the initial negotiations, it seems
    to me that serves our national interest.
        Let me turn to General Dickinson. ISR [intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance] is very important generally,
    but I want to talk about a war that is not Ukraine. It is the
    war that is killing our people in Maine, two a day, and I refer
    to the international trade of narcotics. The question is, do we
    have sufficient space assets that can provide ISR and
    monitoring of drug shipments that can assist us in interdicting
    those drug shipments and preventing the death of our people?
    This is a war that is killing Americans in a large number every
    single day, and to say we cannot afford to watch what is going
    on with those shipments, particularly from Latin America and
    the Caribbean, it seems to me is a dereliction of our duty to
    defend the country.
        General Dickinson. Senator, up front I would say that is a
    little bit maybe out of my purview as a combatant commander in
    the Department of Defense. However, I would say to you that
    watching the--to answer your question, I think when you look at
    the explosion in the commercial market in terms of ISR, and
    quite frankly some of the things that we have just seen in the
    Ukraine situation over the last couple of weeks with regards
    to--we are all watching TV and we see those images, you know,
    many of those, if not all of those are coming from a commercial
    company.
        [Additional information provided by General Dickinson to
    follow:]

        General Dickinson. ``Space-based ISR is an important
    portion of space operations, but some of the specific assets
    you described for counterdrug operations fall under the purview
    of agencies outside the DOD. While we partner extensively with
    those organizations on our respective missions and
    responsibilities, USSPACECOM's defined Area of Responsibility
    begins at 100km above mean sea level and extends out
    indefinitely. The national space-based ISR assets you described
    are governed by the U.S. Intelligence Community as described in
    Title 50 of the United States Code and Executive Order 12333
    (as amended). Although we do not directly control these
    capabilities, USSPACECOM is focused on their defense through
    Joint Task Force Space Defense and the National Space Defense
    Center.
        In direct support of the Drug Enforcement Administration,
    USSOUTHCOM, and other agencies on the front lines of countering
    the international narcotics trade, USSPACECOM provides enduring
    and secure satellite communications, overhead persistent
    infrared sensor coverage, and precision navigation and timing.
    When combined with overhead ISR platforms operated by the
    National Reconnaissance Office, a Title 50 organization, these
    capabilities ensure the ability of our partners to detect,
    track, and interdict narcotics traffickers from multiple points
    across the globe. As we continue building Joint Integrated
    Space Teams to all of the combatant commands to enable further
    alignment and mutual support, USSPACECOM is committed to
    ensuring USSOUTHCOM has the appropriate mix of space
    operations, planning, and intelligence expertise on site to
    continue the close integration of Department of Defense space
    capabilities into all facets of operations.''

        What is interesting is how much that commercial market has
    expanded, exploded if you will, to provide us additional
    capabilities. In other words, I think we have a big enough
    commercial market that can satisfy that demand signal, and
    really for us, in U.S. Space Command, with that augmentation we
    are able to use our military type of ISR assets to do some
    other things.
        Senator King. I hope you are right, but the word that
    disturbed me in your answer was one of your first words, which
    was ``not in my purview.'' That is my problem. It does not seem
    to be in anybody's purview. We have got DEA [Drug Enforcement
    Administration], we have got DHS [Department of Homeland
    Security], we have got the military, and we have got people
    dying. I would hope that you would consider discussing this
    question to me. If this were an attack by another adversary on
    our country that was killing thousands of people a day, it
    would be within your purview. I am suggesting it is within your
    purview, and I hope that you will review that.
        Let me ask a second question on your satellite capability.
    There has been a lot of discussion about resilience and
    redundancy. How are we in terms of cyber resilience, in terms
    of our space assets, blocking of signals, stealing of
    information coming from satellites?
        General Dickinson. Senator, so when we stood up the Command
    in 2019, we made a very deliberate effort to make sure that we
    did not add cyber onto the equation as we grew. We built it in
    from the very beginning as we looked at our organization. From
    an organizational perspective we have got cyber expertise and
    capabilities built within the Command that is in particular in
    the headquarters.
        So in the headquarters that I mentioned I have got about
    1,000 people now. Within that headquarters itself I have got--I
    just established my joint cyber cell within the Command that is
    under my J3 operations directorate. We have got an integrated
    planning element from Paul Nakasone, CYBERCOM, embedded with
    us. Two of my five service components are dual-hatted as not
    only Space Command but also CYBERCOM. So that is kind of the
    structural piece.
        Senator King. I would urge you to add to that structure a
    red team. Ask Paul Nakasone to attack it and see how it goes.
    Admiral Richard, I would make the same suggestion.
        Admiral Richard, in the view seconds I have left, a major
    sort of strategic question. How would we respond, under our
    current nuclear posture, to a Russian use of a tactical nuclear
    weapon in Ukraine?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, I would be happy to answer that
    question in closed session.
        Senator King. I thought that might be your answer, and I
    will ask the question in closed session. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator King.
        Senator Rounds, please.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, gentlemen,
    first of all let me begin by saying thank you for your service
    to our country.
        Admiral Richard, I would like a clarification if I could
    with regard to Senator Gillibrand had asked a question
    concerning command and control, and specifically command and
    control between conventional weapon systems versus command and
    control for nuclear weapon systems, and you mentioned an
    overlay of the two with regard to JADC2. Could you clarify a
    little bit the separation between the two that I think we
    always try to keep, between command and control of conventional
    versus nuclear weapon systems?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, first, we do not always try to
    keep separation between conventional and nuclear command and
    control. We cannot. We never have and we will never be able to
    achieve that. Strategic platforms are still platforms. They
    have to interoperate with other platforms to accomplish their
    mission, even for simple deconfliction purposes. So one, we
    have to be able to tell an airplane where the other airplanes
    are, even if they are not on a similar mission. So you have to
    have some overlap to do that.
        Two, it is to our benefit, where appropriate, to use our
    conventional command and control to add redundancy and
    resiliency to our nuclear command and control. You could not
    afford to build two completely separate systems if we tried to
    achieve that in the real world.
        The final piece, though, there is always a piece of nuclear
    command and control that has to go to a higher standard.
    Nuclear command and control has to be able to withstand the
    worst threats that we can postulate against it. Regular command
    and control does not, and that is why we separate it out. We
    have always done that, and we are going to do it to an
    appropriate degree going into the future.
        Senator Rounds. The reason for my question, with regard to
    clarification, is that I know that we are very sensitive to
    where other nations may try to impact our ability to command
    and control our nuclear weapons systems. We have the same
    concern about interacting with other nations' command and
    control.
        Can you talk a little bit about the clarification between
    the two in terms of the interest in making sure that others are
    not put on alert because it appears that we are impacting
    theirs, and the same reason that we would have a concern about
    them impacting our ability, and what that does with regard to
    stability?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, first I think it is important
    that I say here--and I would be happy to go into a lot more
    detail in closed session--the cause of, I would call it
    apprehension and valid concern over the security of our nuclear
    command and control, particularly the cybersecurity, is our
    Nation's nuclear command and control has never been in a
    stronger, more protected, more resilient lineup than it is
    today, based on some very good work operationally done over the
    last 6 to 8 months, and I would love to go into more detail as
    to why I say that.
        As to your concerns about the strategic implications of
    threatening another nation's nuclear command and control, and
    vice versa, that is very well understood. That is very well
    factored in as we think through the overall effects that we are
    trying to achieve.
        I do want to put one more caution out in terms of, we tend
    to use terms, at least back at STRATCOM, in strategic
    stability. Our basic definitions of strategic stability are
    probably out of date. They date back to the Cold War. They are
    two-party dynamics pieces. They tend to think of nuclear as the
    only major effect that has to be considered. When you move this
    into a three-party problem it is a completely different set of
    effects, dynamics that I think we need a lot of work to get
    into to understand how that works.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir. General Dickinson, in our
    ability to achieve and maintain a competitive edge in space
    relies heavily on a rapid capability and development in
    eliminating acquisition bottlenecks. Can you discuss how you
    are partnering with commercial and interagency organizations to
    expand our space capabilities at the pace that we need them to
    be expanded, and what steps have you taken to improve your
    acquisition process in order to onboard new capabilities at a
    faster pace?
        General Dickinson. So that has really been one of the
    highlights with the Command over the last couple of years is
    really the partnership we have with the commercial industry.
    Two examples of that. One is the two main areas that we work
    closest with the commercial partners right now, but we are
    expanding that, is satellite communications and the other one
    is space domain awareness. Satellite communications capability
    with our commercial industry has really been out at Vandenberg
    Space Force Base for years, but has expanded. We have got 10
    commercial partners right now as part of our commercial
    integration cell out at Vandenberg Space Force Base, and that
    is a great relationship in terms of how do we expand our
    capabilities and capacity in the satellite communications
    domain or enterprise and how we do that.
        The second one is space domain awareness, and really that
    has been a rather new, about a 1\1/2\ or 2 years old. We have
    got a cell in Colorado Springs that works for my Joint Task
    Force Space Defense and a commercial integration cell that
    really what it does is it provides to us what commercial space
    domain awareness capabilities can see around the world. So they
    are looking up, looking in the space domain for us, telling us
    what they see, and we utilize that in addition to what we are
    doing with our exquisite sensors.
        So the integration of those two enterprises, space domain
    awareness and SATCOM, has been very, very powerful. It is
    growing so much now that we have had to develop a new
    commercial framework by which we can bring those partners on
    board and expand it even more.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
        Senator Kaine, please.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you to each of you for your service,
    and Admiral Richard, let me begin with you. You talked about
    how some of our defense concepts are a little bit outdated in
    your realm because they were based upon kind of a two-party
    dynamic and now we have to grapple with a three-party dynamic.
    I think it is even more complicated than that because two of
    the three parties are now cooperating in ways that they had
    not.
        I have often asked questions in this committee and in the
    Foreign Relations Committee about growing cooperation between
    Russia and China, and usually folks on your side of the table
    tell me that I do not need to worry about it much because there
    is so much historical animosity between Russia and China that
    they are not likely to cooperate. I think we are finding that
    actually not to be the case. Whatever the past is, they are
    cooperating a lot more now.
        So I would like you to each tell the committee in your
    domain how are you planning to take into account the increasing
    cooperation between Russia and China in either the STRATCOM or
    SPACECOM areas?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, first I would say I am not going
    to tell you that I am not concerned about that. I am very
    concerned about what opportunistic aggression looks like. I am
    worried about what cooperative aggression looks like, and so,
    one, this gets back to I have to deter all of them, all of the
    time, which means every day we are thinking about their
    decision calculus and what we have to do to influence so that
    basically they say, ``Not today.''
        Right now you have to look at what is happening in one
    place and then walk over and see what that does to change
    decision calculus and change your messaging potentially, change
    your posture, and that is just in the opportunistic frame. Then
    do you have the plans ready to understand what cooperative
    looks like? So we do that every day, Senator.
        Senator Kaine. Great. General Dickinson?
        General Dickinson. Senator, we look at it each and every
    day, just as Admiral Richard does, but in the space domain we
    just have to look and see how much more capability development
    that they have done just on orbit. We can go back to November
    to look at the Nudol tests, and then as I mentioned in my
    opening statements, the SJ-21, in particular.
        So just individually, the growth of their capabilities on
    orbit is of concern. When you look at from the civil
    perspective, the Chinese and the Russians have entered into a
    lunar station agreement that they are going to build a station
    on the moon. So it is not just the military that we are looking
    at carefully. It is also kind of their civil piece as well, by
    both those nations.
        Senator Kaine. General Dickinson, you have segued into my
    next question, the civil dimension. There has been news
    recently that was sort of interesting news, kind of in a way
    positive news. Elon Musk has been getting some press for his
    role in providing ground stations and internet coverage to
    Ukraine with the Starlink satellite connection. So that is
    positive. Russia has been trying to jam the signals and block
    coverage. That has made me wonder, hmm, there are non-state
    actors in space too that can enter into contested environments.
    Describe the legal framework for commercial capability in
    space, and the SPACECOM war game scenarios where private actors
    become involved in contested situations.
        General Dickinson. We do look at that, Senator, and really,
    to begin with, I think what we are seeing with Elon Musk and
    the Starlink capability he is providing is really kind of
    showing us what a mega-constellation or proliferated
    architecture can provide in terms of redundancy and capability.
    But to your point, we work very closely in our commercial
    integration cells with that very issue.
        Senator Kaine. Admiral Richard, one last question for you.
    I met last week with General Von Ovost of TRANSCOM, and we
    talked about future tanker requirements. It is my understanding
    that the airborne tankers that support the bomber leg of the
    triad have a varying degree of EMP, electromagnetic pulse
    hardening, to include the KC-46. So talk to us about STRATCOM's
    role in shaping requirements for future tanker programs to
    ensure that EMP hardening is part of the DNA.
        Admiral Richard. Senator, you hit on a key point, as I am
    one of the customers of the tanker fleet, and in that I have
    certain requirements, EMP protection, electromagnetic pulse,
    being one of those. So one is to clearly articulate the
    requirements. Two is go see what we can do in terms of
    employment of our force to reduce that demand signal. A great
    example I would point to, and I would give credit to the Air
    Force, is the re-engining of the B-52s. The engines on those
    date back to the '60s and they burn a lot of gas. Re-engine,
    less fuel required, less tanker demand. What other efficiencies
    can we achieve while still maintaining the flexibility and the
    signaling capability of the air leg, which is one of its prized
    attributes.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you. I appreciate. Thank you, Mr.
    Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
        Since a quorum is present I would now ask the committee to
    consider the following civilian nominations: the Honorable
    Robert P. Storch to be Inspector General of the Department of
    Defense, Dr. Lester Martinez Lopez to be Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Health Affairs, Mr. Christopher J. Lowman to be
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, Mr. Peter
    Beshar to be General Counsel, Department of the Air Force, the
    Honorable Frank R. Parker to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy
    for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Dr. Agnes G. Schaefer to be
    Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve
    Affairs, and Mr. Frank Calvelli to be Assistant Secretary of
    the Air Force for Space Acquisition.
        We have reviewed these nominations with Senator Inhofe and
    he concurs. Is there a motion to favorably report these seven
    nominations to the Senate?
        Senator Wicker. So moved.
        Chairman Reed. Is there a second?
        [Multiple seconds.]
        Chairman Reed. All those in favor, say aye.
        [Chorus of ayes.]
        Chairman Reed. The motion carries. Thank you very much.
        Now let me recognize Senator Tillis, please.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
    you for being here and for your service.
        Admiral Richard, have you recognized any tangible
    operational changes resulting from Putin's announcement that
    they need to increase nuclear readiness, and have you seen any
    posture changes on the part of Russia or the PRC with respect
    to that?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, I would like to go into detail in
    answer to that question inside the closed session, but if you
    will allow me to make a broader point that I think relates.
        The scenarios that we are seeing right now, potential
    escalation, limited unclear use in a conventional aggression
    scenario, STRATCOM has been preparing for this for years, along
    with other combatant commands. General Dickinson's command has
    been doing that, and so we have rewritten deterrence dynamics
    theory over the years. We have new analysis that we are using.
    We got criticized for that. We got told that it was highly
    improbable or somehow self-serving for us to think our way
    through this, but we ignored that such that to this point
    nothing has happened that we did not anticipate, we had not
    thought about, and had not prepared for.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you for that. With Belarus indicating
    their willingness to have nuclear assets deployed within their
    territory, how does that rethink our forward-deployed
    capabilities in Europe?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, again I respect your indulgence
    to allow me to answer that in closed session.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you. General Dickinson, I want to
    talk a little bit about end strength. I think you are somewhere
    around 45 percent of goal, augmented by Reserves, civilians,
    and Guard, but you are relatively new. So what is right
    timeline to get up to the desired end strength, and what kind
    of strategies are you putting together to make sure that we get
    there?
        General Dickinson. Yes, thank you for the question,
    Senator. You are correct. We are at 45, 50 percent strength
    with an augmentation of contractors that get us over, like I
    said in my opening statement, to about 1,000. So our strategy,
    quite frankly, is to get to the end strength as quickly as I
    can. We have worked with the Department very carefully in terms
    of how do we bring manpower from certain fiscal years back to
    the left so that I can be at a reasonable strength here in a
    couple of years.
        But that is where we are going, and what we are trying to
    do right now is attract that talent that we need in the
    command, and that is both a balance between civilian as well as
    military. The civilian force that I have is Department of the
    Air Force civilians, and we are working very closely right now
    in how to attract them. We have got some programs out there in
    terms of internship programs, to bring young adults into the
    command with STEM [Science, Technology, Engineering and
    Mathematics], technical type of degrees.
        I have been very pleased with the military presence that we
    have had within the commands from all the services. The two
    biggest services that I have represented in the command right
    now is, quite frankly, as you would expect, the Space Force and
    the Army. Bringing them into a joint command, building them to
    full operational capability, utilizing exercises, and, quite
    frankly, real-world operations. So we have had a couple of
    events over the last couple, 3 years, if you will, that have
    really driven us to be very proficient in what we do.
        I will just take the Nudol event, for example, back in
    November. That, for us, when I declared initial operational
    capability last August, was a direct result of having that
    talent and expertise within the command, rehearsed through
    processes and procedures and techniques that the joint world
    knows and recognizes, to the point where we can actually
    provide a strategic effect for our national-level leaders. That
    is really the strategy going forward. Right now we have got an
    initial operational capability which means we can provide those
    effects, but we are building out the capacity within the
    command so that I can do that more robustly.
        Senator Tillis. Do you have sufficient authorities to be
    able to get to where you need to be with end strength or
    resources?
        General Dickinson. I do. I have the right authorities right
    now.
        Senator Tillis. Admiral Richard, just really quickly, with
    advances, particularly with respect to China and hypersonics
    and other capabilities, is our current strategy mapping up
    against their emerging threats, or do we need to rethink maybe
    how we counter threats 10 years, 20 years from now,
    differently?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, I am conscious of the fact that
    the Nuclear Posture Review and national defense strategies have
    not been promulgated, but I am confident that we are going to
    have a good strategy. The question is going to be capability,
    capacity, and posture, and to acknowledge those will not be
    static and we are going to have to think through those much
    more frequently than we have needed to in the past because of
    the very threats you are referring to.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
        Senator Kelly, please.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Richard--
    and good morning to you both. Thank you for being here, Admiral
    and General. Admiral Richard, we have all been following
    reports of Russian attacks on Ukrainian nuclear plants and
    other very concerning developments in this conflict, and Russia
    is now targeting civilians, probably out of frustration. This
    should be--you know, I think is viewed as escalatory. It is
    clearly a war crime.
        I am concerned about further escalation, and I understand
    the United States military has established a hotline or direct
    communication channel with the Russian military, particularly
    because Russia media and cyber actors have sought to spread
    disinformation, making reliable information hard to assess in
    real time. It is my view that this direct military-to-military
    communication is critical to avoid misunderstandings that could
    lead to a dangerous military escalation between two nuclear
    powers.
        As this committee knows well, in a crisis decision time,
    time to respond to a nuclear threat is only a matter of
    minutes. Admiral Richard, I understand the hotline will be run
    out of United States European Command. Can you elaborate on how
    STRATCOM will remain in the communication loop of this hotline?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, a couple of points if I could.
    Actually, you do not have to respond to threats, nuclear or
    otherwise, in minutes. In fact, I am not allowed to put the
    President in the position that he only has--or her--minutes to
    respond. So I want to make sure everybody understands, this
    Nation always has the time to make a fully informed decision on
    any action that it takes.
        Second, for strategic purposes, we have long had hotlines
    between the United States and Russia. They date back to the
    Cold War. They are still there, they are tested every day, and
    those are still available to us. We are a long way from needing
    to use anything like that right now. I will go into more detail
    on the rest of your questions in closed session, sir.
        Senator Kelly. All right. Thank you.
        General Dickinson, we are currently seeing reports of
    commercial satellite systems, you know, very effectively being
    used, you know, information for the Ukrainians, also for us,
    and these satellite systems are likely to be of interest to
    Russia too and how should they ultimately counter them in the
    context of this invasion. Russia's and China's anti-satellite
    capabilities have received a lot of attention in years with a
    couple of anti-satellite tests, one before one of my space
    shuttle launches in around 2008.
        But I want to spend a little time today discussing Iranian
    and North Korean anti-satellite capabilities that tend to get
    less airtime, especially North Korea, who obviously has an
    intercontinental ballistic missile capability. Iran hopes to
    develop one. One concern is that ICBMs can be used to create a
    debris cloud in low-Earth orbit, and that could impact U.S.
    satellites.
        General Dickinson, can you expand on how United States
    Space Command is viewing both the North Korean and the Iran
    capabilities, and how do you assess their willingness to target
    and impact United States satellites in space?
        General Dickinson. Thank you, Senator. First of all I would
    just say that you identify a big problem, if you will, within
    the space domain. We just saw it a couple of months ago when
    the Russians destroyed--they had conducted their Nudol test
    that left about 1,500 pieces of debris in low-Earth orbit that,
    quite frankly, we are tracking every day now and we will
    continue to track that for years to come.
        To your example, back before your flight, when the Chinese
    did that test, we still track objects today from that very test
    that, quite frankly--and sir, you are an expert on this--could
    be threatening to the International Space Station. We do a lot
    of work each and every day very closely with NASA [National
    Aeronautics and Space Administration] to make sure that we look
    at that and make sure that the astronauts on the International
    Space Station are safe.
        With regard to both Iran and North Korea, I would like to
    expand on that, if I could, in the closed session.
        Senator Kelly. All right. Thank you, and I yield back the
    remainder of my time.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly.
        Senator Blackburn, please.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to each of
    you I thank you for your service and thank you for being here
    today with our questions.
        Admiral Richard, I do want to come to you first. I fully
    understand that there are sensitive matters that affect our
    government and STRATCOM, and we all understand that many times
    public comment is not appropriate or productive. However, we
    have to keep in mind that silence is also a message, and a very
    strong one, and you have been an excellent, outspoken commander
    of STRATCOM, and you have been a wonderful advocate in the
    public venue for why we need to modernize our nuclear forces. I
    think you have been the commander we need at the time that we
    need him, and we thank you for that.
        So I am disappointed by the lack of clarity on answers that
    you have today, and many of these are appropriate in an
    unclassified sphere, and I was disappointed in the weekend's
    cancellation of the Minuteman-III test, because we only have
    four of those a year, and I was disappointed to learn that
    STRATCOM has put out a schedule of tests to consider others for
    cancellation.
        I appreciate--I think we all do--that you have to be
    careful, especially at a time like this, because of the message
    that our actions could send to Moscow. But this message of
    silence coupled with inaction, in my opinion, does not project
    one of strength. It is not a message of deterrence. I would
    probably venture to guess in your opinion, your professional
    opinion, it would question the judgment of such actions.
        We have to be ready to respond to any threat, any place,
    any time, and I think that we are facing two nuclear-capable
    adversaries at this point. So let us say speaking
    hypothetically, entirely hypothetically, what message does
    cancellation of a prescheduled, routine test send to our
    adversaries?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, let me offer first that the test
    has been rescheduled, not cancelled, and it will be important
    for us to go do that test. I want to acknowledge up front that
    is an Air Force service weapons test. It is done under their
    authorities.
        But it is very important to me, and to the Air Force. That
    is a 50-year-old rocket that we are talking about, and as it
    ages, our ability to understand its performance is very
    important both for my operational planning as well as the
    effort the Air Force has to have to sustain it until we can get
    a replacement system.
        My fundamental recommendation is that we maintain our
    normal set of operations. Day-to-day we very carefully craft a
    series of operations, activities, and other evolutions that are
    designed to show our readiness, it is designed to maintain that
    readiness, and it is designed to give us confidence in our
    forces. In general, that is my recommendation under these
    conditions.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. Then let me take it this way with
    you. Then what impact does delay or reduction in funding, how
    does that affect the modernization and the implementation
    efforts that you need?
        Admiral Richard. Ma'am, any delay or interruption in
    funding is one of the most corrosive things that we can do in
    order to enable those programs to stay on schedule such that we
    do not have a diminishment in the capabilities required to
    execute our strategy. So not only does it have a practical
    effect in terms of potential delays and the dates that we can
    have these systems, it is also a signal of a lack of will on
    our part, fundamentally to defend ourselves.
        Senator Blackburn. So you would see that as diminishing and
    not improving our abilities, capabilities?
        Admiral Richard. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. General Dickinson, I do have some
    questions for you but I am running out of time. I am going to
    send these to you for answer, because I want to explore a
    little bit more the commercial opportunities that you have and
    how we can build off of some of the commercial advancements
    that are going to affect the space and your command.
        So thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
        Senator Warren, please.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    Admiral Richard and General Dickinson for being here.
        So Admiral Richard, last year you testified before this
    committee that you hope the nuclear policy review would include
    looking at the wide array of capabilities we have in our
    arsenal, including space and cyber. In other words, our ability
    to deter adversaries is not only about nuclear weapons that we
    have, it is also about conventional weapons and other areas of
    strength. It sounds like the adoption of integrated deterrence
    that will be part of this review does precisely that.
        Was Strategic Command fully consulted and able to fully
    participate in the Nuclear Posture Review process?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, first I want to endorse the idea
    of integrated deterrence, that STRATCOM and previous commanders
    have been calling for this, the idea that you use every
    available instrument, beyond the military, to best deter your
    opponent and resolve political issues at the lowest possible
    level of violence. So we are strongly in support of that.
        Second is to understand, though, that nuclear deterrence,
    in particular, is a part of integrated deterrence. They are not
    different things. In fact, if you do not have the nuclear piece
    inside of it the rest of integrated deterrence does not work
    because your opponent might be able to----
        Senator Warren. Excuse me for interrupting, Admiral. I
    understand this. I am just asking a question about process. Was
    Strategic Command fully consulted and able to fully participate
    in the Nuclear Posture Review process?
        Admiral Richard. STRATCOM was fully involved in the Nuclear
    Posture Review process up through the Secretary of Defense. I
    had plenty of opportunity to tell the Secretary personally. We
    led portions of the Nuclear Posture Review. But beyond that,
    ma'am, I do not know.
        Senator Warren. Okay. Now as we discussed last year, the
    Nation's nuclear policy is up to the President and the
    Secretary, and the goal of the Nuclear Posture Review is to
    rigorously examine options to determine the proper role for
    nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. So, Admiral
    Richard, do you agree that the Nuclear Posture Review
    benefits--let me put it this way, from hearing a wide variety
    of views to make sure that we are developing the smartest
    possible policy?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, yes, and my responsibility inside
    that is to offer the operational implications to each of those
    wide range of views.
        Senator Warren. Okay. Do you think our nuclear policy
    should be informed by objective technical analysis?
        Admiral Richard. Ma'am, we provide a lot of that objective
    technical analysis.
        Senator Warren. So you think it should be informed by
    technical analysis and a broad variety of views. We are in
    agreement on that.
        Admiral Richard. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Warren. Good. You know, I am looking forward to
    reviewing the Nuclear Posture Review when it is released, but
    the reason I am focused on this is because I have concerns
    about the process that produced it. Over the past year, the
    Pentagon has repeatedly pushed out and obstructed efforts to
    have more rigorous debates and analysis to support this review,
    and I just want to give one example of this.
        The ground-based strategic deterrent is a $264 billion
    program. I requested that DOD contract with a respected group
    of outside experts to determine the technical feasibility of
    extending the Minuteman-III program instead of just buying
    expensive new weapons. I was then told that the DOD did not
    have the contract authority to do so, and that is just simply
    not true. It appears DOD simply did not want to do a study that
    might show that a massively expensive nuclear spending program
    was not actually necessary.
        Now my view on this is no secret. We must reduce the role
    of nuclear weapons in our defense strategy. It is dangerous and
    it results in a staggering amount of spending, more than $630
    billion over the next decade. But no matter what you believe
    about these weapons, our nuclear policy should be developed by
    asking tough questions, not formulated in an echo chamber.
        So thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Richard. Senator, can I suggest that I look forward
    to the Nuclear Posture Review being published so you can see
    exactly how and what it concluded. But I will add, thank
    goodness we have ICBMs right now. I will explain more in closed
    testimony.
        Senator Warren. So I am glad that you are looking forward
    to seeing the report. As I said, I am as well. But my whole
    point is that if we do not have a process that includes
    alternative points of view, a widespread point of view, then
    the product that comes from it is too likely to come from an
    echo chamber instead of being fully informed, and that is what
    troubles me.
        Admiral Richard. Yes, ma'am.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren.
        Senator Ernst, please.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you,
    gentlemen, very much for being here today.
        Unfortunately, Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has
    really reminded us of the threat that is posed by our
    adversaries and threat to our own international stability. We
    certainly cannot take peace for granted, so again, thank you
    very much for your service to our Nation.
        If we could go back a little bit, you know, I understand
    some of the discussion that is here, but if you could again,
    Admiral Richard, just please reiterate why we cannot extend the
    life of the Minuteman-III.
        Admiral Richard. Senator, there are a couple of reasons and
    there is one that I probably have not emphasized enough in my
    previous testimony. Any of our deterrence systems have to be
    able to operate in the threat environment that they face.
    Fundamentally, they have to be able to pace the threat.
    Minuteman-III, because it has been extended so long, has
    basically no margin left to be able to pace improvements in
    other nations' defensive systems. That is on top of the cost
    benefit that we would achieve by changing to a new system,
    modern, well-designed, lower operating cost.
        But I want to come back to, for any of these weapons
    systems, with Minuteman-III being the best example, it has to
    be able to pace the threat in order for it to deter anybody.
        Senator Ernst. Pacing that threat but then also safety
    implications as well. You mentioned that the Minuteman-III is
    50 years old, but certainly there are ways that we can
    modernize and not only impact safety implications going forward
    but also workforce implications. Maybe could you speak a little
    bit to that as we are going through modernization efforts and
    how we would be able to, as well, keep pace with the technology
    necessary to upgrade and modernize?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, a common issue here is, it is not
    just about modernizing a rocket. It is the entire weapon
    system. So a key attribute the GBSD will bring is a much-
    improved nuclear command and control system for that particular
    piece. That alone is another significant reason that we have to
    go do that.
        You mentioned workforce. The GBSD--and I will defer to the
    Air Force for the specifics--GBSD requires a lot less number of
    people to operate it because it has modern methods of
    maintenance and sustainment. Remember, Minuteman-III was not
    designed to be modernized at all. The Air Force did heroics to
    reverse-engineer the ability to do that on a weapon system only
    designed to be in service for 10 years. So there are a number
    of these benefits the Nation will achieve if we modernization
    the intercontinental ballistic missiles.
        Senator Ernst. I appreciate that. You have also spoken to
    the fact that not having a stable appropriation, stable budget,
    how that has impacted negatively the modernization effort. So I
    just wanted to reemphasize that, that we really need to do our
    work as Congress and make sure that we get back into regular
    order.
        So, Admiral, what is your assessment of the capability and
    ability of our domestic supply and production chains to produce
    our nuclear cores?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, one, it would be best for me to
    defer the specifics of an answer to that to the people that
    actually buy this stuff. That is the services and the agencies.
    But bottom line is that is a very big concern that we have let,
    across the board, our industrial base atrophy, and we will need
    to take steps to restore capability and capacity in any number
    of areas--weapons complex, nuclear command and control,
    delivery systems--such that we have a robust, resilient defense
    industrial base that is able to produce the capabilities that
    commanders like I will have to use to defend us.
        Senator Ernst. Just in the remaining time, I really
    appreciate that, the need to really modernize out there. I know
    there are a number of different opinions on this committee as
    we come to nuclear strategic deterrence, but the fact that we
    should have regular order in the way we do appropriations so
    that we can continue to modernize, if that is the directive
    that comes from this committee and from the Administration. But
    then also the workforce that goes with that as well. I think
    there are a lot of issues that comes to this discussion today.
    We are just very grateful to have you there and working on
    these issues with us.
        So with that I will yield back. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Ernst.
        Senator Shaheen, please.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Admiral
    Richard, General Dickinson, thank you both for your testimony
    this morning.
        General Dickinson, I want to follow up on the conversation
    that has come up in several questions around the proliferation
    of debris in space. It is my understanding that the current
    collision screening notification criteria were developed over a
    decade ago. Is there an effort underway now to update that
    criteria, and who is in charge of that, and when do you expect
    that to happen?
        General Dickinson. Thank you for the question. Just to the,
    right up front, if I could just talk about the size of the
    debris and how much that is growing, just to give you a
    statistic or a feel for that. Back in 2019, when the Command
    stood up, we tracked on a daily basis about 25,000 objects in
    space. Today, in 2022, it is almost 44,000. So we have seen,
    obviously, a tremendous growth in things that we have to track
    each and every day around the globe. We have seen, with the
    Nudol test, for example, back in November, how that can expand
    quite quickly.
        So the process that we use today to do that is done out at
    Vandenberg Space Force Base by the 18th Space Control
    Identification Unit out there. The algorithms and the C2 that
    they use has been upgraded. We look at that each and every day
    in terms of how we are able to identify and work with NASA to
    make sure that we are able to identify potential issues with
    the International Space Station and its safety.
        Senator Shaheen. But you are looking only at the
    International Space Station?
        General Dickinson. No. Ma'am, we are looking at all the
    debris up there in terms of being able to provide that
    information out. That is just one area that I highlight,
    because it has such visibility on it.
        Senator Shaheen. Am I correct that there is specific
    collision screening and notification criteria that you are
    looking at?
        General Dickinson. Yes, ma'am. So there is, and we work
    very closely with not only NASA but we also work very closely
    with our commercial partners as well. We have agreements with
    over 100 companies right now, what we call a space situational
    awareness agreement, and that agreement allows us to share that
    information with them. So for example, if you are a commercial
    company that has satellites on orbit, we will let you know, or
    we will let them know if there is an issue that we project with
    potential debris.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, I guess what I am trying to figure
    out is this criterion that is updated on a regular basis, do
    you all do that? Does somebody else do that? How are other
    companies and other countries notified about that?
        General Dickinson. So we do that. That is on a website that
    we have that is called spacetrack.org, where that unit at
    Vandenberg Space Force Base updates that routinely with
    information that we have that we are gathering from our sensors
    and through our analysis process.
        Senator Shaheen. Okay. I want to switch to a more mundane
    topic, because I certainly share the urgency with which both of
    you talked about the challenges we are facing from both China
    and Russia. We have had a number of conversations on this
    Committee about whether our decision-making process should be
    more efficient, should we address procurement. How do we
    address what we are seeing happening in China and Russia with
    respect to their increasing military capability, although we
    may want to raise questions about Russia after Ukraine?
        But I raise this in the context of the proposed relocation
    of SPACECOM headquarters from Colorado to Alabama, because I am
    puzzled, given the urgency, given the challenges of setting up
    this new command of the fact that you are still only in about
    50 percent capacity in terms of the staffing that you need, why
    we are going to spend several years now trying to move SPACECOM
    to a new location that is going to take us, as I understand, a
    year and a half before we actually even know whether Redstone
    is potentially an appropriate location because of environmental
    concerns. Are we reassessing that decision? My understanding
    also is that it will take us until 2026 to actually move
    SPACECOM to that location, if the assessment proves to be that
    that is an appropriate location.
        So help me understand why given all of our urgency and all
    of the decisions that we need to make we are going to spend the
    money and the time to relocate Space Command to a totally
    different place?
        General Dickinson. So, ma'am, Senator, there are two long-
    going efforts. I am sure you are probably aware the DOD IG
    [Department of Defense Inspector General] is conducting their
    evaluation along with the GAO [Government Accountability
    Office]. Both of those are moving along, and I am looking
    forward to the completion of those two efforts.
        For me, it is not necessarily about the location. It is
    about the decision. So, in other words, I need a decision as
    soon as I can possibly get one so that I can build to full
    operational capability as quickly as possible.
        We do have competitors that are moving very quickly. Those
    competitors are not necessarily waiting for me to reach FOC, or
    full operational capability. So I need a decision, and based on
    that decision I will do whatever I need to do to make sure that
    I can achieve my mission.
        Senator Shaheen. Okay. I am out of time but I just want to
    follow up one point on that. If you were going to stay in your
    current location, do you have any sense of how long it would
    take to settle in to do any renovations that you need to do
    there versus moving to a new location in Alabama, and how long
    that would take and the cost of that?
        General Dickinson. So we are in the process right now of
    building the infrastructure that we need to do the mission that
    I have been given today, and we are moving in that direction. I
    would say we are a couple, 3 years away from full operational
    capability.
        Senator Shaheen. Wherever you are located.
        General Dickinson. Wherever I am located.
        Senator Shaheen. Is that based on the number of personnel
    you have to hire?
        General Dickinson. It is based on many things, Senator. One
    is personnel. The other has to do with expertise within the
    command, attracting the right expertise within the command, and
    making sure that I have trained those processes and procedures
    within the command to be able to do the entire mission set that
    I have been given.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Fischer, please.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
    Admiral and General, for being here today.
        One of the reasons we have never adopted a no-first-use
    policy or made a sole purpose declaration is the real threat of
    a strategic non-nuclear attack. President Obama's 2010 Nuclear
    Posture Review states the following: ``There remains a narrow
    range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still
    play a role in deterring a convention or CBW [chemical and
    biological weapons] attack against the United States or its
    allies and partners. The United States is therefore not
    prepared at the present time to adopt a universal policy that
    deterring nuclear attack is the sole purpose of nuclear
    weapons.''
        Admiral Richard, chemical and biological threats are
    sometimes treated as an afterthought. How has the risk of major
    non-nuclear attack changed since 2010, and has it decreased?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, first it has certainly not
    decreased. You are correct that often gets overlooked, at least
    in public discourse. I will tell you, as a part of the Nuclear
    Posture Review that was looked at very closely, and I look
    forward to the publishing of the Nuclear Posture Review to show
    you what the result of that analysis was.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Also, those who favor reducing
    the size of our nuclear forces often argue that non-nuclear
    capabilities such as space and cyber capabilities can be
    substituted for nuclear weapons without diminishing our ability
    to credibly hold targets at risk, deter adversaries, and assure
    our allies. What are your views on this idea?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, what I would offer is, one, I
    applaud efforts--that is fundamentally you are getting after
    some of the capabilities that are used inside integrated
    deterrence, and we applaud that effort.
        But I need to be clear about something here, which is there
    is no other capability or combination of capabilities that gets
    anywhere close to the demonstrated destructive potential of a
    nuclear weapon. That is why it is integral to integrated
    deterrence. Then with that foundation, with that backstop, you
    then use every other capability in our disposal to deter the
    opponent.
        An important point here, Senator, if I could. When we are
    talking about issues between nuclear-capable great powers, it
    quickly becomes less about an order of battle comparison and
    who wins the fight and quickly becomes more about who judges
    greater stake and who is willing to take greater risks to get
    it. Integrated deterrence sets us up very well to resolve
    issues like that.
        Senator Fischer. Our threats are only increasing. We have
    already brought up that we have two peer competitors when it
    comes to the threats that we face now. How do you think we can
    get that message across to the people of this country so that
    they have a more complete understanding of the threats we face
    and what we must do to protect this Homeland and also to offer
    assurances to our allies?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, I would offer that our opponents'
    actions are speaking to us much better than anything I can say
    in words. I think it is important for us to understand we do
    not know how far China is going to go, and Russia is also
    expanding. But also we are seeing demonstrations of how you can
    use these capabilities coercively.
        We are so trained in thinking that all we do is deter. I do
    not think that we fully understand or have thought about, in a
    long time, what the coercive use of these capabilities looks
    like, and we are getting real-world demonstrations of that
    right now.
        Senator Fischer. Admiral, you quote China's strategic
    breakout in your opening statement and you note that, quote,
    ``The PRC likely intends to have at least 1,000 warheads by
    2030, greatly exceeding previous DOD estimates.'' As concerning
    as that is, it only captures, I think, part of the problem.
        I know there is not a lot you can say in this environment,
    but do you believe it is wise to assume that China's nuclear
    forces will stop expanding when they reach that point?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, I will tell you, I told my staff
    that whatever the time estimate that the intelligence community
    gives you on anything from China, divide it by 2 and maybe by 4
    and you will get closer to the right answer. So no, I do not
    know that we have any idea of what the end point and/or speed.
    When I first testified here we were questioning whether or not
    China would be able to double that stockpile by the end of the
    decade. They are actually very close to doing it on my watch,
    and I think we need to factor that into our calculations as we
    think through what we need to defend ourselves.
        Senator Fischer. As we look at China's breakout, or we look
    at the continued growth of Russia's non-strategic arsenal,
    obviously nuclear threats are still growing. We are not trying
    to match any adversary system for system, but at the same time,
    an imbalance in forces does undermine our strategic stability.
    Isn't that right?
        Admiral Richard. Yes, ma'am, and said another way I think
    it emboldens coercion and aggression.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
        Senator Rosen, please.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed, for holding this
    important hearing. I would also like to thank Admiral Richard
    and General Dickinson for testifying today and for your service
    to our country. Thank you.
        I want to return now to the major role that Nevada plays in
    the capabilities and safety of our nuclear arsenal,
    specifically at the Nevada National Security Site, because we
    need some infrastructure upgrades in order to continue to
    complete and do our mission.
        Admiral Richard, since 1993, the Nevada National Security
    Site, or we call it NNSS, has overseen the nuclear Stockpile
    Stewardship Program, principally at the U1a facility. It is an
    underground laboratory where scientists conduct those
    subcritical experiments to verify the reliability and
    effectiveness of our nuclear stockpile. This is the only
    facility in the country where this is done, and U1a is
    undergoing major construction projects that will soon host our
    most capable weapons radiographic system in the world. Of
    course, I have visited NNSS a few times. I am very proud of it,
    that it contributes to the certification of our nuclear
    stockpile.
        However, the NNSA faces several challenges as we have seen
    and you have testified to, to its modernization programs,
    including significant infrastructure delays which you note in
    your testimony dates back to the Manhattan Project era. The
    Nevada National Security Site is no exception. Unfortunately,
    Chairman Reed, the Nevada National Security Site is larger than
    all NSA sites combined and is the equivalent to the size of the
    state of Rhode Island, I might add.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you.
        Senator Rosen. So we have a vast amount of infrastructure
    to build and maintain.
        So Admiral Richard, can you please speak to how upgrades to
    the Stockpile Stewardship Program like the U1a affect
    STRATCOM's certification of our nuclear stockpile, and how do
    these delays impact your ability to fulfill your
    responsibilities?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, first I would put the Stockpile
    Stewardship Program on the list of things that make me proud to
    be an American that we actually figured out how to do that such
    that we relieved ourselves of the need to actually conduct
    nuclear weapons testing.
        But what I think is important to understand is that alone
    will not give us the confidence that we have to have in our
    weapons. That is what this fundamentally comes back to. Are you
    confident in your stockpile and your deterrent because that
    underpins credibility which is needed to deter?
        There are two other things we have to do in addition to the
    good work in the Stockpile Stewardship Program. One of them is
    you have to have a flexible and modern stockpile, which means
    we need to move past life extensions, which we have been doing
    for 30 years, and move into refurbishments, which is where NNSA
    is about to go. The second one goes back to the infrastructure
    you are talking about. You have to have a modern, responsive,
    and resilient infrastructure, and we have delayed too long, in
    my opinion, giving NNSA the resources necessary to do that
    piece. All three of those are necessary for us to have the
    confidence we need to conduct my mission.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. Speaking of mission, we have
    cyber mission and space, and cyber, I could talk all about
    workforce, the workforce challenges that we have with
    developing that. Senator Ernst brought that up. But as we see
    what is happening particularly in the Ukraine, are you
    concerned, General Dickinson that the increasing threats of
    cyberattack from Russia could jeopardize our United States
    space operations? Maybe you cannot speak of it here. We will
    talk later about space cyber aggression as the war in Ukraine
    continues to go forward.
        General Dickinson. Well, thank you, and I will provide more
    in the closed session. But I will say here, this morning, is
    just to echo what Admiral Richard said in terms of posture at
    this particular point. I support Admiral Richard in a lot of
    things that he does in terms of his nuclear command and
    control, and I am very satisfied in the posture that we have
    today with respect to space as well as cyber. We have taken a
    lot of effort to ensure that we are cyber hardened and that we
    have got the right types of experts looking at our systems, our
    vital space systems. But I can provide more to you in the
    closed session.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that. I know my time
    is almost up. I do want to talk about workforce development. I
    have been lucky enough to have a Junior ROTC STEM bill passed,
    which means our youngest kids, kids in high school, they have a
    track for joining Junior ROTC to put them into STEM professions
    in the military. It is really important. We will talk later
    about developing that workforce. I will submit them for the
    record. But we really need to up our game there as well, to be
    nimble and modernize.
        Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
        Senator Cramer, please.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to both
    of you for your service and for being here. Admiral Richard,
    let me just say as others have said, one of your strongest
    qualities, since I have known you anyway, has been your
    forthrightness and your clarity. But I have to say, in the
    moment that we are in right now, I have especially appreciated
    your boldness and clarity. We need to hear it. The people we
    work for need to hear it.
        I also have to compliment you on your composure, being able
    to sit through some of this. The suggestion that there has not
    been enough variables or enough varying opinions to commit $630
    billion over 10 years to the most important deterrence to
    aggression in the world is frightening enough, but it is
    galling in the context that around here some people think
    nothing of spending trillions of dollars over the course of 10
    months or 10 weeks or even 10 days, based on the opinion of one
    person at HHS. I will leave it at that. So congratulations on
    having composure as well.
        I do want to get back to an issue that Senator Blackburn
    raised with regard to the postponement of that ICBM watch. As
    you can imagine, those of us in North Dakota pay close
    attention to those things. I appreciate your answer,
    particularly your commitment that it is only a postponement,
    that it is now rescheduled. Did you agree with postponing that,
    if I might ask?
        General Dickinson. Senator, I had an opportunity to
    directly advise the Secretary of Defense, among others. I think
    it would be best if I left that advice private between him and
    I.
        Senator Cramer. I understand and I appreciate that, because
    it seems to me that reality is now clashing with some people's
    fantasies. I appreciate you raising the reality of the moment.
    You said it well a little bit ago when you said opponents'
    actions are speaking as loudly as anything that we could
    probably say.
        General, I want to talk a little bit about--I want to bring
    it home a little bit as well. You, of course, are very
    familiar. You and I visited the very old PARCS radar station,
    the Cavalier Radar Station, now the Cavalier Space Force
    Station, it seems like last month but I think it was probably a
    year or two ago. As you know, we had this very important early
    warning system designed to, of course, warn us early in case
    something is coming over the Arctic. Now, of course, it has
    been monitoring space as well. You have talked about the need
    for decision superiority. That was, I think, something you
    referenced or talked quite a bit about over the last couple of
    years.
        I am just wondering if the PARCS array at Cavalier Space
    Station that relies on this very old technology, if there is
    modernization opportunities for our decision superiority as
    well that we should be talking about.
        General Dickinson. Senator, thank you, and I did enjoy my
    trip up there. I think it was over a year ago, maybe 2 years
    ago now. But certainly that particular sensor, and all of those
    early warning radars, are very critical to our overall
    architecture, to be able to provide that missile warning,
    missile defense, and space domain awareness. So critical to
    provide that very decision space to our national-level leaders.
        So in terms of what that capability is today, we continue
    to look at that through a lifecycle management, and really I
    work very closely with the Space Force, because they are
    ultimately in charge of those upgrades and the modernization of
    those assets. What I do is identify whether or not we have a
    gap or a requirement that would need that. So we are working
    very closely with them and we are looking at the entire
    architecture, not just necessarily one asset. Because as we
    look to the future, it will not only be a terrestrial-based
    type of capability that is up there right now but we will look
    at a space capability too, that augments that, so we have a
    layered warning capability globally.
        Senator Cramer. I think, Admiral, you had mentioned
    earlier, maybe both of you have talked about, throughout this
    hearing, the delay or interruption in funding of modernization,
    what that means, the kind of signal that that sends, the
    practical, functional consequences of that.
        Let me ask this. If we were, in this place, able to get our
    act together, if we were able to have enough consensus and
    realization that modernization is not just important but
    critical, and if we were to have the political will, would it
    even be possible to not only not delay but even accelerate any
    part of modernization if we were able to make that case?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, I would defer to the services to
    give you the specifics of that. But I think you are hitting at,
    we need to ask questions differently. We used to ask what is it
    going to take, and we have gotten into the habit of saying how
    are we going to mitigate our assumed delay or failure. We used
    to ask the question the other way around. That is how we got to
    the moon by 1969. We need to get back to understanding the
    operational risk is on par with programmatic and technical
    risk, reverse the way we ask questions, and get back to
    producing capabilities to way we used to.
        Senator Cramer. I appreciate it. Thank you both. Thank you,
    Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cramer.
        Let me recognize Senator Tuberville for the purpose of a
    unanimous consent request.
        Senator Tuberville. Oh, thank you very much. Just really
    quickly, you know, I would like to correct for the record the
    remarks of my colleague from New Hampshire, and I appreciate
    General Dickinson being a bipartisan approach here on the
    movement of Space Command from Vandenberg to Redstone Arsenal
    in Alabama.
        The recently released draft environmental study found,
    quote, ``significant impact on socioeconomic conditions and
    environmental justice,'' end quote, at Vandenberg. By contrast,
    the study found no significant environmental concerns at
    Redstone.
        Mr. Chairman, I would just like to submit this study to you
    for the record and correct that as we go along.
        Chairman Reed. Without objection.
        [The information follows:]

      Draft Finding of No Significant Impact Environmental Assessment for
        United States Space Command Headquarters Basing and Construction
        Pursuant to provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act
    (NEPA), 42 United States Code 4231 to 4270d; Council on Environmental
    Quality (CEQ) Regulations, 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 1500-
    1508; and 32 CFR Part 989, Environmental Impact Analysis Process, the
    U.S. Air Force has prepared the attached environmental assessment (EA)
    to address the potential environmental impacts associated with the
    establishment of a headquarters for the U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM;
    Proposed Action) at one of five Department of Defense (DOD)
    installations in the United States.
              purpose and need (ea section (Sec. ) 1.2, page 1-1)
        Pursuant to Section 1601(c) of the National Defense Authorization
    Act for fiscal year 2018, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense was
    directed to review national security space DOD components and recommend
    changes to Congress by August 1, 2018. The U.S. Deputy Secretary of
    Defense's final report to Congress recommended that the President of
    the United States modify the Unified Command Plan to standup a new
    combatant command for space (USSPACECOM). The U.S. Strategic Command's
    Joint Force Space Component Command was elevated to a combatant command
    and assumed these duties in 2019.
        The purpose of the Proposed Action is to establish a permanent
    operational USSPACECOM headquarters as a functional combatant command.
    The need for the Proposed Action is driven by the need for suitable
    permanent facilities to fulfill USSPACECOM required functions to enable
    achievement of full operational capability by 2025.
              description of the proposed action and alternatives
        The Proposed Action and all reasonable alternatives are presented
    and evaluated in the attached EA.
    Proposed Action (EA Sec.  2.1, page 2-1)
        The Proposed Action would establish a USSPACECOM headquarters at
    one of five DOD installations in the United States: Buckley, Peterson,
    or Schriever Air Force Base (AFB) in Colorado; Vandenberg AFB in
    California; or U.S. Army Garrison Redstone Arsenal (Redstone Arsenal)
    in Alabama. The proposed headquarters facility would accommodate
    approximately 1,870 personnel in a typical headquarters setting
    consisting of 498,000 square feet of office/administrative space, and
    502,000 square feet for privately owned vehicle (POV) parking, totaling
    1,000,000 square feet, or approximately 23 acres. POV parking would be
    provided in adjacent parking lots except at Peterson AFB, where it
    would be provided in parking garages. The majority of the permanent
    facility would be sensitive compartmented information facility space,
    and open administrative space, offices, conference rooms, classrooms,
    kitchen, dining, and break rooms. USSPACECOM operations would include
    command and control of global DOD space operations, support to other
    combatant commands, defense of U.S. and allied space operations, the
    gaining and maintaining of space superiority, and the evolution of DOD
    space capabilities and training.
        To conduct operations prior to the completion of the permanent
    construction (estimated to be 2025), temporary basing would include
    193,000 square feet for interim facility space, and an estimated
    502,000 square feet for parking. Existing, vacant office/administrative
    space or leased office/administrative space on or outside the selected
    installation, and/or new temporary/modular buildings that would be
    purchased or leased by the Air Force and placed on a suitable site
    within the selected installation's secure perimeter would be used in
    the interim until the permanent headquarters facility is operational.
    POV parking would be provided in existing parking lots and/or temporary
    gravel lots. To maximize flexibility for siting USSPACECOM headquarters
    operations, the interim and permanent facilities would not necessarily
    be at the same installation. Staffing of the interim facility would
    begin in 2019, and gradually increase to a total staff of approximately
    1,870. Staff would transfer from the interim to the permanent facility
    after construction of the permanent facility is complete.
        Force protection measures for the new facility will be incorporated
    in accordance with the Unified Facilities Criteria 4-010-01, DOD
    Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings, February 9, 2012.
    Construction of the permanent facility would comply with the U.S.
    Environmental Protection Agency's Construction General Permit in effect
    at the time of construction, and with the Energy Independence and
    Security Act (EISA) Section 438 requirements. Construction activities
    would be implemented using sustainable design concepts as outlined in
    the Unified Facilities Criteria and the selected installation's design
    and construction standards. Sustainable design concepts would emphasize
    state-of-the-art strategies for site development, efficient water and
    energy use, and improved indoor environmental quality. Stormwater
    management at the new facility would use low-impact development as
    required by Section 438 of the EISA, and the selected installation's
    municipal separate storm sewer system permit.
    Alternatives (EA Sec.  2.3, pages 2-7 to 2-33)
        The Air Force identified seven potential interim and seven
    potential permanent site alternatives at the five DOD installations
    noted above. These site alternatives are summarized in Table 1. The
    perimeter of all alternative sites can be accessed by existing roads at
    the DOD installations being considered. The attached EA analyzes
    potential impacts from implementing the Proposed Action at these
    interim and permanent site alternatives.
        All other potential installations and alternative sites evaluated
    during the Air Force's basing selection process were dismissed from
    analysis in the EA because they did not meet one or more of the Air
    Force site selection screening criteria, and therefore failed to meet
    the Proposed Action's purpose and need.

                         Table 1 Summary of Alternatives
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Site Alternative               Site Alternative Description
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Buckley AFB
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Interim Site Alternative 1 (West End        Previously disturbed but
     District)                                   currently vacant land
                                                 containing maintained
                                                 vegetation on the western
                                                 side of the base outside of
                                                 its Restricted Area (RA).
                                                 Interim facilities would
                                                 consist of modular
                                                 buildings.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Permanent Site Alternative 1 (North Corner  Previously disturbed but
     Site 1)                                     currently vacant land on
                                                 the northeastern side of
                                                 the base outside of its RA.
                                                 Partially overlaps a former
                                                 skeet range.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Permanent Site Alternative 2 (North Corner  Immediately southwest of
     Site 2)                                     Permanent Site Alternative
                                                 1. Partially overlaps
                                                 vacant structures
                                                 associated with the former
                                                 skeet range, an on-base
                                                 thrift store, and
                                                 construction lay-down area.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Peterson AFB
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Interim Site Alternative 1 (Command         Previously disturbed but
     Complex and Leased Off-base Office Space)   mostly undeveloped vacant
                                                 land east of Building 3 in
                                                 the installation's Command
                                                 Complex. Interim facilities
                                                 would consist of modular
                                                 buildings and existing,
                                                 leased off-base office
                                                 space within 4 miles of
                                                 Peterson AFB's West Gate.
                                                 Temporary parking for the
                                                 on-base modular facilities
                                                 would be established on
                                                 adjacent vacant land leased
                                                 from the Colorado Springs
                                                 Municipal Airport.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Permanent Site Alternative 1 (Command       Existing paved parking lot
     Complex)                                    immediately south of
                                                 Buildings 1 and 2 in the
                                                 installation's Command
                                                 Complex. POV parking would
                                                 be provided in two garages
                                                 that would be built on
                                                 existing paved parking lots
                                                 as part of the alternative.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   Table 1 Summary of Alternatives--Continued
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Site Alternative               Site Alternative Description
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Schriever AFB
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Interim Site Alternative 1 (Inside RA /     Previously undeveloped sites
     West Side of RA / Leased Off-base Office    consisting of maintained
     Space)                                      vegetation (i.e., prairie
                                                 grass). Interim facilities
                                                 would consist of modular
                                                 buildings and existing,
                                                 leased off-base office
                                                 space within 4 miles of
                                                 Peterson AFB's West Gate.
    -------------------------------------------
    Interim Site Alternative 2 (Outside RA /
     North of Building 24 / Leased Off-base
     Office Space)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Permanent Site Alternative 1 (Inside RA)    Previously undeveloped sites
     (West Side of RA)                           consisting of maintained
                                                 vegetation (i.e., prairie
                                                 grass)
    -------------------------------------------
    Site Alternative 2 (Outside RA) (Northwest
     of Building 24)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Vandenberg AFB
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Interim Site Alternative 1 (Buildings       Buildings 6523, 7225, and
     6523, 7225, and 10577)                      10577 would undergo minor
                                                 interior renovations to
                                                 accommodate the interim
                                                 facility. POV parking would
                                                 be provided in existing
                                                 lots and in an
                                                 approximately 28,000-square-
                                                 foot gravel-covered area
                                                 that would be established
                                                 adjacent to the existing
                                                 parking lot at Building
                                                 6523.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Permanent Site Alternative 1 (California    Previously disturbed but
     South)                                      currently vacant land in
                                                 the installation's
                                                 cantonment area. Land cover
                                                 primarily consists of
                                                 maintained vegetation and
                                                 parking lots. An existing
                                                 modular building on the
                                                 site would be demolished.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Redstone Arsenal
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Interim Site Alternative 1 (Redstone        Personnel would occupy
     Gateway, and Buildings 5201 and 5220)       office space currently
                                                 under construction at
                                                 Redstone Gateway, an
                                                 enhanced use lease area
                                                 within the installation's
                                                 secure perimeter
                                                 administered by the U.S.
                                                 Army Corps of Engineers,
                                                 and existing vacant office
                                                 space that would undergo
                                                 minor interior renovations
                                                 at Buildings 5201 and 5220.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Interim Site Alternative 2 (Area 2, and     Personnel would occupy
     Buildings 5201 and 5220)                    existing vacant office
                                                 space that would undergo
                                                 minor interior renovations
                                                 at Buildings 5201 and 5220,
                                                 and modular buildings that
                                                 would be placed on Area 2,
                                                 a previously disturbed but
                                                 currently undeveloped area
                                                 that primarily consists of
                                                 maintained vegetation.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Permanent Site Alternative 1 (Area 5 and     The new permanent facility
     Building 5201)                              would be built on Area 5,
                                                 which is previously
                                                 disturbed but currently
                                                 vacant, and consists of
                                                 maintained vegetation.
                                                 Existing vacant space in
                                                 Building 5201 also would be
                                                 used following minor
                                                 interior renovations.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    No Action Alternative (EA Sec.  2.3.7, page 2-33)
        Under the No Action Alternative, the interim and permanent
    USSPACECOM headquarters would not be established. USSPACECOM would not
    be able to effectively perform the strategic objectives outlined in
    Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act Section 1601c.
                        summary of environmental impacts
        The analyses of the affected environment and environmental
    consequences of implementing the Proposed Action presented in the EA
    concluded that there would be no significant impacts on the following
    resources at any of the candidate installations or site alternatives:

          Transportation

          Hazardous materials and waste

          Air quality

          Biological resources

          Cultural resources

          Geology and paleontological resources

          Water resources

        The Proposed Action would have a potentially significant impact on
    socioeconomic conditions and environmental justice communities near
    Vandenberg AFB if that installation is selected for implementation.
    This impact and proposed mitigation measures are discussed below.
        Because this potentially significant socioeconomic impact would
    have no interrelated physical environmental effects, it would not, in
    and of itself, require the preparation of an Environmental Impact
    Statement as stated in the CEQ regulations at 40 CFR 1508.14.
    Transportation (EA Sec.  4.2, page 4.2-1)
        The Proposed Action would generate additional construction-related
    traffic in the short term, but the number and frequency of additional
    vehicles traveling to and from the project site would vary during the
    construction phase. The additional volume of construction-related
    traffic would be proportionate to the scale of the facilities being
    renovated or built to accommodate the interim and permanent facilities,
    and would not be particularly unusual.
        In the long term, the Proposed Action would increase commuter
    traffic volumes on and off the selected installation(s), and require
    minor improvements to installation roads to provide vehicular access to
    the proposed interim and permanent facilities. However, these traffic
    increases would not exceed the existing capacity of the vehicular
    transportation network on or outside the selected installation(s), or
    noticeably contribute to the degradation of traffic conditions outside
    the installation.
        Therefore, short-term and long-term impacts on transportation from
    the Proposed Action would be negligible or minor, and would not be
    significant.
    Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste (EA Sec.  4.3, page 4.3-1)
        Hazardous materials and hazardous and non-hazardous solid wastes
    used and generated, respectively, during the Proposed Action's
    construction and operational phases would be managed in accordance with
    applicable Federal, State, local, and Air Force regulatory
    requirements; would be small in the context of such substances present
    on the selected installation(s); and would not exceed the selected
    installation's capacity to manage them, nor the capacity of licensed
    disposal facilities outside the installation to accept and dispose of
    them. To the extent possible, recyclable construction debris would be
    segregated from the non-recyclable waste stream in accordance with
    applicable Air Force/installation policies. Implementation of the
    Proposed Action would not delay or prevent the continued management and
    remediation of Environmental Restoration Program sites on the selected
    installation(s), and would not result in changes to the selected
    installation's Environmental Protection Agency generator status.
        Therefore, short-term and long-term impacts from hazardous
    materials and hazardous waste from the Proposed Action would be
    negligible or minor, and would not be significant. In the long term,
    remediation of contaminated soils or hazardous materials underlying or
    at the selected site alternatives would represent a beneficial effect
    on hazardous waste management.
    Socioeconomics and Environmental Justice (EA Sec.  4.4, page 4.3-1)
        The Proposed Action would have positive short-term socioeconomic
    impacts in jurisdictions adjacent to or near the selected
    installation(s) from employment, sales, and tax revenues generated by
    construction activities. Construction-related impacts with the
    potential to disproportionately affect environmental justice
    populations or concentrations of children would not extend beyond the
    boundaries of the selected interim and permanent sites, and therefore,
    would have no potential to affect those communities.
        Implementation of the Proposed Action would not result in
    significant long-term socioeconomic impacts for any of the proposed
    candidate sites, apart from Vandenberg AFB. The nearest sizable
    municipalities to each installation except Vandenberg AFB have an
    existing supply of public and private services to meet the needs of the
    1,870 staff that would be assigned to the proposed facilities.
        Nearly 20 percent of the population in the cities of Lompoc and
    Santa Maria, California lived below the poverty line in 2017, and
    upwards of 60 percent of households that rent spend 30 percent or more
    of their income on rent. Any sizable increase in demand for housing
    that is not closely matched by an increase in supply would be expected
    to result in an increase in housing and rental prices. Low-income
    populations, which have less discretionary income compared to high-
    income populations, would face disproportionate impacts if there is
    increased competition for housing. The current housing supply and
    associated public and private services in those cities would not be
    able to meet the demands of the new population required for the
    Proposed Action at Vandenberg AFB.
        To mitigate potentially significant and/or disproportionately
    adverse effects on low-income and environmental justice communities in
    the vicinity of Vandenberg AFB from the Proposed Action, and ensure
    such impacts remain less than significant, the Air Force will
    incorporate one or more of the following measures in the Proposed
    Action:

          Develop a plan for identifying and tracking locally
    available housing options that can help to meet the demand associated
    with new (out of region) personnel assigned to support long term
    operations of the proposed action;

          Continue to dedicate staff resources to assist new (out
    of region) personnel in securing housing;

          Work to identify persons currently living in the region
    to meet some level of the operational staffing needs; and/or

          Collaborate with public (e.g., cities) and private (e.g.,
    developers) entities in the region that have the capacity and desire to
    develop new housing.

        This potentially significant socioeconomic impact would have no
    interrelated physical environmental effects. Therefore, as stated in
    the CEQ regulations at 40 CFR 1508.14, it would not, in and of itself,
    require the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement.
        No mitigation measures would be required at the other candidate
    installations because impacts on socioeconomic conditions and
    environmental justice communities would not be significant.
    Air Quality (EA Sec.  4.5, page 4.5-1)
        Short-term and long-term emissions from the Proposed Action of
    criteria pollutants regulated by the National Ambient Air Quality
    Standards under the Clean Air Act would remain below de minimis levels,
    and would not contribute to the further degradation of air quality such
    that attainment areas would be classified as non-attainment or
    maintenance, or delay or prevent the attainment of air quality
    standards in maintenance or non-attainment areas. A formal general
    conformity determination for the Proposed Action is not required. If
    implemented at Vandenberg AFB, emissions from the Proposed Action would
    remain below California daily significance thresholds. Emissions of
    Hazardous Air Pollutants (HAPs) from the Proposed Action would be
    higher relative to the No Action Alternative; however, de minimis
    levels have not been established for HAP emissions.
        Each of the candidate installations is anticipated to be affected
    by global climate change to varying degrees. Emissions from the
    Proposed Action would contribute to climate change. However, given the
    magnitude of anticipated GHG emissions, the impact on cumulative global
    climate change would be low. Although sea level rise is anticipated to
    affect Vandenberg AFB, effects on the Proposed Action, if implemented
    at the installation, would be minimal because the proposed interim and/
    or permanent facilities would be well inland.
    Biological Resources (EA Sec.  4.6, page 4.6-1)
        Vegetation impacts would be contained entirely within the
    boundaries of the selected sites and/or utility and transportation
    corridors where improvements are made to accommodate the proposed
    facilities. Vegetation removed to construct the interim and permanent
    facilities would constitute a small portion of existing vegetation on
    the selected installation(s) and surrounding region. Areas of the
    project sites not built on or otherwise developed would be revegetated
    in accordance with the installation's landscape design guidelines. The
    introduction or spread of non-native or invasive species would be
    prevented or minimized by adherence to each installation's Integrated
    Natural Resources Management Plan, and/or other applicable policy
    documents.
        Construction of the proposed facilities would remove habitat; and
    displace, and in some limited cases, potentially destroy individuals of
    common wildlife species. Although these would be adverse effects, they
    would occur at the individual rather than population or species level,
    and would not threaten the continued propagation of common wildlife
    species. Mobile individuals would likely relocate to other areas of
    suitable habitat that would remain near the selected sites. Individual
    animals adapted to urbanized environments or high degrees of human
    activity would potentially return to the interim and permanent sites
    once construction activities have ended.
        Adherence to site-specific stormwater pollution prevention plans
    (SWPPPs), erosion and sediment control plans, and/or stormwater
    management plans that would be prepared by the construction contractor
    in accordance with National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
    permit requirements applicable to the selected installation(s) would
    prevent or minimize the potential for the degradation of water quality
    in receiving waterbodies and corresponding impacts on aquatic species.
        Implementation of the Proposed Action would not involve the
    disturbance or filling of jurisdictional wetlands.
        No federally listed species have been documented on the proposed
    interim and permanent sites. State-listed species, species of special
    concern, and/or migratory birds are known or suspected to be present on
    a number of the sites, particularly those in Colorado. Suitable habitat
    for special-status species also is present on a number of site
    alternatives. As applicable, vegetation clearing on the selected sites
    would occur outside of applicable time-of-year (TOY) restriction
    periods to avoid impacts on special-status species. If construction
    must occur during the TOY period, surveys for special-status species
    would be conducted onsites where such species or their habitat are
    known or suspected to be present. If the surveys confirm the presence
    of special-status species, the Air Force would conduct additional
    consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and/or other
    applicable Federal and State regulatory agencies to develop avoidance
    and mitigation measures.
        The operation of the proposed interim and permanent facilities
    would not involve ongoing disturbance of common and special-status
    plant and animal species.
        Therefore, short-term and long-term impacts on biological resources
    from the Proposed Action would be negligible or minor, and would not be
    significant.
    Cultural Resources (EA Sec.  4.7, page 4.7-1)
        No known archaeological resources eligible for listing in the
    National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) identified at the candidate
    installations would be directly or indirectly affected by
    implementation of the Proposed Action. Given prior land-disturbing
    activities conducted on and around site alternatives, unanticipated
    discoveries are not likely, and the potential for unearthing previously
    undocumented resources is low to moderate. In the event of inadvertent
    discoveries of undocumented cultural resources, ground-disturbing work
    would stop immediately and policies in the selected installation's
    Integrated Cultural Resources Management Plan would be implemented to
    preserve and document the discovery, thereby ensuring that impacts
    would not be significant.
        No identified NRHP-eligible buildings would be directly affected by
    implementation of the Proposed Action. Physical alterations proposed
    for unevaluated buildings in Interim Site Alternative 1 at Vandenberg
    AFB would be limited to interior renovations. Therefore, no significant
    direct impacts on the historic built environment under any of the
    proposed interim and permanent site alternatives are anticipated.
        No buildings at Buckley AFB, Schriever AFB, Peterson AFB, and
    Vandenberg AFB that were considered for potential visual or other
    indirect effects appear to be eligible for the NRHP. Building 4381 at
    Redstone Arsenal has been extensively modified and is separated from
    Interim Site Alternative 2 by a forested area. Therefore, Building 4381
    would not be indirectly affected by implementation of Interim Site
    Alternative 2.
        The Air Force has proposed the preparation of a project-specific
    Programmatic Agreement (pPA) to the Colorado State Historic
    Preservation Officer (SHPO) as allowed for in 36 CFR 800.14(b)(1)(ii)
    ``when effects on historic properties cannot be fully determined prior
    to approval of an undertaking.'' If a site alternative in Colorado is
    selected for implementation of the Proposed Action, the pPA would
    commit the Air Force to conducting additional Section 106 consultation
    following signature of the FONSI (if appropriate based on the analysis
    presented in the EA), but prior to beginning construction of the
    proposed facility. The Colorado SHPO has concurred that a pPA for the
    Proposed Action is appropriate, and agreed to participate in its
    development.
        The Alabama and California SHPOs will be provided with a copy of
    the Draft EA for review and comment during the 30-day public comment
    period.
        As of 2019, no Traditional Cultural Places, sacred sites, or items
    of cultural patrimony have been identified at any of the proposed
    interim and permanent sites. Consultation letters were sent in May and
    June 2019 to federally recognized Native American tribes with historic
    affiliations to the geographic areas of Redstone Arsenal and the
    Colorado candidate installations. To date, three tribes have requested
    to be a consulting party to the Proposed Action. Letters announcing the
    availability of the EA and Draft FONSI for public review will be sent
    during the 30-day public comment period to all federally recognized
    tribes initially consulted in May and June 2019.
        Therefore, through ongoing consultation and adherence to applicable
    cultural resource management policies at the selected installation(s),
    the Proposed Action would have no or negligible impacts on NRHP-
    eligible archaeological and architectural resources, or on areas of
    tribal concern. Impacts would not be significant.
    Geological and Paleontological Resources (EA Sec.  4.8, page 4.8-1)
        Construction of the Proposed Action would have the potential to
    disturb soils and alter topography on the selected interim and
    permanent sites. The extent of ground disturbance from site preparation
    associated with the proposed interim and permanent facilities would
    vary depending on the sites that are ultimately selected. Such
    disturbance from an interim alternative involving the use of modular
    buildings would be minimal relative to construction of the proposed
    permanent facility. All interim and permanent site alternatives are
    previously disturbed; do not contain pristine or unique soils; and are
    not considered Prime Farmland. Soils exposed on the sites for extended
    periods would be revegetated to prevent or minimize erosion by wind and
    water. Clean fill soils with properties supporting the proposed
    construction would be imported to the selected sites as necessary to
    supplement or replace soils considered unsuitable for development.
    Soils containing hazardous substances exceeding applicable regulatory
    thresholds (e.g., petroleum constituents) would be removed from the
    selected sites and transported to licensed disposal facilities outside
    the installation(s) for disposal.
        Ground-disturbing activities on the selected interim and permanent
    site alternatives would alter existing topography to provide level
    construction surfaces. The extent of alteration would vary based on the
    site(s) that are ultimately selected; however, all of the proposed
    interim and permanent sites are relatively flat, previously disturbed,
    and do not contain unique, pristine, or noteworthy topographic
    features. The selected interim and permanent sites would be regraded as
    necessary to achieve positive surface drainage post-construction.
        The extent and nature of effects on subsurface geology from
    construction of deep foundations for the permanent facility would be
    determined by site-specific soil properties and depth to bedrock.
    Geotechnical studies would be conducted following selection of the
    permanent site to determine the extent of foundation support required.
    No unique or noteworthy geologic strata would be affected, because none
    are present under any of the permanent site alternatives. Excavation
    associated with construction of the proposed interim facility would be
    relatively shallow (i.e., no more than a few feet at most), and would
    have no potential to affect underlying geologic strata.
        All ground disturbance associated with the Proposed Action's
    construction phase would be limited to the selected interim and
    permanent sites, and discrete areas of the respective installation(s)
    where associated infrastructure and/or road improvements would occur.
    Ground disturbance would be proportionate to the scale of the
    facilities being constructed, and would not be particularly unusual in
    the context of facility construction projects of similar type and scale
    that occur with relative frequency at each of the candidate
    installations.
        If an interim and/or permanent site alternative with a higher
    likelihood for paleontological resources to be present is selected for
    the Proposed Action, additional surveys for such resources would be
    conducted prior to ground-disturbing activities, as determined
    necessary through coordination between the Air Force and the selected
    installation(s). In the event of inadvertent discovery of previously
    undocumented paleontological resources during construction of the
    proposed facilities, all ground-disturbing work would immediately stop,
    and procedures specified in the selected installation's Integrated
    Cultural Resources Management Plan would be implemented to preserve and
    document the discovery.
        Interim site alternatives only involving the use of existing,
    vacant office space (i.e., Redstone Arsenal Interim Site Alternative 1)
    would have no potential to disturb geological or paleontological
    resources.
        The Proposed Action does not involve mineral extraction or the
    ongoing disturbance of geological or paleontological resources. Soils
    not built on or otherwise developed would be revegetated to minimize or
    prevent continued erosion. The proposed permanent facility, and to the
    extent possible, the proposed interim facility, would be built in
    accordance with seismic reinforcement requirements applicable to the
    selected locations.
        Therefore, short-term impacts on geological and paleontological
    resources from the Proposed Action would be negligible or minor, and
    would not be significant. There would be no long-term impacts.
    Water Resources (EA Sec.  4.9, page 4.9-1)
        Construction and operation of the Proposed Action would not involve
    redirecting, channeling, damming, draining, spanning, or withdrawals
    from surface waterbodies; withdrawals or intentional discharge or
    injection of pollutants to groundwater; or disturbance of the 100-year
    floodplain.
        Contractors would adhere to site-specific erosion and sediment
    control plans, Stormwater Management plans, and SWPPPs, in accordance
    with applicable Federal, State, and local regulatory requirements,
    including the applicable requirements of each installation's National
    Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit, to minimize
    concentrations of sediments and pollutants in stormwater discharged
    from the constructionsites, and corresponding degradation of water
    quality in receiving waterbodies.
        All areas of the sites not built on, paved, or otherwise developed
    would be revegetated in accordance with the selected installation's
    landscape design and planting guidelines; or would otherwise be
    maintained in a permeable condition to minimize or eliminate the
    potential for further impacts from erosion of exposed soils and
    degradation of downstream water quality.
        Potential increases in stormwater volume generated on the proposed
    interim and permanent sites resulting from an increase in impervious
    surface would be managed in accordance with the policies and
    requirements of the selected installation's SWPPP and other applicable
    policy documents, thereby ensuring that runoff from the proposed
    facilities would have no potential to contribute to exceedances of
    water quality thresholds in receiving waterbodies. Stormwater
    management infrastructure on or near the selected permanent and interim
    modular site alternatives would be installed or upgraded as necessary
    to account for any additional stormwater volume generated by the
    proposed facility. Incorporation of low-impact development measures in
    accordance with Section 438 of the EISA would maintain the pre-
    development hydrology of the site to the maximum extent technically
    feasible, further minimizing impacts.
        Hazardous materials and hazardous waste used and generated,
    respectively, during construction and operation of the Proposed Action
    would be managed in accordance with label directions and the selected
    installation's applicable policies, including those specified in its
    Hazardous Waste Management Plan and Spill Prevention, Control, and
    Countermeasures Plan, thereby minimizing or preventing the migration of
    hazardous substances to groundwater or receiving surface waterbodies.
    Adherence to these requirements would prevent or minimize the potential
    for accidental spills or releases of hazardous substances.
        Therefore, short-term and long-term impacts on water resources from
    the Proposed Action would be negligible or minor, and would not be
    significant.
    Cumulative Impacts (EA Sec.  4.13, page 4.13-1)
        The Proposed Action analyzed in this EA would have short-and long-
    term, negligible or minor cumulative impacts on transportation,
    hazardous materials and waste, air quality, biological resources,
    cultural resources, geology and soils, and water resources. It is
    anticipated that impacts on those resources from Federal and non-
    Federal projects of similar type and scale occurring on and near the
    selected installation(s) would be similar. Short-term, beneficial
    cumulative impacts on socioeconomics would occur at all installations
    except for Vandenberg AFB, which would experience long-term,
    potentially significant cumulative impacts on socioeconomics and
    environmental justice due to collective demand on housing. Impacts on
    environmental justice communities near Vandenberg AFB, if selected for
    implementation of the Proposed Action, would require mitigation by the
    Air Force; it is anticipated that such impacts from similar Federal and
    non-Federal projects on and near Vandenberg AFB would be similarly
    mitigated through conditions of development granted by Federal, State,
    and local regulatory authorities.
                mitigation and environmental management actions
        The Proposed Action would potentially have significant adverse
    impacts on socioeconomic conditions and environmental justice
    populations near Vandenberg AFB if that installation is selected for
    implementation. Therefore, the Air Force will incorporate one or more
    of the following mitigation measures in the Proposed Action to ensure
    such impacts remain less than significant if the Proposed Action is
    implemented at Vandenberg AFB:

          Develop a plan for identifying and tracking locally
    available housing options that can help to meet the demand associated
    with new (out of region) personnel assigned to support long term
    operations of the proposed action;

          Continue to dedicate staff resources to assist new (out
    of region) personnel in securing housing;

          Work to identify persons currently living in the region
    to meet some level of the operational staffing needs; and/or

          Collaborate with public (e.g., cities) and private (e.g.,
    developers) entities in the region that have the capacity and desire to
    develop new housing.

        As stated in the CEQ regulations at 40 CFR 1508.14, this
    potentially significant socioeconomic impact would have no interrelated
    physical environmental effects, and therefore would not require, in and
    of itself, the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement.
        There would be no significant impacts on other resources analyzed
    in the EA. Therefore, mitigation measures for impacts on those
    resources would not be required.
        To prevent or minimize potential adverse effects on special-status
    species from the Proposed Action, vegetation clearing required on the
    selected sites would be conducted outside applicable TOY restriction
    periods to prevent the removal suitable habitat. Species surveys would
    be conducted prior to construction if special-status species are
    suspected to be present on the selected sites, and vegetation clearing
    must be conducted during TOY restriction periods. If special-status
    species are determined to be present, mitigation or avoidance measures
    would be developed through additional consultation with U.S. Fish and
    Wildlife Service and/or other Federal and State regulatory agencies.
                                   conclusion
        Based on the provisions set forth in the Proposed Action, the
    proposed activities were found to comply with the criteria or standards
    of environmental quality, and coordinated with the appropriate Federal,
    State, and local agencies. The attached EA and a draft of this Finding
    of No Significant Impact (FONSI) were made available to the public on
    24 July 2019 for a 30-day review period.
                        finding of no significant impact
        After review of the attached EA, prepared in accordance with the
    requirements of NEPA; CEQ regulations; and 32 CFR Part 989,
    Environmental Impact Analysis Process, and which is hereby incorporated
    by reference, I have determined that the Proposed Action would not have
    a significant impact on the quality of the human or natural environment
    with the incorporation of applicable mitigation measures. Accordingly,
    an Environmental Impact Statement will not be prepared. This decision
    has been made after taking into account all submitted information, and
    considering a full range of practical alternatives that would meet
    project requirements and are within the legal authority of the U.S. Air
    Force. The signing of this FONSI completes the environmental impact
    analysis process.

    Michelle A. Linn, GS-15,---------------- ............. -Date------------
    DAFC Chief, Engineering Division.......
    Command Civil Engineer.................

    Attachment:
    Environmental Assessment for Construction and Operation of USSPACECOM
    Headquarters Facility, Multiple Department of Defense Installations,
    United States.

        Senator Tuberville. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville.
        Senator Peters, please.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen,
    thank you for being here today, for your testimony, and thank
    you for your service.
        General Dickinson, your posture statement provided a very
    detailed account of the significant progress that SPACECOM has
    made with some partners and allies all over the world. The
    illegal and unjust Russian invasion of Ukraine has certainly
    renewed NATO's sense of purpose. I think we would all agree on
    that. It is very encouraging to see, and it has driven some of
    our key allies to make some sorely needed changes, I think, in
    their security posture.
        My question for you, sir, is with this increased appetite
    for defense cooperation around the free world, what should we
    be doing in the coming years to expand on this even more in the
    space domain?
        General Dickinson. Thank you. That is one of the highlights
    in the Command, I think, over the last 2, 2\1/2\ years, is our
    ability to work with our allies and partners. It has really,
    quite frankly, exploded in terms of our partners coming to the
    table and wanting to be part of the efforts that we are working
    around the world. An example is our Combined Space Operations
    group that we have called CSpOC, just signed a vision statement
    that came out a couple of weeks ago. But that is an example of
    the growing, if you will, the expansion of our partnership.
        Just as an example, there are three different countries
    right now that have actually stood up their own version of U.S.
    Space Command. So the enterprise itself is growing, and the
    willingness to work is just like we have seen in other domains,
    for example, so air, land, and sea. But they are really coming
    and we are working closely together, and it is probably, when
    you look at our integrated deterrence strategy, one of the
    pillars of that is being able to leverage our allies and
    partners in not only situations we are seeing today but ones
    that we do each and every day.
        Senator Peters. Great. Great. General Dickinson, as you
    know, on March 3rd, Russia stated that they will withhold
    delivery of the RD-180 engines that are used by some United
    States defense industries as part of the Atlas V launch system.
    While it certainly appears that this development will not
    significantly hinder any launching operations, I think it
    certainly underscores the importance of supply chain integrity.
    Semiconductors, for example, are a known liability all across
    the many domains.
        So my question for you, sir, is are there additional space-
    specific material or technologies supplied by either Russia or
    China that could result in degraded military readiness, if
    withheld?
        General Dickinson. Not that I am aware of.
        Senator Peters. Great. Admiral Richard, you indicated in
    your posture statement that while STRATCOM academic alliance is
    an excellent asset, with over 70 academic and industrial
    partners, quote, ``It is only a fraction of what is needed to
    reinvigorate research and analysis for deterrence concepts,''
    end of quote.
        My question for you, sir, is what additional ways can we
    leverage the power of American and allied defense industry and
    academia to maintain our strategic edge?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, first, beyond the academic
    alliance what we did at STRATCOM was put together an analytic
    agenda. What are the key questions that we need research done
    on--three-party deterrence dynamics would be an excellent
    example of that--so that we can harness the power of the
    Department of Defense, and the Nation more broadly? Think your
    UARCs, your FFRDCs [Federally Funded Research and Development
    Centers ], other places where we can do that.
        But even that, this is bigger than one combatant command. I
    think this is a broader Department of Defense or national
    issue. I am reminded, this Nation invented the entire Rand
    Corporation to do not much more than think through deterrence
    back in the Cold War. We face an even bigger problem. I think
    it is going to need an equivalent national-level response.
        Senator Peters. Great. Great. Well, I agree. Admiral
    Richard, you outlined how establishment of the Joint EMS
    Operation Center will facilitate joint electromagnetic spectrum
    operations throughout the Department of Defense and combatant
    commands. But as the electromagnetic spectrum is just as vital
    in terms of homeland security, how do you see the Joint EMS
    Operation Center working with non-DOD agencies as well?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, first, I applaud where my
    Department is going in understanding the importance of
    electromagnetic spectrum and the fact that we cannot take it
    for granted anymore. It is a contested, congested space. There
    is an EMS superiority strategy that our Secretary just signed
    out. We are responsible for a piece of it. You are hitting on
    that. We are the operational proponent, and so first we work to
    make sure that the standards and certification inside the
    Department in our forces are sufficient. We are moving out on
    that. We provide support, and we are doing that right now, in
    electromagnetic spectrum operations.
        But fundamentally what I do is come back in and provide the
    operational consequence of programmatic decisions. Those
    changes those decisions to our benefit.
        Senator Peters. Great. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters.
        Senator Scott, please.
        Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman. First of all I want to
    thank both of you for your clarity and for your commitment to
    the freedoms of this country.
        So Admiral Richard, as we all know we are in a position
    where we have to deter two nuclear-armed, great power
    adversaries, Russia and China. First off, based on the funding
    you received and based on how the Congress has been acting
    since you have had this job, do you feel comfortable that
    Congress has your back that we are going to provide you the
    resources that you are going to be able to deter both Russia
    and Communist China?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, first, I would applaud my
    Department because over the course of my tour we are now able
    to say, and I expect this in the next budget, but the last one
    was one of the first ones we could say not only was the
    strategic deterrent forces fully funded, so was the nuclear
    command and control, which are the two pieces inside the
    Department of Defense. We are going to need to continue to do
    that. Additionally, Senator, continue to ask ourselves the
    question, what additional capability, capacity, and posture
    might we need to do?
        So yes, I think Congress, as you said, ``has my back'' if
    we would pass a budget. The budgets are adequate. We just need
    them enacted.
        Senator Scott. So right now do you think we have enough
    capability to prevent Russia and Communist China from
    intimidating us and our allies?
        Admiral Richard. Sir, my forces are ready right now to do
    anything the President asks us to do.
        Senator Scott. Admiral Richard, you have been watching
    Putin's statements, and you might not be able to answer all
    these questions, about his potential use of nuclear weapons. So
    I have got a couple of questions. The first one is, have you
    seen any tangible operational changes following Putin's order
    to increase the readiness of his nuclear forces?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, I would like to answer that
    question in closed session, but I will say we have been
    thinking through this class of problem for years.
        Senator Scott. Second, given your experience of observing
    foreign leaders, which would be part of your job, in your
    personal opinion do you believe America and our allies,
    especially other nuclear powers, should treat Putin's words and
    actions as a legitimate indication that he is crazy enough and
    willing to employ nuclear weapons of any kind?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, I will go into more detail in the
    closed session, but I would look to his previous actions to
    give us a clue as to what his future ones might be.
        Senator Scott. I see. The things that he said outside his
    nuclear capability, has he basically followed through?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, again, I would prefer to answer
    that in closed session.
        Senator Scott. Thank you. General Dickinson, is the United
    States fully treating our outer space as a warfighting domain,
    and are we developing systems consistent with that policy to
    combat and be able to defeat Russia and Communist China in
    their space capabilities?
        General Dickinson. We certainly have seen some activity by
    both Russia and China over the last few years, going back to
    2007 and 2008, when the Chinese destroyed a satellite on orbit,
    and then just as recently as November, with the Russian Nudol
    event that occurred. So we can see, at least from our
    competitor standpoint, they are, in fact, doing testing and
    development in that domain.
        Senator Scott. It seems like there are people who are
    trying to talk about we ought to cooperate with these
    adversaries, but don't they need to know that we are going to
    deter and defeat them in space and we have to be willing to do
    everything we can to be able to beat them?
        General Dickinson. Well, I think, Senator, that each and
    every day that we are operating in space we are doing that very
    thing in terms of deterrence.
        Senator Scott. Do you feel like you have been given the
    resources to be able to do that?
        General Dickinson. I have the resources that I need to
    perform my mission today.
        Senator Scott. So I believe that Communist China and Russia
    plan to use outer space against us. So what is your biggest
    concern about their plans, and what do we need to do that we
    are not doing?
        General Dickinson. Well, it is fundamental, Senator, back
    to my opening statement when I said in order to be able to
    articulate what is happening I have got to have exquisite
    domain awareness, exquisite domain awareness. I need to be able
    to tell you what I see in the space domain, in terms of space
    domain awareness, as a critical function of that to be able to
    interpret what is happening so that I can make recommendations
    and take actions that I need to.
        Senator Scott. General Dickinson, I know that Space Force
    was recently created, but do you feel like you have had
    sufficient progress toward integrating these capabilities all
    across the Pentagon?
        General Dickinson. Senator that is a great question. Our
    relationship with the Space Force is as you would expect it to
    be. We have got a very close relationship with General Raymond
    and his team in terms of being the service that provides most
    of my capability to the combatant command. We are also working
    with the other services because they, in fact, have
    capabilities that I can use in the space domain as well.
        So it is really not just the relationship and integration
    with Space Force. It is across the Department to each one of
    the services.
        Senator Scott. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Reed.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott.
        Senator Cotton, please.
        Senator Cotton. Admiral Richard, last fall, and again today
    in your opening statement, you referred to a Chinese breakout--
    ``breakout'' was your term--of nuclear weapons and
    capabilities. Could you please explain a little bit more, just
    in plain English? I am not sure a normal American watching
    would understand what a ``breakout'' means. Explain a little
    more in plain English what you mean and its implications for
    our security.
        Admiral Richard. Senator, so first that is not a talking
    point. I formally informed the Secretary of Defense of that
    fact last year. There are two components that I can talk about
    here. I would be happy to go into more detail in closed
    session.
        First is it signals a significant shift in their capability
    and fundamentally their strategy. China has long been in a
    minimum deterrence posture, which was consistent with their
    stated no-first-use policy. They now have significantly more
    capability than is necessary to execute a minimum deterrence
    strategy, and enables them now to execute any plausible nuclear
    employment strategy.
        Second is on our side. It drove me to have to take
    operational actions in response to a dramatic change in the
    threat, and I will go into more detail as to what those were in
    closed session.
        Senator Cotton. So despite their so-called no-first-use
    policy, they are building a nuclear arsenal capable of
    executing a first strike.
        Admiral Richard. One, Senator, they have plenty of
    capability that have no role in a true minimum deterrence
    strategy, and, in fact, there is no technical difference
    between a system that is designed to go first or to go second.
    There are attributes that enable that, but we need to be very
    conscious of what they could do with it, not what they say they
    are going to do with it.
        Senator Cotton. So I think we should focus on what they are
    spending and what they are building than rather on what they
    are saying, because they could change their no-first-use policy
    like that, could they not?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, yes, and I put no more credence
    in that than I did in the Soviet Union's no-first-use policy.
        Senator Cotton. All right, Admiral. Earlier this year,
    media reports suggested that the Biden administration wanted to
    cut two nuclear systems from America's arsenal. These were so-
    called non-strategic nuclear weapons, weapons with smaller
    explosive yields, designed often to be used against military
    formations. It this reporting accurate? Were there discussions
    to cut the Whiskey 76-2 and the sea-launched cruise missile,
    also known as the SLCM?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, all the capabilities in our
    deterrence portfolio were examined inside the Nuclear Posture
    Review (NPR). Those are included in that, and I look forward to
    the results of the NPR to see what the decisions were.
        Senator Cotton. When is the NPR going to be released?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, I would have to defer you to OSD
    for that answer. But I do want to make a point about those
    capabilities in particular, which is every capability that is
    in the U.S. arsenal is therefore a reason. It is designed to
    produce an effect against an assessed threat. If we do not have
    a capability, the threat that drove it to be there still
    exists, and so we either as a Nation have to choose to take the
    risk that we can achieve that effect or we have to go find
    another way to go do that, and that is something we are going
    to continue to have to do, even after we finish the Nuclear
    Posture Review. I can give you more details, sir, in closed
    session.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you. I agree with that, and I agree
    that we are, to a degree, self-deterring while we are letting
    Russia run wild on non-strategic nuclear weapons, yet we are
    considering cutting our own.
        I want to turn to the cancelled test in recent days.
    Admiral, it is correct that we have routinely conducted unarmed
    tests for our Minutemen-III missiles and that we give Russia
    advance notice to those tests. Correct?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, that is correct, for a long time.
        Senator Cotton. They are routine. They are scheduled well
    in advance. Correct?
        Admiral Richard. Yes, they are, sir.
        Senator Cotton. We cancelled one of those in the last week.
    Correct?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, we rescheduled it.
        Senator Cotton. So let me ask you this. These tests are a
    critical part of keeping our nuclear deterrent healthy and
    viable. Right?
        Admiral Richard. Senator that is a 50-year-old weapon we
    are talking about. I need those tests, and actually I want to
    acknowledge they are Air Force tests, for us to maintain
    confidence in the reliability.
        Senator Cotton. So you can say we rescheduled it, but there
    is a detailed and longstanding testing schedule. So what we
    really did was cancel it. Did we cancel that test because we
    did not want to, quote/unquote, ``escalate with Russia''?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, we are trying very hard not to
    send any escalatory signals at this point. My recommendation,
    in general, has been to maintain our routine, normal, scheduled
    operations. I think we are all very familiar, and that is the
    best posture for us to be in. We very carefully think through
    those to maintain our readiness and to maintain our training,
    and demonstrate that. So my recommendation overall is that we
    maintain that cadence.
        Senator Cotton. I am glad you recommended that. Do you know
    who, above your rank, decided not to accept that recommendation
    of this test?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, I would like----
        Senator Cotton. Was it the Secretary or----
        Admiral Richard.--to maintain private my specific
    recommendations in this case.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. I will just say that there is nothing
    escalatory about longstanding, long-scheduled, routine tests
    that Russia knows about in advance, and it is just another
    example of how we have mistaken actions that would have de-
    escalated this situation rather than escalated it. This is not
    within your combatant command, but if we had been sending all
    the missiles to Ukraine over the last five months that we had
    been sending on an emergency basis for the last two weeks, I
    know that some people fear that that might cause Vladimir Putin
    to invade Ukraine, but how foolish does that look now? I think
    it also is a bad signal not to continue our routine nuclear
    testing.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
        Senator Hawley, please.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
    gentlemen, both for being here. Thank you for your service as
    always. Admiral, if I could start with you, just a basic
    question here. You were just testifying to Senator Cotton.
    China is a nuclear power, right?
        Admiral Richard. A near-peer.
        Senator Hawley. Russia is a nuclear power.
        Admiral Richard. Yes, sir.
        Senator Hawley. You were just amplifying to Senator Cotton
    your testimony about China being in the midst of a strategic
    breakout. We see Vladimir Putin making now explicit nuclear
    threats. Is this a good time to weaken our own nuclear
    deterrent?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, recapitalization of what we have
    today is the absolutely minimum that we need to do, and we are
    going to need to further ask ourselves if any else in posture
    capability and capacity is warranted based on change in threat
    and what we are learning out of crisis deterrence dynamics
    right now.
        Senator Hawley. Absolute minimum, you testified. I think
    that is very important. Am I right in thinking that our nuclear
    forces remain the bedrock of our strategic deterrent?
        Admiral Richard. Not only our strategic deterrent, Senator,
    but it is integral and foundational to integrated deterrence.
        Senator Hawley. Including our ability to project power and
    to manage escalation beneath the nuclear threshold. That is
    what you are talking about, I think.
        Admiral Richard. Senator, no other plan or no other
    capability in the Department of Defense is going to work if I
    cannot maintain strategic and nuclear deterrence.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. Let me ask your about something
    you wrote in your testimony. You said prioritizing the crucial
    NNSA infrastructure modernization programs is the best and only
    option to pace projected threats and sustain strategic
    deterrence. We have got, in my state, in the state of Missouri,
    we have got the Kansas City National Security Campus which
    supports the nuclear deterrent. We are very proud of that.
        Can you explain why it is important for us to fully fund
    NNSA infrastructure modernization?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, we have reached the point where
    we can no longer deter with the leftovers of the Cold War. We
    have life-extended them to the maximum extent possible. We must
    now start to recapitalize, remanufacture those. That requires a
    very robust infrastructure. We are 10 years behind the point
    where we needed to start recapitalizing the infrastructure, and
    that is NNSA and actually the rest of the complex. The
    consequence is we simply will not have the capabilities that we
    are going to have to have to deter the threat environment we
    are in.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you for that. You told
    me--switching back to China, Admiral, you said during an
    appearance before this committee in 2019, to me, that China had
    the capabilities required to threaten or to actually use
    nuclear strikes to compel the United States to surrender in a
    potential war over Taiwan. We know that since then China has
    continued, and you just testified to this, China has continued
    to develop its nuclear forces in theater, and Chinese
    strategists are showing interest in changing their doctrine and
    also in the need for lower-yield nuclear weapons in order to
    increase the deterrence value of China's force.
        Is it fair to say that China's ability to engage in limited
    nuclear employment at the theater level is growing?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, not only yes, if you will ask me
    that in closed session I will give you a very vivid example of
    what that could do to us.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. If you could just explain for
    us, why are limited nuclear options like, for instance, the
    supplemental capabilities endorsed by the 2018 Nuclear Posture
    Review, why are those so important for deterring China or, for
    that matter, any other adversary that wants to use non-
    strategic nuclear weapons to coerce us?
        Admiral Richard. Limited nuclear use is deterred
    differently than the way you deter the classic large attack,
    and it is designed to make sure that the opponent does not
    think that there is some threshold below which they could use
    the nuclear effect, leaving us with a disproportionate response
    that ultimately winds up self-deterring us.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. General, let me switch to you,
    just in the time I have remaining here. Thomas Shugart, an
    analyst, and others have shown that the PLA is preparing to
    engage in a large-scale, pre-emptive strike operation at the
    outside, or would be prepared to engage at the outset of any
    conflict over Taiwan that we may find ourselves in, in an
    attempt to cripple our ability to project power in the Western
    Pacific.
        It seems to me we have got to assume Beijing may be
    incentivized to strike pre-emptively in space as well, which
    brings me to my question. What are the most important things
    that Congress can do this year to support SPACECOM's efforts to
    bolster the resilience of our architecture in space over the
    next 5 years?
        General Dickinson. Thank you, Senator. So it boils down to,
    and Admiral Richard touched on it, is that predictable funding.
    So when I look at the size of the enterprise and the
    requirements and capabilities that we need, it all boils down
    to having a consistent stream of funding that will allow the
    Space Force and the other services to provide the capabilities
    that I will need.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. My time has expired. Gentlemen,
    thank you both again for your testimony. Thank you for your
    service to this country.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, General. The
    open portion of this hearing will adjourn, and we will
    reconvene in SVC-217, in approximately 15 minutes, and that
    would be 11:50 by my watch, roughly.
        This portion is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:36 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                            national guard in space
        1. Senator Shaheen. General Dickinson, the Fiscal Year 2022
    National Defense Authorization Act asks for additional information from
    Department of Defense about the establishment of a Space National
    Guard. When do you plan to brief the Senate Armed Services Committee on
    the results from the report?
        General Dickinson. National Guard and Reserve members are an
    invaluable part of our team, with representatives throughout our
    Headquarters, and within our components. The industry experience that
    National Guard members bring to the command is invaluable. For
    specifics on how best to organize the space-oriented Reserve component,
    and the results reflected in the subject report legislated in the
    fiscal year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act, I would defer to
    the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Additionally, the
    Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Space Operations are better
    suited to describe the organization of the force.
                            headquarters relocation
        2. Senator Shaheen. General Dickinson, in your statement, you
    mentioned U.S. Space Command reached initial operational capability in
    August. To reach full operational capability, U.S. Space Command will
    have to establish and fully staff its headquarters. What challenges do
    you foresee in fully-staffing U.S. Space Command to reach ``full
    operational capability'' if the headquarters is moved?
        General Dickinson. Currently, my biggest challenge to reaching full
    operational capability comes from the need for a final decision on the
    permanent location of my Headquarters. We can staff the Headquarters
    with fully qualified personnel and execute our mission no matter where
    we are ultimately based. The sooner that decision is in place, the more
    significant progress we will make toward full operational capability.

        3. Senator Shaheen. General Dickinson, would you please clarify
    estimates as to when U.S. Space Command would reach full operation
    capability if it was decided the command will remain in Colorado? If
    the command were to relocate to Alabama?
        General Dickinson. I anticipate USSPACECOM will reach full
    operational capability, assuming appropriate resourcing, approximately
    two to 3 years after we are established in our Headquarters location
    regardless of where the final basing decision puts us. In the meantime,
    we will continue effective mission execution as we build toward full
    operational capability.

        4. Senator Shaheen. General Dickinson, do you have an estimate as
    to how many civilian employees you project to lose if the command is
    relocated to Alabama?
        General Dickinson. Our current civilian employees have chosen to
    live in Colorado Springs. If the final basing decision is elsewhere, we
    would prefer they moved with us. But until we have a final basing
    decision and can announce it to our civilian workforce, we will not
    have an accurate estimate of how many would choose to relocate.
                                space congestion
        5. Senator Shaheen. General Dickinson, as space congestion
    continues to grow and close calls are becoming more likely, are there
    plans to update the collision screening and notification criteria and
    who leads the updating of that criteria? When was the last update to
    the criteria collision screening and notification criteria?
        General Dickinson. I look forward to the Department of Commerce
    (DOC) taking on the mission as they establish their new space traffic
    management capability for civil conjunction analysis and messaging,
    allowing the military members of the team to more directly focus on
    Space Domain Awareness (SDA). Currently, the collision screening and
    notification process is an enterprise-wide effort led by USSPACECOM in
    close coordination and partnership with NASA. One of my functional
    component commanders, the Commander of the Combined Forces Space
    Component Command (CFSCC), has the delegated authority to define
    emergency-reportable screening and notification criteria for predicted
    collisions. The CFSCC Commander last updated these criteria in 2016
    based on interagency, commercial, and multinational feedback. Since
    2016, CFSCC, implemented continuous process improvements to reduce
    latency and provide more actionable data in coordination with both our
    interagency and industry partners.

        6. Senator Shaheen. General Dickinson, in your testimony you spoke
    about U.S. Space Command working with NASA on space congestion and
    debris issues. Would you please elaborate on how U.S. Space Command
    works with NASA and other relevant agencies, like the Department of
    Commerce, to address space congestion and debris issues?
        General Dickinson. NASA is a critical USSPACECOM partner in
    mitigating space congestion and debris challenges, and as Vice
    President Harris described in comments at Vandenberg SFB, space debris
    presents a large risk to the safety of our astronauts, satellites, and
    growing commercial presence. The DOD and NASA signed a Memorandum of
    Understanding in 2005 to foster close collaboration on Space Domain
    Awareness (SDA) operations, data analysis, system development, data
    sharing and international collaboration. Today, NASA orbital analysts
    sit side-by-side with 18th Space Defense Squadron (18 SDS) operators to
    maintain custody of on-orbit objects. They work closely on refining
    data and providing actionable and accurate information to space
    operators. 18 SDS provides a team of orbital safety analysts dedicated
    to human spaceflight safety who interact directly with NASA Johnson
    Space Center on the safety of the International Space Station and
    associated missions. Additionally, as the Department Of Commerce builds
    its space traffic management capability, USSPACECOM is helping inform
    development of their processes and practices.
                               responsive launch
        7. Senator Shaheen. General Dickinson, can you more details about
    those plans, your timeline for completing those tasks and how Congress
    can better support you to bring this capability to operational
    maturity?
        General Dickinson. Assured access to space remains a top national
    security priority. Robust launch infrastructure, and responsive launch
    capabilities are essential to our assured use of space. We are
    fortunate to have our U.S. Space Force service component, and its
    subordinate field command, Space Systems Command, focused on developing
    indigenous military responsive launch capabilities, while also
    fostering industry's development of the same. Prior congressional
    action and direction in support of tactically responsive space launch,
    small satellite constellations, and hybrid space architectures serve to
    inform this development. We appreciate the continued support from
    Congress in development of these capabilities, especially as Congress
    provided the necessary resources to our service components in their
    responsive spacelift organize, train, and equip responsibilities.

        8. Senator Shaheen. General Dickinson, can you describe why rapid
    launch capability can change the cost-calculus of attacking our assets
    in space?
        General Dickinson. Rapid launch capability is part of the solution
    to ensuring space domain mission assurance in contested, degraded, and
    operationally limited conditions. Providing robust reconstitution
    options increases resilience of the systems necessary for mission
    accomplishment. Additionally, launch capability complicates domain
    awareness tasks and raises targeting dilemmas for an adversary. This
    reconstitution and payload delivery capability raises the level of
    effort--and thus cost--required for potential adversaries to
    effectively negate our space capabilities.

        9. Senator Shaheen. General Dickinson, how would U.S. Space Command
    make use of responsive launch capability for the warfighting mission in
    the space domain and what needs to be done to better integrate it into
    U.S. Space Command's resilient architecture and concepts of operation?
        General Dickinson. Our fundamental objective is to deter conflict
    in space. Our mission is to protect and defend U.S. and allied space
    capabilities. Responsive launch capability is key to our ability to do
    both. Responsive launch complements our resilience efforts through
    rapid reconstitution of space capabilities and facilitates
    proliferation, which is important to keep pace with competitors like
    China and Russia. We further use it to effectively demonstrate advanced
    capabilities for deterrence purposes. Proliferation in times of war
    adds resilience to essential capabilities; in times of peace,
    resiliency is cost imposing on our competitors' attack strategies and
    key to integrated deterrence. To better integrate responsive launch
    capability into our space architecture, we collaborate with our service
    components in establishing requirements, developing operational
    concepts, and testing and exercising responsive launch capabilities.
    The key is continued advocacy for these capabilities as critical
    elements of our assured access to space.
                               space procurement
        10. Senator Shaheen. General Dickinson, it is critical that the
    U.S. capitalize on the diverse and robust launch market developing here
    at home. In the Phase III RFI, industry was asked for information that
    should be used to modernize the U.S. Space Force's requirements and
    procurement approach to best match American space lift capabilities
    with the DOD's mission needs. How can you assure this Committee that
    the U.S. Space Force will fully review its procurement approach and
    ensure that it will not create unnecessary barriers to entry or
    disincentivize industry participation with outdating and overly
    burdensome requirements?
        General Dickinson. I defer to the U.S. Space Force to address their
    particular acquisition process, but I agree that finding ways to
    leverage American commercial strengths is critical to competition in
    the space domain. American commercial innovation and capability is an
    asymmetric advantage that our competitors do not possess, and one that
    we should use to the maximum extent possible.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
                        u.s. space command headquarters
        11. Senator Rosen. General Dickinson, one of the primary factors
    for consideration in any basing decision is cost. With regards to
    establishing a permanent U.S. Space Command headquarters, can you share
    your cost estimate for standing up a new HQ? Can you clarify whether,
    in making this basing decision, the Air Force took into consideration
    as a viable alternative the option of renovating the existing building
    in which U.S. Space Command is currently operating?
        General Dickinson. The Department of the Air Force (DAF) is leading
    the USSPACECOM basing decision process. USSPACECOM offered mission and
    functional requirements to help inform that process. Final selection
    criteria as well as costs were part of that process, and information on
    cost estimates which informed the process are the purview of the DAF,
    and will be part of the GAO and DOD IG inquiry reports.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Tom B. Cotton
                             command relationships
        12. Senator Cotton. General Dickinson, I've heard rumors of a
    contested and potentially destructive relationship amongst the highest
    echelons of leadership of the United States Space Force and the United
    States Space Commands. What is Space Command doing to ensure the Space
    Force can operate with its full scope of Title 10 authorities while
    establishing a normal relationship with a nascent service?
        General Dickinson. The Nation's newest combatant command, United
    States Space Command, and our newest branch of the Armed Forces, United
    States Space Force, are critical partners in deterring conflict in
    space, and protecting and defending U.S. and allied interests in the
    domain. The leadership of both organizations understands fully our
    respective roles as outlined in Goldwater-Nichols, and in the numerous
    national level directives and guidance we have been given to inform
    execution of our respective missions. We are dedicated to outstanding
    execution of those roles. The Chief of Space Operations, General
    Raymond, and I collaborate closely and effectively in ensuring our
    collective ability to provide the National Command Authority with
    options for ensuring access to the capabilities offered by the space
    domain. Additionally, our staffs also collaborate daily to achieve
    mission success.

        13. Senator Cotton. General Dickinson, do you believe the United
    State Space Force can successfully organize, train, and equip forces to
    provide Space Command with the operational capabilities Space Command
    requires to execute its mission? If not, would you support transferring
    additional manning and resources to the United States Space Force from
    other services or Defense Department Agencies?
        General Dickinson. Although the United States Space Force (USSF) is
    a new service, it leverages nearly four decades of experience in
    organizing, training, and equipping space forces and capabilities in
    its previous form as Air Force Space Command. Under its new structure,
    appropriate for the new strategic environment, the USSF is rapidly
    adapting and applying its force presentation in response to new
    USSPACECOM requirements, and those of the other combatant commands. As
    those requirements evolve, so too should the force structure of our
    largest space capability provider.
                             duplication of efforts
        14. Senator Cotton. General Dickinson, some concerns have been
    raised about the confusion and overlap between the United States Space
    Force and United States Space Command. You testified that you consider
    yourself ``a customer'' of the United States Space Force. Could you
    please explain what capability the Joint Integrated Space Teams provide
    that aren't otherwise available from the service components?
        General Dickinson. We designed USSPACECOM's Joint Integrated Space
    Teams (JIST) to integrate space into all combatant commands, especially
    into the front end of operations, intelligence, planning, and
    executing, through education, integration, advocacy, and communication
    of all space-related activities that pertain to our Unified Command
    Plan-assigned roles and responsibilities, both in USSPACECOM's
    supporting, and supported functions. As an example, our JIST
    intelligence professionals link the USSPACECOM J2 and Joint
    Intelligence Operations Center to the other combatant commands. Given
    the United States Space Force (USSF) is a close and critical partner of
    USSPACECOM, we work diligently to ensure that we are not duplicating
    efforts. In support of this effort, USSPACECOM and USSF signed a
    ``Joint Space Integration Terms of Reference'' on 17 September 2021 to
    codify and differentiate the roles and responsibilities of the JISTs
    and the Space Force Service Components supporting other combatant
    commands. Overall, JISTs synchronize across combatant commands and
    enable globally integrated deterrence and other operations, while
    combatant command service components integrate capability inside their
    theater of operations.

        15. Senator Cotton. General Dickinson, in addition to overlap of
    authorities relating to the utility and potential duplicity of Joint
    Integrated Space Teams, I'm concerned about the duplication of efforts
    regarding space-related acquisitions. Could you explain the differences
    of Space Command's needs which necessitate the demand for acquisitions
    professionals of its own, rather than providing requirements gaps to
    the services?
        General Dickinson. Acquisitions professionals in USSPACECOM are
    primarily program analysts developing, assessing, and overseeing
    capability requirements and operational capability employment. Our
    small staff of acquisitions professionals help identify, define,
    assess, and prioritize requirements to fill operational gaps.
    USSPACECOM then provides those operational requirements to the services
    for incorporation into their organize, train, and equip processes.
    USSPACECOM has an even-smaller set of acquirers whose focus is on
    contracting, purchasing, and budgeting for the headquarters and
    subordinate forces, capabilities that are inherent in every military
    organization.
                              over-classification
        16. Senator Cotton. General Dickinson, the fiscal year 2022 NDAA
    required a report on the over-classification of space-based
    capabilities. I am concerned that the fear of disclosure is damaging
    readiness by not allowing forces away from the Headquarters to
    adequately train. I'm worried that our exercises preclude training that
    uses all the tools available because they're unaware of a capability's
    existence or some participants in exercises are unable to share a
    capability with other participants due to compartmentalized information
    restrictions such as Special Access Programs. I understand the
    importance of concealing some exquisite capabilities or particularly
    damaging vulnerabilities, but could you explain how you are preventing
    future over-classification of capabilities and streamlining the access
    to capabilities for warfighters in your command for day-to-day training
    and large-scale exercises?
        General Dickinson. We agree with your concerns and will continue to
    advocate for broader access to classified capabilities so that our
    warfighters can more effectively plan, train for, and execute space
    domain operations for the Nation. USSPACECOM works with all services,
    components, and the intelligence community to review classification
    protocols to ensure we operate all capabilities at the lowest
    classification possible while still protecting any technology or
    operational vulnerability. USSPACECOM is assisting our partner
    organizations in striking the delicate balance of information sharing
    with external organizations, partners and allies while still protecting
    it appropriately when national security demands doing so. For
    exercises, we are working to ensure that we train and exercise at the
    appropriate level for the target audience in order to adequately train
    and prepare our forces.
                           defense of orbital assets
        17. Senator Cotton. General Dickinson, I believe that space is a
    warfighting domain. In that vein, could you please explain why we are
    leaving our expensive and exquisite space-based assets undefended from
    kinetic interference from ground-launched or space-based threats?
        General Dickinson. Challenges to our operations in space are
    rapidly increasing. Generally, defending our assets in space is more
    complicated than defending assets in other domains. Our Area of
    Responsibility begins 100km above mean sea level and extends out
    indefinitely. Physics, the challenge of orbital mechanics, lack of
    traditional resupply capability, adversary actions, and a number of
    other challenges make it difficult to defend our on-orbit assets. We
    compensate for those limitations with proactive and preventative
    measures informed and enabled by space domain awareness and
    intelligence, which help us identify, attribute, and discern intent of
    adversaries engaged in hostile activities. Further, we have equipped
    many of our satellites with other protection mechanisms including
    hardening, shielding, mission redundancy, and maneuvering capabilities
    that help safeguard our capabilities. We then maximize these
    capabilities through exercises and tough, realistic training.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                        minuteman iii test postponement
        18. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Richard, regarding the postponement
    of a regularly scheduled Minuteman III test last week, during the open
    session of this hearing you stated, ``[m]y fundamental recommendation
    is that we maintain our normal set of operations. Day-to-day we very
    carefully craft a series of operations, activities, and other
    evolutions that are designed to show our readiness, designed to
    maintain that readiness, and designed to give us confidence in our
    forces.'' Given these remarks, did you recommend to the Secretary of
    Defense to continue with the test as planned?
        Admiral Richard. Yes.

        19. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Richard, do you believe canceling a
    regularly scheduled Minuteman III test like this increases or decreases
    the deterrence of our authoritarian adversaries?
        Admiral Richard. In the long term, cancelling a single Minuteman
    III test will not appreciably affect the deterrence of our adversaries.
    As I have stated in testimony, USSTRATCOM's forces are ready today. The
    Nation's nuclear forces underpin integrated deterrence and enable the
    U.S., our allies, and our partners to confront aggressive and coercive
    behavior. It is important we maintain our day to day activities
    necessary for near and long term readiness as well as to demonstrate
    our will necessary for deterrence.
                            low-yield nuclear weapon
        20. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Richard, last Tuesday, in response to
    Russia elevating the readiness of its nuclear forces, you stated, ``I
    am satisfied with the posture of my forces. I have made no
    recommendations to make any changes.'' In your assessment, are we and
    our allies adequately prepared to respond to Russian employment of a
    low-yield nuclear weapon?
        Admiral Richard. USSTRATCOM, along with the other combatant
    commands, has been studying and training for this type of scenario for
    years. Specifically, USSTRATCOM is prepared to respond to Russian
    limited nuclear weapon employment as directed by the President.
    Likewise, NATO has stated it is ready to respond against any Russian
    attack. However, our current capabilities are the minimum essential to
    prevail against the unprecedented challenges the Nation and our allies
    face. The situation in Ukraine and China's nuclear trajectory convinces
    me a deterrence and assurance gap exists. To address this, a low-yield,
    non-ballistic capability to deter and respond without visible
    generation is necessary to provide a persistent, survivable, regional
    capability to deter adversaries, assure allies, provide flexible
    options, as well as complement existing capabilities. Such a capability
    with these attributes should be re-examined in the near future.
                 spacecom preparation for conflict in indopacom
        21. Senator Sullivan. General Dickinson, in your written statement
    to this Committee in advance of this hearing, you stated that, ``PLA
    writings on doctrine and strategy suggest that reconnaissance,
    communications, navigation, and early warning satellites could be among
    the targets to attack, a strategy designed to `blind and deafen the
    enemy.''' How is U.S. Space Command working to ensure our forces are
    adequately prepared and supported to maintain all-domain awareness in
    the event of conflict with PRC in the Indo-Pacific?
        General Dickinson. USSPACECOM works with all combatant commands to
    exercise and train our capabilities. Specifically in the Pacific,
    USSPACECOM will hold a joint, high-level exercise with U.S. Indo-
    Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) in fiscal year 2023 that will allow us to
    work through and refine the supported and supporting relationships
    between our commands. The exercise will provide opportunities to
    practice space-related and theater-specific problem sets within
    USINDOPACOM and extending into the space domain. Similarly, USSPACECOM
    continues our participation in USINDOPACOM's other exercises,
    emphasizing and educating warriors across the joint enterprise about
    space capabilities employed throughout their area of operations against
    near peer adversaries. Additionally, our professional military
    education efforts have focused on educating the Joint Force about the
    challenges in the space domain and why we must train to fight and win
    in ways that leverage our space capabilities and can overcome
    challenges if they are degraded.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Kevin J. Cramer
                       tactically responsive space launch
        22. Senator Cramer. General Dickinson, I'd like to learn more about
    Tactically Responsive Space Launch. In your testimony to the House
    Armed Services Committee last week, you said that responsive launch
    capabilities are part of the requirements and concepts of operation
    U.S. Space Command is working on to develop a resilient space
    architecture.
        Can you elaborate on what those plans entail--including your timing
    for completing those tasks--and how the Congress can better support you
    to bring this capability to operational maturity?
        General Dickinson. Continued launch advancements to improve
    domestic launch infrastructure are national security priorities and
    will support responsive space capabilities and requirements. Rapid
    tactical launch capability must be a part of the Department of
    Defense's solution to ensure continuity of space operations in
    contested, degraded, and operationally limited conditions. USSPACECOM
    works closely with the United States Space Force and its Space Systems
    Command to narrow the gap between combatant command requirements and
    our ability to acquire and field tactically responsive launch
    capabilities. Continued support from Congress for these capabilities
    will posture the command and the Department of Defense for more secure
    and assured access to space.

        23. Senator Cramer. General Dickinson, after a successful
    demonstration launch last year of a ``tactically responsive'' mission,
    you said that responsive launch capabilities can deter adversary action
    in space by changing the cost-calculus of attacking our assets on
    orbit.
        Can you describe in more detail your reasoning for why rapid launch
    capability is such a deterrent and operational advantage?
        General Dickinson. Rapid launch capability is part of the solution
    to ensuring space domain mission assurance in contested, degraded, and
    operationally limited conditions. Providing robust reconstitution
    options supports resilience of the systems necessary for mission
    accomplishment. Additionally, launch capability complicates domain
    awareness tasks and raises targeting dilemmas for an adversary. This
    reconstitution and payload delivery capability raises the level of
    effort--and thus cost--required for potential adversaries to
    effectively negate our space capabilities.

        24. Senator Cramer. General Dickinson, as the Commander of U.S.
    Space Command you're in charge of deterring conflict, delivering combat
    power and defending US vital interests in space. You've spoken about
    the operational utility of a responsive launch capability to rapidly
    launch or reconstitute our space assets.
        How would U.S. Space Command make use of that capability for the
    warfighting mission in the space domain, and what needs to be done to
    better integrate it into your resilient architecture and concepts of
    operation?
        General Dickinson. Tactically responsive launch will provide
    USSPACECOM with the capability to replace degraded assets or buttress
    capabilities as required by the tactical situation. The commercial
    space industry continues to demonstrate faster capabilities every year.
    We can learn from, and leverage that level of innovation. The ability
    to rapidly augment, reconstitute, and replenish our critical space
    capabilities supports increased resiliency of our architectures and
    raises the cost imposed on those attempting to degrade our space
    missions. Building a resilient space architecture capable of rapid
    reconstitution will help ensure that joint and combined forces receive
    the space support they need to defend the U.S., allies, and partners.

      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR
             FISCAL YEAR 2023 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, APRIL 5, 2022

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

     UNITEDATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND UNITED STATES CYBER COMMAND
                                    POSTURE

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, King, Manchin, Rosen, Inhofe,
    Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Scott, Blackburn,
    Hawley, and Tuberville.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing to order, and for
    the benefit of my colleagues there is a vote at 10:30, and
    conferring with the Ranking Member we will recess at 10:30,
    reconvene at 10:45, so we can promptly get that vote done, and
    then there will be a second vote later.
        Welcome to our witnesses. Good morning. The committee meets
    today to receive an update on the readiness and posture of U.S.
    Special Operations Command and U.S. Cyber Command. Our
    witnesses are Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
    Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Christopher Maier;
    Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command General Richard
    Clarke; and Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, National Security
    Agency Director, and Chief of the Central Security Service,
    General Paul Nakasone.
        I would note that this is likely General Clarke's last
    appearance before the Committee, and I would like to express my
    appreciation for your 38 years of service to the Nation,
    including as the Commandant at West Point and Commanding
    General of the 82nd Airborne Division, but most importantly 3rd
    Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment. Thank you very
    much, sir.
        On behalf of the committee, I hope our witnesses will
    convey our appreciation to the men and women you represent, and
    their families, for their dedication and professionalism.
        For the first time since Congress reformed the
    responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, or ASD SO/LIC,
    more than 5 years ago, the office has, again, for the first
    time, a Senate-confirmed Assistant Secretary and a full-time
    Director of the Secretariat for Special Operations, focused on
    the advocacy and oversight of special operations forces. These
    positions are critical to ensuring our special operations
    forces are trained, equipped, and organized to adequately
    support our National Defense Strategy. I appreciate the
    Department's efforts over the past year to institutionalize the
    role of the ASD SO/LIC, but I remain concerned that the number
    and expertise of the personnel assigned to supporting the
    office's ``service secretary-like'' responsibilities continues
    to fall short of what is required. I hope the Department will
    prioritize and accelerate these hiring efforts in the coming
    months.
        The threat from violent extremist groups like ISIS [Islamic
    State of Iraq and Syria] and al Qaeda, while diminished,
    remains real and will continue to require the sustained
    application of special operations capabilities that have been
    honed over the last 20 years. Additionally, long-term strategic
    competition with China and Russia as well as the challenges
    posed by Iran and North Korea increasingly require the tailored
    and often clandestine capabilities that only our special
    operations forces can provide.
        Following our withdrawal from Afghanistan, the special
    operations community is at an inflection point. Assistant
    Secretary Maier, General Clarke, I look forward to an update
    regarding your efforts to focus and prepare our special
    operations forces for the challenges ahead. In particular, I
    would ask that you discuss the capabilities we need to build an
    enduring advantage over our strategic competitors, how you are
    shaping the force of the future through recruiting, retention,
    and building a culture of accountability, and how you are
    addressing the unique challenges faced by special operations
    families.
        Turning to Cyber Command. General Nakasone, the Commander
    of U.S. European Command recently testified to the committee
    about his appreciation for the performance of your command and
    the National Security Agency prior to and during the Russian
    assault on Ukraine. Please convey our gratitude to the
    personnel under your command for their exceptional work.
        I also want to commend General Nakasone, the President and
    his staff, and the leaders of the intelligence community for
    the unprecedented and skillful release of intelligence over the
    last several months that exposed Russia's aggressive intentions
    and deceitful activities. Intelligence officials are
    understandably cautious about revealing hard-won insights on
    adversaries, but this current strategy has proven highly
    effective in strengthening the international community's
    response and creating dilemmas for Vladimir Putin. This is a
    great example of competing effectively in the information
    domain, and I hope we will continue to make this kind of
    creative use of intelligence information.
        General Nakasone, you have been working to mature the cyber
    force and advance its capabilities to conduct defensive,
    offensive, and supporting intelligence operations to counter
    our adversaries. I know that improving the readiness of our
    Cyber Mission Forces is your highest priority. For you to
    succeed, however, the military services must increase their
    numbers of qualified and trained personnel for this mission
    set. Compounding this challenge, the private sector has
    realized the immense value of our highly skilled military cyber
    operators and is offering them very high compensation to leave
    the military. The services must adjust accordingly by providing
    a combination of incentives to retain these personnel. I would
    note that Senators Manchin and Rounds are holding a Cyber
    Subcommittee hearing focused on this critical topic this
    afternoon, and I would welcome your thoughts on the issue, and
    again, I commend both Senators Manchin and Rounds for their
    forward-looking and insightful approach to the problem.
        Over the past several years, Cyber Command and the NSA
    [National Security Agency], working jointly, have taken
    vigorous and sustained actions to defend our elections from
    foreign interference and malign influence operations. General
    Nakasone, with the 2022 midterm elections approaching, I would
    ask for your assessment of our election defense efforts, which
    you have described as an ``enduring, no-fail mission.''
        Finally, I would note that, in accordance with changes in
    the global security environment and President Biden's
    heightened focus on the Indo-Pacific region, Cyber Command has
    shifted a task force to focus on competition with China and has
    created the China Outcomes Group under senior-level leadership.
    The work of these organizations will be of keen interest to the
    committee.
        I again want to thank the witnesses for their service and
    appearance before us today. I look forward to your testimony.
        Let me now turn to the ranking member, Senator Inhofe,
    please.

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for welcoming our
    great witnesses.
        As I have said many times, we face a more dangerous and
    complex set of threats than any time in my life. Just last
    week, Army Secretary Christine Wormuth said, quote, ``this is
    probably the most dangerous security environment'' in her 25
    years of service. Well, it is the same with me, except it is
    more than 25 years.
        The Chinese Communist Party announced a 7.1 percent defense
    budget increase this year, continuing 2 decades of historic
    military modernization. Every day, they give us more evidence
    that their goals and interests are fundamentally opposed to
    ours.
        Russia's invasion of Ukraine has upended European security,
    North Korea is developing more capable ICBMs [intercontinental
    ballistic missiles], Iran has accelerated its aggression, and
    terrorist groups are reconstituting in Africa and Afghanistan.
        For our witnesses today, you face challenges across each of
    these threats. In addition to growing their conventional
    military capabilities, our adversaries are expanding their use
    of irregular warfare and cyber to threaten the United States
    and our partners.
        I am still working through the recently released 2022
    National Defense Strategy, but I have seen an extensive
    description of the gray-zone expansion and cyber threats posed
    by each of our adversaries. But I have not seen much in this
    budget so far about responding to those threats.
        General Clarke, you have the daunting challenge of
    reorienting SOCOM [Special Operations Command] for a high-end
    fight, even as you will be stretched thin in shouldering the
    burden of the fight against terrorism. Like with our
    Afghanistan withdrawal, I am concerned we are taking too much
    risk there. Mitigating that risk will largely fall on you and
    your troops.
        General Nakasone, the pace of Chinese advances in cyber is
    pretty breathtaking, and our other adversaries are also moving
    fast. We want to make sure you have the resources and
    authorities you need to maintain or regain your advantage. I
    definitely want us to do more in cyber cooperation with our
    allies and partners, so we will have to look at funding for
    that this year also.
        I look to our witnesses to describe how the men and women
    they lead are postured to deal with this array of threats and
    what this committee can do to ensure they have the tools
    necessary to be successful.
        So, Mr. Chairman, I thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Well thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
        Since a quorum is now present I ask the committee to
    consider the following civilian nominees: The Honorable William
    A. LaPlante, Jr., to be Under Secretary of Defense for
    Acquisition and Sustainment; Mr. Erik K. Raven, to be Under
    Secretary of the Navy; Ms. M. Tia Johnson to be a Judge in the
    United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces; and Dr.
    Marvin L. Adams to be Deputy Administrator for Defense
    Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration.
        Is there a motion to favorably report these four
    nominations to the Senate?
        Voice. So moved.
        Chairman Reed. Is there a second?
        Voice. Second.
        Chairman Reed. All in favor, please say aye.
        [Chorus of ayes.]
        Chairman Reed. The motion carries. Thank you very much.
        Now let me recognize Secretary Maier and then I will
    recognize General Clarke and then General Nakasone.
        Mr. Secretary, please.
        You might want to pull that as close as you can get to you.
    Some of us cannot hear.

        STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER MAIER, ASSISTANT
     SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY
                                CONFLICT

        Mr. Maier. Thank you, Chairman. Chairman Reed, Ranking
    Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of the Committee,
    thank you for the opportunity to testify on the global posture
    of our Nation's special operations enterprise, or SOF. I am
    honored to testify alongside General Clarke and General
    Nakasone, two of our Nation's most dedicated military
    professionals.
        On a personal note, and reinforcing, Chairman, what you
    said, I would like to thank General Clarke for his leadership
    and partnership during his tenure as SOCOM commander during a
    time of major transformation and strategic importance. I also
    appreciate the leadership of Command Chief Master Sergeant Greg
    Smith, who is here today.
        The dedication, service, and sacrifice of our SOF leaders
    and the SOF community motivates me each and every day to ensure
    we are doing all we can to provide them the ways and means to
    win, regardless of the challenge. I would also like to thank
    Congress, and particularly this Committee, for its steadfast
    support for our SOF warriors and their families. Since the
    establishment of SOCOM, our strong partnership with Congress
    has been instrumental to fielding the world's most capable and
    elite special operations force.
        We continue to make progress in advancing Congress' intent
    to institutionalize the role of the office I lead, the Special
    Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, within the Department,
    or SO/LIC. Sustaining and enhancing the competitive advantage
    of the U.S. military, and even more broadly the Nation's
    capabilities and future fights, depends on our effectiveness to
    provide the civilian oversight and backing of the SOF
    enterprise. This group of extraordinary military, civilian, and
    contractors has proven itself over so many decades to be
    essential to the U.S. military and strategic success.
        In today's increasingly complex security environment, the
    SOF enterprise provides our Nation's leaders with agile,
    scalable, and discrete options to address challenges across the
    spectrum of competition, crisis, and conflict. SOF play an
    essential role in the National Defense Strategy by holding
    adversary systems at risk and by enhancing our allies' and
    partners' ability to resist aggression and malign influence.
        Even as we transform the SOF enterprise to meet the
    challenges of achieving enduring advantage through integrated
    deterrence and active campaigning, we continue to enhance our
    capabilities to conduct high-priority counterterrorism crisis
    response operations. The President's fiscal year 2023 budget
    request for SOF reflects these priorities in modernizing our
    maritime capabilities and investing in artificial intelligence
    and other key technologies. The budget also supports the Armed
    Overwatch Program to ensure our SOF had the required support in
    remote and austere environments where they operate.
        As reflected in the fiscal year 2023 budget, we continue to
    invest in the health and well-being of our SOF warriors and
    their families. Our flagship Preservation of the Force and
    Families program, or POTFF, complements service-administered
    programs to address the unique physical, cognitive,
    psychological, and spiritual health needs of our SOF community.
        We continue to prioritize enhancing diversity and inclusion
    within SOF. Drawing on a diverse set of talents and
    perspectives is essential to our success in a changing
    operational environment and to SOF's unique ability to engage
    and collaborate with allies and partners around the world.
        The number of women in our ranks continues to grow, and in
    the past 2 years the first three women have successfully
    completed special forces qualification, and last year the first
    woman qualified as a naval Special Warfare Combatant Crew
    member, or SWCC. We are proud of these warriors' individual
    achievements and continue to actively promote a career in SOF
    for all who meet our rigorous standards.
        Lastly, I would like to briefly mention the war in Ukraine.
    Among many observations, it serves as a daily reminder of the
    importance of building the capabilities and resilience of our
    allies and partners. As we watch the Ukrainians employ a number
    of elements of irregular warfare against a larger force to
    great effect, we should internalize the need to continue to
    grow our own irregular warfare skills and continue to develop
    and refine irregular warfare options for our Nation's leaders.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to
    testify today. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of The Honorable Christopher P.
    Maier follows:]

            Prepared Statement by The Honorable Christopher P. Maier
        Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of
    this Committee, thank you for providing this opportunity to testify on
    the global posture of our Nation's Special Operations Forces (SOF)
    enterprise. I welcome the opportunity to testify with General Richard
    Clarke, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and
    General Paul Nakasone, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, two of our
    Nation's most dedicated military professionals and outstanding leaders.
        I would also like to acknowledge the support of Congress for the
    SOF enterprise. Your support and commitment to civilian oversight, both
    within the Department of Defense (DOD) and here in Congress, ensure we
    have the world's most capable SOF. Your support enables the men and
    women of the SOF enterprise to tackle some of the Nation's most
    challenging problems in austere, chaotic, and dangerous environments.
        Today's strategic environment is complex and diverse, with threats
    across the spectrum of competition, crisis, and conflict compounded by
    instability resulting from transboundary challenges like pandemics,
    climate change, and economic stressors. All require SOF, and the entire
    U.S. national security establishment, to be more adaptive, innovative,
    and agile than ever before. We are at an inflection point where the SOF
    enterprise will be called upon to contribute more to counter the
    challenges of China and Russia, while maintaining enduring capabilities
    to counter violent extremist organizations (C-VEO) and conduct crisis
    response to protect Americans and America's interests.
        In alignment with the National Defense Strategy and Secretary
    Austin's priorities, SOF will build enduring advantages, lead and
    support integrated deterrence operations, and actively campaign with
    partners. We will do so by continuing to focus on our people, by
    providing tailored and unique capabilities, and deepening our
    relationships with Allies and partners. As this and prior Congresses
    have made clear, our best chance of success lies in a mature civilian-
    military partnership that is led effectively to be far greater than the
    sum of its parts.
            civilian oversight as key to an optimized sof enterprise
        During his confirmation hearing last year, Secretary Austin
    testified that ``the safety and security of our democracy demands
    competent civilian control of our armed forces'' and pledged to empower
    his civilian staff accordingly. The Secretary actively supports
    institutionalizing the role of ASD (SO/LIC) in the administrative
    chain-of-command for USSOCOM as Congress directed. Last May, the
    Department revised the DOD Directive that explains and validates the
    ASD (SO/LIC) responsibilities and roles, further strengthening my
    office's ability to provide civilian leadership, management, and
    oversight of the organization, training, and equipping of SOF.
        Secretary Austin also reaffirmed that the ASD (SO/LIC) will
    continue to report directly to him as the Secretary of Defense in
    exercising authority, direction, and control of special operations-
    peculiar administrative matters, and reiterated his commitment to
    ensuring that the ASD (SO/LIC) has a seat at the table alongside the
    Secretaries of the Military Departments in key decision forums, such as
    his regular Service Secretary meetings, the Deputy's Management Action
    Group, and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. In doing so, SO/
    LIC is positioned to provide effective and enduring civilian
    representation of SOF equities and competencies to Department and
    national leadership.
        As you have seen in our monthly section 926 updates, our
    Secretariat for Special Operations has made progress building the
    manpower and expertise necessary to conduct meaningful oversight and
    provide civilian leadership to the SOF enterprise. Though we have made
    headway, our development remains a work in progress. The Secretariat
    has increased its expertise and integration with the Department's
    processes across all of the special operations-peculiar administrative
    matters. We will reach full potential when we have adequate amount of
    staff, leadership, and expertise in place to embed in all relevant
    processes at the required levels of seniority, and adequate facilities
    and communications to execute our mission. I appreciate your continued
    support as we institutionalize these reforms.
        Additionally, General Clarke and I have worked together to achieve
    a new level of transparency and collaboration between our
    organizations. On at least a weekly basis, we review key issues of
    importance to the SOF enterprise. Further, the SO/LIC leadership team
    collaborates closely with senior executives and general and flag
    officers on the USSOCOM staff. This partnership allows SO/LIC to more
    effectively understand and represent unique SOF requirements,
    challenges, and capabilities. Perhaps as importantly, it enables us to
    innovate on the best ways to employ and structure SOF today and for the
    future.
        Our collaboration extends to jointly creating a new SOF Vision and
    Strategy earlier this year that represents a shared leadership outlook
    for the SOF enterprise. We are also working on a longer-term vision as
    we closely collaborate to execute a SOF Force Design 2040. In December
    of 2021, SO/LIC and USSOCOM initiated the SOF Force Design 2040 to
    ensure SOF's future force is constructed to address the future threat
    environment. Through this effort, we will also publish a SOF Operating
    Concept 2040, conduct a capability gap assessment, and develop a SOF
    future force structure to implement the operating concept.
        Looking toward an optimized force for the challenges of 2040 forces
    us to think beyond the pressures of immediate operations and also
    consider what developments might not yet be captured in current
    strategies. It focuses our exercise and experimentation work so that we
    continue to innovate where it is beneficial, while sustaining
    capabilities of enduring value. With this new strategic tool, we will
    be better positioned to analyze the SOF enterprise, continue to refine
    the operational vision for future joint SOF, and articulate SOF's
    ability to deliver global, scalable, and tailorable strategic options
    that enable U.S. national leaders to manage risk over the near, medium,
    and long-term. We expect this force design effort to lay the foundation
    for the long-term direction of SOF, and become the basis for a
    repeatable and sustainable cycle of reviewing, testing, and
    experimenting SOF concepts, force structure, and modernization efforts.
        SO/LIC's dual role in shaping the Department's policy, in
    combination with our administrative oversight and leadership and
    management responsibilities reinforce SOF's role in and contributions
    to the Department's strategic priorities. With our unique twin roles,
    we are positioned to ensure key SOF-led capabilities are integrated
    into strategic concepts, and simultaneously ensure appropriate
    investmentsin areas such as irregular warfare, information operations,
    and undersea capabilities. SO/LIC will ensure SOF concepts and
    capabilities inform and supports the Department's regional and
    functional goals. We will also continue to develop the Special
    Operations Policy Oversight Council to ensure that SOF is able to meet
    the Joint Force's requirements and clearly identifies the support it
    needs from the Services.
             building enduring advantages by focusing on our people
        SO/LIC is also partnering closely with USSOCOM to protect and
    preserve our greatest asset--our people. SOF has always recognized that
    the foundation of its success lies in its people and the Secretary of
    Defense established taking care of people as one of his top three
    priorities. We believe at our core that our single most important
    enduring advantage against potential adversaries is personnel who are
    highly trained and motivated to excel in combat arms and in problem
    solving with partners. Continuing to recruit and retain the most
    diverse and talented Americans for SOF is essential. Over the last
    decades we have asked much of these warriors and their families. We are
    motivated by our enduring commitment to the well-being of SOF personnel
    and families who have repeatedly faced the strains of combat and
    repeated deployments while facing some of the Nation's most challenging
    operational problems. We also recognize that the future operational and
    strategic environment will not be the same as the past and we must
    prepare the force for those challenges.
        Together with senior leadership from USSOCOM, I regularly review
    the health and readiness of our special operations workforce. With
    Office of the Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, we ensure
    SOF are integrated into efforts to better quantitatively model the
    impacts of force management decisions on readiness and consider their
    cross-cutting strategic impacts.
        We continue to invest in the resiliency of SOF by taking a
    holistic, whole-person approach to the well-being of personnel and
    their families. With the strong support of Congress, SOCOM is
    strengthening the Preservation of the Force and Families (POTFF)
    program to address SOF-unique challenges and to optimize physical,
    psychological, cognitive, social, and spiritual performance. POTFF,
    through a combination of USSOCOM, Service, and Department resources,
    ensures we are able to meet the unique needs in individual SOF
    components and units. The POTFF's embedded service providers have
    broken the stigmas historically associated with those seeking
    psychological health support and have provided preventative care to
    avert potential suicides during the COVID-19 pandemic. We appreciate
    Congress' support through Section 561 of the National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2022 to enable the SOF
    enterprise to extend the POTFF family support program to our Gold Star
    families and embrace surviving families as important members of the SOF
    community.
        USSOCOM's Warrior Care program also continues to provide members
    who have sustained physical or psychological trauma and their families
    with much needed support throughout the process of recovery,
    rehabilitation, reintegration, and transition. We have no greater
    responsibility than to care for our personnel who sacrificed their
    mental and physical well-being to defend the Nation and to provide them
    with a path to return to service and/or to transition to civilian
    careers following their years of service.
        It has been 2 years since the release of the Comprehensive Review,
    an internal review directed by Commander, USSOCOM and ASD (SO/LIC) to
    address concerns about force employment, leadership, and accountability
    across SOF formations. The implementation of the recommended actions
    from the Review is beginning to have a measurable and positive impact
    on SOF culture and ethics. USSOCOM is working to refine data collection
    so that progress, trends, and risks can be identified and so that
    mitigations can be evaluated for their effectiveness. Across the SOF
    enterprise, there has been commitment to ensuring present and engaged
    leaders at all levels to ensure alignment with SOF values. Our work
    will not stop here; SO/LIC and USSOCOM are committed to going beyond
    the Review to create institutional mechanisms that will continue to
    promote cultural changes that benefit the force and its mission
    execution.
        We remain committed to taking further steps to combat sexual
    assault and extremism activities within our community and support such
    efforts across the Department. USSOCOM created the Health of SOF Cell
    to orchestrate efforts in organizational culture and climate, diversity
    and inclusion, and countering extremism within the SOF enterprise. We
    fully support this comprehensive approach and work closely with the
    Cell to promote the healthy organizational climate and culture of SOF.
    Over the next year, we will improve our data tracking and metrics to
    identify areas requiring additional attention, to examine the efficacy
    of our efforts, and to steer our strategy and resources to where they
    are needed and most effective. As we consider the future operating
    environment, we recognize that SOF is not fully taking advantage of the
    Nation's talent pool. SOF's unique capabilities to communicate,
    coordinate and collaborate with Allies, partners, and other foreign
    groups with different backgrounds and perspectives are a critical
    requirement for the future operational success. I endorse General
    Clarke's view that, ``building a diverse force is therefore both an
    operational imperative and a strategic necessity.''
        The SOF Executive Council for Diversity and Inclusion was created 2
    years ago in response to our requirement to take advantage of the
    Nation's talent to more effectively operate in a diverse global
    environment. This forum provides executive level attention to advancing
    diversity and inclusion in the SOF enterprise. SOF Service components
    are increasing their outreach to groups that previously may not have
    considered a career in SOF and working with their parent Services to
    develop more targeted and effective recruiting initiatives. We do not
    need to change our core standards, but we do need to carefully examine
    how we bring in personnel and the process and sequencing of how we test
    the ability to meet the standards.
      providing targeted and unique capabilities for integrated deterrence
        To meet the challenges of integrated deterrence, we must equip SOF
    with innovative, modern, and reliable capabilities that can out-perform
    our competitors in all areas. We continue to invest in technologies and
    capabilities to empower our personnel to operate in denied areas and to
    conduct high-risk air, land, and sea operations in remote and austere
    environments, with a focus on the near-peer threat environment.
        SO/LIC-USSOCOM collaboration on strategy is mirrored in resourcing.
    General Clarke and I now co-sign the yearly Capabilities and
    Programming Guidance used to develop USSOCOM's 5-year Program Objective
    Memorandum (POM) and the President's Budget request. This past year was
    the first in which SO/LIC was able to formally exercise oversight
    responsibility and submit the USSOCOM POM for the Secretary's ultimate
    review and approval. In addition, this is the first year in which we
    also formally designated Armed Overwatch and Undersea Programs as
    ``special interest'' acquisition programs ensuring more comprehensive
    oversight so that any problems or issues may be identified early and
    rapidly remedied.
        As the Department's advanced strike and surveillance aircraft focus
    on nation-state threats, SOF deployed to remote locations continue to
    require close air support, precision strike capability, and airborne
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to safely
    execute missions in support of integrated deterrence and building
    enduring advantages. The investment into the Armed Overwatch program
    will ensure that this dedicated capability exists, allowing high-end
    fighter aircraft to orient towards other critical needs. The Armed
    Overwatch platform will deliver a capability that ensures our SOF can
    continue to operate wherever we need them, whenever they are needed.
        In our SOF Undersea Programs, we are investing in advancing
    USSOCOM's manned and unmanned undersea systems capability with a focus
    on enhancing joint force lethality. We are working with the Department
    of the Navy to ensure the integration of modernized SOF operational
    concepts and investments intended to facilitate access in denied areas
    and greater range for longer periods of time with less risk to the
    operator.
          campaigning and maximizing our work with allies and partners
        In today's security environment, China is our pacing challenge,
    Russia is an immediate threat to our Allies and partners, Iran's and
    Iranian-supported destabilizing behavior continues in the Middle East,
    North Korean maintains a threatening posture on the peninsula, and
    multiple violent extremist organizations continue to pose a threat to
    the U.S. and our Allies and partners. We also see adversaries operating
    in the ``gray zone,'' or level below armed conflict, where they hope to
    avoid provoking a conventional military response from the United
    States. We see adversaries expanding their capabilities in multiple
    domains (e.g., space, cyber, information) and with unique or modified
    tactics and weapons such as small unmanned aerial systems. Our
    adversaries are also leveraging criminal organizations, fragile
    nations, and poor governance to influence global politics, destabilize
    our Allies and partners, seize natural resources, and fund other malign
    activities. Within the SOF enterprise, there are actions, activities,
    and investments to assist the Joint Force and the Nation to address all
    of these challenges.
        SOF's unique training authorities such as the Joint Combined
    Exchange Training (JCET) program maintains our readiness in diverse
    global environments. These small-unit engagements prepare our teams to
    conduct persistent small-footprint irregular warfare and expand and
    strengthen our purpose-built network of Allies and partners. As COVID-
    19 restrictions continue to be lifted, we are on pace to almost double
    the number of these training deployments conducted this year compared
    to 2021. These persistent and habitual partnership exercises enable
    critical region access, geographic and cultural familiarity, and
    operational interoperability in support of combatant commander
    requirements for high-priority Allies and partners.
        Based on training, capabilities, and mission sets, SOF are ideally
    positioned to support the interagency, Allies, and partners as they
    develop a wide range of low-visibility options for the purposes of
    strategic competition and campaigning in the gray zone. Drawing on
    decades of counterterrorism experience, SOF has the ``muscle memory''
    to integrate activities against a number of diverse state-based
    threats, especially in pre-conflict environments.
        Unique authorities provided by Congress, such as that provided
    under section 1202 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2018, enable SOF to
    assure our Allies and partners of U.S. support during competition,
    crisis, and conflict; and provides key access and placement. Section
    1202 is an example of an authority which enables SOF's transition to
    increased focus on campaigning to gain advantages against competitors'
    coercive actions.
        We continue to execute a sustainable approach to combatting
    terrorism that carefully balances risk and resources. SOF will continue
    to prioritize the Defeat-ISIS campaign and to disrupt and degrade other
    violent extremist organization's threats to our U.S. national security
    interests. SOF will also continue to build the capacity of partner
    forces to address and monitor these threats.
        The SOF enterprise now is at a pivot point where we must build
    enduring advantages, lead and support integrated deterrence operations,
    and actively campaign with partners in to provide to our national
    leaders unique and vital capabilities and options in a more complex
    security environment. For the past 20 years, SOF capabilities and force
    structure were optimized for C-VEO operations. SOF is now adapting its
    concepts, force structure, and capabilities to gain an advantage during
    strategic competition, to help drive integrated deterrence, and to
    support the joint force in conflict should deterrence fail.
                                   conclusion
        Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude by thanking the Committee
    again for its strong support for our special operations personnel, who
    work diligently every day to safeguard our national security. Our
    partnership with Congress is vital to our ability to successfully
    fulfill our mission, and your support of the men and women of the SOF
    enterprise is appreciated.
        I thank the Committee again for the opportunity to testify, and I
    look forward to your questions.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Secretary Maier.
    General Clarke, please.

      STATEMENT OF GENERAL RICHARD CLARKE, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
                   STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

        General Clarke. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
    distinguished Members of this Committee, thank you for this
    opportunity. I am honored to testify alongside the Honorable
    Chris Maier and my good friend, General Paul Nakasone. Joining
    behind me is Chief Greg Smith, SOCOM's senior enlisted leader.
    This is Greg's final time appearing before this Committee
    before he retires after 33 years in uniform. He is
    representative of the extraordinary women and men of USSOCOM,
    and I am consistently grateful for his counsel.
        This April 16th, next week, marks 35 years since USSOCOM
    was activated. We are thankful for the foresight and support of
    Congress and particularly this Committee and Senators Nunn and
    Cohen, who had the foresight to stand up USSOCOM. Thank you for
    your decades of continued support ever since.
        Your special operations forces create strategic, asymmetric
    advantages for the Nation across the spectrum of conflict.
    USSOCOM bolsters deterrence globally through our campaign
    activities, all providing critical options for the Joint Force.
    We are also innovating and modernizing to build enduring
    advantage while strengthening our force and family and make
    continual challenges to the rule-based international order.
    Maintaining a range of credible options unpins our Nation's
    strategic advantage.
        We have witnessed Russia's unprovoked and unjustified
    invasion of Ukraine, China's coercive and malign activity in
    the Indo-Pacific, and efforts by other state and non-state
    actors, including violent extremist organizations to sow
    instability. In this dynamic environment, USSOCOM's enduring
    value resides in our ability to combat asymmetric threats,
    particularly in the gray zone and below the threshold of armed
    conflict. We employ precision and surprise to both prevail and
    respond in crisis, and our formations support the resilience
    and resistance efforts of our allies and partners, often
    through sustained, long-term partnership with their special
    operations forces.
        Regardless of the threats we face, SOF represent a critical
    strategic edge to respond in crisis. Exquisite, tailored
    capabilities enable us to undertake sensitive and high-risk
    missions, crucial to safeguarding our citizens and protecting
    our vital national interests.
        A cornerstone of all these efforts remain our longstanding
    partnership with ASD SO/LIC. The oversight, policy guidance,
    and advocacy within the Department of Defense provided by ASD
    SO/LIC are essential for the modernization, readiness, and
    well-being of our SOF and their families. Together we are
    committed to sustaining trust by strengthening our culture of
    accountability. We are preparing for future threats by
    unlocking our Nation's diverse talent, and we are leading with
    our values through our continual efforts to mitigate civilian
    harm.
        As we speak here today, more than 5,000 men and women from
    SOCOM are defending our Nation and standing shoulder-to-
    shoulder with partners in over 80 countries worldwide. The
    courage and commitment of over 75,000 members of our special
    operations community are inspiring. As this may be my final
    opportunity before this Committee I would emphasize that it has
    been the honor of my lifetime to serve with them every day.
        I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Richard D. Clarke
    follows:]

                Prepared Statement by General Richard D. Clarke
                                  introduction
        Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished members of
    this Committee, thank you for providing this opportunity to discuss the
    posture of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). I am proud to
    testify alongside the Honorable Christopher Maier, Assistant Secretary
    of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/
    LIC)) and General Paul Nakasone, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command.
        ASD(SO/LIC)'s oversight, policy guidance, and advocacy within the
    Department of Defense are essential for the modernization, readiness,
    and wellbeing of special operations forces (SOF) and their families. We
    have continued to deepen our longstanding partnership through our co-
    authored SOF Vision and Strategy documents which provide an enduring
    foundation to guide future SOF activities and investments. This
    collaboration continues as we refine our Future Operating Concept and
    assess force design considerations over the coming months.
        The steadfast support of Congress ensures our Nation's SOF are the
    world's most capable and credible. Your support underpins our efforts
    to bolster deterrence, ensure our enduring advantage through innovation
    and modernization, and strengthen our force and their families. Your
    SOF remain vigilant, ready to respond in crisis, and committed to
    defending the Nation against all threats from state and non-state
    adversaries.
        Today, I am honored to present an account of USSOCOM's priorities,
    activities, and investments to ensure our SOF remain unmatched and
    prepared for the challenges of tomorrow.
        The strategic environment of 2022 is dynamic, but its complexities
    are not new. Nation-states and non-state actors, including violent
    extremist organizations, compete for influence and advantage, acting
    both across domains and transregionally.
        In Ukraine, Russia's unprovoked, unjustified, and premeditated
    invasion reminds us of continued challenges to the rules-based
    international order. Since 2014, following Russia's previous aggression
    in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, SOF supported multinational training
    efforts with Ukrainian SOF forces and provided Military Information
    Support Operations (MISO) assistance to illuminate and counter Russian
    disinformation. Russia's destabilizing activities reinforce the
    importance of USSOCOM's decades-long commitment to enhancing
    interoperability with Allied SOF throughout Europe--a critical asset in
    providing options for the United States and our Allies.
        To preserve and advance our vital interests and those of our Allies
    and partners, the United States must maintain its overmatch in
    strategic deterrence, conventional military force, and space and
    cyberspace capabilities--complemented by credible irregular warfare
    capabilities. Given this overmatch, competitors will prefer asymmetric
    means to attack, erode, or undermine our Nation's advantages and
    interests--particularly our network of Alliances and partnerships.
    Strategic rivals continue to seek advantage through activities in the
    ``gray zone'' below the threshold of a credible military response.
    Disinformation continues to be employed at unimaginable speed and scale
    without regard for geopolitical boundaries. The destabilizing impacts
    of climate change, diminished influence of international institutions,
    and political turmoil aggravated by the global pandemic have provided
    opportunities for non-state actors and nation-state competitors alike.
        SOF create strategic, asymmetric advantages for the Nation across
    the spectrum of conflict. Our formations provide options to the Joint
    Force to deter, deescalate, or decisively prevail if war is
    unavoidable. SOF are problem-solvers. Their enduring value resides in
    their ability to adapt and to combat asymmetric threats, including in
    the ``gray zone''; employ precision and surprise to achieve strategic
    effects in conflict or crisis; build access, placement, and influence
    through sustained partnership with foreign forces; and support Allies'
    and partners' resilience and resistance efforts--all providing discrete
    options when conventional action is impractical or not desired.
        To address current and future strategic challenges, SOF are aligned
    with the DOD's strategic priorities. USSOCOM's institutional and
    operational efforts span three broad areas: bolstering deterrence
    through campaigning, innovating for advantage, and strengthening our
    force and family.
                             bolstering deterrence
        After 2 decades of combat, our SOF today are more integrated,
    credible, and capable than at any point in our Nation's history.
    USSOCOM's dedicated men and women have degraded violent extremist
    organizations (VEOs) and disrupted innumerable plots to attack
    Americans and our interests since 9/11--while remaining vigilant and
    ready today. Their courage and commitment are and have been remarkable.
    Notably, twelve SOF servicemembers have been awarded the Medal of Honor
    for actions since 9/11, and three of those recipients are still serving
    on Active Duty within our SOF formations today.
        SOF are bolstering deterrence globally as part of the DOD's
    integrated deterrence approach. Operations over the past 20 years have
    necessitated operating transregionally alongside capable Allies and
    partners, leveraging the unique capabilities of our interagency
    community, and integrating with the Joint Force across domains--the
    foundation for effective integrated deterrence.
        We have rebalanced our activities to prioritize campaigning for
    strategic advantage--comprising nearly one third of our deployed forces
    in fiscal year 2022--while maintaining sustainable counter-VEO (C-VEO)
    operations. Our command is committed to defending the Nation and our
    interests globally, advancing our partnerships, and actively
    campaigning to strengthen deterrence, including in the ``gray zone.''
    Defending the Nation
        USSOCOM has honed our capabilities to defend Americans, our
    Homeland, and our valued Allies and partners through our operations
    since 2001. We currently have over five thousand SOF deployed to over
    80 countries. Our National Guard SOF supported wide-ranging operations
    globally in over 30 countries while also deploying stateside to 18
    states last year, providing essential Defense Support of Civil
    Authorities, COVID-19 response, inauguration security support, and
    natural disaster relief.
        SOF represent a critical strategic hedge for the Nation to respond
    in crisis. Exquisite, tailored capabilities enable SOF to execute no-
    fail hostage rescue missions and to counter an adversary's efforts to
    produce or deploy weapons of mass destruction. Repeatedly during 2021,
    SOF provided crucial forces and command and control for crises
    requiring rapid deployment, complex problem-solving, and synchronized
    effects--whether responding to manmade and natural disasters or
    safeguarding Americans globally.
        Alongside the ever-increasing capabilities of near-peer rivals, the
    threats posed by select non-state actors will endure. Violent
    extremists will continue to use terrorism as a tactic to achieve their
    objectives. Drivers of extremist violence exist in deep,
    multigenerational ideological divisions that cannot be overcome quickly
    or with military force. Violent extremism and terrorism will persist in
    the decades to come, representing an enduring threat to the United
    States, our Allies, and our partners.
        USSOCOM continues to pursue a sustainable approach to our C-VEO
    operations by prioritizing threats, working closely with international
    and interagency partners, and leveraging expanded options to degrade
    VEO capabilities. During operations to counter the Islamic State of
    Iraq and Syria (ISIS) over the past decade, SOF have played a critical
    role in mobilizing international partners, disrupting illicit
    financing, interdicting foreign fighters, illuminating propaganda, and
    defeating large-scale territorial expansion, when necessary.
        USSOCOM continues to prioritize our role as the DOD's Coordinating
    Authority for CVEO through our Department-wide campaign planning,
    assessments, and recommendations. Our semi-annual VEO threat assessment
    highlights our transregional approach involving multiple Geographic
    Combatant Commands.
        After sustained global pressure since 2001, the threat to the
    United States Homeland posed by VEOs based in the Middle East and
    Africa has diminished. Nevertheless, the threat to U.S. interests
    overseas remains. The continued availability of safe havens coupled
    with local security shortfalls perpetuates the risks of VEOs' external
    attacks. In East Africa, al-Shabaab continues to focus its operations
    within Somalia and presents an ongoing risk to U.S. interests in the
    region. In Afghanistan, ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) has prioritized local
    and regional operations but presents an enduring external threat to the
    United States Homeland and interests abroad. Senior al Qaeda leaders
    also remain committed to attacking the United States Homeland and
    continue to encourage attacks by their affiliates. In Yemen, al-Qaeda
    in the Arabian Peninsula presents a continued threat of conducting or
    directing attacks externally. In Iraq and Syria, ISIS senior leaders
    demonstrate the intent and capability to target American interests
    despite the losses of key operatives and personnel since 2019.
        Violent extremists continue to incorporate new technologies and
    adapt their tactics, posing an ongoing risk to counterterrorism (CT)
    efforts globally. Adversary unmanned aerial systems (UAS) pose a
    pressing challenge, exhibiting a rapid evolution in employment and
    lethality exceeding improvised explosive devices over the past 2
    decades. While the evolving UAS threat from VEOs is troubling, capable
    state adversaries and their aligned paramilitary forces have also
    successfully employed UAS to target American and Allied forces--
    recently in Iraq in early 2022.
    SOF Campaigning
        SOF's full range of core activities, tailored capabilities, and
    enduring partnerships provide critical options for campaigning to
    bolster deterrence. Our combat-credible forces can undermine adversary
    confidence that aggression will succeed, shaping a rival's decision
    calculus. The access, placement, and influence generated by SOF's long-
    term commitments to building partner capacity and improving Ally
    interoperability provide expanded, low-cost options to gain awareness,
    shape the operating environment, or present an adversary with multiple
    dilemmas, if necessary. Additionally, SOF remain ideally suited to
    identify an adversary's challenges in the ``gray zone'' and counter
    those malign activities with firmness while managing escalation.
        USSOCOM continues to prioritize its operations, activities, and
    investments in the Indo-Pacific and Europe while maintaining a
    sustainable posture to counter threats from the Middle East, Africa,
    and other regions. Over the past 3 years, our campaigning activities to
    counter and deter near-peer rivals have more than doubled--comprising
    over 30 percent of our deployed forces in fiscal year 2022 and
    continuing to grow to nearly 50 percent in fiscal year 2023. Our
    command also provides specialized expertise from our stateside forces
    to support Combatant Command priorities globally through Continental
    U.S.-Based Operational Support (CBOS)--a disciplined approach to
    provide tailored, low-density capabilities to support specific
    operational needs. We continue to optimize our global posture to
    counter violent extremists and other non-state actors while sustaining
    the ability to respond to crises worldwide.
        Focused, deliberate campaigning in Eastern Europe over several
    years has supported whole-of-nation resilience efforts among critical
    Allies and enhanced their resistance capabilities if threatened with
    territorial aggression. Our continued focus on honing the core maritime
    capabilities of our Naval Special Warfare and Marine Raider formations
    complemented by exploring creative options to extend SOF's operational
    reach has also improved our ability to act credibly throughout the
    Indo-Pacific.
        USSOCOM has invested heavily to expose and counter adversary
    propaganda and disinformation to better compete in the cognitive
    domain. Competitors, like China and Russia, continue to act assertively
    in the information ``gray zone'' to manipulate populations worldwide.
    As DOD's Joint Proponent for Military Information Support Operations
    (MISO) and the Coordinating Authority for Internet-based MISO, our
    command is adapting our psychological operations forces for the
    evolving information landscape. As part of our ongoing rebalancing
    efforts, our MISO activities to counter strategic competitors have also
    more than doubled over the past 3 years--comprising over 40 percent of
    our MISO activities worldwide in fiscal year 2021. The Joint MISO
    WebOps Center (JMWC) continues to coordinate our MISO conducted via the
    internet and actively engage foreign audiences to illuminate and
    counter hostile propaganda and disinformation online. Since 2021, we
    have incorporated our first foreign partners and interagency liaisons
    within the JMWC.
        Lastly, the critical authorities granted by Congress continue to
    allow SOF to campaign effectively against state and non-state actors
    alike, achieving an outsized impact across multiple mission sets.
    Operations supported by Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization
    Act (NDAA) Sec.  1202 (Irregular Warfare) have proven essential for
    applying SOF capabilities to expose and impose cost on malign actors,
    and the recent extension of this authority in the fiscal year 2022 NDAA
    will continue enabling these critical SOF activities. Operations
    supported by 10 USC Sec.  127e (CT) provide flexible options to apply
    CT pressure in otherwise inaccessible or contested areas--increasingly
    important as we optimize our C-VEO capabilities. Recent authorities
    under 10 USC Sec.  127f (Clandestine Operational Preparation of the
    Environment) and fiscal year 2020 NDAA Sec.  1057 (Intelligence /
    Counterintelligence) also support SOF activities with greater clarity
    and transparency.
    Advancing Partnerships
        USSOCOM benefits from unparalleled integration with our Allies and
    international partners, the interagency community, and the Joint Force
    strengthened over the past 2 decades of operations. While shared
    interests in countering violent extremism and terrorism prompted
    unprecedented levels of integration since 2001, these mutually
    beneficial relationships have extended to the full range of SOF
    operations globally.
        Our network of valued Allies and international partners is our
    Nation's greatest strategic advantage. We cannot surge trust in crisis.
    USSOCOM maintains a global network of liaison officers and exchange
    officers with Allied and international SOF. At our headquarters alone,
    we host exchange officers and foreign liaison officers from 28 Allied
    and partnered nations, offering an unrivaled ability to provide options
    to understand and act worldwide. Through persistent engagement over
    decades, our SOF have fostered extensive interoperability with Allied
    and partner SOF, often intensified by operating shoulder-to-shoulder
    during combat operations for over 2 decades. Authorities under 10 USC
    Sec.  333 (Building Partner Capacity) and 10 USC Sec.  322 (SOF
    Training)--the latter of which enables the Joint Combined Exchange
    Training program--are essential to further enhancing collaboration and
    promoting interoperability.
        SOF's integration with the U.S. interagency community is equally
    important to leverage the Nation's full capabilities to enhance
    awareness and provide expanded options to act. Our extensive
    interagency liaison network facilitates information sharing, speeds
    decision-making, and enhances synchronization for effective whole-of-
    government responses. Routine collaboration with interagency partners,
    such as the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and Department of
    State's Global Engagement Center (GEC), has enhanced USSOCOM's response
    to a range of threats over the past year, including violent extremism,
    adversary misinformation, and near-peer malign activities.
        The ongoing success of Operation Gallant Phoenix (OGP)--a
    multinational C-VEO initiative launched by USSOCOM in 2014--has enabled
    international and interagency partners to share information and
    prosecute violent extremists. While focused upon degrading VEO
    networks, the lessons learned are applicable to future efforts to
    counter adversary actions in the ``gray zone'' and deter aggression.
    Coupled with USSOCOM's Counter Threat Finance authorities and
    expertise, information-sharing operations, like OGP, provide expanded
    options to disrupt illicit financing or deter malign activities.
        Additionally, USSOCOM maintains collaborative, mutually supporting
    relationships across the Joint Force to ensure the most effective
    application of military power. Close coordination with Geographic
    Combatant Commands enables SOF to operate transregionally--particularly
    important as strategic rivals, like China and Russia, pursue advantage
    worldwide. Operating transregionally has proven critical for C-VEO
    efforts and is necessary to counter adversary ``gray zone'' activities.
    Equally strong collaboration with Functional Combatant Commands ensures
    synchronization across critical warfighting domains. Our recent efforts
    to enhance SOF-Cyber-Space capabilities leveraged trilateral
    coordination among USSOCOM, USCYBERCOM, and USSPACECOM in addition to
    other interagency partners. Lastly, our ongoing efforts to promote
    opportunities for experimentation between our components and their
    respective Services have deepened ties, resulted in operational
    breakthroughs, and improved warfighting effectiveness.
        Our role as DOD's Coordinating Authority for Counter-Weapons of
    Mass Destruction (CWMD) draws upon USSOCOM's full suite of
    international, interagency, and joint relationships to counter WMD
    proliferation and deter aggressive actions by state and non-state
    actors. Our recent design and execution of a transregional chemical,
    biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) senior leader forum
    advanced comprehensive partner understanding of the threat and informed
    the development of integrated actions to deter, defend against, and
    respond to WMD use.
                            innovating for advantage
        USSOCOM is innovating and modernizing our approaches, tactics, and
    technologies to build enduring advantage. We continue to invest in
    promising data-driven technologies while also developing a workforce
    well-prepared for our data-driven age. Our command is also accelerating
    our wide-ranging modernization efforts and fully leveraging our
    important acquisition authorities that enable us to capitalize on our
    Nation's innovation advantage--with an emphasis on four key acquisition
    programs: modernized maritime platforms, counter-UAS, Next-Generation
    ISR, and Armed Overwatch. Focused modernization also requires a
    complementary emphasis on divesting dated or obsolete platforms that
    are no longer operationally relevant or effective in the current and
    future environments.
    Investing in a Data-Driven Future
        USSOCOM continues to serve as pathfinder within DOD for integrating
    data-driven technologies, leveraging artificial intelligence (AI)
    powered by machine learning, deep learning, neural networks, and
    similar cutting-edge technologies. Our early work with DOD's Project
    Maven expanded our understanding of data collection and algorithm
    development, leading to successive Service-led initiatives. We are
    modernizing into a data-enabled command employing cloud, data, and AI
    technologies throughout our operations from the tactical edge to
    strategic decision-making.
        Over the past year, we have maximized DOD-wide initiatives, led by
    the DOD Chief Data Officer and the Joint AI Center, to further identify
    opportunities to implement data-driven technologies. Our command was
    one of the first to welcome teams as part of the Deputy Secretary of
    Defense's Accelerating Data and AI Initiative in early fiscal year
    2022. We look forward to continuing these important efforts overseen by
    the DOD Chief Digital and AI Officer. We are closely aligned with DOD-
    wide initiatives to promote responsible and explainable AI to mitigate
    algorithmic risks, ensure traceability, and guard against unethical,
    illegal, or immoral outcomes.
        Valuable partnerships with academia, national laboratories, and
    industry are central to this effort. In late 2021, we launched an
    initiative with Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Lincoln Labs to
    enable SOF information dominance. We continue to invest in promising AI
    and data fusion capabilities to streamline ISR processing,
    exploitation, and dissemination (PED); identify online disinformation;
    enhance mission command; improve predictive maintenance; and leverage
    robotic process automation to enhance a variety of resource-intensive,
    often error-prone processes. Additionally, our network of liaison
    officers in key innovation hubs across the country--including Silicon
    Valley, Boston, Austin, and Washington, DC--enhances our partnerships
    with academia and industry and supports our command-wide modernization
    efforts.
        Harnessing the full capacity of AI requires sustained investments
    in our talented workforce. Our AI-Ready Workforce initiatives have made
    steady progress since their inception in fiscal year 2020, and we are
    codifying lessons learned in our new SOF AI Education Strategy.
    Partnering with leading universities--such as Carnegie Mellon
    University and Massachusetts Institute of Technology--to educate
    hundreds of senior and midgrade SOF leaders on AI principles and ethics
    has accelerated USSOCOM's progress in implementing AI across a spectrum
    of operational problems.
        Several enterprise-wide initiatives further support USSOCOM's data
    transformation, especially with respect to mission command,
    intelligence fusion, and business activities. Equipping our workforce
    with a modern cloud-computing environment is equally critical to
    developing and deploying AI enterprise-wide. Additionally, our recent
    Data Strategy Implementation Plan outlines the ways and means for SOF
    to harness the power of data across our activities globally. Our
    enterprise-wide data steward pilot enables our SOF formations to
    execute their tailored data missions while preserving flexibility.
    Finally, USSOCOM's efforts to accelerate the adoption of Advancing
    Analytics (known as Advana) enable real-time, data-driven decision-
    making throughout our command--including supporting efforts to
    integrate a variety of personnel and readiness systems as well as our
    financial systems.
    Accelerating Modernization
        USSOCOM is rapidly modernizing its materiel and systems and
    incorporating emerging technologies to build enduring advantage. Our
    command leverages its unique acquisition authority to modernize special
    operations capabilities in five focus areas: Next-Generation ISR, Next-
    Generation Mobility, Data and Networks, Precision Effects, and Hyper-
    Enabling the Operator/Biotechnologies.
        We have coordinated closely with the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)) as well as the Services to
    collaborate on and experiment in each of these focus areas. USSOCOM's
    unique attributes of being inherently globally deployed, partnered, and
    joint while also possessing acquisition authorities positions us to
    contribute to the overall modernization of the Joint Force.
    Specifically, we are well-positioned to be the partner of choice
    supporting three of USD(R&E)'s technology priorities: within cyber,
    focusing on MISO capabilities; within directed energy, focusing on
    electronic warfare/electronic attack at the tactical edge; and
    biotechnologies.
        Next-Generation ISR enables finding and fixing a target in a
    contested environment and consists of three components: cyber-based
    ISR, space-based ISR payloads, and small tactical unmanned systems. In
    the cyber domain, we will continue supporting DOD's Project Maven to
    automate the PED process while also collaborating with USCYBERCOM on
    the ability to find and fix adversaries in cyberspace at the tactical
    edge. Our efforts in the cyber domain also include capabilities to
    better leverage the full range of open-source data. To better harness
    advances in space, we have established a collaborative arrangement with
    the Space Force and the Space Development Agency to experiment with
    payloads that will provide our forces with space-based capabilities at
    the tactical edge. Finally, we are aggressively pursuing collaborative
    autonomy through our AI for small unit maneuver efforts across our
    portfolio of ground, air and maritime unmanned and unattended sensors.
        As part of our Next-Generation Mobility efforts, we continue to
    modernize our platforms to prevail in contested environments while
    working closely with the Services. We are equipping our existing
    aviation platforms with advanced infiltration and penetration
    capabilities--such as our Silent Knight terrain-following/terrain-
    avoidance radar for our rotary- and fixed-wing fleets and radio-
    frequency countermeasures for our MC-130s and AC-130s. For the MC-130s,
    we are also exploring an amphibious take-off and landing capability to
    provide expanded options in maritime-focused environments, like the
    Indo-Pacific. We have partnered with both the Air Force for development
    of high-speed, vertical take-off and landing platforms and the Army for
    their Future Vertical Lift program. Finally, we are investing in
    modernized surface and undersea maritime platforms in partnership with
    the Navy. Our efforts in developing, testing, and fielding a range of
    maritime capabilities will strengthen deterrence in the Indo-Pacific
    and across the globe.
        The Armed Overwatch program remains central to our Precision
    Effects modernization efforts--as we advance to a production award
    later this fiscal year. Armed Overwatch will provide responsive and
    available situational awareness, protection, and fires to our ground
    forces executing C-VEO missions in permissive environments.
        Precision Effects are not limited to kinetic fires as we modernize
    our electronic warfare/electronic attack capabilities--best exemplified
    by our counter-UAS (C-UAS) efforts. While our command hones
    capabilities to defeat UAS prior to launch, we are also closely teamed
    with the Army's Joint Counter-UAS Office to detect and defeat UAS that
    pose a threat to deployed SOF and our partners. Through our System
    Integration Partner contract, we have taken an innovative approach to
    C-UAS which will enable us to effectively counter the evolving threat.
    We are pursuing a system-of-systems, open architecture approach to C-
    UAS that will allow for the rapid integration of both emerging and
    proven technologies.
        Within the Data and Networks modernization area, we are advancing
    technologies across three broad capabilities: operations and
    intelligence fusion for our tactical commanders, protection of our
    operators from ubiquitous technical surveillance, and influence
    operations in the cyber domain. Our Mission Command System/Common
    Operating Picture deployed after only 1 year of development by
    embracing agile software development techniques and is USSOCOM's
    gateway to DOD's Joint All-Domain Command and Control. As our forces
    operate in increasingly contested environments alongside partners, we
    must provide identity management capabilities to protect them, their
    partners, and their families. Finally, we will continue to modernize
    our JMWC and other MISO efforts with automation and AI-enabled
    capabilities to operate more effectively in the cognitive domain.
        Our final modernization focus area--Hyper-Enabling the Operator/
    Biotechnologies--focuses largely on developing emerging technologies,
    enabling us to rapidly deploy promising capabilities. Hyper-Enabling
    the Operator pursues technologies to provide decision advantages by
    optimizing information for individuals and teams conducting partnered
    operations--with the goal of enhancing effectiveness. Our biotechnology
    efforts are closely aligned with our Preservation of the Force and
    Family program to address the physical and cognitive wellbeing of our
    SOF. Our ongoing brain health efforts remain a critical component of
    this effort--combining best-in-market, leading-edge data and AI
    industry partners with nutrition and health partnerships while
    leveraging state-of-science commercial and academic labs.
                      strengthening our force and families
        Our people are the underlying source of strength within our SOF
    formations. The creativity and commitment of these men and women is
    crucial to adapting our tactics and technologies for tomorrow's
    challenges. We believe unreservedly that our first SOF Truth endures:
    ``Humans are more important than hardware.'' USSOCOM continues to focus
    on sustaining trust by implementing our Comprehensive Review findings,
    enhancing the readiness and resilience of our teammates and their
    families, and unlocking the potential of our Nation's deep and diverse
    pools of talent.
    Sustaining Trust
        Our commitment to high ethical standards, engaged leadership, and
    maintaining accountability within SOF is critical to sustaining the
    trust earned over decades. USSOCOM continues to make sustained progress
    in implementing the recommendations from the 2019 Comprehensive Review,
    as detailed in the forthcoming biannual report to Congress from our
    command and ASD(SO/LIC). Our Comprehensive Review Implementation Team
    has diligently overseen the continued efforts to codify institutional
    adjustments. Our components have taken active roles in refining their
    processes to select key leaders, enhancing ethical training throughout
    the force, and ensuring accountability for lapses that erode trust.
        Over the past 2 years, USSOCOM has made marked improvements in
    achieving sustainable force employment--one of several underlying
    concerns identified in the Comprehensive Review. Through a rigorous
    review of requirements, we have ensured key tactical leaders are best
    postured to provide present and engaged leadership while minimizing
    risk to our missions overseas. Our formations have attained DOD's
    directed 1:2 deployment-todwell ratio for nearly all SOF--while
    steadily approaching the 1:3 deployment-to-dwell goal+--by exercising
    strategic discipline through our force employment processes.
        We are unequivocal that sexual assault and extremism have no place
    in our formations. We will continue aggressively investigating
    allegations of misconduct and holding personnel accountable, as
    appropriate. USSOCOM actively supports DOD and Service policies,
    including ongoing implementation of the Independent Review Commission
    recommendations, regarding sexual assault and harassment that have
    improved reporting processes, victim advocacy, and prevention. Our
    command also remains fully engaged in DOD's efforts to remove behaviors
    that promote discrimination, hate, or harassment and that are
    inconsistent with our oaths to defend the Constitution against all
    enemies foreign and domestic.
    Enhancing Readiness and Resilience
        The Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) and the Warrior
    Care Programs (WCP) remain central to enhancing readiness and
    resilience for SOF and their families. The POTFF program has evolved to
    foster a holistic, multifaceted approach to human performance,
    resilience, and rehabilitation. Over 60 percent of POTFF manpower now
    supports the psychological and cognitive aspects of performance. The
    increased focus on brain health and cognitive performance--including
    funding authorized for related research in the fiscal year 2022 NDAA--
    is necessary to prepare SOF to operate in an increasingly complex,
    information-rich battlespace. SOF commanders overwhelmingly recognize
    the POTFF program as promoting career longevity, improving retention,
    and enhancing quality of life within our formations.
        Caring for our wounded, injured, and ill teammates is a sacred
    duty, especially after 2 decades of sustained combat. Our WCP, commonly
    referred to as the Care Coalition, has led this critical effort since
    2005. Thanks to the WCP's tireless efforts, we have retained over 70
    percent of wounded SOF in military service--with nearly 60 percent of
    these highly trained, skilled, and experienced warriors returning to
    duty within their original occupational specialty. Congress' continued
    support for these programs has enabled these remarkable results.
        Our formations also maintain a persistent focus on suicide among
    SOF. Leaders are increasingly attentive to underlying risk factors
    through enhanced training and education. Through persistent efforts to
    destigmatize seeking care, the number of servicemembers seeking mental
    health resources through POTFF has increased. While we witnessed a
    modest reduction in suicides in 2021 when compared with the previous 2
    years, any loss of life through suicide is tragic and unacceptable. We
    continue to fully support all efforts in this critical arena.
        Lastly, as the COVID-19 pandemic enters its third year, its impact
    on SOF readiness has been moderate, resulting from cancelled or
    postponed events and decreased interaction with Allies and partners.
    USSOCOM's uniformed, civilian, and contractor populations have been
    largely protected through compliance with DOD-wide and installation-
    specific risk mitigation measures, including vaccination requirements.
    Unlocking the Potential of our Nation's Talent
        The strength of our Nation lies in its boundless and diverse
    reservoirs of talented individuals. Maintaining the world's finest SOF
    in the decades to come requires accessing the Nation's deep and diverse
    pools of talent. Building a diverse force is therefore both an
    operational imperative and a strategic necessity.
        Our Diversity and Inclusion Strategy and accompanying
    Implementation Action Plan continue to guide our efforts with our
    initial report to Congress forthcoming. Our SOF Executive Committee on
    Diversity and Inclusion--chaired by ASD(SO/LIC) and USSOCOM--provides
    senior leader oversight and fosters accountability for sustained
    progress in implementation. USSOCOM is committed to welcoming all men
    and women capable of meeting the high standards required of SOF
    professionals, ensuring these servicemembers are part of inclusive
    teams, and overseeing their equitable careerlong advancement.
        We continue to make incremental, but critical, progress in removing
    barriers to women's and minority participation and advancement within
    SOF. Women and minority servicemembers now serve in key leadership
    roles throughout all four SOF components and within our headquarters--
    in several cases for the first time in USSOCOM's history. Women have
    also continued to successfully enter SOF-specific career fields that
    had previously been closed. While these milestones are important and
    notable, they are not sufficient. Sustained focus in fostering diverse
    and inclusive organizations is still required.
                                   conclusion
        USSOCOM is committed to creating strategic, asymmetric advantage
    for the Nation. SOF are bolstering deterrence by campaigning in line
    with the DOD's strategic priorities while providing critical options in
    the ``gray zone.'' Our force stands ready to respond in crisis and
    defend the Nation from state and non-state threats. Further, our wide-
    ranging modernization initiatives build enduring advantage and prepare
    our force to prevail in the future. Doing so necessitates our continued
    prioritization of our people--our most cherished resource. Our efforts
    sustain hard-earned trust, build resilience within our force, maintain
    quality of life for families, and ensure inclusive and diverse teams to
    succeed on tomorrow's battlefield.
        We will meet the challenges of tomorrow with clear thinking and
    resolve. Our Nation demands it. SOF have proven their innovative spirit
    and determination on countless battlefields over many decades. With the
    continued support of Congress, USSOCOM will demonstrate the strategic
    advantage of maintaining the most credible and capable SOF in the
    world.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Clarke. General
    Nakasone, please.

      STATEMENT OF GENERAL PAUL NAKASONE, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
    STATES CYBER COMMAND/DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/ CHIEF,
                        CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE

        General Nakasone. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
    distinguished Members of the Committee, I am honored to testify
    beside Assistant Secretary Maier and General Rich Clarke. I am
    joined today by Command Sergeant Major Sheryl Lyon, the U.S.
    Cyber Command and NSA senior enlisted leader. We are honored to
    represent the military and civilian members of U.S. Cyber
    Command.
        Command Sergeant Major Lyon and I want to recognize Rich
    Clark and Greg Smith and their families for 36 and 30 years of
    dedicated service to our Nation. Well done, gentlemen.
        Defending the Nation is the heart of U.S. Cyber Command's
    mission. The command has been integral to the Nation's response
    to the current Russia-Ukraine crisis. We have provided
    intelligence on the growing threat, helped to warn government
    and industry to tighten security within critical infrastructure
    sectors, enhanced resilience of the DOD [Department of Defense]
    information network, accelerated efforts against criminal cyber
    enterprises, and together with interagency and allied partners,
    plan for a range of contingencies.
        Coordinating with the Ukrainians in an effort to help them
    harden their networks, United States Cyber Command deployed a
    hunt forward team, who sat side-by-side our partners to gain
    critical insights that have increased homeland defense for both
    the United States and Ukraine.
        United States Cyber Command views 2022 as a year of
    significant opportunity for building our capabilities as we
    pursue five priorities: readiness; operations in defense of the
    Nation; integrated deterrence; recruitment, retention, and
    training; and the Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture and
    Enhanced Budget Control. My goal as the commander remains
    world-class, ready and capable at providing options and
    conducting operations in defense of the Nation with wider
    partnerships and exceptional talent.
        These elements will be essential to national security as
    our Nation faces an array of adversaries who are expanding, in
    scope, scale, and sophistication. Cybersecurity is national
    security. Speed, agility, and unity of effort, brought about by
    the connected relationship between U.S. Cyber Command and the
    National Security Agency is the ingredient that protects the
    United States against our enemies.
        The men and women of the United States Cyber Command are
    grateful for the support of this Committee and Congress that
    you have given to our command. I look forward to answering your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Paul M. Nakasone
    follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by General Paul M. Nakasone
        Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe and distinguished members of
    the Committee, thank you for your enduring support and the opportunity
    today to represent the hard working men and women of U.S. Cyber Command
    (USCYBERCOM). I am honored to be here and testify beside Assistant
    Secretary of Defense Christopher Maier and General Rich Clarke.
        Let me begin by acknowledging the dedicated service of our
    servicemembers and civilians at USCYBERCOM. Their mission is to plan
    and execute global cyber operations, activities and missions to defend
    and advance national interests in collaboration with domestic and
    international partners across the full spectrum of competition and
    conflict. Our three lines of operation are to:

          Provide mission assurance for the Department of Defense
    by directing the security, operation and defense of Department of
    Defense Information Network (DODIN), including DOD's critical
    infrastructure;

          Help deter and defeat strategic threats to the United
    States and its national interests; and

          Assist Combatant Commanders to achieve their objectives
    in and through cyberspace.

