[Senate Hearing 117-962]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-962
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND POLICY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 20, 2022
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT
Available via: http: //www.govinfo.gov
_______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
59-772 WASHINGTON : 2025
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TOM COTTON, Arkansas
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia JONI ERNST, Iowa
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia RICK SCOTT, Florida
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
MARK KELLY, Arizona TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
John Wason, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
september 20, 2022
Page
United States Nuclear Strategy and Policy........................ 1
Members Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 1
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe............................. 3
Witness Statements
Creedon, Madelyn, Research Professor, George Washington 3
University Elliott School of International Affairs.
Gottemoeller, Rose, Steven C. Hazy Lecturer, Stanford University 7
Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and Center
for International Security and Cooperation.
Edelman, Eric S., Counselor, Center for Strategic and Budgetary 12
Assessments, Director, United States Institute of Peace.
Miller, Franklin, Principal, the Scowcroft Group................. 13
Questions for the Record......................................... 47
(iii)
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND POLICY
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TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 2022
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
room 216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis,
Sullivan, Scott, Hawley, and Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Good morning. The Committee meets today to
receive testimony on the United States nuclear strategy and
policy. I would like to welcome and thank the expert witnesses
before us today. Ms. Madelyn Creedon is a Research Professor at
the George Washington University Elliott School of
International Affairs.
She brings more than 30 years of senior leadership
experience across the Department of Defense (DOD), the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and the Senate Armed
Services committee, where she handled the strategic forces
portfolio.
Ms. Creedon currently serves as the Chair of the Strategic
Posture Commission, which was created in the Fiscal Year 2022
National Defense Authorization Act.
Ms. Rose Gottemoeller is the Steven C. Hazy lecturer at
Stanford University. She served most recently as the Deputy
Secretary General of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization],
and previously as the Undersecretary for Arms Control and
International Security at the Department of State, where she
was the chief U.S. negotiator of the New START [Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty].
She is also a member of the Strategic Posture Commission.
Mr. Eric Edelman serves as Counselor at the Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and on the Board of
Directors of the United States Institute of Peace.
He brings decades of experience at the highest levels of
the Defense Department and State Department and has written
extensively on arms control issues and strategic stability.
Mr. Franklyn Miller is the Principal of the Scowcroft
Group. He served for more than 30 years in the Department of
Defense and the White House as an expert on nonproliferation,
nuclear deterrence, and arms control policy, especially with
regard to Russia. He also sits on the Strategic Posture
Commission. Thank you again to our distinguished witnesses for
appearing before the committee and for your decades of service
to our Nation.
Our objective today is to discuss the rapid changes in
nuclear deterrence, strategy, and arms control we are
witnessing around the world. Successfully maintaining our
nuclear deterrent is a mission fundamental to our long term
strategic competition with China and Russia. This mission has
been made especially clear throughout Russia's assault on
Ukraine. Russia has conducted out-of-cycle nuclear exercises,
issued inflammatory statements about tactical nuclear strikes,
and is essentially holding the largest nuclear power plant in
Europe hostage to shield its forces. Vladimir Putin's behavior
has been reckless to a very dangerous degree. More broadly,
Russia has modernized much of its nuclear arsenal, is
developing a suite of weapons outside the terms of the New
START to threaten the United States and Europe. These weapons,
such as cruise missiles, long range torpedoes, and hypersonic
are intended to evade missile defense systems and create a
destabilizing challenge.
China has also made significant changes to its nuclear
approach. Not constrained by the New START, Beijing has built
hundreds of new ballistic missiles and the intelligence
community assesses it may have a stockpile of more than 1,000
warheads by the early 2030. In the past two years, we have also
seen China develop missile field in hardened silos throughout
the country. This development, along with China's development
of air delivered weapons and ballistic missile submarines in
the South China Sea, fundamentally changes the nature of
Beijing's nuclear doctrine.
As I mentioned last week at the nomination hearing for
General Cotton to be STRATCOM commander, we need to seriously
consider that we are entering a new trilateral nuclear
competition era. The Cold War was essentially a bilateral
competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, and
deterrence theory and communication methods were developed
based on two rivals. Those rules now must change with the
ascendancy of China and its growing nuclear arsenal. I would
like to know our witnesses' views on how we might balance
strategic stability with both China and Russia, while exploring
what can be done to possibly bring both into an arms control
framework.
Similarly, I would like your thoughts on whether the force
structure we are investing in will be able to deter future
threats from our competitors. In addition to China and Russia,
we must also managed the challenge posed by Iran.
In the four years since then President Trump pulled out of
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or the JCPOA , Iran has
made key advances in its nuclear program. It has decreased its
breakout time to several weeks from a year under the agreement,
and Iran announced in July it has detected a capacity to build
a nuclear weapon, including the ability to enrich uranium to 90
percent, which is well beyond the 4 percent allowed under
JCPOA. Iran has also hardened its infrastructure and replaced
damaged equipment with more advanced models. While an agreement
to return to Iran to the JCPOA may be closed, the final outcome
has not yet been determined. I am interested to know your
assessment on Iran's nuclear program and whether you agree that
returning Iran to the JCPOA remains in the vital national
security interest of the United States.
Finally, I will recall the testimony of Professor Paul
Bracken from Yale, who testified before the Strategic Forces
subcommittee last year. He noted that we are now in a second
nuclear age with multiple countries and decision makers
involved, a much more complicated environment than the Cold
War. Professor Bracken testified that this second nuclear age
will still have to think our way through it. Indeed, I hope
today's hearing will help us think about and better understand
the complexities we are now facing. It is vital that we develop
the force structure, policy, and arms control strategies
required to overcome the challenges ahead. And I look forward
to the witnesses insights into these issues, and I thank them
for their participation. And now let me recognize the Ranking
Member, Senator Inhofe, please.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Also want to
welcome our witnesses and thank you all for your long service
to our Nation. Today we are facing greater nuclear threats than
at any time since the worst days of the Cold War, threats that
are expected to become even worse in the coming years. China's
massive military investments, especially its stunning nuclear
breakout, will reshape the global balance of power in ways that
we have never seen before. Putin's unprovoked invasion of
Ukraine in his pursuit of new nuclear capabilities clearly
demonstrate that Russia remains a primary threat to the West.
The United States has never faced two nuclear armed peer
adversaries. That is worth repeating, because it is a reality.
The United States has never faced two nuclear armed peer
adversaries. It is clear to me that we are not prepared for
this reality. Despite ongoing efforts to modernize, our own
nuclear forces are older and less capable than they have been
in the past. Our supporting infrastructure is literally
crumbling. Thankfully, the Biden administration did not adopt
some of the more radical options discussed during the recent
Nuclear Posture Review. However, the administration's decision
to discard planned enhancements to our forces even as China and
Russia grow their arsenals, was disappointing to say.
Based in part on the advice of numerous senior officers, we
have taken bipartisan steps to reverse those faulty choices,
but we have much more work to be done. Each of you represents
decades of experience in nuclear issues, and I am glad you are
here to offer us your perspective on the challenges that we
face and how we can best prepare our Nation for dealing with a
dangerous future.
So I look forward to your testimony. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Ms. Creedon,
would you begin, please.
STATEMENT OF MADELYN CREEDON, RESEARCH PROFESSOR, GEORGE
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Ms. Creedon. Good morning, Chairman Reed, Senator Inhofe,
and distinguished members of the committee. It is always an
honor to appear before the Senate committee on Armed Services,
particularly in the company of such distinguished panelists.
Thank you for the invitation and the opportunity to discuss the
future of United States strategic relationships with Russia and
China, the United States nuclear modernization programs, how
these programs will enable the United States to meet future
deterrence requirements, the future of arms control post New
START, and how China's rise can be taken into consideration in
future arms control agreement.
These are important, complex topics that should be
discussed more openly and more frequently. So to start, I want
to be clear today that I share with you my own personal
thoughts and do not represent or speak on behalf of any
organization or entity. The world today is a more dangerous,
more chaotic, and more uncertain place than at any time since
the end of the Cold War. Russian President Putin's distorted
version of Russian history and his aggressive, unprovoked
attack on Ukraine has resulted in a previously unthinkable land
war in Europe. The United States now finds itself, for the
first time, in what can only be described as a three peer or
near peer multipolar environment, complicated by North Korea.
Overlay the regional competition of India and Pakistan,
their nuclear arsenals, and their respective complex
relationships with Russia and China, and the chance of nuclear
use is high. The Doomsday Clock tool is now set at 100 seconds
to midnight.
In contrast, in 1991, at the end of the Cold War, the clock
setting was 17 minutes to midnight. Russia and China engaged in
significant military modernization over the last 15 years, and
both have expanded dramatically the size and variety of their
conventional capabilities and nuclear arsenals.
China has been focused on growing and improving its
conventional space and cyber capabilities, including the recent
test of a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) that
ended with a hypersonic glide vehicle impacting a target in
China. China is amid a surprisingly rapid expansion of its
nuclear capabilities, including a true nuclear triad.
China has thousands of missiles of all ranges and is
expanding its dual use capabilities. Although estimates vary,
China is projected to have somewhere between 1,000, 1,200, or
maybe even more nuclear weapons by 2030. Russia has developed a
wide range of non-strategic, dual capable, and novel nuclear
systems, in addition to the mostly complete modernization of
its strategic nuclear forces, including the SARMAT, a new
merged ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] and a new
ballistic missile submarine. Russia also has invested
substantial sums, modernizing its conventional and non-kinetic
systems, as well as its cyberspace and counterspace weapons.
Recall that Russia tested a kinetic A-SAT weapon in November of
last year, generating thousands of pieces of space debris and
possibly even putting the International Space Station at risk.
And of course, for all its conventional modernization, we have
seen its fairly dismal performance in Ukraine.
North Korea is also increasing its nuclear saber rattling
via a new policy, reinforcing its commitment to never give up
nuclear weapons, clearly stating its preemptive nuclear use
policy, and declaring that nuclear weapons would be used if the
regime leadership were threatened.
This nuclear policy law is yet another DPRK [Democratic
People's Republic of Korea] mechanism to seek acceptance and
recognition of its status as a nuclear weapon State
permanently. Against this most troubling and dangerous picture,
there are six things to keep in mind.
First, to maintain a capable, credible, safe, secure, and
reliable United States nuclear deterrent, the ongoing nuclear
modernization program, which is replacing all three legs of the
triad, air, sea, and land, plus the nuclear command and control
system, as well as other supporting systems, must be fully
funded, including taking into account inflation, as there is
little to no margin in any of these programs. Maintaining the
current systems until the new systems come online is essential.
The current systems are past their lifetimes, have already been
life extended, such as the Ohio-class Ballistic Missile
Submarine, and the new programs will most likely be late, and
the hand-off from old to new will be difficult. Three, the
infrastructure across the entire complex is mostly old but
being replaced.
The NNSA complex needs new or expanding manufacturing, and
material processing and handling capabilities such as plutonium
pits, uranium processing, lithium, tritium, and electronics.
The DOD complex also needs new and expanded infrastructure.
People, people is number four and probably the most important,
recruiting and retaining people at all skill and technical
levels is essential, and just about every aspect of the nuclear
complex is struggling. Five, we have to ensure that the future
systems are modular and adaptable because they will be in the
inventory for decades and must meet future threats. And
finally, don't give up on arms control, strategic stability,
transparency initiatives, setting norms, building relationships
where possible, and maintaining nonproliferation and threat
reduction programs.
A whole-of-government approach is needed to find the new
ways to reduce tensions and prevent an all-out arms race, which
is unaffordable and hopefully something no one wants. With
these six ideas, I conclude my remarks and look forward to your
questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Madelyn Creedon follows:]
Prepared Statement by Madelyn Creedon
Good morning, Chairman Reed, Senator Inhofe, distinguished Members
of the Committee, it is always an honor to appear before the Senate
Committee on Armed Services, particularly in the company of such
distinguished panelists
Thank you for the invitation and the opportunity to discuss the
future of United States strategic relationships with Russia and China,
the United States nuclear modernization programs, how these programs
will enable the United States to meet future deterrence requirements,
the future of arms control post New START, and how China's rise can be
taken into consideration in future arms control agreements.
These are important, complex topics that should be discussed more
openly and more frequently.
To start, I want to be clear that today I share with you my own
personal thoughts and do not represent or speak on behalf of any
organization or entity.
The world today is more dangerous, more chaotic, and more uncertain
than any time since the end of the Cold War. Russian President Putin's
distorted version of Russian history and his aggressive, unprovoked
attack on Ukraine, has resulted in a previously unthinkable land war in
Europe.
A global pandemic from which we are slowing emerging, and which
killed 1 in every 500 people, has called into question the degree of
reliance previously placed on the global supply chain.
The combined aftereffects of COVID 19 and Russia's invasion of
Ukraine have generated inflationary rates not seen since the 1980s.
The United States now finds itself in what can only be described as
a 3 peer or near peer, multipolar environment, complicated by North
Korea. Overlay the regional competition of India and Pakistani, their
nuclear arsenals and their respective complex relationships with Russia
and China, and the chance of nuclear use is high.
The doomsday clock tool is now set at 100 seconds to midnight; In
contrast, in 1991 at the end of the Cold War the clock setting was 17
minutes to midnight.
We live in a world that depending on your point of view, is either
on the cusp of a new arms race or already in one. A world in which
norms are being flaunted, agreements violated or abrogated, where only
one nuclear arms treaty remains in force--the New START. Even New START
is challenged, given Russia's recent decision to suspend inspections.
Progress toward the nuclear disarmament goals of the treaty that
underpins efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons--the Treaty
on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons has reversed.
President Biden has said he is ready to ``expeditiously'' negotiate
a framework to replace New START, which expires in 2026, even as
bilateral talks on strategic stability have stopped. Is Russia even
interested in further discussions? China has shown little to no
interest in any arms control-like discussions.
Russia and China engaged in significant military modernization over
the last 15 years, and both have expanded dramatically the size and
variety of their conventional capabilities and nuclear arsenals.