        U.S. Cyber Command directs operations through its components. These
    include the Cyber National Mission Force-Headquarters (CNMF-HQ), Joint
    Force Headquarters-DOD Information Network (JFHQ-DODIN, the commander
    for which is dual-hatted as the Director of the Defense Information
    Systems Agency) and Joint Task Force Ares. They work with our Joint
    Force headquarters elements, the commanders for which are dual-hatted
    with one of the Services' cyber components (Army Cyber Command, Marine
    Corps Forces Cyberspace Command, Fleet Cyber Command/Tenth Fleet, Air
    Force Cyber/16th Air Force and Coast Guard Cyber Command). The Command
    currently comprises 133 teams across the Cyber Mission Force (CMF),
    approximately 6,000 servicemembers, including National Guard and
    Reserve personnel on Active Duty. The CMF is due to grow by 14 teams
    over the next 5 years.
        USCYBERCOM is postured to execute its missions and meet both the
    Nation's near-term and enduring strategic challenges in cyberspace. I
    shall address the Command's role in the crisis caused by Russia's
    invasion of Ukraine, and then speak to our preparedness for persistent
    threats and in meeting our long-term pacing challenge, China. As the
    Commander of USCYBERCOM and Director of the National Security Agency
    (NSA), I have learned that the Command's linkage with NSA is essential
    to achieving critical outcomes for the Nation in both cyber and
    intelligence operations. The dual-hatted command relationship improves
    planning, resource allocation, risk mitigation, and unity of effort. It
    allows us to operate with speed, agility, and mission effectiveness
    that we could not achieve without it. This is critical to meeting the
    strategic challenges of our adversaries as they grow in sophistication,
    aggressiveness and scope of operations.
                              strategic challenges
        Russia's invasion of Ukraine demonstrated Moscow's determination to
    violate Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, forcibly
    impose its will on its neighbors and challenge the North Atlantic
    Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia's military and intelligence forces
    are employing a range of cyber capabilities, to include espionage,
    influence and attack units, to support its invasion and to defend
    Russian actions with a worldwide propaganda campaign.
        United States Cyber Command (with NSA) has been integral to the
    Nation's response to this crisis since Russian forces began deploying
    on Ukraine's borders last fall. We have provided intelligence on the
    building threat, helped to warn United States Government and industry
    to tighten security within critical infrastructure sectors, enhanced
    resilience on the DODIN (especially in Europe), accelerated efforts
    against criminal cyber enterprises and, together with interagency
    members, Allies, and partners, planned for a range of contingencies.
    Coordinating with the Ukrainians in an effort to help them harden their
    networks, we deployed a hunt team who sat side-by-side with our
    partners to gain critical insights that have increased homeland defense
    for both the United States and Ukraine. In addition, USCYBERCOM is
    proactively ensuring the security and availability of strategic command
    and control and other systems across the Department. We have also
    crafted options for national decision makers and are conducting
    operations as directed.
        When Moscow ordered the invasion in late February, we stepped up an
    already high operational tempo. We have been conducting additional hunt
    forward operations to identify network vulnerabilities. These
    operations have bolstered the resilience of Ukraine and our NATO Allies
    and partners. We provided remote analytic support to Ukraine and
    conducted network defense activities aligned to critical networks from
    outside Ukraine--directly in support of mission partners. In
    conjunction with interagency, private sector and Allied partners, we
    are collaborating to mitigate threats to domestic and overseas systems.
        These measures were made possible by the patient investments in
    cyberspace operations capabilities and capacity over the last decade,
    as well as by the lessons that we as a Department and a Nation have
    learned from operational experience. The current crisis is not over,
    but I am proud of the response of our people and confident in their
    ability to deliver results no matter how long it lasts. Their grit and
    ingenuity have been inspiring.
        Shifting to longer-term considerations, I note that our operations
    are planned and executed in accord with the Interim National Security
    Strategic Guidance. Underpinning our work is Integrated Deterrence. We
    provide combat-capable forces in cyberspace that engage in active
    campaigning to disrupt adversary actions, demonstrate capabilities and
    resolve, shape adversary perceptions and gain warfighting advantages
    should deterrence fail. Integrated Deterrence is multi-partner, multi-
    domain, multi-theater and multi-spectrum, requiring us to compete every
    day in cyberspace against military and intelligence actors seeking to
    undermine our Nation's strength and strategic advantages.
        Cyberspace is a dynamic and inter-connected domain where near-peer
    adversaries seek to exploit gaps and seams between our organizations
    and authorities. Such adversaries use a variety of cyber means to
    compromise our systems, distort narratives and disseminate
    misinformation. These actions threaten our national interests by
    impairing the safety and security of our citizens, stealing
    intellectual property and personal information while seeking to
    undermine the legitimacy of our institutions. Our adversaries have
    demonstrated sophisticated cyber-attack capabilities for use in
    competition, crisis and conflict, but I am confident that USCYBERCOM is
    well postured to meet those challenges.
        China is our pacing challenge, which I see as both a sprint and a
    marathon. China's military modernization over the past several years
    threatens to erode deterrence in the western Pacific, which requires
    immediate steps to redress. At the same time, China is an enduring
    strategic challenge that is now global in scope. Beijing is exerting
    influence worldwide through its rising diplomatic, informational,
    military, and economic power. China is a challenge unlike any other we
    have faced. I have therefore created a China Outcomes Group under joint
    USCYBERCOM and NSA leadership to ensure proper focus, resourcing,
    planning, and operations to meet this challenge. Although we recognize
    that much of our effort will be in support of United States Indo-
    Pacific Command, China is a global challenge. The success of our
    efforts will depend in part on the resilience and capabilities of
    regional and worldwide partners. We are building operating
    relationships and also dedicating long-term work to enhance their
    cybersecurity and cyberspace operations forces.
        Iran and North Korea are cyber adversaries growing in
    sophistication and willingness to act. Despite our strengthened focus
    on China, we are maintaining our ability to counter these threats.
    Tehran has increased ransomware operations, the targeting of critical
    infrastructure, and influence campaigns (including in our 2020
    elections). We support United States Central Command in its efforts
    against Iranian-backed proxies in Iraq and Syria (as we also did in the
    withdrawal from Afghanistan last summer). North Korea uses its cyber
    actors to generate revenue through criminal enterprises, such as
    hacking-for-hire and theft of cryptocurrency. USCYBERCOM works with the
    Departments of State and Treasury to stem Pyongyang's campaigns.
        The scope, scale and sophistication of these threats is rising. The
    United States faced major cybersecurity challenges over the last year,
    beginning with the SolarWinds supply-chain compromise but extending to
    incidents involving software compromises that affected companies like
    Colonial Pipeline, Microsoft, JBS, Kaseya, and Apache. In each
    instance, our Command worked through CNMF and other components to
    provide insights to our homeland security and law enforcement partners,
    who are the Nation's first line of defense for U.S. systems and
    networks.
        Ransomware can have strategic effects as America saw in the
    disruption of Colonial Pipeline's systems. CNMF has taken numerous
    actions over the past year to combat ransomware in close partnership
    with law enforcement, interagency, industry, and foreign partners to
    disrupt and degrade the operations of ransomware groups attacking our
    Nation's critical infrastructure. CNMF and NSA enabled whole-of-
    government actions targeting ransomware actors, passing key insights in
    near-real time. CNMF was a key partner in the whole-of-government
    effort to disrupt and impose costs against those who targeted Colonial
    Pipeline.
        USCYBERCOM (with JFHQ-DODIN) also defended the DODIN against cyber
    threats and helped ensure that disruptions to its systems and data
    remained inconsequential and brief. We continue to innovate in
    enhancing DODIN defenses and countering adversary threats; indeed, we
    must, because our adversaries are agile and adaptive. Key to this
    effort is building resilience in our systems and platforms while
    preparing the Department, the other Combatant Commands and Defense
    Industrial Base (DIB) companies to operate even in degraded cyber
    environments.
                   u.s. cyber command posture for the future
        Our success against these growing challenges is a result of
    sustained efforts and investments, not to mention a lot of hard work. I
    should add that that work over the last 2 years took place under COVID-
    19 mitigations. USCYBERCOM has been on-mission, running operations and
    exercises with the joint force and domestic and foreign partners
    throughout the pandemic, with negligible workforce transmission and
    slight impact to operations. We will continue to prioritize workplace
    safety, workforce confidence, and mission continuity.
        We see 2022 as a year of opportunity to make progress in several
    areas that will enhance USCYBERCOM's capabilities and contributions to
    national security. With this in mind, I have established the following
    priorities for our Command:

          Readiness;
          Operations in Defense of the Nation;
          Integrated Deterrence;
          Recruiting, Retention and Training; and
          Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture and Enhanced Budget
    Control

        Readiness is priority one. It is foundational to the success of
    operations in defense of the Nation and Integrated Deterrence.
    USCYBERCOM has made progress despite challenges. We improved our
    ability to monitor the status of our cyber mission forces down to the
    team, mission element and individual levels. Across the Department,
    USCYBERCOM is responsible for setting standards for all of DOD's
    Cyberspace Operations Forces. We work to provide commanders with the
    situational awareness they require to assess risks and make informed
    decisions, not just in operations but in maintaining force readiness as
    a whole. We will work with the Services this year to ensure the
    progress we have made over the past year continues.
        Second, along with our interagency partners, we defended the
    Nation's recent elections against foreign interference and are
    preparing to support the defense of this year's midterms through the
    combined efforts of USCYBERCOM and NSA. We anticipate that our
    adversaries will continue using their military and intelligence
    elements to affect our democracy. Thus I appointed a USCYBERCOM general
    officer and an NSA senior executive to oversee election security in
    2022. This is an enduring, no-fail mission for USCYBERCOM.
        Interagency partnerships are crucial in these efforts. Working with
    the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of
    Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
    (CISA) has demonstrated that we are much stronger together. Indeed, no
    single agency can defend the Nation on its own. USCYBERCOM imposes
    costs on threat actors and provides insights to domestic and foreign
    partners to mitigate and respond to malign activity, enabling each to
    act under its respective authorities. We will continue to collaborate
    with our domestic partners across the Federal Government and the states
    to share best practices and expertise.
        Our adversaries also target our economy. DIB companies are on the
    frontlines in cyberspace and are constantly targeted by malicious cyber
    actors. Over the past year, we have deepened our relationships with
    private industry through voluntary information sharing. Since the
    Nation's critical infrastructure and systems are largely in private
    hands, these relationships have directly enhanced our operations, in
    addition to the security of their commercial systems.
        Third, supporting the national priority of Integrated Deterrence
    means preparing for crisis and conflict while campaigning in
    competition across the full spectrum of cyber operations. It also means
    building the strategic partnerships that enable the defense of U.S.
    systems and networks beyond the DODIN and the DIB. Our foreign
    partnerships begin with our ``Five Eye'' Allies--the United Kingdom,
    Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The circle of partnership has been
    enlarged in recent years as we enhanced existing relationships with
    allies and forged new ones with several nations, especially in Europe
    and the Indo-Pacific region.
        Fourth is building a skilled workforce through recruitment,
    training, and retention. Talent is key to preserving our competitive
    edge against our adversaries. USCYBERCOM has improved its civilian
    hiring with the use of its congressionally-granted Cyber Excepted
    Service (CES) authorities, which allow us to offer competitive
    compensation packages for high-demand expertise. In addition, a
    diverse, talented workforce that expands equity and inclusiveness is an
    enduring goal. To recruit and retain a skilled military workforce, we
    are also grateful for the authorities Congress has granted the Services
    to offer flexible promotion and commissioning avenues in support of the
    CMF.
        Partnerships with academia will aid in engaging the future cyber
    workforce and enriching the strategic dialogue about cyber. Our new
    Academic Engagement network began last year and comprises 93
    institutions, including 10 minority-serving institutions, across 40
    states and the District of Columbia, as of March 25, 2022. Interest in
    partnering with USCYBERCOM is strong and growing.
        Training and proficiency are improving through our mission
    simulation capabilities, particularly the Persistent Cyber Training
    Environment (PCTE). The PCTE is helping us mature cyber operations
    tradecraft, enhance individual proficiencies and enable faster
    attainment of team certification and collective training in maneuvers
    such as Exercise CYBER FLAG.
        The Reserve Component is critical to protecting the Nation in
    cyberspace. As a result of the partnership between USCYBERCOM and the
    National Guard Bureau during the 2020 election, Guard units could
    rapidly share information on malicious cyber activity with state and
    local authorities. Members of the National Guard and Reserve often have
    private-sector experience in fields of strong interest to USCYBERCOM.
    In addition, the ability of the National Guard and Reserve to hire
    cyber talent has been especially helpful in retaining the contributions
    of servicemembers who decide to leave Active Duty upon completion of
    their commitment; members can transfer to a part-time status.
        Our final priority is guiding the Department's investments in
    cyberspace capability through the Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture
    (JCWA) and Enhanced Budget Control. JCWA consolidates and standardizes
    the Department's cyberspace operations capabilities, enabling us to
    integrate data from missions and monitoring to help commanders gauge
    risk, make timely decisions and act against threats at speed and scale.
    The Department is building JCWA and advancing the Cyber Mission Force's
    capabilities for conducting the full spectrum of cyberspace operations.
        USCYBERCOM is grateful to this Committee and Congress for granting
    us Enhanced Budget Control over resources dedicated to the Cyber
    Mission Force. With this authority, USCYBERCOM will improve direction,
    control and synchronization of investments for cyber operations across
    the Department of Defense.
                                   conclusion
        U.S. Cyber Command views 2022 as a year of significant opportunity
    for building our capabilities against the five priorities above. Our
    overarching goal is to build a Command that is ready and capable at
    providing options and conducting operations in defense of the Nation
    with wider partnerships and world-class talent, all linked through the
    Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture. These elements will be essential
    to our Nation's security as it faces an array of adversaries who are
    expanding the scope, scale and sophistication of their operations
    against us, and will be critical to developing the right mission
    posture to meet the unprecedented challenge of China.
        The men and women at U.S. Cyber Command are grateful for the
    support this Committee has given to our Command. We can only succeed
    with a strong partnership with Congress. Thank you, and now I look
    forward to your questions.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Nakasone.
    Before I begin let me too commend Sergeant Major Greg Smith for
    his service. We all understand that the great advantage that
    the United States military has are the NCOs and enlisted men,
    and thank you for your service.
        Secretary Maier, we, over the past many years, have been
    trying to create this ``service secretary-like'' posture with
    SO/LIC, and as I indicated in my opening testimony, it seems to
    me you need additional resources and additional facilities. Can
    you give us an idea of what you need to be that service-like,
    Secretary?
        Mr. Maier. Chairman, thanks for the question, and this
    Committee, more than any other I think, has been a huge
    supporter of reinforcing the institutionalization of ASD SO/
    LIC, so we very much appreciate that.
        Where I think we have made progress over the last year,
    from the time I was last here, testifying in front of you on
    institutionalizing the role of ASD SO/LIC in the Department
    with, frankly, a lot of advocacy personally from Secretary
    Austin, I think elements of the dual reporting structure that I
    am a big proponent of, where we report up one chain for policy
    and another chain for the service sec responsibilities does not
    translate always well into the Department. It just does not
    graft well in the blueprint. So that puts us, at times, at a
    disadvantage for competing for resources and some of the other
    aspects that we would need in a start-up organization.
        I think your continued advocacy, your continued support for
    funding for staff, and as I think was highlighted in your
    opening remarks, the right mix of expertise, and frankly senior
    expertise, where we are a small proportion as a ratio of senior
    executives who are having the responsibility to oversee many of
    the key aspects of the SOF enterprise, and we are doing it with
    people who traditionally are at a lower rank, as just some of
    the key aspects that we continue to work with the Department to
    reinforce, sir.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much.
        General Clarke, from your perspective as the commander, can
    you indicate how valuable the role is of the SO/LIC, and what
    improvements you might suggest from the standpoint of a
    commanding officer?
        General Clarke. Thanks for the question. Senator, first, it
    is great to have a confirmed nominee that has been consistent
    in the position. Mr. Maier testified last year. Mr. Maier is
    the seventh ASD SO/LIC, either confirmed or acting, that I have
    had. So the consistency for SOCOM is very important, but it is
    also important for those deputy assistant secretaries and the
    structure within.
        The other aspect that I would highlight, Senator, is that
    Mr. Maier now has a seat at the table with the other service
    secretaries that allow him to, one, provide advocacy for SOCOM
    structure and what we need to do in the future for the
    Department but also to provide that advocacy and insights as to
    what the Secretary is thinking. That is everything from human
    resources to the Secretary's priorities, and that has been
    extremely valuable for this command, where sometimes we could
    be working more in the dark without Mr. Maier at the table. So
    thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Clarke. I was
    going to ask questions, General Nakasone, about the need for
    talented personnel, but I think I will cede that to Senator
    Rounds and Senator Manchin today, in anticipation of the
    hearing.
        But I do have a question about the social media data threat
    analysis center. We authorized that in the NDAAs [National
    Defense Authorization Act] of 2020 and 2021. Do you agree that
    it would be helpful to have such a center to provide ongoing
    analysis and trends and also provide some deterrence perhaps?
    Could you comment on?
        General Clarke. Chairman, I can. Based upon my experience
    watching two different election cycles and the work of our
    adversaries to attempt to garner greater influence, I think
    such a center would be helpful. Here is what the center really
    needs to do, though. It needs to be able to look at all of the
    full spectrum operations of what our adversaries are doing.
    What are the tactics? What are the tradecraft? What are the
    procedures they are doing?
        I think the second piece is that what would probably be
    most helpful is this center being outside the Government, a
    federally funded research center or perhaps another center that
    is obviously in support that is able to attract the talent and
    remains very, very vibrant and dynamic in its approach.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Again, gentlemen, thank
    you for your service. General Clarke, please give my regards to
    your father, who was my physical education instructor at West
    Point, and passed me despite my inadequacies. Thank you very
    much.
        Senator Inhofe, please.
        Senator Inhofe. I enjoyed that.
        General Nakasone, it is clear that threats posed by our
    adversaries in cyberspace is growing. China is using cyber to
    steal our cutting-edge technologies and Russia is using
    destructive cyberattacks in Ukraine and elsewhere to deter the
    United States and our partners.
        General Nakasone, in the face of these serious cyberthreats
    your stance has been consistent and it has been clear on the
    benefits of the dual-hat arrangement. The dual-hat arrangement,
    for some reason, has become controversial, and I think you and
    I both agree on this. But why is it that that arrangement is in
    the national security interests of the United States? Explain
    that to us.
        General Nakasone. Senator, thank you for the question. I
    begin with just 2018, when I came into the job, both as
    Commander of U.S. Cyber Command and the Director of the
    National Security Agency, and I look at the change in terms of
    our national security today, in terms of what our adversaries
    in cyberspace are trying to do.
        We were not thinking about ransomware in 2018. We were not
    necessarily thinking about near-peers in terms of their
    capabilities in 2018. Very, very focused on coming out of the
    2016 elections, obviously the midterm elections of 2018, and
    then also being able to address a series of threats with
    counterterrorism.
        But over this past 4 years, as you have indicated, Senator,
    the world has changed considerably, and what we see is a speed
    of sophistication and a willingness for our adversaries to
    operate tremendously impactful within cyberspace.
        What we have done is to continue to mature the relationship
    between U.S. Cyber Command and NSA. How do we bring the best of
    what is being done in foreign intelligence and cybersecurity to
    the work that is being done on the command, to be able to get
    after our adversaries? This is what changed.
        So 1 plus 1, we do not want it to equal 2. We wanted a
    force multiplier of 5 or 10 that can get after our adversaries,
    and we are not alone at this, Senator. Our adversaries are
    doing the same thing.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you. That is a great response.
        China views Africa as key to its global ambitions, which is
    why they built their first overseas military base in Djibouti.
    People do not realize that it is not just that military base in
    Djibouti. That was the first military base, period, in their
    history. So they want to build another one on the West Coast of
    Africa.
        Now we witnessed this in Djibouti, and the bulk of the
    United States Forces in Africa are special operations troops
    who work with our partners to build capabilities, collect
    intelligence, and push back on China, Russia, and terrorist
    groups. We should deploy more of these troops to Africa, given
    the growing threats that we have pointed out several times in
    Africa.
        General Clarke, what is your assessment of what the Chinese
    military seeks to accomplish in Africa, and what can our
    special operations forces do to confront these growing threats?
        General Clarke. Senator, I have been to Djibouti many times
    and also see it as a strategic location not just for Africa,
    but what it gives for a platform for us to conduct
    counterterrorism missions into the Middle East, with its
    proximity to Yemen. As a key strategic hub there, the Chinese
    clearly see the same thing.
        For U.S. Special Operations Command in support of AFRICOM,
    it is to ensure that the violent extremist elements there are
    disrupted so they cannot cause a threat back to the United
    States. As far as our ability, by being there really allows us
    to see and sense what the Chinese pernicious behavior is inside
    of Africa, with a great interest specifically in collecting
    resources and minerals for the future. By being there it helps
    us to highlight those for the partners with whom we work.
        Senator Inhofe. Well, and I am glad that we have that
    opportunity. Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much.
        Senator Gillibrand, please.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General
    Nakasone, it is great to see you, and I just want to give my
    gratitude to all three witnesses today for their extraordinary
    service, especially General Clarke on your retirement. You have
    really been a bright light for many, many years, and we are
    grateful for everything you have done.
        General Nakasone, I have advocated for the need for a
    national cyber and digital services academy, which was
    consistent with the recommendations of the AI Commission, to
    train the next generation of the civilian cyber workforce. This
    would serve as a complement to existing fellowship and
    scholarship programs.
        Looking forward, what are the key competencies that these
    pipelines should be developing? Second and related, DHS
    [Department of Homeland Security] is still in the pilot phase
    of their new DHS community talent management system, where they
    seek to more quickly onboard 150 new cyber personnel outside of
    the traditional OPM [Office of Personnel Management] process.
    Are there any early lessons that can be learned from this and
    helpful to the DOD in increasing civilian hiring?
        General Nakasone. Senator, I think the first lessons that
    we have is we need the largest pool that is possible. This is a
    critical piece of what our Nation is going to do in the future.
    Cyberspace is where our Nation stores its wealth and its
    treasure, and so as we take a look at that, being able to
    attract from a broad range of our society, that traditionally
    perhaps have not touched science, technology, engineering, and
    mathematics is an important first step.
        Secondly is focusing on some of the key competitive
    advantages our Nation is going to need for the future--data
    science, coding, artificial intelligence, machine learning. All
    of these are capacities that our Nation is going to need well
    into the future.
        The third piece, I think, is just the ability to attract
    and to focus on the mission of what really gets done here. This
    is what we have learned at the National Security Agency and
    Cyber Command, is it is the mission that attracts people to
    work in this field. Thank you.
        Senator Gillibrand. Do you have any particular views on the
    development of the national cyber and digital services academy?
        General Nakasone. Senator, if I might, let me take that for
    the record, just so I give a more fulsome answer.
        Senator Gillibrand. I appreciate that. How many personnel
    are detailed to domestic agencies, such as DHS, to help protect
    domestic critical infrastructure? The 2018 MOU authorized 50
    detailees. In 2020, DOD scaled it down to about 20, and as of
    last year, OIG report had only 10 filled. Obviously, we are
    trying to position ourselves to defend against any oncoming
    Russian cyberattacks, especially to the civilian sector, and as
    you know, about 80 percent of our cyber networks are civilian
    owned and operated.
        So I would like to know what your perspective is on this
    and how we can create better collaboration so that not only can
    DOD resources, through the National Guard, but certainly NSA
    and other cybersecurity forces can be supportive of what we do
    to create cyber defense domestically.
        General Nakasone. Senator, what we have done, we began not
    only with the ability, as this Committee has allowed us to
    generate up to 50 personnel, but I think the first thing that
    we want to do is make sure that we exchange liaison officers,
    which has been done now, between ourselves and CISA
    [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency].
        The second piece is focusing a part of my force on direct
    support to CISA. This is a discussion that Director Easterly
    and I have had. It is also the ability for us to look at and
    say, what are the areas that perhaps are unique for our force
    that might be available to CISA and the Nation in the future.
        The third piece is working very closely to better
    understand what are the competitive advantages that we might
    bring from U.S. Cyber Command to what is necessary for defense
    of the critical infrastructure. Thank you.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you very much, General. I would
    like to work with you on creating a more formalized
    relationship between you and CISA for the future, because I
    know that the jointness efforts in New York City are among the
    best in the country. Currently in our cyber protection with
    both assets from National Guard, NSA, NYPD [New York Police
    Department], and FBI, we are collaborating now with over 50
    entities that are deemed critical infrastructure--major banks,
    major supply chain, major energy, major water--and that is
    working extremely well.
        So also for the record I would be grateful for any thoughts
    you have on that collaboration, making sure it could become
    more robust and more formalized. I would like your thoughts if
    you have any today but also for the record.
        General Nakasone. Let me take that for the record, Senator.
    I did have the opportunity yesterday to speak with Director
    Easterly. We were actually in the same location and had an
    opportunity to just go over some of these topics. So that will
    be an apropos time.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you, General. Thank
    you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
        Senator Fischer, please.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Clarke, special operations forces have an
    indispensable and outsized role in counterterrorism operations.
    Would you agree that without sustained CT [counterterrorism]
    pressure terrorist groups are more able to focus on planning
    and preparing for external attacks?
        General Clarke. I would fundamentally agree. That, but I
    would also add that it is key to do that with allies and
    partners, because then you actually are able to expand and get
    a bigger bang for your buck.
        Senator Fischer. As commander you must be extensively
    familiar with the challenges associated with conducting over-
    the-horizon CT operations. Correct?
        General Clarke. I am, Senator.
        Senator Fischer. Can you describe the challenges of
    conducting over-the-horizon CT operations without reliable
    partners on the group, without basing access in neighboring
    countries, and without reliable access to airspace?
        General Clarke. Senator, it is more difficult, and I am not
    going to sit in front of this Committee and say that it is not.
    I would also, on the same hand, though, say that in the last 20
    years we have developed exquisite capabilities, and we can
    conduct counterterrorism missions over-the-horizon, and we have
    exhibited that in the past.
        The most important aspect, from my purview--and I have
    witnessed this multiple times, and you are referencing it--is
    the intel collection that is associated to ensure that you have
    that intelligence to conduct those operations.
        Senator Fischer. We have been successful in the past, but
    have we been successful in the recent past, specifically in
    Afghanistan after we left?
        General Clarke. Senator, I can point to a recent raid in
    Syria to show that we have had success, and we continue to
    observe and monitor in Afghanistan, along with Central Command
    and other intel agencies.
        Senator Fischer. In this setting can you say if we have had
    success in Afghanistan?
        General Clarke. Senator, I think some of those questions
    best be served in a closed hearing.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Secretary Meier, has there been
    progress made towards securing any basing agreements or
    arrangements with any country bordering Afghanistan?
        Mr. Maier. Senator Fischer, there has been but I would
    prefer to talk about that in closed session, due to the
    sensitivities.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. Mr. Secretary, our current strategy
    for countering terrorist groups in Afghanistan assumes an
    immense amount of risk. I am also deeply concerned by the lack
    of intelligence collection capabilities that we have for
    Afghanistan.
        In December, CENTCOM Commander General McKenzie stated
    that, quote, ``we are probably at about 1 or 2 percent of the
    capabilities we once had to look into Afghanistan,'' end quote.
    Does the Department plan to develop any additional resources to
    ISR in Afghanistan or is the Department comfortable with the
    current level of risk associated with the current ISR levels?
        Mr. Maier. Senator, the Department is looking actively
    right now at other forms of intelligence. I would not limit it
    only to ISR. There are other capabilities that I think can be
    surged, and that is an ongoing effort to look at those
    opportunities.
        Senator Fischer. Will you be able to discuss those in a
    closed setting with us?
        Mr. Maier. Senator, yes, I will be able to.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        General Clarke, for the better part of 2 decades the
    counterterrorism fight has been your main effort in your
    command. The unclassified summary of the new National Defense
    Strategy clearly states that China is the pacing threat, and
    de-emphasizes other persistent threats, including the threat
    from violent extremist organizations. How do you envision the
    demand signal from geographic combatant commanders changing
    given the shifting priorities under the new National Defense
    Strategy?
        General Clarke. Senator, the demand for special operations
    forces will always exceed the capabilities that we can provide.
    But what we are doing is to ensure that we are developing and
    modernizing to provide unique capabilities such as undersea
    modernization, maritime mobility that could work very well
    inside the Indo-Pacific, and to do things that only SOF can do.
    We have recently stood up a special reconnaissance enabling
    command to look at our sense of activities that can be applied
    globally.
        Senator Fischer. In your written testimony you talk about
    rebalancing the activities, and for the record if you could
    explain how special operation forces are realigning to support
    the priorities that are identified in that National Defense
    Strategy, please.
        General Clarke. I will. I will take that for the record,
    Senator.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, and thank you so much for your
    service to this country.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
        Senator Hirono, please.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
    testifying, and a special aloha and mahalo to General Clarke,
    as this may be the last time that you are appearing before this
    Committee.
        A question for General Nakasone. In your prepared remarks
    you note that one of your priorities is maintaining a skilled
    cyber workforce through recruitment, training, and retention.
    We all know that recruitment and retention in this area is
    particularly important.
        We have a number of cyber education programs in Hawaii that
    work collaboratively with NSA and DHS, such as the National
    Center of Academic Excellence in Cyber Defense and Center of
    Academic Excellence in Research. However, we also struggle to
    retain these trained cybersecurity experts in Hawaii, where
    opportunities do exist. Yet, we are competing with the private
    sector, among other entities.
        Are you able to meet the demands of an ever-changing cyber
    landscape with the talent that you currently have, General
    Nakasone?
        General Nakasone. Senator, thank you. Very specifically,
    yes right now, but we need to be postured for the future. To
    give you an example, we stood up, at U.S. Cyber Command this
    year, the Academic Engagement Network, over 92 universities
    across 40 different states, to include the University of Hawaii
    at Manoa, which I have had the ability to go and actually talk
    there, and talk with the students there. This is an incredibly
    important piece of what we do because my sense is that as good
    as our technology is, it always come back to people.
        Our talent initiatives right now are focusing on being able
    to develop the next generation. While we have enough for today,
    our Nation needs more for tomorrow.
        Senator Hirono. I think it is a constant need, and so we
    have a situation where we need to recruit or encourage a lot
    more people into the STEM [ Science, Technology, Engineering
    and Mathematics] areas, wouldn't you say?
        General Nakasone. That is correct, Senator. In fact, we
    have a program with the National Science Foundation, Next
    Generation Cyber that is being run by NSA and the National
    Science Foundation, of which we have camps every summer for K-
    12, generating interest in science, technology, engineering,
    and mathematics.
        Senator Hirono. Are you finding that you are able to
    recruit women or girls and minorities into these programs?
        General Nakasone. Senator, we are. However, again, I point
    to the fact that it is not enough, and we need to do better in
    the future. Right now our forces, 35 percent female in terms of
    our overall strength on the civilian side and about 20 percent
    on the military side. Overall, in the cybersecurity industry,
    it is at 20 percent. That is a very, very low number for our
    Nation, and so I am concerned about our command, our agency,
    and certainly our Nation in this area.
        Senator Hirono. I think that whatever programs, educational
    programs that we have that would encourage more women and
    minorities into the STEM fields are important, wouldn't you
    say?
        General Nakasone. I agree, Senator. I think the other piece
    that I would add, being the son of two educators, is ensuring
    that the teachers, that we are able to bring this curriculum to
    the teachers that are so instrumental in being able to sow the
    foundation for the future.
        Senator Hirono. I agree. I know that we have to do a heck
    of a lot more to encourage particularly women and minorities,
    because that is a vast, untapped group of individuals.
        Again for you, it is likely that many of our military
    installations in the Pacific would be targeted in the event of
    conflict with China, and it is clear we need a flexible and
    resilient approach to logistics in the Pacific. In her
    testimony last week, General Van Ovost, commander of
    USTRANSCOM, highlighted cybersecurity as a chief threat to her
    mission as it pertains to contested logistics, and highlighted
    partnerships with CYBERCOM.
        In what ways has CYBERCOM integrated with STRATCOM and
    INDOPACOM regarding the vulnerability of our assets spread
    across the Pacific?
        General Nakasone. Two ways, Senator. First of all, being
    able to ensure that the network that U.S. Transportation
    Command utilizes, along with a series of private sector
    companies. This is an unclassified network, it is resilient,
    and assured in terms of being able to do that. We have special
    focus on USTRANSCOM.
        The second piece is working with USTRANSCOM, USINDOPACOM,
    and other combatant commands to ensure that the partnership
    that we have built in the Pacific and Europe are foundational
    to being able to ensure the cybersecurity of these nations as
    we continue to partner with them.
        Senator Hirono. I do have a few more questions that I will
    submit for the record. But I would also like to join the
    Chairman in expressing our congratulations to you, General
    Nakasone, for exposing Russia's aggressive intentions regarding
    Ukraine. That was very helpful to enable all of us to be much
    better prepared for this terrible war that is happening in the
    Ukraine.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Nakasone. Thank you, Senator. I will pass that on
    to my people.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
        Senator Rounds, please.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First of all, let me begin by just saying, gentlemen, thank
    you for your service to our country, and General Clarke, to you
    and your team, what you have done over your years of service
    will make a difference in the safety and security for our
    country for years to come, and thank you.
        General Nakasone, my understanding is that the
    Administration has launched an interagency review which could
    lead to revisions to the National Security Policy Memorandum
    Number 13, or NSPM-13. For my colleagues who may be unfamiliar
    with this document, the NSPM-13, along with NSPM-21, allows the
    delegation of well-defined authorities to the Secretary of
    Defense to conduct time-sensitive military operations in
    cyberspace. It is based on the idea of persistent engagement,
    which means continuously engaging in contesting adversaries in
    cyberspace.
        Recognizing that you have just talked about dual-hattedness
    and the fact that that has worked successfully, I think you are
    absolutely correct with regard to the dual hat that you wear.
    Would you share with us, with regard to the cyber effects that
    you have been able to conduct? We have made a difference with
    NSPM-13 as well. Could you just share with us, before NSPM-13
    was in effect, which came into effect after the first year or
    so of the Trump administration, but prior to that how many
    cyber operations or cyber-effect operations were conducted
    prior to that time in the previous 4 or 5 years?
        General Nakasone. Senator, I know of no effects operations
    ever conducted prior to 2018, but I would like to take that
    question just for the record to make sure that I look back,
    since it is before my time.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. I think recognizing that we are
    in an unclassified setting, would it be fair to say that the
    number of these operations greatly increased after NSPM-13 went
    into effect?
        General Nakasone. Senator, two critical events took place
    in 2018. One was this Committee allowing cyber to be a
    traditional military activity in the fiscal year 2019 NDAA. The
    second piece, as you highlighted, was National Security Policy
    Memorandum 13.
        Senator Rounds. So would it be fair to say that the NSPM-13
    would have been considered as playing an important role in
    enabling you to protect the 2018 and 2020 elections, along with
    recognizing that it is now part of a traditional military
    activity?
        General Nakasone. That is correct, Senator.
        Senator Rounds. If they were to change the NSPM-13 and the
    authorities that you have, is there a possibility that your
    capability to conduct cyber effects operations may be affected?
        General Nakasone. So certainly, Senator, we would take a
    look at any changes, obviously, and we will adjust to those
    changes. But significant changes to that NSPM, it could affect
    what we need to do.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. General Nakasone, the members
    under your command are highly trained technical experts. There
    is a high demand in the global market for their skill sets. I
    understand that the service components are responsible for
    recruiting and retaining these individuals, but their retention
    directly affects your ability to conduct operations. Senator
    Manchin, as chair of the Cyber Subcommittee, and myself, as
    ranking member, I know we are having a specific subcommittee
    discussion on that this afternoon. But in this open setting I
    think it is critical to discuss the need about, number one,
    either the volume of individuals coming in, the ability to
    retain them for a longer period of time, but also when they
    come to you from the services, because they are theoretically
    supposed to be trained at the service level and then delivered
    to you for the operations, are they in a position today to be
    used directly in operations or do you have to go through an
    extensive retraining or additional training of these
    individuals?
        General Nakasone. Senator, first of all thanks to you and
    Senator Manchin for the hearing you are going to hold this
    afternoon. When I look at readiness, really three parts to the
    readiness with our cyber forces. First of all, what the
    services are responsible for, the man, train, and equip piece
    of that, for 6,187 cyber warriors.
        Secondly, it is what we at U.S. Cyber Command and the
    National Security Agency must do to provide additional
    training. This is above and beyond what someone would come into
    the service and need to be able to be effective on our teams.
        The third piece is I think the critical piece that you have
    highlighted, which is retention and the ability for our cyber
    warriors to continue to stay within our force. That is a shared
    mission between the service and U.S. Cyber Command. I take that
    very seriously. I have worked very closely with the service
    chiefs to make sure that all three of those areas are going to
    be balanced in the future. We have work to do.
        Senator Rounds. So in other words, if you get them and they
    are not ready to go on the job day one, and you are training
    them, that takes time away from the time that they are then
    available for your use by a significant amount of time.
        General Nakasone. It does, but I would say, Senator, that
    there is a basic level that the services have to meet, and for
    the most part they meet that all the time. It is us being able
    to do the advanced training that is so necessary for them to be
    effective as part of our teams.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
        Senator Shaheen, please.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and General
    Clarke, thank you so much for your service. Thank you all for
    testifying this morning.
        General Clarke, I know that The New York Times has pointed
    out that you all had been very involved in Ukraine, and we
    discussed this yesterday, in terms of providing training to
    them that began in 2014. Can you talk about how important that
    has been in providing the expertise that we are now seeing on
    the battlefield in Ukraine?
        General Clarke. Senator, I hit a few highlights. One is the
    competency towards the security force assistance and
    specifically the high-end training that we did for the
    Ukrainian special operations forces. But I would also highlight
    for the Committee the military information support ops, or
    information warfare, that we had a dedicated team that was in
    the Ukraine for 8 years, providing that, and that was
    everything from billboard to print to using internet-based
    capabilities, along with civil affairs teams that were working
    with them. It really, as we see today, the resistance that the
    Ukrainian forces have held and the training that they were
    given I think directly contributed to the success on the
    battlefield.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, and you mentioned the
    importance of the information warfare that has occurred there,
    and clearly Ukraine has been masterful at what they have been
    doing. Of course, Putin also has good a good job in preventing
    his citizens in Russia from knowing what is actually going on
    on the battlefield.
        Can you talk a little bit about whether we should develop,
    or maybe we already have, a gray zone strategy to encompass
    that kind of information warfare as we are looking at
    particular conflict areas around the world.
        General Clarke. Senator, you are pointing at a really key
    factor, and yes, we have already begun this, in coordination
    with ASD SO/LIC and particularly with CYBERCOM, where much of
    the delivery of information resides. It is critical, and I
    would say we already have the authorities, in many cases, to
    conduct information operations. We just have to make sure that
    they are, in fact, directed at the right audiences and that we
    work very closely with our Department of State colleagues and
    the interagency so that we are delivering proper effects at the
    right point in time.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. General Nakasone, what is
    CYBERCOM's role in defending the Homeland from foreign cyber
    threats beyond just the critical infrastructure protection, and
    how are you working with public and private partners to protect
    the country, as we have looked at the potential for the Russian
    Government to attack our critical infrastructure and we still
    are concerned that that might happen? What are you doing?
        General Nakasone. Senator, it begins outside the United
    States, where my authorities rest, and that is through a series
    of persistent engagement campaigns against malicious cyber
    actors that intend to do our Nation harm, with the National
    Security Agency being able to release that information, so when
    we do a hunt forward operation in a specific country, being
    able to understand the tradecraft and the malware. Then
    releasing it publicly provides an antidote to what they might
    do, and then within the United States, working closely in
    support of Department of Homeland Security and CISA, providing
    them any assistant that they need in terms of capacity or
    capabilities.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Mr. Maier, one of the things
    that we have seen, and you mentioned this in your opening
    statement, you talked about the effort to encourage more women
    to join SOF. We have seen, in Afghanistan, with the Female
    Tactical Platoon, and Syria, with the Women's Protection Units,
    we are now seeing in Ukraine the important role that women are
    playing in conflict, and they are actually getting more
    attention today than they were in years past.
        So can you talk about what we are doing to work with our
    international partners to highlight the role of women and make
    sure that they have the attention and support they need when we
    are working in an area?
        Mr. Maier. Senator, I think we concretely say that women in
    SOF are an operational imperative because of the ability to do
    some of the things you described in your question. It is
    critically, and especially some of the areas we have
    traditionally worked, to be able to have women that are
    operators or have exquisite skills go to areas to be able to
    gather information that, frankly, men cannot go, or have a
    different outreach capability to different parts of
    communities. As we look toward the future fight, whether it is
    against gray zone competitors and non-state actors or state
    actors, we are going to need that capability. It is a force
    multiplier, ma'am.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Ernst, please.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and gentlemen, thank
    you very much for your service to our country. General Clarke,
    to you and Suzanne, and Chief Smith, to you and Tina. Thank you
    very much for your collaborative efforts in supporting our SOF
    warriors and their teams.
        There is no doubt that our special operations forces are
    the most capable of military elements on the globe, and of
    course our cyber forces, General Nakasone, are essential to the
    defense of this Nation. We have to ensure that both of these
    elements are fully resourced and modernized to defeat the
    current threats to our national security.
        So General Clarke, the health of the force is the fifth
    pillar in your command, and it ties into directly the first SOF
    truth, which is humans are more important than hardware. I
    think we all believe that, and I, like you, want to make sure
    that we are providing our servicemembers with the best care
    possible.
        So can you talk through SOCOM's efforts focused on brain
    and behavioral health for our servicemembers and, of course,
    for their loved ones as well?
        General Clarke. Thank you, Senator. Our people are our most
    precious resource and we have got to put the resources behind
    that to ensure they are taken care of. Specifically, the Brain
    Health Initiative falling with the Preservation of the Force
    and Family is one of the critical things we do.
        We focused initially on the physical domain because that is
    what you could see. But what we are finding is through the
    invisible wounds, TBI [traumatic brain injury], multiple
    explosions, multiple breaches in proximity to those explosions
    is having an impact, and so we are working very closely.
        I recently went up, with Chief Greg Smith, up to Boston,
    where we are working with Mass General and a couple of academic
    departments and universities up there to look at how we can do
    imaging that previous we could not do except on a cadaver. This
    may be groundbreaking for us to be able to determine beforehand
    what some of our operators may be going through.
        As you are well aware, we stood up an additional pillar
    within our Preservation of the Force and Family specifically
    towards the cognitive domain, because we realize that this is
    the most important part for our people is what is inside their
    brain housing group, that they can make the right decisions,
    and it affects everything they do. So we are going to continue
    working to improve our operators' and their families' lives.
        Senator Ernst. I appreciate that, sir. It is so important,
    and you brought up Preservation of the Force and Family, as did
    ASD SO/LIC Maier. But how can we take this program and sustain
    improvements in how our military approach is sustaining those
    SOF operators? Again, just focused on POTFF, how do we sustain
    and improve?
        General Clarke. Senator, the key for us is the sustained
    funding that we need in order to do that, and most of that
    funding attributes to the people that we have to support the
    Preservation of the Force and Family program.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, and just very briefly as well, I
    want to talk a little bit about your operational posture,
    General Clarke. I am frustrated by a number of mobilizations
    within terror networks, whether it is Russia and China across
    Africa, what we see in South America, Eastern Europe, all these
    hot zone conflicts that are currently ongoing.
        What does supporting your unfunded requirement list, or
    what I like to think of as risk assessment list, by us in these
    particular theaters?
        General Clarke. Senator, what it provides us, if we find
    support for the unfunded, it buys down risk, because we are
    able to modernize faster, and then we are also to ensure
    readiness, that we are placing the appropriate dollars towards
    those unfunded requirements. We will buy some of that back.
        Senator Ernst. For me, Mr. Chair, that is extremely
    important that we are able to focus on these unfunded
    requirements because they are so important within the area of
    SOCOM, and making sure that we are taking one of our smallest,
    most agile elements and being able to use them as a force
    multiplier.
        So thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, gentlemen, very much
    for being here today.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Ernst.
        The vote has commenced, and as I indicated at the beginning
    of the hearing, and with the concurrence of Senator Inhofe, we
    will recess for approximately 10 minutes. We will rejoin the
    hearing at the call of the chair, but approximately 10 minutes,
    so we can accomplish this vote, and then get on with the
    hearing.
        The Committee stands in recess.
        [Recess.]
        Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing to order again. I
    thank the witnesses for their understanding as we voted, and
    let me recognize Senator Rosen.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed. It pays to be the
    first one back from votes, does it not? So thank you. I want to
    thank you for testifying. Thank you for your years of service
    and continual service. I know you are going to continue to
    serve on, and for everyone else that is here.
        But we have got a lot going on with Russia, so I want to
    talk about Russian cyber threats, General Nakasone, because
    last month President Biden warned that Russia is exploring
    options for cyberattacks targeting the United States. The
    elevated threat level comes as we know Russia is launching
    cyberattacks against Ukraine, hitting the country's national
    telecommunications industry just last week, and causing great
    denial of service, service disruptions.
        Last week Senator Rounds and I called on the Administration
    to brief Congress on how we are protecting critical
    infrastructure right here in the U.S., and I am happy to report
    that just last night Director Easterly was with us in a
    classified briefing to talk about what CISA is doing.
        Can you tell me how CYBERCOM has been coordinating with
    Ukraine to harden their networks, and as you conduct your hurt
    forward operations to identify network vulnerabilities are you
    sharing that not just with Ukraine but all the NATO [North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies, particularly the border
    countries that are helping to provide that military and
    humanitarian relief?
        General Nakasone. Yes, Senator. As I mentioned, we had a
    hunt forward team that deployed to Ukraine at the end of 2021,
    and spent well over 2 months working with our partners there to
    harden their networks, focused on a number of key critical
    assets.
        The big piece about hunt forward, though, is not only the
    fact that we understand the networks of our allies and partners
    as they invite us in there but it also understanding what our
    adversaries are doing, and then to your point, sharing that
    broadly, not only with our partners and NATO but also with the
    private sector. Critical infrastructure is within the private
    sector, so as we expose these types of things they are broadly
    being able to shine a light on this type of activity.
        Senator Rosen. Yes, I think it is important, and I know
    this is not classified but can you speak broadly about some of
    the insights that we have gained? Are they using their state-
    sponsored networks? Are they using criminal networks?
        General Nakasone. So broadly, Senator, what I would say is
    what we learned is obviously what we had a pretty clear
    indication, which is the fact that there is a persistence that
    the Russians have towards this type of activity, and they have
    been in the Ukraine for a long time. So being able to identify
    the persistence, being able to identify the adversaries, being
    able to share that information, again, broadly with our
    partners, broadly with our allies and NATO, and then, most
    importantly, with the private sector again reinforces this idea
    of you cannot hide in terms of what you are doing.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I look forward to some more
    classified briefings with everyone.
        But I want to move on to you, General Clarke, because we
    know the world is watching. We know Iran is watching. We know
    this for sure, and so we have to combat Iranian aggression. In
    several previous hearings we know Iran and Iran-aligned militia
    groups, they are increasingly targeting the United States
    installations and servicemembers in Iraq, in Syria, via rocket
    and, of course, drone attacks. On a regular basis, Iran is, of
    course, we know the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism.
    They threaten the United States and they threaten our allied
    interests in the Middle East and around the world, via both
    direct attacks and through its support for Hezbollah and the
    Islamic Republic's other terrorist proxies such as KH [Kataib
    Hezbollah] and AAH [Asaib Ah al-Haq].
        So can you discuss the threat Iranian-aligned militia
    groups in the Middle East are posing to our United States
    troops and allies, and do you believe the United States, how do
    you think we should respond as you are currently addressing
    this threat? Do you have the necessary authorities, besides the
    ability to act in self-defense?
        General Clarke. Senator, I have served a long amount of
    time in CENTCOM area, and specifically in Iraq, and I have
    watched the Shiite militia groups, as you accurately described,
    their capabilities, which are only growing, particularly, as
    General McKenzie identified to this Committee, in the missile
    and in their unmanned aerial systems, which threaten United
    States Forces.
        I would leave the policy side to what we do with the
    authorities to Mr. Maier, but at the same hand I would say that
    we continue with our special operations forces to provide
    options for those policymakers by seeing and understanding how
    they conduct these attacks and try to be in front of those
    attacks to provide those options.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. Oh, I see my time is up. I yield
    back. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
        Senator Tuberville, please.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
    being here today. General Clarke, thank you for your service.
        General Clarke, in January 2021, the DOD awarded Teledyne
    Brown Engineering a contract to continue production on the Mark
    11 Shallow Water Combat Submersible. These subs are used to
    deliver Navy SEALs and their equipment, special operations.
    When do you expect these Mark 11s to be delivered, all of them?
        General Clarke. I will take that one for the record,
    because we do have a timeline over years, Senator. But what I
    am committed to, and take it broader, is that this capability
    for a maritime, undersea collection is critical for our Nation,
    to be able to work in the littorals and team with the Navy, to
    be able to do those type of operations.
        Senator Tuberville. Do we need more of them?
        General Clarke. Senator, I think what we have requested has
    been sufficient, and if we believe we need more of that unique
    capability--because it is not just that delivery system but it
    is other SEAL deliver systems that we are putting forward, to
    give variances of the type of capabilities we will need. But if
    we need more I will come back to this Committee and to the
    Department.
        Senator Tuberville. Good. Thank you.
        Secretary Maier, to what do you attribute the cost and time
    overruns of Block 2 of the Dry Combat Submersible, an important
    asset for the Pacific?
        Mr. Maier. Senator, I would also like to take that for the
    record. That is a complicated answer that I do not have all the
    details on. But we will get you written responses.
        Senator Tuberville. Take more than 5 minutes to explain
    that probably, would it not?
        Mr. Maier. Yes, it would, sir.
        Senator Tuberville. You know, in November, Acting Secretary
    of Defense Chris Miller enacted the fiscal year 2017 NDAA
    requirement to elevated SO/LIC positions to be on par with the
    other service secretaries, but last May, Senator Austin
    reversed this decision, burying SO/LIC back under the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Policy. SO/LIC is still understaffed
    and is not getting the routine direct access to the Secretary
    and Deputy Secretary as should, as directed by the NDAA.
        As a service Secretary, do you control acquisition and
    budget items in your purview?
        Mr. Maier. So, Senator, by law I do not for acquisition,
    but I approve the special operations budget. So the answer is
    yes to one and no to the other.
        Senator Tuberville. Okay. Thank you. You know, I would like
    to say this, that Secretary Austin changed this back but this
    body, we believe in civilian oversight, and hopefully we can
    get back to that somehow.
        General Nakasone, in July 2021, General Hayden said that
    the joint warfighting concept had, quote, ``failed in many
    different ways,'' end quote, could not produce a victory
    against an aggressive red team, and needed a new emphasis on
    space and cyber.
        Where, specifically, regarding Indo-Pacific, did the joint
    warfighting concept, JWC, fall short with cyber?
        General Nakasone. Senator, this is one that I certainly
    will take for the record, just because I want to provide a
    classified response to that. There are some very unique things
    that we have addressed, but again, I think it is better to put
    that in a classified response.
        Senator Tuberville. All right. What resources to ensure
    cyber protections across the joint force have you asked for and
    not received? Is there anything that you have not received that
    you have asked for?
        General Nakasone. Senator, not right now. I think the
    broader question which the Department is working towards right
    now is how big a cyber force, and that is a study that is being
    undertaken right now. We will grow by 14 different teams over
    the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], but I think that, in
    our estimation that that is probably a down payment on a
    broader force that is going to be necessary for the Nation.
        Senator Tuberville. How can we help you in this coming
    budget?
        General Nakasone. I think the biggest piece is just the
    continued support of our talent initiatives. We have talked
    about this. The importance of being able to grow a force begins
    well before they ever are recruited for any of the services or
    enter civilian service.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, and I would love for you to
    come to Alabama and check our new Cyber Technology and
    Engineering School, grades 9 through 12, top in the state,
    started 2 years ago. It is unbelievable and going to be
    unbelievably successful. It will open the doors of its new
    building this year, coming up in September, and we have over
    150 in it now, and it is an amazing place of education, and I
    think it is going to be very beneficial to what you are doing.
    I am talking about high school kids. I am not talking about
    college, and these kids will be ready to go to work as soon as
    they get out of high school. So hopefully one day you can visit
    in Huntsville.
        General Nakasone. Senator, I would enjoy that. I would
    also, Senator, to solicit your assistance for our Academic
    Engagement Network for U.S. Cyber Command. We have four
    institutions within the state of Alabama. But given your long
    experience as an educator I think your proponency within the
    state of Alabama could double that number.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank
    you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville.
        Senator King, please.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before beginning my
    questions I want to associate myself with the questions of
    Senator Rounds about National Security Presidential Memorandum
    13. My understanding is that the Administration is considering
    changes. Substantial changes, I believe, would be a grave
    mistake, would undermine deterrence at the worst possible
    moment, and I have communicated that to the White House, along
    with Congressman Mike Gallagher, my co-chair of the Cyberspace
    Solarium Commission.
        General Nakasone, if you can answer this in an open
    session, why no Russian serious cyberattack in Ukraine? We all
    thought that was going to be the first thing they did, and it
    did not happen. I know there were some attacks but nothing of
    the scale that we were expecting. Do we have an answer to that?
        General Nakasone. So Senator, I think I would begin by
    saying we are not out of Ukraine yet, so obviously our position
    right now is one of vigilance, in terms of anything that might
    still be done.
        In terms of what the Russians decided to, I would
    anticipate that this was based upon a series of assumptions
    that they may have made, I think coupled with the defensive
    capabilities that we were able to work with a number of
    partners within Ukraine, and then thirdly, I think is just a
    realization that a lot of times these are very, very difficult
    attacks to be able to conduct.
        Senator King. I think their assumption was that the war
    would last a week so they did not really have to do that. That
    seems to be one of their gravest mistakes.
        I am concerned about attribution. If we are going to
    respond to cyberattacks we have to have timely attribution. Are
    the U.S. Government's attribution assets adequate? Do we
    coordinate adequately? Who is in charge of attribution if a
    cyberattack occurred tomorrow? Is it you? Is it NSA? Is it the
    FBI? Is it CISA? Where does that responsibility fall?
        General Nakasone. So certainly, Senator, there is a
    combination of all of those that lead to attribution, to
    include our partners as we work very closely with them. I think
    the other one that I would add is the private sector. You know,
    when you consider some of our private sector entities that have
    over 300 million endpoints in the United States, being able to
    understand what is going on there is critical for what we are
    able to see.
        But ultimately this is brought up to a policy-level
    decision based upon what we are able to provide from
    intelligence and our partnerships with industry and foreign
    nations.
        Senator King. It makes me nervous when I hear the first
    part of the answer being coordination. I like it when somebody
    is in charge and responsible, but I understand that the
    coordination is important.
        One of the--I do not know if I would call it a gap, but you
    mentioned, for example, outside of our borders, that is where
    NSA's responsibility is, CIA's [Central Intelligence Agency]
    responsibility is. We are no longer in a world of borders, and
    what concerns me is a cyberattack that originates in a foreign
    country but goes through a server in New Jersey or California,
    and therefore it is a gray question as to where that
    cyberattack is coming from. Do we have adequate authorities and
    lines of authority and definitions to deal with a foreign
    cyberattack that comes through U.S. infrastructure?
        General Nakasone. I think that we are making much better
    progress in being able to address some of those authority gaps.
    You have identified one of the areas that we certainly were
    relevant during the SolarWinds most recently supply chain
    attack, when our adversaries had positioned themselves within
    the United States and we found that there was a blind spot
    there.
        So again, the breach notification that has been done, the
    discussions in terms of upping the standards for both national
    security systems and government systems that the Administration
    has done I think have all contributed to this.
        But you point out a key piece, Senator, which is this is
    much more difficult than one person being in charge. There is
    not one agency, one department, or even one entity that has all
    the information, and is so why this coordination is so
    important.
        Senator King. We talked about recruiting talent, and I know
    that is an issue that has been discussed in other questions.
    One of my questions is, what about tenure? Is it an issue in
    CYBERCOM that you have soldiers and sailors and marines, people
    that come through, but they are only there for a limited period
    of time and then they move on, or do they move on within
    CYBERCOM? Do we have enough continuity, or is that an issue
    that we need to address?
        General Nakasone. That is an area that each of the services
    handles differently, and I think each of the services has to
    focus on this. Once we train an operator within our force we
    are very, very reluctant to have them go back and do anything
    else but cyber, and I would offer that most of the cyber
    operators that is all they want to do is cyber.
        Again, the investment in this and the repeat tours is
    critical for us to maintain our readiness.
        Senator King. So we do have repeat tours now. That is a
    standard part of the way you operate.
        General Nakasone. We certainly do, but I think there could
    be more.
        Senator King. General Clarke, I am running out of time.
    Just a short question. Are you providing the kind of training
    that you did to the Ukrainians to other allies, particularly in
    Eastern Europe, in special operations?
        General Clarke. Yes, sir, we are, and I can give you more
    detail or provide that for the record, and we have continued
    that through what is going on in the Ukraine today.
        Senator King. Well I think what is going on in Ukraine in
    terms of success has been attributable to lots of factors, but
    one of them is the training that you have provided. Thank you.
        General Clarke. I agree with that assessment. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King.
        Senator Blackburn, please.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    to each of you for the update.
        General Clarke, I want to talk about the small unit
    dominance for just a moment and see where you are with that, to
    provide solutions for SOF small unit dominance. What progress
    have you made to bolster the collaboration with external
    government and non-governmental organizations concerning
    advancement of adversary asymmetric advantages? Then when you
    look at your resource shortfalls when it comes to information
    gathering, situational awareness, where are you with that? As
    you are very well aware, and as we have talked, Fort Campbell
    and the men and women that are stationed there--and this is
    something that is important to them.
        General Clarke. Senator, you bring out a great point about
    our forces. Many times they are working in small teams and they
    are disaggregated, but they bring with that disaggregation some
    power of being able to work with foreign partners, and
    providing them all the assets and tools, and as we look at
    this, at a point forward that very few could do. It is
    accepting to the host nation that they can work there because
    they have the culture, they have the language, and most times
    they are combat-credible forces who have been tested on the
    battlefields in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in Syria, and providing
    them all the tools that they need.
        What we are focused on is specifically giving them the most
    tools that they can have forward, what we call the hyper-
    enabled operator. That is one of my top five technology focus
    areas, to make sure that they have those tools, and a lot of
    that will be, as you referenced, making sure that we can put
    artificial intelligence and machine learning forward at the
    edge where they are.
        Senator Blackburn. In the 2022 NDAA, SOCOM, we had the
    operating concept, you need to articulate an operating concept
    that supports the joint warfighting concept. When you are
    looking at that joint landscape how do you seek to define that,
    and then how are you filling in those gaps as you bring in and
    avail technology?
        General Clarke. Senator, you are hitting a really key
    point, that working with ASD SO/LIC, who has given us guidance
    to actually look at our force structure and come up with that
    operating concept for 2040. I believe we have the force size
    that we need, but within that force size that we have we
    actually have to do some restructuring to ensure that we can
    properly compete with a nation state like China, and develop
    those unique capabilities that will be required for that future
    conflict.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay, and then in that vein, as you look
    at all of this, how are you going to bring into review
    different levels and degrees of specialization and competence,
    and how do you do that with your existing force?
        General Clarke. The way we do it now, and it works best, is
    through experimentation. We actually create exercises and
    venues so that we can actually test those, and we are doing
    that today. So as you look at our operations and maintenance
    budget for this year, about $9.7 billion, that is what directly
    contributes to that experimentation and building the future
    force that we will need.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. Before I run out of time, General
    Nakasone, I always appreciate your insights. I want you to talk
    for just a minute about the value of the current cyber defense
    partnerships that you have and how that affects your multi-
    domain partnerships, how that affects your multi-capable
    operations.
        General Nakasone. Senator, let me begin with the
    partnerships in a number of different phases. So first of all I
    would say our partnerships with the National Security Agency is
    critical to what we do. U.S. Cyber Command is powerful based
    upon our partnership with NSA.
        The second piece is the partnerships that we have with the
    private sector. As I mentioned, the change that taking place in
    cyberspace is mainly taking place within the private sector. So
    having those partnerships, like our under advisement program
    that this Committee sponsored is critical for what we are
    doing.
        The third piece is partnerships with our allies. Hunt
    forward teams, nine which were conducted in 2021, by the invite
    of foreign governments, coming into their networks and
    understanding is critical.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. I am over time but let me ask you.
    Having those partnerships, does that help you to retain some of
    the human capital and the troops that you need to retain?
        General Nakasone. Most definitely. I mean, people want to
    work with the private sector. They want to be able to deploy.
    They want to be able to work with academic institutions. There
    is an excitement that goes with that.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
        Senator Manchin, please.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all,
    thank all three of you for your service, and General Clarke,
    thank you and your family. I know how a commitment that is and
    what a commitment that is, but now you get to spend hopefully a
    little time with them.
        To General Clarke and to Secretary Maier, this is for you
    all. I noted the comments in your advance testimony about
    special operation forces, unique training authority, and the
    need to maintain readiness in the diverse global environments
    that we are in.
        I wanted to make sure you were both aware that in West
    Virginia we are working and making our state more available to
    SOCOM training operations--e are only 3 hours away now. We are
    not that far. You can hop, skip, and a jump--available for
    SOCOM operations. We have parts of the states that are in great
    condition for training opportunities, if it has not been
    brought to your attention, from subterranean complexes to
    austere rural environments. There is surface mine land--that is
    possible for transfer to DOD for nothing. Zero. One dollar to
    make it legal, probably--the East Coast-based units to train to
    significantly reduce cost compared to similar training that you
    are going to travel to the West Coast and do. It is right in
    your backyard.
        My office has been working with J3 representatives from
    SOCOM and our state as well as the West Virginia National Guard
    to highlight what we have to offer, and I hope to have you out
    soon to do a site visit. If you could I would appreciate it
    very much.
        So if your SOCOM staff has not briefed you on this program
    would you work with me and maybe come and visit and see what we
    have to offer?
        General Clarke. Senator, the SOCOM staff has briefed me.
    Having been appointed to West Point from Martinsburg, West
    Virginia, by Senator Byrd 42 years ago----
        Senator Manchin. Oh, you have got to come. You have got no
    option.
        General Clarke.--I am very familiar with West Virginia and
    this initiative and your hosting of 2nd Battalion 19th Special
    Forces Group and our continuous assessment that we run in your
    state.
        Senator Manchin. We are a state that is totally committed
    to the defense of this country, and think it proves that by the
    amount of veterans that we have who have fought in every war in
    conflict, and have even shed a lot of blood. So we are ready to
    go, and we would love to have you all there because you would
    be most welcome in whatever we have to offer.
        I have always said this too, about West Virginians
    fighting. I say when there is not really a good fight going on
    around the world, we fight each other just to stay in practice,
    because we are ready. Just like Alabama.
        So General Nakasone, this is for you. As Chairman of the
    Cyber Subcommittee I am particularly concerned that it is only
    a matter of time before cyber criminals and bad actors launch
    attacks on our commercial space assets, particularly our global
    positioning system. Cyber and space realms are intertwined and
    it is imperative for CYBERCOM and SPACECOM to work in lockstep,
    because every system SPACECOM uses has a cyber component that
    has to be secure and reliable.
        So how are you all working together, and if there are
    things you can talk about. If not, we will do it in a secured
    setting.
        General Nakasone. So again it begins with the ability for
    us to work closely with U.S. Space Command. We put a cyber
    integrated planning element into Space Command headquarters
    last summer. This is our ability now to work hand-in-hand with
    General Dickinson and his staff to be able to plan those types
    of operations.
        Senator Manchin. How about nitro?
        General Nakasone. Pardon me?
        Senator Manchin. Nitro.
        General Nakasone. If I might come back to you on that,
    Senator.
        Senator Manchin. That is what I thought. Okay. We will do
    that.
        Also, General Nakasone, a few weeks ago we heard from
    STRATCOM and SPACECOM on their readiness posture. Maintaining
    our nuclear deterrent and preserving our ability to operate in
    space are fundamental to today's great power competition with
    Russia and China. I believe that both of these missions are
    connected to our cyber defensive and offensive capabilities.
    The cyberspace and nuclear missions have to be interconnected
    and cannot operate in a vacuum.
        My question would be, given that CYBERCOM is operating in a
    highly complex and ever-evolving environment, how integrated
    would you say that the efforts are between STRATCOM and
    SPACECOM right now?
        General Nakasone. Totally integrated, and it begins with
    the assurance of our nuclear command and control and
    communications capabilities.
        Senator Manchin. I know that Senator King asked the
    question about what is going on and why has Russia not--are you
    seeing indications that we should have some concern there, that
    there might be movement in that area of cyberattacks?
        General Nakasone. So again, Senator, I think that the
    President, as he announced last week with his indications of
    concern, we have concerns all the time. We remain vigilant, and
    we will continue to remain vigilant.
        Senator Manchin. Do you believe that we are adequately
    capable of stopping these horrible cyberattacks that could harm
    just the well-being of the average United States citizen?
        General Nakasone. We are, along with our partners at CISA,
    and the private sector.
        Senator Manchin. So everybody is on track. Thank you very
    much. No further questions.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Manchin.
        Senator Cotton, please.
        Senator Cotton. Welcome, gentlemen. General Nakasone, let
    us talk a little bit about intelligence sharing with Ukraine.
    We have heard a lot about that over the last few weeks. You
    mentioned it a little bit today in your testimony. Can you tell
    us exactly, like how does that happen for you and your people,
    at NSA and CYBERCOM? Do you have partners in Ukraine that you
    are going direct to with intelligence we share? Is it going up
    in the United States Government and then going to them somehow?
    Just give us a little more visibility.
        General Nakasone. Senator, if I might, I think this is a
    great conversation for this afternoon, in closed testimony,
    just because I can lay out the numbers and the procedures upon
    which we do this.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. We will have that conversation in a
    closed session.
        I would like to know what kind of limitations that you face
    on what you are able to share, if any. Has the Administration
    put limitations on your ability to share actionable
    intelligence with Ukrainians?
        General Nakasone. So, Senator, again there is policy
    guidance that we follow at the National Security Agency with
    regards to the sharing of that intelligence.
        Senator Cotton. Are you allowed to share intelligence that
    would allow or facilitate strikes into the Donbas region?
        General Nakasone. Again, Senator, I think this is obviously
    better handled in closed testimony.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. We will talk about it in closed
    testimony. I certainly hope that you and the rest of our
    Government is allowed to share such intelligence, since Russia
    has announced that that is the main effort in Ukraine now and
    that the White House is not nervous as a cat in a room full of
    rocking chairs about allowing Ukraine to retake some of its
    territory in the Donbas.
        General Clarke, you have planned a mission or two in your
    life. Do you think it would complicate Russia's operations in
    the Donbas if they had to worry not just about Ukraine's
    defense operations there but also had to worry about potential
    offensive operations across the line of contact in the Joint
    Forces area?
        General Clarke. Senator, I believe that any time that any
    nation has increased capabilities and knowledge of their
    opponent it is helpful.
        Senator Cotton. I bet it would complicate the hell out of
    their planning, if you asked me. But anyway, we will talk about
    it at closed setting.
        General Clarke, I want to talk to you briefly about a
    couple of matters. The first is Afghanistan and the so-called
    over-the-horizon counterterrorism strikes we heard so much
    about last summer, in the lead-up to and during the collapse in
    Kabul. Since the last American soldier left Afghanistan, how
    many over-the-horizon strikes have we conducted in Afghanistan?
        General Clarke. Senator, I am not aware of any over-the-
    horizon strikes that have been conducted since we departed
    Afghanistan.
        Senator Cotton. Yes. Unfortunately, neither am I. I think
    it might have been better called over-the-rainbow
    counterterrorism strikes at the time by the White House.
        Another thing, General Clarke, I want to address with you
    is the authorities you have. Last year, when the Biden
    administration took office, one of the very first actions was
    to remove approval delegations for actions outside of Iraq and
    Syria, so places like, say, Yemen. We talked about it in this
    hearing last year, and you probably remember me referencing a
    story from the previous President about his first encounter
    with this question, when he was asked to approve a strike, and
    he did not understand why some captain or major or colonel who
    was on the ground was not approving it.
        Has the Biden administration's policies affected your
    ability to get after terrorist targets in places like Yemen or
    Somalia or elsewhere?
        General Clarke. Senator, I defer those specific questions
    to the geographic combatant commander. We continue to give that
    capability to those combatant commanders to conduct those
    strikes with our SOF personnel. I defer policy over to
    Secretary Maier, if there is anything that he would want to add
    on top of that.
        Senator Cotton. Secretary Maier, is there anything you
    would like to add on top of that?
        Mr. Maier. Senator, I think there has been no change in the
    policy from where we talked a year ago.
        Senator Cotton. So at what level in the United States
    Government does a strike against a bad guy in Yemen or Somalia
    have to be approved? Do you have to wake the President up in
    the middle of the night and ask him?
        Mr. Maier. Senator, is that question for me?
        Senator Cotton. Sure.
        Mr. Maier. I think it varies based on the geographic area,
    but there are very few that rise to the level of the White
    House. Most of those are within the DOD hierarchy, sir.
        Senator Cotton. At what level in the DOD hierarchy? Would
    that go to the combatant commander?
        Mr. Maier. Oftentimes the combatant commander, sir, but I
    think it varies depending on how low they are delegated. In
    some cases it is well below the combatant commander.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. General Clarke, I have a lot of
    confidence in you and your combatant commanders, but you know
    who else I have a lot of confidence in? People who are doing
    jobs that Major and Colonel Clarke used to do back in the day.
    Thank you. See you in the closed setting.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Cotton.
        Senator Blumenthal, please.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
    being here. Thank you all for your extraordinarily
    distinguished and dedicated service to our country.
        General Nakasone, in your responses to Senator Cotton you
    did not mean to say that we are not sharing intelligence with
    Ukraine, did you?
        General Nakasone. I did not. I said that I believe,
    Senator, I wanted to make sure that we talked about the details
    in a closed setting.
        Senator Blumenthal. But the idea that we are denying
    intelligence or refusing to share intelligence is incorrect.
        General Nakasone. That is correct, Senator.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        General Clarke, I wonder if you could provide some
    background as to why use of undersea vehicles for inserting our
    special operators is important, whether it is through the Dry
    Combat Submersible or through the existing undersea warfare
    platforms that we have.
        General Clarke. Senator, our naval special operators can
    get into places that a larger maritime ship or an undersea
    vessel, one of the Navy submarines, cannot get into, and it
    provides us the opportunity--which I can cover specifics in a
    closed session--to get in places that we need to conduct
    reconnaissance in, and to be able to give the Joint Force
    insights for potential future conflict and for competition.
        Senator Blumenthal. So the smaller vehicles can enter
    places that submarines could not, which makes them potentially
    very valuable, and I think in response to Senator Tuberville
    you talked a little bit about the timeline. What is the fastest
    that we could see those Dry Combat Submersibles available?
        General Clarke. Senator, we are testing one now. I went on
    it personally within the last 12 months, and found that it is
    almost ready at this point. We are still going through some
    specific testing of it, and I can get back to you on the record
    with what that specific timeline is. But we are talking months,
    probably not years. We are operationally validating it now, to
    make sure it would be completely safe in an operational
    environment.
        Senator Blumenthal. Are you satisfied that the budget, the
    2023 budget, includes sufficient funding to make it operational
    during the coming year, if it is a matter of months before it
    would be?
        General Clarke. Senator, I do, for this year's budget, but
    there are additional capabilities that we will continue to
    advocate for to build the modernization not just of the Dry
    Combat Submersible but other undersea, clandestine type vessels
    that will also assist us in the maritime and the littoral
    domain.
        Senator Blumenthal. I would appreciate hearing more,
    whether it is in a closed setting or on the record in writing
    more about this program.
        General Clarke. Yes, sir. I will take that for the record,
    Senator.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. One other area. When I
    visited Ukraine just very shortly before the invasion, in
    January, and I think it is certain now it is a matter of public
    record that we had trainers there for the Ukrainian forces. How
    would you assess the effectiveness of the training that we gave
    to Ukrainians through our special operations as well as other
    personnel, and would such training now be useful for more of
    them outside of Ukraine? Obviously, we are not going to put any
    of our personnel into Ukraine, but if there were training
    outside the country for some of their special operators.
        General Clarke. I assess that training as very effective,
    and what we did for 8 years prior for both lethal capabilities
    but also in the information operations. I do believe that at
    Ukrainians' desire, based upon what they will need in the
    future, for what could become a protracted engagement with
    Russia, we should look at and assess what future capabilities
    they will need, because they will need to have a sustained
    effort, and I think we could provide those if the policy is
    decided. But I think that would benefit the Ukrainians in the
    future.
        Senator Blumenthal. Absolutely. Thanks so much, General.
    Thank you all.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Sullivan, please.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen,
    thank you for your service here. General Clarke, both you and
    General Nakasone, I think you are two of our best four-star
    commanders focused on lethality, warfighting, crushing our
    enemies when called upon, and I just really want to thank you
    for that, and General Clarke, for your service, if you are
    going to be retiring soon. I hope you are not retiring soon but
    I understand it is maybe close to 40 years now, so good luck
    with everything. But you have done an exceptional job. Both of
    you have.
        I just want to emphasize what Senator Cotton mentioned,
    General Nakasone, on the intel-sharing piece. I know you cannot
    say a lot here, but I think it is strong bipartisan support to
    the extent we can share as much intel, of course, without
    compromising sources and methods, with Ukrainian forces,
    including in Eastern Ukraine. I think it is really important,
    and I think I am speaking for a lot of Senators on this
    Committee.
        General Clarke, I have kind of a multi-part question. Could
    you elaborate a little bit on SOCOM's role in building out
    Ukrainian Special Forces over the last several years, and then
    what lessons are we applying with regard to what we have
    learned there to Taiwan Special Forces?
        one of the things that you mentioned in the what-we-do
    section of your vision for SOCOM is helping shape the
    environment to reduce risk, prevent crises, and set conditions
    for success in competition and conflict, and I would like to
    get a little sense, to the extent you can talk about it here,
    on what we are doing to help Taiwan the way we have helped
    Ukraine, particularly in the SOF world.
        General Clarke. Senator, when we first started training
    with the Ukrainian special operations over 8 years ago they
    were a smaller force and they did not necessarily have a SOCOM-
    like headquarters. That force grew to three brigade
    equivalents, commanded by colonels, and a training regiment.
    They also, over the last 18 months, added a resistance company
    made up of what we--like a home guard, that was embedded in
    each one of those. That was through the persistent effort of
    not just the U.S., but we also brought in allies from other
    NATO countries.
        Senator Sullivan. You are seeing, obviously, some of the
    success of that training and structure in the current conflict.
        General Clarke. Yes, Senator, we are.
        Senator Sullivan. What about Taiwan, to the extent you can
    talk about that?
        General Clarke. Senator, I would prefer to talk about
    Taiwan in a closed setting. But broadly, building both
    resistance and resilience in the force--resistance being the
    ability to give the punch, but resilience being the ability to
    take the punch and make sure you can get back up, through
    medical training, through logistics, and through
    communications--is critical. I think we have got to work on
    both of those with other nations, writ large.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask a question for both of you,
    kind of, again a two-part question. General Clarke, Rear
    Admiral Howard recently wrote a piece in USNI News and talked
    about making sure our special operations forces were combat
    ready for new tactics, techniques, particularly in some of the
    most stressing environment and hard-target conditions. He
    talked about SOCOM competition in the High North.
        Are there initiatives that you are undertaking? General
    Nakasone, can you talk a little bit about what NSA Alaska has
    been doing, the capabilities that they bring? Even a lot of
    Alaskans are not aware of the great work that goes on,
    particularly as it relates to Russia and other places that goes
    on in the High North of America and Alaska, with the buildout
    and exceptional work that NSA Alaska is doing.
        General Clarke, can you take that question first, and then
    General Nakasone.
        General Clarke. Yes, sir. I just left Norway less than 10
    days ago, where I observed our special operations forces
    working 200 miles north of the Arctic Circle, using all of
    their capabilities--insertion clandestinely, looking at hard
    targets, working with partners. Simultaneously, as you know,
    there was another exercise going on in Alaska, where we also
    had a large contingent of all elements of our special
    operations command that were practicing experimenting. This
    alone highlights the importance of training inside the Arctic
    for those hard targets in the future.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you. General Nakasone?
        General Nakasone. Senator, geography matters, and as we
    take a look at our ability to provide both indications and
    warning and awareness of the Pacific, a critical element of
    this is what the men and women at NSA Alaska are doing today.
    That location, in your home state, has provided us insights
    into our adversaries' actions and provided protection to our
    forces that are deployed in that region.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Hawley, please.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to all
    of you for being here. Thank you for your service.
        I want to come back to this question of Taiwan that Senator
    Sullivan was just asking about, and let me frame it this way.
    Secretary Maier, let me start with you.
        I think the Ukrainians are showing how effective and
    important irregular warfare can be for defeating an enemy
    invasion. Obviously that has got a lot of potential relevance
    to the situation that we see in Taiwan. Our goal in Taiwan, I
    think hopefully we all agree, should be to prevent an invasion.
    We do not want to be behind the eight ball where we are trying
    to displace one. But we have got to plan for all scenarios, so
    irregular warfare has an important role to play.
        You testified last year, and I am going to quote you here,
    that the United States should ``strongly''--that is your word--
    ``strongly consider options to strengthen Taiwan's irregular
    warfare capabilities, including their ability to fight in
    depth''--that is you again--``using resistance networks or
    other capabilities after a Chinese amphibious landing.'' Is
    that still your view?
        Mr. Maier. It is, Senator, and I think we are doing more
    work in that regard, as others have testified.
        Senator Hawley. Perfect. Can I just ask you to expand on
    that? Can you give us an update on what you are doing, what the
    Pentagon is doing to help strengthen Taiwan's irregular warfare
    capabilities?
        Mr. Maier. So, Senator, I think General Clarke already hit
    on some of that. Obviously we can only go so much in this
    session. But I think consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act,
    we are doing all we can to look at a whole-of-resistance
    approach. So in some cases that means doing more exercises,
    more ability to touch aspects of the Taiwanese infrastructure
    and determine its both, as General Clarke said, ability to take
    a punch and give a punch. That is sort of the most basic level
    of our assessment at this point.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. General, you testified also last
    year, and you just reiterated it to Senator Sullivan, but you
    testified that you thought the United States should help Taiwan
    strengthen its irregular warfare capabilities. I am assuming,
    based on your answer just a second ago, you think that is still
    a priority. Is that fair to say?
        General Clarke. All in accordance with our policies. But,
    Senator, if I could take it a bit broader.
        Senator Hawley. Yes.
        General Clarke. It is not just about Taiwan either. It is
    also more than 15 countries that we are working with in the
    Indo-Pacific that are like-minded, have the same values, and
    have the same interests. Bolstering their defenses and ensuring
    they are seeing the same pernicious behavior that we have seen
    on behalf of the Chinese is critical, because we would rather
    be looking at 15 nations aligned or 20 nations aligned than
    just one or two.
        Senator Hawley. Sure. Absolutely. I agree with that 100
    percent. As you may or may not know, I have introduced a bill
    called the Arm Taiwan Act, which would create the Taiwan
    Security Assistance Initiative modeled on the Ukraine Security
    Assistance Initiative, that would help accelerate the ideas,
    help accelerate Taiwan's deployment of critical asymmetrical
    defenses. I think it is critical we learn the right lessons
    from what we are seeing in Ukraine. Obviously deterrence failed
    in Ukraine. We do not want to see deterrence fail in Taiwan--we
    just simply cannot afford that--and making sure that they are
    in a position, the Taiwanese are in a position to wage
    irregular warfare if necessary, and China knows they can do
    that I think is critical.
        General, let me ask you a related question. What role do
    you see SOCOM playing in helping to deter or, if necessary,
    defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan?
        General Clarke. Senator, I described our role in that as
    the war around the edges, and being able to hold hard targets
    at risk to ensure that we provide the national command
    authority those options. That is set up by conducting
    reconnaissance and ensuring, as I addressed to other members,
    building the undersea capabilities that we need today, ensuring
    that we are postured in places around the globe that can pull
    that. That is combining elements like cyber, space, and special
    operations forces together to provide unique capabilities for
    our Nation.
        Senator Hawley. Let me ask you if you have been able to use
    any resources freed up from our withdrawal from Afghanistan to
    invest in more capabilities relevant to the Taiwan scenario.
        General Clarke. Senator, we have put additional forces into
    both the Indo-Pacific theater and into the European theater
    over the last 3 years. I would say we started the rebalancing
    of some of the soft requirements based upon the 2018 National
    Defense Strategy that identified the threats from near-peer
    competitors.
        Senator Hawley. But I guess my question is, has the
    withdrawal from Afghanistan, has that freed up resources that
    you have been able to repurpose to this theater for this pacing
    scenario?
        General Clarke. I cannot draw a direct correlation from one
    to another, but fundamentally we do not have as many people in
    Afghanistan today. We have no people in Afghanistan today.
        Senator Hawley. Got it. I have got some additional
    questions that I will give to you each for the record. Thank
    you for your service. Thank you for being here.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
        Senator Scott, please.
        Senator Scott. Thank you, Chair Reed.
        General Clarke, what does the future operating environment
    look like for special forces, special operation forces over the
    next 5, 10, and 20 years, and do you expect to need more
    personnel and resources given the threats from Communist China,
    Russia, and emboldened Iran?
        General Clarke. Senator, I think we have the sufficient
    amount of forces that we need today that exist within the
    force. We have just now, this year, gotten to the first time to
    where we actually have a predictable schedule that all of our
    forces are on a 2-to-1 deployment to dwell, or greater, and so
    the force that we have is right.
        In some cases, though, we actually need to make some
    changes within the force that we have, to be able to put
    towards the capabilities that we will need. For example,
    potentially more information operators that we will need in the
    future. So we may have less in one area but actually look at
    where we need to put more in the future. What we do need is a
    continuous, sustained budget that will allow for increased
    modernization and readiness so that we can build those
    capabilities in time for the Department.
        Senator Scott. Thank you. General, as we know, President
    Biden's budget is in step with the raging inflation we are
    seeing right now. Are there any assets or any spending you
    would like to do that you will be unable to do because of the
    budget basically being cut when you look the inflation?
        General Clarke. Senator, we have submitted an unfunded
    requirement list that hits specifically to the points, and top
    line that asks for additional funding in the information
    operations, in artificial intelligence and machine learning,
    and it hits on the speeding up of some of our modernization of
    our clandestine insertion maritime, but also looks a developing
    counter-UAS, unmanned aerial systems, to be able to protect our
    forces that are forward, and that will speed those processes up
    in the future.
        Senator Scott. We watched Vladimir Putin's aggression
    against Ukraine, and I think we are all disappointed that
    President Biden did not do enough to deter it. But what can
    special operations continue to do to assist Ukraine and support
    our other partners that hopefully will help Ukraine win against
    Russia and also make sure that Putin does not feel emboldened
    to invade a NATO country?
        General Clarke. Senator, I would highlight a few. Number
    one is continue to ensure the lethal aid makes it into the
    Ukraine and for special operators to make sure that it gets to
    the Ukrainian special operations forces. I think they are doing
    a fantastic job today inside the Ukraine.
        But we also have to be predictive and work with the
    Ukrainians on not what they need today but as this potentially
    goes into protracted conflict what will they need in the
    future? It may not be as much on the lethal side but it may be
    other capabilities, whether it is mobility or whether it is
    first aid or whether it is protection. I think we have to be
    predictive to that.
        The other one that was already hit is the continued info
    and intel sharing about what is going on, and we can talk about
    that separately.
        Senator Scott. Are there any lessons learned from how
    United States special operations forces have been able to help
    Ukraine that we can apply to potentially what is going to
    happen when China invades Taiwan or, you know, Iran continuing
    to threaten Israel?
        General Clarke. Yes, sir. Number one is it is not just the
    United States and Ukraine. While we are sitting here we have 16
    NATO nations all on their own accord that are currently working
    with our Special Operations Command Europe, and they are
    collaborating, they are sharing, and they are sensing what is
    happening in that environment that we will then collectively be
    able to provide the best support to Ukraine. I think the same
    lessons could be applied in other theaters.
        The second one is, though, getting ahead of it. The more
    than you can set up for success today, the better off you will
    be. Having the urgency to see that in advance and not waiting
    until the end.
        Senator Scott. Thanks. General Nakasone, what has CYBERCOM
    been able to do to increase its efforts to protect our public
    and private infrastructure from bad actors from Russia?
        General Nakasone. Senator, several things. First of all,
    deploying a team to the Ukraine to see what our adversaries are
    doing and being able to capture their malware and their
    tradecraft and share that broadly with the private sector.
        Secondly, it is working with the lead for this, which is
    DHS CISA, and providing the capacity, if necessary, and also
    the collaboration that is ongoing.
        The last piece is working broadly with the private sector,
    particularly our defense industrial base, to ensure that they
    have an understanding of the tactics and techniques our
    adversaries are using.
        Senator Scott. Thank you. Thank you, Chair Reed.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Scott, and
    gentlemen, thank you too. I will adjourn the open session. We
    will reconvene in SVC-217 in approximately 10 minutes, to begin
    the closed session. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
        [Whereupon, at 11:41 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

               Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand
                                 cyber academy
        1. Senator Gillibrand. General Nakasone, do you have any views on
    the development of the National Cyber and Digital Services Academy?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                                     china
        2. Senator Gillibrand. General Nakasone, the joint efforts in New
    York City with assets from the National Guard, NSA, NYPD, and FBI are
    collaborating with over 50 critical infrastructure entities and the
    efforts are working extremely well. What are your thoughts on that type
    of collaboration, and making sure it can become more robust and more
    formalized?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                                experimentation
        3. Senator Hirono. General Nakasone what opportunities has CYBERCOM
    had for experimentation in techniques and procedures in order to
    maintain our cyber professionals' competitive edge?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        4. Senator Hirono. General Clarke, you mentioned that SOCOM has
    conducted experimentation between its components and their respective
    services. Can you describe what is involved in these experimentations?
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]

        5. Senator Hirono. General Clarke, what have been the most
    beneficial results of these efforts?
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]
                          special operations training
        6. Senator Hirono. General Clarke, SOCOM's efforts to train
    Ukrainian special operations forces since the annexation of Crimea has
    no doubt given their military a great deal of expertise, and has helped
    Ukraine be able to defend itself against invasion. Where else can
    global security best stand to benefit by the partnerships U.S. Special
    Operations Forces has with foreign militaries?
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]
               recruitment of women and minorities into sof units
        7. Senator Hirono. General Clarke, what progress have you made in
    the last year in recruiting more women and minorities into Special
    Operations Forces?
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]

        8. Senator Hirono. General Clarke, how have you been able to
    encourage more women and minorities to join SOF?
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]

        9. Senator Hirono. General Clarke, how many women are part of
    Special Operations Forces teams currently?
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]

        10. Senator Hirono. General Clarke, what measures are you using to
    assess SOCOM's progress in this initiative?
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King
                            ukraine lessons learned
        11. Senator King. General Nakasone, what are some of the
    preliminary lessons learned from USCYBERCOM's efforts supporting
    network fortification prior to Russia's invasion?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        12. Senator King. General Clarke, what is USSCOCOM's strategy in
    Ukraine and Eastern Europe after the conclusion of conflicts in
    Ukraine.
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]
                                     unclos
        13. Senator King. General Nakasone and General Clarke, do you
    support the ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
    the Sea (UNCLOS)?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]

        14. Senator King. China Commission--I believe we must establish an
    unbiased and non-partisan commission to examine a grand strategy for
    our approach to China, similar in intent to President Eisenhower's
    Solarium Project. We need to think of a holistic approach to create a
    stable international order in which China (or Russia) cannot dictate
    regional developments.
        General Nakasone, General Clarke, and Secretary Maier, what are the
    `toughest problems' OUTSIDE of military imbalances?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]
        Secretary Maier. China's ability to mobilize State resources and
    leverage all levers of national power is a significant challenge to a
    stable international order. Within the Office of the Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
    (ASD(SO/LIC)), we work across U.S. Government (USG) departments and
    agencies and with international partners to leverage collective
    expertise and contribute to a USG holistic approach. Three issues stand
    out as key challenges.
        First, China's exploitation and manipulation of populations through
    information operations are pervasive. As we saw with COVID-19, China's
    efforts include shaping the information environment through
    disinformation and proactively shaping the narrative about China and
    its activities. Coordination amongst our allies and partners and a
    proactive approach to address Chinese disinformation will be an ongoing
    focus in the near term.
        Second, China uses paramilitary and civilian elements in operations
    short of armed conflict in furtherance of political objectives. The
    People's Liberation Army ships and aircraft are augmented by large
    numbers of China Coast Guard ships, fishing boats, and other
    paramilitary forces that serve as force multipliers in territorial
    disputes. These ships often engage in intimidating activities,
    including illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, to inhibit
    other nations' access to offshore resources, diminish economic
    development, and raise regional tensions.
        Finally, we need to focus on Chinese efforts in pursuit of foreign
    technology, including through illicit means. Tactics of coercion take
    many forms, including obtaining foreign technology through foreign
    direct investment, overseas acquisitions, legal technology imports, the
    establishment of foreign research and development centers, joint
    ventures, research and academic partnerships, talent recruitment, and
    both industrial and cyber espionage and theft. China also has a
    domestic policy of military civil fusion using domestic industry to
    bolster military technology development.

        15. Senator King. General Nakasone, General Clarke, and Secretary
    Maier, in order to avoid the US trying to ``spend our way out of
    conflict,'' how can we specifically counter China's major activities in
    your area of responsibility?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]
        Secretary Maier. The keys to a sustainable U.S. response are
    building partner capacity and resilience and encouraging allies and
    partners to work together to counter China's malign activities. Allies
    and partners are on the frontlines of China's irregular warfare
    activities, including information operations, paramilitary, and
    civilian operations. Our allies and partners are often in a position to
    respond first and shape the environment in which China is operating.

        16. Senator King. General Nakasone, General Clarke, and Secretary
    Maier, what would be the greatest benefit this commission could
    deliver?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]
        Secretary Maier. I rely on the considered expertise of outside
    groups across the spectrum of activities in my area of responsibility
    as ASD(SO/LIC). Thoughtful recommendations for how to incorporate
    Special Operations Forces (SOF) capabilities as part of a broader,
    whole-of-government strategy, is always useful.

        17. Senator King. General Nakasone, General Clarke, and Secretary
    Maier, what would put us in the best position to avoid the U.S. and
    China from escalating conflict and careening into a war with China?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]
        Secretary Maier.  Open and routine senior leader engagement with
    People's Republic of China counterparts to ensure better understanding
    of actions taken, and their intent, will help reduce misperceptions and
    reduce the likelihood of escalation.

        18. Senator King. Expeditionary Tactical Operations Center--the
    shift to a more scalable, lethal, and mobile combat elements such as
    the Marine Littoral Regiment and Multidomain Task Force is critical to
    the countering the dynamic threats in your Area of Responsibility. The
    DOD's recent investments in the University of Maine's composites and
    advanced manufacturing initiatives has resulted in improving blast and
    ballistic resistant structures and materials. Maine small businesses
    are the direct benefactor of the growing talent and innovation in this
    sector and are concurrently providing critical capabilities to the
    warfighter. The Modular Panelized Shelter System (MPSS) is one system
    of note and is currently employed by NORTHCOM in Alaska, EUCOM in
    Italy, and AFRICOM headquarters.
        General Nakasone and General Clarke, could your command and service
    component commands further benefit from an expeditionary, affordable,
    all weather, TS/SCI certified structures such as the MPSS?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]
        19. Senator King. Arctic--I supported Senator Sullivan's Arctic
    Security Initiative amendment last year, and helped get it into law
    with the Chairman.
        General Nakasone and General Clarke, what specific resource
    shortfalls does your command possess that would limit your ability to
    conduct exercises/operations in the High North? Please be specific to
    include operations and sustainment funding for exercises, equipment
    shortfalls such as weather gear for soldiers or unique platforms.
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Kelly
                    offensive cyber capabilities in ukraine
        20. Senator King. General Nakasone, the Russian invasion of Ukraine
    has demonstrated that cyber operations are no longer simply a gray zone
    tactic. Open-source reporting now suggests that the Russians launched
    at least two major cyber-attacks in the lead-up to their invasion, both
    of which affected Ukraine's military and government agencies. How has
    the Russians' use of offensive cyber capabilities in Ukraine influenced
    or changed our thinking on this type of warfare?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
          cybersecurity risks for commercial off-the-shelf technology
        21. Senator King. General Nakasone, I understand that in 2019, the
    DOD Inspector General released a report that provided an audit of the
    Department's management of the cybersecurity risks for government
    purchased Commercial Off-the-Shelf (or COTS) items. The report
    specifically found that if the DOD continues to purchase and use
    commercial IT items without identifying, assessing, and mitigating the
    known vulnerabilities associated with these items, ``missions critical
    to national security could be compromised.'' Is the Department today
    procuring computers from any companies that are either owned or
    partially owned by the People's Republic of China?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        22. Senator King. General Nakasone, is it possible to purchase
    systems that avoid PRC-compromised supply chains?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        23. Senator King. General Nakasone, if not, and understanding that
    our networks are only as secure as the devices that are connected to
    them, what steps have been taken to protect our cyber infrastructure
    and what other actions are being considered?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                                     taiwan
        24. Senator Sullivan. General Clarke, in the Special Operations
    Forces Vision Statement under the ``What We Do'' section, you State,
    ``[s]hape the environment to reduce risk, prevent crises, and set
    conditions for success in competition and conflict.'' How are we
    setting conditions in Taiwan and the first-island chain to accomplish
    those tasks you outlined?
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]
                                   nsa alaska
        25. Senator Sullivan. General Nakasone, as you know, my great State
    is home to the Alaska Mission Operations Center (AMOC), a US National
    Security Agency facility located on Elmendorf Air Force Base in
    Anchorage. It is considered one of two ``consolidated intelligence
    centers'' in the country and provides combat intelligence to
    battlefield commanders, commands, and DOD leadership. Could you speak
    to the capabilities and contributions of this facility to the strategic
    imperatives of our national defense?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                         joint force cyber integration
        26. Senator Sullivan. General Nakasone, as you know, Alaska is home
    to the DOD's premier training venue, the Joint Pacific Alaska Range
    Complex or JPARC, that integrates all domains--land, air, sea, space,
    and cyberspace. The Secretary of the Air Force has directed JPARC
    modernization to provide Threat Matrix Framework Level 4 training
    capability. This requires the JPARC to migrate its networks and
    infrastructure to the TS-SCI/SAP level. Currently, no such suitable
    facility exists to support this function, but the Air Force is working
    to create a Joint Range Operations Center to provide this capability
    and ensure adequate integration of space, cyber, and command and
    control into training there. Do you believe adequate cyberspace
    integration is of primary importance to Joint Force lethality?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        27. Senator Sullivan. General Nakasone, would you support the
    creation and funding of the Joint Range Operations Center at JPARC to
    ensure space and cyber are properly integrated into the Joint force
    training there?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                            authoritarian aggression
        28. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Maier and General Clarke, from Xi
    Jinping's predatory economic initiatives, repeated neighbor-nation
    coercion, and brutal repression of individual freedoms; to now Vladimir
    Putin's heinous invasion of Ukraine, there is little doubt that we are
    now in a new era of authoritarian aggression. This aggression spans the
    entire spectrum of conflict, from open military warfare to gray zone
    activities below the threshold of armed conflict. What does SOCOM's
    piece of integrated deterrence look like?
        Secretary Maier. USSOCOM's contributions to integrated deterrence
    are twofold. First, SOF capabilities support U.S. efforts to deny
    adversaries' ability to overcome conventional and nuclear deterrence at
    the lower end of the conflict spectrum. The SOF global footprint,
    persistent engagement, low profile, and unique skills and authorities
    enable SOF to counter adversaries' gray zone activities, both directly
    and indirectly through allies and partners.
        Second, SOF capabilities strengthen deterrence by shaping the
    environment and enabling the Joint Force to prevail against adversaries
    in conflict. SOF core activities support access and placement, gather
    information, and establish relationships and infrastructure to set
    conditions necessary for achieving military success.
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]

        29. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Maier and General Clarke, what must
    SOCOM do to make dictators like Xi Jingping and Vladimir Putin think
    twice about their geopolitical ambitions?
        Secretary Maier. SO/LIC and USSOCOM must develop, provide, and
    employ forces in ways that reinforce overall Joint Force combat
    credibility, while diminishing that of adversaries. Adversary decisions
    to act aggressively rely on perceptions regarding overall risk, as well
    as the probability and cost of success. SOF employment must increase
    adversary perception that the probability of success is low and that
    the cost of aggression will be high. SOF must continue to strengthen
    relationships and build allied and partner capabilities, increase
    resilience, and enhance resistance to coercion.
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]
                            fiscal year 2023 budget
        30. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Maier and General Clarke, amid the
    extensive loss of purchasing power from an extended continuing
    resolution this past fiscal year, as well as the currently
    unprecedented inflationary pressures, are current and projected SOCOM
    funding levels adequate to keep pace against our authoritarian
    adversaries?
        Secretary Maier. Yes, the current and projected USSOCOM funding
    levels are adequate to meet USSOCOM's current requirements.
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
      assistant secretary of defense for special operations/low-intensity
                             conflict (asd so/lic)
        31. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Maier, how often do you meet with the
    Secretary or Deputy Secretary concerning SOCOM civilian oversight
    responsibilities?
        Mr. Maier. I meet with the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy
    Secretary of Defense, and the other Secretaries of the Military
    Departments every other week in our regular Service Secretary meeting,
    chaired by the Secretary of Defense. Separately, I meet regularly with
    the Deputy Secretary on SOF administrative responsibilities. As part of
    the Department's implementation of my office's civilian oversight
    responsibilities, I or a member of my leadership team participate in a
    number of Secretary and Deputy Secretary-led senior leader fora to
    include: Senior Leaders Council, Secretary's Large Group, Program
    Budget Review Small Group, Defense Management Action Group, Defense
    Workforce Council, Defense Strategy Steering Group, and the Legislative
    Review Panel.

        32. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Maier, what is SO/LIC's plan to address
    current staffing shortfalls?
        Mr. Maier. In fiscal year 2022, SO/LIC received ten new billets to
    establish and fill civilian positions related to my office's
    administrative oversight responsibilities. We have recently hired
    civilians with expertise in budget and financial management, SOF
    capabilities, special access programs, strategic analysis, logistics,
    force management, personnel programs, and legislative affairs. In
    fiscal year 2023, we will hire against 15 additional billets. To help
    inform future hiring needs, my office is working with the Air Force
    Manpower Analysis Agency to conclude a manpower assessment for the
    Secretariat for Special Operations. This study will help us determine
    the full manpower requirement for my USSOCOM civilian oversight
    responsibilities as laid out in Title 10 U.S. Code and the Department
    of Defense Directive 5111.10, ``Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict,'' May 5, 2021.

        33. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Maier, what specifically is SO/LIC doing
    to hire qualified candidates to fulfill the responsibilities required
    by law for U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) oversight?
        Mr. Maier. We have prioritized the open billets and are hiring
    across the full range of our statutory area of responsibility. We are
    hiring analysts with expertise in programming, budgeting, strategy,
    civilian personnel programs, operation research analysis, legislative
    affairs, and special access programs. We are working closely with
    Washington Headquarters Service to ensure we have effective job
    announcements with appropriate subject matter experts reviewing resumes
    and filtering and interviewing candidates. I am pleased with the number
    and quality of candidates those announcements have produced, and we
    have made steady progress in filling existing needs with highly
    qualified personnel.
                 preservation of the force and family's (potff)
        34. Senator Blackburn. General Clarke, the Government
    Accountability Office (GAO) recently identified shortfalls in POTFF
    overarching vision and data, what steps have been taken to create an
    integrated and holistic system of care?
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]

        35. General Clarke, what do you assess are the limitations with the
    current POTFF staffing allocation model?
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]
                                    somalia
        36. Senator Blackburn. General Clarke, how are your operations
    impacted by the reduction in U.S. troops in Mogadishu?
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]

        37. Senator Blackburn. General Clarke, what is the assessment of
    terror groups in the Horn of Africa threatening American personnel
    abroad?
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]
                               ukraine and taiwan
        38. Senator Blackburn. General Clarke, what lessons have we learned
    from the Ukrainian special operations forces efforts?
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]

        39. Senator Blackburn. General Clarke, what lessons learned from
    the Ukrainian SOF can the U.S. apply to other partners--particularly
    Taiwan?
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]

        40. Senator Blackburn. General Clarke, how does the crisis in
    Ukraine differ from the requirements in a Taiwan scenario?
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]
                               ransomware attacks
        41. Senator Blackburn. General Nakasone, as ransomware groups
    target American logistics and shipping companies, what can be done to
    improve deterrence across multiple domains simultaneously?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                                     socom
        42. Senator Blackburn. General Clarke, how do you plan to divest
    and prioritize SOCOM's focus geographically?
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]

        43. Senator Blackburn. General Clarke, as SOCOM embraces
    specialization, can you articulate the potential limitations in overall
    flexibility to respond to crisis?
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
                            european burden-sharing
        44. Senator Hawley. General Clarke, our European allies are
    beginning to ramp up defense spending. This is long overdue, but it's
    an important step in the right direction. In your view, what kind of
    special operations capabilities should our Allies--including Germany--
    be investing in to strengthen deterrence along NATO's eastern front?
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]

        45. Senator Hawley. General Clarke, what are some of the missions
    that U.S. special operations forces are doing in Europe now that our
    European allies could help with, or even take over, as they build out
    their own special operations forces?
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]
                                ukraine conflict
        46. Senator Hawley. General Nakasone, it was widely expected that
    large-scale cyber operations would precede Russia's attack on Ukraine,
    yet that does not appear to be the case. Could you speak to how cyber
    operations factored into Russia's military strategy during this
    conflict, and if Russia's use of cyber operations deviated from Russian
    doctrine in any particularly notable ways?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        47. Senator Hawley. General Nakasone, have you noticed adaptation
    in Russian cyber conduct during this conflict?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        48. Senator Hawley. General Nakasone, have you noticed adaptation
    in Chinese conduct in cyberspace during the conflict in Europe?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        49. Senator Hawley. General Nakasone, it has been publicly reported
    that cyber mission teams in Europe conducted defensive operations prior
    to and during Russia's invasion of Ukraine. As the entire forces
    manages multi-theater demands, how do ongoing cyber operations during
    this conflict impact CYBERCOM's readiness to defend against Chinese
    aggression in the Western Pacific?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                        counterterrorism in afghanistan
        50. Senator Hawley. General Clarke, have U.S. special operations
    forces been active in Afghanistan under Title 10 or Title 50
    authorities since September 1, 2021, and if so, what have they been
    doing?
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]

        51. Senator Hawley. General Clarke, what is SOCOM's role more
    broadly in our current over-the-horizon CT approach in Afghanistan, and
    how is performing this role impacting SOCOM's ability to regenerate
    readiness and focus more on China?
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]

        52. Senator Hawley. General Clarke, General McKenzie told this
    Committee that we have not conducted any over-the-horizon operations in
    Afghanistan since August 2021. Do you feel the rules of engagement
    governing over-the-horizon strikes in Afghanistan are too restrictive,
    or do they provide the flexibility needed to find and neutralize
    terrorists on the ground there?
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]
                                deterring china
        53. Senator Hawley. General Nakasone, the 2022 NDS identifies China
    as the pacing challenge for the Department. How have NSA and USCYBERCOM
    improved our cyber posture vis-`-vis China, and what challenge persist
    in conducting cyber operations against China?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        54. Senator Hawley. General Nakasone, how would you describe
    Chinese and Russian cyber targeting prioritiesare they prioritizing
    influence operations, going after critical infrastructure, military
    targets, or something else entirely?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        55. Senator Hawley. General Nakasone, how confident are you in our
    ability to use cyber operations to help degrade and deny a Chinese
    assault on Taiwan?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        56. Senator Hawley. General Nakasone, are there particular
    capability or capacity gaps at CYBERCOM that need to be filled so you
    have the tools you need degrade and deny a Chinese assault on Taiwan,
    in particular?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        57. Senator Hawley. General Clarke, how many SOF have been
    allocated to the Indo-Pacific region following the withdrawal from
    Afghanistan?
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]

        58. Senator Hawley. General Clarke, which Indo-Pacific countries
    with which SOCOM engages are most able to help bolster deterrence
    against Chinese attack?
        General Clarke. [Deleted.]

      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR
             FISCAL YEAR 2023 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, APRIL 7, 2022

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
    Manchin, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds,
    Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, and
    Tuberville.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. Good morning. The Committee meets today to
    receive testimony on the President's Budget Request for the
    Department of Defense (DOD) for fiscal year 2023.
        Our witnesses this morning are Secretary of Defense Lloyd
    Austin, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Michael
    McCord, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark
    Milley. Thank you for appearing before us today, and please
    extend the Committee's thanks to the uniformed and civilian men
    and women of the Defense Department who selflessly serve the
    Nation.
        Last week, President Biden released his Defense Department
    budget request for fiscal year 2023 with a top line of $773
    billion. The request focuses on several key areas, including
    prioritizing China as our key strategic competitor, addressing
    the acute threats posed by Russia and other adversaries, and
    modernizing the Defense Department. Our national security
    challenges have never been more stark.
        One month ago, Russia unleashed its illegal and unprovoked,
    and indeed, a barbaric attack on Ukraine, upending peace and
    stability in Europe. Putin's invasion has inflicted horrific
    suffering upon innocent civilians in Ukraine, threatened
    European security, and caused serious consequences for the
    global economy.
        The Ukrainian military has performed heroically in the face
    of this overwhelming violence and the Ukrainian people have
    shown the world what true courage looks like.
        If Putin thought his actions would drive a wedge between
    NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] members and within
    the international community, he was badly mistaken. The
    conflict in Ukraine has reinvigorated the NATO alliance and
    exposed the brittle nature of Putin's regime. Since the start
    of the conflict, the international community has implemented a
    severe and far-reaching series of economic and energy sanctions
    against Russia, increased military and humanitarian assistance
    to Ukraine, and reinforced NATO's military presence along the
    eastern flank. The international community has united in a way
    not seen in decades, and our potential adversaries around the
    world are taking note.
        With that in mind, this budget request appropriately
    recognizes China and then Russia, as the key strategic
    competitors for our military. Concurrent with the release of
    the budget, the Defense Department submitted to Congress
    classified versions of the National Defense Strategy, the
    national Nuclear Posture Review, and the Missile Defense
    Review. These, along with other strategic planning documents
    yet to be released, will serve as key guideposts for this
    Committee as we take a clear-eyed approach to what is necessary
    to succeed in our long-term strategic competition.
        An essential element of our strategy going forward is the
    need to build the joint capabilities of our armed forces across
    all domains, including space, cyber, and information
    operations, and I am interested to hear from our witnesses how
    this budget supports joint capabilities to ensure our military
    remains the world's premier fighting force.
        I am encouraged that this budget includes the largest-ever
    request for research, development, testing, and evaluation: a
    total of $130 billion, or a 9.5 percent increase over last
    year's enacted levels. The budget includes significant funding
    for modernization areas such as microelectronics, artificial
    intelligence, hypersonics, and 5G; technologies which will be
    critical for our national defense.
        Our strategy toward China and Russia should not be solely
    defined in dollars by ``how much,'' but rather ``where'' and
    ``why'' to achieve the greatest comparative advantage. I am
    also pleased to see that this budget request places a priority
    on taking care of our men and women in uniform and the
    civilians who serve alongside them, by including an across-the-
    board pay raise for military and civilian personnel of 4.6
    percent. While this pay raise is required by law for military
    personnel, too often Defense Department civilians have been
    overlooked. This increase in civilian pay sends an important
    message to the workforce.
        Keeping our strategic competition with China front and
    center, this budget request includes $6.1 billion for
    priorities covered by the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, or
    PDI. Although we are awaiting the specific details of the
    Department's PDI request, I am encouraged by the progress we
    have made thus far and this Committee will continue working to
    help improve the design and posture of the joint force in the
    Indo-Pacific region, including by improving logistics,
    modernizing infrastructure, conducting exercises and training,
    and building the capabilities of our allies and partners.
        This budget request also includes $12.1 billion for
    military construction projects, and I am particularly pleased
    to see increases in the Energy Resilience Conservation
    Investment Program. The improvements to our facilities'
    sustainment, repair, and modernization will go a long way
    toward the Joint Force's readiness. This effort is further
    supported by the budget request's initiatives to weapons
    platform propulsion efficiencies to save fuel.
        With regard to our nuclear strategy, I understand that the
    budget request supports important steps for the modernization
    of our nuclear triad. Given the reckless statements by Putin
    over the past several months, including an out-of-cycle nuclear
    exercise before invading Ukraine, our allies and partners
    depend on our extended deterrence now more than ever.
        We must also be acutely aware of China's rapidly growing
    arsenal. Modernization of our strategic forces is needed to
    reassure not only our allies but deter any attack on our
    Homeland by either of our near-peer, nuclear-armed competitors.
    But even as we modernize, we should seek ways to promote
    strategic stability, including follow-on talks beyond New START
    to cover all types of nuclear weapons and, if possible, reduce
    nuclear stockpiles when verifiable for all parties.
        Given these strategic threats, the proposed investment in
    tried-and-true platforms like the Columbia- and Virginia-class
    submarines is a prudent decision. Similarly, this budget
    supports the development of a new long-range stealth bomber,
    strengthening the fighter fleet, and building up the defense
    industrial base, including upgrades to the Navy's public and
    private shipyards. Keeping the nature of strategic competition
    in mind, however, it is also necessary to divest of platforms
    and capabilities that are either not necessary or inefficient
    for supporting our strategy.
        Belt-tightening in any department, particularly Defense, is
    always a challenge, but it is also an opportunity to evaluate
    what is necessary and what drives innovation. The Department
    has taken the first difficult step in proposing $2.8 billion
    worth of divestments and retirements of platforms, and I will
    work with my colleagues to evaluate these proposals and make
    hard, but necessary, choices.
        Amidst a global pandemic, climate change, economic
    uncertainty, renewed Russian aggression in Europe, and
    disruptive technologies in the hands of competitors, we have to
    recognize the interconnected nature of the threats before us.
    Congress must make thoughtful decisions about how we resource
    and transform our tools of national power. Now that President
    Biden has issued his budget request, the Committee can begin
    our work of crafting an NDAA that meets America's needs now and
    in the future.
        Again, I thank the witnesses for their participation today
    and I look forward to their testimonies.
        Chairman Reed. Let me now recognize Ranking Member Inhofe.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES INHOFE

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you, and I
    join in welcoming our witnesses.
        For 4 years, this Committee has been using this 2018
    document, the National Defense Strategy Commission and I don't
    recall ever having one document hanging around for so long. The
    12 who got involved with this to start with did a good job in
    putting us where we are now.
        Last week, we received the classified version of the Biden
    administration's new NDS; that is this. From what I have seen
    so far, it appears that the new strategy document does a good
    job expanding our understanding of the scale and the scope of
    the threat from the Chinese Communist Party and its military
    modernization.
        There are some things that we will probably have
    disagreements about. We have done that in the past, but we
    continue to consider the new strategy. For example, there are,
    there may be some areas of the strategy that the administration
    is willing to take risks, and the Congress may or may not
    agree.
        But it is clear, and I really can't stress this enough, the
    Chinese threat is beyond anything that we have dealt with
    before in our lives.
        General Milley, last year, you told us that the Chinese and
    Russians, combined, spend more than we did on national defense.
    This year, Beijing announced an additional 7.1 percent increase
    in their defense budget. This is a scary thing; this is a big
    deal.
        Mr. Secretary, I do appreciate that based on the new NDS,
    that you went to the White House to ask for more resources, and
    I appreciate that very much. But even then, the budget just
    doesn't rise to the moment. It doesn't deliver the real growth
    our military needs, and it says it very clearly in this
    document, in the very beginning of the document, the 3 percent
    to 5 percent range is where we need to be. That real growth is
    a recommendation that comes from the bipartisan committee.
        The budget also doesn't reckon with record-high inflation
    we are seeing today in the realm of 7 to 8 percent, and on the
    bipartisan basis, Congress tried to give our defense budget
    real growth in 2022, but the military will end up losing buying
    power due to inflation. This historic inflation is a new, I
    call it the ``new sequestration.'' We all remember when we went
    through sequestration together.
        For me, this isn't just about how much money we spend on
    defense; this is about how we spend that money.
        We need a higher top line because what is in this budget
    right now is not nearly enough to make up for lost time.
        This budget shrinks both, our naval fleet and our Air Force
    aircraft fleet. It cuts end-strength. The end-strength has been
    very disturbing to all of us and I am glad to see the
    investments in research and development. So some good things
    are out there working and we are all doing it together.
        The reason I took so long in this opening is that this is
    the first budget hearing of the season. You know, people don't
    realize that this goes on 12 months a year, and that is what
    this is all about, and we are going to do a good job.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
        Thank you, Mr. Secretary, the Chairman, and Secretary
    McCord.
        We have been informed that there is a vote that will
    commence at 10:00 a.m. There will be three votes in order.
        So, we will be slipping out, ones and twos, but we will
    continue the hearing throughout the morning and then we will go
    into the classified section at the conclusion of this open
    session.
        With that, let me address a question to Secretary McCord.
        I am trying to anticipate the votes, so I jumped ahead.
        Secretary Austin, let me recognize you for your opening
    statement.
        [Laughter.]

       STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LLOYD AUSTIN III, SECRETARY OF
                                DEFENSE

        Secretary Austin. Well, thank you, Chairman.
        Good morning. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe,
    distinguished Members of the Committee, thanks for the
    opportunity to testify today in support of the President's
    Budget Request for fiscal year 2023.
        It is great to be here with General Milley, who has been an
    outstanding partner. I am also glad to be joined today by our
    comptroller and chief financial officer, Mike McCord.
        Mr. Chairman, we are still focused on three key priorities
    at the Department of Defense and they include defending our
    Nation, taking care of our people, and succeeding through
    teamwork. The budget request that we have submitted to you
    helps us meet each one of those priorities.
        Our budget seeks more than $56 billion for air power
    platforms and systems and more than $40 billion to maintain our
    dominance at sea, including buying nine more battle force ships
    and almost $13 billion to support and modernize our combat-
    credible forces on land. Our budget request also funds the
    modernization of all three legs of the nuclear triad do ensure
    that we maintain the safe, secure, and effective strategic
    deterrent.
        Of course none of these capabilities matter without our
    people and their families. So, we are seeking your support for
    a 4.6 percent pay raise for our military and civilian personnel
    and other special pay and benefits. We also plan to invest in
    outstanding and affordable childcare and the construction of
    on-base child-development centers and ensuring that all our
    families can always put good and healthy food on the table.
        We are also deeply focused on the terrible problem of
    suicide in the U.S. military. I will keep on saying it: mental
    health is health, period. So, we are increasing access to
    mental health care, expanding telehealth capacities, and
    fighting the tired, old stigmas against seeking help. With your
    support, I have just ordered the establishment of an
    independent review committee to help us grapple with suicide,
    to better understand it, to prevent it, and treat the unseen
    wounds that lead to it.
        At the same time, we are still working hard to implement
    the recommendations of the Independent Review Commission on
    Sexual Assault, because we know that we have a long way to go
    to rid ourselves of this scourge. Our budget seeks nearly $480
    million for that enterprise. Sexual assault is not just a
    crime; it is an affront to our values and to everything that we
    are supposed to represent to each other and to this country,
    and this is a leadership issue and you have my personal
    commitment to keep leading.
        Now, while I am on the topic of leadership, let me briefly
    address our military's role in the world, because, as I have
    said, we succeed through teamwork. As I have witnessed myself
    in the last several weeks, countries around the world continue
    to look to the United States to provide that sort of
    leadership. With help from Congress, we have been able to rush
    security assistance to Ukraine to help the Ukrainian people
    defend their lives and their country and their freedom.
        Last October, I visited Kyiv to meet both, my Ukrainian
    counterpart and President Zelenskyy, and we discussed our
    deepening defense partnership and our unwavering support for
    Ukrainian sovereignty in the face of Russian aggression.
        Even before Russia's unprovoked and illegal invasion, we
    provided Ukraine with a billion dollars' worth of weapons and
    gear through presidential drawdown authority. Now, we are
    delivering on another billion dollars pledged by President
    Biden.
        Our budget includes $650 million more for security
    assistance in Europe, including $300 million for the Ukraine
    Security Assistance Initiative. Just a couple of days ago, the
    President authorized an additional $100 million to send more
    Javelin anti-armor systems, weapons that will provide critical
    support to the Ukrainians as they continue to resist Russian
    offenses in the east and in the south of the country. We are
    also helping to coordinate the delivery of material provided by
    other nations, which continues to flow in every day, and let me
    thank you for your strong leadership toward our shared goal of
    helping Ukraine defend itself.
        Since the invasion, I have spoken and met frequently with
    Minister Reznikov, my counterpart, including on Monday, and I
    have assured him that we will continue this effort and we will
    get him and his troops the tools and the inventory that they
    need most and that they are using most effectively against
    Russian forces.
        We have also reinforced our NATO allies. We sped additional
    combat power to the alliance's eastern flank, raising our
    posture in Europe to more than 100,000 troops. These
    reinforcements include dozens of aircraft, an aircraft carrier
    strike group, two brigade combat teams.
        As President Biden made clear, we will defend every inch of
    NATO territory, if required, and we are making good on that
    promise.
        Mr. Chairman, as you have heard me say many times, we need
    resources to matched to strategy and strategy matched to policy
    and policy matched to the will of the American people; This
    budget gives us the resources that we need to deliver on that
    promise, as well. It reflects our recently submitted National
    Defense Strategy, which highlights the pacing challenge of
    China. That is why we are investing some $6 billion of this
    budget in the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. It is why we are
    realigning our posture in the Indo-Pacific toward a more
    distributed footprint.
        We are going to enhance our force posture, infrastructure,
    presence, and readiness in the Indo-Pacific. This includes the
    missile defense of Guam. That is why we are making broad
    investments in such key areas as undersea dominance, fighter
    aircraft modernization, and advanced weaponry, including
    Hypersonic Strike.
        Many of these investments will pay dividends in countering
    the acute threat of Russia, as well, which our strategy
    underscores. At the same time, we must be prepared for threats
    that don't observe borders, from pandemics to climate change,
    and we must tackle the persistent threats posed by North Korea,
    Iran, and global terrorist groups.
        Now, the National Defense Strategy advances our goals in
    three main ways: forging integrated deterrence, campaigning,
    and building enduring advantages. An integrated deterrence
    means combining our strengths across all warfighting domains to
    maximum effect to ward off potential conflict. Campaigning
    means day-to-day efforts to gain and sustain military advantage
    and to counter acute forms of coercion by our competitors and
    to complicate their preparation for aggression. To build
    enduring advantages, we need to accelerate force development,
    acquiring the technology that our warfighters need.
        So, our budget seeks more than $130 billion, as you point
    out, Mr. Chairman, for research, development, testing, and
    evaluation, and that is the largest R&D [research and
    development] request this Department has ever made. It is
    nearly a 10 percent increase over last year, which was the
    Department's previous high-watermark.
        This includes $2 billion for artificial intelligence, $250
    million for 5G, nearly $28 billion for space capabilities, and
    another $11 billion to protect our networks and develop a cyber
    mission force. This budget maintains our edge, but it does not
    take that edge for granted and, quite frankly, Mr. Chairman, in
    the twenty-first century, you either innovate or you get left
    behind.
        Through the President's Budget and with the help of this
    Committee, we will continue to innovate, and with your help, we
    will continue to defend this Nation, take care of our people,
    and support our allies and partners. With your help, I know we
    will continue to lead.
        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The statement of Secretary Lloyd J. Austin follows:]

              Prepared Statement by Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III
                                    overview
        Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, distinguished Members of the
    Senate Armed Services Committee: thank you for the opportunity to
    testify in support of the President's Department of Defense Budget
    Request for fiscal year 2023.
        On behalf of myself, Deputy Secretary Hicks, the leadership of the
    Department of Defense, and the men and women of our Department and
    their families, let me also thank you for the support that Congress
    continues to provide. Thank you also to the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff, General Milley, who is testifying alongside me and is
    a critical partner in realizing the Department's priorities. I am also
    pleased to be joined by our Comptroller, Under Secretary Mike McCord.
        The President's $773 billion defense budget request would provide
    the Department of Defense with the resourcing we need to address the
    threats that America faces and to advance the Department's four key
    strategic priorities: to defend the Homeland, deter strategic attacks,
    deter aggression while being prepared to prevail in conflict when
    necessary, and build a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem. As
    always, the Department is determined to match resources to strategy,
    strategy to policies, and policies to the will of the American people.
        For more than seven decades, American vision and leadership have
    been pillars of international peace and prosperity. A strong,
    principled, and adaptive U.S. military remains central for U.S.
    leadership in the 21st century as we face dramatic geopolitical,
    technological, economic, and environmental changes. The Department
    stands ready to meet these challenges and seize opportunities with the
    confidence, creativity, and commitment that have long characterized our
    military and the democracy that it serves.
        We face rapidly evolving military capabilities on the part of our
    competitors, accelerated by emerging technologies and intensified by
    the potential for new threats to strategic stability and the U.S.
    Homeland. We also face an escalation of our competitors' coercive and
    malign activities in the ``gray zone,'' as well as transboundary
    challenges that impose new demands on the Joint Force and the Defense
    enterprise. Our competitors seek to exploit our perceived
    vulnerabilities, including by developing conventional and nuclear
    capabilities that pose all-domain threats to the United States and
    could jeopardize the U.S. military's ability to project power and
    counter aggression.
        The People's Republic of China (PRC) is the Department's pacing
    challenge due to its coercive and increasingly aggressive efforts to
    refashion the Indo-Pacific region and the international system to suit
    its interests and preferences. The PRC has expanded and modernized
    nearly every aspect of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), including
    its conventional forces and nuclear capabilities, with a focus on
    offsetting U.S. military advantages. The PRC seeks to fragment U.S.
    alliances and security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, and the
    PRC's leaders hope to leverage their economic influence and the PLA's
    growing military strength to coerce China's neighbors and threaten
    their vital national interests.
        The PLA is also rapidly advancing and integrating its space,
    counter-space, cyber, electronic, and information-warfare capabilities
    to support its holistic approach to joint warfare.
        As we have seen in recent weeks, Russia also remains an acute
    threat, requiring close and sustained coordination across the NATO
    alliance to prevent further aggression in Europe. Russia's flagrant
    attack on its peaceful, sovereign, and democratic neighbor, Ukraine,
    poses a huge challenge to transatlantic security. Russia's nuclear
    capabilities also pose significant challenges now and in the future.
        While the PRC and then Russia pose the greatest challenges to
    United States security, we must also remain vigilant against other
    dangers. We face persistent threats from North Korea, with its nuclear
    arsenal and developing missile capability, and Iran, with its nuclear
    ambitions and support for proxy groups that threaten the security of
    our forces and our allies, partners, and interests in the Middle East.
        Meanwhile, other threats persist. We have degraded the capabilities
    of global terrorist groups--including al Qaeda and ISIS--but some may
    be able to reconstitute in short order. The whole world has learned how
    deadly and destabilizing a pandemic can be, and we must also be ready
    for other transborder challenges, such as cyber attacks and the
    existential threat of climate change.
        To address these challenges, we have developed a budget that we
    believe offers the right mix of capabilities across all domains, while
    retiring certain platforms that no longer meet the needs of the Joint
    Force. We are grateful for our partnership with Congress as we seek to
    ensure that the Department can successfully address present and future
    threats.
        As we work to defend the Nation, the Department will continue to
    invest heavily in our people, who are the most important element of our
    national defense. Our All-Volunteer Force, with the support of their
    families, and our civilian and contractor defense enterprise, work
    tirelessly every day to defend the United States.
        After decades of leadership and investment, the United States
    enjoys an unparalleled network of allies and partners, who together
    provide an enormous strategic advantage that our competitors cannot
    match. This advantage has been on full display in Europe, where a
    galvanized NATO has risen to the moment and shown extraordinary unity
    in the face of unprovoked Russian aggression against a democratic
    neighbor, Ukraine.
        Countries around the world share a vital interest in a free and
    open international system. Close cooperation with allies and partners
    is foundational to protecting United States national security interests
    and to our collective ability to address the risk of aggression from
    the PRC and Russia, while responsibly managing the full array of other
    threats we face. In all cases, we strive to be the partner of choice
    for our friends. We will continue to work with our allies and partners
    to advance our shared interests and maintain the rules-based
    international order that relies on U.S. global leadership.
        The President's fiscal year 2023 defense budget request seeks to
    address these national security imperatives in three major ways:
    integrated deterrence, campaigning, and building enduring advantage.
        Integrated deterrence entails working seamlessly across military
    domains and the spectrum of conflict, using all instruments of U.S.
    national power and our extraordinary network of alliances and
    partnerships. It applies a coordinated, multifaceted approach to
    reducing competitors' perceptions of the net benefits of aggression
    relative to restraint, tailored to specific circumstances. Integrated
    deterrence is enabled by combat-credible U.S., allied, and partner
    forces, and it is backstopped by a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
    deterrent.
        Campaigning is the way that we tie together the global, day-to-day
    actions of the Joint Force to achieve deterrence. From joint exercises
    to military diplomacy, from advanced weapons tests to short-notice
    operations with close allies and partners, we campaign to make our
    competitors question the efficacy of coercion and aggression. Simply
    put, we aim to convince them that today is not the day to challenge the
    United States or our friends around the world.
        To shore up the foundations for integrated deterrence and
    campaigning, we are moving urgently to build enduring advantages across
    the defense ecosystem--the Department of Defense, the defense
    industrial base, and the array of private-sector and academic
    enterprises that spur innovation and support the systems on which our
    military depends. We will continue to swiftly modernize the Joint
    Force, with a focus on innovation and rapid adjustments to new
    strategic demands. We will make our supporting systems more resilient
    and agile in the face of any and all threats, and we will cultivate the
    talents of our exceptional team, recruiting and training a workforce
    with the skills, character, and diversity that our Nation needs to
    creatively tackle today's national security challenges.
        Ultimately, this year's budget request seeks the resources for a
    Joint Force that can deter competitors and campaign across the spectrum
    of competition and conflict each and every day. But most critically, it
    also seeks the resources that the U.S. military needs to fight and win
    decisively should deterrence fail.
                             integrated deterrence
        Integrated deterrence aims to bring to bear the right mix of
    capabilities to demonstrate beyond doubt that the United States can
    respond across domains and the spectrum of conflict, working closely
    across the U.S. Government and with our global allies and partners--all
    in the manner, time, and place of our choosing.
        This requires that the Joint Force maintain our superiority in the
    air, on land, at sea, undersea, in space, throughout cyberspace, and
    anywhere in the gray zone where our competitors may seek to challenge
    us. Integrated deterrence also requires a safe, secure, and effective
    nuclear deterrent, which remains the ultimate backstop of our national
    security posture, and we will keep our capabilities networked and
    ensure that our warfighting concepts are integrated and optimized for a
    potential future fight.
        To maintain superiority in the air, the Department is focused on
    modernizing our global strike capabilities and continuing to provide
    rapid global mobility to the Joint Force, so that we can respond to any
    conflict or crisis effectively and swiftly. The President's fiscal year
    2023 defense budget request invests in our air command-and-control
    framework; in our surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities; in our
    Next Generation Air Dominance system of systems; in resilient basing,
    sustainment, and communications in contested environments; and in long-
    range strike and fires capabilities, including the B-21 family of
    systems and investments in long-range standoff weapons and hypersonics.
    We have also made significant investments in 4th, 5th, and 6th
    generation fighters, logistics, and uncrewed aircraft systems.
        On land, the fiscal year 2023 budget continues to build a combat-
    credible, ready, and lethal force that can tackle challenges around the
    world. Our budget request seeks to invest in additional Security Force
    Assistance Brigade rotations in the Indo-Pacific region and Europe, and
    it works to build capacity and improved capabilities in the Arctic. We
    are also focused on developing our long-range hypersonic weapons and
    mid-range capability prototypes on land, and we are increasing the
    command and control and domain awareness capability in our forces
    focused on defending the Homeland. This will require unified network
    investments to facilitate the Joint All Domain Command and Control
    efforts across the Joint Force.
        At sea and undersea, we are investing in mobility, self-reliance,
    and survivability, and our budget request seeks to produce a balanced
    fleet that remains capable of a high level of readiness for power
    projection, sea control, maritime security, and sealift. Investments in
    this year's budget focus on force design to deliver a ready force now
    and in the future, including through investments in ship and aviation
    maintenance, training, and facilities. We have also invested in long-
    range precision fires and platforms that ensure our future combat
    capability, including guided missile destroyers, attack submarines, and
    globally responsive, combat-ready naval expeditionary forces in the
    maritime littorals. The construction of our new battle force fleet
    ships and the incremental construction of Ford-class nuclear-powered
    aircraft carriers will ensure we maintain our dominance at sea.
        In space and cyberspace, we must continue to build and maintain our
    advantages over our competitors. The PRC has made significant
    investments in space-based and cyber capabilities. To protect our space
    architecture, the President's fiscal year 2023 defense budget proposes
    significant investments in space resilience and a more distributed
    space architecture. This includes investments in missile warning and
    tracking architecture, launch enterprise investments, protected
    satellite communications, and the Global Positioning System (GPS)
    enterprise.
        In cyberspace, our budget will help defend national security
    systems, including the Department of Defense Information Network;
    enhance the Department's own cybersecurity by implementing Zero Trust;
    build more redundancy and resilience into our cyber infrastructure;
    organize, train, and equip cyber mission forces; advance our cyber
    partnerships with like-minded countries; and reinforce international
    norms in cyberspace promoted by the United States.
        To defend the Homeland, the fiscal year 2023 budget invests in the
    development of the Next-Generation Interceptor for Ground-Based
    Midcourse Defense, and it extends the service life of the current
    Ground-Based Interceptor. The budget also includes significant
    investment in the defense of Guam. We also improve our ability to see
    over the horizon, with investment in new homeland defense radars. Just
    as important is our investment in multi-Service, multi-domain, long-
    range fires, including hypersonic capabilities on land, at sea, and in
    the air. The budget request would also procure more than 3,500 highly
    survivable subsonic weapons for new and existing launch platforms.
        We must be able to track, understand, and respond to malign
    activities in the gray zone, including the information space, and
    maintain a strategic hedge against unexpected, rapidly emerging
    threats, including from violent extremist organizations or an
    adversary's use of weapons of mass destruction. We also need to sustain
    a robust crisis-response capability. This budget invests in theater
    integration, including irregular warfare capabilities, internet-based
    military information support operations (MISO), armed overwatch, and
    efforts to counter unmanned aerial systems (UAS) before they launch.
        Our nuclear triad remains the ultimate backstop of our national
    defense. Maintaining global strategic stability--particularly in light
    of Russia's significant nuclear capability and China's expanding
    nuclear arsenal--requires the United States to maintain a safe, secure,
    and effective nuclear capability. The President's fiscal year 2023
    defense budget provides for that investment through the modernization
    of our nuclear command, control, and communications system. It also
    fully funds the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine; ramps up
    production funding for the B-21 bomber; fully funds both the Ground-
    Based Strategic Deterrent and the Long-Range Standoff weapon; and funds
    the revitalization of science and technology (S&T) research and
    development to keep pace with the evolving nuclear threat. The
    Department's nuclear modernization investments will ensure our extended
    deterrence commitments for years to come.
                                  campaigning
        Day after day, the Department will strengthen U.S. deterrence and
    increase our advantage against our competitors' coercive measures
    through campaigning: the conduct and sequencing of coordinated military
    initiatives aimed at advancing well-defined, strategic priorities over
    time. The United States will operate forces, synchronize broader
    Departmental efforts, and align our activities with other instruments
    of national power to counter our competitors' coercion, complicate
    their military preparations, and develop our own warfighting
    capabilities, along with those of our allies and partners.
        In the Indo-Pacific region, campaigning requires thinking, acting,
    and operating differently every day, including by re-aligning our
    posture toward a more distributed footprint and building and exercising
    the preparatory elements needed in crisis and conflict, including
    infrastructure, logistics, dispersal and relocation. To that end, the
    President's fiscal year 2023 defense budget request makes clear that
    China is the Department's pacing challenge, and it makes investments
    that robustly support the requirements of United States Indo-Pacific
    Command, as well as the development of capabilities and operational
    concepts aligned to those requirements. This includes leveraging
    existing and emergent capabilities, posture, and exercises to influence
    China's perception of asymmetric, temporal, and geographic advantages.
        Specifically, the budget invests in site surveys and the planning
    and design for potential future military construction projects, in
    achieving initial operating capacity for new missile warning and
    tracking architecture, in defense of Guam efforts, in a framework for
    multinational information sharing and multi-domain training and
    experimentation, and in other security cooperation efforts to improve
    allied and partner capability and capacity in the region. The fiscal
    year 2023 budget request includes significant investments in the
    Pacific Deterrence Initiative, and we remain grateful for congressional
    partnership in our efforts to address challenges posed by the PRC.
        Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine poses a historic challenge
    to transatlantic security. We need to continue robust investments in
    all domains relevant to European security. The fiscal year 2023 budget
    makes significant investments to support Ukraine's self-defense efforts
    through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative and includes funding
    to support security cooperation programs throughout Europe,
    strengthening the capability and capacity of our allies and partners in
    the region.
        The Department was able to swiftly deploy additional forces to the
    European theater through our enhanced presence efforts, increasing
    readiness, operational flexibility, and interoperability with our
    allies. All of this was made possible by sustained investments in the
    European Deterrence Initiative (EDI). EDI has been vital to efforts to
    improve indications and warning, command and control, and mission
    command in Europe. Investments in EDI helped prepare United States and
    allied forces for the current situation in Europe, for credibly
    deterring an attack on alliance territory, and for ensuring we are
    ready to fight and win should deterrence fail. The Department is
    grateful to Congress for your leadership in the provision of EDI
    authorities and resources.
        Meanwhile, Iran challenges Middle East stability and poses threats
    to United States forces, our partners, and the free flow of energy. At
    the same time, ISIS, al-Qa'ida, and other violent extremist
    organizations remain a proximate threat to the security of the United
    States, our citizens, and our interests in the Middle East and South
    Asia. In response, our forces increasingly need to operate forward with
    a sustainable military posture and an operationally ready force capable
    of deterring security threats.
        Our fiscal year 2023 investments in support of campaigning
    activities across the Middle East and South Asia are focused on
    technological advancement, partner engagement and coordination, and
    focused military operations. We also continue to bolster integrated air
    and missile defense and counter-UAS systems. We are proud to cooperate
    with our partners through regional multilateral exercises, MISO,
    foreign military sales, and efforts to secure access, basing, and
    overflight. Throughout the region, we remain committed to countering
    Iran's malign influence and to counterterrorism operations that degrade
    groups that have the will and capability to harm the United States.
        In Africa, we face a series of intersecting challenges--from malign
    PRC activity, the evolution of violent extremist groups, and
    destabilizing transboundary dynamics across the continent. China and
    Russia have invested heavily in Africa to challenge United States
    influence and undermine our partners. In response, our forces in Africa
    are focused on day-to-day campaigning to counter violent extremist
    organization activity, strengthen the capability of our partners in the
    region, and observe, assess, and frustrate Chinese and Russian coercive
    behavior.
        Our military personnel are engaged in campaigning activity
    throughout the Western Hemisphere to combat cross-cutting threats.
    Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance solutions offer low-cost
    capabilities to compete in the gray zone. Through increased security
    cooperation and the sharing of information, our strong, willing
    partners in the region have become force multipliers.
        In the Homeland and the High North, our forces are working to
    sustain and strengthen United States deterrence to defend the United
    States and our allies and partners. The scale and scope of homeland
    vulnerabilities have fundamentally changed, and the United States faces
    multiple, simultaneous challenges from highly capable and advanced
    competitors, including nuclear and conventional missiles. Meanwhile,
    strategic competitors, rogue states, and non-state actors seek to
    strike institutions and critical infrastructure in the United States
    through cyber means to exploit our vulnerabilities, offset our military
    advantages, and disrupt our power-projection capabilities. At the same
    time, climate change is creating opportunities and vulnerabilities in
    the Arctic, requiring that we develop resilient infrastructure to
    support Arctic operations and train and equip our Joint Force to
    compete in this important region.
        A globally integrated, layered defense remains critical to
    deterring and thwarting potential attacks against the U.S. Homeland.
    Our campaigning efforts in the U.S. Homeland support homeland defense
    by helping our forces gain and maintain domain awareness, information
    dominance, and decision superiority. Annual exercises in the Arctic,
    including ARCTIC EDGE, ICEX, NORTHERN EDGE, and COLD RESPONSE, provide
    valuable experience and lessons-learned for conducting multi-domain
    operations while simultaneously demonstrating the U.S. commitment to a
    free, peaceful, stable, and open Arctic region.
                          building enduring advantage
        Finally, the Department must maintain our enduring advantage to
    continue to field the best joint fighting force in the world. That
    means changing and adapting the ways we operate across domains and
    within our Joint Force and the Department to ensure that the Joint
    Force will deter conflict across all theaters and domains now and in
    the future.
        To construct a durable foundation for our future military
    advantage, the Department--working in concert with other U.S.
    departments and agencies, Congress, the private sector, and our valued
    allies and partners--will move swiftly in five key ways.
        Transform the Foundation of the Future Force. Building the Joint
    Force requires modernization of the Department's force development,
    design, and business management practices over time. That starts with
    establishing a framework for strategic readiness. This framework will
    keep the Department's eyes on the horizon, ensuring that the urgent and
    competing demands of the present are balanced with preparations for the
    future.
        This effort requires investments in training, exercises,
    sustainment, and mission capability in all Military Services, the
    special operations community, and across the Joint Force. The
    Department is also updating and advancing its centerpiece joint
    training program to support integrated deterrence and campaigning by
    demonstrating and exercising our capabilities alongside our allies and
    partners.
        The fiscal year 2023 budget supports the exercise and engagement
    requirements of the 11 combatant commands, increases joint integration
    in Military Service exercises, and trains individuals and staffs in key
    joint skills. Our Department training efforts will better integrate
    major force elements across multiple levels of command and control in
    the conduct of Joint All Domain Operations against a strategic
    competitor, with live forces, virtual forces, allies, and partners.
        Make the Right Technology Investments. The United States'
    technological edge has long been key to our military advantage. To keep
    that edge razor-sharp, the Department will support the innovation
    ecosystem, both at home and in expanded partnerships with our allies
    and partners. That is why the fiscal year 2023 budget request includes
    the largest research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E)
    budget in the Department's history--more than a nine percent increase
    over last year's already historic RDT&E request.
        Our investments to build enduring advantages include resources for
    science and technology research, the National Defense Education
    Program, and the Department's educational and STEM programs, ranging
    from K-12 to the postgraduate level and continuing through employment.
        The Department will also invest further in the Rapid Development
    and Experimentation Reserve (RDER), which brings together the Military
    Services and combatant commands to experiment with advanced and
    emerging technologies. RDER's continuous, coordinated iteration across
    global and virtual exercises moves advanced capabilities into the hands
    of warfighters earlier, while developing new operational concepts and
    demonstrating our capacity for innovation to our competitors.
        In addition, the Department is committed to making the United
    States a world leader in 5G by working with the commercial sector and
    fielding 5G to the warfighter. We are enhancing the cybersecurity of
    the defense industrial base by sharing information and providing tools
    and expertise. By fielding resilient GPS and alternative Position,
    Navigation, and Timing capabilities to our most critical systems, we
    are enabling continuous operations in degraded environments. We are
    also prioritizing the Artificial Intelligence and Data Accelerator
    initiative to support combatant commands with urgently needed data,
    analytics, and AI-enabled capabilities.
        Adapt and Fortify Our Defense Ecosystem. The Department will
    prioritize joint efforts with the full range of domestic and
    international partners in the defense ecosystem. This will help us
    fortify the defense industrial base, our logistical systems, and
    relevant global supply chains against subversion, compromise, and
    theft.
        The fiscal year 2023 budget request includes significant investment
    in microelectronics, casting and forging, batteries and energy storage,
    strategic and critical minerals, and kinetic capabilities. The
    Department will also adapt and fortify the defense ecosystem by
    fostering supply chain resilience, including by making use of the
    Defense Production Act Title III and the Industrial Base Analysis
    Sustainment Programs and maximizing Made in America manufacturing and
    procurement where appropriate.
        The Department's ability to strengthen the defense ecosystem and
    project military force is inextricably linked to industry. Our
    industrial partners provide critical transportation capacity and the
    global networks to meet our day-to-day and wartime requirements. Our
    forces in U.S. Transportation Command spend approximately $7 billion
    with industry each year in transportation services to execute defense
    requirements. Our proactive approach and vibrant relationships with our
    commercial partners ensure that we have sufficient military capacity to
    satisfy wartime demands at acceptable levels of risk, making use of our
    industry emergency preparedness programs, such as the Civil Reserve Air
    Fleet, the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement, and a newly
    implemented Voluntary Tanker Agreement. We also maintain a strong
    relationship with the National Defense Transportation Association.
        Strengthen Resilience and Adaptability. The Department must
    maintain our ability to respond quickly and effectively to emerging and
    transboundary threats such as climate change and pandemics. To that
    end, the budget invests in installation resilience and adaptation,
    operational energy and buying power, science and technology, and
    contingency preparedness. We will also invest in the Energy Resilience
    and the Conservation Investment Program, which allows us to carry out
    military construction projects that make our installations more energy
    resilient.
        To further fight the damage wrought by climate change, the
    Department will strengthen resilience on several fronts. Climate change
    is a fact of life for Department of Defense installations around the
    country and the world that are facing rising sea levels and
    increasingly severe storms and droughts. The resilience of our
    installations is a critical component of our military readiness.
    Further, investing in more fuel-efficient platforms eases the logistics
    burden on the Joint Force and can extend the reach of our weapons
    systems. Finally, we must move with the commercial market toward
    electrification where it makes sense if we are to avoid being left
    behind, stuck with old technologies that are expensive and difficult to
    sustain.
        We must also learn from the current global pandemic and be more
    prepared for future outbreaks. Fighting COVID-19 will continue to be a
    priority for the Department, and our activities will be informed by the
    best science, the most rigorous evidence, and the need to maintain
    readiness.
        The Department has worked hard to tackle the COVID-19 challenge,
    providing urgently needed support across the United States. That has
    included vaccinating our force, their families, and Americans around
    the country, sending vaccines around the world, and supporting stressed
    healthcare systems. Our determined COVID-19 response has also included
    procuring personal protective equipment, therapeutics, and tests on
    behalf of the Federal government. Safe and effective vaccines against
    COVID-19 help ensure that we remain the best and most ready fighting
    force in the world.
        Additionally, the fiscal year 2023 budget request supports the
    Biological Threat Reduction Program (part of the DOD Cooperative Threat
    Reduction Program), which will help strengthen the Department's
    capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to global outbreaks of
    disease. The program also strengthens partner countries' capacities to
    mitigate biological threats--whether deliberate, natural, or
    accidental.
        Cultivate the Workforce We Need. Strategies mean little without the
    right people to execute them. To recruit and retain the most talented
    workforce, we must advance our institutional culture and reform the way
    we do business. The Department must attract, train, and promote a
    workforce with the skills and abilities to tackle national security
    challenges creatively and capably in a complex global environment.
    Investments included in the fiscal year 2023 budget request aim to
    diversify and dynamically shape the mix of skills and expertise among
    our workforce to meet the needs of our missions, now and in the future.
        The Department must improve its capacity to find, support, and
    nurture an innovation-minded workforce to support our warfighters and
    encourage innovative best practices throughout the armed forces. The
    across-the-board pay raise of 4.6 percent is critical to compete for,
    hire, develop, and retain our force. Authorities for incentives,
    special pay rates, and workforce-development programs will be vital to
    growing our team.
        Enhancing diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility is
    fundamental to our strategy. Building a talented workforce that
    reflects our Nation improves our ability to compete, deter, and win in
    today's increasingly complex global security environment--and doing so
    is a national security imperative.
        Taking care of our workforce is also a national security
    imperative. Every day, Americans who answer the call to serve need the
    Department's support to do their best work to defend our country.
    Across the Department, we have implemented initiatives to make sure
    that Service members and their families, and our civilian and
    contractor employees, can stay safe, be healthy, and thrive.
        That includes numerous efforts to combat sexual assault in the
    military. Sexual assault is an affront to our values and a threat to
    our readiness. Implementing the approved recommendations from the
    Independent Review Commission (IRC) on Sexual Assault in the Military
    requires a long-term culture change. We will not compromise on the
    safety of our teammates, and we will get this right.
        In furtherance of these efforts, the fiscal year 2023 budget
    request provides significant resources to reform military justice by
    putting prosecution decisions for sexual assault and other named
    offenses in the hands of trained, experienced attorneys; fielding a
    specialized prevention workforce in every Military Service to reduce
    sexual assault, suicide, and domestic violence; and providing sexual-
    assault response coordinators and victim advocates with independence
    and increased expertise needed to foster recovery and to ensure that
    victims have the resources they require.
        The Department is deeply committed to the health and well-being of
    Service members and their families--in body and mind. That is why we
    have been clear: mental health is health. We are steadfastly committed
    to preventing, identifying, and treating mental health conditions
    across the force.
        One suicide in the U.S. military is too many. Suicide stems from a
    complex interaction of factors, and there is no single fix. We are
    addressing the problem of suicide in the military comprehensively to
    increase access to mental health care, to reduce barriers to getting
    support, to combat old stigmas on getting help, and to reach out to
    populations at highest risk. Our fiscal year 2023 budget request
    expands telehealth, implements programs to end stigma, optimizes use of
    mental health providers, embeds mental health providers in units, and
    conducts comprehensive mental health screening throughout one's
    service.
        Serve Military Families. Child care support is essential to many in
    our Joint Force, and it is critical to the readiness, efficiency, and
    retention of our people. The Department provides high-quality,
    affordable child care for children from birth to age 12, through
    installation-based Child Development Programs and community-based fee
    assistance. To help meet the child care needs of our Service members
    and civilian workforce, the Department will invest in the construction
    of additional on-base child development centers, expand fee assistance
    programs, extend eligibility for fee assistance programs to lower
    income Department civilian employees, and support public-private
    partnerships to increase child care capacity in high-demand, low-
    capacity areas. The fiscal year 2023 budget request also continues a
    promising pilot program that provides financial assistance to Service
    members to offset the cost of in-home child care.
        The economic security of our Service members and military families
    is also critical. Military compensation must remain competitive with
    private sector pay, and we must address the high stress and demands on
    the force, today's tight labor market, and the effects of inflation on
    our Service members.
        We will work across the Department to enhance support to military
    families, increase access to healthy food, improve financial resources,
    and increase awareness of available resources. The Department is
    focused on the food security of our military families, and we continue
    to gather data to better understand the problem of food insecurity. But
    we will not wait to take action. This is a multifaceted problem,
    without a single solution, and we will pursue several angles to get at
    this challenge.
        The Department will also continue to improve the environment in and
    around our installations. This includes transitioning from the use of
    potentially harmful chemicals and cleaning up the soil and groundwater
    on and around our bases, to ensure that our military families and the
    surrounding communities have access to safe, clean drinking water. The
    budget invests in programs and initiatives to ensure that we are
    meeting these obligations.
                                    closing
        Providing the resources for our strategy requires hard choices,
    which are reflected in the President's fiscal year 2023 defense budget
    request. We have made some tough but necessary decisions already, such
    as shifting our posture, ending the United States war in Afghanistan,
    transitioning our combat forces in Iraq, and prioritizing modernization
    to meet future challenges. The Department undertook a rigorous
    analytical process to retire vulnerable systems and programs that no
    longer meet mission needs. That included the decommissioning of certain
    ships, including some Littoral Combat Ships, and divestment of some A-
    10s, E-3s, and KC-135s. Taken together, these savings will enable the
    Department to improve the Joint Force's efficiency and to redirect
    resources to higher national defense priorities.
        We are focused on the most important security challenges facing the
    United States, while ensuring that we maintain the capabilities
    required to protect our global interests and respond to emerging crises
    around the world. We must maintain that discipline to move the
    Department forward--and we look forward to Congress's support and
    partnership as we build the force of the future.
        The United States has advantages that no other country can match.
    We have the right strategy, resources, people, and partners around the
    globe to do precisely what the Department has always been called upon
    to do: defend the Nation, protect our national interests, take care of
    our outstanding people, and work as a team with those who share our
    values. We will continue to help lead the free and open international
    system through this tumultuous period to a place of greater peace,
    prosperity, and stability.
        Ultimately, America's strength stems not just from our military
    might but from our democratic values, our Constitution, our open
    society, our diversity, our creativity, our hard-fought operational
    experience, our unmatched network of allies and partners, our valued
    colleagues across the U.S. Government, our civilian and contractor
    workforce, and above all, the extraordinary patriots of our All-
    Volunteer Force and their stalwart families. We will meet the Nation's
    security challenges with the vigor to prevail in the near term and the
    strategy, resilience, and wisdom to remain strong in the long term.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
        General Milley, please?

     STATEMENT OF GENERAL MARK MILLEY, USA, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
                            CHIEFS OF STAFF

        General Milley. Chairman Reed, and Ranking Member Inhofe,
    and Members of the Committee, I am privileged to represent the
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and guardians of the United
    States Joint Force.
        Our troops are the best led, best equipped, best trained,
    most lethal, and most capable military force in the world.
    Alongside our allies and partners at any given time,
    approximately 400,000 American troops are currently standing
    watch in 155 locations around the world, conducting operations
    every day to keep Americans safe.
        Currently, we are supporting our European allies and
    guarding Europe's eastern flank in the face of an unnecessary
    war of aggression by Russia against the people of Ukraine and
    the assault on democratic institutions and rules-based
    international order that have prevented the great power war for
    the last 78 years, since the end of World War II.
        We are now facing two global powers: China and Russia, each
    with significant military capabilities, both of whom intend to
    fundamentally change the current rules-based global order. We
    are entering a world that is becoming more unstable and the
    potential for significant international conflict between great
    powers is increasing, not decreasing.
        The United States military comprises one of the four key
    components of America's national power: diplomatic, economic,
    informational, and military, to protect the Homeland and
    sustain a stable and open international system.
        In coordination with the other elements of power, we
    constantly develop a wide range of military options for the
    President, as Commander-in-Chief, and for this Congress to
    consider.
        As the U.S. military, we are prepared to deter and, if
    necessary, fight and win against anyone who seeks to attack the
    United States, our allies, or our significant, vital national
    security interests.
        The Joint Force appreciates the work that our elected
    representatives do to ensure that we have the resources needed
    to train, equip, and manage the force in order to be ready. We
    thank this Congress for increasing last fiscal year's level of
    funding and we look forward to your support for this year's
    budget.
        The Joint Force will deliver modernization and readiness
    for Armed Forces and security to the people of the United
    States at the fiscal year 2023 budget request of $773 billion.
    This budget will enable the decisions, the modernization, and
    the transformation of the Joint Force in order to set and meet
    the conditions of the operating environment that we are likely
    to face in 2030 and beyond; the so-called changing character of
    war that we have discussed many times in the past. We will work
    diligently to ensure the resources of the American people
    entrust to us are spent prudently and in the best interests of
    the Nation.
        In alignment with the forthcoming National Defense
    Strategy, the classified document is out. In the national
    military strategy, this budget delivers a ready, agile, and
    capable Joint Force that will defend the Nation, while taking
    care of our people and working with our partners and allies.
        We are currently witness to the greatest threat to the
    peace and security of Europe and, perhaps, the world, in my 42
    years of service in uniform. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is
    threatening to undermine not only European peace and stability,
    but global peace and stability that my parents and generations
    of Americans fought so hard to defend.
        The islands of the Pacific and the beaches of Normandy bore
    witness to the incredible tragedy that befalls humanity when
    nations seek power through military aggression across sovereign
    borders. Despite this horrific assault on the institutions of
    freedom, it is heartening to see the world rally and say, never
    again, to the specter of war in Europe.
        Your military stands ready to do whatever it is directed in
    order to maintain peace and stability on the European
    continent, a peace that ensures global stability and
    international order where all nations can prosper in peace. We
    are also prepared and need to sustain our capabilities anywhere
    else on the globe, as well as our priority effort in the Asia-
    Pacific region, measured against our pacing challenge of the
    People's Republic of China, and in defense of our Nation, we
    must maintain competitive overmatch in all the domains of war:
    space, cyber, land, sea, and air.
        The United States is at a very critical and historic
    geostrategic inflection point. We need to pursue a clear-eyed
    strategy of maintaining peace to the unambiguous capability of
    strength relative to China or Russia. This requires that we
    simultaneously maintain readiness and modernize for the future.
    If we do not do that, then we are risking the security of
    future generations and I believe that this budget is a major
    step in the right direction.
        I look forward to your questions.
        [The statement of General Mark A. Milley follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by General Mark A. Milley
                                  introduction
        I am privileged to represent the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines
    and guardians of the United States Joint Force. Our troops are the best
    led, best equipped, best trained, most lethal and capable military
    force in the world. Alongside our allies and partners, American
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and guardians are currently standing
    watch in 155 countries and conducting operations every day that keep
    Americans safe. We are supporting our NATO allies and guarding the
    Eastern flank in the face of the unnecessary war of Russian aggression
    against the people of Ukraine and the assault on the democratic
    institutions and rules-based international order that have prevented
    great power war for 78 years.
        The United States military is a key component in the efforts to
    sustain a stable and open international system and an important
    component of our national power. In cooperation with our diplomatic
    corps, economy, and democratic institutions, we are part of the range
    of options available to this legislative body and the Commander-in-
    Chief. As the U.S. military, we are prepared to fight and win if those
    who seek to attack the United States, our allies, and partners are
    undeterred.
        The Joint Force appreciates the work that our elected
    representatives do to ensure that we have the resources needed to
    train, equip, and manage the force in order to be ready. This
    legislative body increased the level of military funding for the last
    fiscal year and with that additional funding we are ensuring that the
    future modernization of the armed forces along with funding the
    security requirements of today remain on track.
        The Joint Force will deliver modernization of our armed forces and
    security to the people of the United States at the fiscal year 2023
    budget request of $773 billion. This budget will enable the decisions,
    modernization, and transformation the Joint Force needs to set the
    conditions for the Force of 2030. This budget allows the Joint Force to
    remain on a stable glide path toward that future.
        The people of the United States through Congress provide the
    military the resources we need, and we will work diligently to ensure
    it is spent prudently in the best interest of the Nation. In alignment
    with the forthcoming National Defense Strategy and National Military
    Strategy, this budget delivers a ready, agile, and capable Joint Force
    that will defend the Nation, while taking care of our people and
    working with our partners and allies.
                             strategic environment
        We are witness to the greatest threat to the peace and security of
    Europe and perhaps the world in my 42 years of service in uniform. The
    Russian invasion of Ukraine is threatening to undermine the global
    peace and stability that my parents--and generations of Americans--
    fought so hard to defend. The islands of the Pacific and the beaches of
    Normandy bore witness to the incredible tragedy that befalls humanity
    when nations seek power through military aggression across sovereign
    borders. Despite this horrific assault on the institutions of freedom,
    it is heartening to see the world rally and say never again to the
    specter of war in Europe. Your military stands ready to do whatever is
    asked to maintain peace and stability on the European continent, a
    peace that ensures global stability and an international order where
    all nations can prosper in peace.
                         the people's republic of china
        The People's Republic of China (PRC) remains our #1 long term geo-
    strategic pacing challenge. The PRC continues to challenge the
    stability and security in the Pacific and is increasingly exporting
    their ability to destabilize countries abroad.
        The PRC has and continues to develop significant nuclear, space,
    cyber, land, air, and maritime military capabilities, and they are
    working every day to close the technology gap with the United States
    and our allies. In short, they remain intent on fundamentally revising
    the global international order in their favor by midcentury, they
    intend to be a military peer of the United States by 2035, and they
    intend to develop the military capabilities to seize Taiwan by 2027.
        Furthermore, they are actively watching the events in Ukraine and
    intend to exploit efforts in order to weaken the United States and our
    allies supporting Ukraine. Where Russia is an acute threat, the PRC is
    our long-term, geo-strategic national security pacing challenge. As
    President Biden's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance stated,
    China is the only country ``capable of combining its economic,
    diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained
    challenge to a stable and open international system.''
        History is not deterministic; war with the PRC is not inevitable.
    The PRCis clearly a strategic competitor, and it continues to improve
    its technology and modernization of its armed forces. It is imperative
    that we keep our relationship with the PRC a competition and not allow
    it to become a conflict.
                             integrated deterrence
        Integrated deterrence, as defined in the National Defense Strategy,
    is how we will align the Department's policies, investments, and
    activities to sustain and strengthen deterrence - tailored to specific
    competitors and challenges and coordinated and synchronized to maximum
    effect inside and outside the Department. We must act urgently to
    develop deterrence approaches - including denial, resilience, and cost
    imposition - across domains, theaters, and spectrums of conflict. If we
    remain militarily superior to our adversary, then conflict is less
    likely. As history has shown, peace through strength is a time-tested
    approach and our best approach for a strategic way ahead.
                                     russia
        In recent months, Russia - under the direction of Vladimir Putin -
    has taken unprovoked, premeditated actions to violate a sovereign
    nation. With the invasion of Ukraine, Putin has created a dangerous,
    historical turning point and has invaded a free and democratic nation
    and its people without provocation. Shoulder-to-shoulder with our
    allies, we have bolstered NATO's Eastern Flank and imposed wide-ranging
    costs on Russia, demonstrating our willingness to defend the
    international, rules-based order. Russia retains a large and varied
    nuclear capability to threaten the United States and our allies and
    partners, and we have heard very provocative rhetoric concerning
    Russia's nuclear force alert levels from Russian senior leaders. Russia
    has repeatedly demonstrated its capability and will to conduct complex
    malicious cyber activities targeting American protected digital
    infrastructure, both military and commercial.
                     democratic people's republic of korea
        The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) continued
    weapons testing and development poses real threats to our allies and
    partners in the Indo-Pacific as well as the Homeland. The DPRK
    continues to enhance its ballistic missile capability and possesses the
    technical capacity to present a real danger to the U.S. Homeland as
    well as our allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific. They show no
    signs of relenting in their myopic focus on military capability at the
    expense of their citizens and peace of the Korean Peninsula as well as
    the entire region.
                                      iran
        Iran is likely to remain a significant regional threat to the
    United States and our partners and allies. Through its support of
    terrorist activities and a proxy army inside the borders of its
    neighbors, along with its ballistic missile programs, Iran seeks to
    revise the Middle East regional order and balance of power in Iran's
    favor. Iran has continued to develop its nuclear program as leverage
    towards that end. Furthermore, if not constrained through a new
    diplomatic agreement, their continued nuclear program threatens the
    emergence of a regional arms race. Additionally, Iran continues to
    openly threaten to assassinate current and former members of United
    States Government and our military, which is unacceptable.
                        violent extremist organizations
        Following the conclusion of two continuous decades of United States
    presence in Afghanistan, terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda,
    ISIS, Al Shabaab, and others continue to export terror, destruction,
    and destabilization. Until and unless the root causes of instability
    that give rise to these types of groups are resolved, we will continue
    to deal with their attacks to undermine legitimate governments
    worldwide. The root causes can only be effectively addressed by
    governments of the region and we can best influence outcomes with
    diplomatic, economic, information and stability efforts along with
    train, advise, assist and intelligence sharing combined with an
    effective counter-terrorism capability that can find, fix, disrupt, and
    destroy an emerging specific terrorist threat. Through coalition
    efforts in support of local governments and an aggressive counter-
    terrorism strategy, we will continue to ensure they do not possess the
    capacity and capability to exert their terror in the U.S. Homeland.
                               allies & partners
        Our alliances and partnerships are our most significant asymmetric
    advantages and are key to maintaining the international rules-based
    order that offers the best opportunities for peace and prosperity for
    America and the globe. This budget allows us to build our partners and
    allies capabilities, foster interoperability, and strengthen
    relationships. Doing so allows us, our allies, and partners to counter
    the coercion of our strategic competitors, the malign activity of
    regional challengers, and meet the varied security challenges state and
    non-state actors, terrorism or any other threat that may emerge. We are
    stronger when we operate closely with our allies and partners.
    Simultaneously, we must be ready for today and prepare for tomorrow.
                          readiness and modernization
        Continued modernization is imperative for the Joint Force. We
    cannot allow ourselves to create the false trap that we can only either
    modernize or focus on today's readiness, we must do both. The United
    States has always had the advantage of time to conduct a long build up
    prior to the beginning of hostilities, we have the fortunate geography
    of having the Atlantic and Pacific oceans as our east and west borders
    and having friendly neighbors to our north and south. With advances in
    technology, we will no longer have the luxury of a long protected
    buildup prior to conflict. Having modernized forces in sufficient size
    and readiness that can rapidly respond at scale will be the key to
    sustaining deterrence and maintaining the peace, and if deterrence
    fails, being able to fight and win.
        Our Strategic competitors are modernizing their militaries, weapons
    and capability. We will continue to modernize ours to ensure we deter
    and, if necessary, defeat adversaries. We will divest legacy systems to
    enable the modernization of our forces not only in terms of materiel,
    but also in terms of doctrine. In the fall of 2019, the Joint Staff
    began to develop the Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) to address the
    changing character of war, fully informed by the future operating
    environment and threats we will face. The JWC guides how we organize,
    train, and equip the Joint Force. It further guides us in shaping our
    strategic environment and future operations. JWC continues to evolve
    and is being refined through robust experimentation and war-gaming.
    Among the enablers for JWC, Joint all domain command and control
    (JADC2) is a warfighting capability to sense, analyze, and act at all
    levels and phases of conflict, across all domains, and with partners,
    to deliver information advantage to our forces and decision makers at
    greater speeds than our adversaries can react. JADC2's data-centric
    approach to command and control will dramatically increase the speed of
    information sharing and decision-making in a contested environment.
    Conceptual frameworks like the JWC and JADC2 will ensure capabilities
    such as Long Range and Hypersonic Fires, Logistics and Information
    Advantage are employed to the full extent. This combination of
    operational concepts and technology will enable integrated deterrence.
        As important is the education of our military leaders. The Joint
    Chiefs of Staff and their senior enlisted advisors unanimously endorsed
    two documents: shared visions for both officer and enlisted joint
    professional military education. We increased the time our developing
    leaders spend studying the changing character of war and a greater
    focus on both the PRC as the pacing challenge and Russia as our
    immediate threat, which seeks to create leaders fully versed in the
    Joint Warfighting Concept. Furthermore, our shift to outcomes based
    military education will help us better measure progress and the return
    on our investment.
        Our staff college and war college curriculum are being streamlined
    to focus on the warfighter skills necessary to execute the JWC and
    prevail in future conflict. Also underway is the first class of
    GATEWAY, the Joint Staff's newest in-person enlisted development course
    introducing the Joint Environment to E-6s and E-7s from across the
    force. GATEWAY is designed to develop joint enlisted leaders capable of
    operating in Joint Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational
    (JIIM) organizations, and we, the Joint Force, must also focus on
    recruiting the most capable talent so we can develop our leaders of the
    future.
        We are focused on building a more lethal Joint Force ensuring that
    we continue to modernize our concepts, doctrine, training, and military
    education. It is imperative that we continue to invest in capabilities
    that sustain our advantages, while strengthening alliances and
    attracting new partners. Investments in this budget will ensure that
    the requirements our Nation levees on the Joint Force are executable.
    The investments made in this budget will specifically ensure that we
    remain a relevant and ready force while ensuring that nuclear
    modernization, long range fires, hypersonic technology, shipbuilding,
    missile defeat and defense, space and cyber remain at the center of our
    funding priorities.
                             nuclear modernization
        The nuclear triad is the cornerstone of our strategic deterrent.
    Our adversaries are improving their nuclear stockpiles and potential
    nuclear threats continue to emerge. While today's nuclear TRIAD is
    safe, secure, and effective, most U.S. nuclear deterrent system are
    operating beyond their original design life, increasing concerns about
    mission effectiveness, reliability, and availability. Replacement
    programs are in place, but there is little or no margin between the end
    of useful life of existing systems and the fielding of their
    replacements. Managing the programmatic risk is a key feature of our
    approach going forward, however we must also account for geopolitical,
    operational, and technical risks the could pose new deterrence dilemmas
    in the future. Risk mitigation in the programs is one aspect, the other
    area encompasses the nuclear weapons complex, infrastructure, and the
    nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3). All of which remain
    a high priority in the Department and the Joint Force.
                                long range fires
        One need look no further than the current conflict in Ukraine to
    see the devastating effect that long range fires provide. Ensuring we
    have a strike capability without having to also maintain air
    superiority is a critical asset. We must field multi-domain, long-range
    offensive capabilities that are both cost-effective and cost-imposing
    as a means of improving deterrence. By enabling power projection from
    standoff ranges, the risk to critical United States assets decreases
    while the defensive burden imposed upon the enemy increases. The PRC
    has thousands of ground-launched theater-range missiles in its arsenal
    that would be difficult for the United States to counter given its
    current inventories. Investments in long range missiles are a cost-
    effective strategy that improves our ability to compete with the PRC.
                             hypersonic technology
        This technology is going to continue to be developed by our
    adversaries and the means and mechanisms for delivery will be varied
    and difficult to detect and defeat. At the very core of this technology
    is a speed that is almost unbeatable. It is for this reason that we
    must invest in this technology. Hypersonics are a suite of capabilities
    that provide transformational warfighting capability to our Joint
    Force.
                           missile defeat and defense
        Missile Defeat is all whole-of-government activities to counter the
    development, acquisitions, proliferation potential, and actual use of
    adversary offensive missiles of all types, and to limit damage for such
    use. As the scale and complexity of missile capabilities increase, we
    must continue to develop, acquire, and maintain credible U.S. missile
    defeat capabilities as necessary to protect against possible missile
    attacks on the U.S. Homeland, allies, and partners. The Ground-Based
    Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, and continued modernization and
    expansion of it, will remain an important and effective element of our
    comprehensive missile defeat approach to defend the Homeland from DPRK
    long-range missiles.
                           optimizing force structure
        To pace the PRC threat, we can no longer afford to maintain weapons
    that are not relevant in the future fight and whose capabilities can be
    matched by superior technology. Sustaining such equipment takes needed
    defense dollars away from the acquisition of systems that are needed
    for modernization. We need to retire aging platforms, and ensure that
    every defense dollar is spent on programs and equipment that will be
    relevant to the high-end fight in contested environments. We cannot
    continue to mortgage our future by being wedded to technology of the
    past.
                                  naval forces
        Strategically, the United States has always been and remains a
    maritime Nation, and we cannot have a world class Navy without world
    class ships. Manufacturing our warships overseas is simply not in our
    national interest. Our shipbuilding and supporting vendor base are a
    national security capability that needs support to grow and maintain a
    skilled workforce. The Fiscal Year 2023 President's Budget reflects the
    Administration's strong commitment to continued American naval
    superiority, including a properly sized and well-positioned industrial
    base to meet the demands of our current and future defense needs. The
    conclusions from past force structure analyses have been fully
    considered and are simple: ship count is an incomplete metric, as it
    fails to fully capture the capability, payload capacity, and employment
    of ship classes in the fleet. We must have the right ships, with the
    right crews, and the right capabilities in the theaters where they
    matter. This budget specifically procures warships and submarines with
    credible combat power to deter China while continuing remotely operated
    ship development and investing in the industrial base to support fleet
    modernization and on time delivery of the Columbia-class submarine.
    Sealift recapitalization is a critical component of our fleet, 90
    percent of war material moves by sea and the DOD fleet is reaching its
    end of life with an average vessel age of 46 years. Our overall sealift
    readiness rate is consistently below our stated requirements. We must
    recapitalize our fleet.
                                  space forces
        More so now than ever, space is essential to our way of life; space
    capabilities are essential to our economy, quality of life, our
    exploration initiatives, and our ability to wage war. Every day we see
    additional commercial space launches and increased competition for low
    earth orbit as well as increased reliance on these space assets by
    Americans. Adversaries are testing and fielding counterspace weapons
    that threaten not just our National interests and advancements in
    space, but those of all nations that rely upon space. Russia recently
    tested both a ground-based anti-satellite missile and an on-orbit anti-
    satellite weapon prototype which will threaten our space capabilities
    once fielded. Left unsecured, our capabilities in space will become
    strategic vulnerabilities, and if we begin to lose our freedom of
    maneuver in space, this impact will be felt by Americans of all walks
    of life. This year's budget submission provides a significant
    investment in resilient space architectures so U.S. and allied partners
    will be able to continue to derive the national security and societal
    benefits from space in the face of these threats.
                                  cyber forces
        Our adversaries are leveraging the open commerce platform that is
    the modern cyber environment to further their own nefarious ends. The
    PRC consistently uses the cyber domain to collect intelligence from the
    United States Government and to extract proprietary commercial
    information from the private sector. Malign cyberspace actors
    increasingly exploit supply chain vulnerabilities, such as commercial
    software, to gain network access and conduct cyber operations against
    U.S. citizens, organizations, and institutions. The low cost combined
    with deniability and the frequency with which non-state actors conduct
    operations make this domain a priority focus for adversaries to
    asymmetrically compete without escalation in other domains. Therefore,
    we must increase our ability to compete in cyberspace and ensure all
    elements of informational power are integrated into operations,
    activities, and efforts to deter our adversaries and protect the U.S.
    Homeland. This requires investment in partners and technology, building
    and maturing cyber operations and readiness, reducing risk to weapon
    systems and critical infrastructure, strengthening cybersecurity, and
    improving network resiliency.
                                 ground forces
        Decision in war is ultimately achieved on land, and maintaining a
    capable land force in the United States Army and Marine Corps is key to
    our overall deterrence capability and national security. The Army is
    rapidly modernizing with innovation, creativity, and entrepreneurship
    in the application of combat power. Modern battlefields are
    increasingly faster, more lethal, and more distributed. To meet
    emerging challenges, the Army is transforming to provide the Joint
    Force with the speed, range, and convergence of cutting edge
    technologies that will generate the decision dominance and overmatch
    required to win the next fight. By 2035, the Army aims to realize its
    vision of a multi-domain force. Similarly, the Marine Corps is
    deliberately transforming its capabilities, capacity, and composition
    through its expeditionary advanced base operations to meet future
    challenges.
                                   air forces
        Maintaining the role as the global leader in airpower requires our
    Air Force to accelerate change or lose. In an environment of aggressive
    global competitors and technology development and diffusion, the Air
    Force must have the capabilities to control and exploit the air domain,
    while also underwriting national security through nuclear deterrence.
    To best address these necessary changes, we must balance risk over
    time. The Air Force will develop and field new capabilities
    expeditiously while selectively divesting older platforms not relevant
    to our pacing challenge--all while maintaining readiness. The Air Force
    must ensure its path continuously drives towards readiness to be best
    prepared when called upon by the Nation. Accelerating change means both
    getting the direction right and moving as fast as possible.
        In last year's budget submission, the Air Force began the process
    of making hard decisions to modernize the Force. Last year's budget
    highlighted the Air Force needs for 2030 and beyond, and the message
    has not changed: the need to modernize is critical to counter strategic
    competitors. The Air Force is taking measured risk in the near-term,
    while simultaneously prioritizing an affordable, defensible force
    structure that grows readiness over time and accelerates investment in
    critical capabilities to deter and defeat the advancing threat.
                        special operations forces (sof)
        SOF's full range of core activities, tailored capabilities, and
    enduring partnerships provide critical options for campaigning to
    bolster deterrence. The access, placement and influence generated by
    SOF long-term commitments to building partner capacity and improving
    Ally interoperability provide expanded, low-cost options to gain
    awareness and present an adversary with multiple dilemmas, if
    necessary. Additionally, SOF remain ideally suited to identify an
    adversary's challenge in the ``gray zone'' and counter those malign
    activities with firmness while managing escalation. USSOCOM continues
    to prioritize its operations, activities and investments in the Indo
    Pacific and Europe while maintaining prioritized posture to counter
    threats from the Middle East, Africa, and other regions.
        SOF continue to optimize our global posture to counter violent
    extremists and other non-state actors while sustaining the ability to
    respond to crises worldwide. Focused, deliberate campaigning in Eastern
    Europe over several years has supported our recent response in
    conjunction with critical Allies and Partners. This will enhance their
    resistance capabilities if threatened with territorial aggression or
    abrogation of sovereign territory.
                       people first / people and families
        We must take care of our people. Taking care of our people is a
    fundamental component of readiness. People are our most important
    resource in the Joint Force. We must ensure that we are doing all that
    we can do to take care of and guard our most critical resource in order
    to attract both our troops and their families and retain the best
    talent in the world. Taking care of people decisively impacts unit
    cohesion, recruitment, retention, and confidence in leadership.
        Just one example in the Budget of taking care of our troops and
    families is ensuring that the services increase their childcare
    capacity. The DOD childcare system is the gold standard of childcare
    with 98 percent of centers being accredited. Funding support from
    Congress is vital for fully-staffed military childcare. Childcare is
    key to keeping military families serving and ensuring the safety of our
    children.
        The Joint Force is committed to growing a bench of talent and
    ensuring that all who meet the requirements to serve are able to serve.
    The Joint Force competes for the talent of America's youth along with
    every other business, and organization who seeks our Nation's best and
    brightest. The Joint Force's objective is to field the most lethal and
    combat effective fighting force in the world. We will continue to
    support the accessions of all qualified people to all jobs and
    positions within the Joint Force.
        Finally, another example of taking care of our people and emerging
    realities is the Secretary of Defense's decision to close Red Hill. The
    Secretary made the decision to close the Red Hill fuel storage location
    earlier this year, and this decision demonstrates that we will ensure
    we do all we can to safeguard our most important resource. Closing Red
    Hill is not only an opportunity to demonstrate to our people that we
    care, but also an opportunity to modernize how we distribute fuel to
    our fleet in the Pacific. Moving away from a large legacy bulk storage
    system to a distributed system improves our warfighter campaign and
    ensures safe water for our troops, their families, and the local
    community. Looking for opportunities to take care of our people and
    modernize our force and capabilities is something we will continue to
    prioritize.
                                   conclusion
        The United States is at a very critical and historic geo-strategic
    inflection point. We are entering a world that is becoming more
    unstable and the potential for significant international conflict
    between great powers is increasing, not decreasing. The United States
    needs to pursue a clear-eyed strategy of maintaining the peace through
    unambiguous capability of strength relative to the PRC and Russia. This
    requires we simultaneously maintain readiness and modernize for the
    future. If we do not, then we are risking the security of future
    generations. This budget is a major step in the right direction.
        It remains imperative that we redouble our efforts to improve
    readiness and to modernize so that we remain the most capable and
    lethal Force on the planet. Our job as the Joint Force, our contract
    with the American people is that we, the United States military will
    always be ready to deter our enemies and if deterrence fails then to
    fight and win.

        Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much, General, and Mr.
    Secretary.
        I would like to address my first question to Secretary
    McCord, and that is, one of the concerns everyone has right now
    is the impact of inflation on the budget.
        Can you explain how the Department calculates inflation and
    how it was taken into account in this budget request, both in
    terms of personnel and in major contracts.
        Secretary McCord. Yes, Chairman.
        We paid just as much attention to this as we did to the
    program content that we are going to spend most of the hearing
    discussing. So, when we saw prices changing last year, we
    jumped on it at the same time we were doing our program review.
    We took all the information available to us at the time, up to
    the time we had to finish, which is basically the end of last
    calendar year, built that into our budget.
        What did that mean?
        The GDP deflator, which is what we use at DOD, not the CPI,
    the CPI does not reflect what we buy, so we weren't chasing 7
    percent, but we were chasing an increase up to 4 percent vice
    two. We built that into the pricing of what we buy from
    contractors and then we also, the pay rates, which you
    described, the 4.6 pay raise, we took the increase in wages
    into account.
        The result of both of those things, we added $20 billion a
    year to our program from 2023 through 2027. Working with the
    White House, the Secretary made both points to the President
    both, on the content of the program and on the cost of the
    program. On top of the twenty to $30 billion of programming
    content that we added, we added $20 billion a year to catch up
    on this pricing increase that we saw last year.
        Then comes the tricky part, Mr. Chairman, is the world
    keeps changing. After we finished the budget, the invasion of
    Ukraine spiked, rattled the markets, spiked energy prices. You
    know, we do not have that in our budget. So, the world keeps
    evolving. The global economy, let alone the U.S. economy, are
    very complex and hard to predict what is going to happen next.
        So, what we saw happen last year is not what we see
    happening today and may not be what we see happening tomorrow.
    But with all the information we had when we finished, we caught
    up so that we would not start behind on our pricing.
        The last point I would want to make, I want to acknowledge
    that we have a letter from Ranking Member Inhofe and Ranking
    Member Rogers with a detailed set of questions.
        That would be another opportunity for us to explain this in
    more detail going forward.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
        Secretary Austin, could you highlight for us some of the
    key capabilities that are included in this budget that will
    implement the National Defense Strategy that you just proposed
    and the President has proposed.
        Secretary Austin. Well, thank you, Chairman.
        You know, one of the tenets of this strategy is, as you
    heard me say earlier, is this concept of integrated deterrence
    and the principle here is that we maximize the capability,
    capacity resident in every warfighting domain: air, land,
    space, sea, cyber, and that we are able to network those
    capabilities in new and different ways.
        So, you can see from this budget that we are investing in
    space in a significant way, $27 billion. Cyberspace is another
    $11 billion. Missile defeat and defense, $24 billion. Long-
    range fire is another $7 billion.
        So, a significant investment in the types of capabilities
    that we know we will need to be relevant, not only relevant,
    but dominant in future conflict.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        I indicated in my statement the difficult choices you had
    to make with respect to retiring platforms, et cetera, which I
    presume, and I will ask you, is essential to being able to,
    first, have the efficiency to continue to operate, have the
    innovation to anticipate problems going forward. Might you and
    General Milley talk about the needs for this disinvestment?
        Secretary Austin. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman.
        As you know, it becomes very difficult and costly to try to
    maintain platforms that will not be relevant and effective in a
    fight with a peer competitor, and so because these platforms,
    in many cases, are very difficult to continue to maintain, we
    need to choose to off-ramp those capabilities and invest in
    capabilities that we know that will provide us what we need in
    a future fight.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you.
        General Milley, please?
        General Milley. Thank you, Senator.
        The divestment to invest strategy that retires a variety of
    platforms, mostly Navy and Air Force that are quite expensive,
    and the cost-benefit analysis to sustain them over time doesn't
    add up, number one. Number two is the technologies in those
    systems, many of those systems that we are divesting are old,
    so we are trying to modernize the force for the future
    operating environment, 2030 and beyond, and that is where the
    investments are in this budget.
        Chairman Reed. I appreciate that.
        I think looking at not just the fighting in Ukraine, but
    also the fighting recently in Azerbaijan or Armenia, the impact
    of drones, for example, vis-a-vis, tanks, they symbolize, I
    think, in a way, the future, where large systems which we
    assumed in the past were difficult to defeat have been handled
    quite adroitly by the Ukrainians.
        So, with that, let me recognize Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. McCord, the chairman asked a question and led off with,
    which I was going to do, but currently now, the question would
    be in 2022, do you want to expand a little bit on that year?
        Secretary McCord. Yes, Senator.
        On inflation in 2022, the GDP deflator, which is what the
    Department has always used, was the budget that you got last
    year at this time was built on 2 percent. We now saw the year
    ended at 4 and that is what we caught up on, so that that
    pricing going forward, building it into our program going
    forward would not be behind.
        The tricky part from now is assessing what is going to
    happen in 2023 going forward, given how hard it is to predict
    these things and whether oil-price spikes are going to persist
    or not persist, things like that.
        Senator Inhofe. Uh-huh. Which I think they will be
    persisting.
        Secretary Austin, there are some who say that we shouldn't
    be talking about the top line; we should be talking about how
    the budget aligns with the strategy. I think we need to talk
    about both, but we only have a classified defense strategy and
    we have no National Security Strategy.
        So, how are we supposed to connect the dots between the
    strategy and the budget? Is there any timeline for the White
    House to release the National Security Strategy to that we
    could have a debate in public about the strategy? Secretary
    Austin. Well, if you, Senator.
        I can't offer you a timeline on when that is going to be
    released. I would only say that as we construct the National
    Defense Strategy, we used the guidance that was available in
    the very detailed national security--security strategy guidance
    that was published very early on in this administration. That
    was very helpful to us to allow us to map out the strategy that
    you now see.
        If you look at that strategy and you look at the budget,
    you will see direct linkages between the budget and the
    strategy, because we used the strategy to fabricate the budget.
        Senator Inhofe. That is good. Thank you very much.
        General Milley, I am going to ask you one question, and I
    already know the answer, because I know you, and I think it
    needs to be stated in this hearing. I want to follow-up on this
    Congresswoman Turner's question from the task hearing earlier
    this week.
        You said your position on the sub-launch nuclear missile
    hadn't changed. I just wanted to confirm, Admiral Richard and
    General Walter your best military advice is to continue
    development of this missile for deterrence purposes.
        General Milley. That is correct, Senator.
        My position didn't change and I think that it is important
    to have as many options as possible for this President or any
    other President.
        But I do want to state, also, that we have lots of options
    and we have a significant nuclear capability, so I don't want
    any foreign adversary to misread what I am saying. I just
    happened to believe that this President and every President
    needs lots of options, which we have, but I think more options
    are better.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay. Great.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Shaheen, please?
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Thank you, Secretary Austin, Chairman Milley, and Under
    Secretary McCord for being here this morning and for your
    service.
        Secretary Austin, the Senate NATO Observer Group, which I
    co-chair with Senator Tillis, recently sent a letter to
    President Biden, and one of the things we raised in the letter
    was in view of what is happening in Ukraine, whether we should
    have a more strategic and comprehensive approach toward the
    Black Sea region, which, as we are watching Russia is freely
    using to attack Ukraine and has the potential to shut off that
    region.
        As we think about our future strategy, how are we factoring
    in efforts to address what is happening in the Black Sea
    region, particularly?
        Secretary Austin. Well, thank you, Senator.
        This unlawful and unprovoked aggression by Putin has had
    the effect of changing the security architecture in the region
    for some time to come. So, what NATO is now doing is taking a
    look at what has changed and what NATO will need to do to make
    sure that we continue to do what is necessary in protecting our
    NATO countries, defending our NATO countries.
        That work has just commenced. It is ongoing. I expect that
    we will have a robust discussion as we go to the summit in
    June, but, again, it is ongoing work.
        We recognize, however, that change has occurred and that
    change needs to be accounted for.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, again, the Black Sea region is a
    particular vulnerability right now, given what is happening,
    and are we working with our allies in the region on what that
    strategy should look like?
        Secretary Austin. Absolutely, Senator.
        Prior to this, we were working with the countries in the
    region on, in terms of their capability and capacity and what
    needed to do to evolve that. That will all be a part of the
    ongoing discussion, but, clearly, they will have a voice in
    that discussion.
        Senator Shaheen. As we look, as you pointed out, the
    architecture of Europe is going to be different because of this
    war, and it appears that we are, right now, looking at a much
    more robust presence in Europe.
        How do we think that is going to affect our long-term
    military posture in Europe?
        General Milley. I wouldn't care to speculate at this point,
    Senator. I would say that as we look at that posture, we are
    going to look at capability in all five warfighting domains and
    we are going to look at capability across NATO.
        We do expect that it will change our footprint. In terms of
    how much it changes the U.S. contribution, that is left to be
    seen, and whether or not it includes permanent stake, permanent
    basing forward or, you know, additional rotational forces in
    and out of the eastern flank, or a combination of both. These
    are things that have to be worked out.
        Again, we will work with NATO on this and to your point,
    it, no doubt, will be different going forward.
        Senator Shaheen. Chairman Milley, would you like to
    speculate?
        General Milley. I won't speculate, Senator.
        We are developing options for the Secretary and President
    to consider on the future force posture in Europe to achieve
    the two fundamental purposes, which is to assure our allies and
    deter any adversaries, specifically, Russia. But right now,
    those are under development.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, I was pleased to see that the
    President's Budget included $4.2 billion for the European
    Deterrence Initiative, but in view of what is happening in
    Ukraine, do we not think we are going to have to increase that
    request?
        I don't know if that is for Under Secretary McCord or for
    you, Mr. Secretary.
        Secretary Austin. Well, certainly, that is something that
    we will look at, but let me take this opportunity to thank you
    for what you did in the past to provide us with that. That
    enabled to us very rapidly flow forces into theater. You saw us
    flow a brigade combat team from Georgia into Europe, fall in on
    pre-positioned equipment, and we are ready to go in a very
    short period of time.
        That, in addition to a number of other things that you
    helped us with, created some great capability. But to your
    point, I think we will need more of that going forward. Exactly
    how much, unknown.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        I am almost out of time, but I do want to raise an issue
    around Per- and Polyfluoroakyl substances (PFAS) because the
    2022 NDAA and the omnibus budget bill contained funding for
    PFAS testing and remediation at DOD installations, and for
    those of us who have constituents who are affected by what has
    happened with PFAS exposure at military installations, it is
    nice to be able to say help is on the way.
        So, are you committed to ensuring that all of the
    initiatives that are funded as part of both of those bills get
    out on time and as quickly as possible?
        Secretary Austin. I am absolutely committed, Senator.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Wicker, please?
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        In your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, you talked about
    the acute threat we are facing. You termed the challenges as
    being stark.
        In the statement by General Milley, he said the danger is
    increasing, not decreasing. Certainly, Senator Shaheen is
    correct about a more robust presence in Europe and of course
    that is going to require more funds from the Congress, the
    branch of our government that has the power of the purse.
        I don't see how we can view the current climate as being
    one in which budget tightening is appropriate. So, I would just
    challenge my colleagues on this Committee and in the House and
    Senate to assert our authority as the appropriators and as the
    branch of government charged with providing enough funds to
    provide for the common defense under the Constitution.
        Now, Secretary Austin, let me talk about amphibious ships.
    To your credit, you assured Senator Kaine and me that you would
    fund the Commandant's need for amphibious ships to conduct
    Marine Corps missions. You did this in the Department's fiscal
    year 2023 budget; it calls for full funding of LPD 32 and funds
    LHA 9. So, thank you for working with Senator Kaine and me on
    that.
        However, I have significant concerns for the future of
    amphibious ships. The Department of Defense has not delivered
    the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan for Congress. When are we
    going to get that?
        Further, the Department of Defense has not delivered its
    amphibious ship study to Congress; again, when will we get
    that?
        Yet, even without these two documents, the Department is
    proposing to end the LPD amphibious ship construction line
    after LPD 32. Now, by contrast, the Commandant of the Marine
    Corps has been clear: he needs a minimum of 31 amphibs.
        The math is simple. If you end the LPD line after LPD 32,
    you cannot reach the 31 traditional amphibious ships. The
    Marine Corps even included funding for an entire LPD 33 as its
    number one, unfunded priority in fiscal year 2023.
        So, Secretary Austin, why did you not include funding for
    LPD 33 in the fiscal year 2023 budget? How do you propose
    filling the operational gap that this is going to cause? Do you
    think we should take note of the fact that the Marine Corps
    chose LPD 33 as its top choice for additional funding?
        Secretary Austin. Well, thanks, Senator.
        Let me also thank you for what you have done to continue to
    support us and continue to support our Navy and our Marine
    Corps.
        As you pointed out, there is $2.8 billion in the 2023
    budget focused on amphibs. Amphibs are important to us today.
    That will be important to us going forward. There is $5 billion
    allocated to amphibs across the FITA.
        As you know, based upon the Commandant's vision of the
    future Corps, we will track along with what the Commandant's
    needs are, we will continue to work with him. We are also
    investing in an amphibious warfare ship, which is a lighter
    version of an amphib, and we will make those investments.
        But we will continue to work with the Commandant going
    forward and those two reports that you mentioned earlier, the
    shipbuilding plan and also the amphib study, those are
    forthcoming in the next several weeks.
        Senator Wicker. In the next several weeks. Well, very good.
        Let me ask you this, Secretary Austin, with regard to
    Ukraine. You said on Tuesday it is the objective of the
    Government to deter Putin, but as General Milley describes, it
    is very difficult to do so unless you put forces on the ground.
        In the Omni, Congress provided you with $3 billion in
    authority to further arm the Ukrainians, yet we have only used
    $900 million of this, less than a third of the amount
    authorized. This could also be used to backfill the eastern
    flank NATO partners.
        Why hasn't the administration provided the full $3 billion?
    Does the administration not want to send it yet? Is it not
    available yet? Are there throughput problems at the Pentagon
    and how do we fix these problems to get our friends in Ukraine,
    the equipment, the weaponry they need to defeat the Russians?
        Secretary Austin. Well, we communicate with the Ukrainian
    leadership routinely. As I indicated, Senator, I just talked to
    Minister Reznikov on Monday. I will talk to him again this
    afternoon. The chairman is in close contact with his
    counterpart, as well. We base what we are doing on their needs
    and those needs are identified in those frequent engagements.
        We are flowing resources into Ukraine faster than most
    people would have ever believed conceivable. Now, from a time,
    in some cases, from a time that authorization is provided, you
    know, 4 or 5 days later, we see real capability begin to show
    up.
        Senator Wicker. You are not suggesting they are receiving
    everything that they are asking for?
        Secretary Austin. If I said that, I certainly didn't mean
    to say that.
        What I meant to say, Senator, was we are providing them
    with those capabilities that are relevant and effective in this
    fight, and you have seen us do, provide a tremendous amount of
    anti-armor, anti-aircraft capability and also communications
    capabilities, as well as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). We
    are also looking to help them in a number of other ways.
        But we are providing those capabilities that have proven to
    be absolutely effective in this fight.
        Senator Shaheen. [Presiding.] Thank you, Senator Wicker.
        Senator Gillibrand?
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        General Milley and Secretary Austin, I just want to commend
    the fine work you are doing in Ukraine, with regard to being
    supportive of the Ukrainian people's will to fight and will to
    win.
        I went with a delegation with Senator Ernst just a few
    weeks ago and we were able to meet with the 82nd Airborne, as
    well as our troops in Poland, as well as troops that are doing
    exercises in Germany. I can say it was extremely inspiring and
    something I think that you should be very proud of.
        Do you believe our current strategy is sufficient for
    Ukraine to win the war against Russia and if not, what shifts
    in strategy would you suggest, and second, we talked about how
    this conflict could ultimately be resolved and I want to know
    if you are engaging with any Russian counterparts or whether
    any NATO allies are doing so?
        Secretary Austin. In terms of whether or not we are
    engaging with Russian counterparts, both the Chairman and
    myself have frequently reached out to our counterparts in
    Russia to try to ensure that we maintain a dialogue; that is,
    in the last, since mid-February, that has not been very, we
    have not been very successful because the Russians have not
    responded.
        In terms of whether or not, you know, this is the right
    approach, you know, our goal, our objective has been to make
    sure that we help Ukraine defend itself, protect its sovereign
    territory. They have done a credible job of doing that, because
    they have the will, the determination to defend their sovereign
    territory; that has been really, really impressive.
        But you also need the equipment, as well, to do that, and
    so, we provided them those anti-armor and anti-aircraft weapons
    and also the UAVs that they have been really somewhat decisive,
    for lack of a better term, in a number of these fights.
        Putin thought that he could very rapidly take over the
    country of Ukraine, very rapidly capture the capital city, but
    he was wrong. He was wrong, in part, because he made a number
    of bad assumptions, but also, in part, because of the stiffness
    of resistance that he encountered.
        I think, you know, Putin has given up on his efforts to
    capture the capital city. He is now focused on the South and
    East of the country and our goal is to make sure that we give
    the Ukrainians everything that they need, that we can possibly
    get to them, as fast as we can get it to them, and we are
    pushing it very, very quickly, so that they can be successful
    in that fight, as well. That will be our focus going forward.
        Senator Gillibrand. General Milley?
        General Milley. Yes, Senator, I would say that, you know,
    what does winning look like?
        I think winning is Ukraine remains a free and independent
    nation that it has been since 1991, with their territorial
    integrity intact. That is going to be very difficult; it is
    going to be a long slog. This is not an easy fight that they
    are involved in.
        The first part of it has probably and successfully been
    waged here in the last 6 weeks. They have managed to defeat the
    Russian onslaught on to Kyiv, but there is a significant battle
    yet ahead down in the Southeast, down around the Donbas-Donetsk
    region, where the Russians intend to amass forces and continue
    their assault.
        So, I think it is an open question right now, how this
    ends. Ideally, Putin decides to ceasefire, stop his aggression,
    and there is some sort of diplomatic intervention, but right
    now, that doesn't look like it is on the horizon, the immediate
    horizon.
        Senator Gillibrand. Do you believe we need any shifts in
    strategy or are you, do you believe that the current course is
    the best course? Are there any concerns about escalation that
    you need to mitigate?
        Secretary Austin. Yes, I do think the current strategy is
    the right strategy, which is, number one, do not engage in
    armed conflict with Russia; United States forces don't engage
    in armed conflict with Russia. Second is to continue to support
    the Ukrainian people and their government with sufficient
    weapons and arms, et cetera, so that they can help defend
    themselves. Third is to maintain the cohesion of NATO, because
    NATO is a very powerful organization in its both, the military
    and political alliance in many ways, and it definitely acts as
    a deterrence.
        So, those are the three main objectives the President has
    laid out for us as the uniform military and we will continue to
    execute those and I think that is the right track.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
        I have expired my time, but I want a question for the
    record. Secretary Austin, the People's Republic of China have
    rapidly advanced their cyber and information warfare
    capabilities and Russia's ongoing cyberattacks against Ukraine
    are an indication of how this dimension of warfare is bound to
    become more complex.
        What are some broad strategies and approaches that we
    should be considering to recruit more civilians and uniformed
    personnel to improve our cyber readiness?
        You either do a short answer now or submit your answer for
    the record; it is your choice.
        Secretary Austin. I will take the question for the record,
    Senator. Thank you.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Reed. [Presiding.] Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
        Senator Fischer, please?
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to begin by noting my frustration with the timing of
    this hearing. We are here today to review the Department's
    budget, but we have no detailed budget justification data. My
    understanding is that the J book will be released mid-April.
        We can't talk about any strategy, either. The
    administration's National Defense Strategy, the Nuclear Posture
    Review, and the Missile Defense Review, were submitted to
    Congress last week, but all of those documents are classified.
    Last year and in 2017 and 2018, this Committee delayed the
    Secretary's testimony so that there was ample time to review
    the budget and have a meaningful oversight hearing and I am
    disappointed that that is not the case.
        With respect to the NDS and the NPR, I would note that the
    previous administration released these documents publicly in
    early 2018 and the committee had almost 3 months to review them
    before Secretary Mattis and General Dunford appeared to
    testify.
        Secretary Austin, in your opening comments, you said that
    in this budget, resources are matched to strategy, matched to
    policy, matched to the will of the people.
        I think having this hearing without any detailed
    information about the budget and when we are unable to openly
    discuss any of the administration's strategy documents directly
    undermines the Committee's ability to conduct its oversight
    work and it is contrary to the spirit of transparent government
    that these public hearings are intended to support.
        I will be deferring most of my questions to the classified
    portion, but I do have a few that we were able to glean from
    the top lines that we were given.
        Secretary Austin, in Section 1684 of the 2017 NDAA, it was
    directed that the Department would designate an acquisition
    authority to be responsible for defense of the Homeland from
    cruise missile threats, but the Department has still not made
    such a designation.
        What is the status of this and does the Department intend
    to make a designation and when or can we expect that to happen
    in the near future?
        Secretary Austin. Well, thanks, Senator.
        We do intend to make a designation and we will, again, we
    will move out smartly on that.
        In terms of being transparent and when the budget, detailed
    budget is released, I would like to ask, invite Mr. McCord to
    make a couple of comments there. But it is our goal, it is our
    desire, it is our mandate to be as transparent with you as
    possible and we will do that.
        Senator Fischer. I would like to continue with my
    questions, since I will run out of time here, but I would point
    out that one of my missions, and I have talked to you about it,
    I have talked to all of the service chiefs to the Joint Chiefs,
    to be able to declassify much of the material that we see as
    members of Congress. I think there are ways to do that, and we
    have to be able to do that so that the people of this country
    understand the threats that we face. So that when they have the
    information and can review that for themselves, they will
    support our national defense.
        They will support our national security, and I feel that we
    have gone backwards here in making these classified documents
    and not being transparent.
        But if I could continue, given the increasing cruise
    missile threat to the United States, again, I think it is
    important that we make this designation. It was in the 2017
    NDAA and that was a long time ago, so I hope that you will step
    up and do this.
        Also, Secretary Austin, under this budget, the Air Force is
    divesting 369 aircrafts this year and buying 87, which is a net
    loss of 282. The 5-year plan projects buying 467 aircraft and
    divesting 1,468, a loss of 1,001. The Navy's battle force
    shrinks as well, under this budget, dropping from 298 ships
    today, to 280 in fiscal year 2027.
        You know, I am open to the concept of divesting of legacy
    platforms, but I think that is dangerous and a dangerous way to
    put stress on the force that we have.
        So, how are we planning to deal with that dilemma and are
    we expecting operational demands to fall, you know, how
    realistic is that?
        Secretary Austin. Well, thanks, Senator.
        First, let me just highlight that there--affirm that there
    will be an unclassified version of the strategy that comes out
    a bit later.
        Again, in terms of a divestment and investment, we are
    investing in those capabilities that will enable us to be
    decisive in the future fight. Those capabilities that are not
    survivable in that fight, I think that we have divest of them,
    and also, because they are very expensive to maintain.
        We can use those resources to invest in future
    capabilities, the kind that we need to the next fight, and so,
    that is our strategy. Again, as you match the budget to the
    strategy, I think you will find a direct match there.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. I hope you remember it has to
    be matched to the will of the American people, as well.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
        Senator Blumenthal, please?
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for your service. I will say on my own
    behalf, that we are very, very fortunate at this very dangerous
    time in our Nation's history to have one of the most impressive
    defense and national security teams in recent history. So,
    thank you for your service to our Nation at this very perilous
    time.
        You know, I have visited Ukraine, as well as more recently,
    Poland, the Ukrainian border with a number of my colleagues;
    Since 2014, I have very vocal, indeed, vehement, in support of
    more lethal arms delivered more quickly to Ukrainians while
    they have lost 14,000 of their men and women in this fight for
    close to a decade against the Russians.
        Now I must say that I continue to feel that we need to do
    more and do it more quickly in providing lethal arms to
    Ukraine, including fighter jets, air defense systems,
    ammunition, Javelin missiles, Stingers, and other systems that
    the Ukrainians can use.
        Now, I agree that it is going to be a long slog, Mr.
    Chairman. It is a protracted war going to the east, but we need
    to be there for the Ukrainians in the midst of this long slog.
        You have said that the outcome is an open question, but
    what troubles me is that saying it is an open question is a
    prediction. The objective is to enable the Ukrainians to win
    and it seems to me that often our strategy seems somewhat
    schizophrenic.
        We want the Ukrainians to defeat the Russians, but we are
    afraid that pushing Putin into a defeat may provoke escalation.
    It seems to me that we need to address those fears and
    realistically provide Ukrainians what they need to win.
        Let me ask you whether you feel, for example, that we can
    do more to train the Ukrainians in anticipation of that long
    slog to use more advanced weapon systems that we could provide.
    Number two, can we provide systems such as the A-10s that we
    are, in fact, diminishing in use in our own armed services? Can
    we provide more enabled assets to be more effective in the
    kinds of aerial defenses that will stop Putin's reign of
    terror?
        Can you give me an assurance that we will do whatever it
    takes to enable the Ukrainians to win, while avoiding the
    escalation into a nuclear confrontation?
        Secretary Austin. Well, thank you, sir.
        Well, first of all, I have to tell you that providing the
    Ukrainians what they need is at the top of my list of things to
    focus on every day, and this is a thing that the Chairman and I
    talk about with our subordinate commanders every day. We are
    personally involved in engaging countries in the region and
    around the world, quite frankly, in trying to make sure that we
    not only provide what we can, but that we are getting some
    assistance from other countries.
        There are some 30 nations that are providing assistance, in
    addition to us, and that is the part that you don't see on a
    daily basis, because we don't talk about it very often. Many of
    these systems are systems that the Ukrainians are used to
    using. They have been very effective, thus far, and we will
    continue that work.
        Can we provide them training?
        Our focus right now is to provide training, where
    necessary, on those systems that we are providing them, you
    know, that we can get that training done in short order.
        They are in a knife fight and so, you know, taxes large
    numbers of people out for long periods of time is not helpful
    to them.
        On the A-10, I will invite the Chairman to comment on this,
    but, again, this is a high-threat, air defense environment and
    the A-10, we have to do the analysis to ensure that if you did
    that, it could survive and I question whether or not it would
    survive in the current environment.
        Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you this, Mr. Secretary,
    shouldn't we be using, now, the Defense Production Act to
    produce more of the Javelins, the Stingers, all of the stocks
    that we are using and diminishing and running low on and our
    allies, as well, shouldn't we be applying the Defense
    Production Act?
        Secretary Austin. We are pushing hard and engaging industry
    to make sure that we move the production of these items as
    quickly as we can, and that is not an easy task with at least
    one of the items there. But we will move this, continue to move
    this in terms of additional production as fast and efficiently
    as we can.
        Senator Blumenthal. Are you alarmed that the Russians are
    not returning your call, that they are not communicating with
    you? Shouldn't we be alarmed?
        Secretary Austin. Disappointed, for sure. But, you know,
    again, based upon what they have done, nothing surprises me,
    but it doesn't mean that we will stop reaching out to engage
    them. I think we have to have the ability to talk to the
    leadership.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Cotton, please?
        Senator Cotton. Secretary Austin, why will you not say the
    words ``win'' and ``victory'' when it comes to Ukraine?
        Senator Blumenthal just gave an impassioned speech about
    this. It is clear that it is what both parties want.
        I reviewed your written testimony. You talk about
    deterrence 29 times. You never once used the word ``win'' or
    ``victory'' in reference to Ukraine, nor does the Secretary of
    State, the National Security Advisor, the vice president, or
    the President.
        Have the words ``win'' and ``victory'' been purged from the
    administration's vocabulary when it comes to Ukraine?
        Secretary Austin. The word ``win'' has certainly not been
    purged from our vocabulary.
        Senator Cotton. Do you want Ukraine to win or do you want
    this war merely to end?
        Secretary Austin. I think the Chairman pointed out very
    accurately what our desired end state would be: Ukraine
    maintains its sovereignty and its ability to protect its
    country, defend itself; it maintains its government.
        Russia is weakened militarily and Russia, from a
    geopolitical standpoint, has, you know, is a pariah and, you
    know, countries will not volunteer to align itself with Russia.
    Some of that will happen, but we can see those kinds of things
    beginning to happen.
        Senator Cotton. I thought, I mean, I thought the Chairman's
    response to Senator Gillibrand was pretty good on this point
    about what Ukraine winning looked like: a free and independent
    Ukraine with sovereignty and control over its own territory.
        Does that include the territory that Russia or Russian
    proxies controlling the Donbas, as of February 24, the day
    before the invasion?
        Secretary Austin. I think it is appropriate to let
    President Zelenskyy and the Government of Ukraine define what
    that is going forward, sir.
        Senator Cotton. Are you or anyone else in the
    administration discouraging President Zelenskyy or your
    counterparts from launching attacks that would involve taking
    back any part of the Donbas or the Crimea?
        Secretary Austin. No.
        Senator Cotton. Are you providing them intelligence to
    conduct such attacks?
        Secretary Austin. We are providing them intelligence to
    conduct operations in the Donbas; that is correct.
        Senator Cotton. In the Donbas, on the territory that Russia
    or its proxies controlled before the invasion?
        Secretary Austin. Yes. We are going to make----
        Senator Cotton. Offensive operations to reclaim their own
    territory, are you providing that intelligence to them?
        Secretary Austin. We want to make sure that is clear to our
    force, and so updated guidance that goes out today, we will
    make sure that that is clear.
        Senator Cotton. Updated guidance. So, that means that the
    current guidance has said, don't provide that information?
        Secretary Austin. Well, certainly, the current guidance was
    not clear in that regard, so we will make sure it is clear.
        Senator Cotton. I think this is part of what you heard from
    both parties in this Committee, is that as much as we have
    done, we are still engaged in too many half-measures. There is
    still too much hesitancy intended to miss in our posture
    towards this war.
        I just want to talk about our own posture. Admiral Richard
    testified to the Committee that he had advised that we should
    go forward with a normal routine, regularly scheduled test of
    our ICBMs. That test was postponed and now it has been
    canceled.
        Why did you cancel that test, Mr. Secretary?
        Secretary Austin. Well, we postponed it so that, you know,
    again, we are at a very tenuous point. We wanted to make sure
    that we were doing prudent things and managing escalation, and
    we reached a point where I made the decision that we had
    postponed it to the degree that it was best to go ahead and
    cancel it.
        I would tell you that I am confident in our ability to
    maintain our programs and to stay on track and to provide a
    credible deterrence and to protect our allies and partners.
        Senator Cotton. Well, this, see, I am confident, as well. I
    am confident because we do conduct these routine tests. We
    don't cancel them because Volodymyr Putin has decided to invade
    one of his neighbors.
        The fact that we postponed it and then we canceled it
    because it is escalatory, to me, just says to Volodymyr Putin,
    that we are nervous about what he is going to do, as opposed to
    trying to make him nervous about what Ukraine and America and
    NATO is going to do next. This is a form of----
        Secretary Austin. If we were concerned about him being
    nervous----
        Senator Cotton. This is a form of self-deterrence. I mean,
    the Chairman has said this war could go on for years.
        If a missile test in March of 2022 is escalatory, is it
    going to be escalatory in 2023 and 2024 and 2025?
        Secretary Austin. It really depends on what is going on at
    that point in time.
        Senator Cotton. All right.
        Secretary Austin. If you will look at, I know it is not
    lost on you, Senator, that we have rapidly deployed forces to
    the eastern flank. We have pushed in a tremendous amount of
    security assistance to Ukraine, and none of those actions
    indicate that we are afraid of Mr. Putin.
        Senator Cotton. All right.
        One final question for the Mr. Chairman. General Milley, I
    constantly hear concerns about professional military education
    across the services, that it is not focused enough on rigorous,
    operationally focused education.
        There is too much things that are kind of beyond the core
    warfighters' domain like, you know, international studies, or
    development, economics. You put out a very strong memo on this
    in May of 2020. Unfortunately, I still hear that some of the
    schools are not implementing that fully.
        Could you talk to me a little bit about your concerns in
    that memo and what plans you have to make sure that that is
    driven down to the lowest level at our professional military
    education schools?
        General Milley. Yes, thanks, Senator.
        Look, the U.S. military has two tasks: prepare for war and
    fight and win wars. That is it, and the PME is designed to do
    that.
        We set out that guidance in 2020 to emphasize that,
    warfighting, operational skills, strategic thought, et cetera,
    and we do periodic reviews. I just got a report probably about
    a couple of weeks ago, actually.
        I said, how many contact hours do we do in the war colleges
    and staff colleges? It came out to, round figures, just under
    5,000.
        I did the math, my guys did the math, the analysis, and 80
    percent of that time was spent on warfighting, operational art,
    and strategy. The others are spent on things like congressional
    engagement, public affairs, administrative tests you have to do
    to run the military.
        So, it is focused, 80 percent of the time is focused on the
    warfighting skills necessary for command and leadership at the
    staff level at different organizations.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
        Senator Cotton. I would really like to take it to 100
    percent.
        General Milley. Sure.
        Senator Cotton. I bet the one thing you would like to
    strike is the congressional engagement?
        General Milley. No, it is an important----
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
        Senator Hirono, please?
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Austin, I want to commend you for reaching the
    decision that you did to de-fuel and permanently close the Red
    Hill storage facility on Oahu. Ensuring the health and safety
    of our citizens has been my number one priority, and this
    decision not only protects the island's drinking water, but
    will ultimately benefit operations in INDOPACOM as we look to
    expand our ability to operate in a distributed manner across
    the AOR.
        I also would like to particularly thank Deputy Secretary of
    Defense Katherine Hicks for her diligent work on this issue and
    her communicating with me personally. The closure of Red Hill
    is going to be a multi-year, multi-phase endeavor. There is a
    de-fueling process, itself; the closure of the facility; the
    cleanup of the site. The entire effort will require significant
    planning and resources for years to come.
        I ask you to work closely with the Hawaii Department of
    health and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as we go
    forward. The funding in the President's Budget shows DOD's
    commitment to the long-term closure and cleanup of Red Hill and
    demonstrates, very importantly to the people of Hawaii that the
    environmental remediation will not fall to the wayside.
        Secretary Austin, would you like to add any comment to
    this?
        Secretary Austin. Just a couple, Senator.
        First of all, I want to thank you, personally, for your
    leadership and that of your colleagues in doing the work that
    you did to help us work our way through this and we remain
    grateful to that. I would also highlight that the safety and
    security and the health of our troops, our families, the people
    in the community, it is absolutely important to the Department
    of Defense.
        You are correct, we have allocated funds that will help us
    begin to address the critical components here going forward.
    The de-fueling process, remediation, will be, no doubt, carry a
    significant expense, and I certainly hope that Congress will
    continue to support us, as you have done to this point. So,
    thank you.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you for your continued leadership.
        Secretary, it is my understanding that this year, the
    National Defense Strategy and the Missile Defense Review were
    developed simultaneously for the first time to ensure alignment
    of decision-making across these documents.
        In the NDS, one of your four stated priorities is defending
    the Homeland, which will make sense to ensure that missile
    defense is in line with that priority. Though the budget
    justification books are not out yet, one concern I have is for
    the defense of Hawaii for missile threats.
        To date, the Department has spent significant resources on
    HDH--HDR-H Hawaii, which I have supported, because we were told
    many times that this was required by the operational
    commanders. While we wait for greater detail on the
    Department's decision relating to the future of HDR-H Hawaii, I
    would like to understand the Department's position on defense
    of Hawaii and how, if HDR-H Hawaii is not funded, how the
    Department plans to upgrade radar discrimination capability for
    the defense of Hawaii.
        The question is, Secretary Austin, what is your plan for
    the future defense of Hawaii from missile threats?
        Secretary Austin. In terms of the defense of Hawaii right
    now, we are absolutely committed to defending this country.
    Hawaii is a key part of that defense and certainly is defended
    as we speak.
        Now, going forward, Senator, you will note that we are
    investing $24.7 billion in----
        Senator Hirono. Yes.
        Secretary Austin.--in missile defense and defeat, and so,
    you know, we are developing the next-generation interceptor
    and, you know, our goal is to stay two steps ahead of our
    adversaries' emerging technologies and Hawaii will absolutely
    be a key part of that.
        Senator Hirono. So, just to be clear, then, if we are not
    going to be continuing to fund HDR-H Hawaii, that you are
    developing, as you mentioned, the next-gen interceptors to make
    sure that Hawaii is defended against missile threats?
        Secretary Austin. Absolutely, Senator.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you.
        I just want to add my voice of concern regarding Senator
    Wicker's line of questioning, relating to amphibious ships and
    the fact that there will be only 3 of the 13 planned purchases
    of the San Antonio-class ships. So, I just want to add my
    concern that General Berger had asked for 31 ships and we are
    falling short of that, so I hope that you have said that you
    are continuing to work with General Berger, so I hope that we
    can come to a positive resolution of the need that he has for
    these ships.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
        Senator Rounds, please?
        Senator Rounds. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, let me begin by saying thank you to all of you
    for your service to our country.
        Secretary Austin, I appreciated the comments, the
    clarifications, and so forth that you shared with Senator
    Cotton. I think it is really important that the American people
    understand that we want the Ukrainians to win and that we will
    support them with the appropriate background intelligence
    information and weapons so that they can regain the territory
    that has been lost to Russia, and that includes the area in the
    Donbas. I think that is a very important, clarifying point, so
    I thank you for that, sir.
        I also, Mr. Secretary, and if this is an issue which you
    would prefer to have Mr. McCord address, that is fine with me,
    sir, but the industrial base that we have today in the United
    States is one that we, particularly, the Defense Industrial
    Base is one that sometimes comes under question with regard to
    our long-term capabilities and, yet, it is something that has
    been of concern to this Committee. I think that the Joint
    Chiefs have expressed their concern in the past about our
    ability to respond and to build the weapons and to maintain the
    weapon systems that we have.
        I want to point out one that we have in the past, and while
    it did not start on your watch, sir, I think it is critical
    that we fix it as soon as possible. What I would like to talk
    about is an example that I have talked about before. The
    ability of the Navy, and I am going to use the Navy, because we
    have used the Navy in the past, the ability of the Navy to
    manage scheduled maintenance for its vessels is beyond
    concerning.
        The USS Boise is a case in point, but far from being the
    only example. Now, the USS Boise is a Los Angeles-class nuclear
    attack sub. It was commissioned in November of 1992. The Boise
    has not been on patrol since 2015. It lost its dive
    certification in 2017.
        Now, we have had some of our folks, my MLA was onboard the
    Boise in September of 2019, as its crew executed pre-
    maintenance procedures. Here we are, 7-years-plus later since
    it was last on patrol and it is still awaiting its engineered
    overhaul and there is no funding to allow this to happen until
    at the earliest, fiscal year 2024, but probably fiscal year
    2025.
        Now, this is what is concerning. Multiple captains of the
    Boise have spent their entire command at sea tour while it has
    been stuck in limbo. American taxpayers continue to pay for a
    nuclear attack submarine that hasn't executed its mission in 7
    years.
        Now, myself and my colleagues have asked tough questions of
    Navy leaders for at least the last 5 years and yet nobody in
    the Navy has been able to solve the problem.
        Now, I am hearing that the Boise may be decommissioned
    without ever receiving an overhaul.
        I think this is simply not acceptable to have the taxpayer-
    funded, nuclear attack submarine with those capabilities out of
    service for more than 7 years and we can't seem to get to the
    bottom of what the problem is.
        Mr. Secretary, I am not sure if you are prepared to discuss
    this or if you would like to have Mr. McCord attempt it, but I
    would sure like to hear your thoughts.
        Secretary Austin. Well, thanks, sir.
        I would certainly invite Secretary McCord to make comments
    as well, but a couple of points that I would make up front is
    that, as you have heard me say, we continue to invest in our
    sub capability, especially the Columbia-class and that will
    continue going forward. We think it is critical.
        But the issue that you raise, I think, is an issue of
    capacity in our shipyards and so this budget invests $1.7
    billion in public shipyard capacity and the industrial base. I
    think it is critical and we will continue to do our part to
    make sure that we are helping industry have what it, are
    helping create the capacity to take care of our capabilities
    here.
        Senator Rounds. Mr. Secretary, thank you.
        Perhaps rather than spending the rest of my time on this
    particular one, could I ask, would you get back with us and
    let's find a solution to this problem.
        Secretary Austin. Sure. Absolutely.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        General Milley, I have just one question for you and that
    is, I know that you have been an Army officer and that you have
    commanded ground troops and you understand the need to have all
    possible systems available for their use.
        There was and there continues to be a question as to
    whether or not land mines should be a part of our systems of
    operations and, yet, sometimes I think people get a
    misunderstanding of the difference between anti-vehicle land
    mines and those which are anti-personnel land mines and they
    don't understand the differences on them.
        This is a needed capability for our Armed Forces, is to
    have the ability for these land mines to be able to be used in
    certain situations. You understand that.
        The Army has been developing land mine alternatives for
    over 12 years, yet the objective capability is not scheduled to
    be fielded until at least fiscal year 2030 or 2031. To me, the
    results are unacceptable to the mission and to the force.
        General Milley, could you, using your best professional
    military advice, share with this Committee, the need or without
    the need for the upgrade of land mines and its critical
    importance to our Armed Forces.
        General Milley. Thank you, Senator.
        I do think land mines are important, especially if you are
    in the defense, but also in any other capability in order to
    shape enemy operations. We need to look no further than what is
    happening, actually, in Ukraine. Land mines are being
    effectively used by the Ukrainian Forces to shape the avenues
    of approach by Russian armored forces, which puts them into
    engagement areas and makes them vulnerable to the anti-tank,
    the 60,000 anti-tank weapon systems that we are providing the
    Ukrainians. So, that is one of the reasons why you see column
    after column of Russian vehicles that are destroyed.
        So, anti-tank or anti-personnel mines are a very effective
    use in combat. There is a policy governing those for the United
    States for use and we are, the reason we are developing a newer
    one is so that they time out and they don't present harm after
    the conclusion of hostilities and they would self-detonate or
    self-, you know, destroy. They become inert at the end of
    hostilities. So, but land mines are a very effective use in
    combat.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        Thank you, Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Thank you very
    much.
        Senator Kaine, please?
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you to our witnesses for your service and for your
    effective work in recent months.
        So, as Russia moves the focus on their military operations
    to Donbas and the South, how would you, Secretary and Chairman,
    characterize North and West Ukraine, now, is it battlefield or
    non-battlefield?
        Secretary Austin. Well, I would still categorize it as part
    of the operating environment, the battlefield, the battle
    space. There is no telling what Mr. Putin will decide going
    forward. Certainly, we expect that he will continue to conduct
    strikes throughout that landscape and so, in my view, it is
    still part of the battlefield.
        Senator Kaine. General?
        General Milley. Yes, the same thing.
        I mean, the main effort, if you will, of the Russians is
    shifting to the South and the city of Donbas, as reported
    through the news. That really goes from Kherson all the way up
    through Kharkiv with the main effort in the vicinity of Izium.
        But the rest of Ukraine is still a battlefield, because
    there is air and missile strikes that still go on and, you
    know, Russian Special Operations Forces are still operating in
    some of those areas. So, it is clearly still a combat zone and
    the rest of Ukraine, as well.
        Senator Kaine. As the war ratchets up in the South and
    East, do you agree with me that it is likely that Ukrainians in
    that region, in some numbers, will try to flee the region,
    either to other parts of Ukraine or to other countries?
        General Milley. I think for civilians, the answer, you
    know, the human instinct to survive is very powerful, so as
    they recognize the danger they are in, I think there will be a
    high likelihood that additional refugees or internally
    displaced persons will leave. We already have got five million
    or so refugees and another five million, I think, of internally
    displaced. We are well over 10 million right now and I would
    imagine more will leave that area.
        Senator Kaine. As a general matter, I think Ukrainians
    would like to say in their own country.
        If we could shape it, wouldn't it be better for those
    fleeing the East to go elsewhere in Ukraine if they were safe,
    rather than to go into other nations, where they are a
    significant burden on other countries?
        General Milley. Sure.
        Senator Kaine. If President Zelenskyy were to appeal to the
    United States, NATO, the U.N., and say, the ratcheting up of
    the war in the East is going to create such a pressure for
    people to flee, these people want to stay in Ukraine, can you
    guys, our allies and NGOs flood humanitarian relief into
    Western Ukraine, shelter, medical capacity, food, so that
    displaced persons in large numbers, will be able to come to a
    place in Ukraine, rather than flee across the borders and if
    President Zelenskyy were to ask for the United States'
    assistance in doing that, should we seriously entertain that
    request?
        General Milley. I would say that is a policy question, but
    in terms of humanitarian aid, there is a lot of humanitarian
    aid moving into Ukraine in addition to the military. But the
    latter question, or the question, itself, I think is more
    appropriate as a policy question.
        Senator Kaine. Mr. Secretary?
        Secretary Austin. I agree with the Chairman, Senator. It is
    a question that our leadership will have to take on and be very
    deliberate about. One of the things that we would need to
    consider is what we need to do if we are going to put people in
    there to protect that area, and that is a decision that takes
    you to, you know, to fighting the Russians.
        That is a pretty significant decision, but I would
    emphasize what the Chairman has said, United States Agency for
    International Development (USAID) and others are flowing a lot
    of humanitarian assistance across the border now and the
    Europeans are pretty good at providing this kind of assistance.
        Senator Kaine. Right. Let me switch topics.
        Some of my colleagues have raised the concern about
    inflation and what that means with respect to the defense
    budget. There is other economic trends, other than inflation:
    historic job growth right now, historic growth in the GDP,
    historic growth in wages and salaries.
        This morning, new unemployment claims were announced and it
    is the lowest number since 1968. In January of 2021, we are
    seeing 965,000 new unemployment claims a week. It is 166,000
    now.
        Many of us met with Admiral Gilday and Secretary Del Toro
    this morning. We asked about, hey, that is fantastic, the
    strong job growth is great, but it also creates workforce
    challenges, both within the uniform service, but also in our
    industrial base.
        How are you tackling the workforce needs of our defense
    system today when the unemployment rate is dropping so quickly?
        Secretary Austin. Well, that certainly does, one of the
    things that creates headwinds for us going forward in terms of
    recruiting not only uniform personnel, but also getting the
    right kinds of talent that we need to fill our ranks here. We
    will continue to, you know, devote resources to making sure
    that we are doing the right things and marketing and
    advertising and outreach.
        But these are challenges that we faced before and we are
    just going to have to double-down and make sure that we are
    active in the right areas and we are committing the right
    resources to make sure that we get the quality people that we
    need to be successful.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
        Senator Ernst, please?
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Gentlemen, thank you so much for your continued service to
    our great country. We are appreciative.
        Secretary Austin, there has been a lot of discussion about
    Ukraine and Russia this morning. In your opening statement, you
    did say that United States security policy must reflect the
    will of the American people. The American people right now, we
    are calling on the administration to do more and to be tougher
    on Russia and bring more capability to bear for Ukraine.
        The Washington Post just this morning, in one of their
    polls, found that 56 percent of Americans think we haven't been
    tough enough on Russia. So, whatever the hesitancy to say when
    for Ukraine, victory for Ukraine, I will say it, and I know a
    number of my colleagues will say it. I feel very firmly about
    victory for Ukraine and maintaining its sovereign integrity as
    a nation. Their democratic form of governance, is it all very
    important to so many Americans, because so much Americans see
    themselves reflected in the Ukrainians. They are a first world
    country. They have come a long way over the last 30 years. So,
    success to me, is still a free and sovereign Ukraine.
        So, I do hope that we will continue to press very hard to
    make sure. As you say, things are speeding up, delivery of
    lethal aid, but we absolutely must ensure that we are doing
    everything we can for the country of Ukraine and the citizens
    that are there.
        So, I am going to turn, because we have focused lot offer
    Ukraine and Russia. General Milley, I just, I would like to
    jump to Central Command, if we can. I am concerned about the
    budgetary cuts and some of the flatlines that we are seeing
    across our CENTCOM operations budget.
        Many of the extremist organizations that are backed by the
    Iranian regime are striking across the region and there are
    four terrorist organizations that are now operating in
    Afghanistan and yet we don't have a United States footprint
    there to make sure that they aren't pushing threats against our
    Homeland.
        So, have your Gulf State military counterparts,
    particularly, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Abraham Accords-
    member countries, react to our reduced military budget, have
    you had any input from them?
        General Milley. Not about the budget per se, but there is
    concern because we have, the Department of Defense, we are
    doing a global posture review, as you know, and we are making
    adjustments to the footprint and then the Ukraine situation is
    a new development since we began that review quite some time
    ago. CENTCOM is part of that review, as well.
        So, there is concern in the CENTCOM area of operations
    about what the result will be in terms of the footprint in
    CENTCOM and we are continuing to work with our allies and
    partners to make sure that it is appropriate to the level of
    threat. We clearly recognize the terrorist threat both, the
    residual threat in Afghanistan, but also throughout the
    region----
        Senator Ernst. Uh-huh.
        General Milley.--and we think that we do have ``over the
    horizon'' capabilities, which we can discuss in classified
    session, but we do think we are effective in being able to
    find, fix, and when necessary, strike any potential threat to
    the Homeland.
        Senator Ernst. It has been reported that the Emirates won't
    accept the President's phone calls. Are you able to visit with
    your counterparts in the U.A.E.?
        General Milley. I have not had any issue contacting
    counterparts in the Middle East.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you for continuing the conversation
    with them. It is important that we maintain relationships
    through the Middle East, so I do appreciate that.
        With the administration continuing the negotiation of the
    Iranian nuclear deal and then pair that with the reduced
    footprint that we have in the Middle East, is that driving some
    of the Gulf States' neutrality when it comes to the Russian-
    Ukrainian conflict, your opinion?
        General Milley. I actually don't know. I would have to ask
    them point-blank. I haven't asked those questions point-blank
    to them. I think they probably, I don't know, I would be
    speculating, so I would have to get back to you on that.
        Senator Ernst. Oh, okay. No, I appreciate that.
        Then just very briefly, as well, we haven't talked about
    this today, but it is something that is on my mind, and that is
    recruiting for our military. We have found that Americans
    between the age of 17 to 24, only 29 percent of them would even
    be eligible to enlist.
        Just very briefly, thoughts on that?
        General Milley. That is, you are about right, 29 percent
    are eligible to meet the standards: medical, educational,
    discipline, legal, all that. Even less than that have a
    propensity, it is less than 5 percent that have a propensity to
    serve. We know that part of that is because of COVID. We know
    that propensity to serve goes up once you make contact.
        So, contact, personal contact with individuals out there in
    the recruiting regions, that is the key to propensity to serve.
    So, it is a tough recruiting environment right now, and as you
    know, I think the Army is a little bit behind. The Navy,
    Marines, and Air Force are all meeting their marks. We are only
    4 months into the year and that will get adjusted as high
    schools graduate in the summer. I think at the end of the year,
    the Army is projected to come in a point or two below the 100
    percent.
        The other services are going to be at 100 percent.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you.
        Thank you, Gentlemen.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
        Senator Warren, please?
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        So, in the new budget, the Pentagon is asking for a lot of
    money: $773 billion. But some lawmakers say this is too low and
    last week they proposed adding as much as ninety to $100
    billion more. The claim is that the extra money is needed
    because of inflation.
        Now, there is no question that inflation is raising costs
    across the country, but we have also seen big companies taking
    advantage of inflation to jack up prices and to pad their
    profit margins. That is a particular problem in industries with
    lots of consolidation.
        The defense industry, which had 51 major companies
    competing for defense contracts 30 years ago, today, has five.
    That is concentration.
        Price gouging by defense contractors has been a big problem
    for a long time. Inspector General reports have found that
    defense contractors charge DOD $71 for a pen that should have
    cost less than a nickel and $80 for a drainpipe segment that
    should have cost $1.41, and CEOs are already investing to their
    investors that profits will be even higher this year. That kind
    of profiteering wastes taxpayer dollars and it hurts military
    readiness.
        Secretary Austin, let me ask you, under our budget,
    obviously, you have to account, we have to account for cases
    where suppliers are increasing prices to cover higher costs
    elsewhere in the supply chain. We understand that. But these
    companies are doing very well for themselves.
        Should taxpayers be expected to subsidize higher profits
    for contractors that are using inflation as a cover to raise
    their prices above and beyond what is justified by an increase
    in expenses?
        Secretary Austin. The short answer, Senator, is no, and you
    have any commitment and the commitment of my entire team that
    we are going to do everything within our power to make sure
    that we are managing contracts and monitoring behavior so that
    we enable the people of the United States of America to get
    best value for its investments.
        Senator Warren. Good. I very much appreciate that,
    Secretary Austin.
        You know, one of the things that defense contractors love
    to do when they are flush with extra cash, courtesy of the
    taxpayers, is to goose their stock prices. The Pentagon's top
    contractors spent $15.5 billion on net buybacks last year,
    sending their stock prices zooming. That is the most of any
    year on record ever.
        But it is not just members of Congress who are using
    inflation as an excuse to ask for more money from the Pentagon.
    I was actually troubled to hear some Pentagon officials doing
    the same earlier this week.
        So, Secretary Austin, let me ask you directly: Are you
    comfortable with the figure in the President's proposed budget?
        Secretary Austin. I am comfortable, and here is why,
    Senator. I you may have heard me say earlier that we went
    through great pains to develop a National Defense Strategy and
    we knew that our budget would have to match that strategy. We
    went through great pains to make sure that was the case.
        This is a robust budget and I think it allows us to get the
    capabilities that we need to support our operational concepts.
        Senator Warren. Okay. You are good on this number, without
    adding another ninety or $100 billion to it?
        Secretary Austin. We certainly want to have the buying
    power to get the things that we need, but, yes, this is, this
    budget gives us what we need to get the operational
    capabilities.
        Senator Warren. I think that $773 billion for the Pentagon
    is already way too high, but the notion that we need to
    increase the total by another $100 billion or $400 billion
    every year just invites defense contractors to pick taxpayers'
    pockets.
        The American people are willing to pay to defend this
    country, but they are not going to sit still for being gouged
    by hugely profitable defense companies. I appreciate your help
    on this, Secretary Austin.
        I am almost out of time. But, Mr. McCord, I want to remind
    you that you owe this Committee a backlog of several years of
    reports on the European Deterrence Initiative.
        Do I have your word we are going to get that done soon?
        Secretary McCord. Yes, Senator. We will get those reports.
        Senator Warren. All right. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren.
        Senator Sullivan, please?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your hard work. I know you have
    been burning the midnight oil. This Committee certainly
    appreciates it.
        I want to agree with Senator Fischer on the NDS and getting
    that out. I actually read the classified version.
        I think there is not much in it that is classified,
    actually. I think you could get that out publicly pretty soon,
    you know, maybe remove a certain element to it, but I think
    that would be important.
        I was struck by pretty much everybody here, the Chairman,
    all of you gentlemen talking about how dire the global security
    challenges are, great power conflict increasing, more likely.
        General Milley, you said the greatest to global peace and
    security in your lifetime right now.
        So, clearly, national security threats have increased since
    the last time you were here a year ago, isn't that correct, Mr.
    Secretary? General Milley?
        Secretary Austin. Well, certainly, you know, we have been
    focused on our pacing challenge of China.
        Senator Sullivan. Yes.
        Secretary Austin. Russia is an acute threat and, right----
        Senator Sullivan. But I mean, I don't want to be rude, but
    since you testified last year, your testimony today, both of
    yours with last year's, the security threat has been
    significantly heightened and that is what you have both just
    said, correct?
        Secretary Austin. Tensions are certainly heightened, that's
    right.
        Senator Sullivan. General Milley?
        Well, you already said it, so----
        General Milley. That is correct.
        Senator Sullivan. So, here is the thing on that. I am
    actually stunned that the President put forward another budget
    that actually calls for real defense cuts. A 4 percent increase
    with 8 percent inflation is a 4 percent real inflation adjusted
    budget.
        I think it is irresponsible. I think it is dangerous. When
    you look at shrinking the Navy, shrinking the Air Force, there
    is no doubt in my mind that that gives our enemies comfort and
    I think that this budget doesn't align with your statements
    about the severity of the national security challenges we face
    right now.
        What is likely to happen, and it is sad, is that once
    again, we are going to have to push the President to increase
    the budget in a bipartisan way, the way we did it last year. It
    is sad.
        The Commander-in-Chief can't reject some of his far left
    members and say, we need a robust budget. We put forward a
    budget that cuts defense spending, so I am going to have
    problems with that.
        General Milley, I want to compliment you on your speech. I
    think it was in 2016, you gave a really prophetic, in my view,
    speech on Putin and the threat he brings forward, and you were
    all criticized for that speech, I remember, but I think if you
    re-read the speech, you were right on with what was happening.
        But you are seeing, here, I think there is a source of
    bipartisan frustration to what is happening. I know you have
    been working hard on Ukraine, but I think when the intel
    committees were briefing us prior to the invasion, they got it
    right and so did all of you, what was going to happen.
        Then there was this notion that, and we were all briefed on
    it, that they were going to lose, the Ukrainians, within 7 to
    10 days. That was the uniform briefing: they are going to get
    crushed.
        Okay. They got that wrong. A lot of people got that wrong.
        I think the shift that we need to do now is to Senator
    Blumenthal, Senator Cotton, Senator Ernst, to strategically
    think about victory. Again, General Milley, I know you are
    working this hard, but when you have to talk about key
    objectives, number one, don't engage Russia with a conflict,
    keep NATO cohesion, support the Ukrainian people as the key
    objectives, doesn't it make sense to have as our number one
    objective, imposing a strategic defeat on Putin that we have
    the opportunity to do right now in align with what you said.
        I think that is a source of frustration for a lot of
    senators. We are not hearing that language.
        General Milley. I mean, I think, well, I have heard that
    language many times, actually.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, I mean, you just listed the three
    objectives.
        General Milley. I did.
        Senator Sullivan. Those were the, to be honest, they were
    all defensive-sounding.
        General Milley. Yes.
        Senator Sullivan. Here is what we won't do. Here is what we
    won't do.
        General Milley. Right.
        Senator Sullivan. Here is what we will do.
        But what about, we are at a big moment. This is bigger than
    Ukraine. What about----
        General Milley. If I may?
        Senator Sullivan. Yes, sir, go ahead.
        General Milley. At the national level, the President has
    said to us, at large, the national security team, to impose
    severe costs and do not let Putin win to ensure that Ukraine--
    --
        Senator Sullivan. I would respectfully recommend you put
    that as your number one objective. You didn't even mention that
    in your three objectives.
        General Milley. Right. But those severe costs are being
    done by other elements, not the U.S. uniform military. That is
    why, the United States uniform military has a different task
    here, which is to ensure, deter our NATO allies to prevent war
    expanding and escalating, to ensure that Ukraine gets the means
    that are necessary in order to defend itself so it can remain
    free and sovereign, and then also to continue to maintain the
    cohesion of NATO. Those are the uniform military tasks. We are
    not talking about a broad, but just the uniform military tasks.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me--I have one question, Mr.
    Chairman, and it will be quick, just one final one.
        There are press reports that the JCPOA consideration, one
    of the big redline debates right now is for us to agree, us,
    the United States, the to delist the RGC as an organization
    that sponsors terrorism. The Iranians want it.
        You gentlemen, unfortunately, have led troops, some of our
    finest, over 2,000 wounded and killed by the Quds Force Islamic
    Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) with the weapons they supplied
    to Iraqi militias. I am sure hundreds under your command were
    killed or wounded. The IRGC has recently been responsible for
    missile attacks in coordination with the Houthis against U.A.E.
    civilians, our longstanding ally in the region, U.A.E.
        Is there any universe in which the two of you could say you
    support the delisting of this terrorist organization with blood
    of American soldiers on its hands, recently, and delist them as
    state sponsor of terrorism because Iran wants it?
        We should tell Iran to go pound sand. There is no way in
    hell that they shouldn't be delisted. What do you two in your
    personal opinion, given how much experience you have with Iran
    in the Middle East, believe on that question?
        Secretary Austin. Senator, respectfully, I won't comment on
    negotiations that are ongoing and speculate on what my advice
    to the President is going to be. So, I will----
        Senator Sullivan. In your personal opinion, we have asked
    you before that you can give us that, even though it might
    conflict with the administration's view. That is what you
    committed to do with this Committee, so I would ask you, again,
    both of you, your personal opinion.
        Secretary Austin. My answer remains unchanged, Senator.
    Thank you.
        Senator Sullivan. General Milley, you have been asked in
    your personal opinion.
        General Milley. Yes, Senator, just for clarity, political
    appointees are different than me. I have to sign a document
    that requires me to give you----
        Senator Sullivan. You are right, and I am sorry, Mr.
    Secretary, I didn't mean you. I meant General Milley.
        General Milley. So, in my personal opinion, I believe the
    IRGC Quds Force to be a terrorist organization and I do not
    support them being delisted from the foreign terrorist
    organization.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you for your honesty.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Thank you very
    much.
        Senator King, please?
        Senator King. Thank you.
        A series of fairly detailed questions. Mr. McCord, you
    haven't had much fun this morning, so I want to try to get you
    into this discussion.
        The Ukrainian aid that we have supplied thus far and we are
    planning to supply and will undoubtedly supply more in the
    future, where does that fit into the defense budget? We don't
    have OCO anymore. Is this coming out of the current defense
    budget? Are they extra budgetary appropriations?
        Secretary McCord. Senator, the aid that the Secretary has
    been talked about this morning, the Javelins, the Stingers, the
    body armor, all those things have come out of the funding that
    was provided in the supplemental attach to the omnibus funding
    bill that was enacted----
        Senator King. So, it is not, and there will be a
    replenishment as well. We are going to have to replenish stocks
    that we are supplying and also replenishment to some of our
    NATO allies.
        Will that come out of the future defense budget? I am not--
    this is isn't an argumentative question, I am legitimately
    curious.
        Secretary McCord. No, you are correct, Senator.
        The funding to replenish, part of that supplemental $3 and
    a half billion of that supplemental was funds to replenish the
    drawdown materials provided to Ukraine. The first tranche of
    that was notified to the Committee, I believe, last Friday. A
    billion and a half of those funds will start flowing, but it is
    not part of the normal defense budget build to exercise
    drawdown authority at this level.
        So, if we are going to continue, that might be something we
    need to look at going forward.
        Senator King. Two other questions. I think you testified
    you wrestled with inflation as you were preparing the budget. I
    think you said that the general CPI rate of inflation doesn't
    necessarily apply to the things that you buy; is that correct?
    So, it is not accurate to say if we have 7 percent inflation,
    the military, and the military budget doesn't have 7 percent
    increase, then it is a cut.
        Please explain the inflation as it applies to the military
    budget.
        Secretary McCord. That is correct. About 60 to 65 percent
    of our budget is buying goods and services from our industrial
    base and about 25, 30 percent goes to military pay, and then we
    have a couple other if factors like fuel.
        We have different inflation rates that are applied to each
    of them, but by and large, a GDP deflator is the most accurate
    description of what we buy. That went up 4 percent last year,
    not 7 percent. That is the point that I was making.
        Senator King. A quick other question for you.
        How are we doing on the audit? That has been something that
    has been going on as long as I have been on this Committee. Are
    we making progress to getting toward a clean audit?
        Secretary McCord. Senator, we are making progress, but the
    progress is not where it needs to be. The Secretary has been
    clear with me on that. The progress we made last year was not
    where it needed to be and there was a couple of reasons for
    that, from the gaps in a transition year to COVID.
        We have been making some progress that is a bit below the
    radar screen. It has not yet translated to the pass-fail grades
    that are the heart of an audit. We do need to redouble our
    efforts and Secretary----
        Senator King. Well, I would appreciate it.
        The prior administration made some progress on that and I
    hope that that momentum won't be lost. This is a responsibility
    that we have to the American people.
        Secretary Austin, there are several wars going on right
    now. One is in Ukraine, but one of them is also within the
    United States where about, I think 100,000 people died of
    overdose deaths last year. That is an attack on our country.
        My concern is, when we had SOUTHCOM in here, they don't
    have, they have 1 percent of the intelligence, surveillance,
    and reconnaissance (ISR) resources worldwide and they don't
    have adequate resources to interdict those shipments by sea
    that we know about through our limited ISR.
        I would hope that you would pay some attention to that, to
    add to your attention to that, and also to think about setting
    this up in some way that there is somebody in charge.
        My worry is you have got Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), you
    have got the Coast Guard, you have partners, you have the CIA,
    and you have the Defense Department and nobody is in charge,
    and the result is two people a day in my state are dying. I
    understand we have to work on the demand side, but it is very
    frustrating when I have testimony year after year that we are
    only interdicting 25 percent of the shipments that we know
    about. That is inexcusable.
        Mr. Secretary, I hope you will recommit to this war.
        Secretary Austin. Two things, Senator. We will certainly
    make sure that SOUTHCOM Commander has what she needs to be
    effective in these efforts and, you know, I have discussed this
    with her before, but clearly, you know, the limiting factor is
    ISR. We will work with her to make sure that, where possible,
    we get her more capability.
        Senator King. Well, let's put it in the budget and buy
    more. I mean, ISR in a function of how many devices you have
    and it seems to me that is an engineering problem and we should
    be able to solve that.
        I am out of time, but Mr. Secretary, I want to commend you
    on the significant both in the R&D budget. I think that is an
    enormously important area and, frankly, it is an area where we
    have fallen behind. Hypersonics and directed energy are two
    areas that are strategic game changers that, frankly, I think
    our country is behind, and so the additional resources into R&D
    is absolutely critical. Wars often turn on the utilization of
    new technology. The English at the Battle of Agincourt with
    one-third of the French Army, won that battle because the
    radical utilization of the long bow. That changed warfare in
    1450 and it is technology that is going to win the next war.
        Again, I want to commend you for the commitment to R&D, and
    standfast on that. I don't think there is a more expenditure in
    the budget.
        Senator King. [Presiding.] Senator Cramer?
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Senator.
        Thank you both for being here and for your service.
        Mr. Secretary, last month, your deputy said that the
    Department, as directed by President Biden, aims to reach net-
    zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. Then, she said, she
    mentioned the danger posed by China, illegal Russian aggression
    in Europe, persistent threats from Iran, North Korea, and other
    state actors. You both, and others that work with and under
    you, consistently and appropriately referenced the importance
    of modernization, lethality, readiness, obviously.
        My question is, do you think China, Russia, Iran, and North
    Korea are going to be slowed in their military development by
    climate-change concerns?
        Secretary Austin. I don't believe so and I don't believe we
    will either, Senator.
        Senator Cramer. Do you know if they have plans to reach
    net-zero, any of them?
        Secretary Austin. Senator, I, again, I have asked you for
    $773 billion to support the capabilities that we think we need
    and I certainly appreciate what you have done for us in the
    past, but I think there is also things that we can and should
    be doing to address the climate issue, as well.
        It affects our installations. It causes problems that cause
    mass migration and other things in the areas that we operate in
    and our forces are committed to fighting wildfires and helping
    in the aftermath of severe storms on an increasing basis.
        So, I don't think this is a thing that we can discount and
    I think the Defense Department has to do its part.
        Senator Cramer. I appreciate that.
        FRankly, I hope that we can give you a lot more than you
    have asked for to actually do those things, Mr. Secretary. But
    as you are talking with me, I am imagining the calculation that
    would measure the negative impact of say, our failure to deter
    the Russian invasion of Ukraine; in other words, I appreciate
    that you have this concern, but I also hope we can keep the
    main thing the main thing, because just like more energy
    development in the United States and providing that energy to
    our allies actually brings down greenhouse gas emissions, I
    think deterring the same polluters that have benefited from a
    lower standard than ours would also do the same.
        We want to make sure that you have the resources to do
    exactly what you need to do to get--to accomplish all of those
    good goals.
        General Milley, maybe I can just ask you. I noticed you
    don't mention it much; in fact, you didn't at all. The
    Secretary mentioned climate change five times in his written
    opening comments. It is referenced in the National Defense
    Strategy, sort of highlighted. We will see if it is in the
    national military strategy when you provide that.
        But do you think climate change is a military objective
    that the Department should be focused on tackling?
        General Milley. It is a Departmental objective.
        For the military, though, for the uniform military, it is a
    condition under which we will operate and it is something that
    we will have to took into consideration in the conduct of our
    operations, for sure, because you know, if you look at Lake
    Chad as just one example, if you look at a picture in 1950 and
    look at Lake Chad and look at it today, well, the reason that
    there is a lot of instability in that particular region is
    because there is no water and there are a lot of resource
    struggles going on.
        So, climate change has an impact on military operations for
    sure, and it is going to be a predictor for where likely
    instability will occur in the future. So, it is a condition
    under which we operate, as opposed to something that we can
    fix.
        Senator Cramer. Mr. Secretary, I want to talk a little bit
    about the fear of escalation. That is, we hear that a lot. It
    seems that many times the fear of escalating the situation in
    Russia depends on us and a lot less on Volodymyr Putin, and I
    just think we have made too many, my personal view is we have
    made too many decisions based on how we think Volodymyr Putin
    would respond to this situation, things like limiting the kind
    of help we would provide Ukraine, how quickly we would provide
    that help, postponing and then canceling a Minuteman test that
    was scheduled, a Minuteman-III test and not facilitating the
    transfer of MiGs, just a few of the examples.
        Do you have any evidence that Volodymyr Putin is ever
    worried that his massacre of women and children civilians would
    escalatory?
        Secretary Austin. You know, I don't know what is in the
    mind of Volodymyr Putin and a lot of other people don't either,
    Senator.
        You use the word ``fear'' and Putin in the same sentence
    and I just want to point out that my job, one of my key
    responsibilities is to manage escalation and make sure that we
    don't find ourselves in a nuclear contest in that is avoidable.
        Again, there is nothing about Mr. Putin that we fear, and
    you see the kinds of things that we have done in rapidly
    deploying combat power to Europe and the eastern flank. What we
    have done, and continue to do, is provide assistance to
    Ukraine.
        You know, not a military issue, but the sanctions that we
    have imposed on Mr. Putin are going to have a significant
    impact on his economy for years to come.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. [Presiding.] Thank you, Senator Cramer.
        Senator Rosen, please?
        Senator Rosen. Oh, there it is. Thank you, Chairman Reed,
    Ranking Member Inhofe, and thank you all for your service and
    for being here. Again, we appreciate how accessible you are to
    this Committee and others.
        General Milley, last month, I traveled to Poland and
    Germany as part of a bipartisan codel led by Senator Ernst,
    several other members of this Committee on the codel. We had
    the privilege of meeting the United States forces, receiving
    briefings from commanders on the situation in Ukraine, seeing
    firsthand, the security assistance and training NATO is
    providing the Ukrainians.
        This trip: horrific. Horrific is too light of a word, I
    guess, to use, but the horrific images of the Russian war
    crimes we have seen since, it really underscores for me that we
    can and we must do more to support Ukraine, defeat Volodymyr
    Putin, and defeat what he is doing.
        So, President Zelenskyy continues to ask for greater
    American support to close the skies, allow Ukraine to defend
    itself. I do understand the arguments as to why the MiG-29,
    specifically, might not make sense for Ukrainians' defensive
    battle, but is there another aircraft they could fly that could
    be impactful, something else that could provide close support?
        I understand we are not in the classified setting. Are
    there other forms of lethal assistance you could talk about
    here that might help Ukrainians defend themselves against this
    brutality?
        General Milley. The most effective is that, which we have
    been providing, which is air defense systems. So, the Russian
    Air Force has not even today established air superiority, let
    alone, air supremacy, which is one of the reasons why they have
    having great difficulty on the ground. So, the air superiority
    mission has not been achieved.
        Why is that? It is because of the survival of the air
    defense systems, both, the--that we have been providing
    Stingers and the like from other NATO countries, plus the
    longer-range SAMs that have been provided and that they already
    had. So, that system has denied the airspace, effective use of
    the airspace to the Russian military.
        Now, that is not to say Russian air is not getting through.
    They are on occasion, but for the most part, they are not being
    very effective, the Russian Air Force, and that is the reason,
    is because of the air defense.
        So, the best method right now, and the Ukrainians, I have
    talked to my Ukrainian counterpart every couple of days, they
    are very, very thankful, extraordinarily thankful on the 60,000
    anti-tank weapons, which is the second system that is really
    effective and the 25,000 anti-aircraft weapons systems that
    have been sent by the United States and our allies and
    partners.
        So, those are the two weapon systems that have proven most
    effective and the one for the air, in particular, the best way
    to deny the Soviets--or the Soviets--the airspace is through
    the air defense systems and that is what they are using.
        Senator Rosen. Well, given the heavy losses that the
    Russian military has suffered in the Ukraine, we know they are
    repositioning. Like you said, we are doing a good job. We are
    getting them the lethal support that they need.
        How do you assess their ability as they are repositioning
    and trying to resupply their forces----
        General Milley. The Russian ability?
        Senator Rosen. The Russian ability in their attack on
    Eastern Ukraine as they begin to reposition themselves more
    down towards the Donbas.
        General Milley. The Russians have been struggling with
    their logistical resupplying: fuel, ammunition, food, also med
    evac, et cetera, they have been having a very, very difficult
    time. Part of that is because the lines of communications that
    they have, the ground lines of communications are at risk to
    dismounted and mounted Ukrainian Forces that are conducting
    ambushes along those lines of communications. So, they have
    really had a difficult time with logistics.
        Senator Rosen. Well, and so, on the other side of that, we
    know if they are repositioning, the Ukrainian military and
    ground forces there have to reposition as well. So, looking
    ahead, do you think the Ukrainians have the right equipment and
    logistics in place to defend against this repositioning that
    Russia is, seems to be doing?
        General Milley. They are asking for, and they could
    probably use additional armor and artillery, and we are looking
    around through allies and partners to get those types of weapon
    systems that require no training.
        Of course, we have armor artillery, but it is not the kind
    that they have used before and it would require months of
    training to get them into a U.S. system. So, we are looking
    around, along with other countries and NATO, to help them out
    in terms of building them up for armor and artillery.
        The fighting down in the Southeast, the terrain is
    different than it is in the north; it is much more open and
    lends itself to armor, mechanized offensive operations on both
    sides. So, those are the systems that they are looking for and
    that is what people are trying to help them out with.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you.
        I want to submit my next questions for the record, but they
    are really important. They will be for Secretary Austin and
    Under Secretary McCord. It is about housing for our junior
    enlisted troops. They are not able to receive their base
    allowance for housing, they are transitioning, the cost of
    housing is expensive, they are not getting reimbursed in the
    way they should be. We also have issues for those on Creech
    that have to travel a far way to go to Las Vegas and go to
    work, and so I am going to submit those for the record.
        I see my time is up and I will look forward to speaking
    with you about that.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
        Senator Tuberville, please?
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you very much.
        Thank you for being here today, Secretary.
        General Milley, good to see you last week. I thought that
    was a great change of command down in CENTCOM.
        Secretary Austin, as we all know in the near future, we are
    going to get the Inspector General (IG) report on Space Command
    hopefully moving to Huntsville. The Redstone Arsenal, we have
    got a lot of great comments from you and Acting Secretary of
    the Air Force, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall and, of
    course, General James Dickinson. All positive comments.
        The IG report will come out in the future.
        Any thoughts about the future?
        Secretary Austin. Well, thanks, Senator.
        As you know, I will never comment on an IG, on a subject
    that is under IG scrutiny. So, when that report comes out, we
    will make sure that we get, analyze it as quickly as possible
    and take on the recommendations.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you.
        General Milley, last year's NDAA 2022, we got a jump-start
    on the Aegis system in Guam. Hopefully, we can continue that in
    the next few years. It is going to take a while to get that
    done on a land base, which I think all of us agree we need.
    Then we have an Iron Dome there. You know, that is, to me,
    after visiting Guam a few months ago, that would be kind of
    like swatting flies.
        What do you think in the near future, we could do with that
    Iron Dome?
        General Milley. Well, the Iron Dome is a very effective
    system, but let me just take a step back for the ballistic
    missile defense in the Pacific region, and Senator Hirono had
    asked about that earlier.
        It is a layered system that starts, literally, over in
    Japan and comes through the entire Pacific and includes radars
    and various missile systems that are arrayed throughout to
    include Guam, Hawaii, Alaska, et cetera. Specifically, to the
    Iron Dome, is it a great system and it is a very accurate
    system and it has a very good track record, and there is all
    kinds of utility for it in a wide variety of environments. So,
    I am a big fan of the Iron Dome.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you.
        Secretary Austin, extremely concerned about the situation
    at the southwest border. According to the latest data, the
    Border Patrol has encountered more than 150,000 illegal
    immigrants a month for at least the past 12 months and it is
    estimated that at least 500 illegal immigrants that evaded the
    border just recently.
        I am especially concerned about the trafficking of drugs,
    fentanyl, and the new drug most people haven't heard of called
    another called ``ISO,'' which is 20 times more lethal than
    fentanyl coming across the border. The New York Post reported
    yesterday that you approved DHS' [Department of Homeland
    Security's] request for additional DOD at the border; is that
    accurate?
        Secretary Austin. DHS did submit a request for our support
    and as we have done in the past, we--I approved the request.
    We, again, DHS is a lead federal agency in this endeavor. We
    provide enabling support to DHS when and where we can and where
    legally possible.
        Senator Tuberville. Yes. It is obvious that we need help,
    especially if we do away with Title 42, which it looks like it
    is coming.
        Have you done any assessment of, or has the secretary given
    you any assessment of about how many we would need down there
    if we did do something in your purview?
        Secretary Austin. Secretary Mayorkas, obviously, Senator,
    will work up his requirements and his assessments and provide
    those to the President and, you know, he certainly has not
    provided that assessment to me.
        Senator Tuberville. Has he talked to you about it, you
    know, maybe in the future?
        Secretary Austin. Not about future requirements. He has
    only talked to me about current requirements.
        Senator Tuberville. Yes, okay.
        I want to pick up where Senator Ernst was at the end of her
    questioning, and anybody can answer this, but you know, we are
    going to spend all this money on all this great equipment and
    we are all good with that, but it takes people to do that, and
    you all know that.
        I would love to see a better recruiting effort of spending
    some money, because we are fighting big tech. We are fighting a
    lot of areas now. Being an all-volunteer army, I think we have
    got to put a larger foot forward in getting the best and the
    brightest young men and women in whatever part of our military,
    and I think it is going to be one of the most important things
    we do. We can't fight a war or have a deterrent unless people
    really understand we have got a fighting force that really is
    sold out on this country and wants to lay their life on the
    line.
        Just your thoughts, both of your all's thoughts on that
    real quick.
        Secretary Austin. I absolutely agree with you, sir. We need
    to continue to invest in the quality of our force. That is
    exactly what you have heard come from our Army leadership, the
    Secretary and the Chief, and it is what you will hear coming
    from all of our Secretaries. It is what--what we need, what has
    made us dominant and the best force in the world, and what we
    will need, going forward, to continue to be the best force in
    the world.
        General Milley. I just want to assure you and everyone that
    is listening, that we have tremendous standards and we have
    tremendous people in uniform today.
        As we go forward, we have to take into account the future
    operating environment, the change in the character of war.
        So, our recruiting does need to be adjusted. We need to up
    our game. We are going to have to look at, in some cases, look
    at different recruiting bases in order to get people for cyber
    and space and some of the other high-tech things, because we
    are moving into, literally, a different era in warfare and we
    are going to have to adjust our recruiting to match that
    future.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you for your service.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville.
        Senator Kelly, please?
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you to all of you for being here today.
        Secretary Austin, I want to discuss PFAS contamination near
    military facilities. This is a big challenge in Arizona. Both,
    the Phoenix and Tucson areas have growing PFAS plumes in the
    groundwater aquifers and as we face worsening drought
    conditions along the Colorado River, the groundwater, so
    groundwater will become a more important source of drinking
    water for our communities, including our military
    installations.
        The Department of Defense has remedial investigations into
    PFAS contamination in aquifers near both, Luke Air Force Base
    and Davis Monthan Air Force Base. While, I understand that
    these investigations can take time and rely on scarce
    resources, affected communities that can't move forward on
    permanent solutions with DOD until these investigations have
    concluded.
        With conditions on the Colorado River degrading rapidly, I
    mean, we are in a 1200-year drought, or the worst drought in
    1200 years and this one we are in has been going on for 20
    years; it is significant. I am worried that we may need to rely
    on these groundwater aquifer sources as sources of drinking
    water, instead of getting all of our drinking water off of the
    river.
        So, Mr. Secretary, as the Department makes determinations
    about which remedial investigations to prioritize, how is it
    accounting for the needs of communities in regions that have a
    prolonged drought and because of that, has a higher likelihood
    of a future need of using the groundwater?
        Secretary Austin. Thank you, Senator.
        I would just like to emphasize to you that the health and
    welfare of our troops, our families, and the people in the
    community are very, very important to me and I, and, certainly,
    we will continue to focus on getting these assessments done and
    work with the appropriate regulatory agencies to make sure that
    we are doing the right things and we will move out as quickly
    as possible.
        In terms of, you know, where we go, how we go forward, I
    think what you have raised is an important issue. If you are
    dependent upon that ground source of water, then that needs to
    go into the equation there in terms of what we address first
    and that--we are going to comply with the regulations, you
    know, work with the regulatory commissions, but certainly take
    into account the things that you just raised.
        Senator Kelly. Well, thank you.
        The fiscal year 2022 NDAA requires that DOD produce a
    schedule. So, it would be really appreciated if you could
    consider the drought situation as that schedule is being
    developed.
        Secretary Austin, I also have a question on TRICARE
    eligibility in our remaining time here. With a 4.6 percent
    increase in pay and increases in basic needs and DHS housing
    allowance that I pushed for, this budget goes a long way to
    addressing the needs of our servicemembers.
        This builds on the work that the Department and Congress
    did last year in addressing suicide and sexual assault in the
    military. I commend your attention on these issues, however, I
    want to address one other disparity in the military when it
    comes to pay and benefits and that relate to healthcare.
        I am concerned about the fact that military families don't
    have the same healthcare coverage that Americans enjoy, and
    what I am getting at is one specific thing. I introduced some
    bipartisan legislation on this to bring TRICARE plans in line
    with private insurance plans.
        My bill, the Healthcare Fairness for Military Families Act
    would allow the children of servicemembers to stay on their
    parents' insurance until they are 26. That exists in civilian
    life. It does not exist currently under TRICARE.
        So, Mr. Secretary, can I get your commitment that you will
    work with my office and this Committee on efforts to bring
    TRICARE in line with private insurance plans?
        Secretary Austin. Yes, Senator, you can.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you.
        I yield back the remainder of my time.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly.
        Senator Hawley, please?
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
        General Milley, let me start with you, if I could.
        Following Russia's first invasion of Ukraine back in 2014,
    Congress stood up the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative,
    which I hope has been of some help the Ukrainians in the lead-
    up to this most recent invasion. I want to ask you about that,
    what we can draw from that, with regard to Taiwan and over in
    PACOM.
        If Congress were to enact a similar funding mechanism for
    Taiwan, do you think that would help strengthen Taiwan's
    ability to defend itself against a potential invasion by China?
        General Milley. I do, yes.
        Senator Hawley. From a military perspective, is it fair to
    say that strengthening Taiwan's defenses would help bolster
    deterrence against China, number one, but also reduce the
    operational risk to American forces, who might be called upon
    to help Taiwan in the event of an invasion?
        General Milley. Absolutely, yes.
        Senator Hawley. This is, I agree with you and thank you for
    those comments, this is why I think it is important to take
    that action right now and not to wait and get behind the 8
    ball. I introduced the Arm Taiwan Act, which would establish
    the Taiwan Security Assistance Initiative, modeled on what we
    did in Ukraine those years ago and I think, I hope the
    Committee will take it up. I think it is an important
    initiative.
        Mr. Secretary, if I could switch to you, Secretary Austin.
    The Assistant Secretary for Defense Mara Karlin wrote, prior to
    her confirmation, I am going to quote her here so I get it
    right, that deterrence by denial should be prioritized when it
    comes to China and Taiwan, in particular, and she went on,
    deterrence by cost imposition can complement, but shouldn't
    supplant deterrence by denial when it comes to deterring China.
        Assistant Secretary of Defense Eli Ratner had said
    something similar. He told the Committee, with China as the
    pacing challenge, the Taiwan is the pacing scenario and that is
    driven by a strategy of denial.
        Okay. With that setup, here is my question to you. When it
    comes to the 2022 NDS and the NDS priorities, can you--and I am
    aware we are in an unclassified setting here--but could you,
    can you tell us that we will see in the unclassified summary of
    the NDS, a commitment to deterrence by denial, especially when
    it comes to China and Taiwan?
        Secretary Austin. Our defense strategy accounts for the
    things that you just highlighted, Senator, which is why both of
    my Assistant Secretaries have highlighted that.
        But, yes, that is in the strategy and we will make sure
    that the, you know, our unclassified version of the strategy
    appropriately reflects what is in the strategy.
        Senator Hawley. Good. So, just to make sure I understand,
    when you say it is in the strategy, you mean deterring----
        Secretary Austin. It is accounted for in the strategy.
        Senator Hawley.--deterring by denial, deterrence by denial,
    when it comes to China and Taiwan is in the strategy. Have I
    got that right?
        Secretary Austin. That is right.
        Then I can entertain your other questions in the classified
    setting.
        Senator Hawley. Great. Fair enough.
        But just to close the loop on this, you said we would see
    that reflected in the unclassified summary when that is made
    available?
        Secretary Austin. What I said was you will see the
    unclassified summary reflect what is in the classified summary.
        Senator Hawley. Okay.
        Secretary Austin. We need to be mindful of what is
    transportable, what we can move to the unclassified section.
        Senator Hawley. Okay. Good.
        Just staying on the same here, Assistant Secretary Ratner
    has also testified that Taiwan is the pacing scenario. I think
    you have testified to that effect, Mr. Secretary, I think. I
    know that General Milley has.
        Secretary Austin. I said that China was the pacing
    challenge.
        Senator Hawley. Okay. Great.
        I think General Milley had said that the Taiwan scenario,
    the fait accompli scenario was the pacing scenario. If I am
    wrong about that, General, I don't want to put words in your
    mouth, you correct me.
        I know that Dr. Ratner has, so let's stick on that.
        General Milley. I said that before.
        Senator Hawley. Go ahead, General.
        General Milley. I have said that before, and that is the
    scenario, that is one of the scenarios that we use for force
    development and so on and so forth----
        Senator Hawley. Thank you.
        General Milley.--but it is clearly the most important one.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you.
        So, here is my question, then, to you, Mr. Secretary. Will
    we see that, the Taiwan scenario, the danger of a fait
    accompli, will we see that in the unclassified summary of the
    2022 NDS?
        Secretary Austin. Again, I will just say that the
    unclassified summary will reflect what is in the National
    Defense Strategy. In terms of specific wording, I won't commit
    to a specific wording at this point.
        Senator Hawley. Could you, could I get you to commit to
    this, would you echo what General Milley just said and that I
    assume your Assistant Secretaries reflect your views, but----
        Secretary Austin. That is exactly right; they do.
        Senator Hawley. Okay. So, could you tell me in your own
    words, though, Mr. Secretary, I mean, is it--let me ask you
    this way. I don't want to put the words in your mouth, so let
    me ask you, is it your view that the Taiwan fait accompli
    scenario is the pacing scenario, just as China is the pacing
    threat; is that fair to say?
        Secretary Austin. It is a pacing scenario and I would say
    that our policy, our China policy has not changed.
        Senator Hawley. My time has expired. I will have a few more
    follow-up questions and hopefully also in the classified
    setting.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
        Senator Peters, please?
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, gentlemen,
    thank you for being here today.
        I understand that as part of the United States deterrence,
    the measures up to and after the invasion of Ukraine, there are
    now three United States armor brigades forward-deployed in
    Europe.
        That is the most since the early 2000s, when the United
    States made a strategic decision to permanently move its heavy
    armored forces out of Europe and bring them back to the United
    States.
        Recently, Army senior leaders have said that the strain on
    the Army's 11 active-duty armored brigades, ABCTs, is at a high
    point and noting that the rotational units basically need a 3:1
    rotation, a ratio to avoid excessive operational tempo and that
    11 active ABCTs falls short of a sustainable ratio.
        I also note that while Congress has consistently provided
    funding for at least one brigade of tanks each funding cycle,
    only three United States Army brigades have been fielded, the
    most modern Abrams tanks, including one brigade set in Army
    preposition stock in Germany, that is now being forward-
    deployed to Poland.
        So, my question for you, Secretary Austin, do you think
    that we need more armored forces now than we did last year, as
    this budget was being developed both, in terms of those armored
    brigades forward-deployed to Europe and those which we could
    rotate worldwide?
        Secretary Austin. Thank you, Senator.
        I truly believe that we have what we need currently. As we
    figure out the future footprint in NATO, especially on the
    eastern flank, if we have additional requirements, then,
    certainly, we will come back and ask for additional resources.
        I would remind you that we have over 100,000 troops in
    either stationed in Europe or deployed to Europe or operating
    in Europe's waters and so we have a robust capability there
    now. We were able to do what we did recently, as you heard me
    say, Senator, because of what you did earlier, to provide us
    with the resources and European Deterrence Initiative (EDI).
    You saw that armored brigade combat team deploy rapidly from
    Fort Stewart, fall in on pre-positioned equipment, and then
    rapidly move to Germany. Again, that was all possible because
    of EDI. We have been able to train heel-to-toe along the
    Eastern flank because of the resources that you provided us, as
    well.
        So, as we do our analysis going forward, if we need
    additional resources, I will work with the Secretary of the
    Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chairman, and come
    back and ask for more resources if we need them.
        Senator Peters. Great, thank you.
        General Milley, do you think the up tempo on the 11 ABCTs
    that we have will be sustainable over the long-term, given
    Russia's apparent expansionist goals in Europe?
        General Milley. Senator, I think that with 11, you know,
    the 3:1 ratio, you got three over there. 3:1 will get you nine,
    so you need armored brigades, plus we have one rotating back
    and forth to the fence line. So, I think it is about right, but
    I will go back to General McConville, the chief staff of the
    Army, to make sure that my analysis is correct and I will get
    you a better answer.
        If there is some sort of stress on the up tempo of the
    armored force, that hasn't been brought up to me yet, specific
    to this contingency.
        Now, long-haul, that depends on how long the long-haul is
    and that is not known right now. We are taking a look at that
    and we are going to adjust as we go here.
        Senator Peters. Right.
        General Milley. Thank you.
        Senator Peters. General Milley, the recently released
    National Defense Strategy describes China as, quote, our most
    consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge for
    the Department, end of quote. Certainly, the Department will
    have to bring the full might of our Joint Force to bear in
    order to compete with this challenge.
        Now INDOPACOM is a maritime domain, so certainly, the role
    of the Navy and the Marine Corps is very clear, as well as the
    Air Force and Space Force will also play a vital role.
        But I would like your thoughts as Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff and a decorated Army officer, I would like to
    hear your view as to the role of the Army in the Indo-Pacific.
        General Milley. The Army has a very important role in the
    Indo-Pacific, and, you know, just to go back to World War II,
    there was, I think, 15 or 20 divisions of the Army and Marines
    in the Indo-Pacific. Our largest land wars of the United States
    that we fought in the Indo-Pacific with Vietnam, Korea, and the
    World War II Pacific campaigns. So the ground forces have a
    very Gant role, but I would say that in any sort of future
    conflict, if there was one, hopefully, there will never be one
    with China, my estimate is that the maritime forces and the
    naval forces will be the predominate player but the military
    forces that are on the ground, Army special forces, Marine
    forces, and Army ground forces will be really significant,
    especially in areas like air defense, long-range fires,
    precision fires, and Special Operations.
        In addition to that, the amphibious forces of the Marines
    will be key. So, there is a very important, very significant
    role for ground forces in the Pacific, but the predominance
    will likely be maritime or Air Forces.
        Senator Peters. [Presiding.] Great. Thank you, General
    Milley.
        Senator Scott, you are recognized for your questions.
        Senator Scott. Thank you, Senator Peters.
        I thank each of you for being here. I thank you for your
    hard work. I know this is a very, this is a tough time to
    serve. I mean, this is probably, in my lifetime, this is
    probably one of the most difficult times to serve with all of
    our enemies.
        I share the concerns of the ranking member and many of my
    colleagues in the Senate that President Biden's budget request
    does not reflect our current defense needs. After many years of
    underspending, we recently began to grow the defense budget in
    line with the threats we face, particularly, Communist China.
        So, just last year, we had to increase the President's
    Budget by more than $25 billion and for months now, we have
    been urging the administration to increase our defense spending
    so we can meet our modernization needs, deter and, if needed,
    defeat our enemies and overcome the impact of the terrible
    inflation this administration has caused with reckless
    spending.
        So, we are living in some of the most difficult times since
    the Cold War with Communist China, Russia, Iran, North Korea,
    reflecting their muscles, increasing their hostility to us and
    our allies, but you wouldn't know it, based on this budget
    request. So, to me, it is disappointing that the President
    didn't request a budget that would do a better job of putting
    us in a position that we can deter our enemies and make sure we
    take care of our servicemembers and their needs.
        I was disappointed the administration wants to decommission
    24 ships and weaken our Navy's power and capabilities. I know
    the administration has said this is enough.
        General Milley, I think you have previously stated that if
    you combine Communist China and Russia, that they spend more
    than the United States does now. Beijing just announced a 7.1
    percent increase for 2022 and I think you just testified to the
    House that this budget assumes an inflation rate of 2.2
    percent, but we all know it is 8 percent-plus right now.
        All the manufacturers I talk to, you know, are saying it is
    actually more than that. So, while inflations could go up and
    go down, this, I don't think the budget is clearly enough and
    it doesn't seem to me that you think it is enough.
        So, tell me, how does this happen? I mean, you seem pretty
    persuasive. So, how does this happen that we end up with a
    budget that doesn't stay up with inflation and doesn't do a lot
    more to deter our enemies, especially Communist China?
        General Milley. Well, let me say a couple of things.
        First, on the inflation piece, I would ask that Mr. McCord
    talk about the details and how they did the calculations, et
    cetera. But I fully support this budget.
        Seven hundred and seventy-three billion dollars is a lot of
    money and it is our duty, those of us in uniform, to make every
    cent of those dollars count and to deliver for the nation, a
    force that is capable of defending it.
        I think, as I said in my opening statement, we can do that
    on 773. Having said that, there is always elements of risk and
    there is always elements to mitigate, but we have to focus on
    the future. This budget does that. We have to focus on
    modernization. This budget does that.
        We put more money in research and development intentionally
    in this budget than has ever been done in any defense budget
    and we have to focus on the pacing threat of China with the
    acute threat, as we call it, with Russia.
        It is very significant. There are areas of risk. We
    recognize those areas of risk. But I do think that this budget
    will allow us to move forward and take the next steps towards
    protecting the United States.
        Senator Scott. Could I ask each of you, what, how
    comfortable are you that this budget is going to do enough to
    deter Communist China and why do you think, what in the budget,
    and what are the things that we are doing that you think are
    going to be the key things that are going to deter Communist
    China from trying to expand, first, I guess, would be into
    Taiwan?
        Do you want to start, Secretary Austin?
        Secretary Austin. Thanks, Senator.
        I think when we look at the challenge of China, we consider
    China to be a now and forever problem, in terms of a challenge.
    We want to invest in those things that help keep us ready,
    capable, and dominant today, but also recognizing that the
    challenge of China will evolve over time, investing now in
    those capabilities that will be relevant down the road, as
    well. So, you have seen us invest in technology in this budget.
    You have seen us invest in space capabilities, cyberspace,
    undersea capabilities. All those things are focused on not only
    the China set, but also provides us great capability, with
    respect to the acute threat that we are experiencing right now
    and that is Russia.
        General Milley. Senator, I would just add, with respect to
    deterring China and Taiwan, I think Senator Hawley hit it right
    on the head. The best defense of Taiwan is done by the
    Taiwanese. We can certainly help them. This is being done in
    Ukraine, for example, and I think there are a lot of lessons
    that are coming out of the Ukraine that China is taking very,
    very seriously.
        Crossing the Taiwan straits and conducting an amphibious
    and/or air assault on the island of Taiwan and the city of
    Taipei with the millions upon millions of people there, the
    mountainous terrain of Taiwan. Taiwan is a defensible island,
    we just need to help the Taiwanese defend it a little bit
    better and we can do that.
        But that is the best deterrent, is to make sure that
    deterrent by denial, to make sure that the Chinese know that if
    they were to attack Taiwan, it is a very, very difficult
    objective to take.
        Senator Scott. Thank you to each of you.
        I know this is a very difficult time. I mean, in my
    lifetime, I don't think we have ever had a threat like we have
    now with what Putin is doing and what Xi says he is going do,
    so thank you for what you are doing.
        Senator Duckworth. [Presiding.] Thank you, Senator Scott,
    and the chairman is still voting, so I get to recognize myself.
    Serving is truly a selfless act and I want to thank each of our
    witnesses for your service and commitment to our national
    security. That service comes with honor and strength, as well
    as pride and humility. These attributes make our military the
    most capable, most combat-credible force in the world. You
    already know this.
        But to ensure that this continues long into the future, we
    must take care of the military's most important assets: our
    people. Each of you have spoken to this.
        As leaders, we must remove barriers our military members
    face in supporting their families as well. This is an important
    readiness issue. Knowing that their family is safe and healthy
    relieves a burden on servicemembers so that they can better
    focus on the mission and, if necessary, fight for the safety of
    others.
        That is why I hope the Department will work with me to
    finally solve a critical issue facing our men and women in
    uniform, along with their families, and that is food
    insecurity. Advocacy groups that serve military families report
    an increased demand for support during the pandemic.
        Secretary Austin, I appreciate your leadership in issuing
    guidance to the DOD late last year to begin addressing military
    hunger challenges; however, despite your leadership, there
    appears to be a hesitation to fully engage on this pressing,
    readiness issue Department-wide.
        We are still hearing heartbreaking stories of less-senior
    members of the military struggling to pay their bills, to put
    good, quality food on the table for their families. They are
    still met, you know, these stories are still met in some
    quarters with skepticism and denial that the problem even
    exists.
        I think that is why it is vital that the DOD fulfills its
    statutory mandate under the fiscal year 2020 NDAA and provide
    Congress with a comprehensive report examining food and
    securities challenges experienced by servicemembers and
    military families.
        Secretary Austin, will you commit to me that you will
    deliver the DOD study on food and security in the military by
    the end of this month, and if you can't do it by the end of
    this month, when can you deliver it?
        Secretary Austin. We will deliver it as quickly as we
    possibly can.
        Senator, let me thank you for your leadership in that area.
    You know, I have really set out to tackle the issue of economic
    insecurity across the board. That is why you see the pay raise,
    the elevation of Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH), and some
    other things.
        Certainly, I appreciate the support that you are giving us
    and I know you will continue to give us, but we will move out
    and get you the report as quickly as possible.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        I have no question of the commitment of each of the
    witnesses here today to making sure that we address this issue.
    That has not been the problem.
        The issue that I have is that there is still resistance
    across the Department, and Secretary Austin, in fact, when you
    first addressed this issue last November, you tasked the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to deliver a
    strategy and implementation roadmap to strengthen food security
    within the force.
        Would you commit to sharing that strategy and
    implementation roadmap with Congress once it is developed to
    help us better understand how DOD is addressed military hunger?
        Secretary Austin. I will, Senator. Thank you.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        Last year, I led the bipartisan effort to authorize a new
    basic needs allowance under fiscal year 2022 NDAA and I am
    encouraged that the services are planning to provide this new
    assistance in their annual budgets; however, questions still
    remain on how the Department will roll out this new allowance.
        For example, Secretary Austin, the final text includes a
    compromise that allows you to not count, so you have the
    discretion to not count BAH as income, when determining who is
    eligible to receive the basic needs allowance. Additionally,
    families are going to need to opt-in to this, so they must
    understand how to opt-in to the food allowance, which over the
    years, we have learned is often much easier said than done when
    it comes to program participation for anything you have to opt-
    in for.
        Secretary Austin, what is the status of developing an
    implementing the basic needs allowance and can you share
    actions that the Department intends to take to ensure that all
    servicemembers are made aware of this new support and
    encouraged to apply, if eligible?
        Secretary Austin. Yes. As you may know, we are still
    working our way through this, but I will tell you, Senator,
    that I am predisposed to making sure that we provide as many
    benefits to our troops and our family members as possible.
        As we work our way through this, we are going to make sure
    that it is streamlined so that it is easy for people to
    understand what they need to do to qualify and we are going to,
    again, I am predisposed to making sure that they get as much as
    they possibly can.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        Will you commit to using your discretion to not count BAH
    as income to the maximum extent possible?
        Secretary Austin. I will do everything I can that is
    legally possible and feasible to give our troops greater
    capability of greater resources.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, General.
        With that, yield back.
        Chairman Reed. [Presiding.] Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
        Senator Blackburn, please?
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Austin, why don't we make our intelligence
    reports public?
        Secretary Austin. We share as much as we can from our intel
    reports, but as you know, we have to be careful about
    protecting----
        Senator Blackburn. Yes, would you agree----
        Secretary Austin.--sources and methods----
        Senator Blackburn. Right.
        Secretary Austin.--so that we don't lose capability.
        Senator Blackburn. Would you agree that giving our
    adversaries access to our intel reports is a poor decision?
        Secretary Austin. Exactly. I think that is something that
    we need to absolutely work to avoid.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay, and so, then, why did senior Biden
    official hold nearly half a dozen meetings with top Chinese
    officials to give them information on Russian troop movements?
        Secretary Austin. I don't know of, I don't have insights on
    any occurrences like that.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. So, it seems the Chinese called up
    their comrades in Russia and sent Moscow the intel that binder
    staffers provided them, and it appears that United States
    officials knew Beijing gave the intel to Moscow.
        So, I would imagine you do not support giving Russia our
    intelligence?
        Secretary Austin. I am unfamiliar with the issue that you
    raise.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay.
        Secretary Austin. But you are right, I do not support
    giving our adversaries----
        Senator Blackburn. All right. General Milley, under what
    circumstances, if any, have you advised intelligence-sharing
    with Beijing?
        General Milley. Zero. Never.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you.
        Given what we know now about how that subsequently shared
    information, this intelligence went to Moscow, what would you
    advise for similar scenarios going forward?
        General Milley. I don't think you should give intelligence
    to your adversary, period.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. Thank you.
        What senior leader is ultimately responsible for this
    decision of intel-sharing; is it you? Is it Secretary Austin?
    Is it Jake Sullivan? Is it the President? Who is it?
        General Milley. My opinion is, well, I will give you a
    couple of answers to that. One is the Director of National
    Intelligence is responsible for all the intelligence agencies
    in the----
        Senator Blackburn. National Intelligence.
        General Milley. DNI.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay.
        General Milley. So, that is the person who is technically
    responsible, but, obviously, the President is responsible for
    everything the Government does, the Executive Branch does.
        Then each of us are responsible for within our areas of
    responsibility.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. So, under what authorities would
    we share our intelligence with Beijing?
        General Milley. I would ask that you ask these questions of
    the DNI; however, my knowledge of the system is that the
    President and/or the Director of National Intelligence or
    perhaps the director of the CIA or someone like that does have
    authorities, but I don't know what those are, specifically----
        Senator Blackburn. Okay.
        General Milley.--and it is not something I can answer with
    accuracy.
        Senator Blackburn. So, it is not a practice that you
    approve of, but we do know that it has happened, correct?
        General Milley. I don't know that it has happened. I am not
    aware of what you are talking about, actually.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. We have talked a good bit about
    Afghanistan today, so did Biden's precipitous withdrawal from
    Afghanistan, which really fed perceptions of America in
    retreat, did that play a role in shaping Putin's decision to
    invade Ukraine?
        General Milley. From the intelligence I have read, it is
    not clear. I think it certainly is possible, but I also know
    that Putin had aims on Ukraine long before the end of the war
    in Afghanistan, in fact----
        Senator Blackburn. I think we all know that.
        General Milley. Yes.
        Senator Blackburn. So, he saw his opening, right?
        General Milley. Well, the forces were building up.
        They began to build up their forces in September and
    October, so I think in order to do that, they would have had to
    have the plans and approval long before September, October.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. They have a habit of moving
    forward at the end of the Olympics.
        General Milley. Yes.
        Senator Blackburn. They did it 2008. They did it in 2014.
    We were watching and the White House chose not to move forward.
        I want to ask you, you have both failed, and this comes to
    each of you, to share with us the budget line items for
    diversity and inclusion initiatives and much less, any way that
    you would tie those initiatives to warfighting, but public
    reporting has given us some insight into what is being spent
    and how some of that money has been spent.
        Secretary Austin, earlier this year, there was a report
    that said the Department of Defense is studying the issue of
    allowing gender, non-binary people to serve in the military; is
    that true?
        Secretary Austin. I am supportive of allowing any person
    that is eligible and can meet the qualifications to serve their
    country.
        Senator Blackburn. Who is involved in this study? Are
    uniformed military personnel involved?
        Secretary Austin. I can't speak to, at this point, who was
    involved in any of the studies that we have ongoing, just off
    the top of my head. But I will certainly take the question for
    the record.
        Senator Blackburn. What will the living arrangements be
    made for non-binary servicemembers? Are you all going to come
    back to us and ask for an appropriation for housing?
        Secretary Austin. Senator, any study that we do, it will
    make, certainly be transparent and make it available to you.
        Senator Blackburn. What about gender-fluid individuals, how
    will you handle a servicemember who identifies as male on some
    days and female on other days, or polygender individuals?
        Secretary Austin. I don't care to speculate on, you know,
    what we are going to ask you for or what we are going to--how
    we are going to qualify people.
        Again, some of this is in litigation in various states and,
    you know, I think it is best to take your question for the
    record.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. I have some questions, Mr.
    Chairman, that I will submit for the record.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Blackburn. But Secretary Austin, I do have some
    questions on hypersonics.
        Chairman Reed. We will be going, immediately, Senator
    Blackburn into a classified session and those questions, I
    think, would be answered there.
        Gentlemen, let me thank you for your testimony. We will
    adjourn the open hearing and reconstitute the Committee in SV-
    217 at 12:30.
        At this point, I will adjourn the open session and join you
    at 2:30 at SV-217, SVC-217. Thank you.
        [Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                               indopacom posture
        1. Senator Hirono. Secretary Austin, General Milley, it is good to
    hear that the budget includes $6.1 billion in funding for INDOPACOM's
    priorities. While technological advances are important, we also need to
    ensure there is adequate funding to support a resilient and distributed
    force posture in the Indo-Pacific and improved training ranges. Admiral
    Aquilino identified these requirements in his recent 1242 Report to
    Congress. How does this budget prioritize funding for distributed force
    posture needs?
        Secretary Austin. A resilient and distributed posture and realistic
    high-end training in the Indo-Pacific region are essential to the
    Department as we address our number one pacing challenge, China. To
    that end and as highlighted in the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI)
    budget display, DOD's fiscal year 2023 President's Budget request
    includes $1.2 billion for infrastructure improvements to enhance
    responsiveness and resiliency of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific
    region. This funding advances critical initiatives in support of a
    distributed force posture in the Indo-Pacific region, including major
    military construction (MILCON) on Guam to realign Marines to the
    island, and major MILCON on Tinian, Commonwealth of the Northern
    Marianas Islands to support airfield facility development. In addition,
    these funds also support planning and design of additional facilities
    that will enable further distribution of DOD's force posture in
    locations that DOD deems politically and technically feasible. PDI also
    includes $2.3 billion for exercises, training, experimentation, and
    innovation, including funding for the Pacific Multi-Domain Training and
    Experimentation Capability (PMTEC), one of the top priorities
    identified in United States Indo-Pacific Command's (USINDOPACOM's) 1242
    report. PMTEC will enhance and network multiple training ranges across
    the Indo-Pacific region in order to provide realistic, peer environment
    training for United States forces.
        General Milley. The Presidential Budget 2023 request invests in key
    efforts toward modernizing and strengthening DOD's presence in the
    INDOPACOM region. Specifically, the DOD invests in improving logistics,
    maintenance, and pre-positioning; carrying out exercises, training, and
    experimentation; improving infrastructure; and building defense
    capabilities of allies and partners. Additionally, Presidential Budget
    2023 funds United States Indo-Pacific Command's (USINDOPACOM)
    priorities for Guam missile defense, the Pacific Multi-Domain Training
    and Experimentation Capability (PMTEC) network of training ranges for
    United States and ally/partner forces, and the Mission Partner
    Environment (MPE) framework for multinational information sharing.

        2. Senator Hirono. Secretary Austin, how are you working with the
    State Department to ensure that the United States has entered into the
    international agreements necessary to achieve the required force
    posture in the Pacific?
        Secretary Austin. We are working closely with the State Department
    to ensure we have the necessary international agreements in place to
    support our posture in the Indo-Pacific region. Specifically, we are
    working together to review relevant policy and political-military
    considerations, to assess the willingness of partners to conclude
    needed agreements, and to conduct negotiations. Efforts are ongoing to
    expand and modernize our access, information and intelligence sharing,
    and logistics agreements to support DOD activities in the Indo-Pacific
    region. Differences in our partners' strategic views and limitations in
    our partners' political willingness to enter into agreements remain key
    challenges. We are in continuous coordination with the State Department
    to overcome those challenges and progress the agreements required to
    support DOD posture in the Indo-Pacific region.

                             shipyard modernization
        3. Senator Hirono. Secretary Austin, while I've been supportive of
    the Navy's Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan (SIOP), I'm
    concerned about the timeline, cost overruns, and the capability, even
    with these upgrades, of maintaining a future larger fleet. If we let
    timelines on construction of drydocks slip, that will delay critical
    upgrades to infrastructure that supports the workforce. How does this
    year's budget invest in SIOP?
        Secretary Austin. We are making a once-in-a-generation investment
    in our shipyards through the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization
    Program (SIOP). The budget requests $1.7 billion in fiscal year 2023
    and $8.3 billion across the FYDP to ensure that we maintain a world
    class ship maintenance capability. This is an historic amount that will
    enable the Navy to continue to invest in three primary lines of effort:
    construct and recapitalize the Nation's dry docks; recapitalize and
    reconfigure infrastructure toward optimization; and modernize capital
    equipment.

        4. Senator Hirono. Secretary Austin, does this year's budget
    request for drydock construction projects reflect lessons learned from
    the significant cost overruns for the drydock at Portsmouth?
        Secretary Austin. We are always looking for ways to improve our
    processes and to ensure that we use taxpayer dollars responsibly and
    judiciously. With respect to drydock construction, the Navy is
    aggressively implementing lessons learned from recently awarded
    projects in the areas of acquisition, design, cost estimation, and
    organizational and process changes. The Navy looked at data related to
    ongoing projects and those in design and acquisition to better improve
    cost and schedule fidelity for drydock construction projects, which is
    reflected in the fiscal year 2023 budget.
                                 climate change
        5. Senator Hirono. Secretary Austin, General Milley, I am glad to
    see that the Department's proposed budget includes $3.1 billion to
    address the effects of climate change. Sea level rise, drought, and
    severe weather events are a few examples of negative effects climate
    change has on DOD installations and operations. It is critical that the
    effects of climate change be accounted for in future threat
    assessments, strategic documents, and training. How are you ensuring
    that climate change considerations are incorporated at all levels of
    decision making within the Joint Force?
        Secretary Austin. Every day, our forces contend with the grave and
    growing consequences of climate change, from hurricanes and wildfires
    that inflict costly harm on U.S. installations and constrain our
    ability to train and operate, to dangerous heat, drought, and floods
    that can trigger crises and instability around the world. You see DOD's
    focus on the effects of climate change reflected in our strategy and in
    our budget. For the first time, climate change considerations are
    integrated throughout the National Defense Strategy (NDS), which I
    submitted to Congress in March 2022. This strategy will drive mission
    prioritization and resourcing and ensure that climate considerations
    are incorporated at all levels of decisionmaking within the Joint Force
    and across the Department. The investments we propose to make in the
    fiscal year 2023 budget will enhance the resilience of our
    installations, make operational platforms more energy efficient, and
    bolster our science and technology programs. These efforts will all
    help make the vision articulated in the NDS and other strategic
    documents a reality. I'd also note that as part of a recent re-
    organization, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
    established a new office that will focus specifically on matters
    associated with Arctic security policy and global climate security and
    resilience issues. This new office will help ensure these critical
    issues are incorporated in the Department's strategic approach to
    navigating the rapidly evolving security environment.
        General Milley. The Joint Staff is actively including the security
    implications of climate change in our risk analyses, strategy
    development, and planning guidance. Through the Joint Staff Climate
    Change Action Group, we are also ensuring climate change considerations
    are included in our decisionmaking processes. In line with the
    Department of Defense Climate Adaptation Plan and recently published
    National Defense Strategy, we are analyzing the effects climate change
    has on the Joint Force through modeling, simulation, and wargaming.
    These analyses are then integrated in strategies and plans, and used to
    assess, understand, operate, and invest in climate-smart approaches for
    resiliency.

        6. Senator Hirono. Secretary Austin, Secretary McCord, how will the
    $617 million be used to maintain the readiness of the Joint Force to
    operate in a future shaped by climate change?
        Secretary Austin and Secretary McCord. The Department's $617
    million of new investments will strengthen the efficiency and
    resilience of installations ($263 million); enhance the development of
    demand reduction and energy storage technologies ($186 million);
    leverage DOD buying power to increase efficiency of operational
    platforms, pursue the electrification of non-tactical vehicles, and
    develop the workforce needed to improve installation energy efficiency
    and mission resilience ($153 million); and ensure that Department
    wargaming and analyses incorporate climate-related contingencies and
    variables ($15 million).
                          defense energy/fuel posture
        7. Senator Hirono. General Milley, I believe that renewable energy
    is not simply an environmental calculation, but it is becoming a
    tactical necessity for DOD. I have included provisions in past NDAA's
    to prioritize energy security and resilience at military installations.
    What advantage would decreased reliance on fossil fuels provide the
    Joint Force in the Indo-Pacific?
        General Milley. Effective, reliable, and often onsite alternate
    energy sources can enhance resilience to energy disruptions, reduce
    energy logistics requirements for deployed operating forces, and
    increase the agility of forces across the globe. In alignment with
    improvements to combat effectiveness and capability, the Department
    will continue to integrate renewable energy into our installation
    planning and capability development processes, and invest in
    innovations that enhance our ability to operate in contested
    environments.

        8. Senator Hirono. Secretary Austin and Secretary McCord, what
    types of green technologies is the Department prioritizing for future
    investments?
        Secretary Austin and Secretary McCord. The Department is pursuing a
    range of investments in energy-related technologies that improve unit
    readiness, deployment agility, and installation resilience while also
    reducing our impact on the environment. In many cases, what is good for
    the mission is also good for the environment--and vice versa. Reducing
    our energy usage and diversifying our energy sources can enhance
    operational effectiveness while also mitigating the drivers of climate
    change. For our installations, we are pursuing energy sources for on-
    base power generation, including advanced nuclear microreactors and
    renewable energy, and microgrids to give us more robust options in the
    event of grid supply disruptions. We are helping to accelerate grid
    transition to clean electricity to power our bases with more resilient
    and sustainable power. We are increasing our use of non-tactical zero-
    emission vehicles, with charging infrastructure, microgrids to provide
    transportation resilience in the event of energy disruptions. For our
    tactical forces, we are certifying up to four additional sustainable
    aviation fuel pathways to ensure we are ready to use any drop-in
    compatible, low carbon aviation fuels available on the market. We also
    are improving the efficiency of current combat vehicles, ships, and
    aircraft, and investing in electrification, new propulsion
    technologies, and innovative designs to reduce our energy demand and
    increase our capability in contested operating environments.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Angus King
                            ukraine lessons learned
        9. Senator King. Secretary Austin, General Milley, what are some of
    the preliminary lessons learned from the conflict in Ukraine on the
    future of warfare? Please be specific with the new perceived
    effectiveness of different weapon systems and changes to military
    doctrine regarding tactics and strategy.
        Secretary Austin. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine is already
    highlighting several potential lessons learned that could impact the
    future of warfare. First, our efforts, including those to reinforce
    NATO's Eastern Flank, have made NATO's conventional deterrent stronger
    now vis-`-vis Russia than at any time in recent decades. We must now
    capitalize on the opportunity by collaborating with our Allies to make
    smart investments, to include improved interoperability, precision
    strike, ISR capabilities, and electronic warfare systems. Second, our
    use of intelligence and information operations throughout the crisis
    has demonstrated the value of seizing early advantage in the
    information space. Third, our integrated response--alongside our Allies
    and partners--demonstrated the potency of non-military instruments of
    power and the ability to impose crippling costs on Russia, thereby
    strengthening the credibility of integrated deterrence. Russia will
    struggle to rebuild its military capability due to our sanctions and
    export controls targeting their defense sector. Finally, the conflict
    demonstrates the utility of collaborating with Allies and partners to
    adopt capabilities and approaches to improve their ability to deny the
    military objectives of aggressors and to improve resistance.
        General Milley. Preliminary lessons learned from the conflict in
    Ukraine include: the importance of working closely with our allies and
    partners to deter aggression, the need for rapid intelligence and
    information sharing, the value of timely and relevant security
    assistance, and the need to counter nuclear coercion via strategic
    deterrence. We operated bilaterally with several nations in Europe to
    directly support Ukraine, while also directly enhancing NATO's defense
    of its member nations. Our Intelligence Community was able to rapidly
    share critical information to alert our allies and partners to the
    threat and provide military information to assist Ukraine's defense of
    their homeland. We have, together with our partners, been successful
    supporting Ukraine logistically in a contested environment, by rapidly
    providing critical materials enabling the Ukrainians to get those
    weapons to the front lines for immediate use. Our pre-conflict Security
    Force Assistance training, through the Joint Multinational Training
    Group-Ukraine and the International Military Education and Training
    program, strengthened Ukraine's ability to withstand Russian assaults.
    We experienced an adversary attempting to use nuclear coercion, re-
    affirming the importance of both understanding the nuclear threat and
    our necessary responses. Additionally, it is imperative to achieve air
    superiority in order to conduct successful offensive combined arms
    maneuver. Conversely, it is key to deny air superiority if you are
    conducting a defensive operation. Last, having a decentralized mission
    command and control is critical to success in modern conflict. The
    Joint Staff is also conducting an in-stride review of lessons learned
    from the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Upon completion, the Joint Staff will
    begin a formal process to incorporate relevant lessons learned into
    future military doctrine, strategy, and tactics.

        10. Senator King. General Milley, based on observations in Ukraine
    and Afghanistan, what has the military learned regarding assessing an
    enemy's `will to fight'? How can this be applied to future situations
    of heightened tension and conflict?
        General Milley. The `will to fight' is a significant center of
    gravity. The Russian strategic messaging greatly enhanced the Ukrainian
    will to fight with the pronouncements by Putin and other war leaders
    that the invasion was an existential war to eliminate the Kyiv regime,
    military, and its supporters. Conversely, the Russians indicated the
    war was only existential to the Russian elite's grip on power, not
    their people. Russian forces are far less motivated to conduct high-
    risk offensive operations while Ukrainian forces view this war as
    legitimate and supported by the Ukrainian citizenry.
        Senior leadership is crucial, especially in times of heightened
    tension and conflict. President Zelensky's personal courage, combined
    with effective use of all forms of strategic communication and clear
    messaging contrasts clearly with President Ghani's fleeing of Kabul
    that contributed to the collapse of Afghan resolve. We need deeper
    analysis of all sides' motivations, morale, will to fight, leadership,
    and popular support in future situations.
                                   inflation
        11. Senator King. Secretary McCord, what metrics is the DOD using
    to measure inflationary costs to the DOD budget, and how does the
    President's budget off-set these costs?
        Secretary McCord. The DOD budget is developed using a wide array of
    inflationary measures, which are used to administer specific programs
    and assess inflationary impacts. In addition to the general purchases
    inflation rate applied to estimate inflation costs to most goods and
    services the Department purchases, which by law (2 U.S.C. 907) is based
    on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) chain-type price index, the
    Department uses specialized indices for certain items, such as the
    purchase of fuel and the various aspects of compensation to service
    members (e.g., housing market rental surveys for BAH, U.S. Department
    of Agriculture Food Cost Index for BAS, various medical inflation rates
    to project our health costs, etc.). As required by law, the annual pay
    raises for military basic pay and civilian salaries are based on
    Employment Cost Index (ECI), which is not strictly speaking a measure
    of inflation, but rather a reflection of changes in private sector wage
    growth so that our military and civilian pay rates remain competitive.
        Based on the available updates in these various inflationary
    measures between the submission of the fiscal year 2022 budget and the
    fiscal year 2023 President's budget, the Department, with the support
    of the President and the Office of Management and Budget, added
    approximately $20 billion per year to the Department's topline over the
    fiscal year 2023 to fiscal year 2027 period. Of that amount,
    approximately $14 billion per year reflects updated pricing for the
    purchase of goods and services, and the other $6 billion per year
    addresses higher pay and compensation costs.
                                     audit
        12. Senator King. Secretary McCord, when can the Committee expect a
    `clean' Pentagon Audit?
        Secretary McCord. DOD leadership remains committed to making steady
    and consistent progress toward achieving an unmodified, or ``clean,''
    audit opinion on our financial statements, but it will be a multi-year
    effort. The DOD uses a combination of tools to consolidate audit
    findings, establish milestones for corrective actions, monitor
    progress, and promote visibility and accountability. Each reporting
    entity under standalone audit with a disclaimer of opinion maintains an
    audit roadmap that details corrective action plan completion dates by
    fiscal year and financial statement line item or audit focus area. To
    hold leadership accountable, deviations from approved roadmaps require
    Deputy Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense
    (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer approval.
        During our fiscal year 2021 financial statement audits, components
    succeeded in downgrading five material weaknesses. We are expecting our
    fiscal year 2022 financial statement audits to demonstrate similar
    progress. However, there were 28 Department-wide material weaknesses
    from our consolidated audit last year. We will need to see significant
    progress from the DOD Components toward downgrading material weaknesses
    for their standalone audits before we can expect to achieve an opinion
    on our consolidated financial statements. This is a multi-year effort,
    but we expect to see consistent progress along the way and I will work
    with leadership across the Department to find opportunities to
    accelerate that progress.

        13. Senator King. Secretary McCord, what cost-saving measures can
    the DOD immediately put in place that would improve efficiency? If
    legislative changes are required, what are these?
        Secretary McCord. First and foremost, I would urge Congress to be
    mindful of the negative effects Continuing Resolutions (CR) have on our
    operations and ability to realize efficiencies. CR stopgap measures are
    wasteful to the taxpayer, reduce the Department's purchasing power, and
    reverse the gains our military has made in readiness and modernization.
    In order for us to plan for and execute the National Defense Strategy,
    DOD must have the ability to better align our funding toward
    prioritized accounts and programs. Under a CR, we are unable to begin
    new programs or projects, production rates for weapons, equipment and
    munitions cannot be increased, and a CR disrupts major exercises and
    training events. Time is money and year after year we continue to give
    away both in CRs.
        In terms of cost-saving measures, we believe that accelerating our
    digital efforts and automating wherever possible is of paramount
    importance to improving efficiency. In February, the Department stood
    up the Office of the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer
    which we expect to increase the speed of our development and use of
    artificial intelligence, data analytics, and machine learning which
    will translate into faster and better decisionmaking and sustain
    military advantages.
        We also expect our financial statement audits to also continue to
    pay dividends in optimizing our operating efficiency. The
    recommendations from our independent auditors have proven to be
    valuable in identifying opportunities for streamlining our business
    processes and strengthening controls over our information systems.
    Corrective action plans implemented thus far have resulted in cost
    savings and operating efficiencies that have more than offset our audit
    fees.
        Additionally, the Department of Defense has one mandatory spending
    proposal of note in this budget, which is to expand the accrual-based
    funding of healthcare for Medicare-eligible retirees (generally those
    age 65 or older) to include all military retirees. This expansion helps
    the Department on several fronts, including: protecting us from the
    risk of significant execution year reprogramming actions due to changes
    in health care costs, providing funds for the retiree population's
    mandatory health care costs during possible continuing resolutions and
    shutdowns, and last, from an audit perspective, implementing best
    practices by recognizing and funding liabilities when they occur--and
    addressing the roughly $260 billion unfunded liability for military
    retiree healthcare by transferring the liability from DOD to the
    general Treasury, while converting to accrual funding going forward.
    The Department has submitted a fiscal year 2023 legislative proposal
    with a fiscal year 2024 start date in support of this request.
        Last, I request Congress to work with the Department to eliminate
    or reduce obsolete reporting requirements that take valuable manpower
    and funding resources away from our National Defense Strategy
    priorities. I strongly believe that we can ensure strong congressional
    oversight while simultaneously reducing the administrative burden on
    the Department.
                            research and development
        14. Senator King. Secretary Austin, General Milley, what is the
    expected timeframe for the United States to match and surpass China and
    Russia's capabilities in hypersonic missile technology and directed
    energy weaponization?
        Secretary Austin. First, I would say that the Department requires
    the right mix of capabilities to match our warfighting concepts and our
    strategy. In some cases, that will involve hypersonic and directed
    energy capabilities. That is why you saw us include $7.2 billion to the
    fiscal year 2023 budget request for long-range fires, such as
    hypersonic and highly survivable sub-sonic weapons. You also saw us
    bring together a group of industry leaders early in this Administration
    to focus our efforts on hypersonic technology. We can and should move
    more rapidly on this front.
        Developing hypersonic technology directly contributes to the three
    pillars of the Department's 2022 NDS: Integrated Deterrence;
    Campaigning; and Building Enduring Advantages. The Department is making
    significant investments to facilitate rapid development and testing of
    hypersonic and related technologies, to enable affordable production at
    scale, and to accelerate the delivery of these capabilities, which are
    critical to strategic stability. In concert with select allies, DOD is
    pursuing multiple hypersonic-based capability solutions as additions to
    an existing suite of diverse warfighting capabilities. The development
    of hypersonic technology will deliver additional cutting-edge
    capabilities and strategic options to our Armed Forces, supplementing
    our existing unparalleled capabilities.
        We are on pace to deliver intermediate range hypersonic strike
    capability to the Army in fiscal year 2023, and the Navy in fiscal year
    2025 for surface ship launch and fiscal year 2028 for subsurface
    launch. We are developing medium range hypersonic strike capability for
    the Air Force that will be available in fiscal year 2023 and the Navy
    is developing medium range capability that will be available in fiscal
    year 2026. The fiscal year 2023 budget significantly accelerates the
    fielding of this initial set of prototype weapons system capabilities.
        United States development of Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) also
    supports our Integrated Deterrence approach and our warfighters'
    requirement to carryout Integrated Air and Missile Defense, offensive
    operations, and the need to operate in contested environments. The
    development of U.S. DEW technology is moving forward rapidly and now
    enabling multiple ongoing operational demonstrations. This includes
    laser and high-power microwave systems being operated across the world
    by the Services. Four Directed Energy Maneuver Short Range Air Defense
    prototypes will be delivered to an Air Defense Artillery unit by the
    end of fiscal year 2022. The fiscal year 2023 budget continues
    development, enables some key operational demonstrations especially in
    the area of missile defense, and allows the acceleration of DEW
    weaponization of some capabilities, Efforts in fiscal year 2023 and
    fiscal year 2024 include delivery of Indirect Fire Protection
    Capability High Energy Laser, High Powered Microwave, and High-Powered
    Microwave counter missile system prototypes.
        General Milley. Hypersonic weapons remain a top modernization
    priority as we seek to build a modernized joint force that will deter
    peer adversaries. The fiscal year 2023 budget request invests a total
    of $4.7 billion--a 30 percent increase from President's Budget 2022--to
    develop offensive hypersonic systems fielded on air, land, and sea
    platforms. We recently had a successful flight test of the DARPA
    Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC) program, and we remain
    on track to field offensive hypersonic capabilities by the early to
    mid-2020's. Specific details regarding the projection of future United
    States hypersonic capabilities relative to Russia and China are
    classified. Classified response is provided.
                             hypersonic investments
        15. Senator King. The DOD budget request and your posture
    statements highlight the significant funding for the Missile Defense
    Agency investments in kinetic `bullet on bullet' defenses and offensive
    hypersonic investments.
        Secretary Austin, General Milley, what are the investments by the
    Missile Defense Agency and each of the services for defending against
    hypersonics, including both kinetic and non-kinetic?
        Secretary Austin. The Missile Defense Agency is investing $465
    million in fiscal year 2023 and $1.8 billion over the FYDP to defend
    against the hypersonic threat. This includes development of a glide-
    phase interceptor and demonstration of two hypersonic and ballistic
    tracking space sensors in coordination with U.S. Space Force. The
    Department can provide additional information at a higher
    classification level and would be happy to provide a briefing at your
    convenience. The directed energy investments for countering hypersonic
    missiles are rapidly increasing starting in the fiscal year 2023
    budget.
        MDA is the Executive Agent within DOD for Hypersonics Defense.
    There are no significant separate Service investments to develop
    systems specifically driven by hypersonic defense requirements,
    although there are several terminal defense systems that will provide
    advanced air and missile defense capabilities that will include some
    limited capability against hypersonic threats.
        General Milley. The Department has and continues to invest funds
    toward developing Hypersonic Defenses across multiple programs and
    efforts within the Missile Defense Agency, Services and Defense
    Agencies. The Department [USSF/SDA] has allocated funding to develop
    spaced based sensors to detect and track hypersonic missile threats, as
    well as [USAF] improvements to terrestrial based radars. Additionally,
    the President's Budget request for fiscal year 2023 [MDA] continues to
    leverage and upgrade existing systems for future demonstrations
    designed to incorporate hypersonic glide vehicle defenses into the
    Missile Defense System architecture. Finally, the Department's ongoing
    efforts include [Department of Navy] research and development programs
    to improve hit-to-kill capabilities of current defensive systems
    against emerging hypersonic threats as well as developing new [DARPA]
    advanced technologies.

        16. Senator King. Secretary Austin, General Milley, what are the
    investments by the Missile Defense Agency and each of the Services in
    directed energy for fiscal year 2023 and across the Future Years
    Defense Plan?
        Secretary Austin. The directed energy budgets for the Missile
    Defense Agency (MDA), the Services, and the Office of the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (OUSD(R&E)) are shown
    in the chart below. The OUSD(R&E) budget funds key high energy laser
    technology necessary for missile defense. The total for fiscal year
    2023 is $1.079 billion and the total over the Future Year Defense
    Program is $3.411 billion.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Fiscal Year 2023-
                                       Fiscal Year 2023           27
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Air Force.......................                218               1,013
    Army............................                547               1,044
    Navy............................                129                 394
    MDA.............................                 15                  79
    OUSD (R&E)......................                170                 881
      Total.........................              1,079               3,411
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        General Milley. The directed energy budgets for MDA and the
    Services are shown in the chart below. The OUSD (R&E) RT budget is also
    shown because it funds key high energy laser technology necessary for
    missile defense. The total for fiscal year 2023 is $1,079 million and
    the total over the FYDP is $3,411 million.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Fiscal Year 2023-
                                       Fiscal Year 2023           27
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Air Force.......................                218               1,013
    Army............................                547               1,044
    Navy............................                129                 394
    MDA.............................                 15                  79
    OUSD (R&E)......................                170                 881
      Total.........................              1,079               3,411
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        17. Senator King. Secretary Austin, General Milley, what is the
    proportion of kinetic `bullet on bullet' defense systems versus non-
    kinetic (electronic warfare, directed energy) for fiscal year 2023 and
    across the Future Years Defense Plan?
        Secretary Austin. The Department spends 4 to 5 times as much on
    kinetic missile defense as it does on non-kinetic missile defense. The
    Missile Defense Agency (MDA) will spend $9.6 billion in fiscal year
    2023 and $52.8 billion over the FYDP for kinetic missile defense. MDA
    is investing $45 million in fiscal year 2023 and $245 million in the
    FYDP on research and development of non-kinetic defenses. The Services,
    MDA, and OUSD (R&E) will spend $1.079 billion in fiscal year 2023 and $
    3.411 billion over the FYDP on Directed Energy. Of this a substantial
    portion is for missile defense. The DOD is spending approximately $1.2
    billion on electronic warfare for missile defense in fiscal year 2023.
    The amount over the FYDP is approximately $6 billion. The Department
    can provide additional information on the Services non-kinetic
    investments at a higher classification level and would be happy to
    provide a briefing at your convenience.
        General Milley. The Department of Defense spends 4 to 5 times as
    much on kinetic missile defense as it does on non-kinetic missile
    defense. The Missile Defense Agency will spend $9.6 billion in fiscal
    year 2023 and $52.8 billion over the FYDP for kinetic missile defense.
    MDA is investing $45 million in fiscal year 2023 and $245 million in
    the FYDP on research and development of non-kinetic defenses. The
    Services, MDA, and OUSD (R&E) will spend $1,079 million in fiscal year
    2023 and $ 3,411 million over the FYDP on Directed Energy. Of this a
    substantial portion is for missile defense. The DOD is spending 8$1.2
    billion on electronic warfare for missile defense in fiscal year 2023.
    The amount over the FYDP is 8$6 billion.
                                     unclos
        18. Senator King. General Milley, do you support the ratification
    of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)?
        General Milley. Like my predecessors, I support ratification to the
    Law of the Sea Convention. The Convention reflects customary
    international law on which the United States has long relied for its
    freedoms of navigation and overflight around the world. These rights
    are vital to our national security, and joining the Convention is the
    best means of placing them on a secure footing and maximizing the
    ability of our armed forces to move through and over the world's
    oceans.
                               drug interdiction
        19. Senator King. Secretary Austin, what coordination is currently
    underway by the DOD with the ONDCP to stem the flow of illegal drugs
    into the United States?
        Secretary Austin. The Department is part of a broader interagency
    effort, along with international partners, pursuant to certain limited
    DOD authorities, to stem the flow of illegal drugs into the United
    States. DOD is a National Drug Control Program agency in accordance
    with certain specific DOD statutory authorities and participates in the
    development of the various strategies and other guidance documents
    issued by the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy
    (ONDCP). DOD is also a member of the Interdiction Committee, whose
    members meet to discuss and resolve issues regarding the coordination,
    oversight, and integration of U.S. Government drug-interdiction efforts
    and to advise the Director, ONDCP, on issues regarding drug-
    interdiction strategy and policies.

        20. Senator King. Secretary Austin, who is the lead person `in
    charge' of policy and operations for DOD?
        Secretary Austin. Ultimately, I am in charge of policy and
    operations for all of DOD. When we talk about the exercise of specific
    counter-drug policy and operations in the Department, the Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Counternarcotics and
    Stabilization Policy provides policy direction and program management
    for DOD's counterdrug and counter transnational organized crime
    efforts. The DASD is under the authority, direction, and control of the
    Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. Separately,
    the Combatant Commanders are responsible for counterdrug operations in
    their respective areas of responsibility, and the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Personnel and Readiness is responsible for DOD policy
    regarding drug testing, education, and treatment of DOD personnel.

        21. Senator King. Secretary Austin, what qualitative measures of
    effectiveness are used to determine the Department's contribution to
    counterdrug operations--success or otherwise.
        Secretary Austin. The Department is part of a broader interagency
    effort, along with international partners, to disrupt, degrade, and
    deter the flow of illicit drugs, precursor chemicals, and associated
    funds. Given the supporting role we play our measures of effectiveness
    are necessarily a part of our partners' respective measures of
    effectiveness. That is, our collective success is our main qualitative
    measure of effectiveness. With respect to specific efforts, we provide
    detection and monitoring and intelligence analysis support to
    counterdrug efforts. Our partners are responsible for interdictions,
    seizures, arrests, sanctions, and designations.

        22. Senator King. General Milley, what operations and exercises are
    planned this year in the Western Hemisphere to build partner capacity
    to help with the war on drugs?
        General Milley. The Joint Force has several planned exercises that
    focus on Counter Drug (CD) and Counter Transnational Criminal
    Organization (CTOC) operations in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility
    (AOR). USSOUTHCOM joint exercises TRADEWINDS and CENTAM GUARDIAN are
    multi-domain Field Training & Command Post Exercises that build
    capacity of participating nations and enhance skills related to CTOC
    operations. TRADEWINDS includes interagency participation from the
    United States Coast Guard, United States Drug Enforcement Agency, and
    the Federal Bureau of Investigations. Additional joint exercises in the
    USSOUTHCOM AOR build skills that are transferable to CTOC operations
    such as interoperability, domain awareness, and intelligence/
    information sharing.
        Joint Interagency Task Force--South (JIATFS) conducts ongoing air
    and maritime detection and monitoring operations to enable law
    enforcement interdiction and apprehension of illicit trafficking within
    the JIATFS Joint Operations Area. Additionally, in fiscal year 2023 the
    Joint Force plans to support steady State partner nation detection,
    monitoring, interdiction and apprehension operations with France and
    Netherlands in the Central and Eastern Caribbean Sea and focused
    operations with Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama.
                                china commission
        23. Senator King. I believe we must establish an unbiased and non-
    partisan commission to examine a grand strategy for our approach to
    China, similar in intent to President Eisenhower's Solarium Project. We
    need to think of a holistic approach to create a stable international
    order in which China (or Russia) cannot dictate regional developments.

        Secretary Austin, General Milley, in order to avoid the United
    States trying to ``spend our way out of conflict,'' how can we
    specifically counter China's major activities in your area of
    responsibility?
        Secretary Austin. You have heard me say many times that our number
    one pacing challenge remains China. We reiterated this point in our new
    National Defense Strategy. The Department is focused on getting the
    right mix of capabilities aligned to our warfighting concepts and our
    strategy and ultimately in response to the many national security
    challenges we face. I feel confident that our fiscal year 2023 budget
    request fully resources the NDS, including our primary focus on
    responding to challenges posed by the People's Republic of China (PRC).
    We are focused not only on maintaining our strategic edge, but on how
    we remain dominant on the battlefield--today, and in any future
    conflict. That is why we are focused on strengthening our approaches to
    integrated deterrence, campaigning, building enduring advantages, and
    working closely with our allies and partners to deter adversaries and,
    if deterrence fails, to prevail in conflict. That includes focusing our
    efforts on securing access, basing, and overflight in key parts of the
    Indo-Pacific region, and why we are pursuing a more distributed and
    forward posture there. We also have great capability and capacity in
    some of our closest Allies and partners in the region that we must
    continue to draw on now and in the future.
        General Milley. The Joint Force will continue to pursue an Indo-
    Pacific region that is free and open, connected, prosperous, secure,
    and resilient. To ensure this we are advancing integrated deterrence
    through active campaigning by:

          deepening cooperation and enhancing interoperability with
    allies and partners;

          maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait;

          innovating to operate in rapidly evolving threat
    environments, including space, cyberspace, and critical-and emerging-
    technology areas;

          strengthening extended deterrence;

          pursuing the complete denuclearization of the Korean
    Peninsula;

          delivering on AUKUS

          expanding United States Coast Guard presence and
    cooperation against other transnational threats;

          working with Congress to fund the Pacific Deterrence
    Initiative and the Maritime Security Initiative.

        24. Senator King. Secretary Austin, General Milley, what would be
    the greatest benefit this commission could deliver?
        Secretary Austin. The Department does not currently have a position
    on the creation of a commission to examine a grand strategy for our
    approach to China.
        General Milley. Develop a collective competitive framework that
    synchronizes DOD's actions with the interagency in a system that
    addresses the PRC objectives essential to the achieve our Nation's
    strategic objectives.

        25. Senator King. Secretary Austin, General Milley, what would put
    us in the best position to avoid the United States and China from
    escalating conflict and careening into a war with China?
        Secretary Austin. My primary focus with respect to the People's
    Republic of China (PRC) is to deter conflict and avoid war. It remains
    critical that we have good lines of communication with China's leaders
    at all levels to ensure that we do not unnecessarily escalate tensions
    or end up in a conflict. To that end, we are focused on implementation
    of the National Defense Strategy and its primary methods, especially
    integrated deterrence, and campaigning. By developing and combining our
    strengths to maximum effect while gaining advantages against the full
    range of China's coercive actions, we will ensure that we are in a
    position to deter the PRC from escalating potential crises into
    conflicts. We are also working to establish crisis communications
    mechanisms with the PRC, to prevent inadvertent escalation.
        General Milley. We must continue to reinforce to President Xi and
    other PRC leaders that the risks and costs of military action outweigh
    potential benefits, while also enhancing our crisis communications
    architecture with Beijing to prevent incidents from unintentionally
    escalating into conflict.

        26. Senator King. Secretary Austin, General Milley, what are the
    `toughest problems' OUTSIDE of military imbalances?
        Secretary Austin. Our global competitors have greater access to
    commercial state-of-the art technologies than ever before and can
    leverage these technologies to threaten United States national
    security. For example, the People's Republic of China's (PRC's)
    Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) Development Strategy is a nationwide
    endeavor that seeks to meld the PRC's economic and social development
    strategies with its security strategies, in support of the PRC's
    national rejuvenation goals. This is why it is so important that the
    United States continue to work to on-shore critical capabilities like
    microelectronics and why we must protect our own critical supply
    chains. In addition, the PRC is seeking to establish a more robust
    overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the People's
    Liberation Army (PLA) to project and sustain military power at greater
    distances. The Department is also focused on security access, basing,
    and overflight in the Indo-Pacific region to maintain our strategic
    edge and to counter Chinese aggression.
        General Milley. The Chinese economic ties with our country and
    every one of our allies and partners increases the PRC's leverage,
    decreases allies and partners will to resist PRC pressure, and
    increases vulnerability of domestic populations should national leaders
    take tougher stances against the PRC.
                                     arctic
        27. Senator King. I supported Sen Sullivan's Arctic Security
    Initiative amendment last year, and helped get it into law with the
    Chairman.
        Secretary Austin, General Milley, what specific resource shortfalls
    do our armed forces currently possess that would limit its ability to
    conduct exercises/operations in the High North? Please be specific to
    include operations and sustainment funding for exercises, equipment
    shortfalls such as weather gear for soldiers or unique platforms.
        Secretary Austin. I am confident that our Joint Force is resourced
    to complete our exercises and operations around the world, including in
    the High North. The United States is an Arctic nation, and the
    Department strongly supports efforts to ensure the protection of our
    interests in the Arctic region. As you know, we recently created a new
    Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Arctic and Global Resilience,
    and last year we announced the establishment of the Ted Stevens Center
    for Arctic Security Studies in Alaska. We will remain focused on the
    Arctic, and I will never hesitate to request more resources if we
    determine that we need them.
        The Department will also continue to work with Allies and partners,
    and as part of a whole-of-government approach, to closely monitor our
    competitors' activities in the Arctic and strengthen the rules-based
    order in the region. United States activities and posture in the Arctic
    must be calibrated to enable the Department to preserve its overall
    focus on the Indo-Pacific region, but the Department is making key
    investments in enhancing our domain awareness capabilities, including
    investments in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    capabilities; early warning; weather satellites; and communications, to
    achieve our homeland defense priorities. By improving our capabilities,
    deepening our partnership with Canada in the context of the North
    American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), and working with Allies and
    partners to increase shared air and maritime domain awareness, we are
    sending key strategic deterrent messages to our competitors.
        General Milley. Thank you for the support of this important
    initiative. The Joint Staff directs the global readiness levels that
    our forces must maintain. It is an issue for the entire Joint Force. As
    a Joint Force, we are not fully equipped to operate at the desired
    level in the High North. The Joint Force continues to expand and
    address the operational challenges that the High North presents through
    expansion of exposure through Joint, Interagency, and Multinational
    exercises.
                                  kc-46 basing
        28. Senator King. Maine is the proud home of the Air National
    Guard's 101st Refueling Wing, the ``MAINEiacs.'' Maine geographic
    location and air corridors offer a strategic hub for supporting trans-
    Atlantic deployments as well as Arctic operations.
        Senator King. Secretary Austin, would you support modernizing the
    unit with the new KC-46 aircraft?
        Secretary Austin. As they do with all basing modernization
    decisions, the Department of the Air Force will use the strategic
    basing process to determine locations best suited for future rounds of
    KC-46 aircraft basing and will consider all factors relevant to the
    decision.

        29. Senator King. General Milley, do you believe having a
    modernized and capable fleet of KC-46s at the strategic location of
    Bangor, ME is beneficial to the facilitating operations in the Arctic
    and trans-Atlantic flights to EUCOM?
        General Milley. The aerial refueling and technological capabilities
    that the KC-46 provides to the Joint Force are critical. This is
    especially relevant as was highlighted in the recent NDS with China as
    the pacing challenge. The ANG 101st refueling wing in Maine plays a
    critical role in our Nation's ability to globally project the Joint
    Force.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
                             usmc force design 2030
        30. Senator Manchin. Secretary Austin, as you know the Marine Corps
    has made many painful, but necessary, divestments from legacy platforms
    such as tanks and investments in newer technologies and capabilities
    that will better enable the Marine Corps to counter our pacing threat,
    China. I think the Marine Corps' investment and divestment so far made
    in Force Design 2030 are important to highlight because we are at a
    tipping point. All eyes are on the Marine Corps to complete this
    necessary realignment of their force, and if we falter now we risk
    creating compounding problems for the other Services who are following
    the Marines' lead. Myself and a number of the Members on this Committee
    have already committed to making tough decisions even if it means we
    lose equity in equipment that is built in our home states. Can you
    comment on Force Design 2030? Specifically, how quickly do each of the
    Services need to meet their modernization goals to counter the future
    threats we're going to be facing?
        Secretary Austin. The Commandant of the Marine Corps has briefed me
    on his Force Design 2030 plan, which I support. As you note, it is
    important that we look at what capabilities no longer meet the need,
    and where we must invest for the future. Each of the Services,
    including the Marine Corps, is undertaking modernization efforts today
    to ensure that the Joint Force has the right mix of capabilities to
    meet current and future challenges.
        The Marine Corps is focused on reallocating its budget request to
    its highest priority requirements: long-range precision fires,
    resilient sensor and communication networks, and mobility platforms.
    These investments will result in new anti-ship missile capabilities,
    advanced ISR assets, and additional mobility platforms in fiscal year
    2023 and over the next several years. The fiscal year 2023 budget
    request continues to build out capacity so that the Marine Corps can
    better contribute as a naval expeditionary force in support of the
    Joint Force.
                       ukraine and future warfare trends
        31. Senator Manchin. General Milley, Putin's war in Ukraine is
    offering us many interesting, if tragic, insights into how a future war
    with a near-peer competitor might play out. Of note, according to open
    source intelligence, Russia has lost over two-thousand tanks. The
    overwhelming majority of these roughly 10 million dollar Russian tanks
    were destroyed by 120 thousand dollar anti-tank missiles such as the
    Javelin. Understanding the open nature of this communication and based
    upon your analysis and observations of Putin's war in Ukraine, what
    types of technologies do you believe will be decisive in our next war?
        General Milley. To prevail against a near-peer adversary in our
    next war, the Joint Force must employ a variety of new technologies
    across multiple domains. To that end, the Department has identified 14
    critical technology areas vital to national security. The Joint Force
    will continue to evolve our Joint Warfighting Concept and deliver these
    technologies as warfighting capability as the ever-changing threat from
    our adversaries demand.

        The Department's 14 critical technology areas are:

        1. Seed Areas of Emerging Opportunity
             Biotechnology
             Quantum Science
             Future Generation Wireless Technology (FutureG)
             Advanced Materials

        2.  Effective Adoption Areas--where there is existing vibrant
    commercial sector activity
             Trusted AI and Autonomy
             Integrated Network Systems-of-Systems
             Microelectronics
             Space Technology
             Renewable Energy Generation and Storage
             Advanced Computing and Software
             Human-Machine Interfaces

        3. Defense-Specific Areas
             Directed Energy
             Hypersonics
             Integrated Sensing and Cyber

        32. Senator Manchin. General Milley, how is this reflected in the
    Department of Defense's budget request?
        General Milley. We are witnessing a fundamental change in the
    character of war driven by advancements in disruptive technologies like
    hypersonics, artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, and cyber. The
    Fiscal Year 2023 President's Budget request makes the largest-ever
    investment in RDT&E, at $130B, to modernize the Joint Force to fight
    the battles of the future and keep up with the revolution in technology
    already underway. The budget also includes the largest ever S&T request
    at $16.5B, and includes investment in 14 critical enabling technologies
    that could be decisive in the next war, like biotechnology, quantum
    science, and trusted AI.
                             amphibious ship fleet
        33. Senator Manchin. Secretary Austin, the vast majority of the
    challenges you highlighted in your opening statement are directly
    supported by our navy, which as you know are powerful tools of force
    projection. While aircraft carriers are the premier demonstration of
    that force projection, I would argue that our L-class amphibious ships
    offer much greater flexibility. From quick response deployments like
    the USS Kearsarge is on to Europe for the crisis in Ukraine to
    Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Response missions after natural disasters
    around the globe, our Sailors and Marines on amphibious ships arguably
    do more to maintain United States global dominance than any other tool
    in our kit. Unfortunately, maintenance and new procurements within the
    Navy's amphibious fleet leave our influence abroad greatly reduced. Are
    you familiar with these issues and how do we ensure that we're not
    losing capability by over-focusing on aircraft carriers and submarines?
        Secretary Austin. We are focused on getting the right mix of
    capabilities matched to our warfighting concepts and our strategy to
    respond to security challenges today, and into the future. Amphibious
    ships will remain a cornerstone of our global presence, deterrence, and
    crisis response. Our fiscal year 2023 budget request seeks to produce a
    balanced fleet that remains capable of a high level of readiness for
    power projection, sea control, maritime security, and sealift. That
    required near-term divestment of some Littoral Combat Ships that
    experienced high operating and sustainment costs. The near-term
    divestment will enable us to field advanced capabilities that will
    better support future combat requirements.

        34. Senator Manchin. Secretary Austin, I've been told our minimum
    number of amphibious L-class ships should be in the 36 to 40 range, but
    in your opinion, what is the absolute minimum number of L-class
    amphibious ships required to meet our strategic needs?
        Secretary Austin. We are focused on getting the right mix of
    capabilities matched to our warfighting concepts and our strategy to
    respond to security challenges today, and into the future. Amphibious
    ships will remain a cornerstone of our global presence, deterrence, and
    crisis response. Our fiscal year 2023 budget request seeks to produce a
    balanced fleet that remains capable of a high level of readiness for
    power projection, sea control, maritime security, and sealift. I am
    confident it does so.
                     cost savings by commercial comparison
        35. Senator Manchin. Secretary McCord, while I know it's not a
    perfect comparison, I was surprised to learn that in making acquisition
    decisions the Department of Defense either doesn't have access to or is
    not choosing to compare the commercial price of equipment to the cost
    the Department, and our taxpayers, are paying. One example I was made
    aware of was the lack of transparency from aircraft manufacturers that
    sell to both airlines and the Department. Essentially, we have to
    assume that airlines are paying a substantially reduced price for a
    similar aircraft that DOD is buying at substantial markup. Would you be
    supportive of Congress requiring any defense contractor that also
    supplies the commercial market making their commercial prices available
    to DOD?
        Secretary McCord. The Department is supportive of legislative
    changes to increase transparency and require industry to provide the
    data needed to determine price reasonableness of commercial products
    and services, including commercial sales data. The existence of
    shortcomings in current acquisition regulations can create barriers to
    completing adequate price reasonableness determination. Contracting
    officers continue to experience challenges obtaining necessary
    commercial data to determine price reasonableness. The Department has
    submitted a legislative proposal to address these challenges.
                              cyber mission force
        36. Senator Manchin. Secretary Austin, Tuesday was a big cyber day
    for this Committee. In the morning we heard from Cyber Command's
    General Nakasone, and in the afternoon, my friend Senator Rounds and I
    held a hearing with the Commanders of each Service's cyber force. Our
    technical capabilities seem to be mostly on par with our adversaries
    across the joint force, but the individual services are far below where
    they should be on recruiting and retaining top talent within our Cyber
    Mission Force. We've already provided enhanced budget authority to
    Cyber Command, and increased incentive pay to $5,000 a month, but we
    just heard that there is a Department of Defense Instruction limiting
    that pay within the Services. I hope that you're unaware of this
    Instruction, but it appears to me that Congress has clearly provided an
    authority that is desperately needed to keep our highly qualified cyber
    operators and the Office of the Secretary of Defense has gone out of
    its way to put that authority on hold. Can you comment?
        Secretary Austin. Our cyber warriors add enormous value to our
    Department and our warfighting mission. That is why you saw us include
    $11.2 billion for cyberspace in our fiscal year 2023 budget request
    with resources to further develop our Cyber Mission Force. We are also
    grateful to Congress for the authorities you have given us to be able
    to offer a wide range of monetary incentives to recruit and retain
    cyber talent. With these existing authorities, DOD can selectively
    target incentives where they are needed most. In particular, the
    Department can offer enlistment bonuses of up to $50,000 for a 2-year
    enlistment and retention bonuses of up to $30,000 per year for each
    additional year of military service an enlisted member commits to
    serving. Officers are eligible for a 3-year accession bonus of up to
    $60,000 and retention bonuses of up to $50,000 per year. If these
    bonuses and incentives are not sufficient, the Department can also
    offer a critical skills retention bonus of up to $200,000 over a career
    for an active-duty military member. These incentives are effective
    monetary tools for recruiting and retaining the military cyber
    workforce.
        Additionally, the Department is authorized to offer up to $5,000
    per month (or $60,000 annually) to military members to serve in hard-
    to-fill or arduous assignments, or positions of significant
    responsibility. Over the past 14 years, however, the Department has not
    needed to pay the maximum amount and, by policy, has limited payment to
    $3,500 per month (or $42,000 annually). If necessary, the Department
    can make exceptions and can also increase its policy limit to the
    maximum authorized. It is reassuring to know that the Department has
    both the flexibility and authority to do so.

        37. Senator Manchin. Secretary Austin, I look forward to working
    with you on this issue and a number of others affecting our cyber
    force, but I cannot overstate the importance of qualified cyber
    professionals to future conflicts. Cyber affects everything that we do
    today and even more so in the future. Can you commit to me that you
    will make it a priority to empower our cyber Commanders to retain their
    talent?
        Secretary Austin. You absolutely have my commitment to support our
    cyber commanders and help them retain talent. Our cyber warriors add
    enormous value to our Department and our warfighting mission. That is
    why you saw us include $11.2 billion for cyberspace in our fiscal year
    2023 budget request with resources to further develop our Cyber Mission
    Force. The Department is focused on developing a sustainable force
    generation model for the Cyberspace Operations Forces, because we know
    that without a world-class workforce, the Department will not be able
    to compete effectively in cyberspace.
                                   __________
                      Questions Submitted by Senator Rosen
                       housing for junior enlisted troops
        38. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, Secretary McCord, Junior
    enlisted servicemembers, including Airmen stationed at Nevada's Nellis
    Air Force Base, are averaging only 12 months in on-base housing and
    being forced to move off base due to shortages. This is compounded by
    the fact that these troops are forced to cover their rental deposits
    and moving costs before they are eligible to begin receiving their
    Basic Allowance for Housing. That is why I worked to include a
    provision in last year's NDAA directing DOD to brief Congress by March
    1st of this year on the Department's plan to provide a partial
    dislocation allowance to these troops. We have still not received this
    briefing, and I recently heard from Nellis that none of their Airmen
    who were forced to move out of the dorms have received a dislocation
    allowance. Why is DOD not providing our junior enlisted troops,
    including Airmen at Nellis and across the country, with the dislocation
    allowance they are authorized to receive? How do you plan on addressing
    the housing shortage?
        Secretary Austin and Secretary McCord. The health and well-being of
    our Service members and their families is my top priority. That is why
    I recently approved a Partial Dislocation Allowance (DLA) for our
    Service members. Effective April 27, 2022, a partial dislocation
    allowance is paid to a member of the Uniformed Services ordered to
    occupy or vacate housing provided by the United States. This update
    authorizes all members, including junior enlisted members without
    dependents, to be eligible for a Partial DLA when ordered to vacate
    government quarters, including barracks and dormitory-style housing. We
    are committed to providing high quality housing to our men and women in
    uniform, and to support them when government housing is not available.
                    commuting assistance for servicemembers
        39. Senator Rosen. Secretary McCord, airmen stationed at Creech Air
    Force Base and servicemembers stationed at many other installations
    have to commute many miles to base from where they live. Creech has
    very limited housing nearby, so the vast majority of Airmen live in Las
    Vegas, which is about 45 miles away. It's an even longer commute for
    those who have to drop off their kids at the child development center
    or utilize other services at Nellis Air Force Base on the opposite end
    of town. Does DOD have the existing authorities to provide these airmen
    with a gas stipend or something similar to make their commute less
    expensive? Or is this something the services would need help from
    Congress to address?
        Secretary McCord. In general, outside of congressionally approved
    programs like the Mass Transit Benefit Program [5 U.S.C. Sec.  7905],
    commuting costs are considered a personal expense of the servicemember.
        The Department also notes that a gas stipend, as suggested in your
    question, would be considered taxable income for members under the
    Internal Revenue Code. At this time, the Department has no authority to
    provide reimbursement for single-occupant motor vehicles used for daily
    commuting from service members' domicile to their assigned duty
    stations.
        The Department does, however, have a program in place that Services
    can use to incentivize hard-to-fill assignments (37 U.S.C. Sec. 352),
    and a program to account for the cost of living in high-cost areas (37
    U.S.C. Sec.  403b). Currently, Creech Air Force Base does not qualify
    for either of these programs.
                   maintaining our defense technological edge
        40. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, Global competition, declining
    R&D, contracting challenges, and the STEM workforce gap are a few
    impediments eroding our technological edge with adversaries. How do you
    assess the United States' ability to develop, adopt, and deploy
    emerging technologies for national security? How do you assess China's
    ability to do the same?
        Secretary Austin. The United States continues to focus urgently on
    developing, adopting, and deploying emerging technologies in support of
    our national security. It is critically important that the U.S.
    military not only maintain our strategic and technological edge but
    that we remain dominant on the battlefield in all domains. Science,
    technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) and innovation are
    cornerstones of the American economy that support those efforts. The
    innovation ecosystem that has developed within the United States, which
    includes academia, small and non-traditional businesses, not-for-profit
    entities, and large business, continues to provide the Department with
    technology options that enable new and innovative warfighting
    capability.
        The Department, however, remains concerned with China's goal to
    out-innovate the United States. China's annual research and development
    (R&D) spending grew 169 times from around 14.3 billion yuan ($2.21
    billion) at the beginning of the 1990's to 2.44 trillion yuan ($382
    billion) in 2020, and China's total R&D expenditures overtook Japan's
    in 2013, becoming second in the world after the United States. Growing
    Chinese research capabilities, combined with a focus on military-civil
    fusion and later-stage developmental research, is accelerating China's
    ability to conduct translational research and indicates that China has
    developed a strong ability to develop, adopt, and employ emerging
    technologies.
        It is crucial that the Department maintain situational awareness of
    Chinese, and all international, R&D advances to avoid technological
    surprise. This is in part accomplished through fostering collaborations
    between U.S. and foreign scientists, which are key for both advancing
    U.S. research and innovation and for understanding advancements
    occurring overseas. In addition, a focus on international collaboration
    can help to draw more scientists to the United States where we can add
    to our capabilities.
        At the same time, the DOD International Science and Technology
    Engagement Strategy establishes a framework for the Department's
    international S&T engagement for both collaboration and awareness of
    international research. The Department has taken a number of steps and
    has existing programs that allow us to be highly innovative. Programs
    such as the Small Business Innovation Research and Small Technology
    Transfer Program (SBIR/STTR) program enables the Department to take
    advantage of the small business community or extensive use of DIU to
    enhance connectivity and incorporation of non-traditional performers
    into the Department's innovation ecosystem. The Department also
    continues to invest in science and technology, from basic research
    through advanced technology and development that lays the foundation
    for national security and commercial applications in the future.
        Finally, it is important that the Administration work with Congress
    to address the urgent need to invest in made-in-America semiconductors
    as well as research and development that will protect our economic and
    national security. Weapon systems employed on the battlefields of today
    and emerging technologies of tomorrow depend on our access to a steady,
    secure supply of microelectronics. Our strategic competitors are making
    substantial investments in this area--China, the United States
    military's pacing challenge, has already spent $150 billion updating
    its semiconductor industry. The investments made through legislation
    like the CHIPS Act are critical to our national security and will
    directly support America's technological and military edge.

        41. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, the PROMOTES Act--bipartisan
    legislation I introduced with Senators Rounds, Blackburn, and Peters to
    authorize a DOD program to prepare students in JROTC for STEM fields--
    became law as part of the fiscal year 2021 NDAA. What are other ways
    Congress can improve the Department of Defense's ability to recruit,
    train, and retain a more technologically literate workforce?
        Secretary Austin. Thank you for your continued leadership in
    supporting the young recruits coming into the military, particularly by
    championing science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM).
    Congress has provided significant support to DOD's hiring needs, to
    include providing streamlined direct hiring authorities and enhanced
    pay authorities for positions requiring expertise in STEM, as well as
    cyber and other critical positions. The Department continues to seek
    innovative means to use existing hiring, compensation, and employee
    development authorities and programs to better recruit, train, and
    retain the diverse and highly skilled technological workforce required
    to meet mission demands now and in the future.

        42. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, I'd like get your thoughts on
    the ``valley of death,'' which is the point in the DOD innovation cycle
    when cutting-edge technologies die before they can win a contract to
    produce software or equipment at scale. What are specific steps the
    Department of Defense can take to improve the transition of successful
    technology prototypes to the point of production, and then rapidly
    field these technologies at scale so that we can leverage technology to
    better compete with our adversaries?
        Secretary Austin. The DOD is urgently focusing on ways to tackle
    what is described as the ``valley of death,'' where we lose so many
    good technologies before they are fully brought to market and built at
    scale. To ensure the private sector pursues the technologies needed for
    national defense, the Department has increased its leadership
    engagement and collaboration with innovative companies in the defense
    industrial base. We have increased our engagement with the small
    business community to understand their challenges and my team has been
    charged with developing strategies to remove obstacles systemically. We
    are committed to making it easier for small businesses to work with the
    Department and to overcoming barriers and creating pathways to
    transition technology at scale. The President's budget for fiscal year
    2023 makes a substantial investment in the Rapid Defense
    Experimentation Reserve (RDER). The goal of RDER is to produce
    capabilities to support the Joint Warfighting Concept. RDER will
    accomplish this goal by engaging in iterative experimentation with
    integrated prototypes, including 32 in the fiscal year 2023 sprint. We
    also recently established Competitive Advantage Pathfinders (CAPs) to
    identify and overcome pain points across the defense acquisition
    system, including transitioning emerging technology and enabling
    scalable reforms to improve the delivery of producible and sustainable
    capability.
        As these initiatives are executed, we are committed to continuing
    to review our internal processes with an ultimate goal of accelerating
    the timelines in which emerging technologies are fielded so we maintain
    our technological edge and remain dominant on the battlefield.

        43. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, one of the gaps in the defense
    technology development process is the lack of private capital interest
    in defense-centric startup companies. How can the Department of Defense
    better incentivize private capital investments in small to medium size
    defense companies and does it need any new authorities to do so?
        Secretary Austin. The Department is currently exploring new ways to
    catalyze private investment in national security related activities,
    and we will come to Congress if we believe we need additional
    authorities to support our work. Coordinated With: OGC.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
                             landmine alternatives
        44. Senator Rounds. General Milley, thank you for your response on
    landmine alternatives at the DOD Posture Hearing. Unfortunately, due to
    time, I was unable to ask my complete question.
        General Milley, can you describe the capability gap that has
    emerged, due to both policy and the degradation of our stocks, and the
    resulting threat to our ground forces' ability to use explosive
    obstacles for protection, to increase the effects of our systems, and
    to influence enemy freedom of maneuver on the battlefield?
        General Milley. The loss of APL outside the Korean Peninsula
    increases the challenge to the United States military to effectively
    respond, but does not preclude an effective response. The United States
    maintains a range of capabilities to respond to challenges across the
    globe and adaptability is a hallmark of the U.S. military. We most
    certainly maintain the capability to influence enemy freedom of
    maneuver on the battlefield.
        The Army is developing the XM204 Top Attack and XM343 Standoff
    Activated Volcano Obstacle Bottom Attack munitions as the new
    generation anti-vehicle system with initial operating capability in
    fiscal year 2023.

        45. Senator Rounds. General Milley, can you explain how these
    landmine alternatives would increase the effectiveness of Javelins and
    other direct (and indirect) fire weapons systems, both for United
    States forces and had we been able to be provide these capabilities to
    the Ukrainians?
        General Milley. Planned landmine alternatives will serve the same
    doctrinal function as the current landmine inventory, which includes
    use in counter-mobility operations to increase enemy force
    vulnerability.
        Canalize enemy forces into pre-established kill zones maximizes
    enemy vulnerability to direct and indirect fire systems.

        46. Senator Rounds. General Milley, can you describe the
    precautions the United States takes with this type of capability, from
    rules of engagement to release authority, to self-destruct and self-
    deactivate capabilities and provide your best professional military
    advice on the gravity of this gap, the risk to our ground forces, and
    the risk to our mission?
        General Milley. The DOD complies with the international legal
    obligations governing use of landmines under the Amended Mines Protocol
    II annexed to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.
        The Department will only employ, develop, produce, or otherwise
    acquire landmines that possess self-destruction mechanisms and self-
    deactivation features.
        The loss of APL outside the Korean Peninsula increases the
    challenge to the United States military to effectively respond, but
    does not preclude an effective response. The United States maintains a
    range of capabilities to respond to challenges across the globe and
    adaptability is a hallmark of the U.S. military. We most certainly
    maintain the capability to influence enemy freedom of maneuver on the
    battlefield.

        47. Senator Rounds. General Milley can you describe the studies
    that have been conducted by DOD, or on behalf of DOD, and what the
    findings have been with respect to force structure requirements and the
    projected reductions of friendly casualties, while executing assigned
    missions or contingency plans? Please submit a classified response if
    you cannot address this question with an unclassified response.
        General Milley. The current DOD Landmine Policy was informed by the
    2016 Department of Defense Report on the Utility of and Alternatives to
    Antipersonnel Landmine and Cluster Munitions and the 2018 Antipersonnel
    Landmine / Cluster Munitions Study.
        Given the classified nature of both studies, I will submit a
    classified response.

        48. Senator Rounds. General Milley, I have been told that the Army
    has been developing landmine alternatives for over 12 years, yet the
    objective capability is not scheduled to be fielded until at least
    fiscal year 2030 or fiscal year 2031. To me, this results in
    unacceptable risk to the mission and the force.
        Can you provide a plan on what the department would have to do to
    aggressively accelerate the development of a landmine alternative
    before fiscal year 2030?
        General Milley. The Services are committed to developing landmine
    alternatives in support of Combatant Commanders and the Joint Force.
        The Army is developing the XM204 Top Attack and XM343 Standoff
    Activated Volcano Obstacle Bottom Attack munitions as the new
    generation anti-vehicle system with initial operating capability in
    fiscal year 2023.
        Both the XM204 and XM343 are effective when utilized on their own
    to delay enemy maneuver.
        These systems will close any capability gap.

        49. Senator Rounds. Can you also provide a plan on how the
    Department could maintain sufficient numbers of the current capability,
    which has self-deactivate/self-destruct features?
        General Milley. The Services are committed to developing landmine
    alternatives in support of Combatant Commanders and the Joint Force.
        The Army is developing the XM204 Top Attack and XM343 Standoff
    Activated Volcano Obstacle Bottom Attack munitions as the new
    generation anti-vehicle system with initial operating capability in
    fiscal year 2023.
        Both the XM204 and XM343 are effective when utilized on their own
    to delay enemy maneuver.
        These systems will close any capability gap.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                            usmc force requirements
        50. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, in your written testimony for
    this hearing, you state, ``[t]his budget will enable the decisions,
    modernization, and transformation the Joint Force needs to set the
    conditions for the Force of 2030. This budget allows the Joint Force to
    remain on a stable glide path toward that future.'' Yet, in the last
    several weeks, the Navy has indicated that it plans to end LPD
    production and further delay the Light Amphibious Warship until fiscal
    year 2025. Top Marine officials have stated ``the Marine Corps has a
    requirement for absolutely no less than 31 amphibious warfare ships,''
    and that the proposed fiscal year 2023 funding plan would shrink the
    amphibious force to just 25 ships in the next five years. Do you
    believe this budget puts the United States Marine Corps on that
    ``steady glide path'' you speak of?
        General Milley. The fiscal year 2023 budget enables the Navy and
    Marine Corps team to support all near and mid-term Amphibious Ready
    Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit Global Force Management Operations. The
    Navy has recently completed its amphibious fleet requirement study and
    is going through the review process. We believe the results of the
    study will provide a strategic approach that enables the department to
    support and sustain a continued Marine Corps presence afloat that is
    fully capable of performing its mission essential tasks.

        51. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, in your written statement,
    you write that the PRC, ``intend[s] to be a military peer of the United
    States by 2035, and they intend to develop the military capabilities to
    seize Taiwan by 2027.'' Based on the President's fiscal year 2023
    Budget, the Marine Corps will be well below the amphibious ship
    requirements it identified to execute Expeditionary Advanced Base
    Operations and Stand-In Forces in 2027. Do you believe the acquisition
    schedule for L-class amphibious ships and the Light Amphibious Warship
    positions the Joint Force for success in the event the PRC is indeed
    militarily capable of invading Taiwan in 2027?
        General Milley. The Navy has recently completed its amphibious
    fleet requirement study and is going through the review process. We
    believe the results of the study will provide a strategic approach that
    enables the department to support and sustain a continued Marine Corps
    presence afloat that is fully capable of performing its mission
    essential tasks.
                            arctic strategy funding
        52. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin, during your confirmation
    hearing before this committee last year, I asked if you would commit to
    ensuring that the service Arctic strategies are fully resourced and you
    responded, ``You have my commitment to do that.'' Yet several weeks ago
    in a hearing before this committee, I asked NORTHCOM Commander General
    VanHerck if he had seen adequate funding for the service Arctic
    strategies, to which he responded, ``[w]e have not seen the funding
    that I would like to see with regard to the Arctic.'' In your opinion,
    has funding to execute service Arctic strategies been adequate or
    inadequate since you made that commitment in 2021?
        Secretary Austin. I am confident that our Joint Force is resourced
    to complete our exercises and operations around the world, including in
    the Arctic region. The United States is an Arctic nation, and the
    Department strongly supports efforts to ensure the protection of our
    interests in the Arctic region. As you know, we recently created a new
    Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Arctic and Global Resilience,
    and last year we announced the establishment of the Ted Stevens Center
    for Arctic Security Studies in Alaska. We will remain focused on the
    Arctic, and I will never hesitate to request more resources if we
    determine that we need them.
        The Department will also continue to work with allies and partners,
    and as part of a whole-of-government approach, to closely monitor our
    competitors' activities in the Arctic and strengthen the rules-based
    order in the region. U.S. activities and posture in the Arctic must be
    calibrated to enable the Department to preserve its overall focus on
    the Indo-Pacific region, but the Department is making key investments
    in enhancing our domain awareness capabilities, including investments
    in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; early
    warning; weather satellites; and communications, to achieve our
    homeland defense priorities. By improving our capabilities, deepening
    our partnership with Canada in the context of the North American
    Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), and working with allies and partners
    to increase shared air and maritime domain awareness, we are sending
    key strategic deterrent messages to our competitors.
                            fiscal year 2023 budget
        53. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, this past Tuesday before the
    House Armed Services Committee you stated, ``[t]his budget assumes an
    inflation rate of 2.2 percent, which is obviously incorrect, because
    it's almost 8 percent. It might go up, it might go down, but most
    forecasts indicate it's going to go up and it could level out at 9 or
    10 percent.'' Given this reality, and the significant loss of
    purchasing power from this recent continuing resolution, do you believe
    the fiscal year 2023 budget is adequate to modernize and grow
    capability to deter and if necessary defeat authoritarian adversaries?
        General Milley. I recommend this question be directed to the
    Secretary of Defense to provide specifics with regards to budget and
    growth capability.
        Protecting our buying power is important. The Department considered
    the impact of inflation when building the budget and affiliated pricing
    assumptions--all in an effort to ensure we have an executable budget
    with the resources needed to implement the NDS. We will do the same in
    future budget cycles to ensure we remain aligned with strategy and
    National Security priorities.
                                 mental health
        54. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin and General Milley, as you
    are aware, the issue of suicide has been steadily on the rise nation-
    wide in the last decade, and has had an outsized impact on Alaska. For
    U.S. Army Alaska personnel, the problem has been particularly acute.
    Just this past year, 17 soldiers, a number three times the historical
    average, took their own lives. I commend your recent establishment of
    the Suicide Prevention and Response Independent Review Committee, in
    which your Department will review a number of installations, including
    several in Alaska, to determine a comprehensive way forward in
    addressing this issue. Do you believe this budget does enough to
    address the military's mental health provider shortfall?
        Secretary Austin. The loss of one life by suicide is too many. As
    you have heard me say many times, mental health is health. Period.
        We are clearly not where we need to be on suicide prevention, which
    is why we are taking an integrated prevention approach. As you note and
    as Congress directed, we have launched the Suicide Prevention and
    Response Independent Review Committee, and our fiscal year 2023 budget
    request includes $193 million for suicide prevention efforts. We are
    also asking for another $33 million for the Defense Suicide Prevention
    office and $1.4 billion in broader mental health efforts. We are
    focused on primary care behavior health, tele-behavioral health,
    substance abuse, and measures related to traumatic brain injury, post-
    traumatic stress, and other mental health conditions. There is also
    more work to do to optimize the use of our behavioral health providers
    to ensure we have the right providers in the right locations. Over the
    next 6 months, the Defense Health Agency (DHA) will work with the
    Military Departments and other DOD partners to finalize a staffing
    model for behavioral health. This staffing model will allow the DOD to
    place the right provider at the right location to meet the behavioral
    health needs for specific military medical treatment facilities (MTFs),
    by determining optimized personnel allocation, by provider type, and by
    supported mission. This will help inform resource allocation and
    personnel authorizations to maximize the behavioral health workforce to
    meet current demand. It may require moving personnel requirements and
    resourcing allocation between DHA Markets and MTFs. This model may also
    require new authorities to recruit and retain all identified personnel
    requirements.
        The staffing model alone will not resolve existing capacity
    shortfalls, but it will allow the Department to have the ability to
    determine what deficiencies exist and inform how to resolve
    constraints. The Department will then be able to leverage technical
    solutions such as virtual behavioral health, optimization of existing
    provider inventory or increasing behavioral healthcare delivery through
    recruitment actions or leveraging existing TRICARE network capability.
        General Milley. Across the Department, our commitment to suicide
    prevention is unwavering. The fiscal year 2023 budget invests $1.4
    billion in clinical mental health programs and initiatives to include
    those which evaluate, treat, and followup with patients with a variety
    of mental health issues. These programs leverage evidence-based best
    practices and treatment, practical problem resolution, case management
    and crisis management to support positive health outcomes. Ongoing
    mental health efforts within the Department include: Primary Care
    Behavioral Health, Tele-Behavioral Health, National Intrepid Center of
    Excellence and Intrepid Spirit Centers, Substance Abuse Program, as
    well as research on mental health aimed to accelerate the innovation
    and delivery of preventive interventions and treatments for TBI, PTSD,
    and other mental health conditions. Flexibility is key to ensuring
    these initiatives, support Service members by reducing barriers to
    receiving support, and target our populations of highest risk.
                    lessons from ukraine, applied to taiwan
        55. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin and General Milley, the
    global security picture looks drastically different now than it did in
    February. NATO is more united than ever. The EU is more united than
    ever. Both have taken action in concert with the United States to
    respond to unprovoked Russian aggression against Ukraine through
    sanctions and the shipment of weapons and equipment to Ukraine. The
    Russian economy is staggering and the ruble has plummeted in value. In
    light of this, do you believe Xi Jinping is reevaluating his
    assumptions on Taiwan?
        Secretary Austin. As you point out, the consequences for President
    Putin of his illegal, unjust war have been precisely what he did not
    want: a more unified NATO. I have never seen NATO more united.
        While I believe there are many lessons that will be learned from
    the conflict, I would caution drawing a direct comparison between the
    war in Ukraine and a potential conflict involving Taiwan. What I would
    say, however, is that a lesson that The People's Republic of China
    (PRC) has likely learned from this war is that the United States is
    committed to helping our Allies and partners defend themselves. The PRC
    likely also has learned that the United States can marshal a coalition
    of like-minded nations to respond to aggression wherever it appears.
    President Xi is also likely taking note of the economic costs of
    attacking a neighbor, and of the many challenges the Russian military
    is experiencing in sustaining their forces in conflict.
        General Milley. Yes, Beijing is likely seeking to gain insight from
    Russia's military failures in Ukraine to improve its own capabilities,
    however, there is no evidence that Russia's failed invasion has changed
    Beijing's willingness to use force against Taiwan. While unification
    with Taiwan remains one of Beijing's top priorities, PRC experts are
    evaluating Russia's shortcomings in Ukraine and are assessing potential
    implications for Beijing in a future military conflict.

        56. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin and General Milley, do you
    think the Russian invasion of Ukraine has changed Taiwan's perspective
    on its need to prepare for a PRC invasion?
        Secretary Austin. Over the past 2 years, we have seen increased PLA
    coercion of Taiwan. We remain committed to supporting Taiwan's efforts
    to enhance its self-defense, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations
    Act. Even as Taiwan prioritizes critical defense reforms--including to
    Reserves and Mobilization--our Taiwan partners recognize that they will
    face significant challenges, in sustaining operations and maintaining
    communications if they were in a crisis. We will continue to work with
    our Taiwan partners to improve their capabilities and ability to defend
    themselves in a crisis or conflict.
        General Milley. Taiwan's perception of the risk of a PRC invasion
    has increased since Russia invaded Ukraine, and President Tsai has
    publicly reiterated her commitment to improving Taiwan's asymmetric
    defense capabilities. Taiwan officials recognize Ukraine's battlefield
    successes and emphasized increasing Taipei's production of its own
    indigenous capabilities, including land-attack and anti-ship cruise
    missiles, as well as its Kestrel man-portable light anti-tank weapon.

        57. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin and General Milley, what
    lessons should we take away from failed deterrence in Europe to ensure
    deterrence doesn't fail in the Indo-Pacific?
        Secretary Austin. Let me first say that deterrence has not failed
    in Europe. From the outset, President Biden made clear that our core
    military deterrence objective was to deter an attack on the United
    States or NATO. We have thus far been successful in sustaining and
    strengthening deterrence in support of these priorities and have
    greatly bolstered NATO's territory and its resolve. Our military
    efforts before the invasion also bolstered Ukraine's ability to resist
    a Russian invasion.
        I believe the conflict in Ukraine identified at least four lessons
    learned that demonstrate the value of integrated deterrence. First, a
    combination of Russian military shortcomings and our efforts to
    reinforce NATO's Eastern Flank likely makes NATO's conventional
    deterrent stronger now vis-`-vis Russia than at any time in recent
    decades. Second, our use of intelligence and information operations
    throughout the crisis has demonstrated the value of seizing early
    advantage in the information space. Third, our response--alongside our
    Allies and partners--demonstrated the potency of non-military
    instruments of power and the ability to impose crippling costs on
    Russia. Finally, the conflict demonstrates the utility of collaborating
    with Allies and partners to adopt asymmetric capabilities and
    approaches to improve their ability to deny the military objectives of
    aggressors and to improve resistance. The Department is carefully
    considering how these early lessons may apply to other priority
    challenges.
        General Milley. First, I'd like to clarify that deterrence has not
    failed in Europe in support of United States policy objectives as
    established by the President. Russia has not, and shows no indication
    of attacking a NATO country. While Ukraine is not a member of NATO, the
    United States, through security assistance programs and unprecedented
    intelligence sharing, has assisted Ukraine in building a combat
    credible force that denied Russia a quick victory in its aim to
    dislodge the sitting Ukrainian Government.
        While I caution against drawing similarities between the Russo-
    Ukraine War and other scenarios, including Taiwan, we have already
    drawn some fundamental conclusions, none of which are groundbreaking.
        1.  The strength of our military comes from the training and high
    levels of readiness we maintain while conducting exercises to stress
    interoperability with our Allies and Partners. The Russian military is
    a mix of professional and conscript Soldiers with a limited non-
    commissioned officer corps which has proven critical. With respect to
    Taiwan and the Indo-pacific, we are leveraging military engagement to
    demonstrate our resolve to states in the region and build the
    collective will amongst likeminded nations to push back against those
    states who seek to disrupt the status quo.
        2.  The United States and likeminded countries around the world
    have moved an unprecedented amount of military equipment to Ukraine
    over the last several weeks. This has been a herculean effort. In
    Ukraine we have benefited from its geography and its borders with NATO
    countries to facilitate the distribution of security assistance. This
    would not be the case in Taiwan where breaking through a sea blockade
    to deliver assistance or providing it via air drop would likely be
    necessary. Therefore, we must have critical capabilities and military
    training before conflict begins. To that end, the Taiwan Relations Act
    provides the authority for the DOD provides arms and services of a
    defensive nature commensurate to the PLA threat. Through our
    observations of the war in Ukraine and increasing PRC gray zone
    activities, we're looking into ways to expedite the transfer of
    critical capabilities to Taiwan that will improve and modernize
    Taiwan's military--particularly asymmetric capabilities that will
    enable Taiwan to delay, degrade, and deny a PRC invasion.
        3.  Last, we saw in the case of Ukraine, the decision to rapidly
    declassify our intelligence was essential in quickly building support
    among our allies and partners. A similar approach would be useful in
    building international support to help defend Taiwan early against
    Chinese military aggression.
        Successfully implementing integrated deterrence in the Indo-Pacific
    requires us to do these things and more in day-to-day competition with
    China and far left of any conflict.

        58. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin and General Milley, from Xi
    Jinping's predatory economic initiatives, repeated neighbor-nation
    coercion, and brutal repression of individual freedoms; to now Vladimir
    Putin's heinous invasion of Ukraine, there is little doubt that we are
    now in a new era of authoritarian aggression. This aggression spans the
    entire spectrum of conflict, from open military warfare to gray zone
    activities below the threshold of armed conflict. The central tenet of
    the newly published National Defense Strategy aimed to counter this
    spectrum of conflict is ``integrated deterrence'', which you define as,
    ``working seamlessly across military domains and the spectrum of
    conflict, using all instruments of U.S. national power and our
    extraordinary network of alliances and partnerships.'' Do you believe
    integrated deterrence failed its first test in Ukraine?
        Secretary Austin. No, I do not believe integrated deterrence failed
    in Ukraine. From the outset, President Biden made clear that our core
    military deterrence objective was to deter an attack on the United
    States or NATO. We have thus far been successful in sustaining and
    strengthening deterrence in support of these priorities and have
    greatly bolstered NATO's territory and its resolve. Our military
    efforts before the invasion also bolstered Ukraine's ability to resist
    a Russian invasion.
        General Milley. Integrated deterrence is and will continue to
    impose costs on Russia. Militarily, Ukraine is defending their
    sovereignty with a combat credible force. Allies and partners are
    united in providing Security Force Assistance while imposing harsh
    economic sanctions on Russia. This is integrated deterrence in action.

        59. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin and General Milley, how do
    we ensure our integrated deterrence efforts are successful in the Indo-
    Pacific?
        Secretary Austin. Integrated deterrence first and foremost is about
    having the most dominant, combat-credible force in all domains. It is
    also about drawing on the strengths of our Allies and partners, who are
    force multipliers in our efforts to deter aggression and prevail in
    conflict and using all instruments of national power to deter a
    competitor or adversary across the spectrum of competition and
    conflict. Implementing integrated deterrence--including in the Indo-
    Pacific region--requires being cognizant of competitor deterrence
    calculus and being disciplined and focused on advancing our defense
    priorities. In the Indo-Pacific region, for example, the Department
    will bolster deterrence by leveraging existing and emergent force
    capabilities, posture, and presence. Collaboration with Allies and
    partners will cement joint capability with the aid of multilateral
    exercises, co-development of technologies, greater information sharing,
    and combined planning on shared deterrence challenges. We will also
    build enduring advantages by undertaking foundational improvements and
    enhancements in our technological edge and combat credibility.
        General Milley. We continue to enhance our force posture,
    infrastructure, presence, and readiness levels in the Indo-Pacific
    region. We must ensure that we have sufficient military and economic
    power when combined with our allies and partners. Last, we must shape
    our desired outcomes concerning the PRC without escalating to armed
    conflict between our two nations.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
                             hypersonic technology
        60. Senator Blackburn. Secretary Austin, do you agree with General
    Hyten that the U.S. is lagging in hypersonic development due to not
    testing systems until being highly confident in their capabilities? How
    does the Fiscal Year 2023 President's Budget Request offset this?
        Secretary Austin. First, I would say that what the Department
    requires is the right mix of capabilities to match our warfighting
    concepts and our strategy. In some cases, that will involve hypersonic
    and directed energy capabilities. That is why you saw us include $7.2
    billion to the fiscal year 2023 budget request for long-range fires,
    including hypersonic and highly survivable sub-sonic weapons. You also
    saw us bring together a group of industry leaders early in this
    Administration to focus our efforts on hypersonic technology. We can
    and should move more rapidly on this front. The hypersonics program is
    energized to conduct flight tests early and often to accelerate the
    pace of development by emphasizing that testing is not a function of
    program failure, but instead is an opportunity to learn early and
    succeed sooner. We believe that this approach will increase confidence
    and lead to more rapid fielding of systems.
        The fiscal year 2023 budget request and FYDP continue to
    significantly invest in our ground and flight test infrastructure to
    enable an increased pace of developmental and operational testing for
    hypersonic systems. With the Fiscal Year 2023 President's Budget, by
    fiscal year 2027 the Department will have invested $1.4 billion in
    hypersonic test improvements to enhance capability and increase
    throughput.

        61. Senator Blackburn. Secretary Austin, what is the value of a
    hypersonic test--both practically to the U.S., and from a deterrence
    perspective to our adversaries?
        Secretary Austin. The Department tests systems under development to
    reduce risk. The progression of testing from modeling and simulation to
    ground testing to full-system flight testing gives us the confidence
    necessary to safely field an operationally effective weapon system.
        From a deterrence perspective, a flight test provides evidence of
    the Nation's commitment to aggressively develop and transition this
    significant warfighting capability. As we increase the pace of testing,
    this commitment will become even clearer.

        62. Senator Blackburn. Secretary Austin, where does the U.S. rank
    on the global stage regarding hypersonic testing frequency?
        Secretary Austin. We have gone from conducting flight tests once
    every couple of years to 17 scheduled flight tests this fiscal year.
    Our pace of testing is based on the number of systems we have in
    development and the stage of development for those systems. The
    Department is focused on acquiring the right mix of capabilities to
    match our warfighting concepts and our strategy. In some cases, that
    will involve hypersonic and directed energy capabilities. That is why
    you saw us include $7.2 billion to the fiscal year 2023 budget request
    for long-range fires, including hypersonic and highly survivable sub-
    sonic weapons. You also saw us bring together a group of industry
    leaders early in this Administration to focus our efforts on hypersonic
    technology. We can and should move more rapidly on this front.
                                    nuclear
        63. Senator Blackburn. Secretary Austin, why was the SLICM-N
    cancelled?
        Secretary Austin. The Administration considered a variety of
    regional deterrence contingencies as part of the 2022 Nuclear Posture
    Review, which affirmed the need to deter limited nuclear use by
    adversaries. We already field capabilities intended to address these
    scenarios, including the recently introduced W76-2 low-yield submarine-
    launched ballistic missile, the B61-12 gravity bomb delivered by dual-
    capable aircraft, and the existing air-launched cruise missile that
    will eventually be replaced by the modernized Long-Range Standoff
    Weapon. Given the deterrence contributions of these capabilities, the
    nuclear weapons-capable sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) program
    was canceled, considering its marginal utility, its estimated cost in
    light of other nuclear modernization and defense priorities, and the
    fact that it could not be delivered before the 2030's.

        64. Senator Blackburn. Secretary Austin, how does the PBR
    facilitate a complete nuclear modernization program that deters our
    adversaries?
        Secretary Austin. The nuclear triad remains the bedrock of our
    national security. That is why the President's Fiscal Year 2023 Budget
    invests $34.4 billion in Nuclear Enterprise Modernization. This request
    reflects full funding for recapitalization of all three legs of the
    nuclear triad, as well as modernization of U.S. nuclear command,
    control, and communications (NC3) systems. Above all, the President's
    Budget supports a modern, safe, secure, and effective nuclear
    deterrent, and strong and credible extended deterrence.
                     diversity, equity, and inclusion (dei)
        65. Senator Blackburn. Secretary Austin, what are the objectives of
    the Department of Defense's study concerning ``nonbinary'' people
    serving in the military? Who is involved in this study?
        Secretary Austin. The Institute of Defense Analysis is currently
    conducting a study to collect information on a range of issues,
    regarding our existing personnel policies and systems.

        66. Senator Blackburn. Secretary Austin, do you believe the
    Department can allow nonbinary people to serve in the military without
    Congressional authorization?
        Secretary Austin. DOD is authorized to establish qualifications for
    military service.

        67. Senator Blackburn. Secretary Austin, how much has the President
    requested for each Service's fiscal year 2023 DEI initiatives?
        China
        Secretary Austin. Our greatest strategic advantage over our
    competitors and adversaries is the strength of our people. That is why
    the Department is working every day to recruit and retain the best
    talent--because America's military should look like the country we
    serve. A key to retaining talent is to ensure that every service member
    has pathways of opportunity. As part of our DEI efforts, this year the
    Department launched a series of focused reviews on key points in the
    military career cycle--accessions, mid-career, and pathways to senior
    leadership--to provide actionable insights for the Department on how to
    recruit and retain a diverse force.
        With respect to funding, the Department's diversity and inclusion
    initiatives are funded through various programs administered by the
    Military Departments and other DOD Components. The Department's fiscal
    year 2023 budget request includes a total of $87 million for diversity
    and inclusion activities, including $8 million for the Office for
    Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion, $53 million for the Defense Human
    Resources Activity, $4 million for the Department of the Army, $7
    million for the Department of the Navy, and $15 million for the
    Department of the Air Force. We will continue to invest in our people,
    who are the most critical element of our success.

        68. Senator Blackburn. General Milley, does the Biden
    administration budget address the current assessment of the
    advancements made by the People's Liberation Army (PLA)?
        General Milley. I am confident that the President's Budget request
    adequately provides for the defense of our Nation. Specifically, the
    fiscal year 2023 Budget includes $276 billion in our investment
    accounts for procurement and R&D to modernize the Joint Force in order
    to deter, and if necessary, prevail in conflict. While we continue to
    modernize the Joint Force to pace the future challenge from China, this
    budget also sustains the capability, capacity, and readiness to respond
    to aggression from any adversary today.

        69. Senator Blackburn. Secretary Austin, considering the department
    has identified China as the pacing threat, what shortfalls do you
    identify in the PBR's ability to meet this threat?
        Secretary Austin. The President's Budget request for fiscal year
    2023 is robust and fully aligned with the new National Defense
    Strategy, which identifies the urgent need to sustain and strengthen
    deterrence across domains, theaters, and the spectrum of conflict, with
    the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the Department's pacing
    challenge. Our strategy, resources, and capabilities are aligned to our
    priorities which we will advance through the lines of effort described
    in the National Defense Strategy: integrated deterrence, campaigning,
    and building enduring advantages. To this end, the budget request
    includes $6.1 billion in the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), and
    we are making other investments outside PDI that are broadly applicable
    to the PRC. For example, other investments in operations, maintenance,
    research and development, and procurement that are not included in PDI
    will also help advance our priorities in the Indo-Pacific region and
    beyond.
                                   inflation
        70. Senator Blackburn. Secretary Austin, how does the
    administration's failure to account for record high inflation impact
    our Reserve and Guard Forces?
        Secretary Austin. This is a significant defense budget and one that
    buys us tremendous capability. As you know, the President's budget was
    finalized last year and the chalk was snapped, so to speak, on some
    economic assumptions, which is how budgets are built. We will continue
    to watch inflation closely, to ensure we have the buying power to
    deliver the military capabilities we believe we need to support our
    warfighting concepts, and to take care of the total Force. If I feel I
    need more resources, I will not hesitate to request them.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
                      defense strategy and prioritization
        71. Senator Hawley. Secretary Austin, Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner testified before
    the House Armed Services Committee on March 9, 2022, ``With China as
    the pacing challenge, Taiwan is the pacing scenario, driven by a
    strategy of denial.'' \1\ Can you confirm that ``Taiwan is the pacing
    scenario'' for the Department of Defense, as Dr. Ratner testified?
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20220309/114487/HHRG-
    117-AS00-Wstate-RatnerE-20220309.pdf
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Secretary Austin. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is our most
    consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge for the
    Department. A PRC invasion of Taiwan is a key pacing scenario for the
    Department of Defense.

        72. Senator Hawley. Secretary Austin, you've written for the record
    that ``a combat-credible, forward deterrent posture is instrumental to
    the U.S. military's ability to deter, and if necessary, deny a fait
    accompli scenario.'' Is this still your view?
        Secretary Austin. Yes. To deter aggression, especially where
    potential adversaries are positioned for rapid seizure of territory,
    the Department must ensure we have credible capabilities and
    warfighting concepts necessary to deny aggressors the ability to
    achieve their objectives. Ultimately, integrated deterrence is enabled
    by combat-credible forces postured to fight and win, and backstopped by
    a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.

        73. Senator Hawley. Secretary Austin, does the 2022 National
    Defense Strategy retain the Global Operating Model from the 2018 NDS
    and, if not, does the Department remain committed to maintaining its
    ability to delay, degrade, and deny a Chinese fait accompli against
    Taiwan from the outset of such a conflict?
        Secretary Austin. The Department is focused on ensuring we have
    credible capabilities and the right concepts to enable us to prevail
    against aggression, including in rapid fait accompli scenarios. The
    2022 National Defense Strategy prioritizes the PRC as our most
    consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge for the
    Department.
                                  simultaneity
        74. Senator Hawley. Secretary Austin and General Milley, is it fair
    to say that many of the capabilities we'd use in a fight against
    China--or withhold to deter Chinese opportunistic aggression--are
    capabilities that would no longer be available to deter or defeat
    Russian aggression and that, as a result, it will be essential for our
    NATO allies to take on a larger share of the burden of deterring
    Russia?
        Secretary Austin. The 2022 National Defense Strategy prioritizes
    the PRC as our most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing
    challenge for the Department and notes that Russia is an acute threat.
    In both cases, our Allies and partners remain a force multiplier for
    the United States along the spectrum of competition and conflict. The
    United States will always be ready to address aggression from multiple
    quarters through the full spectrum of its capabilities and in concert
    with our Allies and partners.
        General Milley. Our commitments as outlined in the Taiwan Relations
    Act, Three Communiques, and Six Assurances remain unchanged. Our
    support for Taiwan remains strong, principled, bipartisan, and in line
    with our one-China policy and longstanding commitments. We are ready to
    confront all adversaries with a graduated, dynamic employment of the
    Joint Force to achieve our National Security objectives. Our alliances
    and partnerships are key to maintaining the rules-based international
    order, and in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific they are the linchpin of
    our strategy of integrated deterrence. We have both sustained our
    strong posture and are taking truly unprecedented steps to strengthen
    our alliances and partnerships.
        The United States will continue to ensure our NATO allies have the
    forces necessary to deter, or if necessary, defeat Russian aggression.
    Putin's actions in Ukraine have solidified NATO's purpose and
    invigorated Allies into taking renewed interests in their military
    investment and capabilities. While the United States will maintain its
    commitments in Europe, we will prioritize the development of systems
    critical to the security of the INDOPACOM theater. These advances will
    increase military advantages in both theaters.
                                 defense budget
        75. Senator Hawley. Secretary Austin, the Department has said that
    ``campaigning'' is a core element of the 2022 National Defense
    Strategy. Why then is there $437 million for theater campaigning on
    INDOPACOM's unfunded requirements list?
        Secretary Austin. Our National Defense Strategy lays out what I
    have said many times since I joined the Department as Secretary of
    Defense, which is that China is our number one pacing challenge. United
    States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) is an integral part of how we
    address the challenges posed by the People's Republic of China, and I
    am proud of the work our team at USINDOPACOM continues to do to deter
    aggression and protect our interests in the region. Well-disciplined
    campaigning is critical to advancing our priorities in the Indo-Pacific
    region. In support of this effort, the President's Budget request for
    fiscal year 2023 would fund $276 million of USINDOPACOM's Section 1242
    request of $712.7 million for campaigning. This is the maximum amount
    of funding that DOD determined it could execute feasibly with available
    forces and without degrading the readiness of the Joint Force. Joint
    Force readiness is foundational to integrated deterrence, and the
    budget request includes almost $135 billion to enhance the readiness of
    the Military Services, with ready forces available for allocation to
    USINDOPACOM if required. The budget request also includes $540 million
    (designated as PDI) for exercises, experimentation, and innovation,
    which will also contribute to campaigning within USINDOPACOM.

        76. Senator Hawley. Secretary Austin, the budget request shrinks
    our naval battle force from 298 ships today to 280 in fiscal year 2027,
    when many agree that the risk of Chinese invasion of Taiwan will be
    especially high. How does DOD plan to make up for this loss of
    capacity, so we have the naval forces we need to ensure deterrence
    holds through this critical period?
        Secretary Austin. We have today and will continue to have in the
    future the most dominant navy in the world. We are focused on acquiring
    the right mix of capabilities that are matched to our warfighting
    concepts and our strategy. The Department's fiscal year 2023
    shipbuilding and maritime systems program budget request of $40.8
    billion supports a broad range of forces, including aircraft carriers,
    submarines, surface combatants, and support ships. This budget makes
    significant investments in our Navy--including funding the Columbia-
    class nuclear submarine, two DDGs, amphibious ships, and a new frigate.
    The Navy is retiring some ships that are near the end of their service
    life--or, in the case of Littoral Combat Ships, the Navy is retiring
    some hulls to invest shipbuilding dollars in more lethal capabilities.
        The fiscal year 2023 budget delivers many new capabilities within
    the FYDP (fiscal year 2023 to 2027), including DDG 1000 with
    Conventional Prompt Strike, DDG Flt III with the Air and Missile
    Defense Radar, XLUUV autonomous underwater vehicle, Maritime Strike
    Tomahawk, MQ-4 maritime surveillance drone, and MQ-25 aerial refueling
    drone.

        77. Senator Hawley. Secretary Austin, has the Department decided to
    prioritize posture investments in the Indo-Pacific over analogous
    investments in other theaters?
        Secretary Austin. The Global Posture Review (GPR) established the
    Indo-Pacific region as the priority region for DOD posture investments.
    The 2022 National Defense Strategy further reinforced this
    prioritization. In implementing this guidance, DOD will continue
    balancing emergent near-term requirements--such as reinforcing NATO in
    response to Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine--with its focus on
    the People's Republic of China as the pacing challenge.

        78. Senator Hawley. Secretary Austin, if the Department has decided
    to prioritize posture investments in the Indo-Pacific over analogous
    investments in other theaters, then why does INDOPACOM's unfunded
    requirements list include $47.6 million for unfunded military
    construction projects and another $260 million for a Joint Program
    Office to facilitate timely delivery of INDOPACOM posture improvements?
        Secretary Austin. Prioritizing posture investments in the Indo-
    Pacific region is a key element of DOD's strategic approach of focusing
    on the People's Republic of China as the pacing challenge. DOD is laser
    focused on advancing these initiatives, which require detailed
    logistical and resource planning, assessment of political-military
    considerations, and in many cases, formal negotiation with host nations
    to secure access, basing, and overflight permissions before
    construction can commence. As an example, the highest value military
    construction projects on USINDOPACOM's Unfunded Priorities List were
    proposals for Papua New Guinea, a country where the United States
    Government is still working to secure the required bilateral
    agreements.
        The President's Budget request for fiscal year 2023 makes
    substantial investments in the Indo Pacific. For example, the fiscal
    year 2023 budget funds $276 million of USINDOPACOM's Section 1242
    request of $712.7 million for campaigning. This is the maximum amount
    of funding that DOD determined it could execute feasibly with available
    forces and without degrading the readiness of the Joint Force. Joint
    Force readiness is foundational to integrated deterrence, and the
    fiscal year 2023 budget request includes almost $135 billion to enhance
    the readiness of the Military Services, with ready forces available for
    allocation to USINDOPACOM if required. The budget request also includes
    $540 million (designated as PDI) for exercises, experimentation, and
    innovation, which will also contribute to campaigning within
    USINDOPACOM.
                                   munitions
        79. Senator Hawley. Secretary Austin, how many years will it take
    us to reach requirements for preferred munitions in our priority
    theaters at current levels of production?
        Secretary Austin. This is an area that I am closely monitoring,
    particularly as we draw down stocks in support of Ukraine's self-
    defense. We will continue to keep the Congress informed if we believe
    we require any authorities or resources to strengthen our munitions
    stocks.
        As a general matter, the Department performs a portfolio-based
    review of munitions annually based on the Munitions Requirements
    Process to inform the budget process. The current proposed munitions
    levels for fiscal year 2023 align with Department budget priorities.
    Your support in funding the President's Budget request will ensure we
    have the level of munitions we need to support our objectives.

        80. Senator Hawley. Secretary Austin, are there any preferred
    munitions that could be produced a higher rate than what is reflected
    in the budget request, and if so, which are they?
        Secretary Austin. The Department is constantly working with our
    industry partners to determine what surge capacity is needed to help
    sustain readiness. The defense industrial base has the ability to
    support demand level changes and urgent wartime requirements through
    current maximum production rates and ongoing coordination with the
    Department's industrial policy and acquisition experts. As industry
    continues working to resolve the obsolescence and supply chain issues
    that challenge manufacturing sectors around the globe, now more than
    ever, we need to send a consistent demand signal on U.S. munitions
    requirements and those of our allies and partners. Authorities and
    programs such as the Department's Critical Munitions Acquisition Fund
    will aid the Department in ensuring the health of the defense
    industrial base and the immediate availability of critical munitions.

        81. Senator Hawley. Secretary Austin, General Milley, and Secretary
    McCord, has the Department done an analysis to identify capabilities
    that would be in high demand in both Asia and Europe in the event of
    simultaneous conflicts, and if so, can you provide a list of those
    capabilities to this committee?
        Secretary Austin and Secretary McCord. Yes, we have conducted
    analysis that highlights key capabilities from both a near-term and
    long-term perspective that would be in high demand in each warfight. We
    can provide more information at a higher classification level. We are
    continually updating and refining our analysis as we experiment with
    innovative concepts and capabilities.
        General Milley. Our National Defense Strategy is centered on
    deterring our adversaries from entering this type of hypothetical
    scenario. Current NDS drives toward a single engagement and deter in
    others. This Integrated Deterrence will develop and combine our
    strengths by working seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters,
    the spectrum of conflict, the other instruments of U.S. national power,
    and our unmatched network of Alliances and partnerships. To backstop
    Integrated Deterrence, we must continue to develop capabilities in
    accordance with our Joint Warfighting Concept to deter, and to win the
    next war, if required. The Fiscal Year 2023 Long Range Fires invests
    $7.2 billion in Conventional Prompt Strike, Hypersonic Air-launched
    Cruise Missiles, Long Range Hypersonic Weapons, Joint Air and Surface
    Standoff Missiles, Long Range Anti-ship Missile, and Guided Multiple
    Launch Rocket System.
                               nuclear deterrence
        82. Senator Hawley. Secretary Austin, why did the Administration
    cut the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile over the objections
    of General Milley, the STRATCOM Commander, and the EUCOM Commander?
        Secretary Austin. The Administration considered a variety of
    regional deterrence contingencies as part of the 2022 Nuclear Posture
    Review, which affirmed the need to deter limited nuclear use by
    adversaries. We already field capabilities intended to address these
    scenarios, including the recently introduced W76-2 low-yield submarine-
    launched ballistic missile, the B61-12 gravity bomb delivered by dual-
    capable aircraft, and the existing air-launched cruise missile that
    will eventually be replaced by the modernized Long-Range Standoff
    Weapon. Given the deterrence contributions of these capabilities, the
    nuclear weapons-capable sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) program
    was canceled, considering its marginal utility, its estimated cost in
    light of other nuclear modernization and defense priorities, and the
    fact that it could not be delivered until the 2030's.
        *\1\ https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20220309/114487/HHRG-
    117-AS00-Wstate-RatnerE-20220309.pdf

      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR
             FISCAL YEAR 2023 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                              TUESDAY, MAY 3, 2022

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                               AIR FORCE POSTURE

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Gillibrand,
    Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Manchin,
    Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton,
    Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Blackburn, and
    Hawley.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. Good morning. The Committee meets this
    morning to receive testimony on the plans and programs of the
    Department of the Air Force in review of the fiscal year 2023
    President's Defense Budget Request.
        I would like to welcome our witnesses: Mr. Frank Kendall,
    Secretary of the Air Force; General Charles Brown, Chief of
    Staff of the Air Force; and General John Raymond, Chief of
    Space Operations. We are grateful to the men and women of the
    Air Force and Space Force for their service, and to their
    families for their continued support.
        President Biden's defense budget request for fiscal year
    2023 includes approximately $234 billion in funding for the Air
    Force, an increase of $13.5 billion from the fiscal year 2022
    enacted budget. In preparing this budget request, the Air Force
    faced difficult decisions in balancing the need to modernize
    and keep technological advantage over near-peer competitors
    against the need to support ongoing operations around the
    world. The budget before us aims to maintain that balance by
    increasing funding to address readiness concerns while also
    funding technologies for the future fight and modernizing our
    strategic deterrent capability.
        The budget request for the Air Force would include
    additional investments in capabilities such as Next Generation
    Air Dominance, the B-21, Long-Range Stand-Off Weapons,
    hypersonics, and Air and Ground Moving Target Indication. These
    changes are part of continuing to implement General Brown's
    strategic vision of ``Accelerate Change or Lose.'' During
    today's hearing I hope we will hear more on the programs that
    have received increased emphasis under the Chief's vision.
        The budget request also proposes to retire or realign
    various elements of the Air Force, with a net reduction of
    roughly 370 aircraft in fiscal year 2023. This would include
    reducing or altering the force structure for A-10s, F-16s, F-
    15s, F-22s, C-130s, KC-135s, KC-10s, JSTARS aircraft, AWACS
    aircraft, and MQ-9 Reaper remotely piloted aircraft. Any
    proposal of this sort deserves our careful consideration. I
    hope the witnesses will provide the Committee with reasoning
    for the proposed retirements and realignments within this
    budget request and assures that any decisions are well thought
    out before disruptions to the force structure begin.
        We will have to evaluate these proposals against the
    backdrop of the conflict in Ukraine. First, this conflict
    causes many of us concern about retiring weapons systems that
    could actually be required in the very near term. Second, we
    need to be sure that we maintain or increase our stocks of
    munitions, spare parts, and other elements of the sustainment
    portfolio to ensure we are sufficiently prepared to deter any
    aggressors. Third, we need to evaluate our domestic industrial
    base to avoid making short-sighted decisions that could harm
    our Nation's ability to provide for our defense. I am
    interested to know your thoughts on these matters, as well as
    your plans to improve shortfalls within the pilot and
    maintenance personnel communities.
        Turning to the Space Force, Congress established the Space
    Force with the purpose of consolidating numerous space
    activities in the Department of Defense (DOD). General Raymond,
    I would like to know how you are growing the service in terms
    of personnel. I am also interested in an update on how you are
    normalizing operations within the larger Department of Defense,
    including progress on the merging of the Space Development
    Agency into the Space Force by October 1, 2022.
        With regard to space warfighting capabilities, section 1602
    of the Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act
    required the Secretary of Defense to designate the Chief of
    Space Operations as the force design architect for future
    satellite constellations of the armed services. It is critical
    for the Space Force to design its warfighting objectives in the
    same way the Chief of Naval Operations designs our Navy fleets
    and the Chief of the Air Force designs our air posture. I will
    want to know your progress toward that objective.
        Finally, now that the Space Force is up and running, it is
    important to present a trained force with substantive
    capabilities to the combatant commands. One of the capabilities
    for the combatant commands now under discussion is tactical
    space intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, ISR. This
    is a new operating domain for the Defense Department, and I
    would ask the witnesses to discuss what resources they believe
    are needed to ensure its success.
        Secretary Kendall, General Brown, and General Raymond,
    thank you again for appearing before our committee and I look
    forward to your testimony.
        With that let me recognize the Ranking Member, Senator
    Inhofe.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES INHOFE

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in
    welcoming our three witnesses today.
        I will get right to it. I have reviewed the new 2022
    National Defense Strategy, and I have examined the budget. I
    have attended multiple threat briefings--Secretary Kendall, I
    was sorry to miss one of yours but I made all the rest of
    them--and they did not paint a very optimistic picture of what
    we are faced with.
        So, I do not understand how this Air Force budget even
    begins to resource the strategy. First, inflation is the new
    sequestration. It is destroying your buying power, and the
    salaries of your servicemembers. That is definitely true in
    2022, and probably true in 2023.
        Second, there is simply not enough in this budget to
    reverse the trends we hear about in classified sessions. That
    is particularly true over the next 5 to 7 years. This budget
    divests 1,500 aircraft and buys 500. You know, the math does
    not work out.
        Let us take one example. The budget retires almost 31--
    well, there are 31 total of the AWACS of which 31 are in
    Oklahoma and I think some are forward deployed, maybe 5 or 6,
    and that is one example of where we are right now, and when the
    replacement will not come online until 2027. I have always been
    in favor of divesting aircraft when it makes sense and we can
    mitigate the risk. But we are not mitigating the risk unless we
    move much, much faster than we are moving today.
        I appreciate your decision to pursue a sole-source of the
    E-7 Wedgetail. I look forward to working with you to use
    existing authorities to get this critical capability as soon as
    possible.
        Another, this budget buys only 33 F-35As, the lowest since
    sequestration. These Block 4 aircraft will be the cornerstone
    of our fleet, new allies and partners are joining the program,
    and our commanders and pilots tell us they love the aircraft
    and they love to fly it.
        We are still buying multiple air munitions at very low
    rates. We are buying tankers at very low rates, despite
    concerns about contested logistics. I could go on and on, but
    you get the idea.
        Just to be clear, I am not blaming you. The three witnesses
    today, they are not to be blamed on this. I do not want that to
    be misunderstood. This is what is happening when you get an
    arbitrary topline, when the budget just does not match the
    strategy. It is not strategy-based budgeting.
        There are bright spots in the Air Force budget. Nuclear
    modernization is proceeding well. The B-21 and Next-Generation
    Air Dominance are significant success stories. But most of the
    bright spots share one thing in common. That is they are 10
    years away.
        I am proud of what the Space Force has been able to achieve
    with real budget growth since its standup. We find they are
    moving a fleet to meet the threat in space.
        Now here is something that was significant because we could
    go today. We had a hearing here in this chamber and we had
    David Berteau. I am going to use this quote as often as I can
    to remind people, we can sit around and talk about what I just
    did in an opening statement, but when it gets down to it,
    though, we really should be talking about what China is doing.
        His quote, David Berteau, a week ago today, said, ``It
    takes today 3 years to do what China can do in 3 days in terms
    of deciding, resourcing, and getting started on something that
    needs to be done, particularly bringing new technology into
    play.'' That is a significant thing here. You know, how far
    behind we are, we are getting further behind, and I think we
    discussed why this is happening, and this is the thing that we
    need to be addressing.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
        Now let me recognize Secretary Kendall. Secretary Kendall,
    please.

    STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE FRANK KENDALL III, SECRETARY OF THE
                               AIR FORCE

        Mr. Kendall. Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
    Inhofe, and Members of the Committee. I am honored to have
    General Brown and General Raymond join me in representing the
    nearly 700,000 airmen and guardians that defend our Nation. We
    are all thankful for your consistent support over the years.
        Speaking in 1940, General Douglas MacArthur said the
    following: ``The history of failure in war can almost be summed
    up in two words: too late. Too late in comprehending the deadly
    purpose of a potential enemy, too late in realizing the mortal
    danger, too late in preparedness, too late in uniting all
    possible forces for resistance, and too late in standing with
    one's friends.''
        I believe MacArthur made this comment after France fell to
    Nazi Germany and their aggression but before the attack on
    Pearl Harbor drew the United States into a war in Asia, a time
    that, in some ways, may be analogous to our own.
        What my colleagues and I are trying to do, and what we need
    your help with, is to ensure that America's Air and Space
    Forces are never too late in meeting our pacing challenge,
    which is China. We are also concerned about the now obvious and
    acute threat of Russian aggression.
        Many of you have heard the China threat briefing that we
    presented. It lays out China's efforts to develop and field
    forces that can defeat our ability to project power in the
    Western Pacific. China is also significantly increasing its
    nuclear weapon inventory and working to field long-range strike
    capabilities that can put our Homeland at risk.
        Today we will say more about how the Department of the Air
    Force is responding to that threat through our fiscal year 2023
    budget and through future budgets. Our budgetary submission
    provides a balance between the capabilities we need today and
    investment in transformation required to address emerging
    threats. With the requested budget, the Air and Space Forces
    will be able to support our combatant commanders in the
    continuing campaigns that demonstrate our resolve and support
    and encourage our allies and partners around the world.
    Simultaneously, our fiscal year 2023 budget represents a
    significant early step in the transformation of the Air and
    Space Forces to the capabilities needed to provide enduring
    advantage.
        An important feature of our budget request is a substantial
    increase in research and development funding. This investment
    is a down payment on production and sustainment investments and
    hard choices that are yet to come.
        We are comfortable with the balance struck in this budget
    submission. We also want to ensure the committee understands
    that hard choices do lie ahead at any budget level. In this
    request we are asking for divestiture of equipment that is
    beyond its service life, too expensive to sustain, and not
    effective against the pacing challenge. These divestitures are
    necessary to provide the resources required to transform the
    Department of the Air Force to support integrated deterrence.
    We appreciate the committee's support for the divestitures
    requested last year, and we ask for your support for these we
    are requesting this year and those in the future.
        Change is hard but losing is unacceptable, and we cannot
    afford to be too late.
        The work we have ongoing in the Department of the Air Force
    to define the necessary transformation is focused on seven
    operational imperatives, each of which is associated with some
    aspect of our ability to project power. As of today there
    should be no doubt that great power acts of aggression do
    occur, and equally no doubt of how devastating they can be to
    the victims of that aggression and for the global community.
        First, if the Space Force is to fulfill its mission of
    enabling and protecting the Joint Force we must pivot to
    transformational space architectures and systems. In fiscal
    year 2023, we are asking for funding to begin the
    transformation to resilient missile warning and tracking and to
    resilient communications networks.
        Second, we must integrate and officially employ Air and
    Space Forces as part of a highly lethal Joint Force to advance
    battle management system, or ABMS. This budget continues
    funding for the early increments of ABMS and the ongoing work
    that will define the additional investments the Department
    needs to cost-effectively modernize our command control of
    communications and battle management networks.
        Third, to defeat aggression we must have the ability to
    hold large numbers of air and surface targets at risk in a
    time-compressed scenario. This budget funds the E-7 Wedgetail
    as an interim AWACS replacement, while supporting work to
    define the transformation to a resilient combination of air and
    space intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting
    systems.
        Fourth, our control of the air is being challenged and we
    must proceed to an affordable, next-generation air dominance
    family of systems. The budget increases funding for the NGAD
    [next-generation air dominance] family of systems to include a
    sixth-generation crewed platform, and an uncrewed, unmanned
    combat aircraft.
        Fifth, you must have resilient forward basing for our
    tactical air forces. This budget continues funding for agile
    combat employment in both the Indo-Pacific and European
    regions, while we define the most cost-effective mix of
    hardening, active defense, deception, and dispersion.
        Sixth, we must ensure the long-term viability and cost-
    effectiveness of our global strike capability. This budget
    begins the transition of the B-21 from development to
    production, and it continues the work to define a more
    extensive global strike family of systems that also includes
    uncrewed aircraft.
        Finally, the Department of the Air Force must be fully
    ready to transition to a wartime posture against a peer
    competitor. In particular, we must strengthen our cybersecurity
    and our resilience against attack on the information systems
    and facilities that we depend upon to go to war.
        Members of the Committee, I look forward to your support as
    we work to ensure that America's Air and Space Forces are never
    too late. One team, one fight.
        We absolutely look forward to your questions.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Let me now recognize General Brown, please.

     STATEMENT OF GENERAL CHARLES BROWN, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR
                                 FORCE

        General Brown. Good morning, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
    Inhofe, and Distinguished Members of this Committee. It is an
    honor to appear before you and represent the 689,000 total
    force airmen serving today. Thank you for your continued
    support to our airmen and their families.
        I appreciate the opportunity to be here today with
    Secretary Kendall and General Raymond to testify on the fiscal
    year 2023 budget submission, a budget that continues to
    accelerate the Air Force's rate of change to address the
    security challenges articulated in the National Defense
    Strategy, a budget that continues to build on the successes of
    fiscal year 2022.
        The United States Air Force is a leading example. Our
    airmen make air power look easy. It is anything but. A world-
    class Air Force requires world-class airmen that are organized,
    trained, and equipped to remain the world's most respected Air
    Force. But if we do not continue to transform this may no
    longer be the case. We must continue to communicate and
    collaborate with this committee and key stakeholders so we can
    accelerate change.
        Last year's budget communicated the Air Force the Nation
    needs for 2030 and beyond. Our message has not changed for
    fiscal year 2023, and it will not change in future budget
    submissions. We must modernize to counter strategic
    competitors. The PRC [People's Republic of China] remains our
    pacing challenge and Russia remains our acute threat, so we
    must balance between the demands of today and the requirements
    of tomorrow. Failure to do so puts our ability to execute the
    National Defense Strategy at risk. It puts soldiers, sailors,
    marines, guardians, and airmen, along with allies and partners,
    at risk. It puts our ability to place air power anytime,
    anywhere at risk.
        The only way our Air Force and the Nation will be
    successful balancing risk between today and tomorrow is if we
    collaborate. In fact, collaboration is the critical work in
    ``Accelerate Change or Lose.'' We are beginning to see the
    success of our collaboration efforts towards transitioning to
    the future.
        This year's budget brought substantial increases to
    research and development, focused on placing meaningful
    military capability into the hands of airmen. Investments in
    systems and concepts allow Air Force to penetrate and dominate
    in any scenario. This is as important as our investment
    efforts. We have been successful beginning to divest systems
    that are increasingly irrelevant against today and tomorrow's
    threats.
        We did not do this alone. Support of Congress is much
    appreciated.
        Accelerating change is the impetus behind the Department of
    the Air Force's operational imperatives. This means moving with
    a sense of urgency and doing so in the right direction. This
    year's National Defense Strategy provides us the needed
    direction, and when you combine the operational imperatives in
    the National Defense Strategy you see this year's budget is an
    alignment with what our Nation demands of our Air Force.
        The Air Force we are building is critical to integrate
    deterrence, campaigning, and building enduring advantages.
    Because nuclear deterrence is the backstop of any deterrence,
    this year's budget ensures our nuclear portfolios are fully
    funded. Current events are emblematic of how our Air Force is
    campaigning. We deployed Air Force assets within days, shared
    vital information, and increased interoperability with our
    allies and partners.
        Finally, the Air Force is investing in enduring advantages
    that allow us to defend the Homeland, project air power
    globally, and operate as joint allied and partner force. More
    than anyone, I want tomorrow's airmen to be ready to respond
    when our Nation calls. This includes investing in programs that
    allow all of our airmen and their families to reach their full
    potential.
        As the United States Air Force celebrates its 75th
    anniversary this year, we are committed to remaining the world-
    class Air Force America can be proud of. Current events
    demonstrate the world is growing more complex and uncertain. I
    am certain we will need air power anytime, anywhere, I am
    certain this year's budget is another step towards
    transformation of our Air Force, and I am certain there is
    still more work to be done. Therefore, we must continue to
    communicate and collaborate so we can accelerate change.
        Thank you for the opportunity to be with you today, and I
    look forward to your questions.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, General Brown.
        General Raymond, please.

        STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN RAYMOND, USSF, CHIEF OF SPACE
                               OPERATIONS

        General Raymond. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
    distinguished Members of the Committee, it is an honor to
    appear before you today with Secretary Kendall and General
    Brown, and I am privileged to be part of this leadership team.
    On behalf of the almost 14,000 guardians stationed around the
    world, let me begin by thanking you for your continued
    leadership and your strong support of our guardians and their
    families.
        As we testify before you today, we find ourselves at a
    strategic inflection point where we are faced with an acute
    threat from Russia and a pacing challenge from China. The
    Russian invasion of Ukraine has showcased the importance of
    space to all instruments of power. Information derived from
    space, including commercial imagery, has been instrumental in
    dominating the information environment, communicating with
    forces, detecting missile threats, and sharing intelligence
    amongst allies and partners.
        It is clear that the character of war has changed and space
    is foundational to that change. However, Russia's recent
    direct-ascent, anti-satellite missile test in November is just
    the latest evidence of efforts to deny our Nation the
    advantages that space provides.
        Just as concerning, our pacing challenge, China, is
    integrating space into their military operations to detect,
    track, target, and strike the Joint Force, putting our
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and guardians on the
    ground, in the air, and on the sea at high risk. We cannot
    allow potential adversaries to gain an unchallenged ability to
    conduct space-enabled attacks. Our Joint Forces will remain at
    risk until we can complete the transformation to a resilient
    architecture and protect the Joint Force from space-enabled
    attacks. This is critical to supporting all aspects of the
    National Defense Strategy, integrated deterrence campaigning,
    and building an enduring advantage.
        To remain the world's leader in space this President's
    budget request prioritizes space and invests $24.5 billion to
    ensure our assured access to and freedom to maneuver in space.
    The largest share is in research, development, testing, and
    evaluation funding, almost $16 billion, to modernize our
    forces, a portion of which will begin the pivot to a more
    resilient and mission-capable missile warning and missile
    tracking force design.
        Notably, this includes funding for the Space Development
    Agency, which is included in the Space Force budget for the
    first time this year, and sir, it is on track to transition
    into the Space Force on 1 October of this year.
        In contrast to legacy approaches, this architecture will be
    built to survive and degrade gracefully under attack, help
    manage escalation, and be rapidly reconstituted. This
    transformation will allow us to capitalize more fully on two of
    our national advantages: our commercial industry and our allies
    and partners.
        To increase readiness we are funding operational test and
    training infrastructure. This ensures that we can get the right
    capability on orbit and in the hands of operators trained and
    operating in a contested domain. Robust test and training
    capabilities are also critical to fielding our next generation
    of modernized systems.
        Other key investments include increased funding for weapon
    system sustainment, a more resilient global positioning system,
    and the next generation of satellite communications.
        Finally, and most importantly, we invest in our guardians
    and their families. Over the past two years we have overhauled
    how we recruit, assess, train, develop, promote, employ, and
    take care of our guardians. Resilient space power is not just
    about satellites. It is also about guardians. This is one of
    the reasons we are seeking the integration of Active Duty and
    Reserve forces into a single, hybrid component. This space
    component is central to our human capital plan and will allow
    us to best align our full-time and part-time members. This is
    our number one legislative proposal, and we look forward to
    working very closely with this committee to implement this bold
    and transformational approach.
        As Secretary Kendall has mentioned, change is hard and
    losing is unacceptable. The transformation we are beginning now
    is essential to protecting the Joint Force and to the security
    of space.
        Thank you again for your leadership and support for our
    Space Force. It is an absolute honor to appear before you, and
    I look forward to your questions.
        [The joint prepared statement of The Honorable Frank
    Kendall, General John W. Raymond and General Charles Q. Brown,
    Jr. follows:]

     Joint Prepared Statement by The Honorable Frank Kendall, General John
                  W. Raymond and General Charles Q. Brown, Jr.
                    department of the air force introduction
        The Department of the Air Force, in line with the Department of
    Defense, recognizes the rapidly evolving, global environment and the
    complex challenges it presents. The Department of the Air Force
    provides unique competencies and capabilities to achieve our national
    security priorities to defend the Homeland, deter any strategic
    attacks, deter aggression and be prepared to prevail in conflict, and
    build a resilient joint force. We will advance these priorities through
    integrated deterrence, campaigning, and building enduring advantages.
    Among those priorities, the greatest challenge to the Department of the
    Air Force's ability to perform its missions is the People's Republic of
    China's (PRC) long-standing and extensive military modernization
    program. While the PRC remains the Department's pacing challenge,
    recent events in Eastern Europe highlight that Russia also remains an
    acute threat. Additionally, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
    Iran, and violent extremist organizations are persistent threats that
    will continue to exploit opportunities to further their interests.
    Beyond state and non-state actors, transboundary challenges, such as
    climate change, also demand attention as they transform the strategic
    context in which we operate.
        The Department of the Air Force organizes, trains, and equips as
    part of a joint and combined team. While focused on the PRC--our pacing
    challenge--the Department provides forces that enable our country to
    meet the challenges associated with the full range of national security
    threats. ``One Team, One Fight'' is more than our mantra; it is a
    guiding principle. The Department of the Air Force encompasses two
    Services, united with shared infrastructure, complementary skills,
    resources, competencies, and goals. Our capabilities underwrite the
    design of the joint force, support every combatant command, enable
    every instrument of national power, strengthen our allies and partners,
    and enhance the security and prosperity of every American.
        Meeting our obligations to the Nation and the joint force demands
    we accelerate the transformation from the force we have today to the
    one needed to meet our pacing challenge. The risks we must address are
    increasing over time, in both strategic and conventional defense. This
    evolving strategic landscape requires us to balance risk by investing
    in the more capable and lethal future force the Nation needs to more
    effectively counter current and emerging threats. This transition is
    just beginning; achieving it will require trade-offs between
    maintaining capabilities to address combatant commands' current needs
    while accelerating vital modernization efforts for success in high-end
    conflicts. These investments have been prioritized to focus on key
    contributors to military advantage. fiscal year 2023 marks the next
    step of a much larger journey. Continuing progress is essential but
    will become increasingly challenging over time. Change is hard. It is
    hard politically, culturally, technologically, and institutionally.
    Still, we must make the needed transition; we must make tough choices;
    we must accept prudent risk; and we must get it right, or we will lose.
        One challenging step we are taking in the fiscal year 2023 budget
    is to make relatively modest short-term changes to the mix of
    capabilities and capacity of our air and space assets; this will drive
    limited divestments in fiscal year 2023. The aircraft we seek to retire
    are respected platforms that have served us well and whose capabilities
    were invaluable on yesterday's battlefields. However, they are not
    well-suited for today's contested environments or tomorrow's high-end
    conflicts. They do not give our competitors cause for concern, are
    aging and increasingly costly to maintain, and do not provide our joint
    force the capabilities to deter--and if called upon--to fight and win
    against pressing threats. Any budget is finite, and forced resourcing
    of outdated systems jeopardizes our ability to guarantee air and space
    superiority in the future. We must balance the risk associated with
    retiring older platforms in order to onboard new, necessary
    technologies and capabilities. This will allow us to ensure the United
    States maintains sufficient military advantage to secure our vital
    national interests and support our allies and partners. In addition to
    eliminating the expense of maintaining outdated platforms, these
    divestments allow our most valuable resource--our people--to transition
    to capabilities that provide an enduring advantage. Providing our
    airmen and guardians with the tools they need to prevail is our most
    sacred obligation.
        Last year, Congressional support enabled us to initiate this
    transition to better confront our pacing challenge. Congressional
    approval to begin retiring outdated fighter, tanker, cargo, and command
    and control aircraft, and to begin updating our space architecture,
    allows us to start investing in the necessary capabilities we require
    to win future conflicts. While the Department of the Air Force remains
    grateful for past and future Congressional support, we continue to face
    burdensome restrictions on structural changes year after year, impeding
    the development of a more modern, operationally relevant force that the
    Nation requires. We need continued Congressional collaboration and
    support to ensure deterrence and, if needed, victory.
        This year, the Department of the Air Force, powered by
    approximately 700,000 airmen and guardians, celebrates 75 years of air
    and space dominance. This milestone was achieved through the dedication
    and sacrifice of generations of Total Force members who served our
    Department throughout its rich history. Their legacy is foundational to
    this incredible Department and continues to be honored by those who
    serve today. Our team of military and civilian Active, Guard, and
    Reservist airmen and guardians all contribute to our Nation's air and
    space security. These brave, inspiring Americans provide great hope for
    the future of our Department and our Nation by ensuring the high ground
    always belongs to the United States.
        Airmen and guardians are our competitive advantage, and the
    Department of the Air Force is creating a future force with the human-
    capital capabilities and competencies required to win. We must continue
    to maximize opportunities for all members to serve to their fullest
    potential. We remain committed to building a culture of respect, where
    sexual assault and harassment are not tolerated in any form. We will do
    this by supporting victims and prosecuting offenders through the
    Uniform Code of Military Justice and reinforcing the Department of
    Defense's implementation roadmap to employ the recommendations of the
    Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment.
    Additionally, the Department will continue to confront racial, ethnic,
    and gender disparity, interpersonal violence, and suicide, all of which
    erode morale, hinder our airmen and guardians' ability to achieve their
    full potential, and degrade our ability to execute our missions.
    Furthermore, we will continue to highlight successful diversity and
    inclusion initiatives, ensuring all of our personnel understand and
    contribute fully to our collective strength. Dedicated, talented, and
    selfless Airmen and Guardians enable our success, and they must all be
    valued, supported, and empowered to reach their full potential so they
    can make the maximum possible contribution to the Department's
    readiness.
        While fiscal year 2023 fully budgets for the strategic deterrent
    recapitalization as well as Homeland defense-oriented systems, the
    Department of the Air Force has evaluated the threat landscape and
    determined that additional modernization efforts are required to
    address seven conventional warfare operational imperatives. The former
    AF/A9 element of the Air Staff has been transferred to the Office of
    the Secretary of the Air Force and redesignated as the Department of
    the Air Force Studies and Analysis Office (DAFSA). DAFSA will provide
    analytical support to each of seven imperatives. These seven
    imperatives focus our efforts and lay the framework for this and
    subsequent budgetary requests. They also reflect the conventional
    warfare priorities of the Department of Defense and the Department of
    the Air Force. Our current capabilities in each of these areas will not
    be adequate to address emerging threats, and hard choices in future
    budgets will almost certainly be necessary.
        First, the Department of the Air Force must define and resource a
    resilient, effective space order of battle that ensures our terrestrial
    forces have the support from space on which they depend. At the same
    time, we must deny any potential adversary the operational services
    they expect to receive from space, especially the ability to target key
    elements of the joint force. Space is a warfighting domain and
    contested environment today, and it will only become more so in the
    future. In the fiscal year 2023 budget, we begin the transition to more
    resilient communications and missile warning architectures. The
    Department of the Air Force is also currently working with the
    Intelligence Community and others to define joint solutions to our
    intelligence, operational surveillance, and reconnaissance needs.
        Second, we must achieve an operationally-optimized Advanced Battle
    Management System (ABMS) as the Department's primary contribution to
    Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2). The fiscal year 2023
    budget continues funding for early increments of ABMS. Ongoing work
    will define additional future investments that are needed to most cost-
    effectively modernize the Air and Space Forces Command, Control, and
    Communications Battle Management networks and to integrate those
    networks with the joint and combined force.
        Third, achieving Moving Target Indication (MTI) and tracking of
    surface and air threats at scale in a challenging operational
    environment is a necessary step in any JADC2 or ABMS system. Existing
    systems, principally Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and
    Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), are aging and
    increasingly vulnerable to advanced threats, as are uncrewed systems
    designed for permissive environments. The fiscal year 2023 budget
    provides funding to acquire an interim AWACS replacement while ongoing
    analysis will define the optimal mix of air-based and space-based
    ground and aerial MTI systems and architectures. These systems must be
    able to find and track high-priority mobile targets in the air, on the
    sea surface, and on the ground in contested environments. The ability
    to hold larger numbers of targets at risk in a time-compressed scenario
    is essential to conventional deterrence and defeating aggression.
        Fourth, both threat developments and affordability concerns dictate
    that the Air Force proceed to develop and field a Next Generation Air
    Dominance (NGAD) family-of-systems. This family-of-systems will include
    a sixth-generation crewed platform, as well as uncrewed combat aircraft
    and a cost-effective mix of sensors, weapons, and communications
    systems. Several years of technology maturation have led the Department
    of the Air Force to conclude that crewed-uncrewed teaming for air
    dominance and other tactical missions is within reach. The NGAD core
    crewed platform is funded for development in the fiscal year 2023
    budget, and the work to define other elements of this family-of-systems
    has been initiated.
        Fifth, we must define and resource cost-effective, resilient
    forward basing for our tactical aircraft. The last decades of conflict
    saw our airfields operating with comparably little interruption or
    threat, but the PRC has invested extensively in precise long-range
    ballistic and cruise missiles that threaten our forward air bases.
    Their investments into hypersonic weapons, which are much harder to
    defend against, further threaten our forward bases. This budget
    continues funding for Agile Combat Employment (ACE) in both the Indo-
    Pacific and European regions while work is ongoing to define the most
    cost-effective mix of hardening, active defense, deception, and
    dispersion activities. This includes necessary mobile logistics or
    prepositioned assets required to sustain operations. All our
    investments in tactical airpower depend on our success at achieving
    resilient forward basing.
        Sixth, our global conventional strike capabilities will be built
    around the B-21 Raider and associated family-of-systems. The fiscal
    year 2023 budget fully funds the B-21 for continued development and the
    initiation of production. The Department of the Air Force is working to
    determine an affordable family-of-systems that will be associated with
    the B-21 and include uncrewed combat aircraft with comparable range.
    Like NGAD, the B-21 is envisioned to operate as part of a more
    extensive set of systems with significantly more operational
    performance than the B-21 alone.
        Seventh, to provide effective integrated deterrence, the Department
    of the Air Force must be fully ready to expeditiously transition to a
    wartime posture. We must be ready to mobilize against a peer competitor
    who has spent decades researching and developing the means to attack
    the systems and infrastructure we depend on to go to war through cyber
    and non-cyber means. This budget includes resources to modernize and
    harden our existing information systems. Ongoing work will define
    additional steps that should be taken to deter and defeat cyber and
    other attacks on our information systems and logistical infrastructure.
        In summary, the Air Force and Space Force fiscal year 2023 budgets
    balance the risks of maintaining current readiness to support combatant
    commands today with the need to develop and deliver the force needed
    for tomorrow. In the following sections, we discuss how the Space Force
    and Air Force will balance these risks from the perspectives associated
    with the goals of integrated deterrence, campaigning, and building
    enduring advantages. This budget and our ongoing efforts lay the
    groundwork for the tough choices we expect to face next fiscal year and
    beyond. The Department of the Air Force has undergone historic
    transitions through our rich, 75-year history, and we are in the
    infancy of another historic change now. This change will ensure we
    maintain our ability to deter and, when necessary, defeat those who
    seek to prevent our Nation and our allies and partners from being
    secure, prosperous, and free. Change is hard--losing is unacceptable.
    ``One Team, One Fight.''
                           united states space force
        The United States Space Force and its capabilities underwrite all
    instruments of national power and enable the joint force to operate
    effectively. The joint force cannot succeed without space capabilities.
    Spacepower is a source of our Nation's strength both at home and abroad
    and provides socioeconomic benefit to all Americans, an expanding
    network of allies and partners, and the global community. Access to and
    use of space are vital national interests, and space capabilities
    provide critical data, products, and services that drive innovation in
    the United States and around the world. Our pacing challenge, the PRC,
    understands the importance of space and is acquiring the space systems
    and counter-space systems to hold our interests at risk and defeat us
    in conflict.
        Uninterrupted use of space and protection from adversary counter-
    space operations are foundational to the design and function of the
    joint force. Historically, precise missile warning and the ability to
    attribute the source of the threat helped deter missile strikes on the
    homeland; high-resolution satellite imagery allowed the joint force to
    revolutionize the speed and sophistication of target development;
    precision navigation, enabled by the Global Positioning System (GPS),
    revolutionized weapons accuracy and the efficiency of munitions; and
    satellite communications (SATCOM) enabled over-the-horizon power
    projection, which is essential to deterring aggression. It is not
    hyperbole to say the joint force cannot prevail without space. The
    United States also cannot allow potential adversaries to gain an
    unchallenged ability to conduct space-enabled attacks on our joint
    forces and terrestrial interests.
        The United States is the world's premier space power, and our
    military capabilities enable the joint force to succeed, but this
    position is being challenged as never before. The PRC and Russia
    understand the unique advantages that spacepower provides and have
    demonstrated the willingness and ability to attack space capabilities
    and endanger peaceful use of the domain. The November 2021 Russian
    anti-satellite missile test, whose debris continues to threaten all
    nations' space assets, is just the latest of many irresponsible
    counter-space weapon demonstrations by both the PRC and Russia. Both
    competitors are researching, developing, and fielding the space and
    counter-space systems needed to defeat the joint force. In addition to
    developing the ability to attack in space, the PRC has integrated space
    capabilities into its military operations in order to target maritime,
    air, and land forces and project power through space. The PRC's 2021
    test of an orbital hypersonic glide vehicle constitutes a new challenge
    to strategic deterrence and stability. Further, in its invasion of
    Ukraine, Russia maintains the ability to deploy and employ a wide range
    of ground-based electronic warfare capabilities to counter GPS,
    tactical communications, SATCOM, and radars.
        The Space Force must take urgent action to meet growing threats to
    vital national interests and to strengthen deterrence. This budget
    represents the beginning of an unprecedented transformation from a few
    exquisite space systems to more capable, resilient, and defendable
    architectures comprised of a diverse and distributed mix of
    capabilities.
                  space force's role in integrated deterrence
        Integrated deterrence starts with space. The Space Force provides
    the joint force and our allies and partners critical services that are
    essential to integrated deterrence and effective defense. Unique
    services such as missile warning, positioning, navigation and timing,
    communications, and space-enabled intelligence, make the United States
    a valued security partner. Deterrence has long depended on assured
    missile warning and the ability to communicate with strategic forces in
    all circumstances. The Space Force delivers unmatched capability in
    these missions today and is developing the next generation of
    capabilities to meet mission requirements in the future.
        Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared provides critical
    tactical and strategic ballistic missile warning and acts as a bridge
    from legacy detection and warning to the more robust missile tracking
    needed to counter modern, maneuverable threats. The transition towards
    resilient, proliferated architectures will extend to other mission
    areas, including battlespace awareness and space-based intelligence. In
    addition to our ability to provide warning and tracking of modern
    threats, the Evolved Strategic Satellite Communication system will
    ensure the ability to command and control strategic forces despite
    attack.
        Space provides an asymmetric advantage in military operations. The
    joint and combined force cannot succeed in conflict against a space-
    capable adversary without the ability to gain and maintain space
    superiority. Potential adversaries are actively developing and fielding
    systems intended to deny the use of space in conflict. By denying the
    potential for a sudden decisive attack in space, the Space Force
    bolsters integrated deterrence across all domains. Beginning in fiscal
    year 2023, the Space Force's transformation to resilient architectures
    is purpose-built to deny an adversary's ability to acquire an advantage
    through an attack on a few fragile, high-value space assets. This new
    design approach enhances capability and resiliency through distributed
    systems proliferated across multiple orbits. Taken together, these
    features measurably increase deterrence of the full spectrum of
    advanced threats.
        The first mission area to undergo this transformation is the
    Missile Warning/Missile Tracking architecture. The fiscal year 2023
    investment in this transformation implements a force design developed
    by the Space Warfighting Analysis Center (SWAC). Supported by a multi-
    agency collaboration, the Space Force is building upon the Overhead
    Persistent Infrared Enterprise Architecture Strategy to deliver
    architecture capabilities that can be protected, survive attack,
    degrade gracefully under attack, and be rapidly reconstituted. In
    conjunction with our network of allies and partners, the transformation
    to resilient architectures communicates to the world that our joint
    combat credible forces, in space and terrestrially, will continue to
    sustain operational advantages through all domains and phases of
    conflict.
        Space Domain Awareness (SDA) is essential to attributing bad
    behavior in space as well as tracking objects in orbit, launch attempts
    worldwide, and active payload deliveries, and, if necessary,
    controlling space assets during a conflict. Fiscal year 2023
    investments, such as the Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability, will
    deliver continuous, all-weather radar capabilities for deep-space
    object tracking. Additionally, Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability
    will enhance the Space Force's ability to track foreign launches, from
    liftoff to final destination, and improve the ability to observe the
    behavior of existing and emerging threats. In addition to supporting
    the transfer of the space traffic management mission to the Department
    of Commerce, the Space Force increasingly uses SDA data, provided by
    allies and commercial companies, to improve awareness of the domain and
    distribute vital data to the joint force, interagency, allies and
    partners. By providing continuous assessments of potential adversary
    behaviors in space, the Space Force contributes to the range of
    measures available under the integrated deterrence concept.
        Space can become a conflict zone at any stage of the possible
    transition from peace to unconstrained conventional or even nuclear
    warfare. Integrated deterrence spans this spectrum. The Space Force is
    in the process of transforming to a suite of capabilities that can
    deter across that spectrum, help to assure the security and support of
    our allies and partners, and, if necessary, transition to wartime
    operations. The fiscal year 2023 budget begins that transformation.
                       space force's role in campaigning
        The Space Force strengthens and amplifies campaigning initiatives
    for the joint force, combatant commands, and allies and partners by
    delivering global services and effects that enable and enhance all
    joint and combined functions. The unique characteristics of the space
    domain provide a range of options for military operations, response to
    gray zone challenges, and peacetime influence operations. Furthermore,
    space leverages its inherently global coverage to support all combatant
    commands as well as our allies and partners. The Space Force also
    supports the campaign to ensure the peaceful use of space, supports
    appropriate international behaviors in space, and works closely with
    the National Space Council to further interests in security as well as
    peaceful commercial and scientific uses of space.
        Last year, the Secretary of Defense issued Tenets of Responsible
    Behavior in Space to establish foundational criteria under which the
    application of military spacepower complements, rather than competes
    with, the growing civil and commercial use of space. New capabilities,
    including those intended to protect national interests in space, must
    strengthen American leadership as well as foster a secure, stable, and
    sustainable space domain open to all responsible actors.
        Our ability to use space effectively at all times starts with
    assured access. The Space Force's National Security Space Launch (NSSL)
    program has delivered an unprecedented record of 90 successful launches
    stretching back to 2002. The NSSL program has achieved commercial-like
    pricing for routine missions and reduced overall launch costs by half.
    This budget ensures our NSSL launch capacity requirement to place new
    capabilities in orbit. While there are fewer NSSL missions than last
    year, our investment is right-sized to manifest requirements, and it
    does not reflect a drop in capacity or space operations. Additionally,
    the Space Force is utilizing the four remaining Atlas V launch
    vehicles, effectively eliminating dependency on the Russian RD-180
    engine moving forward. The Space Force's launch infrastructure is
    another critical element of our transformation. The Range of the Future
    vision enables us to keep pace with the accelerating United States
    space launch market and maintain safe and assured launch for
    commercial, civil, and Department of Defense users.
        As a member of the Intelligence Community, the Space Force
    collects, analyzes, and delivers intelligence on threat systems,
    foreign intentions, and activities in the space domain in support of
    national leaders, the acquisition community, and joint warfighters,
    before and during all phases of conflict. The National Space
    Intelligence Center (NSIC) will focus this effort, provide the
    scientific and technical intelligence necessary to support threat-based
    requirements development, future space acquisition decisions,
    campaigning in support of deterrence, and defense of space systems from
    anti-satellite weapons, such as those being developed and demonstrated
    by the PRC and Russia. The Space Force will leverage NSIC to coordinate
    with the rest of the Intelligence Community, and our investments in
    full functionality of the NSIC will better inform threat-based
    requirements development and future acquisition decisions.
        To ensure data transport in support of ABMS and JADC2, the Space
    Force, through the Space Development Agency, will deliver an initial
    space data transport layer that will enhance secure and resilient data
    access for joint force and allied users across the globe at all times.
    This data transport layer, based on a force design led by the SWAC,
    will be an integral element of JADC2, delivering assured, low-latency
    connectivity to the full range of warfighting platforms. This
    initiative supports another operational imperative driving ABMS towards
    an operationally optimized solution. At full strength, the space
    transport layer will consist of a constellation of satellites to
    provide seamless, assured global connectivity to warfighters.
        GPS is the gold standard for positioning, navigation, and timing,
    used daily by billions of people around the globe. Navigation and
    timing systems depend on accurate, reliable, and highly-precise
    geolocation services in support of commercial and military activity.
    These capabilities are mission-essential for virtually every modern
    weapon system and critical for public safety and government services.
    This year's budget continues procurement of advanced GPS III follow-on
    satellites and emphasizes specific modernization efforts to improve the
    resiliency of GPS services. This includes anti-jamming, upgrades to
    military user equipment, and advanced cyber protection for the ground
    operating systems.
        SATCOM enables global voice and data connectivity for Presidential
    support, Command and Control (C2), Intelligence, Surveillance, and
    Reconnaissance (ISR), and Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications
    (NC3). The Space Force is ensuring joint force SATCOM availability by
    operating a suite of mobile, wideband, and secure systems, and by
    investing in programs such as Protected Tactical SATCOM and the
    Protected Tactical Enterprise Service to deliver reliable joint force
    communications. Space Force also continues to enhance SATCOM
    effectiveness, efficiency, and resilience through the use of
    international partnerships, commercial SATCOM, various acquisition
    pathways, and the transfer of Army and Navy capabilities and programs.
        The Space Force is also responsible for the continuous operation of
    over 50 legacy platforms. Even as Space Force embarks on a
    transformation, many legacy platforms must operate for years into the
    future. To ensure capabilities that were designed and delivered before
    space was recognized as a warfighting domain remain credible and
    viable, the Space Force is investing in additional cyber protection,
    evaluating select legacy systems for resiliency upgrades, and
    integrating space capabilities from a number of allies and partners.
    These investments ensure today's space capabilities are ready to
    support day-to-day campaigning in the near-term as the Space Force's
    modernization efforts pave the way to deliver new architectures that
    are resilient by design.
        The services that Space Force provides enable the joint force and
    combined force to contribute to campaigning efforts that reinforce
    deterrence. The Space Force also directly supports campaigning by
    contributing some of those same services to allies and partners and by
    increasing the attractiveness of cooperating with, and operating in
    conjunction with, the United States. Equally important, the Space Force
    can support campaigning by providing increased levels of security to
    allies and partners through the potential to negate and, therefore,
    deter threatening space systems.
               space force's role in building enduring advantages
        Building the future Space Force also hinges on investment in
    diverse and highly talented Guardians--the core of the Space Force's
    enduring advantages. With this budget, the Space Force assumes
    responsibility for its own Military Personnel account from the United
    States Air Force, enabling it to more fully and effectively develop and
    manage the incredible talent resident in the Space Force. The Guardian
    Ideal is the Space Force's foundational document outlining the
    Service's boundary-pushing, innovative approaches to talent management.
    This inclusive, modern, and holistic talent management approach
    incorporates work-life balance, resiliency, training, education, and
    individualized development. The Space Force also needs a force
    structure and resourcing approach capable of adapting to changing
    circumstances, quickly and effectively scaling on-demand to meet
    mission requirements. With Congressional support, creating a Space
    Component with full- to part-time fluidity for all uniformed members
    will give the Space Force the unique opportunity to achieve those
    objectives.
        Space Force is advancing space education by embedding space
    curriculum into the Department of the Air Force's Basic Military
    Training, Non-Commissioned Officer academies, the United States Air
    Force Academy, Officer Training School, and Reserve Officer Training
    Corps. This ensures both guardians and airmen have a foundational
    understanding of the space domain and its importance. Additionally,
    dedicated, space-centered education within officer and civilian
    intermediate- and senior-level professional military education programs
    drives long-term strategic thought and builds the technical leaders of
    tomorrow.
        To address the operational imperative on transitioning to a wartime
    posture against a peer competitor, the Space Force must ensure
    readiness for that contingency. Currently, the Space Force is
    inadequately equipped to train for a high-end fight. Readiness requires
    education and training to equip Guardians with the knowledge, skills,
    and tools necessary to operate and prevail against a determined
    adversary with a diverse array of threat systems. To meet this need,
    this budget begins the transformation of the legacy Operational Test
    and Training Infrastructure and expands the National Space Test and
    Training Complex as the premier venue to develop warfighting space
    capabilities. This will include developing live, virtual, and
    constructive environments where Guardians can train against a
    professional, doctrinally sound, and threat-representative aggressor
    force. This training will be applied, tested, and validated by Space
    Flag, Red Flag, and various joint, allied, and partner exercises.
        To further improve the joint force's enduring advantage, the Space
    Force, together with the Intelligence Community, is analyzing the
    Department of Defense's ISR requirements and examining national,
    commercial, allied, and partner ISR integration opportunities. By
    exploiting new technologies, commercial services, and distributed
    architectures, the space domain offers opportunities to provide greater
    capability to meet warfighter requirements while reducing operational
    risk. Under the operational imperatives, Space Force, in partnership
    with the National Reconnaissance Office, is also exploring options and
    opportunities to apply these solutions to the problem of moving target
    indication and tracking from space at scale.
        Space Force needs a digital workforce with the skills to rapidly
    turn data into valuable insights. Digital fluency is foundational to
    being a Guardian, and, to improve that literacy, the Space Force
    provides Digital University access to every Guardian. The Space Force
    continues to build a cadre of organic software coders (known as ``Supra
    Coders'') with a plan to train 90 in 2023 and achieve a target
    inventory of over 200. These initial efforts will prepare Guardians to
    embrace the digital processes and technology required to innovate and
    increase effectiveness and efficiency against space operations threats.
        A key aspect of digital transformation is digital engineering. The
    Space Force has made initial investments into an ecosystem where
    digital engineering will be conducted to manage the complexities of
    force design, requirements validation, weapon system acquisition, test
    and evaluation, training, and operations. These investments will
    accelerate and modernize the entire capability development lifecycle--
    from conception to deployment to operations. Further, data management
    is foundational to advancing capabilities. The goal of becoming the
    world's first fully digital Service is to deliver a force capable of
    winning a data-centric conflict and protecting the vital interests of
    the Nation, allies, and partners.
        The Space Force is surging to address the first operational
    imperative of defining a resilient space order of battle that
    encompasses offensive and defensive capabilities by implementing a
    cost-conscious, threat-informed, data-driven force design process to
    define space architectures that will replace legacy, single-platform
    solutions built for a benign domain. The SWAC, working with DAFSA, is
    leading this transformational shift by analyzing thousands of possible
    architectures for each mission area and evaluating the performance,
    cost, and resilience of each to clearly define the threat, inform
    requirements, and increase transparency with potential solution-
    providers to expedite the delivery of capabilities. Space Force is
    adopting this approach across all elements of force design to ensure it
    can accelerate concept development, access the most cutting-edge
    science and technology, use digital engineering, and integrate
    acquisition efforts, turning designs into fielded systems at the speed
    of need. This method also increases access to a more diverse base of
    satellite vendors and launch providers.
        Through a unity of effort approach to acquisition of enduring
    advantages, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space
    Acquisition and Integration leverages the Program Integration Council
    to communicate and align efforts among senior leaders from the Space
    Systems Command, Space Rapid Capabilities Office, Department of the Air
    Force Rapid Capabilities Office, Space Development Agency, National
    Reconnaissance Office, Missile Defense Agency, United States Space
    Command, Space Operations Center, and the Air Force Research
    Laboratory. In conjunction with this process, the formal transfer of
    the Space Development Agency into the Space Force at the beginning of
    fiscal year 2023 will enhance the Space Force's ability to integrate
    innovative acquisition approaches and deliver new satellites and ground
    system prototypes into the operational baseline.
        Technology and pacing threats are evolving at an ever-increasing
    rate, and achieving enduring advantages means the Space Force must
    undergo a transformation from current legacy systems to the
    architectures needed to be competitive. The Space Force is leveraging
    technology to deliver game-changing space capabilities.and solidify an
    ecosystem through our University Research Consortium. Quantum
    technologies, counter-hypersonics, artificial intelligence/machine
    learning, and directed energy are several of the emerging technologies
    that are necessary to integrate into the Space Force architectures to
    stay ahead of potential adversaries.
                            united states air force
        The United States Air Force remains integral to the Nation's
    defense and continues to lead the joint team by developing and
    deploying critical capabilities in support of Defense priorities. The
    Air Force does so through the execution of its mission statement:
    ``Fly, Fight, and Win . . . Airpower Anytime, Anywhere.'' The Air Force
    brings unparalleled speed, agility, survivability, mobility, and strike
    to the joint fight while simultaneously providing command and control,
    reconnaissance, and deterrence capabilities. Simply put, no one else
    can do what the Air Force does, and without its capabilities, the joint
    force loses.
        As the Air Force celebrates its 75th anniversary as an independent
    service this year, our airmen can look back and honor three-quarters of
    a century of pioneering. Since 1947, airmen have dutifully executed
    their mission successfully in the same way the airmen of today are
    called to do: ``Innovate, Accelerate, and Thrive.'' Innovation, fueled
    by airmen, is the Air Force heritage. airmen continue to push
    technological and cultural boundaries, making the Air Force the leader
    in airpower. For 75 years, the Air Force has kept pace with rapid
    changes in technology, modernizing platforms, and accelerating
    advancements in tactics with unprecedented success. Our Nation's airmen
    thrive as the world's greatest Air Force because of those who have gone
    before us--particularly those who weren't afraid to break barriers.
    This success was hard-fought to achieve, and it must be fiercely
    maintained into the future.
        Maintaining the Air Force's role as the global leader in airpower
    requires us to Accelerate Change or Lose. In an environment of
    aggressive global competitors and technology development and diffusion,
    the Air Force must accelerate change to control and exploit the air
    domain while also underwriting national security through nuclear
    deterrence to the standard the Nation expects and requires. The
    necessity to Accelerate Change or Lose is the impetus behind the
    Department of the Air Force's operational imperatives, which are
    identifying the changes and investments needed to be successful. To
    best address these necessary changes, the Air Force must balance risk
    over time. The Air Force will develop and field new capabilities
    expeditiously while selectively divesting older platforms that are no
    longer relevant to our pacing challenge--all while maintaining
    readiness. The Air Force must ensure its path continuously drives
    toward readiness to be best prepared when called upon by the Nation.
    Accelerating change means both getting the direction right and moving
    as fast as possible.
        In last year's budget submission, the Air Force began the process
    of making hard decisions to modernize the force. Last year's budget
    highlighted the Air Force the Nation needs for 2030 and beyond, and the
    message has not changed: the need to modernize is critical to counter
    strategic competitors. The Air Force is taking measured risks in the
    near-term while simultaneously prioritizing an affordable, defensible
    force structure that grows readiness over time and accelerates
    investment in critical capabilities to deter and defeat an advancing
    threat. Continued collaboration with Congress enables us to best
    execute the resources that protect the Nation and, in turn, secure
    vital national interests and backstop the security of allies and
    partners. This process will not end with the fiscal year 2023 budget;
    additional difficult decisions will be required in the future.
        The character of war continues to change. Advances in technology
    produce a combat environment that rewards speed, tempo, agility,
    lethality, and resilience. These have been hallmarks of the Air Force
    since its inception, and it takes the solemn task of building upon
    those attributes as part of the joint team very seriously. The Nation
    deserves and demands nothing less.
                   air force's role in integrated deterrence
        The Air Force plays a unique role in integrated deterrence as the
    Nation's leading and most agile choice for executing seamlessly across
    warfighting domains, theaters, and spectrums of conflict. The Air Force
    provides a range of combat-credible capabilities backed by a safe,
    secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent. As stewards of two-thirds of
    the nuclear triad and three-fourths of the Nation's NC3, the Air Force
    foundationally enables the Nation's nuclear deterrence for a stable
    international order. Relationships and connections with the interagency
    and allies and partners--whether in the Indo-Pacific with Japan,
    Australia, and the Republic of Korea or as demonstrated by current
    deployments in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization--are
    critical elements of integrated deterrence. Across the joint force,
    combatant commands, and allies and partners, Air Force airpower
    capabilities prove invaluable as demand consistently exceed supply.
    Through focused efforts to balance near-term risk, the Air Force is
    able to continue supporting these demands while accelerating
    investments in future capabilities.
        Nuclear deterrence is a significant part of integrated deterrence.
    The United States' strategic deterrent provides the joint force, allies
    and partners, and the Nation security guarantees while deterring other
    nations' use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear deterrent can also serve
    as a deterrent to other strategic attacks on American and allied vital
    interests in general and provides critical reassurance to strategic
    allies. As the Service responsible for the majority of the Nation's
    nuclear capabilities, the Air Force's fiscal year 2023 budget continues
    investments and improvements to sustain and reinforce strategic
    deterrence.
        Capable of providing prompt, overwhelming response, the ground-
    based leg of the nuclear triad is a critical capability for deterring
    peer adversaries and is fully funded in the fiscal year 2023 budget. To
    ensure this capability remains ready, the Air Force is modernizing with
    the Sentinel system, our Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD). Its
    on-time delivery is critical as the existing Minuteman III fleet ages
    and our pacing challenge is investing heavily to grow and modernize its
    nuclear arsenal. The PRC recently built more than 100 new
    intercontinental ballistic missile silos in its western desert. At the
    same time, Russia's nuclear modernization efforts are more than 80%
    complete, and Russian leaders publicly stated the nuclear forces were
    recently placed on high alert. The United States has delayed nuclear
    recapitalization as long as possible, and consistent investment in the
    Sentinel comprehensive weapon system is an absolute necessity.
        The Air Force's nuclear-capable bomber force provides the second
    leg of the Nation's nuclear triad. The B-21 Raider represents the
    future of our bomber force. As the most flexible leg of the nuclear
    triad, the B-21 is a unique national security capability. This budget
    includes additions to continue Engineering and Manufacturing
    Development and support to nuclear certification. In support of the
    operational imperative, as the B-21 family-of-systems is defined, the
    Air Force will develop, test, and field the B-21 while pursuing the
    potential to introduce a lower-cost, complementary, uncrewed aircraft
    to provide an enhanced level of conventional capability. As the Air
    Force modernizes, it will continue the transition to a two-bomber fleet
    capable of nuclear and conventional weapons delivery through the B-21
    and B-52. These modernized capabilities will provide global nuclear and
    conventional global strike options for decades to come.
        The Air Force must continue its investment in researching,
    developing, testing, and fielding cost-effective long-range traditional
    and hypersonic weapons. The Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-
    Extended Range is funded at maximum production capacity, and the Long-
    Range Standoff Weapon continues in development, providing future
    nuclear long-range strike options. The hypersonic Air-Launched Rapid
    Response Weapon system is funded for completion of development;
    however, production funding is deferred until successful flight tests
    occur. The Joint Advanced Tactical Missile (JATM) continues in full-
    scale development, while the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile ramps up
    its development. The Air Force must develop these revolutionary
    capabilities and other advanced weapons to maintain a competitive
    advantage over the pacing challenge.
        The Air Force's pursuit of the NGAD family-of-systems ensures air
    superiority in the future through cutting-edge concepts and technology.
    Adversaries are investing in capabilities that erode the Air Force's
    advantage, and NGAD investments continue development efforts for
    advanced sensors, resilient communications, and air vehicle
    technologies. NGAD's family-of-systems will provide survivable,
    persistent, and lethal options through a mix of crewed and uncrewed
    aircraft equipped with a flexible combination of weapons, sensors,
    electronic warfare, and other mission systems as it links with current
    and future targeting systems through ABMS.
        In support of integrated deterrence, the Air Force will be working
    with our allies and partners around the world to ensure that our
    collective, joint, and combined capabilities are used in the most
    effective way possible. ABMS will provide the connectivity and
    collaborative decision-making needed to make this possible. The budget
    funds a mix of foundational infrastructure, early increment
    capabilities, and advanced battle management tools as the Air Force
    component of JADC2.
        As the Air Force contributes to integrated deterrence, it will do
    so with the joint force, and allies and partners. The Air Force is
    working broadly to ensure that current capabilities and future weapons
    systems maximize interoperability with allies and partners alike. The
    Air Force is consistently engaged across borders to build, repeat, and
    reinforce a simple message to strategic competitors--the benefits of a
    stable international order far outweigh aggression and instability.
        Air Force's Role in Campaigning
        The Air Force will play a role in a full range of major military
    activities designed to achieve strategy-aligned objectives through
    campaigning. The Air Force will support both permanent and rotational
    deployments, exercises, forward presence, and other activities that
    contribute to maintaining deterrence and support other long-term
    strategic objectives. The Air Force's fielded forces are in constant
    global demand, providing direct military advantage to combatant
    commands, the joint force, and allies and partners while supporting
    diplomatic and whole-of-government efforts. The fiscal year 2023 budget
    investments in ABMS, ACE, readiness and sustainment of fielded forces,
    and continued support to allies and partners highlight some of the key
    roles the Air Force plays in ongoing campaigns to strengthen
    deterrence.
        The Air Force's readiness hinges on the ability to operate,
    maintain, and sustain an aging fleet of aircraft while funding the
    flying hour program to the maximum executable level. Operations and
    maintenance, the largest of Air Force appropriations, funds day-to-day
    operations critical to sustaining readiness, building resiliency, and
    enhancing wartime posture. Weapons system sustainment requirements--
    funded at 85%--continue to grow due to aging platforms and the
    acquisition of new, highly technical, and complex weapons systems.
        Air Force rapid global mobility platforms enable power projection,
    extend range and persistence, and ensure air superiority and joint
    force capabilities are in the right place, at the right time. In order
    to maintain our air refueling edge for the joint force, this budget
    continues the fielding of the KC-46 Pegasus aircraft. Recapitalizing
    the Air Force tanker fleet with the KC-46 increases the likelihood of
    mission success while lowering risk in a peer conflict.
        Tactical and strategic airlift underpin the Nation's rapid global
    mobility capability. This budget submission maintains the long-term
    viability of the C-130 fleet and invests in communication and avionics
    capabilities for the C-17. This ensures the Air Force has the right mix
    of platforms to fulfill the joint force demand.
        ISR underpins all military actions, and the Air Force continues to
    balance maintaining and fielding systems that provide combatant
    commands with this critical capability. The ability to win future high-
    end conflicts requires accelerating change across the ISR force
    structure to be more connected, persistent, and survivable while
    divesting legacy assets that lack these characteristics. In this
    budget, the Air Force modernizes existing ISR platforms with new
    sensors, cyber, and other classified capabilities while improving the
    ability to fuse data in a resilient network.
        The ability to prosecute targets in advance of our adversaries is
    pivotal to the C2 advantages the Air Force currently holds. The current
    Air Force C2 architecture, including the AWACS and JSTARS platforms, is
    aging, analog, and vulnerable to failure or attack through kinetic or
    non-kinetic means. The fiscal year 2023 budget divests a significant
    portion of both the AWACS and JSTARS fleets while pursuing and funding
    a replacement to close the Air MTI gap while a resilient long-term
    solution is identified.
        Detecting, tracking, monitoring, and striking moving targets at
    scale is a requirement in modern warfare. The Air Force's legacy
    Airborne Moving Target Indicator and Ground Moving Target Indicator
    (AMTI/GMTI) capabilities will be neither effective nor survivable in
    highly-contested environments. The Air Force must be able to operate in
    radar-jamming environments, detect low-observable and hypersonic
    threats, and survive. This operational imperative must integrate with
    ABMS in order to share and take advantage of information at
    operationally-required speeds across all domains. The fiscal year 2023
    budget supports this imperative through investments in future air and
    space capabilities as well as upgrades to existing ones. The Air Force
    will also leverage key allies' capabilities and systems to engage
    multiple mobile targets in the air, on the sea surface, and on the
    ground.
        A modernized C2 architecture will include ABMS, the Air Force's
    contribution to the JADC2 concept, and will accelerate communication,
    enhance decision-making, and shorten the kill chain. ABMS must be
    operationally optimized to leverage unprecedented sensing, provide
    processing, and integrate data across multiple domains to warfighters
    when and where needed. Fiscal year 2023 increases the investment into
    this critical capability to connect joint and allied and partner teams
    enabling domain awareness, faster decision-making, and execution than
    our adversaries.
        Exercising across the joint force and with allies and partners
    helps ensure the Air Force's readiness while reinforcing cooperation
    nationally and internationally. Continued investment in operational
    test and training infrastructure and exercises sends the clear message
    of the Nation's unified goals and collective capabilities. These
    exercises, budgeted to continue this year, enable the Air Force to be
    the partner of choice while also increasing interoperability and
    combined-force planning. These initiatives are especially important
    with those allies and partners who are more susceptible to military
    coercion or aggression.
                air force's role in building enduring advantages
        To build enduring advantages, the Air Force is undertaking a series
    of initiatives to apply current and emerging technologies to solve
    operational challenges while simultaneously building the workforce
    needed for the future. Research and development accounts are increased
    substantially in the fiscal year 2023 budget. These investments are
    focused on placing meaningful military capability into the hands of
    airmen as quickly as possible. Programs like NGAD, B-21, and JATM are
    moving into and through development toward fielding.
        The Air Force will continue to modernize to ensure a more lethal,
    resilient, sustainable, survivable, agile, and responsive force. As
    such, the Air Force must have a mix of multi-role air superiority
    capabilities and capacity to defend the homeland, project airpower
    globally, and operate as a joint and allied and partner force. The Air
    Force remains committed to the F-35 Lightning II with full Block 4
    capability as the long-term cornerstone of the United States' future
    fighter force. This year's budget submission temporarily reduces F-35
    procurement to invest in the overall tactical aircraft portfolio. This
    includes F-35 fleet modernization and advanced weapons, specifically
    advanced propulsion, the Stand-In Attack Weapon, Block 4 retrofits, and
    enterprise infrastructure. Accelerated F-15EX procurement provides
    expanded weapons carriage capacity and enables a rapid recapitalization
    of the F-15C over the next two years before returning to larger F-35
    procurement numbers. Funding of F-22 advanced sensors provides
    capabilities to bridge until replaced by the NGAD family-of-systems.
    The NGAD crewed platform has increased funding in this budget
    submission for continued development, and funds are provided to
    initiate development of an uncrewed combat aircraft. Additionally,
    funding for F-16 modernization supports lethality and survivability
    over the remaining service life by adding capacity to Air Force air
    superiority capabilities.
        Artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled technologies and advanced
    collaborative weapons are critical enablers that will transform the
    future joint force and fulfill a crucial role across the Air Force and
    joint force. In order to maintain a competitive edge and build enduring
    advantages, the Air Force will rely on crewed, uncrewed, and
    cooperative teaming platforms. The Air Force is investing to accelerate
    the development of advanced collaborative weapons systems to leverage
    AI and increase lethality in highly-contested environments. Human-
    machine teaming will enable airmen to process massive amounts of data
    and arrive at sound operational decisions more rapidly and with
    confidence.
        Securing enduring advantages depends upon understanding and acting
    in anticipation of long-term challenges such as the transboundary
    threat of climate change. The fiscal year 2023 budget includes funding
    for the Adaptive Engine Transition Program to provide operational
    improvements and reduce energy use. The Air Force is also increasing
    Facilities, Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (FSRM) funding
    in fiscal year 2023 for both climate-related and operational
    resiliency. As the Air Force updates and repairs facilities, it is able
    to incorporate new climate mitigation techniques and improve energy
    efficiency, quality of life, and mission readiness. Additionally, the
    increased FSRM funding allows us to address the operational imperative
    of ensuring resilient basing, sustainment, and communications in
    contested environments. Facility updates and repairs can be affordably
    executed to reduce climate risk and enhance combat capability and
    mission execution.
        Airmen across the Total Force remain the Air Force's most
    significant enduring advantage. In the fiscal year 2023 budget, the Air
    Force provides funding to address sexual assault prevention and
    response reform, suicide prevention, diversity, equity, and inclusion
    initiatives, quality of life issues, and economic insecurity. The
    budget provides a $15 minimum wage for all civilian employees and
    includes investments to provide affordable childcare for the Total
    Force. The fiscal year 2023 budget also provides funding to cover
    increased costs of living for our military and civilian personnel to
    ensure they receive the pay they deserve and need.
                     department of the air force conclusion
        The Department of the Air Force fiscal year 2023 budget balances
    risk between maintaining current readiness in support of combatant
    commanders today while developing, building, and fielding the force
    needed for the future. The seven operational imperatives help guide
    this transformation, which is just beginning. Throughout the last 75
    years, the Department has shown its resolve and capability to execute
    the missions demanded by our Nation while constantly advancing to
    remain the world's premier air and space forces. This transformation
    will not be easy, but there is no alternative.
        While our Department remains incredibly capable, it cannot make
    these necessary changes alone. Instead, we must operate as ``One
    Team,'' working together within the Department, across the joint force,
    in the interagency, and in concert with our allies and partners. Our
    ``One Fight'' unites us all around a common purpose. Russia may pose a
    very visible and acute threat, but the PRC remains our pacing
    challenge. The PRC's military modernization program is well resourced,
    strategic, and sophisticated. The risks to operational and
    technological superiority that we face are grave and increasing over
    time.
        Congressional support enabled the start of this transition to the
    future force the Nation needs, and Congressional support remains
    critical to our success. The necessity of Congressional backing to
    invest in the future while we continue divesting outdated assets and
    building modernized air and space capabilities will only increase as
    the Department continues its modernization efforts to deter, and, if
    called upon, to win the Nation's future conflicts. The defense of the
    Nation demands a transformation to the future air and space
    capabilities that will replace the obsolete platforms of today, and
    this can only be achieved with Congress' support for the difficult
    decisions to come.
        Today, America's airmen and guardians deliver innovative solutions
    to some of our Nation's most challenging problems while projecting
    airpower and spacepower around the globe. They remain our competitive
    advantage, and we will ensure they are all provided the opportunity to
    serve to their fullest potential. Every combatant command, ally,
    partner, and American benefits from their selfless dedication. We have
    an immense responsibility to provide our airmen and guardians the
    tools, training, platforms, and support they need to safely and
    effectively defend our great Nation, and we will. Change is hard;
    losing is unacceptable. ``One Team, One Fight.''

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Raymond, and
    gentlemen, thank you for your excellent testimony.
        General Raymond, Section 1602(v) of the fiscal year 2022
    National Defense Authorization Act, which was signed into law
    December 27, 2021, requires the Secretary of Defense, within 90
    days of enactment, to designate the Chief of Space Operations
    the Force Design Architect of the Armed Forces and notify the
    Congressional Defense Committees of that designation. Has this
    occurred, and if not, why not?
        General Raymond. I know it is being worked by the new
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space in OSD [Office of the
    Secretary of Defense]. I will tell you, though, that a Space
    Warfighting Analysis Center, which we stood up, is doing all
    the force design work for the Department. It is uniting the
    Department in that force design, and the force design that we
    are funding in this budget was again led by the Space Force,
    and that is going to continue.
        Chairman Reed. Well, again, I would you to urge them and
    the Secretary to make the official designation and communicate
    it to the committee as directed by the legislation.
        General Brown, the fiscal year 2023 budget request would
    retire roughly half of the E-3 airborne warning and control
    system, AWACS aircraft, 15 of 31. The Air Force just announced
    its intent to provide a sole-source contractor, Boeing, to buy
    an aircraft, the E-7 Wedgetail, to replace some of the E-3
    fleet. It will take several years to get that aircraft in the
    air and on duty. Can we wait that long, given the pacing threat
    of China, particularly?
        General Brown. Chairman Reed, I appreciate the question.
    You know, ideally we want to go as fast as possible and we want
    to work very closely with this committee but also with the
    contractor. But I would tell you that I personally have flown
    on the aircraft a couple of times and worked very closely with
    our allies and partners, particularly the Australians, who
    operate it today. Our goal here is to learn as much as we can
    from them, and at the same time to accelerate where we can to
    get the procurement. But we want to put ourselves in the best
    place possible to make sure we have the capability that is
    required.
        Chairman Reed. Secretary Kendall, typically you fly the
    aircraft before you buy it, you test it, et cetera, but as
    General Brown alluded to the Australians are already flying the
    E-7. Great Britain is ahead of us in line in terms of
    production. Are there any thoughts about making a grand bargain
    and getting those aircraft faster?
        Mr. Kendall. Chairman, we are exploring options to try to
    do that. It is not clear that there are opportunities but we
    are investigating them.
        The timeline is driven by the fact that we are buying new
    commercial airplanes and then modifying them to be the
    surveillance platforms that we want. Getting the airplanes is
    about a 2-year process, then then modifying them is another 2-
    year process.
        So there are things that we could do, however, to maybe get
    access to aircraft earlier, one way or another. There are
    things that we might be able to do to reduce risk and to make
    sure that we make that schedule. So I would be happy to work
    with the committee on ideas to move forward at a quicker pace.
    That is something we all want.
        Chairman Reed. I concur and I look forward to working with
    you, Mr. Secretary.
        Both the Air Force and the Space Force have set up a robust
    unfunded priority list, and let me underscore the word
    ``priority.'' General Brown, does that list represent your
    carefully evaluated priorities, what your needs are, so that
    you we will not buy something that is nice to have but not
    critical?
        General Brown. Chairman, it does, and actually, the way it
    is laid out, it looks at some of our readiness aspects as well
    as procurements and weapons to go with the platforms we are
    pursuing. So it is a combination of not just the platforms but
    really all the capability we require to move forward.
        Chairman Reed. General Raymond, the same question.
        General Raymond. Absolutely the same, sir. It reflects my
    priorities focused on modernization and readiness.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you.
        A final question, Secretary Kendall, is that we have to
    renew the Small Business Innovation Research and Transitions
    Programs. They are expiring September 30th. You have had
    extensive experience in many different capacities with these
    programs. How critical is it is for us to extend these
    programs?
        Mr. Kendall. They are very important programs. They have
    been used for a very long period of time to provide money to
    encourage small businesses, particularly to develop their
    products and to transition them to where they are at a position
    where we could acquire them.
        The Air Force, in particular, is using a new approach to
    this to try to bring in more outside competitors. I think that
    has been fairly successful. It brings firms to the market for
    the Defense Department that normally would not be there, and
    they try to transition those projects quickly.
        General Brown and I are going to be reviewing a lot of the
    ongoing projects to decide which ones we think definitely need
    to get across the valley of death so that we can do that more
    predictably than it has been done in the past.
        But the program itself is of very high value. We strongly
    support it.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Thank
    you, gentlemen.
        Senator Inhofe, please.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a couple of
    questions that are very similar to what the chairman has asked,
    that gives you a chance to go in a little deeper if you want to
    do so. I have referred to the hearing that we had a week ago
    today with two other experts, and actually gave a quote from
    one of them. We have heard, at this end of the table, from
    contractors, from servicemembers, everyone from aircraft
    production to military construction, about its significant,
    harmful effects.
        Late last night we just received your response from a
    letter that Mr. Rogers, from the House, and I sent some time
    ago. Now we only got a response late last night, but I suspect,
    and I want to make sure that we get this in the record, that
    you had your response completed prior to that time but we had
    not received it yet. Is that accurate.
        Mr. Kendall. Senator, we had worked on that response over a
    period of time and it was reviewed multiple times as it was
    finalized. I signed it out yesterday, just before it was
    delivered to you, I believe.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes. But on the other hand your part was
    completed prior to that, I would suspect.
        Mr. Kendall. I do not know that I can say that, Senator.
        Senator Inhofe. All right. That is fine.
        I also talked about something very similar to what the
    chairman was talking about here, talking about the AWACS, the
    A-7, in my opening statement. Now this is an issue that is very
    close to us because AWACS, some 27--I think 27 are in Oklahoma,
    but the other 6 are forward deployed, I understand. But I think
    all of us agree that we need to get the A-7 as fast as possible
    for the high-end fight.
        Now that was asked by the chairman but I would like to be a
    little more specific. What options are you looking at to
    accelerate this program? Can we accelerate the acquisition
    authorities and is there a way that you think we can put this
    together so that we could actually have the contract done in
    2022, so we do not lose an extra year? That is the concern that
    I had in my opening statement. What do you think?
        Mr. Kendall. Senator, we would really like to accelerate
    the program if we could. It is not clear at this time that
    there are opportunities to do that, and we talked about this
    just yesterday with you. I am exploring some options that might
    be possible but I cannot say with any certainty that they can
    be executed yet, and some of them, quite frankly, are going to
    require some changes by people who we do not necessarily have
    control of in terms of their priorities. We have to get new
    airplanes and we have to modify them, and the supply chain that
    supports all that is a big part of what we have to do. That is
    what takes so much time.
        I would like to be able to get things that could reduce
    risk, to ensure we meet that schedule. There may be things we
    can do to accelerate planning. But access to the aircraft we
    would have to modify is going to be the thing that I think
    limits us more than anything else. But we are going to continue
    to look for options and we will cooperate with you on that.
        Senator Inhofe. Well, Mr. Secretary, I appreciate that, and
    yes, we talked about that yesterday with all three of you, and
    I just wanted to give you an opportunity to get on record with
    that, because I think that is significant.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
        Let me now recognize Senator Gillibrand.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you all for your testimony. I
    recently read about Space Force's decision to forego your
    annual fitness test and instead institute a program promoting
    physical activity, mental health, and healthy lifestyle
    activities. What impact do traditional fitness requirements
    have on the ability of Space Force to recruit and retain the
    technical talent needed for its mission?
        General Raymond. Thank you for that question. One of the
    great advantages we have seen since establishing the Space
    Force is our ability to recruit talent. We have more people
    knocking on our door than we can take. The quality of our folks
    has gone significantly higher. What we are trying to do with an
    innovative, science-based approach is to take a holistic look
    at health and fitness.
        So we have put together a three-part program which is
    incentivizing continuing fitness across the year round and then
    episodic, one-time-a-year test, and using data to be able to
    help support that. We also, focusing on physical fitness,
    mental health, and cognitive fitness as well.
        We are also, as part of that, going to establish an
    advanced physical health assessment part which gives more
    access to mental health, and we have an education part of it as
    well, where throughout the entire lifespan of a guardian, from
    when he comes in to when he or she leaves the service, they
    have education on the importance of health.
        Senator Gillibrand. Who are the types of recruits that the
    Space Force is seeking to fill its uniformed ranks, and do you
    need any additional flexibilities to recruit and retain these
    individuals?
        General Raymond. As I mentioned, the recruiting is going
    really, really well. We are looking for largely STEM-focused
    folks. Also space is a data domain. You do not experience the
    domain unless you are an astronaut. In person you experience
    that through data, so we are looking at software coders, we are
    looking at data scientists.
        One interesting point is we have had 400 folks from
    industry apply to us to transfer in laterally from industry,
    and we have narrowed that down now, scaled it down, whittled it
    down to about 45 applicants, and we are going to bring 6 in
    this summer. So we are getting a lot of great talent, STEM,
    software, data.
        Senator Gillibrand. What is the difference between your
    civilian complement and your uniformed complement?
        General Raymond. About 50-50, ma'am. We are just shy of
    14,000, and it is roughly 50-50.
        Senator Gillibrand. Is there an ability to recruit one over
    the other, or are there differences between what the
    requirements are for one over the other?
        General Raymond. We are having equal success in recruiting
    both civilians and military. There are physical requirements on
    the military side, obviously, that are different than the
    civilians. In fact, we have had some that have not been able to
    get into the service physically and we have given them civilian
    jobs.
        Senator Gillibrand. I have been working to create a cyber
    and digital services academy to help meet the cybersecurity
    needs of the Federal Government. Given Space Force's need for
    highly technical servicemembers and the Space Force's openness
    to alternative approaches to traditional military requirements,
    as demonstrated by your move away from the annual fitness test,
    would it be advantageous to the Space Force to send cadets to
    the civilian-oriented cyber, digital services, and space
    academy?
        General Raymond. Cybersecurity on the space side is really
    important to us. It is an area that we have put a lot of focus
    on. I would be really interested in exploring a relationship
    there once that materializes.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
        Secretary Kendall, the committee was briefed that the
    services will be implementing the DOD's Independent Review
    Commission recommendations on sexual assault. Can you provide
    more detail on when you expect these recommendations to be
    implemented in the Air Force, and how will you roll these
    recommendations out to your force to ensure servicemembers are
    sufficiently informed?
        Mr. Kendall. Thank you, Senator. We are moving as quickly
    as we can to implement the recommendations of the Independent
    Review Commission. Regarding those dates as guidance, I am
    trying to do everything I can to accelerate the implementation
    of them. Frankly, I think that the timelines associated with
    them are longer than we need for many things. For example, we
    are going to be setting up the Independent Special Prosecutor's
    Office a month earlier than the current schedule requires.
        So we are moving as quickly as we can. We use a variety of
    means to inform our people. We use social media, emails,
    various publications that we have to make sure that our airmen
    and guardians are well aware of the resources that are
    available to them so that they can get help if they need it.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Your budget includes a
    significant amount for financial bonuses for critical skilled
    positions. Can you discuss what positions those bonuses are for
    and what non-financial incentives are available to retain
    servicemembers given that they have a number of employment
    opportunities in the civilian sector?
        Mr. Kendall. We have recently increased bonuses across a
    number of fields. I can give you a list for the record. This
    covers both enlisted and officer occupational areas. It is
    essentially the things that you would think would be in high
    demand. Right now the economy is doing well and there is a
    large demand for labor. So we are doing what we need to do to
    be competitive in that market.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
        Senator Fischer, please.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown, first let me express
    my appreciation for the support shown in this budget for
    modernizing the Air Force's nuclear equities, including nuclear
    command, control, and communications, or NC3. These programs
    are absolutely vital and they must be delivered on time, and I
    appreciate the commitment to doing so that is shown in this
    budget.
        As you both also know, Offutt Air Force Base was severely
    damaged by historic flooding in 2019, and is still in the
    process of rebuilding. I would like to thank the Air Force for
    its support in the rebuild efforts.
        General Brown, I was pleased to see an addition $286
    million for the Natural Disaster Recovery Fund in your unfunded
    priority list for fiscal year 2023.
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown, can I have your
    commitments to continue to prioritize recovery efforts at
    Offutt and to look for opportunities to complete these projects
    as quickly as possible?
        Mr. Kendall. Yes. Absolutely, Senator.
        General Brown. You have my commitment as well.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Secretary Kendall, I remain
    concerned about the toll of both inflation and supply chain
    issues on the Department of Defense. How do you expect the
    increased costs of building materials to impact ongoing MILCON
    projects?
        Mr. Kendall. It is something we are concerned about, and we
    are concerned about inflation across the board. Our biggest
    immediate concern is fuel prices, which have gone up
    substantially, and we are going to have about a $2 billion
    shortfall this year that we will have to address, through one
    mechanism or another.
        In the letter that we responded to, to Senator Inhofe and
    Ranking Member Reed, all of us talked about the steps that we
    need to take. We do not know what 2023 will be like yet, and we
    do not know how different aspects of the economy will be
    affected, so we are going to need to work with the Congress to
    make adjustments as we go forward. So we will appreciate your
    support as we address this.
        Senator Fischer. General Raymond, nice to see you.
        General Raymond. Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. Can you discuss the changes that are being
    made to the Next-Gen OPIR program in the fiscal year 2023
    budget and how the new Resilient Missile Warning Missile
    Tracking program integrates with this effort?
        General Raymond. Yes, ma'am. It is critical. It is our
    number one mission, Missile Warning Missile Tracking, and it is
    critical that we make this transformation, as I said, to get
    after two important realizations. The one is that the missiles
    that the satellites need to detect are changing, and it is
    getting after the hypersonic glide vehicles and being able to
    detect and track that. It is critical to make that
    transformation for that effort.
        The other thing is that by diversifying the architecture,
    very similar to what we do with our financial portfolios in
    diversifying, you then reduce the threat in space to an attack
    that may occur. So on both of those efforts, in this budget we
    pivot from handfuls of very exquisite, very expensive
    satellites to an architecture that is more diversified, to get
    after both the emerging class of missiles and the threat that
    currently exists in space.
        Senator Fischer. So the plan is really to keep the Block
    Zero Polar and the geo-capabilities but supplement them with
    the distributed architecture. Is that correct?
        General Raymond. Yes, ma'am. The challenge that we face as
    we make this transformation, this pivot to a new architecture,
    is we do not have the luxury of taking down what we have today
    and telling the Nation we will come back in a handful of years
    with a new architecture. So we had to develop a bridging
    strategy, and we looked at it. It is a risk-informed strategy
    to keep alive what we have for our Nation as we make this
    important transition.
        Senator Fischer. Do you still expect to have the first geo
    satellite in at 2025 then?
        General Raymond. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. It is vital. It is vital.
        General Raymond. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown, what do you think the
    war in Ukraine teaches us about air power on the modern
    battlefield? I know we have heard some commentators argue that
    anti-air defenses have made sophisticated air power obsolete in
    the same way that others argue anti-tank munitions have made
    armor obsolete. What is your view?
        Mr. Kendall. I would begin, Senator, by saying that control
    of the air is critical to military success and the failure of
    the Russian military to gain control of the air is a major
    contributor to the difficulties that they are having.
        On the other side of the equation, the Ukrainians have used
    the air defense systems that they had quite well. They have
    been able to keep them survivable against the threat, which I
    think says as much about the lack of capability of the Russians
    as it does about the capability of the Ukrainians.
        So you need to be careful about trying to learn too many
    lessons from this until we really study it carefully. But they
    have reinforced my views about the importance of air power,
    first of all, but the successful air power must be
    sophisticated enough to deal with the threats that it faces,
    including ground-based air defense systems like the ones the
    Ukrainians are employing.
        Senator Fischer. General Brown, would you like to add
    anything?
        General Brown. I would. Air superiority cannot be taken for
    granted, and airpower, anytime, anywhere, it is not only the
    airplanes that will be airborne to go against other airplanes
    but it is the ability to also take out the air defenses that
    are on the ground. It is a combination of capabilities, and
    that is what we, as the United States Air Force, are focused
    on, to make sure we have the capability to do both and train to
    that as well.
        Senator Fischer. Be prepared for possible, more
    sophisticated encounters than we are seeing in Ukraine?
        General Brown. Most definitely.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir. Thank you both very much.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
        Senator Kaine, please.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and to our witnesses I
    appreciate your service. This is a question for Secretary
    Kendall and General Brown. We had a hearing last week with
    Secretary Hicks, and she, frankly, talked about the challenge--
    it is an obvious challenge--in determining the best way to get
    from the force we have to the force we want to have in 2030.
    This kind of mid-period transition is a challenge.
        When I hear phrases like ``divest'' and ``reinvest'' I am
    not skeptical about that. You have to do it. But I tend to
    think about them through the lens of workforce, being chair of
    the Readiness Subcommittee. As you make this transition it can
    be particularly challenging on our specialized workforces--
    shipbuilding, aircraft production, certain electronic
    components.
        Do you think the fiscal year 2023 and the FYDP projections
    for procurement adequately address the sustainment of the few
    remaining manned aircraft production lines in the United
    States?
        Mr. Kendall. I do, Senator. We are continuing production on
    the F-35, not quite at the rate that we were at before. We are
    trying to wrap up production of the F-15EX over the next 2
    years, and so we actually accelerated, increased the rate there
    in order to do that more quickly. I cannot think of any other
    example. KC-46, we are continuing with that production line.
        So generally speaking we are continuing at a rate which we
    think will support the industrial base and allow them to
    support us going into the future.
        Senator Kaine. General Brown?
        General Brown. Senator, I would agree, and the thing I also
    think about is the fact that I do not want my staff to talk
    about divest and invest. It is how we make the transition from
    where we are today to get to the future. We have got to make
    sure we are still working on procurement and then still
    maintaining capability to support today's operations at the
    same time we make sure we are not taking undue risk that is
    going to impact us in the future. So it is a combination of
    those two that come together.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you. Now for Secretary Kendall and
    General Raymond, I want to ask about the space domain. It is
    getting crowded up there. You know, many nations have assets in
    space that have a defense or military purpose. The commercial
    platforms in space just proliferate dramatically, and they can
    have an impact upon defense missions. We have seen what
    Starlink has done in terms of providing internet service in
    Ukraine. So these commercial platforms have a security
    dimension to them as well.
        Then the third thing we have got to worry about in space is
    debris. One of my favorite government publications is NASA's
    Orbital Debris Quarterly. The debris can be accidental debris
    or it can be debris that is actually created to jeopardize
    other assets in space. It seems like an area where we have to
    do a lot to keep our platforms safe, but there is also probably
    need for more rules of the road on an international level to
    try to protect these very expensive assets in space.
        So talk a little bit about how, from the DOD perspective,
    you are focusing on the protection of our assets in space and
    whether there are international rules of the road that we
    should be considering to try to make sure that all these assets
    are protected.
        Mr. Kendall. Well, Senator, one rule that we recently
    talked about is the one the Vice President discussed recently
    on the norm prohibiting the type of destructive tests that the
    Russians conducted recently, which was very irresponsible. They
    created large fields of debris. General Raymond can talk about
    the numbers of objects we are currently tracking up there as a
    result of that one test. So we have got to get people to agree
    not to do that. That puts everything we have in space and low-
    earth orbit, particularly, at risk.
        There are other norms that we have talked about with regard
    to proximity operations and so on, and the National Space
    Council I think has been working on some of these to try to get
    wider appreciation of the need to have things that allow us all
    to operate in space and to do so to the benefit of every
    nation, frankly. General Raymond I think will have more to say
    about that.
        General Raymond. You are absolutely right that space is
    becoming more congested, more contested, more competitive. If I
    were to testify in front of you 2 years I would have said we
    were tracking about 22,000 objects. Today we are probably
    tracking close to mid-40,000 objects. If I had said 2 years ago
    the numbers of satellites that we were tracking was about
    1,500. Today that number is close to 5,000, and the trends are
    going up. Everybody is proliferating access to space, largely
    because commercial space has reduced the cost to launch. It has
    enabled a lot more access.
        That provides us opportunities and it provides us
    challenges. On the challenges side we are working really hard
    to keep the domain safe for all. We act as the space traffic
    control for the world. We provide warning across the world to
    keep satellites from colliding. We demonstrate safe and
    responsible behavior by how we act, and we do so in partnership
    with our allies and partners. We are committed to keeping the
    domain safe for all.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you very much. Thanks, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
        Senator Rounds, please.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all,
    gentlemen, thank you very much for your service to our country.
    I want to take this opportunity to thank you for what you have
    been doing to make sure that the B-21 bomber program stays on
    time, on target. Folks in western South Dakota, Ellsworth Air
    Force Base, are truly looking forward to getting their first
    look at it, hopefully later on this year, and they most
    certainly want to be a part of the program, and they want to
    make sure that they are in a position to welcome the new crews
    and the new teams on board. I appreciate your cooperation in
    working with them to make sure that they know what to expect in
    terms of schools and so forth, and I am sure we will be able to
    work through all of that, make sure there are no delays in
    that.
        The B-21 seems to be an example of a platform plan which is
    working according to schedule. When I look back at some of the
    other challenges that we have it would seem that while we are
    going to be able to procure the B-21s in some reasonable
    fashion, we are probably going to need more than what we had
    originally estimated.
        General Brown, would you talk a little bit about what the
    expectations are for the B-21? I think originally we talked
    about a plan in which we would buy perhaps 100 of them. Would
    it be fair to say that in any of the new estimates, with near-
    peer competition growing, that our demand for that particular
    platform will be greater than what we originally anticipated?
        General Brown. Senator, part of that is the ongoing
    analysis that we do to determine not only what we have already
    decided on but where we might need to, in this case, procure
    either more B-21s or other capabilities to complement the B-21,
    and this one of the operational imperatives that we are working
    through. In fact, if you look at a crewed and an uncrewed
    collaborative platform that can work very closely with the B-
    21. So it may not mean necessarily an increased number of B-21s
    but it is additional capability to go with the B-21 as well.
        Senator Rounds. I think it would be fair to say that right
    now if we had--the F-22 is a good example of a platform in
    which we started out with one number that we wanted. Today I
    think there are very few of us that would say that we have
    enough F-22s that are mission capable, because even though you
    have a number of them a portion of them are always either being
    repaired or being used for training. So fair to say that even
    though we talk about 100 B-21s, what we are really talking
    about is some of them would be in maintenance, some of them
    would be for training. So we really would not have that many
    which would be on mission. Would you agree with me on that?
        General Brown. We will always have some that are in
    training or in some type of maintenance. The goal here as we
    look at this particular program is, as you described it, it is
    on track, and I think one of the key areas we want to take a
    look at is how we do a better job to make sure we are
    sustaining that aircraft and making it much easier for our
    airmen to maintain as well.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Secretary Kendall, this budget,
    this proposal this year plans for the elimination or the
    divestment of about 250 aircraft, but it looks like we are only
    going to be able to procure about 87 new aircraft. Granted
    there is, at least from what I can see, first of all some of
    the aircraft are flat out there Hangar Queens. They are there,
    they are on the inventory list, but they are really not
    operational, and the cost to maintain them, even to get them
    out, is such that it is really not worth the taxpayers dollars
    to try to continue to make them operational. But that also
    means then that we are going to end up with a shortfall with
    regard to the number of platforms we can put in the air.
        Is it fair to say that we are trying to do as many new
    platforms as we possibly can? Is the holdup the budget or is
    the holdup the inability of our manufacturing teams to be able
    to produce the number of new aircraft that we need?
        Mr. Kendall. We are trying to get the balance right and
    trying to sustain our support to combatant commanders, give
    them what they need while we go through this transition. So
    that is essentially what we try to do in the budget.
        What we are taking on includes a mix of systems. About 100
    of them are MQ-9s, which are actually not coming out. They are
    transferring to another government agency. We are taking out
    trainers, the T-1, which is our multi-engine trainer, and what
    we are going to do is something that is more like the
    commercial airlines, where pilots that are going down the
    multi-engine path will go directly from their primary trainer
    to the aircraft that they are going to actually operate. So we
    will actually have some efficiency in the pilot production line
    because of that.
        In the case of the F-22, we are taking our oldest and
    least-capable F-22s, about 33 of them. They are only used for
    training right now. So we can work on that capability of
    aircraft for training and have those aircraft available for
    contingency if we needed them in an emergency. But to have some
    efficiencies as well in terms of operating cost.
        So it is a mix of things that we are trying to do. Some of
    it is simply divesting to replace, as in the case of the
    tankers, for example.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, my time has
    expired. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rounds.
        Senator Ernst, please.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen,
    thank you so very much for your service and your willingness to
    testify in front of the committee.
        General Raymond, we will start with you. The investment in
    Space Force in this year's proposed NDAA is pretty significant.
    We have a top line of $24.5 billion, and over $16 billion is
    marked for research and development.
        We are briefed constantly in this body about the speed of
    acquisitions, or lack thereof, and we know that the Chinese's
    acquisition timelines are much faster, sometimes three to five
    times faster in domains like space and cyber. It is so much
    quicker than the way we move at the Pentagon. I think that
    justification for a Space Force distinct from the Air Force
    requires a distinct 21st century culture that will move quickly
    to adapt and modernize with all of these new technologies and
    really closes the gap on where we are with our near-peer
    adversaries.
        So we hear all the time in posture hearings, we are
    bemoaning the fact that acquisition timelines are too long, we
    have these risk-averse cultures, and they really trouble the
    other services. You are a brand-new service. So how will you
    build that culture in Space Force that will ensure and
    encourage a fast-follower type model for private industry and
    is willing to assume that prudent risk and fail faster? So how
    can we do that? We want to make sure that you are successful
    but we have to compete with our near-peer adversaries.
        General Raymond. I could not agree more with you. We have
    to be bold and be innovative, and I think space provides an
    opportunity to do that. The model, the business model that we
    have used in the past in space are very large, very exquisite
    satellites that are very expensive and not very easily
    defendable. This force design work that we have done shifts us
    to less-exquisite, with higher numbers that allows us to adopt
    more of a business model that you might see commercial
    companies doing, and so that is on the transformation of our
    capabilities. That is the path we are headed down.
        On the people part of this, we are investing in developing
    and acquiring talent that has commercial experience. In fact,
    last year, when the Air Force Academy cadets graduated, 118
    were coming to the Space Force. They had a little bit of time
    before they were going to go into training and we sent them to
    commercial companies and said, ``Go figure out how they do
    that.'' So everything that we are doing is focusing on getting
    after a culture that can go fast, be agile.
        But I will tell you, it is not like Amazon Prime where you
    can order it overnight. It is going to take a little bit of
    time to build this, but that is exactly where we are headed.
        Senator Ernst. So with that model--and I am glad you
    mentioned the personnel aspect of that because we have to make
    sure that as new authorities are being pushed to the service
    branches, in your case Space Force, that your acquisition
    personnel are properly trained on those new authorities. Do you
    feel that they are receiving the training necessary to move as
    quickly as possible and use some of these new models?
        General Raymond. I am satisfied that the training allows
    them to do that. We have got great folks. I think just the
    capabilities that we had set us on a path that did not allow us
    to take risk, and what we are trying to shift towards is a
    model that does.
        Senator Ernst. Yes, thank you, and Secretary Kendall, just
    sticking on this theme as well, you had noted last week in
    front of HASC that the Chinese are better than us at,
    ``starting a lot of new things and then taking them through to
    fielding''. Why is that? What is it that we can do differently?
    We have heard General Raymond talk about Space Force. How can
    we do this different in Air Force and our other service
    branches?
        Mr. Kendall. Senator, I want to first take a little bit of
    issue with what you said earlier about how long it takes the
    Chinese to do things. They are actually not faster at
    engineering than we are. But what they do is, what I was
    talking about in the HASC was that they have made decisions
    quickly. I think somebody earlier mentioned how they can do a
    decision in 3 days and we take 3 years to do a decision, and
    then to get money it takes us time to get money and start
    because of the process that we go through here.
        But I looked recently at the J-20, their most modern
    fighter, for example, and the development time for that
    aircraft was comparable to the F-35. It was not remarkably
    faster.
        But they do seem to be very creative and innovative. They
    are studying how we fight, what we depend upon to project
    power, in particular, and designing systems that are intended
    to defeat us. I have talked to people earlier about how when
    the Soviets were in existence and they wanted to do a new
    program, the question of leadership I always asked was, ``Are
    the Americans doing it?'' If the Americans were not doing it
    then the Soviets did not do it either.
        But with the Chinese they do not care about what we are
    doing. They are looking at how we fight, what we depend upon,
    and they are being very creative about the things that they are
    buying to come after us.
        Senator Ernst. Good, thank you, and I do hope that we can
    continue with the model of efficiency and be less risk-averse
    as we move forward. We want to make sure that you have
    everything you need to succeed.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
        Senator Warren, please.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Kendall,
    I want to talk about this proposal to retire 33 F-22s that is
    part of the Air Force's budget submission. Now I have got to
    say, my ears perk up any time the Pentagon talks about wanting
    to cut costs, and I am inclined to support you on this. But how
    we got here is a real problem.
        The F-22 fighter jet designed to establish air superiority
    over enemies like Russia. The Air Force started buying them
    from Lockheed Martin in 1999, and said we would be using them
    until the 2060s.
        Secretary Kendall, you are Secretary of the Air Force but
    you used to run the acquisitions program for the whole
    Pentagon, so I know you know all of the issues behind this.
    When the Air Force started buying F-22s in quantity, was the
    testing and development for this aircraft complete or were we
    still figuring out a number of its major capabilities?
        Mr. Kendall. You raise a great question----
        Senator Warren. Yes.
        Mr. Kendall.--and I am afraid I do not know the answer. I
    was there for the F-22 Milestone B Decision. It was the
    decision to start development. I was not there for the
    production decision.
        Senator Warren. Okay, but----
        Mr. Kendall. But I understand where you are coming from,
    and I think it is really an interesting thing to pursue.
        The ones we are retiring are less capable. They were the
    first ones we bought and they did not have the full combat
    capability. So it would be worthwhile to go back and do the
    case study to understand why that is the case.
        We have a similar problem with F-35, where a lot of our
    earlier aircraft need a lot of modifications, and I know you
    are going to go to my acquisition malpractice comment.
        Senator Warren. You bet I am. But let's unpack this a
    little bit as we go forward, because it is my understanding,
    and I think the record shows pretty clearly that we started
    buying these planes before we had uncovered all the design
    deficiencies and capability shortfalls that had to be fixed in
    order to make them work the way they were supposed to work.
    These are very expensive planes, so we spent $6 billion on
    them. The GAO [Government Accountability Office] now estimates
    we are going to need to make upgrades that will cost $11.7
    billion, nearly double what we spent to buy them in the first
    place.
        I understand why the Air Force decided that was just too
    much and you want to retire these planes, and frankly, I
    applaud you for making the tough call. But the F-22 is not the
    only program where we have seen this problem. The GAO thinks we
    will have purchased a third of the F-35 fleet before testing is
    complete. I appreciate the capabilities of the F-35 and the
    role that they are going to serve in the military, but the
    process gives me pause here.
        Secretary Kendall, you know where I am going with this. You
    called the F-35 program, ``acquisition malpractice.'' Can you
    just say a word more about what you mean by that?
        Mr. Kendall. What I meant at the time that the decision to
    enter production was made before any flight testing of the
    production prototype, and so we did not have data to verify the
    design. It was not a stable design. My rule of thumb for
    aircraft programs is you should have about a year a flight
    testing under your belt, at least, before you commit to
    production.
        As good as our digital models are, and as more
    sophisticated they get, we just push our designs to be as close
    to the edge as possible. We often push for more performance
    than we have had before, so our models are not as good.
        There is always this tension, Senator, between people who
    are really, really anxious to get the new product. You know,
    they want that new, wonderful airplane that is coming out and
    they do not want to wait another 2 or 3 years to have you
    finish the design and then put on it the upgrades that are
    coming.
        The other factor that comes into it is that almost all of
    our aircraft evolve over time to respond to the threat. If you
    look at the F-16, for example, it has gone through a number of
    different models. You look at the F-15, the same thing. The F-
    35 is now going through, you know, it is Technology Refresh 3
    and it generally gets Block 4 level of sophistication. Part of
    this is that the threat keeps changing, and part of it is that
    technology keeps changing.
        Senator Warren. Look, Mr. Secretary, I understand that.
    When the threat changes and we have to make adjustments I
    totally get that. But I would not buy a car from a car company
    that said, ``We are not sure if we have figured out all the
    details to keep this thing from bursting into flames, but do
    not worry. We are going to go ahead and sell it to you and
    later on you can buy the parts that will keep it from burning
    up.''
        You know, I think you have it right when you say we need to
    fly before we buy. Otherwise, we just run the risk of not only
    flushing money down the drain but time and effort that we put
    in this direction.
        So now we are replacing the F-22s, the ones that we are
    scrapping after having spent $6 billion on them, with the Next
    Generation Air Dominance program. I just want to make a point
    about this program. It is largely classified, and that may be
    necessary, but it also means there is going to be even less
    oversight over this program. No public reports, less public
    scrutiny from the GAO, from the DOD IGs [inspector generals]
    and from the press. This lack of transparency means the process
    that we have already seen fail us becomes an even riskier
    process.
        So I see that I am out of time. I would like to talk to you
    more about how we estimate the costs around this. But I would
    like to urge you to rethink this question about making it more
    transparent, what we are doing in the development of this new
    product.
        The American people are willing to pay what it costs to
    keep us safe. We want cutting-edge technology. But they do not
    want to be in the position of flushing more money down the
    toilet because we were out purchasing something before we even
    knew if it would work.
        So that is my request, Mr. Secretary.
        Mr. Kendall. I think you are slightly overstating the case
    with the F-22, because those earlier models were of use to us
    operationally and have been up until this time. It is not that
    they have no capability or that they have a defective design.
    It is just not upgraded to the state that we need to meet the
    current threat. It would cost--I think my number is about $2
    billion to upgrade those aircraft, $50 million apiece, roughly,
    and it is not a high enough priority for us to do relative to
    other investments.
        Senator Warren. I know we are out of time but I just want
    to say, it was sold as a $6 billion airplane that was going to
    meet these specifications and accomplish these ends, and now we
    are being told it will cost $11 billion extra to be able to
    meet those qualifications. That means there is something wrong
    in the process.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren.
        Senator Cramer, please.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to all
    three of you for being here and for your service.
        First of all, I do want to join Senator Fischer in thanking
    the Air Force for maintaining the nuclear deterrent, keeping it
    on track, on target. All of that is fantastic, and thank you
    all for doing that.
        I want to talk a little bit, at first, about the radar
    station, the PARCS [perimeter acquisition radar attack
    characterization system] radar station at Cavalier. I sort of
    chuckle when I look at the three of you because all three of
    you have visited North Dakota in your capacity in the
    wintertime, and that is special. Particularly special, Mr.
    Secretary, was your visit to Minot right before Christmas.
    Thank you for that.
        But I have to say General Raymond visited Cavalier on a day
    when it was 41 degrees below--that would be zero, for those of
    you who do not know what below means--below zero windchill, so
    he knows a little something about how remote and how difficult
    an environment that is.
        But that radar is 50 years old, the PARCS radar, and I am
    concerned a little bit because this year's budget document say
    that the radar has, ``a high risk that equipment failures will
    cause unacceptable mission downtime.'' I believe that the last
    year's budget had some similar language to it.
        So my staff took a briefing recently from the program
    office that said they are planning for digital upgrade that
    would ``drastically decrease detection time, accuracy, and
    contributions to both missile warning and space domain
    awareness missions''. You have all talked about the importance
    of a lot of that, but I do not see the funding for it in this
    budget.
        So I will maybe start with you, General Raymond. You are
    obviously aware of the precarious situation at Cavalier. I know
    you are going to visit there again. What do you think? Do we
    need to upgrade?
        General Raymond. Sir, first of all, missile warning,
    missile tracking, and space domain awareness are critical
    missions, and Cavalier and the radar at Cavalier, the PARCS
    radar, is a very important radar. We have upgraded that
    throughout the years. We have spent about $22 million a year
    sustaining that, operating and sustaining that capability. The
    priority for this year's budget was the space missile warning
    segment because we have to get after being able to detect and
    track hypersonics.
        As you mentioned, the program office right now is looking
    at an analog-to-digital modernization effort and we will
    address that in the coming budget years.
        Senator Cramer. Great. Mr. Secretary, anything you would
    want to add to that?
        Mr. Kendall. No. I think General Raymond covered it pretty
    well.
        Senator Cramer. Beautiful. Thank you.
        General Brown, you and I and others have had very frank
    discussions, of course, about ISR [intelligence, surveillance,
    and reconnaissance] and the ISR retirements and the tradeoffs.
    There has been a lot of discussion already today again about
    how to balance all of that, and I appreciate that. Some of us,
    of course, had doubts about the retirement of the RQ-4, the
    Global Hawk, because Air Force ISR capacity really was not
    keeping up, at least with what many of the COCOMs would like,
    whether they need them all or not, but it seems like they could
    always use more. But we ultimately agreed, and I think based on
    your wisdom and your counsel to trade some capacity for new
    capabilities.
        But this year's budget is cutting even more Air Force ISR,
    even though the COCOMs are relating, in their hearings, that
    they need more. I am also hearing that you are looking at
    cutting some of the manpower, including up to maybe 30 percent
    at Grand Forks. Again, I have not confirmed that but we are
    hearing that.
        I just want to get a sense of your vision and goal in this
    transition.
        General Brown. Sure. Well, first of all I support your
    support. I know we got a chance to engage on this particular
    topic a number of times. There is no intent to cut any manpower
    at Grand Forks. Hopefully that will put you a bit at ease.
        Senator Cramer. It does.
        General Brown. One of the areas I would highlight, though,
    as we look at the ISR we have today versus the ISR that we need
    for the future, the ISR in the future needs to be connected,
    persistent, and survivable. Persistent we do have. Connected
    and survivable, not so much. I look forward to maybe talking a
    bit more. When we go to our closed session I can get into a bit
    more detail on the capabilities that we are pursuing, and this
    is something that I think will help us along the way.
        I would also offer the fact that how we get information
    today, not from our classified systems but also from our open
    source, plays a key role in how we bring all the information
    together. This our advanced management system and some of the
    other tools that help us with the decision superiority will
    actually add to, to cover some of the ISR from a different
    perspective as we look at how the character of war has changed.
        Senator Cramer. I appreciate that. I appreciate all of you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cramer.
        Senator Rosen, please.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed. It is really an
    important hearing that we are having here today on the Air
    Force. Secretary Kendall, I really appreciate you being here
    today, for taking the time to speak with me last week ahead of
    today's hearing. Of course, thank you to all the witnesses.
        I understand the Air Force has an updated legislative
    proposal to modernize the Nevada Test and Training Range. While
    I agree that modernization is critical for our national
    security and our overall readiness, I am disappointed that the
    Air Force once again did not work with me or the rest of the
    Federal delegation on its proposal, even after every Air Force
    senior leader promised that they would do so. Since learning of
    its existence, my staff and I have been asking for details on
    the proposal, but the Air Force has been reluctant to provide
    many.
        Our delegation, we have really enjoyed open lines of
    communication with the Navy as we work through its proposal to
    modernize Naval Air Station Fallon, and we just want to have
    the same relationship with the Air Force regarding your
    proposal to modernize the Nevada Test and Training Range.
        So Secretary Kendall, recognizing where we are in the
    calendar year, it seems likely that your proposal would be
    under consideration for the fiscal year 2024 NDAA. Can you
    recommit to me now that you will work with me and Senator
    Cortez Masto and the rest of the Federal delegation on this
    proposal which will be submitted to Congress for our
    consideration?
        Mr. Kendall. I would be happy to work with you, Senator. I
    have looked into this since we talked and there is some
    discussion within the Executive branch between agencies that
    has to take place to finalize the proposals. I think you are
    aware. The Intergovernmental Executive Committee that is
    involved is meeting in about 2 weeks, so hopefully that will
    free things up so we can move forward. I have asked my staff to
    share with you in general what our intentions are. We cannot
    share the specific proposal because it is going through the
    legislative proposal process. But we would be happy to work
    with you to try to make sure there is communication about what
    we are trying to do.
        Senator Rosen. I understand. At least talking generally
    about it is a good start.
        I also want to talk to you a little bit about housing for
    junior enlisted. It is an issue that I have been working on.
    Our junior enlisted servicemen, including airmen stationed at
    Nevada's Nellis Air Force Base, are averaging only 12 months in
    on-base housing. They are being forced to move off the base due
    to shortages. You know this. The troops are forced to cover
    their rental deposits and moving costs before they are eligible
    to begin receiving their basic allowance for housing, or BAH.
    It is why I have worked to include a provision in last year's
    NDAA directing DOD to brief Congress by March 1st of this year
    on the Pentagon's plan to provide partial dislocation allowance
    for these troops. We still have not received this briefing, and
    I recently heard from Nellis that none of their junior airmen
    who were forced to move out of the dorms received a dislocation
    allowance.
        So Secretary Kendall, why is not the Air Force supporting
    and providing our junior enlisted airmen with the dislocation
    allowance you are authorized to provide them?
        Mr. Kendall. Senator Rosen, I have looked into that as well
    and there is some relief available for the airmen who have to
    move off the base. They can apply for advanced base allowance
    for housing and accelerate payments for that. They are not
    currently getting dislocation allowance because of some
    limitations in the joint travel regulation, but we are working
    to change that and correct it. It is a DOD issue, not just an
    Air Force.
        Senator Rosen. We need to change that because the most
    junior enlisted airmen--and I know this is happening at other
    places--they are the least likely to be able to afford this. It
    is really putting a strain on them. We have authorized it.
    Let's have a discussion, because this is really hurting our
    service men and women, particularly the young ones. So thank
    you.
        I want to move on, in the time I have left, to talk about
    C-130J recapitalization, because Nevada's Air National Guard's
    152nd Airlift Wing in Reno, it flies its legacy C-130s in some
    of the hottest temperatures, highest elevations, and in the
    most challenging and mountainous environments of any C-130
    unit. Integral to their mission is flying the Modular Airborne
    FireFighting System. We call it MAFFS.
        Upgrading the Nevada Air National Guard's C-130 fleet with
    C-130Js would have a substantial impact on their readiness and
    the firefighting capabilities, not just in Nevada but the
    entire Western United States. I know you have seen the
    wildfires. They are just burning out of control. We are just
    plagued, and I cannot imagine it is going to get any better.
        So I am really discouraged that the Air Force is still not
    considering MAFFS when evaluating base candidates for C-130J.
    During last year posture hearing General Brown and then Acting
    Secretary Roth both committed to considering making MAFFS'
    mission part of the Air Force basing criteria for C-130Js.
        So, Secretary Kendall, again I am putting you in the
    hotseat. Can you update the committee where you are on the
    process? Can we get a commitment that the 152nd Airlift Wing in
    Reno will be seriously considered, given its critical mission
    to saving lives in the West?
        Mr. Kendall. Senator, we will be looking at the special
    missions, for various special missions that C-130s do. MAFFS is
    an important one, obviously. We will be taking those special
    mission capabilities into consideration as we go through the
    basing decisions for the 130Js.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate it. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
        Senator Cotton, please.
        Senator Cotton. Secretary Kendall, General Brown, I want to
    commend you again for your clear-headed and even single-minded
    focus on regaining our technological edge against China. I have
    supported those efforts in the past and I continue to support
    them now.
        General Brown, I want to talk to you a little bit about
    some of those efforts and something of a challenge you face.
    For a few years now the Air Force has talked to us about
    divesting certain assets. Those things are known there,
    apparent to the eye. Local communities depend on them, whether
    it is Little Rock or C. Moore Johnson or Nellis. But you are
    investing in a lot of things that we cannot necessarily see.
    Either they are in development or they are highly classified
    programs. These are capabilities, though, that we need to
    continue to outpace and deter China.
        I know we are going to have a closed setting later where we
    can touch on some of those as a committee, but can you just
    confirm you are going to provide in that closed session the
    classified details that we need on the following programs, the
    first would be the F-35 along with other future fighter force
    investments?
        General Brown. Senator, we will. If I could also add, one
    of the areas that I am focused on with my staff is to get as
    many briefings as possible, at the same time providing some
    unclassified talking points like we did for Grand Forks on the
    ISR being consistent, persistent, and survivable, so they have
    an idea of things they can talk about with their constituents
    as well as the other Members of the Congress.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. A second one is the future of air-to-
    ground weapons and air-to-air weapons and that especially
    includes hypersonics.
        General Brown. I will be very happy to talk about that in
    the closed session.
        Senator Cotton. The future of ISR, you have already
    touched. Some key space capabilities I cannot even name here. I
    will ask you first and then turn it to General Raymond.
        General Brown. I really depend on General Raymond. I am a
    beneficiary of his capabilities.
        Senator Cotton. Okay.
        General Raymond. Sir, I look forward to talking to you in
    the closed hearing.
        Senator Cotton. Okay, and General Brown, we have touched on
    this with a few other Senators, the B-21. We will get a
    classified update on that as well?
        General Brown. You will.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. I just want to say that I understand
    some Senators' desire to have some of these programs at a lower
    classification level, and I do believe there are certain cases
    where the government overclassifies matters. But some of these
    are extremely sensitive programs, and if the Chinese or the
    Russians were to understand these capabilities it would put all
    of our troops and our Nation at graver risk in the future.
        Senator Warren said that we need to have more ability for
    oversight and transparency and she cited inspector generals and
    NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] and the press. That is
    what we are here for, though. NGOs' job is not to oversee the
    government. The press's job is not to oversee the government.
    They are not elected by the people and they are not vested with
    that authority under our Constitution. It is this institution,
    and in particular this committee, to oversee these programs.
    That is exactly what we do, even if they are highly classified.
        General Brown, I want to touch on another issue with you. I
    am concerned about the threat of China acquiring land and
    property in the vicinity of some sensitive bases. It is not
    just an Air Force problem. It happens across our military and
    our intelligence community as well. I just want to bring to
    your attention one specific project. This is at the Grand Forks
    Air Force Base in North Dakota. Fufeng, a Chinese company, is
    investing millions in a local corn mill there. Maybe it is just
    a corn mill, but it would also provide the potential, at least,
    for Chinese intelligence to engage in intelligence collection
    of various kinds, both signals collection and human collection.
        What is the Air Force's plans to be sure that that is not
    happening, not just at this one site in Grand Forks but at any
    of its bases around the country, if you can discuss that in an
    open setting?
        General Brown. I really cannot discuss that, the details,
    in an open session like this. I recently just became aware of
    this one in particular, but it is something we do pay attention
    to across the board.
        Senator Cotton. Good. I am glad to hear that. Again, it is
    a concern about all our military and intelligence installations
    around the country. It is not just Grand Forks. But Senator
    Cramer and I have discussed this at length. I would feel
    exactly the same if some giant Chinese conglomerate started
    building a facility outside of Little Rock Air Force Base as
    well. But I look forward to exploring that with you in a closed
    setting.
        Thank you, gentlemen.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
        Senator Tillis, please.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Secretary Kendall, I
    had not expected to ask this question but based on the exchange
    with Senator Warren, I think it may be helpful and it may be
    necessary to do in a classified briefing, but it would be
    helpful with the F-22 and the F-35 to talk about some of the
    kinks that we are working out, technical kinks, and separate
    those from modifications that we are making specifically
    because we have identified new threats. We got a briefing a
    week or so ago, but I think that would be helpful.
        I, for one, think one of the reasons why the acquisition
    process is so difficult is we have a near-perfection
    requirement for specifications before we move forward. If we do
    not understand with some of these platforms, some of the more
    technically challenging ones, I can understand where you want
    to do a lot of homework, but in some respects we have got to be
    able to accept failure if we are going to actually learn from
    failure. I use SpaceX as a classic example of that. One of the
    reasons why they have got such a successful program now is they
    were prepared to go on TV and have what I think Elon Musk
    referred to as a ``rapid, unplanned disassembly.''
        So we cannot, on the one hand, say you have got to compress
    the time to value and then on the other hand say in every case
    it has to be perfect. I think maybe for a future hearing we
    should talk about that.
        You know, I have got a little bit of a history of bringing
    up the KC-10, and the KC-46 we are going to be happy to host
    down at C. Moore Johnson. But I was curious with the current
    conflict in Ukraine, the increase in refueling needs, and then
    gaming out how this conflict could go, if there is any thought
    process in the Air Force behind whether or not we are retiring
    KC-10s a little bit faster than we should, based on threats
    that we did not know about before February the 24th, or did not
    necessarily anticipate?
        Mr. Kendall. Yes, Senator, I am not aware of any impact
    coming out of the Ukraine lessons learned that would affect
    that. General Brown, do you want to comment?
        Senator Tillis. If you could also just give me an update on
    KC-46 and some of the technical challenges that we are working
    through. General Brown?
        General Brown. Sure. Nothing in a threat that actually
    would change where we are with the KC-46. What I will also tell
    you, we did send KC-46 to Europe for about 5 weeks and have a
    chance to work and support some of those operations, and even
    air refuel some of our NATO partners. The airplane performed
    very well. I think our airmen learned a lot while we were there
    about how to work in a deployed environment.
        As far as the KC-46, one of the key areas that we have been
    working on was the remote visual system. We have come to an
    agreement with Boeing on that and we will start that process
    here in about a year or so to start the conversion.
        But I have personally flown the airplane and flown on the
    airplane, and had a chance to talk to the airmen that operate
    it. They are very pleased with the airplane, and what we are
    finding is as we go through and certify different airplanes, we
    are about eight airplanes away from all of the fleets that we
    would actually be able to air refuel.
        So again, the airplane is going well. It does have some
    issues we are working through, but by and large it is meeting
    some of the requirements, and we will continue to work that
    with the other platforms we have, with the KC-10 and the KC-
    135.
        Senator Tillis. Okay. General Brown, maybe sticking with
    you. I know that you are cutting the Active Duty end strength.
    To my understand some of that is primarily due to budget
    constraints. So if you did not have the budget constraint would
    you be able to use those personnel?
        General Brown. Well, all the personnel that were taken out
    of the Active Duty strength, and the Guard and Reserve--we are
    coming down in the Active, a little bit up in the Guard, and
    down a little bit in the Reserve--all of that is tied to force
    structure. So it is not arbitrary, just taking airmen out. It
    is tied to actual capability.
        Senator Tillis. Okay. So then it really was not budgetary
    driver for the force reduction?
        General Brown. No, it was not.
        Senator Tillis. Okay. General Raymond, Senator Cotton
    mentioned some of the classification and de-classification. I
    believe we were supposed to get a report due out at the end of
    March. We have not gotten that. Do we have any idea when we
    should expect to see that report?
        General Raymond. I know OSD policy, specifically the new
    ASD [Assistant Secretary of Defense], is working that, and he
    is doing the work. I do not have an estimate on when it will
    get to you.
        Senator Tillis. Okay. If you could report back and give us
    an expected due that I would be interested in hearing that.
        I guess a final question, I got a briefing before the
    Personnel Subcommittee. All of our service lines had some
    headwinds on recruiting. Air Force and Space Force seems to be
    maybe not as challenged as the Army. How are we doing on
    recruiting? What more do we need to do, as a matter of
    authorities or resources, to make sure you can hit your
    recruiting goals?
        Mr. Kendall. We do have issues on recruiting but we think
    we will be close to our meet our goals this year. Looking
    forward we are using up some of our delayed entrants in order
    to make that goal.
        So there are some headwinds, the economy and demand for
    labor, a few other things, that are impacting recruiting. We
    are addressing this at the Department level, the Department of
    Defense as well as the Department of the Air Force. We have a
    number of things, such as bonuses, that we are offering now,
    increased advertising, and so on, outreach to places we have
    not been able to go. Under COVID our recruiters could not get
    into schools for a long time so that has been a big setback and
    that is corrected now, in general, we are doing alot of things.
        I am not aware of anything that we need from the committee
    or from the Congress at this time, though.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
        Senator Wicker, please.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. General
    Brown, I think the chairman of this committee is correct to
    worry aloud in his opening statement that the budget proposal
    comes against a backdrop of a very dangerous environment,
    including a very heated shooting war in Eastern Europe. Yet we
    have a list of $4.6 billion that are not funded, including
    hypersonic testing, F-35 procurement, and weapon system
    sustainments, among other things.
        Why aren't these in the budget request? I think I know the
    answer. You know, General Washington established a provision
    over two centuries ago that the military is answerable to the
    elected leadership of this country, and that is one of the
    crowning jewels of our system. I support that, and when the
    President tells you what to do, you salute.
        But am I to understand that hypersonic testing, F-35
    procurement, and this $4.6 billion worth of unfunded priority
    list would help us in this dangerous environment?
        General Brown. Senator, they would, and this is in addition
    to what we have in the budget, but these are the capabilities
    provided for the Air Force to be able to do what the Nation is
    asking it to do.
        Senator Wicker. So if we do not get them, what will the
    result of that be, General Brown?
        General Brown. Well, anything we do not have is going to
    drive some level of risk, and this is something that we talk
    internal to the Department of the Air Force and with the
    Department of Defense of how best to balance against the
    current threat and then also posture ourselves against a future
    threat.
        Senator Wicker. I hope it is going to be the position of
    Republicans and Democrats in this committee that these are
    risks we do not need to take in this current environment.
        General Brown, we know that you cannot predict the future.
    That is why the fiscal year 2022 budget planned for 2.2 percent
    inflation, and yet here we are, over 8 percent. What do you
    think the inflation will be for the things you need? I think it
    certainly will be more than 2.2 percent, and actually it's 5
    percent plus difference in predicted inflation and actual
    inflation. That is having a negative impact on the Air Force's
    fiscal posture, is it not? Is it more expensive for you now to
    procure the needed items and train airmen than it was for you
    last year? Therefore, would you support more funding through a
    defense supplemental in order to account for the difference in
    what we thought inflation as going to be and what it actually
    is?
        General Brown. As you might imagine, with inflation, as you
    said, I cannot predict the future. But as we see what is
    happening today and what the trend lines might be, the aspect
    for us really to come back and work with the Committee and the
    Congress on how best to approach this and how both internal but
    also with the committee on how best to approach where inflation
    is taking us, not only right now but what might happen here in
    the future, as well.
        Senator Wicker. So I am asking your advice on whether this
    committee and this Congress should come back and account for
    higher inflation in a defense supplemental.
        General Brown. Well, whether it is a supplemental or
    whatever other approaches you might take, what I am tell you is
    we do want to work with the committee and the Congress on how
    best to address inflation.
        Senator Wicker. Well, a defense supplemental would do it
    quicker, would it not, General?
        General Brown. It probably would.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. Now let me also ask General Brown
    about undergraduate pilot training. The budget process proposes
    retiring 50 T-1 training aircraft, including many in my state
    of Mississippi. These requirements are part of the Air Force's
    shift to Undergraduate Pilot Training 2.5, which incorporates
    simulators to a larger extent. Do you expect to produce the
    quantity and quality of pilots needed in the Air Force by
    shifting to these virtual simulators in the Undergraduate Pilot
    Training 2.5 model?
        General Brown. I do, and I think one of the areas that--I
    go back to when I went to pilot training, you know, nearly 37
    years ago. The technology we have today in our simulator
    capabilities is much different from when I went to pilot
    training. So we are really taking a different approach and also
    understanding how our young people, our lieutenants that come
    to pilot training, how they learn and learn differently from
    the way I did. So I do see that we will still be able to make
    the numbers and provide the quality.
        Senator Wicker. How long has that been in the works?
        General Brown. We have been working on this process for
    probably about 3 to 4 years.
        Senator Wicker. It is not budget driven.
        General Brown. It is not budget driven.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir, and thank you all for your
    service.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
        Senator Hawley, please.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to all the
    witnesses for being here.
        Mr. Secretary, if we could start with you. Can you tell me,
    just give me a sense with regard to the budget, what
    specifically does this budget request do to increase the Air
    Force's ability to deter a Chinese fait accompli situation in
    Taiwan in the next several years?
        Mr. Kendall. Generally I think it provides a number of
    capabilities that will effectively do that. It sustains the
    current force to a level which supports combatant commanders.
    It is acquiring systems like the F-35, though not quite at the
    numbers we would have originally intended, as well as
    transforming some other elements of the force structure with
    increased capabilities.
        Some of the capabilities I mentioned in my opening
    statement, however, will be longer. It will take longer to get
    them than the next few years, so there is a period of risk
    there.
        Senator Hawley. Well, you are hinting at what my concern is
    here, which is that you appear to be cutting capabilities that
    we could use to deter China in the near term in favor of making
    investments, which I support for the long term, but of course
    that sets us up with a scenario where when we are in this
    potential danger zone between now and, say, 2030, as Chinese
    capability ramps up, we want to be sure that we can deter and
    deny in that window as well. I am concerned that this budget
    may not have us on track to do that.
        Do you want to just respond to that, allay my concerns?
        Mr. Kendall. I do not think any potential adversary should
    underestimate the United States' military capability. We have
    the most powerful military in the world, by a wide margin, and
    anyone who wants to challenge us should recognize that and
    realize that we are prepared. It is a very ready military as
    well. It has global responsibilities, and because of that it is
    fairly large, but it can swing those capabilities from one
    theater to another fairly quickly.
        So any potential adversary I think should be given great
    pause when it looks at possibly taking on the United States, at
    any point in time. The risk is increasing over time because our
    adversaries, potential adversaries--China, who I am concerned
    about the most--is fielding increased capability over time. So
    we have to respond to that, and we are making marginal changes
    in the near term in order to have better capability in the
    longer term.
        Senator Hawley. Let me ask you specifically about the
    Pacific Air Force's, PACAF. This would be the point of the
    spear for the Air Force, is the point of the spear for the Air
    Force and the Pacific. Were all of the posture requirements
    identified by PACAF or this fiscal year, fiscal year 2023, this
    budget cycle, were they funded in the budget request?
        Mr. Kendall. We do not fund posture requirements per se. We
    fund organizations that then are used to provide forces to
    combatant commanders. There is a constant dialogue, and General
    Brown was very involved in this, about what portions of our
    force are forward and how, as we modernize, we take forces out
    and replace them.
        So there have been discussions about what forces to keep
    forward and as we retire certain aircraft, what should be
    changed in terms of forward posture. That is a continuing
    dialogue that really happens in the context of the Joint Staff
    and under the Secretary of Defense's direction.
        General Brown, do you want to comment about that a little
    bit more?
        General Brown. Sure. So part of that dialogue is not only
    with PACAF but also, in this case, with INDOPACOM [United
    States Indo-Pacific Command], with Admiral Aquilino, on his
    requirements, and balance that between all of our global
    commitments to be able to not only support INDOPACOM but also
    the other combatant commands, and EUCOM [United States European
    Command] is one of those today that you see.
        So there is a constant dialogue about how we base, how we
    posture, and how we actually train our airmen as well to handle
    really all the threats that we think we might face.
        Senator Hawley. So are you telling me, Mr. Secretary, that
    there are no unfunded requests from PACAF? They got everything
    they wanted?
        Mr. Kendall. I am not aware of their requests, the unfunded
    requests from PACAF. They may have them but I am just not aware
    of them.
        Senator Hawley. Okay, great. Could you take that for the
    record for me? If there are unfunded requests would you provide
    those to me?
        Mr. Kendall. Certainly.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you. Let's talk about long-range
    anti-ship missiles if we could. If we were to be in a kinetic
    situation with China, a fight with China, we would burn through
    LRASMs [Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles] pretty quickly, would we
    not?
        Mr. Kendall. That would be speculating. We are acquiring
    some LRASM for the Air Force in our budget, and we probably
    will be doing more as we go forward.
        Senator Hawley. Here is my concern. Last year you requested
    zero LRASMs. This year it is 28. Combined with the 60 LRASMs
    requests by the Navy for fiscal year 2023 that means we are
    only buying 88 total LRASMs in this budget year. I mean, can
    our industrial base not produce more than 88?
        Mr. Kendall. I am not sure what the limitations is there,
    but LRASM is not our only anti-ship capability. There are other
    weapons that can be effective in that mission as well.
        Senator Hawley. So why are we not buying more then? Let me
    just put it to you that way. They are not the best bang for the
    buck? They are not efficient? I mean, help me get some clarity
    here.
        Mr. Kendall. We basically try to balance our munitions
    acquisition across all the different demands, and that is one
    of several. This is a new acquisition, I think, for the Air
    Force. So we are going to be integrating them into the force
    and learning how to use them. I would tell you there will
    definitely be more anti-ship capability going forward. Whether
    it is the LRASM or not, I am not certain at this point.
        Senator Hawley. Great. My time has expired. I will have a
    few additional questions for each of you for the record. Thanks
    again for being here.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
        Senator Peters, please.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Kendall, good to have you here. Thank you for
    your testimony. As we have discussed many times together, and
    you are well aware, Michigan's national defense footprint,
    including Selfridge Air National Guard Base and its A-10 and
    KC-135 missions that they have are critical for our national
    defense. It was an honor to host Deputy Secretary Hicks last
    year at Selfridge, so she could see the capabilities of that
    airfield firsthand, and for former Acting Secretary Roth to
    affirm the Air Force's commitment to Selfridge, writing in a
    letter to me as well as to Senator Stabenow, and I will quote,
    ``As we adapt our Air Force to meet current and future national
    security challenges, Selfridge will continue to play an
    essential role,'' end of quote.
        So, Mr. Secretary, my question for you is do I have your
    commitment that Selfridge will continue to play an important
    role in the Air Force's long-term plans as those are developed?
        Mr. Kendall. Senator I have no reason to believe otherwise.
        Senator Peters. I appreciate that.
        General Brown, when speaking with Air Force Magazine on
    April 13th of this year, General Nahom stated that the Air
    Force needs to buy 72 new fighters a year in order to
    recapitalize a fighter force that can fight and win against a
    near-peer threat such as China. Yet the fiscal year 2023 Air
    Force budget only calls for 33 F-35s and 24 F-15EXs to be
    purchased this year. It also calls for overall cuts in terms of
    the F-15EX, about a 50 percent reduction, from 144 aircraft to
    only 80.
        By your own admission and statements that you have made,
    the F-15EX has several unique capabilities and for certain
    missions in particular, such as homeland defense, it is a
    superior platform to fifth-generation aircraft.
        So my question for you, sir, is why is the Air Force
    planning on reducing the procurement of a proven, capable
    platform that can help us recapitalize the National Guard's
    fighter fleet, and more importantly, free up fifth-generation
    aircraft for more relevant missions?
        General Brown. Senator, we, as an Air Force, we are
    committed to 72 a year. That actually helps us to bring down
    our average age, and there is some analysis that has been done
    to work through that.
        One of the things, as we went into this budget, was to
    balance the capability, not just from the fighter itself but it
    is also the weapons, it is the support and infrastructure that
    goes with it, which has put us in a position this year not to
    actually go after 72. So it is a balance of all the
    capabilities that need to come together to support the fighter
    force, we have a full capability, not just a partial
    capability, as we go forward.
        This will be a continuing dialogue and continuing analysis
    that we will do as an Air Force to make sure we have the full
    capability for each one of the platforms we do procure.
        Senator Peters. Given that, the last question, would you
    purchase more F-15EXs if you were appropriated funds to do so
    by Congress?
        General Brown. We would definitely consider that, but I
    would also, as we do that, I would also look at the weapons
    that go with the platform so we actually have not only the
    capability but the capacity to go with those particular
    fighters.
        Senator Peters. Very good.
        Secretary Kendall, I have sent a letter to Secretary Austin
    regarding my concern's with the Department missing some
    critical PFAS reporting deadlines, including both a deadline
    that requires the Department to explain a delay in reaching
    agreement with the state on proposed CIRCLA cooperative
    agreement cleanup plan as well as a March 1, 2022, deadline for
    reporting to Congress on status of PFAS remediation at 50
    priority military installations.
        Two of those installations are located in Michigan. PFAS
    remediation remains a high priority for all Michiganders,
    including myself. My question for you, Mr. Secretary, is what
    are your PFAS-related priorities, and just given the sheer
    scale of the contamination challenge that we face right now,
    how will you use your limited budgetary resources in the most
    effective way to deal with this problem?
        Mr. Kendall. PFAS is a well-recognized and national
    problem, of course, in the Air Force because of its use of it
    in firefighting and training over the years. That is obviously
    been a big source of that getting into the environment.
        We are working through the CIRCLA process, and I think we
    are doing assessments, generally, now. We are well into that
    and finishing that. What we are all waiting for, of course, is
    for an EPA standard that will help us understand what the
    remediation requirements are going to be, and then we will be
    able to move forward on remediation as well.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, and I appreciate your focus on
    this very important issue.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters.
        I am going to recognize Senator Sullivan. We have a
    confidential session, closed session, afterwards, so if we can
    restrict our questions to 5 minutes I would appreciate it.
    Thank you.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen,
    good to see you. I want to begin by thanking you for your
    service to our country, which has been exceptional from all
    three of you. I also want to compliment the Air Force in a big
    way. You know, General Brown, Mr. Secretary, the F-35 bed-down
    at Eielson started on April 20th. A pretty difficult time if we
    all remember April--I am sorry, April 2020, and I am sure you
    have heard the last F-35 of the two squadrons has arrived. So
    on time, on budget during the biggest pandemic in 100 years. It
    is remarkable--remarkable work by the Air Force. I do not even
    know how you did that, so thank you.
        As you know, that now provides Alaska with over 100 fifth-
    gen fighters. No place on the Planet Earth has 100 combat-coded
    fifth-gen fighters. I think the Russians and the Chinese
    certainly are noticing, so I appreciate that exceptional work
    by your team, and please pass that on to all the members in
    Alaska and everybody else who made that happen. It was a really
    incredible feat, so thank you very much for that.
        Secretary Kendall, and for both generals, I have been
    disappointed, to be honest, by the budget submitted by the
    President. Last year he put forward a budget that was real
    defense cuts. Secretary Austin and Chairman Milley testified a
    couple of weeks ago, saying this was the biggest threat
    situation globally they have seen in 50 years and yet the
    budget is a 4 percent cut--4 percent increase, 8 percent
    inflation is an inflation-adjusted 4 percent cut--to the
    Department. Are you supportive of that kind of cut, Mr.
    Secretary?
        Mr. Kendall. I do not believe we made a cut. I think we had
    a significant increase, at least in the Air Force and the Space
    Force.
        Senator Sullivan. Overall, I am talking about.
        Mr. Kendall. Overall we are 11 percent above the 2022
    request. We are 6 percent, I believe, above the 2022 enactment.
        Senator Sullivan. No, I asked for the overall DOD budget.
    It is a 4 percent cut by any measure.
        Mr. Kendall. I am not sure how you are doing your math,
    Senator.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, I will do my math right now. Four
    percent increase from last year, which we boosted because the
    President put forward a weak defense budget. We increased it
    here in the Armed Services Committee. Eight percent inflation,
    which is actually 8.5 percent. That is pretty simple math, Mr.
    Secretary. That is a 4.5 percent real inflation-adjusted cut to
    the Department of Defense. Maybe you can just wave off and say
    you are in charge of the Air Force, but do you support that?
    That is a cut.
        Mr. Kendall. We are prepared to work with the Congress on
    inflation. We know that inflation is uncertain right now for
    2023.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, look. I know that a number of our
    uniformed members do not support this but have to because the
    President is the Commander in Chief, and I understand that and
    I actually respect that. But we do not have to support the
    President's budget. We did not last year, and I doubt we will
    do it this year, in this committee.
        Let me ask, Mr. Secretary, with regard to the Joint Pacific
    Alaska Range Complex, JPARC, I have been briefed on the need
    for the Joint Range Operation Center, the JROC, as a necessary
    item to integrate highly classified systems on fourth-, fifth-,
    and sixth-generation aircraft, simulating combating and
    superior adversaries. A number of folks have seen that as very
    important. Should we expect to see this as a priority in the
    Air Force's budget, both the JPARC upgrades and the JROC, that
    will enable us to not only operationalize the training there
    but to make it have implications for real-world contingencies?
        When I went to Northern Edge last year with Admiral
    Aquilino this was a topic that was on everybody's mind. I know
    you and I have talked about it. General Brown, I would welcome
    your view on this as well.
        Mr. Kendall. JPARC is obviously of great importance to us.
    It is one of our premier ranges. It is critical for us to be
    able to train the way we need to train.
        I do not have information for your now, and I will have to
    take it for the record, on the specific facility that you asked
    about.
        Senator Sullivan. The JROC? General, do you have a view on
    that?
        General Brown. JPARC is one of our key ranges. The other
    one is the Nellis Test and Training Range and JPARC is the
    second. As we look at our range complex across the Air Force,
    those are the two primary ones that we want to upgrade. I will
    have to look into the details on the JROC, but knowing you have
    got to have that capability in order to actually be able to
    operate and train like we need to for an increasing threat.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
        Senator King, please.
        Senator King. I will have several questions in the
    classified session, but a couple of questions. First, Mr.
    Secretary, it is good to see you again. Thank you.
    Congratulations.
        How are we doing on the sustainment costs of the F-35? Are
    we making progress? Is that a black hole or is that something
    that we have an opportunity to fix?
        Mr. Kendall. Senator, I think there is still opportunity
    there. We have worked that hard over the years. The costs of
    the F-35 are roughly comparable to, say, the F-15. They are not
    dramatically out of line but that does not mean we cannot work
    harder to get them down. We are modernizing the Alice
    [phonetic] system, for a number of reasons, part of it
    operational and partly to reduce cost. There are problems with
    the engine that need to be addressed to try to reduce the cost
    there.
        Part of this is about readiness and about having the
    operational availability that we need as well as about reducing
    costs. It is going to be an ongoing, continuous effort.
        As we modernize the system and go through Block 4 hopefully
    we will get the systems that are more reliable as well and
    reduce sustainment costs there.
        Senator King. You mentioned availability. How does the Air
    Force stand up against Delta Airlines, for example, in terms of
    readiness and availability of its aircraft?
        Mr. Kendall. I think the short answer would be not well,
    but we have a very different operating model. I have been to
    Delta and looked at how they do their maintenance, for example.
    It is built around keeping their aircraft constantly in the air
    to provide revenue, essentially. We try to provide combat
    readiness, so it is a very different model.
        But nevertheless, there is a lot we can learn from airlines
    like Delta in terms of how to keep the fleet current and manage
    the resources that you have much more effectively.
        Senator King. I hope so, because that is one of the answers
    to the financial problem is to have more planes ready to fly.
        On that note, where are we with the KC-46? Are the problems
    behind us? Are we ready to deploy those or is it still being
    worked out with Boeing?
        Mr. Kendall. We are using the KC-46 operationally. We just
    signed an agreement with Boeing to do the redesign of the
    remote vision system that is used for refueling by the operator
    controls and refueling. We have some other technical issues
    that they are working on to resolve. Right now we are able to
    service about 85 percent of our types of aircraft we have to
    refuel, and that is up pretty dramatically from where we were a
    year ago.
        So the trends are very much in the right direction. We
    still have a little way to go to get the product that we
    absolutely have to have. I never project how an acquisition
    program is going to go. I think that is folly because they
    always have problems. But I think given the progress that has
    been made we can be reasonably hopeful about where we are going
    to be in terms of where we will end up with the aircraft.
        I make the analogy to the C-17, which was plagued with
    horrendous difficulties for years and ended up being a product
    that we are all very happy to have now.
        Senator King. With regard to personnel rather than
    equipment, we have had a lot of discussion here about a
    shortage of fighter pilots and also a shortage of maintainers.
    Are we making progress on those two fronts? At one point, I
    cannot remember, I think we were short 1,500 or over 1,000
    fighter pilots. How are we doing in that, both in recruitment
    and retention?
        Mr. Kendall. We have brought the backlog or the gap in
    fighter pilots down by about 300. It was on the order of 1,800,
    and we brought it down to about 1,500.
        The shortage we have is not actually in units that have
    people flying. It is in rated officers who serve in staff jobs,
    where we want that kind of expertise available to help us with
    staffing functions. So we are managing our way through this,
    but it is something we are addressing.
        We are particularly interested in trying to increase the
    diversity of our pilots, our members in that operational career
    field, and C.Q. Brown can talk about that a little bit. We have
    not made the progress we would like to have made in that area,
    so we are doing a lot to reach out to communities that we would
    like to be able to draw from, and we are trying a number of
    initiatives to open up the opportunities to serve in aviation,
    to become a pilot, to be in the Air Force to groups that might
    not have that expectation. That is starting to bear some fruit,
    I hope.
        On the maintenance side, I am not aware of any critical
    shortfalls there, but let me ask General Brown to comment on
    that.
        General Brown. The only thing I would add to that, Senator,
    on the maintenance piece, is that there are maintainers that
    are actually operating the systems we have today that are the
    same maintainers that we are going to actually have to
    transition to the capabilities we are going to procure. As we
    maintain some capability, if we maintain it too long then we
    cannot actually man and maintain the aircraft that are coming
    off the production line and coming into our units. So there is
    balance of how we make that transition.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        I have got just a few seconds left. General Raymond, you
    are doing well on recruitment, I trust. This year's Air Force
    Academy graduates, do they want to join the Space Force?
        General Raymond. Sir, we are going to commission 101 here
    in another few weeks into the Space Force. Recruiting is going
    very well.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Final point, congratulations, Mr. Secretary, on the
    emphasis on R&D [research and development]. Wars are generally
    won on new technology, and I think you are putting money
    exactly where it needs to be. I want to commend you on that
    budget priority. Thank you.
        Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King.
        Senator Blackburn, please.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    all so much for your service to our Nation and for your time.
    General Brown, thank you for your time last week on the phone.
    I appreciated the conversation about hypersonics and AEDC
    [Arnold Engineering Development Center] and that importance to
    us in Tennessee.
        We talked some about ARRW [Aerospace Rescue and Recovery
    Wing], and so, Secretary Kendall, I want to come to you on
    that, because the reports indicate, recent reports indicate
    that you are looking to move that funding away from ARRW and
    the hypersonics, and you are looking to pivot to R&D. So if you
    would, talk about the implications of this decision and moving
    away from ARRW, what that is going to mean to how you use those
    funds, where they are going to go, critical infrastructure, and
    how can Congress support the R&D that is necessary for ARRW and
    hypersonics?
        Mr. Kendall. Senator, we fully funded ARRW for research and
    development for the development of the program in the 2023
    budget. We have not funded procurement yet, and ARRW, as I
    think you know, has had a series of test failures. As much as
    we are encouraged to have failures we have to have success
    before we can move forward to production. There are, I think,
    two tests that are planned over the next several months that
    will give us a better indication of where we are in the
    program, and then we will look at it again as we----
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. Let's talk about that, because
    General Brown and I talked a little bit about how we become
    less risk averse. Because there has got to be a way to do this,
    especially when you look at the Communist Chinese and the
    amount of emphasis that they are putting on hypersonics, what
    you see happening in North Korea with hypersonics. There has to
    be a way that the Air Force says we are accepting failures
    because we learn from failures, and maybe even looking at this
    as there is no such thing as a failed test because we have to
    be learning and become competitive.
        Mr. Kendall. Yes, it is well understood in engineering that
    tests are ways to learn about your product and find problems
    and fix them. Eventually, though, you do have to get to
    successful performance in order to go ahead and field.
        The best place to have failures and to tolerate them is in
    the early stages of technology maturation, when you are doing
    experimental prototyping to demonstrate whether or not
    something can actually be done at all. Once you are committed
    to a product that you want to take to production, you have a
    different----
        Senator Blackburn. We understand that. We understand that.
    But what we are concerned about is falling behind.
        Mr. Kendall. I agree.
        Senator Blackburn. There has to be a balance brought to
    this, where you are doing the appropriate R&D. AEDC is the
    place for doing much of this R&D, and testing, which we have to
    be committed to that testing phase so we can get to procurement
    and deployment, and those necessary components. But it also
    means that we have to invest in infrastructure and maintenance
    so that we have the ability to do that. I hope you will commit
    to visiting AEDC with me.
        Mr. Kendall. I think I have made that commitment before,
    and I will do so, Senator.
        Senator Blackburn. Well, that sounds good.
        General Raymond, I want to move to Space National Guard.
    There is quite a bit of interest in this. Some of us have
    legislation that would move forward with establishing a Space
    National Guard. Of course, we have wanted to do this--we have
    asked several times for reports, is the best way to say it, on
    the value and the feasibility of establishing a Space National
    Guard but we have not received reports.
        So what can you tell me about where that is in the process?
        General Raymond. When the law established to establish the
    Space Force, or passed to establish the Space Force, Congress
    directed us to do a study, and we have done those studies. The
    number one legislative proposal that we have this year is to
    take the Reserve forces and Active and push them together in
    one. It is a legislative lift, but we want to work with the
    committee to do that.
        On the Guard side, today we have been operating with the
    Guard for 25 years.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. In my time left, then, what is the
    most effective and efficient way to make certain we have a
    Space Force National Guard?
        General Raymond. There are several ways you can do it.
    There are three ways. You can have a separate----
        Senator Blackburn. Best way.
        General Raymond. Best way is one of two. Either have a
    separate Space National Guard or take the capabilities from the
    Guard and move them into this one component.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
        Senator Kelly, please.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, as you know, any modern-air combat requires
    substantial jamming capability and suppression of enemy air
    defenses. I personally benefitted from that in the first Gulf
    War, often, flying with prowlers right behind me, shooting
    anti-radiation missiles.
        As you know, currently the Air Force is transitioning from
    EC-130H aircraft to EC-37B for the Compass Call mission. The
    last of the 14 remaining EC-130s are supposed to retire in
    early 2026, and currently the Air Force has only funded 6 of
    the 10 replacement aircraft. So while I was really pleased to
    see an additional 4 Compass Call EC-37Bs listed as the Air
    Force's number two unfunded priority. I am also concerned with
    the fiscal year 2023 budget treatment of this capability, which
    requires Congress to find the funds to make this request a
    reality.
        So, Mr. Secretary, how important is the EC-37B Compass
    Call's role in maintaining our decisive advantage in the battle
    space, and how does the platform fit within the Department's
    operational imperatives?
        Mr. Kendall. Senator, it is important, but like any similar
    aircraft against the most advanced threats it is going to have
    some issues with survivability. The judgment was made in the
    course of doing the budget that the inventory of six would be
    adequate to meet our needs. I know that General Brown has
    suggested that we should have more than that, but I will let
    him address that.
        Senator Kelly. So if you do receive additional funding,
    what is the plan? Do you want to still rapidly field a minimum
    of 10 airplanes?
        Mr. Kendall. If the Congress provided additional resources
    we would use them as directed.
        Senator Kelly. Okay, and maybe in the closed session we can
    discuss some of those vulnerabilities and the plan to get
    around those.
        General Raymond, I want to ask you briefly about anti-
    satellite testing and capabilities. So the Administration
    recently announced an intent to ban anti-satellite, or ASAT,
    tests. As someone who has flown in space and had to maneuver
    around these debris clouds, particularly the one in 2007,
    created by the Chinese, I have witnessed the devastating
    effects that this irresponsible testing can have, ASAT testing,
    and what it can do to low-earth orbit and our ability to
    operate there.
        You know, I do believe we need to lead from the front on
    this issue and I applaud the Administration's steps here.
    However, it is clear that our adversaries do not share this
    goal, and this policy should not impede our military readiness,
    much like the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty did not impede our
    ability to field a nuclear triad. It is imperative that we
    continue to develop our Nation's space capabilities.
        So how will the U.S. Space Force continue to develop the
    capabilities needed to maintain a competitive advantage in
    space, in a responsible manner, despite the Administration's
    call for an end to ASAT testing?
        General Raymond. I could not agree more with you and your
    words, and I look forward, in the closed hearing, to go into a
    lot more details. We do not need to test capabilities in a
    destructive way, and I think to do so is irresponsible and not
    a behavior that we appreciate. So there are plenty of
    opportunities for us, and I really looking forward to talking
    to you more about that in the classified hearing.
        Senator Kelly. All right. Thank you, General, and Mr.
    Chairman, I yield back the remaining minute.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Kelly.
        Senator Scott, please.
        Senator Scott. Can you hear me?
        Chairman Reed. Yes.
        Senator Scott. Secretary Kendall and General Brown, can you
    tell me how you will anticipate using A-10s over the next 5
    years?
        Mr. Kendall. A-10s still have some utility in certain
    situations--counter-insurgency, counterterrorism, in
    particular.
        Senator Scott. Are you using them----
        Mr. Kendall. They are less useful against more advanced
    threats.
        Senator Scott. All right. But there is no place where you
    are using them today. Is that right?
        General Brown. We do not have them deployed right now,
    today.
        Senator Scott. So in your budget you are continuing to
    maintain these aging A-10s, and then it seems to me that what
    we are doing is that you have got--you are only requesting 33
    F-35As, which is the fewest since 2015. Does that make any
    sense? I mean, why do we keep these maintainers on the A-10s
    which we are not going to use and we do not anticipate using,
    and then we do fewer F-35s?
        General Brown. Our goal, Senator, is to transition away
    from the A-10, and what I want to have, from a nuclear fighter
    fleet, multi-capable, multi-role platforms. The intent here is,
    as we retire the A-10, just to take those maintainers and those
    operators and put them into the other capabilities like the F-
    35 and the F-15EX.
        Senator Scott. But in your budget you are still maintaining
    A-10s. I mean, we do not have unlimited dollars, right? So it
    just does not seem logical that we are continuing to maintain
    A-10s and then you have less money to get F-35s. I mean if it
    is just politics I get it. I mean, you can tell me it is just
    politics. But that does not seem to make much sense.
        General Brown. Part of it, Senator, is the transition and
    our ability to transition and maintain some level of
    capability, not only for today's combatant commanders but as we
    make the transition what our future commanders will require.
        It is something that we have talked about, as you might
    imagine, over the years, of how we make that transition, and it
    is something we will continue to work with this Congress and
    this committee on how best to do that.
        Senator Scott. General Raymond, it was previously
    understood that the Air Force, Space Force, and the National
    Guard Bureau all agreed that it was prudent to establish a
    Space National Guard. Now OMB is fighting this, and claims the
    establishment of Space National Guard will cost hundreds of
    millions of dollars--I do not think that is true. There is no
    need to establish a Space National Guard in every state, and I
    do not think that OMB should be saying that otherwise. It seems
    to me that we only need about 17 units across 7 states. So do
    you think that makes sense?
        General Raymond. We have been operating with the Guard for
    25 years. They are in eight states and one territory. We have
    839 guardsmen that perform space missions, and those are
    critical folks today operating critical capabilities for us
    today.
        Senator Scott. Okay. So in your opinion it would be more
    cost-effective and operationally efficient if we established a
    Space National Guard?
        General Raymond. There are several ways you can do this.
    There are several courses of action. You can establish a Space
    National Guard, you can have the Air Force National Guard
    continue to support us, like they do today, or you can take the
    capabilities out of the Guard and move them into this one
    component. There are several different options. The NDAA of
    last year directed us to do a study, and we will do that and
    come back to you with more thoughts on that.
        Senator Scott. Okay. Secretary Kendall and General Brown,
    let's go back to the A-10s. I mean, it is just pure politics?
    Does it not bother you? I mean, you have unbelievable
    expectations. You watch what is going on in Europe. You watch
    what is going on in Communist China. You do not have an
    unlimited budget. I just do not get this idea that we have to
    maintain something that we are not anticipating using any time
    again, and we are not spending enough money on F-35s.
        So in your opinion what would you do? I mean, forget what
    you have to do based on your jobs. What is your opinion of what
    we should do with A-10 versus more F-35s?
        Mr. Kendall. Senator, we are divesting, I think, 21 A-10s
    in this budget, in Indiana, replacing them with F-16s. We would
    expect to divest additional A-10s in the future.
        General Raymond. We are continuing on the path of the
    transition away from the A-10 to the F-35 and F-15EX.
        Senator Scott. But is your money--would you keep
    maintaining the A-10s?
        General Brown. Part of this again, Senator, it is a
    transition away from the A-10 to where we are today. As you
    might imagine, I cannot predict the future, but my sense is we
    are not going to be in many environments where the A-10 will
    survive, which is why we have got to make the transition away.
        Senator Scott. Thank you for what you are doing, I do not
    think your jobs are easy, and good luck.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott.
        Senator Manchin, please.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        This will be to all three and I will start with General
    Brown. Just you all's evaluation from a professional level what
    you can share with us today in the whole Ukraine-Russia, or let
    us say Putin war on Ukraine in the air, the air war that is
    going on there, and the perception of a lack of defense or lack
    of a force coming from Ukraine, or the support of NATO or us.
    People have criticized why did we not do this, why did we not
    get more involved, air cover, why did we not do a complete
    support of air retaliation.
        Can you speak on that, General Brown, just in generalities?
    I know from detail you cannot get into it, but if you evaluate
    the Ukraine, what Russia has done, how we have been able to
    defend, why Ukraine is not flying the planes they already have,
    but they are asking for more, and they want air cover or
    basically they want a no-fly zone?
        General Brown. I cannot speak to exactly why the Ukrainians
    are not flying. I know they are doing some flying. But what I
    would tell you, Senator----
        Senator Manchin. They do have aircraft. I mean, they are
    not utilizing all their aircraft that they already have access
    to. Is that correct?
        General Brown. That is somewhat correct.
        But here what I will tell you, Senator. Air superiority
    cannot be assumed, and one of the things that the Ukrainians
    have been able to do, based on their air defense capability, is
    actually threatens the Russian air power. From that aspect it
    is a combination of not only what you are able to do with the
    airplanes in the air but what you are able to do with your
    other defenses. That is something, I think, as you look at
    the--I would say the Ukrainians have been fairly successful in
    using their air defenses.
        Senator Manchin. Are you talking about the missile defense,
    things of that sort?
        General Brown. Some of the missile defense. Some of the
    capabilities they already had indigenous into the Ukrainian
    Armed Forces. They have had some capability and they made it
    more challenging for the Russians from an air power
    perspective.
        Senator Manchin. I am just saying I have not heard any
    attacks coming from their air, from the Ukraine Air Force, if
    you will, and the planes they already had. I heard it is coming
    mostly from basically air and missiles or that were drones and
    things of that sort.
        Secretary, if you had any information you could share in an
    open meeting like this?
        Mr. Kendall. I do not think I have any we can share in an
    open forum. We might have some information we can give you in a
    classified setting.
        Senator Manchin. We are going to that next.
        General Raymond, did you have any observation you want to
    share?
        General Raymond. I would just----
        Senator Manchin. People are interested. They ask me all the
    time, and I want to let them know that we are supporting every
    way possible, Ukraine.
        General Raymond. I think it is clear that the character of
    war has changed, as I said in my opening statement, and I think
    this war shows the value of space being able to provide
    information. I think one of the things is that it also showed
    the value of commercial capabilities, and commercial space
    specifically, and being able to share intelligence more
    broadly, being able to shape the gray zone operations. So it
    has been really important.
        Senator Manchin. General Raymond, this will be for you all.
    You know you have one of the smallest uniformed services within
    the Department of Defense, and I know you are actively getting
    the best of the best. I would just ask, where do you stand on
    the Space National Guard? If that is a way, there are a lot of
    talented people all over this country. I know in West Virginia
    National Guard they are ready to go. How are you looking at
    that?
        General Raymond. Yes, sir. Today we operate with 839
    guardsmen. We have been operating with them for 25 years. They
    are really important to us. They are limited in states on where
    they are located. They are located in eight states and a new
    unit that is standing up in Guam, and so those capabilities
    that are there and the people that are there are very important
    to us and we cannot do our job without them.
        Senator Manchin. Are they integrated into the space part?
        General Raymond. Currently they are in the Air National
    Guard and they support us in the Space Force, like they did
    when we were in the Air Force. That has continued.
        Senator Manchin. You all are actively involved in
    evaluating their capabilities of where you might have the
    strongest support?
        General Raymond. Absolutely. Yes, sir.
        Senator Manchin. Secretary Kendall.
        Mr. Kendall. I will just add that those people are
    important to the Space Force and we want to keep them. The
    exact mechanism by which we do that and how they are titled and
    structured, I think we are open to discuss.
        The concern the Administration had, I think, was that we
    would create a lot of overhead costs associated with a new
    organization. There were concerns that CBO had, I think, about
    establishing a headquarters and so on. I do not think that is
    necessary. I think we can find a way to keep those people doing
    what they are doing. They are a very valuable part. They are
    significant fraction of the Space Force. They are about 10
    percent of the force right now.
        So we want to keep them around. They are important to us.
    They are valuable. Obviously we need to find the right
    mechanism to do it.
        Senator Manchin. We are very proud of the West Virginia
    National Guard, and they do an unbelievable job, and so much
    talent is coming from different arenas that I think can be
    very, very supportive.
        Thank you all for your service. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
        Senator Duckworth, please.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    gentlemen, for joining us today.
        I have advocated consistently in this committee for combat-
    credible air mobility and aerial refueling capabilities that
    need to reside not just in our Active component but that
    maximizes the incredible combat power of our Guard and Reserve
    components. I applaud your use of total force integration, or
    TFI, in your concept of operation for the KC-46. Formally
    associating Active Duty units with Guard and Reserve units
    truly acts as a combat multiplier for our crewed airlift
    squadrons.
        Yet I am deeply aware of the challenges classically
    associated that units face as they star to employ TFI
    operations. It can take years to build the administrative
    processes, and most importantly, the trust between Active and
    Reserve components working shoulder to shoulder.
        General Brown, could you comment on the value of total
    force integration for units that provide vital capabilities
    like aerial refueling, and how does this concept of integrating
    Active and Reserve component servicemembers impact the total
    Air Force's readiness operations and budget?
        General Brown. There is great value in our total force, and
    when I think about our airmen both that are Active Duty but
    also that are Guard and Reserve, and the experience that they
    have had, it is tremendous. I will just tell you that I have
    watched this over a number of years. When I was a lieutenant
    colonel in the Pentagon I ran the Total Force Initiative
    program operational planning team to actually get us on a path.
    Hill and Langley were a couple of examples. Vermont was another
    example.
        What we have learned here, you kind of talked about the
    culture and the trust. We have come a long way in the past--I
    would say it has probably been about 17 years when that
    occurred.
        So great value in the ability to work very closely with our
    Guard and Reserve, and it gets to a point where you almost
    cannot tell the difference, when we all go out and deploy and
    operate together. That is the real benefit of the total force.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, General. I am proud of the
    excellent track record of successful total force integration
    operations at the 126th Air Refueling Wing out of Scott Air
    Force Base in Illinois. The recently won their tenth Air Force
    Outstanding Unit Award, which is their third in a row. I am
    very proud of them.
        Looking past the final fueling of the KC-46, though, the
    future of aerial refueling is somewhat ambiguous. We agree that
    the future concept of aerial refueling may look vastly
    different from today, and I appreciate that developing this
    concept of operations and the technology to enable it will take
    time and investment from both government and industry. It is
    imperative that we are transparent in our industrial base and
    suppliers as to our plans. This transparency builds the trust
    needed to achieve our future combat capabilities and ensure
    that we are not left with a critical capability gap.
        Secretary Kendall, how are you working with our defense
    industrial base to provide transparency on the KC-Y commercial
    derivative tanker plans, and when do you intend to start
    identifying requirements for the future KC-Z tanker to ensure
    that the Air Force stays on track to replace our aging KC-135
    fleet by the mid-2050s with the fully capability tankers
    required to meet the needs of USTRANSCOM and the other
    combatant commanders?
        Mr. Kendall. That is a great question, Senator Duckworth.
    Our plan for the tanker fleet is evolving over time, and we are
    having to react to what the threat is doing. At one time we had
    a plan that the KC-46 would be followed by the KC-Y, as what we
    called a ``bridge tanker'' to a future KC-Z, which had not
    really been defined.
        As we look at the requirements--and I am trying to be very
    direct about this--it does not look at necessary or as cost-
    effective as it once did to introduce another aircraft that is
    KC-Y. So we are not sure what we are going to do about that
    yet. We have not finished analyzing the requirements, but if
    the needle was over here at competition it has moved back
    towards not necessarily having competition, part of the way
    anyway.
        As far as KC-Z is concerned, what we do really for a next
    generation, I think that is going to be threat driven. What I
    am seeing happening with the threats is that they are trying to
    find creative ways to reach out further and engage our tankers
    at ranges at which they would once have been secure, and that
    is going to be a very big problem for us. We have to rethink
    how we support our forward tactical aircraft, in particular,
    and what the tanker of the future looks like, in a much broader
    sense. So that work is really just getting underway.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        As we aggressively modernize our forces we expect the
    services to achieve a delicate balance between funding new
    acquisition programs and the maintenance programs necessary to
    maintain today's fleet. Across the DOD, some program offices
    are using FAA-certified used and refurbished parts and engines,
    known as used serviceable materials, into their supply chains.
    When implemented, this practice has demonstrated significant
    cost savings, potential and increased availability of parts,
    yet used serviceable materials are not consistently
    incorporated into the supply chain for all commercial
    derivative platforms. I know I have brought this up with both
    of you before.
        General Brown, what benefit do you see used serviceable
    materials playing in the maintenance of our commercial
    derivative platforms and how can Congress help the Air Force to
    expand the use of this innovative approach, allowing you to
    realize the potential cost savings and greater repair parts
    availability of used serviceable materials, and the advantages
    that they offer?
        General Brown. The advantages they offer, as you actually
    highlight, is cost. It also makes a broader pool of parts
    availability to us. I think one of the things we will have to
    continue to work with, with the Congress but also internal to
    the Air Force, is laying out a bit of the process and culture
    to do that. It is not something we have done as much,
    typically, but it something I think we could take advantage of
    here, more so in the future.
        Senator Duckworth. Well, count on me to help you in
    whatever way you can to help change that culture. The
    commercial airlines use them. There is no reason why we cannot
    use them in the Air Force as well.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Duckworth, and gentlemen,
    thank you for your excellent testimony. We will reconvene
    immediately in SVC-217 for the classified portion of this
    hearing. With that I will adjourn the open portion of the
    hearing.
        [Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
       combat search and rescue (csar) demand in a russia/china conflict
        1. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Kendall and General Brown, we saw
    significant use of Air Force Rescue Squadrons in Iraq and Afghanistan,
    where the numbers of downed pilots or isolated personnel was relatively
    low. How much greater a demand signal would you expect for combat
    search and rescue missions in a conflict with Russia or China?
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown. Our analysis and the nature of
    the threat indicate demand would increase, but there would also be a
    dramatic increase in the threat to our CSAR helicopters, if we
    experienced losses over land. In the Pacific, we would expect more
    losses over the ocean, where CSAR specialized assets would not be
    required.
                              other csar platforms
        2. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Kendall, what other platforms are
    you fielding within the next decade that will be more survivable and
    have the same versatility as an H-60 Whiskey to perform the CSAR
    mission?
        Secretary Kendall. Science and technology investments are underway
    to explore advanced, high-speed, vertical takeoff and landing
    technologies that could increase survivability against advanced
    threats.
                            long term plans for csar
        3. Senator Blumenthal. General Brown, on the Combat Rescue
    Helicopter (CRH), the United States Air Force has already begun to
    retire ahead of plan the existing HH-60G fleet, leaving these high
    demand fleets stretched. What is your long-term plan to provide rescue
    capability for combat forces to ensure we ``leave no one behind''? How
    will the United States Air Force keep the Active and Guard and Reserve
    fleets available to support the growing rescue demands of the DOD?
        General Brown. The AF Personnel Recovery triad of HH-60W Jolly
    Green II helicopters, HC-130J Combat King aircraft, and Guardian Angel
    extraction teams will provide combat search and rescue capabilities to
    the Joint Force for the foreseeable future. Each of these weapons
    systems has Active, Guard, and Reserve components. Both aircraft-based
    weapons systems are new and have higher aircraft availability rates
    than the legacy systems they replaced. The demand signal for Combat
    Rescue aircraft was originally based on two Counter Insurgency fights.
    Today, China is our most consequential strategic competitor and the
    pacing challenge for the Department. The HH-60W is not effective in the
    highly contested environment, nor is it effective across the distances
    required for Pacific operations. Long-term plans include leveraging
    Science and Technology investments, which are underway, to explore
    advanced, high-speed, vertical takeoff and landing technologies that
    could increase survivability against advanced threats.
         h-60 availability for a peer conflict under fiscal year 2023
                                procurement plan
        4. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Kendall and General Brown, will
    United States rescue squadrons be able to meet the demand of a conflict
    with Russia or China in the next 10 years under the acquisition plan
    laid out in the fiscal year 2023 budget?
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown. With the existing force, Air
    Force Rescue Squadrons will have a reduced utility to meet combat
    rescue demand in a peer conflict. This is an example of an area where
    the Air Force is taking prudent risk in order to transition from the
    force we have today to the force needed to meet our pacing challenge,
    China.
                       timeline to reestablish squadrons
        5. Senator Blumenthal. General Brown, if we stand down squadrons,
    or do not replace all our Pavehawks, how long would it take to
    reconstitute or reestablish combat rescue squadrons and capabilities
    necessary for a China or Russia fight?
        General Brown. Current CSAR systems will have limited utility in a
    conflict with China or Russia due to their lack of survivability
    against advanced threats. It is unlikely we would increase those
    capabilities, but if we did so, it would likely take several years.
                  material condition of current pavehawk fleet
        6. Senator Blumenthal. General Brown, I have heard reports from the
    33rd Rescue Squadrons in Kadena, Japan and from other squadrons of
    structural issues with their Pavehawks from their heavy use in
    Afghanistan. Which squadrons will be fully recapitalized with the H-60
    Whiskey and which will not due to the decreased buy?
        General Brown. Reduced HH-60W procurement will limit the ability to
    recapitalize HH-60G units one-for-one. The Air Force is completing a
    Global Posture Review for fighters and rescue, intended to provide
    options to the SecAF and CSAF of required force structure changes,
    strategic basing recommendations, and recapitalization plans for legacy
    aircraft. Results of this review will inform the strategic basing
    process.
                        pavehawk service life extensions
        7. Senator Blumenthal. General Brown, how many of our current
    Pavehawks are currently at or near or at the end of their service lives
    and will not be replaced? How long will they continue to fly and what
    has been the effect on aircraft readiness?
        General Brown. The remaining HH-60G fleet of 82 aircraft are at or
    near the end of their service lives and retirements will be complete by
    the end of fiscal year 2026. Aging fleets such as this are more costly
    to sustain, and they maintain lower levels of readiness.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
                 delivery of the new aerial refueling aircraft
        8. Senator Hirono. General Brown, in last year's NDAA, Congress set
    limits on the number of KC-135 and KC-10 refueling aircraft the Air
    Force could retire over the next three years as a result of acquisition
    delays and capability limitations the new KC-46 replacement aircraft is
    still experiencing. Has the Air Force made any progress on speeding up
    the delivery of additional KC-46 aircraft?
        General Brown. Delays caused by re-work from quality escapes on
    aircraft coming from the factory represent the greatest impact to the
    Boeing delivery schedule. Boeing has matured its engineering designs
    and manufacturing processes. These areas have stabilized since the
    early phases of the production program. The Air Force and the Defense
    Contract Management Agency are exploring corrective options available
    with FAA partners to further improve Boeing's quality and production
    rate. Concurrently to the Government working with Boeing to improve
    delivery timelines, Air Mobility Command (AMC) has been successfully
    fielding KC-46 interim capability to support operational and training
    missions and meet USTRANSCOM air refueling requirements. Currently, the
    KC-46A can refuel receiver sets that constitute about 85 percent of
    USTRANSCOM receiver-type taskings. AMC is evaluating adding other
    receivers for operational use, with the target of increasing that
    number by mid-summer 2022.

        9. Senator Hirono. General Brown, what is the timeline for
    correcting the KC-46's problem with refueling planes in different
    lighting conditions?
        General Brown. The current KC-46 Remote Vision System (RVS) has
    deficiencies preventing safe and effective refueling in changing
    lighting conditions. RVS 2.0 is expected to resolve the deficiencies of
    the current system, providing marked improvements through a complete
    re-design of the refueling operator station, along with upgraded
    sensors, displays, and associated hardware/software. The RVS 2.0
    Preliminary Design Review officially closed in April 2022, and the
    program schedule is currently on track, with retrofit and production
    cut-in planned to start in mid-to-late 2024. The full KC-46 fleet is
    expected to be outfitted with RVS 2.0 by end of 2029.
        In parallel to these RVS deficiency resolution efforts, Air
    Mobility Command (AMC) has been successfully fielding KC-46 interim
    capability to support operational and training missions and meet
    USTRANSCOM air refueling requirements. Currently, the KC-46A can refuel
    receiver sets that constitute about 85 percent of USTRANSCOM receiver-
    type taskings. AMC is evaluating adding other receivers for operational
    use, with the target of increasing that number by mid-Summer 2022.
                         support for indopacom and pdi
        10. Senator Hirono. Secretary Kendall, General Brown, and General
    Raymond, Admiral Aquilino published his ``Seize the Initiative''
    concept which describes how INDOPACOM plans to implement integrated
    deterrence as a part of the National Defense Strategy. The DOD's Fiscal
    Year 2023 President's Budget request also includes $6.1 billion in
    targeted investments to specific programs for the Pacific Deterrence
    Initiative (PDI). How do projects such as the Pacific Multi-Domain
    Training and Experimentation Capability, or PMTEC, shape these
    initiatives and enhance the Air Force's presence in the Pacific?
        Secretary Kendall, General Brown, and General Raymond. The pace of
    China's military modernization, its increasingly aggressive actions in
    the Indo-Pacific theater, and its ability to threaten the Homeland
    should be continuously evaluated. Initiatives such as PDI help us to
    continue deliberate prioritization of requirements, guiding decisions
    regarding trade-offs between short-term and long-term risks associated
    with modernization efforts. The Pacific Multi-Domain Training and
    Experimentation Capability (PMTEC) provides an environment for joint
    and coalition partners to conduct integrated training across all
    domains (ground, air, maritime, cyber, space, and information).
    Integrated training events demonstrate resolve and reinforce the value
    of integrated deterrence.

        11. Senator Hirono. General Brown, how will Air Force military
    construction projects on islands around the Pacific enhance PDI?
        General Brown. To win in an Indo-Pacific theater contingency, DOD
    must design a lethal and resilient forward-deployable force, able to
    protect the interests of the United States, as well as our Allies and
    partners. DOD must also posture that force to permit effective and
    timely employment to credibly deter and/or decisively engage in the
    future fight. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) Military
    Construction (MILCON) investments help ensure the United States is best
    equipped, trained, and positioned to accomplish this. The investment of
    resources to improve infrastructure and facilities throughout the Indo-
    Pacific theater provides our allies, partners and strategic competitors
    a clear indication of the United States' long-term commitment to the
    Pacific. These MILCON projects will build resiliency in the Indo-
    Pacific region and include establishing a Pacific Divert capability,
    key facility recap & hardening, resource dispersal, and fuel support
    facilities.

        12. Senator Hirono. General Brown, how do the divestitures of
    aircraft included in your budget affect the Air Force's operational
    commitments in the Pacific in the short-term?
        General Brown. The Air Force continues to work with INDOPACOM, and
    more broadly across the joint force, as we make decisions to retire
    certain aircraft. When determining what forces we must keep forward
    positioned and what we can divest in order to advance modernization
    efforts to address the challenges of tomorrow, we strongly consider the
    Combatant Commands' operational knowledge and military recommendation.

        13. Senator Hirono. Secretary Kendall, General Brown, what else is
    the Air Force doing to support INDOPACOM and PDI?
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown. We would be happy to discuss
    your question in a classified setting. What we can say is, the most
    important metric for the Nation is that its Air Force has confidence in
    the ability to win wars against near-peers and especially our pacing
    challenge. Balancing investments with affordable capacity, the Air
    Force must identify and prioritize critical capability gaps in order to
    build a force that best supports the Joint Force mission and wins the
    future fight. The solution to minimizing capability gaps is not hanging
    on to legacy capabilities, not only across the fighter fleet, but the
    entire Air Force.
        We remain committed to supplying the Nation with a fighter force
    that is capable, sustainable, and affordable, with the ability to
    operate across the entire range of mission sets.
                                small businesses
        14. Senator Hirono. Secretary Kendall, in conjunction with AFWERX,
    the Air Force has been awarding Small Business Innovation Research
    (SBIR) contracts that include technology research and development
    projects ranging from artificial intelligence to supply chain security.
    These types of initiatives coupled with the Air Force's annual Tech
    Warrior Exercise help small businesses bring much needed technological
    advancements into the Department. What progress has the Air Force made
    in removing barriers to entry for small businesses to access both SBIR
    contracts and other small business initiatives?
        Secretary Kendall. AFWERX established the United States Air Force
    SBIR/STTR Open Topic Program in part to remove barriers to entry for
    small businesses. Out of approximately 1,800 AFVentures-funded
    companies, more than 75 percent received their first Air Force SBIR/
    STTR award through the program. Additionally, AFWERX has streamlined
    the evaluation and contract award process, dramatically reducing the
    timelines for award. Currently AFVentures issues 85 percent of SBIR/
    STTR awards in under 180 days--an increase from 42 percent prior to
    AFWERX' founding. AFWERX is implementing a cross-SBIR/STTR standard of
    a maximum 90 days to award and objective of 75-day timeline to award.
    By implementing standardized processes and disciplined parameters for
    execution, the program intends to continue to improve award timelines
    and other barriers to small businesses. Additionally, the Department of
    the Air Force (DAF) initiated the ``DAF CISO's Blue Cyber Initiative''
    for DAF SBIR/Small Business/Academic-Research Institution contractors
    and potential contractors to ensure these defense industrial base
    partners have no cybersecurity or information protection questions. It
    provides connection to the multitude of state and federal resources
    available to assist small businesses to become cyber secure; many
    funded by the DOD Office of Local Defense Community Cooperation (OLDCC)
    grants-to-states for defense industrial base cybersecurity development
    program.
        Over the last 6 months, the DAF Office of Small Business Programs
    (SAF/SB) successfully assisted DOD and OMB with development and
    issuance of the following comprehensive guidance on reducing entry
    barriers: (1) OMB Memorandum M-22-03, Advancing Equity in Federal
    Procurement, (2) DOD Equity Action Plan, and (3) DOD EO 14017 Action
    Plan, Securing Defense-Critical Supply Chains. The DAF is beginning to
    implement this guidance, in coordination with the DOD and the other
    Military Departments. We will keep Congress informed of our progress.
    Further, SAF/SB provided extensive recommendations to the Defense
    Business Board (DBB) on improvements and expansion of the DOD Mentor-
    Protege Program, which the DBB adopted in its MPP Report to Congress.
        SAF/SB is currently assisting DOD with updating the 2019 DOD Small
    Business Strategy, which is expected to include measures to reduce
    entry barriers consistent with Congressional direction at 10 U.S.C.
    4901. Other examples include efforts to eliminate barriers: DAF is
    working proactively with the Department of Defense on implementing
    important flexibilities provided by Congress to let small businesses
    take advantage of SCIFs and facility clearance (FCL) resources of
    partner firms through joint venturing, as well as through the DOD and
    SBA Mentor-Protege Programs. The DAF Office of Chief Information
    Officer has recently announced the Blue Cyber initiative to assist
    small businesses with cyber security compliance.

        15. Senator Hirono. Secretary Kendall, what is the Air Force doing
    to overcome the dreaded ``valley of death''?
        Secretary Kendall. The two great barriers to transition are funding
    availability and low prioritization. Nevertheless, we are working to
    improve transition opportunity and efficiency.
        Last fall, I directed a Department of the Air Force Management
    Initiative to assess technology transition pipelines and mechanisms,
    and recommend improvement actions. The team, spanning 35 DAF
    organizations, reviewed current technology transition pipelines and
    engaged partners to identify common themes, barriers, and areas for
    improvement. Key findings include the importance of transition funding
    for concept refinement and risk reduction, and the prioritization of
    acquisition, requirements, and resourcing activities to facilitate
    transition. Detailed results are currently being formulated into
    actions to improve tech transition speed and effectiveness.
        In fiscal year 2022, the DAF established the AFWERX Prime program
    to identify emerging commercial technologies that can enhance military
    capabilities, and co-invest with industry to deliver capabilities in 2
    to 4 years. Industry benefits from the government expertise,
    infrastructure, and certification expertise (e.g., airworthiness,
    safety). The DOD benefits from accelerated capability of emerging
    disruptive technologies. The first Prime program, Agility Prime, is
    enabling alternative mobility options, reduced carbon footprint,
    flexibility, and runway independence. SPACEWERX initiated an Orbital
    Prime program, which will advance dual-use markets for active debris
    remediation.
                                pilot shortages
        16. Senator Hirono. General Brown, the Air Force has been
    experiencing significant shortfalls in both pilots and aircraft
    maintainers in recent years. What steps are you taking to address the
    pilot and aircraft maintainer shortage?
        General Brown. There are 6 initiatives to innovate and increase
    production to meet the minimum annual production target of
    approximately 1,500 pilots:
        1. UPT 2.5 seeks to increase combat capability and prepare for a
    peer fight.
        2. Rotary-only Undergraduate Helicopter Training increases our
    production by approximately 90 grads per year in fiscal year 2024,
    using a rotary only path to wings.
        3. Civil Path to Wings is a currently unfunded program to produce
    military pilots from highly qualified civilian pilots.
        4. Remote Civilian Simulator Instruction could increase production
    by up to 100 grads per year, through increased simulator instructor
    manning--prototype contract awarded in Oct 2021 with demonstration in
    fall 2022 (no funding beyond demo).
        5. Pilot Training Next increases utilization of simulator training;
    several recently graduated students attended Air Mobility Fundamentals
    using a simulator-only curriculum.
        6. Proposed Accelerated Path to Wings [T-1-only track] increases
    pilot production with 200-250 grads per year through fiscal year 2024
        To address the maintainer shortage, the Air Force continues to
    focus on the aircraft maintenance retention strategy that has
    successfully contributed to the current 98 percent fill rate for our
    funded maintenance billets. The 2 percent dip from last year is the
    result of the maintenance community gaining additional authorizations
    in this fiscal year. The retention strategy focuses on building and
    maintaining the right skill levels and specialties within its enlisted
    maintenance workforce. It focuses on cyclical evaluation of historical
    retention trends; on-going review and adjustments to retention goals by
    skill level and maintenance specialty; clear understanding of retention
    rates necessary to attain those goals; and establishment of metrics
    needed to track performance against those goals from year to year.
    Keeping maintenance manning and retention high relies on being able to
    coordinate timing for aircraft divestment with arrivals of new weapons
    system (e.g., F-35, KC-46, B-21, NGAD). Without the ability to
    repurpose our maintenance manning in a timely manner, retention levels
    will be put at risk again.

        17. Senator Hirono. General Brown, what efforts are you undertaking
    to recruit, retain, and remove barriers for a more diverse force, and
    in particular what steps are you taking to diversify the pool of pilots
    serving in the Air Force?
        General Brown. The DAF is taking an integrative approach to recruit
    and retain diverse talent representative of the best of the United
    States, as well as mitigate barriers. It stood up the Secretary of the
    Air Force Office of Diversity and Inclusion and also have seven DAF
    Barrier Analysis Working Group Teams that identify barriers for
    underrepresented groups. The Air Force has updated policies and
    continues to evaluate policies, guidance, and procedures to remove
    exclusionary practices or language, as well as eliminate unnecessary
    barriers for career progression and development. Additionally, we have
    conducted surveys to allow members an opportunity to inform us where
    additional barriers may exist as well as convey why personnel choose to
    continue to serve or end their service.
        The DAF, through the Air Force Recruiting Service (AFRS),
    specifically recruits diverse talent for military personnel, and the
    Air Force Personnel Center does marketing for civilian personnel. AFRS
    is conducting in-person and virtual events that include special events,
    conventions, expos, conferences, job fairs, air shows, school visits,
    etc. to reach a diverse field of potential applicants. AFRS conducts
    targeted campaigns on various platforms such as streaming video, social
    media apps, premium video advertising, and experiential marketing.
        Recruitment of a more diverse pool of personnel includes a multi-
    pronged effort focused on outreach and engagement. In particular, our
    recruiters recently participated in the largest collegiate ESPORTS live
    event to date--offering an opportunity to explain how technology is the
    basis for our STEM career fields. The DAF currently has multiple STEM-
    specific partnerships that strategically target this audience: First
    Robotics, Major League Hacking, 4H, USA Science and Engineering, Skills
    USA, Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, Organization of Black
    Aerospace Professionals, Women in Aviation, and American Institution of
    Aeronautics and Astronautics, and Space Camp.
        University Partnership Program (UPP) facilitates the education and
    recruitment of a diverse pool of military and civilian STEM talent into
    the Guardian workforce and funds research projects of vital interest to
    the universities and the United States Space Force. UPP provides a
    consistent pipeline of required talent through scholarship, internship,
    and mentorship opportunities. The UPP is comprised of 14 nationally-
    renowned universities. The DAF is establishing first-ever University
    Affiliated Research Center (UARC) to develop opportunities to better
    connect Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU) and MSIs
    with STEM and Science and Technology needs of the Department. The UARC
    is expected to be awarded in fiscal year 2023.
        The DAF has stood up an office at the Air Education and Training
    Command that directly works on rated diversity initiatives and an
    aviation Task Force at the Air Force Headquarters-level. The Air Force
    has a Rated Prep Program that expanded in fiscal year 2021 to include
    enlisted applicants. Underrepresented group participants increased from
    51 percent in fiscal year 2019 to 65 percent in fiscal year 2021.
    Moreover, The Rated Prep Program increases United States Air Force
    Academy (USAFA) Cadet Engagement with Diverse Rated Officers and
    increases career mentorship opportunities. The USAFA class of 2024 is
    the most diverse class ever with 30.2 percent women and 36.2 percent
    self-identified as racial/ethnic underrepresented groups.
        The Air Force JROTC Flight Academy Summer Program in 2021 had 299
    AF JROTC Participants = 27 percent minority/35 percent female (52
    percent underrepresented groups). 103 cadets of 216 graduates are from
    underrepresented groups; 68 cadets of 216 graduates are female (31
    percent). In fiscal year 2022, the Aim High Flight Academy conducted
    three camps with 72 students in which 53 percent of the students were
    from racial/ethnic underrepresented groups and 40 percent were females.
                          missile warning and tracking
        18. Senator Hirono. General Raymond, the Space Force is
    collaborating with other DOD partners, including the Missile Defense
    Agency, on the Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared missile
    warning and tracking system--what can you tell me about your progress
    on this system?
        General Raymond. Successful multi-agency collaboration resulted in
    an updated Missile Warning/Tracking/Defense force design formalized in
    the 4th quarter fiscal year 2021. Since then, the United States Space
    Force's Space Systems Command, the Space Development Agency, and the
    Missile Defense Agency partnered with the broader mission area team to
    allocate capability requirements, establish a Combined Program Office,
    and begin the acquisition of a first-ever proliferated architecture
    consisting of more than 150 satellites and associated open architecture
    ground segments. This revolutionary missile warning and tracking
    capability is an essential component of strategic deterrence; it will
    provide global coverage of infrared events, and detect advanced
    tactical to strategic threats, including advanced hypersonic threats.
    It will provide reliable warning for the National Command Authority's
    nuclear response decision process, thereby informing senior decision
    makers to include the President, the Secretary of Defense, and
    Combatant Commanders.

        19. Senator Hirono. General Raymond, how is the Space Force
    planning to protect critical intelligence, missile warning and
    tracking, and communications satellites in space from emerging Chinese
    and Russian threats?
        General Raymond. China and Russia have been developing, testing,
    and deploying an array of ground- and space-based counter-space systems
    that could directly threaten the United States space assets. In order
    to counter these current and future threats, United States Space Force
    created an analytically-based, threat-informed force design process to
    determine the space capabilities needed by the Nation, and in some
    cases by our allies, to provide missile warning and other functions.
        United States Space Force designs inform operational requirements
    and budget needed for future space programs, and incorporate resiliency
    against current and projected threats into our design through system
    attributes, such as orbit diversity and proliferated satellite
    architectures. In addition to greater resiliency, proliferated and
    distributed architectures also provide opportunities for increased
    mission capacity and/or capabilities.
        United States Space Force completed its first major force design
    study on our missile warning and tracking mission, the results of which
    form the foundation of the fiscal year 2023 budget request. We are
    currently conducting force design assessments on the space data
    transport architecture and other mission areas.
                               future fighter mix
        20. Senator Hirono. General Brown, last year the Air Force and CAPE
    launched a tactical aircraft study which was to inform your fiscal year
    23 budget request. What were the key takeaways from the study?
        General Brown. The United States Air Force Tactical Aircraft
    (TACAIR) report is classified SECRET and was used to inform capability
    and capacity options for our future fighter force. The unclassified
    portions of the executive summary align with the Fighter Force
    Narrative made public in September 2021. This effort was a
    comprehensive report of previous modeling, simulation, war gaming, and
    analysis from the last five years. We would be happy to brief you at a
    classified level on the results.

        21. Senator Hirono. General Brown, what is the overall timeline of
    the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) aircraft?
        General Brown. The NGAD timeline is classified. Further details can
    be provided in classified correspondence.

        22. Senator Hirono. General Brown, how will NGAD fit in the Air
    Force's future fighter mix over the next two decades?
        General Brown. The NGAD family of systems is foundational to United
    States Air Force air superiority capability in the future fighter force
    structure. The NGAD platform will be the Air Force's primary air
    superiority fighter in the highly contested environment and has the
    ability to strike ground-based threats. The NGAD family of systems will
    be integrated with uncrewed collaborative combat aircraft. The NGAD
    platform will replace the upgraded, but aging F-22 that cannot be made
    competitive against the future threat expected two decades from now.
    Advanced NGAD capability is enabled through Digital Engineering, Open
    System Architecture, and Agile Software Development.

        23. Senator Hirono. General Brown, what lessons have you learned
    from the F-35 development that you intend to apply to the NGAD?
        General Brown. The NGAD program is using engineering technologies
    and processes that are a generation more advanced than the F-35. These
    include: digital engineering, agile software development, and open
    system architectures. This approach drives upgrade opportunities
    through modularity, maximizes competition across a broad industrial
    base throughout the life of the program, and retains government
    ownership of the technical baseline and the final design.

        24. Senator Hirono. General Brown, how does the Air Force see the
    future of unmanned systems complementing or replacing current fighters?
        General Brown. Controlling the air domain is an absolute imperative
    if the Nation, and our allies, are going to be successful in future
    operations. The United States Air Force needs to add less expensive,
    uncrewed autonomous aircraft to the air dominance suite of
    capabilities, in order to increase overall capability at an affordable
    rate. Uncrewed systems will complement current fighters. The exact mix
    of crewed and uncrewed teaming is under development.
                                satcom personnel
        25. Senator Hirono. General Raymond, what is the timeline for
    consolidating Army and Navy satellite operations under Space Force?
        General Raymond. The Global Army Wideband and Navy Narrowband
    SATCOM Operations missions are set to transfer to the United States
    Space Force in fiscal year 2022, along with the Army SATCOM Support
    Centers that plan and task SATCOM support to Combatant Commanders. In
    fiscal year 2023, the United States Space Force is prepared to receive
    the transfer of the Navy program office that fields and sustains the
    Narrowband SATCOM space and ground segments supporting Joint Force
    mobile, tactical, shipborne, and airborne users.

        26. Senator Hirono. General Raymond, over the past several years,
    the Regional SATCOM Support Center-Pacific has experienced a
    significant amount of mission growth, as the Armed Forces have become
    more reliant on satellite communications. Unfortunately, Regional
    SATCOM Support Center-Pacific has not seen a corresponding manpower
    increase to support this additional work. The Army recognized a
    requirement for more personnel to support all four regional SATCOM
    planning cells after conducting a Total Army Analysis in 2019. With
    Army satellite operations set to be consolidated under Space Force in
    the near future, will you consider increases to the Space Force's
    manpower levels to ensure every unit is able to keep pace with its
    mission requirements?
        General Raymond. The Army and Space Force have jointly planned to
    transfer 502 associated manpower authorizations (302 military/200
    civilians associated with its SATCOM elements) to support transfer of
    SATCOM missions. Once this transfer is complete, we will evaluate the
    Total Army Analysis of its four regional SATCOM Support Centers and
    will consider increases to the manpower levels to ensure every unit is
    able to keep pace with its mission requirements. Fiscal limitations
    will require we make risk-informed trade-offs in manning
    prioritization, while we address competing combatant command
    requirements.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Angus King
                            ukraine lessons learned
        27. Senator King. Secretary Kendall, General Brown, and General
    Raymond, what are some of the preliminary lessons learned from the
    conflict in Ukraine on the future of warfare? Please be specific with
    the new perceived effectiveness of different weapon systems and changes
    to military doctrine regarding tactics and strategy.
        Secretary Kendall, General Brown, and General Raymond. Control of
    the air is critical to military success, and air superiority cannot be
    assumed. The failure of the Russian military to gain control of the air
    is a major contributor to the challenges the Russians are facing.
        Conversely, the Ukrainians have used air defense systems quite
    well. They have been able to keep them survivable against the threat,
    which we think says as much about the lack of capability of the
    Russians as it does about the capability of the Ukrainians.
        We need to be careful about trying to learn too many lessons from
    this until it is studied in detail, but the situation is a significant
    testament to the importance of airpower. To ensure success, airpower
    must be sophisticated enough to deal with the threats that it faces;
    including ground-based air defense systems like the ones Ukrainians are
    employing.
        Additionally, it is clear the character of war is changing. This
    war shows the value of the space domain: being able to provide
    information. It also showed the value of commercial capabilities in
    space; being able to share intelligence more broadly, being able to
    shape the gray zone operation.

        28. Senator King. Secretary Kendall, General Brown, and General
    Raymond, based on observations in Ukraine and Afghanistan, what has the
    military learned regarding assessing an enemy's `will to fight'? How
    can this be applied to future situations of heightened tension and
    conflict?
        Secretary Kendall, General Brown, and General Raymond. What the
    military has learned about assessing an enemy's `will to fight' is that
    it remains difficult to do adequately and is challenged by inadequate
    intelligence access, collection, and analysis. We do not to focus
    intelligence collection on our allies and partners, which further
    impedes insights into how strong an ally or partner's `will to fight'
    might be when tested. Conveying the intelligence that is available and
    the associated uncertainty is a challenge for the Intelligence
    Community, policy makers, and commanders because `will to fight' is not
    readily measured or counted. Tangible things like numbers of tanks,
    artillery, surface to air missiles systems, fighter jets, and naval
    ships are easier to observe, collect, and are often prioritized by
    policy makers and commanders. A correlation of forces approach has a
    long history of how to perform such complex analysis, but the variable
    of how forces interpret what they are fighting for, what they are
    willing to die for, and what their leadership can inspire them to do
    can lead to unexpected results. Moving forward, while we may continue
    to rely on correlation of forces to assess combat power in periods of
    heightened tension and conflict, we need to continue to invest in our
    understanding of populations, their military forces and political
    leadership.
        One lesson we have re-learned from our observation of the Russia-
    Ukraine conflict is that multiple factors combine to influence the
    ``will to fight.'' National motivation, pride, the role of military and
    political leadership, confidence in training and equipment, and faith
    in the man or woman to your right or left drive thousands of individual
    decisions within a military force or an entire population. We are proud
    of the contributions made every day by Airmen and Guardians to making
    sense of all kinds of data and transforming it into intelligence
    supporting decision advantage for commanders.
        Discerning `will to fight' is not an easy task. We recognize that
    while more easily measured, military technology and equipment alone
    does not lead to an effective fighting force. The men and women who
    comprise a military force matter; as does their character, their
    training and their leadership. Areas that are unfortunately difficult
    to collect and analyze effectively. We will continue to utilize the
    tools, training, and lessons learned to advance the tradecraft to get
    after this challenging analytic problem.
        We also will focus on our own warrior ethos, so that when the Air
    Force or Space Force is called upon, we remain ready and lethal. It is
    why we owe so much to those Airmen and Guardians that have gone before
    us, and why we need to lead, train and equip the next generation of
    Airmen and Guardians to effectively fly, fight, and win. Whenever
    Airmen and Guardians work and train alongside our allies and partners,
    they are bolstered and we reinforce ideals that keep the peace. We are
    both strengthened and gain confidence in our ability to defend freedom
    together. This in turn challenges a potential adversary, eroding their
    confidence to take us and our allies or partners on in the next period
    of heightened tension or conflict.
                            research and development
        29. Senator King. Secretary Kendall, General Brown, and General
    Raymond, what is the expected timeframe for the United States to match
    and surpass China and Russia's capabilities in hypersonic missile
    technology and directed energy weaponization
        Secretary Kendall, General Brown, and General Raymond. China and
    Russia are pursuing these technologies and capabilities to address
    their goals, while the DAF is investing in multi-domain capabilities to
    address our requirements for maintaining flexibility and options for
    superiority. The DAF is making substantial investments in the
    development of both boost glide and air breathing cruise missile
    hypersonic weapons. Operational hypersonic air-launched weapons will
    enable the United States to hold high value, time sensitive targets at
    risk in a contested environment. Hypersonic weapons will be employed
    within the context of a larger force mix.
        Our current hypersonic technology is comparable to China. The
    United States is ahead in some areas in terms of technology and China
    is ahead in others. The DAF assesses our advancements in air-launched,
    air-breathing hypersonic cruise missiles are second to none, while
    China has demonstrated impressive ground-launched capabilities.
    However, this is not a race with China to field hypersonics, but rather
    a race for technological superiority and the ability to service the
    target sets that we're concerned about operationally.
        We would be happy to discuss further program details at a
    classified level. In the meantime, unclassified information on existing
    programs is provided here. The DAF is developing an air-launched boost-
    glide hypersonic weapon, AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon
    (ARRW), as well as an air-breathing Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile
    (HACM). The AGM-183A ARRW is planning to field an early operational
    prototype based capability in fiscal year 2023. ARRW is a hypersonic
    maneuvering, boost-glide system designed to engage and kill soft,
    fixed, time-critical targets in contested environments from standoff
    range. The fiscal year 2022 new start HACM program leverages the
    Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research Experiment (SCIFiRE)
    investment, which is a bilateral United States-Australia air-breathing
    hypersonic cruise missile prototyping effort.
        The DAF is also supporting a national directed energy weapon
    development roadmap with increased investment in directed energy
    Science and Technology activities, which will improve effectiveness,
    reduce cost, and identify key risks of integrating advanced ground and
    airborne directed energy effectors into a hybrid base defense
    architecture.
                             hypersonic investments
        Our strategic adversaries, China and Russia, have invested heavily
    in hypersonic weapons and have a significant advantage on the United
    States in this critical area. As you know, hypersonic air vehicles
    require the use of exotic alloys, polymers, and ceramic composites that
    can withstand extreme temperature and flight environments. Although
    great effort is going into the development of these materials, we often
    overlook the more basic manufacturing systems and processes, such as
    full-size determinant assembly (FSDA) and model-based engineering
    (MBE), that are essential for rapid and affordable production.
    Unfortunately, this lack of vision results in too few airframes at
    excessive cost.
        30. Senator King. Secretary Kendall, General Brown, where should
    the AF invest resources to create the ability to mass produce complex
    hypersonic airframe structures rapidly and affordably?
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown. The DAF fully funds the
    completion of the ARRW RDT&E budget, and has applied lessons learned
    from the ARRW program and others to appropriately fund HACM RDT&E in
    fiscal year 2023. We prioritized ARRW's RDT&E to finish the flight test
    campaign to inform a future production decision. ARRW and HACM
    represent the two primary approaches to hypersonics--boost glide and
    scramjet cruise missile technology--which both have unique airframes,
    structures, manufacturing, and materials. These programs were enabled
    by the hypersonic Science and Technology (S&T) activities the Air Force
    Research Lab performs and we continue to invest there as well. To make
    future air-launched hypersonic airframe structures more affordable and
    rapidly producible, and to create a wider competitive industrial base,
    we are considering technology investments in the following areas:
    carbon-carbon materials and manufacturing processes, ceramic matrix
    composites for hypersonic thermal protection systems, high temperature
    metals and alloys, high temperature coatings, 3D printing for
    manufacturing, model-based systems engineering tools, and large
    diameter solid rocket motors and propellants. To bolster these
    investments, we would also consider investing in expansion of
    classified facilities, tooling, and equipment for increased production.

        31. Senator King. Secretary Kendall, General Brown, what analytic
    tools are needed to model the thermal, structural, and environmental
    performance of ultra-high temperature material for hypersonic vehicles?
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown. Verification and validation of
    existing or developing modeling tools within government and industry
    are necessary, followed by high temperature mechanical and relevant
    environmental testing of metallic and composite compounds, and
    subcomponent structures. We need a full understanding of the effects of
    defects, as we do not know what the critical defect size is today. As a
    result, the safety factors being used are currently likely to be
    oversized, in part due to manufacturing variability. We need methods to
    separate up front good parts from bad, so bad parts don't go through
    multiple expensive processes. Ideally, we would like to have validated
    models that link Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE) from green parts to a
    go/no-go decision point so that we only take known-good-parts to full
    density and final machining state.
                             advanced manufacturing
        32. Senator King. The United States Air Force has prioritized the
    development of ``uncrewed'' companion aircraft for the B-21 Raider and
    Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) platforms as operational
    imperatives. Similarly, there is growing interest in pairing autonomous
    collaborative platforms (ACP) or Skyborg uncrewed companion with
    existing 4th and 5th Generation aircraft. Pairing an exquisite, high-
    end system with a low-cost attritable aircraft creates a dilemma for
    our adversaries--capability and capacity. However, the traditional way
    of designing and manufacturing structures intended for long service
    life is not a cost-effective model. Design and manufacturing low-cost
    attritable aircraft development should reflect new expectations in
    cost, performance, and safety. Among those expectations is a
    demonstration of scalable and responsive manufacturing approaches tied
    to certification strategies, as well as material selection and topology
    optimization for military relevant cases.
        Secretary Kendall, General Brown, what initiatives are you taking
    to identify scalable and responsive manufacturing approaches, material
    selection, and design optimization to maximize the value of low-cost
    attritable structures?
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown. The DAF has several
    initiatives to identify scalable and responsive manufacturing
    approaches, material selection, and design optimization to maximize the
    value of low-cost attritable structures.
        For example, in terms of manufacturing approach initiatives, the
    Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is leveraging mature automotive/
    trucking composite manufacturing processes, such as RapidClave and Long
    Fiber Injection, to increase production. We are addressing
    responsiveness by leveraging large scale additive manufacturing and
    robotic sheet metal forming for composite tooling. In conjunction with
    DOD, AFRL is sponsoring high speed thermoplastic forming and welded
    assembly initiatives. We are collaborating with the Institute for
    Advanced Composites Manufacturing Innovation to identify manufacturing
    processes of interest and encourage engagement with the aerospace
    community. We are also establishing strategic partnerships supporting
    Agility Prime and Urban Air Mobility to understand needs and identify
    alternative rapid composite manufacturing processes.
        In terms of material selection initiatives, we have evaluated
    multiple composite resin suppliers and identified five rapid cure resin
    systems that are of interest and currently being processed on Globes'
    RapidClave system. We are also partnering with Covestro for the
    identification of rapid cure, aerospace relevant polyurethane composite
    resins and Zoltec's debundling carbon fibers for application to the
    automotive Long Fiber Injection manufacturing process. AFRL and Arkema
    are working on the development of UV-cured resin systems that are
    compatible with the Continuous Composites robotic additive
    manufacturing of composite structures.
        Finally, in terms of design optimization initiatives, we have
    developed Topology-Optimized (TO) wing frame designs and are providing
    the design to Continuous Composites for robotic additive manufacturing
    fabrication of wing frame as part of a Phase II SBIR effort. We are
    managing the Phase II SBIR with Big Metal Additive for Siemens
    software-supported, topology-optimized spacecraft designs and
    fabrication, using aluminum.

        33. Senator King. Secretary Kendall, General Brown, what is the
    United States Air Force doing with industry partners that possess
    experience in large-scale, high-rate commercial metallic and composite
    aerostructures to develop transformative structures technologies for
    attritable aircraft?
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown. The Air Force is engaged with
    industry to demonstrate design methodologies for a new class of
    uncrewed aircraft able to support a variety of missions in support of a
    family of future collaborative combat aircraft. The aircraft design
    methodology is based on the automotive practice of using a standard
    chassis for multiple variants. This is complemented by additional
    activities with industry to advance collaborative aircraft autonomous
    capability, operations modeling, hardware in the loop platforms, and a
    network architectures.

        34. Senator King. Secretary Kendall, General Brown, how can the
    United States Air Force leverage ``lessons learned'' by Allied partners
    in similar programs, most notably the Royal Air Force's Project
    MOSQUITO?
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown. Partnerships with allies to
    move important, mutually-beneficial research and development forward is
    vital in today's security environment, including our efforts with the
    United Kingdom (Project MOSQUITO) and Australia (GHOST BAT). All
    partners are actively sharing approaches and lessons learned from the
    design and manufacturing of low-cost attritable aircraft. The DAF,
    through bilateral partner agreements and collaborative partnership
    forums such as AUKUS and The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP), is
    engaged with the UK's Royal Air Force MOSQUITO program, as well as the
    Australian's RAAF GHOST BAT program. In April, AFRL met with the RAAF
    Capability Development Team, and had a similar in-person meeting in May
    with the RAF, gaining insight into program details and leveraging their
    experiences. AFRL will reconvene for a combined Capability working
    group and S&T working group this fall to focus on ``red teaming'' each
    other's analysis and concepts.
                     sexual assault prevention and response
        35. Senator King. Secretary Kendall, General Brown, the Air
    National Guard Director, mentioned the initiation of the XYZ program in
    order to better address sexual assault and harassment cases in the Air
    National Guard. How do you feel this initiative will impact sexual
    assault instances in the Air Force?
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown. We believe this Prevention
    Workforce program approach will improve the climate within the ANG
    because it allows us to increase prevention personnel at all levels,
    develop and implement assessment tools for identifying risk and
    protective factors, address negative attitudes and beliefs that can
    lead to an environment that tolerates harmful behavior, and manage key
    sexual assault risk and protective factors. We believe our long-term
    goal focused on equipping leaders at all levels and promoting positive
    unit culture is key to preventing sexual harassment and sexual assault.
                                     unclos
        36. Senator King. General Brown and General Raymond, do you support
    the ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
    (UNCLOS)?
        General Brown. Although the United States is not a party to the
    UNCLOS, the Convention's provisions concerning traditional uses of the
    sea and airspace, including with respect to navigation and overflight,
    reflect customary international law. The Air Force defers to the
    Administration to advise regarding ratification of the UNCLOS.
        General Raymond. The Space Force would defer to the Administration
    regarding ratification of the UNCLOS, and whether the UNCLOS would have
    any applications to the conduct of our operations in the space domain.
                               drug interdiction
        37. Senator King. Secretary Kendall, what coordination is currently
    underway by the DAF with the ONDCP to stem the flow of illegal drugs
    into the United States?
        Secretary Kendall. While the DAF does not have a counter-narcotics
    mission and does not coordinate directly with ONDCP regarding illegal
    drug flow into the United States, the DAF does work directly with the
    Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counter-narcotics &
    Stabilization Policy (DASD CN&SP) and Combatant Commands (CCMDs) to
    facilitate force provider support to drug interdiction missions. The
    Civil Support Division, within the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for
    Operations, develops Air Force goals and objectives that integrate into
    the President's National Drug Strategy and objectives.
        The DAF also serves as the Counterdrug Program Manager for all DOD
    Counterdrug activities and is responsible for developing and/or
    implementing Air Force and Space Force counterdrug programs congruent
    with DOD policy and guidance.
        The DAF provides timely information to the Joint Staff (JS),
    supported combatant commanders (CCDR), and the Deputy Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Counter-narcotics and Stabilization Policy
    (CN&SP) enabling responsive and effective decision making. Examples
    include utilizing GPS to counter trans-national crime, and leveraging
    GPS applications in coordination with NGA and commercial partners to
    map transnational criminal activity, which is related to counter-
    narcotics.
        The DAF provides administrative support to the Director, Narcotics
    and Transnational Crime Support Center (NTC). The DAF is also
    finalizing a MOA with Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Counter-narcotics and Stabilization Policy (CN&SP) to provide full
    administrative support for all NTC DOD-personnel.

        38. Senator King. Secretary Kendall, General Brown, and General
    Raymond, what operations, exercises, capabilities acquisitions, or
    other efforts are planned this year in the Western Hemisphere to secure
    the Homeland and build partner capacity to help with the war on drugs?
        Secretary Kendall, General Brown, and General Raymond. The DAF is a
    force provider for DOD Counter-narcotic (CN) missions and supports the
    Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counter-narcotics and
    Stabilization Policy (CN&SP), who has responsibility for developing
    strategy and policy, establishing priorities, and providing guidance
    applicable to DOD CN and counter-transnational organized crime
    activities consistent with national security and defense strategies and
    with DOD policies and objectives. United States military, interagency,
    and partner nation aircraft work together to support detection and
    monitoring missions. We have allocated ISR support to USSOUTHCOM in the
    fiscal year 2023 Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP), and
    participate in routine Joint Force exercises, along with regional
    partners, to practice assisting law enforcement with counter-narcotic
    and counter-transnational organized crime activities. PANAMAX 2021, and
    TRADEWINDS 2022, which is currently in planning, are examples of such
    cooperative exercises.
                                china commission
        39. Senator King. I believe we must establish an unbiased and non-
    partisan commission to examine a grand strategy for our approach to
    China, similar in intent to President Eisenhower's Solarium Project. We
    need to think of a holistic approach to create a stable international
    order in which China (or Russia) cannot dictate regional developments.
        Secretary Kendall, General Brown, and General Raymond, In order to
    avoid the United States trying to ``spend our way out of conflict,''
    how can we specifically counter China's major activities in your area
    of responsibility?
        Secretary Kendall, General Brown, and General Raymond. We need to
    emphasize technological superiority embedded in an affordable mix of
    capabilities and concepts. Our framework to accomplish this is the
    Operational Imperatives. The first thing we can do is divest legacy
    platforms not well-suited for today's contested environments or
    tomorrow's high-end conflicts, in order to free up resources to invest
    in new capabilities supporting the National Defense Strategy and our
    Operational Imperatives. These come with significant opportunity cost,
    and as good stewards of the taxpayers' dollars, the Department of the
    Air Force needs the flexibility to pivot investments from sustaining
    weapons systems not effective in a near peer conflict to those that
    deter, and if necessary, win, relative to our pacing challenge.
        Importantly, we need to continue work across the whole-of-
    government, with our allies and partners, and with the private sector
    to find novel ways to achieve advantages outside of traditional
    capability investment. The swift and unified response of our network of
    allies and partners to the situation in Ukraine demonstrates the
    advantages of integrated deterrence.
        We also need to take advantage of the unique characteristics of
    space systems. Space is an inherently global domain, meaning that
    China's major activities not only threaten the freedom of action of our
    space and terrestrial forces, but also threaten the freedom of action
    of our allies and partners. This underscores the imperative that the
    United States not attempt to counter PRC aggression alone, but instead
    continue to leverage ally and partner activities in space.
        Expanding partner participation will complicate the PRC's decision
    calculus, allow us to reduce costs when closing gaps in capability,
    increase resilience with complementary capabilities, and accelerate
    modernization efforts across the enterprise. By not only further
    developing existing relationships, but also striving to be the
    ``partner of choice,'' we can most effectively counter major PRC
    activity and provide the collective security for those who join us.

        40. Senator King. Secretary Kendall, General Brown, and General
    Raymond, what would be the greatest benefit this commission could
    deliver?
        Secretary Kendall, General Brown, and General Raymond. Establishing
    such a commission would be a Presidential or Congressional initiation,
    outside the scope of our responsibilities. The National Security
    Strategy and National Defense Strategy provide adequate guidance to the
    DAF. If successful however, such a commission could provide a basis for
    a unified national approach to China.

        41. Senator King. Secretary Kendall, General Brown, and General
    Raymond, What would put us in the best position to avoid the United
    States and China from escalating conflict and careening into a war with
    China?
        Secretary Kendall, General Brown, and General Raymond. If we
    advance the priorities of the 2022 National Defense Strategy--
    integrated deterrence, campaigning, and building enduring advantages--
    the Department can deliver the unique capabilities we provide to
    national security and deter strategic attacks and aggression.
        Our wargaming has consistently demonstrated how helping our allies
    and partners field credible interoperable defenses bolsters deterrence
    and increases the chances of victory. There exists a dynamic tension
    between shaping the competitive space to avoid armed conflict and
    setting favorable conditions to prepare for armed conflict. Creating
    favorable conditions and demonstrating the prohibitive cost of PRC
    aggression are key to deterring China. For the Department of the Air
    Force, this means building a credible, capable, and lethal force ready
    to transition to wartime.

        42. Senator King. Secretary Kendall, General Brown, and General
    Raymond, what are the `toughest problems' OUTSIDE of military
    imbalances?
        Secretary Kendall, General Brown, and General Raymond. We have
    reason to believe that future adversaries will attack our population
    with disinformation/propaganda and attempt to weaken our institutions.
    They will do this to weaponize internal divisions in an attempt to
    undermine our will to fight.
                                     arctic
        43. Senator King. I supported Senator Sullivan's Arctic Security
    Initiative amendment last year, and helped get it into law with the
    Chairman.
        Secretary Kendall, General Brown, and General Raymond, what
    specific resource shortfalls do our armed forces currently possess that
    would limit its ability to conduct exercises/operations in the High
    North? Please be specific to include operations and sustainment funding
    for exercises, equipment shortfalls such as weather gear for soldiers
    or unique platforms.
        Secretary Kendall, General Brown, and General Raymond. As required
    by the Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act, the U.S.
    Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is in the process of completing the Arctic
    Security Assessment (ASA), an independent assessment of activities and
    resources required for fiscal year 2023 to 2027, to implement DOD-wide
    and service-specific Arctic strategies. The DAF was involved in that
    effort and looks forward to working with the combatant commands and
    Congress to address identified shortfalls in resourcing for exercises
    and operations in the High North. The DAF is currently funding several
    Arctic initiatives. Implementation and current investments are focused
    on enabling capabilities, including homeland defense and communications
    architectures, engagement with allies and partners, and modernization
    of the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) for advanced threat
    training.
        This budget proposes approximately $1.2 billion in additional
    investments with Arctic relevance that support exercises, equipment,
    and platforms. Some examples include planned investments in Over the
    Horizon Radar (OTHR) sites in Northern Tier States, JPARC enhancements,
    Cobra Dane, Enhanced Polar System Recapitalization, Evolved Strategic
    Satellite Communications RDT&E, and weather system follow-on
    improvements.
        Regarding Space, specifically, we operate from Thule, Greenland
    (Missile Warning, Space Domain Awareness, and Satellite Command and
    Control), Clear AFS, Alaska (Missile Warning, Missile Defense, and
    Space Domain Awareness), Eareckson AFS, Alaska (Missile Warning,
    Missile Defense, and Space Domain Awareness), and Cavalier SFS, North
    Dakota (Missile Warning, Missile Defense, and Space Domain Awareness).
    Aging equipment and infrastructure affect mission equipment, voice and
    data communication, power and fuel storage, and personnel facilities.
    These challenges complicate our ability to maintain domain awareness
    and access, high-latitude communication, and homeland defense. We have
    sustainment accounts for our radars that will help keep them operating,
    while we move to a more resilient architecture, and partnerships with
    allies to help address high-latitude communications. Support for
    infrastructure investments in Greenland and Alaska will help us more
    quickly mitigate shortfalls.
                                  kc-46 basing
        44. Senator King. Maine is the proud home of the Air National
    Guard's 101st Refueling Wing, the ``MAINEiacs.'' Maine geographic
    location and air corridors offer a strategic hub for supporting trans-
    Atlantic deployments as well as Arctic operations.
        Secretary Kendall, would you support modernizing the unit with the
    new KC-46 aircraft?
        Secretary Kendall. Our number one priority in the Air Refueling
    portfolio is continuous recapitalization of the KC-135 fleet. KC-135
    recapitalization in Maine and other locations is dependent on the Air
    Force ability to expeditiously procure additional tankers after the
    current KC-46 contract is complete. Any delay in delivering new tanker
    aircraft beyond the current KC-46 procurement plan will also delay
    providing modernized aircraft to units flying the KC-135. We look
    forward to working with Congress to ensure seamless modernization of
    the tanker fleet.

        45. Senator King. General Brown, do you believe having a modernized
    and capable fleet of KC-46s at the strategic location of Bangor, ME is
    beneficial to the facilitating operations in the Arctic and trans-
    Atlantic flights to EUCOM?
        General Brown. Air Refueling is important in all regions of the
    world and provides an asymmetric advantage that allows the United
    States to globally project power. Our number one priority in the Air
    Refueling portfolio is continuous recapitalization of the KC-135 fleet.
    Maine and other potential KC-46 locations are dependent on our ability
    to expeditiously procure additional tankers after the current KC-46
    contract is complete.
                              space national guard
        46. Senator King. Secretary Kendall, General Brown, and General
    Raymond, what is the cost of establishing a Space National Guard?
        Secretary Kendall, General Brown, and General Raymond. The
    Administration strongly opposes establishing a separate Space National
    Guard (as stated in the Statement of administration Policy for H.R.
    4350--National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2022), because
    of cost considerations. The Department of the Air Force continues to
    work with the Executive Branch to review alternatives that are
    efficient, effective and appropriate for Air National Guard space units
    and personnel. We highly value the people and units in the Air Guard
    who perform space related missions.

        47. Senator King. Secretary Kendall, General Brown, and General
    Raymond, what is the benefit of establishing a Space National Guard?
        Secretary Kendall, General Brown, and General Raymond. Space
    professionals in the Air National Guard are critical to the Space
    Force, and the DAF and United States Space Force benefit from their
    skills and expertise. Presently, ANG space units provide 60 percent of
    the Space Electromagnetic Warfare capability, 42 percent of National
    Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Operations Center (NOC) critical
    augmentation, and 25 percent of the national Missile Warning & Space
    Domain Awareness capability. Additionally, the ANG has the only
    survivable/endurable, mobile Missile Warning & nuclear detonation
    detection capability, and the only back-up capability for Milstar
    Satellite Communications & Advance Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)
    systems--protected satellite communications for NCA, NC3, and priority
    joint operations. United States Space Force cannot execute our missions
    today without their operational capability. As a result, keeping these
    capabilities and units in uniform and serving our country is a high
    priority. There are equally viable ways of accomplishing this, of which
    a Space Guard is one, but not the only, viable model.
        The Department of the Air Force continues to work with the
    Executive Branch to review alternatives that are efficient, effective
    and appropriate for space units and personnel. The Administration
    strongly opposes establishing a separate Space National Guard (as
    stated in the Statement of Administration Policy for H.R. 4350--
    National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2022).
                    expeditionary tactical operations center
        48. Senator King. The shift to a more scalable, lethal, and mobile
    combat elements such as the Marine Littoral Regiment and Multidomain
    Task Force is critical to the countering the dynamic threats in your
    Area of Responsibility. The DOD's recent investments in the University
    of Maine's composites and advanced manufacturing initiatives has
    resulted in improving blast and ballistic resistant structures and
    materials. Maine small businesses are the direct benefactor of the
    growing talent and innovation in this sector and are concurrently
    providing critical capabilities to the warfighter. The Modular
    Panelized Shelter System (MPSS) is one system of note and is currently
    employed by NORTHCOM in Alaska, EUCOM in Italy, and AFRICOM
    headquarters.
        Secretary Kendall, General Brown, how have the Air Forces units
    benefitted from utilizing MPSS?
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown. The Modular Panelized Shelter
    System (MPSS) is currently employed by some combatant commands. These
    Commands are reaping tangible benefits from MPSS. Currently, MPSS is
    not an asset in the Air Force War Reserve Materiel (WRM) inventory.
    Potentially, the Air Force could benefit from expeditionary,
    affordable, all weather, TS/SCI-certified structures, such as the MPSS.

        49. Senator King. General Raymond, could your command and service
    component commands benefit from an expeditionary, affordable, all
    weather, TS/SCI certified structures such as the MPSS?
        General Raymond. Yes, potentially. The United States Space Force
    has deployable space forces providing Combatant Commanders with
    regionally focused space capabilities. Technologies such as MPSS might
    enhance the deployability and utilizations of those forces.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                      next generation air dominance (ngad)
        50. Senator Warren. Secretary Kendall, I am very concerned about
    reduced transparency in the Next Generation Air Dominance program and
    how that will impact oversight. You recently said that each plane would
    cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Do you have a cost estimate for
    how much Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) will cost?
        Secretary Kendall. The 2023 President's Budget submission includes
    $15.8 billion in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation dollars
    within the FYDP that will be used to continue NGAD development. Any
    funding detail beyond what is provided in the justification books is
    classified. I would be happy to share that information with you in a
    classified setting.

        51. Senator Warren. Secretary Kendall, Will you publicly release
    the total contract dollar amount of the EMD contract?
        Secretary Kendall. The topline budget is releasable, but
    contractual details to include the vendors and dollar amounts are
    classified, and there are currently no plans to declassify and release
    this information. I would be happy to provide it to you in a classified
    setting.

        52. Senator Warren. Secretary Kendall, what major program
    information for NGAD does the Air Force expect to be able to publicly
    release?
        Secretary Kendall. Due to the extremely sensitive nature of this
    program, very little information will be releasable to the public.

        53. Senator Warren. Secretary Kendall, you said NGAD can skip risk
    reduction activities because the technology is already mature. Which
    specific risk reduction activities is the Air Force forgoing?
        Secretary Kendall. The NGAD prototype program was a risk reduction
    program. It allows NGAD to move into EMD with acceptable risk. In order
    to accelerate the program, we are initiating many activities typically
    not done until closer to fielding, to include prototyping and
    technology demonstrations. In the later program phases, we can take
    advantage of those activities that were already accomplished to reduce
    risk. Digital engineering and tight relationships between the
    government and contractor teams also allow us to do this.

        54. Senator Warren. Secretary Kendall, has the Air Force skipped
    any of those risk reduction activities for previous programs?
        Secretary Kendall. The Air Force has had several programs perform
    pre-Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) trade studies and
    enter the acquisition process at the EMD phase. Examples include the B-
    52 Radar Modernization Program, as well as the B-61 Mod 12 LEP Tailkit
    Assembly. During the pre-EMD effort, we focus on ensuring the
    technology maturity and readiness is at the appropriate level to enter
    at Milestone B. There is risk in every program. The DAF attempts to
    balance risk with urgency, cost impacts, and other considerations.

        55. Senator Warren. Secretary Kendall, which programs skipped any
    of those risk reduction activities?
        Secretary Kendall. he Air Force has had several programs perform
    pre-Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) trade studies and
    enter the acquisition process at the EMD phase. Examples include the B-
    52 Radar Modernization Program, as well as the B-61 Mod 12 LEP Tailkit
    Assembly. During the pre-EMD effort, we focus on ensuring the
    technology maturity and readiness is at the appropriate level to enter
    at Milestone B. There is no fixed rule for their decisions, they are
    dependent on specific factors for each program.

        56. Senator Warren. Secretary Kendall, did the Air Force,
    Government Accountability Office, or the Department of Defense
    Inspector General find any delays in program schedule or increase in
    program cost that may have been connected to skipping those risk
    reduction activities?
        Secretary Kendall. Skipping risk reduction can lead to disastrous
    consequences, there are many examples. The NGAD prototyping program
    initiated in 2015 was structured to reduce the major risks in the EMD
    program. The Air Force regularly updates the Government Accountability
    Office on our progress and approach to accelerate NGAD. We will
    continue to provide insight on our approach with digital engineering
    and acquisitions as we pull risk reduction efforts earlier in the
    acquisition timeline.
                             air force retirements
        57. Senator Warren. Secretary Kendall and General Brown, can you
    quantify, in real terms, capability gap risks from divesting legacy
    fighters over the future years defense program (FYDP) given delays in
    procurement of future fighters?
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown. We would be happy to discuss
    your question more fully in a classified setting. The most important
    metric for the Nation is that its Air Force has confidence in the
    ability to win wars against near-peers and especially our pacing
    challenge. Balancing investments with affordable capacity, the Air
    Force must identify and prioritize critical capability gaps in order to
    build a force that best supports the Joint Force mission and wins the
    future fight. The solution to minimizing capability gaps is not hanging
    on to legacy capabilities, where capability gaps already exist. This is
    true across the fighter fleet and the entire Air Force. We remain
    committed to supplying the Nation with a fighter force that is
    sizeable, capable, sustainable, and affordable, with the ability to
    operate across the entire range of mission sets. Funding made available
    through strategic divestment (approximately $15.5 billion across the 5-
    year Future Years Defense Plan) will be reallocated to advance the
    capabilities of the total force, minimizing to the max extent, near-
    term capability gaps while reducing gaps overall. We would like the
    opportunity to discuss our capability gap concerns in a classified
    setting.

        58. Senator Warren. Secretary Kendall and General Brown, my
    understanding is that manpower associated with legacy fighter fleets
    would be directly repurposed to future fighter fleets. What is your
    plan for preserving the highly skilled manpower associated with Air
    National Guard legacy fighter fleets being divested?
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown. We value the experience of the
    Air National Guard and see it as a force multiplier. We expect
    recapitalization to be balanced across the Reserve and Active
    components, but it is unlikely all Air National Guard legacy fighter
    units will transition to newer fighter fleets. Our team is in the
    process of completing a posture review for fighters and rescue,
    intended to identify required force structure changes, strategic basing
    recommendations, and recapitalization plans for legacy aircraft. The
    DAF is committed to finding suitable missions (which may include non-
    flying missions) for these affected units to insure these highly
    skilled Airmen remain assets to the total force.

        59. Senator Warren. Secretary Kendall and General Brown, the Air
    Force has committed to divesting the F15C over the FYDP. What is the
    recapitalization plan for the six Air National Guard units that
    presently fly the F15C?
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown. The Air Force is completing a
    posture review for fighters and rescue, intended to identify required
    force structure changes, strategic basing recommendations, and
    recapitalization plans for legacy aircraft. Results of this review will
    be reflected in the strategic basing process. We will share relevant
    details as they become available.

        60. Senator Warren. Secretary Kendall and General Brown, what is
    the specific plan to recapitalize the Air National Guard F-15C fleet in
    MA?
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown. The DAF is completing a
    posture review for fighters and rescue, intended to inform the CSAF and
    SECAF of required force structure changes, strategic basing
    recommendations, and recapitalization plans for legacy aircraft.
    Results of this review will be reflected in the strategic basing
    process. As legacy aircraft divestments and conversion plans are
    finalized, the Air Force will develop operational concepts to cover the
    homeland defense mission within acceptable risk.

        61. Senator Warren. Secretary Kendall and General Brown, the top
    priority in our national defense strategy is to protect the Homeland.
    How will the Air Force ensure that units that support the aerospace
    control alert, including potentially closed F-15C units, are able to
    continue to support this mission with manned aircraft?
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown. The United States Air Force is
    completing a posture review for fighters and rescue, intended to inform
    the CSAF and SecAF of required force structure changes, strategic
    basing recommendations, and recapitalization plans for legacy aircraft.
    Results of this review will be reflected in the strategic basing
    process. As legacy aircraft divestments and conversion plans are
    finalized, the Air Force will develop operational concepts to cover the
    homeland defense mission within acceptable risk levels.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
                             adversary air training
        62. Senator Rosen. The contractor providing adversary air training
    at Nellis Air Force Base was recently notified by Air Combat Command
    (ACC) that ACC does not intend to continue the contract, which expires
    next month. A-C-C instead intends to operate adversary air support
    completely organically. In written responses to my staff, the Air Force
    states that it will use Nellis' F-16s ``while ACC builds an F-35
    Aggressor capability'' but that the ``timing of this capability growth
    is yet to be determined.'' I am concerned by these responses, and by
    the capability gap that will exist until the Air Force can completely
    compensate for the adversary air training currently being performed
    today--at some future, unspecified date.
        Secretary Kendall, given that the Air Force does not currently have
    the capability to carry out sole adversary air missions without
    reducing training capacity, why has ACC chosen this path--without the
    aircraft or pilots--particularly when the Air Force has warned for
    years of the growing pilot shortage? Specifically, how does the Air
    Force intend to bridge the capability gap for adversary air at Nellis
    AFB after losing the aircraft and personnel responsible for 63 percent
    of aggressor flying hours?
        Secretary Kendall. The AF is moving to 100 percent organic F-16/F-
    35 ADAIR at Nellis AFB and we expect no degradation to the training
    capabilities or pilot readiness from this change.

        63. Senator Rosen. Secretary Kendall, what will be the impact on
    adversary air training at Nellis AFB in terms of delayed training and
    pilot readiness?
        Secretary Kendall. The AF is moving to 100 percent organic F-16/F-
    35 ADAIR at Nellis AFB and we expect no degradation to the training
    capabilities or pilot readiness from this change.

        64. Senator Rosen. Secretary Kendall, when can we expect the first
    F-35 Aggressors to be delivered to Nellis AFB and when will delivery be
    complete?
        Secretary Kendall. The F-35 Aggressor Squadron is expected to
    receive two aircraft in June 2022, with plans to add an additional nine
    aircraft, when funding and maintenance conditions permit. The earliest
    delivery of the remaining nine aircraft is expected to be in fiscal
    year 2024.