Russia has developed a wide range of nonstrategic, dual capable and
novel nuclear systems in addition to the mostly complete modernization
of its strategic nuclear forces, including the SARMAT, a new, MIRV
ICBM.
Russia also invested substantial sums in modernizing its
conventional and non-kinetic systems as well as its cyber, space and
counter space weapons. Recall that Russia tested a kinetic ASAT weapon
in November of last year, generating thousands of pieces of space
debris possibly putting the international space station at risk.
The unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has been a real-life test of
Russia's conventional modernization program. Consumption of what are
now seen as underperforming conventional capabilities may well bring
increased reliance on nuclear capabilities, and greater instability in
the future.
China has been focused on growing and improving its significant
conventional, space and cyber capabilities, including the recent test
of a fractional orbital bombardment system that ended with a hypersonic
glide vehicle impacting a target.
Now China is amid a surprisingly rapid expansion of its nuclear
capabilities including a true nuclear triad. China has thousands of
missiles of all ranges and is expanding its dual use capabilities.
Although estimates vary, China is projected to have between 1000 and
1500 nuclear weapons by 2030.
Russia of course is the near-term nuclear threat but over the
longer-term China will pose the greatest threat to the United States.
Beijing has a stated goal of being a world class military power by 2049
and is employing a whole-of-government approach to exert its influence
globally.
North Korea is also increasing its nuclear saber-rattling via a new
nuclear policy law reinforcing its commitment to never give up nuclear
weapons, clearly stating its preemptive nuclear use policy, and
declaring that nuclear weapons would be used if the regime leadership
was threatened. This nuclear policy law is yet another DPRK mechanism
to seek acceptance and recognition of its status as a nuclear weapons
state.
While none of this is new news, the timing of the law, and the
possibility of an underground nuclear test, during increased nuclear
tensions with Russia, is unfortunate.
The United States has also embarked on a challenging nuclear
modernization program.
As you well know, the United States modernization program covers
all legs--sea, air, and land--of the nuclear triad, the NC3 system, as
well as the continued life extension and now development of new nuclear
weapons based on United States testing pedigrees.
There is little to no margin in any of these programs.
Moreover, much of the necessary infrastructure is old, there are
continued supply chain issues, significant workforce challenges and the
industrial capacity is limited.
Looking ahead, inflation could well delay progress in the
modernization programs. Unless the modernization funding at least keeps
pace with inflation, there is a real probability that the existing
systems, which have already been life extended, may not last.
Until the hand off from old to new is finished, maintaining the
current systems is essential and must be funded adequately. We
shouldn't underestimate how hard this hand-off will be---placing
significant demands on people and handling and support equipment.
Infrastructure investments across the enterprise must also
continue, including major projects at NNSA such as the Uranium
Production Facility (UPF), the Savanah River Pit Production Facility
(SRPPF), and new lithium and tritium facilities.
Underpinning all the nuclear enterprise is the scientific and
technical expertise that must be sustained, particularly the
experimental and computational capabilities at the NNSA.
A question going forward is how to keep the existing modernization
program of record threat relevant. At a minimum, the replacement
programs and the infrastructure must be substantially more flexible and
modular than the systems they replace.
Moreover, the warhead design and manufacturing process must be
faster, more efficient, and more linked, and use modern digital
approaches and advanced manufacturing techniques, such as additive
manufacturing. The whole process from design to manufacture takes too
long and costs too much.
Nuclear deterrence remains the ultimate underpinning of deterrence,
but integrating deterrence across the whole-of-government, engaging
where possible to increase transparency and reduce risks, seeking
international norms or agreements if useful, and clearly and openly
analyzing and discussing this uncertain and dangerous world are all
essential.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Ms. Gottemoeller.
STATEMENT OF ROSE GOTTEMOELLER, STEVEN C. HAZY LECTURER,
STANFORD UNIVERSITY FREEMAN SPOGLI INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES AND CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION
Ms. Gottemoeller. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And
good morning to you, to Ranking Member, Mr. Inhofe, and to the
distinguished members of the committee. I am delighted to be
here today. It is very much my honor to appear. You have asked
me to comment on the future of arms control, in particular my
role on arms control agreements in the context of a possible
New START follow on, as well as how China's rise will be taken
into account for any future arms control agreements beyond New
START.
I am pleased to do so, but I do want to underscore that I
agree with my colleague, Madelyn Creedon, in each of the six
points that she has just laid out. I think they are an
excellent roadmap for how we need to proceed, and I
particularly underscore her emphasis on all the necessary
points with regard to nuclear modernization.
So I am going to abbreviate my prepared remarks in the
interest of time, but I do ask that they be placed on the
record.
Chairman Reed. Without objection.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Thank you, sir. Now, turning to my
points, I wanted to note that while the Russians are continuing
to comply with the New START, the central limits of which is
1,550 warheads and 700 delivery vehicles, that is the missiles
and bombers on which they are deployed, then this will be a
significant advantage to the success of the United States
nuclear modernization.
Of course, we must watch carefully for any sign of Russian
noncompliance with the treaty. If they continue to comply, the
treaty gives the United States a significant level of
predictability about the size and composition of the Russian
strategic nuclear forces.
Therefore, we will enjoy a somewhat stable and predictable
environment in which to carry out our own nuclear
modernization. And I repeat, it is an urgently needed one. I
underscore every point that Madelyn Creedon has made in that
regard.
My concern is rooted in the fact that the Russian
Federation has been embarked on a nuclear modernization for
over a decade. They have hot production lines for both their
missiles and their warheads.
In my view, if suddenly released from New START limits,
they could easily outrun us in missiles and warhead production
because we are just at the beginning of rebuilding our own
missile and warhead production capacity.
This fact is the important reason to seek a follow on to
the New START, which expires in February 2026. At that time, we
will still be rebuilding our production capacity and be in the
midst of our nuclear modernization program. A predictable and
stable nuclear environment with the Russians will continue to
be vital to its success.
As for the Chinese, like others, I am greatly concerned
about their nuclear modernization and the opacity with which
they are conducting it. They clearly seem to be moving away
from their dependance on second strike retaliation as a core
tenet of their nuclear doctrine.
However, we do not yet know exactly where they are planning
to go. Are they rushing to parity with the United States or is
something else afoot? Our most important objective with the
Chinese must be to influence that direction of travel.
Therefore, we should engage as early and as frequently as we
can in talks, both to clear up the opacity surrounding their
nuclear forces and to convince them of the value of nuclear
restraint.
To be honest, I am confident that we can respond, if we
must, to a Chinese nuclear build up. The competition that
concerns me more is in the arena of high technology, artificial
intelligence, biotechnology, quantum computing, and other
areas. If the Chinese outrun us in that arena, then we will be
left in the dust, I am concerned, in the coming decade.
In sum, the United States should not be the one to launch a
nuclear arms race, but it must be ready to respond to others
who do. This point relates not only to the continued strength
and viability of our nuclear deterrent, but also to our ability
to compete successfully in technology and innovation in the
century to come. The last thing that the United States needs as
it is trying to prevail in new technologies is a nuclear arms
race. One final point, Mr. Chairman, that does not appear in my
testimony, I am horrified this morning at the news of Russia's
dangerous strike at the nuclear power plant in Southern
Ukraine, but I am not surprised. They have been writing of such
targets in their military journals for years. But this matter
gets at the question of how can we negotiate with such people?
My answer comes down to the point that we can't always choose
our negotiating partners. We must look to our own national
security interest. In my view, it is squarely in the national
security interest of the United States to negotiate constraints
and restraints on nuclear weapons, and we should continue to do
so, both with the Russians and now in the future with the
Chinese.
Thank you for your attention. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gottemoeller follows:]
Prepared Statement by Rose Gottemoeller
Good morning, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Mr. Inhofe, and
Committee Members, it is my honor to appear before the Senate Armed
Services Committee today and I thank you for the invitation. You have
asked me to comment on the future of arms control; in particular, my
views on arms control agreements in the context of a possible post New
START world with Russia, as well as how China's rise will be taken into
account for any future arms control agreements beyond New START. I am
happy to comment on these matters, as well as any other particular
issues that you wish to raise with me. I will abbreviate my prepared
remarks, however, in the interest of time, and ask, with your
permission, that they be placed in full on the record.
As the Trump administration debated whether to extend New START in
November 2019, I argued that the success of our United States nuclear
modernization depended on the Treaty \1\. The Russians had already
completed over a decade of their own nuclear modernization program, and
continued to build missiles, including several concerning new types
\2\. By extending New START, I underscored, we could hold the Russians
to the central limits of the Treaty--1,550 warheads and the 700
delivery vehicles (missiles and bombers) on which they are deployed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/08/opinion/dont-let-the-new-
start-treaty-lapse.html
\2\ https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/
issue-brief/russias-exotic-nuclear-weapons-and-implications-for-the-
united-states-and-nato/. The heavy ICBM SARMAT and hypersonic glide
vehicle AVANGARD would fall under the limits of the New START once
deployed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Of course, we would have to watch carefully for any sign of Russian
non-compliance with the Treaty. If they continued to comply, the Treaty
would give the United States a significant level of predictability
about the status and size of the Russian strategic nuclear forces.
Therefore, we would be able to enjoy a stable and predictable
environment in which to carry out our own urgently needed nuclear
modernization.
At the time, one of the concerns I had was that the Russian nuclear
modernization already well underway had given the Russians hot
production lines for both their missile and their warheads. Russian
missile production and warhead manufacturing were up and running at
high capacity, having been modernized to enable the Russian triad
modernization. New machine tools had been acquired for missile
production plants and warhead production facilities had been updated.
By contrast, the United States, at the beginning of its nuclear
triad modernization, was scrambling to find missile and warhead pit
production capacity. The U.S. had significant work to do before it
could begin the active production of new intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs). Furthermore, warhead pit production required new
facilities that would take years to build.
In this situation, I was concerned that if the New START suddenly
went away, then the Russian Federation could quickly outrun the United
States in deployed nuclear warheads. It could immediately upload more
warheads on its existing missiles, and it could quickly produce more
missiles capable of carrying more warheads.
In fact, this scenario was beginning to take shape with the
emergence of the SARMAT heavy ICBM. This is a modern version of the SS-
18 missile first deployed in the 1970s, which was capable of carrying
over ten warheads per missile. As long of the SARMAT fell under the
limits of the New START, the Russians would be constrained from
deploying too many of them and from loading them with too many
warheads. The Russians have indicated that they consider the SARMAT to
be an ICBM that by definition falls under the limits of the Treaty.
Another concerning development in 2019 was the emergence of a
Chinese nuclear modernization program. In the 50 years since the United
States and the Soviet Union, later Russia, had been negotiating about
bilateral nuclear restraint, the Chinese had never been part of the
process. They had expressed restraint through a national no-first-use
policy and dependence on a second-strike retaliatory posture, keeping
their nuclear arsenal small.
But their effort to acquire a nuclear triad during their
modernization process, adding strategic strike submarines and long-
range bombers to their ICBM force, seemed to augur a major shift in
their nuclear policy and doctrine. Perhaps the Chinese had even begun
striving for nuclear parity with the United States and Russia, which
would mean a big build-up in their nuclear forces, including the number
of deployed nuclear warheads.
In the four years since 2019, nothing has happened to assuage my
concerns. In fact, just the opposite has occurred: The Russian
Federation is still capable of producing new nuclear warheads and
missiles, but now it is also engaged in a bloody war with Ukraine of
its own making. Its leading figures, especially President Vladimir
Putin, have engaged in egregious nuclear saber-rattling that has been
unheard of since the Cuban Missile Crisis, sixty years ago this
October. Russia is behaving like a big nuclear pariah state.
My concerns about China also have deepened, with the discovery of
an estimated 300 ICBM siloes dug in the desert north and west of
Beijing and continued emphasis on nuclear modernization. These signs of
its nuclear ambitions are very worrisome--even more so because China
has not shared information about its modernization program. Its nuclear
intentions remain opaque at a time when its conventional deployments in
air and sea have become more active and its threats of military
action--especially against Taiwan--more bellicose.
At this moment of crisis in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, neither
Russia nor China seems much invested in nuclear stability and
restraint. It is a dangerous time, but one that argues strongly for
carrying forward a careful but intensive modernization of our U.S.
nuclear weapon systems. As President Barack Obama first said in his
Prague speech in April 2009, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the
United States must maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
arsenal.
The modernization program for the nuclear forces of the United
States is moving into a more active phase, with steadier funding. I
know that this committee keeps a keen eye on the budget
for nuclear modernization, and I thank you for it. Decisions are
finally being made about building up production capacity for both
missiles and warhead pits. Replacing the submarines, intercontinental
ballistic missiles, and bombers will take well over a decade, but the
process is vital to ensure that the United States remains secure from
nuclear attack during a fraught period of global competition.
In particular, the United States must watch China. As noted above,
China has gone from a nuclear posture depending on a small force of
missiles intended for second-strike retaliation to something else.
Still, there is no need to panic. Even if it quintuples its stockpile
over the next decade, as some experts are predicting, China's number of
warheads will still be well below the numbers in the United States
arsenal in 2030.
Washington must remain alert as well to what Russia is doing. The
country is a highly capable and experienced nuclear power with a
leader, Vladimir Putin, whose belligerence is breathtaking. His nuclear
threats are unlike anything seen in the over seven decades since
nuclear weapons were last used to attack Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the
close of World War II.
But a modernized U.S. nuclear force posture will help keep these
threats in check, ensuring a strong deterrent, one in which Washington
can be confident. The fact that New START continues in place ensures
that the United States has a predictable and stable environment in
which to carry forward its nuclear modernization. The Russians cannot
outrun us by quickly deploying more missiles and warheads as long as
the Treaty remains in force. The fact that our nuclear modernization
will be far from finished when the Treaty does go out of force in
February 2026 is the most important reason, in my view, to work hard to
replace New START.