        65. Senator Rosen. Secretary Kendall, given the current situation,
    is the Air Force considering re-competing the adversary air contract at
    Nellis AFB?
        Secretary Kendall. The Nellis Contract Air Support contract remains
    open and does not have to be re-competed for one year. However, at this
    time, we have elected not to exercise the remaining option year on the
    Nellis Contract Air Support effort. The decision was based on the
    contractor not being able to support high end threat replication, which
    is necessary for training at Nellis AFB. The remaining funds for this
    option year, which expired 4 June, will be used at other operations and
    training units throughout the Combat Air Force locations, where
    Contract Air Support threat replication remains sufficient.
                               space superiority
        66. Senator Rosen. General Raymond, the Space Force now has a seat
    on the Joint Chiefs, which is critical given space power is a
    foundational support to the entire Joint Force. However, China and
    Russia continue to advance their technology and capabilities in space,
    which degrade the United States' ability to support our Joint Force
    Team. These advancing threats will significantly impact our way of
    life, how we deter conflict, and how we project force as a Nation.
    Given current policy restrictions, what is the Space Force doing to
    develop flexible, responsive, reusable, and multi-domain systems that
    can meet current and projected threats that seek to deny our advantage
    in space?
        General Raymond. We have begun the pivot to transforming to
    resilient architectures for missile warning and space communication
    constellations. We are working closely with the intelligence community
    to ensure our joint operational and intelligence needs are being met.
        There are no policy restrictions that inhibit these or other
    programs.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Kelly
                             a-10 wing replacement
        67. Senator Kelly. Secretary Kendall and General Brown, Arizona is
    home to 89 A-10 aircraft at Davis Monthan--by far the largest
    concentration of these jets anywhere. These uniquely capable aircraft
    have proven themselves time after time in every major conflict the U.S.
    has engaged in since the first Gulf War, saving countless lives while
    delivering unmatched close air support. As the security situation in
    Ukraine clearly demonstrates, the world is a dangerous and
    unpredictable place, and it is foolish to think that we will not find
    ourselves in a position that requires the A-10's unique capabilities in
    the future. I am concerned then that the Air Force's budget does not
    request funding for procurement of additional wing sets, and notes that
    the Air Force has procured enough wings for a fleet of 218 aircraft.
    This is significantly less than the fleet size of 260 aircraft proposed
    by the Air Force or the current fleet size of 281 aircraft. It is also
    counter to the fiscal year 2022 NDAA requirement that the Air Force
    continue modernization of the full fleet. If the A-10 fleet is
    maintained above 218 aircraft, does the Air Force agree that additional
    wing sets must be procured to support that fleet size?
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown. Of the A-10 fleet maintained
    above 218 aircraft, each aircraft has a different amount of wing life.
    The remaining wing life ranges between 9 flight hours and 3,000 flight
    hours depending on aircraft. The United States Air Force continues to
    overhaul and install legacy wings on our highest-hour jets via
    scheduled Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) and unscheduled Depot
    Field Teams, as wing availability allows. Legacy wings are either
    overhauled existing wings or regenerated boneyard wings that still have
    service life available.

        68. Senator Kelly. General Brown, you have indicated in recent
    Congressional testimony that the Air Force could be on a ``path'' to
    procure additional wings. There is no procurement money requested for
    additional wing sets in the budget documents. What is the path?
        General Brown. If required to maintain a fleet above 218,
    additional wings must be awarded on contract no later than April 2023
    (fiscal year 2021 estimate) to prevent a break in production on the
    existing wing contract. In order to maintain a fleet of 281 A-10s, an
    additional 63 wings would need to be procured with an additional $615
    million across the FYDP.

        69. Senator Kelly. Secretary Kendall and General Brown, my office
    has heard reports that the Air Force may be pursuing a plan to replace
    wings on A-10 aircraft with wings out of the Boneyard rather than
    procuring new wings. This would be concerning since wings from the
    Boneyard have far less life on them than the 10,000 flight hours or
    more that new wings provide. Is the Air Force engaged or planning to
    engage in a process in which wings from the Boneyard will be installed
    on operational aircraft rather than procuring new wings? What is the
    relative cost to take these wings off of aircraft in the Boneyard and
    then install them on operational aircraft relative to procuring new
    wings? What effect does this have on service life?
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown. The DAF previously installed
    173 Enhanced Wing Assembly (EWA) wings, and purchased an additional 50
    with installations currently underway. The additional 50 will complete
    a fleet of 218 with 4 spares. As a result of long lead times for new
    wing deliveries, the Air Force bridged the gap between EWA and the
    purchase of the additional 50 wings by overhauling existing wings
    (Legacy A wings) or installing regenerated Boneyard wings (Legacy B
    wings) that still had service life available. Because new wings were
    not yet available, the Air Force installed 27 Legacy B wings from
    fiscal year 2017 to fiscal year 2021. We do not plan nor see a need to
    install additional Legacy B wings. Legacy B wings service is variable
    based on hours remaining to next overhaul for each individual wing,
    ranging from 500 to 2,671 additional flight hours. Wing installs are
    typically combined with Scheduled Structural Inspection (SSI) rather
    than a stand-alone wing install process. The cost of an A-10 SSI/Legacy
    B wing is $6.9 million (fiscal year 2021), whereas the cost of a
    comparable SSI/new wing is estimated at $5.9 million (fiscal year 2021
    SSI costs combined with new wing installation estimate). Aircraft
    service life is affected by a multitude of factors not limited to
    wings; however, new wings will provide 10,000 hours before first major
    depot overhaul, whereas Legacy B wings deliver 500 to 2,671 hours prior
    to next depot overhaul.
                               kc-135 replacement
        70. Senator Kelly. Secretary Kendall and General Brown, I am
    increasingly concerned about the age and wear on our KC-135 fleet. As
    you may know, I've had the privilege of piloting both space shuttles
    Discovery and Endeavour. The oldest of these, the Discovery, entered
    service in 1984. That is 20 years after the newest KC-135 tail in the
    Arizona Air National Guard's 161st Air Refueling Wing entered service.
    And while the Discovery has been retired for ten years, that KC-135 is
    still flying daily in support of local, national, and global missions.
    As I understand it, the KC-Y will bridge the gap between the 179
    planned KC-46 tankers and the future KC-Z, or ``Advanced Air Refueling
    Tanker.'' The expectation is that the KC-Y, like the KC-46, will
    continue replacing our aging KC-135 fleet and will enter service
    sometime late this decade. Understanding that there is more than one
    competitor for the KC-Y contract, what would be the operational
    impacts, with respect to the aging KC-135 fleet, of a protest and
    subsequent delay of the KC-Y contract?
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown. The Air Force is currently
    refining requirements/capabilities for KC-Y and will be using them to
    inform the acquisition strategy for tanker recapitalization. The two
    acquisition strategy options under consideration are Full and Open
    Competition and Sole Source. The KC-Y will be a non-developmental
    aircraft with limited developmental mission systems for connectivity
    and survivability. Delaying planned KC-Y procurement increases
    maintenance and sustainment costs and increases operational risk
    associated with the aging KC-135 fleet.

        71. Senator Kelly. Secretary Kendall and General Brown, what is
    your plan to mitigate risk to the oldest KC-135s in the fleet in the
    event of a contract delay?
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown. The KC-135 remains the
    backbone of aerial refueling operations and will continue to be for the
    foreseeable future. To ensure the aircraft's longevity, the Air Force
    is funding eight modernization efforts, including three new efforts in
    fiscal year 2023--Center Console Refresh and replacement of two legacy
    radios.
        In addition, all KC-135s are inducted into Programmed Depot
    Maintenance (PDM) every five years, where they undergo a thorough
    inspection and repair of defective components. This rigorous process
    has been key to the aircraft's longevity, and the aircraft will
    continue undergoing regular PDM induction until retirement.
        Modernization efforts and regular scheduled PDM visits are key to
    ensuring the remaining KC-135s serve the Air Force until 2040 and
    beyond.

        72. Senator Kelly. Secretary Kendall and General Brown, our KC-135
    unit in Arizona has an extremely high demand signal as one of the few
    in the West. How are you thinking about distribution of tanker assets
    as more modernized platforms come online?
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown. Our number one priority in the
    Air Refueling portfolio is continuous recapitalization of the KC-135
    fleet. We look forward to working with Congress to ensure seamless
    modernization of the tanker fleet. KC-135 recapitalization in Arizona
    and other locations is dependent on the Air Force ability to
    expeditiously procure additional tankers after the current KC-46
    contract is complete. Any delay in delivering new tanker aircraft
    beyond the current KC-46 procurement plan will also delay providing
    modernized aircraft to units flying the KC-135.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                                      uas
        73. Senator Inhofe. General Brown is the Air Force seeing an
    increase in UAS overflight of its bases in the United States and
    overseas?
        General Brown. Yes. The commercial proliferation and availability
    of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) created new risks for the Air Force
    and other Services. In 2021, there were 497 UAS overflights at Air
    Force and Space Force bases overseas and in the Homeland that impacted
    our missions in various ways, such as ceasing airfield operations and
    posing aircraft strike hazards. Since 1 January 2022, we've already
    experienced 129 UAS overflights.
        Technology trends have dramatically transformed legitimate
    applications of UAS, while also making them increasingly dangerous
    hazards and weapons in the hands of state and non-state actors,
    criminals, and negligent hobbyists. The United States Air Force and DOD
    must continue to protect and defend our personnel, facilities and
    assets in all environments, where increasing numbers of UAS share skies
    with DOD aircraft, operate in airspace over DOD installations, and are
    employed by adversaries and negligent operators. The United States Air
    Force will continue to invest in the latest kinetic, non-kinetic, and
    directed energy solutions to keep pace with threats and ensure our
    missions are not negatively impacted.

        74. Senator Inhofe. General Brown, what actions is the Air Force
    taking to defend against UAS threats?
        General Brown. After fielding various kinetic and non-kinetic
    Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft System (C-sUAS) technologies to meet
    urgent needs at locations in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, and to
    safeguard missions supporting United States Strategic Command
    (USSTRATCOM), we designated Air Force Materiel Command as the Lead
    Command to support strategy and technology development. Our Security
    Forces perform operator duties to integrate this important mission with
    our air base ground defense skillsets. The United States Air Force has
    programmed to spend $269 million on C-sUAS research and development
    (R&D), fielding and sustainment over the next five years (fiscal years
    2023 to 2027). Currently, 87 of 187 United States Air Force locations
    have c-sUAS capability that allows for response to incursions.
        To keep pace with the threats, our strategy focuses on delivering a
    government-owned, modular, open-system with automated Command and
    Control architecture that enables a backbone for rapid integration with
    the latest sensors and effectors developed by industry, academia or
    labs.
        The Secretary of Defense designated the Army as the Executive Agent
    for C-sUAS Groups 1-3 in 2020 to unify Service efforts within the
    Department. This led to the establishment of a Joint C-sUAS Office
    (JCO) headed by the Army. We continue to work closely with the JCO, who
    is responsible for coordinating joint requirements, minimizing
    duplication and redundancy across the Services, integrating testing and
    training efforts, and managing R&D funding for new, emerging
    capabilities that will become joint solutions across the force.
                            directed energy weapons
        75. Senator Inhofe. General Brown, is the Air Force looking at
    utilizing directed energy, to include lasers and high-power microwave
    technology, for base security and integration on Air Force aircraft?
        General Brown. Yes, the United States Air Force has ongoing science
    and technology and prototyping activities that are maturing the
    technology and informing our understanding of the current and future
    utility of directed energy weapons (both high-powered microwave and
    high energy laser). The focus has included force protection for our
    bases, as well as other mission capabilities, such as aircraft system
    integration. These efforts are collaborative with our Service
    counterparts. My staff can provide more details as appropriate.
                              commercial industry
        76. Senator Inhofe. General Raymond, is the Space Force working
    with commercial industry to incorporate advancements in power
    efficiency technologies?
        General Raymond. Yes, the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is
    looking at multiple approaches to improve the power efficiency in our
    space systems through partnership with commercial industry. Three prime
    examples are:
        1. Partnering with Sandia National labs through the Space High
    Performance Computing Center of Excellence in New Mexico. This is a
    multi-year joint effort supported by an Other Government Agency (OGA)
    that is investigating and screening processing technologies working
    towards high-performance computing on-orbit.
        2. Leveraging commercial state of the art chips that yield improved
    performance and efficiency with a wide variety of processor
    architecture types with fault tolerant designs.
        3. Collaborating with industry partners, who are providing new rad-
    tolerant Single Board Computers. These partnerships are aimed at
    growing the LEO small-sat market to support increasing reliability and
    faster radiation qualification and validation, which AFRL's Hope
    program seeks to address.
                             emerging technologies
        77. Senator Inhofe. General Raymond, there are emerging
    technologies such as digital predistortion (DPD) that are improving the
    efficiency, power, and linearity of non-linear circuits. Is the Space
    Force looking at this and other technologies to improve on existing
    power efficiencies within our systems in space? Has this exploration
    been included in the Space Force budget?
        General Raymond. Yes, AFRL is working on solutions to improve the
    power efficiency in our space systems. Digital/Analog convergence, as
    well as ideas for leveraging Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning
    in space-electronics are being worked through multiple projects at
    AFRL, such as our Spacecraft Processing Architectures and Computer
    Environment Research focusing on new solutions for data processing on-
    board spacecraft to improve the power efficiency, computational
    performance, and radiation tolerance. The approach identifies and
    prioritizes the areas providing the biggest return on investment, while
    exploring new trade space for game changing concepts--adiabatic
    circuits, a low-power electronic circuit that uses ``reversible logic''
    to conserve energy, is a great example of this. There is funding in the
    Science & Technology portfolio to pursue these efforts.
                     national security space launch program
        78. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Kendall and General Raymond, has the
    National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program benefited United States
    national security and the Space Force? If yes, how?
        Secretary Kendall and General Raymond. Yes. Since 2013, the NSSL
    program has saved over $7B, successfully launched 59 missions, and put
    more than $48 billion of space capability on orbit. NSSL is a force
    enabler, so maintaining our 100 percent mission success is the best way
    to maximize on-orbit capability that is crucial to countering emerging
    threats. The NSSL program will continue to benefit from the savings
    associated with competition.

        79. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Kendall, General Raymond, what are
    cost impacts of launch failure on our national security in terms of
    payload and, more importantly, the loss of capability?
        Secretary Kendall and General Raymond. Cost impacts of a launch
    failure could exceed more than a billion dollars for some of today's
    satellites; however, the loss of space capability is unacceptable and
    degrades our advantage over our adversaries. A launch failure could
    result in significant launch delays until we can get to the root cause
    of the failure and are able to address the cause. As an extreme
    example, we lost a MilStar secured communications satellite in 1999 and
    it took us more than 10 years to replace that capability with the first
    AEHF launch.

        80. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Kendall, General Raymond, last week
    Ms. Lord testified before this committee about the importance of block
    buys for National Security Space Launch (NSSL). How has block buy
    purchases impacted National Security Space Launch (NSSL)? Has it
    reduced the overall price of National Security Space Launch (NSSL)?
        Secretary Kendall and General Raymond. Yes, since 2013 the
    Department of the Air Force has reallocated $7 billion from the launch
    budget to other warfighting capabilities. These reductions were
    achieved through block buys and competition. The future acquisition
    strategy is in work, and aims to continue providing affordable,
    reliable launch services, leveraging competition from the robust
    domestic launch industry, and providing flexibility to the warfighter.

        81. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Kendall and General Raymond, as the
    Department considers the next launch procurement contract, what new
    requirements will be included to ensure the United States leapfrogs
    Chinese and Russian efforts to impact our space capabilities?
        Secretary Kendall and General Raymond. The National Security Space
    Launch (NSSL) program's current contract performance requirements are
    unchanged and will continue to drive the launch systems we need.
    Affordable and highly reliable launch services are critical to our
    success. To achieve this end, NSSL's next contract will utilize full
    and open competition and continue leveraging the nation's robust
    domestic launch industrial base, thus reducing the cost of launch,
    harnessing launch industry innovations such as reusable rockets, and
    providing assured access to space.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
                              divestment of ea-18g
        82. Senator Cotton. Secretary Kendall, the Navy recently submitted
    a plan to divest of 5 EA-18G squadrons, all of their land-based
    electronic attack capability. The Air Force relies on this capability
    heavily in training and deployments as a key part of operations. What
    will the real effect on the Air Force be with this divestment?
        Secretary Kendall. The entire Joint Force, not just the Air Force,
    relies on the United States Navy Expeditionary EA-18G squadrons for
    many critical missions. If the Navy divests the 5 expeditionary EA-18G,
    we will have a reduced ability to exploit the Electromagnetic Spectrum
    to impact our adversaries and protect our forces. Recent analyses by
    several COCOMs indicate that the remaining carrier-based EA-18Gs will
    not be enough to fulfill their needs, and there will be a gap in
    capability as a result of this divestiture. In this event, Air Force
    platforms will primarily be dependent on on-board defensive self-
    protection jammers, until we can develop our planned future
    capabilities.

        83. Senator Cotton. Secretary Kendall, if the Navy's request is
    approved, what is the Air Force's strategy for stand-in electronic
    attack?
        Secretary Kendall. The Air Force has both a Department
    Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy and an Air Force Service
    Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Operating Concept. Both documents
    outline our plan for networked, distributed electromagnetic attack,
    using cognitive algorithms to compete with adversary complex emitters.
    Further information is available at another classification level. We
    are currently exploring ways to fund the key parts of our future EA
    strategy, Cognitive EA and Electromagnetic Battle Management, to meet
    DAF's pacing challenge.
                                 orbital debris
        84. Senator Cotton. General Raymond, it is undeniable at this point
    that space is congested, especially in low earth orbit but increasingly
    in others as well. We have seen the Russians and Chinese conduct
    destructive tests against satellites on orbit, and who only knows what
    else is going on up there. We keep hearing about space debris from
    these kinds of events from you and others in the Space Force. Please
    tell us, what are you doing about space debris.
        General Raymond. The most important contribution the Space Force
    makes toward solving the debris problem is preventing the generation of
    additional debris in the first place. Guardians perform this function
    everyday by providing collision warnings to any and all satellite
    operators regardless of affiliation of nationality to support space
    traffic management. The Space Force is also committed to norms of
    responsible behavior, to include not conducting destructive direct
    ascent anti-satellite missile tests, enhanced engineering standards so
    satellites do not break apart at end of life, and new launch debris
    mitigation steps. From a technology perspective, knowing where the
    debris is and what spacecraft are threatened is the next step in
    mitigating the danger of orbital debris--in close collaboration with
    mission partners like U.S. Space Command and the Department of
    Commerce, the U.S. Space Force continues to modernize its Space Domain
    Awareness architecture to track and disseminate the orbital debris
    hazard. The U.S. Space Force has partnered with the most innovative
    minds in industry, academia, and research institutions to research
    state of the art technology and concepts related to debris mitigation
    and removal. This partnership will hopefully allow the U.S. Government
    to purchase debris mitigation services in the future. The U.S. Space
    Force continues to partner with the State Department to promote
    standards of responsible behavior in space. The success of this effort
    will create a broad coalition of actors committed to the responsible
    use of space now and in the future.
                      rapid response to electronic attack
        85. Senator Cotton. General Brown, Space-X recently fended off a
    Russian attempt to jam its Starlink Internet in Ukraine. Shortly after,
    the OSD Director of Electronic Warfare publicly said Space-X handled
    faster than the United States military could've if it wanted to. In
    2021 you stood up the Spectrum Warfare Wing, theoretically to handle
    problems like this one and others. How long until we can expect to see
    a similarly capable response from the Air Force in the electronic
    warfare domain?
        General Brown. The answer for current Space Force anti-jam
    capabilities is classified. It will come under separate cover from
    Chief of Space Operations. Regarding the 350th Spectrum Warfare Wing,
    it will reach IOC this summer, focused on electronic warfare
    reprogramming for airborne platforms, with emphasis on F-35, and
    building cognitive infrastructure for future capability development.
    FOC capabilities will include cognitive EW improvements per our
    strategy document. Timeline for FOC capabilities is not determined.
                      over-classification of capabilities
        86. Senator Cotton. Secretary Kendall, I heard that shortly after
    being sworn in you directed a review of the portfolio of Special Access
    Programs with the intent to reduce the number of them in the Air Force.
    What was the result of that review?
        Secretary Kendall. I reviewed all the DAF SAPs and concluded that
    the large number of compartments and subcompartments was a serious
    obstacle to collaboration. The Deputy Secretary of Defense reached a
    similar conclusion, and as a result, the DAF is conducting a review of
    our Special Access Programs and will provide results to the Deputy
    Secretary of Defense later this year.

        87. Senator Cotton. Secretary Kendall, there is tension between the
    strategy of ``integrated deterrence'' and the security apparatus
    purposefully designed to prevent integration of exquisite capabilities.
    What is your plan to ensure the right people, outside of higher
    headquarters buildings, have access to the information they need to
    plan, test, and train with our high-end but classified capabilities?
        Secretary Kendall. The security apparatus is designed to manage
    necessary access to personnel who require it. The DAF Office of Primary
    Responsibility oversees the security construct and enables personnel
    access, but the ability for the DAF to enable planning, testing, and
    training is based on requirements established by the warfighter
    (examples of the selective use of key Special Access Programs, or SAPs,
    include support for Weapons School, WEPTAC, exercises, or simulated war
    games). The security apparatus across the SAP enterprise similarly
    follows an acquisitions-like track for readiness to move from
    development to testing and ultimately operations capabilities towards
    apportionment under the Integrated Joint Special Technical Operations
    (IJSTO), led by AF/A3 and SF/COO. MAJCOMs and FIELDCOMs continue to
    identify gaps, where key personnel require access; improvements based
    on their feedback include the use of several access portfolios
    (including multi-domain and multi-Service capabilities) to support key
    MAJCOM and FIELDCOM staff, the Weapons and Tactics community and the
    United States Air Force Weapons School. In parallel with any
    acquisition effort, the T&E community and the warfighter community are
    kept well abreast of capability development (typically as members of
    the program office led Integrated Product Team) and the timelines and
    requirements involved to support testing and fielding. Accesses are
    continually updated based upon test community requirements to support a
    ``test as we fight'' concept to ensure integration across functional
    domains and integration with other Services. The lead MAJCOM or
    FIELDCOM is responsible to establish training pipelines in cooperation
    with the formal training command and to identify the operational units
    that provide the capability to the COCOMs. The DAF coordinates accesses
    through requirements established by the acquisition community, the T&E
    community and the warfighting community to enable planning, testing,
    and training of classified capabilities.

        88. Senator Cotton. Secretary Kendall, I've heard horror stories of
    the huge amount of time and effort spent on an outdated security
    architecture regarding Special Access Programs. Specifically, despite
    the existence of an online database of accessed individuals, Airmen and
    Guardians must ask their security managers to email visit certificates
    for temporary duty assignments as if we're still using secure fax
    machines. In the most egregious cases, Airmen within the same Wing or
    Delta that have secure facilities at the same base but managed by
    different subunits must send visit certs to go across a parking lot.
    What are you doing to address the wasted time and energy spent on this
    bureaucracy to allow our Airmen and Guardians to focus on warfighting?
        Secretary Kendall. The DAF is familiar with, and shares, the
    concerns regarding the time it takes to move clearances from office to
    office, while at the same time balancing the need to maintain the
    security of these programs. However, the DAF is required to follow the
    processes and use the systems, not owned by the DAF, that work across
    the entire defense enterprise, even if that is just to communicate on
    the same base. In order to address this latency, the DAF is pursuing an
    exception to policy for visits to facilities within the purview of the
    DAF; the DAF will coordinate with other DOD components, who are likely
    experiencing the same issue. This exception to policy will nullify the
    requirement for written correspondence, adding agility and speed to the
    process.

        89. Senator Cotton. General Raymond, before he retired the last
    Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced an initiative to
    declassify or downgrade the classification level of the vast portfolio
    of Special Access Programs in the Space Force and Space-based. What is
    the status of that effort and when will see the results of that
    directive?
        General Raymond. Through the ongoing Space Strategic Review (SSR)
    directed by the National Security Council, the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Space Policy is leading work that will inform a review of
    the Department's space classification and related disclosure policy. I
    anticipate that work will yield policy guidance that should be taken
    into account in carrying out appropriate review of classified programs
    managed under the authority of the Space Force as to whether the level
    of classification of a given program could be changed to a lower level,
    or the program could be declassified. This will take time as it
    requires the review of hundreds of programs, as most programs contain
    some classified information.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                              awacs modernization
        90. Senator Sullivan. General Brown, this past Tuesday, the Air
    Force finally decided on the E-7 Wedgetail to replace the aging E-3
    Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). The service's
    proposed fiscal year 2023 budget calls for the retiring of 15 E-3s, or
    almost half of the service's inventory, yet estimated delivery of the
    first E-7 platform isn't expected until 2027. Given, this, will there
    be a gap in the service's early warning and control capability?
        General Brown. There is a capability gap that exists in this
    mission area today, and it can never be filled by the E-3. We must move
    to a modern platform to close this capability gap. As for capacity, the
    E-3's availability rate has declined to an average of 40 percent and we
    routinely see lower rates on a day-to-day basis. Divesting the E-3 is
    crucial to the AF's intent to invest in the E-7A, a modern, more
    capable, and reliable airborne early warning platform. The DAF is
    exploring options to accelerate E-7 fielding.

        91. Senator Sullivan. General Brown, if the E-3 retirement timeline
    will create a gap, how is the Air Force going to mitigate it?
        General Brown. There is a capability gap that exists in this
    mission area today because of the lack of capability of the existing E-
    3 fleet. We must move to a modern platform to close this capability
    gap. Retaining any number of E-3's will not help with the capability we
    need. During the transition to the E-7, the United States Air Force
    will leverage other assets including, but not limited to, Control and
    Reporting Centers and Over-the-Horizon radars, and other organic
    sensors.
        92. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Kendall and General Brown, I
    understand one of the issues you face to fielding the E-7 sooner is
    that Boeing is building other 737-derived platforms and doesn't have
    excess capacity. Would more funding, sooner allow you to field E-7s
    faster?
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown. The interdependency of the
    primary lines of effort to build a complete E-7 present a greater
    limitation than Boeing's 737 production capacity. The three primary
    lines of effort for building an E-7 are: 1) the ``green aircraft'' from
    Boeing; 2) radar integration components (Section 46 and radar); and 3)
    development of the United States mission system. All three lines of
    effort must be accelerated together to accelerate delivery of a
    complete E-7 aircraft. To aid in accelerating delivery, we would need
    new start authority to be granted in fiscal year 2022 and stable and
    predictable budgets for fiscal year 2023 and beyond. Continuing
    Resolutions (CR), regardless of length, drives uncertainty and
    inefficient execution, threatening the readiness of our force and our
    ability to keep pace with our adversaries.
                           air force arctic strategy
        93. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Kendall, during your confirmation
    process last year, I asked you for the record, ``[i]f confirmed, can I
    get your commitment to . . . fully resource the Department of the Air
    Force's Arctic strategy so that our Nation can successfully defend the
    Homeland along our northern approaches? To which you responded,
    ``[y]es.'' Since releasing its Arctic Strategy in 2020, the Air Force's
    MILCON budget priorities in the Arctic have been: runway extension and
    living quarters repair JBER, and a new dormitory to house the
    additional LRDR personnel at Clear Space Force Station. Do you believe
    these MILCON budget priorities reflect the commitment you've made to
    fully resource your Department's Arctic Strategy?
        Secretary Kendall. I believe the Department's MILCON investment
    funding of Arctic priorities is consistent with objectives in our
    Arctic Strategy. The projects highlighted are best characterized as
    supporting Current Mission. The Department schedules New Mission MILCON
    projects to provide new facilities when they are needed, as identified
    by the Program Executive Office and our strategy. Currently, the DAF is
    also making significant MILCON investments at installations in the
    Northern Tier states for the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent and for
    the Weapons Generation programs. Importantly, our MILCON projects are
    not the only reflection of our commitment to resourcing the Arctic
    Strategy. Our planned investment also includes Over the Horizon Radar
    (OTHR) sites in Northern Tier States, JPARC enhancements, Cobra Dane,
    Enhanced Polar System Recapitalization, Evolved Strategic Satellite
    Communications RDT&E, and weather system follow on improvements. In
    all, the DAF has identified approximately $1.2 billion in additional
    investments with Arctic relevance.

        94. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Kendall, what additional Arctic
    MILCON budget priorities can we expect to see from the Air Force going
    forward?
        Secretary Kendall. The DAF is working closely with the Air Force
    Research Lab and Office on Naval Research on the programming and
    planning of land acquisition and facilities construction to support
    Over the Horizon Radar (OTHR) facilities.
                         joint range operations center
        95. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Kendall, while visiting the Joint
    Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) with ADM Aquilino early last year,
    we were briefed on the need for a new Joint Range Operations Center
    (JROC), which is necessary to integrate the highly classified systems
    on 4th, 5th, and 6th generation aircraft and simulate combat against a
    peer adversary. JROC construction is critical to operating the JPARC
    with Threat Matrix Level 4 capability. Last year, in a question for the
    record, you said this capability ``could be the difference between
    winning and losing a future fight.'' Given this importance, when should
    we expect to see this as a priority in the Air Force's budget?
        Secretary Kendall. The Air Force has developed requirements for the
    Joint Range Operations Center, though they are not currently in the
    fiscal year 2023 FYDP MILCON Budget Request; the Air Force is
    considering inclusion of this requirement in a future budget request.
                        homeland defense infrastructure
        96.Senator Sullivan. General Raymond, as you are aware, Alaska is
    home to most of our Nation's ballistic missile defense and domain-
    awareness infrastructure, including the recently finished long-range
    discrimination radar at Clear Space Force Station. The Air Force's
    fiscal year 2023 budget requested $68 million for a dormitory required
    to house the additional radar operators necessary to operate this new
    radar, which is essential to executing that homeland defense mission.
    What other Space Force investments are necessary to ensure our Homeland
    defense infrastructure modernizes with the threats we are facing?
        General Raymond. The dorm project at Clear SFS was one of our
    highest MILCON priorities as it supports the personnel for the new Long
    Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) in Alaska. The LRDR radar is an
    important part of the United States' ability to identify and track more
    advanced threats to the Homeland coming over the poles. Equally
    important to homeland defense is our pivot to a new resilient missile
    warning / missile tracking force design, which we initiated in the
    fiscal year 2023 President's Budget. The new missile warning / missile
    tracking force design will enable the United States Space Force to
    detect and track ever advancing missile threats, and is more resilient
    to the growing list of PRC and Russian space threats. We also continue
    to invest in several other ground based radars in Alaska and around the
    world.
                     clear space force station tour lengths
        97. Senator Sullivan. General Raymond, the community surrounding
    Clear Space Force Station is eager to host guardians and their families
    if Air Force policies permit accompanied tours. I understand that the
    Space Force has the authority to implement two or three year
    accompanied tours for guardians assigned to Clear SFS. Do you need any
    additional authorities to implement such a policy?
        General Raymond. Unfortunately, Clear SFS will likely remain an
    unaccompanied tour for the near future due to the lack of quality of
    life/family-related programs and resources on station or in the
    surrounding area. Twelve Active Duty Guardians, 105 National Guard
    personnel, and 20 Airmen are currently assigned to Clear SFS.
        1. Anderson is the closest town, population <200 per 2020 census
    (about 6 miles away) with very limited services available.
        2. Nenana is the next closest town, population <400 per 2020 census
    (about 20 miles away) with very limited services available.
        3. Fairbanks is the closest metro area, approximately a two hour
    drive away.
        Exceptions to policy could be granted (with a waiver from DOD), but
    would require thorough vetting to ensure the member could find housing
    in Anderson or Nenana, while understanding the limited community and
    family support services within the normal commuting distance of 50
    miles.
                                  b-21 basing
        98. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Kendall and General Brown, is the
    Air Force considering any OCONUS basing options for the B-21 Raider?
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown. The United States Air Force is
    not currently considering OCONUS basing options for the B-21.

        99. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Kendall and General Brown, what is
    the process by which the Air Force is deciding where B-21 Raiders will
    be permanently and rotationally based?
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown. The Department of the Air
    Force (DAF) is using its strategic basing process to determine the
    permanent locations of the three B-21 main operating bases. The final
    basing decision for the first main operating base, Ellsworth AFB, was
    announced on June 10, 2021. The preferred locations for the remaining
    two main operating bases are (in sequence)--Whiteman AFB, and Dyess
    AFB. The DAF anticipates initiating the development of Environmental
    Impact Statements for main operating bases 2 & 3 in the 4th quarter
    fiscal year 2022. Additionally, the DAF may rotationally deploy the B-
    21 as part of a Theater Support Package in future years, if required.
                               acquisition reform
        100. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Kendall, General Brown and General
    Raymond, the GAO has identified ``adequate pricing'' as one of five key
    area vulnerabilities of the DOD. For example, the existing statutory
    language in 41 U.S.C. 103 continues to complicate the DOD' ability to
    ensure that commercial goods and services are acquired based on
    competitive market pricing that represents the best value or the best
    price. This section discusses the definition of a commercial product
    which qualifies for defense acquisition as having been, ``sold, leased,
    or licensed, or offered for sale, lease or license, to the general
    public,'' but makes no mention of demonstrated scale. This leads to the
    DOD using commercial item procedures to procure items that are
    misclassified as commercial items and therefore not subject to the
    forces of a completive marketplace. Would you support modifying
    regulations like this to ensure the DOD is getting the best acquisition
    pricing?
        Secretary Kendall, General Brown, and General Raymond. The
    Department of the Air Force supports modifying the commercial items
    definitions and rules to ensure the DOD is getting the best acquisition
    pricing, by limiting commercial products and services to those that are
    subject to the forces of a competitive market. Although it is crucial
    to leverage commercial industry and commercial practices as much as
    possible, there are many instances where supplies or services are
    categorized as commercial but not sold to non-Government customers to
    any significant extent, or at all. In such circumstances, the
    Government is not gaining the benefit of the commercial market and is
    often unable to obtain sufficient cost or pricing data to evaluate the
    reasonableness of the proposed price. Addressing this concern would
    improve the Government's ability to negotiate reasonable prices and
    could also expedite acquisition timelines by ensuring the Government
    can obtain the data it needs to evaluate proposed prices. We recognize
    that industry will strongly oppose broad statutory changes in this area
    of commercial item acquisition. The Department of the Air Force
    strongly supports DOD Legislative Proposal#427, Data Requirements for
    Commercial Item Pricing Not Based on Adequate Price Competition, which
    seeks modest change with a tailored approach to obtain data to support
    new commercial ``of a type'' determinations, particularly for sole
    source items that lack adequate price competition. The Air Force
    understands that the Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition and
    Sustainment is in active discussion with the Armed Services Committee
    staff on this matter and is exploring ways to achieve this objective.

        101. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Kendall, General Brown and General
    Raymond, while competition should lead to lower prices, in a sole-
    source environment buyers need more information to ensure they get a
    good deal. Government buyers are in the strongest negotiating position
    when they are able to review certified cost or pricing data to
    determine whether a contractor's proposed prices are fair and
    reasonable. Over the years, ``acquisition reform'' has gutted
    requirements on companies to provide this data to government officials,
    including certified cost and pricing data for goods and services that
    have been designated commercial. Would you support removing or limiting
    pricing data exemptions for commercial goods and services if they are
    acquired via sole-source?
        Secretary Kendall, General Brown and General Raymond. Yes, the
    Department of the Air Force supports removing or limiting pricing data
    exemptions for commercial goods and services if they are acquired via
    sole-source. The biggest challenge to the Department is that this be
    done for ``commercial of-a-type'' items. Under this regulatory regime,
    it can be difficult for Contracting Officers to determine if prices are
    fair and reasonable in sole-source situations because contractors can
    offer items for sale without actually selling them. Contractors can put
    an item in a catalog with no intention of selling it commercially in
    order for the item to meet the minimum of the definition of commercial
    item.
        While it is crucial to leverage commercial industry and commercial
    practices to the greatest extent possible, there are many situations
    where pricing information for commercial products and services is not
    readily available to the Government. In these situations, the
    Government spends a lot of time and resources attempting to obtain data
    (often unsuccessfully) from the contractor or other sources in order to
    make a price reasonableness determination. Limiting or removing pricing
    data exemptions for commercial goods and services in such situations
    would expedite acquisition timelines and improve the Government's
    ability to assess the proposed prices for reasonableness.
        The Department of the Air Force recognizes that industry will
    strongly oppose limiting or removing pricing data exceptions for
    commercial goods and services. The Air Force supports DOD Legislative
    Proposal #427, Data Requirements for Commercial Item Pricing Not Based
    on Adequate Price Competition, which provides a reasoned set of
    circumstances for obtaining price and cost data in sole source,
    commercial ``of a type'' acquisitions.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
                                    testing
        102. Senator Blackburn. General Brown, what is the current role of
    modeling and ground testing for hypersonics? How should that role be
    altered or expanded?
        General Brown. Both modeling and ground testing are valuable tools
    that reinforce each other and can have strong synergy with flight test.
    Both are being improved as our knowledge of hypersonics advances. The
    Air Force and Office of Secretary of Defense Test Resource Management
    Center (OSD/TRMC) are making critical investments to recapitalize the
    Nation's hypersonic infrastructure and to develop the new hypersonic
    ground test, flight test, modeling and simulation, and analysis
    capabilities needed to support hypersonic weapon system development. In
    partnership with OSD/TRMC, significant investments are being made in
    the areas of high temperature material test facilities, hypersonic high
    speed test track, hypersonic wind tunnels for hypersonic air breathing
    engines and modeling and simulation of weather effects on hypersonic
    weapons. The Air Force and OSD/TRMC will continue to evaluate current
    and planned hypersonic investments in the modeling and simulation and
    ground test capability improvements.

        103. Senator Blackburn. Secretary Kendall, what are the immediate
    and enduring implications of starving critical infrastructure for
    testing hypersonics and other critical weapon systems?
        Secretary Kendall. The Air Force and DOD recognize the critical
    importance of investing in test infrastructure. In the area of
    hypersonics, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Test Resource
    Management Center (TRMC) is making significant investments in
    hypersonic infrastructure to include open air range test capability
    (Edwards AFB), high-speed test track capabilities (Holloman AFB), and
    high-temperature test facilities (Arnold Engineering Development
    Complex). In addition to the OSD investment, the AF is investing $336
    million across the fiscal year 2023 FYDP for hypersonic test
    infrastructure, of which 100 percent will go to AEDC. Currently for
    test infrastructure, United States Air Force invests $109 million
    (fiscal year 2023) in Facilities, Sustainment, Restoration, and
    Modernization (FSRM), of that historically 81 percent goes to AEDC.
    United States Air Force invests $65 million (fiscal year 2023) in
    modernization improvements across the test enterprise, of which 25
    percent goes to AEDC.
                               nuclear enterprise
        104. Senator Blackburn. General Brown, how does the budget balance
    the long-delayed strategic nuclear modernization program and aircraft
    procurement?
        General Brown. The Air Force must do both. In an environment of
    aggressive global competitors and technology development and diffusion,
    the Air Force must rapidly modernize to control and exploit the air
    domain, while also underwriting national security through nuclear
    deterrence to the standard the Nation expects and requires. Our budget
    fully funds our key nuclear modernization programs, makes targeted
    investments to best position the Nation for peer competition, while
    accepting risk in legacy capabilities not optimized for the future
    fight we envision.

        105. Senator Blackburn. General Brown, how does the budget support
    the design and operational nuclear certification of systems, units, and
    tests at scale for current conditions?
        General Brown. Consistent with the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, the
    fiscal year 2023 President's Budget request fully resources nuclear
    certification requirements needed to ensure on-time fielding of safe,
    secure, reliable, and effective nuclear weapons systems. If
    appropriated, the fiscal year 2023 budget request would increase
    funding for nuclear certification activities at the Air Force Nuclear
    Weapons Center by $41.6 million to meet the oncoming ``bow wave'' of
    nuclear certification demands. These funds will support independent
    technical evaluations and testing for new nuclear systems such as
    Sentinel, Long Range Standoff (LRSO), B-21, and Weapons Generation
    Facilities, as well as sustainment of currently fielded capabilities
    (E.G., B-2, F-35, MMIII, B-52). Stable and consistent funding for
    nuclear certification remains vital to the success of Triad
    modernization programs.
         space force research development, test, and evaluation (rdt&e)
        106. Senator Blackburn. General Raymond, how is the Space Force
    collaborating with commercial industries to develop resilient and
    defendable architecture and space capabilities?
        General Raymond. Commercial applications enable diverse,
    distributed and resilient architectures and capabilities to be
    delivered quickly and economically. In our approach, we evaluate each
    mission area, assess risk, and look for opportunities to leverage
    capabilities for inclusion into the mission architecture. Space Force
    shared our force design with commercial industry early in the process
    and sought industry input. New force design must capitalize on
    commercial or we won't be able to afford the new design.
        Additionally, we will work closely with the warfighter so that our
    commercial acquisition efforts support the USSPACECOM Commercial
    Integration Strategy vision to collaborate, integrate and partner with
    industry to mitigate gaps, and maintain a competitive advantage.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
        107. Senator Hawley. Secretary Kendall, you committed during the
    hearing to provide any Pacific Air Forces unfunded requirements. Can
    you provide in the next 30 days a list of PACAF posture requirements
    that were identified during the fiscal year 2023 budget cycle but were
    not funded in the fiscal year 2023 budget request, along with an
    explanation for why each of those items was not funded?
        Secretary Kendall. Pacific Air Forces is the Air Force component
    supporting INDOPACOM. In fiscal year 2023, in accordance with DOD
    guidance, the Air Force requested $86.8 million in Operations and
    maintenance funds to support the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI).
    The INDOPACOM Commander's fiscal year 2023 unfunded priorities
    submitted to Congress listed four United States Air Force equities:
    Service Tactical Signal Intelligence (SIGINT); Upgrades, Joint Air-to-
    Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), Theater Campaigning, and Mission
    Partner Environment (MPE); Battlefield Information Collection &
    Exploitation System--Extended (BICES-X).

        108. Senator Hawley. General Brown, I understand the Air Force's
    ``palletized munitions'' concept offers a promising way to expand U.S.
    strike capacity and deliver longer-range weapons at a lower cost. Do
    you think this concept is promising?
        General Brown. Yes, the concept is promising with respect to
    delivering massed effects over time. With more weapons needed, and less
    time to deliver them, we are forced to investigate non-traditional
    methods of delivering weapons. Palletized delivery, for any number of
    different weapons, allows us to dramatically increase the number of
    weapons we can deliver in a compressed period.

        109. Senator Hawley. General Brown, has the Air Force considered
    using C-130Hs as delivery vehicles for palletized munitions?
        General Brown. Yes, the Air Force has considered this, and we have
    not precluded integration on the C-130H in the future. For now, we have
    prioritized the C-130J and C-17 due to their increased performance,
    including a larger combat radius, which we will need in Pacific
    scenarios.

        110. Senator Hawley. General Brown, what progress has the Air Force
    made on operationalizing Agile Combat Employment over the last year,
    where have you met delays, and what are your priorities for ACE over
    the coming year?
        General Brown. We had done a lot of ACE experimentation in previous
    years to prove out this way of operating, and over the past year that
    emphasis has shifted to making the concept a reality across all aspects
    of airpower. Over the past year our focus has been on developing the
    enterprise concept to support the detailed training, team structures,
    tactics, partner nation relationships, supporting infrastructure, and
    enabling capabilities for ACE. ACE looks a bit different in the Indo-
    Pacific versus in Europe, or for fighter aircraft than it does for
    bombers or our mobility aircraft. We've challenged ourselves to
    understand those differences and develop a strategy for how we can
    organize, train, and equip the force to conduct ACE worldwide. The ACE
    exercises we've conducted over the past year have shown us how to
    conduct dispersed operations effectively, and they've strengthened our
    interoperability with our allies and partners worldwide. Looking ahead,
    our focus is on solidifying and formalizing how we will conduct ACE,
    and in prioritizing the investments that will make it possible. We see
    no delays in meeting these objectives.

        111. Senator Hawley. General Brown, when do you expect Agile Combat
    Employment to reach Initial Operational Capability and Full Operational
    Capability?
        General Brown. ACE is a way of operating that is made possible by a
    wide range of capabilities, procedures, and dispersed operating
    locations, so it's a bit challenging to use terms like initial
    operating capability or final operating capability as we would with a
    new weapon system. Each of our Major Commands has developed its own
    criteria for what it considers to be a baseline ability to conduct ACE
    that will effectively assure our allies and partners, deter aggression,
    or respond to crises. We can discuss those criteria in a different
    forum. We'll continually improve on that baseline as we learn through
    doing, integrate with our joint and combined partners, and bring new
    capabilities to bear to support this resilient way of generating
    airpower.

        112. Senator Hawley. General Brown, the Guam cluster will play an
    important role in future air operations in the Pacific. This in mind,
    can you explain how the fiscal year 2023 budget request supports
    development of operational locations and related activities in the Guam
    cluster?
        General Brown. The Air Force is in continuous dialogue with
    INDOPACOM on the development of operational locations and forward
    posture. We are working together to identify requirements and what is
    needed to balance those requirements, considering global commitments.
    Simultaneously, we are taking a look at what is required to ensure our
    servicemen and women, across the Department of Defense, have the
    training required to handle all the threats we think we may face, not
    only in the Indo-Pacific, but in Europe as well.

        113. Senator Hawley. General Brown, as you know, Whiteman Air Force
    Base is the home of the B-2 stealth bomber. Can you confirm that
    sustainment is on track to keep the B-2s mission ready until they're
    replaced by B-21s?
        General Brown. Yes, the Department values a well-funded B-2 Weapon
    System Sustainment program in the fiscal year 2023 President's Budget
    and the B-2 will continue to provide capacity until B-21 fields.

        114. Senator Hawley. Secretary Kendall, the 509th Bomb Wing and the
    Missouri Air National Guard's 131st Bomb Wing both fly B-2s out of
    Whiteman. These units are fully integrated and a great example of how
    our Active Duty and Air National Guard forces can work to complement
    one another. Does the Air Force plan to maintain total integration
    between the 509th and 131st Bomb Wings when B-21s are fielded, or are
    you considering putting an end to that arrangement?
        Secretary Kendall. The Air Force supports the current association
    construct between the 509 BW and 131 BW and will strive to maintain it
    in all future actions and missions at Whiteman AFB.

        115. Senator Hawley. Secretary Kendall, how does the Air Force plan
    to transition from B-2s to B-21s at Whiteman Air Force Base?
        Secretary Kendall. For each Main Operating Base, we will seek to
    expeditiously transition units away from the legacy bomber platforms,
    and to the B-21. Upon arrival of the B-21, we gain the greatest
    efficiencies for our Airmen and the mission, by shifting our training
    and employment focus as quickly as possible away from the legacy
    platform and to the B-21. Specific to the B-2, we will also be mindful
    to holistically maintain our nuclear requirements through the
    transition.

        116. Senator Hawley. Secretary Kendall, how will ``advanced
    collaborative platforms'' improve the Air Force's ability to counter
    Chinese air forces and when do you expect these capabilities to reach
    Initial Operational Capability and Full Operational Capability? Please
    provide a classified response, if necessary.
        Secretary Kendall. The Air Force is currently exploring operational
    concepts and working with industry partners to evaluate technical
    maturity. Once these activities are complete we will be able to share
    more information in a classified response.

        117. Senator Hawley. Secretary Kendall, Air Force Magazine reported
    on April 28, 2022 that the Air Force is accelerating the production
    timeline for the B-21 program by overlapping development and
    production. Given this development, what is the current Initial
    Operational Caand Full Operational Capability estimate for the B-21
    program? Please provide a classified response, if necessary.
        Secretary Kendall. More complete program definition will be
    included in the fiscal year 2024 President's budget. IOC and FOC have
    not been finalized yet, but IOC can be expected later this decade.

        118. Senator Hawley. Secretary Kendall and General Brown, you
    stated during the hearing that the Air Force has multiple anti-ship
    capabilities other than the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM). What
    are those capabilities, when will they become available (if they are
    not already), and how do they compare to LRASM in terms of their
    ability to sink or disable enemy ships in a contested environment?
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown. More complete program
    definition will be included in the fiscal year 2024 President's budget.
    IOC and FOC have not been finalized yet, but IOC can be expected later
    this decade.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Tommy Tuberville
                                  flight hours
        119. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Kendall and General Brown,
    studies have shown that a pilot needs at least 200 flight hours per
    year or four sorties a week to remain combat ready. How many flight
    hours did United States Air Force pilots average in 2021 and what is
    your expectation for that number in 2022?
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown. Overall, Air Force pilots flew
    an average of 135 hours in 2021 with Fighter Pilots averaging 103
    hours. Factoring in planned force structure reductions and moderate
    inflation, we anticipate Air Force pilots will be able to fly 130 hours
    in 2022, with fighter pilots averaging approximately 101 hours.

        120. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Kendall and General Brown, at
    present, how many Air Force pilots are considered combat ready?
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown. The number of pilots
    considered combat ready can fluctuate from day-to-day and month-to-
    month given pilots are continually moving through some level of
    initial, upgrade, or continuation training as part of the normal course
    of our pilot experiencing cycle. For operational security purposes, we
    will need to provide those numbers in a closed session. Generally
    speaking though, in order to have a healthy, sustainable, and properly
    sized mission ready crew force, the Air Force needs to maintain a
    balance of experienced and inexperienced pilots to include an
    appropriate number of instructors to support the continuum of training.
    Today, the Air Force is challenged to both produce and absorb the
    number of pilots it needs. Currently, the Air Force is 1,650 Total
    Force pilots short of its requirement and needs to produce 1,500 pilots
    annually. However, at the same time, our pilots are flying on average
    30 percent below the required hours annually, which is impacting our
    ability to absorb and season the pilots we produce. By absorb, we mean
    train our pilots at the right pace to keep that proper balance of
    experienced and inexperienced pilots at the unit level. By season, we
    mean make inexperienced pilots combat ready and allow them to progress
    until they are experienced. If the current trend continues, we will
    have an overly inexperienced force in the future. Therefore, we must
    start flying more in order to properly experience the force and
    similarly train to the proficiency required to prevail against a peer
    adversary. Divesting our oldest, least operationally relevant systems
    may be one component that could free-up resources to supplement flying
    hours on our most needed platforms and help buttress combat readiness.
    While not a panacea in itself, it would be supplemental and a move in
    the right direction for combat readiness.

        121. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Kendall and General Brown, what
    resources do you need to ensure all U.S. Air Force pilots are combat
    ready?
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown. While not all pilots are
    combat ready, because a portion are in initial or upgrade training, a
    properly resourced flying training program is needed to absorb,
    upgrade, and train our pilots. We now fly about 30 percent less hours
    than the training requirement, which impacts combat readiness. Improved
    combat readiness requires investment in manpower, the sustainment
    enterprise, and our operational training infrastructure. We need
    continued congressional support for tough choices to free up resources,
    including divestment of our oldest, least operationally relevant
    systems. Divesting legacy platforms particularly helps us with our
    maintenance manpower shortfall. 9 percent of our maintenance positions
    are currently unfunded and approximately 50 percent of our aircraft
    maintenance personnel have less than six years of experience. Divesting
    a portion of the A-10 fleet alone would free up approximately 900
    critical maintenance personnel. Additionally, sustainment requirements
    are exceeding our ability to keep pace. Maintenance workload has
    increased more than 50 percent in the past 25 years and legacy aircraft
    break 33 percent more often. We also forecast a 54 percent increase in
    depot workload over the next 20 years due to modernization requirements
    and structural life extension actions. New aircraft are expensive to
    procure, but old aircraft have accelerating costs simply to keep
    flying. These resourcing challenges limit the amount of flying hours we
    can generate and directly impact our combat readiness. Continued
    congressional support provides the resources needed to strike a balance
    between crucial modernization and current force readiness.
                      combat and support wing evaluations
        122. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Kendall and General Brown, at
    present, Air Force combat and support wings are responsible for
    evaluating themselves. This used to be the job of the Inspector
    General. Is it true that since wings moved to evaluating themselves
    that their passing grades have increased dramatically?
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown. Wings and wing-equivalent
    units across the Department are responsible for self-assessment
    processes, while they also receive external inspections, including
    those regularly conducted by MAJCOM or equivalent levels under the Air
    Force Inspection System. Since implementation of the current Air Force
    Inspection System in 2013, we've noticed no significant difference in
    wing-level pass rates. In comparing all wing-level Unit Effectiveness
    Inspections conducted during the most recent two-year period to the
    last two years of wing-level inspections conducted during the previous
    inspection system, the pass rate is actually slightly lower now:
        Inspection Pass Rate Jun 2020 to May 2022:
        163 inspections. 6 Marginally Effective or Ineffective (2). Pass
    Rate=96.3 percent
        Inspection Pass Rate Jan 2011 to Dec 2013:
        193 inspections. 3 Marginal or Unsatisfactory (2). Pass Rate=98.5
    percent
        While pass rates and grades are important in terms of overall
    assessments, it is important to note that a strong DAF-wide unit
    culture of critical self-assessment, along with the robust and rigorous
    processes of the Air Force Inspection System, have identified 6,486
    deficiencies across the Department in the last two years alone. All of
    these deficiencies are tracked to resolution.

        123. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Kendall and General Brown, share
    your thoughts on transitioning wing evaluations to the Air Force I.G.
        Secretary Kendall and General Brown. The Air Force Inspector
    General closely oversees policy, process, and trending for inspections
    of all units in the Department, from wing, delta, and garrison level,
    up to our headquarters staffs. For the entire Department, including the
    United States Space Force (USSF), the Air Force Inspection System
    (AFIS) is built upon the premise that Commanders at all levels have the
    responsibility to assess their units' effectiveness, efficiency,
    discipline, and readiness. Inspectors General (IGs) independently and
    objectively inspect readiness and compliance of a commander's
    subordinate units by carrying out inspection responsibilities and
    activities as required by United States Code, DOD policy, and DAF
    instructions. Each wing-level commander is required to conduct
    continuous internal self-inspection activities. By way of illustration,
    during a two-year command tour, a typical wing-level commander will
    experience more than 100 inspection events, either conducted or
    overseen by an organic team of IG personnel or by external IG teams
    from higher-headquarters level. All IG team members are trained by the
    Air Force Inspector General. Most wing-level commands are also
    inspected 2-3 times per year by a MAJCOM (or equivalent) level for
    mission readiness and compliance. Each MAJCOM-level IG independently
    reports the results of those inspections to the MAJCOM (or equivalent)
    Commander. Adding another layer of oversight on behalf of the Air Force
    Inspector General, the Air Force Inspection Agency conducts inspections
    of MAJCOM-level IG teams to guarantee planning, execution, quality,
    standardization, objectivity, and thoroughness of inspections across
    the Department of the Air Force. Finally, AFIS employs a continuous-
    evaluation process over multi-year inspection windows, rather than
    relying solely upon single-snapshot inspections. Under this construct,
    inspections accomplished on wings and garrisons that are orchestrated
    by wing-level IG personnel may be incorporated into a MAJCOM IG's
    assessment of each wing. In addition to validating local self-
    assessments, MAJCOM-level IG teams inspect the quality of the wing-
    level self-assessment program and incorporate a risk-based sampling
    system to assess the wing across the range of readiness and compliance
    areas.
                         national security space launch
        124. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Kendall, General Raymond, what
    are the most successful aspects of the U.S. launch program?
        Secretary Kendall and General Raymond. The most successful aspects
    of the National Security Space Launch program are its 100 percent
    mission success rate, robust competition from the industrial base, and
    significant reduction in launch cost. The NSSL Phase 2 contract,
    awarded to United Launch Alliance and SpaceX in August 2020, produced
    commercial-like prices for commercial-like missions and reduced launch
    costs for our more demanding missions by more than 50 percent, while
    providing assured access to space and stability to our launch
    providers.

        125. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Kendall, General Raymond, has
    the transition from single launch procurement awards to block buys
    reduced the price of space launch?
        Secretary Kendall and General Raymond. Yes, since 2013 the Space
    Force has reallocated $7 billion from the launch budget to other
    warfighting capabilities. These reductions were achieved through block
    buys and competition. The future acquisition strategy is in work, and
    aims to continue providing affordable, reliable launch services,
    leveraging competition from the robust domestic launch industry, and
    providing flexibility to the warfighter.

        126. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Kendall, General Raymond, as the
    department considers the next launch procurement contract, what new
    requirements will be included to ensure the United States beats Chinese
    and Russian efforts to impact our space capabilities?
        Secretary Kendall and General Raymond. The National Security Space
    Launch (NSSL) program's current contract performance requirements are
    unchanged and will continue to drive the launch systems we need to
    retain space superiority. Affordable and highly reliable launch
    services are the most critical aspects to achieving this superiority.
    To achieve this end, NSSL's next contract will utilize full and open
    competition and continue leveraging the Nation's robust domestic launch
    industrial base, thus reducing the cost of launch, harnessing launch
    industry innovations such as reusable rockets, and providing a 100
    percent mission success rate.

      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR
             FISCAL YEAR 2023 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                             THURSDAY, MAY 5, 2022

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                                  ARMY POSTURE

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Gillibrand,
    Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth,
    Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
    Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Blackburn, and Hawley.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. I would like to call the hearing to order.
        The Committee meets today to receive testimony on the
    President's Defense Budget Request for the Army for fiscal year
    2023. Our witnesses this morning are Christine Wormuth,
    Secretary of the Army, and General James McConville, Chief of
    Staff of the Army. Thank you both for your service, and please
    convey the gratitude of this committee to the men and women
    serving under you.
        President Biden's Defense Budget Request for fiscal year
    2023 includes approximately $178 billion in funding for the
    Army, an increase of $2.8 billion from the fiscal year 2022
    enacted budget. The Army's request appropriately focuses on
    taking care of its people, enhancing training and readiness,
    and modernizing equipment, but it does so against a largely
    flat budget. As such, the Army has prepared a tightly crafted
    budget that attempts to balance all its priorities. However, to
    maintain momentum on its signature modernization efforts, the
    Army has significantly slowed its procurement of enduring
    capabilities. This effort to hold onto every program has
    inevitably led to inefficiency and ``spending more for less.''
    To avoid triggering further increases in cost per unit, I would
    like to know how the Army can ensure it makes best use of its
    resources even as it reduces procurement quantities.
        The military is shifting its focus and resources to the
    Indo-Pacific region, and the Army has a critical role to play
    in this theater, including contributions to Joint Force
    capabilities, enabling logistics and prepositioned stocks, and
    strengthening relationships with our allies. With that in mind,
    I am interested in hearing about the Army's view of its mission
    globally, especially in the Indo-Pacific, as well as how the
    service is adjusting its operating concepts and force posture
    to support the National Defense Strategy.
        The Army's most valuable asset has always been its people.
    I am pleased to see this budget request places a priority on
    taking care of our men and women in uniform and the civilians
    who serve alongside them, including an across-the-board pay
    raise for military and civilian personnel of 4.6 percent. At
    the same time, this budget would decrease the Army's end
    strength to just under one million soldiers, largely due to a
    difficult recruiting environment. I understand the Army is
    conducting a holistic review of its recruiting and retention
    practices, and I would ask for an update on how you plan to
    identify and attract a broader pool of potential recruits and
    grow back-end strength in the out years.
        The Army must continue to improve its readiness in the
    context of long-term strategic competition. This budget
    increases flying hours and training miles to improve the
    readiness of the individual soldier. It also funds numerous
    rotations to Combined Training Centers to maintain unit-level
    readiness. Further, the Army's ongoing focus on large training
    exercises, including the Defender series in Europe and the
    Pacific, and its leadership in the Project Convergence series,
    demonstrate a commitment to regional preparedness. These large-
    scale events not only test system capabilities, exercise
    critical skills like deployment of the force, and demonstrate
    the value of prepositioned stocks, they also facilitate joint
    and coalition experimentation and training, reflecting how the
    United States would fight in future operations. We are seeing
    the importance of efforts like this right now in Ukraine.
        The Army's budget request includes an overall decrease in
    research, development, test, and evaluation, RDT&E, but makes
    important increases in several cutting-edge technology areas.
    To remain competitive with China and Russia we must continue to
    invest in emerging technologies that will define future
    battlefields across all domains. The Army specifically has been
    pursuing modernization in the areas of long-range precision
    fires, air and missile defense, soldier lethality, next-
    generation combat vehicles, future vertical lift, and the
    communications network. These are ambitious and far-sighted
    objectives, but we must acknowledge that the Army has
    historically struggled to modernize effectively.
        The establishment of Army Futures Command and the
    reorganization of associated commands injected tremendous
    energy into modernization efforts, and Congress has provided
    the Army with wide latitude to make programmatic and structural
    changes. The Army recently published a directive that refines
    and clarifies roles and responsibilities for Army
    Modernization. Secretary Wormuth, General McConville, I would
    ask that you update the committee on the Army's modernization
    efforts and what resources are necessary to effectively
    continue them.
        Again, I thank the witnesses for their participation today
    and I look forward to their testimonies.
        At this point let me now recognize the ranking member,
    Senator Inhofe.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES INHOFE

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Chairman Reed. I join you in
    welcoming our witnesses. I had an opportunity, and have in the
    past, several times, of getting to know them quite well, and I
    appreciate the efforts and the challenges they are facing right
    now.
        For 4 years this committee has used the 2018 National
    Defense Strategy and Commission report as the roadmap. We have
    gotten our money's worth out of this thing over the last couple
    of years.
        Rightly, the Biden administration recently released a
    defense strategy underscoring the accelerating threat of the
    Chinese Communist Party and its unprecedented military
    modernization.
        Unfortunately, the Administration has sent to Congress a
    budget request that does not provide the resources necessary to
    combat that threat or others that we are facing right now. Not
    only does it fail to provide the 3 to 5 percent real growth
    recommendation that is in the NDS report and that we have been
    following for a number of years, it does not even keep up with
    the record-high inflation we are facing.
        The absence of real growth in the request, combined with
    record-high inflation, would leave our military under-
    resourced.
        This is most evident in the budget request for the Army. Of
    course, those of us old Army guys always observe that Army gets
    the short end of this stuff when changes are made. Am I the
    only one who ever observes this, Mr. Chairman?
        Chairman Reed. No, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay. Anyway, the request cuts military
    construction by 39 percent, it cuts research and development by
    6 percent, and cuts procurement by 7 percent. Notably, the
    procurement cut would substantially slow modernization of
    armored brigade combat teams which are essential to deter
    further Russian aggression.
        Given the inadequate budget request, it is no surprise that
    the Army's unfunded priorities list, what I call the risk list,
    totals $5.1 billion.
        I look forward to understanding from our witnesses the
    risks associated with this budget request. Additionally, I look
    forward to hearing what will be done to overcome a significant
    recruiting challenge. This is one that I have not seen before,
    and I think it is more severe than any challenge that we have
    had in the past, and that is that we are now facing, just in
    this year, a request shortfall of 12,000.
        So Mr. Chairman, clearly we have got a lot to do to ensure
    that our military has the resources that they need Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Let me now recognize the Secretary of the Army, Christine
    Wormuth. Madam Secretary.

    STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTINE WORMUTH, SECRETARY OF THE
                                  ARMY

        Secretary Wormuth. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe,
    and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for your
    ongoing support for the Army as we continue to work to
    significant transform to meet future threats. I am really
    pleased to appear before you today as I near the 1-year mark of
    being Secretary of the Army. We have accomplished a lot this
    year but we have a lot of work ahead of us.
        We remain focused on our three key priorities: people,
    readiness, and modernization. The fiscal year 2023 budget
    request enables us to support the National Defense Strategy,
    take care of our people, and meet operational demands at home
    and abroad. We will invest $35 billion in modernization, almost
    $2 billion in military housing and infrastructure, and fund 22
    combat training center rotations in fiscal year 2023.
        We are modestly reducing our end strength from 485,000
    soldiers in the Active component to 476,000 soldiers this year
    and about 473,000 soldiers in fiscal year 2023. We are doing
    this because we are really focused on ensuring a high-quality
    force. We did not want to have to lower our recruiting
    standards. At the same time, we are working hard to adjust our
    recruiting efforts, given the challenging recruiting
    environment that we and the other services are facing.
        We are also committed to maintain our momentum on our six
    major modernization portfolios. In fiscal year 2023 alone we
    will field four Long Range Precision Fire systems, the first
    Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon battery, our ship-sinking,
    midrange capability, the Precision Strike Missile, and the
    Extended Range Cannon Artillery platform. We are also
    modernizing our air and missile defense systems and adding
    another Patriot battalion to our force structure. We continue
    to fund both the develop of FLRAA [Future Long-Range Assault
    Aircraft] and FARA [Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft],
    which are scheduled to field in about 2030.
        As important as it is to maintain momentum on
    modernization, people are the strength of our Army and our
    greatest asset. This budget increases soldier and Army civilian
    pay and funds a number of important quality-of-life
    improvements, including barracks family housing and childcare
    initiatives.
        We remain focused on building positive command climates
    across the Army. Positive command climates begin with good
    leaders, and our new leader assessment programs are truly
    helping us to select the very best leaders for command.
        To reduce harmful behaviors we are building out a
    prevention workforce that will help us with our efforts to
    build cohesive teams that are trained, disciplined, and fit.
    Our SHARP Fusion Directorate pilot brings together, in one
    place, all of the resources to assist victims of sexual
    harassment and assault and those pilots are up and running. We
    have also hired a new civilian director for our Criminal
    Investigative Division, and we will establish the Office of
    Special Trial Counsel later this summer.
        We continue striving to prevent suicide in our ranks. We
    have started conducting 100 percent mental health wellness
    checks in some of our units, and we are surging behavioral
    health resources to where they are most needed, even as we
    confront a national shortage of providers.
        As we focus on taking care of soldiers and their families
    and transforming to meet future threats, the Army also plays a
    key role in addressing threats in the here and now. Today we
    have over 45,000 soldiers in Europe to reassure our allies,
    deter aggression against NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization] territory, and assist Ukraine in its fight to
    defend itself. The Army, as you all know, has provided a wide
    range of lethal assistance to Ukraine, including Javelins,
    Stingers, Howitzers, drones, ammunition, and even MI-17
    helicopters.
        While we are focused on Europe we have not taken our eye
    off the pacing challenge of China in Indo-Pacific. Through
    Operation Pacific Pathways, we deployed thousands of Army
    forces and equipment sets to the region for exercises that
    strengthen Joint Force integration, demonstrate combat
    capability, and promote interoperability. In just the last 2
    years, our Fifth Security Force Assistance Brigade has deployed
    40 advisory teams to 14 different nations.
        The interoperability and relationships our Army forces are
    building with allies in the region increased the potential for
    additional access and combined action in the event of a future
    conflict. Our access presence and influence around the world
    are enduring advantages that contribute to integrated
    deterrence.
        To continue building this enduring advantage relative to
    our adversaries we have to pursue cutting-edge experimentation
    and innovation. Much of our experimentation activity will
    culminate this fall at Project Convergence 2022, where our
    sister services will join us with operational units and new
    technologies to work together to solve key operational
    challenges.
        America's Army is fit, trained, and ready when called upon
    to fight and win the nation's wars. We are transforming for the
    future, which we have to do, given the very dangerous security
    environment we face each day. I am proud of everything that our
    soldiers do to protect our country, and look forward to your
    questions this morning.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
        General McConville, please.

     STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES McCONVILLE, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
                                  ARMY

        General McConville. All right. Apache Pilot will get that
    thing straight. Okay.
        Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, distinguished members
    of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here
    today and for your continued support to the Army and our
    people, our soldiers of all components, our families, our
    civilians, and our Soldiers for Life, our veterans, and
    retirees. Speaking of Soldiers for Life, we would like to thank
    Senator Inhofe for your many years of service in support to the
    Army and the nation, from basic training at Fort Chaffee and
    all your years on Capitol Hill. We wish you all the best in a
    well-deserved retirement. So thank you, sir.
        The men and women of the United States Army stand ready to
    fight and win our nation's wars, as a member of the Joint
    Force, and I could not be more proud of each and every one of
    them. The Army is well-aligned with the National Defense
    Strategy through our existing priorities of people, readiness,
    and modernization. We win through our people. They are our
    greatest strength, and they are our most important weapon
    system, and that is why people remain the Army's number one
    priority.
        We are in a war for talent. That means recruiting our
    nation's best and modernizing our talent management systems.
    That means retaining our best. We recruit soldiers but we
    retain families, so we are ensuring access to quality housing,
    health care, childcare, spouse employment and PCS moves. When
    our soldiers get the call that it is time to deploy, we want
    them laser-focused on their mission, knowing that their
    families will be well taken care of at home. Above all, putting
    our people first means building cohesive teams, where everyone
    is treated with dignity and respect, and everyone, in every
    unit, is highly trained, disciplined, and fit, and ready to
    fight and win.
        But being ready today is not good enough. We must also be
    sure we are ready tomorrow, and that is what modernization is
    all about--future readiness. The Army continues to undergo the
    greatest transformation in over 40 years, and we remain
    committed to our six modernization priorities. We will have 24
    signature modernization systems in the hands of our soldiers by
    fiscal year 2023, either for testing or fielding, and also in
    fiscal year 2023 we will stand up the third of our five multi-
    domain task forces.
        The U.S. Army never fights alone, so we continue to invest
    in strengthening our relationships with allies and partners
    across the globe. We can see the return in those investment in
    our response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Never before have
    we asked so many to move so quickly, and we could not do it
    without the access and presence our allies and partners
    provide.
        In less than a week, the 1st Armored Division of the 3rd
    Infantry Division was able to deploy from Fort Stewart,
    Georgia, and be on the ground in Germany, starting live-fire
    exercise with tanks drawn from the Army prepositioned stocks in
    Europe. That is a testament to our tactical and strategic
    readiness, to the quality of our incredible logisticians, and
    to the investments Congress has made over the last several
    years in setting the European theater.
        When it is time to go, we go with the Army we have, and the
    Army we have is the world's greatest fighting force. We must
    ensure it stays that way, and with your continued support we
    will.
        I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of The Honorable Christine E.
    Wormuth and General James C. McConville follows:]

      Joint Prepared Statement by The Honorable Christine E. Wormuth and
                          General James C. McConville
                putting the army on a sustainable strategic path
        America's Army remains prepared to fight and win our Nation's wars
    as a member of the Joint Force, and we continue to serve as the
    Nation's premier response force to protect Americans, our Allies, and
    our interests when unexpected crises arise at home and abroad. We thank
    Congress for providing the funding that allowed us to deliver highly-
    trained forces for a broad spectrum of challenges, including continued
    COVID-19 response efforts in local communities, unprecedented natural
    disasters, the largest non-combatant evacuation operation in U.S.
    military history, and now support to NATO in response to Russia's
    unprovoked invasion into Ukraine.
        As the Army continues its most significant transformation in over
    40 years, our priorities continue to be people, readiness, and
    modernization. Building upon those priorities, the Army further defined
    six objectives to guide the force towards a vision of the Army of 2030.
    First, we are ensuring the Army continues down a sustainable strategic
    path that allows us to transform to face new challenges without
    sacrificing our readiness to answer our Nation's call anytime,
    anywhere. Second, we must ensure the Army becomes more data-centric and
    capable of operating in contested environments in order to prevail on
    the modern battlefield. Third, we must continue our efforts to be
    resilient in the face of climate change, adapting our installations,
    acquisitions programs, and training to remain ready to operate in a
    changing environment. Fourth, we are building positive command climates
    at scale across all Army formations. Fifth, we must reduce the harmful
    behaviors that hurt our soldiers and break trust with the American
    people, including sexual harassment and assault, racism and extremism,
    and domestic violence. Sixth, we must strategically adapt the way we
    recruit and retain our Nation's best talent to sustain the All-
    Volunteer Force.
        This year's budget request supports these priorities and
    objectives, enables us to maintain momentum on our six modernization
    portfolios, and aligns the Army with the strategic ways of the 2022
    National Defense Strategy (NDS): Integrated Deterrence, Campaigning,
    and Building Enduring Advantages.
                     army support to integrated deterrence
        Integrated deterrence is a whole-of-government effort across
    multiple domains, theaters, and the spectrum of conflict to ensure that
    the Joint Force--in close coordination with the U.S. interagency, and
    our Allies and partners--makes the costs of aggression so clear to our
    adversaries that they refrain from hostile behavior altogether. The
    Army's role is to provide combatant commanders with combat-credible
    ground forces capable of fighting and winning in large scale combat
    operations. We are the backbone of the Joint Force in the Indo-Pacific,
    our priority theater for responding to China as our pacing challenge.
    In Europe, the Army remains the tip of the Joint-Force spear in
    responding to Russia as an acute threat and reassuring our NATO Allies.
        Combat-credible ground forces for deterrence. To echo the Secretary
    of Defense, our support for Ukraine is unwavering, and our commitment
    to defend every inch of NATO territory is ironclad. In recent months,
    we have collectively witnessed a return on multiple investments that
    Congress and the Army have made over the past several years, especially
    the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) and Army Prepositioned Stocks
    (APS). The U.S. Army has over 45,000 troops committed to reassuring our
    NATO Allies and supporting our Ukrainian partners, including those
    assigned to U.S. Army Europe-Africa, which we elevated to a four-star
    command in 2020. Our deployed forces now include two Corps--the XVIII
    Airborne Corps and our newly re-activated V Corps--two Divisions--the
    82nd Airborne Division and 1st Infantry Division--six Brigade Combat
    Teams, and two Combat Aviation Brigades. Three of the six brigades we
    have committed in Europe are Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs): 1st
    ABCT, 1st Infantry Division; 1st ABCT, 3rd Infantry Division; and 3rd
    ABCT, 4th Infantry Division. In addition to the large-scale deployments
    to NATO's eastern flank, as of April 2022, U.S. Army Special Operations
    Command has hundreds of personnel supporting 38 missions with Allies
    and partners across 17 different European countries.
        Never before has the U.S. Army moved so many forces so quickly. It
    took less than one week after receiving deployment orders for an
    armored brigade to deploy from Savannah, Georgia and be on the ground
    in Germany starting live-fire exercises with tanks drawn from APS in
    Europe. That is a testament to years spent investing in our alliances
    and partnerships, and to maintaining strong relationships that enabled
    the Army the access and presence needed to bolster NATO deterrence.
    This also demonstrates the importance of setting the European theater
    over the past several years to deter conflict, and responding quickly
    to fight and win should deterrence fail. It also speaks to the Army's
    collective readiness--not just the tactical readiness of our combat
    units, but the strategic readiness of our logisticians, mobilization
    force generation installations, and power projection platforms required
    to equip, transport, and project those units.
        Rapid crisis response at scale across the globe. Rapid crisis
    response capabilities to defend our interests and protect our citizens
    across the globe is another component of integrated deterrence. Last
    year in Afghanistan, the Army deployed elements from the 82nd Airborne
    Division, 10th Mountain Division, Army Special Operations Forces,
    Minnesota and Vermont National Guard, the Army Reserve's 936th Forward
    Resuscitative Surgical Detachment, and multiple sustainment and
    military police enablers to Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA)
    to support an extraordinarily difficult and dangerous non-combatant
    evacuation operation. Working hand-in-hand with the Marine Corps and
    Air Force, Army soldiers helped to evacuate more than 124,000 American
    citizens, Allies, partners, and Afghans who fought for our values over
    the past 20 years. At the height of operations, 17,000 soldiers across
    the NORTHCOM, EUCOM, and CENTCOM areas of responsibility supported
    Afghan Special Immigrant Visa application and family relocation
    efforts. Working closely with interagency partners, more than 8,000
    soldiers from all components supported Operation Allies Welcome,
    relocating more than 76,000 Afghans to the continental United States.
        Contributions to Homeland Defense. Integrated deterrence begins at
    home with domestic resilience against strategic attacks. By integrating
    the Army's Homeland Defense capabilities with the Joint Force and
    federal, state, and local partners, the Army enables the Nation's rapid
    response for disaster relief, as well as critical infrastructure
    attacks. Nowhere is that more apparent than in our Army Reserve and
    National Guard. Over the last year, the Army Reserve and National Guard
    have been the backbone for our Defense Support to Civil Authorities,
    responding to everything from hurricanes, tornadoes, and winter storms
    to wildfires, floods, and the Southwest Border. The National Guard has
    made an invaluable contribution to the Nation's COVID-19 response,
    deploying 16,670 soldiers across 44 states, 3 territories, and the
    District of Columbia. Their missions included everything from COVID
    screening, testing, and contact-tracing to vaccine storage, transport,
    and distribution. The National Guard also provided vital healthcare
    facility assistance for some of the country's most vulnerable
    populations.
         maintaining the modernization momentum toward the army of 2030
        Modernization is future readiness, and we remain firmly committed
    to the six modernization portfolios we defined to Congress in 2018:
    Long Range Precision Fires, Next Generation Combat Vehicle, Future
    Vertical Lift, the Network, Integrated Air and Missile Defense, and
    Soldier Lethality. By the end of fiscal year 2023, we will deliver 24
    of our signature modernization efforts into the hands of soldiers,
    either for experimentation, testing, or fielding. We could not achieve
    this rapid development without congressional support and authorities.
    Middle Tier Acquisition authorities and Other Transaction Authorities
    are helping the Army to reduce bureaucracy, streamline decision making,
    and accelerate the development of systems in order to field
    capabilities more quickly. The Army has also forged partnerships with
    non-traditional industries, academia, and others to accelerate
    innovative, game-changing materiel solutions. As we build the Army of
    2030, we are laying the foundation for the Army of 2040 and beyond.
        Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF). In fiscal year 2023 we will
    field the first batteries for hypersonic missiles and our ship-sinking
    Mid-Range Capability, in addition to fielding our Precision Strike
    Missile capability. Our Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs) will provide
    Command and Control (C2) of long range precision fires and effects
    through intelligence, information, cyber, electronic warfare, and space
    capabilities. MDTFs will enable the Joint Force to penetrate enemy air
    defenses while establishing our own. We are standing up three new MDTFs
    in addition to the two currently supporting the Indo-Pacific and
    European theaters. Together, they will offer multiple options to
    combatant commanders and complicate decision-making for potential
    adversaries.
        Next Generation Combat Vehicles (NGCV). We have begun fielding the
    Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) as an adaptable and more
    survivable multi-variant vehicle. The AMPV replaces the M113 family of
    vehicles to provide ABCT combat support and enabler elements the
    capability to move at the pace of attack formations, as well as
    incorporate anticipated future technologies. We are testing prototypes
    of Mobile Protected Firepower, a lighter, more deployable armored
    combat vehicle that will provide large-caliber, long-range direct fires
    in support of Infantry BCTs. Robotic Combat Vehicles (RCVs) will
    provide unmanned platforms that will augment the mobility, lethality,
    survivability, and situational awareness of our formations. The RCVs
    will undergo increasingly rigorous experiments and capability
    demonstrations with a decision to procure by the end of fiscal year
    2024. Finally, the Army remains committed to developing the Optionally
    Manned Fighting Vehicle as the primary replacement for the Bradley
    Fighting Vehicle. We are currently in the initial design phase and plan
    to award up to three contracts for prototyping in fiscal year 2023.
        Future Vertical Lift (FVL). The Army remains committed to
    developing our Future Long Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) and Future
    Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA). We are scheduled to down select
    FLRAA to a single vendor in the coming months and are on track to have
    both systems begin fielding by fiscal year 2030. The Army starts
    fielding its family of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in fiscal year
    2024 to provide air-launched effects with an array of payloads and
    networks. This will provide the next generation of UAS platforms for
    multiple echelons: front-line troops, operational formations, and
    theater commands.
        The Network. Data is as important as ammunition on the future
    battlefield. That is why the network is the key to maintaining
    overmatch as a combined, joint force through decision dominance, the
    ability to make better decisions faster than our adversaries. It is not
    enough to develop new interoperable systems with open systems
    architecture. We must also develop a data fabric that facilitates
    information sharing more seamlessly across the Army, Joint Force, and
    our Allies and partners. Project Convergence is the Army's campaign of
    learning and annual series of experiments to inform development of
    Joint All-Domain Command and Control capabilities, Multi-Domain
    Operations (MDO), and the Joint Warfighting Concept. Last fall, our
    second iteration of Project Convergence (PC21) expanded to nearly 1,500
    participants from the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Space
    Force, becoming the largest Joint Force experiment in 15 years. This
    year's PC22 will incorporate key Allies--during the main experiment or
    for testing in our Joint Systems Integration Lab at Aberdeen Proving
    Ground--to address the challenges of operating as a combined, joint
    force across vast distances in the Indo-Pacific and Europe.
        The Army is building a more resilient network by modernizing Global
    Position System receivers to meet current and emerging threats with the
    help of advanced Assured Position, Navigation, and Timing systems. Our
    implementation of cloud and Artificial Intelligence (AI)-supported data
    analytics aims to ensure that data is shared and acted upon by those
    who need it. XVIII Airborne Corps, I Corps, U.S. Army Pacific
    (USARPAC), and U.S. Army Europe-Africa (USAREUR-AF) have already
    trained in cloud and data-enabled, mission-command exercises. Future
    experimentation and pilot exercises will incorporate commercial
    satellite services into cloud-enabled, command-post exercises.
        Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD). IAMD capabilities will
    protect combined, joint forces from adversary aircraft, missiles, and
    drones. The Army is fielding the IAMD Battle Command System while
    developing new radars to expand coverage and streamline sensor-to-
    shooter linkages that will enable us to more efficiently target
    incoming threats. We are increasing Patriot Missile Segment Enhancement
    interceptor capacity and growing an additional Patriot battalion by
    fiscal year 2029 to enhance our defenses of theater base clusters. We
    are developing an Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) to protect
    forward C2 and logistics nodes. There are six IFPC battalions
    programmed to begin fielding to our MDTFs in fiscal year 2025. New
    formations like the Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD)
    battalions provide mobile air defense for tactical maneuver formations.
    Fielding began for four divisional M-SHORAD battalions in fiscal year
    2020.
        The growing threat posed by UAS is emerging as the next big
    challenge for IAMD, with both defense and homeland security
    implications. We established the Joint C-sUAS Office (JCO) as the
    executive agent for Counter small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-sUAS) in
    February 2020. The JCO leads Department of Defense development of
    integrated plans, technologies, training concepts, and doctrine to
    focus resources and minimize redundancies across the department and
    interagency. Operationally, our combat training centers are preparing
    our combat formations to counter and defeat ubiquitous sUAS threats,
    and our budget includes funding to field C-sUAS sets for multiple
    divisions.
        Soldier Lethality. The Army seeks continued congressional support
    for the rapid prototyping, development, and procurement of the Next
    Generation Squad Weapon (NGSW), Integrated Visual Augmentation System
    (IVAS), and the Synthetic Training Environment (STE), among others. In
    fiscal year 2023, the Army will equip the first unit with the NGSW, as
    well as its higher-caliber ammunition. Thanks to iterative soldier-to-
    industry feedback, we will equip the first unit with initial IVAS
    prototypes by 4th Quarter, fiscal year 2022. The STE--which uses a
    combination of hardware and software to enable soldiers, units, and
    commands to train in virtual or constructive environments--is due to
    reach Initial Operational Capability in the 4th Quarter, fiscal year
    2023. An example of the payoff to the soldiers comes from the 82nd
    Airborne Division, which last August used One World Terrain to create a
    three-dimensional representation of HKIA that gave commanders on the
    ground the ability to identify massing crowds and emerging
    vulnerabilities.
        Organic Industrial Base (OIB) and Supply Chain Risk Management
    (SCRM). As the Army undergoes its greatest transformation in more than
    40 years, we have an opportunity to simultaneously review the entire
    OIB for modernization. This includes addressing facilities, equipment,
    people, information technology, cybersecurity, and energy requirements.
    Our support to Ukraine has reinforced that we need an OIB that can
    successfully meet current Army demands, while providing the
    capabilities and capacities to surge and sustain large scale combat
    operations. Our OIB modernization effort also has a resilience
    component, which seeks to reduce single points of failure in the supply
    system and decrease reliance on foreign supply chains and resources. In
    close consultation with and support from Congress, the Army is using a
    15-year phased approach to modernize the OIB for the 21st century
    through collaboration across the entire Army enterprise, coupled with
    industry engagements, while ensuring projects are tied directly to the
    Army's signature modernization efforts. The Army will also modernize
    facilities to upgrade the infrastructure to support the workload in our
    depots, arsenals, and ammunition plants.
        Managing supply chain risk requires a whole-of-government approach,
    and SCRM is integral to the Army's acquisition and sustainment
    processes. Managing supply chain risk early in a weapon system's life
    cycle is critical to ensuring affordability and mitigating risk before
    a weapon system is fielded. The Army has already begun using
    commercially available tools to assess and identify risk in our supply
    chains. The Army also recognizes and uses the authority granted by the
    President in the Defense Production Act. The Army will publish an SCRM
    policy in the 3rd Quarter of fiscal year 2022 and conduct a series of
    tests in December 2022 to apply the best supply chain risk tools and
    assess the skills, knowledge, and abilities needed to empower our
    logisticians and other personnel supporting supply chain activities.
        Modernizing the unit lifecycle model. Last October, the Army
    adopted its new unit lifecycle model, the Regionally Aligned Readiness
    and Modernization Model (ReARMM), and it is projected for Full
    Operational Capability by January 2023. This new model aims to
    harmonize historically conflicting Army priorities. ReARMM facilitates
    modernization by giving units dedicated windows to integrate new
    equipment, reorganize formations, and train on new doctrine. Adopting
    this model is transitioning the Army from small, incremental,
    evolutionary modernization of platforms to large-step modernization of
    our formations across the Total Force. Regional alignment enables units
    to develop additional knowledge of the terrain, culture, and people
    where they are most likely to operate. Joint Force commanders also gain
    by leveraging habitual, trusted relationships between Army formations
    and Allies and partners. It takes care of people by reducing
    operational tempo and maximizing predictability and stability to
    commanders, soldiers, and families. Finally, units aligned to ReARMM
    recently validated the model by successfully participating in Operation
    Allies Welcome both in the United States and abroad without excess loss
    to readiness or the need for major process realignments.
                 army campaigning in support of the joint force
        A key dimension of the Army's transformation is the need to
    strengthen and expand--where possible--our work with Allies and
    partners to actively campaign against coercive and revisionist Chinese
    and Russian activities. The Army's access, presence, and influence
    around the world supports dynamic, day-to-day military activities that
    bolster Allies and partners while frustrating our competitors. The
    Army's security assistance enterprise annually executes more than 6,100
    foreign military sales cases with 135 countries to build and strengthen
    Allied and partner capacity.
        Security Force Assistance Brigades - the leading edge of
    campaigning. Our six new Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs),
    the last of which activated in 2020, are aligned with each geographic
    combatant command and are strengthening relationships with Allies and
    partners through training, advising, and assistance. In AFRICOM over
    the past year, 2nd SFAB deployed 38 advisory teams to nine African
    countries, including Djibouti, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Niger, Senegal,
    Somalia, Tunisia, and Uganda, in addition to partnering with Senegalese
    units for a rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center. In
    CENTCOM, 3rd SFAB has supported Operation Inherent Resolve, Operation
    Freedom's Sentinel, and the entire CENTCOM area of responsibility.
    After supporting the Afghan advise-and-assist program, 3rd SFAB was
    instrumental in coordinating the planned withdrawal from Afghanistan.
    In fiscal year 2022, up to 10 teams will deploy to the United Arab
    Emirates, Jordan, Kuwait, and Iraq to advise partner land forces on
    interoperability through persistent presence. In EUCOM during fiscal
    year 2021 and fiscal year 2022, 4th SFAB deployed advisory teams to 10
    nations in support of field exercises: Albania, Bosnia, Georgia,
    Germany, Hungary, Kosovo, Latvia, North Macedonia, Poland, and Romania.
    Additionally, 4th SFAB advisory teams are currently training with
    several multinational partners to assess and enhance their integration
    into forward-deployed NATO battlegroups. In INDOPACOM during fiscal
    year 2021 and fiscal year 2022, 5th SFAB has deployed 40 advisory teams
    to 14 nations, including: Bangladesh, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan,
    Malaysia, the Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, Papua-New Guinea, Philippines,
    Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Thailand.
        USARPAC: Backbone of the Joint Force in the Indo-Pacific. The Army
    in the Indo-Pacific provides the Joint Force with decisive, integrated
    land power required to succeed in competition, rapidly transition and
    respond during crisis, and prevail in low-intensity and large-scale
    conflict. Exercising regularly with our Allies leads to enhanced
    capacity and greater interoperability in the event of a contingency.
    USARPAC's Operation PATHWAYS (OP) annually projects thousands of Army
    forces and equipment sets into the region to execute a series of
    international exercises that strengthen Joint Force integration and
    promote interoperability with Allies and partners. It also allows
    USARPAC, as the Theater Army, to prepare, rehearse, and validate
    training for strategic movement, operational maneuver, and tactical
    employment of land forces across extended distances west of the
    International Date Line.
        The Army continues to signal its deep commitment to the Indo-
    Pacific through the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI). For fiscal
    year 2023, the Army has committed $1.4 billion of investments and
    activities that support the tenets of PDI. The Army is leveraging PDI
    to improve forward posture inside the first and second island chains,
    increase conventional deterrence, and support and enable the Joint
    Force. The Army is also developing the intellectual, conceptual, and
    technical tools necessary to guide our transition to an MDO-capable
    force with an emphasis on the Indo-Pacific.
        USAREUR-AF: Tip of the spear in Europe. USAREUR-AF's role in the
    midst of Europe's most significant military crisis in a generation
    demonstrates how European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) investments built
    U.S. Army muscles to rapidly flow forces into Europe and coordinate
    NATO's defense. Thanks to the support of Congress, the initiative
    supports five lines of effort: Increased Presence; Exercises and
    Training; Enhanced Prepositioning; Improved Infrastructure; and
    Building Partnership Capacity. Total Army EDI funding in fiscal year
    2022 was $2.4 billion.
        The Army supports increased presence to EUCOM through the rotation
    of a Division Headquarters Forward, an ABCT, and other enablers. This
    force package ensures a U.S. presence across Eastern Europe, including
    the Baltic States, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. USAREUR-AF's premier
    exercise series in Europe-- DEFENDER--continues to enhance the capacity
    and interoperability of Allies and partners to deter adversaries,
    transform operational mission commands, build readiness, and strengthen
    the NATO Alliance. In 2021, DEFENDER integrated approximately 28,000
    multinational forces from 26 nations to conduct near-simultaneous
    operations across more than 30 training areas in 12 countries.
        Through EDI, the Army continues building a division-sized set of
    prepositioned equipment, with corps-level enablers, that will contain
    two ABCTs, two fires brigades, and air defense, engineer, movement
    control, sustainment, and medical units. Additionally, EDI funding
    diversifies capabilities by providing access to Army National Guard and
    Army Reserve units for NATO training objectives. The fiscal year 2022
    EDI budget supports an average strength of 9,450 Army Compo 1, 2, and 3
    personnel deployed in the EUCOM theater. The Army also funds facility
    improvements for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward-movement and
    Integration, as well as Mission Partner Environment network enclaves,
    including in the Baltics and Eastern Europe.
       building enduring advantages by investing in people and resilience
        People are our greatest strength and most important weapon system,
    including soldiers across the Active Army, Guard, and Reserve, their
    families, our Army civilians, and our soldiers for life--our veterans
    and retirees. We ask much of our people, and taking care of them is
    both a sacred obligation and essential to sustaining the All-Volunteer
    Force. Prioritizing people means modernizing our talent management
    systems, taking care of families through our quality of life
    initiatives, and most importantly, building cohesive teams that are
    highly trained, disciplined, and fit, where everyone is treated with
    dignity and respect, and that are ready to fight and win.
        Recruiting high-quality talent. The All-Volunteer Force is in a
    competition for talent, and the Army is strategically adapting the way
    it recruits and retains talent to reflect the Nation. We have
    established an Army Recruiting Tiger Team to holistically assess the
    Army's recruiting and accessions enterprise. COVID-19 impacted
    recruiting operations at all levels and across all Services, with a
    high percentage of high schools and colleges limiting in-person access
    from March 2020 through March 2022. As pandemic conditions improve, the
    Army is getting its recruiters back into America's high schools,
    colleges, and communities. As of April 2022, the Army has 1,721 Junior
    Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC) programs across the country,
    whose purpose is to instill in high school students the value of
    citizenship, service to country, personal responsibility, and a sense
    of accomplishment. Thanks to congressional support, the Army is
    strategically growing this powerful youth program to reach new
    communities and better connect America to its Army. In fiscal year
    2022, the Army expanded JROTC to 25 new schools in New Jersey,
    Pennsylvania, New York, Kansas, Illinois, Missouri, District of
    Columbia, Ohio, Nevada, California, Washington, Alabama, Georgia, and
    Texas.
        The Army is using improved analytics to more precisely tailor
    incentives and place recruiters. The Army appreciates congressional
    efforts to sustain military service as a competitive choice by ensuring
    their earnings are at the top of the 80th-percentile with comparable
    civilians, and higher percentiles for junior soldiers and junior
    officers. The Army is strategically deploying recruiters to communities
    across the country based on demographics, ethnicity, race, and gender.
    The Army is working with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
    for Personnel & Readiness to improve how it tailors career options and
    incentives to increase new-recruit job satisfaction. The Army is also
    allowing recruits to choose from select installations as their duty
    station of choice. Over 2,000 enlistees have taken advantage of this
    benefit in fiscal year 2022. The Army is also on track to meet its
    directed level of 5,800 officer commissions while increasing diversity
    representation within the combat arms branches (25 percent in fiscal
    year 2021 to 27 percent in fiscal year 2022). While these immediate
    efforts are having a positive impact on current accessions, we continue
    to adapt our recruiting strategy to posture for emerging societal,
    demographic, and geographical shifts.
        Developing tech talent in the ranks. The Army knows that it must
    develop new talents within its ranks so soldiers can thrive in a
    Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics-saturated operating
    environment. The Army has implemented eight of the nine authorities
    (Sec. 501-506, 513, 518) granted in the fiscal year 2019 National
    Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). These authorities allow expansion of
    opportunities to increase the talent pool and fill critical shortages
    in technical fields based on unit demand signals. The Army's Cyber
    branch is a dynamic effort that is having success attracting highly-
    talented soldiers (their average vocational test scores are top-tier
    and 25 percent have a bachelor's degree) and officers from top-rated
    universities. The Army is also using direct commissions for specific
    technical talents, as well as incentive pay and bonuses to retain high-
    value talent. In fiscal year 2020-2021, Army Futures Command (AFC)
    began piloting AI and Agile Software Development Workforce initiatives
    within the AI Integration Center and Army Software Factory, where
    cohorts develop software and data science-enabled solutions to address
    problems sourced from across the Army. The Army Reserve's 75th
    Innovation Command is AFC's link to unique expertise in the private
    sector, facilitating a diverse tech-talent pipeline that is
    instrumental to the Army Software Factory's success.
        Modern talent management systems to satisfy and retain talent. The
    Army has several initiatives underway to give soldiers and officers
    enhanced flexibility to shape their careers. With the Assignment
    Interactive Module (AIM) for officers, and now Assignments
    Satisfactions Key-Enlisted Module (ASK-EM) for Non-Commissioned
    Officers (NCOs), the Army has created an assignment process and
    marketplace which empowers officers and NCOs to make informed
    preferences. From a talent management perspective, AIM and ASK-EM help
    the Army get the right people in the right places through algorithmic
    matching and market clearing for greater assignment satisfaction.
    Additionally, the Army is creating more options for Regular Army
    warrant officers and officers to continue service in the Army Reserve.
    The Army is also exercising officer options for brevet promotions to
    fill critical requirements, as well as options to compete for promotion
    and command.
        Data system modernization is as critical for effective talent
    management as it is for successful combat operations. The Integrated
    Personnel and Pay System-Army (IPPS-A) is the Army's flagship Human
    Resources (HR) modernization effort, and will be implemented across the
    Active Duty, Army Reserve, and National Guard by the end of 2022. IPPS-
    A delivers a secure, comprehensive, and data-rich HR talent management
    system that consolidates the systems previously required by separate
    components, as well as giving transparency to soldiers right from their
    mobile device.
        Quality Infrastructure for taking care of our soldiers. Providing
    quality housing, barracks, childcare, and services for our soldiers and
    their families is a key factor for retaining talent. The Army is
    committed to sustaining quality housing conditions. Residential
    Community Initiative (RCI) companies are planning to invest $3 billion
    in housing over the next 10 years. Seventy-five percent of RCI housing
    are new builds, major, or medium renovations. Seventy-two percent of
    government-owned Army Family Housing (94 percent of which is overseas)
    is rated Q1 (good) or Q2 (adequate), while the Army has programmed $1.5
    billion in family housing construction and maintenance over the fiscal
    year 2023-2027 period to improve its inventory. Seventy-five percent of
    Army barracks are rated in good or adequate condition as well, with
    $4.2 billion programmed for fiscal year 2023 to 2027 to improve
    conditions for unaccompanied soldiers.
        Taking care of our families--and taking care of our children,
    especially-- increases the readiness of our force. The Army is
    addressing access to childcare by increasing and sustaining childcare
    infrastructure, recruiting and retaining quality childcare staff,
    incentivizing Family Child Care, providing Army Fee Assistance, and
    exploring new initiatives and partnerships. Childcare staffing
    continues to be a challenge across the country. In June 2021, the Army
    increased compensation for direct care staff and we continue to monitor
    the childcare labor market accordingly.
        Positive command climates--an essential component of cohesive
    teams. Positive command climates at scale are the foundation of a
    combat-effective Army, and positive command climates begin with good
    leadership. Selection for battalion and brigade command are two of the
    most important personnel decisions the Army makes, and the Army
    continues to expand its generational change to the way it selects these
    leaders. The Army started its Battalion Command Assessment Program in
    January 2020, which is designed to assess a candidate's cognitive,
    psychometric, physical, and communication attributes, culminating in a
    double-blind interview with a panel of senior Army leaders. Over the
    last two years, the Army has expanded its Colonel Command Assessment
    Program to assess potential leaders for O-6/GS-15 commands as well.
    Since 2020, the two command assessment programs have assessed over
    3,400 candidates. Now the Army is expanding the program to the NCO
    corps, launching a Sergeant Major Assessment Program to assess the
    readiness of brigade command sergeant major candidates to lead and
    coach the junior NCOs and soldiers in their formations.
        Positive command climates are also built on infusing professional
    development across the ranks. In the last few years, the Army has
    instituted Project Athena at resident professional military education
    courses for officers, warrant officers, NCOs, and civilians. Project
    Athena provides rising leaders with assessments, feedback, and
    development resources to turn insights into action. To date, these
    rising leaders have completed over 161,000 assessments. Expansion to
    Army Reserve and National Guard resident courses is slated for fiscal
    year 2023 to 2024. The Army has also fielded a standardized Individual
    Development Plan for people to map their personal and professional
    goals, supported by an Interactive Leader Development Guide to aid an
    individual's self-assessment and development. To improve our company
    commanders' doctrinal fluency, technical knowledge, and leadership
    skills for MDO, the Army has undertaken the most significant redesign
    of its Captains Career Course since 2005.
        The Army is also exploring ways to better assess command climates.
    The Army tested a comprehensive organizational climate assessment
    through the deployment of a Cohesion Assessment Team (CAT) and, based
    on the results, will institutionalize the capability no later than
    January 2023. CATs use survey results, focus groups, leader interviews,
    and observations to provide commanders better knowledge of the
    organizational climate of their units. In FY 2021, CATs supported five
    brigades. Future assessments will be based on institutional metrics to
    identify units that could benefit from expert input on soldier programs
    and unit climate. The Army is also using a new Counseling Enhancement
    Tool (CET) for developmental counseling sessions. The CET assists
    junior leaders and soldiers by requiring them to reflect on past
    performance before a formal dialogue, and providing guidance for
    interactive, collaborative, and meaningful discussions.
        Reducing harmful behaviors to cultivate healthier soldiers. The
    Army is placing greater emphasis on finding ways to prevent harmful
    behaviors and generate healthier, more resilient soldiers. Prevention
    begins with equipping leaders with better visibility tools to monitor
    and shape soldier health and resilience. The Army is developing
    individual and unit assessment tools such as Azimuth Check, Behavioral
    Health Pulse surveys, and Commander's Risk Reduction Toolkit to provide
    a more holistic and comprehensive picture of both individual soldier
    and unit-risk history.
        From prevention to response, the Army is fully committed to
    implementing the Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the
    Military's recommendations, as directed by the Secretary of Defense.
    Building on existing expertise, the Army is developing a full-time
    prevention workforce to enable a holistic approach to preventing
    harmful behaviors. As part of a year-long pilot program, the Army
    launched Sexual Harassment/Assault Response Prevention Fusion
    Directorates across six installations and an Army Reserve command to
    integrate existing response functions and empower survivors with a
    multitude of resources. All reports of sexual assault and harassment
    will be thoroughly investigated and offenders will be held
    appropriately accountable based on the unique circumstances of each
    allegation. With support from experienced Sexual Assault Response
    Coordinators and Victim Advocates, all survivors of sexual assault and
    domestic violence will be fully supported through compassionate,
    quality care.
        Part of improving our response is augmenting our investigative and
    prosecutorial functions. In fiscal year 2022, the Criminal
    Investigative Division (CID) is adding investigative specialists at all
    field offices and aggressively exercising direct-hire authorities to
    add another 99 experienced criminal investigators. CID has realigned
    itself into geographic field offices, akin to the standard federal law
    enforcement model. Three highly-experienced civilian special agents-in-
    charge have been selected to run the field offices at Fort Hood, Fort
    Carson, and Fort Bragg. The fiscal year 2022 NDAA instituted the most
    significant change to the Uniform Code of Military Justice in over 70
    years by requiring trained, experienced prosecutors, outside of the
    chain of command, to make prosecutorial decisions in cases of sexual
    misconduct, domestic violence, child abuse, and homicide. In accordance
    with these reforms, the Army is creating regional circuit Offices of
    the Special Trial Counsel, staffed by experienced criminal litigators,
    to integrate prosecution with victim services and provide legal
    expertise, longevity, transparency, and consistency across the force.
        Climate Resilience for a changing operational environment. In
    addition to investing in people, the Army is taking important steps in
    alignment with the NDS to build enduring advantage through climate
    resilience. The Army's core mission of fighting and winning our
    Nation's wars remains unchanged. Climate change, however, makes this
    mission more challenging not only for the Army, but the entire Joint
    Force. The Army must proactively adapt to climate change impacts and
    respond to climate risks to maintain its strategic edge in a climate
    change-impacted world. The Army Climate Strategy (ACS), which was
    released earlier this year, and the ACS Implementation Plan, scheduled
    to be released this summer, will synchronize our efforts to: increase
    capability; enhance installation resiliency; prepare for new hazards
    and operating environments; and modernize processes, standards, and
    infrastructure while reducing operational energy demands and greenhouse
    gas emissions.
        The Army requires resilient, efficient, and affordable installation
    energy and water infrastructure to support the Army's ability to
    deploy, fight, and win. Army installations provide secure and
    sustainable facilities and infrastructure that support commander
    priorities, enable missions, and maintain soldier and unit readiness.
    The Army must increase installation energy and water resilience to
    anticipate and withstand future threats, including climate change-
    driven increases in extreme weather, and man-made kinetic and cyber
    threats that increase the risk of extended power and water disruptions.
        The ACS has set a goal to achieve a 50 percent reduction in Army
    net greenhouse gas pollution by 2030, shift to carbon pollution free
    electricity by 2030, and attain net-zero Army greenhouse gas emissions
    by 2050 in order to build a resilient and sustainable Army that can
    operate in all domains. The ACS drives increased resiliency and
    capabilities of the force. The Army is moving out to install a micro-
    grid on every installation by 2035 to ensure installation resiliency as
    we face a contested homeland and an environment of increasingly severe
    weather. By 2040, we aim to achieve enough renewable energy generation
    and battery storage capacity to self-sustain critical missions across
    the Army. We are also on schedule to field an all-electric, light-duty,
    non-tactical vehicle fleet by 2027 and an all-electric, non-tactical
    vehicle fleet by 2035, reaping cost and resource efficiency, and adding
    to the resilience of Army transportation in spite of climate and energy
    challenges.
        The Army takes pride in stewardship of our lands and resources for
    the American people. The Army is reducing its greenhouse gas emissions
    to mitigate its contributions to climate change and act as good
    environmental stewards to further protect the American people. We are
    including climate change threat mitigation into all land management
    decisions and incorporating the latest climate and environmental
    science into stationing, construction, and fielding decisions.
                                    closing
        ``This We'll Defend'' has been the proud motto of the U.S. Army
    since 1775. It captures the resolve, resilience, and readiness of
    generations of American soldiers and citizens who have answered the
    Nation's call and picked up arms in her defense. Today is no different.
    When the Nation calls, we send the Army we have--and the Army we have
    is the world's greatest fighting force. With timely, adequate,
    predictable, and sustained funding, we will remain ready to fight and
    win our Nation's wars as a member of the Joint Force, reassure our
    Allies and partners, take care of our people, and pursue our greatest
    transformation in over 40 years.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General McConville.
        Secretary Wormuth, could you elaborate on the specific
    investments and capabilities in this budget that supports the
    2022 National Defense Strategy?
        Secretary Wormuth. Certainly, Chairman. As I said, we have
    about $35 billion for modernization in this budget, and that is
    really focused on each of our six major modernization
    portfolios, whether it is Long Range Precision Fires, air and
    missile defenses, next-generation combat vehicles, Future
    Vertical Lift. All of those new systems will contribute to us
    being able to continue to field combat-credible forces, which
    are core to integrated deterrence, which is one of the major
    lines of effort in the National Defense Strategy.
        We also have considerable, billions of dollars associated,
    obviously, with operations and maintenance, and that supports
    our ability to campaign day-to-day to be able to compete
    against Russia and China. So for example, the budget supports
    the operations that are underway right now. You know, again, as
    General McConville and I mentioned, the tens of thousands of
    Army soldiers who are in Europe right now, for example, or our
    forces that are operating in the Indo-Pacific through the
    Operation Pacific Pathways series of exercises.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Madam Secretary, and General
    McConville, in producing these capabilities I know you have got
    an eye on the Joint Force because the battles of the future, as
    in mostly in the past, will be fought not just by the Army but
    by the Joint Force. Can you tell us how you are developing
    capabilities that benefit the Joint Force?
        General McConville. Yes, Senator. I think it starts with a
    concept that we are all developing, a joint warfighting
    concept. The enabler of that is what we call the Joint All
    Command and Control System. I add a C to it because I think are
    going to find combined, and what that allows us to do is to
    move data and communications very, very quickly between every
    sensor and shooter on the battlefield. By being able to do that
    we provide a much more lethal force on the joint side, and then
    as the Secretary mentioned, the Army does logistics. We do that
    very, very well. We are providing long-range precision fires.
    We are providing air and missile defense. All these
    capabilities work to support the Joint Force in whatever
    theater that we end up fighting.
        Chairman Reed. You indicated in your response that the
    first sort of major objective would be fully integrated and
    fully secure communications. What is your sense in terms of how
    far we are away from that objective?
        General McConville. Well I think we are making a lot of
    progress, Senator. We have conducted a thing we call Project
    Convergence, and we have been doing it over the last 3 years.
    The first time we did it we brought the Army out there and we
    worked our systems back and forth. We just finished one with
    the Joint Force and have had success, and this year coming up
    we will bring out some of our allies and partners to do that.
        But we also stood up a Joint Systems Integration Laboratory
    up at Aberdeen, and what that is, we bring in all the different
    systems that we use to communicate and make sure they could
    communicate before we take them out in the desert in some
    extreme conditions, and we have found that to be very
    successful.
        Chairman Reed. Very good, and Secretary Wormuth, I have a
    short bit of time left, but we had an opportunity to discuss,
    and I think Senator Inhofe was also interested in the issue of
    recruiting in a very complicated world. The number of qualified
    individuals continues to shrink. But what else is happening is
    that it is becoming somewhat insular. I think General
    McConville indicated that somewhere close to 80 percent of
    recruits come from military families, and if you look at the
    geographic distribution it is moving away from a more national
    focus, certainly as it was under the draft, to more regional,
    the South and West.
        So could you comment briefly on that? I think my colleague
    will probably pursue it also.
        Secretary Wormuth. Yes, Senator. It is absolutely true that
    a large number of young Americans that come into the Army today
    come from families that have served in the military. So I think
    one of the things we have got to do is find a way to help all
    young Americans understand all of the great opportunities that
    they can have in the Army and all of the things that the Army
    will enable them to do.
        So we are working hard, for example, on our marketing
    efforts, to really try to reach out to as many Americans as
    possible and to help them understand what the Army is about. We
    are also looking at things like our Junior ROTC programs, for
    example, which also expose young kids to the Army, and we may
    look at expanding those programs, for example.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, and thank you both
    again for your service, and please give our congratulations to
    those who serve with you.
        Senator Inhofe, please.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I always like to
    start off when we have General McConville here with an update
    on his three kids. I can remember when they were all three
    captains. Now they are moving up but still very active. What is
    going on there?
        General McConville. Well, they are very proud to serve.
    They are serving around the world in Special Operations Forces
    and I am very, very proud of what they are doing. I also have a
    son-in-law that is serving too. So we are trying to get this
    recruiting effort going.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes. That is good. I know how proud you
    are.
        Chairman Reed. Ask him about Patton.
        Senator Inhofe. Oh yeah, and Patton. Do not forget.
        General McConville. Well, I am very proud to have our first
    grandson. His name is Patton James Nancer, and he is 6 months
    old, and we are real proud of him. He has already got a hall
    named after him over at Fort Myer, Patton Hall.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Inhofe. Okay. That is great. Well, as noted in my
    opening remarks the Army unfunded priorities total $5.1
    billion, and I guess the first question I would ask you would
    be is everything on your list executable at this time?
        General McConville. Yes it is, Senator.
        Senator Inhofe. As I highlighted in my opening statement it
    is my understanding that the Army's reduced end strength of the
    473, that was talked about by both of you before, but it is
    driven by recruiting challenges. I know that you have already
    talked about that a little bit, but it is something that is
    more serious than any recruiting challenges that I have
    experienced in the years that I have been here.
        In 2018, and General Milley testified before this committee
    that we are shooting to get north of 500,000, which was
    recommended in this document. That is in the regular Army, and
    last year you said, and this is a quote from you, you said, ``I
    think the regular Army should be somewhere around 540,000 to
    550,000.'' Despite the difficulty we are having right now, the
    biggest problem we are having, I think, is recruiting at this
    time. We talked about that a couple of days in my office, and
    this is still, I believe, the most serious problem.
        In spite of the difficulty in recruiting the Army is facing
    right now, that we discussed just a couple of days ago, is it
    still your best military judgment that we require an army
    greater than 500,000?
        General McConville. Senator, I think we need a bigger Army.
    I stand by the comments I made before.
        Senator Inhofe. I say that knowing full well the recruiting
    problem. Everything that you are trying and the efforts there,
    I understand that. But where does that leave us?
        General McConville. Well, I also think that quality is more
    important than quantity, and what we have to do to get after
    this is, as the Senator said, right now 83 percent of the young
    men and women that are coming into the Army are coming from
    military family members. It is nice that is a military family
    business. We need this to be an American family business. We
    need to attract others. We need to expose others to the
    benefits of serving their country, and, you know, again, what
    we are finding right now is 23 percent of Americans are
    qualified to serve in the military.
        So we have got to do some work in our high schools and we
    have to do some work in preparing young men and women to come,
    because I do not think there is any better way to serve, and I
    think we need to have a call to service.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay, and I agree with that.
        Madam Secretary, I know my time is expiring but the
    conflict in Ukraine has revealed serious munitions production
    challenges that we have at this time, and I know that there is
    another member that is going to ask you about that. But just as
    an overview, what should be done to fix what I consider to be
    the second most urgent problem that we are dealing with right
    now?
        Secretary Wormuth. Well, Senator, I think what we need to
    do is work closely with the defense industry to look at how we
    can help them address some of the supply chain challenges that
    they are having, for example. The money that Congress, that you
    all providing through the supplemental will help us do that, in
    terms of accelerating some of those production lines. The Army
    has actually invested considerably more in ammunition in its
    budgets in the last couple of years, recognizing the
    criticality of the munitions issue.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay. Well you are going to have an
    opportunity to expand more on this urgent problem.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Shaheen, please.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you Secretary Wormuth and
    General McConville for your service to the country and for
    being here this morning.
        I want to begin with a real concern I have, because looking
    at the 2023 budget request I noted that it does not include any
    funding, zero funding, to continue procurement of the Enhanced
    Night Vision Goggle-Binocular, or ENVG-B. I am concerned that
    this decision not only harms our soldiers by limiting access to
    more advanced night vision systems but also affects our
    nation's already limited night vision manufacturing industrial
    base. In fact, the Army's own unfunded priority list notes
    that, and I quote, ``A lack of funding decreases soldiers'
    survivability'' and, quote, ``places the manufacturer at risk
    of closing the production line,'' end quote.
        So can you talk about how you justify that decision to cut
    a program that the Army's own unfunded priority list says will
    affect soldiers' survivability? I think that is probably for
    you, Madam Secretary.
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator, we had made the judgment, I
    believe, and I think General McConville can speak to this as
    well because it is on his UPL, that we had procured the
    quantities of night vision goggles that we thought would meet
    our requirements. Again, a lot of what we are trying to do with
    the resources that we have is balance between making sure that
    we continue to have resources to invest in the new
    modernization programs as well as continue to invest in some of
    the enduring systems that we have. So that is always a bit of a
    tightrope for us, and those dials are ones that we may be able
    to adjust through things like items that are on the unfunded
    priorities list.
        Senator Shaheen. But just last month an audit by the DOD
    inspector general found that the Army is at risk of wasting up
    to $21.88 billion in taxpayer funds to field a system that
    soldiers may not want to use or use as intended. I understand
    the need to continue development, and the IVAS [Internet Value-
    Added Service] system is what appears to be the future, but I
    also understood that the RDT&E for that had not been adequately
    completed. So we are investing in a system that we are not sure
    is going to work, and we are not sure we have enough of the old
    system or the current system to address the soldiers' needs. So
    I am not convinced on your argument.
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator, on IVAS [Internet Value-Added
    Service], we have worked very closely with our soldiers through
    the soldier-centered design process to get their feedback all
    along the way, and, we did not fully agree with some of the GAO
    [Government Accountability Office] findings. We have a major
    operational test with IVAS that is starting this month and that
    will continue through June, and we will be looking carefully at
    those results to inform ultimately where we go with IVAS.
        But I feel pretty comfortable with where that program is.
    We have been working very closely with Microsoft, and I think
    that program is on track and that we have actually gotten quite
    a bit of good feedback from soldiers as we have worked to
    develop IVAS.
        Senator Shaheen. So you do not agree with the inspector
    general's report?
        Secretary Wormuth. We did not particularly agree with the
    characterization that soldiers were not going to use IVAS
    ultimately. I mean, again, I think one of the things the Army
    has done very well is to try to have a more soldier-centered
    design process across the board and to allow us to get that
    kind of feedback. So I think it was just a bit of an over-
    characterization by the inspector general on that particular
    point.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, I look forward to hearing how that
    RDT&E goes because I am very concerned that we are going to
    lose our manufacturing base for the ENVG-B and that is going to
    put soldiers at risk.
        I want to switch to childcare because Secretary Hicks and
    General McConville, you both talked about the importance of
    taking care of our troops. And as we think about the
    recruitment and retention challenges that we have in the Army
    it reminds me of an effort that I spearheaded when I was
    governor in New Hampshire in the 1990s to try and expand access
    to early childhood education and childcare. One of the models
    that we looked at was the Department of Defense and what our
    military was doing, for the very reason that you talked about,
    that so many of our soldiers come from military families, and
    investing in childcare is a way to invest in those soldiers
    from the earliest years.
        So can you talk about why that is so important? I raise it
    because we are pursuing an interesting approach in New
    Hampshire, where the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is partnering
    with the New Hampshire National Guard to use funding to
    construct a new child development center.
        General McConville. Yes, Senator. You know, as I mentioned,
    we recruit soldiers but we retain families, and when we take a
    look at, I think, what makes our Army the greatest Army in the
    world it is our noncommissioned officers, and 89 percent of our
    leaders, basically sergeant and above, have families, and if we
    want to compete for the best we have got to take care of their
    families.
        As you know, right now our child development centers are
    really, standard-wise, the best in the country as far as
    standards, but we do not have enough. We are trying to get
    more. We are trying to build more. We are trying to take care
    of the ones we have. We are also putting a lot of bonuses in
    place to get the right caretakers, because in order for us to
    either provide fee assistance or help with the child
    development centers, the people we are going to hire have to
    meet the standards. Again, we want quality people taking care
    of our kids, and to me it is extremely important.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I appreciate the emphasis.
    Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Fischer, please.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary and
    General, welcome.
        Madam Secretary, the new National Defense Strategy clearly
    states that China is the pacing threat. How is the Army using
    this budget to develop and employ capabilities towards the
    Joint Force effort in INDOPACOM [United States Indo-Pacific
    Command]?
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator Fischer, I would first highlight
    our Long Range Precision Fires investment, particularly the
    Long-Range Hypersonic Missile, which we will have our first
    battery in fiscal year 2023. You know, given the long distances
    in INDOPACOM I think that system will be particularly relevant.
    But the midrange capability that we are developing with the
    Navy I think is also very relevant for potential conflict in
    INDOPACOM.
        We are also investing quite a bit in upgrading our air and
    missile defense systems, making sure that we are with our
    systems such as the IFPC , which is designed to try to counter
    cruise missiles as well as other air threats. You know, given
    the missile numbers that China has, for example, air and
    missile defenses are going to be very important if there were a
    conflict in the Indo-Pacific, and that is another area where I
    think the Army is very relevant.
        Senator Fischer. Do you believe that that should also
    include more capable helicopters and vehicles as well, as part
    of that long list?
        Secretary Wormuth. Yes, exactly. I mean, both FARA [Future
    Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft] and FLRAA will be significant
    upgrades in terms of speed, range, survivability, and we are
    going to need, I think, to continue to be able to transport our
    forces, to be able to have airborne assault forces. So we
    continue to fully fund both of those efforts.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. General, how will the Army
    adjust the way it trains and equips soldiers to better prepare
    for conflict in a contested environment where the adversary has
    advanced ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]
    and other high-end capabilities?
        General McConville. Senator, we realize that we are at an
    inflection point right now. The last 20 years we have been
    doing what we call counter-insurgency, irregular warfare,
    counterterrorism. So we have taken our combat training centers,
    and our soldiers are going through very aggressive and rigorous
    training that fights what we would call a high-end enemy that
    has unmanned aerial systems, that has the ability to jam their
    weapon systems and their navigation systems, and has the
    ability to attack their command post, and has the ability to
    attack their logistics.
        So we are giving them a scrimmage, if you will, that will
    have them ready for that type of combat in the future.
        Senator Fischer. Do you also conduct those exercises where
    communications are denied or GPS is denied? Do you conduct
    those with allies or with other services, or do you believe it
    is important just to focus entirely on the Army at this point?
        General McConville. No, I think it is important we work. We
    are going to fight as a Joint Force, we train as a Joint Force,
    and we often bring our allies and partners to the combat
    training center, which is really the gold standard of how we
    train in a high-intensity environment. Everyone is very, very
    aware of that, and we are learning a lot of lessons from
    Ukraine.
        Senator Fischer. The National Defense Strategy highlights
    both the importance of fortifying our network with our allies
    and our partners and using that campaigning to strengthen
    deterrence. Can you discuss some of the insights that you have
    gained from those recent exercises and how the military-to-
    military exercises are going to be, I think, more important in
    the Pacific, just because of the geographic expanse and being
    able to cover the region.
        General McConville. Yes, Senator. What we are believers in
    is you never want to be what I would call a one-option
    commander. If you only have one radio net, they can jam that
    and take that away from you. So as we start to look at what we
    are trying to do, we are looking at like data fabrics where
    there are multiple ways of moving communications. There are
    multiple ways of getting navigation information. So if your
    adversary shuts down one capability you have another option
    that you can quickly move to. We use a term we call PACE. We
    have a Primary Alternate Contingency and Emergency type
    communications ability. We train our troops on that so if
    something goes wrong they can immediately move to another
    course of action.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
        Let me recognize Senator King, please.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First I want to
    compliment, General, you and the Secretary, but also the
    thousands of people that work with and for you for the
    logistics work that has gone on with Ukraine. It has been an
    absolute marvel of logistics in terms of time, speed, accuracy.
    What has been accomplished, people will be writing books about
    this, and I want to please convey the thanks of this committee
    for that work.
        Following up, you mentioned one phrase I just picked up in
    your answer to Senator Fischer, ``lessons from Ukraine.'' Could
    you expand on that? What have we learned so far, both about the
    failures and the weaknesses of the Russian Army but also about
    the successes of the Ukrainians, and which systems have been
    most important, which have worked best? Tell me what we are
    learning thus far from what is going on.
        General McConville. I think a couple of things. You know,
    the plan that initially the Russians had was very complex,
    which takes highly trained disciplined and fit soldiers in
    unison to execute, and as we saw they did not have that
    capability. So when we talk about having quality soldiers we
    think that is really important. They do not have the
    noncommissioned officer corps, the junior leaders that are used
    to taking mission command-type orders and operating in a
    contested environment.
        You mentioned logistics. The old adage is that
    professionals study logistics and amateurs study tactics
    because if you are going to prosecute a very complex mission
    like that you have to have logistics. If you are going to do
    complex operations, like airborne operations, air assault
    operations, or amphibious operations, those are very, very
    complex to undertake, and we can look at other parts of the
    world where they may be required.
        You can take a look at some of the systems, the appropriate
    air and missile defense systems that the Secretary mentioned,
    and one of the other systems we are developing, which is
    midrange capability that allows you to sink ships. We saw that
    happen with the Ukrainians. All those tools come together to
    give you some of the things you need.
        I would just add, on the Ukrainian side, leadership matter.
    You see it at the top. The prime minister stayed there and led
    his troops, if you will. All the able-bodied people stayed to
    defend their country. They have the capability, probably not as
    much. They have the capacity, probably not as much as Russia,
    but they have got this thing called will, and I talk about
    building cohesive teams. That is what it is about. That is the
    difference that is happening in Ukraine, which different than
    some of the other places we have seen.
        Senator King. I think that is a good list and I am sure
    that list will grow as time goes on. It is an extraordinary
    opportunity to see what is actually occurring.
        I think you are right. I remember asking several months
    before the invasion, was Zelenskyy, Ghani or Churchill, and he
    certainly has turned out to be closer to Churchill, and I think
    that has made an enormous difference.
        Secretary Wormuth, on an entirely separate issue, I work
    with a lot of veterans in Maine, and one of the problems that
    keeps coming up is the weakness of the transition from Active
    Duty to veteran status, the handoff from the Defense Department
    to the VA. I believe, and I do not have the data in front of
    me, but that many of the veteran suicides take place in that
    relatively short period of time between Active Duty and
    civilian status.
        I believe that you should put as many resources, time,
    effort, and people into transition out as you do into
    recruiting in. Can you address that problem, because from
    everything I have learned on the ground in Maine this is a
    serious issue?
        Secretary Wormuth. Certainly, Senator, and yes, I think
    there is data that shows that that transition out of the
    service back into the civilian community can be a critical
    time. We do try to work very closely with the Department of
    Veterans Affairs to ensure that there is a warm handoff, and
    with the transition programs that we have for folks getting out
    of the Army we try to make sure that they have the resources to
    know what to expect, to be able to sort of link them to
    employment resources, and things like that.
        But I think that is something that we can continue to work
    on, and frankly, I have heard some folks say, ``The transition
    programs helped me learn how to tie a tie and to do a resume,''
    but psychologically, making the adjustment to sort of going
    back into the civilian world is not something that I have heard
    sometimes people say that they get as much emphasis on. So I
    think that is an area we could work on.
        Senator King. I hope you will, and I hope you will not only
    commit to working on it but work on it in a systematic way,
    perhaps appoint a task force or some group whose responsibility
    it is to talk about and think about and work on this problem.
    Because, as you know, we have an epidemic of veteran suicide
    and suicide in the military. This is one place where I think we
    could make a difference. So thank you very much, and I hope you
    will follow up in an urgent way on this problem.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King.
        Senator Cotton, please.
        Senator Cotton. I am disappointed and borderline appalled
    at the fiasco that the Army Combat Fitness Test has become. For
    years the Army said that you were going to have gender-neutral
    standards. You both sat at that table less than a year ago and
    testified that you would have gender-neutral standards. Yet,
    Ms. Wormuth, just few weeks ago you issued a new directive
    saying there would not, in fact, be gender-neutral standards.
    Has something changed about the nature of combat in the last 10
    months I am unaware of?
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator, I think when I was here for my
    confirmation hearing I said that I wanted to look at the data
    that the Army was developing.
        Senator Cotton. No, no, no, no, no. When you were here on
    June 15, 2021, I asked if you would have gender-neutral
    standards, and you said, ``We are continuing to look at how to
    finalize the design for the ACFT. We are continuing to have
    gender-neutral standards.'' I asked General McConville, ``Are
    you committed as well to maintaining gender neutrality on the
    test?'' General McConville said, ``I am.''
        What happened in the last 10 months?
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator Cotton, we looked at over
    630,000 diagnostic test scores. We looked at the results of the
    congressionally directed RAND study that was to give us
    recommendations and findings about what we should be looking
    for in designing a new fitness test. What we found was we
    wanted to make sure that we had a fitness test that was a
    general fitness test that would make sure that it would raise
    our overall level of fitness, be something that would help us
    develop a higher level of fitness, and we wanted to make sure
    that we did not unfairly have standards for a particular
    subgroup that people could not perform. We did not want to
    disadvantage any subgroups.
        When we looked at that data, what we found was there were
    subgroups that were disadvantaged. We looked at the
    recommendations from RAND, we looked at the data, and we found
    that the way to have a test that meets our objectives was to
    have age- and gender-normed tests.
        Senator Cotton. So that is exactly what the old Army
    Physical Fitness Test had, as well, and you have abandoned also
    any MOS-specific tests. An earlier version of this had heavy
    physical activity, significant physical activity, and moderate
    physical activity MOSs that had separate standards. Have you
    abandoned those as well?
        Secretary Wormuth. The Army moved away from the MOS-
    connected standards I think a couple of years ago, before I
    became Secretary. But, I would say that the new Army Combat
    Fitness Test is much more challenging than the Army Physical
    Fitness Test.
        Senator Cotton. No, it is not. It is not. The new standards
    are pathetic. They are absolutely pathetic. Here is what a
    female, age 17 to 21, has to do to qualify for any job, to
    include infantry and special forces--10 pushups, run two
    miles--let me put ``run'' is scare quotes as well. Make sure
    the record reflects I am doing air quotes around ``run''--in 23
    minutes and 22 seconds. The standards for men, age 17 to 21 are
    equally pathetic--10 pushups and a 22-minute run, in scare
    quotes again, ``run'' in 22 minutes. Under the old test, a
    female age 17 to 21 had to do 13 pushups. A man had to do 35
    pushups. A female had to run a two-mile run in 19 minutes and
    42 seconds. A man had to do it in 16 minutes and 36 seconds.
        Do you really think these new standards are adequate for
    the infantry and the special forces and artillery?
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator, one of the reasons the numbers
    you just quoted are the case is because the new test is a six-
    event test as opposed to a three-event test.
        Senator Cotton. I am well aware of how many events there
    are. The standards for the other events are equally pathetic.
    They are equally pathetic.
        So it is a well-known fact that in certain MOSs, in the
    infantry, every unit I served in, every school I went to, a 60-
    point minimum was not acceptable. If you wanted to be promoted
    or get awards or go to schools you had to get 90 points. Are
    you going to let subordinate commanders establish higher
    standards for their units?
        Secretary Wormuth. For things like the special forces there
    are absolutely additional physical fitness requirements.
        Senator Cotton. No. Are you going to let them say you have
    to have 90 points, not 60 points, to be in this unit?
        Secretary Wormuth. the ACFT [Army Combat Fitness Test] is
    our general fitness test.
        Senator Cotton. The answer is no. Your own frequently asked
    question says, ``Commanders cannot set physical standards for
    acceptance into or retention in a combat unit.''
        This is going to get people killed. What you need to do is
    have gender-specific and age-specific tests and MOS-specific
    tests. You do not need cyber specialists and cooks and nurses
    to meet the same standards as infantry and special forces, but
    in those units you need men and women alike to meet the same
    standards.
        Let me just read one quote here to you to finish up.
    ``While it may be difficult for a 120-pound woman to lift or
    drag 250 pounds, the Army cannot artificially absolve women of
    that responsibility. It may still exist on the battlefield.''
    The entire purpose of creating a gender-neutral test was to
    acknowledge the reality that each job has objective physical
    standards, to which all soldiers should be held, regardless of
    gender. The intent was not to ensure that women and men will
    have an equal likelihood of meeting those standards.'' Do you
    know who said that?
        Secretary Wormuth. No, I do not believe that I do.
        Senator Cotton. Captain Kristen Griest, the Army's first
    female infantry officer and one if its first Ranger School
    grads. She also said, ``It is wholly unethical to allow the
    standards of the nation's premier fighting units to degrade so
    badly.'' I agree. I am not going to let it stand.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
        Senator Gillibrand, please.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General McConville, the conclusion of the conflict in
    Afghanistan demonstrated that we did not accurately assess the
    Afghan military's capabilities. The Army now has Security Force
    Assistance Brigades designed to train partner forces and
    accurately report their progress. Can you describe how the
    SFABs assess foreign forces and how are their assessments
    checked for accuracy by the DOD? More to the point, we
    understood, in Afghanistan, that there was a question about
    will to fight. They were very well trained but there was not
    necessarily a high regard for the Ghani government because of
    corruption. The question that should have been asked is will
    these Afghan forces, who are well trained, die for this
    particular government or would they rather hand over their
    weapons to the Taliban because they would rather not die and be
    under new leadership.
        So do we ask the type of political questions that that
    analysis would require to assess will to fight? With regard to
    Senator King's line of questioning, we learned in Ukraine that
    the Ukrainians did very much have a will to fight because their
    leader inspired that will by determination to stand his ground.
        So when we are making these assessments I understand our
    training is excellent and I understand you can train anyone to
    have full capability, but the will to fight is about much more.
    So have you changed how you make this assessment?
        General McConville. Well, Senator, we are certainly taking
    a look at that. You know, we had a better idea. First of all,
    having spent a lot of time in Afghanistan, when we were with
    the Afghans and we were accompanying and we were shohna ba
    shohna, shoulder to shoulder, fighting with the Afghans, the
    Afghans fought, and that is what tends to happen when you have
    cohesive units working together. As we brought down our forces
    and we were less and less with those who were on the leading
    edge, people will say they will fight and then you take a look
    at them, and we have given them the best equipment, much, much
    better than the Taliban had, we gave them the capacity, and
    really a much greater capacity than Taliban had.
        But there is something inside soldiers when they go to
    combat, and that is where leadership really matters, and it
    matters all the way up, because when people look up and they
    say, ``Am I willing to die for my country?'' that is hard to
    measure at times, and obviously in Afghanistan we did not
    measure that correctly. I am very, very impressed with what the
    Ukrainians are doing as far as the will to fight. As we talk to
    other allies and partners we hold up the example of what the
    Ukrainians have done as an example of what we should expect for
    those who are going to support.
        Senator Gillibrand. In November of 2021, the Army enacted
    Cyber Military Intelligence Group, which is designed to provide
    intelligence support to Army Cyber Command. Can you describe
    the mission, function, and personnel of this newly formed unit,
    and how would this unit operate in a large-scale conflict like
    the war in Ukraine?
        General McConville. I think, and as you know, the
    importance of our Cyber Command, I think we have the best in
    the world and the appropriate support. I was just down there
    for the change of command. What they are doing in support of
    Ukraine, their mission is extremely important. Not only
    protecting but also a defensive, offensive, and working in the
    intelligence community getting the information that we need to
    provide to our partners has been very, very helpful.
        Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Wormuth, the committee was
    briefed that services will be implementing the DOD's
    Independent Review Commission recommendations on sexual
    assault. Can you provide more detail on when you expect these
    recommendations to be implemented in the Army and how you will
    roll these recommendations out to your force to ensure
    servicemembers are sufficiently informed?
        Secretary Wormuth. Sure, Senator Gillibrand. We have been
    trying to, frankly, move out on those recommendations as
    quickly as we can. So for example, right now we are focused on
    developing a prevention workforce. That was one of the
    Independent Review Commission recommendations. So we are
    looking at exactly what that means in terms of the kind of
    people that we need to have, how many people we need to have,
    and where we can best use them; to what extent do we already
    have folks who work for the Army who perform duties that are
    related to preventing harmful behavior. So we are working on
    finalizing that plan.
        As I mentioned in my opening statement, we will be standing
    up the Office of Special Trial Counsel, which will report
    directly to me, in July. We have a promotion or a selection
    board to pick the individual who will be that special trial
    counsel. Then we have also started doing things like the Fusion
    Directorates for our SHARP program, that puts all of the
    resources for survivors in one place. I actually was able to
    visit one of the Fusion Directorates at Fort Sill in Oklahoma
    recently and was very impressed with what they are doing.
        So we are trying to move quickly and would be happy to come
    and talk with you and your staff in more detail, if you would
    like.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Let me now recognize
    Senator Cramer, please.
        Senator Ernst. Yes. Thank you, Secretary Wormuth and
    General McConville, for appearing in front of our committee
    today.
        Chairman Reed. Excuse me, Senator Ernst.
        Senator Ernst. Oh, I am sorry.
        Chairman Reed. Senator Cramer.
        Senator Ernst. Oh, Cramer. Oh, excuse me. So sorry.
        Chairman Reed. That is my Rhode Island accent. I apologize.
        Senator Cramer. I was happy to yield and listen.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks, both of you, for being
    here and for your service.
        I have been struck by how many times you stated what I
    suppose is the obvious and yet it is inspirational to hear you
    say it many times. Both of you referencing the most important
    part of the Army force are the people, and you speak with great
    affection, passion, sincerity about it.
        Secretary Wormuth, you and I got to know each other a
    little bit earlier on, working with your team to fix this pay
    problem.
        Secretary Wormuth. Major Cimock [phonetic]. I remember it
    well.
        Senator Cramer. Yes, and General, you were very helpful as
    well. It highlighted a broken system.
        The new Integrated Personnel Pay System, which I became
    familiar with through that process, was supposed to fix this
    last year, but I am told it is still struggling to rollout
    properly. Can you just maybe give me an updated on that and
    tell us if there is anything we can do to help? When I look at
    the big employers in the world today, and obviously the
    military is one of those, and the Army specifically is one of
    those, but there are much bigger ones that do not seem to have
    these same sorts of problems.
        So maybe just give me an update on how it is rolling out
    and what we can expect.
        Secretary Wormuth. Sure, Senator Cramer. You know, we are
    working very hard on IPPS-A, which the National Guard is
    already able to use some of the features of that personnel
    system. We are working very hard to be able to roll out the
    next increment of IPPS-A, Release 3, hopefully later this fall.
    We feel like we will be on schedule for that, although frankly
    we are working very aggressively with the contractor to make
    sure that they are able to meet what we have asked them to do.
    That next release will bring out some of the talent management
    features, it will enable people to look at what assignments are
    available, and then it will be the next increment, as I
    understand it, that will really provide the pay transparency
    across all components.
        I know this is a system that is very important to the
    chief, so you may want to add something there.
        General McConville. Yes, Senator. Right now we have what we
    call an industrial age personnel management system. We treat
    everybody as interchangeable parts. We have three different
    personnel systems for our regular Army, our National Guard, and
    Reserve, and, quite frankly, it is no way to run a railroad. We
    need to have everyone on the same system. We need to be able to
    manage individuals so we do not manage everyone the same. We
    have tremendous talent in the Army that is masked by a person's
    grade and their MOS. Probably one of the best examples I could
    give you is we have a specialist, a medic specialist, an E-4 in
    the United States Army, that is at a software factory that
    codes at the PhD level. We would never know that unless we did
    a workaround.
        So we have got a lot of work to do in this, and as we
    manage the future and compete for talent we are going to have
    to manage soldiers' talents to get the best in the Army.
        Senator Cramer. You just outlined, I think, a great
    illustration of why it is so important. As we talk about
    modernization, and you are both very fluent on the importance
    of modernization, the priorities of modernization, it seems
    that this would be a really high priority, not as sexy looking,
    but when we are talking about challenges in recruitment,
    retainment, getting the best, all of that, yes, this would be a
    part of that.
        So I just want to tell you, I encourage you to stay at it.
    You have every incentive in the world to do that, but stay at
    it. Keep us informed. If there is anything we need to do from a
    policy standpoint, oversight standpoint, anything that helps
    you with the contractor or anyone else, please reach out. We
    want to keep the main thing the main thing, the first thing the
    first thing.
        Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cramer.
        Let me recognize Senator Kelly, please.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    Secretary Wormuth, General McConville, for testifying today.
        Secretary Wormuth, our military test ranges are the key to
    the Army's modernization, and Arizona test ranges such as Yuma
    Proving Ground provide foundational support for long-range
    fires, provides the ability for us to test counter unmanned
    aerial systems and Future Vertical Lift and cyber operations,
    to name just a few.
        Unfortunately, budget briefs often start with major weapon
    systems and go through a priority order with facilities often
    at the tail end. In order to maintain our competitive edge,
    particularly as we pivot to an era of great power competition,
    we need to continue investing in and prioritizing our military
    test ranges.
        So how does the fiscal year 2023 budget request address the
    importance of funding our test infrastructure and the workforce
    that supports it?
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator, as we pursue our six major
    modernization portfolios we are, at the same time, making sure
    that we look at things like what kinds of test ranges do we
    need for those new systems, from an RDT&E perspective. What are
    the implications of fielding those new systems for our
    maintenance facilities, for example, and motor pools? So we are
    trying to be very deliberate and comprehensive looking at
    making sure that we have the test ranges to support those new
    systems, and more broadly, we also have a 15-year organic
    industrial base plan that is looking at making sure that the
    Army's organic industrial base is also able to support those
    new systems.
        So we are trying to factor that in as we pursue our new
    weapon systems. I can just say, having been to Yuma Proving
    Group last fall, that is where Project Convergence 2021
    culminated. It underscored to me the importance of those kinds
    of test ranges.
        Senator Kelly. Yes, I was there as well----
        Secretary Wormuth. That is right. We sat right next to each
    other.
        Senator Kelly.--yep, for Project Convergence. I mean, that
    exercise, I think it particularly highlights the importance of
    the work that happens in test ranges across the country. I used
    to spend a lot of time on the test range not far from here, off
    of Naval Air Station Patuxent River. But like I said in my
    question, it is often like the end of the line as a priority
    for new systems, whether it is Theodolite radar systems control
    centers, it is often down the line. But it is so important for
    us to have the most modern fighting force in the world.
        Another question here about Fort Huachuca. You know, Fort
    Huachuca, in Southern Arizona, hosts one of the largest
    unmanned aerial vehicle training facilities in the world and
    supports operations for not only the Army but the Air Force,
    Marine Corps, and Customs and Border Protection. I understand
    that they are working to expand airspace in Southern Arizona to
    facilitate unmanned aerial systems and electronic warfare
    testing done at the Army's Electronic Proving Ground.
        In the past, my office has heard concerns that the Army is
    not adequately funding the overall budget for testing across
    the range complex, and specifically at EPG, the Electronic
    Proving Ground. Are you aware of efforts to expand the airspace
    at Fort Huachuca in order to support a greater range of
    testing, and if so, are you supportive of these efforts?
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator, I think we are supportive of
    those efforts, and certainly if there are issues that your
    staff has heard of we can look into those, because we are very
    concerned about UAS [Unmanned Aircraft System] threats are a
    major issue, and we need to also be able to build up our EW
    capabilities. So think generally those are areas that we
    support.
        Senator Kelly. Yes. Whether it is electronic warfare or
    artillery or air-to-air missile systems, you know, in the case
    of airplanes they get faster, our electronic warfare systems
    get more powerful. The stick gets longer on air-to-air missile
    systems. What that means is, whether it is the test pilot or
    the guys in the Army running these tests, is that, in essence,
    the range just feels like it is getting smaller all the time,
    as these systems get more capable. So we have to look for
    opportunities to expand ranges, not only for testing but also
    for operations as well.
        Thank you, and, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly.
        Let me recognize Senator Tuberville, please.
        Senator Tuberville. Good morning. General, Stryker vehicles
    are on your unfunded priority list. Can you take a moment and
    explain why you prioritized these tanks?
        General McConville. What I am trying to do, Senator, right
    now is produce the Army with the resources we get, and that is
    what is in the budget request. But also I have a requirement to
    list, if there was additional funding, what they would be, and
    those are the priorities that were unfunded and that is why
    they are on the list. If you take a look at some of the things
    on the list, there are some people things we want to do. You
    know, we are very concerned about where our soldiers are living
    and housing.
        On this budget particularly there is cost to complete. I
    think there are 25 projects on that UPL list that we need
    addition money because costs have risen, to finish those
    projects that are authorized and appropriated for.
        Then some of the things are things that changed. As we go
    through, we are looking at Stingers right now are on the UPL
    because we did not anticipate giving a whole bunch of those
    away like we have, and we also want to, if they are going to be
    used in the future, rather than building old stuff we would
    rather upgrade the systems we have if we are going to replenish
    them.
        Senator Tuberville. Yes. A few weeks ago President Biden
    pledged that we would spend billions of dollars to make every
    military vehicle climate friendly. I find this ironic
    considering the President's 2023 Budget requests only 102
    Strykers, 67 below the Army's established baseline for funding
    half a brigade. Do you have any comments on that?
        General McConville. Well, Senator, it gets back to the
    tradeoffs that we make when we are producing the budget. You
    know, we want to fund modernization, and when we look at the
    Strykers and we look at the Abrams and we look at the Bradleys,
    and we look at the Paladin PIM Howitzers, we are trying to
    modernize the enduring force. They are going to be around for a
    while. But at the same time we want to make sure we keep the
    momentum going on our future systems, which I absolutely
    believe we must have if we are going to be the Army we need to
    be in the future.
        So that is the tradeoff, and then, the way the system works
    is I come back as the chief and provide those unfunded
    priorities list, and that is what ends up here, and then it is
    up to you all to decide what you want to do with it.
        Senator Tuberville. Yes. Secretary, do you believe that
    with the shortcomings now that we will be able to reach our
    maximum that we need in terms of Strykers by 2030? With the
    shortcomings do you think that we will be able to catch up with
    that in the next 8 or 9 years?
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator, I think that is hard to predict
    without knowing what the top line is going to be for the Army
    in the future years. I think, frankly, what we will probably
    do, and what future secretaries and future chiefs will do is
    each year, as we put forward the budget request, look at how to
    balance, as General McConville said, between investing in those
    new systems and also continuing to modernize those enduring
    systems.
        Senator Tuberville. Yes. We are going to have a lot of
    catching up to do if we continue to cut like that. Obviously it
    is going to put us way behind, but I understand what you are
    saying.
        General, in 2020 you testified, ``Seventy-four percent of
    the Active component brigade combat teams have been at the
    highest level of tactical readiness.'' For the Army, who is
    responsible for assessing the readiness of our brigade combat
    teams, who is responsible for assessing the teams, in your
    mind?
        General McConville. Well, when we talk about the readiness
    it is actually the commanders. The commanders have certain
    criteria, what their personnel status is, what their readiness
    status is, have they gone through a combat training center and
    achieved the level of training? So those all come together to
    give us an assessment.
        Senator Tuberville. Has it always been that way or has
    there been a third party involved?
        General McConville. Well, there are people that check what
    the commanders are saying, and then we have this thing called
    combat, which is a really good check, and so when we call up a
    commander and say, ``You are going to Eastern Europe. You have
    got 7 days to go there,'' and they are able to do that, we
    think that a pretty good check.
        Senator Tuberville. Do you feel like a third party, but not
    the brigade chain of command, such as an IG, would give a very
    positive feedback from what we are doing now, in terms of our
    readiness?
        General McConville. Well, I do not know what the IG would
    say, but what I do is talk to our combat training centers that
    run them through a very rigorous 2- to 3-week period. I talk to
    commanders who are responsible and accountable for that. Then,
    really, the proof is in the execution. How well do they do when
    it comes to accomplishing----
        Senator Tuberville. Your experience in the past, are combat
    commanders tougher or is the IG tougher in terms of assessing
    readiness, in your experience?
        General McConville. My experience is I trust my commanders.
        Senator Tuberville. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville.
        Senator Kaine, please.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to our
    witnesses.
        Russia had a plan to dominate Ukraine, quickly topple the
    government, depose Zelenskyy. Their plans failed. I want to
    follow up on a line of questioning from Senator Kaine, who
    complimented our logistics. There are a whole series of
    factors, Ukrainian resolve chief among them, but I share
    Senator King's belief that the superior logistics of the U.S.
    and our allies in providing support to Ukraine has been a real
    factor in being able to dramatically shrink the success of
    Russian war aims.
        If you could maybe each talk about whether you agree with
    me on that and compare it with logistical failures on the
    Russian side.
        Secretary Wormuth. Yes, Senator. I mean, I fully believe
    that logistics has been an Achilles heel for the Russians, and
    I think we have demonstrated, by how quickly we have been able
    to get our own forces over to Europe but also in terms of the
    speed and volume of lethal assistance that we are providing to
    Ukraine, we are showing the incredible competency of the U.S.
    Army in the area of logistics.
        This is something, frankly, that the Army has been focused
    on like a laser in terms of looking ahead to future conflicts.
    I mean, we have a whole joint contested logistics concept that
    we have been working on because there is a recognition,
    particularly in the Indo-Pacific, that given the distances, it
    is that old saying of amateurs study strategy and professionals
    study logistics. I think watching the experience of the
    Russians has underscored how important that is and has just
    reinforced our commitment to focusing on that going forward.
        Senator Kaine. General McConville, do you want to add
    anything to that?
        General McConville. Yes, I would. I think this shows the
    importance of our allies and partners, the fact that we have
    access over there, the fact that we have presence, you know,
    airfields and ports and having put in what we call pre-
    positioned stocks, and having orchestrated this and actually
    rehearsed it. You know, it is one thing to have equipment over
    there, but the equipment actually has to be ready to go. You
    all have helped with that. When we come in and say, hey, we
    need to pre-position tanks, and we need to make sure these
    tanks are ready to go, and we have maintainers over there that
    are making that happen, and we have troops over there that work
    very closely with our allies and partners.
        When you have a crisis we are able to quickly get there. We
    have got a lot of relationships, very strong relationships with
    our allies and partners over there, and it is kind of a model
    for the rest of the world.
        Senator Kaine. I think that your two answers really put the
    logistics question together, because it is one thing to have
    great logistics within the U.S. Army or within DOD-wide, but
    what about the logistics of the DOD and all of our forces
    together with our allied forces. This kind of integrated
    logistics with allies is extremely unique and really has set us
    apart from what we are seeing with Russia.
        Well, I am a strong believer in this and I just have to
    point out, Senator Cotton talked earlier about something that
    he might worry would lead to deaths or challenges on the
    battlefield and the physical standards. I have not served in
    the way he has so I listen carefully.
        Here is something I am worried about. Since November there
    has been a nominee that has gotten through this committee to be
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment. This is the
    chief logistics civilian at the Department of Defense,
    Christopher Lowman. He is a Virginian.
        Now he is not just a political appointee. This was a guy
    who was a Marine officer from 1984 to 1989, and then when he
    retired from Active Duty he joined the Army as a civilian, and
    he has been a civilian with the Army for 33 years, including
    the chief logistics official for the Army. He has been
    nominated and through this committee without any controversy to
    be the chief logistics officer within the Pentagon.
        We cannot get him a vote. I have made unanimous consent
    motions twice in the last two weeks that have been objected to
    by the minority, without citing a single reason that
    Christopher Lowman is not the right person to do this. Why
    would we not be having a logistics leader at the Pentagon in
    the middle of a war in Europe? Why would we hobble ourselves?
    If we are going to talk about something that could lead to
    challenges on the battlefield, not confirming the Pentagon's
    chief logistics official at a time when this is the strategic
    edge that is helping us shrink Russian war aims, I just cannot
    fathom it. I have been asking my colleagues on the other side
    whether Christopher Lowman--and I admit to a bias. He is a
    Virginian. He lives in Fredericksburg--whether you might allow
    this person, who has already served the nation's military
    mission for about 40 years, just allow him to take the position
    and help us in an area that is desperately needed.
        I yield, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
        Senator Tillis, please.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you both for
    being here. I have got a question I do not think has been
    covered yet, and it relates to Finland and Sweden. I am the co-
    chair of the Senate NATO Observer Group, and Senator Shaheen
    and I were in Brussels 2 weeks ago, and we were talking about
    accession, and I met with Swedish officials yesterday. By all
    indications by the time we get to the NATO summit at the end of
    June we were going to have formal request for accession. Then
    we are going to go into a gray area. We are going to do
    everything we can here to expedite the process, and I think it
    will receive broad bipartisan support. But they are going to be
    in a gray area between the time they apply and the time that
    they are ultimately approved by the NATO members.
        So two questions. One, can you all describe the current
    military-to-military relationships with both Finland and
    Sweden? General McConville or Secretary Wormuth.
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator, while Finland and Sweden are
    not NATO allies yet they have worked very closely with the
    alliance over the years, as you know, and we have very strong
    military-to-military relationships with both countries. They
    will both, I believe, joining NATO, be security providers, not
    consumers, and I look forward to them becoming members.
        Senator Tillis. General McConville?
        General McConville. Same thing. We have a very strong
    relationship with their chief, chiefs of staff, at least from
    an Army standpoint. We routinely run exercises, and they are
    very good partners.
        Senator Tillis. With Finland sharing, I think, somewhere
    around 1,340-kilometer border with Russia there is clearly some
    concern about that gray zone, that gray period between
    application and accession. Are there any current military
    exercises, any other activities that are already planned that
    we could potential consider to move up to provide some
    assurances to them as they go through the application process
    or accession process?
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator, I am not aware of the detailed
    schedule of exercises right now. We can certainly look into
    that. You know, I think in the gray area, I do not think from a
    conventional military standpoint Russia is going to be in much
    of a position to move its ground forces, for example. They are
    pretty tied down in Ukraine right now. I think the area that I
    would have concerns about is in the cyber domain, you know,
    what might Russia be tempted to do there potentially, and I
    think that is something that we would want to talk to the Finns
    and the Swedes about.
        Senator Tillis. Yes. Speaking with Swedish officials
    yesterday I think one thing--I tend to agree. Intellectually,
    they are not doing a very good job in Ukraine, and I think it
    is unlikely. But if you are a policymaker in Finland or Sweden
    and you have got relatively strong public support for
    accession, I am sure that there is a real concern, because they
    are seeing what is going on in Ukraine.
        So I think that we have to do other things, just as an
    assurance, and to continue to maintain what appears to be broad
    support in both Finland and Sweden. So looking at that, I
    think, is very important.
        I want to move to Abrams tanks. I know we have got unfunded
    priority from the Army on I think another full brigade, and
    that is particularly interesting to me because some of that
    would go down to the 30th Armored Brigade combat team in our
    National Guard. I think it also touches South Carolina and West
    Virginia.
        Do you all agree that that is a priority and you support
    it?
        General McConville. Yes. I mean, again----
        Senator Tillis. No equivocation. That is good. The next
    question is with what we are seeing we have got stockpiles in
    Germany. We have had Russian tanks move into Ukraine. We are
    moving Abrams tanks around Europe, which is a good thing. But
    we also have an industrial base. We are working on the
    modernization of the Abrams platform. We have an industrial
    base. Can you speak to the importance of making sure that we
    continue investment in that modernization program so that we
    can get efficiencies as we turn out more of these platforms?
        Secretary Wormuth. Yes, Senator. We are very focused on
    modernizing our organic industrial base, and as I said, we have
    a 15-year plan that General Ed Daly, down at Army Material
    Command, has really worked hard on. Because we want to make
    sure that we continue to get what we need out of the industrial
    base that we have but also to upskill some of the workforce
    that we have there and some of the facilities so that they are
    able to eventually be able to repair and maintain the new
    systems that are coming online.
        Senator Tillis. Great, and I have run out of time so I will
    submit a question for the record on modernization plan for
    military housing. We have got challenges down at Fort Bragg,
    and it is not limited to that installation, and I look forward
    to hearing your feedback on it.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
        Senator Rosen, please.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this
    hearing. I really appreciate the work and the service that both
    of you are doing and the vast knowledge you have, and I am so
    grateful for the logistics planning that has gone on for so
    many years, that has allowed us to protect men and women in our
    military and, of course, all of us. So thank you for all those
    spreadsheets and logistics that nobody ever thinks, like was
    said, are very sexy but the most important thing.
        But I want to talk about small arms range for Nevada for
    training in Nevada. Secretary Wormuth, Nevada does not have an
    approved small arms qualification range. In order for soldiers
    to annually qualify on an approved range Nevada's units must
    transport soldiers somewhere between 200 and 600 miles out of
    state to meet this requirement. The average cost for a unit to
    attend the out-of-states weapons qualification is $500,000,
    half a million dollars, a year, per unit. Some units mitigate
    this by sacrificing training days in order to travel, using
    vehicles assigned to the unit. It takes an additional 2 to 3
    days of travel time, which is not often an option.
        So the National Guard Bureau has justified the requirement
    for one multipurpose range complex for Nevada, and the Nevada
    Army National Guard has acquired a 25-year least at Hawthorne
    Army Depot, which is in the center of our state. However, the
    current timeline for MilCom funding to be approved is 2030, at
    its earlier.
        So given that financial cost to transport soldiers out of
    state far exceeds the cost of building a range, can I have your
    commitment to incorporate a small arms range at Hawthorne Army
    Depot into future years defense planning or unfunded priority
    list so that our soldiers can meet their annual requirements at
    greater convenience, and actually at a cost savings to the
    taxpayer?
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator Rosen, I will absolutely look
    into that, and again, work with, it sounds like, General
    Jensen, the Director of the Army Guard, and General Daly, to
    see if there is something that we can do there.
        Senator Rosen. Yes, the cost savings, I think, you get
    better training, save money. It makes sense.
        On that same note, the Reserve components and their new
    army fitness test. So General McConville, our Reserve
    components, they face their own challenges, as citizen soldiers
    without access to day-to-day services available to our Active
    Duty troops on military installations. So one such challenge
    will be the transition to the Army Combat Fitness Test, ACFT.
    While Active Duty soldiers will have ACFT equipment at their
    everyday place of work, Reserve component soldiers will not, no
    matter how much equipment is fielded to their units. These
    soldiers are not at their units 28 days out of the month to
    train on the equipment they are going to be tested on, and many
    just do not live nearby.
        This is going require Reserve component soldiers to pay for
    specialized gym equipment in order to train, whereas every
    soldier, Active Duty soldier, can train for Army Physical
    Fitness Test from their own home.
        General McConville, how do you plan to address this
    disparity as you implement ACFT?
        General McConville. Well, first of all we put a lot of
    equipment, probably the biggest buy of ACFT equipment, but we
    have also put out ways to train if you do not have access to
    the equipment. So we have exercises. If you think about a
    plank, one of the exercises. You do not need equipment to do
    that. The hand-release pushups, you do not need any type of
    equipment to do that. The ball throw, you know, if you do not
    have a ball we can get something that looks like that, and you
    can take some weights and just use some of the things that you
    have, you know, a water can to replicate that.
        So most of the things we can replicate without the
    equipment, and we have exercises that they can do to give them
    the opportunity. But we will not be able to put a full set of
    equipment in every home, but every organization, within limits,
    should have that.
        Going back to--I was not aware of that arms requirement. We
    will take that on----
        Senator Rosen. Oh, thank you.
        General McConville.--okay, for that marksmanship. Our
    soldiers need to be able to shoot. We should not have to go all
    over the state to do that. I just was not aware of that one. I
    will take that one on personally.
        Senator Rosen. Yes, at Hawthorne Army Depot. It is easy to
    get to from northern and southern Nevada.
        General McConville. It seems like it should be really easy,
    Senator, but we owe it, like the Senator said, let us take a
    look at it.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you.
        General McConville. This is the first I have heard of it,
    and I have been in the Army for 41 years. But we will take a
    look at that and we will get on it.
        Senator Rosen. I appreciate it, and I see my time is just
    about up, so I will submit a question for the record about our
    Russian threat assessment and how you think we are going to
    have to adjust now, based on what we have learned over the last
    few months, going on in Ukraine, how we need to surge up, where
    we need to resupply, and logistics again, how they might have
    to change, considering the threats we have now, and what we
    have learned in Ukraine.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
        Senator Hawley, please.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to you both
    for being here. Let us talk a little bit, if we could, about
    housing at Fort Leonard Wood, and Secretary Wormuth, if I could
    just start with you. I understand that there are discussions
    underway about raising the basic allowance for housing at Fort
    Leonard Wood, which I think is essential, both to combat the
    rising inflation but also support future investments in
    housing. Will the Army support raising the BAH for Fort Leonard
    Wood?
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator, we will absolutely look into
    that. As you probably know, we, the Department, raised BAH in I
    think over 50 locations where there were rising costs, so if
    there is evidence that the costs around Fort Leonard Wood are
    rising in a disproportionate way we would want to look at that.
        Senator Hawley. Can I have your commitment, your personal
    commitment, to prioritize this issue, BAH at Fort Leonard Wood,
    in your discussions with OSD?
        Secretary Wormuth. Yes, I would be happy to prioritize it.
        Senator Hawley. Great. Thank you. Along similar lines I
    asked you and General McConville both last year, at this
    hearing, about the Army's plans to replace aging homes at Fort
    Leonard Wood, and you both assured me that that would be a
    priority. Army Material Command followed up with my office
    afterwards and said that the Army would be earmarking funds for
    this. However, as of this week I am not aware that the Army has
    allocated any funds toward replacing housing at Fort Leonard
    Wood. Zero.
        So my question is, why has the Army not put together a plan
    to replacing the aging housing at Fort Leonard Wood, despite
    agreeing that they need to be replaced?
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator, we have a 10-year
    infrastructure plan that looks at housing as well as power
    projection infrastructure. It would surprise me if in that 10-
    year plan there was not investments set aside for Fort Leonard
    Wood. So let me take that and get back to you and find out
    exactly where, in our plan, what year we are looking at trying
    to deal with the housing there.
        Senator Hawley. Well, let me tell you what I was told. I
    was told last year there was $341 million that were going to be
    allocated towards replacing housing. Then I was told later only
    $50 million would be available to Fort Leonard Wood, and then I
    was told after that it would be zero. So you can imagine I am
    not very happy about it.
        I am also not very happy about the fact that the Army does
    not include any funding to replace housing at Fort Leonard Wood
    in the budget request or in the unfunded requirements list for
    fiscal year 2023. So why not?
        Secretary Wormuth. Well, Senator, again, I will go and
    look. We have a 10-year plan. It may well be that there is not
    money in fiscal year 2023, but there may be money in future
    years. So what I would like to do is go back and look into
    exactly where you are in the schedule.
        You know, the Army, as I have come to understand in a whole
    new way, we have huge footprint with housing at installations
    all across the country. We cannot, in a single year, take care
    of all of the housing issues that we have. So we try to look
    where the need is most pressing and sort of develop a schedule.
    But I would be happy to look into it, and I understand that you
    are frustrated hearing different things at different times.
        Senator Hawley. Well, here is the deal. I realize that you
    have got issues you have got to address all over the nation,
    and bases all over the nation, but in Missouri it is a pressing
    issue. When I am told there are going to be funds available for
    housing in Missouri and then there are not, I am not happy
    about it, and I am not happy about getting the run-around about
    what it is going to be and what it is not going to be. Frankly,
    what I want to hear is that Fort Leonard Wood is going to be a
    priority, and that it is going to get done. So 10-year, 20-
    year, 50-year, 500-year plans, I want it done.
        So if you could follow up with me and give me some hard
    facts about what actually is happening and when it is going to
    get done, I would appreciate it.
        Secretary Wormuth. I will do that.
        Senator Hawley. Can I have your commitment on that?
        Secretary Wormuth. You absolutely may, Senator.
        Senator Hawley. Okay. Let me shift topics. You gave a
    speech, Madam Secretary, last year, about the Army's role in
    the Indo-Pacific, and during that speech you said, and I am
    going to quote you now, ``If required, the Army can
    counterattack using its maneuver forces, for example, infantry,
    Stryker elements, and combat aviation brigades to restore the
    territorial integrity of our allies and partners.''
        My question is, given that DOD has designed China as the
    pacing threat and the Taiwan scenario as the pacing scenario,
    what role do you see army maneuver forces playing in helping us
    deter a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan?
        Secretary Wormuth. Well, I think, Senator, that combat-
    credible forces are very important in terms of deterring China.
    So I do not want to speculate too much on hypotheticals but I
    can envision that we would have ground forces in countries in
    Southeast Asia, for example, that might be willing, in a future
    conflict, to give us access.
        You know, we exercise regularly with the Philippines, for
    example. We have a very close relationship with Australia. So I
    can envision situations where ground forces could be very
    helpful.
        Senator Hawley. Good. That is helpful.
        General, can I just ask you, in my last question here, do
    you think that we should maintain the ability to put Army
    forces on Taiwan in the event of a crisis, so the President has
    an option, if necessary, to deter or defeat a fait accompli?
        General McConville. I believe we should provide multiple
    options to the chain of command, and we should not be a one-
    option commander. We have got great sea forces. We have got
    great air forces. We have got great ground forces. What we want
    to do is provide multiple options, and I think our
    modernization priorities do that. With Long Range Precision
    Fire we can sink ships. But at the end of the day, you know,
    someone on the ground is going to have to be there, whether it
    is our allies and partners.
        But the thing we also found out with Ukraine is we put
    soldiers into the Baltics and we put soldiers in place. Having
    American soldiers on the ground reinforced our allies and
    partners, and quite frankly, it reinforces their will to defend
    their country, and I think we should have that option for the
    National Command Authority.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you both and thank you, especially,
    Madam Secretary, for your help on the housing issue. Thank you,
    Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
        Senator Hirono, please.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Army is negotiating renewals of several training area
    leases in Hawaii that are set to expire in 2029, including the
    Pohakuloa Training Area, PTA. Secretary Wormuth, as you know,
    PTA is critical to ensure Army ground forces and Marine forces
    in Hawaii are adequately trained. However, these lands hold
    cultural significance to the Native Hawaiian community, and it
    is imperative that the Army conduct a respectful engagement
    with local community leaders, especially the Native Hawaiian
    population, to listen to their concerns.
        Secretary Wormuth, these training area leases are critical,
    as I just mentioned, as was and is the case with the massive
    Red Hill fuel tank installation. The training lease issue is
    one that will require senior-level involvement to ensure the
    community's concerns as well the national security concerns are
    addressed. So as we have previously discussed, I would ask you
    and General McConville to personally place attention on this
    issue.
        Secretary Wormuth. Yes, Senator Hirono. I appreciate you
    raising that and I will be getting out to the region this
    summer, and I have already talked with General Flynn and intend
    to engage with community leaders the next time I am there, on
    the training range issues.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you very much. I cannot begin to
    express how important Pohakuloa Training Area is going to be
    for our military.
        Secretary Wormuth. We agree.
        Senator Hirono. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville,
    last year Congress made historic changes to how the military
    handles sexual assault, and while those changes are a step in
    the right direction, implementation in a timely manner will be
    important. I also remain concerned about how sexual harassment
    is being investigated and prosecuted because there is no
    question that sexual harassment is also a scourge on the
    military, which is why I introduced the Sexual Harassment
    Independent Investigations and Prosecutions Act to solve this
    outside of the chain of command.
        Do you think, Secretary Wormuth, that moving sexual
    harassment investigation outside the decisions on prosecuting
    sexual harassments outside of the chain of command would be
    another step in the right direction to restore trust in the
    system?
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator Hirono, I certainly think we
    need to restore trust in the system, and I think the changes
    that Congress has legislated already will help us with that. I
    would be certainly open to looking at what you are putting
    forward in your legislation.
        You know, we have made a number of changes. I think it
    would be useful to see what are the results of the changes that
    we are now undertaking. But it is very important to me to
    restore trust with our soldiers, and frankly, with the American
    public. So I am open to looking at what more we might do.
        Senator Hirono. Just as we removed sexual assault from the
    chain of command I do see sexual trauma, military sexual
    trauma, as a continuum, and I believe that a huge part of what
    happens in sexual trauma in the military is the issue of
    harassment.
        So for both of you, last Congress--I am sorry. This is for
    General McConville. The Army's Multi-Domain Task Force, MDTF,
    is focused on defeating an enemy's anti-access and aerial
    denial capabilities, and I believe the Army is planning to
    stand up additional MDTFs beyond the one at Joint Base Lewis-
    McChord in Washington State. Is the Army still planning to
    stand up additional MDTFs, and if so, where?
        General McConville. Yes, Senator, we are. We plan right now
    to stand up five of those. The next one that we are standing
    up, initially, is in Hawaii. The command has been selected, and
    that Multi-Domain Task Force will provide what we call long-
    range precision effects, which is through intelligence, through
    information operations, cyber, electronic warfare, and space,
    and it also, depending, will be tailored to provide Long-Range
    Precision Fires that can penetrate anti-access air-denial
    capabilities, sink ships, and provide fires in a precision way
    for our ground and joint commanders.
        Senator Hirono. What specific steps is the Army taking to
    ensure that the MDTFs can work closely with our allies and
    partners, because that will be an important aspect of what
    these task forces do?
        General McConville. Well, they are very much in high
    demand, just like our Security Force Assistance Brigades. Under
    General Flynn's leadership he has then working very closely
    with our allies and partners, providing those capabilities, and
    we will continue to do that so they are an integral part of
    both the joint and the combined force.
        Senator Hirono. Mr. Chairman, I have some additional
    questions but I will submit them for the record. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Hirono.
        Senator Sullivan, please.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and General,
    Madam Secretary, thank you for your service. I appreciated our
    phone call yesterday, and I kind of want to dive into some of
    the topics we talked about.
        As you know, we have this very kind of dual challenge and
    opportunity in Alaska. The challenge is the very high rates of
    suicide, which nobody wants, and I really appreciate the Army
    focusing on this. I think you have put all your best minds to
    it. It is a complex problem but I want to thank all of you.
    Madam Secretary, you were in Alaska recently. The vice chief
    was in. General, you are up there a lot.
        So we talked about some of what you are thinking through,
    both from a surge capacity on professionals that can provide
    help but also, as part of the Arctic Strategy that you have
    been focused on for quite some time, new capabilities in
    Alaska. I was wondering if you both would not mind touching on
    both of those topics right now. Again, I appreciate your full
    attention to this issue, which I know concerns you as much as
    it concerns me and the people I represent.
        Secretary Wormuth. Certainly, Senator Sullivan. You know, I
    think really there are two big things that we are trying to do
    in Alaska right now under the umbrella of the Arctic Strategy
    for the Army. First, as we talked about yesterday, we are
    really trying to surge a significant quantity of behavioral
    health providers to help deal with the mental health issues. So
    we have behavioral health folks going up, we are sending
    military family life counselors, we are sending chaplains, and
    that will be a 6-month surge, and we will be doing 100 percent
    mental health check of every U.S. Army Alaska soldier.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Secretary Wormuth. One of the things we have found, in
    addition, that we think is contributing, potentially, to some
    of what we are seeing in Alaska is that some of the soldiers
    there do not feel like they have a sense of identity or purpose
    around why they are stationed there. So we are looking at, as
    we talked about yesterday, reflagging the U.S. Army Alaska
    headquarters as the 11th Airborne Division, which is a division
    that was disestablished but has a very storied lineage. We are
    thinking of essentially renaming U.S. Army Alaska the 11th
    Airborne Division.
        Senator Sullivan. So that would be an operational----
        Secretary Wormuth. Yes. It would become an operational
    headquarters, the two brigades that are there. We are not
    adding or subtracting force structure. It is really sort of
    more of a new sense of common identity for the soldiers up
    there.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. General, do you have any thoughts
    on that?
        General McConville. As the Secretary said, as we give them
    the identity, you know, having had a chance to serve in an
    Airborne Division, the 101st Airborne Division, the 11th has a
    great history and heritage and that means a lot to soldiers.
    and tabs on their badges and things like that matter.
        But we are looking at the Arctic very differently. We have
    put out a strategy. We think it is very different. We have got
    to be able to operate in that environment. We have got to make
    sure the units have the capabilities, and that gives them the
    confidence to be somewhat special--you are the ones that can
    operate with the right equipment--and even transform some of
    those units so they have the right vehicles to operate in the
    coldest time, they have the right equipment and the right
    clothing.
        All those things come together to give them a sense of
    identity, and that is who we send there. We have a lot of
    people that want to go to Alaska. They go up there and they
    thrive. We have some that do not. They just have a tough time,
    and I think COVID has exacerbated a lot of the challenges we
    have because of isolation. That is something we recognize. When
    we talk about building these cohesive teams, you build a
    cohesive team around a mission, and you give them focus and you
    give them identity, and that is what brings them together, and
    that is what we want to try to do.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Madam Secretary, we talked
    yesterday about the civilian behavioral health support, and it
    is difficult to fill in a lot of places in the country, and
    particularly difficult to fill in Alaska. Do you think changing
    the ratio of uniformed-to-civilian behavioral health providers,
    in remote locations--I am not just talking about Alaska; this
    happened in other places in the Army globally, not just in the
    U.S.--can that help alleviate the challenge and the shortage
    problem? It is something we are looking at here in the
    committee.
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator, I do think it is something that
    we need to look at. That was something I talked about with
    General Eifler in Alaska. I talked to his hospital director. We
    want to look at that. I mean, we of course need to look at what
    are the second- and third-order effects for changing those
    ratios because we have to make sure we have got enough military
    medical providers for the whole Army, but it is something we
    want to look at certainly.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask a final question, kind of two
    parts. Is part of the 11th Airborne we were just talking about
    the Multi-Domain Task Force? I know that is something you were
    looking at in Alaska as well, and then the recent USARC large-
    scale exercises and JPARC [Joint Pacific Alaskan Range Complex]
    in March. Can you provide a readout, just briefly, on some of
    the takeaways from that? I know it was very significant, hard,
    hard training, joint training, in very cold weather. Any
    thoughts and takeaways on lessons learned from that as it
    relates to what you are planning on in Alaska, and they beyond,
    Multi-Domain Task Force and others?
        General McConville. Yes, I can talk about that. Senator,
    you know, we kind of want to train where we are going to fight,
    and historically Alaska has been more of a basing place. We
    took them out of there and we needed to send them to the
    National Training Center or to Fort Polk. You know, Fort Polk
    in the summer is not the equivalent of the Arctic in the
    winter.
        What we learned was conducting exercises in the winter, in
    a combat training center-like environment is extremely
    important, so our soldiers develop the confidence in how to
    work in that environment. As you know very well, better than I
    do--I have been up there in the winter but not for a long
    period of time--it takes a special type of training. It takes a
    special soldier that can operate and thrive in that
    environment, and that is why we want to give them a high-
    visibility or high-intensity type training event up in that
    environment. General Flynn was very high on it.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you both.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Warren, please.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
    our two witnesses for being here today.
        At the end of the day, budgets are a statement of our
    values. I do not like the statement being made by the Army
    budget request. We have all heard the horror stories of
    substandard, on-base housing. Military families across the
    country live with black mold and collapsed ceilings and
    electrical and fire hazards and a lot of other substandard
    conditions. After this scandal was exposed, then-Acting
    Secretary of Army Ryan McCarthy said, before this committee,
    military housing was, ``our top quality-of-life priority, and
    we are aligning resources against it.''
        Secretary Wormuth, do you agree that safe and healthy
    housing conditions for military families should be a top Army
    priority?
        Secretary Wormuth. I do, Senator Warren.
        Senator Warren. Good. I agree with you on this.
        Secretary Wormuth, the Army's base budget just submitted to
    Congress requests for $1.9 billion in funds for military
    construction and family housing. Is that correct?
        Secretary Wormuth. Yes, I believe so, Senator.
        Senator Warren. Okay. The reason I wanted to clarify on how
    committed the Army is to addressing the military housing
    problems is because that $1.9 billion in the Army's base budget
    represents a cut to military housing and construction funding
    by nearly 40 percent compared with last year.
        Now another big chunk of the money needed to address the
    problem--evidently you think there is still work to be done--
    another $330 million is on a separate list typically referred
    to as the unfunded priorities list. This so-called unfunded
    priorities list is the way for the Pentagon to pad spending
    over and above the official budget. It is not just a few
    extras. The Army's list this year adds up to $5.1 billion.
        Typically, the Pentagon takes some of the most popular
    items that it wants funded, excludes them from the base budget,
    puts them on the unfunded priorities list, and then dares
    Congress not to jack up its budget above the Pentagon's initial
    submission.
        So, Secretary Wormuth, during your confirmation hearing you
    agreed that substandard military housing was both readiness and
    a retention problem. You just told us it should be a top Army
    priority. So why did you not include the whole request in your
    base budget?
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator, thanks for that question, and
    as I was just saying to Senator Hawley, we have a very large
    footprint with a large number of bases. All of them have
    housing. I would love nothing more than to be able to renovate
    all of the housing around the country that needs to be
    renovated in a single year, but we are not able to do that at
    the same time that we are trying to transform ourselves in
    terms of modernization in a way that we have not done for 40
    years, and also maintain the readiness that we need to be able
    to respond quickly, as we have, to the situation in Ukraine.
        So we are trying to balance a number of competing demands.
    We put almost $2 billion in for family housing and barracks,
    and we are required by law, the chief is, to submit an unfunded
    priorities list. I will let him speak to the----
        Senator Warren. The question is not whether or not you have
    an unfunded priorities list. I understand that. My question is
    why housing ended up on it and why your base budget is a 40
    percent cut on housing? It is a 40 percent cut over just the
    year before.
        Look, I just look at it this way. Military families need
    this funding and they should get it. We need to fix our
    shameful military housing problem, and we need to do it as
    quickly as possible. These wish lists distort the budget
    process, and we should end this game. It is not worthy of our
    military. Either have the courage to ask for more money up
    front or, better yet, cut something else from your budget so
    that you have got enough room to be able to keep the promises
    that you have made to military families. If taking care of
    military families is truly a priority then you should be
    including their needs in the base budget request, not using
    military families as pawns to gain the budget system for more
    dollars.
        So I just feel really frustrated about this process.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren.
        Senator Peters, please.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
    our witnesses here today. Thank you for your service.
        Secretary Wormuth, the U.S. and our allies have shipped
    tens of thousands of Javelins and other anti-tank guided
    missile systems to Ukraine where we have seen they have been
    used for just absolutely devastating impact against Russian
    tanks and other armed vehicles. It has been encouraging to see,
    and the skill by which the Ukrainians have deployed them has
    been outstanding.
        The proliferation, though, of affordable, easy-to-operate
    ATGMs [Anti-Tank Guided MissileS] has certainly changed the
    calculus of armor on the battlefield. We do know though,
    however, that active protection systems can be used to defend
    armored vehicles from these kinds of threats. Other countries
    around the world, some of our allies, have embraced the
    solution, have been putting it on their armored vehicles in a
    pretty aggressive way. The U.S. seems to be somewhat reluctant.
    With the exception of a small amount of our Abrams tanks that
    have these systems, the Army does not seem to have a plan to
    test and field anti-protection systems for the entire fleet of
    Strykers, for example, or other armored vehicles.
        So my question for you, ma'am, is does the Army have any
    plans to equip its Stryker with active protection systems, and
    if so, what is the timeline for testing and training? What does
    that look like?
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator, I think you know we are
    certainly very concerned about threats to our tanks, and we
    have watched what drones can do, for example, to Russian tanks.
    So we, at this point in time, I think, think that the
    protection systems that we have on our Abrams, on our Strykers,
    are quite good. I certainly would be willing to look in more
    detail if there are additional systems that have proved to be
    effective.
        We are also looking, as I said, you know, there is a
    balance between how quickly we can modernize some of our
    enduring platforms like Stryker while also modernizing. But I
    will certainly commit to you to look into that in a little more
    detail.
        Senator Peters. Well, as you mentioned, the threat is
    evolving pretty rapidly with relatively inexpensive weapons
    that do devastating damage, so I would hope that we are
    thinking this through, and lessons learned from conflicts are
    usually incredibly valuable.
        Secretary Wormuth. Yes. We are taking active note of the
    lessons coming out of Ukraine.
        Senator Peters. I appreciate that.
        General McConville, the Army's Multi-Domain Task Forces
    represent, as you know, the centerpiece in operationalizing the
    Army's multi-domain operations (MDO) concept, and this vision
    of MDO is critical to understanding how the Army plans to fight
    and win wars in the future.
        The Army has already activated two Multi-Domain Task Forces
    and plans, I understand, to stand up three more. My question
    for you is, in the Army, where the Active component is less
    than 50 percent of the force structure, how does the Army
    National Guard fit into this vision for both MDTFs as well as
    MDO?
        General McConville. Well, you know, the Army National Guard
    is absolutely critical. I cannot speak enough for what they are
    doing for the country. The Army Reserves, as you said, they are
    more than 52 percent. What we have asked them to do in the
    United States and also overseas is just miraculous. I keep
    saying this is the year of the Guard, and every year it seems
    like it is the same year after year, and we have asked them to
    do so much.
        The Secretary and I have committed to the Guard that they
    will get the modern equipment. It will not be the first 31 in
    the regular Army. We have made a promise to the Guard that they
    will be fielded with this type of equipment up front. I have
    talked to General Hokanson. He wants the National Guard, in
    coordination with the governors, to reflect where the regular
    Army is going. They want to have the same capabilities, and we
    are doing that with them as we work through those problem sets.
        Senator Peters. Thank you.
        Secretary Wormuth, as Chair of Homeland Security and
    Government Affairs Committee I am concerned about the impacts
    of the increased domestic activation of our Guard forces for
    national disaster recovery, civil unrest, pandemic response.
    They have been called on for a variety of missions. We
    absolutely need these brave men and women to answer the calls
    to service, but it also has increased operational tempo, and
    that certainly takes its toll.
        Data compiled by my staff indicates that the quantity of
    Army guardsmen that fall short of earning a retirement-credible
    year has increased from less than 1 percent to nearly 4.5
    percent over the last decade. While this is a small percentage
    of the total force, and certainly many factors are at play, I
    do not think it is any coincidence that the number is growing
    amid increased calls for non-Federal duty.
        So my question for you is, while the state and Federal
    management of our National Guard is an essential framework, is
    your department considering the inadvertent side effects of
    state activations while you are undertaking your duty status
    reforms?
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator, you know, as General McConville
    said, we are very aware of how heavily used the National Guard
    is in many parts of our country, and we want to make sure that
    they are compensated and provided the benefits that they should
    get when they are activated in Title 10 status. We try to look
    very carefully at the second- and third-order effects of their
    support to civil authorities. So we will look into what you are
    raising and get back to you with more detail.
        Senator Peters. Well, I appreciate it. We will follow up
    with you and look forward to having a chance to work through
    this and make sure people are treated fairly and equitably. So
    thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters.
        Senator Duckworth, please.
        Senator Duckworth. Wow. Good timing. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Impeccable timing.
        Senator Duckworth. Impeccable. Just got to land your
    aircraft plus or minus 10 seconds.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Wormuth and General
    McConville, thank you for your service to our Army and thank
    you for your discussion with me earlier this week.
        I am truly encouraged by the challenging work you both are
    doing to lead the modernization of our Army, particularly in
    the Future Vertical Lift program. On Tuesday I chaired a
    classified Air-Land Subcommittee briefing on the status of the
    Future Vertical Lift program, and despite the love I will
    always have for my UH-60 I am excited for the future of Army
    aviation. It is clear that the Army has applied lessons learned
    from acquisition programs across the DOD as this program
    remains on schedule and on budget while bringing cutting-edge,
    vital combat capability to our forces. I want this trend to
    continue for all lines of efforts under the Future Vertical
    Lift program and for all phases of each system's lifecycle.
        Secretary Wormuth, given the need for modernization across
    the force, what work is the Army doing to ensure continued
    affordability of these systems, not just during procurement but
    also through sustainment?
        Secretary Wormuth. A primary thing we are doing, Senator
    Duckworth, is really trying to look very early on in the
    development process at affordability costs, at sustainability
    costs, and about maintainability costs, because as you
    undoubtedly know, it is often the sustainment and maintenance
    costs that can really kind of balloon and cause the overall
    cost of the platform to increase. So we are trying to really
    factor that in early and pay a lot of close attention to it as
    we go through the development and acquisition process with
    FLRAA and FARA.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. What portions of this year's
    budget request are fundamental to maintaining on-time delivery
    of all aspects of FVL [Future Vertical Lift]?
        Secretary Wormuth. I am sorry. Could you say that again,
    Senator?
        Senator Duckworth. What portions of this year's budget
    request are fundamental to maintaining on-time delivery of all
    aspects of the Future Vertical Lift program?
        Secretary Wormuth. I would say, Senator, you know, the
    portion of our modernization, $35 billion investment, that is
    associated with Future Vertical Lift is critical to making sure
    that the program stays on schedule. You know, we are in the
    process of--we will be having prototypes for FARA flying in
    fiscal year 2023, we already have some experimental
    demonstrators with FLRAA [Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft],
    and we have the money built into our modernization budget to
    try to keep those programs on schedule.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, and I look forward to working
    with you both to take every opportunity to maintain the success
    of this program.
        I want to switch gears a little bit and talk about
    contested logistics. Our military must be prepared for the
    tough logistical challenges they could face in an Indo-Pacific
    theater of conflict. To do so, we must invest in innovative
    technologies that allow us to provide critical supplies at the
    point of use. Advanced manufacturing programs are already
    producing promising results for the warfighter. For example,
    the Army's Joint Manufacturing and Technology Center at Rock
    Island Army Arsenal in Illinois is leading the way in building
    a robust, additive manufacturing capability with state-of-the-
    art 3D printers.
        Deploying this technology would allow us to rapidly produce
    parts needed for maintenance in theater, among other important
    uses, yet there is a lack of overall guidance on how to
    operationalize these technologies and coordinate their
    development across the Department.
        Yesterday I introduced the Bioindustrial Additive
    Manufacturing For America Act. This legislation directs the
    Department of Defense to build on the success of these existing
    efforts and create an implementation strategy that allows the
    DOD to realize the full benefit of additive and bioindustrial
    engineering and manufacturing.
        General McConville, what role do you see additive
    manufacturing playing in supporting the Army's logistics
    efforts in a contested environment, and what barriers do you
    see to successful operationalization of these innovative
    technologies across the Army?
        General McConville. I think, Senator, it is extremely
    important. If you look at how we have done logistics over the
    years, we used to call it the Iron Mountain. We brought a whole
    bunch of parts with us, and that was very excessive. We tried
    to get more efficient and we went to more just-in-time
    logistics, and that becomes very challenging.
        I think what additive manufacturing does for us is gives us
    the capability to make those parts at the critical time when we
    need them. As you know very well, our helicopters do not fly,
    our tanks do not drive, our trucks do not work without having
    those parts.
        So I think we need to get very aggressive after this
    capability. I think we need to have it on the forward edge of
    the battlefield so we can make the parts that are critical in
    case we cannot get the resupplies, and again, I am a firm
    supporter of it.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I think we also stop this
    tendency, sometimes, also to start cannibalizing parts out of
    one piece of equipment, because what happens is you borrow one
    part, so now it is down for that one part, and then another
    aircraft needs something so let's go take it from that one.
    Before you know it you have got a Hangar Queen, whether it is
    an aircraft or a ground vehicle.
        General McConville, given the increased funding tin the
    Pacific Pathways program in your budget request this year, how
    do you plan to grow these types of exercises, and what can
    Congress do to help support you in these efforts, like the
    Pacific Pathways program and these exercises?
        General McConville. Well, we have been talking about this,
    Senator, and talking with General Flynn and talking to Admiral
    Aquilino. It is really important that we set the theater with
    our allies and partners, that we have forward presence, that we
    have access and presence, that we have equipment forward, very
    similar to what we have in Europe. You know, if we want to be
    in a position to reinforce allies and partners and be a
    deterrence we have got to have forward presence, and we need to
    work on that.
        Senator Duckworth. What can we do to help you with that?
        General McConville. Well, some of it is the resourcing and
    also it is a policy decision. For a lot of this I defer to the
    policymakers, of what type of relationship do we have with
    these countries? Do they allow us to have a status of force
    agreement so our troops can come there, so our troops can
    exercise, and so our troops can stay there?
        Senator Duckworth. I know you certainly have done your part
    in developing these relationships, the mil-to-mil
    relationships, and thank you for your efforts in that.
        I am out of time, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
        I will at this point recess the open hearing and at 11:50
    we will reconvene in SVC-217 so that the Secretary and the
    Chief can elaborate in a classified setting if they feel so,
    and my colleagues can pose questions that may be requiring
    classified answers.
        With that I will adjourn the open hearing, and at 1150
    hours we will see you in SVC-217. Thank you.
        [Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King
                       army transition assistance program
        As we discussed during the hearing I am deeply concerned with the
    quality of information and mentorship that is being provided to
    transitioning servicemembers. We have invested a tremendous amount of
    time and resources into training these professional soldier and they
    have served with distinction. I believe we owe it to the
    servicemembers, their families, and the American people to ensure they
    are postured to rejoin the civilian workforce.

        1. Senator King. Secretary Wormuth, as the DOD's largest force, how
    is the Department of the Army working to provide the transition
    resources servicemembers need and what innovative opportunities are
    available to soldiers?
        Secretary Wormuth.The Army Transition Assistance Program utilizes
    multiple programs and tools to facilitate the connection between
    transitioning soldiers and employers. The six primary connection
    pillars are:

        1.  Army Career Skills Program and DOD support websites like
    MilGears,

        2.  an employment website provided at no cost by Recruit Military,

        3.  Private Public Partnership,

        4.  in person and virtual hiring events,

        5.  American Job Centers, and

        6.  Partnership for Youth Success (PaYS).

        During the second quarter of fiscal year 2022, the Army saw the
    lowest unemployment compensation invoice total in the last 22 years.
    Hopefully, this is an indication that these programs and tools are
    helping transitioning soldiers bridge the gap between military and
    civilian life.

        2. Senator King. Secretary Wormuth, what are the metrics for
    suicides among transitioning soldiers in terms of previous MOS,
    deployments, transition time, etc?
        Secretary Wormuth. The Army tracks several factors, both risk and
    protective, that can potentially increase suicidal tendencies in
    soldiers. This information is visible at multiple echelons in an
    attempt to see risk and be proactive in intervening prior to harmful
    events. Most of this information is provided by authoritative data
    sources and tracked within the Commander's Risk Reduction Toolkit
    (CRRT):

          Soldier risk factors include, but not limited to:
    deployments, criminality/legal issues (courts-martial, nonjudicial
    punishment), substance abuse issues (alcohol and drugs), medical
    profiles / duty limiting issues, limited behavioral health issues (due
    to legal limitations), adverse personnel actions (Flags, bars to
    reenlistment, etc.), safety/accidents; sexual assault information (of
    perpetrators only), and domestic violence data.

          Soldier protective factors include, but not limited to:
    resilience skills training, suicide prevention training to include the
    warning signs and indicators, financial education and self-sufficiency,
    and education on the effects of substance abuse on mental health.

          Personnel data that Army collects to provide general
    demographics for study include, but not limited to: gender, rank, age,
    MOS, deployments, promotions/demotions, and physical fitness testing.
    This data provides the general demographics for study.
        Army Regulation 600-8-101 (Personal Readiness Processing) states
    that all soldiers within 60 days of transitioning out of the military
    are required to complete a periodic health assessment (PHA). In
    accordance with medical regulations, the PHA includes a mental health
    assessment consisting of evidence-based questions for depression, PTSD,
    substance abuse, domestic violence, and suicide. These responses are
    reviewed and assessed in a face-to-face encounter with a primary care
    provider. Referrals to specialty behavioral health care are made after
    consultation, as needed. In addition, soldiers being considered for
    separation for disciplinary reasons are required to have a mental
    status examination performed by a mental health provider.

        3. Senator King. Secretary Wormuth, how can the DOD and VA work to
    better integrate their healthcare system to prevent record loss or
    delays in critical care?
        Secretary Wormuth. Integration of systems to facilitate
    transferring health information of transitioning soldiers is a key
    priority. DOD and VA are working together to better integrate their
    healthcare systems through the Federal Electronic Healthcare Record
    Modernization (FEHRM) Office. In particular, the FEHRM allows the DOD
    and VA to effectively and efficiently implement an integrated, state of
    the market, electronic health record that can be shared between the VA
    and the DOD in real time. The new electronic health record also
    supports data sharing with private and community partners via the
    Health Information Exchange (HIE), as well as review of servicemembers'
    records within legacy electronic records through the Joint Longitudinal
    Viewer (JLV). JLV is a centrally hosted, browser-based web application,
    used in both the DOD and VA environments.
                               suicide prevention
        4. Senator King. Secretary Wormuth, I continue to read the horrific
    stories of suicide across the joint force and I want some done to
    protect our greatest assets in the United States military, the
    servicemembers. I believe it is time to allocate the resources to
    leaders to address the problems and stop conducting inconclusive
    studies on the topic. Leaders at all levels should have the authorities
    and resources to address lift threatening situations and cut the red
    tape slowing care or innovative remedies.
        Secretary Wormuth, what are the metrics by which you measure
    success in the war against soldier suicide?
        Secretary Wormuth. The Army measures progress in the reduction of
    suicides across the force by tracking both the protective factors and
    the risk factors that affect suicidality, to include, but not limited
    to: 1) increased knowledge and understanding through education of
    stressors; 2) increased individual resilience skills, such as emotional
    regulation; improved quality of life (such as housing and community
    activities); increased financial education and self-sufficiency;
    increased usage of both non-clinical and clinical assistance (e.g.,
    behavioral health, chaplains, and Military and Family Life Counselors
    (MFLCC)) as required to reduce stress. Ultimately, though, the truest
    measure of success is the sustained reduction, as evidenced over
    multiple years, in deaths by suicide across the force. This is a long-
    term goal that requires long-term solutions. With that in mind, the
    Army is developing a prevention strategy and building a more robust
    integrated violence prevention workforce to enable a holistic approach
    to prevent suicide and other harmful behaviors. The Army is hiring the
    prevention workforce (PWF) in phased implementation beginning this
    fiscal year through fiscal year 2027. The PWF will be responsible for
    implementing and evaluating evidence-based primary prevention
    activities

        5. Senator King. Secretary Wormuth, what is your assessment of the
    Department's efforts in preventing soldier suicide?
        Secretary Wormuth. The Army has made great strides in establishing
    the foundations of a prevention-focused suicide prevention program. We
    are implementing a public health approach, focused on engaged
    leadership, as well as new, comprehensive and integrated, policies
    designed to prevent and respond to suicide at the individual and
    community levels. This new approach is informed by science,
    specifically the risk and protective factors identified by the Center
    for Disease Control and Prevention and it is closely aligned with the
    White House's suicide prevention strategy. The Army will continue
    collaborating with academia to conduct research to refine future policy
    and program approaches.
        The Army has been conducting multiple studies, pilots, and
    initiatives over the last three years attempting to expand behavioral
    health resources, identify specific factors, increase prevention
    efforts, destigmatize seeking help, and emphasize limiting access to
    lethal means in order to reduce deaths by suicide within our Service.
        Some of the initiatives include:

          Updating and publishing policies and procedures that
    emphasize suicide prevention, to include a major revision to the
    Suicide Prevention Policy; publishing two commander ``how to''
    handbooks to facilitate program execution; and a implementing a total
    force chain teaching program initiated by the Vice Chief of Staff of
    the Army to emphasize suicide prevention as a priority.

          The Army is also emphasizing down to the lowest level
    that servicemembers must demonstrate engaged leadership which includes
    implementing preventative measures, such as mandating 100 percent
    wellness checks at select locations. These locations include the 11th
    Airborne in Alaska, Fort Bliss, Fort Drum, and Fort Stewart. A wellness
    check can be 1) a soldier meets with a Military Family Life Counselor
    (MFLC); 2) a Periodic Health Assessment (PHA)-based review of
    behavioral health records for incoming soldiers; or 3) a barracks or
    home check by leadership.

          Developing and fielding the Behavioral Health Readiness
    and Suicide Risk Reduction Review (R4) tool as an instrument that
    assists first line leaders (company-level and below) with risk
    identification and suicide prevention related conversations.

          Effectuating new suicide prevention training that
    challenges the stigma against seeking help, identifies time-sensitive
    warning signs and risk factors, and outlines steps servicemembers can
    take to address the risk. This also includes briefings to all brigade
    and battalion Pre-Command Courses held since August 2021.

          Refining and fielding the Behavioral Health Pulse (BH
    Pulse) tool to provide commanders with an assessment of behavioral
    health across their formations. BH Pulse is a key visibility tool to
    help prevent harmful behaviors and enhance unit well-being.

          Bolstering BH support in USARAK by adding two Active Duty
    and three reserve providers. This additional staff will provide 186
    appointments a week--a 33 percent increase in mental health services.

          In March, Secretary Austin announced a Suicide Prevention
    & Response Independent Review Committee (SPRIRC) to review relevant
    suicide prevention and response activities. The Army will support the
    review and implement the findings and recommendations of the report in
    the future. OSD announced the group's charter and membership, and they
    will start visiting our installations this August. The final report
    will be provided to the SECDEF in late December.

        6. Senator King. Secretary Wormuth, in remote locations (i.e.
    Alaska) are the mental health resources adequate to handle the combined
    stressors of isolation, harsh environment, OPTEMPO, and potential first
    term duty issues?
        Secretary Wormuth. The most impactful mental health resource in the
    United States Army is the first line leader, who interacts with the
    soldier on a regular basis, provides mentorship, and is responsible for
    taking care of their subordinates. Leaders are always present, even at
    the most austere locations. Mental and spiritual health services
    comprise the next level of support. The Army is constantly re-
    evaluating the distribution of our Nation's limited specialty mental
    health resources within our force. The Army can do ``more with less''
    by employing these resources wisely. The Army, in collaboration with
    the Defense Health Agency, will continue to update personnel
    distribution documents to better support austere locations. It will
    also broaden the impact of its existing mental health services through
    innovations such as virtual health.

        7. Senator King. Secretary Wormuth, how is the Army assessing if
    soldiers are fit to serve in remote locations or high-stress units?
        Secretary Wormuth. Several programs are already in place to
    identify soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers who are well-
    suited for Alaska assignments.

        a.  The ``Option 20'' initiative allows initial entry soldiers,
    based on their preference, to enlist for assignments in Alaska. Due to
    unit type and composition, Skill Level 1 Soldiers constitute a
    significant percentage (over 56 percent) of the assigned strength of
    the two Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in Alaska. Therefore, excluding
    first-term soldiers from cold weather locales may negatively impact
    unit readiness.

        b.  NCOs and Officers leverage the Assignment Satisfaction Key -
    Enlisted Module (ASK-EM), and Assignment Interactive Module 2 (AIM2)
    marketplaces, directly to interact with units to ensure suitable
    candidates are assigned to Alaska-based units.

        Of note, HIPAA prevents Human Resources Command from screening
    soldiers for past or ongoing behavioral health treatment prior to
    assigning them to an Alaska-based unit. The law protects disclosure of
    individually identifiable health information, such as an individual's
    past or current physical or mental health condition, in most
    circumstances. Soldiers with ongoing mental health treatment or other
    medical conditions should consult their medical health provider to
    ensure that they can receive the appropriate treatment at their new
    duty station. Soldier fitness for a particular duty station should be
    determined on a case-by-case basis.
                            research and development
        8. Senator King. Secretary Wormuth, General McConville, what is the
    expected timeframe for the United States to match and surpass China and
    Russia's capabilities in hypersonic missile technology and directed
    energy weaponization?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army is on track to
    deliver a road mobile, air transportable Long Range Hypersonic Weapon
    (LRHW) that will provide residual combat capability to soldiers by the
    end of fiscal year 2023. The Army, in collaboration with the Navy and
    its industrial partners, continue to make great strides in advancing
    this critical hypersonic capability.
        The Army is currently executing three Directed Energy programs.
    First, the Directed Energy Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (DE M-
    SHORAD) is on track to deliver its first combat-capable platoon of
    directed energy weapon systems in the 4th quarter of fiscal year 2022
    and will continue delivering prototypes in fiscal year 2023 and fiscal
    year 2024. DE M-SHORAD is a 50kW-class laser prototype weapon system--
    integrated onto a Stryker platform--that protects divisions and brigade
    combat teams from Group 1-3 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), rotary-
    wing aircraft, and indirect fire threats. These directed energy weapons
    are paired with kinetic weapons to form an integrated and layered
    defense.
        Second, the Army will also deliver 300kW-class High Energy Laser
    (HEL) and High Power Microwave (HPM) prototype weapon systems in fiscal
    year 2024 as part of the Indirect Fires Protection Capability (IFPC)
    battery to support multi-domain operations. As part of tiered and
    layered defense for fixed and semi-fixed sites, IFPC-HEL and -HPM are
    designed to counter threats by Group 1-3 UASs, rotary- and fixed-wing
    aircraft, indirect fire, and Group 1-2 UAS swarms.
        Third, in support of the Joint Force and as part of the Army's role
    as Executive Agent for Counter small-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-
    sUAS), the Army fielded a 10kW capability in June 2022 for deployment
    OCONUS. This capability is focused on countering threats by Group 1-3
    UASs, rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, and enemy indirect fire
    capabilities. This 10kW capability will be followed by a 20kW
    capability by the end of this year.
                                     unclos
        9. Senator King. General McConville, do you support the
    ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
    (UNCLOS)?
        General McConville. National security depends on the global
    mobility of U.S. forces, which in turn depends on the navigational
    freedoms protected by the Law of the Sea. The Army will continue to
    operate within the international legal parameters set by existing law
    and treaties approved by Congress.
                               drug interdiction
        10. Senator King. Secretary Wormuth, what coordination is currently
    underway by the HQDA with the ONDCP to stem the flow of illegal drugs
    into the United States?
        Secretary Wormuth. The Department of the Army Headquarters does not
    directly coordinate with the Office of National Drug Control Policy
    (ONDCP). The coordination between the Department of Defense and ONDCP
    is conducted at the Office of the Secretary of Defense-Policy level or
    at the geographic combatant command level.

        11. Senator King. Secretary Wormuth, General McConville, what
    operations, exercises, capabilities acquisitions, or other efforts are
    planned this year in the Western Hemisphere to secure the homeland and
    build partner capacity to help with the war on drugs?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The U.S. Army currently
    employs Security Force Assistance (SFA) teams in Central and South
    America that train and advise partner nation security forces. Operating
    under title 10, section 321 authorities, the SFA teams assist their
    counterparts in command and control, training management, leader
    development, intelligence analysis, logistics, and communications. The
    partner nations utilize this training to assist in their efforts at
    countering narcotics trafficking (CNT) and Transnational Criminal
    Organizations (TCOs). Section 321 requires all training conducted by
    U.S. forces be in the national security interest of the U.S., as well
    as the primary purpose being to train U.S. forces.
        The U.S. Army supported several exercises in fiscal year 2022
    focused on building partner nation interoperability, readiness, and
    confidence across the region. The recent Central America (CENTAM)
    GUARDIAN 22 Command Post Exercise (CPX) focused on the tri-border area
    of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The CPX built capability,
    capacity, and effectiveness for combating common threats, to include
    cross-border smuggling and illicit drug trafficking.
        To assist partner nation efforts at countering TCO activities, the
    U.S. Army intelligence enterprise gathers and processes information,
    which is then passed to U.S. embassies. Army theater intelligence
    collection assets, forward deployed analysts, and protection
    detachments all support these efforts. Additionally, the U.S. Army
    conducts several subject matter expert exchanges and border security
    tabletop exercises which foster collaboration, assist in improving the
    management of intelligence tasks, and increase the professionalism of
    partner nation intelligence capabilities.
                                china commission
        12. Senator King. I believe we must establish an unbiased and non-
    partisan commission to examine a grand strategy for our approach to
    China, similar in intent to President Eisenhower's Solarium Project. We
    need to think of a holistic approach to create a stable international
    order in which China (or Russia) cannot dictate regional developments.
        Secretary Wormuth, General McConville, in order to avoid the United
    States trying to ``spend our way out of conflict,'' how can we
    specifically counter China's major activities in your area of
    responsibility?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army can and is
    investing in low to moderate cost capabilities and activities that are
    integrated with allies and partners and which generate high returns on
    investment in support of the Joint Force to counter the People's
    Republic of China's (PRC) aggression in the Indo-Pacific. These
    investments focus on exercises and activities in support of OPERATION
    PATHWAYS, which allows the Army to deepen our integration with our
    allies and partners to help them secure their own interests, grow and
    mature our bilateral and multilateral interoperability, and improve our
    logistics and sustainment capabilities west of the international date
    line.
        There are also modernization efforts underway to significantly
    expand integrated air and missile defense capabilities in the AOR.
    Using our Long-range hypersonic weapons, mid-range capability and
    Precision Strike Missile - all of which we will begin fielding in
    fiscal year 2023, the Army has the ability to interdict fires across
    sea lines of communication, suppress enemy air defenses, and provide
    counter fires against mobile targets.
        These moderate investments position joint enabling capabilities
    closer to the point of need to counter China's major activities inside
    the first and second island chains. In addition, the Army has completed
    classified assessments on these investments and activities.

        13. Senator King. Secretary Wormuth, General McConville, what would
    be the greatest benefit this commission could deliver?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Department does not
    currently have a position on the creation of a commission, but DOD
    works with various partners across the U.S. Government to achieve
    national security priorities.

        14. Senator King. Secretary Wormuth, General McConville, what would
    put us in the best position to avoid the U.S. and China from escalating
    conflict and careening into a war with China?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. China, specifically Xi
    Jinping, must believe that the risks of going to war with the U.S.
    outweigh the benefits. The U.S. can avoid war with China by credibly
    proving that we, with and through our allies and partners, can and will
    position and employ key military capabilities west of the international
    date line that deter the PRC from risking aggressive behavior that
    elevates the potential of conflict and war. Clearly demonstrating the
    ability and willingness to position and employ credible military power
    in concert with our allies and partners will influence the PRC's
    assessment of the folly of entering a war and escalating conflict. This
    approach should also be taken in tandem with appropriate diplomatic,
    economic and informational efforts made by our interagency partners,
    diplomats, and their counterparts in ally and partner nations.

        15. Senator King. Secretary Wormuth, General McConville, what are
    the `toughest problems' OUTSIDE of military imbalances?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. There are three
    difficult, non-military problems with potential long-term impacts
    involving the Army's preparations to support and enable the Joint Force
    in the Indo-Pacific for a war with China.

        1.  The overall American ability and societal willingness to
    increase our wartime industrial capacity/production (organic industrial
    base) for a protracted conflict with China.

        2.  American supply chain security and resiliency, ranging from key
    industrial components and to basic daily staples for the American
    public.

        3.  Cybersecurity capacity and capability outside of the Department
    of Defense information technology systems and networks that assures
    Army force projection capabilities.
                                     arctic
        16. Senator King. I supported Senator Sullivan's Arctic Security
    Initiative amendment last year, and helped get it into law with the
    Chairman.
        Secretary Wormuth, General McConville, what specific resource
    shortfalls do our armed forces currently possess that would limit its
    ability to conduct exercises/operations in the High North? Please be
    specific to include operations and sustainment funding for exercises,
    equipment shortfalls such as weather gear for soldiers or unique
    platforms.
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. As part of implementing
    the 2021 Army Arctic Strategy, the Army is continuing to refocus and
    prioritize our efforts to improve Arctic capability. The Army's fiscal
    year 2023 Budget requested $102 million in support of the Arctic
    Strategy: $24 million for Cold Weather All-Terrain Vehicle (CATV), $25
    million for winterization of equipment, $13 million for exportable
    combat training center (CTC) support, and $40 million for
    organizational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE). With this
    funding we will be able to continue execution of our exportable CTC
    capability, field CATVs to units beginning in fiscal year 2023, and
    mitigate some shortfalls in clothing and individual equipment. If not
    funded, the Arctic Strategy will be hindered by the lack of proper
    equipment and will impact overall readiness.
        Additionally, it will be unable to outfit all soldiers assigned to
    train in or deploy to arctic environments elevating risk to soldier
    safety. The Army will continue to assess readiness for Arctic
    operations through the winter training program for its newest division,
    the 11th Airborne Division. Future development of this division and its
    supporting brigade combat teams will inform modernization efforts to
    build Arctic capability to meet future threats.
                           small business challenges
        17. Senator King. Secretary Wormuth, the current strain on supply
    chain and effects of COVID have had an adverse impact on small
    businesses, especially those that negotiated fixed price contracts in
    the last 2 years. Inflation rates in those contracts were in many cases
    negotiated at 2 percent. The current cost of raw material (and labor)
    has increased drastically since 2020. On average the material prices
    have increased 31 percent but key materials like steel, resin and
    fiberglass that our Maine composites industries have increased at a
    much higher rate. What is the Army doing to help acquisition officials
    including providing program managers greater flexibility in cost
    adjustments?
        Secretary Wormuth, what is the Army doing to help small businesses
    navigate this challenging environment?
        Secretary Wormuth. The Army is closely monitoring any impacts due
    to the current inflationary environment. Inflationary impacts will vary
    based on the size and health of the contractor, the types of supplies
    and services and the type of contract. Small businesses are most
    affected and may not be able to deliver at all due to the increased
    costs of materials and labor. We are reviewing each impacted contract
    and determining appropriate remedies based on the specific facts of
    that case and challenges presented to small businesses. For example,
    the extension of required delivery dates and the reduction of required
    quantities.

        18. Senator King. Secretary Wormuth, what authorities does the Army
    require to provide options to program managers and contracting officers
    with better flexibility to address these challenges, especially in the
    case of small businesses?
        Secretary Wormuth. At this time, the Army can manage the
    inflationary impacts with its current authorities. When executing new
    contracts, program managers and contracting officers will consider
    different contract types, shorter periods of performance, and the use
    of economic price adjustment clauses to mitigate the impacts of
    inflation, including those to small businesses.
                           sexual assault prevention
        19. Senator King. Secretary Wormuth, the Air National Guard
    Director, recently spoke to me about the ``Prevention Workforce
    Program'' in order to better address sexual assault and harassment
    cases in the Air National Guard. Is the Department of the Army
    implementing a similar program for the Army National Guard? If not, is
    there a similar program in place?
        Secretary Wormuth. The National Guard Bureau is implementing a
    joint Prevention Workforce Program to serve both Army National Guard
    (ARNG) and Air National Guard (ANG) servicemembers. The program is
    being implemented in two phases, with 28 states and territories
    starting in fiscal year 2022 and fiscal year 2023, and the remaining 26
    in fiscal year 2024.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                             army medical research
        20. Senator Inhofe. The National Defense Authorization Acts for
    fiscal years 2019 and 2020 included provisions to transition the United
    States Army Medical Research and Materiel Command to the Defense Health
    Agency no later than September 30, 2022.
        General McConville, is the Army committed to completing the
    transition in accordance with the requirements and timeline set forth
    in the National Defense Authorization Act?
        General McConville. Yes, the Army remains committed to continued
    partnership and collaboration during this transition. However, on 21
    April 2022, the Army submitted a legislative proposal to Congress for
    the Army to retain elements of the U.S. Army Medical Research and
    Development (MRDC) that closely support the Army's Title 10
    authorities. MRDC and the leadership of the Defense Health Agency are
    engaged in multiple transition meetings to comply with existing law and
    to meet the statutory timelines and will comply with any potential
    statutory changes. The Army is committed to the success of DHA and
    fulfilling title 10 authorities.

        21. Senator Inhofe. General McConville, is the Army committed to
    providing continued leadership with the necessary subject matter
    expertise at the General Officer level to the Defense Health Agency
    Research and Engineering Directorate to complete the transition of the
    United States Army Medical Research and Materiel Command as required by
    law?
        General McConville. Yes.
                                ground vehicles
        22. Senator Inhofe. The overall fiscal year 2023 defense budget
    makes important investments into autonomous platforms including in the
    next generation fighting vehicles, the optionally manned fighting
    vehicle, and unmanned surface vehicles.
        General McConville, what role do you see autonomous weapon systems
    playing in future ground combat?
        General McConville. I believe autonomous systems will be
    increasingly employed to reduce risk to soldiers or to accomplish the
    same tasks with fewer soldiers in harm's way. For example, autonomous
    reconnaissance platforms (both air and ground) can be employed to scout
    in front of maneuvering forces, to identify where the enemy is or is
    not, or to conduct economy of force operations where the threat of
    enemy action is reduced. Autonomous capabilities may also be able to
    conduct dangerous and complex operations, such as mine clearing or the
    breaching of obstacles to optimize maneuver force operations and reduce
    risks to the force.

        23. Senator Inhofe. General McConville, how do we ensure these
    systems are operations ready to fight a near-peer conflict and our
    forces fully training to execute combat operations in that scenario?
        General McConville. Experimentation and training are key to
    ensuring autonomous capabilities can perform assigned tasks and that
    soldiers and leaders know how to best employ and sustain them.

        24. Senator Inhofe. General McConville, what steps are being taken
    to develop trust in these autonomous systems with both the warfighter
    and the American public?
        General McConville. Developing trust in autonomous systems is a
    matter of experimentation and training. Soldiers and leaders will
    develop confidence in autonomous capabilities with the more first-hand
    experience they have. If soldiers and leaders trust the autonomous
    capabilities of these systems, I believe the American public will too.

        25. Senator Inhofe. General McConville, according to the GAO, close
    to 4,000 warfighters died due accidents in legacy ground systems
    between fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2019. What are we doing to
    increase both the safety and combat survivability and capability of
    these legacy systems to include autonomous upgrades?
        General McConville. Soldier health and safety is a top priority,
    and the Army is committed to improving soldier safety and enhancing
    force protection through multiple programs. Recognizing that the
    majority of these tragic incidents involve the Army's light tactical
    vehicle (LTV) fleet, the Army is prioritizing modernization of its High
    Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), through the Joint
    Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program. Every JLTV--unlike their
    predecessors--will come equipped with an anti-lock braking system and
    electronic vehicle control (ABS/ESC), integrated front and rear cameras
    to increase driver awareness, and a crew compartment that enables
    increased survivability in the event of an accident. The competitive
    contract for the JLTV is purposely intended to incentivize industry and
    bring additional driver enhancement technologies into the enduring
    solution. Concerning the legacy HMMWV, important efforts underway
    include retrofitting the field with ABS/ ESC kits which became standard
    after 2018. This technology, also commercially available, directly
    mitigates rollover accidents and their corresponding risk of fatal or
    serious injury to crew members. The Army is also piloting an effort to
    integrate autonomous capabilities on the Palletized Load System (a
    different section of the Army's wheeled vehicle fleet) in order to
    reduce risk to personnel during logistics missions.
                                    ukraine
        26. Senator Inhofe. As the world has watched what was considered a
    superior conventional fighting force, the Russian military, struggle to
    execute offensive operations against a smaller and technologically
    inferior Ukraine military, many experts are looking to see if there are
    lessons the United States can learn from this war. We know Russian
    logistics was a complete failure and the Ukrainian people's will to
    fight has imposed a heavy cost on Russian forces.
        General McConville, from a technology viewpoint, what lessons have
    you learned from this war - command and control, platform vs network-
    centric warfare, use of artificial intelligence and autonomy and modern
    vs legacy systems?
        General McConville. Command and Control: Events continue to confirm
    the importance of interoperability between joint and partner networks
    and systems, and the impact that a lack of interoperability can have on
    all warfighting functions. Observation of Russian command and control
    challenges reinforces the Army's need to create a modernized,
    integrated network that will enable our commanders and forces to
    achieve a holistic picture of the modern battlefield and enable a
    united joint and multi-national force to cut through the fog of war and
    make informed decisions, quickly. The Army remains on a path to create
    a unified network, which will converge and secure separate networks
    into a modern, integrated global NIPR, SIPR, and MPE environment.
        Platforms v. Network-centric: The Army has also observed the
    importance of operationalizing data, including the value of hybrid
    solutions for data and application hosting, where operational elements
    must have access to both local and off-site computing and data storage
    capabilities. The military, federal government and our partners will
    benefit from a dedicated focus on achieving an informational advantage
    built on resilient ``zero trust'' unified networks and data platforms
    with analytics for decision making, command and control, and reliable
    strategic reach-back. A combined capability set hosted locally will
    also provide higher analytic processing power, granting a tactical
    advantage through its use of faster network-centric solutions and
    enabling commanders to make decisions more rapidly than adversaries.
        Artificial Intelligence (AI) & Autonomous: The Army and the Joint
    force have observed some basic uses of artificial intelligence (AI) and
    autonomous-enabled systems by the Russian military, similar to
    observations made in Syria and other conflicts over the past decade.
    These observations include Russian use of autonomous drones to enable
    more accurate targeting and the use of AI-enabled internet technologies
    to enhance Russian dis- and mis-information campaigns. Our Army
    continues to dedicate efforts to observe, orient, and react to these
    systems, including through our counter unmanned aircraft systems (C-
    UAS) capabilities, information advantage efforts, and in cyberspace.
        Modern v. Legacy Systems: We have watched the Ukrainians leverage
    commercial technology, innovate with their legacy systems, and quickly
    adapt to use modern technology and services. Likewise, the U.S. Army
    and our allies are integrating legacy programs with new technology and
    commercial services to enhance intelligence, surveillance and
    reconnaissance (ISR) and situational awareness, shorten the speed and
    range of military effects, and enable quick reaction capabilities. The
    Ukrainian forces are adapting fast, and our Army is moving quickly to
    apply those lessons at scale.
        Logistics: At the forefront of lessons observed and learned is
    Russia's failed logistical performance across the spectrum of
    operations. Logistics is the foundation that projects and sustains
    warfighting capabilities. Logistics conducted at speed and at scale
    enables the warfighting capabilities to initiate and maintain momentum
    against the adversary, especially in a protracted conflict. The lessons
    learned from the Russian invasion of Ukraine reiterates the importance
    of our logisticians, sustained investments in replenishment, and the
    continued evolution in logistical doctrine to maintain the Army's
    ability to project and sustain globally.
                        counter unmanned aerial systems
        27. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Shyu and the White House Science &
    Technology Offices have prioritized of directed energy capabilities,
    and specifically high power microwave technological development.
        Secretary Wormuth, General McConville, how is this being carried
    over to the development and execution of Army's Defense Strategy?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The U.S. Army Rapid
    Capabilities and Critical Technologies Offices (RCCTO) is focused on
    directed energy efforts, including Directed Energy Maneuver Short Range
    Air Defense (DE M-SHORAD), Indirect Fires Protection Capability (IFPC),
    High Energy Laser (HEL), and High Power Microwave (HPM). Specific to
    the HPM, the Army--in coordination with the Joint Counter-small
    Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office (JCO)--is evaluating capabilities and
    lessons learned from the deployment of the Air Force's Tactical High
    Power Microwave Operational Responder (THOR), as well as recent
    industry demonstrations at Yuma Proving Grounds, to inform Army
    decisions on a HPM prototype weapon system. The Army projects that
    IFPC-HEL and IFPC-HPM will be delivered in fiscal year 2024 as part of
    a tiered and layered defense capability for fixed and semi-fixed sites,
    against Group 1-3 Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), rotary- and fixed-wing
    aircraft, indirect fire, and Group 1-2 UAS swarm threats.

        28. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wormuth, General McConville, how are
    Directed Energy systems being leveraged to meet the priority threats
    and the capabilities of the competition?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army is currently
    executing three Directed Energy programs. First, the Directed Energy
    Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (DE M-SHORAD) is on track to deliver
    its first combat-capable platoon of directed energy weapon systems in
    the 4th Quarter of fiscal year 2022 and will continue delivering
    prototypes in fiscal year 2023 and fiscal year 2024. DE M-SHORAD is a
    50kW-class laser prototype weapon system--integrated onto a Stryker
    platform--that protects divisions and brigade combat teams from Group
    1-3 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), rotary-wing aircraft, and indirect
    fire threats. These directed energy weapons are paired with kinetic
    weapons to form an integrated and layered defense.
        Second, the Army will also deliver 300kW-class High Energy Laser
    (HEL) and High Power Microwave (HPM) prototype weapon systems in fiscal
    year 2024 as part of the Indirect Fires Protection Capability (IFPC)
    battery to support multi-domain operations. As part of tiered and
    layered defense for fixed and semi-fixed sites, IFPC-HEL and -HPM are
    designed to counter threats by Group 1-3 UASs, rotary- and fixed-wing
    aircraft, indirect fire, and Group 1-2 UAS swarms.
        Third, in support of the Joint Force and as part of the Army's role
    as Executive Agent for Counter small-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-
    sUAS), the Army fielded a 10kW capability in June 2022 for deployment
    OCONUS. This capability is focused on countering threats by Group 1-3
    UASs, rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, and enemy indirect fire
    capabilities. This 10kW capability will be followed by a 20kW
    capability by the end of this year.
        Our adversaries and non-state actors alike are rapidly
    proliferating the development and execution of Unmanned Aerial Systems
    (UAS) that pose a real threat to U.S. forces and infrastructure.

        29. Senator Inhofe. Our adversaries and non-state actors alike are
    rapidly proliferating the development and execution of Unmanned Aerial
    Systems (UAS) that pose a real threat to U.S. forces and
    infrastructure.
        Secretary Wormuth, General McConville, is the Army seeing an
    increase in UAS overflight over its personnel and installation in the
    United States and overseas?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The number of documented
    Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) overflights has increased in both the
    U.S. and at our overseas installations. In turn, increased training and
    fielding of UAS detection systems have enhanced our awareness of the
    UAS threat and the Army's need for continued observation both at home
    and abroad. As directed by the Joint Staff's Small Unmanned Aircraft
    Systems Reporting Execute Order, the Army is reporting UAS incidents in
    a single joint database for documentation and enhanced analysis.

        30. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wormuth, General McConville, what
    actions is the Army taking to defend against UAS threats?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. As the DOD Executive
    Agent for Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-sUAS), the Army
    established the Joint C-sUAS Office (JCO) to lead the development and
    integration of emerging Joint C-sUAS capabilities, emphasizing rapid
    innovation, the synchronization of material and non-materiel solutions,
    and fostering partnerships.
        As one of its first actions, the JCO conducted an operational
    assessment of current C-sUAS capabilities and selected ten initial
    Joint C-sUAS systems--which are already proving their effectiveness to
    detect and defeat fixed-wing and quad-copter style sUAS attacks.
    Additionally, the JCO published the first-ever DOD C-sUAS Strategy and
    its associated implementation plan and released joint C-sUAS
    operational requirements to address current and future C-sUAS
    capabilities. Further, the JCO and all military services are working
    closely with the Army Fires Center of Excellence to establish joint
    training and doctrine required to enhance C-sUAS operations.
        Additionally, the JCO is also working with industry leaders to
    modernize current capabilities. As part of this effort, the JCO and
    partner agencies across all services host semi-annual industry
    demonstrations to evaluate emerging technologies that close gaps,
    inform requirements, and promote innovation. The JCO's Rapid Response
    Team is also supporting combatant commanders with in-depth analyses of
    the operational threat environment and providing these commands with
    materiel and non-materiel recommendations that reflect C-sUAS best
    practices.
        The Army is also continuing development of specific programs to
    mitigate specific capability gaps concerning the defense of fixed/semi-
    fixed sites and mounted or dismounted configurations. As the efforts
    mature, the Army will continue to inform this committee of our
    progress.

        31. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wormuth, General McConville, how is
    the Army addressing the UAS threat from the top-down?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army continues to
    validate, plan, and source counter-small unmanned aircraft systems (C-
    sUAS) capability requirements in support of contingency operations
    around the world. The Army remains focused on providing critical C-sUAS
    capability to divisions in the operational force, while also growing
    protection of vital fixed and semi-fixed sites in accordance with
    current requirements. With a goal of accelerating the procurement and
    fielding of C-sUAS Division Sets to the operational force, the Army has
    programmed funds to begin this effort in fiscal year 2022.
        Beyond our service-specific efforts to address the unmanned
    aircraft systems threat, the Army also serves as the Department of
    Defense's OS Executive Agent for C-sUAS. In this role, and through the
    Joint C-sUAS Office (JCO), the Army leads and directs the development
    of joint doctrine, requirements, materiel, and training efforts. The
    Army's efforts to identify and develop solutions within a joint
    architecture enhances warfighter capabilities across the DOD.

        32. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wormuth, General McConville, is the
    Army looking at utilizing directed energy, to include lasers and high
    power microwave technology, for base security and integration on Army
    ground vehicles?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Yes. The Army is
    developing directed energy capabilities for base security, maneuver
    fire protection, and for integration onto Army ground vehicles.
        The Army is currently executing three Directed Energy programs.
    First, the Directed Energy Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (DE M-
    SHORAD) is on track to deliver its first combat-capable platoon of four
    prototype directed energy weapon systems in fiscal year 2022. DE M-
    SHORAD is a 50kW-class laser prototype weapon system integrated onto a
    Stryker platform, that protects division and brigade combat teams from
    Group 1-3 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), rotary-wing aircraft, and
    indirect fire threats. These directed energy weapons are designed to be
    paired with kinetic weapons for an integrated and layered defense.
        Second, as part of a tiered and layered defense of fixed and semi-
    fixed sites, the Army will also deliver 300kW-class High Energy Laser
    (HEL) and High Power Microwave (HPM) prototype weapon systems in fiscal
    year 2024 as part of the Indirect Fires Protection Capability (IFPC)
    battery to support Multi-Domain Operations (MDO). The threat set
    addressed by IFPC-HEL is Group 1-3 UAS, rotary- and fixed-wing
    aircraft, and indirect fire. The threat set addressed by IFPC-HPM is
    Group 1-2 UAS swarms.
        Third, in support of the Joint Force and as part of the Army's role
    of the Executive Agent for Counter small-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-
    sUAS), the Army fielded a 10kWatt capability in June 2022 for
    deployment OCONUS. Focused on Groups 1-3 UAS, this fielding will be
    followed by a 20kWatt capability by the end of this year.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
                  army futures command successful transitions
        33. Senator Cotton. Ms. Wormuth, Army Futures Command routinely
    touts its success stories in terms of the amount of dollars let in
    contracts or opening new offices to interface with small and innovative
    businesses. Can you provide a specific example of a contract that Army
    Futures Command let which has transitioned into a program of record?
        Secretary Wormuth. Several of the 31 signature modernization
    efforts are now programs of record or about to be so, including Army
    Integrated Air and Missile Defense, Maneuver Short Range Air Defense,
    Indirect Fire Protection Capability, Lower-Tier Air and Missile Defense
    Sensor, Precision Strike Missile, and the Next Generation Squad Weapon.
                 large maneuver element training opportunities
        34. Senator Cotton. General McConville, one of the constant
    critiques of our adversaries is their major exercises are scripted so
    the commanders always win. Can you tell me--without any caveats--that
    our major exercises are not scripted at both the operational and
    tactical levels, including providing training opportunities for
    soldiers at all echelons, including Brigade, Corps, and Division
    Commanders?
        General McConville. Army major exercises are not scripted so that
    commanders always win. Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations and
    Warfighter Exercises (WFXs) remain the Army's premier collective
    training event for brigade, division, and corps commanders and their
    respective staffs, and offer realistic and demanding training designed
    to build readiness and train Mission Command during Large Scale Combat
    Operations (LSCO) in a contested operating environment across all
    domains. Simulating LSCO in an environment contested across all
    domains, actions by free-thinking opposing forces ensure that
    operational and tactical success is never guaranteed.
                            low-cost tactical radio
        35. Senator Cotton. General McConville, the 1980s SINCGARS radios
    are breaking down and are unreliable. All the modernization in the
    world won't help if we can't talk to each other. I would hate to see
    our soldiers on social media using commercial walkie-talkies like the
    Russians are. Is the amount of money you requested for the low-cost
    tactical radio replacement enough to fix this problem in a relevant
    timeframe?
        General McConville. The Army fiscal year 2023 budget request
    reflects our strategy to replace legacy SINCGARS radios and provide a
    modernized replacement in a relevant timeframe. This modernization
    strategy, funded in the President's Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request at
    $907 million, includes a mix of platforms that contribute to the Army's
    cryptographic modernization efforts and enable a resilient, adaptable
    network in the multi-domain environment.
                      over-classification of capabilities
        36. Senator Cotton. Secretary Wormuth, there is tension between the
    strategy of ``integrated deterrence'' and the security apparatus
    purposefully designed to prevent integration of exquisite capabilities.
    What is your plan to ensure the right people, not only soldiers and
    civilians in the Army but also people in other services, outside of
    higher headquarters buildings, have access to the information they need
    to plan, test, and train with our high-end but classified capabilities?
        Secretary Wormuth. Officials responsible for the development and
    fielding of Army systems follow information security policies required
    by Executive Order 13526, as implemented by the Department of Defense.
    If a particular system contains information that requires protection as
    classified national security information, the Army adheres to
    requirements mandated by the Executive Order, federal regulations and
    DOD policy. Further, Department of Defense issues policies to establish
    eligibility for personnel who may require access to classified
    information. The Army grants access to those who have a clearance and a
    need to know, in order to ensure the right people have the information
    they need to plan, test, and train with our high-end, classified
    capabilities.
                         tactical vehicle safety pilot
        37. Senator Cotton. Secretary Wormuth, I want to ask you a question
    about tactical vehicle safety. It has come to my attention that over
    the last five years, the Army has averaged four fatalities and $73
    million in property damage per year due to tactical vehicle accidents,
    not to mention the countless associated non-fatal injuries. While I
    believe the Army has a good understanding of the principal causes of
    tactical vehicle mishaps, I am uncertain that they or the Marines have
    fully explored innovative approaches that could reduce their
    occurrence. Recognizing that operator behavior is a significant
    contributor to tactical vehicle accidents, what are your thoughts about
    a limited pilot program using data recording devices to help identify
    and alter risky operator behavior before an accident occurs?
        Secretary Wormuth. While Army tactical vehicle fatalities are
    currently historically quite low, one accident is too many as we value
    every soldier who has stepped forward to serve our Nation. A key
    component to reducing the risk of tactical vehicle accidents is
    training,
        leadership, and personal responsibility, which coincides with our
    development and implementation of an improved driver's training program
    designed to prevent vehicle accidents. A limited pilot program would
    likely not yield new data, or would merely confirm what we already know
    from assessing past accidents. Additionally, the use of data recording
    devices would be prohibitively expensive if employed across the force.
    That said, the Army is prioritizing modernization of its High Mobility
    Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), through the Joint Light
    Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program. Every JLTV--unlike their
    predecessors--will come equipped with an anti-lock braking system and
    electronic vehicle control (ABS/ESC), integrated front and rear cameras
    to increase driver awareness, and a crew compartment that enables
    increased survivability in the event of an accident. The competitive
    contract for the JLTV is purposely intended to incentivize industry and
    bring additional driver enhancement technologies into the enduring
    solution. Concerning the legacy HMMWV, important efforts underway
    include retrofitting the field with ABS/ ESC kits which became standard
    after 2018. This technology, also commercially available, directly
    mitigates rollover accidents and their corresponding risk of fatal or
    serious injury to crew members. The Army is also piloting an effort to
    integrate autonomous capabilities on the Palletized Load System (a
    different section of the Army's wheeled vehicle fleet) in order to
    reduce risk to personnel during logistics missions.

        38. Senator Cotton. Secretary Wormuth, understanding that we won't
    be able to prevent all accidents, is there evidence or analysis that
    data recording devices couldn't be leveraged to help leaders identify
    and influence risky operator behavior?
        Secretary Wormuth. The Army has considered installing data
    recording devices in its ground vehicles to help identify risky
    behavior. However, to be cyber-acceptable, these devices would carry a
    significant cost and the data recorded would be relatively minimal
    (speed at impact, etc.). The U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development
    Command (DEVCOM) Analysis Center recently assessed it would cost
    approximately $20 million to install the devices in 0.5 percent of Army
    vehicles for a 2-year pilot program, an outlay that might not lead to
    any conclusive data, and therefore provide no appreciable benefit to
    leaders. In lieu of such devices, the Army views continued safety and
    driver's training, leadership involvement, personal responsibility, and
    accountability measures as the keys to continued improvement in driver
    attentiveness, decision making ability, and conduct.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                    united states army housing modernization
        39. Senator Tillis. Secretary Wormuth, last December, I sent a
    letter to your office regarding the modernization of substandard
    barracks for our Ft. Bragg Soldiers. I strongly believe that adequate
    housing is essential for maintaining Army readiness and maintaining the
    health and well-being of servicemembers. I also believe that Fort Bragg
    remains the ``tip of the spear'' for the Department of Defense. Can you
    speak to the Army's modernization efforts with regard to soldiers'
    housing; what improvements have been made thus far and what further
    plans for improvement do you have upcoming?
        Secretary Wormuth. The Army is working to address unaccompanied
    housing (UH) requirements within a holistic Army Barracks Strategy. As
    part of this strategy, the Army has funded ten UH restoration and
    modernization (R&M) projects at Fort Bragg from fiscal years 2018-2021
    for $102.8 million to address 1,154 bed spaces; two of the fiscal year
    2018 projects are complete and the remaining eight projects are
    ongoing. In fiscal year 2022, the Army plans to award three R&M UH
    projects ($45.9 million/356 bed spaces) at Fort Bragg. Going forward,
    the current Army Facilities Investment Plan includes 22 R&M UH projects
    ($210.4 million/2,988 bed spaces) and one military construction UH
    replacement project ($32 million/144 bed spaces) during fiscal years
    2023-2030. The Army looks to accelerate all barracks renovation and
    construction projects to the extent possible.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                            service member screening
        40. Senator Sullivan. General McConville, last month, I conducted a
    town hall at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson and Fort Wainwright where
    I spoke with behavioral health providers, military spouses, and junior
    enlisted soldier and NCOs about the issues they are facing in Alaska.
    There were several consistent themes throughout these discussions, one
    of which is proper screening and preparation for being stationed in
    Alaska. This was something you touched on briefly in our conversation
    yesterday, telling me, ``we have to get the right people up there who
    will thrive in that environment.'' Does the Army specially screen
    servicemembers for service in Alaska?
        General McConville. Several programs are already in place to
    identify soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers who are well-
    suited for Alaska assignments.
        a.  The ``Option 20'' initiative allows initial entry soldiers,
    based on their preference, to enlist for assignments in Alaska. Due to
    unit type and composition, Skill Level 1 Soldiers constitute a
    significant percentage (over 56 percent) of the assigned strength of
    the two Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in Alaska. Therefore, excluding
    first-term soldiers from cold weather locales may negatively impact
    unit readiness.
        b.  NCOs and Officers leverage the Assignment Satisfaction Key--
    Enlisted Module (ASK-EM), and Assignment Interactive Module 2 (AIM2)
    marketplaces, directly to interact with units to ensure suitable
    candidates are assigned to Alaska-based units.
        Of note, HIPAA prevents Human Resources Command from screening
    soldiers for past or ongoing behavioral health treatment prior to
    assigning them to an Alaska-based unit. The law protects disclosure of
    individually identifiable health information, such as an individual's
    past or current physical or mental health condition, in most
    circumstances. Soldiers with ongoing mental health treatment or other
    medical conditions should consult their medical health provider to
    ensure that they can receive the appropriate treatment at their new
    duty station.

        41. Senator Sullivan. General McConville, if the Army does not
    screen servicemembers for service in Alaska, will you commit to looking
    into the implementation of a screening process?
        General McConville. Yes, the Army is willing to assess and support
    feasible and legal policy decisions for comprehensive screening
    implementation to ensure the right soldiers are matched for the right
    assignments.

        42. Senator Sullivan. General McConville, does the Army make
    special exceptions for those servicemembers who seek to remain
    stationed in Alaska?
        General McConville. In fiscal year 2022, an Army retention policy
    added a $10,000 incentive to soldier's reenlistment bonus provided they
    were both assigned to Alaska, or Forts Bliss, Drum, Irwin, Polk, Riley
    and they reenlisted for current station stabilization. The locations
    mentioned had reenlistment rates below the Army average of 13 percent
    for fiscal year 2021 and they were the least requested locations by
    soldiers in the Assignment Satisfaction Key-Enlisted Module. All
    indications are that this incentive program is working to increase
    retention in critical skills at less desirable locations. Additionally,
    over the last six months the Army's enlistment incentive program
    guaranteed assignment requests to Forts Polk, Riley, Drum, Hood, Bliss
    and Alaska. Army Reserve personnel also utilize the Army Reserve
    soldier assignment profile to better align soldier preferences in
    conjunction with the Army's requirements to fill positions.

        43. Senator Sullivan. General McConville, as you are aware, the
    Army has an overseas re-enlistment option which guarantees a 12- or 24-
    month assignment to areas outside the contiguous United States, to
    include Alaska. Has this program had much success?
        General McConville. Active Army soldiers utilize Option 4 (Overseas
    Reenlistment Option) to reenlist for an overseas assignment of choice.
    In fiscal year 2022, approximately 16 percent of soldiers stabilized at
    their current overseas assignment while approximately 9 percent of
    soldiers reenlisted for an overseas assignment of choice. Specifically,
    for Alaska, soldiers had a 67 percent increase in overseas
    stabilization rates from fiscal year 2021 to fiscal year 2022.
                            fiscal year 2023 budget
        44. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth, the recently released 2022
    National Defense Strategy highlights the threat from the PLA's
    unprecedented military modernization. With an overall real budget cut
    for the Army, including significant reductions in Research and
    Development, do you believe the President's Fiscal Year 2023 Budget
    adequately enables the Army to meet strategic competition requirements,
    especially in the Indo-Pacific?
        Secretary Wormuth. The Army's budget request enables continued
    transformation to the Army of 2030 force structure initiative. The
    budget request also supports the pivot from the past two decades of
    focus on counterterrorism to an Army that is adapted to meet our top
    pacing challenge of China and the acute threat of Russian aggression.
    The investments requested help the Army meet the National Defense
    Strategy requirements for integrated deterrence, support our active
    campaigning measures, and help us build and maintain an enduring
    advantage over peers and potential adversaries. This budget request
    funds the Army modernization priorities, while simultaneously investing
    in our sustainment facilities, equipment, people, and the Army's
    organic industrial base.
        This budget request will allow the Army to deliver our hypersonic
    long-range weapon prototypes and leverage existing missile technology
    to deliver a Mid-Range Capability prototype. We are transforming the
    force by fielding our third Multi-Domain Task Force, which integrates
    fires, cyber, electronic warfare, and information warfare capabilities
    in an unprecedented way. The request continues to provide investment in
    Project Convergence 22, which allows for experimentation and exercises
    with partners and allies to help promote interoperability of our weapon
    systems. It supports the continued rotations of our Security Force
    Assistance Brigades to build partner capacity. The request also funds
    Pacific Pathway exercises in the Indo-Pacific and Defender Europe
    exercises to assure our allies and partners across the regions.

        45. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth, our authoritarian
    adversaries continue to expand their military capabilities, many of our
    service branches are heading in the wrong direction and shrinking. Just
    this year, the Army's end strength will be reduced by 12,000 soldiers.
    While I understand there is a labor shortage throughout the entire
    country at this time, we still must find ways to compete and expand our
    ranks. What is the Army's strategy to increase recruiting and retention
    to bolster end-strength?
        Secretary Wormuth. The Army, like other services, is facing the
    most challenging recruiting market in the last 20 years. In fiscal year
    2022, Army recruiters are challenged by a tight labor market, a
    decrease in the propensity of the American population to serve
    (currently at 9 percent, lowest since 2007), and a shrinking pool of
    qualified military applicants (only 23 percent of youth (17 to 24) are
    eligible to enlist in the military without a waiver, down from 29
    percent in recent years).
        The Army has achieved nearly 40 percent of its enlisted recruiting
    mission for fiscal year 2022. This is an unprecedented year, but the
    4th quarter is typically when we achieve the majority of our total
    mission goals following high school graduation.
        We do expect these recruiting market headwinds to persist, so the
    Army is improving how we recruit in this new market environment. In
    March 2022, the Army began a comprehensive review and analysis of our
    accessions enterprise, recruiting policy, organizational structure, and
    marketing practices. Recommendations for this review, coupled with
    other immediate steps we are taking, will help the Army address
    recruiting challenges and position the Army recruiting for success in
    the future.
        Army senior leaders, at echelon, are fully engaged to identify and
    implement a variety of initiatives. Some examples include the
    following: The Army is ensuring that there is ample funding to apply a
    prudent bonus strategy to attract more prospects. We are applying
    targeted marketing to increase our outreach to young Americans. In a
    2021 survey, the Army found that 75 percent of today's youth know
    little to nothing about the Army (16-28 year olds). The Army's
    marketing office has two new creative campaigns in the market today to
    generate awareness across youth, address the common misperceptions
    about the Army lifestyle, and motivate receptive prospects. We are also
    bringing back former highly successful recruiters from our operating
    force to add experience and depth to our existing recruiting force.
        Additional immediate Army recruiting efforts include:
          The Army is offering flexible 2 to 6 year enlistment
    contracts, including 2 year enlistment in 84 career fields.
          The Army is offering duty station of choice, which means
    future soldiers can opt to select their first duty station after
    training. This provides predictability for the future and some popular
    locations, like Hawaii, Germany, Colorado and Texas (12 duty stations
    included).
          The Buddy Enlistment Program offers an opportunity for
    friends to serve together. Up to five people can go to training
    together and be stationed at the same place for their first assignment.
          The Army is offering up to $50,000 in enlistment
    incentives for new recruits.
          Quick ship bonuses of up to $10,000 are available for
    individuals who can ship within 30 days of signing a contract.
        The Army and our skilled recruiters are working tirelessly to
    inspire and recruit talented, high-quality individuals to meet fiscal
    year 2022's assigned mission. We would like to continue to work hand-
    in-hand with Congress to ensure that you are fully informed and to
    share any insights or recommendations about the way forward.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
                                   energetics
        46. Senator Blackburn. Secretary Wormuth, how do you intend to
    amend the recently-finalized Army formulating an Organic Industrial
    Base Modernization Plan based on current events in Ukraine?
        Secretary Wormuth. The March 2022 Army Ammunition Plant
    Modernization Plan, which specifically addresses energetics (the
    materials that explode and power projectiles), will be updated
    annually. The next update will be provided to Congress in March 2023,
    per the fiscal year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
    requirement. The capabilities and infrastructure required to produce
    the munitions provided to Ukraine will be assessed for needed
    modernization resourcing and factored into the next plan accordingly.
    In the meantime, the Army is addressing immediate industrial base needs
    to support Ukraine replenishment within Presidential Drawdown funding.

        47. Senator Blackburn. Secretary Wormuth, several times throughout
    this plan, it says that projects ``can be executed earlier if
    additional funds become available in any given year.'' Do I have your
    commitment to working with me--and this Committee--to identify those
    projects and move them forward?
        Secretary Wormuth. Yes, if additional funds become available to the
    Army, I will work with you and the Committee to accelerate projects.

        48. Senator Blackburn. Secretary Wormuth, how does the fiscal year
    2023 budget contribute to shortening energetics production lead time?
    When will we see a return on investment?
        Secretary Wormuth. The fiscal year 2023 budget does not contain new
    projects that will contribute to shortening energetics production lead
    time; however, we will see a return on investment in fiscal year 2025
    when the explosives capacity expansion at the Holston Army Ammunition
    Plant will be realized, which in turn will result in shortened
    production lead times.

        49. Senator Blackburn. Secretary Wormuth, how does the crumbling
    infrastructure of facilities like Holston induce risk, represents a
    single point of failure in the munition's enterprise?
        Secretary Wormuth. Holston Army Ammunition Plant (AAP) is the sole
    supplier of high explosives in the United States, so it is critical
    that this facility is modernized and maintained. In order to mitigate
    the risk of supply disruptions, $808 million of modernization
    resourcing is targeted for Holston AAP through fiscal year 2028. This
    investment will repair and improve all of the Holston AAP's core
    capabilities, infrastructure, and support systems.

        50. Senator Blackburn. Secretary Wormuth, what specific resources
    or authorities will it require to fully modernize Holston? I am
    thinking again of opportunities to move projects forward as identified
    in the Modernization Plan.
        Secretary Wormuth. The March 2022 Army Ammunition Plant (AAP)
    Modernization Plan identifies $808 million to repair and modernize
    Holston AAP through fiscal year 2028. These investments will
    significantly reduce the risk of Holston AAP not being able to meet
    operational needs. As the operating contract for Holston AAP is being
    competed, with a new contract scheduled for award in November 2023,
    moving additional production modernization projects to the left is not
    recommended to avoid encumbering the facility during a potential
    transition to a new operator. However, the fiscal year 2026 ``Upgrade
    Laundry Facility'' ($5.6 million) and the fiscal year 2027 ``Natural
    Gas Pipeline Relocation to Below Holston River'' ($11.6 million)
    projects could be moved to the left if additional resources are
    provided in fiscal year 2023 without significant disruption to the
    facility.

        51. Senator Blackburn. Secretary Wormuth, what additional
    resourcing or authorities are necessary to meet more stringent
    environmental and regulatory compliance in the production of TATB?
        Secretary Wormuth. No additional resources or authorities are
    necessary for the Army to meet the environmental and regulatory
    requirements to produce Triaminotrinitrobenzene.

        52. Senator Blackburn. Secretary Wormuth, what additional
    resourcing or authorities are necessary to meet more stringent
    environmental and regulatory compliance in the production of HMX, RDX,
    IMX, and their precursors?
        Secretary Wormuth. Current environmental regulations, high labor
    costs, and inconsistent demand provide a high barrier to establishing
    and maintaining domestic production for some precursors. We are
    actively working on risk mitigation plans for each material. Examples
    of environmentally sensitive materials include nitrates, formaldehyde
    (precursor for hexamine, which is a precursor to HMX and RDX), and
    fluorinated binders such as BDNAP/F (used in the manufacture of
    Insensitive Munition explosives).

        53. Senator Blackburn. Secretary Wormuth, to what extent do we and
    our allies rely on China for critical energetic materials?
        Secretary Wormuth. The Army is currently tracking multiple critical
    energetic materials that originate from China. These materials are used
    in the manufacture of Army munitions managed by the Army on behalf of
    the other services and in support of Foreign Military Sales to our
    allies.
                                     milcon
        54. Senator Blackburn. General McConville, considering the Army's
    unfunded military construction requirements amount to $1.4 billion,
    what are the long-term risks if Congress does not immediately address
    the Army's unfunded MILCON requirements?
        General McConville. Our unfunded priorities are a recognition of
    our highest priorities in future years. If these priorities remain
    unfunded, the Army will need to defer these new infrastructure projects
    in order to address current deficits and to replace failing facilities.
    We will continue to prioritize military construction efforts to address
    our highest priority needs and seek opportunities to become more
    efficient in using our current infrastructure. However, with an $81
    billion backlog of maintenance for existing facilities, coupled with a
    deficit of $59 billion in required building square footage, there will
    always be greater funding needed than is available to address
    infrastructure requirements.

        55. Senator Blackburn. General McConville, reports indicate that
    military construction has been hit with 22 percent inflation rates. How
    has inflation impacted the Army's MILCON program?
        General McConville. The Army has less military construction buying
    power in the current economic environment. Rising material and
    transportation costs are causing contractor bids to significantly
    exceed both authorized project costs and the Army's reprogramming
    authority of $2 million above project cost. There are reduced funds
    from bid savings to reprogram for these increased costs, causing the
    Army to cancel or reduce the scope of previously authorized and
    appropriated projects. In addition, due to the volatility of materials'
    cost and availability, many contractors will not hold bids for the time
    necessary to obtain congressional approval of a major reprogramming
    action--even when funds are available. In order to hold bids in place,
    contractors generally include added contingencies for anticipated
    future cost increases.
                                 modernization
        56. Senator Blackburn. Secretary Wormuth, how does record-high
    inflation impact the Army's ability to deliver prototypes and continued
    investments in long-range hypersonic weapons?
        Secretary Wormuth. At this time, inflation rates have not barred
    the Army from staying on track to deliver a road mobile and air
    transportable Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) that will provide
    residual combat capability to soldiers by the end of fiscal year 2023.
    The Army is consistently engaged with its industry partners to
    continually manage risk across the development effort, including
    addressing inflationary pressures, to keep the effort on schedule.
                               military personnel
        57. Senator Blackburn. General McConville, how does the Army plan
    to address the staggeringly low numbers of youth qualified for military
    service under current guidelines?
        General McConville. The issue of low numbers of American youth
    qualified for military service presents a challenge for the all-
    volunteer force. Obesity, medical/physical concerns, and behavioral
    health concerns all impact the pool of qualified military applicants
    from which the Army can recruit. To address this diminishing pool, the
    Army is experimenting with initiatives that expand upon current
    definitions of quality to expand the pool of qualified applicants and
    allow interested individuals to serve. The Army has also stood up its
    special accessions/recruiting tiger team to develop near- and long-term
    recommendations to ensure the Army meets its recruiting goals and
    safeguard its future success. This team of experts is reviewing
    initiatives related to Army recruiters, Army marketing efforts, and
    Army policy/doctrine. These initiatives are intended to modernize the
    Army accessions enterprise, provide a holistic review of current
    practices and incentive structures, and ensure that the Army remains a
    competitive employer that attracts and retains desired, high-quality
    talent in a competitive job market. We look forward to sharing the
    results from this review upon its completion.

        58. Senator Blackburn. General McConville, how does the Army plan
    to support troops' reintegration into the civil sector with the current
    state of the economy and record-high inflation?
        General McConville. The Army's Transition Assistance Program
    provides soldiers with multiple programs, classes, and opportunities to
    successfully transition from Active Duty to the civilian sector.
    Additional training and certification options are available through the
    Career Skills Program (CSP), and companies offering placement through a
    CSP are carefully vetted to ensure employment openings provide
    competitive wages.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
        59. Senator Hawley. General McConville, what can we do to
    accelerate development and fielding of Precision Strike Missile
    Increments 2, so we can take advantage of its anti-ship capability as
    soon as possible?
        General McConville. The Army has already invested in a science and
    technology effort to accelerate the technological maturity and concept
    demonstration of the seeker to satisfy Precision Strike Missile (PrSM)
    Increment 2 requirements. This technology maturity effort will
    transition to the PrSM program in fiscal year 2024. We are working
    closely with industry on the interface requirements to ensure the
    seeker technology being demonstrated is compatible with and more easily
    integrated into the base PrSM missile for final system development.

        60. Senator Hawley. General McConville, when is Precision Strike
    Missile Increment 4 expected to reach the Initial Operational
    Capability, and what can we do to accelerate that timeline, so we can
    take advantage of that system's extended range as quickly as possible?
        General McConville. The Army is working on the acquisition strategy
    for PrSM Increment 4 now, with a goal of an early operational
    capability by fiscal year 2027 if the required technology matures as
    hoped and funds are available. The Army plans to provide a more
    detailed way ahead for this program in the fiscal year 2024 budget
    submission.

        61. Senator Hawley. General McConville, has the Army done an
    analysis to see what kinds of forces or capabilities the Army is
    currently providing in Europe that Germany or other NATO allies could
    provide over the next five to ten years, thereby relieving demand on
    our forces?
        General McConville. We are always looking for, and encouraging, our
    allies to do more to provide for their common defense. It is reassuring
    that many of our European allies have increased their defense budgets;
    I hope that this trend remains constant in the future. The Army, in
    concert with the Department of Defense, continues to assess the right
    balance of rotational and permanent U.S. force presence.

        62. Senator Hawley. General McConville, what are some of the things
    U.S. Army forces are currently providing in Europe that our NATO allies
    may able to provide on their own, either using forces they currently
    have or by using forces that they can realistically develop and field?
        General McConville. DOD, USEUCOM, and NATO officials are currently
    participating in high-level sourcing discussions which will help the
    alliance determine future military requirements and NATO's future
    contributions. As a result of these efforts, NATO allies are already
    providing large amounts of lethal and nonlethal aid to Ukraine.
        United States European Command (USEUCOM) and United States Army
    Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF) are responsible for guiding U.S. Army
    security activities and coordinating with our allies in that theater.
    Since February 2, 2022, the U.S. Army has deployed an additional 15,000
    soldiers to Europe to reinforce USEUCOM and NATO.
        These forces provide capabilities that include a Division
    Headquarters, an Armored Brigade Combat Team, and Fires and Logistics
    elements. USAREUR-AF's goals include expanding our NATO allies'
    responsibilities in areas such as command and control, security force
    assistance, and logistics as well as thickening our NATO allies'
    physical footprint further east in Europe.

        63. Senator Hawley. General McConville, how important are
    unattended ground sensors for the U.S. Army in the Indo-Pacific, and
    what kinds of investments can we make in these sensors in order to
    improve intelligence and warning available to the Joint Force as we
    posture to deter Chinese aggression?
        General McConville. In the INDOPACOM area of operations it is
    extremely important to improve the indications and warnings for the
    Joint Force so USARPAC can more easily see, secure, and understand the
    threat environment. To provide these early warnings, the Army is
    investing in unmanned signals intelligence ground sensors. In fiscal
    year 2022, the Army will spend $13.3 million to develop the initial
    sensors. The Army intends to spend additional funding in fiscal year
    2023 to further the development of unmanned signals intelligence ground
    sensors.

        64. Senator Hawley. General McConville, can you provide an update
    on the Army's modernization efforts to develop and deploy a resilient
    network, that can effectively receive targeting data during a potential
    conflict?
        General McConville. We are prepared to provide an update on the
    Army's modernization efforts in this area is through a classified
    briefing. The Army's network modernization team can provide a detailed
    classified briefing on this topic, as requested.

      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR
             FISCAL YEAR 2023 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                             THURSDAY, MAY 12, 2022

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                                  NAVY POSTURE

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
    room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Peters, Rosen,
    Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis,
    Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, and Tuberville.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. Good morning. The Committee meets today to
    receive testimony on the plans and programs of the Department
    of the Navy in review of the President's Fiscal Year 2023
    Defense Budget Request. I would like to welcome the Secretary
    of the Navy Carlos Del Toro, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
    Michael Gilday, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General
    David Berger.
        We are grateful for your service, for the service of the
    men and women under your command, and for the support of all
    Navy and Marine families. The Administration's defense budget
    request for fiscal year 2023 includes approximately $231
    billion in funding for the Department of the Navy, an increase
    of $10.6 billion from the fiscal year 2022 enacted budget. As
    the leaders of the Navy and Marine Corps, I understand you face
    significant challenges as you strive to balance current
    operations and readiness alongside broad modernization efforts.
        Our naval forces continue to maintain extremely high
    operations tempo across all areas. Demand is overwhelming for
    attack submarines, air and missile defense cruisers,
    destroyers, and strike fighter inventories. As a result, our
    ships and the fleet are not meeting maintenance requirements on
    time or within budget. A number of ships have been waiting
    several years for maintenance, including the USS Boise, which
    will spend another year at pier side without diving
    certifications because of deferred maintenance.
        I am also concerned that the Navy will not be able to
    maintain a larger fleet of ships when it is struggling to
    maintain its current fleet of 294 ships on a consistent
    schedule. Deferred ship maintenance, reduced steaming and
    flying hours, and canceled training and deployments have
    created serious readiness problems within the Navy. These
    problems are not limited to one sector but are also being
    experienced by both private shipyards and Navy shipyards.
        The 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) directed
    the Navy to study how to improve the capacity in our shipyard
    industrial base. The Navy has since begun the Shipyard
    Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP) to modernize and
    improve the efficiency of the public sector shipyards. We look
    forward to seeing the results of that effort.
        Looking ahead, I am pleased that the USS Gerald Ford has
    conducted full ship shock trials, and we understand that she
    may be deployed later this year. Looming on the horizon, over
    the next decade, the Navy will need to buy new Columbia-class
    ballistic missile submarines to replace the Ohio-class fleet.
    This is an expensive undertaking on a very tight schedule, and
    I trust the Navy is making every effort to keep this program on
    track. I would ask our witnesses for an update on these plans.
        This year, the Navy is proposing to retire a number of
    ships before the end of their useful service lives. This
    includes a plan to retire nine Littoral Combat Ships (LCS)
    early, one of which would only be 3 years old. I understand the
    LCS program showed promise when it was first conceived, but the
    threats we face have changed, and the Navy no longer believes
    these vessels would contribute much to a high end conflict.
        The Navy made a difficult choice to retire some of the
    ships now and free up more resources in the future. On the
    other hand, it seems that this plan would take us in the
    opposite direction of the Navy's goal for 355 ship fleet. This
    Committee will want an update on this issue. Turning to the
    United States marines, the Marine Corps is restructuring around
    two concepts, Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment
    and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations.
        The key element of these concepts is the more flexible
    amphibious force that can support a broader naval fight once
    ashore. Rather than simply acting as a landing force, the
    Marine Corps hopes to help control the sea and air around them
    in support of the Navy and the other services. To accomplish
    this, I understand the Marine Corps is prioritizing
    modernization of its ground vehicles, including partnership
    with the Army and the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, or the
    JLTV, to replace the Humvee, and targeted investments in the
    High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS, to provide
    marines with ground based indirect fire support.
        In addition, programs like the Amphibious Combat Vehicle,
    the Ground Based Anti-Ship Missile, and long range precision
    fires will provide critical modernization, increased force
    protection, and enhanced lethality to the marines. General
    Berger, I appreciate your consultations and discussions with
    the members of this Committee as you began this restructuring,
    and I appreciate your continued engagement with the Committee
    as this process proceeds.
        There also may be discussions this morning about the
    appropriate amphibious force structure. I understand that the
    Commandant says he needs 31 large amphibious ships to meet his
    requirements, in addition to any smaller vessels invented to
    support the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations concept.
    Others in the Defense Department have determined that only 24
    to 28 large amphibious ships are needed, and I would ask for an
    update on these discussions.
        Again, I want to thank the witnesses for appearing today,
    and I look forward to their testimony. Let me now recognize the
    Ranking Member Senator Inhofe.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JIM INHOFE

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I
    join you in welcoming these three great leaders. For 4 years,
    this Committee has used the 2018 National Defense Strategy
    Commission as our roadmap to meet the threats. It has operated
    very well during this time.
        Unfortunately, the Administration has sent to the Congress
    a budget request that does not provide the resources required
    to combat that threat and other threats. The Department of Navy
    budget provides an increase of only 4 percent, and more
    troubling, the Marine Corps portion includes just 1.8 percent
    increase.
        That is nowhere close to the real growth in--for the
    Marines, once again, if you account for inflation, it is
    actually a cut. Given the inadequate budget requests, it is no
    surprise that Admiral Gilday and General Berger in their
    unfunded priorities--we call those the risk lists--total $7.5
    billion. More broadly, I am concerned about the state of our
    Navy and its downward trajectory.
        I actually had four items I was going to mention on here.
    However, all four of them ended up being in the Chairman's
    opening remarks so I won't use those. The real growth is going
    to have to be a part of the programs that move the needle. On
    that topic, I would like to note General Berger's initiative in
    implementing the National Defense Strategy and his efforts to
    keep this Committee informed of his plans.
        So I look forward to discussing these topics and--from our
    witnesses and--that we have. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
    Secretary Del Toro, please.

    STATEMENT OF CARLOS DEL TORO, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, DEPARTMENT
                              OF THE NAVY

        Mr. Del Toro. Good morning----
        Chairman Reed. Could you bring that microphone as close as
    possible, Mr. Secretary----?
        Mr. Del Toro. Good morning, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
    Inhofe, distinguished members of the Committee. It is an honor
    to be here alongside General Berger and Admiral Gilday to
    discuss the posture of the Department of the Navy. I look
    forward to working with you to ensure that our sailors and
    marines are equipped, trained, and prepared to the best of our
    ability so they can fulfill our vital role to provide combat
    ready forces in support of the Joint Force.
        The United States requires a strong Navy and Marine Corps.
    Our global economy and the self-determination of free nations
    everywhere depends on seapower. Our national security depends
    on seapower. That is particularly true in the Indo-Pacific,
    where Beijing's aggression threatens the rules-based
    international order that protects us all.
        To answer that challenge, your Navy and Marine Corps must
    have the resources and the power to maintain credible,
    integrated deterrence by campaigning forward, forward from the
    sea, on the shore, and in the air. Thanks to the leadership of
    President Biden's Secretary Austin, this budget does provide
    the right balance of capacity, lethality, modernization, and
    readiness that we need to execute the National Defense
    Strategy.
        We will invest these resources through the execution of a
    concise, clear, and transparent strategy rooted in three
    guiding principles. First, maintain and strengthen our maritime
    dominance so that we can deter potential adversaries and fight
    and win decisively. Second, empower our sailors and marines by
    fostering a culture of warfighting excellence founded on strong
    leadership, dignity, and respect for each other.
        Third, strengthen our strategic partnerships across the
    Joint Force, industry, and our international partners around
    the globe. We are executing this strategy through the
    integrated visions of the Marine Corps Force Design 2030 and
    the Navy Navigation Plan. I strongly support these visions, and
    I am committed to fielding the ready, capable, and modernized
    force required to ensure their success.
        To maintain and strengthen maritime dominance, we have to
    be serious about fielding and maintaining the right
    capabilities to win wars. That is why our budget strongly
    invested in a nimble, networked, and survivable Navy, with
    platforms like Columbia, DDG Flight III, with enhanced cyber
    and autonomous capabilities that enable our fleet to campaign
    forward in a distributed manner.
        This budget invests in a truly expeditionary and persistent
    Marine Corps with the mobility and readiness to respond in
    force wherever and whenever needed. For advancing cyber
    security and resilience efforts across the Department with
    investments to expand the cyber mission force teams, harden
    networks, and leverage artificial intelligence and machine
    learning to defend information infrastructure.
        To ensure the combat readiness of our platforms, we are
    more than doubling shipyard infrastructure optimization
    programs, SIOP, investments over the previous budget. This
    budget invests in the climate resiliency of our force and our
    facilities, while continuing efforts to substantially reduce
    our impact on climate change. We are also investing in
    facilities that promote the quality of life of our personnel
    and their families. We owe it to our military families to
    ensure their safety and well-being.
        When we do fall short, we look our problem square in the
    eye, and we take actions to fix those problems. We are
    investing in our efforts to recruit, retain, train, and promote
    the best from all of America. We are increasing funding for
    naval and cyber education, enhanced shipboard training, and
    enabling sailors and marines to build their careers wherever
    the service takes them.
        We appreciate the Committee's interest in ensuring our
    forces have the right facilities to train, fight, and win,
    including the potential expansion of the Fallon Training Range
    Complex. We also appreciate the Committee's efforts to include
    new tools within the NDAA to deter destructive behavior and
    prosecute sexual assault, domestic violence, and other
    offenses.
        At every level of leadership, we are determined to prevent
    sexual assault and sexual harassment, hold offenders
    accountable, and create a safer, stronger, and more inclusive
    Navy-Marine Corps team. I want to close by noting the
    importance of strategic partnerships, from the Joint Force and
    our industrial base, to our allies and partners around the
    world.
        I have seen our partnerships and alliances personally in
    action, from F-35B operations in the Indo-Pacific to North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) exercises in Norway and the
    Mediterranean. But our most important partnership is indeed
    with the American people.
        That is why I am grateful for the oversight and interest of
    this Committee, and I look forward to continuing to work with
    you in the years ahead. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of The Honorable Carlos Del Toro
    follows:]

              Prepared Statement by The Honorable Carlos Del Toro
                                  introduction
        Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, Members of the Committee, it
    is an honor to appear before you alongside General Berger and Admiral
    Gilday to discuss the posture of the Department of the Navy (DON). I
    look forward to working with you to ensure that our sailors and marines
    are equipped, trained, and prepared to the best of our ability, so they
    can fulfill their vital role in support of the Joint Force, protecting
    our national security interests.
        The United States requires a strong Navy and Marine Corps. The
    global economy, and the self-determination of free nations everywhere,
    depends on sea power. Thirty-one million American jobs and $5.4
    trillion in annual commerce rely on the sea lanes, and one third of all
    international commerce transits the South China Sea. Without a ready,
    and capable Navy and Marine Corps protecting the sea lanes and lines of
    communications, the global economy could easily halt.
        The national and economic security of our Nation depends on free
    and open access to the sea. The rules-based international order that
    benefits us all requires a strong maritime force, campaigning forward
    alongside allies and partners to provide the sea control and integrated
    deterrence we need to counter strategic competitors, from Beijing,
    Moscow, and beyond.
        As Secretary Austin stated in his testimony before this Committee,
    ``Integrated deterrence means combining our strengths across all the
    warfighting domains to maximum effect to ward off potential conflict.''
    The Navy and Marine Corps Team offers forward maneuverable strengths in
    every domain that serve as a force multiplier within the Joint Force
    and alongside our allies and international partners. We are determined
    to ensure the integrated all domain force required to ensure maximum
    effect for civilian and military leadership, across the range of
    military options.
        Thanks to the leadership of President Biden and Secretary Austin,
    President's Budget 2023 provides the right balance of capacity,
    lethality, modernization, and readiness needed to field the globally
    engaged and dominant naval force required by the National Defense
    Strategy. This budget will maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of
    each dollar entrusted to us by the American taxpayer, ensuring
    sufficient resources for today's challenges, while building future
    overmatch.
        We will invest these resources through a concise, clear, and
    transparent strategy centered on three primary lines of effort:
        1.  Strengthen Maritime Dominance.
        2.  Empower Our People.
        3.  Expand Strategic Partnerships.
        Admiral Gilday, General Berger, and I are executing these lines of
    effort as one fully integrated DON. The Navy Navigation Plan and Marine
    Corps Force Design 2030 are complementary visions working together to
    ensure the distributed capacity, long range fires, amphibious mobility,
    and network of allies and partners our sailors and marines need to make
    mission.
        Together, we are committed to working with you to ensure these
    plans are fully resourced, with vigorous oversight, to deliver maximum
    value to the American taxpayer, and to fulfill our sacred oath to
    protect the American people.
                         strengthen maritime dominance
        The security and freedom of the seas, and the resulting prosperity
    and security of our Nation, did not happen on its own. It required
    significant investment and foresight by generations of legislative and
    executive leaders.
        Two hundred and twenty-five years ago, Congressional funding led to
    the commissioning of USS Constitution. One hundred years ago, the Navy
    launched our country's first aircraft carrier, USS Langley. Eighty
    years ago, the Marine Corps began purchasing Higgins Boats. Seventy
    years ago, President Truman laid the keel for USS Nautilus, the first
    nuclear submarine.
        Each of these investments yielded exponential returns, fueling the
    remarkable growth and global leadership of the United States during
    centuries of conflict and change. We stand at a similar inflection
    point today, where our national and economic security depend on the
    investments we make today to build and maintain our maritime dominance.
        Just as our first frigates defended American shipping from foreign
    aggression, tomorrow's networked frigates and destroyers will define
    the future of sea control. Just as our early aircraft carriers provided
    the critical edge at Midway, Ford-class carriers will transform the
    forward posture of our Nation in the conflicts ahead.
        Just as the Higgins Boats seized the shorelines from Guadalcanal to
    Okinawa, tomorrow's amphibious platforms will maintain our combat
    credibility throughout the Indo-Pacific, and just as our undersea fleet
    maintained the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad for the last
    seven decades, our strategic future depends on delivering Columbia-
    class submarines, our top acquisition priority.
        Seapower has always required foresight and investment, and the
    future of our Nation will be defined by the strategic choices we make
    today. The posture and availability of naval forces must always reflect
    the strategic needs of the Nation, providing effective options for the
    President and Secretary of Defense to counter every challenge.
        The DON fiscal year 2023 budget request delivers these forces
    through sustained investment and performance improvement, developing
    more lethal, networked capabilities and concepts, closely integrated
    between the services and with our Joint Force and government partners,
    as well as our allies and international partners.
    Fleet Investments
        The CNO's Navigation Plan refocuses our integrated all-domain naval
    power on the core functions of sea control and power projection through
    Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO). DMO places a high priority on
    the long range fires and advanced connectivity that will result in a
    resilient, networked, and dispersed fleet, providing decision advantage
    and unified action in contested environments.
        President's Budget 2023 will invest in both manned and unmanned
    platforms to meet the strategic and operational demands of DMO, and
    will invest in the industrial capacity and capability to meet
    availability and maintenance demands as required to defend the Nation.
    President's Budget 2023 focuses on delivery and maintaining platforms
    that will provide the greatest combat capabilities and readiness across
    the fleet, while divesting in platforms that have less relevance in
    contested maritime environments where adversaries have advanced weapon
    systems. This budget provides funding for nine battle force ships in
    the coming year, including two Virginia-class attack submarines and two
    Arleigh Burke Flight III Destroyers, and also continues funding for the
    Columbia-class and Ford-class programs.
        President's Budget 2023 increases innovation and modernization
    efforts in Research and Development by 9 percent for the Navy and 6
    percent for the Marine Corps. A $2.7 billion investment in long range
    fires and hypersonic technologies will extend the lethality and
    capability of our platforms, and ensure maximum reach, survivability
    and decision space for our sailors and marines. With an increase of $81
    million for Operation Overmatch in fiscal year 2023, the Navy will
    field a resilient, networked, and dispersed fleet, connected through
    the Naval Operational Architecture and Project Overmatch to provide
    decision advantage in contested environments. President's Budget 2023
    also commits $1.2 billion of Research and Development funding to
    recapitalization of all portions of the undersea leg of the triad
    including the submarines, TACAMO, Trident D5, and our Nuclear Command,
    Control and Communications network.
        To increase availability, improve maintenance, and maximize
    throughput for our warships, President's Budget 2023 continues targeted
    shore investments designed to increase fleet readiness. I was honored
    to break ground on a new drydock facility at our public shipyard in
    Portsmouth last fall, and have visited each of the Navy's four public
    shipyards as Secretary. Each of these facilities provides critical
    contributions to the availability and maintenance of our fleet, and
    each has modernization imperatives which are being addressed.
        In order to improve naval maintenance production capacity at these
    facilities, the DON is fully committed to the Shipyard Infrastructure
    Optimization Program (SIOP), more than doubling SIOP investments over
    the previous budget, with over $1.7 billion in funding for dry dock
    recapitalization, facility optimization, and capital equipment and
    modernization.
    Expeditionary Capabilities
        President's Budget 2023 continues planning and design for the
    future Light Amphibious Warship (LAW). This budget provides for one
    Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD) and one Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA).
    Amphibious warships like the LHA and LPD are vital for the organic
    mobility and expeditionary persistence of our Marine Corps, and remain
    in high demand as a ``Swiss Army Knife'' for the Joint Force, meeting
    varying needs in dynamic situations. These ships provide the sealift
    necessary to deploy marines for crisis response, contingency missions,
    humanitarian assistance, and integrated deterrence, supporting Marine
    Corps Aviation as well as diverse capabilities such as ISR/sensing,
    long range fires, and decoys.
        The Joint Force needs a truly expeditionary and persistent Marine
    Corps-armed, agile, and postured--capable of operating persistently
    inside actively contested environments, and ready to respond in force
    at the speed of relevance. To answer these needs, the Marine Corps has
    put into motion an aggressive modernization of the Service through
    Force Design 2030, a transformational effort rooted in the anticipated
    challenges of the future operating environment.
        I thank the Congress for its support of this transformation in the
    fiscal year 2021 and fiscal year 2022 authorization and appropriation
    bills. Your support is critical to the future readiness and lethality
    of the Marine Corps. Building on the cooperative efforts of all of our
    sea Services, the Marine Corps is reinvigorating the Fleet Marine
    principle to execute expeditionary warfighting concepts including
    Expeditionary Advanced Basing Operations (EABO) and Littoral Operations
    in a Contested Environment (LOCE).
        Agile, smaller combined-arms warfighting units, such as the Marine
    Littoral Regiment (MLR), Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and Marine
    Expeditionary Unit (MEU) are the 9-1-1 force for our Combatant
    Commanders in the most dynamic and volatile situations. For example,
    during the evacuation efforts at Kabul International Airport last
    August, the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit was first on the ground,
    keeping the aviation lifeline open.
        The ARG/MEU is able to support a variety of mission sets, from
    humanitarian assistance, to coordinated operations with our allies and
    partners, to agile and lethal response in the combat zone. All of this
    requires investment in organic mobility, from the fleet, to the field,
    to the air.
        Accordingly, President's Budget 2023 prioritizes and fully funds
    Marine Expeditionary Forces, and will advance the expeditionary vision
    of Force Design 2030 through aircraft like the CH-53K King Stallion,
    with rotary heavy lift capability unmatched across the Joint Force.
    Platforms like CH-53K and C-130J will play a key role in the rapid
    deployment of marines and equipment wherever and whenever needed.
    Air Wing of the Future
        As we mark the centennial of American carrier aviation, naval
    aviators from both the Navy and Marine Corps are achieving exceptional
    results in the operational deployment of the F-35 Lightning.
        From the short takeoff and nimble capabilities of the F-35B, to our
    unmatched, carrier-based, precision strike F-35C, the Joint Strike
    Fighter is having a transformational effect on the reach and capability
    of naval aviation. In the coming years, a combination of F-35 and Next
    Generation Air Dominance systems will provide even greater power
    projection from our carrier force. President's Budget 2023 will procure
    additional F-35C and F-35B aircraft, and will also invest in the Navy's
    MQ-25 unmanned aerial refueling system and MQ-9 Reaper, a crucial
    enabler for the effectiveness, visibility, and maneuverability of
    marines in the field.
        We are taking a comprehensive approach to modernizing the Navy's
    Fleet Readiness Centers (FRCs), which conduct depot level maintenance,
    repair, and overhaul of U.S. Navy aircraft, engines, components and
    support equipment. To build on the positive trend lines we have
    achieved in operational availability and readiness, President's Budget
    2023 includes an 11 percent increase in airframe, engine depot, and
    component funding. We continue to see positive results in aircraft
    availability, sustaining a mission-capable rate of 80 percent for F/A-
    18E/F Super Hornets for three consecutive fiscal years, and five
    additional airframes achieving 80 percent mission capability over the
    last 18 months.
        Through the Performance to Plan (P2P) initiative we're using data-
    driven decision-making across the Navy to identify the root causes of
    maintenance delays and operational mishaps. This data-driven decision-
    making is integral to a ``Get Real, Get Better'' approach being applied
    across the Navy, demanding rigorous self-assessment, detailed analysis
    characterizing current performance, and providing opportunity to
    implement improvements. In order to ensure every dollar is maximized to
    equip and prepare the warfighter, we are building on our financial
    statement audit success to improve our business systems, account for
    every asset, and leverage data as a strategic asset.
    Sustaining Maritime Information Superiority
        Modernization of our information technology infrastructure is a
    critical warfighting priority for the DON. As an information age naval
    force, every Navy and Marine Corps warfighting function and mission
    area is dependent on data and information to rapidly inform decision-
    making throughout the entire competition to conflict continuum. We are
    using data driven decision-making to achieve tangible savings while
    consistently working to become more effective and more efficient. For
    example, the Marine Corps has implemented Artificial Intelligence-
    enabled counter-intrusion systems aboard bases, and we will continue to
    explore the use of information technology to harden defenses and enable
    capabilities.
        Effective use and management of data is key to our digital
    transformation, and will change how we will fight and win at every
    level. We are exploring the warfighting enabling capabilities of 5G
    expansion, and seeking additional ways to leverage new technology for
    distributed warfighting and unified command and control. Leaders in
    every functional unit and discipline have been directed to set business
    systems modernization on an integrated path that is sufficiently
    resourced and supported across the DON.
    Climate Readiness
        The United States Navy and Marine Corps recognize the reality of
    global climate change and the need to prepare for its short and long
    term effects on operational capability, as well as our responsibility
    to mitigate our environmental impact.
        To make our shore infrastructure more resilient to a changing
    climate, the Department is incorporating sea level rise modeling and
    modern facility standards into our new building designs. Navy and
    Marine Corps installations are adding a resilience component to their
    master plans and taking steps to ensure critical-mission infrastructure
    has access to reliable energy sources.
        Reducing fuel consumption also reduces overall costs, not only
    related to end-point consumption, but also costs associated with
    transporting fuel and resources to protect those assets. New
    technologies are reducing fuel consumption, including hybridization for
    newer platforms. In addition, advanced batteries and synthetic fuels
    are the starting point for platforms that are smaller, more lethal, and
    more integrated into future battlefield networks.
        President's Budget 2023 resources $719 million for climate-
    cognizant solutions including hybrid vehicles and propulsion system
    efficiencies. Reducing energy demand and fuel consumption through
    advanced technology will enable warfighters to remain forward and self-
    sufficient for a longer period of time while also contributing to
    climate change goals.
        Especially noteworthy are the regional challenges facing Naval
    forces in the Arctic, from the changing physical environment and
    greater access to sea routes and resources, to increased military
    activities by Arctic states, such as Russia, and non-Arctic states and
    their attempts to alter Arctic governance. Harsh operating conditions
    in the Arctic affect our meteorological forecast capability,
    hydrographic surveys, modeling, and sensors have the potential to
    impact sea lines of communications.
        I have therefore directed a review of our current strategic
    document for the Arctic, the Arctic Blueprint, to ensure we are
    adequately preparing our forces for climate change within and through
    the region. The Navy is also engaging with our Arctic partners and
    allies through programs such as the Denmark Newport Arctic Scholars
    Initiative recently co-hosted by the President of the US Naval War
    College and Commandant of the Royal Danish Defense College.
                             empowering our people
        Everywhere I've gone as Secretary of the Navy, I have been
    impressed with the professional dedication of every sailor, marine, and
    civilian executing the many missions of the DON. Admiral Gilday,
    General Berger, and I are determined to ensure opportunities for every
    sailor, marine and civilian to advance and grow without barriers or
    discrimination. It all starts with a culture of warfighting excellence,
    where all are treated with dignity and respect.
    Building the Future Force
        To maintain a Fleet prepared to fight and win in long term
    strategic competition, we must continue to evaluate and improve our
    capability to attract, retain, and develop a talented and diverse
    workforce. We face an intensely competitive job market for talented
    workers, and a rapidly evolving tactical and technical landscape,
    driving us to modernize and enhance our entire talent management
    approach in order to succeed.
        We are expanding opportunities for civilians with prior military
    service to contribute their unique experiences to our force through the
    Targeted Reentry Program. We are also expanding avenues for personnel
    to learn, operate, and innovate with partners from the private sector,
    across the Joint Force, and alongside our allies.
        We are continuously identifying opportunities for personnel to
    develop their leadership skills throughout the ranks, promoting equal
    opportunity in every aspect of our force. For example, the Marine Corps
    Talent Management 2030 is focused on identifying the individual
    strengths of every marine and matching these talents to the needs of
    the Corps.
        Our mission demands leaders who possess the highest intellectual
    and warfighting capabilities to confront the many dangers of a complex
    world. We value critical thinking, creativity, communication,
    collaboration, and problem solving. The institutions of our naval
    education enterprise are developing leaders with the warfighting rigor,
    intellectual dynamism, and innovation to hold our strategic advantage
    against competitors and global adversaries. We are creating a continuum
    of learning through ready, relevant education, attuned to the battle
    rhythm of Active Duty service.
        President's Budget 2023 invests $425 million in our naval education
    institutions, including the US Naval Academy, Naval Postgraduate
    School, Naval War College, and Marine Corps University. This funding
    will expand access to the Naval Community College ensuring that all of
    our personnel have access to a high quality college education, no
    matter where their service takes them. We are investing in distance
    learning and increasing shipboard training and certification
    opportunities, while expanding opportunities for personnel to work and
    research alongside our industrial and academic partners.
        We appreciate the Congress's interest in ensuring our naval forces
    have the right facilities to train, fight, and win. Specifically, we
    are grateful for the Congress's continued attention to the urgent need
    to expand the Fallon Training Range Complex, which is necessary to the
    readiness of every naval aviator and Navy SEAL. I have personally met
    with Tribal and local community leaders, as well as my counterparts
    across the Federal Government, and I am committed to finding a
    favorable solution for everyone involved.
    Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion
        In order to meet the challenges of a complex world, we must
    continue to recruit, retain, train, and promote the best from all of
    America. We need a diverse force, so every child in America can see
    themselves wearing the uniform or working in our civilian ranks
    tomorrow, and every viewpoint is represented in our operations today,
    so that we can draw talent from all of America to build our warfighting
    advantage. This is a national security imperative, and a critical
    aspect of the DON's Diversity, Equity and Inclusion initiatives.
        We have been reaching out across the Department, through efforts
    like Task Force One Navy, the Executive Diversity Advisory Council, the
    USMC Diversity Review Board and the Navy DEI Council to understand what
    is working, and where we fall short. We are looking at areas of under-
    representation in military and civilian occupations, and finding ways
    to build diversity, equity and inclusion efforts into our Navy and
    Marine Corps culture.
        We are expanding recruitment efforts like our Junior Officer
    Diversity Outreach Program, to build recruitment networks in diverse
    and underrepresented communities. We are expanding and increasing
    awareness of career development and mentorship opportunities to help
    cultivate the next generation of diverse leadership through the ranks.
    In accordance with the 2017 Women, Peace and Security Act, we are
    working with partner nations to expand the meaningful participation of
    women in defense around the world.
        We continue to expand gender integration in Marine Corps recruit
    training and operational units, strengthening our entire force. Out in
    the fleet, women are leading as never before. In December, I
    commissioned USS Daniel Inouye, under the command of Commander DonAnn
    Gilmore. In January, USS Abraham Lincoln Captain Amy Bauernschmidt
    became the first woman to command an aircraft carrier at sea. In
    February, I was honored to preside over the change of command at USS
    Constitution, as Commander Billie Farrell became the first woman to
    command our Nation's flagship.
        Many more outstanding women are on their way up the ranks. This
    semester at the U.S. Naval Academy, five of the six people chosen
    through a competitive process to serve on the staff of the Brigade
    Commander, the highest ranking midshipman, are women, including the
    Brigade Commander, herself.
        From the E-Ring to the Air Wing, the deckplates to the field, our
    force is stronger today because of the many women and minorities in our
    ranks and leadership. But there is still more work to be done. We are
    working to reduce under-representation by examining our accession and
    promotion pipelines to recognize and value the service of all our
    enlisted and commissioned personnel. Our office of Diversity, Equity
    and Inclusion continues to identify areas for improvement and action.
    We look forward to working with the Committee to continue expanding
    opportunities for all Americans to serve and lead.
    Destructive Behaviors
        Leaders at all levels are expected to set the tone for a healthy
    climate and culture where destructive behaviors are never tolerated.
    Trust is at the heart of all our warriors do. Extremist ideologies are
    a strategic threat to that trust and have no place within the Navy and
    Marine Corps.
        Throughout 2021, DON representatives participated in the Secretary
    of Defense's Countering Extremist Activity Working Group to develop
    recommendations to address extremism in the ranks. Specific focus areas
    included military justice and policy, training and enhancing the
    insider threat program.
        This budget requests $240 million for Sexual Assault Prevention and
    Response activities--an 84 percent increase over fiscal year 2022. We
    have focused our efforts on recognizing and preventing harmful
    behaviors in the first instance, and ensuring that leaders at every
    level have the training, skills, and tools available to ensure
    offenders are held appropriately accountable.
        I appreciate the work of this Committee to include new tools within
    the fiscal year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to deter
    misconduct and prosecute sexual assault, domestic violence, and other
    covered offenses. The Department of Navy is moving forward to create
    Offices of Special Trial Counsel, as required by the NDAA, and we
    welcome the meaningful change these offices will help enable. Trained
    and independent military prosecutors will capably oversee sensitive
    investigations of covered offenses and independently determine, based
    on the evidence, which cases are referred to trial by court-martial.
    They will be led by a senior judge advocate who will report directly to
    me.
        DON leaders have circulated the ``Watch List'' throughout the
    force. This prevention tool details warning signs that increase the
    risk of sexual assault within a command, including sexual harassment,
    gender discrimination, lack of responsibility and intervention,
    workplace hostility, and lack of respect and unit cohesion. In
    conjunction with this training tool, we encourage leaders at every
    level to speak up and take action when they see these or other
    behaviors on the continuum of harm.
        This fiscal year, we will begin hiring an integrated prevention
    workforce across the force to redouble our focus on early
    identification and prevention of harmful and destructive behaviors. I
    have also directed the DON to expedite the implementation of five
    recommendations of the Secretary of Defense's Independent Review
    Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military. These five accelerated
    recommendations focus on developing, educating, and promoting leaders
    dedicated to fostering command climates in which all individuals are
    treated with dignity and respect.
        These changes will improve our ability to prevent sexual assault
    and sexual harassment, hold offenders accountable, and create a safer,
    stronger and more inclusive Navy-Marine Corps team. I am releasing the
    DON ``No Wrong Door'' policy, ensuring victims receive professional
    care to the fullest extent practicable, regardless of where they
    initially seek support. This new policy will also serve to supplement
    existing efforts to further professionalize our workforce, prioritize
    the prevention of sexual harassment and eliminate collateral duty
    personnel with full time personnel. This ``No Wrong Door'' policy also
    recognizes that sexual assault, sexual harassment, and domestic abuse
    exist on a continuum of harm. The DON's implementation efforts, led by
    the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs,
    are already underway.
    Take Care of Our People
        The DON is committed to ensuring the health, safety, and well-being
    for all members within our military community. We are reforming
    operating procedures and promotion practices to reward initiative,
    applied problem solving, and innovative thinking at every level. A top
    priority as we evaluate personnel practices are the needs and
    challenges of military families, particularly to ensure our policies
    respect the needs of single parent and dual service families.
        The DON offers a variety of mental health and counseling resources,
    encouraging positive help-seeking behaviors and eliminating the stigma
    around mental health care among servicemembers. The importance of this
    issue and the continued emphasis on suicide prevention has been
    highlighted in recent weeks as we mourn the loss of young sailors
    aboard USS George Washington. We continue to emphasize suicide
    prevention efforts, breaking the silence, and increasing visibility and
    access to critical resources.
        Through a combination of non-monetary, quality of life, and
    customer service programs, we are responding to the needs of our
    warfighters and their families. For example, this budget increases
    Child and Youth Services funding by 38 percent, including $56 million
    for a new Child Development Center at Point Loma, childcare data
    management system upgrades, and full funding for the Fee Assistance
    Program.
        President's Budget 2023 also includes significant funding for
    construction and oversight of family housing, including $249 million
    for new family housing at Joint Region Marianas--Andersen Air Force
    Base, Guam, and $75 million for construction improvements to family
    housing in Yokosuka, Japan. President's Budget 2023 also includes the
    funding necessary for DON to sustain our increased oversight as
    necessary to ensure Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI)
    projects on Navy and Marine Corps bases provide quality housing and a
    positive living experience for sailors, marines and their families.
        As demonstrated by recent quality issues at barracks buildings in
    Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bethesda in Maryland, the DON must also
    ensure that our unaccompanied housing is properly maintained and
    consistent with modern living standards. I have recently visited the
    barracks at NSA Bethesda to confirm that these quality issues have been
    appropriately addressed, and I am committed to improving our
    unaccompanied housing facilities and preventing future problems.
    President's Budget 2023 also includes significant investment in
    unaccompanied housing, including $101 million for phase II of a Navy
    barracks project at Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, and $101 million for a Marine
    Corps Barracks Complex at Kadena, Japan.
        Finally, I fully support the Secretary of Defense's decision to
    defuel and permanently close the Red Hill facility, and I take very
    seriously the DON's responsibility to make things right after fuel
    releases contaminated the drinking water system at Joint Base Pearl
    Harbor-Hickam. I will continue to work closely with our federal
    interagency partners and the Hawaii Department of Health to protect the
    environment and support the military families and residents who have
    been impacted by fuel-contaminated water on Oahu, Hawaii.
    COVID-19
        With consistent personal and fleet discipline, vaccine
    distribution, and continued refinement of best practices, we have
    ensured a robust, proactive, and coordinated COVID-19 response across
    the DON. I particularly want to note the contributions of the 265,000
    civilian employees across the DON, whose faithful service has continued
    through the many challenges brought on by the pandemic, continuing
    critical and essential roles to enable our force to continue making
    mission.
        Guided by Health Protection Condition (HPCON) determinations and
    mission requirements, we continue to implement flexibilities to help
    minimize risk to our people and their families as we respond to
    evolving situations and ensure the continual readiness of our force. We
    are well positioned to emerge stronger than ever, as the pandemic has
    forced us to rethink and refine our recruitment, training, and
    personnel movements across the DON, as well as shipyard operations,
    deployments, and maintenance schedules, with efficiencies and
    applications of technology that can continue to benefit our operations
    and throughput long after COVID-19 is in our wake.
                       strengthen strategic partnerships
        Our partnerships provide an unmatched and irreplaceable advantage
    over every potential adversary. From our fellow Joint Force and
    government personnel, to our vital industrial base, to our global
    network of allies and partners, we will sustain, expand, and strengthen
    strategic partnerships by building seamless integration, communication,
    and collaboration with each of our partners at the same time that we
    cultivate new relationships.
    Joint Force and Government
        Across both services and throughout the DON, President's Budget
    2023 will invest in the readiness of integration-ready platforms to
    ensure continued freedom of action throughout the maritime domain, from
    amphibious and ground element equipment, to agile warships and
    submarines, to dominant aircraft carriers and air wings. Successful
    implementation of the concepts within the Navigation Plan and Force
    Design 2030 will be pursued through a unified, integrated effort at
    every echelon.
        But our fully integrated naval force is only part of the formidable
    Joint Force team that stands united in the protection of the American
    people. Collaboration between Departments, from the Pentagon to the
    operational front line unit, is critical to the defense of the United
    States. We are constantly seeking opportunities to maximize the
    combined efficiency and effectiveness of our force in cooperation with
    the Army, Air Force, and Space Force. For example, we continue to work
    with our fellow services on critical advanced research programs
    including hypersonic weapons, and worldwide, the Joint Strike Fighter
    program is yielding unprecedented reach and agility for the entire
    Joint Force.
        We are also proud to serve alongside our fellow sea service, the
    United States Coast Guard. Building on Advantage at Sea, our Tri
    Service Maritime Strategy, we are continually seeking ways to leverage
    our combined capabilities, from ice breakers to coastal facilities to
    embarked personnel. For example, last year USS Tulsa and USS Charleston
    conducted missions with embarked Coast Guard detachments as part of the
    Oceania Maritime Security Initiative. This joint effort improves our
    maritime domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific to reduce illicit
    fishing, combat transnational crimes, and enhance regional security.
    President's Budget 2023 will build on cooperative efforts like this to
    safeguard every part of the maritime domain.
        We continue to work with the United States Strategic Command, the
    National Security Council and the United States Air Force to support
    the Strategic Deterrent Forces. We work closely with our Joint Force
    partners to ensure DON is fully integrated into the national command
    authority, and ensure the Navy's sea based strategic deterrent is ready
    at a moment's notice to defend our nation. We will continue to work
    closely with the Department of Energy and our National Laboratories, to
    ensure Navy is forward leaning with modernization and sustainment as we
    continue to invest in the future deterrent through programs like
    Columbia and TACAMO.
    Community Partnerships
        Across the United States and around the world, Navy and Marines
    Corps installations partner with the local communities that host us to
    pursue joint opportunities, collaborate on shared challenges and
    develop regional plans that enable military readiness while supporting
    community priorities.
        Installation commanding officers are successfully using
    Intergovernmental Support Agreements to partner with a state or local
    governments to obtain installation support services, often at a
    considerable cost savings. Initiatives like the Defense Community
    Infrastructure Pilot program provide construction funds to states and
    communities to address deficiencies in community infrastructure that
    support military installations. Under the Readiness and Environmental
    Protection Integration (REPI) program, the DON is partnering with local
    governments and organizations and combining resources to enhance and
    preserve mission readiness and achieve mutually beneficial, sustainable
    communities near our installations and ranges.
    Industry Partnerships
        From the skilled shipwrights who transformed live southern oak into
    USS Constitution's ``iron sides'', to the over 2,000 suppliers and
    contractors contributing to the Ford-class today, our industrial base
    has fueled the strength of our Navy and Marine Corps. The innovative
    platforms and technologies that are so essential to the Joint
    Warfighting Concept would not exist without the private sector's
    involvement.
        Working alongside our vital industry partners, we are aligning our
    efforts to produce the right platforms and capabilities for the
    warfighter, and ensure maximum availability and throughput from design
    to production to maintenance. A robust, resilient, and nimble
    industrial base and supply chain is critical to the long term strength
    of our Navy and Marine Corps. Funding predictability and long term
    planning are key elements in ensuring the efficiency of our
    acquisitions and maintenance processes in partnership with a supply
    chain calibrated to deliver maximum value to the taxpayer and
    warfighter.
        In order to ensure a strong and stable industrial base to meet our
    national security requirements, we must be clear and transparent as to
    our future needs and resource constraints, and fight requirements creep
    whenever possible. In turn, our partners must be transparent with us as
    well, managing costs, strengthening the workforce, and delivering
    platforms on-time and on-budget. Together, we must be good stewards of
    the taxpayer's money.
        President's Budget 2023 will strengthen our industrial base through
    targeted investments in supplier development, shipbuilder
    infrastructure, strategic outsourcing, and workforce development. This
    budget adds $543 million for submarine industrial base investment and
    funds for a predictable build plan of two SSNs and two DDGs per year.
    It maintains a public shipyard workforce at 37,000 full time equivalent
    workers, and funds 45 private ship maintenance availabilities.
        I have held multiple town hall meetings with industry partners to
    hear about their challenges when doing business with the DON, and
    seeking greater transparency and cooperation to pursue greater
    efficiency, innovation and teamwork. I have also made it clear that I
    expect DON suppliers and contractors to meet their small business
    commitments, and expand diversity, equity and inclusion efforts in
    their hiring and subcontracting, in order to expand the innovative
    private sector universe available to the DON to benefit the taxpayer
    and the warfighter.
    Allies and Partners
        As strategic competitors pursue confrontation and coercion, we
    respond with alliances and partnerships, standing alongside a global
    community of nations in defense of our common values. I have witnessed
    the bonds between our sailors and marines working alongside their
    counterparts in Japan, the Republic of Korea, and elsewhere throughout
    the Indo-Pacific. I also saw the power of allied cooperation on recent
    trips to Europe, as I spoke with marines preparing for Exercise COLD
    RESPONSE in Norway, and sailors aboard USS Harry S. Truman carrying out
    tri-carrier maritime and air policing operations in the Mediterranean
    and North Aegean Sea alongside the Italian carrier Cavour and the
    French carrier Charles DeGaulle.
        These activities demonstrate the strength of our integrated
    deterrence, and the agility of our combined forces. Last year, USS
    Sullivans transited the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the
    Philippine Sea as part of the HMS Queen Elizabeth Carrier Strike Group,
    providing air defense and integrated operations alongside Royal Navy
    and Dutch destroyers, while also working with many allies and partners
    including Australia, France, Israel, Italy, New Zealand, Japan,
    Malaysia, Singapore, and more.
        HMS Queen Elizabeth Carrier Strike Group also featured United
    States Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 211 operating aboard the Royal
    Navy's flagship carrier. For seven months, the ``Wake Island Avengers''
    operated ten F-35B Lightnings alongside eight Royal Air Force F-35Bs
    from the decks of HMS Queen Elizabeth. Our marine aviators have also
    operated the F-35B from the decks of Italy's Cavour and Japan's Izumo,
    proving the capability of this aircraft for true allied deck hopping,
    when paired with United States amphibious ships for aircraft
    maintenance and sustainment.
        President's Budget 2023 will strengthen global alliances and
    partnerships with funding for joint operations and exercises around the
    world, including CARAT, MALABAR, and BALIKITAN in the Indo-Pacific,
    NATO operations in the Mediterranean, and exercises in our own
    hemisphere like UNITAS. We will continue to strengthen military-to-
    military relationships with existing allies, leverage specialized
    allied experience in regional operations, and expand and deepen our
    partnerships with like-minded nations around the world.
        We will continue to build opportunities for sailors, marines, and
    civilians to train, learn, and operate side-by side with their
    counterparts in partner and allied forces, and operationally integrate
    with our allies and partners through shared warfighting concepts,
    continually campaigning forward to deter adversaries and protect the
    rules based international order.
        Our sailors, marines and civilian personnel are warrior-diplomats
    for our Nation. Their professionalism and dedication promotes the
    connections that strengthen our collective security and cultivate
    shared ideals that send the message that the United States is a friend
    worth having.
                                   conclusion
        The most important partnership for our Navy and Marine Corps Team
    is with the American people. They entrust us with their hard earned tax
    dollars, as well as the lives and wellbeing of their sons and
    daughters, mothers and fathers, husbands and wives who serve in our
    ranks. We will not fail in our sacred responsibility to the American
    people, and all who serve in the cloth of our Nation.
        On behalf of each of the brave sailors, marines, civilians, and the
    families that serve at their side, I once again thank the leadership
    and membership of this Committee for your oversight, interest, and
    ongoing commitment to the defense of the United States of America. It
    is an honor to work with each of you, and I look forward to your
    questions.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Admiral Gilday,
    please.

        STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MICHAEL M. GILDAY, CHIEF OF NAVAL
                   OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

        Admiral Gilday. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe,
    distinguished members of the Committee. Good morning and thank
    you for the opportunity to appear this morning with Secretary
    del Toro and General Berger.
        For nearly eight decades, America's naval superiority,
    maritime superiority has guaranteed security and prosperity
    across the world's oceans and has played a unique and
    predominant role in protecting our Nation's most vital national
    interests. Maintaining maritime superiority is fundamental to
    implementing our new National Defense Strategy.
        Global competition is heating up, the pace of innovation is
    accelerating, and the environment our naval forces are
    operating in every day is growing more transparent, more
    lethal, and definitely more contested. Everyone in this room is
    familiar with these trends, particularly China's massive
    investment in highly capable forces designed to deny our access
    to the oceans.
        Our Navy's role has never been more consequential or more
    expansive. America needs a combat credible naval force that can
    protect our interests in peace, and that can prevail in war.
    Not just today, but tomorrow, and for the long term competition
    that lies ahead.
        Our budget submission for the President's Budget Request
    for fiscal year 2023 reflects that imperative. It fully funds
    the Columbia-class submarine to ensure continuity for our
    Nation's most survivable strategic deterrent. It keeps our
    fleet ready to fight tonight, funding maintenance accounts,
    filling magazines with ammunition, putting spare parts in
    storerooms, and giving our sailors the steaming days and the
    flying hours they need to hone their skills.
        It modernizes our fleet by investing in weapons with
    increased range and speed, integrated systems to improve fleet
    survivability, and a resilient, cyber secure network
    infrastructure. It invests in affordable, capable capacity,
    building towards the goal of a larger, distributed, hybrid
    fleet in the decade ahead, and taking into account the insights
    that we are gaining on a monthly basis from our fleet battle
    problems with the United States Marine Corps, with exercises
    like Large Scale Exercise 2021, the largest in the world, last
    summer, and also just a few months ago, the world's largest
    international unmanned maritime exercise in the Middle East.
        These exercises and analysis and many others are helping us
    to refine our warfighting concepts, experiment with unmanned
    systems at speed--at the speed of innovation--and grow the
    fighting power of our Navy-Marine Corps team across all
    domains. The need to field a ready fleet today, as we are some
    simultaneously modernizing for the future, has forced us to
    make difficult decisions, including the decommissioning of
    platforms that do not bring the needed lethality to a high end
    fight in contested areas.
        While building this capacity at the expense of readiness
    and modernization can sound like an attractive option, it is
    not one that I endorse. We have been there before, and we have
    seen tragic results. I refuse to repeat it again. We cannot
    field a fleet larger than one we can sustain, and at today's
    fiscal levels, quantity simply cannot substitute for quality,
    especially as our adversaries are building advanced warfighting
    systems.
        Failing to modernize to meet those threats would erode
    America's maritime superiority at a time when command of the
    seas will decide the global strategic balance and power for the
    rest of this century. The stakes in this competition are
    extremely high, which is why U.S. sailors, Active and Reserve,
    uniformed and civilian are committed to strengthening our naval
    power every single day.
        Thank you again for inviting me to testify, and I am
    grateful for the Committee's support to our Navy and Marine
    Corps team. I look forward to answering your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Michael M. Gilday
    follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Admiral Michael M. Gilday
        Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, distinguished members of the
    Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the
    posture of the United States Navy. Moreover, on behalf of all our
    sailors, Navy civilians, and their families, thank you for your
    continued leadership and support. With the funding authorized by
    Congress these last several years, we increased our readiness,
    modernized our capabilities, and kept our fleet deployed forward in the
    most critical regions of strategic competition.
        Since the founding of our Republic, the U.S. Navy has played a
    critical part in defending and advancing national policy by delivering
    sea power far from American shores. Our Navy's role--and consequently,
    its composition--has steadily evolved to ensure American security and
    defend our interests around the world. From our humble beginnings as a
    small maritime force, fending off pirates and protecting American
    shipping, we have become a globally postured fleet that underwrites
    world stability by deterring war, upholding international law, and
    assuring access to the maritime domain.
        Today, our Navy's mission has never been more consequential or
    expansive. We now face potential adversaries who are attempting to
    undermine the rules-based international order, aggressively modernizing
    their militaries, and fielding offensive warfighting capabilities at
    unprecedented speed and scale.
        This is a critical decade. Peaceful, free, and open oceans are
    vital to America's and our allies' security and prosperity in the 21st
    century. As global challengers rise, we must strengthen America's naval
    power to protect and defend our national interests.
                the maritime challenge to u.s. national security
        As a maritime nation, America's maritime superiority is a global
    imperative. Two expansive oceans connect us to our allies and trading
    partners. For all of us, our way of life depends upon free, open, and
    secure maritime areas. Sea control and power projection are essential
    to U.S. national security and long-term economic health. The People's
    Republic of China (PRC), our pacing threat, clearly recognizes this and
    has publically stated that it intends to grow its sphere of influence
    by challenging the United States' military access to the western
    Pacific.
        Over the past two decades, the PRC has built a comprehensive sea-
    denial, anti-access system of sophisticated sensors and long-range
    precision weapons. Backed by a robust industrial base and the largest
    shipbuilding infrastructure in the world, the PRC has extensively
    modernized its military and tripled the size of the People's Liberation
    Army-Navy (PLAN). It is also building next-generation strategic missile
    submarines, erecting hundreds of new missile silos, and growing its
    cyber and space capabilities.
        Under the cover of this anti-access umbrella, the PRC has embraced
    the use of ``gray zone'' activities to turn incremental gains into
    long-term strategic advantages. Using a multi-layered fleet of naval
    ships, maritime militia, and coast guard, the PRC is undermining
    international norms by staking illegal maritime claims, militarizing
    geographic features in the South and East China Seas, and intimidating
    its neighbors regarding offshore resources. Additionally, the PRC is
    extending its global reach with its Belt and Road Initiative--
    leveraging predatory lending practices, aggressive mercantilism backed,
    and hard military power--to access critical maritime terrain, ports,
    and waterways.
        Additional threats persist around the globe. Russia remains an
    acute threat, seeking to fracture NATO and reestablish its sphere of
    influence using a combination of diplomatic, economic, and military
    force. Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has shattered the post-
    Cold War peace in Europe. The support of like-minded nations for the
    brave citizens of Ukraine has reminded would-be aggressors of the
    global intensity of purpose to uphold a nation's inherent right to
    freedom. As the struggle continues, Russia is risking broader
    escalation with threats of nuclear attack, deployments of missile-
    carrying submarines close to American and allied shores, and
    sophisticated cyber-attacks. North Korea continues to develop both
    nuclear and missile programs; Iran's missile program is also
    concerning. All the while, violent extremist organizations remain
    persistent threats.
        Other serious transboundary challenges, including climate change
    and emerging pathogens, are also increasing the complexity of the
    security environment. Strategic competitors and non-state actors are
    gaining access to cutting-edge commercial technologies and wielding
    them to disrupt America's interests and national security. Artificial
    intelligence, ubiquitous sensors, and long-range precision weapons are
    making contested spaces more transparent and more lethal, and these
    systems are proliferating globally at a rapid pace.
        These are several of the many considerations shaping the future
    strategic environment. When examined together, they illustrate the
    complexity of 21st century security challenges, particularly in the
    maritime domain. In a rapidly changing world, a formidable naval force
    is crucial to effectively implement the 2022 National Defense Strategy
    (NDS) and protect American security and prosperity. The Nation cannot
    afford to have its Navy to pull back and cede influence at a time of
    rising tensions and challenges to freedom of the seas. Nor can it
    afford our fleet to lose its warfighting advantage.
                             meeting the challenge
        Looking to the future, the U.S. Navy must continue to deploy our
    fleets forward to meet an unpredictable strategic environment. We must
    also modernize to field the most capable force possible against
    evolving threats. America needs a Navy capable of prevailing over any
    naval adversary to protect and sustain our interests worldwide and
    deter crises that could lead to war.
        Together with the U.S. Marine Corps and Coast Guard, we must
    deliver integrated all-domain naval power to the Joint Force:
    delivering the lethal, resilient, sustainable, survivable, agile, and
    responsive fleet that the NDS requires. Specifically, in support of NDS
    and Department of Defense requirements:
          The Navy must defend the Homeland with an assured nuclear
    deterrent from beneath the sea to deter all forms of strategic attack.
          The Navy must be capable of controlling the seas to deter
    aggression against our allies and partners, and project power ashore as
    an integral part of the Joint Force.
          The Navy must be able to distribute and mass effects,
    integrate with the Joint Force across all domains, and defeat adversary
    forces in conflict.
        To prevail in competition, crisis, and conflict, our naval forces
    must be combat-credible--measured by our ability to deliver lethal
    effects in contested and persistently surveilled battlespaces. We will
    deliver these forces by aligning our planning, resources, and
    investments with national policy end-state objectives:
        Strengthening Integrated Deterrence. Integrated deterrence is
    backstopped by a safe, secure and effect nuclear deterrent. The Navy
    operates and maintains the most survivable leg of the nation's nuclear
    triad. Our strategic submarines represent approximately 70 percent of
    America's deployed nuclear arsenal. Synchronized with the retirement of
    Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, we must deliver Columbia-class
    submarines on time, as we continue to modernize our nuclear command,
    control, and communications systems and supporting infrastructure.
    These efforts are essential to ensure the United States can deter
    nuclear coercion or nuclear employment in any scenario.
        Deterrence also relies on forward-deployed, combat-credible
    conventional forces to control the seas and project power. These roles
    are central to integrated deterrence now and in the future. Employing a
    host of kinetic and non-kinetic effects launched from platforms on,
    under, and above the sea, conventional naval forces deploy globally to
    deter military aggression, support diplomacy, and give national leaders
    options to protect American interests across the spectrum of conflict.
    Should conflict arise, the Navy is consistently deployed forward to
    respond decisively, supporting the Joint Force to end hostilities on
    favorable U.S. terms.
        The Navy also provides the first physical line of U.S. Homeland
    Defense, preventing potential adversaries from using the oceans to
    directly threaten America or our allies and partners. No other element
    of national power can fulfill this role across every domain, from the
    seabed to space.
        Campaigning forward. Naval forces across the globe provide the
    United States strategic advantages in power projection, diplomacy,
    influence, and flexibility, without over reliance on access to overseas
    land bases. Our enduring, forward posture in support of the Joint Force
    guarantees our Nation the ability to respond to crisis, blunt gray-zone
    incrementalism, and preserve a stable and secure global maritime order.
    The Navy's global maneuverability supports diplomacy, reassures our
    allies, and generates favorable influence in key regions.
        Our alliances and partnerships remain our key strategic advantage.
    They recognize U.S. naval forces as their on-scene partner for building
    combined maritime strength. Every day, the Navy operates forward
    alongside allies and partners through combined operations, theater
    security cooperation, and capacity-building initiatives. These
    activities strengthen interoperability, increase information sharing,
    and build capacity for resilient, integrated logistics. Working
    together--particularly with interoperable, critical-capability allies--
    we strengthen our ability to prevail in conflict and further bolster
    integrated deterrence by demonstrating a united front against potential
    adversaries.
        In September of last year, President Biden announced a trilateral
    security agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the
    United States (known as AUKUS). The announcement launched an intensive
    18-month consultation period among the three governments to seek an
    optimal pathway for delivering a conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered
    submarine capability to Australia at the earliest achievable date. The
    Navy is playing a key leadership role in developing this plan to ensure
    that our Nation's preeminent expertise is applied to the nuclear-
    powered submarine initiative. We are focused on ensuring Australia
    understands the full scope of capabilities necessary to design, build,
    operate, and maintain a nuclear navy. AUKUS represents a tremendous
    strategic opportunity for the United States to expand our cooperation
    and collaboration with two of our closest allies, and we are on pace to
    respond to the President's tasking.
        The Navy is also uniquely equipped to contest gray zone
    incrementalism by our adversaries. Gray zone aggression thrives with
    non-attribution. The best way to oppose these activities is to deny our
    adversaries anonymity with persistent domain awareness, the effective
    leveraging of intelligence, and the agile application of sea power.
    Together with whole-of-government partners, the Navy exposes malign
    behavior, imposes reputational costs, diminishes the effectiveness of
    propaganda, and galvanizes international resistance.
        Building enduring warfighting advantages. Based on the PRC's
    current and long-term security challenge, the Navy must set a stable
    and sustainable trajectory to a larger and more capable force now. To
    ensure we remain adaptable and relevant, our future force design relies
    on six overarching imperatives to sustain our warfighting advantage,
    expand our options, and constrain those of our adversaries:
        Expand Distance. Long-range precision fires across all domains--and
    platforms with greater reach--enable naval forces to strike hostile
    targets while increasing our survivability.
        Leverage Deception. Deceptive measures--including stealth,
    concealment and maneuver, emissions control, and electronic warfare--
    degrade enemy surveillance and increase adversary uncertainty, enabling
    naval forces to operate effectively in contested seas.
        Harden Defense. Integrating directed energy with hard-kill and
    soft-kill defensive systems disrupts attacks and keeps naval forces
    survivable when targeted by adversaries.
        Increase Distribution. Distributing naval forces geographically and
    in all domains enables them to threaten an adversary from multiple
    attack axes. Smaller, lethal, and less costly platforms--including
    manned, unmanned, and optionally-manned--further complicate threat
    targeting, generate confusion, and pose dilemmas for our adversaries.
        Ensure Delivery. Resilient logistics connecting the foundry to the
    fleet--enabled by secure communications and information technology--
    refuel, rearm, resupply, repair, and revive distributed naval forces
    down to the last tactical mile.
        Generate Decision Advantage. Naval forces will out-sense, out-
    decide, and out-fight any adversary by accelerating our decision cycles
    with secure, survivable, and resilient networks, accurate data, and
    artificial intelligence. Connecting sensors, weapons, and decision-
    makers across all domains enables naval forces to mass firepower and
    influence without massing forces.
        These six force design imperatives enable Distributed Maritime
    Operations (DMO), the Navy's foundational operating concept of our
    team-centric Fleet construct. Today's priority investments are
    delivering on these imperatives. For example:
          Investments in hypersonic weapons, space-based
    capabilities, unmanned tanking, and long-range precision fires deliver
    capabilities for effects at an expanded distance.
          Investments in undersea platforms, weapons, and systems,
    next-generation aircraft and surface platforms, cyber capabilities,
    counter-surveillance, and integrated weapons systems deliver increased
    deception and defense.
          Investments in smaller, lethal platforms, autonomous
    systems in all domains, artificial intelligence, resilient logistics,
    and integrated combat systems and networks enable a more distributed
    fleet, the delivery to sustain it, and expand our decision advantage
    against peer adversaries.
                    accelerating america's advantage at sea
        The Navy is implementing the 2022 NDS, preparing for the challenges
    ahead of us, and accelerating America's enduring advantage at sea.
    Within the scope of the President's Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, we
    are delivering a combat-credible Navy designed to deter conflict and
    help win our Nation's wars as we maintain a global posture to assure
    our prosperity. To do this, we remain focused on four priorities:
    Readiness, Capabilities, Capacity, and our sailors.
        These four priorities are especially relevant because of today's
    fiscal environment. We face the simultaneous task of recapitalizing our
    strategic nuclear deterrent, our century-old dry dock facilities, and
    our strategic sealift capacity. These programs are all critical to our
    national defense. Meanwhile, Navy manpower, operations, and maintenance
    costs continue to grow above the rate of inflation. This means we must
    carefully invest in capabilities and capacity that offer the most
    significant payoff and warfighting value for strategic competition.
        Based on these priorities, I have consistently said that the Navy's
    size--our capacity--ultimately will be dictated by the budget's top
    line. We will not field a fleet larger than we can sustain. We also
    will not grow the Navy at the expense of building the Columbia--our top
    acquisition priority. Nor will we increase capacity by failing to
    modernize and sacrificing our combat credibility.
        The U.S. Navy cannot outpace an increasingly capable PRC by
    retaining platforms that are decreasingly relevant in modern naval
    warfare. While some of these platforms may have day-to-day utility in
    permissive environments, the Navy's first obligation is to deliver a
    ready, combat-credible fleet with the funding Congress appropriates.
    Simply maintaining the capabilities of today's fleet will be
    insufficient to both preserve our long-term interests and protect
    America. Quantity is not synonymous with quality. We must modernize to
    maintain our maritime edge.
        Therefore, our focus is on delivering capable capacity. America
    needs a modern strategic deterrent; greater numbers of undersea
    capabilities; more distributable surface combatants; a host of manned,
    unmanned, and optionally-manned platforms--under, on, and above the
    seas; and a resilient logistics enterprise to sustain our distributed
    naval force. Based on past and ongoing force structure analysis, it is
    my best military advice that the size of the Navy grows to a 500-ship
    hybrid fleet by 2045. Integrated with the Joint Force and interoperable
    with our allies and partners, this all-domain, hybrid fleet will ensure
    our maritime superiority.
        Our Navigation Plan Implementation Framework supports these
    priorities, implementing lines of effort to deliver measurable
    outcomes, driving a new Force Design process to improve our agility,
    and energizing a fleet-wide movement to strengthen our learning
    culture. Our Navy is addressing the challenges we face with clarity,
    determination, and urgency. We made significant progress over the past
    2 years, and we are continuing to press forward to deliver the
    readiness, the capabilities, the platforms, and the people necessary to
    protect the American people and our interests around the world.
                                   readiness
        To accelerate America's advantage at sea, we must prioritize
    readiness to keep combat-credible forces forward to deter conflict and
    protect the free and open system underpinning American security and
    prosperity. Our competitors are increasing their naval power every day,
    and their malign behavior and growing presence worldwide places an
    enormous demand on our forces. Moreover, the Russian invasion of
    Ukraine and ensuing global instability have provided a stark reminder
    of why the Navy must be ready to deploy globally in defense of U.S.
    interests. In fiscal year 2021, the Navy-Marine Corps team executed
    more than 22,000 steaming days and more than one million flying hours.
    Because naval forces remain in high demand, President's Fiscal Year
    2023 Budget Request emphasizes critical aspects of our readiness.
        The Navy continues to make readiness gains with increased shipboard
    manning, better maintenance performance, increased weapon inventories,
    more training for our crews, and enhanced spare parts availability.
    Sustained funding and systematic reforms throughout the fleet have
    enabled those readiness gains. Despite this momentum, we are not
    satisfied. Our focus remains on continuous improvement.
        Deploying combat-credible forces starts with performing high-
    quality maintenance on time and in full. To this end, we are using
    data-driven reforms such as Performance-to-Plan (P2P), the Naval
    Sustainment System (NSS), and other initiatives to improve maintenance
    processes, increase operational availability, and save taxpayer
    dollars. We continue to see positive results with these methods,
    especially in our aviation community. By leveraging the power of the
    aviation Maintenance Operations Center (MOC), we sustained a mission-
    capable rate of 80 percent for our F/A-18E/F Super Hornets across three
    consecutive fiscal years. Additionally, we have seen five more aircraft
    types achieve this high mission-capable rate as we have incorporated
    them into the MOC construct over the last 18 months. With more aircraft
    available, our aircrews are more ready to dominate the skies than at
    any point over the last decade.
        We continue to take a similar, data-driven approach to improve
    surface ship maintenance, and we see positive results across the fleet.
    Since fiscal year 2020, P2P-driven improvements--such as the goal of
    awarding contracts 120 days before the start of a maintenance
    availability, level loading ports through better prediction of
    workload, better availability planning, and improved long-lead-time
    material acquisition--have generated a 58 percent decrease in days of
    maintenance delay. President's Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request
    prioritizes private sector ship depot maintenance in line with enacted
    fiscal year 2022 levels to provide industry with a stable and
    predictable demand signal. The Other Procurement, Navy (OPN) pilot, is
    seeing positive early results, including more efficient use of
    contracted ship maintenance throughout the entirety of the fiscal year,
    improved on-time delivery of long-lead time materials, and reduced
    impact of growth and new work. We are grateful for the support from
    Congress in continuing this budgetary authority.
        Despite COVID-19, public shipyards have also seen improvements over
    the last 2 years, with fewer maintenance delay days and increased on-
    time completion percentages. However, submarine maintenance remains a
    pressing challenge. We are working hard to reduce submarine idle time
    at public shipyards by conducting thorough, early material condition
    assessments to reduce Days of Maintenance Delay and maximize
    operational availability. Through the Performance to Plan-Shipyard
    (P2P-SY) and Naval Sustainment System-Shipyard (NSS-SY) efforts, we
    continue to focus on achieving on-time maintenance availability
    completion. We are looking for opportunities to balance public and
    private sector workload and maintain a healthy industrial base for
    submarine maintenance and new construction. In addition, we are
    creating a Long Range (15-year) SSN Depot Maintenance Plan to improve
    workload forecasting in both the public and private sectors for fiscal
    year 2023 and beyond.
        Sustaining our platforms also requires critical investments in our
    infrastructure ashore. Our worldwide constellation of bases must be
    capable of sustaining and supporting our fleet at sea, including our
    public shipyards and aviation depots. The average age of U.S. naval
    shipyard facilities and related infrastructure is 61 years, while the
    average dry dock age is approaching 100 years. Our Shipyard
    Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP) provides a strategic roadmap
    for necessary investments in dry docks, capital equipment, and layout
    optimization of these vital national assets. President's Fiscal Year
    2023 Budget Request prioritizes SIOP, investing over $1.7 billion in
    fiscal year 2023, including funding for three major shipyard projects.
    Additionally, the Fleet Readiness Centers Infrastructure Modernization
    and Optimization Plan (FIOP) will ensure our industrial facilities are
    resilient and optimized to maintain both legacy and next-generation
    aircraft, and their associated weapon systems.
        Our commitment to improving readiness also includes our information
    forces. We have established a dedicated team to improve our ability to
    generate and deploy forces for cyberspace operations. We are learning
    from other highly technical warfighting domains such as aviation and
    nuclear power to keep pace with cyber-force growth. This effort looks
    at all aspects of our readiness to include recruiting, training,
    assignment, and retention. This comprehensive review sets a course for
    the Navy to meet and sustain United States Cyber Command's demand.
        Readiness also extends to the training facilities that generate
    warfighting advantages. The modernization and expansion of the Fallon
    Range Training Complex (FRTC) is critical. As the capabilities and
    ranges of our platforms have grown, our training ranges have not. The
    FRTC is now far too small to allow carrier-based aircraft to adequately
    train for high-end conflict with precision-guided weapons, and it is
    too small for SEALs to conduct mobility maneuver training in a
    realistic tactical environment. Our sailors need the most realistic
    training possible if they are going to defeat a strategic competitor.
    FRTC modernization will ensure that future generations of warfighters
    remain the most effective in the world. We understand the challenges
    associated with this project, and we are deeply committed to listening
    and working with every stakeholder towards a mutually acceptable
    modernization plan.
                                  capabilities
        To accelerate America's advantage at sea, we must modernize our
    capabilities to credibly deter war and, if necessary, win in conflict.
    Disruptive technologies are changing the potential applications and
    impacts of military activities from the seafloor to space. Artificial
    intelligence, machine learning, autonomy, quantum computing, and new
    communications technology are transforming the character of future
    warfare. Modern naval warfare demands integrated systems, resilient
    kill chains, better terminal defense, and a robust logistical footprint
    to support a more distributed force. Transitioning to these
    capabilities will increase our deterrence posture by expanding our
    ability to distribute our forces and mass effects.
        As we build and put to sea a force able to deter and, if necessary,
    defeat a strategic competitor, we must prioritize capabilities that
    support Distributed Maritime Operations, or DMO--our previously
    mentioned foundational operating concept. Kinetic and non-kinetic
    effects must be distributed geographically--on, under, and above the
    seas--as well as in the information environment, the cyber domain, the
    electromagnetic spectrum, and in space. To operate effectively,
    platforms, sensors, and weapons must all operate and work together as
    one cohesive, integrated team. The teams are centered on our Numbered
    Fleet construct--our cross-domain contribution to the Joint Force. The
    Navy must empower these teams through secure, survivable, resilient,
    and common networks. Project Overmatch will deliver the Naval
    Operational Architecture (NOA), the Navy's contribution to Joint All-
    Domain Command and Control (JADC2) making major improvements in both
    resilience and capability to plan, coordinate and execute missions as a
    critical member of the Joint Force. President's Fiscal Year 2023 Budget
    Request includes $195 million in fiscal year 2023 and $898 million
    across the Future Years Defense Program for core activities of Project
    Overmatch, which is an increase of $122 million in fiscal year 2023.
    This increase represents a deliberate and executable investment to
    accelerate the delivery of NOA Increment 1 to carrier strike groups by
    next year.
        Strategic competitors are continuing to develop sophisticated
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that
    complicate our operations globally. Our President's Fiscal Year 2023
    Budget Request investments accelerate and enhance core Counter-Command,
    Control, Communications, Computers, Combat Systems, Intelligence,
    Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting (C-C5ISRT) activities that
    generate warfighting advantage by degrading adversaries' understanding
    of the operational environment. In support of both offensive and
    defensive DMO, these investments integrate three Counter C5ISR&T tenets
    required to sustain operations in a contested environment with
    acceptable risk: (1) understand the risk of detection posed by
    adversary capabilities; (2) orchestrate actions to reduce naval units'
    targetability; (3) synchronize delivery of kinetic and non-kinetic
    effects.
        As an example, to pace the growing air and missile defense threat
    set, the Navy developed and approved a strategy over the past budget
    cycle to deliver enhanced radar sensitivity and electronic warfare
    capabilities to our DDG Flt IIA ships. This strategy is called DDG Mod
    ``2.0'' and includes the back-fit installation of the Shipboard
    Electronic Warfare Improvement Plan (SEWIP) Block 3, adding enhanced
    capabilities to current SEWIP Block 2; a 24 Radar Module Assembly SPY-6
    radar to replace SPY-1; and Aegis Baseline 10.
        President's Budget 2023 also includes investments in developing and
    demonstrating conventional sea-based hypersonic strike weapon systems.
    The Navy Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) Program Office and Army
    Hypersonic Project Office are using a common missile design and joint
    test opportunities to field non-nuclear hypersonic weapon systems. In
    2021, we conducted two First Stage and one Second Stage Solid Rocket
    Motor static fires, marking the first successful tests of the newly
    developed missile. The CPS Program also completed an eight-shot Solid
    Slug Launch Test Campaign, which provided initial validation of the
    cold-gas launch approach for use on Navy platforms. Stable funding at
    the requested level will keep this critical capability on track to
    field on Zumwalt-class DDGs followed by Virginia-class SSNs equipped
    with the Block V Virginia Payload Module.
        We are incorporating other long-range, highly capable weapons into
    our magazines to improve lethality across domains. President's Fiscal
    Year 2023 Budget Request sustains the production of the Blk-I/IA SM-6
    and the modernized Blk-V Tomahawk Missile, and it funds the transition
    of the Maritime Strike Tomahawk to a Program of Record. Additionally,
    we are arming our submarines with better MK-48 Heavyweight Torpedoes
    and pursuing more advanced variants. We are also improving the
    effectiveness of our fighter aircraft, extending their all-domain reach
    with the Advanced Anti-radiation Guided Missile, AIM-120 Advanced
    Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile, and Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile.
    Altogether, the weapons procurement in President's Fiscal Year 2023
    Budget Request is our best capability insurance against near-term
    threat escalation while keeping us postured for the future.
        In parallel, we are maturing multiple directed energy projects to
    improve overall fleet survivability in contested environments. We have
    successfully deployed three directed energy weapons systems in the 7th
    and 5th Fleets to support Counter-ISRT and Counter-Unmanned Aerial
    Vehicle missions. To reach our goal of ``bottomless'' magazines, we
    will need continued advancements and investments in directed energy,
    scaling and platforms with enough space, weight, power, and cooling
    (SWAP-C). President's Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request funds $262
    million across the Future Years Defense Program to install the eighth
    Optical Dazzling Interdictor and provides continued funding for Solid
    State Laser-Technology Maturation, High Energy Laser with Integrated
    Optical dazzler and Surveillance (HELIOS), and the High Energy Laser
    Counter Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Project (HELCAP). Our future Navy
    surface combatants, such as FFG-62 and DDG(X), include SWAP-C
    reservations to accommodate such systems. We are taking a truly
    holistic view of this emerging portfolio to carefully incorporate
    directed energy into the fleet in an evolutionary way.
                                    capacity
        To accelerate America's advantage at sea, the Navy will build a
    combat-credible, hybrid fleet, bolstered by mature, cost-effective
    unmanned technologies and operational concepts. A new platform can take
    up to a decade to go through the planning process, receive
    authorization from Congress, and complete construction before joining
    the fleet. To keep up with the accelerating pace of innovation, the
    Navy must build future platforms with modernization in mind--hardware
    upgradeable and software updateable at the speed of innovation.
        Our number one acquisition priority remains the on-time delivery of
    the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, which constitutes our
    Nation's most secure and reliable strategic nuclear deterrent. Together
    with the Trident II D5LE2 Strategic Weapons System (SWS), Columbia will
    ensure the effectiveness and availability of the Nation's Sea-Based
    Strategic Deterrent through the 2080s. With the Ohio-class submarines
    nearing the end of their service life, there is no further margin for
    delays in this once-in-a-generation program without impacting U.S.
    Strategic Command requirements. Columbia must be on patrol no later
    than October 2030. The first submarine began construction last year,
    with the second boat on track for procurement next fiscal year. We will
    continue to advocate for aggressive construction schedules and
    incorporate ``lead ship learning'' to guarantee on-time delivery of the
    entire class to ensure this national asset's capability in the decades
    ahead. Columbia will continue to grow substantially as a proportion of
    the total shipbuilding budget beginning in fiscal year 2026, exceeding
    25 percent when Columbia enters full-rate production.
        Sea control and sea denial from beneath the waves are among our
    Navy's core advantages, and we refuse to yield any ground to the
    competition. President's Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request underscores
    our sustained support for procuring two Virginia-class submarines per
    year, and it invests in developing a follow-on attack submarine
    program, SSN(X), which will be key to sustaining our undersea
    advantage--setting the conditions for the warfighting advantage of our
    fleet.
        Unmanned systems will play a key role in DMO. We released the
    Unmanned Campaign Framework in March 2021 to serve as the comprehensive
    strategy for a future wherein unmanned systems serve as an integral
    part of the Navy's warfighting team. U.S. 3rd Fleet executed Unmanned
    Integrated Battle Problem 2021 to integrate manned and unmanned
    capabilities in operational scenarios. To further operationalize the
    Campaign Plan, we established Task Force 59 (CTF-59) to accelerate
    unmanned and AI solutions, demonstrating the importance of warfighters
    and industry partners in operational experimentation with available
    technologies. We intend to scale these lessons to 7th Fleet. We also
    continued work with partners and allies in events such as NATO Maritime
    Unmanned Systems Initiative Exercises and International Maritime
    Exercise 2022.
        We completed MQ-25A ``T1'' aircraft in-flight refueling of Navy
    carrier-based aircraft and its first carrier demonstration and
    completed over 4000 hours and 46,000 nautical miles of USV operations.
    Additionally, we recently established the Unmanned Task Force, a cross-
    functional team focusing on rapid experimentation and solving
    operational problems to quickly inform acquisition strategies. The
    focus remains on enabling technologies to provide near-term capability,
    take an evolutionary approach, and lay the foundation for the future
    hybrid fleet.
        This year, we celebrated the centennial of our aircraft carriers.
    They have proven to be the most survivable and versatile airfields in
    the world, and our nuclear-powered carriers will remain a cornerstone
    of the Navy's conventional deterrence for decades to come. USS Gerald
    R. Ford (CVN 78) achieved Initial Operating Capability in December
    2021, completed flight deck certification, and is scheduled to deploy
    later this year. President's Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request supports
    procuring our follow-on aircraft carriers. CVN 79 construction is 85
    percent complete and on track to deliver in fiscal year 2024; CVN 80
    construction is 12 percent complete and scheduled to deliver in fiscal
    year 2028.
        The sustained striking power and adaptability of our Carrier Air
    Wing is vital to controlling the seas and projecting power in contested
    environments. Today's air wings are more capable than ever with the
    addition of the F-35C, the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, and the CMV-22B
    Osprey. Carrier Air Wing TWO recently completed a deployment with these
    capabilities, showcasing the cutting-edge lethality of naval airpower.
    President's Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request adds to our F-35 inventory
    to expand our fourth- and fifth-generation fighter mix, and it funds
    the unmanned MQ-25 Stingray, on track to deploy in 2026, which greatly
    extends the reach of our Carrier Air Wings into contested battlespaces.
        We are also laying the groundwork for tomorrow's air wing through
    the Next Generation Air Dominance portfolio. This highly networked
    sixth-generation family of systems will leverage manned-unmanned
    teaming to further advance the cross-domain lethality of our air wings
    in contested battlespaces. Delivering this capability is vital to
    outpace PRC fighter development.
        Our future fleet design places emphasis on a balance of greater
    numbers of large and small surface combatants as the foundation of
    distributed operations. Our newest class, the Constellation-class
    frigate, is a versatile, multi-mission platform that will support
    operations across the spectrum of conflict. The future large surface
    combatant, DDG(X), will bring additional space, weight, and power to
    support evolving capabilities for a high-end fight. Together, these two
    ship classes will form the center of our cross-domain teams, bringing
    more lethality, survivability, and endurance to the fleet.
        The Naval logistics enterprise continues to become increasingly
    agile and resilient to deliver the means to refuel, rearm, resupply,
    repair, and revive distributed forces, ensuring the Joint Force stays
    combat credible against any adversary. Over the past 2 years, we have
    improved our afloat fuel distribution systems, introduced more secure
    digital systems for better logistics planning and execution, and
    validated our Future Afloat Logistics Forces Initial Capabilities
    Document, which defines the capabilities and capacities needed to
    sustain naval forces. Adequate capacity is a continuing challenge and
    President's Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request pursues several platform
    solutions to close the gaps we have identified, including the continued
    construction of the John Lewis (T-AO 205) Class Fleet Replenishment
    Oiler Program, the Submarine Tender AS(X), and continued research and
    development to support the Next Generation Logistics Ship.
    Additionally, we are continuing to leverage the generous authorities
    Congress has provided us to renew our surge sealift capacity with used
    vessels, helping us meet combatant commander readiness requirements. We
    are grateful for this Committee's support.
                                    sailors
        To accelerate America's advantage at sea, we must invest in
    trained, resilient, and educated sailors who can adapt faster than our
    adversaries in today's rapidly changing strategic environment. Our
    sailors and civilians remain the true source of our naval power. We
    must continue to prioritize and care for them. From culture to training
    and education, to overall health and wellness, President's Fiscal Year
    2023 Budget Request supports the most important element of our Navy--
    our people.
        History shows that the navy which adapts, learns, and improves the
    fastest gains an enduring warfighting advantage. The essential element
    in doing so is fostering a healthy ecosystem--a culture--that assesses,
    corrects, solves problems, and learns faster than the opposition. Our
    ``Get Real, Get Better'' movement will help us reduce the variability
    in performance between our best and worst performers. Get Real, Get
    Better will train and educate our leaders on the leadership behaviors
    required to create this culture, along with the supporting tools to
    solve our hardest problems. Focusing on our people, and their leaders,
    will further expand the asymmetric advantage that is the American
    Sailor.
        Through the Ready Relevant Learning (RRL) initiative, we are
    providing sailors with practical, accessible knowledge and skills that
    can adapt to the needs of the Navy. Today, RRL provides timely,
    relevant training using an agile, multi-path approach to ensure our
    operators have the knowledge they need on the deck plates to succeed in
    combat. RRL supplements our traditional brick-and-mortar schoolhouses
    with modern, multi-media, multi-platform solutions. Recently, we
    transitioned 8 enlisted ratings to this model and completed
    requirements development for 39 additional ratings. With the funds
    provided by President's Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, the Navy will
    advance the Career Long Learning Continuum effort, which is critical to
    the program goal of maintaining continuity and currency of individual
    training.
        The Navy has prioritized the Fleet Training Wholeness initiative to
    integrate live platforms and simulators across our strike groups. This
    initiative funds Live, Virtual, Constructive (LVC) unit and strike
    group training. In the fleet, LVC continues to be a game-changer in
    training our combat leaders. From the pilot in the cockpit to the
    technician on the radar scope, LVC allows all domains to train together
    at unprecedented levels of integration and complexity. President's
    Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request builds upon the continued integration
    of live ranges, ships at sea, and aviation shore simulators, and
    includes funding to integrate aircraft and information warfare systems
    and capabilities into LVC training. These investments are advancing our
    sailors' tactical skills and proficiency against our most advanced
    competitors.
        Building upon the momentum of the Navy's Culture of Excellence
    campaign, we will implement a holistic and prevention-based Total
    Sailor Fitness framework. This effort will maximize sailor, unit, and
    organizational performance while improving sailor trust, resilience,
    mental health, connectedness, and behavioral metrics. Our Warrior
    Toughness program enables better performance before, during, and after
    critical events, providing concepts and skills to develop peak
    performance and make sailors more resilient and ready for the Fleet. We
    integrate these programs into the curricula of the Recruit Training
    Command, Officer Training Command, United States Naval Academy, and our
    NROTC units. As we drive forward with this Culture of Excellence, the
    Navy seeks to put the most combat-credible sailors to sea--first-rate
    warriors who are willing and able to defend our Nation.
        In addition, suicide prevention, Sexual Assault Prevention and
    Response (SAPR), and Diversity, Equity and Inclusion remain pillars on
    which the Culture of Excellence will continue to build. As part of our
    suicide prevention efforts, the Sailor Assistance and Intercept for
    Life Program provides rapid assistance, ongoing risk management,
    coordination of care, and reintegration assistance for at-risk
    servicemembers. Continued resourcing of this program saves lives. A
    full continuum of mental health and wellness support is also available
    worldwide, including at specialty and primary care clinics, Navy
    installation counseling centers, on the waterfront, embedded within the
    Fleet, and via virtual health platforms. Non-medical mental health
    services are available for sailors and their family members through
    Fleet and Family Support Centers, Military and Family Life Counseling,
    and Military OneSource. Navy Chaplains provide confidential counseling
    and are essential in ensuring the spiritual readiness and resiliency of
    the Naval Force. There is ``no wrong door'' for our sailors to get
    help.
        The Navy is leveraging metric-based, sexual assault data to better
    understand sexual assault risk factors. This strengthens our SAPR
    programs with research-informed approaches to prevention programs and
    policies. We are also implementing recommendations from the Independent
    Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military, using a
    deliberate, methodical approach to improve accountability, prevention,
    climate, culture, and victim care and support. These include addressing
    gaps in leader training to develop inclusive cultures that foster
    healthy command climates, providing sexual harassment victims with SAPR
    victim advocacy services, completing a SAPR Workforce Study to ensure
    unfettered support to sexual assault victims that phases out non-
    deployable collateral duty victim response personnel, and the phased
    hiring and integration of a primary prevention workforce.
        The Navy is building a force that looks like the Nation we serve.
    We benefit from our sailors' talent, experience, and insights. Today,
    the Navy is more demographically diverse than ever before. As we strive
    to become a more diverse, equitable, and inclusive force, we have built
    on lessons learned from our findings in Task Force One Navy,
    implementing 36 task force recommendations, with 18 more in progress.
    We must actively include all perspectives to harness the creative power
    of diversity, accelerating the Navy's warfighting advantage.
        To support our sailors, increase productivity, and generate cost
    efficiencies, the Navy is modernizing its Manpower, Personnel,
    Training, and Education Enterprise. Our Human Resources (HR) processes
    and operations have not fundamentally evolved in over 70 years. For too
    long, we have been managing our force with over 55 aging information
    technology systems, some of which are over 40 years old. These systems
    are not interoperable and do not provide a single authoritative data
    source. MyNavy HR Transformation is fixing this. We continue to make
    strides towards our Navy Personnel and Pay system rollout, which is an
    important foundational step for the overall transformation. By
    synchronizing and streamlining all aspects of personnel readiness, this
    overhaul will improve the lives of all sailors and their families.
        The Navy is a family, and our families serve along with us. Having
    witnessed the steadfast resilience of Navy families every day of my
    career, I have made it a daily practice to think about how to improve
    their lives. As all servicemembers know, when we take care of them,
    they take care of us.
                                   conclusion
        The U.S. Navy's mission has never been more essential for the
    preservation of American security and prosperity. Facing increasingly
    aggressive challengers, the Navy's priorities--Readiness, Capabilities,
    Capacity, and our sailors--will help us maintain our combat credibility
    in contested seas.
        We will need Congress's continued support. Since 2010, the Navy's
    buying power has not kept pace with inflation. ``Must pay'' once-in-a-
    generation strategic deterrence recapitalization and once-in-a-century
    shipyard infrastructure investments--along with rising readiness,
    labor, and material costs--are consuming larger shares of the Navy's
    budget. This loss in buying power has delayed modernization, reduced
    procurement, and constrained our ability to grow the force. To
    simultaneously modernize and build the capacity of our fleet, the Navy
    would need sustained budget growth at three-to-five percent above
    actual inflation. Short of that, we will prioritize capability over
    capacity. This will decrease the size of the fleet until we can deploy
    smaller, more cost-effective, and more autonomous force packages at
    scale.
        The investments we make this decade will determine the maritime
    balance of power for the rest of this century. Ships, submarines, and
    aircraft are undoubtedly expensive instruments of national power, as
    are the associated costs of maintaining them at a high level of
    readiness. But history shows that without a powerful Navy, the price
    tag is much higher.
        On behalf of more than 600,000 Active and Reserve sailors and Navy
    civilians, thank you for allowing me to testify today. I am grateful to
    this Committee and to your colleagues in Congress for your steadfast
    commitment to the Navy. We look forward to sailing alongside you to
    sustain our advantage at sea.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Admiral Gilday. General Berger,
    please.

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID H. BERGER, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE
                     CORPS, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

        General Berger. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
    distinguished members of the Committee, as we sit here this
    morning in a backdrop of a war raging in Ukraine and the malign
    activities that are ongoing in the Indo-Pacific, it is a good
    reminder for me that we don't have the luxury of building a
    Joint Force for one threat, for one region, for one form of
    warfare. We have to be prepared for the full range of
    operations, in places we might not expect, and probably on
    timelines we didn't anticipate.
        That is why your Marine Corps' ability to respond to crisis
    in any clime and place is essential to our national security.
    Three years ago, as the chairman and ranking mentioned, we
    embarked on an ambitious program of modernization in an effort
    to ensure that your Marine Corps could continue to meet its
    statutory role as America's force in readiness. With the
    bipartisan support of the members of this Committee, that
    modernization effort is on track and is building momentum.
        Over the past 3 years, your Marine Corps has self-funded
    $17 billion worth of modernization. Today, I would like to
    offer you an update in three areas where we have seen
    significant progress over the past 12 months. First, over the
    last 18 months, out in Twentynine Palms, California, which is
    our live fire maneuver training site, we have conducted nine
    force-on-force exercises over the past year and a half. Here is
    what we have learned, and these lessons--these learned lessons
    have really validated what we thought from the beginning.
        Basically, that smaller, more mobile, more distributed
    units, if they can employ 21st century combined arms and they
    have organic Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
    (ISR) and they have loitering munitions, they are more lethal
    than larger units that employ traditional sorts of force
    structures and traditional concepts.
        That is entirely consistent so far with what we have seen
    in Ukraine. In less than 2 years, we formalized a concept for
    Stand-In Forces and we built a capability that has dramatically
    expanded what we can achieve in support of both land and
    maritime operations. One of those Stand-In Forces is now
    forward deployed in Europe. As the U.S. European Command
    (EUCOM) Commander recently testified here in D.C., his words,
    that force is precious for effective deterrence.
        Second, we have achieved some important operational
    milestones. This year, we are going to deploy the Amphibious
    Combat Vehicle (ACV) for the first time aboard ship on a Marine
    Expeditionary Unit. We will retire the Amphibious Assault
    Vehicle (AAV), the aging AAV, ahead of schedule. We are doing
    that because of the support of this Committee. This year marked
    the first deployment of an F-35B squadron aboard an allied
    carrier, the first deployment of an F-35C squadron aboard a
    Navy carrier, U.S. Navy carrier.
        In fact, some of you all probably heard the brief from
    VMFA-211 aboard the HMS Queen Elizabeth. That was, in our
    opinion, a significant advancement in not just
    interoperability, but interchangeability with both United
    Kingdom jets and Marine Corps United States jets WF-35s, on
    board the Queen Elizabeth. That is how you commit to allies and
    partners.
        The Marine Expeditionary Unit, the MEU, enabled by
    amphibious ships, is the crown jewel of our naval expeditionary
    forces. No naval vessel in our inventory is capable of
    supporting a wider set of missions than the amphibious warship.
    Secretary Del Toro, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), and I
    all agree that the minimum number of L-class traditional
    warships, amphibious warships the U.S. needs is 31, and your
    support for sustaining that minimum capacity is essential to
    national security.
        Finally, this past year, we published a plan to modernize
    our personnel system. That will allow us to better recruit,
    train, align the skills of individual marines, retain them,
    match them with the needs of the Marine Corps. All that said,
    what the Marine Corps does for this Nation will not change.
        We remain America's force in readiness. We are capable of a
    diverse set of missions across the operational spectrum. But
    how we accomplish those missions is changing, and your support
    is critical to our collective success.
        In closing, would just like to offer to Ranking Member
    Inhofe our sincere gratitude for the three of us for your 50
    years of public service. Army veteran, State Legislator, Mayor,
    U.S. Representative, Senator, just on behalf of the sailors and
    marines and all of us here at this table, thank you, sir, for
    your years of service.
        With that, I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Berger follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by General David H. Berger
                                  introduction
        Chair, Ranking Member, and distinguished Members of the Committee,
    thank you for the opportunity to present this annual report and share
    my perspective on the opportunities and challenges confronting your
    Marine Corps, the naval services, and the larger joint force. As recent
    events in Ukraine so clearly illustrate, our strategic adversaries and
    competitors are ready and willing to employ violence--at scale--to
    support their revisionist aims. They are willing to sow chaos, destroy
    cities, inflict mass casualties, and suffer casualties themselves to
    rewrite the international order--an order that has broadly and deeply
    benefitted humanity. To ensure the joint force remains able to deter,
    and if necessary, defeat these adversaries, we need to move at even
    greater speed to modernize the force.
        As Commandant, I offer the Service's sincere thanks for the
    Committee's support to our modernization efforts--anchored on Force
    Design 2030 and Talent Management 2030. Today, I respectfully ask you
    to recommit to our modernization program. Embracing change before a
    catastrophic event occurs takes both courage and foresight; thank you
    for demonstrating both. As I have stated in the past, the Marine Corps
    does not seek any additional resources for modernization. Rather, we
    seek your oversight and assistance in ensuring that the resources the
    Service generates through divestments, reorganization, and redesign are
    reinvested in our Corps' modernization priorities.
        As I have previously testified, the suggestion that we have to
    choose between preparing to fight tonight, which we are ready to do, or
    preparing for some distant point in the future presents a false
    dichotomy. We must balance the very real and delicate resource tension
    between the force we employ today and the development of the force
    needed for the future. Our Nation can no longer afford to hold on to
    capabilities that do not create a relative advantage over our potential
    adversaries at the expense of capabilities that will keep us ahead of
    them--no matter how culturally significant or nostalgic to an
    individual service those capabilities may be.
          we will remain ``most ready when the nation is least ready''
        When defense leaders submitted their posture statements last
    spring, few of us would have predicted that a major conventional war in
    Europe--the largest since 1945--was only a year away. Russia's brutal
    invasion of Ukraine is a stark reminder that despite our best efforts,
    we can never know with certainty when, where, or how an adversary might
    precipitate conflict. Reflecting on this challenge in a related
    context, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said: ``When it comes
    to predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements,
    since Vietnam, our record has been perfect. We have never once gotten
    it right, from the Mayaguez to Grenada, Panama, Somalia, the Balkans,
    Haiti, Kuwait, Iraq, and more--we had no idea a year before any of
    these missions that we would be so engaged.''
        Why does this matter? From the perspective of a service chief, it
    matters because we don't have the luxury of building a joint force for
    one threat, one region, or one form of warfare. We must be prepared for
    the full range of operations in places we might not expect, and on
    timelines we did not anticipate. While this is true to some degree for
    all the services, it is especially so for the United States Marine
    Corps. Our history is footnoted by examples of our readiness to respond
    to crisis at a moment's notice in ``any clime and place.'' This is
    essential to our identity as marines, and part of our enduring value to
    the Nation. In these times of increasing complexity and uncertainty,
    the Nation needs one force, maintained at the highest levels of
    readiness that can respond to the crises that few saw coming. We are
    that force. Maintaining the entire joint force at heightened readiness
    levels is both unnecessary and unaffordable. Ensuring that the marine
    Corps does is both strategically vital and fiscally prudent. As
    marines, we have been, and will continue to be, ``America's 911
    Force''--the Nation's force-in-readiness.
        Our ongoing efforts to modernize through Force Design 2030 (FD
    2030) and Talent Management 2030 (TM 2030) will ensure the Marine
    Corps' ability to meet our statutory role and be ready to respond to
    crises--across the Range of Military Operations--from active
    campaigning to conflict. While China, as the pacing threat, is critical
    to informing our force development efforts, the capabilities we seek
    are theater agnostic. The fact is, our current modernization efforts
    will enable us to operate, fight, and win in a more diverse set of
    scenarios and geographic regions than we can today. We are, and will
    remain, ``most ready when the Nation is least ready''--a force in
    readiness prepared to respond to any crisis, anywhere, at any time.
                                    posture
        Today, approximately 30,000 marines are forward-deployed or
    forward-stationed, with hundreds more on watch at our embassies across
    the globe. However, in contrast to earlier periods, fewer of these
    forward deployed marines are afloat in service to the Fleet. I remain
    committed to a robust forward posture to support campaigning and to
    expanding this forward presence through the employment of additional
    marines aboard L-Class ships, Light Amphibious Warships, and other
    expeditionary vessels operated by the Fleet or our allies and partners.
                l-class ships & light amphibious warships (law)
        L-Class Ships. For decades, the Navy and Marine Corps have
    demonstrated the power and versatility of marine expeditionary forces
    embarked on amphibious ships. Operating as a combined arms team,
    marines have come ``from the sea'' to support all manner of operations,
    to include: projecting combat power ashore, providing humanitarian
    assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), reinforcing U.S. embassies,
    training allies and partners, and executing non-combatant evacuation
    operations (NEO). No naval vessel in our inventory is capable of
    supporting a more diverse set of missions across the range of military
    operations than amphibious ships.
        Amphibious ships provide platforms from which to base and employ a
    host of multi-domain capabilities--air, ground, surface, undersea, and
    cyber. Amphibious ships serve as mobile command posts, strike
    platforms, expeditionary maintenance facilities, search-and-rescue
    platforms, floating hospitals, sources of potable water and electricity
    for disaster response, transport and docking stations for smaller
    vessels, and locations where marines can train with international
    partners without the requirement for host nation access. In the near
    future, amphibious ships with well decks will increasingly be used as
    mother ships for uncrewed vessels, carrying a wide variety of unmanned
    surface vessels (USVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) for
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), anti-submarine
    and anti-surface warfare, mining, command and control, and military
    deception. Amphibious ships are also visible signs of U.S. reach and
    resolve, and because of their unique characteristics, can deploy to a
    region with a less escalatory posture than many traditional warships.
    Those unique characteristics include an ability to self-sustain
    embarked forces for weeks at sea without replenishment. Such resilience
    and persistence are a unique and vital capability for our combatant
    commanders.
        Viewed through the lens of both the 2018 and 2022 National Defense
    Strategies, big deck amphibious ships (LHA/LHD), which carry F-35Bs,
    MV-22s, CH-53s, unmanned aerial systems (UAS), and surface landing
    craft, are arguably the most versatile warships in our inventory. These
    ships, when paired with their embarked marines, have the highest
    utility across the entire spectrum of conflict from building partner
    capacity to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, to embassy
    reinforcement, to recovery operations, to strikes and raids against a
    peer or near peer adversary. This is the very epitome of campaigning
    forward from mobile sovereign platforms.
        During his March 2022 testimony before the House Armed Services
    Committee (HASC), the Commander of United States European Command
    (USEUCOM), General Tod Wolters, noted that his requirement for a 365-
    day Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) presence could not be met due to
    the limitations of the current amphibious fleet inventory, and further
    characterized the MEU as ``precious for effective deterrence.'' A week
    later, Secretary Austin noted in his HASC testimony that, ``Amphibs are
    important to us today. They will be important to us going forward.'' I
    wholeheartedly agree with the conclusions of both leaders, as requested
    in the fiscal year 2023 Budget. Our MEUs need them; our Fleets need
    them; and our combatant commanders need them. The National Defense
    Strategy cannot succeed without them.
        Light Amphibious Warship (LAW). Distinct, yet complementary to
    traditional L-Class amphibious ships, the LAW is envisioned to be a
    small, amphibious warship purpose-built to provide tactical maneuver
    for Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs), forward-deployed naval forces,
    and other expeditionary advanced base-enabling forces operating within
    contested environments. The LAW will be a maneuver asset, and as a
    shore-to-shore connector, is unique and critical to expeditionary
    littoral mobility. It will facilitate campaigning and will be capable
    of supporting diverse missions such as security cooperation, HA/DR,
    logistics support, and the launch and recovery of uncrewed systems for
    maritime domain awareness. While not optimized for any one threat or
    region, we envision the LAW as being of particular utility in the sort
    of maritime gray zone contests we see in the Indo-Pacific. This type of
    vessel would be well-suited as a platform for marines countering
    threats posed by groups like the People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia
    (PAFMM), and because of its size and characteristics, could be employed
    with lower risk of escalation. The LAW will be an important asset to
    advancing our strategic interests by allowing us to more effectively
    counter our adversaries' strategies, support and reinforce alliances
    and partnerships, and do so at a relatively low cost.
        On 9 September 2021, the Secretary of the Navy commissioned the
    Amphibious Fleet Requirement Study (AFRS). The study directed a
    determination of the ``required size and composition of the future
    amphibious warship fleet . . . needed to support combat operations,
    global presence, and safe and effective training.'' The study found we
    should have a mix of traditional L-Class Amphibious Warfare Ships and
    Light Amphibious Warships. The study will be one of many factors
    considered by the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of Defense and
    the Administration as shipbuilding plans and future budget requests are
    formulated. In my military judgment we will need to employ a mixed
    fleet of no less than 31 traditional L-Class Amphibious Warfare Ships
    and 18-36 Light Amphibious Warships to enable us to carry out the NDS.
           naval expeditionary crisis response forces and campaigning
        While the traditional role of crisis response forces in disaster
    relief operations, such as those executed by the Expeditionary Strike
    Group centered on the USS Bonhomme Richard during Operation Unified
    Assistance or via the USS Essex during Operation Tomodachi, is well-
    documented and well-understood, these operations are not always
    perceived as ones that create relative advantage in strategic
    competition and campaigning. They do. Our response to humanitarian
    crises and other natural disasters using expeditionary forces--quickly
    and decisively--demonstrates to our allies and partners that they are
    never alone when partnered with the U.S. Further, our ability to
    execute HA/DR operations from amphibious shipping--without a large
    logistical footprint ashore in support of U.S. forces--maximizes our
    flexibility and capability to respond while preserving resources best
    used for relief. In the strategic sense, the significance of this
    amphibious-based capability and its impact should not be
    underestimated. While our ability to ``be there first'' on the scene of
    a natural or man-made disaster is, of course, critical to the
    preservation of life, it is also a strategic imperative, affecting our
    bilateral relationships and matters like access and overflight, as well
    as our international standing. This is true in every region, but today
    is most pronounced in the Indo-Pacific, where China aims to expand its
    regional influence through its own amphibious crisis response
    capabilities.
        At the same time, it is important to recognize the criticality of
    campaigning with our allies and partners--in their regions--on a daily
    basis. Naval expeditionary forces operating forward and persistently
    provide combatant commanders with a sort of ``escalation rheostat,''
    prepared to respond to crises--or prevent them--by employing
    capabilities that are credible across the range of military operations.
    Both our presence and the credibility of our forces reassure allies and
    partners.
                    marine rotational force--darwin (mrf-d)
        In 2011, we established the Marine Rotational Force--Darwin (MRF-D)
    in the Northern Territory in partnership with the Australian
    government. Our rotational presence has grown from a company-sized
    element with limited capabilities to a MEU-sized Marine Air-Ground Task
    Force (MAGTF). Through our recurring presence, we have achieved a high
    level of mutual confidence and interoperability with the Australian
    Defence Force, to the point where marines routinely operate from
    Australian amphibious ships. The training areas in the Northern
    Territory and other regions of Australia are some of the best in the
    world, and certainly the region, affording marines an opportunity for
    high-end training alongside one of our closest allies. Additionally,
    our rotational presence in Australia has enabled marine forces to
    engage and train with a range of international allies and partners in
    ways we did not predict when MRF-D was first established.
                 vmfa 211 deployment aboard hms queen elizabeth
        From April to December 2021, ten F-35Bs from Marine Corps Fighter
    Attack Squadron 211 (VMFA 211) deployed aboard the United Kingdom's
    aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth. This historic deployment--the
    first in which a marine squadron completed a deployment aboard an
    allied vessel--represents the culmination of 10 years of focused
    bilateral cooperation and demonstrates how far we have progressed in
    building United States-United Kingdom interoperability. Together with
    the U.K.'s embarked F-35B squadron, VMFA 211 completed nearly 1300
    sorties, flew in excess of 2200 hours, and executed 44 combat missions
    in support of Operation Inherent Resolve. The deployment also marked
    the first time an F-35B cross-decked from a foreign vessel to a U.S.
    vessel (USS America) to refuel and arm before a strike. During its
    approximately seven month deployment, which spanned three U.S.
    geographic combatant commands' areas of responsibility, VMFA 211
    conducted exercises with 10 partner nations and flew from the flight
    decks of three allied ships: Japan's JS Izumo, Italy's ITS Cavour, and
    the HMS Queen Elizabeth. Finally, VMFA 211 was our first F-35B squadron
    to deploy as a 10-jet squadron in accordance with our FD 2030 goals and
    as outlined in my 2019 planning guidance.
                     force design 2030 and stand-in forces
        As we further refined Force Design 2030 through wargaming,
    experimentation, and analysis, it became apparent that we required new
    thinking to address anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategies, that
    our Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) needed additional operational
    flexibility, and that marines operating with our MEUs and MLRs could be
    a substantial part of the solution. This new approach is reflected in A
    Concept for Stand-In Forces, which describes how forward-postured
    forces, operating in contested areas, and capable of transitioning
    rapidly from campaigning, to crisis, to conflict, and back again, can
    create strategic advantage for the joint force.
        Stand-in Forces (SIF) are small, lethal, low signature, mobile
    forces that are relatively simple to maintain and sustain, and designed
    to operate across the competition continuum within a contested area as
    the leading edge of a maritime defense-in-depth. The enduring function
    of SIF is to help the fleet and joint force win the reconnaissance and
    counter-reconnaissance battle at every point on the competition
    continuum. That means SIF monitor a potential adversary's activity and
    track its forces and sensors at a level that facilitates targeting by
    the fleet or joint force. Below the threshold of conflict, SIF's
    tracking of adversary actions can help expose its malign behavior,
    which can contribute to deterrence. If armed conflict does erupt, SIF
    will have already gained and maintained contact with opposing forces in
    a posture that provides relative positional advantage, enabling the
    fleet and joint force to attack effectively first, seizing the
    initiative.
        Winning the counter-reconnaissance fight means SIF make themselves
    difficult to find by maintaining a low signature, moving frequently and
    unpredictably, and using deception to impose costs on potential
    adversaries, forcing them to expend limited ISR resources. In the
    context of a naval campaign, it also means that SIF will help screen
    for the fleet and joint force, protecting it and increasing the fleet
    commander's freedom of action.
        Beyond reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, SIF possess
    lethal capabilities for warfare at, on, below, or from the sea. For
    example, SIF can contest a chokepoint, sanitize a strait, or deny a
    specific area, presenting a surface behind which the fleet can
    maneuver. Area denial could also serve to canalize or ``herd'' an
    adversary into a maritime zone where the joint force enjoys relative
    advantage. Integrated with other elements of organic and joint
    capability, the SIF becomes both an enabler and a lethal executor of
    the joint force mission. In competition / campaigning, SIF provide
    capabilities that support new deterrence approaches like deterrence by
    detection, integrating the results of its reconnaissance with other
    elements of national power. In conflict, SIF serve as battle managers
    and provide long-range precision fires at the forward edge of a
    maritime defense-in-depth, enabling naval and joint forces to persist
    within contested areas rather than attempting to force access into them
    by fighting through an adversary's A2/AD defenses. Our ongoing
    experiments with SIF have focused on building a globally-relevant
    capability of value to all geographic combatant commanders, rather than
    more narrowly on a single potential threat or theater. While some view
    the SIF concept as Indo-Pacific focused, the fact is that some of our
    most aggressive experimentation is occurring in other theaters. For
    example, in his March 2022 HASC testimony, the USEUCOM Commander noted
    of his II MEF SIF capabilities: ``a brown water force that can shoot,
    move, and communicate, and that is very, very expeditionary, is
    priceless for 21st century security.''
                force design 2030 and the russo-ukraine conflict
        It is too early to draw definitive conclusions about the changing
    character of war based on the current conflict in Ukraine. Marines aim
    to be careful and humble students of the ongoing struggle, and resist
    temptations to declare that it validates or invalidates the
    foundational assumptions of FD 2030. With that said, we can draw some
    preliminary conclusions. First, winning the reconnaissance and counter-
    reconnaissance battle matters. If you are located on a modern
    battlefield saturated with sensors, you will be targeted. Signature
    management, maneuver, deception, and tempo are playing an increasingly
    important role on the modern battlefield. Second, loitering munitions,
    missiles and rockets are increasingly capable of rendering major
    weapons platforms vulnerable, whether MANPADS against helicopters,
    modern anti-armor systems against armor, or ground-based anti-ship
    missiles against surface vessels. Finally, highly-trained and
    distributable small units able to create combined-arms effects continue
    to prove their worth on the modern battlefield. Assertions as to the
    waning utility of dismounted infantry are proving baseless.
                  force design 2030 and close combat lethality
        Generations of marines have been educated and trained to locate,
    close with, and destroy the enemy through fire and maneuver. While the
    tactical tasks associated with that mission set have not changed, how
    we satisfy those tasks on a modern battlefield is changing. In
    addition, the weighting of the discrete tasks within that simple
    statement is changing, and we must change with it. ``Locating,'' for
    example, has become far more important on the modern battlefield.
    Marines within our three experimental infantry battalions, as well as
    those participating in force-on-force field exercises, are learning and
    fine-tuning their skills, integrating existing and emerging
    capabilities in a combined arms system that accounts for the ongoing
    changes we see on modern battlefields--changes witnessed since at least
    the 2006 Second Lebanon War. We will build upon the major investments
    made by the 37th Commandant in close combat lethality (e.g.,
    investments in the Multi-purpose Anti-armor Anti-personnel Weapons
    Systems [MAAWS]) by adding loitering munitions, organic UAS, and
    additional Javelins to our infantry units. Finally, it is important to
    note that throughout the Force Design process, the focus has been, and
    remains, maneuver warfare in every dimension and combined arms in all
    domains, including space and cyber.
        In the midst of this organizational change, it is also important to
    highlight those things that are not changing. When we consider ways to
    maximize our close combat lethality, two things that will never change
    are: (1) our commitment to growing and sustaining smart and tough small
    unit leaders--those marines actually tasked with locating, closing
    with, and destroying the enemy; and (2) our commitment to what the 29th
    Commandant called operational excellence--the ability of a marine to
    apply their training, leadership, and discipline with lethal
    proficiency. No new piece of equipment or warfighting concept can ever
    be as important. We have always maintained that the individual marine
    is the most formidable weapon on the battlefield. We still do.
                   force design 2030 prioritized investments
        MQ-9 & related sensors. We remain on-schedule to both modernize and
    increase the number of Marine Corps uncrewed aerial vehicle squadrons
    (VMU). In 2022, we will expand fielding of the MQ-9, immediately
    improving the Marine Corps' capability to support both naval
    expeditionary forces and the joint force. Uncrewed aerial systems are
    ubiquitous on the modern battlefield, as recent global conflicts have
    powerfully demonstrated--whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Gaza,
    Yemen, Nagorno-Karabakh, or Ukraine. Over the next 2 years, the Air
    Force will transfer ten MQ-9AER Block V aircraft to the Marine Corps,
    saving the Service approximately $170 million in procurement costs,
    which can be invested into sophisticated sensors like Skytower or
    sonobuoy dispensing pods. These advanced sensors, employed from our MQ-
    9s, will radically improve our ability to conduct reconnaissance and
    counter-reconnaissance, and further reinforce our competitive
    advantages in undersea warfare.
        F-35B/C. The F-35 is the most advanced fighter, strike, and sensor
    platform in the world. As the Commander of United States Indo-Pacific
    Command (USINDOPACOM) recently noted during testimony, ``The importance
    of the F-35 cannot be overstated.'' We remain convinced that low
    observable and very low observable, short take-off and vertical landing
    (STOVL) aircraft like the F-35B provide combatant commanders a
    competitive warfighting advantage. Mindful of both cost per flight hour
    (CPFH) and cost per tail per year (CPTPY), I remain committed to
    working with the Joint Program Office to reduce costs for both
    acquisition and sustainment. The Marine Corps remains focused on
    accelerated transition to an all F-35 tactical aviation (TACAIR) fleet
    in order to stay in front of our pacing challenge. We have procured 176
    of 353 F-35Bs and 48 of 67 F-35Cs to-date.
        Organic Precision Fires--Infantry/Mounted (OPF-I/M). OPF-I/M will
    provide multiple echelons of the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) with an
    organic, loitering, beyond line-of-sight, precision strike capability,
    profoundly enhancing the close-combat lethality of maneuver forces. We
    are currently investing $2 billion in OPF across the Future Years
    Defense Program (FYDP), and expect the first systems to be fielded with
    our enhanced infantry battalions and new mobile reconnaissance units in
    fiscal year 2025. OPF-I will be employed at the low tactical level to
    allow marines to rapidly engage the enemy beyond the range of direct
    fire weapons, while minimizing collateral damage and exposure to enemy
    direct and indirect fires. OPF-M will integrate a vehicle mounted,
    multi canister launch platform on our Joint Light Tactical Vehicles
    (JLTV), Light Armored Vehicles (LAV), and Ultra-Light Tactical Vehicles
    (ULTV). On its own, OPF-M can strike targets at ranges beyond 40km.
    However, its lethality is amplified when employed with Group-2 UAS as
    part of our emerging ``hunter-killer team'' employment concept.
    Operating as a hunter-killer combination, our mounted units can deliver
    precision effects, as well as surveillance before, during, and after
    striking targets, at ranges previously reserved for the air wing. These
    combat-tested and combat-proven capabilities will redefine how small
    units close with and destroy an adversary. Once fully fielded, each
    infantry and mobile reconnaissance battalion will possess no fewer than
    four ``hunter'' UAS (potentially the Stalker VXE Block 30) and seven
    dedicated ``killer'' mounted launchers.
        Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV). In 1989, the 29th Commandant wrote
    in his posture statement that his number one priority was the
    procurement of an advanced amphibious vehicle to ``replace our current
    amphibious assault vehicle (AAV), now approaching the end of its
    service life.'' Thirty-three years later, we divested of the AAV and
    are now focused on accelerating the procurement of the ACV. It remains
    a ``must-have'' capability for our forces operating in the global
    littorals--especially in archipelagic environs across the Pacific. We
    remain committed to an approved acquisition objective (AAO) of 632
    vehicles and have procured 267 to-date. We anticipate procuring another
    74 in fiscal year 2023.
        Medium Range Missile (MMSL) Batteries. Due to the continued support
    of Congress, we remain on-schedule to reach initial operating
    capability (IOC) for one MMSL battery in the Pacific by 2023 (to be
    employed by 3d MLR). We remain focused on fielding 14 total MMSL
    batteries (142 total launchers) by fiscal year 2030. These MMSL
    batteries--combining the Navy Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship
    Interdiction System (NMESIS) and ROGUE Fires--will be capable of firing
    the Naval Strike Missile (NSM) and Tactical Tomahawk, thereby holding
    adversary targets at-risk both afloat and ashore, further complicating
    their decision-making. This capability is just as relevant in the
    Western Pacific as it would be in eastern Ukraine, where shore-based
    fires have already been used to destroy enemy surface combatants.
        Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM). In addition to the
    investments made in Ground-Based Anti-Ship Missiles (GBASM), we have
    also begun investing in AGM-158C (LRASM) to further expand the range
    and lethality of our aviation-delivered fires. Marine aircraft equipped
    with LRASM, operating from both ship and shore, will thicken the
    existing network of fires, further distribute lethality across a
    theater, and enhance the credibility of our existing deterrent in any
    region.
        CH-53K. The CH-53K provides the FMF and combatant commanders with
    an unmatched vertical heavy-lift capability to project, maneuver, and
    sustain combat forces. It remains the only fully marinized heavy-lift
    helicopter in development or production. The CH-53K can lift more,
    farther, and faster than any other rotary wing platform in the world.
    We declared CH-53K IOC on 22 April after fielding a four-plane
    detachment worth of aircraft, support equipment, and trained aircrew
    and maintainers. While we remain concerned by the continued growth of
    procurement costs, we have actions in place to try to mitigate growth.
    We are further concerned by the projection of the sustainment costs and
    the total cost of ownership, which may exceed $390 million per
    aircraft. We are actively working with industry to reduce those costs
    and will continue that fight throughout the life of the weapon system.
    Still, a marinized, heavy-lift capability is an absolute ``must have''
    for the joint force as the costs of maintaining the increasingly
    outmoded CH-53E inventory is prohibitive. To date, we have procured 40
    aircraft.
        Ground Based Air Defense (GBAD). GBAD includes multiple FD 2030
    priority programs such as the Marine Air Defense Integrated System
    (MADIS) and Medium Range Intercept Capability (MRIC). MADIS will enable
    our low altitude air defense (LAAD) battalions to provide short-range
    air defense (SHORAD) for our maneuver forces and fixed facilities, to
    include against hostile aerial threats from UAS. MRIC--currently in
    development--is an air defense system for fixed sites, designed to
    counter large UAS (Groups 3 and 4), cruise missiles, and fixed/rotary
    wing aircraft. Based on on-going operations in Ukraine, and lessons
    learned from recent conflicts in Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh, we believe
    these GBAD programs to be essential for our Marine Expeditionary
    Forces.
                         fd 2030 emerging capabilities
        Long-Range Unmanned Surface Vessel (LRUSV) and Unmanned Underwater
    Vehicles (UUV). Just as our MQ-9AER and successor platforms will
    provide persistent surveillance and reconnaissance of competitors and
    strategically critical geography from the air, the Long-Range Unmanned
    Surface Vessel (LRUSV) will do the same from a sea-based platform. It
    will also provide unique capabilities for undersea scouting and C2
    enabling. The rapid evolution of long-range precision munitions allows
    for form factors that can be employed at sea or ashore, and will
    progressively increase deterrence options as they become available. Our
    plan is to home-station these capabilities in Guam, Japan, and Hawaii.
    In addition, UUVs deployed from our existing inventory of L-Class ships
    or from future Light Amphibious Warships can further reinforce our
    competitive advantages in undersea warfare, expand our battlespace
    awareness and that of our partners and allies, and when armed with
    torpedoes, further reinforce sea-denial operations in contested spaces.
        Artificial Intelligence (AI)-Enabled Counter-Intrusion and Counter-
    UAS. For the past 18 months, we have conducted tests with AI-enabled
    counter-intrusion and counter-UAS systems aboard several of our bases
    and stations. The performance of these systems has exceeded all
    expectations. As a result, the Commander of Marine Corps Forces,
    Pacific submitted an urgent-needs statement requesting the capability
    be fielded at all bases and stations in the Pacific. Initially, this
    capability will be employed at fixed sites. However, in the near-to-
    mid-term we anticipate employing a mobile version of this small
    footprint, AI-enabled sensing platform. This will allow our stand-in
    forces--with allies, and partners--to better sense and make sense of
    the dynamic maritime and urban terrain where we operate.
        Swarming UAS. Over the next 12 months, we will conduct a series of
    experiments at I MEF with AI-enabled swarming UAS and loitering
    munitions. While planning for this effort is in the early stages, we
    are confident this capability will create game-changing improvements to
    close-combat lethality for our ground forces and will further realize
    the vision of the 31st Commandant's Hunter Warrior experiments from
    1997-1998. Swarming UAS will extend the area of influence of every
    maneuver element, creating competitive warfighting advantages over our
    adversaries.
        Unmanned Logistics System-Aerial (ULS-A) and Future Vertical Lift
    (FVL) Family of Systems (FOS). The past 5 years of wargames have
    demonstrated that our logistics and sustainment capabilities will be
    targeted by near-peer competitors. As the ongoing conflict in Ukraine
    has poignantly illustrated, even traditional ground logistics resupply,
    executed over interior lines and relatively short distances, can be
    disrupted, with operational level effects. As we develop our new naval
    expeditionary units and expand our uncrewed aircraft capability, we
    will increasingly invest in uncrewed logistics aircraft such as the
    ULS-A Medium and ULS-A Large. This year we will invest $32 million in
    ULS-A Medium (Group 3 UAS), which is capable of carrying 300-600 pounds
    of cargo a distance of 100NM, while developing plans to procure ULS-A
    Large. To date, the Air Force has the most mature understanding of this
    capability, and has experimented with an electric vertical takeoff and
    landing (eVTOL) aircraft that may satisfy our needs in the future. We
    are wrapping all these efforts together within our aviation
    enterprise's FVL (VTOL FOS) program, and have invested $584 million
    over the FYDP.
                 force design 2030 installations and logistics
        Our ability to sustain our tactical forces across time and space is
    a critical component of integrated deterrence. The pacing threat
    continues to erode our traditional warfighting advantages, particularly
    the ability to close and sustain our forces at times and places of our
    choosing. Unfortunately, most of our current logistics processes and
    procedures play right into their strengths. Because the operational
    environment is increasingly contested, our logistics efforts from the
    tactical edge all the way back to the homeland will have to
    fundamentally change. As we are witnessing in Ukraine, even a
    numerically superior force will struggle to sustain itself and protect
    supply routes against persistent attack and disruption. We cannot allow
    this occur.
        As part of the broader logistics enterprise, we must improve the
    ability of our installations to provide the critical requirements that
    enable FMF readiness. We must have resilient infrastructure and
    services that provide the platforms necessary to enable delivery of
    capabilities from across the service enterprise. Because the
    environment is dynamic, we must have the means to protect our
    installations and organic industrial base from an increasingly complex
    range of operational, environmental, and climate-related threats. With
    the proliferation of the Mature Precision Strike Regime and expanding
    information-related threats, we need to better leverage technology,
    specifically AI, to ensure we maintain the ability to defend ourselves
    from emerging and evolving threats such as those posed by small,
    unmanned aerial systems.
        In the Pacific, we are experimenting with command and control and
    organizational proofs of concept so our installations and logistics
    units can make more effective, direct contributions to FMF warfighting
    capability. We will place our installations under an operational
    command structure to ensure they are more resilient to operational,
    environmental, and climate-related threats, and better postured to meet
    the needs of the FMF.
        We are pursuing a range of material capabilities to diversify and
    modernize our logistics portfolio, aligned to a contested littoral
    environment. At the tactical level, we are currently testing and
    assessing several platforms that will enable us to transition from a
    battlefield maneuver and sustainment capability based on crewed
    aircraft and wheeled vehicles to a diverse collection of crewed and
    uncrewed air and ground platforms that are smaller, cheaper, and
    collectively result in a more resilient distribution network of
    platforms and connectors. In addition to our efforts to generate,
    store, and distribute renewable energy forward, these platforms will
    exploit rapidly moving technologies that the Department and our
    industry partners are pursuing to decrease our dependence on vulnerable
    fuel supply chains, while enabling us to deliver critical commodities
    via the naval and joint logistics enterprise across the vast distances
    of the Pacific, despite enemy sensing and targeting capabilities. The
    most visible platforms will be a family of uncrewed logistics air
    systems, the smallest of which are already in prototyping and live
    experimentation. Our experimentation is yielding exciting results that
    underscore the need to expand into large and medium uncrewed logistics
    systems. Additionally, we will begin exploring options to replace our
    ground logistics fleet with a smaller, lighter, fuel-efficient
    replacement for vehicles that have run long past sustainability. We are
    now exploring emerging technologies that we can leverage to deliver
    capable, yet affordable vehicles that reduce our reliance on fossil
    fuels. As a modest first step, we will lease 3,875 non-tactical
    electric vehicles this year, and likely expand our inventory of
    electric vehicles in the future.
        As I have said numerous times over the last year, logistics is the
    pacing function, and the on-going conflict in Ukraine appears to
    validate that conclusion. As such, logistics provides the resources and
    sets the limits for what is operationally possible, even as
    logisticians attempt to extend those limits as far as possible.
                     force design and the reserve component
        We recently established the Marine Innovation Unit (MIU) within our
    Reserve Component. The MIU's work will complement that of our Marine
    Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) by accelerating advanced technology
    development. Reserve marines in the grades of sergeant through colonel
    will be assigned to this unit on the basis of their expertise in areas
    like artificial intelligence, data science, human systems, advanced
    manufacturing, quantum computing, autonomy/robotics, space, supply
    chain management, cyber, synthetic biology, energy and materials
    sciences, and other technology fields. This initiative will allow us to
    tap into the diverse talent pool in Marine Corps Forces Reserve, and
    through its collaboration with MCWL, integrate research in multiple
    advanced disciplines into Force Design and related efforts.
                                   readiness
        Though some aspects of our military require substantial change, we
    should be clear to acknowledge those foundational tenets which remain
    as relevant and operationally suitable today as they have been over the
    previous 70 years. In 1952, Members of Congress noted the Marine Corps
    ``can prevent the growth of potentially large conflagrations by prompt
    and vigorous action during their incipient stages. The Nation's shock
    troops must be the most ready when the Nation is least ready . . . to
    provide a balanced force-in-readiness for a naval campaign and, at the
    same time, a ground and air striking force ready to suppress or contain
    international disturbances short of large-scale war . . . '' This role
    as the Nation's force-in-readiness, prepared to create strategic
    advantage via its ability to be quickest to respond to either crisis or
    conflict, and prepared to both prevent and contain conflict below the
    threshold of armed conflict, remains as valid today as it was when
    first articulated. I remain as committed to ensuring your Marine Corps
    can fulfill this vital role as those who preceded me.
        But as I have previously noted, readiness and availability are not
    the same things. Ready forces are those that create competitive
    warfighting advantages. As we are witnessing in Ukraine, available
    Russian forces are being met by Ukrainian forces possessing competitive
    warfighting advantages. Prior to the commencement of hostilities, if
    one had asked for a relative combat power assessment based on each
    side's bench of ready (available) forces, that assessment would have
    been disproportionately skewed towards the Russians. As we have seen in
    Ukraine and in other recent conflicts, true readiness is a hypothesis
    to be tested and proven via employment in combat, and is not something
    that can be determined via availability alone.
                         readiness and covid 19 update
        As of 22 April 2022, 96 percent of the Active Component is fully
    vaccinated and 97 percent partially vaccinated. Within our Reserve
    Component, 91 percent are fully vaccinated and 92 percent partially
    vaccinated. 3,702 marines asked for a religious accommodation and seven
    have been approved. 1,067 marines have received approval for a medical
    or administrative exemption. As of 22 April, 1,978 marines have been
    separated for a failure to comply with a lawful order.
                        climate readiness and resilience
        The Secretary of the Navy has directed the Navy and Marine Corps to
    develop plans for increasing our capability and capacity to mitigate
    both the near-term and long-term operational impacts of climate change.
    He has also set a goal of achieving net-zero carbon emissions at our
    bases and stations by 2040. For the Marine Corps, I view our climate-
    related mitigation efforts as crucial to increasing the Service's
    operational capability, capacity, and resilience in the face of serious
    environmental challenges, including extreme storms along the East
    Coast, rising oceans levels along the Carolina coast, and water
    scarcity at bases and stations in the Southwest. It also important to
    note that many of the communities surrounding our installations share
    our climate-related vulnerabilities. We believe that partnering with
    Federal agencies, states, localities, tribes, and territories on
    climate change related planning is critical to maximizing the impact of
    our collective mitigation efforts.
                             talent management 2030
        Late last year we published Talent Management 2030 (TM 2030), and
    in doing so, took a major step toward realizing the goals of Force
    Design 2030 and our larger service modernization effort. TM 2030 aims
    to create a personnel system that better harnesses, develops, and
    aligns the talents of individual marines with the needs of the service
    to maximize the performance of both, improving both individual and unit
    readiness, capability, and lethality. The report details the
    deficiencies in our current manpower model and directs a series of
    reforms, initiatives, and changes that will fundamentally improve our
    service's organization, processes, and approach to personnel and talent
    management. TM2030 was informed by years of studies, reports, and other
    research, as well as the work of our sister services in the joint
    force. The influence of Congress is also evident throughout the report,
    and many of the most important initiatives described in its pages are
    the direct consequence of expanded authorities that Congress gave the
    services in the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2019.
        The totality of changes described in TM2030 are significant. They
    are also essential, especially within the broader context of our
    ongoing Force Design 2030 effort. In short, the capabilities we are
    building as part of Force Design 2030, along with the complementary
    concepts of Stand-In Forces, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations
    (EABO), and Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), cannot reach their
    full potential without a profound change to our personnel system. In
    that way, TM2030 should be viewed as a critical requirement to the
    success of our overall service modernization.
        We plan to fully implement the changes described in TM2030 and
    transition from our current manpower system to a talent management
    system no later than 2025. Change of this magnitude requires the
    dedicated commitment and long-term support of both military and
    civilian leaders. While I believe we have most of the necessary
    authorities to fully implement TM2030, I will be sure to inform
    Congress if any challenges or obstacles arise for which we may need
    your assistance.
        Among the more important changes, the implementation of TM2030 will
    adjust our decades-old recruiting-centric enlisted personnel model,
    placing more emphasis on retention. This change will raise the
    aggregate age of our marines and create a more mature force, consistent
    with future warfighting requirements. We expect this will raise
    personnel costs, yet well within accepted norms. For example, today the
    average cost per marine is $73,800 per year (pay, housing, training,
    etc.). By comparison, the average cost of a soldier is $79,800, the
    average cost of an airman is $82,500, and the average cost of a sailor
    is $89,900. While we anticipate a cost increase in the short term, we
    also expect a cost savings over the long term as we reduce the number
    of recruiters, instructors, and other resources required to maintain a
    recruiting-centric enlisted personnel model. In the near term, the most
    visible sign of our shift towards a more mature retention-based force
    will be a drop in the annual recruiting mission by several thousand,
    and a congruent increase in retention.
                        diversity, equity, and inclusion
        I remain committed to maintaining a total workforce that benefits
    from the whole of our Nation's vast human capital by recruiting,
    developing, and retaining marines and civilians from all personal,
    cultural, and professional backgrounds. In practice, that means
    eliminating all structural, administrative, cultural, or other
    obstacles that might limit a marine's ability to have a successful
    career. Capitalizing on the talents, knowledge, skills, abilities,
    experiences, and perspectives of every marine will make our Corps
    stronger, more lethal, and more effective on the battlefield, today and
    tomorrow.
        As a Corps, we have made great strides over the last 5 years in
    eliminating obstacles to the upward mobility of talented marines from
    traditionally underrepresented demographics. One way to measure our
    progress is to examine the rate at which marines from these backgrounds
    are selected to command battalions and squadrons at the O5/lieutenant
    colonel level, a key career milestone that indicates a marine has
    potential for a significant leadership position within the Service.
    Five years ago, 19 percent of African American marines screened for O5
    command were selected. Since then, the average is 34 percent with a
    high of 44 percent. Five years ago, 3 percent of our battalions and
    squadrons were commanded by female marines. Today that number has
    increased to 9 percent. In fiscal year 2021, for the first time, a
    higher percentage of female marines who screened for O5 command were
    selected than their male counterparts. We do not select our commanders
    based on gender, race, or any other marker, so the fact that marines
    from these diverse backgrounds are being selected for O5 command
    indicates to me that we are making progress in reducing obstacles to
    the upward mobility of talent.
        While there is evidence of some progress, there is also evidence we
    still have obstacles to eliminate. For example, we continue to
    experience a concerning lack of diversity within our TACAIR community.
    Despite a significant increase in the number of African American
    officers over the last four decades, we have the same number of African
    American TACAIR pilots today as we did in 1981. Last year we asked
    former NASA Administrator and marine, Major General Charles Bolden
    (USMC, Ret.), to conduct a third-party review to examine the structural
    and systemic issues that might be leading to this outcome. His
    observations and conclusions were valuable, and I am confident his
    recommendations will help us to create a more equitable playing field.
             sexual assault prevention and military justice reform
        The eradication of sexual assault from our ranks has been a goal of
    every Marine Commandant for decades. Despite making progress in
    fostering a culture where reporting of sexual assault crimes has
    increased and where victims are more willing to communicate with their
    leadership, we have admittedly been unable to accomplish what we all
    seek--the elimination of sexual assault altogether. In 2021, there were
    1,202 reported sexual assaults in the Marine Corps. We must consider
    any policies that could increase prevention and offender
    accountability, and reduce or eliminate retaliation or retribution
    against victims. I remain committed to timely implementation of the
    Independent Review Committee's (IRC) recommendations, as well as
    implementation of changes in the fiscal year 2022 National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA) that seek to improve the investigation,
    disposition, and litigation of victim-related crimes.
                          parental leave and childcare
        As part of TM2030, we will begin making several key updates to our
    parental leave program beginning in 2022. First, we are grateful to the
    Congress for the additional authorities to increase the duration of
    parental leave for primary and secondary caregivers; we have expanded
    our secondary caregiver leave and are working with OSD on the timely
    implementation of increased leave in cases of adoption or long-term
    foster care. Second, we are developing mechanisms by which primary and
    secondary caregivers can take additional parental leave--beyond the
    congressionally-authorized 12-weeks--if they agree to extend their
    service contracts. Third, we will implement a phased return to work
    program for the primary caregiver, allowing the caregiver to return to
    work gradually. Finally, and most importantly, we won't stop learning.
    We will carefully study the best practices of top performing American
    companies and institutions, always with an eye to enhancing our service
    parental leave programs as new research becomes available.
        Increasing the availability of childcare remains a top priority for
    the Service. Unfortunately, persistent supply and demand imbalances
    have resulted in unacceptable wait times for our marine families. The
    average wait time for childcare across our major bases and stations is
    65 days. However, based on a number of actions taken this year, we
    anticipate a decrease in the average wait time by 50 percent over the
    next 12 months. Additionally, we increased funding for our Marine
    Family Care Programs by $91 million, beginning in fiscal year 2023
    across the next 5 years. To provide a variety of options that fit a
    families' needs and to mitigate lengthy Child Development Center (CDC)
    waitlists, we also offer fee assistance for eligible marines who are
    geographically remote, reside more than 15 miles from an installation,
    or are assigned to an installation with a lengthy CDC waitlist.
                          barracks and family housing
        In fiscal year 2021, we renovated 13 barracks, and in fiscal year
    2022, we plan to renovate another 10 at a cost of $93 million. We
    anticipate renovating a further 10 barracks in fiscal year 2023 at a
    cost of $112 million. This will leave 94 barracks for future
    renovation. The renovations completed in fiscal year 2021 to fiscal
    year 2023 will positively impact 3,780 marines living in the barracks.
    In terms of family housing, our biggest challenge is related to ongoing
    efforts to renovate over 300 homes at MCAS Iwakuni, for which we
    recently issued a contract to renovate 44, to be completed by fiscal
    year 2023. Additionally, we anticipate spending a further $104 million
    in fiscal year 2023 to further remediate housing deficiencies across
    our bases and stations.
                              training philosophy
        In 1990, then Commandant Gray stated, ``Training will reflect the
    fact the modern battlefield demands high levels of initiative and an
    ability to operate at a fast tempo in an atmosphere of uncertainty,
    confusion, and rapid change. Unit training will largely be free-play
    training in order to develop this ability. Individual training,
    starting with boot camp, will seek to develop independent action and
    initiative.'' This guidance remains as relevant today as it was 32
    years ago.
                                training ranges
        The Marine Corps has no outdoor training spaces or ranges where
    ground units can operate in an electromagnetic spectrum operations
    (EMSO) denied, degraded, or disrupted environment, and limited
    opportunities to replicate such an environment in simulation. Today, we
    are able to conduct some of this training at joint facilities, most
    notably in Alaska's Joint Pacific Alaskan Range Complex (JPARC).
    However, we need to be able to train in a similar manner at all of our
    major training facilities. This is a critical shortfall of our existing
    training infrastructure in Arizona, California, Hawaii, and North
    Carolina. Additionally, we lack littoral maritime training ranges akin
    to our legendary Range 400 at the MAGTF Training Center in Twentynine
    Palms, California. As we modernize the force for naval expeditionary
    operations in contested environments, we will require a maritime
    training site with suitable seaward and landward ranges where we can
    train with the full range of our multi-domain weapon systems, to
    include uncrewed systems. Finally, we must remain mindful of the
    impacts of urbanization and community growth on our training capacity,
    especially in Hawaii.
                     enhanced infantry and leader training
        In 1997, the 31st Commandant gave a speech at the National Press
    Club in which he articulated the need to transform our most valued
    Marine Corps asset--the marine infantry non-commissioned officer (NCO).
    While most remember his characterization of the future ``Three Block
    War'' and the new importance of the ``Strategic Corporal,'' most forget
    the context of his argument. General Krulak described to his audience
    the Battle of Teutoburg Forest, during which the Roman pro-consul
    Quintilius Varus had his force of three legions ambushed and destroyed
    by an adversary he put down 3 years prior. As his force was collapsing
    around him, Varus was heard to say, ``Ne cras, Ne cras'' (Latin for
    ``not like yesterday''). General Krulak's prescient assumptions about
    the future of ground combat in urban areas has proven accurate time and
    again--whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, or Ukraine today.
        Our continued force-on-force experimentation and training in
    support of FD 2030 further demonstrate that the future battlespace will
    not be like yesterday, and change is required--even among the elite
    marine infantry community. As a result, over the past year we have
    greatly expanded our infantry training by adding an additional six
    weeks to the program of instruction. This expansion provides our
    infantry marines with the training necessary to employ networked
    communications, organic precision fires to include loitering munitions,
    and multi-domain ISR capabilities at the lowest tactical level. The
    result will be a more technically competent and tactically proficient
    infantry than has ever existed in the Marine Corps--prepared to
    operate, fight, and win on any modern battlefield. One with both the
    physical stamina and mental resilience required of all marine infantry
    past and present. These changes are not limited only to our enlisted
    force. We have made significant improvements at our Infantry Officers
    Course (IOC) to expand practical applications via a new live-fire
    ambush, a new amphibious operations package, uncrewed aircraft systems
    integration instruction, and final live-fire exercise against a multi-
    domain threat. Through our continued wargaming and experimentation, it
    is perfectly clear that an elite infantry is a critical requirement to
    success on the future battlefield, and the changes that are occurring
    at IOC and at our Schools of Infantry are now producing that force.
                                recruit training
        In the 2020 NDAA, Congress directed the Marine Corps to gender
    integrate training at both Marine Corps Recruit Depots (MCRDs) Parris
    Island and San Diego no later than fiscal year 2025 and fiscal year
    2028, respectively. We are on pace to achieve those deadlines. Since
    enactment, we have trained 26 integrated companies at MCRD Parris
    Island and 3 at MCRD San Diego--a total of 11,121 male and female
    marines who started their service and journeys together. At present,
    each MCRD company consists of five male platoons and one female platoon
    (5+1 model), although there are times when a four male platoon plus two
    female platoon model (4+2 model) has been employed to accommodate
    increased female recruit throughput.
                                  afghanistan
        In August of last year, our collective mission in Afghanistan
    ended. During nearly 20 years of operations, 115,992 marines served in
    Afghanistan; 5,101 marines were wounded in action; an untold number
    sustained invisible and permanent emotional wounds; and 478 families
    became Gold Star Families after the loss of their marine. We have a
    moral obligation to each of our marines and their families to resist
    the temptation to push Afghanistan into our distant memory, and instead
    bring our experiences there into sharp focus in order to learn.
    Thousands of marines, sailors, soldiers, and airmen answered the call
    to serve in Afghanistan, and while the outcome there was not what any
    of them expected, their service was honorable and their courage real.
    We owe them a hard look at how the war was executed--what we got right
    and what we got wrong. To that end, I fully endorse the nonpartisan
    Afghanistan War Commission and its aims to help us more completely
    understand the full scope of the conflict.
        When reflecting on our experience in Afghanistan, we also cannot
    forget the significant contributions of our allies and partners. The
    U.S. military was fortunate to operate alongside patriots from dozens
    of allied and partner nations, and we will never forget the service and
    sacrifices of these brothers and sisters in arms.
                            joint chief perspective
        Trust and Confidence in the Military. I remain concerned with
    continued reports of the public's declining trust and confidence in the
    uniformed leadership of the armed services. I am old enough to remember
    when military service was not perceived in the positive light that it
    is today. I entered service within a decade after the collapse of the
    U.S. position in Southeast Asia and a year after the failed rescue
    attempt known as Desert One. Within 2 years of my commissioning, faith
    in the uniformed and civilian leadership of the military was further
    rocked by the tragedy of the suicide-bombing of the Marine Barracks in
    Beirut.
        We must address negative perceptions of the military without
    hesitation. We must also remain mindful that the deeper we dig into the
    decisions of the past, particularly related to our campaigns in
    Afghanistan that such negative perceptions may grow. The long-term
    health of the Marine Corps, naval services, and entire joint force is
    dependent upon the cultivation and sustainment of a special bond of
    trust and confidence between the military and the public. We must
    ensure that Americans who wish to serve, and the families who support
    them in their service, trust their military and pursue their service
    ``without any mental reservation.'' To that end, we must all make a
    concerted effort to speak with precision, encourage transparency, and
    welcome any and all oversight that would restore the public's
    confidence in the military.
        Finally, I am increasingly concerned that in our shared desire to
    eliminate discrimination, harassment, sexual assault, extremism, and
    every other destructive act within the joint force that is contrary to
    the core values of all the services, we are unintentionally creating a
    harmful mental model and stereotype of the services as places where
    these are the norm vice the exception. The vast majority of young men
    and women across the joint force serve honorably, and are incredible
    representatives of their individual families and communities across the
    entire country. We must never allow the public to think for a moment
    that military service is anything other than the most honorable service
    one can provide to their fellow citizens. The success of our All-
    Volunteer Force requires the special trust and confidence of the
    public. As you hold me and the other senior leaders accountable for all
    we do or fail to do, and rightfully seek to eliminate persistent
    behaviors inconsistent with our values, please continue to help me
    spread the word that military service is honorable service, and that
    you remain incredibly proud of the young men and women in uniform.
        Wargaming and Transparency. In September 1964, the Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff sponsored a wargame on Vietnam for uniformed and
    civilian leaders from the Department of Defense (DOD), Central
    Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Department of State (DoS). The wargame
    was intended to provide senior policy makers with an opportunity to re-
    examine our national strategic objectives and the strategy required to
    attain those objectives. For those passionate about wargaming, SIGMA II
    64 is ``Exhibit A'' in the case for its importance. Once declassified,
    the wargame report provided clear evidence that senior uniformed and
    civilian leaders understood the situation in Vietnam much better than
    historians previously assumed.
        The story of SIGMA II 64 illustrates the potential of wargames to
    increase the breadth and depth of our understanding, but more, it
    illustrates the damage that can result from a lack of transparency. The
    SIGMA II 64 wargame results were classified and tightly controlled, not
    shared widely or with those who maintain oversight responsibilities,
    like Congress. While it is impossible to know if our national leaders
    would have pursued a different course in Vietnam had the SIGMA II 64
    results been more widely shared, it is certain that the debate would
    have been better informed.
        As a joint force, we should make every effort to increase the
    frequency, sophistication, and scope of our wargames. In particular, we
    should look to expand the participation of our allies, partners,
    interagency teammates, and industry, whose collective insights are
    essential to a strategy which aims at integrated deterrence. At the
    same time, we must seek greater transparency. I encourage Congress and
    staff to participate in wargames, continue asking tough questions, and
    challenge us to be as transparent as possible.
                                   conclusion
        As HASC Chairman Smith recently noted, ``The Pentagon tends to
    reward conformity. As long as you check all the boxes and go up through
    the 15 layers of decision making, we're all good, instead of you saw a
    problem and solved it.'' This has to change, is changing, and can
    continue to change with your oversight and assistance. For some, the
    daily feed of images and intelligence from Ukraine has persuaded them
    that a change in our availability-based model of readiness and our
    warfighting investments are required. I agree with these individuals.
    For others, the case for change has long since been made on 21st
    century battlefields -with little if anything in common. I agree with
    those individuals as well. However, this does not mean that everything
    requires change, and that our forces are not ready today, to create
    advantage today, and to succeed today in whatever challenge confronts
    them. While the need to train and equip our marines and sailors with
    modern capabilities and equipment that create advantage is beyond
    dispute, what is also beyond dispute is that those individuals--the
    individual marine and sailor--are a source of competitive advantage for
    the service and for the larger joint force, and will always be the most
    important resource. Your marines are ready today, just as they have
    always been. What they need is your continued support for resourcing,
    your continued policy oversight, and your continued faith and
    confidence. With those things, they will never fail.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Berger.
    Secretary Del Toro, one of the issues that is arising is the
    performance of shipyards. We saw, for example, on the attack
    submarines that the slippage in terms of both delivery time and
    increase in costs, the reason that most people give is the
    difficulty of securing the appropriate labor and workers. What
    can you do and what can the industrial base do to get back on
    track?
        Mr. Del Toro. Thank you, Senator. I am also deeply
    concerned about the pace with which both our public shipyards
    and our private shipyards keep up with the maintenance that is
    required by both our submarine fleet, as well as our surface
    fleet as well. I have visited most of the yards, all four
    public shipyards, and most of the private yards as well. I have
    met with the leadership of those shipyards to try to better
    understand the challenges that they face. Without question, the
    impact of COVID on the last 3 years has been significant.
        We continue to cooperate very collaboratively, thanks to
    the support of the Congress as well, and making investments in
    those shipyards, both capital investments and also investments
    with regards to the talent management that is necessary to run
    those shipyards. I believe that there is still a lot of work
    that needs to be done, and it does take a team to work this
    through, obviously.
        But the other message that I have also relayed to the
    leadership of these shipyards is that they also have a
    responsibility to deliver these platforms on time and on
    schedule, and they need to divert the proper resources
    necessary to do so in terms of capital equipment and also in
    terms of hiring the necessary workforce at those shipyards in
    order to increase the pace at which these maintenance cycles
    are taken.
        Let me, if I could ask the CNO to just weigh in as well on
    this issue.
        Chairman Reed. Could I?
        Mr. Del Toro. Yes, sir. Forgive me.
        Chairman Reed. I thank you because--General Berger, Force
    Design 2030 recognizes this is a much different world than 10
    years ago, 20 years ago, certainly 30 years ago. Since World
    War II, we have basically had guaranteed air superiority if we
    choose to fight. We also had relatively uncontested logistics.
        We have had uninterrupted communications. The concept of
    joint operations has been evolving for a long time, but it is
    now more critical than ever. So when you look at all of these
    factors, lack of air superiority, logistics difficulties,
    communications that might be disrupted, and the need to operate
    as a truly Joint Force, I assume that has informed your view of
    what you want to do with the Marine Corps in terms of your new
    design.
        General Berger. That is entirely accurate, Chairman. I
    don't think any of the Joint Chiefs, if all of us were lined up
    here, would see it any different. Especially on the high end,
    we will fight, we will operate as a Joint Force. We have to
    have a pretty keen understanding of the joint capabilities
    involved there and where the overlaps are and where the gaps
    are.
        The areas that you highlighted, air superiority, command
    and control, logistics, absolutely are part of the focus. We
    also know that we are not going to match the--People's
    Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in number for number, but that is
    not actually how we are going to deter and how we are going to
    dissuade them. It is going to be asymmetric.
        Lastly, I would say the need to operate forward as the
    Secretary and CNO highlighted, paramount. You have got to know
    what they are doing. You have to paint a picture for the Joint
    Force Commander 24/7 and that is our role.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. A question I will
    address to Admiral Gilday, and with time to General Berger, is
    that the Navy's unfunded priority list is $4 billion this year.
    Marine Corps is $3.5 billion. Last year, because of the
    Committee's support for Senator Inhofe's initiative, we were
    able to cover all of your unfunded priorities.
        We can't assume that this year. So I assume that these
    unfunded priorities are really in priority order. That if we go
    to the first one, that is the most critical. The second one,
    the second most critical. Is that accurate, Admiral?
        Admiral Gilday. It is absolutely accurate, sir, and so my
    priorities--everything on the unfunded list were high regrets
    that we couldn't get into the budget and are primarily
    readiness related. So as an example, for weapons arranged in
    speed, Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), Joint Air to
    Surface Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER), Maritime Strike
    Tomahawk, SM-6, what we are trying to do is maximize domestic
    production lines to send a demand signals so we can fill our
    magazines with weapons, and make sure that if the fight does go
    down tonight or in the 2027 timeframe, that we are ready to go.
        Likewise, those priorities include flying hours, steaming
    days, maintenance, spare parts in both the aviation side and
    for our ships as well. It is funding for people, and so those
    are all--those all have to do with needed midterm readiness.
    There are also some modernization priorities there as well.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. General Berger, I will
    ask for your response in writing and for the record so that we
    can recognize Senator Inhofe. Senator Inhofe, please.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and General Berger,
    thank you very much for your nice remarks. As noted in my
    opening remarks, the unfunded priorities total $7.5 billion,
    approximately $4 billion for the Navy and $3.5 billion for the
    Marine Corps. The question I would ask you, is a yes or no
    question, is everything on your list executable today?
        General Berger. Yes, sir. Same for the Marine Corps, yes,
    sir.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes. All right. Thank you very much.
    Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday, it has been 3\1/2\ years
    now since I visited the USS Gerald Ford. At that time, they had
    just completed their--everything has been late on that effort.
    The catapult and the arresting gears, I think at that time,
    3\1/2\ years ago, were just about completed. My understanding
    is that the elevators now, which the last thing, are finally
    done, albeit 7 years later and $2.8 billion over budget.
        The burden that this 7 year delay of the Ford has placed on
    the rest of the aircraft fleet can't be overstated. I would
    like to get from all three of you who--in whatever order you
    would like the--a couple of things, several things here. One
    is, what kind of a burden has that placed, that 7 year delay
    placed, and when will it deploy, and probably the lessons
    learned.
        That seems to be the significant thing, I believe, the
    lessons learned. I have talked to each one of you over a period
    of time on the, you know, how much of this could be a result of
    this sole source situation. So any comments you want to make
    just on the Ford now that we have reached this important time
    zone. I would like to hear from you.
        Mr. Del Toro. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I would like
    to say that you charged me at my confirmation hearing to fix
    the elevators on the Ford. I am at least pleased to say that
    they are fixed on the Ford now. I think when acquiring ships of
    this nature, which are extremely complicated, it is very
    important to ensure that we fully understand the whole--we
    fully understand the maturity of the technologies that we are
    going to put on those platforms before we actually acquire
    them.
        I think that those are some of the key lessons that are
    being learned as we look at DDG Flight III, as we look at our
    future DDG(X) or SSG(X), as well as the Constellation-class
    frigate. I would like to say that the mistakes that were made
    in the past are being applied very aggressively to these new
    acquisition programs that are going to be rolled out in the
    future.
        I think the criticality of land-based testing, for example,
    for the engineering plants is also very critical to this and
    the submodules that are necessary to go on to these platforms.
    I will ask the CNO to continue the conversation in the limited
    time we have.
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, the biggest lesson learned from Ford
    and other platforms is that we need to drive down technical
    risk in these programs, and so we do that with land-based
    prototyping. We do that with plenty of testing upfront before
    we become an informed customer and come to you for the money to
    scale these platforms, LCS would be another example.
        If I take a look at the Columbia-class submarine, we are at
    85 percent design right now as we are building that submarine.
    If I compare that to the Ohio-class, we were at 4 percent,
    Seawolf 25 percent, Virginia-class 40 percent, and so we are
    learning our lessons with respect to Ford and putting in the
    good work now.
        We have money in the budget with respect to unmanned to
    actually have land-based prototyping, significant land based
    prototyping in Philadelphia as we have had with other ships so
    that, again, we can make informed decisions before we scale
    platforms.
        Senator Inhofe. Let me comment, before a third--I wasn't
    being critical in terms of certainly any of the three of you,
    but the fact that it did take a longer period of time does have
    implications on other vehicles that are out there.
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir, it has. Obviously, funds have
    been diverted in order to keep Ford moving along track. We are
    very pleased to get her deployed later on this year and likely
    again the following year. I want to keep her on a high--high
    degree of operations tempo. This past year, she has had the
    highest, probably the highest operations tempo of any ship in
    the Navy. She was our carrier--aircraft carrier off the east
    coast of the United States.
        She was qualifying our new pilots with their cats and
    traps, and so we are going to continue that high degree of
    operations tempo with her, keeping in mind, of course, stress
    on the crew. But they want to go to sea, they are proud of
    their ship, and it is operating to our expectations right now.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Senator Shaheen,
    please.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Good morning to each of you.
    Thank you for being here and thank you for your service to the
    country. Secretary Del Toro, I would like to begin with you and
    Admiral Gilday, because the Navy's request includes $503
    million in funding for the SIOP Multi-Mission Drydock Project
    at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in New Hampshire and Maine.
        I know that you have both been up there to see this
    project. But given the cost overruns that we saw last year, are
    you confident that that $503 million is going to be enough to
    keep the project on schedule this year?
        Mr. Del Toro. Senator, I think I am confident that we are
    moving in the right direction. These are extremely complicated
    programs, as you well know. It is our largest capital project
    in the Department of Navy. I think that there are going to be
    more discoveries that will be made. But I don't think that they
    will be of the nature and increases of the past mistakes that
    were made previously.
        One of the charges that I have given our acquisition force
    is to ensure that we actually do take the necessary time to
    come up with accurate cost estimations for the projects, so
    what you have going on now, we will propose in the future. That
    takes some time, additional time to reach those answers, and so
    I would like to think that we are actually moving in the right
    direction with the necessary discipline to make accurate cost
    estimations.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, I appreciate that. I guess--I am
    trying to understand then why the Navy hasn't adopted the
    Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommendations from the
    2017 report that just--this GAO report just came out recently
    that identified concerns with SIOP. Planning, including
    adopting best practices for cost estimation.
        It also points out that the performance metrics that were
    expected to be done by now are not going to be done until 2025.
    So can you talk about why the delay is there and what needs to
    happen in order to get things back on track?
        Mr. Del Toro. Yes, ma'am. I can't make--look, I am not
    going to make excuses for deals of the past. I do know that
    certainly since I have become Secretary we are taking this
    responsibility very seriously and trying to come up with very
    accurate cost estimations and being allowed to be given the
    time to come up with those cost estimations so that we are not
    just flying by the cuff.
        Senator Shaheen. I recognize that the war in Ukraine has
    happened since the budget was developed, and that along with
    inflation have added to costs. So do you have any estimate on
    how that is going to affect the budget numbers that you--we
    have before us now?
        Mr. Del Toro. I don't today, but that is an accurate
    assessment that increasing inflation and the shortages in the
    supply chain as well too will have an impact on costs as we
    continue to evolve these projects.
        Senator Shaheen. How soon will you be back to the
    Committee?
        Mr. Del Toro. So I promise you in the next several months
    we will have more accurate numbers. We have been working on
    this very aggressively in the time that I have been Secretary.
    I have demanded that we have an accurate accounting of
    projected costs for the SIOP program so that we are on track.
        We have also made some additional adds to the program
    management team as well to make sure that we have the right
    skill sets on that program management team to address all the
    necessary risks that are involved.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. General Berger, both the chair
    and ranking member talked about the challenges, and you all
    have talked about the challenges of recruitment and retention
    in the Marine Corps. The marines historically have had the
    smallest percentage of women compared to the other services.
        Obviously, that is one place where there is talent that the
    Marine Corps could look to for the future. So can you talk
    about how talent management 2030 is going to look at more
    gender inclusivity in the Marine Corps and how you expect to
    incorporate more women?
        General Berger. You know, a system that we have had since
    the All-Volunteer Force was put in place, largely replaced 75
    percent of the marines every year, a very young force. That is
    what we needed at that time, and it suited us fine. But going
    forward, as you have highlighted and others, this is a
    competitive market for people, and the requirements that we are
    going to have for marines and sailors, all servicefmembers, is
    going to be even more demanding, even more challenging.
        So the change for talent management is instead of the view
    them as a whole body, each person matching their--what they
    have coming in, and we have to do a better job of assessing
    that when they come in, matching that with what the Marine
    Corps needs, and then a path for each individual to go forward.
    That is the difference.
        Senator Shaheen. Do you expect to have any particular focus
    on recruiting women, or how do you expect to get those numbers
    up?
        General Berger. The recruiters across the country, as you
    have highlighted, the last 2 years of not being in high schools
    has been a real challenge during COVID because their exposure
    and the high school students' exposure to recruiters is really
    tough. You have to have the right recruiters out there and they
    have to have access to the high schools, which now they are
    back in.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Fischer,
    please.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,
    gentlemen. Thank you for being here today. General Berger, how
    is the Marine Corps looking to change existing logistics
    processes and procedures to better align with the Force Design
    2030 initiative, particularly looking at the Indo-Pacific
    theater?
        General Berger. The framework we have for logistics in the
    Indo-Pacific theater that you highlight largely assumed a
    protected backside. It assumed that we would not be contested.
    We don't assume that going forward. So the large depot style-
    like hub and spokes of parts and all classes of supply and from
    there would be distributed, that has got to change. Because we
    assume that it is going to be contested all the way from the
    most forward units back to the factory, all the way.
        Not just physically, of course, but in cyber as well. So
    what does that mean for us? We have to have organically the
    means to move that--move these sustainment supplies up
    tactically to operationally, in other words, at that level
    organically. That is why things like the 53K, CH-53K, the MV-
    22, unmanned systems that are going to allow us to push
    supplies laterally, that is what we have to have, that we don't
    have in numbers yet.
        Everything that we do, logistics has to assume that they
    are going to try to contest it. Which means we got to decoy. We
    have to camouflage it. We have to move it in smaller numbers.
    We have to just operate in a different way. But that is--this
    is natural for marines to do. It is not a new thing, but the
    change probably is an assumption that all of that will be
    contested.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, do you have
    anything to add?
        Mr. Del Toro. Yes, ma'am. We are actually making major
    investments over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) in
    additional--adding additional oilers, for example, to support
    the ships that will be necessary and the sealift that is
    necessary. We are also making investments in sealift, buying
    more used sealift as well, too.
        All of this is integrated into Force Design 2030, along
    with the addition of additional amphibious lift and as well as
    the wires to provide the shore to shore connectors that are
    necessary for the marines to be able to effectively execute
    their expeditionary mission.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. General Berger, since Russia's
    invasion of Ukraine, we have seen how small groups of
    warfighters armed with missiles and loitering munitions, they
    have real impacts on the ground.
        While I agree it is too early to draw definitive
    conclusions from the ongoing conflict, how do you expect the
    Marine Corps to incorporate any insights that are gained so far
    into future exercises as you test out new concepts of
    operations?
        General Berger. One advantage that we have, and the Army is
    the same, as we are deployed, we have deployed units in Europe
    right now. So they can see firsthand, a
        lot closer than you and I from Washington, DC, what is
    working and what is not. We have a built in model within the
    Marine Corps to feed that back in through our warfighting
    laboratory at Quantico into the ideas, the concepts, the
    capabilities of forces design 2030. There is no filter. It is a
    constant feedback loop.
        I think, as you hinted, although you got to be patient in
    terms of jumping on lessons learned too early while conflict is
    going on, I think the two for me, the character versus the
    nature of warfare, some things in other words, are enduring,
    and those lessons learned haven't changed, frankly. Some of
    them that my counterparts have highlighted in terms of the
    importance of small unit leaders and decentralized command and
    control, speed, momentum, inside the operating decision cycle
    of an adversary, those are enduring things.
        But the things that are changing, of course, the character
    of war, as you highlighted, the unmanned, the sensors, the
    growing importance of instilling confidence in those junior
    leaders to make decisions on their own quickly. So some things
    are staying the same and validated, some things in terms of the
    character of war, we need to absolutely feed back into the
    modernization effort, and we have a means to do that.
        Senator Fischer. Have you started any kind of consultation
    with our allies, especially within NATO, looking ahead at
    situations that are currently ongoing or that may develop in
    the near future?
        General Berger. In NATO specifically, yes. Yesterday I met
    with the Chief of Defense (CHOD) of Norway. We traveled to
    Norway last month, met with my counterparts and the Vice CHOD
    in Norway. In Poland right now, we have marine units operating
    in Poland, Latvia, and Estonia. We have a good exchange back
    and forth about what is working and what is not.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fisher. Senator Kaine,
    please.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to the
    witnesses. General Bergner, in his opening statement said, we
    are all on the same page, we need 31 amphibious ships. I just
    want to make sure Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday, that
    is, he was putting, not putting words in your mouth, but
    stating a consensus opinion.
        Mr. Del Toro. Thank you, Senator. This Administration is
    very committed to amphibious lift without any question. As you
    all know, there is over $2 billion in the budget this year
    alone in support of LHA and LPD-32 as well too.
        I commissioned an amphibious study when I became Secretary
    of the Navy to try to get at what the right requirements are.
    That was coordinated closely between the Navy and the Marine
    Corps, and we informed the Office of Cost Assessment and
    Program Evaluation (CAPE) as well of all of our progress.
        That amphibious study is today being reported out here in
    the next couple of weeks within the Department. The findings of
    that amphibious study will also be included in the ongoing
    naval force structure analysis that takes place--is taking
    place right now in preparation for Program Objective Memoranda
    (POM) 2024. I suspect that as we conclude all those
    assessments, we will see considerable support for amphibious
    lift moving forward.
        Senator Kaine. Admiral Gilday.
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. So the study that we just
    completed concluded 31, and we actually took a look at three
    cases that are consistent with the National Defense Strategy
    (NDS), the new NDS strategy. We took a look at traditional
    amphibs by themselves, looking across the spectrum of war and
    what they contribute, both in deterrence and also in the fight.
        We took a look at light amphibious warships in the future
    with those vessels in expeditionary advanced bases. Then we
    took a look at traditional amphibs and light amphibs together.
        We tried to take a look at it holistically, not just in the
    first two cases, but at the total amphibious fleet, postulating
    as best we can how we use them in the future. That is informing
    both the final number and then our acquisition path to field
    them.
        Senator Kaine. Well, this is good news that--you know,
    there have been mixed messages about this and the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cape had numbers as low as 12 or 24.
    So I know the study will be out formally soon. Based on the
    testimony today, we expect to see that at 31, and I appreciate
    your testimony.
        Secretary Del Toro, I want to ask you about the George
    Washington (GW). There has been a series of deaths, but also
    the underlying conditions that sailors endure while a carrier
    is undergoing an overhaul. These overhauls are unlike others,
    which might be months at a time. They take several years. The
    GW has been in overhaul since 2017, and that means that some
    sailors will spend their entire career on a ship that never
    goes to sea, and they will never perform the duties that they
    trained for after graduating from boot camp.
        I wonder if that fact, the length of these berths in the
    shipyard, is a challenging factor. I know that you were in a
    shipyard with one of the ships you commanded for 18 months
    during your Active Duty career. Talk a little bit about how the
    Navy is looking at this George Washington situation, not only
    the particular instances, but the particular challenges that
    result from these very lengthy shipyard berths.
        Mr. Del Toro. Yes, sir, and thank you for your question,
    Senator. Without question, there is no greater responsibility
    than our safety of our sailors and our marines, and
    particularly when sailors go into an extended overhaul in a
    shipyard. Shipyard life itself is challenging enough.
        When you are in the shipyard that long, it presents
    additional challenges. I think institutionally, the Department
    of the Navy, we need to collectively do a better job to provide
    the necessary resources to the ship itself in the contracts
    that are negotiated with the shipyard itself, to provide a
    higher quality of life for those sailors in the shipyard.
        There are two investigations that are ongoing right now,
    command investigation, as well as an additional investigation
    by the Navy to look at some of these additional quality of life
    factors that perhaps play a role in this very unfortunate
    situation.
        But we need to develop a plan that is more robust than what
    we are currently doing for especially aircraft carriers,
    because you are introducing upwards of 2,500 sailors into an
    already challenging environment.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and finally,
    General Berger, I am just going to conclude. My wife and I are
    moving this weekend from the family home of 30 years into a
    condo, and everything, every drawer we open is a memory and
    everything we throw away is a memory, and everything we give to
    the kids or to refugee families is a memory. We are excited,
    but change is hard. Change is hard.
        I have been thinking about that a little bit in connection
    with some of the comments about Force Design 2030. I, for one,
    appreciate the fact that you have rethought fundamental
    assumptions and recognized the great things we have been doing,
    but also that the realities of the world mandate a Marine Corps
    that can perform the same mission but in very different ways,
    and that you are willing to embrace some significant change. I
    appreciate it. Thanks, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Cotton,
    please.
        Senator Cotton. Good morning, gentlemen. Welcome. Thank you
    all for your testimony and for your service to the country. Mr.
    Secretary and Admiral, I want to thank you two for taking the
    time recently to discuss the findings of the report that I
    commissioned with a few House members about the state of
    culture and warfighting in the Navy, especially the surface
    Navy.
        I want to thank you for your thoughts on what you are doing
    to try to address some of those challenges. Mr. Secretary, I
    want to raise one of those specifically with you. What the
    report found was the so-called zero defect mentality in the
    Navy, especially among the officer corps in the surface fleet.
        Could you talk to us about the specific policies that you
    have enacted since you took over to counteract that zero defect
    mentality?
        Mr. Del Toro. Yes, sir. It is more about an approach to our
    cultural approach in the Navy with regard to the command. As
    you know, the CNO, with my support and collaboration, have
    initiated a policy of get real, get better. Part of getting
    real is coming to a very honest determination of the challenges
    that you face and things that has to improve in order for us to
    get better.
        Part of that cultural dynamic is not having a zero defect
    mentality so that we can actually encourage our leadership at
    all levels, not just within the officer corps, but also within
    the noncommissioned officer corps, which is critical to our
    mission, so that they can honestly face the challenges that
    they have and provide recommendations that actually make things
    better.
        So it is more cultural change to just the issuance of
    individual policies.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. Do you think that Lieutenant Halsey
    or Lieutenant Nimitz would have made it past Lieutenant
    Commander in today's Navy?
        Mr. Del Toro. Probably not.
        Senator Cotton. Admiral Gilday, what about you?
        Admiral Gilday. One of the things that we did recently is,
    I issued a new charge of command. This is a direction to our
    commanders, and I specifically addressed some areas where we
    have a Navy where we don't have tolerance, drug use would be an
    example, but we certainly can't be a no defect Navy.
        One of the things that, in terms of changing the culture,
    that we together are trying to institute is this idea of
    embracing the red. So as you see slides in the Pentagon where
    there are usually stoplight slides and people like to focus on
    things that are green, things that are going well, swimmingly
    well, when what we really need to focus on and create an
    environment to address is to embrace the red and to fix the
    red.
        This gets right to the fundamental need to be able to self-
    assess and then to self-correct, as individuals is and as an
    institution. When we took a look at a major fires review and we
    took a look at 15 different fires over the course of 12 years,
    and we took a look at the variance between units that perform
    very well and units that don't, it came down to the ability to
    self-assess and an environment that allows that to happen
    without being punished for basically communicating fearlessly
    up the chain of command.
        That is what we are looking for fundamentally, sir, in
    terms of changing the culture, not just in the surface Navy,
    but across the Navy. It is going to take us a while, but I
    think we are on--we are in the beginning of a right path that
    has been well received by the fleet.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. Thank you both. Again, that was just
    one issue from that report. I thank you all for the time you
    took to discuss that and the other issues, and I look forward
    to continue to work with you to implement those reforms, make
    sure our surface Navy is strong and healthy and ready to fight
    and win wars in the future.
        General Berger, I heard a lot today about your Force 2030
    concept and you have heard some support for it from the
    Committee as well. I just want to be direct about it, though.
    You seem to have kicked over a hornet's nest among a lot of
    your fellow retired marines--I guess you are not retired, but
    fellow marines who are retired.
        Even among a former marine who was Secretary of the Navy
    and a member of the Senate. So I just want to give you a chance
    in plain English to respond to their many public critiques of
    your plan. Why do you think they are wrong in those critiques?
        General Berger. The genesis, the start point was really
    General Dunford when he was Commandant and then followed by
    General Neller when they, in a setting like this, articulated
    that the Marine Corps, although is very healthy and capable at
    that time, was not organized, wasn't trained, wasn't equipped
    for what the National Defense Strategy called for.
        I agree with that. I also think that the speed at which we
    have to change is not necessarily driven by ourselves, it is
    driven by the adversary. It is driven by the pace of change of
    the threats. The level of risk is probably where it boils down
    to between those who feel like we should go at a more
    conservative, slower pace. I am driven by the pace at which the
    adversary is moving. We have to stay in front of that.
        My job, like the CNO's, is not just to make sure that the
    Marine Corps is capable today, but 5 years from now that we
    have a margin of advantage over the PLAN or whatever the pacing
    challenge is 5 years from now. That is our job.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you for the testimony and thank you
    for all the hard work you put into that. I hold you and the
    Marine Corps in high esteem. I hold many of your critics in
    high esteem as well, though, and I know the Committee will be
    working through all of those arguments about what has happened,
    because we share the same goal about a Marine Corps that is
    ready not just to fight today, but back tomorrow as well.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Hirono,
    please.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Del
    Toro, thank you for your support and commitment to deal with
    the Red Hill fuel installation situation in a way that helps
    restore Hawaii's confidence in the Navy. So the President's
    decision to include $1 billion for the Red Hill Recovery Fund
    in his fiscal year 2023 request to permanently close Red Hill,
    not only protects the island's drinking water, but ultimately
    benefits our operations in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
    (INDOPACOM).
        The closure rate is going to be a multiyear and multi-
    faceted endeavor and will require the Department of Defense to
    work closely with the Hawaii Department of Health and the
    Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Secretary Del Toro, can
    you explain how the Navy is planning for the execution of these
    funds, and any concerns you have related to safe defueling of
    the tanks and closing of the facility?
        Mr. Del Toro. Thank you, Senator. Thank you, Senator--and
    thank you for your leadership on this issue. It means a great
    deal to our sailors, our marines, our Air Force, our Army
    soldiers, and, of course, all the people of Hawaii as well,
    too.
        I am pleased that the Department of Navy has collaborated
    very closely with all the agencies in Hawaii, on Oahu and
    elsewhere, on this very important task. We will continue to
    collaborate and work very aggressively with all the appropriate
    agencies. As you know, I have a requirement to submit to the
    Secretary of Defense a Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M).
        We are currently in the assessment stage of putting
    together that plan of objectives analysis memorandum to come up
    with the right steps that are necessary. At the same time,
    there are several investigations that are underway that are
    going to be revealing on matters and issues that have to be
    corrected as well too. Those findings will be included in our
    overall plan.
        There is a third party assessment, as you know, that has
    concluded and is being reviewed right now in the Department of
    Defense so that we can properly make the investments that are
    necessary to determine what steps have to be taken to properly
    and safely defuel Red Hill. We will be collaborating very
    closely in accordance with the Executive Order that was just
    issued--revised Executive Order.
        As you know, we have appealed the right to a hearing on
    that, and we wish to continue to collaborate very closely with
    Hawaii and all the involved agencies to get to the right
    result, so that we could also inform the Congress in terms of
    the investments that have to be made to properly execute the
    plan.
        Senator Hirono. Well, what started off, from my
    perspective, as a situation where the State of Hawaii, the
    Navy, Department of Defense (DOD) writ large, we were
    definitely not on the same page, and that is why your
    commitment to collaborating, and where I have seen that the
    State of Hawaii is withdrawing probably some concerns they had
    about the third party assessment, and the Navy holding back on
    some appeals processes that they could pursue, I think that is
    what we have to do. That everybody needs to get on the same
    page and work together, so that is what I am looking for
    because this is a very complicated situation, as you well know.
        General Berger, we have heard a lot about the 30--
    commitment to 31 amphibious ship situation, and this is a new
    number. So how would terminating the LPD line and having fewer
    than 31 ships impact the Marine Corps' ability to respond
    globally?
        What I am getting at is I too am committed to 31 ships and
    there are people who don't think that that is the right number,
    but what if you--if you have fewer than 31 ships, what does
    that do to your ability to respond globally?
        General Berger. I will start off, and if there is time, ask
    the CNO if he has additional thoughts. But from my perspective,
    with the rest of the Joint Force modernizing as it is, the
    Marine Corps is probably one of the best hedges you have right
    now in the next 4 or 5 years. We have to be forward. We have to
    be ready.
        This study that came to the result of 31 Incorporated, as a
    CNO highlighted, not just scenarios that OSD uses, but how to
    deter, how to respond quickly. 31 is a floor. Even with 31,
    there is risk. Of course there is. If we don't have 31, there
    are places--and there are things that are going to happen in
    the next 4 or 5, 6 years where the U.S. cannot respond. In the
    worst cases, somebody else gets there first and they are not a
    friend of ours.
        Senator Hirono. Admiral Gilday, do you have anything to
    add?
        Admiral Gilday. I do. Thank you, ma'am. So this is all
    about speed. It is about flexibility. It is about agility. It
    is about having options, not just in one theater, but around
    the globe. The Fleet Marine Force afloat provides options to
    every single combatant commander, whether it is in the High
    North, where we see those forces exercising today, or whether
    it is in the Middle East or whether it is in the Western
    Pacific, everything from humanitarian assistance to they are
    perhaps our best platforms for working together with allies and
    partners.
        Why? Because they are like F150 trucks filled with hundreds
    of marines with Ka Bar in their teeth. They are a motivator for
    our allies and partners. There are hundreds of different uses,
    almost--you are almost only limited by your imagination in
    terms of how you can use that force.
        So, again, they provide options, agility, speed. I think
    the number 31 allows you to get more ships at sea and allows
    you to have--allows you to have more options.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, and, Mr. Chairman, if I could
    just make two very short observations or comments. Regarding
    SIOP, we better to do a much better job of estimating the cost
    of the dry docks and all of that, because that is--that was a
    huge difference in what was happening with Portsmouth.
        The cost estimate was $750 million and then the contract
    came in at $1.7 billion. Huge difference. We need to not have
    that. I brought up the 15-ship multiyear procurement, and I
    checked with the shipbuilders, and they said that they could
    build an additional ship.
        So we need to come together on whether or not 15 ships is
    what we can actually get to. So I just wanted to make that
    observation, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Rounds,
    please.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, first
    let me begin by saying thank you to all of you for your years
    of service to our country. Admiral Gilday, let me once again
    thank you for the time that you have taken to visit with us
    most recently on Tuesday of this week, and your explanation of
    the movement that you are making within the cyber operations
    for the Navy and the improvements that you envision making as
    well.
        I would like to pivot from that a little bit and move back
    in along a similar line to what some other members here have
    talked about, and that is with regard to the maintenance and
    the operations within our shipyards. In particular, I come back
    down to the same boat that I have talked about in the past ,
    the USS Boise, I believe a Los Angeles-class attack submarine.
        This is an item which has been up for, and it was supposed
    to be in the shop for its overhaul in the 2015, 2016 time
    period. It has been delayed for a number of reasons since that
    time, and there has been a constant discussion about moving
    forward. I understand that you are now moving forward and that
    you have decided to begin that process.
        Could you share with the Committee the thinking that you
    are using and the thought process that goes into the decision
    that rather than scrapping that piece of machinery and actually
    rehabbing it, and the other ones, which are also behind it in
    line, for their upgrades?
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. So I think everybody in this room
    understands the utility of our submarine force and its
    importance on a day to day basis in not only deterring
    adversaries, but when it comes to fight and win, they are
    absolutely essential as our most survivable, stealthy, strike--
    effective strike platform that we have in the Navy, perhaps in
    the entire Joint Force. So giving away any single submarine
    should only be--that decision should be made after great
    deliberation and exhaustion of other options.
        So in the case of some of our newer 688--688 submarines or
    688i's, which have a Vertical Launch System (VLS) capability,
    we have seven of them planned for engineering overhauls as an
    example, to keep what some might refer to as a legacy platform,
    continue to get four or five deployments out of these
    submarines so that we can continue to keep them in the fight,
    if you will. The challenge with Boise really rests inside the
    private shipyard that is doing that work.
        So we have two private yards that do that work and we need
    their capacity. So based on the fact that we continue to build
    a viable submarine force, and we know that we don't have the
    capacity in our public shipyards to handle all of that
    maintenance, we need Electric Boat, and we need Huntington
    Ingalls to be able to do that work.
        They are underperforming. They are over cost and way over
    schedule. But because we need them, we need to hold their feet
    to the fire to those contracts. They need to pay penalties when
    they don't meet their requirements. But we need them to be all
    in with us and the Nation that they are supporting in this
    critical effort. But we need to continue sort of to press them
    to do a better job. We need that capability. It is a national
    imperative.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir. General Berger, I have
    looked at your Force Design 2030, and I know that Senator
    Cotton led into this a little bit. There are some very well-
    respected former officials within the Marine Corps that had
    questioned whether or not it was the right direction to go.
        I appreciate the fact that you have continued to move
    forward, but I think perhaps just for the Committee, we could
    walk way back a little bit in terms of all of the reasons for
    the need to move in this direction.
        I think back to perhaps, and I may be off on this, but in
    the Nagorno Karabakh war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which
    was caught between September of 2020 and November of 2020, we
    saw two countries that really did not have huge armies, and yet
    in a very short period of time, Azerbaijan was able to have a
    very decisive victory using 21st century weapons systems,
    including loitering munitions, long range precision fires, a
    lot of the items that you are identifying as being necessary
    for the Marine Corps.
        Could you talk a little bit about the way that you envision
    the marines fighting, not just when it comes to People's
    Republic of China (PRC), but other areas around the world that
    some people think, well, we are looking at PRC. It appears to
    me that you are looking at lots of different scenarios here,
    but in particular, the reason why you have moved in the
    direction of loitering, munitions, and so forth.
        General Berger. Some folks have written about the precision
    strike regime, the evolution of that over the past 15 years, 20
    years. I am in full agreement there. Combine that with the
    proliferation of sensors, makes it a very different battlefield
    than we had 20 years ago. So we have to be able to operate
    inside the threat's collection range, inside their weapons
    range, and be lethal, both.
        That meant adjusting the construct, the warfighting
    concepts of the Marine Corps and our own structure within, to
    make sure that we can operate inside there persistently, strip
    away the adversary's ability to collect against the Joint Force
    and collect against them all at the same time. That is where we
    are headed. It is a different force than we had in Desert
    Shield, Desert Storm. It is not a persistent--it is not a
    second land army. It is what the Nation needs us to be able to
    do.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Senator King,
    please.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to start with
    an observation. Senator Cramer and I the other night had dinner
    with a former member of the Ukrainian parliament from Odessa,
    and he told us, this is a side effect of this war that I
    thought reflected well on our support of the Ukrainians,
    apparently a common name for a new male Ukrainian baby these
    days is Javelin.
        For female babies, it is Javelina, and I thought that was
    an indication of the importance of the support we are providing
    to the Ukrainian people. Mr. Secretary, I want to start with a
    complement which often doesn't occur at these hearings. I want
    to compliment you because, as I see it, your largest single
    increase in your budget is research and development (R&D).
        I think that is absolutely essential. Looking back through
    history, technology often wins wars or certainly has an
    important influence on the outcome of wars. In World War II,
    radar and of course the invention of the atomic weapon, which
    was pure R&D, ended World War II. Going back to the Battle of
    Agincourt was the longbow.
        Even the homely stirrup, many historians believe was the
    basis of Genghis Khan's ability to conquer the known world at
    that time because it provided stability to his archers on
    horseback. So I want to thank you for that. Now, here is the
    question. I believe the technological breakthrough of this
    moment in time is the hypersonic missile. My question is, are
    we dealing with that issue both from a defensive and an
    offensive capability point of view with the requisite sense of
    urgency?
        My concern is that our, for example, our forward presence
    in the Pacific is based upon aircraft carriers. I realize this
    is an unclassified setting, but I want some assurance that this
    is a hair on fire issue at the Pentagon to deal with what could
    be a strategic game changing technology, the hypersonic
    missile.
        Mr. Del Toro. Thanks for the question, Senator, and let me
    assure you wholeheartedly that this is a hair on fire type of
    investment in terms of developing the necessary, not just
    developing the R&D for it, but also as it applies to all our
    platforms and ensuring that we can quickly acquire that
    technology from the R&D to capabilities that we can actually
    put in the hands of the warfighters across the board.
        With regard to hypersonic, yes, we are making major
    investments in hypersonic. I feel quite confident that we are
    going to be seeing some of these tremendous capabilities,
    particularly Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) on Zumwalt-class
    destroyers, be deployed within the next couple of years. Then
    we will be aggressively deploying those ships in the Indo-
    Pacific where they will be most needed.
        Senator King. Admiral Gilday, are you comfortable with our
    progress in dealing with the strategic applications of
    hypersonic?
        Admiral Gilday. No, sir. I am not. But I will tell you what
    we are taking a look at. With respect to terminal defense,
    layered terminal defense, right now we have--we are deploying
    directed energy systems on some of our ships. We are testing it
    real time against both swarming surface vessels as well as a
    ballistic missile defense system, which gets your point about
    hypersonics.
        High powered microwave is another critical technology that
    we are investing in, and a critical enabler for any of those
    terminal defense systems is going to have to be quantum
    computing, another area where the Secretary has us making
    additional advances with respect to R&D.
        So in terms of giving us decision superiority over the
    adversary and understanding, applying both quantum computing
    with AI capabilities, helping us put a defensive weapon on a
    target like a fast moving hypersonic missile is going to be
    key. So those are some of the things that we are working on
    right now, sir, inside that R&D----
        Senator King. I like it that you started your answer to my
    question with no rather than bland assurances, because that
    indicates to me that you recognize the seriousness of this
    issue. A quick final point, Mr. Secretary, on an entirely
    different subject. There is data that indicates the most
    dangerous point for veteran suicide is in the first 2 or 3
    years after they separate from the service.
        I believe that the services should be putting as much money
    and time and effort and thought into transition out as it is to
    recruiting in, because this veteran suicide issue is serious.
    It is an embarrassment, and it is a tragedy to be losing
    something in the number of 20 veterans a day.
        But since we know from the data that that first year or so
    after leaving Active Duty is a moment of maximum danger, I hope
    that you will think about how to make that handoff from after
    Active Duty to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) warmer.
    Think about not only the physical pieces but also the mental
    and the stressors that impact our veterans as they become
    veterans.
        Mr. Del Toro. Senator, I have, and I do actually, having
    personally made that transition myself. I know the challenges
    that one faces with regards to suicide and depression and
    things of that matter. I talk about it just about everywhere I
    go.
        I talk about how important it is for our sailors to take
    care of each other, to really care for each other throughout,
    when a sailor shows up to the ship, to the squadron, wherever
    it may be, while they are there, and actually as they
    transition from their command to another command or to the
    civilian sector as well, too.
        So we are focused on that, and we actually do work with the
    Department of Veterans Affairs on this issue.
        Senator King. Thank you. I hope that will be an urgent
    priority as well. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Blackburn,
    please.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    to each of you for your service and for being here with us
    today. I want to start with the Nuclear Posture Review. Admiral
    Gilday, yesterday in the House Armed Services Committee
    hearing, you were asked about support for continuing the Sea-
    Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM), and your quote was you
    supported continuing it while we get a better understanding of
    the world we live in with two nuclear capable peer competitors.
        This is something that I have talked about with our
    commanders as they have come before us for their hearings. I
    have mentioned it to our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. They
    have all expressed concern with the Administration's decision
    to cancel the Sea-Launched Cruise Missile and have--the
    Administration's position of that is redundant with our other
    capabilities.
        That is something that causes me concern. So, Admiral
    Gilday, I appreciated your remarks on this. So Secretary Del
    Toro, let me ask you, what is your position on this?
        Mr. Del Toro. Yes, ma'am. I agree with the President's
    budget. I believe that we should zero out the SLCM line. I
    believe the President has all the tools in his toolkit
    necessary to deter and deal with the threat of a tactical
    nuclear missile----
        Senator Blackburn. So you are not worried about our
    capabilities?
        Mr. Del Toro. I am not. I believe that the President has
    all the tools in his toolkit, whether W-76 weapons----
        Senator Blackburn. Your assessment of China as a--with
    their push on great power competition, that doesn't keep you up
    at night or worry you?
        Mr. Del Toro. That absolutely keeps me up at night and
    worries me. But as far as deterring China's nuclear capability,
    I believe that we far exceed what we have right now in terms of
    being able to deter the use of a tactical nuclear missile with
    the W-76 warhead----
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. What message do you think it sends
    to our competitors if we are going to reduce rather than
    bolster our nuclear capabilities?
        Mr. Del Toro. I think the message that it sends is that we
    are actually using those resources and to the tune of about $30
    billion to make the necessary investments in hypersonics----
        Senator Blackburn. So you completely agree with the
    President?
        Mr. Del Toro. Excuse me, ma'am?
        Senator Blackburn. You completely agree with the President?
        Mr. Del Toro. I completely agree with the President and
    Secretary of Defense.
        Senator Blackburn. That is what I wanted to know. Admiral
    Gilday, you also referenced a, in your words, a particular gap
    in capabilities which SLCM could fill. So tell me, what is that
    particular gap?
        Admiral Gilday. So the gap specifically is the tactical
    nuclear capability of specifically Russia, but gaining steam is
    China. The question is, how do you best close that gap? SLCM-N
    has been offered as a single point solution. I would offer that
    there are others to think about, including low yield nuclear
    weapons that we deploy right now and had support of the
    Congress, making those changes based on the previous Nuclear
    Posture Review (NPR).
        I also think hypersonics are an important capability. The
    Army is fielding that capability this year. The Navy is going
    to follow suit in 2025, as the Secretary mentioned, with that
    same capability.
        Senator Blackburn. Yes. Let me ask you about hypersonics
    because--and by the way, thank you for mentioning quantum
    computing. I totally agree with you and Oak Ridge National Lab
    is doing some great work in quantum research. When we look at
    hypersonics and we look at Arnold Engineering Development
    Center in Tennessee, which has the capability to support this
    hypersonic supply chain, talk to me about where you think we
    are with modernization for our testing facilities, where we are
    with outsourcing, when it comes to our hypersonic capabilities.
        Admiral Gilday. We continue to make investments in the
    testing facilities, including the testing facilities that allow
    us to take out hypersonic weapons and to refine its
    capabilities so that it is actually able to be launched from a
    submerged submarine, because we want to put that capability
    aboard our new subs as early as 2028. So that is an example of
    continued investment.
        As I look at the hypersonics program, that is a joint
    program among the services, we are meeting every benchmark and
    milestone in that program. So I am confident, I have a pretty
    high degree of confidence in the Army system that we will field
    this year, in a mobile system, and then the Navy system will
    follow suit.
        Now, I think with the continued support of Congress in
    those funding lines, and last year you actually doubled the
    Navy's funding for hypersonics, which we are grateful for.
        Senator Blackburn. Well, I spoke to General Brown during
    the Air Force posture hearing about this issue and the
    capabilities that we have at Arnold, and also about looking at
    how we leverage risk and how we take more risk in pushing
    forward in this sector. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Blackburn.
    Senator Kelly, please.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Berger, I
    have got a question about Marine Corps Air Station in Yuma.
    Arizona is really proud to host the marines in Yuma, including
    F-35 squadrons. I have had the opportunity to fly the F-35
    simulator a couple of times. It is nice to know that our
    fighters, our premier fighters, outmatch those of our
    adversaries, and we are happy to have them in Arizona.
        So we have got this premier fighter, but we also have a
    base that has some infrastructure problems, critical
    infrastructure. Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, they are
    currently planning to upgrade the water treatment facilities on
    the installation. My understanding is that the current
    treatment plant was built in 1947, so it is nearly 80 years
    old. This treatment plant supplies water for a large part of
    the base, bases, the bases' systems, but also supplies water
    for family housing and tenant commands, and the water doesn't
    meet water quality standards.
        I understand that the current budget plans would not seek
    funding for this project until fiscal year 2026. So I am
    concerned that the system is not able to meet these water
    quality regulations for potable water. This cannot be--with the
    current plan will not be addressed for a number of years.
        General, are you looking to expedite projects like Yuma's
    water treatment plant that affect the health and safety of our
    marines and their families?
        General Berger. Thanks, Senator. Having lived at Marine
    Corps Air Station Yuma in 1991 to 1994, I think, I know exactly
    what you are talking about. If you will allow me, Senator, I
    would like to look into this problem and come back to you
    individually with where that project is in funding, and to your
    point, what might be done to accelerate it.
        But you are never going to--I don't think you expect us to
    shoot from the hip. So if it is okay with you, I will do the
    homework and I will come back to your office with ``here is
    where it lays right now and we--and this is what it would take
    to accelerate it.''
        Senator Kelly. I appreciate that. I have spent a lot of
    time down there on the base looking at facilities. You know, I
    really love looking at the airplanes and spending time there,
    but it is as important as the airplanes are, you know, things
    like enlisted housing, which also we, my office would like to
    follow up on that issue as well. Got a totally different
    question for Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday.
        In April, the State Department announced that the United
    States and India had agreed at their recent two plus two dialog
    to explore possibilities of utilizing Indian shipyards for
    repair and maintenance of ships of the United States Maritime
    Sealift Command. I was in India just a few weeks ago and had
    discussions about this with Indian officials, deputy National
    Security advisor, their Secretary of Defense, and they were
    really interested in this opportunity and optimistic about it.
        So in connection with this possibility, Mr. Secretary, to
    what degree would doing this work enhance Navy and DOD
    operations in the Indo-Pacific region, and would doing this
    work in Indian shipyards strengthen U.S., Indian relations?
        Mr. Del Toro. Thanks, Senator, and thanks for your
    dedication to this issue, because what distinguishes us from
    the Russians and the Chinese is the alliances, the strength of
    the alliances that we have with our partner nations around the
    globe. That is no better example of our relationship with India
    as it continues to grow.
        While the specifics of this deal is being negotiated, I
    think overall that it is a perfect representation of what we
    need to continue to do around the globe as well in order to
    support our ships deployed in the Indo-Pacific. The CNO has
    been very engaged in this, and with your permission, I would
    like to ask him to discuss the matter further.
        Admiral Gilday. Thank you, sir. I visited India and I
    specifically asked to go to Mumbai to take a look at their
    civilian shipyards, to see for myself what their capabilities
    are. This is a quick win for the United States-India
    relationship. We are just sending now a team over there to do a
    more detailed survey. My goal is to get a ship in there this
    summer to do voyage repairs.
        So, it gives us more flexibility, more opportunities in
    theater to get ships fixed. They have a high degree of
    confidence in their ability to do that. I think we are on the
    right track, sir, and I will follow up with you as we nail down
    that deal.
        Senator Kelly. All right, and if there is any other, you
    know, gaps and authorities that you need from Congress, please
    let us know. I would like to figure out a way to get this done.
    India and the United States, we have the same strategic problem
    in the region, and that is China. So it is--wherever we can
    look for opportunities to work jointly with the Indian
    Government, the Indian military, I think it benefits us. Thank
    you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Senator
    Tuberville, please.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very
    much, gentlemen, for being here today and your service. Admiral
    Gilday, after the fall of Afghanistan, we didn't see a single
    senior officer lose their job. I think that surprised many,
    many people here in the United States.
        You know, we have heard a lot today about current culture
    problems plaguing the military, but I want to commend something
    that the Navy does exceptionally well, accountability. The Navy
    has a huge culture and accountability--for example, the USS
    Connecticut hit an underwater mountain last fall. Am I correct
    that you removed the Commander, Executive Officer, and the
    senior enlisted boat Chief?
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir, we did.
        Senator Tuberville. In your words, why is the Navy's
    culture of holding senior officers accountable more important
    in maintaining standards and performance? Could you give me
    your thoughts?
        Admiral Gilday. Well, sir, I think standards of command are
    very important. They are grounded in the law. They are also
    grounded in Navy regulations. But more importantly, there is
    the expectation that our sailors have that we hold our seniors
    accountable.
        Perhaps even more important than that, the confidence of
    the American people. That they send their youth to serve for
    their country and that they be well-led. If they are not well-
    led, then we change those leaders out.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. In your opening statement,
    there was a couple things that struck me, and this is also for
    General Berger. Recruiting, training, and accountability. You
    said that you would much prefer quality over quantity, and I
    think we all agree with that. 21st century military. I think
    that we all need to open our eyes about what just happened in
    the last 70, 80 days, Russia going into Ukraine.
        Russia had every hand up in Ukraine, except Russia didn't
    realize, they hadn't been in a war in a while, and their mid-
    level officers failed, their leadership failed. They had all
    kind of weapons, and they got their tails handed to them. I
    think it is very, very important that we understand this is a
    different era. I just came from coaching. The kids, young men
    and women have changed over the last 20, 30 years, and we need
    to change with it.
        Now, I take my hat off to General Berger of what he has
    done in terms of changing his philosophy of the weapons that
    they might use in certain ways. What do you think about the
    future of recruiting and training and the accountability of
    today's young men and women in our armed forces?
        Admiral Gilday. Well, sir, I think our recruiting--there
    are definitely recruiting challenges based on the fact that the
    pool of qualified recruits is getting smaller, is not getting
    larger. I will say this, I think it is important for the
    country to celebrate what a great military that we have so that
    our youth actually see that as a viable, attractive option for
    them to serve their country with pride and to make their
    families proud.
        But it is something that, you know, all too often, you
    know, there are plenty of cheap shots out there, it is easy to
    be negative. But, boy, the further you get away from D.C., the
    better things look with respect to the United States Navy and
    the United States Marine Corps, and the quality of people that
    we have serving and the quality leaders, the dedication, the
    passion, the commitment, it is a great outfit with a great
    future for anybody that wants to join.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. General Berger.
        General Berger. Sir, you mentioned Russia and other folks
    in here have mentioned China. I think in the same way as some
    people contrast the democracy versus, you know, autocracy, we
    have an All-Volunteer Force. Not lost on us, right. In other
    words, sort of like democracy is an experiment. All-Volunteer
    Force is not on autopilot. I mean, that is where you are
    driving it.
        We have to work at an All-Volunteer Force. It is not on
    autopilot. Now all of us, every recruiter, all of you are part
    of the health of that force. They come into the military for a
    lot of reasons. Money is an incentive, but that is not why they
    joined the Navy, that is not why they joined the Marine Corps.
    They want to be part of something bigger. They want to be
    challenged. They want to contribute to the U.S. We all have to
    be proactive, I think, in how we bring them into the military.
    It is not on autopilot. It is not on cruise control.
        Senator Tuberville. We can't lose our hard nose training
    because you just saw what happened with Russia's military.
    Social media, to those men and women fighting for Russia was a
    problem. They all had phones and they are able to read those.
    It is a different era.
        We need to make sure we can adjust to this era along with
    it, because if we don't, then it doesn't make any difference
    how much money we spend or how we go about recruiting. If we
    don't look at the problems that we just saw from a superpower,
    then we will not learn ourselves and we could end up on the
    same side of the boat. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Senator
    Peters, please.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Del
    Toro, in February of this year, a Federal judge approved a
    settlement agreement in the class action lawsuit Manker v. Del
    Toro. The lawsuit alleged that the Navy had systematically
    denied discharge status upgrades to Corporal Manker and
    thousands of other marines and sailors who were suffering from
    Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) or Traumatic Brain Injury
    (TBI) at the time of their discharge.
        These denials were in direct contravention of statute, as
    well as internal DOD memoranda. That both a Federal judge and
    the Department of Navy agreed to a settlement demonstrates the
    veracity of the claims put forward by Corporal Manker. This
    agreement is also in line with the earlier settlement agreement
    from Kennedy v. McCarthy, which dealt with nearly the same
    issue but for the Department of the Army.
        As a sponsor of the Fairness for Veterans Act, the issue of
    bad paper discharges and ensuring our veterans are getting the
    benefits they have earned through their service is a priority
    for me, and the allegations leveled in Manker v. Del Toro are
    certainly extremely troubling for these folks who were
    suffering from PTSD and was not diagnosed at the time of their
    discharge.
        My question for you, sir, is why did the Navy choose to
    ignore the Fairness for Veterans Act as well as protections
    laid out in Hagel, Kurta, Wilkie, and Carson memos when dealing
    with veterans appearing before the Naval Discharge Review
    Board?
        [Technical problems.]
        Chairman Reed. Mr. Secretary, could you bring the
    microphone close, please?
        Mr. Del Toro. Thank you, Senator, for your support of the
    Fairness for Veterans Act. As to the question--and thank you
    for your support of our veterans in general. I am committed to
    ensuring that our veterans receive the appropriate due process
    through the Navy's Discharge Review Board, and I am pleased
    that we were able to settle on this matter. As I understand it,
    the Department of the Navy did not endorse the Fairness for
    Veterans Act, or the protections laid out in these memos.
        Though Department of Navy did not clearly articulate that
    the memos were taken into consideration during the adjudication
    process itself. The memos provide that not all misconduct can
    be mitigated. However, there are nuances, including when the
    memos were issued, and which entities and classes of veterans
    were subject to them.
        I would be happy to set up a specific briefing with your
    offices to discuss these nuances and your concerns but let me
    assure you that we will continue to cooperate to the fullest
    extent as we actually execute the details of the agreement
    itself.
        Senator Peters. Do you do you see any difficulties in fully
    complying with this settlement, and what are the timelines you
    have?
        Mr. Del Toro. I do not. I will have to get back to you on
    the exact timeline, Senator.