People often ask me how we can bear to negotiate with Russians when
their regime is perpetrating a bloody and needless war in Ukraine. My
answer is in three parts. First, we cannot always choose our
negotiating partners. Hostage negotiators know this: they must deal
with dreadful terrorists or criminals to secure the release of innocent
victims. If it is in our interest to negotiate, then we should be ready
to do so.
Which leads to my second point: it is squarely in our national
security interest to negotiate a follow-on to New START. As I noted
above, a new treaty will ensure that we have a stable and predictable
environment in which to carry forward our nuclear modernization and
complete it in the 2030s.
Which leads, finally, to my third point: a completed nuclear force
posture modernization will ensure that we have the industrial base in
place should others choose to launch a nuclear arms race. Today, we are
working hard to ensure that we have adequate production capacity to
build new ballistic missiles and warhead pits. We are not finished with
that process, however, and new production facilities for some
components of the nuclear force posture will only fall into place later
in this decade or into the next. Therefore, it is also in our national
security interest to sustain legally binding reciprocal limits on the
nuclear forces of Russia and the United States. Put most bluntly, we
are not ready for a nuclear arms race.
China is well below the New START limits today, but if they try to
build up to 700 delivery vehicles and 1,550 deployed warheads,
Washington will see it coming with enough time to respond. The United
States, in other words, will have sufficient strategic warning of a
Chinese sprint to parity.
In the meantime, our immediate objective with China should be to
seek greater understanding of what they are expecting to achieve with
their nuclear modernization. We need to understand why they are
building so many ICBM silos in their western regions: is it to play a
shell game, as the USSR did in the 1950s and 1960s? Or is it to
challenge the United States to a peer nuclear competition?
Indeed, we need reciprocal understanding, since the Chinese no
doubt have their own concerns about the United States nuclear
modernization program. If we can launch into a balanced discussion that
moves beyond the formulaic to produce mutual predictability, then we
will have achieved significant gains in confidence in both countries.
Of course, we are nowhere near that state of mutual confidence and
understanding today, thus we need to keep a sharp eye on developments
in the Chinese nuclear force posture.
Secure on the nuclear modernization front, the United States must
renew its attention to the technological revolution. China's intention
is to dominate the new technology space \3\. It has the clear goal of
being the world leader in artificial intelligence (AI) by 2030, and it
is putting substantial resources into achieving that objective. Beijing
has already put AI to work in tightening the security bubble around
China's society and economy, gaining an enormous amount of experience
with the technology in the process. If the United States is not
careful, China will outrun the United States not on the nuclear front,
but in AI innovation, leading to a dangerous gap in military
capabilities. And AI is only one arena where the Chinese are seeking
dominance. Beijing also has biotechnology, quantum computing, and other
sectors in its sights.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ For my views on this matter, see https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2022-03-09/how-stop-new-
nuclear-arms-race.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Choosing to focus on this technological competition is not easy at
a time when the Russian Federation is pounding Ukraine in an unprovoked
and unwarranted military invasion, China is menacing Taiwan, and both
are modernizing their nuclear forces. I strongly believe, however, that
the future security of the United States as a whole depends on our
ability to stay in the technology race, to compete, and to succeed.
In sum, the United States should not be the one to launch a nuclear
arms race, but it must be ready to respond immediately to others who
do. This point relates not only to the continued strength and viability
of our nuclear deterrent, but also to our ability to compete
successfully in technology and innovation. The last thing that the
United States needs, as it is trying to prevail in new technologies, is
a nuclear arms race.
The wisest choice for Washington, then, is to modernize its nuclear
force posture as planned while putting its main emphasis on developing
and acquiring new technologies for military applications. If we are
forced to enter into a nuclear arms race, then we will be sidetracked
in a direction that is not in the U.S. national security interest. If
we must engage in a nuclear arms race, we will, but we should do
everything that we can to avoid it.
As I close, I would like to make one final point. I am horrified at
the way in which Russia is perpetrating dangerous strikes near nuclear
power plants--at Zaporizhzhia, but also at a nuclear power plant in
southern Ukraine, far away from the front lines of fighting. I am
horrified but not surprised. Russian military experts have been writing
of such targets in their military journals for years. But these attacks
naturally lead to the question: how can we negotiate with such people?
My answer comes down to the point that we cannot always choose our
negotiating partners--we must instead look to our national interests.
It is squarely in the national security interest of the United States
to constrain Russian nuclear weapons, and a proven way to do so is at
the negotiating table.
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Mr. Inhofe, distinguished Members of
the Committee, thank you for your attention to my remarks and I look
forward to your questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Let me now recognize
Ambassador Edelman.
STATEMENT OF ERIC S. EDELMAN, COUNSELOR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC
AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS, DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF
PEACE
Mr. Edelman. Thank you, Chairman Reed and Ranking Member
Inhofe, Members of the Committee. I very much appreciate the
invitation to appear before you today on this distinguished
panel to talk about the challenges that the United States faces
in continuing to deter nuclear war and preserving the tradition
of nonuse of nuclear weapons that has prevailed globally since
1945.
In deference to time and the fact that my colleagues and
you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Inhofe, have already addressed
many of the challenges that we face that are addressed in the
joint statement that my colleague Frank Miller and I submitted
to the committee, I would ask that you include that in the----
Chairman Reed. Without objection.
Mr. Edelman.--record of the hearing. And I am just going to
limit my comments really to emphasizing one of our preliminary
conclusions that Frank, and I reached, that echoes very much
what my colleague on this panel, Madelyn Creedon, has said,
which is the importance of moving forward with the
modernization of our nuclear triad.
This is something that the Senate, in its wisdom, when it
ratified the New START in 2010, called for. And it is even more
important today in light of the fact, Mr. Chairman, that you
and Senator Inhofe and my two predecessors on this panel have
adverted to.
I would like to make the point that we frequently hear that
the modernization of U.S. nuclear forces is either triggering
or is participating in an arms race, with the notion that it is
an action, reaction parallel effort on both sides, and that
U.S. efforts to modernize will only make things worse.
In fact, the historical record I think is pretty clear that
although there were elements of arms racing in the arms
competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in
the Cold War, by and large, other factors on both sides drove
the development of the nuclear forces that each side developed.
And rather than the sort of image of apes on a treadmill
that is sometimes used to depict that, I think former Secretary
of Defense, the late Harold Brown in the Carter administration
captured it best when he said, when we build, the Soviets
build, when we stop building, they keep building. And I think
that very much describes the situation we find ourselves in
today.
The United States has actually been quite slow to modernize
its nuclear triad. We have only really begun in earnest in the
last few years, in the face of this very, very dramatic buildup
that we have seen on the other sides. And it is absolutely
imperative in order to sustain deterrence, that we maintain a
force that is flexible, survivable, responsive, and has the
range. And today, as Madelyn suggested, our margin for error--
because we have essentially one program to modernize each
element of our triad, as opposed to the multiple programs that
our adversaries are fielding for different elements of their
triad, we have very, very little margin for error.
So with that, I would conclude my oral comments, and I look
forward very much to engaging with you and the other members of
the committee.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Ambassador. Mr. Miller, please.
STATEMENT OF FRANKLIN MILLER, PRINCIPAL, THE SCOWCROFT GROUP
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Chairman Reed, and Ranking Member
Inhofe, and Members of this Committee. It is a pleasure and an
honor to appear before you again. And I should say that the
views expressed here this morning are my own, and they don't
represent those of any organization with which I am affiliated.
As you have noted, sir, we are in a unique and
unprecedented time. We need to deter two nuclear peer potential
enemies. And Professor Bracken notwithstanding, and I testified
alongside him at that hearing, we do know how deterrence works.
The United States needs to hold at risk what potential enemy
leaders value most. Often we are tempted to assume Xi and Putin
think as we do. But as the Scowcroft Commission noted almost 40
years ago, and I quote, ``deterrence is not and cannot be
bluffed. In order for deterrence to be effective, we must not
merely have weapons, we must be perceived to be able and
prepared, if necessary, to use them effectively against the key
elements of an enemy's power. Deterrence is not an abstract
notion amenable to simple quantification. Still less is it a
mirror of what would deter ourselves. Deterrence is the set of
beliefs in the minds of the enemy leaders, given their own
values and attitudes about our capabilities and our will. It
requires us to determine as best we can what would deter them
from considering aggression, even in a crisis, not to determine
what would deter us.'' Ambassador Edelman and I have stated in
our written submission that we believe the United States needs
to be able to deter both China and Russia simultaneously.
Dictators can agree secretly to support one another and spring
that on an unknowing world at short notice. The Nazi-Soviet
pact of 1939 is the prime example.
This is something we cannot ignore in our planning, even if
we believe the event is unlikely. The forces we currently
deploy under the New START will not be adequate for this dual
deterrence task. The 1,550 weapons limit was agreed to in 2010,
a period in time when Russia was a competitor, not a potential
enemy ravaging another European State and threatening to use
nuclear weapons on the battlefield, and China was not even a
real part of the discussion.
As the Commission knows full well, the world is very
different now. Our goal must be a secure and effective
deterrent, which is sized appropriately for the two nuclear
peer task. There is no replacement for such a capability. Arms
control treaties, if they provide for a secure and effective
deterrent, can help mitigate arms competition, but only if
those treaties are observed.
They are not a substitute, however, for the deterrent. And
the prospects for arms control in the near future are dim.
Russia is wholly untrustworthy, and China is scornful. The
Putin government, as a matter of policy, has systematically
violated either covertly or overtly all of the arms control
agreements it is bound by save for one. And the Chinese
Government, believing that transparency and verification are
signs of weakness, refuses to enter into arms control talks.
So I repeat, there is no substitute for capable and
adequate deterrent, which in the current and projected future
environment requires an ability simultaneously to deter both
Moscow and Beijing from attacking ourselves or our allies. Our
current modernization program is absolutely necessary.
I believe, however, that in the out years it may likely
require that the SSBN [submarine, ballistic, nuclear] and air
breathing programs be augmented. And as Ambassador Edelman and
I wrote in our written submission, I believe that a nuclear sea
launched cruise missile is important both for regional
deterrence and for reassuring vital U.S. allies.
I look forward to answering and expanding on any of these
thoughts during your questions. Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Eric S. Edelman and
Mr. Franklin C. Miller follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Eric S. Edelman and Franklin C. Miller
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Reed, Ranking member Inhofe, members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to address the
challenges that the United States faces in continuing to deter
nuclear war and preserving the tradition of non-use of nuclear
weapons that has prevailed globally since 1945. Today the
United States faces the most complex configuration of questions
about nuclear weapons than it has ever faced since the onset of
the nuclear age. Some of these developments are the result of
quantitative and qualitative changes in the composition of the
nuclear arsenals of the major nuclear weapons states, some from
the aspirations of new or prospective nuclear powers, and some
arise from the advent of new technologies whose interaction
with nuclear weapons may create new uncertainties about
strategic stability.
DETERRENCE AND THE NEW GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: WHAT'S NEW?
The most important new factor is the potential that the
U.S. will have to deal with two near nuclear peers
simultaneously. For the 40 years of the Cold War the United
States was preoccupied with the threats represented by Soviet
nuclear forces. Even after the People's Republic of China
tested a nuclear weapon in 1964 the dangers presented by its
nuclear forces were mitigated by what most observers concluded
was China's reliance on a minimum nuclear deterrence strategy
and then later by the Sino-Soviet split and the ability of
United States diplomacy to seek better relations with each of
the communist power than they had with one another. Today, as
Chairman Reed noted last week ``We need to seriously consider
that we are entering a new, trilateral nuclear competition
era'' in which the United States and its allies must ``deter
not one, but two near-peer nuclear adversaries,'' a challenge,
we would note that it is unprecedented. \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Karoun Demirjian, ``U.S. General Warns of China's Expanding
Nuclear Arsenal,'' Washington Post, September 15, 2022, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/15/china-nuclear-
weapons/; Hal Brands, ``U.S. Isn't Ready for Nuclear Rivalry with
Russia and China,'' Bloomberg Opinion, January 30, 2022, https://
www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-01-30/u-s-isn-t-prepared-for-a-
nuclear-war-with-russia-and-china?leadSource=uverify%20 wall
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The PRC arsenal which experts had estimated to consist of
roughly 200 warheads for many years has expanded significantly.
Today China disposes of roughly 350 warheads--but that arsenal
is expanding rapidly. The most recent report of the Department
of Defense on Chinese military power suggests that by 2027
China will have some 700 warheads enroute to nearly 1000 by
2030. Although projections of the growth of nuclear arsenals
are always subject to uncertainty commercially available
satellite imagery of missile silos being excavated in northern
China as well as the PRC's efforts to expand plutonium
production certainly suggest that these projects are well
rooted in reality. It is no wonder that STRATCOM commander
Charles Richards described the growth of China's arsenal as
``breathtaking'' and former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff General Hyten called it ``unprecedented'' and
suggested that prudence required the United States to plan
against this growing threat. \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security
Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2021, (Washington,
DC: Department of Defense, November, 2021), p. 92; Demetri Sevastooulo,
``China's Nuclear Build-up: One of the Largest Shifts in Geostrategic
Power Ever,'' The Financial Times, November 15, 2021, https://
www.ft.com/content/d7c50283-18c8-4f2e-8731-970d9a547688; Henry
Sokolski, ed. China's Civil Nuclear Sector: Plowshares to Swords,
Occasional Paper 2102, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, March
2021; John Grady, ``Hyten: China's `Unprecedented Nuclear
Modernization' Chief Concern,'' USNI News, September 14, 2021 https://
news.usni.org/2021/09/14/hyten-chinas-unprecedented-nuclear-
modernization-chief-concern.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
China's quantitative and qualitative nuclear modernization
entails not just the growing size of its intercontinental
ballistic missile threat but the development of a full nuclear
triad on a timeline that is much earlier than most observers
anticipated and capabilities that could call ``strategic
stability'' into question. The key developments include the PLA
Air Force's H6N air refuelable bomber armed with air launched
ballistic missiles that are likely dual capable as well as the
prospective development of the H20 long range strategic bomber.