        Mr. Del Toro. Based on current staffing levels, and the
    need to continue meeting the regular demand and activity of all
    Council of Review Board (CORB) boards, the CORB anticipates a
    minimum of 60 months to complete the review and handle the
    roughly 3000+ cases involved in the Manker settlement.
        One restrictive measure is the need for a medical officer,
    usually a psychiatrist or psychologist, to be part of the
    review team. Medical officers, especially psychiatrists and
    psychologists, are in short supply.

        Senator Peters. Well, I appreciate it. I would love to work
    with your office on this issue going forward.
        Mr. Del Toro. Yes, sir.
        Senator Peters. General Berger, Force Design 2030 calls
    for, among many things, the Marine Corps to more
    enthusiastically embrace the use of drones, both at the
    tactical level, through the use of Ravens and Pumas, but also
    at the operational level with a recent procurement of MQ-9s.
        If U.S. Indo-Pacific Command is the theater priority, which
    it is, and increasing the marines' organic ISR is a priority of
    yours as well, that I understand, I am curious though, how you
    plan to embrace these new platforms as you also at the same
    time simultaneously seek to divest yourself of roughly 10,000
    marines over the next decade.
        So my question for you is, in an era of constrained budgets
    and static or declining personnel levels, how do you plan to
    leverage the manpower resources available to you in the Marine
    Corps Forces Reserves to bolster the Marine Corps ISR
    capabilities and use of drones?
        General Berger. A couple of thoughts, sir. First, the
    divestments for the Marine Corps are largely done. That is what
    the last 3 years was focused on, including the structure. We
    are about where we are leveled off at 177,000 plus or minus,
    and that is about where we were before 9/11. So that part is
    complete.
        The modernization of the Marine Corps, as you highlighted,
    will amplify the role of unmanned systems, air, surface,
    ground, and closing--organically closing kill chains and kill
    webs is what enables that forward force to do what it is going
    to need to do. So what is the difference?
        Well, some of it is the change in the way that we operate.
    In other words, unmanned systems for the last 15 years had a
    big footprint on the ground in terms of ground control
    stations, infusion. All of that, I think artificial
    intelligence and the modernization of the network will shrink
    that.
        Second, frankly, the folks who operate those systems now,
    they are digital natives. This is the world they grew up in. So
    we are not teaching somebody something from scratch. This is
    something they have lived with since they were a teenager.
        Senator Peters. That is correct. Thank you so much. Thank
    you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters. Senator Sullivan,
    please.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen,
    thank you for your service. General, I want to stay focused on
    Force Design. Again, I appreciate, like a lot of Senators, bold
    initiatives pursuant to the 2018 NDS that you have undertaken
    with Force Design. I do want to go into a couple of the bigger
    issues that have emerged, one in which I see probably the
    biggest risk to the force and the mission of the Marine Corps
    that I am concerned about is the rate of divestiture compared
    to the rate of new capability development being fielded.
        It is in essence building on what Senator Peters mentioned.
    In particular, a lot of the experts view one of the most
    dangerous periods in United States, China relations as in the
    late 2020s. As you have executed Force Design, the Marine Corps
    has reduced the number of--the number and size of infantry
    battalions, divested all its tanks, reduced the number of
    aviation squadrons and cannon artillery batteries.
        Additionally, just last month, the Light Amphibious Warship
    (LAW), a central piece to the concept of Stand-In Forces in
    Force Design, was announced will be further delayed until 2025.
    First ship is not expected till 2027.
        Can you explain how the rate of divestiture and the rate of
    new capability development integration keeps the Marine Corps
    optimally prepared for conflict today and in the future? Is
    there risk and how do you mitigate it? I believe there is risk.
        General Berger. There absolutely is risk. I think in any
    organization that goes through Force Design, civilian sector or
    military, if you are going through that effort, there is
    absolutely some risk. The challenge is making sure you can see
    it, you can understand it, that you share it with the
    stakeholders, including this Committee.
        You have ways to offset that risk while you are modernizing
    at speed. If we had waited--for example, Senator, if we had
    waited 3 years, let's say we have waited until this year to
    start divestment, we would never be able to stay in front of
    China. That is the assumption going forward.
        At the rate that they are modernizing and expanding, if we
    had waited, we never could have closed the gap, never would
    have stayed in front.
        Senator Sullivan. Can I ask you, General, just to your
    comments that you just made, to work with this Committee to
    ensure that this--again, there is a lot of divestment going on
    right now, pretty dramatic, and capability development is
    further out. The LAWs are delayed. Some of these systems
    haven't been fully developed.
        Can you provide to this Committee a timeline and a chart
    that anticipates year by year between now and 2030, or maybe
    even looking back when Force Design 2030 began, to what we are
    divesting and what we are gaining and how will that make sure
    that the gap in the trough between divestment in combat
    capability is not so big that it poses risk to the force or
    mission? Can you provide that to the Committee?
        General Berger. I can absolutely do that, and that is the
    rationale, that is the reason behind publishing each year,
    ``this is where we are with Force Design, this is what we have
    learned today, the actions taken, this is the plan ahead,''
    which we published last month for this year.
        Senator Sullivan. Yes. No, I saw that.
        General Berger. That is the goal.

        General Berger. Given the current operational and threat
    environment, legacy and status quo capabilities do not sustain
    the United States' competitive advantage. By modernizing at
    speed, the Marine Corps reduces ``long-term'' risk to force and
    mission. Modernization efforts will always incur some risk to
    current operational demands. However, the prolonged delay in
    modernization creates greater risk with respect to a pacing
    adversary. Our modernized systems provide an order-of-magnitude
    increase in capability that is applicable in a near-peer fight,
    and across the range of military operations.
        The Marine Corps does assume short-term risk in overall
    capacity stemming from the transition from current legacy
    platforms to a modernized capability. However, the current
    modernization program will not incur risk to the Marine Corps'
    crisis response capability. As modernization progresses,
    capability will actually increase. The Marine Corps continues
    to leverage all elements of the Marine Air Ground Task Force to
    mitigate potential imbalances between investments and
    divestments.

        Senator Sullivan. I appreciate you working with us on that.
    Let me go to another issue and you mentioned it in your
    testimony, but some of the criticisms of Force Design is that
    it is so China focused that it undermines the Corps' capability
    to be a lethal force in readiness, to meet any contingency
    anywhere in the world, which, of course, is a hallmark of the
    Marine Corps.
        Can you describe in detail how the Marine Corps of 2030
    will apply to combat--combined arms across a range of global
    conflict scenarios, and how that compares and enhances your
    current combined arms and Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
    capabilities anywhere in the world, not just China.
        General Berger. The distinction--the understanding of what
    pacing means matters, of course. The term pacing, of course,
    predates 2018 when the National Defense Strategy first came
    out. Pacing, that is that level, that is the bar at which the
    capabilities, if you have to either match or overmatch that in
    order to compete and win.
        It is not about invading China. It is not about fighting
    China. It is about that is the level of capabilities that the
    Joint Force and the Marine Corps has to have, has to have a
    relative advantage over. So the whole Force Design effort, in
    fact, the modernization of the Joint Force is meant with that
    in mind.
        Not us, what is the likelihood of us fighting China, but
    what is the level of capabilities that we will need in order to
    have a relative advantage now and into the future? Combined
    arms in the past of course worked very well for the Marine
    Corps, has ensured our success. It will be the foundation going
    forward. But how we fight combined arms will change. The
    integration of sensors to shooters was step number one.
        The second one is the shortening the steps from the data to
    the shooting element. This is a progression of combined arms,
    this natural, this is evolution. Again, driven by technology on
    the one hand, and the threat on the other hand.
        Combined arms in 2030 or combined arms in 2027 will look a
    little bit different than today, and it is necessary, but it is
    still combined arms, and it is in support of, or in conjunction
    with, maneuver always.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Senator Rosen,
    please.
        Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman Reed, for holding
    this hearing. Thank you, the witnesses, for being here today,
    for your service. Secretary Del Toro, it is really good to see
    you again. Thank you for meeting with me recently. Of course, I
    am going to talk about our Fallon Naval Air Station today.
    Secretary Del Toro, as you well know, we are so proud, Nevada
    is so proud to host Fallon Naval Air Station. It is home to Top
    Gun, our Nation's premiere carrier air wing, and our SEAL
    training centers.
        The Navy is seeking to expand Fallon by over 650,000 acres.
    As we have discussed on several occasions, this proposal would
    impact our local communities, our tribes, sportsmen, ranchers,
    and others who currently access and operate on these lands. I
    really appreciate the visits you and Admiral Gilday have made
    to Fallon, and your continued collaboration with me and the
    Nevada delegation.
        Thank you to all the local stakeholders, as we all work to
    reach consensus on a proposal that both supports the military
    modernization requirements you are speaking of, keep up with
    our current and emerging threats, while maintaining Nevada's
    natural and cultural resources through land mitigations in the
    northern parts of our State.
        I know we have been working with the Department of Interior
    to improve the original expansion request, and that the Office
    of Management and Budget (OMB) has just cleared the legislative
    proposal on Tuesday for Congressional review. So now that it
    has been released to Congress, could you speak a little bit
    about the specifics and how you think it addresses the concerns
    raised in the original Fallon proposal, Mr. Secretary?
        Mr. Del Toro. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for your leadership and
    the leadership of the entire delegation on this critically
    important issue to our combat readiness across to the
    Department of the Navy, both Marine Corps and Navy.
        Obviously, the expansion of Fallon is simply critical to
    our combat readiness in the future to be able to deter our
    aggressors and China, Russia, and anywhere else around the
    globe with modernized aircraft and missile systems and weapon
    systems.
        It is just simply critical that our warfighters be able to
    train like they fight in order to create a culture of
    warfighting excellence.
        I am very pleased the Department of Navy has been able to
    come to agreement with all the stakeholders that are involved
    in a very respectful way across the entire community to try to
    come to a better place so that this legislative proposal can
    move forward here in the Congress.
        We do look forward to its possible passing this coming
    year.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I want to talk about a critical
    housing shortage, though, at the Naval Air Station, because it
    is the only naval base in the continental United States that is
    designated as a critical housing area.
        The housing shortage has just been--we have been briefed to
    leadership for future construction. Little progress has been
    made. The shortage, of course, is only getting worse. As we
    modernize and expand, this is going to place a bigger strain on
    housing.
        I understand that there is about 400 acres of land adjacent
    to the current base housing at Fallon, which was once housing
    that was demolished years ago. Are there plans to re-utilize
    this, and can I have your commitment to really increase housing
    in Fallon and surrounding areas?
        Mr. Del Toro. Senator, this is another issue that is
    incredibly important to the quality of life of our sailors
    across all the Nation, and specifically to Fallon as well too.
    Allow me to come back to you with answers that regards a
    specific issue there at Nevada in terms of the timeline.
        But we are deeply committed to providing not just family
    housing to our sailors who have families, but also to our
    single sailors as well too in order to provide them the quality
    of life that they deserve. Admiral, would you like to comment
    any further on that or----?
        Admiral Gilday. Just a quick comment, ma'am. Fallon is a
    national treasure. What we--what it provides for our
    warfighters is absolutely unmatched. If you take a look at
    Russia showing up to a fight untrained that is a reason why we
    need Fallon.
        The first time we use these weapons with these aircraft
    can't be in conflict. With respect to housing, we are making an
    investment in Fallon, and we hope to put, we are on track to
    put a contract for 172 new units in place about a year from
    now.
        Senator Rosen. Well, that is terrific, because we know
    Fallon, of course, is a small area surrounding there. There is
    a housing shortage already. You can't expand and modernize and
    bring the kind of staff that we need, even the workforce for
    the surrounding community to support everyone, unless we have
    at least affordable housing for our servicemen and women.
        I appreciate you getting on this and thinking about it as
    quickly as we can and get it on the board. Because I--we can't
    have homeless servicemen and women. That is for sure. Thank
    you. I yield back.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rosen. Senator
    Scott, please.
        Senator Scott. Thank you, Chair, for holding for me. I want
    to thank each of you for your service, your hard work in trying
    to make sure we have the most lethal military in the world. Can
    you talk about how it doesn't seem like our risks are going
    down? China is continuing to be belligerent. They are trying--
    they are building a big navy. Russia is not getting better.
        You know, there is no place in the world that seems like it
    is getting safer right now. So the President's Budget has us
    shrinking our naval battle force from 298 ships today to 280 in
    fiscal year 2027.
        So talk about how you are going to--how you are going to
    deal with the reduced capacity, how--you know, what plans do
    you have to be able to continue to provide the same support
    around the world where it might be needed?
        Mr. Del Toro. Good morning, Senator. It is an incredibly
    important question. Yes, capacity does dip down in the next 5
    years, but then it steadies out again 5 years later according
    to the shipbuilding plan. But what is more important is that
    although the size of the Navy may dip, the capabilities of the
    Navy are actually going to be greater than they ever have been
    before.
        We are actually bringing online just over the next set of
    50 battle force ships and supply ships that are going to be far
    more capable of deterring our aggressors, China, Russia,
    anywhere else that we face aggressors around the globe than we
    have been able to in the past with the type of R&D investments
    in modernization that is critical to deter them in every way.
        Senator Scott. Admiral Gilday.
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, we have underinvested in the United
    States Navy for two decades, for a good reason, based on our
    priorities in Afghanistan and Iraq. As you know, getting the
    industrial base, putting that rudder over and generating new
    capability at speed, that is a challenge, particularly when you
    think about the complexity of the warships, the best warships
    in the world that we put to sea manned by the best sailors in
    the world, and so it is going to take time.
        I would draw a parallel to the Commandant's challenge with
    Force Design 2030, when new capabilities always lag the
    divestment. But based on the top line that we have, and based
    on the threat that we face, particularly with respect to China,
    we have to make sure that based on the budget we have, we are
    fielding the most lethal, capable, ready force that we can.
        You mentioned in your comments upfront that lethality
    matters, so I think we are 100 percent aligned with respect to
    that. We are trying to make sure that both the Navy that we
    have today, the Navy we have in the future, has the best
    capabilities, but also is the best trained force that we can
    put on those ships.
        Senator Scott. Can you explain what happened with the
    Littoral Combat Ships that we just commissioned a couple of
    years ago, now we are talking about--I mean, what happened? Did
    we just--did our needs change or did we pick the wrong ship
    before? I mean, it is a pretty big investment to get rid of.
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. So the Navy's enduring missions
    are sea control and power projection. We should never, ever
    lose sight of the capabilities that we are going to invest in,
    contribute to those two missions. I would offer that LCS was an
    idea 20 or 25 years ago that just did not consider those two
    missions with respect to those two enduring missions, with
    respect to a high end peer competitor like we face right now
    with China.
        With respect to the nine ships we have right now on the
    table in this budget proposal to retire, that is primarily
    driven by the fact that the systems that we were going to put
    on that ship just did not pan out in terms of technical
    capability against the threat that we are facing.
        My best advice would be not to put another dollar against
    those systems, but to reinvest that in systems that really make
    a difference in the future and in weapons that we need today in
    the fleet.
        Senator Scott. Okay. Thank you. General Berger, as you
    revamp what the Marine Corps is doing, can you talk about how
    you are going to have to change your working relationship with
    the other branches of Government to be able to fulfill your
    mission?
        General Berger. I don't know that it is a fundamental
    shift, or are you talking about outside the Department of
    Defense, Senator? Is that what you mean or----?
        Senator Scott. No, the other branches of the military.
        General Berger. Oh, the other branches. Here, I think no
    fundamental change, no, but I think a more realistic view of
    where overlaps are between the services that are healthy and
    where they are redundant and excessive. In certain areas, for
    the Joint Force to do what it needs to do, overlap is healthy--
    overlap is a good thing. But where it gets to be excessive,
    inefficient, okay, there we have to be able--we have to make
    the hard decisions. That is part of what is driving Force
    Design.
        Senator Scott. All right. Thank you. Thank each of you for
    what you are doing.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator Wicker,
    please.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I understand there
    has been a lot of discussion about LPDs. Let me just see if we
    can summarize. General Berger, your requirement for traditional
    amphibious ships is 31, is that right?
        General Berger. That is correct, sir.
        Senator Wicker. Admiral Gilday, you agree with that, is
    that correct?
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. Our joint analysis supports that.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. Now, there is a study that the CNO,
    Admiral Gilday, has told us today confirms that 31 is the
    requirement. So, Mr. Secretary, that is a fact, is it not?
        Mr. Del Toro. The study has concluded. The findings of the
    studies are now being reported out and being discussed in the
    Department of Defense, as well as by myself, as well as in the
    Department of Navy. The findings of that study now has to be
    balanced by the force structure assessment that is being
    conducted for POM 2024 that is aligned to the National Defense
    Strategy. So there is some additional work that needs to be
    done before the final determination is made.
        Senator Wicker. Mr. Secretary, do Admiral Gilday and
    General Berger know what they are talking about?
        Mr. Del Toro. Yes, sir, they do.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. So have they made a misstatement
    today?
        Mr. Del Toro. No, sir, they have not made a misstatement
    today.
        Senator Wicker. Okay, and we were told we would have this
    study before today's hearing. Assistant Secretary Stefany said
    that. So why do we not have the study yet?
        Mr. Del Toro. I don't know why the Assistant Secretary told
    you that, sir. He may have misspoken, but certainly he did not
    consult with me in releasing that study because it hasn't been
    reviewed yet by senior leaders of the Department of Defense.
        Senator Wicker. When do you think we will have that study,
    when all of these extra steps you mentioned are done?
        Mr. Del Toro. It should be, if required, it should be
    released in the next several weeks, sir.
        Senator Wicker. Let me just say also, during the chairman's
    opening statement, he talked about the 355 ship Navy, and that
    is I think he may have mentioned it as a goal. You are aware,
    Mr. Secretary, that that is in the statute, the law of the land
    passed by both houses of Congress and signed into law by the
    President of the United States. Are you aware of that?
        Mr. Del Toro. Yes, sir, I am. Okay.
        Senator Wicker. Are you guided at all by the fact that the
    statute actually says 355 ships?
        Mr. Del Toro. Yes, sir, I am guided by that. If you
    actually look at the, one of the alternatives in our
    shipbuilding plan, it actually meets the requirements of that
    statute.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. General Berger, would you elaborate
    on the update to Force Design 2030. What does it mean in
    layman's terms about the hider-finder emphasis and its ability
    to support lethality and our ability to win future fights?
        General Berger. Hider-finder, reconnaissance-
    counterreconnaissance, goes by different names, but it is the
    same idea, Senator, in that if you have the lethal means to
    engage your target, hold them at risk, there is a presumption
    there you can find them. There is also a presumption that you
    can find them first and get the first round down range.
        So more and more as from satellites down to terrestrial,
    down to subterranean sensors are allowing not just great powers
    but a lot of powers to see what is going on around them. So
    winning that--when I say, when we say winning the hider-finder
    competition, it means the ability to detect, track, and conceal
    your own location or stay within a displacement cycle that
    moves you more rapidly than they can target you.
        Winning that stays in front of the adversary. Losing that
    means they can engage you, means you are held at risk. So it
    doesn't decrease the importance of lethality. Absolutely, it is
    important as it always has been.
        But more and more and more important is the realization
    that we have to have the means to detect, to track, to hold at
    risk the adversary and do it first.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I
    don't--in six seconds, I don't have time to ask about the
    failure of the USS Sioux City and the reason for the class-wide
    failure of the ship's engineering plant. So I will see if I can
    take a second round or ask that on the record, and I yield.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker. Let me
    recognize Senator Tillis, please.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
    you for being here. Admiral Gilday, I enjoyed the time that
    Senator Gillibrand and I spent with you and Admiral Joyner.
    Thank you for giving us that time.
        I want to talk a little bit about Finland and Sweden for a
    moment, because we have a number of members I think that need
    to increase their level of understanding as we move into what
    will likely be an invitation from NATO, to join NATO after they
    express their desire to do so in the coming days or weeks. Just
    for our edification purposes, Finland is a Nation of 5 million
    people.
        Right now they have 62 F-18s. They have 64 F-35s on order.
    They are already spending 2 percent as a percentage of Gross
    Domestic Product (GDP) on military, and they have announced
    putting out another $2.2 billion. In Sweden, they have 80
    Gripen fourth generation, somewhere between an F-16, F-18
    capability. They are spending 1.3 as a percentage of GDP today,
    and they have expressed a commitment to getting to 2 percent by
    2028.
        We know that they embrace Western norms. They have the rule
    of law. They check all the boxes with respect to what would be
    a welcomed member of NATO. Number one, would you refute any of
    that? Number two, can you tell me a little bit about your
    relationships with your counterparts in both Sweden and Finland
    and your observations on their participation in various joint
    exercises that we have had?
        We will start with Admiral Gilday, and then, Mr. Secretary,
    you are more than welcome to opine, but I am really interested
    in the mil-to-mil relationships first and how you would assess
    their capabilities. I, for one, think they would be a net
    exporter of security if they were able to achieve accession
    into NATO. I would like to get your view on that for the
    record.
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. I have a relationship with both
    heads of the navy. In terms of the Swedish CNO, she was just at
    my home last month for dinner, and so we have ongoing dialog
    with her. Both of those militaries, as you stated, are very
    capable. We like their geography as well. They are in a key
    position.
        I would also just reiterate what the Committee already
    knows and that is they both enjoy a special partnership as a
    near ally status, and so we exercise and work very, very
    closely with those militaries.
        I would characterize our ability to work together with them
    in exercises as highly interoperable, and so I see this
    transition into NATO, if it happens, as virtually seamless from
    a military perspective.
        Senator Tillis. General Berger.
        General Berger. Sir, I would, probably like the CNO and
    some others, I have trained with both countries and also from
    Kosovo to Middle East, fought with them in combat, served with
    them in units. They are phenomenal, both countries. Both are
    very focused, very dedicated, disciplined, and well-trained,
    well-led.
        Second part, I would say Finland, because of the long
    border that they have with Russia and the decades since World
    War II, have a unique insight into Russia, very valuable for
    us, just because of the length of the shared border and I would
    just call it a unique relationship that is very valuable.
        Norway just has a little short border with them, but
    Finland a long one. Third, I would say the unique relationship
    between Norway and Finland and Sweden will be hugely valuable
    to us, because Norway being a founding member of NATO, and us
    working with them for 70 years, their relationship with Finland
    and Sweden will be a tremendous benefit to the U.S. and to the
    mil to mil relationship.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you. Mr. Secretary.
        Mr. Del Toro. The only thing I will add, Senator, is I
    think there is tremendous opportunities for collaboration among
    all four of those nations that were mentioned in the high North
    and in the Baltic.
        Senator Tillis. Okay. I am going to submit a lot of
    questions for the record about Fleet Readiness Center (FRC)
    East and resource requirements, things like that. Admiral
    Gilday, I appreciate your comment when we had breakfast about
    getting back down there again, and Commandant, I appreciate
    your focus on that area.
        The last thing I want to focus on is whether or not you all
    believe that Admiral Mullen's concerns about our national debt
    back in 2011, when it was just approaching $12 trillion, is
    every bit as much a threat to us today in terms of national
    security now that we are approaching $30 trillion?
        Now, he didn't state, if you read all that he spoke on and
    wrote there, it wasn't because of a dollar value, it was
    because of how disruptive that becomes with the ebbs and flows
    of investment for defense, for modernization.
        Am I correct in assuming that at least some of what is
    driving you all to rethink how we counter the threat in an
    effective way in the future is driven by the ebbs and flows and
    the lack of certainty that you get from Congress with respect
    to short and long term investments?
        Mr. Secretary, I will start with you, and then I will have
    either of the two opine as well. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. Del Toro. Senator, I am always concerned about the
    Nation's deficit and the Nation's national debt as well, and
    the impact it has on the economy. Those are challenging
    economic issues that have to be well balanced among all the
    other concerns that the Nation faces. Certainly our Nation has
    faced great challenges since 2001, economic, militarily, and
    with regards to COVID as well.
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir, quickly. I would say that a key
    piece of that is lack of predictability and stability, and so
    not just inside the military and not just for the U.S.
    industrial base, but also what we project to our allies and
    partners and potential adversaries.
        General Berger. The CNO captured it. I think things like a
    continuing resolution hurt both internally and externally, just
    the way that Admiral Gilday highlighted. So working closely
    with this Committee to make sure we do get a budget on time in
    October, absolutely instills the confidence that we need.
        Senator Tillis. Mr. Chair, I know I have run over, and I
    try not to most of the time. I just want to say that when we,
    excuse me, we have discussions about our disappointment with
    progress on certain systems, progress on implementing certain
    strategies, that from time to time we have to look at ourselves
    and recognize that decisions we make here are a part of the
    root cause for some of the challenges that you have to deal
    with.
        Not that they are error free, but I think this is a joint--
    we are jointly responsible for doing a better job and helping
    you all be more successful. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tillis. Senator
    Blumenthal, please.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you all for your leadership and your service. Commandant,
    you know, I was very interested in one of your responses to an
    earlier question about the enduring lessons of war and the new
    lessons, the technology changes, but some of the enduring facts
    about military strength remain. One of them has always seemed
    to me, and it is a strength of the Marine Corps, our
    noncommissioned officer (NCO) leadership.
        If what we hear and see is true about the Russian military
    right now, one of their central weaknesses has been lack of
    leadership on the ground among the equivalent of our
    noncommissioned senior leadership--not so senior, probably. For
    us, it is men and women in their 20s and early 30s who command
    units and are able to drive them in times of danger and need.
        I think that is one of the enduring facts about the Marine
    Corps that is a source of its strength for the Nation. I am
    assuming that you are focused on developing that kind of
    leadership wherever it may be, regardless of geography, race,
    religion, and gender.
        General Berger. Two thoughts to offer back to you, Senator,
    absolutely yes. I am so grateful that my predecessors, like
    General Gray and others, put the emphasis and the resources on
    the training and the education of the noncommissioned officers,
    because without that--they didn't have the tools. He and others
    focused on that 25, 30 years ago, where we are reaping the
    benefits of that now.
        The second part of that, I would say the NCO Corps itself
    is the officers have to have confidence in them and delegate to
    them without micromanaging, trust that they are going to lead,
    trust that they are going to make decisions on their own, and
    that is the way that the Marine Corps operates. That is, as you
    have captured it, that is the strength of what we do, is the
    NCO Corps.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Admiral Gilday, I know you
    made reference to earlier in response, I think, to Senator
    Rounds, the value of having a private shipyard do submarine
    maintenance work.
        I think that Electric Boat has been a source of great
    strength in terms of maintenance. The Navy has not yet awarded
    the contract for work on the Hartford, and I hope that it will
    do so fairly promptly. I understand it may be in June. Am I
    correct in that understanding?
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, I will get back to you in the exact
    timeline. But yes, I would just like to double down on my
    comments on how important both Electric Boat and Huntington
    Ingalls are from a repair--not only from a production
    standpoint, but from a repair standpoint. They are absolutely
    critical.

        Admiral Gilday. The Navy expects to award the USS Hartford
    (SSN-768) Engineered Overhaul (EOH) contract to Electric Boat
    in July 2022. The Navy and Electric Boat teams are in the final
    stages of negotiations, nearing settlement. Electric Boat is
    required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to provide
    Certified Cost or Pricing data before Contract Award, which
    typically takes several weeks for similarly complex
    negotiations. The Navy is committed to awarding the USS
    Hartford EOH quickly upon receipt of Electric Boat's
    certification.

        Senator Blumenthal. I also want to focus on a somewhat
    arcane, but I think important, question about the unusually
    hazardous risk indemnity. This issue is complex, but again, for
    contractors, it is a very important one. I have recently voiced
    my concerns over a change in the unusually hazardous risk
    indemnity policy in an exchange with Assistant Secretary
    Stefany, last week, as a matter of fact.
        I am not going to have time and I know we are at the end of
    a lengthy hearing, but I would be interested in comments that
    you may have in writing. The Navy risks losing its private
    partners and thus its ability to build major weapons systems
    and technologies for future conflict if it fails to take
    account of the risks that they undertake by reversing a decades
    old indemnification policy to no longer cover those kinds of
    risks involving conventional weapons that rely on high energy
    propellants.
        It may seem like a technical issue, but it is one of great
    concern to the companies that manufacture these weapons, and I
    would appreciate you looking into it.
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator
    Hawley, please.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks, all of
    you, for being here. Thank you for your service. General
    Berger, I just want to start by saying that I was particularly
    pleased to see in Force Design 2030 annual update your
    continued focus on China as the Nation's pacing threat, on the
    Taiwan scenario, and your continued use of those scenarios and
    that threat to benchmark the, what the Marine Corps efforts
    are, and your strategic design.
        I think it is a bold vision which you have been doing, much
    overdue. I just want to say, I think you have done it in a very
    rigorous and thoughtful way. So I think it is a model. Keep up
    the good work.
        Mr. Secretary, if I could come to you, you said in response
    to a question a minute ago that one of the shipbuilding
    profiles, this is on a shipbuilding plan, one of the profiles
    of three of them, one of them supports the statutory
    requirement of a 335 ship Navy. Is that profile three, I
    assume?
        Mr. Del Toro. Yes, sir.
        Senator Hawley. Okay. On the same plan, Admiral, Navy
    officials told me earlier this week and last week that profiles
    one and two of the shipbuilding plan do not meet the Navy's
    operational requirements for the pacing scenario in INDOPACOM
    with regard to Taiwan. Can you confirm that profile three would
    meet the Navy's operational requirements?
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, three does a better job. The
    constraint--constraint is still faced in three is the ability
    of the industrial base to produce those for, the production
    line to actually produce those ships at pace to meet our
    requirements. So the warfighting requirements in the Navy and
    Marine Corps are what--they are best reflected in alternative
    three.
        Senator Hawley. So are you telling me, Admiral, we would
    get there in three, but we might, it might still be a push,
    even under three. Am I hearing you right?
        Admiral Gilday. We would get there with three, but that
    would require real growth in the budget.
        Senator Hawley. Let me just ask you how long it would take
    to get to the point under three where the Navy would be able to
    meet its operational requirements?
        Admiral Gilday. So with respect to 355, sir, that would be
    out in the 2040s in order to put us on that path, which I think
    is probably physically reasonable, given, again, the
    constraints of the industrial base.
        Senator Hawley. What about the operational requirements for
    the pacing scenario in INDOPACOM--that is defeating a fait
    accompli against Taiwan.
        Admiral Gilday. So capacity does give you, obviously gives
    you greater capability. Based on the way we are going to fight,
    which we believe is to be distributed, a distributed fleet
    rather than amassing forces, we would mass effects. We want--we
    need more ships of every different type.
        I am not ignoring the need for capacity but given the top
    line that we have and dealing with reality, what we are trying
    to do, Senator, is make sure that the ships that we have and
    that we are building are the most capable and high quality that
    we can field.
        Senator Hawley. I just want to say again, for the record,
    that I think it is disturbing, and this is no reflection on
    you, Admiral, but I think it is disturbing that of the three
    profiles in the shipbuilding plan, only one of them comes
    close, and you were saying even then it will be a push but
    comes close to meeting the operational requirements that the
    Navy has to deal with the pacing challenge and the pacing
    theater.
        I mean, if that is not a wakeup call to this Committee, I
    don't know what is. Let me ask you about the danger of
    simultaneous conflicts, Admiral, in multiple theaters. So what
    would happen if the Navy--well, let me ask it this way. What
    would the impact be on the Navy's ability to meet its
    operational requirements in EUCOM if we had to withhold Navy
    forces from Europe in order to deter Chinese aggression in
    INDOPACOM?
        Admiral Gilday. I think we would be challenged. We would
    have to take a look at how you squeeze the most are the Joint
    Forces have and use it in the best possible way. But I think we
    would be challenged. You know, right now, the force is not
    sized to handle two simultaneous conflicts. It is sized to
    fight one and to keep a second adversary in check. But in terms
    of a two--two all-out conflicts, we are not sized for that.
        Senator Hawley. Can you give us a sense of what kind of
    capabilities that the Navy provides that would be in high
    demand, are in high demand in both EUCOM and PACOM?
        Admiral Gilday. First of all, submarines. I think secondly
    would be carrier air. Third would be amphibious ships, and then
    you need destroyers with multiple weapons in order to protect
    those assets. So across the board, you need more of everything.
        Senator Hawley. Yes. Thinking about the constraints that we
    would face in either theater, but particularly in EUCOM, what
    are some of the capabilities you would say that the Navy is
    currently providing in Europe that maybe our allies in that
    region could be doing more to provide on their own, should we
    need them in PACOM or elsewhere?
        Admiral Gilday. I think submarines are a key capability in
    any fight, and so that would be one message I would give to
    Europe to invest more heavily in those kinds of platforms.
        Senator Hawley. Yes. Thank you. In my few remaining seconds
    here, Mr. Secretary, let me ask you about an interesting
    article I read from former Undersecretary of the Navy, Robert
    Work, who recently said, I want to make sure I get this right,
    he is talking about forward presence, and he said, over time,
    an emphasis on forward presence could lead to a decline in
    warfighting readiness with potentially dire results.
        Do you agree with the Former Secretary that the presence
    operations can trade off with proficiencies that are critical
    to combat?
        Mr. Del Toro. I don't agree with his assessment that we
    need less forward presence. I think we need greater access to
    bases and logistics, bases in particular across the globe,
    wherever we can find them.
        Senator Hawley. Let me just--last question here, Mr.
    Chairman. I will finish with this. Let me ask if you agree with
    this statement. This is Work again. The Navy's warfighting
    materiel readiness should no longer be sacrificed on the altar
    of forward presence and the Navy should no longer confuse that
    with winning a war. Do you think that that is right, wrong,
    oversimplified?
        Mr. Del Toro. I don't think we have sacrificed our wartime
    capabilities in exchange for presence. I think the two go
    together. I think what we need is the right capacity, the right
    capabilities to deliver the right lethality. That also demands
    access to those logistical bases throughout the globe, working
    with our partners and allies.
        Senator Hawley. I am not so sure about that, but we will
    follow up. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley. We have concluded
    the first round. Members have requested a second round. We will
    have a classified session in SVC-217.
        I will recognize Senator King first and then go to the
    other side. I would ask you to keep your questions concise and
    necessary for this open session, because you will have another
    opportunity to talk to these gentlemen in a closed session.
    Senator King, please.
        Senator King. Just several quick points. Number one, I want
    to associate myself with Senator Hirono's comments about the 15
    ship multi-year for destroyers. I know there is some discussion
    about whether the industrial base has the capacity to meet
    that. I think there is a bit of a circular argument.
        My experience, working with Bath Iron Works is you give
    them the signal and they can meet it. If they don't get the
    signal of the longer term multi-year, then it makes it less
    likely that they will meet it.
        So I don't think there should be a constraint. I think
    everyone realizes from this discussion that, number one, multi-
    years are better for the taxpayers, they are better for the
    industrial base, and a longer multi-year sends a strong signal
    to the industrial base that the business will be there. They
    can make the investments and meet that requirement. That is
    number one.
        Number two, on the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, we have been
    talking a lot about readiness, and I want to thank you for the
    investment that the budget makes in completing or at least
    moving forward the capital improvements at the shipyard.
        Already with that new dry dock, Mr. Secretary, as you and I
    saw, the USS Cheyenne is in that dry dock successfully. So the
    next step, of course, is to double the capacity of that dry
    dock. But I want to mention a sort of a side issue, in talking
    to the people of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, they are
    talking about all the investments in the infrastructure, that
    is really important. But they also have investments in the
    people.
        Every worker, every business in America is short of
    workers. They told me that the way to attract additional
    workers to Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is childcare and parking,
    and, you know, you don't really think about parking as a naval
    function. But if we want good people, and they are competing
    for the best in the region, we have got to think about those
    kind of quality of life things, and that we were talking a lot
    today about new requirements of younger workers.
        Those are the two things that have been brought to my
    attention. So I wanted to mention those to you as you think
    about the investment in the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. Finally,
    Mr. Secretary, you have indicated in an excellent report about
    the collaboration and joint development that is going on
    between Huntington Ingalls, Bath Iron Works, and the Navy on
    the new DDG(X).
        I want to commend you for that report, and just, if you
    could just state for the record, why it is important in the
    development of this new platform, because where we have had
    problems in the past is on new platforms. This is a case where
    I think we are moving down a very beneficial path. If you would
    just state for the record your conclusions on that subject.
        Mr. Del Toro. Yes, Senator. Obviously, given the power
    constraints on our current classes of DDG Flight IIs and Flight
    IIIs due to the size of the whole DDG(X), or sort of that next
    transition to new technologies that will take us above and
    beyond, such as the utilization of laser systems, is one
    example. It is important to have that transition. As we stated
    earlier today, is also important to ensure that the
    technologies that are going to go on that platform are mature,
    well understood technologies that work so that we don't make
    the mistakes of the past.
        Finally, I would argue that we also need to ensure that
    DDG(X)'s, the concept of operations for its employment is well
    thought out, so that we could also integrate the autonomous or
    semi-autonomous technologies that we look forward to
    integrating well into the future as well.
        Senator King. In order to do that successfully, working
    with the yards to be sure that what we design and set for
    requirements can be built, I think, is an important part of
    that process. Do you agree?
        Mr. Del Toro. It is, Senator.
        Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Wicker is
    recognized, and I, just for the benefit of everyone, I am going
    to enforce the five minute rule. I don't do it usually.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. Very good, and I think we can do this
    in less than 5 minutes. Secretary Del Toro, just last Friday,
    it was reported that the USS Sioux City would be headed to the
    Arabian Gulf. It has been spending time in the Mediterranean.
    This is a Freedom variant LCS ship. The Navy has announced it
    will decommission a total of 24 battle force ships, including
    the first 10 Freedom variant LCSs.
        The Sioux City is reportedly going to be decommissioned
    only 4\1/2\ years after it was commissioned, and in part due to
    a class-wide failure in the ship's engineering plant. So I want
    to ask this, how many ships have this class wide failure in the
    ship's engineering plant?
        If the failure is that serious, why is it capable of being
    sent to the Arabian Gulf for serious duty? Either it is not
    reliable and not capable, or it is capable enough to send it--
    to be sent into harm's way. Then we will leave time for Admiral
    Gilday to help answer that question also.
        Mr. Del Toro. Yes, sir. It is my understanding that the USS
    Sioux City being of the Freedom variant with the Anti-Sub
    Warfare (ASW) module on it, and that is particularly the reason
    why it is going to be decommissioned. As to the class-wide
    failure, there are operational restrictions that were put on
    the utilization of the ships in general, which keeps them safe
    to operate, but not in their most extreme fashion. Perhaps I
    could ask the CNO to further elaborate on that.
        Admiral Gilday. Secretary is right, sir. We have operating
    limitations on those ships based on a known problem in the
    engineering plant that needs to be replaced. Over time, you
    know, we are replacing the combining--it is called the
    combining gear. It gives you more flexibility with your
    engineering plant configuration and allows you--it allows you
    to operate at high speeds.
        To your point, we believe the risk is--we can mitigate the
    risk using that vessel forward, given the operating constraints
    that we have identified and the guidance that we have given to
    the commanding officers. So we have trained that ship for
    combat and sending her forward to be able to provide the
    capability needed by the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
    Commander.
        Senator Wicker. Is the failure in, Admiral, is the failure
    in the engineering plant the same in all of these ships--in all
    of this class?
        Admiral Gilday. No, sir. Just in the Freedom--just in the
    Freedom variant.
        Senator Wicker. How many of those are there?
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, there are about between 15 and 20.
        Senator Wicker. So the failure is the same in those 15 or
    20?
        Admiral Gilday. The fix needs to occur in those 15 or 20.
    But one of the proposals is to decommission nine, right, and so
    as the Secretary mentioned, it is not just the combining gear,
    but also we were making an investment in an anti-submarine
    warfare module for that ship that is technically has not met
    its requirements. It is incapable, in other words----
        Senator Wicker. What about the others that are going to
    be--that are going to not be decommissioned?
        Admiral Gilday. So 15 of those will have a mine
    countermeasures module. That particular capability is on track
    to reach Initial Operational Capability (IOC) this year. Those
    15 ships are going to be required to replace our existing
    minesweepers that operate out of both the coast of Japan and
    Bahrain. Additionally, there are six LCS that we would have the
    existing anti-surface module on those ships, and that is a
    proven capability that went IOC 3 years ago.
        Senator Wicker. Mr. Chairman, I yield back 49 seconds.
        Chairman Reed. We appreciate it, and that is the challenge
    for our other colleagues. Senator Sullivan, you are recognized.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Berger,
    you mentioned that the rate of divestiture and the rate of new
    combat capability development pose a risk, and you have got to
    manage that risk.
        One of your assumptions on the overall Force Design was
    flat budgets, that you had to make these difficult choices.
    Unfortunately, I think you are seeing that that is actually
    true. If you actually had a more robust budget, it would help
    mitigate some of the risk in modernization, wouldn't it,
    General?
        General Berger. It would, absolutely. Everything on the
    unfunded priority list for us accelerates modernization.
    Correct.
        Senator Sullivan. So, Mr. Secretary, I was disappointed,
    and I have raised this with Secretary Austin and General
    Milley, we have clearly a more dangerous National Security
    situation around the world, and yet the budget that was being
    put forward by the President for the Department of the Navy,
    that is the Navy and Marine Corps combined, is a 4 percent
    increase from the enacted budget, we bolstered that.
        Again, the President put forward a weak budget last year.
    But with 8 percent inflation, that is actually a 4 percent
    inflation adjusted cut. So do you support a 4 percent inflation
    adjusted cut? The Commandant just showed that this would help
    mitigate the Force Design risks if we had a more robust budget.
        But I am concerned, very concerned, and Congress is likely
    to have to do cleanup like we did last year and significantly
    increase the budget despite the President putting forward a
    weak budget. He has done it again. So how do you support such a
    budget--4 percent inflation adjusted cuts?
        Mr. Del Toro. Senator, I do support the President's budget
    completely. It is actually the first time in quite some time
    where we have actually proposed a budget that is greater than
    the previously enacted budget, and I applaud the President for
    doing that.
        Senator Sullivan. A 4 percent increase with 8.3 percent
    inflation is a 4 percent inflation adjusted cut, correct?
        Mr. Del Toro. So it is today. However, budgets, as you well
    know, Senator, are prepared well in advance of when they are
    executed, and inflation is always a difficult thing to predict
    in the future.
        It is part of the reason why in the President's EABO 2023
    budget, we actually also enacted 4.6 percent increase for our
    sailors and marines across the board, and a 5 percent increase
    in Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH)----
        Senator Sullivan. Again, I appreciate all those, but the
    reality is even those don't keep up with inflation. But let
    me--I am going to try to keep to my five minutes. I want to
    turn to Force Design, but to you, Mr. Secretary and Admiral.
        I was struck by the Navy's documents, strategy documents,
    which my team and I read the tri-service strategy, CNO's
    navigation plan, the surface warfare competitive edge plan, and
    how they don't articulate how the Navy will support the
    survivability and sustainability of Marine Corps Stand In
    Forces and otherwise facilitate the execution of Expeditionary
    Advanced Base Operations (EABO).
        Those are all key parts of the Marine Corps Force Design
    strategy. So here is my question. Actually, when you look at
    the Navy documents, Stand In Forces, forces that I don't even
    think they are mentioned, they are alluded to, but much of
    these documents describe how Stand In Forces will enable the
    fleet to control the seas and reposition to conduct naval
    strikes from a myriad of different directions.
        But there is little, if anything, in these documents about
    support in the reverse. What I mean by that is the fleet
    support to enabling successful EABO or stand in forces. So, Mr.
    Secretary, maybe start with you, Admiral, a fleet commander is
    ready to help execute this part of Force Design and Stand In
    Forces to execute the EABO concept and other things, which
    would put ships at risk.
        If so, how come none of that is articulated in the Navy
    strategies that at least I have been reading thus far?
        Admiral Gilday. I would offer, sir, that you can get an
    inaccurate picture by just judging our commitment to Force
    Design based on the tri-service strategy and the navigation
    plan, and the reason I say that----
        Senator Sullivan. You do see my question though----
        Admiral Gilday. I do. But the reason I say that is because
    most of what has been written publicly about Stand In Forces
    has been produced after the production--after the release of
    both of those documents.
        Now, if you take a look at the concept of operations that
    are cosigned by both fleet commanders and Marine Expeditionary
    Force (MEF) commanders, whether it is in the Western Pacific or
    whether it is in Europe, they both rely heavily on Stand In
    Forces as part of the warfighting concept.
        I would also offer that today the Naval Commander in
    Europe, the Component Commander under General Walters, has
    marine elements, I would characterize them as EABO, EABs in
    terms of what they are doing, in terms of sensing and making
    sense of the environment, in terms of helping understand what
    effects that we can produce in theater. They are right now on
    the ground in places like Estonia, in Iceland, and in Norway.
        So I would offer, sir, that is very much alive at the fleet
    level in terms of how we are integrating with the Marine Corps.
    I will have an update to my navigation plan within the month,
    and I will take special note to make sure that I footnote Stand
    In Forces.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Sullivan--Senator Sullivan. Thank
    you very much. Senator Hawley, do you request recognition?
    Please.
        Senator Hawley. Yes, sir. Briefly. Admiral, just a question
    for you on aircraft carriers. I realize that by statute, by
    law, Navy is required to maintain at least 11 operational
    carriers, but absent that statutory requirement, my question
    is, is it the best use of the Navy's allocation to maintain 11?
        Here is where I am going with this. If you had 8 or even
    10, that would free up a lot of resources to invest in other
    capabilities that might be more effective in deterring China
    and our pacing theater. So do you have a thought on it?
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. Honestly, I think 11 is a
    conservative estimate. Based on the demand signal from
    combatant Commanders now, there is no more survivable airfield
    in the world than an aircraft carrier. In terms of what it
    brings to the fight, in terms of sortie generation, in terms of
    our move now with unmanned refueling that extends the range of
    the air wing by hundreds of miles.
        My unfunded list tries to top off on domestic production of
    weapons with range and speed principally for the air wing. They
    remain, along with our submarine force, the main batteries of
    the United States Navy with respect to offensive weapons. So,
    sir, I remain very bullish on aircraft carriers, and I can't
    think of anybody out there in the Joint Force that is not.
        Senator Hawley. How survivable, though, is the carrier,
    admiral, if it is parked in the Taiwan Strait? I mean, I know
    they are survivable off the coast of Hawaii, but doesn't it
    depend on where they are?
        Admiral Gilday. So based on how we use those carriers, sir,
    we are going to put them in a place where they can be most
    effective. We also are leveraging both space and cyber in terms
    of how we position those units. I will tell you that if you
    take a look at an airfield on an island in the middle of the
    Pacific that was targeted when the lava cooled, you can move an
    aircraft carrier tomorrow, but Reagan National is going to be
    the same place that is today.
        If that were an aircraft carrier, tomorrow it would be West
    of the Mississippi and Missouri, or it could be off in
    Newfoundland, or it could be off of Key West, Florida. So we
    can move them around. That is one of the real value of naval
    forces in general.
        Senator Hawley. Fair enough. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley. Thank you,
    gentlemen. We will recess or adjourn the open session and let
    us attempt to reassemble at SVC-217 at 12:20 p.m. For my
    colleagues, there is a vote pending right now.
        We will vote and then we will attempt to get together again
    at 12:20 p.m. at SVC-217. Again, gentlemen, thank you for your
    testimony. The open hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                               gender integration
        1. Senator Shaheen. General Berger, reports indicate that the
    Marine Corps will need nearly $198 million over the next few years to
    upgrade facilities at its recruit depots for gender integration. Will
    these cost estimate change if you integrate boot camp at the platoon
    level versus company level? If so, what additional changes need to be
    made to integrate at the platoon level and how much more would it cost?
        General Berger. The infrastructure identified for recruit training
    depots are necessary investments in aging facilities that will ensure
    the continued success of recruit training writ large and are not
    specifically tied to gender integration efforts. Per 10 USC 8431, we
    are required to provide physically separate housing and latrine
    facilities for males and females at recruit training; regardless of the
    integration model used, recruits will sleep and conduct hygiene in
    separate squad bays as they currently do. As such, the level of
    integration (platoon vs company) is projected to have no impact on the
    estimated cost for barracks construction.

        2. Senator Shaheen. General Berger, it appears the Marine Corps is
    heading down a path to integrate boot camp at the company level, but
    leave platoons segregated by gender. Why is the Marine Corps continuing
    with plans to integrate women at the company level versus the platoon
    level?
        General Berger. We are committed to executing gender integration in
    a deliberate way and are continuously evaluating the effectiveness of
    our integration model to ensure that we are pursuing a sustainable
    solution without compromising the careers of those who train recruits
    or the top-tier training we provide at the depots. Our entry-level
    training continuum is unique in that we have a multi-phased approach
    which begins with recruit training--transforming civilians into
    marines. After recruit training, all marines undergo follow-on training
    at the School of Infantry and then Military Occupational Specialty
    Schools, all prior to arriving at their first duty station. Training
    events where males and females are integrated at the platoon level and
    below exist at every phase of this training continuum, to include
    recruit training, and become more frequent as marines progress through
    their training and into the Fleet Marine Force.

        3. Senator Shaheen. General Berger, marines historically have been
    comprised of the smallest percentage of women compared to the other
    services. According to the most recent Department of Defense (DOD)
    Annual Demographics report, just 8.9 percent of Active Duty and 4.3
    percent Reserve marines are women. What is the Marine Corps doing to
    improve its ability to recruit and retain women?
        General Berger. This year I published Talent Management 2030, a
    modernization effort, which is focused on reforming our personnel
    system to recruit and retain talent. The Marine Corps' personnel
    management system was designed in an industrial era that predates
    contemporary cultural and technological norms. We recognize that this
    system, which was built to create and maintain a young, enlisted force
    of primarily conscripts, is not adequate for the more diverse and
    highly-trained force that we employ. Talent Management 2030's focus is
    on the mission and the marines we need to complete that mission. These
    systemic changes will improve professional and personal opportunities
    for women.
        Our data shows that we retain women at similar rates to men
    overall, with a few variations at different career decision points.
    While we are still studying the factors that go into marines' decisions
    to stay in or get out of the Marine Corps, we are committed to new
    ideas to keep women in the Corps.
        Some of the example of initiatives under Talent Management 2030
    include expansion of career flexibility options, reducing strains of
    multiple permanent change of station (PCS) moves on the marine and
    their family, and data-informed and decentralized manpower management
    in order to ensure the assignment of the marine support their
    individual goals, the mission needs of the command, and the overall
    needs of the Marine Corps.
        Importantly, we are committed to better supporting marines and
    their families while maintaining our mission readiness. The Military
    Parental Leave Program (MPLP), marine parents with a new child are
    authorized paid leave that includes Maternity Convalescent Leave (MCL),
    either Primary Caregiver Leave (PCL) or Secondary Caregiver Leave
    (SCL), and annual leave. This year, we expanded SCL leave from two to
    three weeks, and we are working with the Department on the recent
    parental leave expansion authorities in the fiscal year 2022 NDAA.
    Currently, primary caregivers are authorized up to 5 months of paid
    leave (6 weeks MCL + 6 weeks PCL + 8 weeks annual leave); MCL may be
    extended as medically necessary. Secondary caregivers are authorized up
    to 2.75 months of paid leave (3 weeks SCL + 8 weeks annual leave)
    following the birth of a child.
        Additionally, we recently updated our policy regarding parenthood
    and pregnancy--notable guidelines include:
        1) Assignment: To the extent possible, pregnant marines must not be
    assigned duties that adversely affect their health
        2) Deployment: The Marine Corps allows, but does not require
    birthparents to defer operational deployments, overseas assignments, or
    any TAD/TDY away from home station for up to 12 months after the birth
    or adoption of a child.
        3) Physical Training flexibility: Effective 8 Feb 2021, a marine is
    exempt from physical fitness and body composition standards until at
    least 12 months after the date of the birth event.
        Recognizing that a marine may want to pursue an unconventional
    opportunity, stabilize their family, or stay in career-broadening
    tours, we recently implemented the statutory authority that permits
    qualifying eligible officers to ``opt out'' of promotion consideration
    without penalty. Approvals of opt out requests are based on the service
    of the requesting officer in a broadening assignment, completion of
    advanced education, completion of an assignment of significant value,
    overall performance history, and the officer's ability to meet career
    progression milestone requirements.
        The Marine Corps has offered new flexibilities in 2022 for officers
    to remove their name from consideration by the Commandant's Education
    Boards (CEB) and the Recruiting Station Commanding Officer (RSCO)
    selection boards. Historically, these boards screened eligible officers
    regardless of their desire to compete, and as a result, if selected,
    officers had to make decisions either to accept a duty that is not
    within their career or family goals or exit the Marine Corps. These
    initiatives now allow officers to have a more active voice in career
    decisions as they relate to professional, personal, and family needs
    and desires.
        Additionally, we have modified the ``pay back'' for the Career
    Intermission Program to make it more attractive for marines. In 2013,
    the Marine Corps implemented the Career Intermission Program (CIP) to
    allow marines to take a temporary break from Active Duty to meet
    personal or professional needs outside the Service. CIP currently
    allows marines to take up to 3 years-off to raise a family or pursue
    other goals with no impact to their career. This year, we reduced the
    payback requirement from, from 2:1 to 1:1, effectively lessening the
    burden on the servicemember.
        Finally, we are also continuing to refine and reduce PCS (Permanent
    Change of Station) tours in order to increase marine and family
    stability and, ultimately, retention. Since 2019, we have steadily
    increased the number of local moves known as permanent change of
    assignment (PCA) where it made sense in lieu of PCS. Last year, we had
    an all-time high of 22,000 PCA orders. The net result today is 40,000
    marines who have been at their duty station for more than 3 years. We
    will continue to seek out way to increase stability for marines and
    their families, balanced with the needs of the Marine Corps.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Angus King
                                china commission
        4. Senator King. I believe we must establish an unbiased and non-
    partisan commission to examine a grand strategy for our approach to
    China, similar in intent to President Eisenhower's Solarium Project. We
    need to think of a holistic approach to create a stable international
    order in which China (or Russia) cannot dictate regional developments.
        Secretary Del Toro, Admiral Gilday, and General Berger, in order to
    avoid the United States trying to ``spend our way out of conflict,''
    what are China's primary areas of influence the United States and
    allies should focus on countering that will provide the most
    significant impact?
        Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. The United States and its
    allies in the Pacific and elsewhere should focus on creating credible,
    lethal combat forces, and developing new partnerships and modes of
    fighting which complicate China's defense planning. The trilateral
    security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United
    States known as AUKUS and Marine Corps Force Design 2030 are examples.
        General Berger. Increase persistent and consistent Joint Force
    presence throughout the Indo-Pacific, this presence will both assure
    allies and partners and deter People's Republic of China (PRC) actions
    by providing security cooperation exercises. Training and exercises
    will increase allies' and partners' capabilities while assuring United
    States resolve to deter significant People's Liberation Army (PLA)
    intervention. Continued forward presence also provides capabilities to
    counter PRC malign gray zone activities and provide the national
    command authority with options in the theater during crisis and
    conflict.

        5. Senator King. Secretary Del Toro, Admiral Gilday, and General
    Berger, what would be the greatest benefit this commission could
    deliver?
        Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. The proposed commission
    might well make important contributions to U.S. strategic thinking on
    China. The activities of the existing ``China Economic and Security
    Review Commission'' should be assessed and coordinated with the mission
    of any new ``China Commission'' created by Congress. Also a new
    Commission should incorporate the very significant amount of China-
    related analysis and strategy development accomplished by the Executive
    branch in recent years.
        General Berger. An unbiased, non-partisan commission could help
    synchronize United States Government efforts across all instruments of
    national power to focus on the current and future threat posed by the
    People's Republic of China (PRC). This commission could recommend
    policies that would support the United States and allied Defense
    Industrial Base, aligning efforts across the U.S. Government to
    accelerate or moderate efforts to shore up U.S. competitive
    capabilities while avoiding triggering inadvertent escalation which
    could result in military actions.

        6. Senator King. Secretary Del Toro, Admiral Gilday, and General
    Berger, what would put us in the best position to avoid the U.S. and
    China from escalating conflict and careening into a war with China?
        Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. Integrated Deterrence will
    best position us to deter escalation of conflict. This approach
    combines our strengths to the greatest effect--working across
    geographic theaters and warfighting domains, employing all elements of
    national power in a mutually reinforcing fashion, and combining our
    strengths with our network of Alliances and partnerships.
        General Berger. In the short term, we must position the Joint Force
    to both assure our allies and partners of our resolve to counter
    People's Republic of China (PRC) activities. Forward presence deters
    People's Liberation Army (PLA) military intervention by forcing the PRC
    to contend with a strong United States response in its attempts to
    leverage its military to achieve its political aims.
        In the long term, we must prevent acquisition of critical
    technologies and build Western/allied supply chain resiliency while
    impeding PRC supply chains for critical supporting materials/
    technologies. Resiliency thus would enable Western/allied nations to
    weather sudden economic sanctions and reduce PRC ability to weather
    sanctions. This further increases the national cost to the point that
    the benefit of military action overwhelmingly outweighs any political
    aims of the CCP.

        7. Senator King. Secretary Del Toro, Admiral Gilday, and General
    Berger, what are the `toughest problems' OUTSIDE of military
    imbalances?
        Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. The tyranny of distance is
    one of the greatest challenges. To address the challenge, the
    Department of Navy will strengthen relationships with Allies and
    partners and explore opportunities to further extend access through
    development of enhanced and new partnerships. Together, partnership and
    access assist in mitigating the tyranny of distance as like-minded
    nations work toward common objectives to deter or, if deterrence fails,
    defeat an adversary.
        General Berger. The current decline of the U.S. industrial base
    along with the illegal transfer of critical scientific research and
    technologies.
                united nations convention on the law of the sea
        8. Senator King. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, do you support
    the ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
    (UNCLOS)?
        Admiral Gilday. I support U.S. accession to UNCLOS. As the world's
    foremost maritime power, U.S. security and broader national interests
    are intrinsically liked to the freedom of navigation. UNCLOS codifies
    the law in a manner beneficial to naval operations, preserving the
    freedoms of navigation and overflight, passage rights, and traditional
    uses of the sea. The United States is currently forced to rely on
    customary international law to contest activities by other countries
    that are inconsistent with the law of the sea. Accession would also
    enhance our ability to counter excessive maritime claims, land
    reclamation, and militarization efforts by China in the South China
    Sea, as well as excessive maritime claims by Russia along sea routes in
    the Arctic.
        General Berger. Yes. The United States has treated the navigation
    and overflight provisions of the Convention as customary international
    law, and acts in a manner consistent with those provisions. Accession
    would increase U.S. credibility and legitimacy when acting to protect
    the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea reflected in the
    Convention. It would give the United States a seat at the table to set
    the course for future law of the sea discussions and counter the
    excessive claims of China and Russia. The law of the sea is
    continuously being interpreted, applied, and developed. By not being a
    party, the United States is not on the inside to protect and advance
    its interests, and risks losing the Convention's benefits the longer it
    remains a non-party.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                           littoral combat ship (lcs)
        9. Senator Warren. Secretary Del Toro, the LCS has been plagued
    with numerous technical and mechanical issues since its inception in
    2001, leading to the Navy's decision to retire nine Freedom-class
    ships. What is the estimated cost of maintaining the Freedom-class
    through its lifecycle if it is not retired?
        Secretary Del Toro. The total buyback cost for all nine Freedom-
    class Littoral Combat Ships is $568 million in fiscal year 2023 and
    over $4.3 billion over the next 5 years. Within our directed budget
    topline, the Navy's Fiscal Year 2023 President's Budget prioritizes
    these resources on investments with higher warfighting value for
    strategic competition.

        10. Senator Warren. Secretary Del Toro, has the Navy estimated the
    cost of the repairs the LCS would need to complete its anti-submarine
    warfare mission?
        Secretary Del Toro. The total cost to repair and upgrade the nine
    Freedom-class Littoral Combat Ships proposed for decommissioning in
    fiscal year 2023 is $568 million in fiscal year 2023 and over $4.3
    billion over the next 5 years. In addition, the cost to reverse the
    anti-submarine warfare (ASW) mission package sundown would be an
    additional $117 million in fiscal year 2023 and $489 million over the
    next 5 years. With the forthcoming introduction of FFG 62 as a capable
    ASW platform, these resources are better prioritized on investments
    with higher warfighting value for strategic competition within our
    directed budget topline.

        11. Senator Warren. Admiral Gilday, you testified before the House
    Armed Services Committee that the Navy ``[hasn't] had the best track
    record of procurement'' and cited the LCS class as an example. What
    lessons does the Navy hope to learn from the failures of the Freedom-
    class?
        Admiral Gilday. I would say the LCS program taught us to approach
    our new programs with an ``evolutionary, vice revolutionary'' mindset
    and deliberate risk reduction. Starting with requirements for FFG-62
    and DDG(X) the Navy has established ``informed'' requirements through a
    collaborative process including Acquisition Professionals, Naval
    Architects, Fleet, Industry and cost estimators. This enables us to
    establish requirements across cost, schedule, and performance that can
    be achieved with confidence. The Navy has initiated a renewed focus on
    utilizing non-developmental technologies and existing proven Program of
    Record combat system elements to reduce execution risk, provide
    required capabilities and leverage existing training and spare parts
    through increasing commonality. A prime example is the new FFG-62
    class, which required use of a proven parent design, non-developmental
    technologies, and will be outfitted proven Navy Program of Record
    combat system elements like AEGIS combat system, SPY-6 variant radar,
    MK-41 VLS as well as common C4I and Electronic Warfare capabilities.
    Additionally, this evolutionary approach will be realized on DDG(X) by
    using the proven DDG Flight III Combat System while evolving the hull
    and power systems. In parallel with design efforts and prior to ship
    activation the engineering plants and hull forms will be tested at
    land-based test sites which also significantly buys down integration
    risk prior to test and activation in new ship construction. Use of
    land-based test sites is being implemented for both FFG and DDG(X).
        We are also reinforcing the Fleet Integration Team (FIT) effort, to
    ensure the necessary support; whether it's training, supply support, or
    tech manuals, is in place for ship delivery so sailors have the tools
    and resources necessary to succeed from the first day new platforms
    enter service. These structures were not fully enacted when LCS entered
    service and it took significant effort to get the resources the fleet
    needed to operate and maintain the ships. FFG-62 is planning to have
    full supply system support in place at time of delivery.

        12. Senator Warren. Secretary Del Toro, you testified before the
    House Armed Services Committee that ``if the Congress approves to
    divest some of these ships, particularly the LCSs, I think those are
    very strategic opportunities to move some of those ships to our allies
    and partners.'' Does the Navy have any plans to recoup any portion of
    the cost of the LCS through the sale of these ships?
        Secretary Del Toro. The Navy plans to place the ships in an
    inactive status.

        13. Senator Warren. Secretary Del Toro, if any of those LCS are
    sold, how much does the Navy estimate it will be able to recoup?
        Secretary Del Toro. The price for sale of a single decommissioned
    ship to a non-grant eligible country would be roughly fifty percent of
    the acquisition cost, depending on material condition and other
    factors.
                 sea-launched cruise missile--nuclear (slcm-n)
        14. Senator Warren. Secretary Del Toro, do you believe that there
    is a significant enough gap in the United States' existing nuclear
    arsenal lacks that warrants further investment into the SLCM-N at the
    expense of investment in conventional Navy capabilities?
        Secretary Del Toro. No, the Department of the Navy eliminated SLCM-
    N research and development funding as part of the President's Budget
    2023. The Department will continue to evaluate nuclear deterrence
    requirements and needs to ensure naval capability investments,
    including conventional requirements, support implementation of National
    Defense Strategy priorities.

        15. Senator Warren. Secretary Del Toro, if the budget stays
    relatively flat, what conventional Navy capabilities will need to be
    reduced in order to support SLCM-N?
        Secretary Del Toro. The Department of the Navy eliminated funding
    for research and development for a SLCM-N in fiscal year 2023, which
    eliminated the need to conduct tradeoff analysis to support SLCM-N.

        16. Senator Warren. Secretary Del Toro, what analysis has the Navy
    done on how its broader conventional goals may be impacted by
    investment in the SLCM-N?
        Secretary Del Toro. An impact analysis of SLCM-N investments was
    not conducted by the Department of the Navy, as funding for SLCM-N was
    eliminated during the Analysis of Alternatives phase and prior to
    developing the Concept of Operations.

        17. Senator Warren. Secretary Del Toro, do you believe that the
    SLCM-N will serve as a deterrent to either Russia, China, or other
    potential adversary that would prevent aggression against U.S. allies
    or the expansion of their own nuclear arsenals?
        Secretary Del Toro. No, funding for SLCM-N was eliminated in fiscal
    year 2023. Nuclear capabilities are a critical component of integrated
    deterrence and the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad is essential to
    complicating adversary decision calculus and diminishing any perceived
    benefits of aggression.

        18. Senator Warren. Secretary Del Toro, the Navy has a goal of
    expanding its fleet to 355 ships by 2043. Does the Navy believe this
    goal is achievable on this timeframe if it is simultaneously developing
    a missile that you and other senior DOD officials have suggested is
    redundant?
        Secretary Del Toro. Based on the Navy's analysis in Alternative 3
    of the fiscal year 2023 Shipbuilding Plan, expanding to 355 ships by
    2043 is achievable with significant additional resources to procure,
    operate, and sustain this increased fleet size. Under any topline, the
    Navy carefully balances readiness, capability, and capacity. The
    resources required to grow capacity would be in addition to the
    resources needed to support readiness and modernization requirements to
    defend and advance national policy in accordance with the national
    defense strategy.

        19. Senator Warren. Secretary Del Toro, if the Virginia-class
    submarines were outfitted with SLCM-N what impact would that have on
    their basing?
        Secretary Del Toro. Research and development funding for SLCM-N was
    eliminated in fiscal year 2023; therefore, the impact of outfitting
    Virginia-class submarines with SLCM-N was not assessed.

        20. Senator Warren. Secretary Del Toro, would they still be
    stationed in Groton and Norfolk?
        Secretary Del Toro. Research and development funding for SLCM-N was
    eliminated in fiscal year 2023 prior to the development of a concept of
    operations; therefore, stationing considerations were not reviewed.

        21. Senator Warren. Secretary Del Toro, if so, would new
    arrangements need to be made to account for a nuclear payload?
        Secretary Del Toro. Research and development funding for SLCM-N was
    eliminated in fiscal year 2023 prior to the development of a concept of
    operations; therefore, the Department of the Navy did not review the
    need for potential new arrangements.

        22. Senator Warren. Secretary Del Toro, has the Navy done any
    analysis of how outfitting the Virginia-class may impact basing in
    allied ports abroad given several countries have banned port calls from
    ships carrying nuclear weapons?
        Secretary Del Toro. Research and development funding for SLCM-N was
    eliminated in fiscal year 2023 prior to the development of a concept of
    operations; therefore, a detailed analysis of where, how often, and
    which ships it would be deployed on had not been conducted. It is
    longstanding U.S. policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence or
    absence of nuclear weapons aboard warships or on aircraft; the five
    Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) around the globe contribute to the
    Department's strategic calculus when determining global force posture.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Roger Wicker
                              littoral combat ship
        23. Senator Wicker. Secretary Del Toro, Admiral Gilday, the LCS
    mine countermeasure (MCM) warfare package should reach initial
    operational capability this year. The four existing MCM vessels
    stationed in Bahrain are scheduled to be decommissioned in 2025, and
    the four MCM vessels in Sasebo are scheduled to be decommissioned in
    2027. Will the LCS will be ready to replace existing MCM vessels, or
    will there be a capability gap in 5th Fleet or 7th Fleet?
        Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. No, there will not be an
    Mine Countermeasure (MCM) capability gap in 5th Fleet or 7th Fleet. The
    Littoral Combat Ship MCM Mission Package will have four mission
    packages ready to deploy to 5th Fleet by the end of 2024 and an
    additional four MCM MP ready to deploy to 7th Fleet by the end of 2027.
    This schedule will allow the MCM-1 Avenger-class vessels in both 5th
    and 7th Fleet to be decommissioned as scheduled in 2025 and 2027,
    respectively.

        24. Senator Wicker. Secretary Del Toro, Admiral Gilday, what has
    the Navy done to ensure that Bahrain and Sasebo have the necessary
    support infrastructure to facilitate the arrival and presence of LCS?
        Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. Sasebo and Bahrain are both
    supportable ports for LCS.

        1.  Sasebo: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) has been using Sasebo for 7
    years.
            a.  First LCS port visit: USS Forth Worth-2015
            b.  Last LCS port visit: USS Charleston-May 2022
            c.  No additional facilities are required to support LCS
    missions out of Sasebo.

        2.  Bahrain
            a.  At NSA Bahrain, Navy has constructed a multi-story
    maintenance/administration building. The facility provides
    administrative, industrial and management support spaces, marine
    maintenance and shop areas, operational storage including limited
    hazmat storage, and a LCS Mission Module Readiness Center (MMRC) and
    single story high-bay warehouse/operational storage facility
    foundation. The MMRC provides dedicated storage and pre-staging for
    double-stacked twenty-foot equivalent units, Operations/Installation
    maintenance and Mission Package support. A separate exterior covered
    and uncovered staging and lay down areas includes converters for
    special power, 28 VDC, 400 Hertz electrical power as well as 60 Hertz
    power (shore power in Bahrain is 50 Hertz) as well as a passenger/
    freight elevator and high bay bridge crane.
            b.  Pier, wharves, and utilities support LCS and other various
    class ships whether transitory or homeported.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
                                     slcm-n
        25. Senator Cotton. Admiral Gilday, is it your best military advice
    to continue developing the Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missile?
        Admiral Gilday. The long lead time for modern weapon system
    development requires us to anticipate and invest for a degree of
    uncertainty in the future. Waiting until we need a capability is too
    late to invest and SLCM-N would fill anticipated future deterrence
    gaps. It is worth continued investment for development and technology
    maturation, building a capability we could scale when needed. However,
    to continue that effort, Navy would require topline relief in order to
    also afford today's operational tasking, sustainment, and
    modernization.

        26. Senator Cotton. Admiral Gilday, would you agree that a partial
    investment in a capability such as the Nuclear Sea Launched Cruise
    Missile, which requires long development schedules, makes those
    programs take even longer?
        Admiral Gilday. The long lead time for modern weapon system
    development requires us to anticipate and invest for a degree of
    uncertainty in the future. Waiting until we need a capability is too
    late to invest and SLCM-N would fill anticipated future deterrence
    gaps. It is worth continued investment for development and technology
    maturation, building a capability we could scale when needed. However,
    to continue that effort, Navy would require topline relief in order to
    also afford today's operational tasking, sustainment, and
    modernization.
                              divestment of ea-18g
        27. Senator Cotton. Admiral Gilday, on average, how many flight
    hours remain on the EA-18G aircraft you propose to divest?
        Admiral Gilday. The average flight hours remaining on EA-18G
    aircraft in operational squadrons is 4,361 out of the current 7,500
    flight-hour limit.

        28. Senator Cotton. Admiral Gilday, the Navy hosts the only
    dedicated stand-in electronic attack platform in the joint force. How
    would the joint force fill the capability gap if these aircraft were
    divested?
        Admiral Gilday. The Joint Staff is conducting an assessment on
    Joint force Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) capabilities within each
    service to fulfill COCOM identified mission sets in the high-end fight.
    The assessment will identify all available Joint AEA capabilities and
    evaluate risk to force and risk to mission in the absence of
    Expeditionary EA-18Gs. The assessment will help inform the Joint Staff
    on future courses of action for AEA capability and capacity for each
    service.

        29. Senator Cotton. Admiral Gilday, did the Navy investigate
    transferring these aircraft to carrier-based squadrons rather than
    divestiture?
        Admiral Gilday. The divestment of Growler squadrons is proposed to
    occur in fiscal year 2024--there is no action or savings in fiscal year
    2023. Navy continues to assess all of our warfighting requirements
    based on the changing security environment and 2022 National Defense
    Strategy. We are currently re-assessing our requirements for airborne
    electronic attack capability and capacity--this work is ongoing and no
    decision has been made yet. If this divestment is included in the
    fiscal year 2024 President's Budget, then Navy will consider
    transferring the aircraft to carrier-based squadrons rather than
    divestiture.

        30. Senator Cotton. Admiral Gilday, without going into classified
    details, are there current operational plans that might be affected by
    the divestment of these aircraft?
        Admiral Gilday. The Joint Staff and Combatant Commanders are
    conducting an assessment on the impact to operational plans without the
    expeditionary Airborne Electronic Attack capability.
                                 fleet training
        31. Senator Cotton. Admiral Gilday, I'm pleased to see the
    improvements in training with the Fleet Battle Problems reintroduction.
    Could you clarify, are submarines involved in these exercises?
        Admiral Gilday. Our submarines participate in the Fleet Battle
    Problem series of exercises. To support the recent exercise objectives,
    submarines have acted as opposing hostile forces to exercise and test
    our fleets' anti-submarine warfare capabilities, including advanced
    capabilities introduced in the inaugural unmanned battle problem hosted
    by 3rd Fleet in 2021. Previous fleet battle problems exercised our
    submarines' integration with the fleets in a friendly force role,
    executing multi-domain fires.

        32. Senator Cotton. Admiral Gilday, do submariners have
    opportunities to train in large exercises the way naval aviators do at
    exercises such as RED FLAG or TOP GUN's Integrated and Advanced
    Training Phases?
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, submarines have long participated in large
    scale exercises, and those exercises continually adapt to changing
    operational conditions and are increasingly more inclusive of our
    allies as outlined in our National Defense Strategy. These include:

        1.  The DYNAMIC series of exercises that test and train warfighting
    interoperability with NATO.

        2.  The BLACK WIDOW series of exercises that brings together Navy
    aircraft, surface ships, and submarines to rehearse our unique undersea
    warfare capabilities in a high-end warfighting environment.
        Each submarine is also tested in a Combat Readiness Evaluation.
    However, in terms of RED FLAG and TOP GUN, the enduring crown jewel of
    combat training for our boats and crews is the Submarine Command
    Course. No other navy's submarine force can match the scale of the
    operational planning, execution, and logistics required to safely and
    successfully engage in this at-sea crucible training, and we do this
    four times a year. While this course focuses on prospective submarine
    Commanding and Executive Officers, it's notable that three to four
    boats and crews, including ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs),
    support each class, and those boats get to fire an entire torpedo room
    full of exercise weapons in scenarios called ``Mini-Wars'', opposed by
    anti-submarine warfare capable surface action groups, fixed and rotary-
    wing aircraft, and other U.S. nuclear and allied non-nuclear
    submarines. The Mini-Wars occur on 3-dimensional instrumented ranges in
    the Atlantic and Pacific, tracking every participant and weapon from
    space to the seabed, leaving no doubt as to weapons placement and
    effectiveness. Each course also includes specified tactical development
    objectives for the participating warfare communities, so the course
    provides a steady forcing function to improve the state of the practice
    for maritime warfighting.

        33. Senator Cotton. Admiral Gilday, aside from Live, Virtual, and
    Constructive models, what is the Navy's strategy to develop or invest
    in full spectrum maritime training facilities which focus on proving
    the concepts of Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), subsea
    and seabed warfare, special operations forces, and aviation forces
    integrating and operating in the near-shore or in contested littorals?
        Admiral Gilday. Navy continues to recognize the critical role force
    training provides in every environment we operate in, including the
    littorals. Our investments across the PESTONI (Personnel, Equipment,
    Supply, Training, Networks, and Installations) pillars capture fleet
    integrated priorities and evaluate requirements through the Fleet
    Training Wholeness process that best support force generation while
    developing realistic open air and learning center training environments
    so our sailors are prepared to prevail against current and emergent
    threats.
        We continue to modernize our ranges and learning center simulators
    supporting surface, undersea, aviation, and SEAL exercises in Fleet
    concentration areas and open air ranges such as the Pacific Missile
    Range Facility (PMRF), Southern California Tactical Training Range
    Complex (SCTTR), and the Fallon Range Training Complex (FRTC), among
    others. Recent investments include upgrades to Navigation, Engineering,
    and Combat Systems training facilities for surface ships and undersea
    warfare facility trainers as well as recapitalization of the
    instrumented undersea warfare training ranges (Barking Sands Tactical
    Underwater Range (BARSTUR) and Barking Sands Underwater Range Expansion
    (BSURE), Southern California Offshore (SCORE) Deep Water Range, and
    Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center (AUTEC) while continuing
    to developing robust synthetic and LVC capabilities to prevail against
    our strategic competitors.
        Our investments in the Undersea Warfare Training Range (USWTR)
    Program includes $47.98 million dollars in fiscal year 2023 and $448.56
    million across the FYDP to recapitalize the BARSTUR/BSURE deep water
    ranges, SCORE deep water range and install shallow water training
    ranges in vicinity of Tanner Bank and San Clemente Island to provide an
    instrumented undersea training environment. AUTEC recapitalization
    includes $26.7 million dollars in fiscal year 2023 and $44.6 million
    across the FYDP.
        The Navy is pursuing the Fallon Range Training Complex
    Modernization which supports all advanced aviation training and SEAL
    ground mobility training. This modernization effort, submitted as an
    fiscal year 2023 Legislative Proposal, requests additional withdrawal
    of both federal and private land to increase the FRTC foot print by
    approximately 828,000 acres to support the increased standoff distance
    required for new weapons systems and provide a realistic tactical
    training environment. If the legislative proposal is approved, Navy
    requested $48.3 million for MILCON P-445, Fallon Range Training Complex
    Land Acquisition Phase II as a CNO Unfunded Priority List item.
    Additionally, the Navy has invested $332.5 million in the Naval
    Aviation Warfighting Development Center (NAWDC) Integrated Training
    Facility (ITF) at Naval Air Station Fallon. At initial operational
    capability (IOC) in December 2022, the ITF will facilitate fully
    informed, synthetic Carrier Air Wing integrated training for F/A-18E/F,
    EA-18G, E-2D, and Aegis operators.
                      over-classification of capabilities
        34. Senator Cotton. Secretary Del Toro, I've heard horror stories
    of the huge amount of time and effort spent on an outdated security
    architecture regarding Special Access Programs. Specifically, despite
    the existence of an online database of accessed individuals, sailors
    and marines must ask their security managers to email visit
    certificates for temporary duty assignments as if we're still using
    secure fax machines. What are you doing to address the wasted time and
    energy spent on this bureaucracy to allow our sailors and marines to
    focus on warfighting?
        Secretary Del Toro. The Department of the Navy, in coordination
    with our fellow Services and the Department of Defense, continue to
    evaluate ways to remove cumbersome work practices such as what you
    highlighted. Our goal and current practice is to leverage digital tools
    to meet our enduring requirements. These tools support managing access
    to our most classified capabilities in an agile and flexible manner.

        35. Senator Cotton. Secretary Del Toro, the Department of the Navy
    maintains a robust portfolio of Special Access Programs. When is the
    last time a Secretary of the Navy has directed a review of those
    programs to determine if they should remain classified as Special
    Access Required?
        Secretary Del Toro. The Department of the Navy is organized to
    ensure our Fleet is proficient at using our most highly classified
    capabilities. For instance, the Department of the Navy has a single
    accountable official responsible to me for developing, delivering, and
    protecting our Special Access Program capabilities. He does so as a
    member of both the Navy staff and my SECNAV staff to ensure we have the
    proper requirements, resourcing, and security for these capabilities
    from cradle to grave. In executing these authorities, he ensures our
    Fleet has the personnel accesses, the physical spaces, and information
    technology capabilities to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures,
    and then routinely operate and exercise with these capabilities so that
    our sailors and marines can fight and win on demand. I have designated
    my Under Secretary to provide oversight of these capabilities on an
    annual basis to ensure we are protecting only those capabilities which
    merit enhanced security protections and to ensure that our Fleet is
    proficient at using those capabilities we must protect at the enhanced
    security level.
        The Department annually validates the continued need for each
    Special Access Program, considering key risk factors when making these
    evaluations. Upon determination that a security change is warranted, a
    plan is developed to implement the desired outcome. These annual
    reviews are necessary to ensure we are not over-protecting
    technologies, thus artificially constraining employment in the Fleet.
        Additionally, Alternative Compensatory Control Measures (ACCMs) for
    the Department of the Navy follow strict adherence to guidance
    published by Department of Defense Manual for ACCMs.

        36. Senator Cotton. Secretary Del Toro, if the National Defense
    Strategy relies on integrated deterrence, what steps are you taking to
    ensure security barriers such as Special Access Programs or Additional
    Compensatory Control Measures within the Department of the Navy don't
    hinder operational and tactical integration at echelons lower than
    headquarters?
        Secretary Del Toro. The Department of the Navy is organized to
    ensure our Fleet is proficient at using our most highly classified
    capabilities. For instance, the Department of the Navy has a single
    accountable official responsible to me for developing, delivering, and
    protecting our Special Access Program capabilities. He does so as a
    member of both the Navy staff and my SECNAV staff to ensure we have the
    proper requirements, resourcing, and security for these capabilities
    from cradle to grave. In executing these authorities, he ensures our
    Fleet has the personnel accesses, the physical spaces, and information
    technology capabilities to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures,
    and then routinely operate and exercise with these capabilities so that
    our sailors and marines can fight and win on demand. I have designated
    my Under Secretary to provide oversight of these capabilities on an
    annual basis to ensure we are protecting only those capabilities which
    merit enhanced security protections and to ensure that our Fleet is
    proficient at using those capabilities we must protect at the enhanced
    security level.
        The Department annually validates the continued need for each
    Special Access Program, considering key risk factors when making these
    evaluations. Upon determination that a security change is warranted, a
    plan is developed to implement the desired outcome. These annual
    reviews are necessary to ensure we are not over-protecting
    technologies, thus artificially constraining employment in the Fleet.
        Additionally, Alternative Compensatory Control Measures (ACCMs) for
    the Department of the Navy follow strict adherence to guidance
    published by Department of Defense Manual for ACCMs.
    mental health for marines at hamid karzai international airport (hkia)
                                   in august
        37. Senator Cotton. General Berger, I know there are many
    counseling and mental-health resources readily available to support our
    troops, but do you know what support has been specifically provided to
    the members of the Marine Corps involved at the Kabul airport gates
    last August?
        General Berger. Within days of receiving 24th MEU's orders to
    support the retrograde from Hamid Karzai International Airport, the
    Commanding General of II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) engaged with
    the Force Chaplain and the Force Surgeon to form a Religious Ministry
    and Behavioral Health Support Team to surge in support of this mission.
        This team consisted of the Deputy Force Chaplain, two Operational
    Stress Control and Readiness (OSCAR) Providers, a Religious Program
    Specialist, and two Behavioral Health Technicians.
        Upon reaching the retrograde site in Kuwait, this team provided
    Warrior Transition, mental health counseling and behavioral health
    counseling to the retrograding units. This support consisted of stress
    management, grief, anger and alcohol, moral injury, and group
    counseling.
        Providing Warrior Transition and Decompression in a forward setting
    was critical to helping our marines process their grief and begin the
    process of recovery. Individuals were assigned an elevated risk in the
    Command Individual Risk and Resiliency Assessment System (CIRRAS) in an
    effort to continue to keep faith with affected marines and sailors.
        Upon return to their home station, our marines received a follow-up
    round of Warrior Transition (``Warrior Transition II'') consisting of
    one-on-one counseling and appropriate referrals to higher echelons of
    care. We continue to support our marines and their families with
    additional care.

        38. Senator Cotton. General Berger, have you followed up with the
    marines who served at HKIA in August to see how they've been coping
    since their return?
        General Berger. I attended the memorial services for both 2d
    Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment and II Marine Expeditionary Force, where
    the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps and I personally engaged with
    marines returning from Afghanistan. Since then, we have visited the
    marines at 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade in Bahrain and have held
    town halls attended by marines who were deployed in support of this
    operation. I am also in regular contact with the MEF Commanders leading
    these marines and sailors; they keep me apprised of anything concerning
    to them. More important than visits from me, our Service is providing
    these marines the professional resources and support they need to
    grieve, cope, and prepare themselves for continued service.

        39. Senator Cotton. General Berger, will you commit to working with
    me on this issue moving forward?
        General Berger. Absolutely. I am fully committed to health and
    well-being of all marines, particularly those who most need our
    assistance after answering the Nation's call. I've reminded commanders
    and staff that the health and well-being of these marines is a priority
    and to ensure they are getting the assistance they need.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                          fleet readiness center--east
        40. Senator Tillis. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday, the
    Fleet Readiness Center East (FRC-East) aboard Marine Corps Air Station
    provides depot level service and repair to multiple airframes across
    the Department of Defense. Last year, we talked about how FRC-East has
    been relegated to operating out of 1950s-era hangars and buildings that
    lack the necessary infrastructure and space. FRC-East supports 4,000+
    well-paying jobs in eastern North Carolina, not to mention significant
    support to marine aviation. While the Department of the Navy continues
    to invest in modern aircraft, it seems to fail to recognize the need
    for maintenance facilities such as this. Can you provide an update on
    any plans you have to improve FRC-East's infrastructure?
        Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. The Department of the Navy
    has developed a depot infrastructure modernization and optimization
    plan to ensure that the Navy and Marine Corps aviation sustainment
    system meets the needs of the current and future force with the ability
    to surge in the event of a major conflict.
        On April 29, 2022, the Navy submitted a 5-year plan to the
    Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, which outlines
    the near-term infrastructure efforts at the three aviation depots. The
    plan integrates all infrastructure and industrial plant equipment
    investments to improve Navy maintenance capabilities by expanding depot
    capacity and optimizing depot configuration. At Fleet Readiness Center
    East, the Fiscal Year 2023 President's Budget requests MILCON funding
    for an H-53K Gearbox Repair and Test facility ($38.4 million) and had
    funds programmed to construct an F-35 Aircraft Sustainment Center in
    fiscal year 2025 ($217.4 million). In addition to these infrastructure
    projects, ongoing investments began in fiscal year 2021 to address
    aging, inefficient, and unreliable industrial equipment to include
    advanced technology.
        The DON is evaluating additional opportunities to maximize our
    depot capacity, reduce cost of ownership, and foster cooperation with
    private industry in accordance with all applicable laws and DoD
    guidance. This includes potential partnership opportunities with the
    State of North Carolina to support Navy and Marine Corps Aviation both
    now and into the future.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                 rate of divestiture to capability development
        41. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, to execute Force Design 2030
    you have pursued a divest-to-invest strategy, aimed at generating
    savings internally to use for modernization efforts. I commend you for
    this bold and urgent approach to address the threats identified in the
    2018 National Defense Strategy. I am concerned about the rate of
    divestiture compared to the rate new capabilities are being fielded.
    There is much discussion within the Senate, the DOD, and outside
    experts that the 2020s may be the most dangerous period in United
    States-China relations because we have only belatedly begin a military
    modernization process designed to deter and defeat the Peoples Republic
    of China (PRC) in a military conflict. To execute Force Design 2030,
    the Marine Corps has reduced the number and size of its infantry
    battalions, divested of all its tanks, and reduced the number of
    aviation squadrons and cannon artillery batteries. Additionally, just
    last month it was reported that the Light Amphibious Warship--a central
    piece to the concepts of Stand-in Forces (SIF) and Force Design--would
    be furthered delayed until 2025, with the first delivery not expected
    until 2027. I'm concerned that this could create a significant gap in
    capability during a dangerous time-frame related to a Taiwan scenario.
    Could you explain how the rate of divestiture to the rate of new
    capability integration keeps the Marine Corps optimally prepared for
    conflict both now and in 2030?
        General Berger. Through experimentation and consultation with
    stakeholders, including this Committee, we build the necessary force of
    tomorrow while maintaining our capabilities for crisis response and
    combat. The Marine Corps continues to leverage all elements of the
    Marine Air Ground Task Force to mitigate potential imbalances between
    investments and divestments. Recently designating II Marine
    Expeditionary Force as a Service retained CONUS-based immediate
    response force, Task Force 61/2 activities in Europe, and 2d Marine Air
    Wing's shift from exercises in Norway to help counter Russian
    aggression reflect the Service's ongoing initiatives to support the
    Joint Force and remain prepared for conflict. Meanwhile, as a result of
    continuous experimentation and refinement, we adjusted artillery,
    infantry, and aviation structure to optimize meeting our modernization
    objectives while remaining a viable, relevant force today. We will
    continue this iterative process of sourcing combat-credible task-
    organized forces, experimenting, and refinement, constantly mindful of
    the pacing threat and our Service's role to the Nation.
                                 combined arms
        42. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, in public remarks you have
    been adamant that Force Design 2030 will not prevent the Marine Corps'
    from generating combined arms capable formations. Marine Corps
    Doctrinal Publication--1 Warfighting defines combined arms as ``the
    full integration of arms in such a way that to counteract one, the
    enemy must become more vulnerable to the other.'' For the last 80
    years, combined arms in the Marine Corps meant tanks, cannon artillery,
    and aviation. Underpinning Force Design is a new vision of what
    combined arms warfare requires under modern combat conditions. Could
    you describe in detail the difference between how the Marine Corps
    employs combined arms now and how it will do so in 2030?
        General Berger. Combined arms now and in the future encompass
    additional domains such as space, cyber, and information. New
    capabilities in each of these domains must be integrated within our
    combined arms approach. Additionally, we must also use older
    capabilities in new ways that are effective against technologically
    advanced adversaries.
        Force Design 2030 will retain 7 Active component and 6 Reserve
    component cannon artillery batteries and 14 Medium Range Missile (MMSL)
    batteries and 3 Long Range Missile (LMSL) batteries. While initially
    fielded with an anti-ship missile, the MMSL will incorporate the MLRS
    Family of Munitions (MFOM) enabling a wider array of effects.
    Additionally, our Organic Precision Fires (OPF) program will add
    loitering munitions to the force, which when integrated in a combined
    arms plan will significantly increase the lethality of the force as
    shown recently in the Second Nagorno Karabakh war and in ongoing
    operations in Ukraine.
        These new capabilities at echelon enhance the combined arms effects
    (both kinetic and non-kinetic) that units can generate. Combining anti-
    armor (loitering munitions, MAAWS, Javelin and manned aviation) systems
    along with fielding the Amphibious Combat Vehicle provides an ability
    for armor protected maneuver, fires and anti-armor capability.
        Finally, the Marine Corps retains its ability to conduct combined
    arms operations at echelon while enhancing its ability to serve a
    critical role in gaining and maintaining custody of targets and
    subsequently closing ``kill webs'' for the Naval and Joint force. Our
    continuous experimentation in reconnaissance / counter reconnaissance
    continues to inform this capability.

        43. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, throughout time the Marine
    Corps proved itself ``most ready when the Nation was least ready,''
    rapidly accomplishing all assigned missions and prevailing on every
    battlefield to which it was committed. How will the Marine Corps, both
    now and in 2030, be able to maintain a ``force in readiness'' and
    respond to crises outside the Indo-Pacific?
        General Berger. While the Service focuses on the pacing threat in
    the Indo-Pacific, it remains the Nation's premier expeditionary force
    in readiness, capable of global employment at a moment's notice.
    Marines serve currently in multiple crisis response missions outside
    the Indo-Pacific region:

          Our marines deploy aboard Navy Amphibious Ready Group
    (ARG) shipping as part of Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU), offering
    the Geographic Combatant Commanders a ready force which cooperates with
    Allies and Partners, competes with potential adversaries, and stands
    ready to provide humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, or otherwise
    respond to crisis.

          We provide task organized rotational forces to Europe,
    capable of rapidly shifting from competition to crisis response, as
    demonstrated this year when Russia invaded Ukraine and Marine Corps
    forces exercising nearby shifted location and mission to support the
    Geographic Combatant Commander and our allies.

          Task Force 51/5 is an integrated Navy-Marine Corps team
    in U.S. Central Command, capable of crisis response. In fact, 51/5
    provided some of the first boots on the ground during the 2021
    Afghanistan noncombatant evacuation operations.

          Marine Corps Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Teams and
    Marine Security Augmentation Units posture in the United States and
    abroad to reinforce embassies or other United States Government high
    value locations worldwide. We also provide aviation support to crisis
    response forces in East Africa.

        Meanwhile, we work to enhance our crisis response capability by
    recently designating II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) as a Service
    retained CONUS-based immediate response force. This force will include
    a 2 to 3-star Joint Task Force Headquarters, a regimental headquarters
    (led by a Colonel), and an infantry battalion, all capable of deploying
    within 10 days to wherever the Joint Force needs marines to stabilize a
    situation and/or build our national security leaders' situational
    awareness. Also, recent Task Force 61/2 activities in Europe reflect
    the Service's experimentation with formations similar to Task Force 51/
    5, capable of competition and crisis response in other geographic
    regions. These forces will be complimentary to, not in place of
    deployed ARG/MEUs that we and our Navy counterparts will continue to
    deploy at a persistent global presence.
                                     access
        44. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, the concept for Stand-in
    Forces calls for the marine to operate within an adversary's weapon
    engagement zone (WEZ). However, in the event of a conflict with the
    PRC, many of the countries in which Stand-in Forces might be deployed
    will be under immense political, economic, and military pressure from
    the PRC to either expel U.S. forces or deny access to U.S. forces. What
    assumptions about access have you made with SIF concept development?
        General Berger. The Stand-in Forces' (SIF) forward and persistent
    presence establishes posture and enables it to support naval
    campaigning in the contact layer by building upon existing
    relationships with allies and partners. These relationships then inform
    how SIF provide specific support to allies and partners, and where and
    how they can operate from host nation littorals. Achieving the
    necessary level of access will require close coordination through the
    chain of command to the combatant commander, as well as close
    coordination with interagency partners, particularly the State
    Department. Among other activities, SIF use security cooperation,
    security force assistance, and exercise events to deepen relationships
    and to develop the maritime domain awareness picture. Ultimately, SIF
    seek to routinely and consistently operate forward with our allies and
    partners to build and sustain access during competition. If armed
    conflict occurs, SIF extend the battlespace as the forward element of a
    maritime defense-in-depth to limit adversary freedom of action in
    support of naval maneuver and joint force access. Furthermore, having
    an increase in shipbuilding for our amphibious fleet will provide the
    flexibility and resilience under various operational contexts.

        45. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, how would denied or revoked
    access to Indo-Pacific nations within the first- and second-island
    chains impact the Marine Corps' ability to employ SIF or execute EABO?
        General Berger. Any operations conducted without the support of
    allies and partners significantly reduces military options. Operations
    in close alignment with them, from their territories, alongside their
    ships and aircraft, and in cooperative and even integrated formations
    on the ground will enhance deterrence and enable success. Our
    collective security is a product of our alliances and partnerships.
    Stand-In Forces must campaign continuously with our partners to ensure
    we are postured to deter adversaries such as China. Our modernized
    global positioning network consisting of a mix of shore and ship based
    pre-positioning assets provides us with the flexibility and resilience
    to operate under a variety of operational contexts. This is why we
    continue to advocate for an increase in shipbuilding for the U.S. Navy
    including our amphibious fleet.
                     combatant commanders and force design
        46. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, how has combatant commander
    demand signal shaped Force Design 2030?
        General Berger. As our Marine Expeditionary Forces continue to work
    with their Fleet counterparts, the geographic combatant commanders are
    taking notice of the value we bring. For example, our experimentation
    with the Sixth Fleet conducting reconnaissance and counter-
    reconnaissance activities is filling a gap for the EUCOM Commander. The
    same is the case in both Central Command and Indo-Pacific command. The
    more we experiment with the fleet with newly fielded equipment, the
    more we are learning. We continue to evaluate our assumptions and
    theories and are making adjustments as we go. Combatant Commanders want
    capabilities that are useful across a variety of contexts. For example,
    they want marine capabilities to respond to crisis, provide situational
    awareness, and possess combat credible capabilities to support
    deterrence. Our Corps meets those demands.

        47. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, how have combatant commanders
    been integrated into the iterative process of Force Design 2030?
        General Berger. Largely through our operations and experimentation,
    as described above. Each time a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) deploys
    or a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) conducts an experiment or
    exercise, they are in support of a combatant commander. Marines are
    filling the requirements the combatant commanders are registering. For
    example, we directly support the Indo-Pacom commander with exercises
    such as Pacific Sentry and RIMPAC. We do the same for EUCOM during
    exercises such as Cold Response. The objectives for these exercises are
    set by the combatant commanders and refined by the Marine Expeditionary
    Force and Marine Force planners to ensure we provide what they want
    along with testing some of our hypotheses.

        48. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, did the U.S. Combatant
    Commanders concur with the level of risk being introduced into their
    plans, operations, activities, and investments with the implementation
    of Force Design 2030?
        General Berger. With modernization there is an inherent balance of
    near and long-term risk. If we sacrifice long-term risk in favor of the
    present, the risk in the long-term is likely to grow exponentially to
    which we may not recover from. As part of the Title X requirements for
    the Commandant of the Marine Corps, it is the Commandant's legal
    responsibility to man, train, and equip a force capable of meeting
    statutory requirements now and in the future. The Commandant must
    balance Geographic Combatant Commanders and the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff's requirements with available resources and emerging
    technological, cultural, financial, and other trends.

        49. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, in the past, the Marine Corps
    had three infantry regimental headquarters and eight infantry
    battalions located in the Indo-Pacific Command's theater west of
    Hawaii. Under Force Design 2030, these infantry regimental headquarters
    will transition into three Marine Littoral Regimental headquarters. Was
    this significant change approved by the Indo-Pacific Command Commander?
        General Berger. Under Title X, the Commandant of the Marine Corps
    is responsible for manning, training, and equipping the service
    necessary to meet its statutory requirements. This is includes
    modernizing a force to increase its value proposition to the joint
    force. The current plan to transition 3d, 4th, and 12th Marine
    Regiments to 3d, 4th, and 12th Marine Littoral Regiment, we believe,
    does just that. However, as part of our Campaign of Learning, the
    Marine Corps will refine its modernization by, with, and through the
    input of our operating forces to ensure the right support for the joint
    force.
                          amphibious ship requirement
        50. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, Admiral Gilday, and
    General Berger, in a statement to Defense News on April 4th, Deputy
    Commandant of the Marine Corps for Capabilities Development and
    Integration, Lieutenant General Karsten Heckl, stated, ``the Marine
    Corps has a requirement for absolutely no less than 31 amphibious
    warfare ships.'' Could you please elaborate on the operational
    imperative for 31 amphibious warfare ships?
        Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. The operational imperative
    for 31 traditional amphibious ships (LHA/LHD/LPD/LSD) is to provide
    credible deterrence, support campaigning strategies, and offer options
    for the rapid aggregation of forward, scalable, tailored, and ready
    forces to respond to crisis or conflict in support of Combatant
    Commanders operational and Global Force Management (GFM) requirements.
    Additionally, traditional amphibious ships provide crisis response
    outside of conflict through activities such as Humanitarian Assistance/
    Disaster Relief and Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations. Thirty-one
    ships provides global response options at an acceptable level of risk
    while maintaining Navy and Marine Corps force generation cycles for
    maintenance and training.
        In the past 12 years in AFRICOM and CENTCOM, marines from
    amphibious warfare ships evacuated United States embassies in Libya and
    Yemen; reinforced the embassy in Iraq; rescued a downed Air Force pilot
    in Libya; put artillery units ashore to bombard ISIS in Syria; and,
    most recently in August, were the first on the ground to support the
    evacuation efforts out of Afghanistan. With fewer than 31 traditional
    amphibious ships, the Navy will have reduced capacity to respond to
    crises in the future.
        General Berger. In my professional military judgment, the Marine
    Corps has a requirement for no less than 31 amphibious warfare ships.
    As ships are being decommissioned faster than they are procured,
    delivered, and eventually employed, the inventory under the current
    plan will decrease to approximately 25 ships over the next few years.
    With this lower inventory, we will likely still support the Indo-
    Pacific region but will have to accept risk elsewhere in the world. For
    instance, in the past 12 years in AFRICOM and CENTCOM, marines from
    amphibious warfare ships evacuated United States embassies in Libya and
    Yemen; reinforced the embassy in Iraq; rescued a downed Air Force pilot
    in Libya; put artillery units ashore to bombard ISIS in Syria; and most
    recently in August, were the first on the ground to support the
    evacuation efforts out of Afghanistan. The Marine Corps' ability to
    respond to crises like these in AFRICOM, CENTCOM and EUCOM will be at
    risk as amphibious warfare ship numbers decrease to approximately 25
    ships in the next few years and remain at that level for the remainder
    of the decade.

        51. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, in your statement
    submitted to this Committee, you write, ``Amphibious warships like the
    LHA and LPD are vital for the organic mobility and expeditionary
    persistence of our Marine Corps, and remain in high demand . . . ''
    Yet, this budget would cut LPD production after hull number 32 and
    potentially dip the amphibious ship count to around 25 by fiscal year
    2027. If these ships ``remain in high demand'' as you state, why is
    that not reflected in the budget?
        Secretary Del Toro. The Department is very committed to amphibious
    lift. The fiscal year 2023 budget balances capability and capacity
    across warfare areas to deliver a combat capable force in the near-
    term. Warfighting requirements will be updated based on the 2022
    National Defense Strategy, which will inform the fiscal year 2024
    shipbuilding plan. Further, the forthcoming Amphibious Fleet
    Requirement Study will set the requirement for traditional amphibious
    ships (LHA/LHD/LPD/LSD) and inform the Navy's strategic approach to
    amphibious force structure. Resourcing decisions will be reflected in
    future budget submissions.

        52. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, how would having only 25
    amphibious warships degrade our ability to deter and if necessary
    defeat an adversary?
        General Berger. The primary deployed formation of America's crisis
    response force is a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) aboard a Navy
    Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). The ARG consists of 3 amphibious warfare
    ships; 1 LHA/LHD and either 2 LPDs or 1 LSD and 1 LPD. Removing 7
    amphibious warfare ships reduces the battle force inventory by one-
    third, or over two ARGs worth of expeditionary warfare capacity.
        With our current inventory of 32 amphibious warfare ships we can
    produce an annual global presence of 1.7 deployed ARG/MEUs to support
    theater campaign objectives. This includes our 1.0 ARG/MEU deployed
    contribution to the Immediate Response Forces, as well as a .7
    patrolling presence from our Forward Deployed Naval Forces. This
    readiness allows for consistent campaigning activities that do not cede
    key areas of the global commons to the enemy, making it difficult to
    retake that terrain after a conflict has commenced. This same formation
    enables joint force maneuver during the early stages of conflict--a key
    factor in denying the enemy's ability to achieve fait accompli
    objectives as observed in campaign analyses.
        With 25 ships and based on historical readiness rates, the Marine
    Corps will be unable to maintain a reliable, consistent, and enduring
    forward deployed ARG/MEU presence. Gaps between the consecutive ARG/
    MEUs and our forward presence will become pronounced and are likely to
    increase substantially over time due to a proportionally higher demand
    on a smaller set of aging platforms. Moreover, if a Combatant Commander
    requires the capability to conduct an amphibious assault in a formation
    larger than an ARG/MEU, our war planning requirements dictate 15-20
    amphibious warfare ships. The Marine Corps estimates that with an
    inventory of 25 ships, a significant effort by our already weakened
    industrial base would be required to assemble an amphibious task force
    of that size--with risk to responsiveness and capability, and,
    ultimately, risk to mission.
        An inventory of 25 amphibious warfare ships reduces our Nation's
    forward presence that supports campaigning and limits our Nation's
    ability to respond to crisis. Moreover, the limited amphibious warfare
    ship inventory increases the time necessary to assemble assets in
    conflict. Lastly, an inventory of 25 amphibious warfare ships poses a
    significant risk for training and readiness as substantiated by the
    KEARSARGE ARG's inability to deploy inside of 30 days prior to its
    scheduled departure, despite the fact that today's battle force
    inventory includes 32 L-class ships.
                            light amphibious warship
        53. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, Admiral Gilday, and
    General Berger, the Navy announced recently that the Light Amphibious
    Warship would be delayed again, this time until fiscal year 2025. In
    your annual update to Force Design you said the Marine Corps would use
    Expeditionary Transfer Docks (ESBs), Expeditionary Fast Transports (T-
    EPF), Landing Craft Utility (LCUs), and leased ships to bridge the gap
    until the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) begins delivery. In your
    estimate, how close is the Marine Corps to validating the LAW
    requirements for production and delivery?
        Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. The Light Amphibious Warship
    analysis of alternatives (AOA) and final report is complete. Next
    actions include AOA sufficiency analysis by the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, a Joint Staff
    Review, a Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) review, and JROC
    memorandum publication. These actions are scheduled to complete in
    fiscal year 2022. This process, coupled with inputs from industry, will
    inform the writing of the Capabilities Development Document (CDD),
    planned to be approved in fiscal year 2023. Prior to CDD publication,
    concept and preliminary design efforts are proceeding with industry
    partners.
        General Berger. The Landing Ship Medium (LSM), formerly known as
    the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW), analysis of alternatives (AOA) and
    final report is complete. Next actions include AOA sufficiency analysis
    by the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office, a Joint Staff
    Review, a Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) review, and JROC
    memorandum publication. These actions are scheduled to occur between
    now and July 2022. This process, coupled with inputs from industry,
    will inform the writing of the capabilities development document (CDD),
    planned to be approved in early fiscal year 2023. Prior to CDD
    publication, preliminary design is expected to be complete in August
    2022.

        54. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, Admiral Gilday, and
    General Berger, what else remains to be validated to move forward with
    the Light Amphibious Warship?
        Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. The Navy is in the material
    solution analysis phase of the acquisition process for the Light
    Amphibious Warship program. The Navy approved the Analysis of
    Alternatives (AOA) at a Gate 2 on 22 March 2022. The AOA concluded a
    purpose-built ship is best suited for the mission from a cost and
    effectiveness perspective. The AOA is currently undergoing sufficiency
    review at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and
    Program Evaluation, and will then enter Joint Requirements Oversight
    Council staffing.
        The Navy awarded the Concept Study (CS)/Preliminary Design (PD)
    effort to five industry partners in June 2021: Austal, Bollinger,
    Fincantieri, VT Halter, and TAI Engineers. These industry partners
    completed the CS phase in October 2021. The Navy exercised the PD
    options with all five industry partners in January 2022. The program is
    incorporating the AOA results and feedback from the five industry
    preliminary designs into the Capabilities Development Document (CDD) to
    support endorsement by the Navy as part of the Gate 3 Program Review
    targeted for 4th quarter fiscal year 2022.
        The Navy is on track to have an approved CDD to support the
    acquisition timeline to procure the lead ship in fiscal year 2025.
        General Berger. The Landing Ship Medium (LSM), formerly known as
    the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW), analysis of alternatives (AOA)
    final report is complete. Next actions include AOA sufficiency analysis
    by the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office, a Joint Staff
    Review, a Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) review, and JROC
    memorandum publication. These actions are scheduled to occur between
    now and July 2022. This process, coupled with inputs from industry,
    will inform the writing of the capabilities development document (CDD),
    planned to be approved in early fiscal year 2023. Prior to CDD
    publication, preliminary design is expected to be complete in August
    2022.

        55. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, I understand the Marine Corps
    plans to lease two commercial stern-ramp landing vessels starting in
    late summer 2022 to experiment with the LAW concept. Is this a
    preliminary effort to validate the LAW's requirements or is it a
    parallel effort to give Marine Littoral Regiments platforms to
    experiment with while they wait for the LAW to be built?
        General Berger. The Marine Corps, through Military Sealift Command,
    is chartering an existing civilian Offshore Support Vessel, modified
    with a stern beach landing capability, to support service level
    experimentation over the next 5 years. While experimentation is the
    primary purpose, the Marine Corps anticipates these actions will help
    inform and validate Light Amphibious Warship requirements.

        56. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, some DOD
    officials and commentators have questioned the survivability of these
    Light Amphibious Warships given their comparative lack of defensive
    systems. Can you explain why and how these ships are survivable across
    the conflict spectrum?
        Admiral Gilday. The Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) is designed to
    operate in a highly contested environment. The Navy is in the process
    of defining the requirements for the LAW with the approval of the
    Capability Development Document (CDD) expected in the beginning of
    fiscal year 2023. The specific systems that the Navy is considering as
    options to achieve the required level of survivability are classified;
    however, the Navy is working closely with our industry partners to
    ensure the design of the LAW meets all operational requirements.
        General Berger. A comprehensive analysis of alternatives was
    conducted to examine the Landing Ship Medium (LSM), formerly known as
    the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW), survivability. The findings reveal
    that by improving design, employing proper operational methods, and
    applying technological means the LSM can significantly reduce the
    probability of detection and intercept, which in turn drastically
    improves survivability. To operate effectively in key maritime terrain
    littoral maneuver is a primary function to enable success. The
    survivability of the entire Stand-in Force is enhanced when they can be
    delivered to a shoreline, a littoral transition point, at the time and
    place of our choosing and execute the functions outlined in
    expeditionary advanced base operations. The unit's survivability is
    further enhanced when the unit can rapidly displace from key maritime
    terrain and reposition via LSM.
                                 nmesis testing
        57. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, in his opening statement
    before the Seapower Subcommittee last month, Lieutenant General Karsten
    Heckl stated, ``[i]n this budget request, the Navy/Marine Corps
    Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) continues to be the
    Marine Corps' top modernization priority and is the critical lethality
    component to our anti-ship capability.'' Continuing later in his
    statement, he writes, ``the Marine Corps has successfully tested NMESIS
    twice, once in November 2020 and more recently in August 2021.'' What
    did these two operational tests show you that allowed the Marine Corps
    to request $345 million for the program in the fiscal year 2023 budget?
        General Berger. Guided Flight Tests, Characterization Tests, and
    Early User Evaluations for the Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship
    Interdiction System (NMESIS) have been ongoing since 2020 with positive
    results, leading to a planned fiscal year 2022 3rd Quarter Operational
    Assessment that includes Ballistic Flight Tests. Characterization
    Testing has assessed leader/follower operations, cross country
    movements, road movement, and deep water fording. Early User Evaluation
    has reported positive results in execution of three different mobility
    field exercises and two raid missions utilizing KC-130s with simulated
    firing missions and 11th Marines continues to evaluate the system.
    Additionally, testing and certification for transport via helicopter
    (externally), landing craft air cushion, and KC-130 has been completed.
        Based on the NMESIS program's positive trend, the Service has
    request $345.054 million to procure 24 NMESIS systems and 115 Naval
    Strike Missiles. These procurements will build on the initial fiscal
    year 2022 procurement, increasing inventory levels to support
    operational requirements.
                                   logistics
        58. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, in your most recent update to
    Force Design 2030, you write, ``[o]ur capstone Service game
    EXPEDITIONARY WARRIOR 21, informed the Distributed Maritime Logistics
    Operations concept currently in development in partnership with the
    Navy and shaped our logistics experimentation campaign plan.'' Could
    you provide a report on the findings of this capstone service game as
    it relates to contested logistics?
        General Berger. The wargame explored the organization and concept
    of operational logistics in INDOPACOM in order to inform the
    development of concepts required to posture and sustain a naval force-
    in-readiness (in this case the Marine littoral regiment) executing
    expeditionary advanced base operations in a contested environment. The
    game examined aspects of force closure, time critical resupply, and
    continuity of operations in both contact and blunt layers. The
    following findings related specifically to contested logistics.
        The USMC and Navy need to establish a functional concept for
    advanced naval bases (ANB). An ANB is not the same as an expeditionary
    advanced base. It is a temporary base established in or near an
    operational area (but generally outside the enemy weapons engagement
    zone) whose primary mission is to support fleet operations, to include
    expeditionary advanced based operations, during the conduct of a naval
    campaign. The draft Distributed Maritime Logistics Operations (DMLO)
    specifically mentions the development of policy and codification of
    processes for advanced naval base operations. Moving forward the USMC
    will seek opportunities to examine the evolving ANB concept in
    wargames.
        Prepositioning will be critical to successful operations in the
    INDOPACOM area of operations. The draft DMLO discusses the criticality
    of prepositioning and need for wargaming, experimentation and
    exercises. The USMC is evaluating its current concept for
    prepositioning (Maritime Prepositioning in Support of Distributed
    Maritime Operations, June 2020) and exploring other prepositioning
    options. The USMC will seek opportunities to refine these concepts
    through an integrated planning team in September 2022, future logistics
    wargames, analytical studies, and live force experimentation.
        Further analysis is required to integrate installations and
    operational units in the Western Pacific in order to achieve unity of
    command and effort in a contested environment. Our draft Logistics
    Experimentation Campaign Plan supports analyzing advance base concepts
    and operational logistics integration. We executed a follow-on game
    analyzing the Fleet Marine Force Logistics Command in May of 2022 and
    will conduct a game in August of 2022 to assess advance base concepts.
    These games will build on each other and feed into the October 22 Naval
    Services Game, which will have an operational logistics focus.
    Additionally, wargames will leverage ongoing studies, such as the
    Operations Analysis Directorate's Marine Logistics Support Group
    Transformation Study.
        In addition to the relationship with the Navy, USMC relationships
    and activities with other joint and interagency counterparts are key to
    conducting successful logistics operations in a contested environment.
    The draft DMLO discusses the need for greater integration with the Navy
    and other joint and interagency counterparts in contested logistics
    environment. Both the August 2022 logistics game and the Naval Services
    Game in October 2022 are being designed to include joint, interagency,
    alliance and coalition partners to the maximum extent possible.

        59. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, how is the Marine Corps
    experimenting with or testing ways to reduce the logistical demand
    signal from MLRs or other task-organized Marine Corps units deployed
    inside an adversary WEZ?
        General Berger. The Marine Corps has developed a service-level
    Logistics Experimentation Campaign Plan (LECP) for execution during
    fiscal years 2022-2025. The plan is aligned to the objectives and
    learning demands identified during the service's ``campaign of
    learning'' process. The Marine Corps will conduct extended
    experimentation simultaneously across multiple lines of effort. Units
    from the Fleet Marine Force, Marine Forces Reserve and the supporting
    establishment will conduct experiments during exercises and wargames
    sponsored by the Naval Services, Combatant Commands and Joint Staff.
    Experimentation focus on demand reduction and logistical sustainment
    across the phases of conflict in a contested environment. The
    experimentation will also examine the reorganization of support units,
    their command relationships and how best to leverage operational and
    strategic logistics support mechanisms.
        Logistics experimentation will include field user evaluations of
    equipment focused on small power and water production, renewable and
    hybrid systems, batteries/power storage, and improved fuel efficiency
    in a variety of legacy manned and unmanned mobility platforms.
    Experimentation will also include the introduction of new and
    innovative distribution platforms. The Marine Corps will continue
    participation in ongoing DON and OSD energy demand reduction working
    groups and will produce a service energy strategy that to addresses
    both operating force units and activities aboard bases and stations
    located within the weapons engagement zone (WEZ). Experimentation will
    also examine evolving the current pre-positioning program into a Global
    Positioned Network that incorporates afloat and ashore resources with
    theater-specific supplies, equipment and service capabilities.
        Lastly, the Marine Corps will experiment with an enhanced logistics
    IT system that will be employed to support maneuver elements. This
    system will provide the commander a common operational picture showing
    near-real time status of supply and support (service capacities,
    location, and inventories). This system will increase decision-making
    accuracy and the operational reach of logistics information, ultimately
    increasing lethality.

        60. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, General Eric Smith appeared
    on the USNI Proceedings Podcast on May 4, 2022, stating, ``[l]ogistics
    is hard for everybody, and that remains the pacing challenge . . . a
    gallon of gas still weighs almost seven pounds, gallon of water weighs
    8 pounds, you still got to move it. So what's the answer? Don't need it
    . . . forage it.'' Do you believe locally sourcing food, water, and
    fuel is viable in locations where the government and population do not
    support a U.S. presence?
        General Berger. The Marine Corps sustains its marines in accordance
    with Department of Defense (DoD) nutritional guidelines; when overseas,
    this is often accomplished by leveraging host nation contracts that
    have been vetted through Army Public Health Command and are on the DoD-
    approved sources list. Any opportunity to locally source food, water,
    or fuel requires a feasibility assessment that is conducted during a
    logistics preparation of the operating environment or a physical
    network analysis. Local sourcing is one way to increase our sustainment
    web while reducing a unit's footprint in order to provide flexibility
    and redundancy to a commander. An unsupportive government and/or
    population is part of that feasibility analysis, and could reduce some
    of those opportunities to locally source capabilities. Marines are also
    currently taught basic survival concepts during entry-level schools to
    provide appropriate field-craft skills should marines find themselves
    low on resources with uncertain resupply timelines.

        61. Senator Sullivan. General Berger and Admiral Gilday, how are
    the Navy and Marine Corps coordinating and collaborating on unmanned
    systems development to overcome the logistical challenges associated
    with implementing EABO, SIF, and Distributed Maritime Operations?
        General Berger. The Navy and Marine Corps assume that our logistics
    will be contested in future conflicts. Consequently, the development
    and incorporation of unmanned systems and capabilities is part of an
    overall effort to ensure we will be able to provide the Fleet and
    warfighters the required logistical support. The two services continue
    to work together at multiple levels and lines of effort in mutual
    support of fighting as a unified team and a key component of the Joint
    Force.
        Some specific lines of effort where Navy and Marine Corps are
    coordinating and collaborating on unmanned systems development to
    overcome logistical challenges include:

          OPNAV N95 is sponsoring, in coordination with other Navy
    and Marine Corps representatives, a Center for Naval Analysis study to
    determine potential LPD upgrades for Launch/Recovery and tendering of
    unmanned systems.

          T-EPF 13 is being built with a unique Autonomous
    Prototype on board, and the ship will be tested to autonomously
    navigate in open waters. This coordinated USN and USMC effort based on
    the T-EPF intra-theater transport vessel will further our understanding
    of how to apply autonomy not only in this class of logistic support
    ship but potentially to other vessels.

          U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) and U.S. Marine Corps Forces,
    Pacific (MARFORPAC) have jointly submitted Rapid Defense
    Experimentation Reserve (RDER) proposals and a Naval Innovative Science
    and Engineering (NISE) proposal for furthering the use of remotely
    operated logistic surface platforms in support of expeditionary
    advanced bases.

          The Marine Corps has developed a prototype of an unmanned
    landing craft, the Autonomous Littoral Connector (ALC.) Funded by the
    Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, ALC has been tested in Europe as
    part of the NATO Joint Logistics Over-The-Shore exercise (JLOTS.) This
    was the first time an autonomous landing craft was deployed as part of
    a NATO exercise outside the continental United States and included
    autonomously transporting a load from ship to pier.

          In accordance with Force Design 2030, the USMC has funded
    and is executing a robust Unmanned Logistics System-Air (ULS-A) program
    to meet a formal small and medium category airborne battalion-level and
    below tactical supply requirement. The Small Tactical Resupply UAS
    (TRUAS) has completed competition and demonstration and is currently
    engaged in Extended User Evaluations (EUE with a fielding decision
    planned early fiscal year 2023. The Medium ULS-A (MULS-A) will commence
    prototyping in fiscal year 2023 with delivery of initial prototypes
    fiscal year 2024. The initial prototypes will be evaluated by end users
    for follow-on prototyping or fielding. Though the initial TRUAS and
    MULS-A systems focus on ashore operations; future iterations with
    technological maturation, will include ship-to-ship, ship-to-shore, and
    shore-to-ship capabilities.

          Further testing of this capability is scheduled during
    the Office of Naval Research's Navy/Marine Corps SCOUT experiment event
    in SOUTHCOM AOR on USNS BURLINGTON in October 2022.The Chief of Naval
    Air Training (CNATRA) is establishing a dedicated undergraduate
    unmanned Air Vehicle Operator (AVO) training pipeline to serve all Navy
    and Marine Corps AVOs, and the Navy's first class of undergraduate AVOs
    began training in March 2022.

        Admiral Gilday. The Navy and Marine Corps assume that in future
    conflicts our logistics will be contested, and the development and
    incorporation of unmanned systems and capabilities is part of an
    overall effort to ensure we will be able to provide the Fleet and
    warfighters required logistical support. The two services continue to
    work together at multiple levels and lines of effort, all in mutual
    support of fighting as a unified team and a key component of the Joint
    Force.
        The Navy and Marine Corps are working together to develop unmanned
    capabilities in support of logistics in a contested environment to
    include:

          Conducting Navy/Marine Corps Mothership analyses/studies
    to support all UxS domain launch/recover/tender and maintenance
    demands.

          Developed an experimentation plan for concept
    exploration/development between the Stern Landing Vessel and EPF-13
    which has been upgraded for autonomous surface navigation.

          The use of remotely-operated logistic surface platforms
    in support of EABs.

          Autonomous landing craft to autonomously transport loads
    from ship to pier.

          The Unmanned Logistics System-Air (ULS-A) program to
    support Battalion level and below tactical supply requirement.

          Established a dedicated undergraduate unmanned Air
    Vehicle Operator (AVO) training pipeline to serve all Navy and Marine
    Corps AVOs.

        62. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, when discussing the
    modernization of the Marine Corps logistics portfolio in your statement
    submitted to the Committee, your write, ``[t]he most visible platforms
    will be a family of uncrewed logistics air systems, the smallest of
    which are already in prototyping and live experimentation.'' Has the
    use of unmanned systems, whether aerial, surface, or subsurface, show
    enough promise to become a significant provider of joint force
    logistics?
        General Berger. The Marine Corps is currently assessing the future
    role of unmanned systems in providing logistics support. For example,
    the Marine Corps has funded and is executing a robust Unmanned
    Logistics System-Air (ULS-A) program to meet a formal small and medium
    category airborne battalion-level and below tactical supply
    requirement. The Small Tactical Resupply UAS (TRUAS) has completed
    competition and demonstration and is currently engaging in Fleet field
    assessments and maturing down selected prototypes via an Other
    Transaction Authority contracting strategy. Further testing of this
    capability is scheduled during the Office of Naval Research's Navy/
    Marine Corps SCOUT experiment event in SOUTHCOM AOR on USNS Burlington
    in October 2022.

        63. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, will you provide an update or
    briefing to this Committee on the validation of unmanned systems in
    support of joint force logistics?
        General Berger. The Marine Corps is currently assessing the future
    role of unmanned systems in providing logistics support. For example,
    the Marine Corps has funded and is executing a robust Unmanned
    Logistics System-Air (ULS-A) program to meet a formal small and medium
    category airborne battalion-level and below tactical supply
    requirement. The Small Tactical Resupply UAS (TRUAS) has completed
    competition and demonstration and is currently engaging in Fleet field
    assessments and maturing down selected prototypes via an Other
    Transaction Authority contracting strategy. Further testing of this
    capability is scheduled during the Office of Naval Research's Navy/
    Marine Corps SCOUT experiment event in SOUTHCOM AOR on USNS Burlington
    in October 2022.
                                     fires
        64. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, the Force Design 2030 Annual
    Update lists actions that the Marine Corps plans to undertake in the
    upcoming year. Some issues were identified as ``requiring further
    analysis'', such as to ``conduct a holistic study of MAGTF [Marine Air-
    Ground Task Force] fires to enable sound prioritization for future
    resource decisions...'' and, specifically, Directed Action 20, to
    ``conduct a holistic MAGTF fires study to identify any gaps in all-
    weather fire support coverage.'' What fires studies were completed
    before the Marine Corps decided to divest itself of a significant
    portion of its cannon artillery?
        General Berger. A robust body of analysis, framed by existing
    strategic guidance, has informed each step of the Force Design (FD)
    2030 iterative process. Within that process, a fundamental principle is
    that the Marine Corps will not ask Congress to increase its total
    budget. Instead, we will judiciously divest of legacy systems in order
    to invest in modernized capabilities that most contribute to gaining
    relative warfighting advantage over potential adversaries. Below is an
    unclassified summary of key fires-related contributory efforts that led
    to the initial direction in the Commandant's Planning Guidance (July
    2019) and objective force investment decisions published in the FD2030
    Phase I & II Report (March 2020):

          Future Ground Combat Element Fires for MAGTF Operations
    Study (Operations Analysis Directorate, 2018): Holistic gap analysis of
    M777 (cannon), M142 (rocket), and TPS-80 (G/ATOR) across multiple
    scenarios and force structures. The study objective was to
    quantitatively understand artillery gaps from the time of the study
    through fiscal year 2025 based on the Marine Corps Operating Concept
    and multiple recent (at the time) qualitative wargames indicating
    potential artillery shortfalls. Gaps identified include: range of
    cannon artillery vs. adversary precision munitions, timeliness of
    counter-fire capabilities, availability of preferred M777 munitions
    limiting both its lethality and volume of fires, and survivability
    based on mobilization time. M142 gaps were fewer than those of M777
    across all assessed cases.

          Study on Countering Anti-Access Systems with Longer Range
    and Standoff Capabilities: Assault Breaker II (Defense Science Board,
    2018): A joint examination of emergent pacing threat capabilities and
    objectives. Recommendations included the requirements of the U.S. joint
    force to respond in a timely manner to deny adversary theories of
    victory without undue escalation or large scale deployment of U.S.
    manned forces. Denying or deterring adversary strategic objectives
    requires long-range and/or pre-positioned short range weapons with
    dedicated, persistent, and survivable intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance to hold adversary command and control and power
    projection assets at risk.

          Provident Stare: USMC Force Design 2030 Integrated
    Planning Team (Combat Development and Integration, 2019): A multi-
    domain mission analysis of Marine Corps tasks per 2018 National Defense
    Strategy and Title X responsibilities against the framework of the
    Distributed Maritime Operations, Littoral Operations in a Contested
    Environment, and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations concepts. This
    Integrated Planning Team (IPT) compared an unconstrained baseline force
    against two comparative force structures using different priorities to
    identify the most significant contributory units and systems. IPT
    outputs included recommendations on quantities of these units and
    associated systems.

          Sea Control MEU - MEU Composition Study (Center for Naval
    Analyses, 2020): A focused exploration of Marine Expeditionary Unit
    (MEU) composition in light of emergent peer adversary capabilities and
    objectives. Key findings are classified, but did address specific
    trade-offs between cannon and rocket efficacy. All MEU missions were
    assessed to identify and understand trade-offs and limitations of
    modernized vs. traditional capabilities in both high-end and day-to-day
    operations.

        Summary: The common theme across these analytic efforts is that the
    Marine Corps needed more and better longer-range fires capabilities in
    order to meaningfully contribute to future Joint deter, deny, and
    defeat objectives. In a zero-sum fiscal environment, that meant
    divesting of cannon to invest in rocket artillery.
        The above represents a snapshot of the collective FD2030 Campaign
    of Learning that includes dozens of discrete IPTs, wargames, modeling &
    simulation, and analyses that informed original and subsequent FD2030
    decisions. Additional insights and contributory efforts are available
    at higher classification levels.

        65. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, is the Marine Corps
    integrating Unmanned Aerial Systems into cannon artillery or HIMARS
    batteries to generate an organic target acquisition capability?
        General Berger. In establishing and executing effective kill
    chains, sensors in all domains--particularly airborne, but not
    exclusively--are being integrated with the most direct ties to fires
    elements. The fusion of sensor data will generate target-quality tracks
    available to all elements of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force and the
    Fleet. The persistent surveillance of organic sensors layered with
    theater and national capabilities will also provide battle damage and
    combat assessments to complete the kill chain to determine if desired
    effects have been achieved or re-attack is required.

        66. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, it is my understanding that
    cannon artillery batteries across the Active Component and Reserve
    Component will grow from six guns to eight guns under Force Design
    2030. When will this transition start and when will it finish?
        General Berger. Correct. The plan to transition to eight guns per
    artillery battery will be executed in fiscal year 2025.

        67. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, how are personnel in cannon
    artillery batteries being retrained to operate HIMARS and NMESIS?
        General Berger. During the initial training phase, existing Field
    Artillery Cannoneers were trained to operate HIMARS via New Equipment
    Teams as the systems arrived to their units. Currently, Field Artillery
    Marines in ranks E1-E5 that are slated to serve in HIMARS-equipped
    units attend entry-level HIMARS Operator training at Fort Sill. This
    course provides students with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to
    function as a member of the HIMARS section. Fort Sill also provides
    intermediate and advanced level training. Intermediate level training
    consists of the Section Chief Course and is available to Artillery
    Marines between the ranks of E4 to E6, enhancing their military
    occupational specialty (MOS) knowledge to effectively serve as
    cannoneers/HIMARS operators in the artillery battery at section chief
    levels. The Cannoneer Advanced Course is available to Artillery Marines
    between the ranks of E6 to E-8, further enhancing their MOS knowledge
    to effectively serve as senior cannoneers in the artillery battery at
    chief levels. All Artillery Officers receive formal instruction on
    HIMARS at the Basic Artillery Officers School in Fort Sill. NMESIS
    training will occur in two phases: Initial Training and Future Training
    at Formal Learning Centers (FLCs). Initial training is anticipated to
    conclude in fiscal year 2026, followed by formal training at Marine
    Corps FLCs and/or the Naval Strike Missile Schoolhouse in fiscal year
    2027.
                                training ranges
        68. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, in your prepared statement
    for the Department of the Navy posture hearing you noted the
    opportunities the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) affords
    the Marine Corps to train in degraded, denied, or disrupted
    electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO) environment. How will the
    Marine Corps use JPARC to exercise the new capabilities and concepts
    you are developing in an EMSO environment?
        General Berger. The ability to sense and make sense of the
    operating environment is rapidly changing with advances in
    electromagnetic capabilities; meanwhile the services are limited by
    available training areas to explore with existing and emerging
    electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO) capabilities. I cannot get
    into much detail in an unclassified setting, but the JPARC is
    especially promising in that it offers electromagnetic spectrum,
    maritime, and littoral training areas.

        69. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, in your 2022 annual update to
    Force Design 2030 you noted that the Marine Corps' ``current range and
    training infrastructure does not adequately support the combined-arms
    integration of the new systems we are fielding.'' In your prepared
    statement for the Department of the Navy posture hearing you stated the
    need for the Marine Corps to develop a littoral maritime training range
    akin to Range 400 in Twentynine Palms. You also stated that the Marine
    Corps will ``require a maritime training site with suitable seaward and
    landward ranges were we can train with the full range of our multi-
    domain weapon systems, to include unscrewed systems.'' JPARC provides
    the capabilities you have identified. How does the Marine Corps plan to
    use JPARC to exercised combined-arms integration with the full range of
    your multi-domain weapon systems?
        General Berger. Use of our current ranges face several limitations.
    Within CONUS, our Open Air/Live Ranges have limitations due to FAA/FCC/
    First Responder network interference. Overseas, use of our ranges are
    subject to additional host nation and international agreements which
    limit usage of jammers and certain transceivers. Events on our ranges
    are also under constant adversary surveillance as a means of looking at
    our systems, observing our tactics, techniques, and procedures, and
    examining our efforts to mitigate adversary degrade, deny, and disrupt
    (D3) capability. The Marine Corps needs to better determine what
    training we do on Open Air/Live ranges and what we will do in closed
    loop simulation systems. While we may dedicate use of live ranges to
    practice our networking and integration of command and control and data
    sharing between forces/units/services, we may also create garrison
    facilities that allow teams, platoons, and companies to play
    simulations and war-games which emulate dynamic D3 environments. Our
    goal is to provide operators with the ability to practice systems
    operations, learn how to identify issues and create solutions to
    problems in dynamic environments, and reinforce teamwork needed to
    maneuver in the electromagnetic operating environments (EMOE).
                                  air defense
        70. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, what counter-Unmanned Aerial
    System (UAS) capabilities does the Marine Corps currently field that
    would be effective against the variety of UAS currently used in combat
    by Ukraine and Russia?
        General Berger. All counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS)
    capabilities currently deployed by the USMC are in support of Urgent
    Needs. The systems fielded are Light Marine Air Defense Integrated
    Systems (L-MADIS), Expeditionary MADIS (E-MADIS), Installation CUAS (I-
    CUAS), and the Compact Laser Weapon System (CLaWS).
        L-MADIS is a mobile C-UAS system. One L-MADIS system is fielded on
    each Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) via the Low Altitude Air Defense
    (LAAD) Detachment. When not deployed, each system goes through
    maintenance in preparation for the next rotation. The L-MADIS provides
    a non-lethal defeat of UAS via jamming of the radio frequency and/or
    GPS.
        E-MADIS is a fixed/semi-fixed C-UAS capability deployed to PACOM
    defending critical assets on key installations. The E-MADIS provides a
    non-lethal defeat of UAS via jamming of the radio frequency and/or GPS.
        I-CUAS is a fixed/semi-fixed C-UAS capability deployed to various
    USMC installations in the Continental United States (CONUS). The I-CUAS
    provides a non-lethal defeat of UAS via jamming of the radio frequency
    and/or GPS.
        CLaWS is a lethal directed energy weapon system deployed in
    CENTCOM. Originally operated by the USMC, the CLaWS became Theater
    Provided Equipment and is now operated by the U.S. Army. Although
    deployed by the U.S. Army, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC)
    directed the USMC to sustain the CLaWS.

        71. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, what counter-UAS capabilities
    is the Marine Corps developing to counter the types of UAS currently
    used in combat by Ukraine and Russia?
        General Berger. The Marine Corps is currently in various stages of
    developing the Marine Air Defense Integrated Systems (MADIS), Light
    Marine Air Defense Integrated Systems (L-MADIS), Installation Counter
    Unmanned Aerial System (I-CUAS), and man-portable CUAS Programs of
    Record. Testing and evaluating of future technology is consistently
    being updated to increase the lethality and effectiveness of all
    components.
        The MADIS Program of Record will be deployed on a pair of Joint
    Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV). Currently, MADIS is going through
    System Integrated Testing and will begin fielding to the Fleet Marine
    Force in fiscal year 2024. The MADIS will be able to defeat UAS both
    lethally and non-lethally.
        The L-MADIS Program of Record will be deployed on a pair of Ultra-
    Light Tactical Vehicle (ULTV). The Critical Design Review will be
    complete this month. L-MADIS Program of Record will begin fielding to
    the FMF in fiscal year 2024 and complete in fiscal year 2028. The L-
    MADIS will be able to defeat UAS non-lethally. The I-CUAS Program of
    Record will primarily be used to defend critical assets aboard CONUS
    installations; however, these systems could be operationally employed
    in support of fixed and semi-fixed sites. The I-CUAS will only provide
    a non-lethal defeat of UAS until U.S. Policy dictates otherwise.
        Man-Portable CUAS requirements are in the initial stages of
    development. The system will provide all units down to the Squad level
    the ability to detect, track, identify and defend themselves against
    Group 1 and 2 UAS. The system will be light weight, easy to train and
    operate. Currently the Warfighting Lab is conducting experiments that
    will inform the future weapon system.
        The Mobile All-Domain Observation and Sensing System (MA-DOSS) is a
    developmental effort. MA-DOSS will be a part of the networked force
    protection capabilities available to both the expeditionary force and
    installations. MA-DOSS is being developed with the ability to integrate
    with the MADIS, L-MADIS and I-CUAS PoRs through software commonality
    and open architecture design, providing additional capability for
    sensing, early warning, and targeting data to the kill web(s). MA-DOSS
    is not designed to counter UAS (e.g. through kinetic or non-kinetic
    means) on its own, but rather adds a layer of sensing that supports
    tactical early warning across multiple domains: air, land and sea.
        The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) is currently working
    with industry to develop overlapping methods of detection and defeat of
    UAS. MCWL is testing radio frequency (RF) detection, persistent
    cameras, and AI/ML software to identify airborne threats. The lab is
    developing multiple sensors and systems through a modular open system
    architecture to collect data across a wide spectrum of detection means
    and ingest the data into a single command and control (C2) structure
    that will consolidate and fuse the data into a target quality track.
    MCWL is exploring both kinetic and non-kinetic means of defeating
    adversary UAS after positive identification. These systems range in
    size and capabilities to address emerging threats. MCWL is evaluating a
    wide range of technologies to enhance the warfighter at the tactical
    small unit level to close with and immediately destroy opposing UAS as
    well as directed energy methods, such as high powered microwave, that
    can be used to defend bases in standard or austere environments from
    single or swarming attacks. Work in developing this enhanced counter-
    UAS kill chain will also apply to countering crewed or uncrewed systems
    in other domains.
                            budget and force design
        72. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, if your budget increased,
    would you be able to field any of your planned capabilities sooner?
        General Berger. Yes; with a budget increase, items listed on the
    unfunded priority list would be funded. This would accelerate the
    procurement of future capabilities required to modernize the force.

        73. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, if more money would allow you
    to field capabilities sooner, which capabilities do you view as the
    most critical?
        General Berger. First and foremost, those listed on the unfunded
    priority list. Those items near the top that are not funded equal
    strategic risk. Simply put, they are the parts of Force Design required
    to ensure our capabilities are the same or better than our pacing
    threat. Systems like ground based anti-ship missiles, manned and
    unmanned expeditionary platforms, and communications. All of these
    capabilities enable your Marine Corps to move forward, in a contested
    environment, in a way that supports Naval and Joint Force kill chains.

        74. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, in your statement submitted
    to this Committee, you wrote, ``[a]s I have stated in the past, the
    Marine Corps does not seek any additional resources for modernization.
    Rather, we seek your oversight and assistance in ensuring that the
    resources the Service generates through divestments, reorganization,
    and redesign are reinvested in our Corps' modernization priorities.''
    How would additional resources reduce the risk of Force Design 2030
    implementation?
        General Berger. If left unfunded, all of our unfunded requirements
    equal risk. We are learning as we go with Force Design. We did not know
    2 years ago exactly what the Marine Corps would need to look like a
    decade out. We have a much clearer picture now. In order to give the
    Committees a larger menu to select from--with a clear picture of where
    the Marine Corps is going--we added to the unfunded priority list.
    Those items near the top that are not funded equal strategic risk.

        75. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, Admiral Gilday, and
    General Berger, would additional funds allow you to increase your
    Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation and experimentation efforts
    to solve the contested logistics problems as you currently understand
    it?
        Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. The Department of the Navy
    (DON) established a Naval Contested Logistics Working Group in fiscal
    year 2022 to coordinate and align logistics (supply) and weapon systems
    and platform (demand) development, in support of the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense's Contested Logistics and Operational Energy
    Working Group. The working group developed a list of future Research,
    Development, Test, and Evaluation efforts that would help solve the
    contested logistics problem, which highlights an increase in overall
    logistics demand and energy logistics complications as a result of
    Distributed Maritime Operations, Littoral Operations in Contested
    Environments, and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations concepts and
    an increase in force size and tempo.
        The list includes efforts such as:

          Development of more adaptive distribution systems that
    allow for modularity and point of need refueling capability beyond
    traditional logistics.

          Energy command and control including monitoring and
    planning technologies to provide closer to real time data on energy
    needs to enable adaptable and optimized logistics.

          Studies and analysis to develop more adaptive and
    responsive systems to operate within a contested logistics environment.

        Funding in these areas would address the studies and analysis,
    research and engineering, and experimentation necessary to enable the
    movement and support of military forces across multiple domains/
    environments in a contested environment, and will be evaluated for
    inclusion in future budget requests.
        General Berger. Yes, additional Budget Activity (BA) 6.3/6.4 RDT&E
    funding would increase experimentation and prototyping efforts related
    to secure logistics communication, autonomous and unmanned distribution
    (air, surface, sub-surface, and ground), renewable energy, enhanced
    maneuver to and from seabases/expeditionary advance bases in the
    littorals, and enhanced survivability/sustainment of a highly
    distributed force. Any increase in funding will enable assessment of
    these technologies and their ability to overcome future contested
    logistics challenges.

        76. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday, I have
    tremendous concern about the shrinking size of our fleet resulting from
    the anemic budget put forth by the President. The fiscal year 2023
    Presidential Budget request provides for a 4.1 percent increase over
    the amount enacted the fiscal year 2022. Even if the inflation
    estimates of 2.6 percent used by the Department were an accurate
    depiction of economic conditions, this would only be 1.5 percent real
    growth, far below the bi-partisan Nation Defense Strategy Commission
    recommendation of three to five percent real growth. If current levels
    of inflation persist into next fiscal year (latest figures showing 8.3
    percent), the Navy would be facing a 4.2 percent inflation-adjusted
    cut. Given these economic conditions, do you believe the fiscal year
    2023 budget in its current form is adequate for sustained capability
    and capacity growth?
        Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. The President's Budget 2023
    provides the right balance of capacity, lethality, modernization, and
    readiness needed to field the globally engaged and dominant naval force
    required by the National Defense Strategy. This budget will maximize
    the efficiency and effectiveness of each dollar entrusted to us by the
    American taxpayer, ensuring sufficient resources for today's
    challenges, while building future overmatch. Should additional
    resources or flexibility be needed to deliver the capability the Nation
    needs, the Department of the Navy will work with the President and
    Congress on those issues.

        77. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Gilday, attending the WEST 2022
    Conference in February of this year, you stated, ``I've concluded--
    consistent with the analysis--that we need a naval force of over 500
    ships.'' In your statement submitted to this Committee, your write, ``
    . . . the Navy's size--our capacity--ultimately will be dictated by the
    budget's top line. We will not field a fleet larger than we can
    sustain.'' Given that the President's fiscal year 2023 budget provides
    for a fleet of 280 ships by the year 2027--a decrease of 5 ships from
    present day--do you believe the budget puts our Navy on the path of
    meeting the requirements you have outlined?
        Admiral Gilday. The fiscal year 2023 President's Budget delivers a
    combat-credible Navy designed to deter conflict and help win our
    Nation's wars as we maintain a global posture to assure our prosperity.
    Today's fiscal environment requires careful investments in capabilities
    and capacity that offer the most significant payoff and warfighting
    value for strategic competition, including focusing on capable capacity
    and not retaining platforms that are decreasingly relevant in modern
    warfare. To simultaneously modernize and build the capacity of our
    fleet, the Navy would need sustained budget growth at three to five
    percent above actual inflation.

        78. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, while attending the WEST
    2022 Conference in February of this year, Admiral Gilday, stated,
    ``I've concluded--consistent with the analysis--that we need a naval
    force of over 500 ships.'' In Admiral Gilday's statement submitted to
    this Committee, he wrote, `` . . . the Navy's size--our capacity--
    ultimately will be dictated by the budget's top line. We will not field
    a fleet larger than we can sustain.'' As you are aware, the President's
    fiscal year 2023 budget provides for a fleet of 280 ships by the year
    2027--a decrease of 5 ships from present day. Do you support a budget
    that fails to put our Navy on the path to meet the requirements
    outlined by the Chief of Naval Operations?
        Secretary Del Toro. The Chief of Naval Operations has clearly
    stated that his priorities are funding Columbia, readiness, capability,
    and then capable capacity only. The new era of strategic competition
    requires a modernized, capable, global, forward, and multi-domain Navy.
    In the fiscal year 2023 budget, the Navy prioritized promising
    technologies that need to be fielded quickly and at-scale to be
    operationally relevant in the coming years to ensure that the Navy
    meets Joint Force operational requirements, and made difficult choices
    to divest of ships that do not meaningfully support warfighting
    requirements. The President's Budget 2023 only grows warfighting
    capacity at a rate supported by the fiscal guidance and our ability to
    sustain that capacity in the future. Consistent with the Defense
    Planning Guidance, this plan does not resource any capacity beyond what
    can be sustained--manning, training, operations, and future
    modernization. Within the Future Years Defense Program, this careful
    prioritization in the near-term, in accordance with the Interim
    National Security Strategic Guidance and National Defense Strategy,
    will result in a Navy battle force that is more ready, more
    sustainable, and more lethal.

        79. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, did you advocate in
    private for a higher budget for the Department of the Navy?
        Secretary Del Toro. I have consistently advocated for the
    President's Budget request as the right balance of capacity, lethality,
    modernization, and readiness needed to field the globally engaged and
    dominant naval force required by the National Defense Strategy.

        80. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, the Marine Corps has had
    to make significant divestitures to fund its force modernization. With
    these divestitures comes risk. Do you agree that the Marine Corps, and
    by extension, the Department of the Navy, would be assuming less risk
    if the President's fiscal year 2023 budget were more robust?
        Secretary Del Toro. I fully support the Marine Corps divestitures
    General Berger identified in Force Design 2030 and the President's
    Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request. I work closely with other senior
    leaders to manage risk across the defense program.
     navy support for expeditionary advanced base operations and stand-in
                                     forces
        81. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Gilday, at the May 11, 2022 hearing
    before the House, Representative Moulton asked you in regard to Force
    Design, ``[h]ow is the Navy preparing to support this concept and its
    implementation?'' To which you responded, ``We are doing it right now.
    I talked to the Naval Forces Europe Commander yesterday, and his
    headquarters has about 30 marines in their Joint Forces Maritime
    Component Cell, the Deputy Commander is a marine, the concept of
    operations signed by his 3-star fleet commander, Commander of U.S.
    Sixth Fleet, is also signed by the Commander of II MEF . . . '' While
    the collective buy-in between the headquarters is great, could you
    provide a few concrete examples of what that looks like in exercises
    and experimentation between operational elements that demonstrate this
    commitment?
        Admiral Gilday. There are two primary examples that are currently
    underway in the European theater; Task Force (TF) 61/2, and
    experimentation in support of the Commandant's Reconnaissance/ Counter
    reconnaissance (RXR).
        TF 61/2 is led by a Marine Corps General Officer and a Marine Corps
    Headquarters staff under tactical control of U.S Commander SIXTH Fleet
    (C6F). This task force is responsible for command and control of
    amphibious and Fleet Marine Forces task organized to C6F conducting
    operations, activities and investments (OAIs) within NAVEUR's area of
    operations. TF 61/2 is charged with enhancing C6F's Maritime Domain
    Awareness (MDA) while remaining capable of conducting crisis response
    operations. TF 61/2 successfully participated in five integrated
    exercises to date in 2022 improving the fleet's ability to employ
    naval, amphibious, and expeditionary forces in concert with our allies
    and partners. Operationally, Marine Corps Forces Europe are integrated
    with the C6F intelligence section and are directly contributing to
    expanding maritime domain awareness and intelligence security
    cooperation with our allies and partners.
        Incorporating multiple aspects of the Commandant's Force Design
    2030, the RXR elements in EUCOM provide C6F a stand-in Force, enhancing
    naval integration, and partner nation interoperability. While
    coordinating with multiple elements across the area of responsibility,
    the RXR marines tested and validated the ability of the Fleet Marine
    Forces to provide flexible, efficient, scalable, and task-organized
    forces to the Fleet Commander to enhance MDA and facilitate the kill
    chain within the littoral environment.
        The RXR forces conducted numerous exercises including a Force
    Reconnaissance Visit Board Search and Seizure (VBSS) interoperability
    event across a variety of C6F platforms aimed at executing multiple
    mission sets that focused on integrating, experimenting, and validating
    the Navy and Marine Corps sensor interoperability and maritime strike
    capabilities.