In addition, the deployment of the type 094 SSBNs armed with
JL-2 SLBMs provide the PRC with its ``first credible, sea-based
nuclear deterrent.'' Finally, the test last year of what seems
to be a Fractional Orbital Bombardments system raises the
prospect of a short or no-warning attack--an extremely
destabilizing development. \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ OSD, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's
Republic of China, 2021, p. 49; SIPRI Yearbook 2022: Armaments,
Disarmament and International Security, (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2022) pp. 380-390.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the buildup of its strategic nuclear forces
the PRC is also augmenting its theater nuclear capabilities
with the DF-26 dual capable intermediate range ballistic
missile System (IRBM) which the DOD China Military Power report
notes is China's ``first nuclear capable missile system that
can conduct precision strikes, and therefore, is the most
likely weapon system to field a lower-yield warhead in the near
term.'' Chinese writings suggest that ``the most important type
of future regional wars will be conventional conflicts under
conditions of nuclear deterrence, deterrence and actual war-
fighting will exist at the same time, and their function will
be mutually complementary.'' In light of the recent Russian
invasion of Ukraine and accompanying threats to use so-called
``tactical'' nuclear weapons we need to consider whether the
PRC will see its full suite of nuclear weapons as providing it
with a powerful counter-intervention capability to deter the
United States and its allies from defending Taiwan in a
crisis.ballistic missile System (IRBM) which the DOD China
Military Power report notes is China's ``first nuclear capable
missile system that can conduct precision strikes , and
therefore, is the most likely weapon system to field a lower-
yield warhead in the near term.'' Chinese writings suggest that
``the most important type of future regional wars will be
conventional conflicts under conditions of nuclear deterrence,
deterrence and actual war-fighting will exist at the same time,
and their function will be mutually complementary.'' In light
of the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine and accompanying
threats to use so-called ``tactical'' nuclear weapons we need
to consider whether the PRC will see its full suite of nuclear
weapons as providing it with a powerful counter-intervention
capability to deter the United States and its allies from
defending Taiwan in a crisis.ballistic missile System (IRBM)
which the DOD China Military Power report notes is China's
``first nuclear capable missile system that can conduct
precision strikes , and therefore, is the most likely weapon
system to field a lower-yield warhead in the near term.''
Chinese writings suggest that ``the most important type of
future regional wars will be conventional conflicts under
conditions of nuclear deterrence, deterrence and actual war-
fighting will exist at the same time, and their function will
be mutually complementary.'' In light of the recent Russian
invasion of Ukraine and accompanying threats to use so-called
``tactical'' nuclear weapons we need to consider whether the
PRC will see its full suite of nuclear weapons as providing it
with a powerful counter-intervention capability to deter the
United States and its allies from defending Taiwan in a crisis.
\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ OSD, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's
Republic of China, 2021, p. 49; SIPRI Yearbook 2022, p. 93; Yu Xijun,
ed, The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, quoted in Jennifer
Bradley, ``China's Nuclear Modernization: Ways Beijing Could Adapt its
Nuclear Policy,'' National Institute for Public Policy, Occasional
Paper, 2:7, July 2022, pp. 27-28; Evan Montgomery and Toshi Yoshihara,
``Leaderless, Cut Off, and Alone: The Risks to Taiwan in the Wake of
Ukraine,'' War on the Rocks, April 5, 2022 https://warontherocks.com/
2022/04/leaderless-cut-off-and-alone-the-risks-to-taiwan-in-the-wake-
of-ukraine/ and Evan Braden Montgomery and Toshi Yoshihara, ``China's
Post-Minimalist Challenge: Implications for U.S. Assurance and
Deterrence,'' forthcoming.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russia, of course, remains today the only existential
challenge to the United States because of the size of its
nuclear arsenal. The extensive modernization of Russian nuclear
forces over the past decade and a half, as well as the
promiscuous Russian nuclear sabre-rattling (both before and
after the February 24 unprovoked, premeditated Russian invasion
of Ukraine) represent an especially important challenge for
United States nuclear policymaking. Although the United States
has argued that MIRVs are destabilizing, and we have de-MIRVed
our own ICBM force Russia continues to modernize its forces
with MIRVed missiles. New variants (both road mobile and silo-
based) of the TOPOL-M missile are being deployed. The Russians
are about halfway through the modernization of their SSBN fleet
and the air leg of their nuclear triad features upgraded TU-95
and TU-160 bombers armed with the new KH-102 nuclear armed
cruise missile that will serve as a bridge to the future PAK-DA
next generation bomber that is expected to enter into
production by the end of the decade. \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ SIPRI Yearbook 2022, pp. 355-368.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russia, of course, also maintains a large stockpile of
theater nuclear weapons--perhaps 10 times the number of similar
weapons in the United States inventory. Russian theater nuclear
forces are unfinished business of the Cold War--a fact
recognized by the Senate in its Resolution of Ratification of
the New START in 2010 which, as a condition of ratification,
insisted that it is the policy of the United States to
negotiate an agreement ``to address the disparity between the
non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons stockpiles of the
Russian Federation and the United States.'' Unfortunately, this
disparity remains unaddressed and Russian threats to use such
weapons in Ukraine underscores the importance of doing
so.States to negotiate an agreement ``to address the disparity
between the non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons stockpiles
of the Russian Federation and the United States.''
Unfortunately, this disparity remains unaddressed and Russian
threats to use such weapons in Ukraine underscores the
importance of doing so.States to negotiate an agreement ``to
address the disparity between the non-strategic (tactical)
nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian Federation and the
United States.'' Unfortunately, this disparity remains
unaddressed and Russian threats to use such weapons in Ukraine
underscores the importance of doing so. \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ SIPRI Yearbook 2022, pp. 365-366; The text of the Resolution of
Ratification can be found at https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/
organization/154123.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
President Putin announced, with great fanfare in 2018,
several exotic nuclear weapons including ``a new heavy
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM); a nuclear-armed
hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV); a nuclear-armed, air-launched
hypersonic missile; a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise
missile; and a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed submarine
drone.'' Most of these, like Russia's theater nuclear weapons
are not covered by the New START. The precise purpose of these
new weapons remains unclear and some of them seem to reflect
the pursuit of capabilities which the U.S. considered but
decided not to pursue because they were too dangerous (nuclear
powered cruise missiles). Nonetheless, they create additional
uncertainty about ``strategic stability'' and must be addressed
if there is to be any follow-on agreement to New START. \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Matthew Kroenig, Mark Massa, Christian Trotti, ``Russia's
Exotic Nuclear Weapons and Implications for the United States and
NATO,'' Atlantic Council, Issue Brief, March 2020 https://
www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Russias-Exotic-
Nuclear-Weapons.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The challenge of deterring two near-peer or peer nuclear
competitors will require some rethinking about U.S. nuclear
posture, declaratory policy, and potentially arms control. It
does not, however, mean that we must reinvent the proverbial
wheel--a theme to which we will return below.
In addition to the challenge of deterring Russia and China,
the United States must also contend with the challenge of the
growing DPRK nuclear arsenal whose diversification and
sophistication is outstripping what earlier forecasts might
have suggested. Open-source estimates suggests that the DPRK
possesses 20 to 60 warheads (with the capability of producing
roughly 6 warheads a year) although most observers seem to
believe the number is closer to the lower than the higher end
of the spectrum. That said, North Korea continues to produce
fissile material and to diversify its means of delivery by
developing ICBMs and SLBMs. Recently the DPRK adopted a new law
on nuclear weapons that suggests it has developed an automated
launch system that would enable a retaliatory strike even if
Kim Jong Un were killed or incapacitated much like the old
Soviet Dead Hand or Perimetr system. Recent activity suggesting
an imminent nuclear test should serve as a reminder that the
scale and scope of the North Korean nuclear effort will remain
a persistent challenge for U.S policymakers.system. Recent
activity suggesting an imminent nuclear test should serve as a
reminder that the scale and scope of the North Korean nuclear
effort will remain a persistent challenge for U.S policymakers.
\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ David Sanger and William Broad, ``How U.S. Intelligence
Agencies Underestimated North Korea,'' The New York Times, January 6,
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/06/world/asia/north-korea-
nuclear-missile-intelligence.html; SIPRI Yearbook 2022, pp. 417-418;
Josh Smith, ``New North Korea law outlines nuclear arms use, including
preemptive strikes,'' Reuters, September 9, 2022 https://
www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/nkorea-passes-law-declaring-itself-
nuclear-weapons-state-kcna-2022-09-08/; Michelle Nichols, ``North Korea
`Paves the Way' for More Nuclear Tests, UN report says,'' Reuters,
August 4, 2022 https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-
paves-way-more-nuclear-tests-un-report-2022-08-04/
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Whether or not Iran and the United States ultimately agree
on steps to resuscitate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Agreement (JCPOA) that country's progress enroute to a nuclear
weapons capability continues apace. Even if the JCPOA is
revived many of the limitations on Iranian enrichment capacity
and capability will begin to expire within a few years and all
the limits will end in 2030. At that point Iran will be a
latent, if not declared, nuclear power. That could well be the
death knell of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the non-
proliferation order it created--arguably the most significant
accomplishment of arms control and a crucial element of United
States grand strategy since 1945. Russia, which has
traditionally cooperated with the United States on non-
proliferation policy, even in the worst days of the Cold War
has recently shown its willingness to subordinate commitment to
the NPT order to short-term considerations by blocking
consensus at the NPT Review Conference to protest the final
document's reference to ``concern'' about the situation in
Ukraine. A more proliferated world will mean even more
challenges to nuclear deterrence, notably to the United States
but to Moscow and Beijing as well. \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ See the two recent reports by David Albright and his colleagues
at the Institute for Science and International Security, https://isis-
online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/
Analysis_of_Sept_2022_IAEA_Iran_Verification_Report_Sept_12_Final.pdf;
https://isis-online.org/uploads/ isis-reports/documents/
The_IAEA's_Iran_NPT_Safeguards_Report_Sept_12_2022_ Final.pdf; Francis
J. Gavin, ``Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear
Revolution, and Non-Proliferation,'' International Security, 40:1, pp.
9-46 https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/
publication/004-ISEC_a_00205-Gavin.pdf; https://www.state.gov/nuclear-
non-proliferation-treaty-remains-strong-despite-russian-obstructionism/
;
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The role of new technologies like artificial intelligence,
hypersonics, and cyber capabilities may complicate nuclear
deterrence in ways we are only beginning to understand. Cyber
intrusions into nuclear command and control systems, for
instance, could undermine important assumptions that underpin
our concepts of nuclear deterrence like assured second-strike
retaliatory capability. Although there is a lot of hype about
hypersonic weapons (it is good to remember that ICBMs enroute
to their targets travel at hypersonic speeds) it is also the
case that combined with other technologies--like the Fractional
Orbital Bombardment system that China tested in 2021 it could
provide nations with a ``decapitation'' option that would also
undermine many assumptions about deterrence and force
governments to adopt very risky launch on warning postures.
Russia, and now perhaps North Korea, may have incorporated
automated launch systems into their nuclear forces. Artificial
intelligence may be seen by some as an antidote to decreasing
warning times, but it seems highly inadvisable to put our trust
in computer systems to decide whether we launch nuclear war
today. These kinds of question will require the kind of
sustained intellectual effort that we undertook in the Cold War
but largely abandoned after 1992.
Finally, as if all of the above challenges were not enough,
we must also think through the potential of a combined Russia-
China attack scenario. This may seem far-fetched to some but
the historical record of alliances of strange bedfellows which
emerge at extremely short notice (the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact
provides one example) means that it cannot be excluded and
planning against such a threat could prove extremely difficult.
WHAT IS OLD BUT STILL RELEVANT?
Facing these daunting challenges some observers and
officials have concluded that the lessons of deterrence learned
during the Cold War are no longer valid and that new
circumstances require a root and branch rethinking of
deterrence including the novel challenge of simultaneously
deterring two near-peers. Some argue that the United States
should move away from the long-term tendency to focus on what
potential enemy leaders value rather than counter-value
strategies and must accept that extended nuclear deterrence for
U.S. allies is unlikely to hold up in the future. Before we
dispense with the hard-won intellectual achievements of the
Cold War and discard approaches that successfully prevented the
kinds of great power conflicts that made the first half of the
20th Century the most destructive in human history, we think it
is worth reasserting some continuing hardy perennial verities.
\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ https://breakingdefense.com/2022/08/the-nuclear-3-body-
problem-stratcom-furiously-rewriting-deterrence-theory-in-tri-polar-
world/; Francis J. Gavin, ``Time to Rethink America's Nuclear Strategy:
How to Learn the Right Lessons of the Cold War,'' Foreign Affairs,
September 5, 2022 https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/23/its-time-to-
fold-americas-nuclear-umbrella/; Stephen M. Walt, ``Time to Fold
America's Nuclear Umbrella Over Its European and Asian Allies,''
Foreign Policy, March 23, 2021 https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/23/
its-time-to-fold-americas-nuclear-umbrella/; for an effort to capture
the achievements of Cold War strategists and explain why practitioners
diverged from the late Cold War writings of nuclear strategists see
Eric S. Edelman, ``Nuclear Strategy in Theory and Practice: The Great
Divergence,'' in Hal Brands, ed., The New Makers of Modern Strategy:
From the Ancient World to the Digital Age, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2023) pp. 665-691 forthcoming.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First and foremost, it is still the case that deterrence
requires holding at risk what potential enemy leaders value.