        82. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Gilday, in response to my questioning
    at the hearing, you stated that it would be hard to judge the Navy's
    commitment to Stand-in Forces because ``[m]ost of what has been written
    about publicly about Stand-in Forces, has been produced after the
    release of both those documents [the CNO NAVPLAN and Surface Warfare:
    The Competitive Edge].'' The Triservice maritime Strategy was released
    in December 2020, the CNO NAVPLAN was released in January 2021, and
    Surface Warfare: The Competitive Edge was released on January 2022.
    Force Design 2030 was released in March 2020 and The Concept for Stand-
    In Forces was released in November 2021. There seems to have been ample
    time and opportunity for the navy to more explicitly address its roles
    and responsibilities in EABO and SIF. I was glad to hear that your
    upcoming strategy documents would more explicitly address the Navy's
    role in EABO and SIF. Will you commit to doing so in all relevant Navy
    documents released hereafter?
        Admiral Gilday. Yes.

        83. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro, in your statement
    submitted to this Committee, you write, ``[s]uccessful implementation
    of the concepts within the Navigation Plan and Force Design 2030 will
    be pursued through a unified, integrated effort at every echelon.''
    Building on the recently agreed upon amphibious warship requirement, as
    Secretary of the Navy, how will you continue to ensure this unity of
    effort at the fleet level, as well as before Congress?
        Secretary Del Toro. The Department of the Navy is improving
    integration through complementary operating concepts, an integrated POM
    development process, and wargaming efforts. Together with the Service
    Chiefs, I am committed to prioritizing unity of effort, at all levels,
    in order to sustain and advance naval strength and resilience.

        84. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, once the seizure of advanced
    naval bases is complete, do you assess the marines maintain sufficient
    combat power to go on the offensive in an extended land campaign?
        General Berger. Yes; the ongoing modernization efforts within the
    Marine Corps do not negate or detract from its ability to execute Title
    X responsibilities as the Nation's ``force in readiness.'' The
    capabilities of the current and future Marine Corps will enable to it
    conduct offensive operations, regardless of theater, from land, sea,
    and the littorals.

        85. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, Force Design 2030
    significantly reduces the assets of marine aviation by nearly 30
    percent. How will the remaining aviation assets support current global
    force management operations, as well as the combatant commander's
    operations plans?
        General Berger. The Marine Corps continues to provide high-end
    aviation capabilities globally. In the past year, the Marine Corps
    forward deployed 5th Generation TACAIR in INDOPACOM in support of
    integrated deterrence, 4th Generation TACAIR to assure our allies and
    deter our adversary in EUCOM, and MV-22s in support of crisis-response
    in AFRICOM. Additionally, the Marine Corps maintains the full suite of
    aviation capabilities found aboard our forward deployed ARG / MEUs
    which are afloat 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and 365 days a
    year. Our aviation transition process and reductions have been
    carefully balanced with the Service's Global Force Management
    requirements to continue to supply the Combatant Commanders with the
    required platforms while staying above the Department's 1:2 deployment
    to Dwell (D2D) threshold. Through a deliberate planning process, we can
    forecast that our pilots and crews will be able to maintain the
    targeted 1:2.7 D2D in even our most stressed communities (e.g., MV-22).

        86. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, will you commit to providing
    this Committee both classified and unclassified updates and briefings
    regarding the continued validation of Force Design?
        General Berger. Yes; my staff, my Deputy Commandants and their
    staffs, and I stand ready to provide updates and briefings, as
    requested by the Committee.
                          lessons learned from ukraine
        87. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, when discussion preliminary
    lessons learned from the conflict in Ukraine in your statement
    submitted to this Committee, you write, ``[i]f you are located on a
    modern battlefield saturated with sensors, you will be targeted.
    Signature management, maneuver, deception, and tempo are playing an
    increasingly important role on the modern battlefield.'' How will the
    Marine Littoral Regiments effectively manage their signature to
    maintain survivability in an environment saturated with PRC C5ISR?
        General Berger. The Marine Corps concept of operations is as a
    stand-in force that has the ability to gain and maintain custody of
    adversary targets--and hold some of those targets at risk continuously
    in support of targeting for the naval and joint force. We recognize
    that our value, largely, is in daily competition, building a strong
    coalition of partners, and being ready at a moment's notice to hold the
    adversary to task. In the realm of the defense, we recently finalized a
    functional concept which addresses integrated air and missile defense
    and force protection. These concepts reinforce the employment of
    systems which enable forces to leverage deception, mobility, and early
    detection in order to provide an additional layer of defense within the
    weapons engagement zone. While this functional concept--and its
    suggested force multiplying capabilities--require further development,
    planning, resourcing, training and a unified effort across the Naval
    Expeditionary Force, this concept will greatly strengthen our defensive
    and force protection capabilities. Meanwhile, we are also developing
    logistic capabilities to move small forces quickly and constantly in
    order to overcome the adversary's ability to find, fix, target and
    track us. Through enhanced signature management and decoy/deception
    capabilities, combined with high-mobility, we believe adversary weapons
    effects can be overcome.

        88. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, what specific lessons have
    you taken away from the Russia-Ukraine conflict that validate Force
    Design 2030?
        General Berger. Although the situation in Ukraine is dynamic and
    concrete lessons will take time to develop, one lesson is clear. The
    quality of small unit leadership and the individual soldier is critical
    to tactical unit success. Force Design 2030 and annual updates are a
    portion of the overall Marine Corps' force modernization efforts. These
    modernization efforts include additional initiatives such as Talent
    Management 2030 and soon to be released Training and Education 2030.
    These modernization efforts prioritize individual marines and their
    leadership and establish specific initiatives to mature the force and
    increase individual and team effectiveness.
        Everything starts and ends with the individual marine. While much
    of the Force Design 2030 conversation revolves around materiel,
    modernization efforts are focused on training, educating and equipping
    the individual marine to succeed in competition and conflict.

        89. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, what specific lessons have
    you taken away from the Russia-Ukraine conflict that necessitate a
    course correction of Force Design 2030?
        General Berger. Although the situation in Ukraine is dynamic and
    concrete lessons will take time to develop, one lesson is clear. The
    quality of small unit leadership and the individual soldier is critical
    to tactical unit success. Force Design 2030 and annual updates are a
    portion of the overall Marine Corps' force modernization efforts. These
    modernization efforts include additional initiatives such as Talent
    Management 2030 and the soon to be released Training and Education
    2030. These modernization efforts prioritize individual marines and
    their leadership and establish specific initiatives to mature the force
    and increase individual and team effectiveness.
        Everything starts and ends with the individual marine. While much
    of the Force Design 2030 conversation revolves around materiel,
    modernization efforts are focused on training, educating and equipping
    the individual marine to succeed in competition and conflict.

        90. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Gilday, what is the Navy learning
    from Ukraine's attempts to execute sea denial or otherwise strike
    Russian naval assets in the Black Sea?
        Admiral Gilday. Commanders must understand the capabilities of
    their adversary, their own vulnerabilities, and the operating
    environment. This is not a new lesson; one in which war at sea rapidly
    provides a harsh reminder. The Russian Federation Navy places a premium
    on capacity over readiness; their experience in the Black Sea
    illustrates this unbalanced investment in capacity to the detriment of
    force readiness or modernization results in failure.
        In contrast, and as I have stated on many occasions, I am fully
    committed to ensuring we maintain our readiness balance.
        The U.S. Navy plans for approximately 70 percent of the current
    force will still be in service a decade from now. Toward the Navy's
    goal of balancing investments between readiness and modernization, the
    USN Research and Development budget focuses on offensive technologies
    such as hypersonics, on the offensive and defensive benefits of quantum
    computing, on defensive directed energy, and high-power microwave
    capabilities to protect the fleet.
        If desired, we can have further discussions about Ukraine's sea
    denial or naval strike measures in a classified setting.
                        allies and partners integration
        91. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, do our allies and partners
    around the globe support the concept for Stand-in Forces and the role
    they'd play in its execution?
        General Berger. Many allied nations have expressed strong support
    for the concept for Stand-in Forces (SIF) and the role they would play
    in execution. Allies are actively working to ensure that they remain
    interoperable as we develop the concept and they transform their own
    forces for the future. As could be expected, partner nations are less
    committal about the SIF concept in terms of practical implementation,
    but they are usually receptive to the overall idea. We continue to
    interact with both allied and partner nations regarding the SIF concept
    via military-to-military engagement and capability development. This
    interaction stresses that interoperability with U.S. forces is critical
    to successful application of the SIF concept, and this ability to
    conduct combined operations enhances all nations' territorial defense.

        92. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, how is the Marine Corps
    working with our allies and partners globally to ensure their seamless
    integration into the concept for Stand-in Forces?
        General Berger. Marine Forces Pacific, works with Allies,
    particularly in the first island chain and Australia, through several
    Joint and service exercises (e.g. TALISMAN SABRE, CCPT, BALIKATAN, KEEN
    EDGE, KEEN SWORD, KAMANDAG, and RIMPAC) to address integration with the
    concept of the SIF. Countries in the second island chain and beyond are
    increasingly the focus of integration into the concept of the Stand-in
    Forces (SIF). In regions with limited USMC posture, our forward-
    deployed headquarters, such as Task Force 51/5th Marine Expeditionary
    Brigade in Bahrain, and Task Force 61/2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade
    in Italy, are stand-in elements, postured to rapidly transition to
    support crisis and contingency operations. These headquarters regularly
    interact with the allies and partners that operate every day as SIF in
    their regions. Additionally, our deployed Marine Air Ground Task
    Forces, such as the Marine Expeditionary Units that are in a continuous
    cycle of deployments world-wide, work closely on interoperability with
    a number of allies and partners during each deployment.
        The Marine Corps has formal interoperability roadmaps with several
    key allies and stresses interoperability enhancement in a broad array
    of interactions, to include exercises, staff talks, military-to-
    military events, and personnel exchanges. These interoperability
    activities focus on SIF as an area of bilateral and military security
    cooperation against common threats.
                     vertical launch system (vls) capacity
        93. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday, when
    you appeared before the House Armed Services Committee on May 10, 2022,
    Rep. Elaine Luria (D-VA) expressed her concerns to you both over the
    fleet's shrinking VLS capacity. I share the concerns she outlined. The
    charts included in your 30-year ship-building plan are on a scale of
    zero to twelve thousand and hides the actual decrease in about 1,980
    VLS cells through 2035. This is a significant decrease in our VLS
    capacity in a time of increased danger regarding a potential Taiwan
    scenario. How does the Navy plan to mitigate the risk associated with
    this decrease in VLS capacity?
        Secretary Del Toro. The new era of strategic competition requires a
    modernized, capable, global, forward, and multi-domain Navy. The
    National Defense Strategy (NDS) underscores the need for the Department
    of Defense to move away from systems that provide less capability and
    do not significantly support our strategy and ability to win in a
    future fight.
        In the fiscal year 2023 budget, the Navy prioritized promising
    technologies that need to be fielded quickly and at-scale to be
    operationally relevant in the coming years to ensure that the Navy
    meets Joint Force operational requirements, and made difficult choices
    to divest of ships that do not meaningfully support warfighting
    requirements.
        Admiral Gilday. There is a reduction in the number of Vertical
    Launching System (VLS) cells and it's a risk-reward decision. The Navy
    had to make a value decision of what it is going to take to get these
    older platforms with less capable combat systems forward versus what
    investments that we need to make that deliver a more capable, more
    lethal Navy in the future. This is also in the context that the United
    States Navy fights from the seabed to space; our submarines, our
    surface ships, and our aviation assets all contribute to the fight in
    addition to those platforms hosting VLS cells.
        Future fights against near-peer competitors require us to integrate
    the all-domain power of the fleet with the Joint Force and our allies
    and partners. Our fleet staffs are already fully integrating
    information warfare, space, cyber, and special operators, both Active
    and Reserve, into their teams to leverage the full power of our Navy.
                               bulk fuel storage
        94. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday, given
    the Secretary of Defense's recent order to shut down the Red Hill Bulk
    Fuel Storage Facility on Oahu, Hawaii within the next 12 months, the
    Joint Force will need to find a way to replace the 250 million gallons
    of fuel storage capacity lost. While not well advertised, the Aleutian
    Island chain in Alaska is actually closer to many of our allies in the
    Indo-Pacific region than Hawaii, and should warrant serious
    consideration for additional bulk fuel storage capacity. What is your
    assessment of the potential utilization of the Alaska, specifically the
    Aleutian Island chain, for bulk fuel storage?
        Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. Senator, as you know, the
    Commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command is responsible for
    determining the operational and support requirements for his area of
    responsibility. My understanding is that INDOPACOM is currently
    shifting their posture to the west in order to more effectively compete
    with and deter China. The Navy, working through the Pacific Fleet, will
    continue to work with INDOPACOM and the Defense Logistics Agency to
    ensure its bulk fuel needs to support the combatant commander are met.

        95. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday, will
    you commit to look into the feasibility and strategic implications of
    bulk fuel storage in Alaska to augment joint force logistics?
        Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. Senator, as you know, the
    Commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command is responsible for
    determining the operational and support requirements for his area of
    responsibility. My understanding is that INDOPACOM is currently
    shifting their posture to the west in order to more effectively compete
    with and deter China. The Navy, working through the Pacific Fleet, will
    continue to work with INDOPACOM and the Defense Logistics Agency to
    ensure its bulk fuel needs to support the combatant commander are met.
                                     aukus
        96. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday, what
    are the most significant opportunities you see for the U.S. Navy
    resulting from the AUKUS agreement?
        Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. The Australia-United
    Kingdom-United States partnership, or AUKUS, is foremost committed to
    providing Australia with military capabilities. Through the
    partnership, the three nations reaffirmed their commitment to a free
    and open Indo-Pacific and more broadly to an international system that
    respects human rights, the rule of law, and the peaceful resolution of
    disputes free from coercion. Through ongoing trilateral consultation to
    determine the optimal pathway for an Australian conventionally armed,
    nuclear-powered submarine capability, the U.S. Navy has enhanced
    relationships with British and Australian counterparts at leader,
    program, and force development levels. Other regional posture decisions
    or naval operations will continue through standing U.S. authorities and
    agreements.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
                          sea-launched cruise missile
        97. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Gilday, what are the short- and
    long-term implications of eliminating SLCM-N? What additional risk do
    you take on without the capability SLCM-N would provide?
        Admiral Gilday. Commander, USSTRATCOM owns the operational risk to
    his POTUS assigned missions based on capabilities the Services provide.
    The gap in current and future nuclear capabilities between the United
    States and Russia is in regional nuclear capabilities, those
    capabilities not governed by New START, the ``non-treaty accountable
    weapons'' or tactical nuclear weapons.
        For our deterrent to be effective, it must have sufficient
    capability, capacity, and credibility to give the adversary pause. We
    do not have to match one-for-one or enter a new arms race, but we must
    have the tools to make Russia, and any other adversary, carefully
    consider their actions. The risk of mission failure belongs to the
    STRATCOM commander. The Services must provide the tools so he can
    provide the President options across the spectrum of potential nuclear
    escalation.

        98. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Gilday, you referenced a
    ``particular gap'' in capabilities that SLCM-N would fill.
    Specifically, please articulate this ``particular gap.''
        Admiral Gilday. When I refer to a particular gap that the SLCM-N
    capability could fill, I am referring to capabilities our adversaries
    possess along the escalation ladder where we have limited or no
    corresponding capability. The U.S. has a very limited number of nuclear
    weapons not governed by New START. Our key nuclear adversary has
    significant capability in the area of ``non-treaty accountable''
    nuclear weapons. Our emerging nuclear adversary, while not restrained
    by a similar treaty, continues to develop a spectrum of capabilities
    with a wide range of yields and delivery options.
        SLCM-N is not the single solution to this gaps, but if it is
    developed into a credible and deployable capability it could integrate
    with other capabilities, both conventional and nuclear, to provide an
    effective spectrum of deterrence options for the President.
                           navy tactical cyber teams
        99. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Gilday, what is the status of the
    development of the ``small tactical cyber teams'' created under your
    direction?
        Admiral Gilday. Though not yet funded, I am developing this
    capability internally by aligning requirements, capabilities and
    doctrine in preparation for future investment. Specifically, the Naval
    Information Warfighting Development Center (NIWDC) published TACMEMO 6-
    03.5-21 Maritime Enabled Cyberspace Operations (MECO), describing the
    tactics, techniques, and procedures for cyberspace missions conducted
    by naval forces for the completion of tactical-level actions or tasks
    in support of commanders' desired end state. With this doctrine as a
    backdrop, I initiated a working group of stakeholders and subject
    matter experts to develop and refine the manpower, capabilities,
    command and control, and resources needed to deliver this capability.

        100. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Gilday, how specifically is the
    Navy working towards the desired end state of providing cyber operators
    to support the fleet mission?
        Admiral Gilday. Navy cyber operators are trained utilizing the
    joint training standards of USCYBERCOM and USSOCOM, then provided to
    USCYBERCOM and USSOCOM in support of joint force requirements,
    including Cyber Mission Force (CMF). Navy requirements for cyber
    operators are satisfied through a Request for Forces (RFF) process to
    the joint force. Question 99 addresses Navy efforts towards Navy
    tactical cyber teams.
                              contested logistics
        101. Senator Blackburn. General Berger, to successfully operate
    within the first and second island chains, how is the Marine Corps
    adequately sustaining, moving, and maneuvering forces in this
    environment?
        General Berger. With an increasingly contested operational
    environment, our logistics efforts from the tactical edge to the
    homeland will have to fundamentally change. We are pursuing a range of
    material capabilities to diversify and modernize our logistics
    portfolio that are all aligned to a contested littoral environment. At
    the tactical level, we are testing and assessing several platforms that
    will enable us to transition to a diverse collection of crewed and
    uncrewed air and ground platforms. These platforms are smaller and
    cheaper while collectively resulting in a more resilient distribution
    network of platforms and connectors. In addition to our efforts to
    generate, store, and distribute renewable energy forward, these
    platforms will exploit rapidly moving technologies that the Department
    and our industry partners are pursuing. We will decrease our dependence
    on vulnerable fuel supply chains while delivering critical commodities
    via the naval and joint logistics enterprise across the Pacific,
    despite enemy sensing and targeting capabilities. The most visible
    platforms will be a family of uncrewed logistics air systems, the
    smallest of which we are already prototyping and conducting live
    experimentation. Our experimentation is yielding exciting results that
    underscore the need to expand into large and medium uncrewed logistics
    systems. Additionally, we will explore options to replace our ground
    logistics fleet with a smaller, lighter, fuel-efficient replacement. We
    are now exploring emerging technologies to deliver capable, yet
    affordable vehicles that reduce our reliance on fossil fuels.

        102. Senator Blackburn. General Berger, how can unconventional
    inter-theater connectors such as commercially available ships be part
    of sustaining, moving, and maneuvering forces?
        General Berger. Commercially available ships can provide
    flexibility and redundancy to our sustainment and distribution
    networks. Leveraging these capabilities strengthens our relationships
    with commercial partners and provides additional capacity.
                                  shipbuilding
        103. Senator Blackburn. Secretary Del Toro, as the Navy navigates
    lessons learned from working within its share of the defense budget
    rather than assessing how many ships it needs to determine the budget,
    what risks do these gaps highlight that the industrial base can create?
        Secretary Del Toro. The Navy recognizes the importance of a secure
    and solid industrial base, and we are collectively working to
    capitalize on the gains and partnerships that are being fostered across
    government, industry, and academic spheres as we look to preserve our
    capability to innovate and execute faster and better than anyone else.
    Expanding infrastructure and the capabilities of suppliers results in
    greater stability, cost savings, and improved efficiency as production
    increases to build. The Navy continues to assess and make strategic
    investments to address risks, establish second sources, and minimize
    disruptions in key market areas using resources such as Defense
    Production Act Title III, capital expenditure investments, and supplier
    development funding.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
        104. Senator Hawley. Secretary Del Toro, A Cooperative Strategy for
    21st Century Seapower directed the sea services to ``employ the global
    reach, persistent presence, and operational flexibility inherent in
    U.S. seapower.'' It also found that ``[t]here is a tension, however,
    between the requirements for continued peacetime engagement and
    maintaining proficiency in the critical skills necessary to fighting
    and winning in combat.'' What is the tension between requirements for
    peacetime presence and readiness for warfighting?
        Secretary Del Toro. Both ``A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
    Seapower'' (2007) and the more recent ``Tri-Service Maritime Strategy,
    Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power''
    (2020) reference a tension between near-term presence demand and
    warfighting readiness. Day-to day presence strengthens alliances and
    partnerships and demonstrates U.S. capabilities and global reach, but
    with finite resources and time available to train, operating forward
    can often come at the expense of joint warfighting training. This
    tension is manifested in competing time demands: The more time spent
    training and making ready, the more powerful the force, but with less
    time available for showing the force through presence. I recognize the
    importance of both and am committed to achieving balance between these
    two national security imperatives.

        105. Senator Hawley. Admiral Gilday, Admiral Conn acknowledged last
    week that the Navy is ``taking risk in VLS [strike capacity] between
    now and about 2030.'' But when I asked him how the Navy plans to manage
    that risk, he couldn't offer any specifics. Why is the Navy choosing
    now to accept all this risk in strike capacity as opposed to waiting
    until we're through what DOD leaders agree is a period of significantly
    increased risk of Chinese aggression?
        Admiral Gilday. There is a reduction in the number of VLS cells and
    it's a risk reward decision. The Navy had to make a value decision of
    what it's going to take to get these older platforms with less capable
    combat systems forward versus what investments that we need to make
    which deliver a more capable, more lethal Navy in the future. This is
    also in the context that the United States Navy fights from the seabed
    to space, our submarines, our surface ships and aviation assets all
    contribute to the fight in addition to those platforms hosting VLS
    cells.
        The new era of strategic competition requires a modernized,
    capable, global, forward, and multi-domain Navy. The National Defense
    Strategy (NDS) underscores the need for DOD to move away from systems
    that provide less capability and do not significantly support our
    strategy and ability to win in a future fight.
        In the fiscal year 2023 budget, Navy prioritized promising
    technologies that need to be fielded quickly and at scale to be
    operationally relevant in the coming years to ensure that Navy meets
    Joint Force operational requirements, and made difficult choices to
    divest of ships that do not meaningfully support warfighting
    requirements.

        106. Senator Hawley. Admiral Gilday, how does this loss of VLS
    strike capacity impact the Navy's ability to meet operational
    requirements for DOD's pacing scenario between now and 2030?
        Admiral Gilday. This new era of strategic competition requires a
    modernized, capable, global, forward, and multi-domain Navy. The
    National Defense Strategy (NDS) underscores the need for DOD to move
    away from systems that provide less capability and do not significantly
    support our strategy and ability to win in a future fight. The Navy
    made difficult choices to divest of ships that do not meaningfully
    support the warfighting requirements.
        In the fiscal year 2023 budget, Navy prioritized promising
    technologies that need to be fielded quickly and at scale to be
    operationally relevant in the coming years to ensure that Navy meets
    Joint Force operational requirements.
        Future fights against strategic competitors require us to integrate
    the all-domain power of the fleet with the Joint Force and our allies
    and partners. Our fleet staffs are already fully integrating
    information warfare, space, cyber, and special operators, both Active
    and Reserve, into their teams to leverage the full power of our Navy.

        107. Senator Hawley. Admiral Gilday, there's a consensus that we've
    got to be able to quickly sink large numbers of Chinese ships in and
    around the Taiwan Strait if we're going to be able to deny a Chinese
    fait accompli against Taiwan, and the U.S. Navy's going to be a key
    part of that effort. Will the Navy's ability to sink Chinese ships in
    the Taiwan Strait increase or decrease over the next 7 years? Please
    provide an explanation for your response.
        Admiral Gilday. The Navy's ability to sink PLA(N) ships in the
    Taiwan Strait will increase in both count and efficiency by developing
    and procuring more effective and appropriate kill chains and munitions
    for the expected threats. The Navy is investing in increased combat
    lethality through more advanced payloads, such as Maritime Strike
    Tomahawk, Long Range Anti-Surface Missile, hypersonics, torpedo
    advancements, and Standard Missile Block 1B. The Navy will improve
    overall kill chain performance with the realization of Maritime
    Targeting Cell capability and Naval operational Architecture in the
    middle of this decade, as well as an array of counter-C5ISRT
    capabilities. F-35 and F/A-18 E/F modifications will improve aircraft
    survivability and combat effectiveness. MQ-25 Unmanned carrier-based
    aircraft will increase the strike range, capability, and lethality of
    the Carrier Air Wing. The Extra Large Unmanned Undersea Vessel will
    achieve initial capability in 2025 and will be capable of multiple
    missions, including mine warfare. Three mining programs--Clandestine
    Delivered Mine (CDM), Hammerhead Encapsulated Effector, and the
    Quickstrike Extended Range (QS-ER)--will all be fielded in the next 7
    years.

        108. Senator Hawley. Admiral Gilday, you said in February that
    ``I've concluded--consistent with the analysis--that we need a naval
    force of over 500 ships'' to execute the National Defense Strategy.
    Does it remain your opinion that the Navy needs a force of 500 ships to
    implement the National Defense Strategy? Please provide an explanation
    for your response.
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, based on past and ongoing force structure
    analysis, it is my best military advice that the size of the Navy grow
    to a 500-ship hybrid fleet by 2045. America needs a modern strategic
    deterrent; greater numbers of undersea capabilities; more distributable
    surface combatants; a host of manned, unmanned, and optionally-manned
    platforms--under, on, and above the seas; and a resilient logistics
    enterprise to sustain our distributed naval force. Integrated with the
    Joint Force and interoperable with our allies and partners, this all-
    domain, hybrid fleet will ensure our maritime superiority.
        However, I have consistently said that the Navy's size--our
    capacity--ultimately will be dictated by the budget's top line. We will
    not field a fleet larger than we can sustain. We also will not grow the
    Navy at the expense of building the Columbia--our top acquisition
    priority. Nor will we increase capacity by failing to modernize and
    sacrificing our combat credibility. Therefore, our focus is on
    delivering capable capacity.

        109. Senator Hawley. General Berger, the Force Design Annual Update
    also acknowledges that the Marine Corps previously ``focused the Marine
    Littoral Regiment too much on lethality and not enough on sensing, the
    ability to make sense, maneuverability, and deception.'' Can you
    elaborate on this lesson learned?
        General Berger. To be clear, lethality will always be important. A
    credible capability to hold an adversary's high value assets at risk is
    an essential ingredient of deterrence. That being said, our Campaign of
    Learning over the past 2 years has steadily reinforced the importance
    of other capabilities we are providing to our Stand-in Forces. Such
    forces, positioned well forward and in close proximity to an adversary,
    can gain and maintain custody of targets, sharing information with
    other elements of the Joint force, as well as coalition partners, thus
    enabling the closing of kill webs in such a way as to significantly
    enhance the versatility and lethality of all forces.
        Similarly, our Campaign of Learning has provided insights regarding
    the value of maneuver and deception. First, Stand-in Forces must be
    able to move rapidly, so as to gain and maintain positional advantage
    against an adversary that is likewise mobile. Second, our Stand-in
    Forces must leverage deception capabilities that will confuse the
    enemy's detection and targeting assets, thus providing us an advantage
    in the ``hider-finder'' competition.

        110. Senator Hawley. General Berger, what are some of the other key
    lessons learned thus far in the Force Design 2030 campaign, and how can
    Congress help you to adjust course as you identify and incorporate
    these lessons?
        General Berger. First, we believe have established an enduring
    process to responsibly modernize. By instituting a campaign of learning
    around a threat informed, concept based approached to capability
    development allows for continuous refinement of the force. Second,
    feedback from the fleet operating forces is a critical element in our
    historical combat development process and is integral to our Force
    Design approach today. As part of the May 2022 Force Design Annual
    Update, the Marine Corps will be updating the Service Level
    Experimentation Campaign Plan and publish an unclassified version no
    later than 30 June 2022. Lastly, the National Defense Strategy
    recognizes the military must be ready for a 21st century conflict
    against a near pear adversary. The Marine Corps is grateful for the
    support from Congress and will continue to ask the same as we modernize
    at speed to meet the current threat.

        111. Senator Hawley. Admiral Gilday, last year the Navy testified
    to the Seapower Subcommittee that it is developing a capability to
    reload VLS at sea. What is the status of that program?
        Admiral Gilday. We currently employ Expeditionary Reload Teams
    (ERT) to perform the Surface VLS Reload mission in austere or non-
    traditional locations. CRUDES VLS demonstrations to rearm pierside and
    at anchor by an Offshore Support Vessel are anticipated in late fiscal
    year 2022; a T-AKE Rearm effort will start in fiscal year 2023 and
    continue into fiscal year 2024 to develop and demonstrate a capability
    to rearm CRUDES VLS and submarine heavyweight torpedoes.
        From the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC)'s Navy
    Expeditionary Logistics Support Group (NAVELSG) we employ ERT to
    perform the Surface VLS Reload mission in austere or non-traditional
    locations (where minimal or no infrastructure support exists). The ERTs
    will play an important role in the Rearm-at-Sea initiative,
    specifically operating the Strike-Up/Strike-Down (SUDS) system being
    developed by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) and Naval Surface
    Warfare Center, Carderock Division (NSWC CD) for VLS Reload at
    anchorage or potentially underway, as well as other skin-to-skin
    evolutions (T-AKE-DDG/CG) which blends with the Navy Cargo Handling
    Battalion (NCHB) Surface Cargo handling capability.
        The Next Generation Logistics TTP Ship (NTS or MV Ocean Valor) was
    chartered starting in fiscal year 2021 and will demonstrate many
    logistics missions for refuel, rearm, and resupply. For VLS rearm
    demonstration to date, a pierside and at anchor VLS rearming event was
    planned for May 2022 but subsequently postponed due to CRUDES
    scheduling conflicts. Efforts are underway to reschedule. In fiscal
    year 2023, the project is currently funded at $0.0 million for VLS
    rearm. Future VLS rearm events may occur with additional funding.
    Charter for MV Ocean Valor concludes fiscal year 2025.
        T-AKE Rearm research and development efforts commence in fiscal
    year 2023 and continue into fiscal year 2024. The R&D efforts will
    determine the feasibility and material solutions for a T-AKE to
    successfully rearm CRUDES VLS and submarine heavyweight torpedoes. In
    fiscal year 2023, the project is funded at $3.3 million.

        112. Senator Hawley. Admiral Gilday, do you continue to believe a
    VLS reload capability is desirable for the surface Navy, given a
    disadvantage in strike capacity vis-a-vis the Peoples Liberation Army
    Navy?
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, Vertical Launch System (VLS) reload is a
    highly desirable capability for the Surface Navy.
        We currently employ Expeditionary Reload Teams (ERT) from Naval
    Cargo Handling Battalions (NCHB) to perform the Surface VLS Reload
    mission in austere or non-traditional locations. CRUDES VLS
    demonstrations to rearm pierside and at anchor by an Offshore Support
    Vessel by the ERT are anticipated in late fiscal year 2022; a T-AKE
    Rearm effort with the ERT will start in fiscal year 2023 and continue
    into fiscal year 2024 to develop and demonstrate a capability to rearm
    CRUDES VLS.

        113. Senator Hawley. Admiral Gilday, the press reports that the
    Navy rejected a 2020 proposal for a fifth shipyard in the Great Lakes
    region and remains concerned about a revised proposal. Given a shipyard
    capacity shortfall, why did the Navy evaluate this unfavorably, and
    does the Navy intend to pursue any further options for a fifth
    shipyard?
        Admiral Gilday. The Department of the Navy is committed to ensuring
    its public shipyards have the resources needed to execute the submarine
    and aircraft carrier sustainment and modernization missions. The Navy
    is making a once-in-a-century investment with the Shipyard
    Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP) that will fully update and
    upgrade the dry docks, infrastructure, and capital equipment at the
    Navy's four public shipyards that conduct depot-level maintenance on
    the Navy's submarines and aircraft carriers. The Navy is executing the
    Shipyard Performance-to-Plan and Naval Sustainment System--Shipyard
    efforts to better define and analyze current performance gaps, better
    predict operational readiness, drive efficiencies into shipyard
    processes, and eliminate barriers to productivity. While the current
    Los Angeles and Virginia-class submarine maintenance backlog is
    impacting current overall readiness, the above efforts are critical to
    ensuring future maintenance execution supports Navy readiness needs.
        I am confident that these efforts, along with continued
    collaboration and partnership with industry, will provide the capacity
    and capability at the four Naval shipyards necessary to execute
    submarine maintenance to meet or exceed the operational needs of the
    Fleet. Therefore, I do not foresee the need in the mid or long term for
    establishing additional nuclear submarine capable shipyards.
        The Navy has not conducted any recent studies focused on executing
    nuclear submarine maintenance at new shipyards. Instead, we are
    utilizing SIOP and Performance-to-Plan and Naval Sustainment System--
    Shipyard to upgrade the four naval shipyards so that they can execute
    maintenance availabilities on time every time.

        114. Senator Hawley. Admiral Gilday, how confident are you that we
    will retain our advantage in undersea warfare vis-a-vis the Chinese?
    Please provide an explanation for your response.
        Admiral Gilday. I am very confident in the United States Navy's
    undersea advantage against strategic competitors such as the People's
    Republic of China. Our Submarine Force and Undersea Warfare programs
    continue to represent the most technologically advanced systems in the
    world. From our Virginia-class submarines with Acoustic Superiority
    upgrades, our modern P-8 Maritime Patrol Aircraft, or our multi-purpose
    Arleigh Burke Destroyers, the United States Navy continues to modernize
    and advance our undersea capabilities. However, one of our greatest
    advantages that our adversaries cannot match is the operational
    excellence and experience of our sailors that operate these platforms
    and systems.

        115. Senator Hawley. Admiral Gilday, under what conditions would
    you begin to worry that the Chinese might be seriously eroding our
    advantage in the undersea domain?
        Admiral Gilday. The PRC has stated their desire to improve their
    undersea warfare capabilities. Over the last 5 years, we have seen
    evidence of their efforts through an increase in the number and quality
    of sensors, weapons, and platforms capable of exploiting this domain.
    The strength of People's Liberation Army-Navy, PLA(N), is their ability
    to rapidly produce weapon systems and supporting sensors and platforms.
    They still have key gaps, most notably their sailors lack the
    proficiency and experience to exploit their maritime capabilities to a
    level that would threaten our undersea dominance. For the PLA(N) to
    seriously erode our advantage would require improvements in all of
    their systems (sensors, weapons, and platforms) and a demonstrated,
    consistent proficiency with command and control and tactical
    exploitation using those systems.
        Every advancement that PLA-N makes has the potential to erode our
    advantage in the undersea domain unless we match or exceed it. It is
    vital that we maintain the commitment to our plans, programs, and
    operations to ensure we do not cede the advantages we currently have.
    We should be constructively dissatisfied with any potential loss of
    overmatch, and are committed to maintaining our dominance in the
    undersea domain giving us an asymmetric advantage over the PLA(N).
        I welcome the opportunity to brief you at the classified level with
    more specifics, if you desire.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Tommy Tuberville
                                ship maintenance
        116. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday, I
    understand that there is a debate over whether the industrial base has
    the capacity to support our ship maintenance workload. Is there
    currently a maintenance backlog for ships needing repairs in the U.S.?
        Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. Yes, the Total Backlog for
    the surface ships needing repair is $2.3 billion across the Future
    Years Defense Program, $535 million of this Total Backlog is based on
    known deferred maintenance and is executable as it was loaded into the
    Navy's forecasted workload in the Port Loading Charts. The remaining
    $1.8 billion of this Total Backlog applies to ships proposed to
    decommission (as of 1 June 2022).

        117. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday,
    recent Department of Defense budgets have included funds to upgrade the
    public naval shipyards, but have not invested in needed upgrades to
    private shipyards, who are essential partners in maintaining our ships
    and ensuring fleet readiness. What are your thoughts on encouraging the
    expansion of private shipyards to be ready for the future fleet?
        Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. Investment in private sector
    shipyards is required to repair and maintain the future fleet. These
    necessary investments range from shore power upgrades to dry dock
    procurement.
        In an effort to expand and evolve the repair industrial base to
    meet the needs of the future fleet, the Navy seeks to promote growth
    through a series of tiered levers. These levers could include
    communication of demand for private investment, Navy-industry
    partnership, or Navy investment. The approach to any given requirement
    varies based on a number of factors including port specific
    considerations, stability of demand, future growth, project risk, and
    barriers to entry.

      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR
             FISCAL YEAR 2023 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                             THURSDAY, MAY 19, 2022

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

     THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
                      ON ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Kelly,
    Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan,
    Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, and Tuberville.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. Good morning. The Committee meets today to
    receive testimony on the Department of Energy's Atomic Energy
    Defense programs in review of the Fiscal Year 2023 President's
    Defense Budget Request.
        I would like to welcome our witnesses, Secretary of Energy
    Jennifer Granholm and Administrator of the National Nuclear
    Security Administration Jill Hruby. Thank you for joining us. I
    also want to thank your Department's workforce for their
    dedicated service to our nation. Please relay that to them.
        The fiscal year 2023 budget request for the defense
    functions of the Department of Energy is $29.7 billion. This
    figure accounts for about 61 percent of the Department of
    Energy's overall $48 billion request. Given the share of the
    defense function of the Department's budget, it is important
    for this committee to continue its oversight of the
    Department's defense activities, which span items like
    maintaining our nuclear stockpile to cleaning up former Cold
    War defense production sites.
        Within this defense proposal, the National Nuclear Security
    Administration, or NNSA, is requesting $21.4 billion, a 3.2
    percent increase over last year's level of $20.6 billion. I
    would also note that the amount for the defense portion of
    environmental cleanup increased by 3 percent to $6.9 billion.
        The Strategic Forces Subcommittee held a hearing 2 weeks
    ago on the Nuclear Weapons Council, a statutory body that was
    created in the 1946 Atomic Energy Act to bridge the civilian-
    military relationship over the manufacturing and employment of
    nuclear weapons. By all accounts the message conveyed to the
    subcommittee was that the relationship between the Department
    of Defense and the National Nuclear Security Administration was
    healthy and productive.
        However, with respect to the Department's requirement to
    increase production of plutonium pits to a rate of 80 pits per
    year by 2030, the subcommittee found several issues.
    Significantly, the costs for converting the Mixed Oxide Fuel
    plant at the Savannah River Site have risen significantly from
    $4 billion to between $6 and $11 billion. Further, the project
    timeline stretched from the 2030 target to between 2032 or
    2035. We need to understand what has driven these overruns and
    how we can hold the Department of Energy accountable to this
    longstanding Department of Defense requirement.
        I understand that the NNSA is experiencing its highest
    workload since the 1980s as it manages five major warhead
    programs while rebuilding nuclear infrastructure that dates
    back 70 years to the Manhattan Project. This original
    infrastructure held up well through the first two cycles of
    triad modernization in the 1960s and 1980s, but it has
    essentially aged out for the third cycle that we are currently
    undertaking. I would like to know how NNSA is managing this
    workload while simultaneously modernizing its production
    facilities.
        Finally, I hope our witnesses will update us on efforts to
    continue cleaning up former defense production sites,
    particularly at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation. These are
    commitments made to local communities that we cannot walk away
    from. The Hanford site has 177 million gallons of radioactive
    waste stored in underground tanks, some which are leaking. Your
    Department is starting operations to remove the first 40
    percent of low-activity radioactive waste from these tanks,
    which accounts for 90 percent of the waste, and I commend you
    on this important milestone. I understand you are also holding
    discussions with the State of Washington on how to next remove
    the high-activity radioactive waste in the tanks. I would ask
    that you share how you are working with the state and local
    communities on these efforts.
        Again, I want to thank our witnesses for appearing today. I
    look forward to your testimonies.
        Now let me recognize the ranking member, Senator Inhofe.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES INHOFE

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I also want to
    welcome our witnesses. We have had the privilege of being with
    our witnesses on other issues in the past, and I am honored to
    have them here today.
        One of the things I have been proud of over the past few
    years is this committee's focus on rebuilding the foundation of
    United States national security, our nation's nuclear
    deterrent. We have made a lot of progress in this area over the
    past several years, but even that progress is just the first
    step in a long journey to make up for decades of neglect.
        A third of NNSA's facilities date back to World War II, and
    we have buildings where concrete has fallen from the ceiling.
    It has hit some of the workers. People are shocked when they
    hear of these things. We have to do better, and I think we all
    understand that.
        In contrast, our adversaries clearly see value in
    prioritizing their nuclear programs. Our lack of focus on
    competing in the nuclear arena puts us in danger of falling
    even further behind, and puts our nation and our allies at
    risk.
        China is expanding its military capabilities faster than
    any country in history. Its investments are shifting the global
    balance of power, and based on recent testimony, China's
    nuclear modernization continues to outpace even our worst
    predictions.
        Putin's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and his reckless
    threats of nuclear escalation have shattered the security of
    Europe, and for the first time in decades, forced Americans to
    face the possibility of a nuclear attack.
        Not to be outdone, North Korea is on a record pace for
    missile testing, and is reportedly preparing for another
    nuclear test.
        Unfortunately, the Administration's fiscal year 2023 DoD
    budget does not give DoD and NNSA the real growth they need to
    meet the National Defense Strategy. While we agreed on real
    growth last year, inflation has completely destroyed that.
        In fact, I have a letter from the administrator that says
    our plutonium pit production project is underfunded by $500
    million. This is the letter, and I want to make this a part of
    the record at this point.
        Chairman Reed. Without objection.
        [The information follows:]

        Senator Inhofe. In fact, we feel that this tells the whole
    story.
        I look forward to your testimony on these issues and the
    rest of the Department of Energy's national security
    priorities. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
        Secretary Granholm, please.

      STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JENNIFER GRANHOLM, SECRETARY OF
                                 ENERGY

        Secretary Granholm. Thank you so much, Chairman Reed and
    Ranking Member Inhofe. My thanks also to the members of the
    committee. It is a privilege to be before you once again on
    behalf of the Department of Energy and with Jill Hruby, our
    NNSA Administrator and the Under Secretary of Nuclear Security.
        As the 16th Secretary of Energy, I have the responsibility
    of leading this Department at a pivotal time. Putin's invasion
    of Ukraine, the outbreak of armed conflict on the European
    continent has underscored the absolute importance of the
    Department's national security mission. We appreciate the
    consistent, bipartisan support that the Senate Armed Services
    Committee has long given the Department when it comes to this
    mission, and we believe this committee will see in this latest
    budget request our resolute commitment to advancing that
    national security mission.
        I am pleased to note that the partnership between the
    Department and our NNSA, our National Nuclear Security
    Administration, is strong, it is collaborative, and likewise,
    we continue to work closely with our colleagues at the
    Department of Defense through the Nuclear Weapons Council.
        As security risks rise around the world, we know we must
    ensure that the nation's ability to respond to threats remains
    unmatched. At the same time, we know that our focus on
    responsiveness must be paired with one of responsibility. Our
    efforts begin, of course, with maintaining the safety,
    security, reliability, and effectiveness of the nuclear weapons
    stockpile. This is the cornerstone of our deterrent. It is
    critical to our ability to protect the American people and
    reassure our allies.
        Relatedly, our work to provide the U.S. Navy with safe and
    effective nuclear propulsion technology is essential to
    ensuring that our military is equipped to carry out their
    operations.
        Ultimately, though, we know that the nation is safer, and
    our deterrent is stronger, and our military is more effective
    when facing lower nuclear risks, and that is why we invest in
    nonproliferation and arms control and in efforts to counter the
    threat of nuclear terrorism. As the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review
    makes clear, each of these stock--stockpile management, naval
    propulsion, and nuclear risk reduction--are all top priorities
    for the Biden administration. Our budget request for fiscal
    year 2023 echoes this Administration's dedicated support for
    each.
        Let me just spend a minute to highlight a few other areas
    that are reflected in the budget request. First is taking care
    of the communities that have supported the nation's nuclear
    weapons programs and nuclear research. The Department's Office
    of Environmental Management is home to the world's largest
    environmental cleanup program. The program has completed
    operations at 92 of 107 cleanup sites over the past 30 years,
    and our environmental management team reached important
    milestones even this past 2 years, with contending with
    challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Our budget request
    will equip them with the resources they need to continue
    building on that track record.
        Second, infrastructure modernization and workforce
    development. As my colleague, Jill Hruby, will explain in
    greater detail, the NNSA is focused on mission delivery in a
    timely and cost-effective manner. Infrastructure and workforce
    are essential this goal. Approximately 60 percent of NNSA
    facilities are beyond their 40-year life expectancy, some, as
    has been noted, date back to the Manhattan Project. But our
    ability to execute our mission depends on a modern, flexible,
    and resilient nuclear security infrastructure, and that is why
    that means we have to continue to bring more of these
    facilities into the 21st century.
        We also have to make sure that we have top-notch talent to
    staff those facilities, by recruiting and training a new
    generation of employees across our national security portfolio.
    That is why we have requested investments in both our
    infrastructure and our workforce needs.
        I am mindful of the trust that this committee and the rest
    of Congress has placed in the Department, and I am proud to
    lead this team as we reduce nuclear risk while navigating an
    increasingly complex global environment. I thank you for your
    partnership in keeping the United States safe and secure, and
    we look forward to your questions.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
        Administrator Hruby, please.

    STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JILL HRUBY, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
                    NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

        Ms. Hruby. Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe,
    and members of the committee for the opportunity to appear
    before you. As Secretary Granholm said, we appreciate the
    committee's consistent, bipartisan support for the Department
    of Energy's enduring national security missions.
        Today we face a shifting geopolitical environment, rapidly
    evolving technological capabilities and modernization needs
    that are expanding our mission requirements. Meeting these
    challenges on behalf of the American people requires us to act
    in a responsive and responsible manner.
        To reach our objectives we are simultaneously executing our
    largest weapon modernization program in decades, while
    recapitalizing our infrastructure and investing in cutting-edge
    scientific, engineering, and technical capabilities. We are
    also providing critical resources to our nonproliferation,
    counterproliferation, and naval nuclear propulsion programs
    that play an important, complementary role to our weapons
    programs. We feel a sense of urgency in achieving our
    objectives and will act to meet our goals in a timely and cost-
    effective manner.
        The challenges ahead are significant, but I am confident in
    the Department's ability to rise to the occasion, in
    partnership with Congress and our colleagues in the Departments
    of State, Defense, Homeland Security, and around the world.
        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The joint prepared statement of Secretary Jennifer M.
    Granholm and The Honorable Jill M. Hruby follows:]

      Joint Prepared Statement by Secretary Jennifer M. Granholm and The
                            Honorable Jill M. Hruby
        Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and esteemed Members of the
    Committee, it is an honor for us to appear before you today on behalf
    of the Department of Energy (DOE) and National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA). We recognize and appreciate the Committee's
    consistent support for DOE's enduring national security missions.
        As the 16th Secretary of Energy and the 8th Under Secretary for
    Nuclear Security, we have the privilege and responsibility of leading
    the Department at a pivotal time. We recognize the importance of moving
    decisively to strengthen America's nuclear security through its defense
    modernization, nonproliferation, naval propulsion, and environmental
    cleanup efforts. As the solutions department we are ready to overcome
    the challenges and deliver results.
        The nation's nuclear weapons stockpile remains the cornerstone of
    our deterrent and a key tool in reassuring our allies. We must remain
    committed to the safety, security, reliability, and effectiveness of
    the nuclear weapons stockpile through sustainment and modernization
    efforts, infrastructure recapitalization, and the rigorous application
    of cutting-edge science and technology. We recognize that our deterrent
    is more effective when nuclear risks are reduced. Therefore, the
    Department works diligently to prevent the proliferation of nuclear
    weapons and prevent terrorist and other non-State actors from acquiring
    nuclear and other radiological material. Additionally, the Department
    provides the U.S. Navy's submarines and aircraft carriers with
    militarily effective nuclear propulsion plants and continues to test
    and provide for their safety, reliability, and longevity. The
    Department recognizes the Administration's strong support for these
    programs as outlined in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the
    President's Fiscal Year 2023 Budget.
        The Fiscal Year 2023 Budget reflects the Administration's
    commitment to protecting our national security, cleaning up legacy
    pollution from historic nuclear activities, and transitioning the U.S.
    to clean energy.
                     nnsa fiscal year 2023 budget overview
        Fully informed by the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the Fiscal
    Year 2023 Budget reflects a commitment to:

          a safe, secure, reliable, and effective nuclear weapons
    stockpile

          nonproliferation, and counterproliferation and
    counterterrorism response to reduce global nuclear threats

          the design, production, and provisioning of naval nuclear
    propulsion capabilities.

        NNSA continues to execute its largest stockpile modernization
    program in decades; develop and recapitalize an adaptive, resilient,
    and modern infrastructure; and advance cutting-edge science and
    engineering programs to oversee stockpile assessment and certification
    activities. In all NNSA programs, we implement exceptional physical and
    cybersecurity systems to guard critical assets.
        The President's Fiscal Year 2023 Budget for NNSA is $21.4 billion,
    an increase of $1.0 billion, and the largest request in NNSA history.
    \1\ While the nuclear stockpile is safe, secure, reliable, and
    effective, NNSA is aware that legacy infrastructure is well beyond its
    intended life designs and incapable of providing all the capabilities
    needed to deliver on the modernization efforts, especially with the
    demanding production schedules. With consistent, sustained, bipartisan
    support from the Administration and Congress, NNSA will make the
    necessary investments to maintain a safe, secure, reliable, and
    effective nuclear weapons stockpile; modernize the nuclear security
    infrastructure; reinvigorate American leadership in arms control and
    nonproliferation; and provide safe and effective nuclear propulsion
    systems for the U.S. Navy.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Funding does not reflect the mandated transfer of $92.75
    million in fiscal year 2022 to the Office of Nuclear Energy for
    operation of the Advanced Test Reactor.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Also, NNSA must grow its human capital and is recruiting a top-
    tier, next generation workforce, developing talent, and creating more
    competitive benefits and compensation programs to help retain people
    with requisite skills during the `Great Resignation' occurring
    nationwide. Together, the people, the facilities, the equipment are the
    best way to provide a resilient and adaptive Nuclear Security
    Enterprise for the future.
        NNSA understands the urgency to deliver and is thankful for the
    trust and support of Congress and the American people.
                               weapons activities
        The fiscal year 2023 budget request for the Weapons Activities
    account is $16.5 billion, an increase of $566 million, or 3.7 percent,
    over fiscal year 2022 enacted levels. This request will be supplemented
    with prior year balances of $396 million. This budget request supports
    the Administration's commitment to modernize all three legs of the
    nuclear triad supported by a flexible, resilient infrastructure and
    protected by highly capable physical, and cyber security.
        The request underscores delivering for our partners at the
    Department of Defense (DoD) while retaining the highest safety
    standards and proceeding in a cost-effective manner. It provides for
    the maintenance and refurbishment of nuclear weapons to maintain
    confidence in their safety, security, reliability, and military
    effectiveness without resuming explosive nuclear testing;
    infrastructure revitalization; investment in scientific, engineering,
    and manufacturing capabilities; and greater resources for physical and
    cybersecurity to foster responsiveness and resilience.
    Stockpile Management
        For Stockpile Management, the fiscal year 2023 budget request is
    $4.9 billion, an increase of $291 million, or 6.3 percent, over the
    fiscal year 2022 enacted level. Funding in this portfolio fully
    supports all five ongoing stockpile life extension and modernization
    programs; stockpile maintenance, surveillance, and assessment
    activities; and the safe dismantlement and disposition of excess
    nuclear weapons and components. The fiscal year 2023 request also
    includes funding to support the current production capabilities
    required for the above activities, as well as Nuclear Enterprise
    Assurance (NEA)--a new effort that helps prevent, detect, and mitigate
    adversarial subversion risks to the nuclear weapons stockpile.
        W88 Alteration (Alt) 370: NNSA is requesting $162 million in fiscal
    year 2023 for the W88 Alt 370 program. The Program is expected to enter
    Phase 6.6, Full Scale Production in July 2022. Production is currently
    on schedule to meet requested DoD deployment schedules.
        B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP): NNSA is requesting $672
    million in fiscal year 2023 for the B61-12 LEP. The Program is expected
    to enter Phase 6.6, Full Scale Production in June 2022. The First
    Production Unit (FPU) was completed in November 2021 and production is
    currently on schedule to meet DoD deployment schedules.
        W80-4 LEP: NNSA is requesting $1.1 billion in fiscal year 2023 for
    the W80-4 LEP. The program is currently in Phase 6.3 Development
    Engineering, and plans to enter Phase 6.4, Production Engineering in
    fiscal year 2023. The FPU date is currently being re-evaluated due to
    COVID-19 impacts, hiring issues, and component technical challenges. An
    updated schedule will be developed by mid-2022. NNSA remains confident
    in meeting schedule requirements to support the U.S. Air Force's (USAF)
    schedule for the Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) cruise missile Initial
    Operating Capability.
        W87-1 Modification Program: NNSA is requesting $680 million in
    fiscal year 2023 for the W87-1 Modification Program. The W87-1 will
    replace the aging W78 warhead and deploy new technologies that improve
    safety, address obsolete design and materials, and streamline
    manufacturability. The funding request supports plans for a FPU in
    fiscal year 2030 to field the warhead on the USAF Ground-Based
    Strategic Deterrent (Sentinel) missile system in the Mk21A reentry
    vehicle. NNSA plans to enter Phase 6.3, Development Engineering, in
    fiscal year 2022.
        W93/Mk7: NNSA is requesting $240.5 million in fiscal year 2023 for
    the W93 program. In February 2022, the NWC voted to authorize the W93's
    entry into Phase 2, Feasibility Study and Design Options. The W93
    incorporates modern technologies that will allow the U.S. to keep pace
    with future threats and allow for operational flexibility during the
    Navy's transition from the Ohio to Columbia-class ballistic missile
    submarines. All W93 key nuclear components are based on currently
    deployed and previously tested designs and so will not require nuclear
    explosive testing to certify.
    Production Modernization
        The fiscal year 2023 budget request for Production Modernization is
    $4.64 billion, an increase of $484 million, or 11.6 percent, over the
    fiscal year 2022 enacted level. \2\ Activities covered by this funding
    include both primary and secondary capability modernization as well as
    non-nuclear components.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ The change from fiscal year 2022 enacted is made on a
    comparable basis using the budget structure proposed for the fiscal
    year 2023 request.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Primary Capability Modernization includes the plutonium pit, high
    explosive, and energetics programs. NNSA's most intense
    recapitalization need in this area is the reconstitution of plutonium
    pit production fabrication operations. NNSA is required to produce no
    fewer than 80 plutonium pits per year (ppy) during 2030. NNSA is
    committed to reaching that goal as close to 2030 as possible utilizing
    a two-site pit production strategy at Los Alamos National Laboratory
    (LANL) and the Savannah River Site (SRS). The fiscal year 2023 budget
    request boosts funding for pit production and associated efforts by 26
    percent compared to fiscal year 2022. At LANL, fiscal year 2023 funds
    will be used for equipment installation activities, including adding
    equipment in Plutonium Facility 4 to support 30 ppy by fiscal year
    2026. At SRS, NNSA is currently executing design activities for the
    Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility, which is funded according
    to NNSA's independent cost estimate in the Fiscal Year 2023 Budget, as
    it moves toward Critical Decision (CD-2). CD-2 will be achieved once 90
    percent of design is complete in early fiscal year 2024. A two-site
    approach provides sufficient capacity to meet program requirements and
    resiliency in the event of unanticipated issues at one site.
        Secondary Capability Modernization includes uranium, lithium, and
    tritium processing efforts. Each of these programs support stockpile
    sustainment and modernization efforts and are currently facing degraded
    capabilities and insufficient capacity to meet future mission
    requirements. NNSA is undertaking significant, long-term infrastructure
    investments to address the situation. For example, the Uranium
    Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 National Security Complex will
    reduce mission dependency on Building 9212, which is currently over 75
    years old, while increasing safety and efficiency. UPF is one of the
    largest construction projects in NNSA history and at its peak will
    support a construction workforce of over 3,000. Ongoing supply chain
    issues and delays associated with the COVID-19 pandemic will result in
    a short extension beyond the scheduled completion date of December
    2025, however, there are no anticipated impacts to warhead deliverables
    as the legacy site will remain operational throughout the transition.
    NNSA is also continuing investments in the Depleted Uranium (DU)
    Modernization Program initiated at Y-12 in fiscal year 2021. Depleted
    Uranium is a key component for the manufacturing of radiation cases for
    weapons systems and current capabilities cannot meet reliability or
    capacity requirements.
        To ensure adequate quantities of lithium, NNSA is in the process of
    creating a Lithium Processing Facility (LPF). LPF will replace current
    capabilities housed at Y-12. Current capabilities can provide
    sufficient supply through 2035 but take place in an aging facility with
    significant infrastructure challenges. LPF will alleviate those
    infrastructure issues while providing expanded capacity to meet demand
    beyond 2035.
        To provide adequate quantities of tritium, NNSA is in the process
    of creating a Tritium Finishing Facility (TFF) at Savannah River Site.
    TFF will replace a 1950's-era facility and will house finishing,
    packing, and shipping functions for gas reservoirs. Doing so will meet
    an important mission need and assist the program in meeting current
    safety standards. Construction of the site preparation subproject is
    scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2024. NNSA also supports continued
    research and development for a future Domestic Uranium Enrichment
    capability to provide enriched uranium for national defense purposes
    including tritium production.
        Non-nuclear components (NNCs) include a wide array of parts that
    weaponize the nuclear explosive package. NNCs account for over half the
    cost of weapon modernizations due to the number of components, their
    complexity, and their need to withstand extreme conditions over the
    life of the warhead. The fiscal year 2023 request includes funding to:
    provide equipment for increased manufacturing capacity at the Kansas
    City National Security Campus; reconstitute thermal spray capability
    for weapon modernization; recapitalize radiation and major
    environmental test facilities at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL)
    used to design and qualify NNCs; and tools and equipment at the
    Microsystems Engineering, Science and Applications (MESA) Complex at
    SNL, which serves as the only approved source of trusted, strategically
    radiation hardened microelectronics.
    Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering
        The fiscal year 2023 budget request for Stockpile Research,
    Technology, and Engineering (SRT&E) is $2.89 billion, a decrease of $83
    million, or 2.8 percent below the fiscal year 2022 enacted level. \3\
    The decrease results from the use of carryover balances to continue
    construction of the U1a Complex Enhancement Project at the Nevada
    National Security Site (NNSS). Funding across the remainder of the
    SRT&E request is in-line with the fiscal year 2022 enacted level. This
    portfolio covers activities which support science-based stockpile
    assessments and warhead modernization program certifications without
    needing to resume underground nuclear testing. We remain fully
    confident in our unmatched scientific and technical capabilities and
    are committed to their continuous improvement. The fiscal year 2023
    budget request will provide significant investment in several short and
    long-term programs which reflect that commitment.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ The change from fiscal year 2022 enacted is made on a
    comparable basis using the budget structure proposed for the fiscal
    year 2023 request.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments (ECSE) will
    produce experimental data at NNSS that will enable assessments of the
    current stockpile and certification of the future stockpile without
    returning to underground nuclear-explosive testing. ECSE experiments
    will remain subcritical throughout the experiment to comply with U.S.
    ``Zero Yield'' policy. NNSA is requesting $277 million for this program
    in fiscal year 2023, an increase of $61.6 million, or 28 percent, over
    the fiscal year 2022 enacted level.
        The Stockpile Responsiveness Program (SRP) is responsible for
    exercising and enhancing capabilities that improve responsiveness to
    future threats, trends, and developments not already covered by
    existing life extension programs. Significant resources in this program
    are devoted to addressing issues in manufacturing, digital engineering,
    component and system prototyping, and testing. The funding request for
    SRP in fiscal year 2023 is $68.7 million.
        The Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) Program supports stockpile
    assessment and certification efforts by providing the conditions
    necessary to collect data in the extreme conditions of nuclear weapon
    operation. The ICF Program also conducts experiments related to
    thermonuclear fusion with the goal of creating high fusion yield in a
    laboratory setting. The fiscal year 2023 request is $544 million, a
    decrease of $36 million, or 6 percent, compared to the fiscal year 2022
    enacted level. This decrease reflects an fiscal year 2022 congressional
    appropriation $51 million above the requested amount. NNSA will also
    participate, where aligned to our stewardship mission, in a new, cross-
    Departmental initiative in fusion energy with the Office of Science
    (SC) Office of Fusion Energy Sciences, the Advanced Research Projects
    Agency Energy, the Office of Nuclear Energy, and the Office of the
    Under Secretary for Science and Innovation that is aimed at advancing
    the technology to realize fusion energy on the grid in a decadal
    timeframe.
        NNSA's Exascale Computing Initiative (ECI)--a joint program with
    the DOE's Office of Science (SC)--will provide NNSA with next-
    generation simulation capabilities to support weapons design, stockpile
    stewardship, and stockpile certification. NNSA continues its strong
    partnership with SC in achieving the goals for exascale computing. The
    NNSA's fiscal year 2023 budget request for ECI is $160 million, a
    decrease of $44 million, or 21.5 percent, compared to the fiscal year
    2022 enacted level. This decrease reflects NNSA plans to bring the
    exascale high performance computing system, El Capitan, online in
    fiscal year 2023 at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory-the third of
    three exascale computers planned for deployment by DOE (including
    Frontier at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Aurora at Argonne
    National Laboratory). The fiscal year 2023 request will continue
    funding maturation and transition of the next-generation simulation and
    computing technologies for production use. Finally, NNSA continues to
    partner with the SC Office of Advanced Scientific Computing Research to
    support the DOE Computational Science Graduate Fellowship, which
    contributes to development of and increasing the availability and
    diversity of skilled computational scientists, mathematicians, and
    engineers needed to meet the needs of the Department's missions.
        The growing needs of NNSA's mission require a diverse base of a
    highly skilled, technical workforce. NNSA's Academic Programs are
    designed to foster, attract, and retain such a workforce. The fiscal
    year 2023 budget request for these programs is $100.5 million, a
    decrease of $11.4 million, or 10 percent, compared to the fiscal year
    2022 enacted level. This decrease reflects Congress' strong support
    during the fiscal year 2022 appropriations cycle in which NNSA's
    Academic Programs were given a significant uplift compared to the
    requested amount. NNSA remains thankful for congressional recognition
    and support for this important program. Funding will support the
    implementation of the Administration's Executive Order on Advanced
    Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities through increased
    engagement between the Nuclear Security Enterprise and Historically
    Black Colleges and Universities, Tribal Colleges and Universities, and
    other Minority Serving Institutions. It will also foster greater
    engagement with students from diverse backgrounds through internships,
    apprenticeships, and fellowship opportunities, in coordination with
    other DOE offices.
                    improving infrastructure and operations
        A resilient, flexible, and scalable infrastructure is the
    foundation of a modern nuclear security enterprise. Approximately 60
    percent of NNSA facilities were beyond their 40-year life expectancy at
    the end of fiscal year 2021 with multiple facilities dating back to the
    Manhattan Project. Consistent congressional support and sustained
    funding have enabled NNSA to make progress on some of its most pressing
    infrastructure needs and is vital to ongoing efforts to fully
    recapitalize facilities, office buildings, power grids, roads, and
    equipment.
        The fiscal year 2023 budget request for Infrastructure and
    Operations is $2.63 billion, an increase of $144 million, or 5.8
    percent, over the fiscal year 2022 enacted amount. \4\ This increase
    will enable NNSA to incorporate lessons learned from the Infrastructure
    Modernization Initiative that will help streamline construction
    practices to save time and money on low-risk, non-nuclear, construction
    projects. NNSA remains grateful for congressional support that raised
    the minor construction authority from $10 million to $20 million in
    fiscal year 2018. Since fiscal year 2018, NNSA has completed 16 minor
    projects valued between $10 and $20 million. NNSA intends to build on
    these accomplishments and the additional authority granted by Congress
    in the Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) which
    raised the cap to $25 million to accelerate the pace of
    recapitalization.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ The change from fiscal year 2022 enacted is made on a
    comparable basis using the budget structure proposed for the fiscal
    year 2023 request.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Across the enterprise, NNSA is using data-driven, risk informed
    tools and initiatives to accelerate the delivery and reduce the cost of
    commercial-like construction projects. In fiscal year 2019 NNSA
    established the Enhanced Minor Construction & Commercial Standards
    (EMC2) pilot program to explore and challenge NNSA's execution of low-
    risk construction projects. There are currently 10 projects in the
    pilot, including the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's Emergency
    Operations Center (EOC) which was the first pilot project to be
    completed earlier this year. In the four projects currently underway,
    estimated cost savings range between approximately 12-31 percent.
    Another six projects in the pipeline are expected to realize savings
    between 17-38 percent.
        As DOE/NNSA confront climate change, we recognize that more
    frequent and higher intensity storms, wildfires, and extreme
    temperatures have the potential to disrupt NNSA's mission and pose a
    national security risk. NNSA currently utilizes a prioritization
    methodology for infrastructure recapitalization that takes
    sustainability and resilience into account along with measures such as
    safety and mission risk. In fiscal year 2023 NNSA will increase its
    emphasis on climate resiliency through the Energy Resilient
    Infrastructure and Climate Adaptation (ERICA) initiative. ERICA
    utilizes direct-and indirect-funded infrastructure programs and
    alternative financing to address adaptation and resilience.
                        defense nuclear security efforts
        The Office of Defense Nuclear Security (DNS) provides protection
    for NNSA's infrastructure, personnel, and critical assets necessary for
    the successful execution of important national security missions. The
    fiscal year 2023 budget request for Defense Nuclear Security is $882.3
    million, an increase of $38.2 million, or 4.5 percent, over the fiscal
    year 2022 enacted level. DNS has experienced increased program
    requirements recently that require additional resources to maintain
    sufficient capabilities. This includes additional allocations for
    plutonium pit production efforts, preparation for UPF operations, and
    other projects. DNS remains focused on recapitalization and improvement
    of physical security with several new projects and the deployment of
    new systems. Efforts are also underway to counter unmanned aircraft
    systems. The first such counter-platform was deployed at LANL in
    December 2017. Deployment at other facilities is expected to reach
    completion near the end of fiscal year 2022.
                    cybersecurity and information technology
        The fiscal year 2023 budget request for information technology and
    cybersecurity is $445.7 million, $39.1 million, or 9.6 percent, over
    the fiscal year 2022 enacted amount. This request funds ongoing
    operations and invests in improvements across NNSA to modernize both
    classified and unclassified systems, improves information management
    and data governance, implements critical aspects of a zero-trust
    architecture in our networks and systems, and allows for the execution
    of a robust cybersecurity program.
        To strengthen oversight of the cyber program, the budget request
    includes a recategorization of certain Cybersecurity program
    investments into the Information Technology program. As a result, the
    request more clearly reflects investments in cybersecurity tools and
    services provided to the enterprise, maintains core cyber operations at
    the labs, plants, and sites, and improves management and transparency
    of these funds.
                        defense nuclear nonproliferation
        For decades, the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)
    has served as a source of innovative solutions and technical expertise
    to fulfill one of NNSA's primary missions of reducing nuclear risk.
    Working with international organizations, partner countries, and the
    private sector, DNN seeks to eliminate proliferation sensitive
    materials and prevent the spread of technologies, expertise, and
    components that would enable the creation of a nuclear or radiological
    device. The fiscal year 2023 budget request for the DNN account is $2.3
    billion, an increase of $274 million, or 13.2 percent, over the fiscal
    year 2022 enacted level. When the use of prior year balances is
    considered, the account funding increases by $397 million, or 19.2
    percent. The use of prior year balances will allow DNN programs to
    supplement new budget authority across its programs. This account funds
    all nonproliferation in the offices of Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation, Emergency Operations, and Counterterrorism and
    Counterproliferation.
        DNN continues to deliver on its objectives and confront current and
    anticipated proliferation challenges. This includes the growing Russian
    and Chinese nuclear programs, the invasion of Ukraine, risks related to
    the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs, and disruptive new
    technologies that lower the barrier to proliferation. Globally, DNN has
    to date eliminated 7,270 kilograms of weapons-usable nuclear material
    from 48 countries and Taiwan; removed the need to utilize weapon-grade
    materials at over 108 civilian research reactors and isotope production
    facilities; converted a cumulative total of 1,201 kilograms of
    plutonium into an oxide form for disposition; and worked with domestic
    producers to secure a sufficient global supply of the critical medical
    isotope molybdenum-99 (Mo-99), which is used in over 40,000 procedures
    every day in the United States, without the use of highly enriched
    uranium, to meet the needs of patients in the U.S.
        DNN's Nonproliferation and Arms Control Program also continues to
    cooperate closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to
    provide subject matter expertise, implement safeguards, and develop new
    policies and technologies for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This
    is especially important as nuclear power use grows and new reactor
    technologies are developed as a means for combating climate change. New
    nuclear safeguards and monitoring and verification technologies are
    needed to secure materials and to detect proliferation activities
    early.
        DNN also sustains a robust research program that provides space-
    based sensors to monitor nuclear activities as well as supports efforts
    to detect proliferation early in the process. Our DNN R&D program
    additionally sustains expertise in labs and universities, including
    people and test beds, and develops ways to get ahead of emerging
    threats.
                    nuclear terrorism and incident response
        The fiscal year 2023 request for the Nuclear Counterterrorism and
    Incident Response (NCTIR) Program is $439 million, an increase of $68
    million, or 18.4 percent, over the fiscal year 2022 enacted amount.
    NCTIR supports two subprograms: Counterterrorism and
    Counterproliferation (CTCP) and Emergency Operations (EO).
        CTCP is tasked with countering nuclear terrorism and proliferation,
    responding to nuclear incidents and accidents around the world, and
    building domestic and international partner capacity for emergency
    preparedness and nuclear incident response. CTCP's unique operational
    capabilities and highly knowledgeable experts provide a strong defense
    against the possibility of a terrorist nuclear attack and broader
    nuclear proliferation, making the office a key element of the U.S.
    Government's layered defense against nuclear threats. NNSA's
    ``Capability Forward'' initiative is an example of this posture.
    Working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, NNSA, through CTCP,
    provides equipment, training, and technical advice to regional counter-
    weapons of mass destruction teams in 14 major U.S. cities to accelerate
    life-saving responses to nuclear incidents.
        CTCP also manages the Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST), a
    group of highly trained technical specialists able to respond to
    nuclear incidents and accidents worldwide. NEST's missions include both
    national security and public health and safety components. NEST
    capabilities include an extensive nuclear forensics repertoire and
    advanced sensors to locate and neutralize nuclear threats. Throughout
    the Ukraine crisis, NEST personnel have been closely involved in United
    States efforts to analyze potential radioactive threats resulting from
    military activity in Ukraine, including the monitoring safety and
    security in and around nuclear power plants and other nuclear
    facilities. NEST personnel are prepared to rapidly provide information
    following the use of nuclear or radiological weapons if they are
    employed in the region.
        EO provides both the structure and methods to deploy a
    comprehensive and integrated approach to all-hazards emergency
    management, improving the readiness and effectiveness of the DOE
    Emergency Management System. The fiscal year 2023 budget request
    supports, among other items, 24/7/365 Consolidated Emergency Operations
    Center communications and coordination to support the DOE/NNSA
    Emergency Management Enterprise and Departmental Senior Leadership.
                                 naval reactors
        The Office of Naval Reactors provides the Nation's submarines and
    aircraft carriers with unmatched mobility, flexibility, and endurance
    thanks to its exceptional handling of the Nation's naval nuclear
    propulsion technologies. The ability to maintain robust fleet
    capabilities on long-term missions is essential for the security of
    global trade and our allies. Our ability to maintain a technological
    edge in this field provides the U.S. Navy with a decisive edge in naval
    warfare and provides for the security and reliability of the sea-based
    leg of the nuclear triad.
        The fiscal year 2023 budget request for Naval Reactors is $2.08
    billion, an increase of $163 million, or 8.5 percent, above the fiscal
    year 2022 enacted level. Funding supports Naval Reactors' three major
    projects: the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine reactor
    systems development; construction of the Naval Spent Fuel Handling
    Facility in Idaho; and the refueling and overhaul of the S8G Prototype
    land-based reactor in New York to support sailor training and
    technology testing. Naval Reactors is committed to supporting the safe
    and reliable operation of the nuclear-powered fleet and advancing
    technological development to bring improvements in performance,
    manufacturability, and affordability--for current and future warships.
        The Department is an active participant in the AUKUS trilateral
    security partnership. The Australian, UK, and United States Governments
    are currently in an 18-month consultation period to establish the best
    path forward for the delivery of a conventionally armed, nuclear-
    powered submarine capability to Australia as quickly as possible. As
    part of the international working group developing nonproliferation and
    safeguards aspects of the AUKUS program, NNSA will provide technical
    advice to the interagency and our AUKUS partners on the full suite of
    requirements that underpin nuclear stewardship to achieve our objective
    of upholding the highest nonproliferation standards. This cooperation
    is fully consistent with each partner's respective obligations under
    the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We remain heavily focused on the
    Administration's long-standing commitment to promoting nonproliferation
    where possible.
                                 nnsa workforce
        To manage this broad portfolio, NNSA depends upon recruiting,
    training, and retaining a highly technical Federal and M&O workforce.
    The NNSA Federal workforce consists of a diverse team of scientists,
    engineers, project and program managers, foreign affairs specialists,
    and support staff that perform program and project management and
    appropriate oversight of the national security missions related to
    Weapons Activities and Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. The fiscal
    year 2023 budget request for Federal Salaries and Expenses (FSE) is
    $496.4 million, an increase of $32 million, or 7 percent, above the
    fiscal year 2022 enacted level.
            new era of progress for environmental management mission
        As important as the missions of today and tomorrow are, the cold
    war left an indelible mark on America. It is the mission of the Office
    of Environmental Management (EM) is to address the legacy of nuclear
    weapons development and government-sponsored nuclear energy research
    that has played a significant role in domestic security and prosperity.
        As the largest environmental cleanup program in the world, EM plays
    a key role in the Department's overarching mission to protect the
    planet. The Department's fiscal year 2023 budget request of $7.6
    billion will help EM continue to make progress in fulfilling the
    government's responsibility to clean up the environment in communities
    that supported nuclear weapons programs and government-sponsored
    nuclear energy research.
        Over the last 30 years, EM has significant progress for the
    environment, completing cleanup at 92 out of a total of 107 sites.
    Despite a global pandemic, the program has continued to achieve a set
    of impactful accomplishments at sites across the country.
        Deactivation and demolition work at the Oak Ridge National
    Laboratory and the Y-12 National Security Complex is reducing
    environmental risks and enabling research and national security
    missions. At the Hanford site in Washington State, EM is treating
    radioactive and chemical waste from large underground tanks for the
    first time ever on a large scale. At the Savannah River Site in Aiken,
    South Carolina EM is processing record amounts of tank waste and
    recently broke ground on the Advanced Manufacturing Collaborative
    facility which will help meet the needs of the Department's cleanup
    mission and create an environment to develop a diverse and talented
    next generation workforce. The EM team in Idaho recently completed
    buried waste remediation, helping to protect the Snake River Aquifer.
    More than 200 transuranic waste shipments were received last year at
    the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico. Cleanup activities at
    the Brookhaven National Laboratory in New York are complete, as well as
    environmental remediation work at the Tonopah Test Range in Nevada.
        The fiscal year 2023 request for EM, which builds on recent
    progress, reflects the Department's strong commitment to protecting the
    environment, enabling national security and scientific research
    missions, and delivering for communities most impacted by the legacy of
    the past. The request supports a ramp up in EM's ability to tackle tank
    waste--one of the Department's largest environmental challenges and
    financial liabilities. The request will also enable continued progress
    in infrastructure improvements at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant and
    support an increased rate of waste shipments from across the EM
    program. In addition, EM will continue to advance facility demolition
    and risk reduction projects across the program.
        The fiscal year 2023 request include $6.9 billion for defense
    environmental cleanup activities, which covers most major EM sites and
    includes the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning
    Fund contribution. The request of $1.6 billion for the Office of River
    Protection will enable EM to remain on track to initiate vitrification
    of Hanford tank waste by the end of 2023 through the Direct Feed Low
    Activity Waste (DFLAW) approach. Also at Hanford, the request of $913
    million for the Richland Operations Office will enable continued risk
    reduction activities including placing another former production
    reactor into interim safe storage, advancing the transfer of cesium and
    strontium capsules to dry storage and treating another 2 billion
    gallons of contaminated groundwater.
        At the Savannah River Site, the request of $1.7 billion supports
    utilization of capabilities to accelerate the tank waste mission. The
    request will also maintain a high State of readiness for H Canyon, the
    only chemical separations facility remaining in operation in the United
    States.
        At the Idaho Cleanup Project, the request of $379 million supports
    operations of the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit which will ultimately
    treat about 900,000 gallons of liquid waste by turning it into a
    granular solid. The Department will also meet another key commitment to
    the State of Idaho by completing the transfer of EM-owned spent nuclear
    fuel to onsite dry storage.
        Along with providing for continued Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
    operations, the budget request supports key modernization and
    infrastructure recapitalization priorities. Shipments of legacy
    transuranic waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant will progress from
    sites across the DOE complex, including the Los Alamos National
    Laboratory in New Mexico, where deactivation and decommissioning of
    NNSA's Ion Beam Facility will be initiated in fiscal year 2023. The
    request also includes $12 million to support continued D&D efforts for
    excess facilities at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory where
    the removal of the Livermore Pool Type Reactor was recently completed.
        EM's fiscal year 2023 budget also facilitates the Department's
    broader national security and scientific research missions. The request
    includes $499 million for Oak Ridge, which will enable EM to continue
    cleanup operations at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Y-12
    National Security Complex excess facilities. The request also enables
    EM to advance progress on the disposition of the remaining uranium-233
    inventory at ORNL and address transuranic debris and sludges.
        In addition to enabling impactful progress at EM sites, the fiscal
    year 2023 request reflects a planning approach that will boost the
    Department's ability to complete its cleanup mission and deliver for
    impacted communities.
        The Department is leveraging the expertise of the Savannah River
    National Laboratory to develop innovative solutions in the fields of
    environmental cleanup, national security and science and energy
    security that will benefit EM, the NNSA and other DOE missions.
        The fiscal year 2023 request invests in building a workforce for
    the future that promotes diversity, equity, inclusion, and
    accessibility. That includes high-quality jobs in environmental cleanup
    where workers from all backgrounds can make a living and make a
    difference. The budget request includes $56 million for EM's newly
    expanding Minority Serving Institutions Partnership Program. This
    program will be primarily focused on Historically Black Colleges and
    Universities and other Minority Serving Institutions with research
    specialties needed to advance the EM mission.
        EM is prepared to put resources to work to enhance environmental
    protections and remediate sites so they can be transitioned to future
    uses in local communities that helped the Nation win the cold war and
    maintain peace for decades. The fiscal year 2023 request represents a
    significant investment in helping the communities grow and thrive in
    the future. The cleanup mission itself is aligned with broader
    environmental justice goals that lead to a vibrant future in all
    communities.
        The budget request further boosts support for the Tribal Nations,
    Alaska Native communities, and communities near EM sites ensuring they
    are safe, providing opportunities for local input into clean up
    priorities and helping build a vibrant future. The request includes
    Payment in Lieu of Taxes funding for communities near Hanford and
    Savannah River to support schools, roads and other local priorities. A
    $40 million investment is included to establish a new Community
    Capacity Building initiative. In addition, the EM Los Alamos Field
    Office was selected as one of five DOE pilot programs for the cross-
    cutting Justice40 Initiative. This whole-of-government effort will
    continue to grow in fiscal year 2023 to support the goal that 40
    percent of the overall benefits from certain Federal investments,
    including the remediation and reduction of legacy pollution, flow to
    disadvantaged communities.
        The Department will continue to work hand-in-hand with workers,
    unions, Tribal Nations, local communities, and Congress to plan for the
    future of environmental cleanup.
                            enhancing cybersecurity
        Geopolitical tensions in Eastern Europe following Russia's invasion
    of Ukraine have heightened the importance of energy sector
    cybersecurity and collaboration with energy industry partners.
    Sophisticated cyber threats from state-sponsored actors such as Russia
    require updated approaches to enable near-real time situational
    awareness of malicious cyber activity, including threats to industrial
    control systems (ICS) that manage physical processes to help operate
    our Nation's energy system, as well as to awareness of critical
    information technology systems.
        As this committee knows well, DOE has tremendous expertise both at
    headquarters and across the 17 National Laboratories to help us tackle
    cyber threats to the U.S. energy sector. DOE, through the Office of
    Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) with the
    help of these labs, leads numerous efforts ranging from deploying
    cybersecurity sensors at utilities to partnering with manufacturers to
    testing their equipment for malicious code. Today, I would like to
    share three new initiatives that CESER is working on that will help
    enhance cybersecurity: 1) the Energy Threat Analysis Center (ETAC)
    pilot efforts; 2) Energy Cyber Sense; and 3) Integrating Cybersecurity
    in Clean Energy Systems.
        1) Energy Threat Analysis Center (ETAC)
        In April 2021, the White House launched an effort to address
    cybersecurity in ICS. The first sprint, which DOE led in partnership
    with DHS, focused on the electricity sector. We worked with the
    industry on deploying cyber sensors in the complex operational
    technology (OT) environment. The goal of this work is to gain near-real
    time situational awareness of the cyber threats across industry and
    government. DOE has long had sensors deployed in information technology
    (IT) networks of energy sector networks through our Cybersecurity Risk
    Information Sharing Program (CRISP), but as a part of this important
    initiative, we are now turning our focus to the OT network. Ultimately,
    we are headed toward establishing what we are calling our Energy Threat
    Analysis Center (ETAC). The ETAC will enable us to jointly collaborate
    with industry, CISA's JCDC, and the Intelligence Community to jointly
    analyze threats and determine the relevant mitigation measures for
    energy systems. We recognize that it will take all of us coming
    together to address these complex and ever-increasing threats to energy
    infrastructure.
        2) Energy Cyber Sense
        There is a clear recognition that not only do we need to work with
    energy sector owners and operators to address cyber threats, but we
    also need to work with manufacturers and suppliers. To that end, DOE
    has been working on numerous efforts to address supply chain security
    issues in the energy sector. Following the passage of the
    Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), we are bringing those
    efforts together and looking to expand them in fiscal year 2023 under
    the ``Energy Cyber Sense'' banner, which was created pursuant to
    Section 40122 of IIJA. This program will be focused on addressing cyber
    threats to critical hardware and software used in the energy sector. To
    date, we have already gotten commitments from three of the largest ICS
    manufacturers to work with us--Schweitzer, Schneider, and ABB/Hitachi--
    and we are working to bring others to join us on tackling supply chain
    threats. Additionally, we are also committed to leveraging policy tools
    such as promoting domestic manufacturing to build critical equipment
    right here in the U.S., where there is less of a risk of adversaries
    manipulating hardware or software.
        3) Integrating Cybersecurity into Clean Energy Systems
        While it is important to address the risks to the energy systems of
    today, it is equally important for us to be thinking about where the
    U.S. energy sector is headed 5, 10, and 20 years from now. In fact, we
    have a strategic opportunity like never before: while we are tackling
    the impacts of climate change by deploying next generation wind, solar,
    hydrogen, and nuclear systems, we can build in cybersecurity.
        I've asked CESER to lead a cross-departmental effort to coordinate
    cybersecurity across the applied energy and science offices ensure that
    cybersecurity is a core component of those systems. To that end, DOE
    just launched a new initiative focused on vehicle-to-grid charging
    infrastructure and cybersecurity will be component of that effort.
    Separately, we are engaging closely with clean energy companies on
    cybersecurity like never before and we'll be developing cyber training
    specific to their systems. Finally, we are working on a strategy called
    ``Cyber-Informed Engineering'' that we will be releasing soon that will
    call upon energy companies of all sizes and shapes, academia, standards
    bodies, manufacturers, and others to come build cybersecurity into
    energy systems from the point of ideation.
        I would also like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the hard
    work NNSAs labs, plants, and sites for providing subject matter
    expertise in cybersecurity and critical infrastructure. Their
    leadership has provided both DOE and NNSA with the ability to leverage
    shared resources and capitalize on critical subject matter expertise in
    support of the national security mission.
        In the current threat environment, the Department cannot afford to
    neglect its cybersecurity capabilities, which serve as frontline assets
    that protect the information, systems, and networks necessary to
    execute its mission.
        I can assure you that cybersecurity will remain a top priority for
    the Department, and these investments will posture DOE to defend
    against an ever-evolving landscape of cyber threats.
                                   conclusion
        At DOE, new breakthroughs in climate science, engineering, physics,
    cyber security, and other fields help advance the enduring goal of
    enhancing American national security. NNSA's weapons activities,
    nonproliferation and counterterrorism programs that help reduce global
    threats, and naval reactors programs all support the continued
    reliability of our nuclear deterrent which remains the cornerstone of
    our national defense. Through the rigorous application of nuclear
    safeguards, safety and environmental standards and cutting-edge
    engineering and technology, we remain steadfast in reducing nuclear
    risk and navigating an increasingly complex global environment. We are
    mindful of the resources and trust that has been placed with DOE and
    are thankful for the continued support of the Committee and the rest of
    Congress.

        Chairman Reed. Well thank you very much, Administrator
    Hruby. Let me begin with a question for you.
        I had the opportunity to participate in the subcommittee
    hearing and I have some concerns that NNSA does not have a full
    picture of the effort to produce 80 pits a year, both Los
    Alamos and Savannah River, which leads me to the question, does
    NNSA have an integrated schedule of milestones and costs for
    achieving this? If we do, I would very much like to see it.
        Ms. Hruby. Thank you, Chairman Reed. I think, as we talked
    before, we have an integrated schedule for each facility that
    is quite complete. We are in the process of integrating those
    schedules so that we have a master schedule for the entire
    plutonium project, including all the peripheral things like
    security that goes with that, and we are committed to provide
    you that this year.
        Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much. One of the
    aspects of this that is complicated is that if something
    happens in one location it would obviously affect the other. It
    is not just structural. It is also personnel and getting ahead
    of that would be very important, not only for us but for us. So
    thank you.
        Secretary Granholm, on April 12th, the Administrator wrote
    to this committee that it had an unfunded shortfall of $250
    million for converting the mixed oxide fuel plant at the
    Savannah River site for production. Can you tell the committee
    what this shortfall consists of and whether the Nuclear Weapons
    Council has validated this shortfall as they committed to do so
    at the May 11th Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing?
        Secretary Granholm. The $500 million that is being
    requested through the letter that Jill Hruby sent is to really
    fulfill what this committee would like to see happen, I
    believe, many on this committee, which is to accelerate to the
    extent we can the production of pits. We will not be able to
    get to the 2030 goal. We know that. But what this letter does
    is acknowledge that there are some long-lead items, like
    gloveboxes, et cetera, that take time, that we know we are
    going to need, that we can now begin to procure.
        With supply chain crunches, et cetera, we believe that we
    would be in a better position to be able to purchase those now
    so that when we get to the point where the facility is
    complete--and, of course, as you know, we are in the middle of
    a design of that redesign, and that is about 90 percent
    complete--that we will be able to get people into the building
    and begin to deal with the plutonium pit issue right away. So
    that is what the letter really intends to do is to accelerate,
    to the extent we can, even though it will not get us to the
    2030----
        Chairman Reed. Well, Madam Secretary, that is a very good
    explanation of the letter. It is very accurate. But a few days
    later the Nuclear Weapons Council issued a letter indicating
    that they did not agree with the money. That is my
    understanding. What is the position of the Nuclear Weapons
    Council, is essentially the question?
        Secretary Granholm. Yes, and I will Under Secretary Hruby
    speak to this, but it is my understanding the Nuclear Weapons
    Council will be supportive of that, or is supportive of that.
        Ms. Hruby. Chairman Reed, we are meeting tomorrow as the
    Nuclear Weapons Council to discuss this budget request. As you
    heard in the hearing last week, the members of the Nuclear
    Weapons Council are supportive of this need to bring money up
    to do the equipment pre-buy so that we can make sure we can
    construct SRPPF [Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility]
    as quickly as possible. You will hear from the Nuclear Weapons
    Council soon.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. We would appreciate
    that, Administrator Hruby.
        Madam Secretary, you pointed out how your environmental
    team has done an extraordinary job over the years. There is
    still, as I mentioned, the Hanford site and other sites. But at
    Hanford you are making progress on the low-level radioactive
    waste, but have you started planning for the high-activity
    waste in these tanks?
        Secretary Granholm. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The budget supports
    the beginning of the effort on the high-level waste. We also
    note that this committee had asked for an assessment of
    alternatives as well. That study is being undertaken right now
    in parallel with the National Academies' study, both of which
    should be complete before the fall so that we will have an
    assessment of what the other pieces are, even as we know that
    we will still be treating some of that high-level waste on
    site, perhaps to move to vitrification as well.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
        Senator Inhofe, please.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary,
    you answered the question I was going to address adequately, so
    let me just mention to Administrator Hruby that in the past
    NNSA officials argued for real sustainable annual growth to
    keep modernization on track. Now how significantly will our
    programs be delayed if NNSA faces annual shortages of a half-
    billion dollars? What is that going to do to us if that
    continues?
        Ms. Hruby. Senator Inhofe, the $500 million request is to
    assure that we do not get more behind by moving money up and
    making purchases earlier, based on information that we have
    learned as we have completed our large construction project,
    the Uranium Processing Facility, and other projects at Los
    Alamos and around the complex.
        So we are totally synced up with the Department of Defense
    on all of our weapons programs, our deliveries of the
    modernization programs. It is challenging but we stay in close
    contact and we are completely synced up. We are just trying to
    keep, with this request, our infrastructure programs in a way
    that we can execute those as quickly as possible.
        Senator Inhofe. In my opening statement I talked about the
    condition of some of the facilities that we have there. Do you
    have any comments on that? Have you looked into that and see
    what that path forward would be appropriate at this time?
        Ms. Hruby. Yes, Senator Inhofe, since I have been confirmed
    into this position I have visited the complex, every place in
    the complex and most of them many times, and, in fact, we have
    a lot of infrastructure work to do, as you noted in your
    opening statement. We are developing a long-term infrastructure
    plan. We have some large projects going right now, and I think
    they are the right projects, not only the big projects in
    uranium and plutonium but also projects in explosives and
    tritium and lithium and depleted uranium and other activities.
        But we have so many needs that will go out for a long time,
    and we are working on a long-term infrastructure plan that
    includes not only our production complex but also our science
    and technology facilities.
        Senator Inhofe. In other words, you are on it, okay?
        Ms. Hruby. Well, this is going to be long term.
        Senator Inhofe. I know it is. I was saying that as a
    compliment. So go ahead.
        Ms. Hruby. Okay. Well, I will take the compliment. Thank
    you.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay, good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Shaheen, please.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning to
    both of you. Thank you both for being here this morning and for
    your work on behalf of the country.
        Administrator Hruby, you talked about what we are doing to
    modernize facilities. Can you also talk about our progress on
    addressing any potential for cyber hacking to affect our
    facilities and our nuclear program?
        Ms. Hruby. Thank you, Senator. The cyber issue is very real
    and very much on our minds all the time. So once Frank Rose and
    I, my principal deputy, assumed these positions we asked for an
    independent review of our cyber capabilities. That review was
    conducted by the Institute for Defense Analysis, and it will be
    published this summer.
        We also have increased our budget for our cybersecurity
    programs, and we have created a line item in our defense
    program's budget that looks at digital assurance of the weapons
    enterprise.
        Senator Shaheen. So are you comfortable that today we would
    not be hacked successfully?
        Ms. Hruby. Look, the answer is I think we are doing
    everything that we can. This is a tricky business, so we have
    to be prepared in the event that there is a successful hack
    that we did not anticipate, we do not anticipate, and know how
    to respond to that. We are working on both sides of this,
    honestly, both a defensive but what would happen, you know, how
    quickly, what would we do and what would happen in the event of
    an attack. But we prevent, you know, many attacks a day in our
    complex, and we hope to continue to be successful at doing
    that.
        Senator Shaheen. Secretary Granholm, do you share the view
    that we are doing everything we can in the Department of Energy
    to address potential hacking that could affect our nuclear
    program?
        Secretary Granholm. Thank you, Senator, for the question,
    because it is so important, especially in the global context
    that we are in. Obviously, there are thousands of attempts per
    day, and we have been successful at not being successfully
    penetrated. The bad guys are morphing all the time, and they
    are continuing to enhance their capabilities, which is why when
    the Administrator says they did an assessment, I mean, part of
    the challenges in that assessment are making sure that we have
    got the IT professionals that are able to continually keep us
    on the cutting edge. I know they have engaged in a program to
    do recruiting, and we have also not just in cyber but across
    the NNSA complex increased pay because we want to make sure we
    can retain and attract the professionals that the private
    sector is also vying for.
        The Department and the NNSA I know have continually
    installed next-generation technology to monitor, to detect, to
    address, to be able to make sure we know what is happening on
    the system. But it is a continuous battle, and we will be
    vigilant all the way.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you both very much for that.
    As you point out, it is critical and it is not at all clear in
    this environment what the next threat is going to be.
        Certainly Russia's unprovoked war in Ukraine, in
    particular, underscores the urgent need for modernization of
    our nuclear efforts. Obviously, it also underscores the
    challenge that we are facing with energy. Secretary Granholm,
    to get off the budget a little bit and talk about what is
    happening with Russia's weaponization of energy, can you talk
    about what we are doing to work with our partners to address
    Russia's efforts to cut off Europe? Earlier this week they cut
    off Finland. Last week it was Bulgaria. What are we doing with
    our allies to try and address the energy concerns that they
    have as the result of the war in Ukraine?
        Secretary Granholm. Yes, thank you, Senator. As you have
    noted, this has really caused an alliance of our allies to make
    us stronger than we have ever seen. It is clear that everyone
    needs to become independent of Russian oil and gas, and, of
    course, for those allies that have been significantly reliant
    upon it is a great challenge.
        So we have been, the Department of Energy and our allies--
    in fact, I have a ministerial today with the U.K.--everyone is
    looking at next-generation technologies for making sure we do
    not see this again, whether it is next-generation nuclear or
    hydrogen, et cetera. But we also are looking at the today. So,
    of course, the United States is doing what it can to permit the
    export of liquified natural gas to Europe to make sure that
    they have the ability to wean themselves off of Russian gas.
        The oil situation is really challenging because Russia's
    actions have pulled 1.5 million barrels a day off of the global
    supply. The President's release of 1 million barrels a day from
    the Strategic Petroleum Reserve is set to try to stabilize
    those prices.
        But the bottom line is we are working with our allies on
    all manner of being able to help make them and help make
    ourselves independent from the volatility of fossil fuels,
    especially from countries that have petro-dictators that
    weaponize energy, and ultimately, many of these countries, most
    of these countries see the movement to clean energy as a way
    to, in the medium and long term, pursue energy independence,
    since no country has ever been held hostage to access to the
    wind or access to the sun.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Rounds, please.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
    Granholm, Administrator Hruby, thank you to both of you for
    your service to our country. I would like to begin with a
    question for Administrator Hruby.
        The W80-4, which is the nuclear weapon itself that would be
    on the Long Range Standoff weapon, the new LRSO, the
    integration between those two will be key in terms of
    developing the weapon system that would be carried by our
    bomber force, both the B-52 and eventually the B-21 stealth
    bomber. The timeline and integration with the B-21 and the B-52
    is crucial to modernizing our nuclear deterrent.
        The W80-4 appears to be continually slipping to the right
    in terms of its development. We have got some concerns about
    that timeline, and specifically that the individual components
    in the development of this system just simply do not seem to be
    meeting up with the timelines that had been earlier developed
    in terms of getting it all put together.
        To the extent that you can in this open forum, can you
    explain the integration efforts between the W80-4, the weapon
    itself, and the LRSO, the system that is going to carry it, and
    the individual platforms such as the B-21 that are being
    developed in order to deliver this weapon, and are the first
    production units of the W80-4 still slated to be delivered in
    2025?
        Ms. Hruby. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Let's see. We work
    continuously with the military to make sure the W80-4 and the
    LRSO missile are aligned. The LRSO missile initial operating
    capability is in 2030. We had initially put the W80-4 first
    production unit in 2025 as a way to have space between all of
    the systems that we are working on today. There are a few
    components, a handful of components on the W80-4 which will
    have difficulty making that FPU, but we are completely synced
    up on being able to produce the W80-4 for the LRSO initial
    operating capability.
        Senator Rounds. The GAO [Government Accountability Office]
    had reported that the NNSA would enter phase 6.4, which is the
    production engineering, in late 2021. However, the NNSA now
    projects entry into phase 6.4 in June of 2022. We are 15 days
    away from that. Are you going to make that goal?
        Ms. Hruby. We will, this summer, lay out a new schedule for
    the W80-4 that has an updated FPU that the military will be,
    again, completely approved and synced up with.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Also for Administrator Hruby,
    according to statute--and I think the chairman alluded to this
    in his opening questions to you--according to Federal statute
    in law now, if DOE does not certify that it can meet plutonium
    pit production requirements the Nuclear Weapons Council
    chairman is required, by law, to submit a plan to enable the
    nuclear security enterprise to meet these requirements. Again,
    according to statute this plan shall include the identification
    of DOE resources that the chairman determines should be
    redirected to support the plan to meet the requirements.
        Administrator Hruby, to the best of my knowledge such as a
    plan has never been sent to the Congress defense committees. As
    a statutory member of the Nuclear Weapons Council, can you tell
    me are you aware of that statute, do you intend to comply with
    that statute, or do you need to get back to us on what your
    plans will be?
        Ms. Hruby. The Nuclear Weapons Council has looked
    extensively at the ability to make 80 pits per year and
    determined that money was not enough.
        Let me just say a little bit more about the idea of having
    a plan to use additional resources. You know, I am an engineer.
    I spent time with blueprints of the Savannah River pit
    production facility, trying to find every angle that we could
    accelerate the design and the construction and then the ability
    to produce pits there. There is no path to produce pits. There
    is no way to do that that would not sacrifice our long-term
    need to produce the minimum 50 pits per year at Savannah River
    forever more, or at least as far as we can see into the future.
        So anything we do now actually puts at risk the longer-term
    need. It would delay our ability right now if I redirected
    resources to look at this issue of what does it take to get to
    2030. I believe, and the Nuclear Weapons Council believe, a
    better path is to figure out how we meet the needs--and we
    think there is a path--to maintain safe, secure, reliable,
    credible deterrent and the Sentinel without the pits in 2030.
        Senator Rounds. My concern, Administrator Hruby, is that
    under the statute there is a redirection that is required, and
    if that is the case that hurts other programs that are equally
    as important within DOE. This is the time of the year in which
    allocations are made and budgets are developed and
    appropriations are planned for, and if there needs to be
    additional direction or additional appropriations made, I am
    simply stating that this needs to happen now and that we should
    not be waiting another year or delaying another year if there
    are items that should be appropriated, or at least the Congress
    should be doing to make sure that DOE has the resources
    necessary to accomplish all of those items that DOE has been
    authorized to move forward on.
        I simply think that the statute, in particular, was
    designed to make sure that Congress was aware if you did not
    have the resources to meet the necessary minimum requirements
    in terms of the nuclear production capabilities. It seems to me
    that what you are telling us is that we are so far down the
    line that you simply do not see a path forward in which we are
    going to meet those minimum requirements.
        Ms. Hruby. That is correct. The 2030 requirement, the
    Nuclear Weapons Council, and I am a member, has agreed that we
    cannot meet that requirement, and it is not resource dependent.
    The request for the additional money, the $500 million, was
    aimed at getting as close to that requirement as possible.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
        Senator Warren has arrived. Are you ready, Senator Warren?
        Senator Warren. Always ready. Thank you. So thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        The cryptocurrency market has exploded over the last few
    years, driven by the popularity of Bitcoin, which amounts for
    about 40 percent of the entire crypto market. Bitcoin's network
    is secured through a proof-of-work algorithm which involves
    miners using powerful computers to guess a random string of
    numbers in order to verify transactions and win a Bitcoin
    reward. The computational work required is deliberately
    inefficient, and it requires increasing amounts of energy
    consumption as more minors compete.
        Now today, Bitcoin consumes more electricity than countries
    like Sweden and Pakistan. That is a country with more than 220
    million people. In fact, a single Bitcoin transaction uses the
    same amount of power as the average U.S. household uses in 72
    days, and a single large crypto mining facility, typically a
    warehouse filled with rows and rows of servers, can consume as
    much energy as a quarter of a million houses in the same period
    of time.
        So Secretary Granholm, one of your key responsibilities is
    to address energy challenges facing our country. Does the
    Federal Government currently know how many crypto miners are
    operating in the United States and how much energy they are
    consuming?
        Secretary Granholm. No. The DOE does not explicitly track
    electricity consumption associated with cryptocurrency
    operations, and I would love to work with you on making sure
    that this happens.
        Senator Warren. Well I am glad to hear that because I am
    really concerned if we are not tracking this information,
    because the one thing we do know is that more and more Bitcoin
    mining operations are moving offshore. Between 2019 and 2021,
    the United States' share of global mining increased from 4
    percent to 35 percent, meaning that over a third of the global
    computing power dedicated to bitcoin mining is now drawn from
    computers in the United States that are spitting out random
    numbers around the clock.
        Mining is increasing emissions from coal and natural gas
    generation, especially when miners bring old, polluting, fossil
    fuel plants around the country online. It also is driving up
    electricity prices for consumers and small businesses in those
    same communities. That is why I have written to several of the
    largest crypto miners in the United States, asking them for
    information about the environmental impacts of their
    operations. But I think that our agencies can do more here as
    well.
        So Secretary Granholm, I know that you are working with
    other agencies on a report on crypto's climate impact as part
    of the President's Executive order on digital assets. Do you
    think it would be valuable if we had additional information
    about the impact of cryptocurrencies on our environment and on
    our energy grid?
        Secretary Granholm. Absolutely.
        Senator Warren. You want to elaborate on that?
        Secretary Granholm. I mean, it is critical to understand
    the strains upon the grid, especially as we face increased use
    of the grid for other purposes. I mean, the Bipartisan
    Infrastructure law gave us funding to be able to expand the
    capacity of the grid, but the projections of the expansion of
    the capacity of the grid that most modelers use have not taken
    into full account the huge energy suck that cryptocurrency
    represents.
        While we add electric vehicles to the grid, for example, we
    have also got to take a look at these other uses because that
    will require significant additional resources to be able to
    respond to if we do not do something else.
        Senator Warren. Thank you. You know, addressing crypto's
    risks is not just a job for financial regulators. It is a job
    for climate regulators as well. Crypto mining could undermine
    our progress to fight climate change, and I look forward to
    working with you to keep that from happening.
        Before I close I would just like to turn to you very
    quickly, Ms. Hruby. We have gone over this in previous hearings
    but I want to reiterate to my colleagues that I remain deeply
    concerned about our pit production plans. Many of these
    problems I know predate your tenure, but let us be clear here.
    NNSA does not know how much this program will cost, the costs
    we do know about have doubled in a matter of months, and now
    your office is already asking for a half a billion dollars more
    than the budget request, even though the Nuclear Weapons
    Council has said it will not bring us any closer to reaching
    our production goals by 2030.
        NNSA has had a terrible record of mismanagement and it
    seems too likely that this will be another case study in
    wasting billions of dollars in taxpayer money.
        So I am out of time but I just want to register that
    concern.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren.
        Senator Tuberville, please.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
    being here today.
        Secretary Granholm, approximately 20 percent of our grid is
    nuclear. Correct?
        Secretary Granholm. Correct.
        Senator Tuberville. How many of our nuclear plants will
    reach the end of their lifespan in the next 20 years?
        Secretary Granholm. That is our concern, is that a good
    number of them, whether they reach the end of their lifespan or
    there may be communities that decide that they want to go in a
    different direction. We want to keep our nuclear fleet afloat,
    which is why we just issued a civilian nuclear credit to be
    able to do that. We want to make sure that we have got
    additional nuclear opportunities.
        Senator Tuberville. So basically a major of them in the
    next 20 years----
        Ms. Hruby. It is a good----
        Senator Tuberville.--running their last. Thank you.
        Next-generation energy. So we are going to try to double
    our energy capacity, keep it carbon neutral, and retire 20
    percent of the cleanest energy sources on the grid. That is
    what we are going to try to do. That is our plan.
        Secretary Granholm. I would not say that we are going to
    try to retire 20 percent. We want to be able to replace those.
    We want to be able to add additional advanced nuclear
    opportunities.
        Senator Tuberville. You know, many Americans are fearful of
    nuclear power. They have a right to be. Most of us grew up in
    this era. You know, decisions made by the Atomic Energy
    Commission and Congress in the 1960s and 1970s prioritized
    economics and building nuclear weapons over safety. It was not
    very safe.
        Are you familiar with the thorium molten salt breeder
    reactor that Oak Ridge successfully tested in the '60s?
        Secretary Granholm. I am familiar that they did, yes.
        Senator Tuberville. Yes. Thank you. Alvin Weinberg, who was
    the director of Oak Ridge and worked on the original Manhattan
    Project, called the thorium reactor, quote, ``only a little
    less important than the discovery of fission,'' end quote. That
    is pretty important. It is one of the safest designs ever
    tested. In fact, a molten salt breeder reactor based on a
    thorium cycle cannot melt down--it is not like the reactors
    that we use nowadays--and it actually consumes nuclear waste.
        At its heart, this reactor contains uranium-233. We have
    the world's largest supply of uranium-233 right in Oak Ridge,
    Tennessee. I think you are familiar with this. But your
    Department was tasked to irreversibly destroy our supply of U-
    233. Is that correct?
        Secretary Granholm. Yes. We are diluting and disposing of
    it.
        Senator Tuberville. Down-blending it. Yes. Thank you very
    much.
        So we are spending $50 million a year to down-blend and
    destroy this resource when, in fact, in 2008, the Department of
    Energy issued reports cautioning that we should not destroy
    uranium-233. Have you read these reports?
        Secretary Granholm. I have not read that one from 2008.
        Senator Tuberville. Okay. In fact, in 2008, the report
    calls U-233 an irreplaceable natural resource. Congress has
    asked ranchers on this. Are you familiar with that, we have
    asked ranchers? Okay, and appropriations bill in 2021 required
    the DOE to inform Congress about the potential of 233. Do you
    know when this report was due, Ms. Granholm?
        Secretary Granholm. When was it due?
        Senator Tuberville. 2021. I do not know why, but this
    report is still not finished, and to me it is a very important
    report. If we are going to do away with gas and we are going to
    try to cut back on our oil supply, we have got to find some way
    to generate more power in this country, clean power. We are all
    for that.
        My colleague, Senator Warren, and I do not see eye to eye
    on a lot of things, but we do agree on how egregious the
    mismanagement and disregard for civilian oversight is within
    our Department of Energy. We have got to pay attention to
    facts, and these are facts that our scientists--we all want to
    follow science--this is facts that scientists have come up
    with. We have a national treasure that could solve our nation's
    clean energy problems and also have been proven invaluable in
    the fight of cancer, and we are destroying it. It's by our own
    admission the Department of Energy says destroying U-233 is a
    terrible, terrible mistake, and we just seem to be overlooking
    it.
        Yesterday, Senator Marshall and I introduced a bill to save
    U-233 called the Thorium Energy Security Act, and I hope and
    pray that this body will halt the Department of Energy from
    down-blending this to give us an option to making clean energy
    for our kids' future, for our grandkids' future, and all of us
    in the future, because we see what is happening as we speak
    with all the problems that we are having with cutting off our
    energy supply and oil supply all at one time. We have to have a
    plan to make amends for that that we are not using.
        Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville.
        Senator Kaine, please.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to the
    witnesses. It is great to be together with both of you.
        Last week I co-chaired a Seapower and Readiness
    Subcommittee hearing, together with Senators Hirono, Cramer,
    and Sullivan, and we talked about the challenges facing
    implementing the Shipyard Industrialization Optimization
    Program, this long-term modernizing and recapitalization of the
    Navy's century-old public shipyards. In a similar vein, the
    origins of many of our nuclear Federal research labs and
    development facilities--Sandia, Los Alamos, Lawrence
    Livermore--date back to World War II.
        Last year we had testimony by Admiral Caldwell, and he
    noted, quote, ``Without recapitalization of our facilities we
    will be unable to effectively support nuclear fleet operations
    and advanced research and development (R&D) efforts at the
    level required by this complex technology.''
        Does the Department have a master plan that would be an
    equivalent to the SIOP [Shipyard Industrialization Optimization
    Program] on the shipyard side for the recapitalization and
    modernization of our facilities?
        Ms. Hruby. Let me address the naval reactors part of that.
    As you know, there is more than one organization that takes
    care of those. We do not take care of the shipyards but we do
    take care of the propulsion capabilities in the Naval Reactors
    Program with NNSA. We are putting a lot of money into doing
    just what you say, to making sure we are building test
    facilities so that they are modern and consistent with the new
    propulsion systems that are coming online. We are building the
    spent fuel handling facility that will allow us to deal with
    the larger reactors that are used in our fleet today. We are
    increasing our R&D budget in Naval Reactors. As Admiral
    Caldwell says, we can no longer assume that we will have the
    best systems in the world if we do not invest in R&D.
        So I feel that the fiscal year 2023 budget for naval
    reactors is paying a lot of attention to the research and the
    facilities that we need for naval propulsion going forward.
        Senator Kaine. Ms. Hruby, let me just follow up on that. I
    appreciate that we are making investments. I guess the thing
    about the SIOP that interests me, on the Navy side, is there is
    this 20-year master plan and every year they make investments
    against it, and we can measure against the plan. Are we
    proceeding according to the plan? Are we making the progress?
    We hope.
        So I understand we are making investments in the
    infrastructure you described but are those investments pursuant
    to a 10-year master plan or a 20-year master plan that would
    enable us to measure how the investments we are making will get
    us to the endpoint that we want?
        Ms. Hruby. Senator Kaine, I would like to talk to Admiral
    Caldwell some more about this and get back with you.
        Senator Kaine. That would be helpful. I mean, just as an
    example, NNSA estimates that the reactor plant design for the
    Columbia-class subs will be completed by 2027, so the design
    will be completed by 2027. I just wonder, are we making the
    investments that will enable us to get to that point? So again,
    how the investments match up against the plan is what I am
    interested in.
        Secretary Granholm, one question for you. There is only a
    handful of universities in the country that have a four-year
    nuclear engineering program, 17. While there are approximately
    47,000 mechanical engineering graduates and 17,000 computer
    engineering graduates annually, there are historically less
    than 950 graduates from a nuclear engineering program every
    year.
        So whether the field is nuclear engineering or applied
    mathematics and physics, I worry about whether the pool of
    talent for the important missions of your secretariat and the
    related agencies is potentially shallow. What are you doing, if
    anything, to focus on the needs of the workforce in this area?
        Secretary Granholm. Yes. Thank you, Senator Kaine. It is
    really a very large concern across all the scientific
    enterprise, right, including our national labs. We want to make
    sure we have got enough STEM [science, technology, engineering,
    math] graduates as well as nuclear scientists to be able to
    fulfill the mission. I know that Under Secretary Hruby has been
    taking action the NNSA side. I can tell you that we have ramped
    up our efforts at recruitment, at showing up at universities to
    directly pitch. We have engaged in new relationships with HBCUs
    [historically black colleges and universities] and MSIs to be
    able to ensure that we have a diverse pool of scientists and
    engineers.
        The point is we want to make science, technology,
    engineering, math, of course, leaning into nuclear, exciting. I
    think that the openness now on the civilian side to look at
    nuclear as power, advanced nuclear reactors, et cetera, has
    created a great awareness. Obviously, the skills that come from
    the military are very prime and a lot of where we get our
    workforce. But we are looking at every avenue to increase
    recruitment and increase the pipeline of those who are
    interested in this as well.
        I do not know if you want to say anything further, Ms.
    Hruby.
        Senator Kaine. I am over my time, but I appreciate that
    answer, Secretary, and I can tell the Administrator was jumping
    in to say the same thing, so this is on your radar screen.
        Ms. Hruby. It definitely is.
        Senator Kaine. That is very apparent. Thank you so much. I
    will yield back, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
        Senator Hawley, please.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to both of
    the witnesses for being here.
        Administrator Hruby, let me start with you. As you know, we
    are very proud, in the state of Missouri, of the work that is
    done at the Kansas City National Security Campus to support the
    nation's nuclear enterprise. I just wonder if you can give me
    an update on the NNSA's efforts to ensure that the Kansas City
    campus has the capacity it is going to need, the additional
    capacity it is going to need to meet production requirements in
    the coming years.
        Ms. Hruby. Thank you, Senator Hawley. We are also very
    proud of the Kansas City National Security Campus, and I am
    pleased to report we are making good progress on expanding
    capacity and moving towards the purchase of facilities and land
    that could help us in the future make sure that we are right-
    sized at Kansas City.
        Senator Hawley. Good. Very good.
        Secretary Granholm, today in the state of Missouri the
    average price of gasoline, today, as of this morning, is $4.10.
    The average price of diesel is $5.18. I am sure you have seen
    the reporting this morning that now AAA is projecting that gas
    prices will hit a national average--average--of $6 a gallon by
    the month of August. Is this acceptable to you?
        Secretary Granholm. No, it is not, and you can thank the
    activity of Vladimir Putin for invading Ukraine and pulling,
    especially those barrels----
        Senator Hawley. Oh, nonsense. With all due respect, Madam
    Secretary, that is utter nonsense. In January of 2021, the
    average gas price in my state was $2.07. Eight months later--
    eight months later--long before Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine,
    that price was up over 30 percent, and it has been going up
    consistently since. What are you doing to reverse this
    Administration's policies that are drawing down our own supply
    of energy in this country, that are throttling oil and gas
    production in the United States of America? What are you doing
    about it?
        Secretary Granholm. With respect, sir, it is not
    Administration policies that have affected supply and demand.
        Senator Hawley. How can you say that when the price of gas
    was up over 30 percent from January----
        Secretary Granholm. If you could let me answer.
        Senator Hawley. Answer my question, and it is my time,
    Madam Secretary. So why do you not answer my question? From
    January to August, the price of gasoline was up over 30
    percent, in my state alone. It has been a continuous upward
    tick since then. Here is what your President did when he first
    came to office. He immediately reentered the Paris Climate
    Accord. He cancelled the Keystone Pipeline. He halted leasing
    programs in ANWR [Arctic National Wildlife Refuge]. He issued a
    60-day halt on all new oil and gas leases and drilling permits
    on Federal lands and waters. That is nationwide. That accounts,
    by the way, for 25 percent of U.S. oil production. He directed
    Federal agencies to eliminate all supports for fossil fuels. He
    imposed new regulations on oil and gas and methane emissions.
    Those were all just in the first few days. Are you telling me
    that has had no effect on our energy supply?
        Secretary Granholm. I am telling you that 94 percent of the
    oil and gas executives that were surveyed by the Dallas Fed
    said that Administration policies had nothing to do with the
    increase in the price of oil, and therefore the price of
    gasoline.
        Senator Hawley. I am not interested in the opinions of
    these people. I am interested in the facts.
        Secretary Granholm. Those are the people who are running--
    --
        Senator Hawley. Are you telling me----
        Secretary Granholm.--the oil and gas industry----
        Senator Hawley.--that these policies had no effect?
        Secretary Granholm. I am telling you that they had no----
        Senator Hawley. Is that your testimony----
        Secretary Granholm.--impact.
        Senator Hawley.--that these policies had no effect?
        Secretary Granholm. I am telling you--I am telling you----
        Senator Hawley. Are you telling me--Madam Secretary, are
    you telling me, under oath, that these policies had no effect?
        Secretary Granholm. I am telling you that 94 percent of the
    oil and gas industry----
        Senator Hawley. I am not interested in their opinion.
        Secretary Granholm.--executives say that they had no
    effect.
        Senator Hawley. I am interested in the facts.
        Secretary Granholm. So no, they did not. Ask Vladimir
    Putin----
        Senator Hawley. That is a remarkable statement.
        Secretary Granholm.--about the increase in demand and the
    decrease in supply from pulling Russian barrels of oil off the
    market, thanks to, rightly, the United States saying we are not
    going to take Russian oil, coming out of COVID----
        Senator Hawley. So what explains----
        Secretary Granholm.--coming out----
        Senator Hawley.--the increase between January and August of
    2021?
        Secretary Granholm.--coming out of COVID--coming out of
    COVID there was an increase in demand because people were
    driving again. When there was no demand the prices dropped.
    That is a basic law of economics. The prices dropped----
        Senator Hawley. I have to say, Madam Secretary, with all
    due respect, your answers are insulting, and they are insulting
    to the people of Missouri who are looking for action. Now you
    said 2 months ago your Department was on war footing. What are
    you doing to bring down the price of gasoline, which has been
    going up consistently since you took office?
        Secretary Granholm. The price of gasoline is derived from
    the price of oil. The price of oil is at $110 a barrel, and it
    is trading----
        Senator Hawley. What are you doing to decrease it----
        Secretary Granholm.--on a global market.
        Senator Hawley.--is my question.
        Secretary Granholm. Sir, if you could let me finish.
        Senator Hawley. If you would answer my question.
        Secretary Granholm. I am answering your question, sir. Oil
    is traded on a global market. We are paying extremely high
    prices today, just as they are in Japan.
        Senator Hawley. What are you doing to get it down?
        Secretary Granholm. Just as they are in Germany. Just as
    they are in South Africa.
        Senator Hawley. What are you doing to get it down?
        Secretary Granholm. We are calling for an increase in
    supply. We are releasing a million barrels----
        Senator Hawley. From whom?
        Secretary Granholm.--a day from the Strategic Petroleum
    Reserve to try to balance out supply and demand.
        Senator Hawley. Who are you calling for an increase in
    supply from?
        Secretary Granholm. It is the largest tool that we have to
    be able to do that.
        Senator Hawley. Who are you calling for an increase----
        Secretary Granholm. Our allies are also----
        Senator Hawley.--in supply from?
        Chairman Reed. Excuse me. Senator Hawley, your time has
    expired.
        Senator Hawley. Could I get an answer to this question, Mr.
    Chairman?
        Chairman Reed. Senator----
        Senator Hawley. Who are you calling for an increase in
    supply from?
        Secretary Granholm. From our domestic oil and gas
    manufacturers. From international oil and gas manufacturers.
        Senator Hawley. Even as you cancelled their leases?
        Chairman Reed. Senator Hawley, if you want an answer you
    have to allow the Secretary to answer.
        Secretary Granholm. I said, we have called repeatedly for
    increases in supply from domestic oil and gas manufacturers,
    from international oil and gas manufacturers. We want to
    increase supply, and that is why the President released an
    unprecedented amount from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and
    our international allies also released from their reserves to
    try to balance out supply and demand while the oil and gas
    companies increase supply. The Energy Information
    Administration has projected that they will have increased, in
    the United States, about a million barrels a day by the end of
    this year.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much.
        Senator King, please. Thank you, Senator Hawley. Senator
    King, please.
        Senator King. Just for the record, Secretary Granholm, I
    was in Germany about six weeks ago and gasoline was $8.50 a
    gallon. Was that President Biden's fault?
        Secretary Granholm. It was not.
        Senator King. Is gasoline at similar levels in Japan and in
    other areas of the world right now?
        Secretary Granholm. Yes, sir. It is traded on a global
    market, as you have noted.
        Senator King. As you say, it is a global market that a
    President of the United States has very little control over one
    way or another. Is that correct?
        Secretary Granholm. That is correct.
        Senator King. Ms. Hruby, totally different subject. The
    basis of our deterrent policy, which is the bedrock of our
    defense policy, is capacity and credibility. We have not
    tested, and do not test, and I am okay with that, but my
    question is, how confident can we be in the non-testing regime
    of computer modeling to maintain the credibility of our nuclear
    deterrent?
        Ms. Hruby. Thank you, Senator King. I think we could be
    highly confident. We have both a very sound science-based
    Stockpile Stewardship Program and an annual process to assess
    the reliability of our systems. Year after year our lab
    directors assess, very carefully, the reliability of the
    program of our weapons without testing and assure us we have
    safe, secure, and reliable systems.
        Senator King. We are assured. Are our adversaries assured?
    In other words, basically I am asking--my question is does the
    non-test regime, the non-physical, destructive test regime
    maintain the credibility of the deterrent in the eyes of a
    potential adversary? In other words, do they believe our
    computer models?
        Ms. Hruby. Well, it is not just computer models. The answer
    is I believe that the world understands that we have very safe,
    secure, reliable, credible nuclear weapons, and they are an
    effective deterrent.
        I also just want to add that we do many things besides
    model. We do subcritical experiments. We do laboratory-based
    experiments, and we have a large test database to draw on, and
    we use that over and over again to assure ourselves--and we are
    skeptics. You know, that is our role is to make sure that we
    can be absolutely certain, and we believe ourselves, and the
    world should believe us.
        Senator King. Thank you. That is what I wanted to hear.
    That was my concern.
        The second level of concern, again, to go back to
    deterrence, deterrence rests upon mutual rationality, if you
    will, that the adversary knows that they would be destroyed if
    they utilized a nuclear weapon. The concern is that that theory
    does not work with a non-state actor, and I am deeply concerned
    about nuclear materials falling into the hands of terrorist
    groups, of non-state actors.
        I hope that we have a Plan B involving sensors, detection,
    intelligence to deal with that threat, because all the
    nonproliferation efforts that we make, which are positive and
    good, there is still the danger of nuclear material, now that
    we know Iran, by virtue of us having abrogated the agreement,
    has vastly shortened their breakout time. Talk to me about how
    we deal with the threat of proliferation to a non-state actor
    of nuclear materials.
        Ms. Hruby. Yes. We still firmly believe that eliminating
    threats is the best path, and we have, in our nonproliferation
    program, on our Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program, a
    significant effort to secure materials around the world with a
    large variety of countries. Of course, we work not only with
    allies and partners but with adversaries on those programs. In
    fact, the fiscal year 2023 budget has an increase in our
    Counterterrorism Program. We still believe we have to pay
    attention to that while we pay attention to Russia and China.
        So we are locking up, removing, eliminating materials. That
    is the bread and butter of our Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
    Program.
        Senator King. I hope you will have urgent attention to that
    question because that is a true nightmare. As I say, the theory
    of deterrence does not work in that case so we need to be
    thinking about all the other provisions, which you have
    mentioned.
        Final quick point, and this is not really a question. But
    we talked earlier about cyber. A group of us here have worked a
    lot on cyber in the last couple of years. I have two
    suggestions that derive from the work that we have done. One is
    red-team the hell out of your systems. You really do not know
    how vulnerable you are until you have somebody really good try
    to hack it in a friendly way. That is number one.
        Number two, 85 or 90 percent of successful cyber intrusions
    start with the desktop, with somebody hitting a phishing email,
    and that is an individual decision at the desktop, and all the
    technology in the world is not going to prevent that.
        I have a friend in the energy business. In his company they
    send fake phishing emails to their staff. If you hit on it once
    you are reprimanded, twice you are in the CEO's [Chief
    Executive Officer] office, third you are gone. I think there
    has to be some real urgent pressure on staff to be careful
    about what they do at their own desktop.
        Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King.
        Senator Blackburn, please.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Hruby, I
    want to come to you. NNSA announced that it cancelled
    solicitation for the management and operations (M&O) at Y-12
    and Pantex, and then they are looking at separate management
    contracts, and they are going to handle these separately after
    they have a new M&O [management and operations] established.
    Then they are going to take the existing contractor and make
    them the overseer. Sounds complicated, does it not, and really
    sounds like quite a mess, does it not?
        So I agree. I know you have heard today from others about
    the instability of the contracting processes for NNSA, and I
    think that we deserve better. Our nation deserves better, and
    they deserve more consistency. Tennesseans that are working up
    there want to know how this is going to affect their mission,
    day in and day out, and what their expectation is. They deserve
    some dependable, competent leadership.
        So what is the timeline for awarding that for Y-12? What
    are you looking at?
        Ms. Hruby. Thank you, Senator Blackburn. Let me just say
    that I could not agree more. While this sounds complicated the
    intention is to get long-term stability and reward our M&O
    contractor workforce----
        Senator Blackburn. Okay.
        Ms. Hruby.--which does the work of NNSA. Make no doubt
    about it----
        Senator Blackburn. All right.
        Ms. Hruby.--that is the people who we count on.
        Senator Blackburn. Then what are the local management
    implications of what you are doing, the path you are going?
        Ms. Hruby. Right now, Pantex and Y-12 share a field office.
        Senator Blackburn. I know what the setup is. I am asking
    about the long-term implications. What are those? What are the
    cost implications?
        Ms. Hruby. Okay.
        Senator Blackburn. Are you doing this and pushing back on
    infrastructure, because that is imperative, as you know, and
    there is a backlog that we are waiting to have addressed.
        Ms. Hruby. Yes. This is in order to get dedicated
    leadership at Y-12 and at Pantex because of the tremendous
    workload that we are asking of those facilities, separate
    dedicated leadership. It may cost a little bit more, but it is
    worth it because we have to make sure that we can deliver.
        Senator Blackburn. And timeline?
        Ms. Hruby. We expect that the first RFP [request for
    proposal] will be out this year. We will have that awarded in 2
    years, and we will then, one year later----
        Senator Blackburn. So we are 3 years away from seeing
    consistency, is what you are telling me.
        Ms. Hruby. We are, but let me----
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. Let me move on. You know that that
    is unacceptable, and you know that that is not fair to the Y-12
    employees. But let us continue to discuss that and to work on
    that issue.
        Secretary Granholm, Senator Tuberville mentioned uranium
    processing, and of course the processing facility in Tennessee
    is one of our largest construction projects, and, you know, it
    gets held up time and again with budget by indecision, and the
    UPF was to come in in 2025 at $6.5 billion. That is no longer
    what is estimated, and the expectation is that it will come
    online in August 2026. Is that when you expect to deliver UPF?
        Administrator, are you wanting to answer that?
        Ms. Hruby. Yes, let me jump in. The answer is yes, that is
    our plan, and we are looking closely right now, independent
    experts, at any cost implications.
        I just want to say, for $6.5 billion project executed over
    8 years during COVID and during all the supply chain issues we
    have, we feel this project is incredibly successful.
        Senator Blackburn. Well, you mentioned yesterday, you told
    one of my colleagues that an 8-month delay was a commendable
    accomplishment, and I really disagree with that comment. But we
    are going to continue to work on it.
        Madam Secretary, I want to come back to you on the issue of
    transportation fuel because that is a top topic. With the
    estimate being $6 a gallon during January, we get asked about
    this every single day--every single day. So what are you doing
    every day to increase production, because you are eliminating
    leases, you are eliminating drilling on Federal land. Senator
    Hawley went through the litany of steps that you all have
    taken, and we hear from people in the oil industry about the
    adverse impact of your actions.
        So tell me what you are doing every day to increase U.S.
    oil production so that we return to being energy independent
    and energy dominant, like we were the day that you went in as
    Secretary.
        Secretary Granholm. Yes. We agree that we want to increase
    supply. It is why, for example, in the first year of the Biden
    administration more permits have been issued than----
        Senator Blackburn. But you do not give the drilling permit.
        Secretary Granholm. No, we are giving those permits. We
    want to, and we have called upon----
        Senator Blackburn. How many people are working on them? Is
    it one?
        Secretary Granholm. No, it is actually across the
    government. It is over at the Department of Interior. It is not
    in my lane.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. All right.
        Secretary Granholm. But I do know that we have been
    increasing permitting because we want to see increased
    production in the United States and abroad, to be able to make
    up for the lost barrels that have been off the market as a
    result of Putin's invasion of Ukraine.
        Senator Blackburn. Ma'am, I would encourage you to stop
    staying that. We are importing 670,000 barrels of oil per day.
    The cost of a gallon of gas, the cost of fertilizer, the cost
    of diesel are at all-time highs.
        Secretary Granholm. I know.
        Senator Blackburn. We need your best effort.
        Secretary Granholm. We are working on this every day to the
    extent we can, given that it is a global market and oil is
    traded----
        Senator Blackburn. It is.
        Secretary Granholm.--on a global market.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am over time.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Blackburn.
        Senator Kelly, please. Excuse me. Yes, Senator Kelly.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Administrator Hruby, during your confirmation hearing last
    year I asked you about the need to recruit the next generation
    of scientists and engineers to replace an aging workforce, and
    I highlighted the University of Arizona's relationship with the
    National Nuclear Security Administration through the Minority
    Serving Institution Partnership Program. You said that it would
    be a top priority moving forward, and I appreciate your
    commitment to that.
        As the chair of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities
    Subcommittee on this committee, I held a hearing a couple of
    months back on innovation and the development of emerging
    technologies that will play such a critical role for our future
    national security. A key takeaway for me is that we cannot
    innovative if we do not have a highly trained and skilled and
    motivate workforce to do that.
        So considering that your agency has now achieved its
    highest workforce levels in the last 9 years I have got a
    couple of questions. How much of that increase is attributable
    to new STEM-related recruits and, in your view, are this year's
    numbers the beginning of an upward trend, and is there any
    opportunity to accelerate that?
        Ms. Hruby. We do have a great need to hire in the complex.
    Our complex has about 57,000 employees. A great deal of those
    are in the STEM disciplines. We have to hire to replace
    retirements, and we have to hire because we are growing. As a
    result, we have many pipeline programs, as you mentioned, the
    Minority Serving Institution Programs, other grant programs and
    centers of excellence, and we have announced a program for
    apprenticeships for craftworkers and technicians that we need
    desperately also around the complex.
        So we are very worried about the workforce but we feel like
    we are putting good programs in place to recruit. Like I said,
    both growth and attrition from retirement and voluntary
    attrition.
        Senator Kelly. So do you feel it looks pretty good for the
    next 10 years? Are you on a good trajectory?
        Ms. Hruby. I think we cannot ever take our eye off this. It
    is close. I mean, we feel like this is a real race for talent,
    and we are trying to do things to improve, especially for both
    our Federal workforce and our M&O workforce, we are paying
    attention to pay, benefits, the environment that we offer, and
    we are stressing how important this mission is so people can
    feel good, as they should, about the work they do every day.
        Senator Kelly. Please let us know what we can do to help
    there.
        Secretary Granholm, so as you and Administrator Hruby know,
    as you both know, rare earth metals are vital in the production
    of many of our most complex national security systems, from
    missile guidance systems to night vision goggles, and the list
    is very long, actually, and both nuclear weapons and nuclear
    reactors are on that list. Much like the semiconductor
    industry, a very high percentage of our rare earth metals are
    sourced overseas, causing potentially catastrophic supply chain
    interruptions in our production of these complex systems.
        This is, in part, what led me to sponsor the Restoring
    Essential Energy and Security Holdings Onshore for Rare Earth
    Act of 2022. I know it is a mouthful, and I sponsored that with
    Senator Cotton. This legislation would create a strategic rare
    earth metal reserve to limit the impact of those potential
    interruptions.
        So for either of you, first of all, how vital are rare
    earth metals to the production of our nuclear weapon systems
    and also our shipboard nuclear reactors, and what is the risk
    posed by reduced access to rare earths?
        Secretary Granholm. Yes. Thank you for your leadership on
    this. This is a moment where we have to look at all of the
    things that we used to rely upon other countries for when we
    have them within our geographic boundaries. Rare earth minerals
    are critical for the nuclear weapons cycle but it is also
    critical for a whole array of other things, including electric
    vehicles, as you know.
        The President and the invoking of the Defense Production
    Act--and thank you for supporting the supplemental for Ukraine
    which funded that to the tune of $500 million--very important
    for us as we move forward. We will be working with DoD to make
    sure that we are sourcing, doing responsible extraction,
    processing. Your support, for example, of the Bipartisan
    Infrastructure law that allowed for us to put out a funding
    opportunity announcement for processing, because the United
    States does not do any processing of critical minerals either.
        So that whole chain, we need to be doing here. Thank you
    for your leadership on it.
        Senator Kelly. I do not want to go too far over but yes-or-
    no answer from each of you. Do you agree it is important that
    we have a strategic reserve of rare earth minerals to hedge
    against potential supply chain issues?
        Secretary Granholm. Yes.
        Ms. Hruby. Yes.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you. Thank you both. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly.
        Senator Scott, please.
        Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman. Secretary Granholm, as
    you know--I mean, you follow the news--we are hitting record
    gas prices each and every day. The poorest families in this
    country are being devastated with gas prices. They are being
    devastated with electricity rates, heating oil over the winter.
        I always thought the purpose of the Department of Energy
    was to make us energy independent and hopefully get prices
    down. Since the Biden administration came in office they shut
    down the Keystone Pipeline, they have attacked the oil and gas
    industry, they have made it difficult to get permits. The Biden
    administration has gone out and attacked the oil and gas
    companies, saying they intentionally do not want to drill for
    oil here while this Administration makes it difficult to get
    permits.
        Then the latest is they go to Iran and Venezuela and say
    they want oil from them, and then this week they went and
    relaxed sanctions on Venezuela so they can drill more oil in
    Venezuela but not more oil in this country.
        So can you explain why your Administration makes it more
    difficult for us to drill more oil in this country and why you
    believe it is in our national security interest to get oil from
    Iran, clearly a dedicated enemy of this country and of our ally
    like Israel, and why would you want to do business with Maduro
    who has committed genocide against his own citizens, and
    millions and millions of people have left Venezuela because he
    has forced starvation in his country.
        Secretary Granholm. Thank you, Senator. First, the United
    States will not be importing any oil from Iran or Venezuela.
    Number two, it is really important to know that this
    Administration is calling for increased production in the
    United States and has issued record number of permits for oil
    and gas drilling. Since this President took office, more
    permits issued in his first year than issued in the first 3
    years of the Trump administration. We are now a net exporter of
    oil, which just speaks to the amount of production that we have
    been doing, and we will be at record production by the end of
    this year.
        A survey was done----
        Senator Scott. If that is true how could gas prices be at
    the--if that is true, why would gas prices have gone up like it
    has gone up?
        Secretary Granholm. As you know, oil--and gasoline is
    derived from oil--oil is traded on a global market. The global
    supply of oil has decreased as a result of the Russian invasion
    of Ukraine because they used to be one of the world's largest
    exporters, and countries like the United States have rightfully
    said we are not going to take any Russian oil because we do not
    want to finance Putin's war.
        Consequently, there have been about 1.5 million barrels per
    day that have been taken off of the global market. The citizens
    in Florida and the citizens in South Africa and the citizens in
    Japan are all paying record amounts because it is traded on a
    global market. It is why increasing supply is so important. It
    is why the President has called for 1 million barrels per day
    to be released from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, and our
    allies across the world have also called for increases in
    theirs, as we are asking for the oil and gas industry to
    increase production.
        Senator Scott. So what you just said is not consistent with
    what I have been given. So if you could get me all that
    information about over the last, say, 10 years, of all the
    permits. Do you think it is appropriate that your
    Administration says the oil and gas companies intentionally do
    not want to drill for oil?
        Secretary Granholm. Well, I think that some are bringing
    rigs online, and there are some who have said, in shareholder
    calls, that they are holding off on investing in capital to
    favor shareholder buybacks. So it is not consistent across the
    board. But I will say----
        Senator Scott. It has nothing to do with the fact that you
    guys attacked them----
        Secretary Granholm. No.
        Senator Scott.--that you attacked the oil and gas industry?
        Secretary Granholm. Absolutely no. We are calling
    repeatedly. I talk to oil and gas industry members all the
    time. We are calling repeatedly for them to step up at this
    moment and increase the rig count. It is historically coming
    back after COVID, where there was a lot shut down, very slowly.
        Senator Scott. Let me go to my next question. Diesel fuel
    prices have hit record highs. Last year it was $3.17. Now it is
    $5.63. I just heard a story from a trucker in Orlando who is
    reconsidering the trucking business because diesel fuel is too
    expensive. He said the cost of diesel has single-handedly taken
    us out of the game, one by one, no matter how big you are. My
    dad was a truck driver. I know how difficult that job is. He
    and my mom did not make much money. They would be doing better
    now until diesel prices went up. So I do not know how a family
    that, you know, is an independent contractor and trying to make
    ends meet is dealing with this.
        What I do not get is, I mean, I do not see that you guys
    are doing anything to get prices down. You look at around this
    country. I mean, people are losing their jobs. Every month you
    are in office gas prices are up. Diesel prices are up. People
    are losing their jobs. I mean, I do not see anything happening.
        Secretary Granholm. We share your deep concern about this.
    For everyday citizens there is no doubt about it. That is why
    we have to increase supply right now. It is why we continually
    call for more investment in rigs to be able to do the
    extraction necessary to get supply up. It is happening all
    across the globe. This is why the inflation numbers, a huge
    number of that, 70 percent, is related to fuel. That is true in
    the United States. It is true all across the world.
        We need to increase supply, even as we accelerate our move
    to clean energy, but we need to increase supply right now to
    address the very concern that you raised.
        Senator Scott. Real quick. If you were in the business and
    your government was attacking--so if you were in the oil and
    gas business and your government is attacking, and the
    President says, ``I want to get rid of fossil fuel,'' would you
    want to go and invest a whole bunch of new money?
        Secretary Granholm. With oil at $110 a barrel I do not know
    that hurt feelings have anything to do with that. I think it
    involves fiscal discipline, as they say, and the decision
    during COVID to ramp back and now to take advantage of these
    high prices.
        However, some area increasing, and I will say this. The
    Dallas Fed did a survey of all of the oil and gas executives,
    and they found, last month, that 94 percent of them say that
    the high prices and the lack of production have to do with
    things other than this Administration's policies. It has to do
    with the price of oil on a global market.
        Senator Scott. It is a pretty good coincidence. It happened
    right after you guys took office. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott.
        Senator Blumenthal, please.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to
    both of you. Thank you for your service, Secretary Granholm,
    particularly, your service before the Administration as
    governor of Michigan and as attorney general of that state when
    we had the opportunity to work together. You have done great
    work and I appreciate you being here today.
        I want to focus on the last part of your testimony dealing
    with cybersecurity. We are very excited that you are going to
    be coming to Connecticut tomorrow and visiting the Millstone
    Nuclear Power Plant as well as the State Pier, where more wind
    power is going to be generated. You make the point, I think,
    very, very well in your testimony that--and I am quoting--``we
    have a strategic opportunity like never before while we are
    tackling the impacts of climate change. By deploying the next
    generation of wind, solar, hydrogen, and nuclear systems we can
    build in cybersecurity,'' end quote.
        I would suggest that we need cybersecurity in existing
    industrial control system--nuclear, wind, solar, not only new
    ones but those being built--and as Senator Shaheen highlighted,
    we are vulnerable. In fact, there has been speculation about
    why the Russians have not attacked us in the cyber space. There
    are a number of informed theories about why they have not, but
    clearly, without going into the classified information that we
    have, they potentially have the capacity to do so. I will be
    interested tomorrow to hear and see some of your suggestions
    about how we can safeguard our cybersecurity, particularly on
    nuclear. I wonder if you can discuss a little bit about more of
    the specifics now.
        Secretary Granholm. Yes. We agree that you have to address
    the existing enterprise as well as build by design, build cyber
    in by design. Both are happening. I know that Administrator
    Hruby has got a whole effort on cyber happening over at the
    NNSA. They have hired an evaluation to happen, and that
    evaluator has identified some points of excellence but also
    some points of challenge.
        The points of challenge involve further investment in the
    workforce, as we have discussed here, as well as in
    infrastructure that will prevent hacking, prevent penetration.
    That includes monitoring. It includes detection. It includes
    addressing on the spot. It includes projection about where
    things are going.
        So all of that must be a really robust part of our
    investments, and we appreciate so much your and the others who
    have raised this issue here because this is certainly not a new
    conversation and it certainly will not be the last conversation
    we have on this.
        Senator Blumenthal. Have you reviewed the security at the
    Millstone plant, cybersecurity at the Millstone plant, and how
    would you assets vulnerability?
        Secretary Granholm. The Millstone, where we are going
    tomorrow, you mean? Yes. I have not yet. I am looking forward
    to coming to learn more as well.
        Senator Blumenthal. Well, we hope that you will give us the
    benefit of your assessment when you finish with your review,
    because cybersecurity there and at every nuclear power plant
    has to be regarded with a tremendous urgency, given what the
    Russians have done in Ukraine in 2015, 2016, and now during the
    invasion at the site of the nuclear power plant there.
        I want to just finish by giving you an opportunity to
    expand a little bit on the questions that Senator Scott was
    asking, and I agree totally that the reluctance to produce more
    is not the result of hurt feelings by the oil companies. Their
    focus is on the bottom line, and perhaps you could expand a
    little bit on why they have not produced more and what can be
    done to persuade them to produce more, even as we go into more
    of renewables. In the short term production might be helpful,
    and their reluctance to produce more now.
        Secretary Granholm. Yes. Just briefly, I know we are almost
    out of time, but I think it is a really important point to
    note, that during COVID there was pressure from the investment
    community investing in oil and gas companies to say you have
    got to pull up off of investing in capital and exercise what is
    known as fiscal discipline. As a result, a lot of rigs and
    capital investment came offline.
        When we were coming out of COVID those rigs did not pick up
    to the extent that the demand was there, and they will say in
    large measure it is because Wall Street wanted to take
    advantage of profits, of the profits of the increasing cost of
    oil and gas, due to the increasing demand. Just simply supply
    and demand.
        Then it is compounded, of course, by the pulling off of oil
    on the global market because of the Russian invasion. So a
    million and a half barrels are off the market, and now you have
    got a slow ramp-up due to COVID, and now you have got other
    countries, rightfully so, like the EU deciding perhaps to not
    take on any more Russian oil, and then you will also have the
    opening up of the Chinese market because they are coming out of
    COVID as well.
        All of those compound to create a huge pressure on demand,
    and we want supply to increase. It is not this Administration.
    It is happening all over the world. As Senator King said, he
    saw that gas was $8.00 a gallon when he was in Germany. It is
    skyrocketing across the world, and this is why we are asking
    these oil and gas companies to step up, and our allies to step
    up production right now, to ease that pressure, even as we
    accelerate the move to clean energy, because ultimately a move
    to clean energy is the homegrown, secure kind of energy that
    will make us independent.
        Senator Blumenthal. I agree. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Sullivan, please.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary,
    I was not going to go into these questions but I just have to
    disagree with you. I care a lot about energy, right. It is a
    national security issue. We talk about it here. There has been
    a comprehensive hostility to the energy sector by this
    Administration, not necessarily you, day one. I watch it every
    day. Every day.
        So you are saying we need to increase supply. Let me give
    you just the last 3 weeks. The Department of Interior--again,
    not you--announced that they are taking half of the National
    Petroleum Reserve, set aside by Congress for oil and gas
    drilling in my state, off the table, the most prolific oil
    reservoir in the world right now. Everybody who explores there
    finds billion-barrel fields.
        Secretary Haaland, your colleague, came to Alaska and
    announced half of it is off the table. That is not focused on
    increasing supply. It is the opposite.
        Let me give you another one. Last week Cook Inlet Basin--
    okay, that is the other prolific oil and gas field in Alaska--
    at the last minute the Biden administration canceled the lease
    sale. That is exactly the opposite of getting supply on the
    market.
        Three weeks ago, the Council on Environmental Quality
    issued new NEPA [National Environmental Policy Act of 1969]
    rules. Everybody and their mother knows what they are. They
    meant to delay energy projects. I read them in detail. This is
    the last 3 weeks--NPRA off the table, Cook Inlet lease sale
    cancelled, and NEPA rules to kill the production of American
    energy. That is what you guys just did.
        Do you have a response to any of that, and I would like
    details. Maybe you do not know, and look, I am not coming after
    you. The Department of Interior is a disaster, from day one,
    and day one President Biden came and said, oh, we are going to
    stop anything in ANWR. He cannot do that. The Congress of the
    United States said there shall be two lease sales in ANWR.
    President, day one, we are not going to do ANWR. Sorry, Mr.
    President. Your job, under the U.S. Constitution, is to
    faithfully execute the law. The laws says two lease sales.
        So you guys have been, from day one--not you, maybe not
    you, not as bad--crushing the energy sector, and it is a fact.
    Rick Scott is exactly right. But can you comment on the three
    examples I just gave. You say you want to increase supply.
    Everything I just said is about directly decreasing supply.
    What about those--NPRA, Cook Inlet, new NEPA rules?
        Secretary Granholm. I hear what you are saying.
        Senator Sullivan. Do you agree with me that those are about
    limiting supply?
        Secretary Granholm. No. It is about limiting supply.
        Senator Sullivan. Of course they are. When you take leases
    off the table----
        Secretary Granholm. But maybe there are other concerns why
    a lease might be taken off the table in a sensitive
    environmental area. Maybe it has nothing to do with----
        Senator Sullivan. Half of the National Petroleum Reserve of
    Alaska?
        Secretary Granholm. You know, this is not my lane so----
        Senator Sullivan. Cook Inlet?
        Secretary Granholm. I understand that there was no interest
    on the part of----
        Senator Sullivan. That is not true. That is fundamentally a
    lie.
        Secretary Granholm. Okay. Well----
        Senator Sullivan. Again, that is not your----
        Secretary Granholm.--again, these are not my areas of
    responsibility.
        Senator Sullivan. How about the NEPA rules?
        Secretary Granholm. Again, that is EPA [Environmental
    Protection Agency]. That is not me.
        Senator Sullivan. No, no. That is the White House, CEQ
    [Council on Enivronmental Quality].
        Secretary Granholm. Well, let me just say this. We want to
    see an increase in supply and we want it to be done in a
    responsible way.
        Senator Sullivan. The actions I just----
        Secretary Granholm. I am just saying----
        Senator Sullivan.--laid out in the last 3 weeks would
    indicate directly otherwise.
        Secretary Granholm. As I said earlier, and maybe you were
    not here for that, but there have been, under the Biden
    administration's first year in office, more permits issued for
    oil and gas drilling than the first 3 years of the Trump
    administration.
        Senator Sullivan. You have 4,600 applications to drill
    stuck at the Department of Interior, 4,600. I recently checked
    on this.
        Secretary Granholm. There are 9,000 permits----
        Senator Sullivan. No. Applications to drill. That is very
    different----
        Secretary Granholm.--there are 9,000 permits out there that
    are sitting unused.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay. Look, I just happen to
    fundamentally disagree with you.
        Chairman Reed. Senator, please.
        Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, this is an incredibly
    important issue for the national security of our country. The
    Biden administration is openly hostile to the energy sector,
    and then they try to come in front of committees like this and
    say they are not. It is just not true.
        Let me just ask another one. The President is in Japan
    right now. This is in your area. All of our allies in Asia and
    in Europe want more American LNG [Liquified Natural Gas]. I
    think the President is going to announce something along the
    lines of we should get more LNG. I think you agree with that,
    Madam Secretary. I would like your views. American LNG to our
    allies.
        John Kerry, though, has come out I know to Japanese
    officials saying you should be very careful on buying American
    LNG. Do you agree with John Kerry's approach to going to Asia
    saying, ``Well, you should have reluctance to buying American
    LNG''? I hope you can disavow that. I have heard that from
    Japanese officials, telling me that he is saying that. I mean,
    whose side is this guy on?
        So where are you on the exports of clean-burning American
    LNG to our allies in Europe and in Asia, and do you think the
    President--my understanding is, I hope he does, he is going to
    announce some kind of initiative in Japan this week.
        Secretary Granholm. I cannot preview what he is going to be
    announcing but I will say that we believe that American LNG is
    an important way to help our allies. We, at the Department of
    Energy, have permitted an additional four LNG terminals for
    export to the EU. We also have permitted 30 billion cubic feet
    of LNG, both at FERC and at DOE that have not even begun
    construction yet. We believe that LNG is one way to help our
    allies, and we think it is important.
        We are also encouraged by the fact that many of the
    producers of LNG are eager to use the infrastructure associated
    with LNG to make it hydrogen ready. So both pieces.
        Senator Sullivan. Good. So just real quick. So assume John
    Kerry did tell some Japanese officials to be reluctant to buy
    American LNG. He is not Senate confirmed. He is kind of, in my
    view, a nobody, with a job in the White House that they will
    not even give us any information on how much he has spent and
    how many people he employs. But you are a Senate-confirmed
    Secretary of Energy. Assume he said that. Can you just openly
    reject that and say of course we would want our allies to buy
    American LNG?
        Secretary Granholm. I have the greatest respect for John
    Kerry. I cannot assume anything or believe words put in his
    mouth. I do believe he is doing an amazing job across the
    globe, getting communities and countries to step up to their
    commitments to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.
        Senator Sullivan. I am just asking to answer a simple
    question.
        Secretary Granholm. I understand you are asking me for a
    hypothetical----
        Senator Sullivan. Our Japanese allies need to know this.
    They have come to me.
        Secretary Granholm. We have spoken with Japan repeatedly,
    and Japan is really interested in forming a relationship on LNG
    in a stronger way. We are supportive of that.
        Senator Sullivan. So buying American LNG would be a good
    thing, not a bad thing.
        Secretary Granholm. Yes.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Thank you,
    Madam Secretary and Madam Administrator.
        We are going to conclude the open----
        Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, can I ask one final
    question? It is not for the Secretary. It is a quick one.
        Chairman Reed. One.
        Senator Sullivan. For Administrator Hruby. Can I ask you,
    the nuclear enterprise that you, Admiral Caldwell, and
    Secretary Granholm are in charge of is really remarkable, and
    the culture there, what we have been able to do in terms of
    nuclear-powered Navy vessels, including submarines is a really,
    really impressive record.
        With regard to AUKUS, which I think is a Biden
    administration initiative that is really, really good and
    really important, and I have been publicly supporting the
    President and his team on that initiative, how do we balance
    the culture and safety of what the nuclear enterprise has been
    able to achieve for our nation, particularly the nuclear Navy,
    with the goals, which I fully support, of broader cooperation
    in that realm with the Australians and the Brits, and are there
    areas beyond nuclear that you think the AUKUS initiative should
    encompass? Madam Secretary, to the extent you want to answer
    that as well. It is an important question, and I want to be
    very supportive of this very important initiative.
        Ms. Hruby. Thank you. Thank you for your support of AUKUS.
    I think the naval reactors folks and everybody on the United
    States and U.K. teams are doing a terrific job during this 18-
    month study period, and have found paths through this that will
    preserve and even make better our capabilities and our
    nonproliferation regime. So I am very optimistic about what
    this agreement can do.
        I do think there are other things that would be interesting
    to work on in the U.K., Australia, United States. I think there
    are energy things. I think there are climate things. I think
    there are science and technology, and I look forward to the
    possibility of doing that as this agreement matures.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, if there are things that we can do
    on the committee to help support it we certainly want to do it.
    Madam Secretary, do you have any views on AUKUS or what we can
    be doing?
        Secretary Granholm. No, just to pick up on the energy side
    of things, I know they are going through an election right now,
    but I hopeful that whoever survives that will continue to work
    with us on, for example, hydrogen production. They are doing
    great work in Australia on that, and I am very close with their
    minister, my counterpart, on sharing technology ideas and
    strategies regarding the production but the export of clean
    hydrogen too.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
        Madam Secretary, Madam Administrator, we are going to
    conclude the open session and we will reconvene at 11:30 in
    SVC-217 for the closed session.
        Before we do that, though, throughout this discussion there
    has been references to the Dallas Federal Reserve Report. It is
    my understanding that the question was asked about what was the
    number one reason, or the primary reason rather, that there was
    not increases in production, and the response, 60 percent of
    those surveyed said it was, quote, ``investor pressure to
    maintain capital discipline.'' Is that accurate, Madam
    Secretary?
        Secretary Granholm. That is accurate. Fifty-nine percent
    said that.
        Chairman Reed. So that is really sort of saying, you know,
    we are going to hold back our capital and give it to our
    shareholders. We will just hold it back.
        Then I believe also too, and if you can confirm this, that
    domestic crude oil output today is less than it was in 2019.
        Secretary Granholm. You are talking about our crude oil?
        Chairman Reed. Our crude oil.
        Secretary Granholm. It is, but we will be at record
    production by the end of this year.
        Chairman Reed. Okay, and then there is 12 million acres,
    approximately, of leased Federal lands that have not yet been
    drilled?
        Secretary Granholm. Correct. Leases on actually over 20
    million acres, on and offshore.
        Chairman Reed. Very good. Thank you very much for that
    clarification.
        At this point we will recess and rejoin in SVC-217. Thank
    you.
        [Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                    submarine nuclear propulsion with aukus
        1. Senator Shaheen. Administrator Hruby, what is the status of the
    negotiations between the United Kingdom, Australia and the Department
    of Energy's Naval Reactors program regarding the transfer of nuclear
    propulsion technology to Australia as part of the AUKUS agreement, and
    how long do you expect it might take for the technology transfer to
    occur?
        Administrator Hruby.We are approximately 9.5 months into an 18-
    month consultation period that will determine the optimal path for
    Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines while upholding the
    highest standards of safety, security, nonproliferation, and
    stewardship. Although we cannot provide detailed answers due to ongoing
    trilateral dialogue, the United States is strongly committed to
    supporting Australia in developing the infrastructure to support a
    nuclear-powered submarine capability.

        2. Senator Shaheen. Administrator Hruby, do you anticipate any
    significant obstacles in that technology transfer process that would
    complicate the United States' ability to help Australia procure their
    nuclear powered submarine fleet?
        Administrator Hruby. The 18-month consultation period is being
    conducted to identify key areas of cooperation required to successfully
    transfer nuclear powered submarine capabilities. To date, no
    significant obstacles have been identified, however, there are plenty
    of challenges that we believe can be sorted out over the next about 8.5
    months of study. We understand that the details matter.

        3. Senator Shaheen. Administrator Hruby, can you provide an update
    on our collaboration efforts with the U.K. to develop the PWR3, their
    third generation naval nuclear reactor?
        Administrator Hruby. Naval Reactors maintains close ties with the
    United Kingdom. As part of our nation's commitment to supporting the
    U.K.'s naval nuclear propulsion program, Naval Reactors is exchanging
    naval nuclear propulsion technology with the Royal Naval under the
    auspices of the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement, an Atomic Energy
    Agreement for Defense Purposes.
        Within the context of AUKUS, leveraging existing United States and
    U.K. technologies will be vitally important to meet that goal of
    bringing an Australian conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine
    capability into service at the earliest achievable date.

        4. Administrator Hruby, has the National Nuclear Security
    Administration determined whether a transition from weapons-grade
    highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium for naval nuclear
    propulsion systems is feasible?
        Administrator Hruby. Within the context of AUKUS, one of the goals
    of the 18-month consultation period is how best to bring an Australian
    conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability into service
    at the earliest achievable date. Leveraging existing technologies will
    be vitally important to meet that goal, and neither the United States
    nor the United Kingdom have naval nuclear reactors that use low
    enriched uranium.
        The R&D roadmap for Navy LEU fuel system development is technically
    challenging and success is not assured in meeting the operational needs
    of the Navy. It will take significant time and considerable fiscal
    resources to identify a HALEU candidate fuel capable of long-life and
    load following operations in a compact reactor. Even if the major
    technical challenges were overcome, an advanced fuel system using an
    LEU core would still be less capable and require naval core refueling,
    standing in stark contrast with today's life-of-ship submarine HEU
    reactor design. This would in turn be followed by substantial
    additional deployment costs and significant operational implications
    for the Navy, bringing the total cost of the effort to tens of billions
    of dollars. Work accomplished to date has narrowed the scope of
    potential fuels and validated the scope and magnitude of the technical
    challenges.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth A Warren
                                 pit production
        5. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, has the National Nuclear
    Security Administration considered developing or already developed
    contingency plans or alternaives to a two-site production plan?
        Administrator Hruby. Prior to the final decision to pursue such a
    strategy in May 2018, DOE/NNSA performed an analysis of alternatives
    and selected the two-site solution as the best alternative to meet pit
    production requirements. This was endorsed by the Nuclear Weapons
    Council (NWC), which noted that the two-site approach bolsters the
    nuclear security enterprise's responsiveness and resiliency. An
    independent study conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses,
    while noting the difficulty in completing the proposed Savannah River
    Plutonium Processing Facility by 2030, also concluded that creation of
    two geographically separated production facilities supports resilience
    from external threats and hazards and enables flexibility to mitigate
    against shutdowns, incidents, or other factors that may impact
    operations at a single site.
        As requested in H. Rept. 116-449, accompanying the Consolidated
    Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260) DOE/NNSA's Pit Production
    Contingency Plans report to Congress, conveys DOE/NNSA's plan to meet
    the needs of the nuclear deterrent and identifies ways to mitigate
    warhead deliverable risk.

        6. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, when will Los Alamos
    National Lab be able to produce no less than 30 pits each year
    reliably?
        Administrator Hruby. NNSA remains focused on developing the
    capability to produce 30 pits per year (ppy) starting in 2026 at Los
    Alamos.

        7. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, is the National Nuclear
    Security Administration confident that Los Alamos National Lab will be
    able to meet its statutory pit production schedule for fiscal years
    2024, 2025, and 2026, of 10, 20 and 30 pits per year respectively? What
    are the risks you see?
        Administrator Hruby. NNSA is confident that the path being followed
    at LANL will lead to a production capacity of at least 30 pits per
    year. As with any project of this complexity, there are many potential
    sources of delays, including equipment failures, supply chain
    interruptions, quality issues with vendor-supplied materials, test
    failures, etc.
        The project requires exquisite choreography among three kinds of
    efforts--pit production, decontamination and removal of old equipment,
    and installation of new equipment--with all three often happening on
    the same day in the same room. The integrated team at LANL has become
    adept at quickly revising the choreography in response to inevitable
    disruptions, has become more efficient in its removal and installation
    efforts, and is creative in its effort to recover schedule margin to
    allow for future disruptions. Nevertheless, there remains the risk that
    future disruptions could cause the dates at which LANL demonstrates
    production rates of 10, 20, and 30 pits per year to slip beyond 2024,
    2025, and 2026, respectively.
                       facility and infrastructure plans
        8. Senator Warren. Secretary Granholm, Administrator Hruby, what
    cost savings could accrue if the National Nuclear Security
    Administration concentrated its efforts on completing the Savannah
    River Pit Production Facility as soon as possible in the early 2030s
    instead of building two pit production facilities?
        Secretary Granholm and Administrator Hruby. The benefit of
    achieving rate production at LANL in the 2026 timeframe outweighs any
    potential cost savings from shifting focus. Both facilities are
    required to meet national security needs. DOE/NNSA is well down the
    path of designing SRPPF for a capacity of at least 50 pits per year,
    which does not by itself meet the nation's pit-production requirement
    of at least 80 pits per year. DOE/NNSA has not performed a detailed
    estimate of the added cost of changing the SRPPF design and
    construction project to meet the full requirement of at least 80 pits
    per year, as this alternative was rejected in 2018 in favor of the two-
    site approach.
        For SRPPF, DOE/NNSA is examining opportunities for cost savings
    through stimulating special-purpose supply chains and place contracts
    for long-lead procurements.

        9. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, will the Savannah River Pit
    Production Facility (SRPPF) project have contingent production capacity
    beyond at least 50 pits per year? What will be the maximum average
    capacity of SRPPF?
        Administrator Hruby. SRPPF will provide a reliable production
    capacity of no fewer than 50 ppy. It will also be possible to ``surge''
    beyond the 50 ppy rate for limited periods. Limited surges may be
    accomplished with a ramp up of workforce personnel to support a second
    shift at the facility. Quantitative details about maximum average and
    surge capacities depend on the details of the pit design and
    specifications.

        10. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, why is completion of the
    Los Alamos National Lab Transuranic Liquid Waste Facility so delayed?
        Administrator Hruby. There are two main factors that contributed to
    the delays in the Transuranic Liquid Waste (TLW) facility. The first
    was a required redesign of the TLW facility and the second was that
    construction contract bids significantly exceeded the estimated cost of
    construction and a Congressional notification was required to increase
    project funding.
        During final design reviews as NNSA approached the planned Critical
    Decision 2/3 (CD-2/3), Performance Baseline and Start of Construction,
    approval milestone in the first quarter of fiscal year 2021, it was
    determined that the TLW facility would not meet all key performance
    parameters as designed and necessary design modifications were
    initiated to ensure the facility would meet all specified requirements
    and capabilities. The design modification and associated reviews were
    completed and the request for proposals (RFP) was issued April 21,
    2021.
        In July 2021, two bids were received for the construction contract,
    one of which was determined to be non-responsive and was eliminated.
    The one responsive bid received significantly exceeded the estimated
    cost of construction. Negotiations were initiated with the one
    responsive bidder in September 2021, however, the final negotiated
    price exceeded approved funding. CD-2/3 was approved in January 2022
    and Congressional Notifications were made in February 2022, additional
    funds were made available, and the contract was awarded in March 2022.

        11. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, will the delay in
    Transuranic Liquid Waste Facility completion affect Los Alamos National
    Lab's pit production schedule?
        Administrator Hruby. No. The construction contract for the
    Transuranic Liquid Waste (TLW) Facility (07-D-220-04) was awarded by
    LANL in March 2022. Construction will continue in fiscal year 2023 and
    is scheduled for completion in fiscal year 2027. NNSA does not
    anticipate that TLW construction delays will impact pit production
    schedules.

        12. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, why has the cost of Los
    Alamos National Lab Transuranic Liquid Waste Facility increased by $79
    million?
        Administrator Hruby. There are two main factors that contributed to
    the increased cost in the Transuranic Liquid Waste (TLW) facility
    relative to the Critical Decision 1 (CD-1), Alternative Selection and
    Cost Range. The first was a required redesign of the TLW facility and
    the second was that market condition at the time of construction
    contract solicitation resulted in a single responsible bid that
    significantly exceeded the estimated cost of construction.
        During final design reviews as NNSA approached the planned CD-2/3,
    Performance Baseline and Start of Construction, approval milestone in
    the first quarter of fiscal year 2021, it was determined that the TLW
    facility would not meet all key performance parameters as designed and
    a project redesign was initiated. The design modifications were
    necessary to add capabilities to ensure the facility would meet all
    specified requirements. The design changes, along with additional
    contract requirements associated with implementation of Executive Order
    (EO) Executive Order 14042, Ensuring Adequate COVID Safety Protocols
    for Federal Contractors resulted in an increase in the overall cost of
    the facility.
        In July 2021, two bids were received for the construction contract,
    one of which was determined to be non-responsive and was eliminated. At
    the time of the solicitation, market conditions in the area were
    impacted by increased construction in the surrounding tri-state region
    limiting availability of construction contractors and workforces,
    supply chain limitations increasing the cost of construction materials,
    and the ongoing impacts of COVID-19. The one responsive bid received
    significantly exceeded the estimated cost of construction. Negotiations
    were initiated with the one responsive bidder in September 2021,
    however, the final negotiated price exceeded approved funding. Critical
    Decision-2/3 was approved in January 2022 and Congressional
    Notifications were made in February 2022, additional funds were made
    available, and the contract was awarded in March 2022.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky S. Rosen
                      long term funding strategy for nnss
        13. Senator Rosen. Secretary Granholm and Administrator Hruby,
    since its inception, the Nevada National Security Site, or NNSS, has
    relied on its large and remote area to conduct missions for the
    nation's nuclear weapons and nonproliferation programs, as well as
    other elements of the national security community. Larger than all
    other NNSA sites combined and equivalent in size to the state of Rhode
    Island, NNSS has a vast amount of infrastructure to build and maintain.
    I am delighted by your recent visits to the Site and welcome the
    excitement and attention your visits have brought to the important and
    unique work being conducted there. However, over the past few decades,
    NNSS has faced unstable and unpredictable program funding, leaving the
    Site with a degraded infrastructure, despite being a facility of
    national importance that is responsible for the certification of our
    nuclear stockpile. I'm pleased that the programmatic situation is now
    changing in a positive direction but remain concerned that we address
    this infrastructure funding issue so that NNSS can continue to be a
    center of excellence for the nuclear enterprise. How are you addressing
    NNSA's infrastructure modernization challenges and delays--particularly
    at NNSS--so they do not impact the agency's ability to fulfill its
    responsibilities, including certification of our nuclear stockpile?
        Secretary Granholm and Administrator Hruby. NNSA fully understands
    the importance of modern infrastructure to ensure a safe, secure, and
    effective stockpile; reduce the risk to mission; and improve employee,
    public, and environmental safety. As you note, NNSA is making
    significant, strategic investments to support the NNSS workforce and
    mission by recapitalizing key facilities. During the last five years,
    NNSA has more than doubled its annual maintenance investment at NNSS,
    going from $28 million in fiscal year 2017 to $64 million in fiscal
    year 2023. NNSA partners with NNSS on vital line-item, minor
    construction, and recapitalization projects to modernize its campus and
    improve resiliency.
        Importantly, NNSA is also investing in new infrastructure for
    sophisticated scientific experiments that are needed to assess the
    performance of new and aged nuclear material. The Enhanced Capabilities
    for Subcritical Experiments program and its associated projects at the
    U1a Complex demonstrate the NNSA commitment to advancing as well as
    sustaining the capabilities at NNSS.

        14. Senator Rosen. Secretary Granholm, are you considering
    innovative approaches to assuring that the NNSS infrastructure is
    supported and recapitalized, including base funding, to guide future
    investment planning?
        Secretary Granholm. NNSA is committed to working with Congress and
    our Management & Operating (M&O) partners to generate meaningful
    progress on infrastructure modernization by maximizing the impact of
    sustained, predictable funding combined with our data-driven, risk-
    informed planning and management tools and innovative execution
    initiatives. NNSA is working to transition its successful innovative
    streamlining initiatives into standard construction practices that will
    save time and money, including on larger scale, commercial-like non-
    nuclear projects. NNSS is a strong partner in these endeavors,
    particularly the Standardized Acquisition & Recapitalization (STAR)
    initiative, as exemplified by the completion of Mercury Building 1
    which is a net zero, high performance sustainable building, that is now
    part of NNSA's STAR design library. The Mercury facility STAR design
    and lessons learned from NNSS are being used at the Pantex Plant for
    its Flexible Support Facility. Moving forward, NNSA will continue to
    develop and execute innovative approaches to infrastructure management
    and evaluate the most effective funding models for infrastructure
    across the enterprise.
                           remote sensing laboratory
        15. Senator Rosen. Secretary Granholm and Administrator Hruby, the
    Nevada National Security Site hosts the Nonproliferation Test and
    Evaluation Complex, the largest facility for open-air testing of
    hazardous materials and biological simulants in the world, which trains
    first responders for nuclear catastrophes. Another equity we're proud
    to host in Nevada is the Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL) on Nellis Air
    Force Base, which provides radiological emergency response teams along
    the west coast, who stand ready to provide emergency radiological
    response to anywhere in the world with deployable teams of experts. RSL
    has been undergoing a number of upgrades to their equipment, including
    helicopters, detectors, and communications gear, and I'm pleased that
    you visited them during your recent trips to Nevada. Can you speak to
    the importance of the NNSS and the Remote Sensing Laboratory and the
    specialized people and equipment they field? Can you also touch on the
    importance of continuing to upgrade their highly specialized nuclear
    detection equipment? To understand the critical role these men and
    women play, we don't have to look any further than the recent
    deployment of a team due to Russia's targeting of nuclear facilities in
    Ukraine.
        Secretary Granholm and Administrator Hruby. The Nevada National
    Security Site (NNSS) and the Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL) are key
    elements of the nuclear security enterprise, particularly in the areas
    of nuclear counterterrorism and nuclear incident response. The
    expertise in radiation detection and data analysis resident in Nevada
    are critical to our ability to provide timely, accurate, and actionable
    public health and safety advice to U.S. decision makers. As such, NNSS
    manages several important facilities and capabilities in support of the
    nuclear security mission.
        NNSS includes an area where four nuclear devices were detonated
    between 1952 and 1957, providing a realistic and safe training area
    where over 200,000 American first responders have trained since 1998.
    Additionally, the Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST) maintains
    specialized equipment and facilities in Nevada for the nation's nuclear
    forensics mission. NEST is responsible for the disassembly, assessment,
    and disposition of nuclear threat devices in support of national
    investigations. In addition to supporting the Stockpile Stewardship
    Program, NNSS provides remote facilities where special nuclear material
    and nuclear components can be staged for testing national security
    detection capabilities and techniques.
        NNSS also maintains a unique on-site capability for developing
    weapons of mass destruction device defeat procedures, tools, and data
    acquisition using large quantities of nuclear material. These
    facilities support international and interagency technical challenges
    and exercises, such as the Small Unit Exchanges with our mission
    partners in the Department of Defense and Department of Justice, as
    well as exercises with the United Kingdom and France. NNSS is the sole
    disposition site for NNSA nuclear forensics and disposition response
    activities required under standing presidential policy.
        Over the last five years, NNSA has committed to modernizing and
    replacing the entire suite of NEST's radiological and nuclear response
    tools, including communications equipment, radiation detectors, and the
    Aerial Measuring System rotary- and fixed-wing airframes. This
    recapitalization will ensure that NEST can maintain its equipment and
    expertise to provide the U.S. Government's most effective and advanced
    nuclear incident response capability.
        RSL has a long history of adapting commercial technologies,
    building custom components, and assembling mission-driven systems to
    ensure the viability of the nuclear counterterrorism mission. The
    facility has developed custom-built, highly sensitive detectors and
    software systems to enable real-time nuclear science expertise and
    nuclear reconnaissance capabilities for U.S. incident response teams.
        In addition to supporting the nuclear incident response mission,
    NNSS' Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex has provided great
    value to NNSA's development of advanced technologies and capabilities
    that significantly improved the United States' ability to monitor
    foreign nuclear weapons development activities.
        Recently, the staff at the RSL have been called into urgent service
    to prepare radiological detectors for use around Ukrainian nuclear
    power plants after the unprovoked Russian invasion. The disruptions in
    reporting of the IAEA radiological detectors as a result of the Russian
    takeover of the Chornobyl and Zaporizhzhia nuclear facilities
    highlighted the critical need to augment existing systems with an
    independent network of remotely monitored sensors.
                    energy security and solar investigation
        16. Senator Rosen. Secretary Granholm, the Department of Defense
    (DOD) is increasing its use of renewable energy because it understands
    the connection between energy security and national security. Renewable
    energy technologies, including solar panels, are uniquely capable of
    withstanding extreme weather events and can cut operational and
    military base energy costs. By using renewable energy, we are also
    eliminating our reliance on foreign energy sources and vulnerable
    supply chains for both fuel and electricity. Unfortunately, the solar
    circumvention petition filed by Auxin Solar and the Commerce
    Department's investigation is harming the entire U.S. solar industry
    and threatening our clean energy goals. I understand the Department of
    Commerce says that it is undergoing a quasi-judicial process, and the
    statutory deadline for the preliminary determination is on August 29.
    However, nothing in statute prohibits Commerce from making a decision
    before that date. Do you support a swift investigation and a timely
    resolution to this investigation?
        Secretary Granholm. Yes, all parties would benefit from an
    expedient resolution to the investigation that is supported by facts.

        17. Senator Rosen. Secretary Granholm, current U.S. solar panel
    manufacturing capacity can only fill 15 percent of domestic demand.
    What programs at DOE are tackling this problem? And what policy
    proposals do you recommend enacting in order to support domestic
    manufacturing to ensure that down the road we are not as reliant on
    solar imports?
        Secretary Granholm. First and foremost, Congress can enact funding
    in fiscal year 2023 for the proposed $200 million Solar Manufacturing
    Accelerator, as proposed in the President's Budget. This funding would
    accelerate domestic manufacturing to fill key gaps in the domestic
    solar supply chain through domestic sourcing and innovation. In
    addition, DOE's Office of Policy is coordinating a series of workshops
    with domestic solar manufacturers to identify a strategy for utilizing
    the President's recent authorization for DOE to apply the Defense
    Production Act (DPA) to tackle this problem. Solar manufacturers may
    also be eligible to receive capital support through new Bipartisan
    Infrastructure Law programs, such as the Advanced Energy Manufacturing
    and Recycling Grant Program. However, ongoing support to offset the
    higher cost of domestic manufacturing is needed. For that, DOE
    recommends Congressional passage of refundable manufacturing production
    tax credits such as those introduced last year in the Solar Energy
    Manufacturing for America Act (SEMA).
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Dan S. Sullivan
                                     aukus
        18. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Hruby, I understand that NNSA and
    Naval Reactors are currently involved in an 18-month study period
    regarding the optimal pathway to deliver nuclear propulsion technology
    to Australia as a part of the AUKUS agreement. The United States has
    only shared nuclear propulsion technology once before, with the United
    Kingdom. Our Naval Nuclear Propulsion Progra is a model of excellence.
    The same can be said for the UK. How you are balancing the need to
    ensure the Australians have the same level of stewardship for their
    program with the need to move out quickly on the terms of this
    agreement?
        Administrator Hruby. NNSA is part of a broad interagency and
    trilateral 18-month study period. Nuclear stewardship is a central
    element of the consultation period. The effort will intensively examine
    the full suite of requirements that underpin nuclear stewardship with a
    specific focus on the following areas: safety, design, construction,
    operation, maintenance, disposal, regulation, training, environmental
    protection, installations and infrastructure, industrial base capacity,
    workforce, force structure and--in the case of Australia--IAEA
    Safeguards.
        We continue to analyze multiple options to identify the optimal
    pathway for Australia to achieve a nuclear-powered submarine
    capability. However, since nuclear stewardship is such an important
    part of the culture and safety of operating this unforgiving
    technology, a focus on stewardship will be foundational to every
    decision we make as we work to fulfill the tasking set forth in the
    AUKUS agreement.

        19. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Hruby, the ``nuclear Navy'' has a
    very unique culture within the US Navy. It is the result of a very
    rigorous training and education pipeline. What training and education
    recommendations are you considering to ensure a similar culture exists
    within the Australian Navy?
        Administrator Hruby. The governments of the United States,
    Australia, and the United Kingdom are currently engaging in an 18-month
    consultation period to seek an optimal pathway for delivering a
    conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability to Australia
    at the earliest achievable date. Leveraging existing technologies and
    training methods and practices will be vitally important to meet that
    goal. Existing United States and U.K. training and education pipelines
    provide a foundation of understanding for this consultation period;
    however, it is premature to commit to any specific recommendations
    before we review the detailed products of the AUKUS Working Groups.
    Among the considerations being evaluated within the working groups are
    governance and regulatory structures and growing operational
    proficiency to safely operate and support nuclear-powered submarines.

        20. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Hruby, we have been building and
    maintaining nuclear submarines since 1952 but we are currently
    struggling to both build and maintain our nuclear submarines.
    Establishing the industrial base to build and maintain nuclear-powered
    submarines is a significant undertaking. How are industrial base
    considerations factoring into the 18-month assessment currently
    underway?
        Administrator Hruby. One of the goals of the 18-month consultation
    period is how best to bring an Australian conventionally-armed,
    nuclear-powered submarine capability into service at the earliest
    achievable date. AUKUS partners are working together to ensure that key
    elements of safety, security, and regulatory safeguards are
    incorporated in the planning, design, and execution of all aspects of
    AUKUS cooperation. Leveraging existing United States and U.K.
    technologies and industrial bases will be vitally important to meet
    that goal and provide a foundation of understanding, however, it is
    premature to commit to any specific recommendations before we review
    the detailed products of the AUKUS Working Groups. Among key
    considerations for the working groups are factors related to developing
    the engineering and technical depth and experience to safely operate
    and support nuclear-powered submarines.
                            fiscal year 2023 budget
        21. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Hruby, as I'm sure you are aware,
    I've been very critical of the anemic budget put forth by the President
    this spring. In his fiscal year 2023 budget submission, the National
    Nuclear Security Administration received a 3.7 percent increase over
    the fiscal year 2022 enacted. However, if inflation persists at its
    current pace, that 3.7 percent ``budget increase'' would in fact be a
    4.6 percent inflation adjusted budget cut. With our nuclear deterrent
    as the cornerstone of the National Defense Strategy's ``integrated
    deterrence'' efforts, I find this unacceptable. Do you believe an
    inflation adjusted budget cut would inhibit the maintenance and
    modernization of our credible nuclear deterrent?
        Administrator Hruby. The President's fiscal year 2023 Budget for
    NNSA reflects the Administration's robust support for nuclear
    modernization. However, issues facing the broader economy have affected
    NNSA. NNSA has managed the unplanned price increases in the near term
    by drawing down prior year carryover balances, and NNSA will continue
    to do this in fiscal year 2023.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Rick L. Scott
                              oil and gas shortage
        22. Senator Scott. Secretary Granholm, you stated during the May
    19, 2022 hearing in the Senate Armed Services Committee that the
    administration will NOT import oil from Iran and Venezuela. Can I get
    your commitment that the Administration will continue to honor this
    statement and never negotiate with the Islamic Republic of Iran or the
    Maduro regime in Venezuela to import oil?
        Secretary Granholm. United States sanctions prohibit the
    importation of Iranian and Venezuelan oil and I would direct your
    question to the Office of Foreign Assets Control at Treasury and the
    State Department.

        23. Senator Scott. Secretary Granholm, in that same hearing you
    mentioned that the, ``administration is calling for an increased
    production in the United States and has issued record number of permits
    for oil and gas drilling. Since this president took office, more
    permits issued in the first year than issued in the first three years
    of the Trump administration.'' This assertion that American oil and gas
    producers are sitting on unused federal leases is simply not true. This
    administration makes it harder for oil and gas producers to use their
    leases by not acting on pending drilling permits. Further, this
    administration continues to attack the oil and gas industry and create
    uncertainty for companies, which hinders them from making additional
    investments in energy production. What messaging and policy changes
    does the administration plan to implement to encourage domestic energy
    production?
        Secretary Granholm. I and others across DOE and the Administration
    have been consistent on calling for more domestic production. And while
    the majority of oil and gas production happens on private lands that
    the States regulate, the unused permits on federal leases have
    naturally raised questions on whether producers are using all of the
    available mechanisms they may have to increase production. The calls I
    and others have made to increase production have led to many recent
    positive, yet frank discussions with industry. These discussions are
    helping to inform what actions the government and industry may be able
    to take to help alleviate the current tightness in the market.
    Additionally, we continue to call on domestic oil and gas companies to
    ensure they are planning appropriately with storage inventories and
    other appropriate measures that leave them positioned to respond to
    market disruptions due to natural disasters and the shifting energy
    landscape due to Russia's unprecedented invasion of Ukraine.

        24. Senator Scott. Secretary Granholm, you also mentioned that the
    Russian incursion of Ukraine is the cause of increased oil prices for
    consumers and that the President is releasing one million barrels per
    day from United States strategic reserves. What long-term strategic
    problems do you foresee from the depletion of our reserves and what
    policies is the administration implementing to encourage domestic
    mining so that the United States is not reliant on global fuel prices
    and shortages?
        Secretary Granholm. Senator, the Administration agrees that it is
    vital to our national energy security to have a robust Strategic
    Petroleum Reserve (SPR) and we want to maintain the integrity of this
    tool for use in future supply disruptions. Therefore, DOE has already
    taken steps to outline a long-term buyback strategy to methodically
    plan to replace barrels being released through emergency sales. We have
    already announced plans to begin this process in the fall to begin
    repurchase of up to 60 million barrels to be delivered to the SPR after
    fiscal year 2023 when demand and prices are anticipated to ease.
    Delaying repurchase until then will provide industry certainty that
    there will be a buyer for increases in U.S. crude oil production
    between now and then. That is also why we have initiated a Notice of
    Proposed Rulemaking that would allow for a competitive, fixed price bid
    approach for repurchase -allowing both industry and taxpayers certainty
    on price and volumes for future delivery. We look forward to working
    with Congress to determine the most effective ways to replenish the
    necessary volume needed to maintain a robust SPR.

        25. Senator Scott. Secretary Granholm, lastly you mentioned you
    would provide the appropriate documentation of all oil and gas permits
    filed in the last 10 years. Can you include this in your response?
        Secretary Granholm. The Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land
    Management regularly publishes statistics on oil and gas leasing and
    permitting on federal lands.
        Statistics on leasing and permitting can be found in a file on this
    page: https://www.blm.gov/programs-energy-and-minerals-oil-and-gas-oil-
    and-gas-statistics
        Monthly statistics on the status of applications for permits to
    drill can be found on this page: https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-
    and-minerals/oil-and-gas/operations-and-production/permitting/
    applications-permits-drill
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
                                   contracts
        26. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Hruby, to what degree does
    contract instability impact infrastructure investment and drawdown of
    deferred maintenance backlogs?
        Administrator Hruby. To date, M&O contract transitions have not
    impacted infrastructure modernization. Infrastructure stewardship is an
    enduring responsibility that requires long-term planning, stable
    funding, and timely execution to mitigate risk and support mission
    needs. Like businesses across the country, NNSA and our M&O partners
    have experienced supply chain and labor shortage challenges. NNSA is
    working with its M&O partners to find creative solutions to these
    challenges, including by consolidating and streamlining enterprise-wide
    procurement to maximize our buying power and accelerate delivery.

        27. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Hruby, how does contract
    instability represent a risk to the cost-effective and timely execution
    of current life extension programs?
        Administrator Hruby. Our M&O contracts have been structured to last
    for up to ten years to provide some significant stability to the
    workforce and to provide continuity to mission work. During an M&O
    contract transition, the vast majority of the workforce, generally over
    99 percent, continues with the new contractor while only a small number
    of senior leaders change. That stability in the workforce helps
    minimize disruptions to the current life extension programs. In
    addition, we build in several months of transition between the
    incumbent and the new M&O contractor to help with continuity. As we
    examine contract competition going forward, we will use continuity and
    ability to deliver program as guiding principles.

        28. Senator Blackburn. What are the Department of Energy and NNSA
    doing to improve the stability and reliability of their schedule for
    releasing draft requests for proposals, requests for proposals, and
    awarding contracts?
        Secretary Granholm and Administrator Hruby. NNSA is committed to
    continuously reviewing its acquisition processes and assessing previous
    M&O contract competitions to look for areas of improvement in schedule
    and streamlining of processes and requirements for each upcoming M&O
    contract competition. NNSA utilizes lessons learned throughout each
    contract action to continually provide improvements to schedule,
    processes, and when necessary, to policy and guidance. The streamlining
    of processes has led to NNSA's unique and complex multi-billion-dollar
    M&O contracts generally being awarded in 24 months or less.

        29. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Hruby, what performance
    mechanisms can be installed to mitigate the unpredictability and
    uncertainty in the contracting process?
        Administrator Hruby. NNSA's unique nuclear security missions
    require long-term planning, stable funding, and timely execution to
    mitigate risk and support mission accomplishment. Our M&O contracts are
    structured to last for up to ten years, rather than the maximum of up
    to five years in typical federal contracts. During an M&O contract
    transition, the vast majority of the workforce, generally over 99
    percent, continues with the new contractor while only a small number of
    senior leaders change. This helps us retain the critical skills
    required to perform our specialized mission functions and provides
    stability for the workforce. The unique M&O contract structure is
    designed to mitigate the greater level of uncertainty and disruption
    during transition that is experienced on other types of federal
    contracts. Additionally, we have applied lessons learned from many M&O
    contract competitions to tailor contract clauses, streamline proposal
    and evaluation processes, and develop contract transition structures
    that help mitigate risk and provide stability and continuity during
    contract competitions and transitions. As we move forward with the new
    Pantex and Y-12 contract competitions, minimizing disruptions will be a
    very high priority.
                                 infrastructure
        30. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Hruby, what is a specific
    example of the potential consequences to the stability of the U.S.
    nuclear enterprise if it must continue to rely on aging infrastructure?
        Administrator Hruby. NNSA is heavily dependent on aged
    infrastructure for critical mission work. One example is the lithium
    capability which supports nuclear weapon, nonproliferation, and
    counterterrorism programs. NNSA's lithium operations rely almost
    exclusively on Y-12's Beta-02, a 79-year-old Manhattan Project-era
    facility that is in poor condition. The $2.8 billion facility is
    experiencing structural failure, including a 200-pound chunk of
    concrete falling from the ceiling in 2016. However, to rebuild this
    capability is complicated and expensive. The NNSA has a replacement
    planned, the Lithium Processing Facility, but it will not be available
    until the early 2030s. Meanwhile, we are investing to stabilize and
    improve the existing facility so it can be used until then because any
    halt of operations at Beta-02 risks negative impacts to stockpile
    management work, radiation detection, and isotope production.

        31. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Hruby, how are budgetary and
    national security issues linked to the billions of dollars reported in
    deferred NNSA maintenance?
        Administrator Hruby. Much of NNSA's infrastructure is in poor
    condition, but we are making progress using line-item and minor
    construction projects in conjunction with strategic maintenance and
    repair investments to reduce risk to our national security missions and
    sustain our enduring infrastructure. Meaningful progress towards
    improving the condition of NNSA's infrastructure will require
    significant and sustained investments during the coming decades. NNSA
    is using data-driven and risk-informed infrastructure tools to enable a
    transition from a financially driven to a risk-driven plan for
    improving infrastructure. New construction will play a large role in
    addressing NNSA infrastructure challenges as so many of our existing
    facilities are well beyond their 40-year design life. In many cases,
    sustainment of such old facilities is not as cost-effective as
    replacement. In fiscal year 2023, we will have a new integrated
    infrastructure plan including the planned major capital projects and
    other infrastructure needs throughout the complex.

        32. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Hruby, what are the recruiting
    and retention issues associated with key NNSA facilities not meeting
    modern safety standards?
        Administrator Hruby. Work across the nuclear security enterprise is
    increasing and with this increase we are looking at two challenges in
    successfully meeting our mission. One is recognizing the infrastructure
    across our sites is old and some of the structures should be modernized
    to better support our workforce and execute our mission. To accomplish
    this, we need to be more effective in recruiting and retaining
    qualified staff that will support the mission as well as our
    infrastructure modernization efforts.
        All our facilities meet the safety standards per the approved
    safety basis for operations. However, NNSA is experiencing the
    demographic challenges of a retiring, experienced workforce as we ramp
    up our mission scope to meet expanding national security needs.
        The second challenge is the recruitment, staffing, and long-term
    retention of the workforce to meet and sustain mission needs. The
    nuclear security enterprise is leveraging all the tools available to
    attract and retain employees in today's competitive market and we
    continue to look at new and innovative ways to remain competitive in
    this challenging and dynamic labor market.
        Key priorities identified to meet this need include competitive pay
    and benefits packages, as well as modern office and laboratory spaces
    that make NNSA an appealing place to work, conduct research, and
    develop critical skills while supporting our national security mission.
    We are paying close attention to pay and benefits, the environment our
    staff works-in including facilities, and stressing the importance of
    the mission we do every day. We are also employing strategies that
    offer more remote work options where appropriate.
                                depleted uranium
        33. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Hruby, what assurances can you
    offer that depleted uranium modernization efforts are on schedule and
    will not delay nuclear stockpile modernization programs?
        Administrator Hruby. The Depleted Uranium (DU) Modernization
    Program enables the restart of lapsed capabilities to ensure NNSA can
    meet imminent weapons delivery mission requirements. NNSA is
    prioritizing restart of the DU-niobium (binary) alloy production
    capability, re-establishment of a reliable supply of high purity
    depleted uranium (HPDU) metal feedstock, and modernization of binary
    radiation case production to meet near-term demands. To meet long-term
    demands, NNSA has asked Y-12 to begin executing a bridging strategy to
    increase capacity in the existing facilities to meet mission
    deliverables through the late 2030s. NNSA is also developing plans for
    a new Depleted Uranium Manufacturing Complex (DUMC) that will be needed
    to meet capacity requirements starting in the late 2030s. The DU
    Modernization Program employs an integrated master schedule, strategic
    materials model, and risk register with multiple risk mitigation
    actions to manage program execution and align investments with mission
    delivery requirements.

        34. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Hruby, what is the status of
    the legacy DU-niobium alloying process, and will NNSA be able to
    produce qualified ingots by October 2023?
        Administrator Hruby. Qualified DU-niobium (binary) alloy is needed
    by December 2023 to meet mission requirements. NNSA's DU Modernization
    Program is restarting the Vacuum Induction Melt (VIM)-Vacuum Arc Remelt
    (VAR)-VAR process to produce new qualified binary alloy to meet current
    and future weapon component requirements. The restart activities are on
    track to meet the December 2023 need date. Y-12 successfully restarted
    the VIM furnace in 2021 and has already begun casting DU-niobium
    ``pencils,'' a precursor to the VAR step. NNSA is in the process of
    restarting the VAR, which is planned to be operational in December
    2022. The wrought process to produce radiation case components from
    qualified ingots is already operational.
                                   personnel
        35. Senator Blackburn. Administrator Hruby, half the workforce is
    close to retirement-eligible status; what impact does this have on
    NNSA's ability to accomplish its mission?
        Administrator Hruby. The population of retirement eligible NNSA
    Federal employees is provided in the chart below for fiscal year 2022
    through fiscal year 2027. Of NNSA's 1,870 Full Time Equivalents (FTE)
    in the Federal Salaries and Expense (FSE) account, 17.2 percent are
    eligible to retire as of June 30, 2022.

                     NNSA Biweekly Staffing Report--September 8, 2022

        The impact of retirement eligible employees is considered in our
    recruitment and outreach strategy and execution efforts along with all
    other attrition factors. NNSA's recruitment strategy focuses on
    ensuring we have the right people in the right jobs at the right time
    and specific attention is given to mission critical occupations.
    Indicators such as, attrition rates (especially in mission critical
    occupations), years until eligible for retirement, geographic location,
    mission scope changes based on political and legislative decisions, and
    special interest initiatives--such as DEIA, are all influencers to our
    recruiting strategies. By employing this focused approach, we can
    address any potential impacts to the NNSA workforce caused by employee
    retirements.
        Currently, approximately one third of the nuclear security
    enterprise M&O contractor workforce population is retirement eligible.
    In addition, the average tenure across the complex of the M&O
    contractor workforce is 11 years of service. This is tracked closely
    and included in workforce planning projections. NNSA is working closely
    with its M&O partners to monitor attrition of all types, including
    retirement, and to make appropriate adjustments in compensation and
    benefit programs to ensure our M&Os are best postured to successfully
    attract and retain the highly skilled workforce necessary to accomplish
    our vital nuclear security missions now an in the future.
        To be able to continue to execute our mission, we need to be
    successful in attracting new employees and having them be full
    contributors as quickly as possible. Therefore, throughout the
    enterprise, we have increased the number of intern and grant programs
    and the knowledge transition efforts.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Josh D. Hawley
        36. Senator Hawley. Secretary Granholm, you said in your verbal
    testimony that ``it is not administration policies that have affected
    supply and demand.'' Asked to clarify that these policies had no
    effect, you testified ``no, they did not.'' Do you maintain that the
    Biden administration's policy decisions related to energy production
    had no effect on rising fuel prices nationwide? Please explain your
    response.
        Secretary Granholm. The Administration has been clear in our calls
    for more energy production and the critical importance of affordable,
    reliable energy supplies. And not only does the government not control
    prices, but we have not taken any actions to prevent companies from
    producing more oil and gas on private and state lands, the source of
    the vast majority of oil and natural gas production. About three-
    quarters of U.S. oil and about 86 percent of the nation's natural gas
    is produced on private and state lands and waters.
        The prior moratorium for new federal leases, where a smaller share
    of oil and gas are produced, did not have a noticeable impact on the
    utilization or percent of federal leases where production is occurring.
    In April, the Administration resumed oil and gas leasing on federal
    lands.
        In their most recent Short-Term Energy Outlook for July 2022, the
    U.S. Energy Information Administration projects that U.S. crude oil
    production will average 11.9 million barrels per day in 2022, a
    significant rebound from the pandemic, and reach 12.8 million barrels
    per day in 2023, a record high.

        37. Senator Hawley. Administrator Hruby, Secretary Granholm told
    the Committee that NNSA cannot produce 80 pits per year by 2030, on
    current trajectory, as is statutorily required. Are you concerned that
    China and Russia might be more incentivized to engage in an arms race
    against us--more than they're already doing--if they know we won't be
    able to keep up?
        Secretary Granholm. The Department of Defense and NNSA work
    together as members of the NWC to ensure the U.S. nuclear weapons
    stockpile is safe, secure, reliable, and effective. Together, we are
    developing strategies that take into account the production limitations
    of NNSA while maintaining the needed deterrence. This will be
    continuously evaluated against Chinese and Russian actions, but I'm
    confident the United States stockpile is a strong deterrent.

        38. Senator Hawley. Secretary Granholm, in 2016 President Obama
    rejected a No First Use policy on the advice of your predecessor,
    Secretary of the Energy Ernst Moniz, and 0ther cabinet officials. Do
    you believe a No First Use or Sole Purpose policy would be prudent
    today, given significant deterioration in the security environment
    since 2016?
        Secretary Granholm. No. As determined through the 2022 Nuclear
    Posture Review, the President has articulated his vision for U.S.
    nuclear deterrence strategy: As long as nuclear weapons exist, the
    fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on
    the United States, our allies, and partners. The United States would
    only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to
    defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and
    partners.

        39. Senator Hawley. Administrator Hruby, the United States is far
    from where it should be in terms of pit production. Would more
    resources help get us back on track faster, or is there truly no way to
    go faster than we're going right now?
        Secretary Granholm. We assess that no amount of increased funding
    will enable us to reach capacity for 80 ppy in 2030. We are
    investigating the use of existing resources to help accelerate the
    Savannah River Pit Production Facility (SRPPF) to complete it as close
    to 2030 as possible.

        40. Senator Hawley. Administrator Hruby, the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
    the Commander of STRATCOM, among others, have stated their support for
    the SLCM-N. How long will suspending development delay IOC of the SLCM-
    N if the United States chooses to reconstitute that program in the
    future?
        Administrator Hruby. Consistent with the Nuclear Posture Review
    direction, the President's fiscal year 2023 Budget did not include
    funding for the SLCM-N program. Other senior military leaders assess
    that the SLCM-N would not provide enough additional capacity or
    capability to be worth the added expense and risk to the program of
    record. A SLCM-N program would have resulted in additional scope to the
    W80-4 Life Extension Program, which is one likely SLCM-N warhead.
    Adding this scope back to the Program of Record would increase schedule
    risk for the existing Program of Record. Costs are dependent on the
    requirements and duration of the program. The timeline for the program
    would be dependent on Federal and laboratory staffing, the overall
    capacity of the nuclear enterprise to handle yet another project on top
    of the major efforts already underway and planned, and the Navy program
    for developing and integrating the design onto a Navy delivery
    platform. SLCM-N IOC would also depend upon the Navy's ability to train
    staff to resume this mission.

        41. Senator Hawley. Administrator Hruby, given the delay in
    plutonium pit production rate, do China and Russia have an advantage in
    producing and uploading nuclear warheads?
        Administrator Hruby. Establishing required pit production capacity
    as close as possible to 2030 remains a high priority and is required
    for sustaining the effectiveness of the Nation's nuclear deterrent.
    DOE/NNSA is working with subject matter experts from across the nuclear
    security enterprise to identify and mitigate risks to completing pit
    production projects on time. At this point we do not assess that the
    delay to achieving our required pit production rate will have an impact
    on the stockpile or our deterrent posture. Classified briefings on
    assessments of Russian and Chinese capabilities can be provided upon
    request.

        42. Senator Hawley. Administrator Hruby, how does China or Russia's
    edge in expanding their nuclear forces affect strategic stability?
        Administrator Hruby. Though this question would be best directed to
    our colleagues in the Department of Defense and the Department of
    State, NNSA believes that adversaries' efforts to modernize, diversify,
    and expand their strategic weapons capabilities erodes strategic
    stability by creating increasingly complex escalation dynamics across
    multiple domains. To address these risks to strategic stability, NNSA
    actively works with the Department of Defense to sustain and strengthen
    United States deterrence against the dual threats of weapons
    proliferation and competition coming from Russia and China. NNSA
    contributes to these efforts by recapitalizing the nuclear security
    enterprise, including the workforce, infrastructure, production
    capacity and capabilities, and scientific base. Additionally, the NNSA
    works with colleagues at the Departments of State and Defense to
    develop specific risk reduction measures designed to increase
    communication, transparency, and predictability in these strategically
    competitive relationships with our adversaries, in an effort to avoid
    deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental escalation. Collectively, these
    efforts underpin a safe, secure, and effective stockpile, address
    emerging threats, and provide options for future capacity building and
    risk reduction measures. Specific and direct contributions include
    developing technologies for future nuclear weapons monitoring and
    verification regimes and exploring how emerging technologies impact
    strategic stability so that future policymakers are prepared to address
    a range of complex deterrence and national security challenges.