Doing so is very difficult because understanding exactly how
foreign policymakers understand the world and reach judgments
about it is intrinsically problematic. As Henry Kissinger has
noted ``deterrence seeks to prevent a given course by making it
seem less attractive than all possible alternatives. It
therefore ultimately depends on an intangible quality: the
state of mind of the potential aggressor.'' As a result, the
United States must be able to show that even in the worst case
we are still capable of inflicting unacceptable damage after
having absorbed a surprise first strike. With two near peers
this will have unavoidable implications for the size of
America's nuclear force. \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity of Choice (New York, NY:
Harper Brothers, 1961) p. 12
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
American treaty allies still rely heavily on the U.S.
nuclear guarantee. The proof of that proposition was recently
demonstrated by the universal opposition of our NATO and Asian
allies to mooted changes in United States declaratory policy
considered as the Biden administration prepared its nuclear
posture review. Moreover, undermining extended deterrence
remains a clear objective of both Russia and China. As long as
the United States hopes to maintain one of its most important
comparative strategic advantages in the long-term competition
with Moscow and Beijing it must still assure allies that we
will defend them against conventional and nuclear aggression.
The credible threat of nuclear retaliation against an aggressor
will necessarily remain a part of the equation. \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Keith Payne, ``Rethinking Deterrence: How and Why?,'' National
Institute for Public Policy, Information Series, No. 533, September 7,
2022; Demetri Sevastopulo and Henry Foy, ``Allies Lobby Biden to
Prevent Shift to `No First Use' of Nuclear Arms,'' Financial Times,
October 29, 2021 https://www.ft.com/content/8b96a60a-759b-4972-ae89-
c8ffbb36878e; Eric Edelman and Franklin Miller, ``President Biden,
don't help our adversaries break NATO,'' The Washington Post, November
4, 2021 https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/11/04/president-
biden-dont-help-our-adversaries-break-nato/
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PRELIMINARY JUDGMENTS
These reflections lead us to some preliminary judgments
recognizing that much additional thought must be devoted to
understanding the requirements of deterrence under today's
unique conditions.
First, we must proceed with modernization of all three legs
of the nuclear triad. This was actually a condition that the
United States Senate attached to the resolution of ratification
of New START in 2010 and the headlong modernization efforts by
our two leading adversaries requires that the U.S. maintain a
robust, redundant, survivable, responsive, controllable,
visible deterrent force that is capable of penetrating enemy
defenses to hold their forces and leadership at risk.
We must avoid a situation in which our retaliatory force
can only be used to threaten adversary populations. In order to
be able to absorb a first strike and retaliate against an
aggressor while also holding in reserve sufficient forces to
deter the other near peer may, in the future, require larger
numbers of deployed warheads than currently allowed under New
START. In the midst of Russia's ongoing aggression against
Ukraine this will undoubtedly be very challenging, and it is
hard to be optimistic about the prospects for arms control in a
period where Russian nuclear threats hang heavy in the air.
\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ On the case for nuclear modernization--particularly the land-
based leg of the Triad see Frank G. Klotz and Alexandra T. Evans,
Modernizing the U.S. Nuclear Triad: The Rationales for a New
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2022); Mark Gunzinger, Carl T. Rehberg, and Gillian Evans,
Sustaining the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent: The LRSO and GBSD, (Washington,
DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2018); Stephen
Cimbala and Adam Lowther, ``Nuclear Modernization and the Sentinel
ICBM,'' Aether: A Journal of Strategic Airpower and Space Power, 1:2,
pp. 57-68;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We must be sensitive to both strategic and theater nuclear
balances. Russia and China will seek to stress and undermine
United States extended nuclear deterrence, much as they did in
the Cold War by ``seeking to de-couple'' the defense of the
U.S. Homeland from defense of our allies. We cannot allow
adversaries to make nuclear threats to deter United States
counter-intervention in Europe or Indo-Pacific without the
means to answer in kind rather than relying on coercive
diplomacy backed by the threat of strategic nuclear forces. It
is for that reason that we support the lower yield options
developed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review and believe it is
unfortunate that the Biden administration seems intent on
killing the SLCM-N. We would urge the Congress to restore
funding for that program whose utility has been attested to by
both Chairman Milley and Admiral Richard.
CONCLUSION
Nuclear deterrence today faces very real and novel
challenges, but that does not mean we need to start from
scratch. There is much about what we have learned about
deterrence that remains valid. ``United States conventional and
nuclear capabilities together must provide Russia and China
with seamless and overwhelming disincentives to their
initiating attacks or engaging in nuclear escalation in the
event of conflict.'' We must maintain a relentless focus on the
survivability of United States second strike nuclear
retaliatory forces even if it proves uncomfortable from the
point of view of arms control. And we must continue to focus on
tailored deterrent strategies for a range of nuclear armed
adversaries, Russia, China, (as well as potentially a combined
Sino-Russian coordinated strike), North Korea and prospectively
Iran.point of view of arms control. And we must continue to
focus on tailored deterrent strategies for a range of nuclear
armed adversaries, Russia, China, (as well as potentially a
combined Sino-Russian coordinated strike), North Korea and
prospectively Iran.point of view of arms control. And we must
continue to focus on tailored deterrent strategies for a range
of nuclear armed adversaries, Russia, China, (as well as
potentially a combined Sino-Russian coordinated strike), North
Korea and prospectively Iran. \14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Keith Payne, ``Rethinking Deterrence,'' National Institute for
Public Policy, Information Series, No. 533, September 7, 2022, p .6
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the Scowcroft Commission noted some 40 years ago:
Deterrence is not, and cannot be bluff. In order for
deterrence to be effective we must not merely have weapons, we
must be perceived to be able, and prepared, if necessary, to
use them effectively against the key elements of [an enemy's]
power. Deterrence is not an abstract notion amenable to simple
quantification. Still less is it a mirror of what would deter
ourselves. Deterrence is the set of beliefs in the minds of the
[enemy] leaders, given their own values and attitudes, about
our capabilities and our will. It requires us to determine, as
best we can, what would deter them from considering aggression,
even in a crisis--not to determine what would deter us.'' \15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ The Report of the President's Commission On Strategic Forces,
(The Scowcroft Commission) April 1983, pages 2-3 https://web.mit.edu/
chemistry/deutch/policy/1983-ReportPresComm Strategic.pdf
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. I thank all the
panelists for their excellent testimony. Ms. Gottemoeller, we
know China is moving rapidly to become essentially a peer
competitor in the nuclear arms race.
How can we engage them? And I think--at least I believe we
should try to engage them and Russia in arms control talks and
have perhaps an agreement. And what might be the starting point
and what might be the endpoint?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would say that
with regard to China, my colleague Frank Miller is quite right.
Thus far, they have been difficult to engage, there is no
question about it. I do find, however, that there is a
considerable amount of work that has gone on behind the scenes
in China, because I work quite a bit on so-called second track
activities where it is clear to me that they are studying the
matter, so to say. The key thing is for them to get the
political go code from Xi Jinping and from the top Chinese
leadership.
So I continue to believe that it is necessary to work very
hard to engage them. And as I put it in my own remarks, to
really understand what is behind that opaque curtain they have
draped around their nuclear modernization. I know that they are
modernizing. We can see that in their triad structures. And I
know they are building up warheads. My argument, sir, is that
we have some time to consider this matter. We will have
strategic warning if the Chinese decide to sprint to parity.
You mentioned yourself, as did Mr. Inhofe, that we expect to
see China reach 1,000 warheads about 2030. More or perhaps
less, but we don't expect to see them sprint to the level of
the approximately 4,000 warheads that the United States has at
the moment.
So I think we have some time to watch and to try hard to
work with them and to get them to recognize the value of
negotiated restraint. So I think that that is the most
important point I would say about China.
Chairman Reed. Ambassador, your comments on this issue?
Mr. Edelman. Chairman Reed, you know, I am somewhat
skeptical about the willingness of the People's Republic of
China to engage in this kind of discussion with us. And partly
because, like my colleague, I broke my pick on this, you know,
in the Bush administration.
When President Bush, George W. Bush, met with Hu Jintao,
they agreed that there should be a dialog between the then
second artillery division and STRATCOM. And despite multiple
efforts, including my own, we were never able to get there
during the remaining three years of the Bush administration.
I know that in the Obama administration, very serious
efforts were undertaken by then Deputy Secretary Jim Steinberg
to engage in this kind of discussion, all without result. And
there has certainly been no willingness publicly on the part of
the Chinese to even entertain the notion of arms control, you
know, negotiations.
In fact, they have held those out as something that goes on
between the United States and Russia, but not something that
they participate in. So, you know, the best I think we can do
is to work in the track two domain.
And I would note that in the history of the United States,
Soviet arms competition, it took a very, very long time, more
than a decade, really, of Pugwash conferences and others to lay
the groundwork before we got into serious arms control
negotiations with the Soviet Union in the late 1960s. So that
would be the best case, in my view.
Chairman Reed. Well, but it is an area, I think, we must
pursue in terms of the multiple approach towards the threat,
not only being--having deterrence, but also talking about it.
And maybe it will take 10 years, but those are probably 10
years of worthwhile investment.
Ms. Creedon, you have experience with the National Nuclear
Security Administration. You talked about some of their
problems. How serious is the challenge NNSA faces in terms of
modernization, of keeping up with the effort?
Ms. Creedon. Thank you, Senator. I think the problems with
modernization actually exist across the board. So DOD has then,
NNSA has them. With respect to NNSA specifically, the most
significant problem at NNSA really is the infrastructure. A lot
of it is very old. Almost all of it has either been replaced or
is in the process of being replaced. It is a huge construction
effort that is going on and with a lot of delays. The second
thing is really people.
The complex is really struggling to attract, retain people,
and get good people trained up. So it is significant. Thank
you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. Mr. Miller, very quickly, my time
is expiring. You have spent years studying the Soviet Union and
Russia. Can you comment very briefly about the recent events
and how it would affect arms control? Putin has made wild
statements about using nuclear weapons or other people have.
And just a quick sense of what you feel.
Mr. Miller. So I believe, Senator, that Putin understands
that our retaliatory capability is adequate today to prevent
him from attacking ourselves or our NATO allies. I think that
we need to continue to modernize our force to be able to do
that into the future.
And if there is arms control in the future, somehow it
needs to get a handle, as this committee and the Senate said
back in 2010, to get our arms around their short range nuclear
weapons, which is the one he is threatening to use against
Ukraine. But I think the key is to be able to maintain a
credible deterrent against him and against Xi Jinping.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Senator Inhofe, please.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Maybe it is my
age, but I enjoyed some of the reflections from the past that
we shared this morning. Ambassador Edelman, and when you said
when the Soviets build--we build when the Soviets build. When
we quit building, the Soviets built. How prophetic that was.
Mr. Miller, numerous senior military officers have testified of
their support for the continuing the sea launched cruise
missile program as a means of offsetting the growth of Russia
and China's nuclear arsenals.
And I agree with this support. I would ask you, first of
all, do you believe that we should continue this program, and
you should be able to continue other enhancements as well. Now,
you offered in your opening statement to elaborate a little bit
on this subject, and I will give you that chance to do it now.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Yes, I agree that a
nuclear sea launched cruise missile is important, both to deter
Russia and China, each of which have large tactical nuclear
arsenals, and to reassure our allies who are faced by those
specific tactical nuclear arsenals.
So it is a program that I think is modest, but I think it
makes a useful contribution. And I don't think it creates any
sort of an arms race potential because we are basically at very
low levels there, and both Russia and China have much higher
levels.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. And I agree with that excellent
statement. This question would be for all witnesses,
considering what we know about China's nuclear breakout and
Russia's large non-strategic nuclear weapons arsenal, do any of
you believe that the United States should not continue
modernizing its own forces? I would like to have each one of
you respond to that.
Ms. Creedon. Senator Inhofe, I completely agree. The U.S.
must continue its modernization programs of all three legs of
the triad.
Ms. Gottemoeller. I do agree that the United States must
continue its modernization programs at pace across the program
of record.
Mr. Edelman. Senator Inhofe, as I said in my opening oral
remarks, I think it is imperative that we do so to sustain
deterrence into the future.
Senator Inhofe. Excellent.
Mr. Miller. Senator, I absolutely agree. And as I said in
my remarks, I think in the out years, in the 2030s, we may need
to augment that program by buying more SSBNs and more long
range standoff weapons, and I am happy to elaborate on that at
some point if you want.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much. And I appreciate the
specifics by each one of you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe. Senator
Shaheen, please.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you all for being here. Just to
follow up on Senator Inhofe's question about the importance of
modernizing in order to hopefully provide the deterrence that
we need as we look at the capabilities of Russia and China.
What do each of you consider to be the biggest threat to
modernization? I will ask you to begin, Ms. Creedon.
Ms. Creedon. Probably two things. The first is money, and
the second is a sustained commitment on the part of everybody,
the administrations, this one, successive ones, as well as
Congress, and also the commitment of the American people to
truly be able to sustain a deterrent.
Senator Shaheen. And do you believe that that commitment is
there now?
Ms. Creedon. I do. And it has been there for a couple of
years. I continue to think that at times it is more fragile
than others. Right now, I think it is quite strong. But this is
a very long term program. And the handoff between the old and
the new isn't really going to happen for another 10 years. And
then we have got a very long period of time where it is very
difficult to handoff.
Senator Shaheen. Ms. Gottemoeller, do you have any
difference in your thinking about what the biggest threat is?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Well, again, Senator Shaheen, I agree
with my colleague Madelyn Creedon with regard to the long term
commitment of the U.S. public and also of our Government from
one administration to the next, very much, so when it comes
down to ensuring a clear budgetary path, as I said, maintain
our intense modernization at pace so we don't have dips and ups
and downs and delays.
But the other thing I would worry about, and I mentioned it
in my remarks, is our industrial capacity. We have not had
ability, I would say, to really turn out missiles and warheads
now for many years in a steady pace.
And so we need to rebuild our industrial capacity to be
able to do so. And I support the efforts that are underway to
improve our industrial facilities for both missiles and
warheads.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Do either of you have anything
different than those responses?
Mr. Edelman. Senator Sheehan, I don't have anything
different. I agree with what both Madelyn and Rose have said,
but I would add that I think the education of the American
public about these issues, which I think is extremely important
since we really haven't talked about them very much as a
Nation, in all honesty, since 1992, since the end of the Cold
War.
And in that regard, I think I commend the committee on
holding this hearing, because I think at least that helps begin
a process, but it has got to continue. We have to talk about
this more to the public so that they appreciate what is at
risk.
Senator Shaheen. Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller. Let me agree with my colleagues but let me
point out also that the industrial base includes the private
sector. And I think that in the area of shipbuilding, submarine
building, building missiles, we have lost a great deal of
talent and we need to worry about that, particularly about
recruiting people through the STEM [science, technology,
engineering and mathematics] programs, so that we have enough
welders and enough engineers and enough designers to carry
these programs through into the future.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I think that is a very
important point. And I would just argue before this committee
that one of the things we need to do is to reauthorize the
Government programs and encourage innovation and encourage the
private sector to do the things that we need. Programs like the
SBIR [Small Business Innovation Research] and STTR [Small
Business Technology Transfer] Program.
But I want to go back to you, Ms. Gottemoeller, as somebody
who has spent a fair amount of time at NATO. Is there a role
for NATO as we look at the nuclear deterrence, the need to try
and bring China into some of these discussions. Do we think
there is anything that NATO can do there to be helpful?
Ms. Gottemoeller. That is a very interesting question,
Senator. I do believe that NATO can play a role here. First of
all, NATO is very concerned about the necessity of getting
constraints on non-strategic nuclear warheads and the missile
systems that deliver them. Frank Miller pointed this out a few
moments ago. As--this is the objective that has to be at the
top of the priority list in our next arms control negotiations.
The allies completely agree with that and are prepared to be
supportive, in my view, including the kinds of cooperation with
the United States that may be necessary to establish a
monitoring and verification regime for such a treaty or
agreement that would involve bases in Europe.
I do believe that they are ready to work with us on that.
Second, your question about China is very interesting because
China and NATO have established some political military dialog
and it is my understanding that in fact that dialog has been
rather rich and ongoing with regard to arms control topics. So
perhaps there could be a role for NATO in that regard also
reaching out to China.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you all very much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator. Let me recognize Senator
Fischer, please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I
would like to thank the panel for being here today. And to all
of you, thank you for your very strong comments of support for
nuclear modernization.
And Ms. Creedon, I specially took note when you said we
also have to factor in inflation, when we look at what is
needed in order to keep up on schedule with regards to nuclear
modernization. So thank you for that.
Also, in looking at a nuclear arms race and looking at the
New START and what is there, Mr. Miller, I liked your comments
about Russia is not trustworthy and China is scornful. We all
know that. None of us want to see an arms race. But I would say
to you, I think we are seeing one. We are seeing it with our
peer competitors, and that would be Russia and China. They are
in a race with us in trying to outpace the capabilities that we
have. So I also appreciated many of the comments that we have
heard so far with regard to that, where we look at comments
from members in the past, from Ash Carter, for example, who
said in the last 25 years we have only made modest investments
in basic sustainment and operations, and we haven't built
anything new in 25 years. And we are seeing tremendous
advancements from the Russians and the Chinese with what they
are building, what they are testing, and what they are capable
of or will soon be capable of. Mr. Miller and Ambassador
Elderman, I saw in your prepared statement you referred to
China's test of a fractional orbital bombardment system as
extremely destabilizing development. And you go on to describe,
``a decapitation option that would also undermine many
assumptions about deterrence and force governments to adopt
very risky launch on warning postures.'' We have heard similar
testimony to that from Admiral Richard, but I don't remember us
ever digging into this at any of our hearings.
So I kind of wanted to go off on that today and have you
explain this problem that we are facing. Give us a little more
detail on that and walk us through why you feel that this
system would be so destabilizing. Ambassador, would you like to
start?
Mr. Edelman. Thank you, Senator Fischer. I am happy to
start and then let my colleague do clean up on aisle nine.
So, the basis of deterrence, we discovered after long and
hard efforts during the first 15, 20 years of the Cold War, was
for each side to be able to have an assured second strike
capability, a retaliatory capability that would allow it to
ride out a first strike and then inflict unacceptable damage on
its adversary.
In order to do that, you have to have robust nuclear
command and control. And the danger that the FOBS [fractional
orbital bombardment system] test I think represents to us, the
maximum danger, is that it could be, we don't really know why
the Chinese did it, but it could be because of the path it
takes which evades our early warning systems and finishes, as
Madelyn pointed out, with a hypersonic glide vehicle--it could
essentially be the basis of a no warning attack on the national
command authority.
Senator Fischer. It is a first strike use, and it is also a
surprise attack where we wouldn't have that warning, correct?
Mr. Edelman. Correct. And that is the danger in it, because
the assumptions of stability are the ones that I articulated
that we have to maintain. But if I have misstated anything, I
know my colleague will correct me.
Mr. Miller. Eric didn't misstate anything. I mean, we faced
short warning threats in the past from Soviet cruise missiles,
submarines off our coast way back in the old days, Yankee-class
ballistic missiles, submarines, but we would know about the
launch of those weapons, and we would be able to track them.
In this case, as Ambassador Edelman said, we would not have
that kind of warning if this system de-orbited, and we wouldn't
be able to tell where it was going. So everything that you have
said, and that Ambassador Edelman said is correct, Senator.
Senator Fischer. Do you believe that it is necessary for us
to continue to look for other options that we could have in
order to maintain a very strong deterrence, including being
able to identify such surprise attacks so that we wouldn't see
this decapitation happen to us, and that would then be off the
table?
Mr. Miller. Yes, ma'am. I think we need to do that. And I
think we need to continue to build a strong and robust nuclear
command and control system. We have allowed that system to
wither after the Cold War ended. The Department of Defense is
now working to improve that. But that is an absolute priority.
As Madelyn Creedon indicated, that is often forgotten. We
talk about the triad, but command and control is at the heart
of all of that.
Senator Fischer. I don't forget it. NC3 is extremely
important. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator Kaine,
please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you to the
witnesses for your wonderful testimony and your service. I want
to ask some intel questions to begin. Isn't it the case that
our ability to deter is advanced significantly if we have the
most comprehensive awareness of the nuclear capacities of our
adversaries? Is that fair to say?
Mr. Miller. I would say that what we have to have is the
most exquisite understanding of what the potential enemy
leaderships value. We know about their weapons systems. The
weapons systems are at the command of their national leaders.
So we need to know what to hold at risk, which canonically
has been the leadership itself, those structures that keep them
in power, selected parts of their military forces, the
industrial potential to sustain war, so that they know if they
aggress against us or our allies, that terrible things will
happen to their ability to have a country.
Senator Kaine. And in addition to wanting to know that
about our adversaries, if the goal is to deter nuclear war, it
is also important to have good intel about other nations that
are not adversaries. So, for example, India and Pakistan are
nuclear nations. They are not adversaries.
But if the goal is to deter nuclear war, having exquisite
information about their plans and nuclear capabilities is
important. And it is also important to have information about
our allies, NATO allies, what their intentions are. This
information is extremely valuable. It is extremely valuable,
and it is very dangerous if it gets in the wrong hands.
There is a prosecution going on right now in West Virginia
of somebody who works over at the Navy Yard who was trying to
pass U.S. nuclear secrets to a Nation that is not an adversary.
Brazil, as is publicly reported, seeking huge dollars for it.
The Federal judge in that case just threw out a plea agreement
where the individual, Mr. Tobey, would have been sentenced to
17 years in Federal prison.
The judge threw that out as insufficient. So obviously
information about U.S. nuclear capacity in the wrong hands is
extremely valuable and it is very dangerous of that information
gets out. And I guess I would like to explore the danger of
information getting out that we have about not our own
capabilities, but other nations.
If having exquisite information about adversaries or allies
or other nations is important to us to further a deterrence
goal. If our information, for example, about adversaries
exquisite capabilities were to be released, I could imagine
very significant dangers. I mean, adversaries would understand
what we would know about them. They could change their plans,
they could obscure what they are doing. They could make it more
difficult for us to come up with the right modernization to
deter them. Similarly, information we have about allies'
nuclear capacity. If those were to get into the wrong hands,
they could be used by other adversaries to target them.
So I guess I want to ask you, given that having exquisite
information about the nuclear capabilities of other nations and
their intent, and their thoughts about deterrence, given how
important that is, you would agree with me that this kind of
information, if it is held by the United States Government, is
highly, highly valuable and we should do everything we can to
make sure that it is not released to others without
authorization, correct? Ms. Creedon.
Ms. Creedon. Yes, sir, very much so. And I would also add,
there are other things that are of equal importance.
So, for instance, cyber capabilities, space capabilities,
all the things that underpin our deterrence and that we need to
know about so that we can have a strong deterrent and also to
be able to counter and protect against some of those things
which are not openly known that others are doing.
Senator Kaine. Others who want to weigh in? Ms.
Gottemoeller.
Ms. Gottemoeller. If I may briefly comment, Senator. It is
a fine balance. I agree with you, absolutely, that information
must be defended and without authorization must not be
released. In certain circumstances, information can have a
deterrent effect, of course.
And I wanted to add to my answer to Senator Shaheen a
moment ago that one of the things that has happened lately is
the NATO allies have all move forward on modernization of their
dual capable aircraft.
Some such as the Germans, we were not expecting them to
move forward so smartly. So having them move forward and talk
about it publicly is good for deterrence in Europe. So
sometimes the information is valuable in that realm.
Senator Kaine. And usually if that information is going to
be shared, there would be a strategic discussion about the
value of it being shared, not shared--and I think, Ms. Creedon,
you opened off and said it was a chaotic world these days.
Information like that, if it is going to be shared, should be
done so strategically and not in a one off chaotic way,
correct?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Absolutely, sir. And authorization,
proper authorization from the Government in charge of the
information responsible for it is always necessary.
Senator Kaine. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Rounds,
please.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, to
all of you on the panel, thank you very much for taking the
time to come in and to share with us your thoughts today. In
the 2022 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], Congress
created a Strategic Posture Commission to review many of the
important issues that we are discussing here.
I know that three of you are members of the Commission with
Ms. Creedon also chairing that group. Ms. Creedon, could you
give us briefly an update on how the Commission's work is
going? And is there any assistance that this committee can
provide to help assure the Commission's success?
Ms. Creedon. Well, thank you for that question, Senator
Rounds. So clearly the Commission got off to a fairly slow
start. We had a lot of logistical issues. But I would say the
folks at Washington headquarters services and the Pentagon and
others, and also staff of a number of the committees were very
helpful getting us around some of the initial security and
ethics sorts of things.
The Pentagon also worked really quickly to get our FFRDC
[Federally funded research and development centers] on board.
We still have a lot of ongoing logistics issues that are
continuing. I worry with those if we will actually be able to
make our due date or not.
They are just difficult, and they seem to be never ending.
On the other hand, the Commission has managed to meet three
times, but we have had one classified session and one
unclassified session, one virtual one.
And so that has all been going pretty well. We have
certainly had challenges, mostly with the arrangement the
department has put in place to screen briefings and documents
in advance. So right now, all DOD documents and briefing
material provided to the Commission must be reviewed by the
Office of Policy to determine if they are releasable to the
Commission.
We have been told that as a Legislative Branch body, we are
being treated as a Congressional committee with respect to the
information that DOD will provide. So we are very early in the
process. The Deputy Secretary of Defense wrote a memo to all
duty components in early August, and she stated in her memo
that DOD components are directed to provide full and timely
cooperation with the Commission through the DOD liaison in
fulfillment of the Commission's statutory duties and
responsibilities as appropriate and consistent with applicable
laws and regulations.
So right now, at the moment, we haven't had a substantive
issue, but as I have told DOD, I am not optimistic, but I will
certainly remain hopeful that the Commission receives what it
needs to accomplish its statutory tasks.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. I think, clearly there was a
reason why we put emphasis on it in the 2022 NDAA. I simply
draw attention to the fact that it is something that we all are
looking forward to receiving.
So, and we thank you for your work. I would offer this
question, and I know that we are going to run out of time, but
I am going to try it anyway. It seems to me that we are really
beating around the bush when we start talking about negotiating
a New START, unless we have China involved in this as well. I
am just going to ask the panel briefly if I could, isn't it
really futile to do a New START unless we have all three of the
major powers involved in actually agreeing to something? And
right now, it doesn't appear that Mr. Putin has necessarily
followed through with everything that you would normally
consider to be acceptable behavior, particularly in Ukraine.
So just briefly, what is the use of a New START unless we
get China involved in this as well?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Perhaps I will start, Senator, if I may.
I want to underscore that I do believe it is necessary to get
China to the table, but the size of their strategic forces
still remains well below that of the United States and the
Russian Federation.
We have, under the New START, 1,550 deployed warheads, we
and the Russians, with additional warheads, approximately 3,000
each, in addition. So our numbers are much higher. And so I
think we can negotiate on the basis of equality. I think we
need to strive to negotiate with the Chinese on the basis of
equality also.
And for that reason, I have been urging that we get into
negotiations with them as soon as possible in areas where we
have some equality of capability. That is what will bring them
to the table. Intermediate range, ground launched missiles, for
example. I think that is an excellent area to try to begin to
actually constrain and reduce with regard to the Chinese.
In the meantime, however, we cannot let their modernization
go unanswered. We have to figure out what they are doing, and
they have to really, I think, talk to us about it, because
otherwise we must suspect the worst, as all of us around this
room suspect the worst. So we need to understand what they are
up to, and as I said in my statement, work with them to
convince them of the value of negotiated restraint.
Otherwise, we are going to have, I fear, an all-out arms
race. And so I think that is a very concerning matter. But I
think there are two separate things. There are negotiations to
reduce and constrain where there is some equality of
capability. And then there are some very direct, tough
discussions about what they are up to.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, my time has
expired, but I simply I would thank the panel for your work,
and I would certainly appreciate your response.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Senator King,
please.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This morning we have
used the word deterrence about 50 times. It is the bedrock of
our strategy with dealing with nuclear weapons going back 70
years. Here is my concern, terrorists with nuclear weapons.
Deterrence depends upon the other side having a fear of death
and a fear of destruction and a fear of the loss of their
country and their infrastructure and their capital city. What
about people who, A, don't care about dying, and B, have no
capital city?
While we were talking here this morning, I Googled building
a nuclear weapon, and I even misspelled building but still got
dozens of responses on Google. How to build a nuclear bomb and
other weapons of mass destruction, a Book.
YouTube, making a nuclear weapon. My personal favorite to
YouTube, so you want to build a nuke? We need another theory or
an adjunct to the theory of deterrence to deal with the threat
of terrorists with nuclear weapons. We have got countries, Iran
and North Korea probably the most likely, building with fissile
material.
And Iran's a week or two away from enough from fissile
material. How do we deal with this threat? Mr. Miller, your
thoughts? It seems to me this is a whole new category that,
frankly, I don't think we are addressing.
Mr. Miller. So, Senator King, I think I would have two
groupings or maybe three, Russia and China, classic deterrence.
I think that a North Korea or an Iran would fall into the case
of a classic deterrence situation, because, as you say, there
is a leadership, there are capital cities, there are valued
assets.
Senator King. I am talking about----
Mr. Miller. I understand----
Senator King.--15 people in a tramp steamer headed for New
York harbor.
Mr. Miller. Yes, sir. I understand. And so the third
category is terrorists. And I think that is outside the realm
of nuclear deterrence. That is the realm of special operations
forces. It is the realm of intelligence. It is the realm of
conventional forces. It is the realm of prevention. It is the
NPT.
It is working with allies and like-minded States to prevent
those people from getting the fissile material and from getting
the weapons knowledge. But as you pointed out, you can get the
weapons knowledge. But that is different than classic
deterrence.
Senator King. I agree. That is the problem. The theory of
deterrence doesn't apply to this situation, which I think is
one of the most serious likely threats. I would suggest perhaps
a Manhattan Project to figure out how to detect nuclear
material from space or from a distance as our best defense,
because deterrence won't work. Other want to address this
question? Ms. Creedon.
Ms. Creedon. Yes, sir, if I may. So for many, many years,
the United States and Russia engaged in a cooperative threat
reduction program, which made very substantial gains in
securing the materials, the uranium, plutonium. Because at
bottom, nobody can make a weapon without the materials,
plutonium and uranium.
So the focus on materials continues to this day. There is a
very large program at NNSA, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
at DOD has them, DHS is focused on them, and it ranges from all
sorts of detection capabilities to even interdiction
capabilities.
Senator King. Do you think it is adequate or is this
something that should be ramped up?
Ms. Creedon. So, I think it is quite good. What I worry
more about is that it is not well understood and like other
things, I think there is this personal opinion. Of course, I
also think there is a little bit of a maybe a boredom, maybe a
tiredness with the threat of nuclear terrorism. It hasn't
happened.
We always thought it was going to. It hasn't happened. So I
worry that the fear of it, the threat of it isn't taken
seriously and it has to be. So all of these programs----
Senator King. People that attacked us on September 11th
killed 3,000 people. They would have killed 3 million if they
could have. And I think this is something we have to take
extremely seriously.
Let me ask another question in the little bit of time left.
It seems to me, Mr. Miller, that hypersonics changes the
strategic balance altogether. And you suggested, I think it was
you that was talking about the danger. You can have a nuclear
weapon essentially dwelling in low earth orbit over Washington.
The analogy to the sword of Damocles is inescapable. Does
this--it seems to me, we can talk about the technology of the
command and control, but if the President, the vice President,
and all the leadership of Congress is gone, we are decapitated,
there is no one to make the decision to launch, which
undermines the deterrence because of the lack of a second
strike, as you outlined. Should we have the vice President live
somewhere else in the country? Should we disperse our
leadership in some way? Because I think you raise a very
important point. Without the threat of a second strike, of a
retaliatory strike, deterrence doesn't work.
And if part of that is command and control, and I don't
mean technology, I mean people, maybe we ought to think about
having the vice President live in Kansas City.
Mr. Miller. I won't speak for Kansas City, Senator. So I
will be very careful in answering your question, because once
upon a time I was involved in Continuity of Government
programs. We need a survivable Continuity of Government to
include nuclear command and control.
Even a fractional orbital ballistics system would not come
out of the clear blue sky, and it would not come at a time of
total peace. In a time of building tension----
Senator King. What if the weapon is up there permanently?
It is just in low earth orbit, just like Starlink, only it has
a nuclear weapon that it can then--in my calculations, it would
take about 10 minutes to hit the earth out of--from 1,200
miles.
Mr. Miller. Someone would need--someone who owns it would
need to make the decision to attack us. And presumably,
presumably, that would not come at a time of total peace.
In a time of building tension, I think it is incumbent on
the Government to establish a survivable nuclear command and
control system, which may include dispersing senior
officials to more remote locations in Washington, D.C.
I think the Government has practiced that in the past. It
can always be improved, but I think the point that you raise is
particularly important.
Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Tuberville,
please.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for
being here today. Just to follow up a little bit on, Senator
King here, the direction he was going. You know, we operate on
the assumption that we, I mean in the President has 30 minutes
to respond to a nuclear attack. But with the advent of
hypersonics, where do we stand with that today? Anybody want to
answer?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Perhaps, Senator, I will just add one
remark, which is that ballistic missiles, ICBMs, are
hypersonic. What is different today is the maneuverability and
the end game. So that is what poses the--so in some ways, we
are not facing a new threat because we have a hypersonic threat
coming at us, but we are facing a new threat in the fact of
this maneuverability.
So I think that where the emphasis has to calm is on
resilience in our command and control system, particularly in
our command and control system for the strategic nuclear
forces. And Mr. Miller has already referred to that, but I
really just wanted to underscore that message.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you.
Ms. Gottemoeller. If I may just add one more thing.
Exercising--exercising this capability, which we don't do
enough of.
Mr. Edelman. Senator, I just would like to add one comment
here, which is we had discussed earlier the--with Senator
Fischer, the fractional orbital bombardment system, which has a
hypersonic glide vehicle on the end of it, which is the problem
that you have with no notice attack.
It is not just China. It was the Russians who first
experimented with this in the 1960s and 1970s. It was
constrained by the original START. The Russians have allegedly
had abandoned it, but it was mentioned by President Putin in
2018 when he talked about other exotic nuclear capabilities.
So it is not really clear whether the Russians have totally
abandoned this idea or not. So it is not just something we need
to worry about with regard to China. We also need to worry
about it with regard to Russia in my personal view.
Mr. Miller. If I could, Senator. This is not the topic of
this hearing, but you have talked about hypersonics. I think we
need to pay a lot more attention to conventionally armed
hypersonics. The Russians and Chinese have conventionally armed
hypersonics would pose a terrific threat to our naval forces,
to our surface forces at sea. We are on the cusp of deploying
some hypersonic systems ourselves, which would be absolutely
critical to taking down the A2--I am sorry, the anti-access
area denial defenses that the Navy has been complaining about
for 15 years. But we are proceeding with deployment at a
snail's pace.
But if our Navy is going to be able to operate in the South
China Sea in a war or in the Baltics, we need to take down
those antique surface and anti-air defenses. And I think the
committee, in its own different work, needs to look very much
at those conventional hypersonic systems, and to push the
Pentagon to speed their deployment.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. The last couple of years,
Admiral Richard has made his top unfunded priority, the sea
launched missile. Hopefully, we get that approved this year.
Mr. Miller, could you talk about that a little bit more, about
the importance of it?
Mr. Miller. I think, Senator, that we need something that
our allies see is theater based that is around. That we can't
keep saying, don't worry, we have got these systems in Omaha
and in the States and deep at sea in the ballistic missile
force.
That we have something that we can show them and that we
can show the Russian and Chinese leadership that we have
capabilities that would match what they have, and therefore,
that would deter them from using those theater and tactical
nuclear systems.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Mr. Miller, do you believe
that pulling out of the JCPOA accelerated Iran's breakout
timeline, or do you believe the Iranians planned to follow this
pathway all along? Do you think they plan on doing in any way?
Mr. Miller. I don't know what direction they are going in,
but as others of your colleagues have said, they are
particularly close to having a nuclear weapon, one way or
another.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. It was good to hear people
talk, some of you talk about recruitment of STEM programs. I
come from the educational field. We are struggling. Huntsville,
Alabama, is looking for engineers every day. We do a lot,
obviously, with our defense. And we are doing a few things to
help accelerate engineers. We have got to do that. We have got
a majority of our kids in this country can't even read, much
less do math or science.
So hopefully we will come up with some better programs to
accelerate that and come up with more engineers in the future
because we are going to need them. Thank you very much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Senator
Warren, please.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So there is no
question that we are confronting a challenging security
environment. But the justifications we keep hearing for buying
nuclear weapons sound like a drumbeat for a new Cold War, which
strikes me as incredibly dangerous for the United States and
for global security.
One of the most common tactics used by boosters for more
nuclear spending is to rattle off the number of weapons held by
our adversaries and to cite projections of how China, in
particular, could increase its stockpile of weapons in the
coming years. Now, according to this so-called logic, any time
a foreign power is catching up to us numerically, we are
supposed to shovel more money to defense contractors to get our
own numbers up. Ms. Creedon, you have decades of experience
working on nuclear weapons policy.
And of course, the size of a country's nuclear stockpile is
one key piece of information. But do you think the best or only
way to measure U.S. power is counting our ability to match
potential rivals warhead for warhead, launcher for launcher?
Ms. Creedon. Thank you, Senator Warren. As you all know,
this is a very complicated question, and it goes far beyond
just who has 24 and who has 50. At a very basic level,
substantial imbalances would be worrisome, but it is not just
about nuclear weapons. It is about everything that we have. It
is about the whole concept of integrated deterrence.
And it is about the quality of our weapons across the
board. It is about the quality of our people, the training of
our people. And at the end of the day, we have guidance from
our President as to what we hold at risk in a variety of
different circumstances.
And it is, can we meet our own goals and objectives? Can we
defend our country? And do our allies feel confident in what we
have so that they are safe under the nuclear umbrella? So it is
way more complicated than just numbers.
Senator Warren. I appreciate that answer. And I am
concerned that focusing so much on the wrong measure may be
good for defense contractors' bottom lines, but it is
incredibly destabilizing. But there is an area where I think we
actually should be doing more talking about the number of
weapons we hold, not for the purposes of inviting an arms race,
but to avoid strategic miscalculation.
The Obama administration took an important first step in
this regard when they declassified the size of our nuclear
arsenal. Disclosing this information helps U.S. diplomats make
the case to countries around the world that the U.S. is
continuing its efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals and it
enhances our credibility in calling for other nuclear powers to
be equally transparent.
Ms. Creedon, when the Trump administration came in, they
denied requests to declassify this same information. Do you
think that the Trump administration's decision was helpful or
harmful to nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation?
Ms. Creedon. So, Senator, I am very supportive of the
declassification of the broad numbers, the total stockpile.
Rose and I were in the Obama administration together when many
of these decisions were made. And so clearly we supported this.
I think it is important for transparency.
I think it has the potential to reduce some arms racing
based out of unknowns, if you will. But on the other hand, you
know, people will do what they want to do. But I still think it
is important for us to be transparent, because even though it
wasn't reciprocated during the Obama administration and this
administration has done it one more time, I still think it is
important. I mean, we do need to lead in these areas.
Senator Warren. You know, we have to keep in mind that
Russia and China don't trust us either. And when we hide this
kind of information, we only add to their paranoia about our
national security strategy.
Thankfully, the Biden administration has reversed this
harmful Trump administration approach, and it has started to
put us back on the right path by declassifying the size of our
nuclear stockpile.
So let me ask you one more question, Ms. Creedon. Would it
be helpful or harmful to continue the declassification of this
information going forward?
Ms. Creedon. So right this minute, Senator, I think it
would continue to be helpful on an annual basis.
Senator Warren. Good. You know, some are saying we should
go back to the Trump era policy of keeping this information
secret. I think that would be a mistake. When we keep this
information classified, we give away our ability to pressure
other nuclear powers to disclose information about their
nuclear weapons.
And I see it as you know, this may be a small step, but
these are among the small steps that we need to take to rebuild
our reputation with our allies and with our enemies. The Trump
administration undermined our credibility significantly by
withdrawing the United States from the Iran deal and from the
INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] treaty. We need to
continue to embrace arms control as part of our deterrence
strategy.
And I am very concerned that we are moving in the wrong
direction when it comes to finding areas to collaborate on
shared interests on nonproliferation. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren. Senator Cotton,
please.
Senator Cotton. Ambassador Edelman, sorry I wasn't here at
the beginning, but I think I heard you reference a fairly well-
known phrase about the Russians, when we build, they build.
When we stop, they build. Did you use that phrase?
Mr. Edelman. I quoted the late Harold Brown, Defense
Secretary in the Carter administration, who famously made that
a marginal note on a memo on the nuclear balance.
Senator Cotton. Good. Thank you. I just want to make sure
that we got for the record, that that was not Eric Edelman
statement. As insightful as you always are, but that was a
statement from Jimmy Carter's Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Ambassador, we heard a lot of talk today about a new
Cold War, as we always do when the conversation turned towards
nuclear weapons. I think I am on safer ground saying you were
around for the end of the Cold War.
Mr. Edelman. Yes, sir. You are dating me. I was.
Senator Cotton. Could you just remind some of those who
maybe weren't in office, who won the Cold War?
Mr. Edelman. You know, I think the truth is we all won the
Cold War, including the people of the Soviet Union, who had a
very brief respite from totalitarianism, only to now have an
authoritarian regime emerge in the last 20 years. But it was, I
would say that the conditions for the end of the Cold War were
set by United States policy, working with its allies.
Senator Cotton. Yes, and can you mention specifically the
role that nuclear weapons, and more broadly, military strength
played in the free world winning the Cold War?
Mr. Edelman. Well, I think we successfully deterred any
major aggression by the Soviet Union, certainly against our
treaty allies. And that, it seems to me, was a great
achievement. And it was underpinned by nuclear deterrence.
Senator Cotton. Another thing we have heard a lot of talk
about this morning, as we always do when we talk about nuclear
weapons, is a dreaded arms race. Ambassador Edelman, can the
United States avoid an arms race simply by not competing? Or is
it a matter of whether we are going to win or lose an arms race
if our adversaries are rapidly building up their arms?
Mr. Edelman. As I said in my opening remarks, our allies--
our adversaries have been building a pace over the last 15
years, and we have been rather slow. I think all of the members
of the panel here would agree that we have not been moving as
quickly as we should to modernize our force.
I think when it comes to the arms race issue, I think it is
fair to say that we do not have to match everything that Russia
does. There are things Russia is doing that I would not
advocate that we match or do.
For instance, we considered back in the bad old days of the
Cold War a nuclear powered cruise missile, and we abandoned the
idea because it was too dangerous. If Russia wants to build a
nuclear powered cruise missile that, you know, spews nuclear
radiation across Northern Russia when it is tested, you know,
they can do that. We don't need to match it. But what we do
need to do is make sure that we have the fundamental--meet the
fundamental requirements of deterrence, which as Frank and I
outlined in our opening statement, requires the ability to have
an assured second strike capability.
And I think all of us on the panel have said this morning
that that ultimately requires the modernization of our existing
triad.
Senator Cotton. Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller. Senator, if I could make four quick points. I
think with respect, Senator Warren mischaracterized the entire
situation, the concern about the Russian and Chinese buildup is
the intent behind those leaders trying to build a large nuclear
force and why. And it is obviously, it is one of intimidation.
Second, there is no arms race. They have been modernizing their
forces for the last 15 years. We are just starting to enter
that game. And we are not talking about matching their numbers
of warheads. What we are talking about is modernizing our aging
systems, which Ash Carter made clear to this committee, if we
don't modernize, those systems go away. So we ought to stay in
the deterrent game by modernizing our forces, putting in new
forces to replace old ones, or we get out of the game. And
finally, to Eric's point, we don't need to have parity with the
Russians. If they want to build more weapons, to build the--
make the rubble bounce, that is their problem.
What we need to do is have sufficient warheads in our
capacity to hold what they value at risk and to hold what the
Chinese leadership values at risk. And in my judgment, 1,550
does not allow us to do that.
Senator Cotton. No, I don't think it does. Your answers
there bring back another nugget of wisdom for the ages. That if
we don't mistrust each other because we have all these weapons,
we have all these weapons because we mistrust each other. And I
would say that Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping have given the
free world many reasons to distrust them for a very long time.
Thank you all.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Kelly,
please.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Edelman,
Ukraine seems to be launching a rather effective counter
offensive against the invading Russian forces. And it appears
that the tide might be turning somewhat in their favor. Well,
we are going to have to see.
News reports suggests that the Ukrainians victory at
Kharkiv, in that region a couple of weeks ago resulted in the
Russian military retreating and then leaving behind a large
amount of equipment, including tanks and howitzers and other
artillery, as well as Russian troops just abandoning their
posts.
Certainly what we want to see. I think it is clear that
this invasion is not going well for Putin. It is not going as
he had hoped. And the question now is how will he respond? Some
are questioning whether he is capable of using a nuclear
weapon, even a low yield tactical weapon for a psychological
effect.
Ambassador, under what conditions would you assess Russia
would use a nuclear weapon in Ukraine? And if so, what type and
how?
Mr. Edelman. Senator Kelly, that, you know, is a
hypothetical question that requires a lot of speculation
because we just don't know the answer, because the answer is
inside Vladimir Putin's head.
I think most likely we would see something, and this is
something that Rose has written about, some kind of
demonstration shot probably over the Black Sea. Russian
doctrine talks about using these kinds of demonstrations of
capability, or possibly a very low yield strike with a theater
weapon, you know, on some transportation hub.
Senator Kelly. You are talking like half kiloton sized?
Mr. Edelman. Might be a little larger than that. But, you
know, but it would--you know, this gets into the question of
what we call tactical nuclear weapons. You know, your
description of whether it is tactical or strategic is equal to
the square root of your distance from the weapon. So, you know,
I think it is a mistake to just, you know, call these merely
tactical weapons, given the impact that they could have on a
place like Ukraine, even at very low yield.
Senator Kelly. Do you think it should affect our calculus
going forward?
Mr. Edelman. I think it has to affect our calculus. I think
President Biden spoke to this the other night. And I think
actually he spoke reasonably well to this question, which is to
advise President Putin not to consider this as an option and
that the consequences would be incalculable.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Ambassador. Ms. Creedon, as the
chair of this committee's Emerging Threats and Capabilities
panel, I have been focused on how technologies like artificial
intelligence and quantum computing can make our weapons more
effective.
And earlier this year, I spoke with the National Nuclear
Security Administrator Jill Ruby, about how we could leverage
emerging technologies to make our nuclear weapons safer. And I
know that you have a lot of experience in the NNSA, as well as
in the Defense Department and on this committee, so I would
like to ask you kind of a related question.
How are novel technologies like AI, unmanned systems,
hypersonics, cyber space related systems, changing the
worldwide nuclear risk environment, and potentially
complicating deterrence?
Ms. Creedon. Well, Senator, thank you for that question. I
mean, obviously, this is one we could spend several days on.
But from a deterrence and also from a safety and security
perspective, things like AI, things like cyber certainly cut
both ways. They can actually pose a--they could pose a threat
and they can also help the U.S. understand what is going on. So
I will use one very small example here as a bit of a
hypothetical, and it does relate back to Senator King's
question. And it is like, are we still focused on threat
reduction and are we still focused on nonproliferation?
Historically, one of our issues has been we haven't been able
to address a proliferant or find until they have done
something. One of the hopes of particular AI is because of the
machine learning, because of the management of the large data
sets, we might be able early on to be able to detect where
anomalies are, where is some entity, where is a country doing
things that are not normal that because of what they are doing
or what they are buying, it may indicate that they are a
nuclear weapons aspirant.
So I think there are opportunities here. It is just a
very--a very new world.
Senator Kelly. All right. Thank you. And thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Senator Hawley,
please.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the
witnesses for being here. Ms. Gottemoeller, if I could start
with you. You argued in your written testimony that Russia has
a distinct advantage over the United States at present in terms
of its ability to upload nuclear warheads and its ability to
produce new warheads and missiles to carry them. And you write
further. I am going to quote you now, ``the United States is
not ready for a nuclear arms race and won't be ready until our
new production facilities come online in the late 2020s or
2030.'' Have I got that right? Is that an accurate statement?
So let me just ask you about this, are you worried, given
all that, about China's upload and production capabilities
relative to ours, given that Beijing is in the midst of a very
pronounced nuclear build up?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, China's nuclear capabilities are in
the course of being modernized. There is no question about it.
But the Russians are master ICBM guys and they have been for
decades now, and they have been deploying heavy missiles that
can carry a lot more warheads, such as the SS-18 missile.
Now the SARMAT is being prepared for deployment. I will
just note, by the way, that both the SARMAT new heavy ICBM and
the Avantgard Hypersonic Glide Missile will fall under the
central limits of the New START. So they will have some
constraints on them in that way.
But I just want to note the mastery of upload, plus the
large number of warheads that the Russians have. The Chinese
certainly have that capability and that understanding of how to
go about it. They just don't have the warheads that the
Russians have.
Senator Hawley. Let me ask you this, you also say in your
written testimony that the U.S. should not be the one to launch
a nuclear arms race, but it must be ready to respond
immediately to others who do. Is it fair to say that our
ability to deter Russia or China from engaging in an arms race
rests in part on our expanding our own nuclear forces?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, I am not sure we need to expand our
nuclear forces, but we do need to modernize them. And we do
need to put in place the industrial capacity to be able to
build warheads and build missiles. And I really underscore this
point, that our industrial capacity has been allowed to lapse.
And that goes--I agree with my colleagues who have spoken
about the necessity of the expertise in addition to the missile
facilities, the warhead facilities. We need the experts who are
everything from the welders that Mr. Miller referred to, up to
the high level engineers who help us to design and build our
nuclear warheads.
Senator Hawley. Let me ask you about a follow on to the New
START. Is your argument that a follow on is in part a way to
help delay further Russian expansion until we have restored our
own production capability?
Ms. Gottemoeller. It gives us predictability, sir, about
what the Russians are up to into the decade. I am assuming that
an agreement or treaty to follow New START would go into the
2030s, and our modernization is extending into the 2030s till
almost 2040. To buy that kind of predictability into the next
decade, in my view, is an important goal and in the national
security interest of the United States.
Senator Hawley. Given that, I mean just given the strategic
balance there, what would Russia's interests be? I mean, why
would we expect Russia to adhere to any such treaty, given
their current, you might argue, strategic advantage in this
area? I mean, why not just wait this out and then come to the
table later with even more leverage?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Just as we are concerned about Russian
capabilities to modernize, they are very concerned about our
ability to modernize. They think of us as 10 feet tall. So I
think we need to live up to that reputation, to be honest, sir,
and get on with our own modernization. But that is the reason,
I think, that they would come to the table. They want to make
sure that we are not building up in a way that they cannot
stomach. So that is the main point.
Senator Hawley. That is helpful. Thank you very much. Mr.
Miller and Ambassador Edelman, if I could turn to you, you
write in your joint statement that being able to absorb a first
strike and retaliate against an aggressor while also holding in
reserve sufficient forces to deter other near-peer competitors,
may in the future require larger numbers of deployed warheads
than currently allowed under New START. Can you elaborate on
that for me? Both of you--either of you.
Mr. Miller. Yes, sir. So New START was done in 2010 when
Russia was not a threat and China wasn't in the picture. Fast
forward 12 years, Russia is a threat, China is a threat. The
1,550 metric, in my judgment, does not apply to say a couple of
years from now when we have to deter simultaneously Russia and
China.
Senator Hawley. Ambassador, anything you would like to add?
Mr. Edelman. Yes, Senator. But I think before you joined
us, we talked a little bit earlier in the hearing about the
requirement, a fundamental requirement of deterrence is to be
able to absorb a first strike and have sufficient forces in
reserve to inflict unacceptable damage on the adversary. If you
posit a Russian first strike and are riding it out, our
retaliation under 1,550, I think, would essentially leave us
denuded of any, you know, reserve to deter the PRC.
And we also, as my colleague has pointed out earlier, we
can't completely rule out at some point that Russia and China,
given their limitless partnership, as Xi Jinping and President
Putin have described it, working together against the United
States. Right now, you see Xi distancing himself a little bit
from the failures in Ukraine, but we don't know what, you know,
what will happen 5 or 10 years from now.
Senator Hawley. My time has expired, but this is a very,
very important topic. And I want to ask you more about how we
can increase our arsenal without getting into the kind of arms
race that I was just talking about with Ms. Gottemoeller. So I
will give that to you for the record and maybe a few other
questions too. Thank you all for being here. Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley. Senator Hirono,
please.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
the panelists for a very enlightening discussion. So this is
for the panel. During last Thursday's SASC [Senate Armed
Services Committee] hearing, my colleagues and I asked several
questions related to the potential reestablishment of the
Navy's sea launched cruise missile nuclear program, SLCM-N.
And I have expressed my concern regarding the necessity for
restarting such a program, and that the development of such a
low yield or tactical nuclear cruise missile could lead to a
dangerous new kind of nuclear arms race.
Given the importance of nonproliferation, are there other
weapons or tactics that the U.S. can use to accomplish the same
strategic objectives as SLCM-N without creating new nuclear
weapons? Anybody on the panel, care to respond?
Mr. Miller. I can start, Senator. With respect to a new
nuclear arms race, we are talking about Russia, which has
dozens of new tactical nuclear systems. The same is true of
China. The United States has some air delivered bombs in
Europe, period, full stop. The development of a limited number
of sea launched nuclear cruise missiles would not contribute to
an arms race.
It would serve as a modest offset to Russian and Chinese
systems already deployed. And I think that would serve as an
enhanced deterrent and as a reassurance to our allies in Europe
and in Asia, many of whom have called on us to deploy such a
system.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Senator, if I may, I would like to
comment briefly. I actually disagree with my distinguished
colleague on this one. I do think that our air launched cruise
missiles, which we are modernizing in a very intensive way, and
I expect to see that to be a very significant capability,
provide that kind of flexible forward deterrent capability if
we need it.
So I do not see the need for a nuclear armed sea launched
cruise missile. I do believe in the role of conventionally
armed sea launch cruise missiles. They are really a
foundational capability for the U.S. Navy.
I also think that when we think about this question, we
need to take into account the operational challenges that the
Navy faces in certifying its ships and submarines for nuclear
curage, and how difficult it can be to sustain ops tempo when
these nuclear capabilities have to be taken into account.
And that is the conduct of a naval man, obviously, or a
naval woman is something I think that the Navy is competent to
comment on. But that is my impression that there is a certain
heavy lift that has to be done to redeploy nuclear weapons of
this class on naval platforms.
Senator Hirono. And that I think you are--not I think, I
know you are in agreement with Secretary Austin. All of you
have noted that it is really important for us to modernize our
nuclear triad. So do you believe that the U.S. should
prioritize modernizing the nuclear triad over expanding its
nuclear arsenal with the program such as SLCM-N?
Ms. Creedon. So I will be happy to jump in on that one. So
right now, the clearly the most important thing is the
modernization of the program of record, which does not include
the SLCM-N. That said, there are other issues associated with
the SLCM-N that certainly need to be addressed.
So operational issues with that, how it would be used in a
deterrence value, how our allies would see it. But the other
thing is a more practical thing, and that is really with the
industrial base. So the warhead for the SLCM-N would be the
exact same warhead that is now being modernized for the new
cruise missile. And there is only so much capacity for warhead
production at NNSA.
And so if you were going to extend the production run for
the 80-4, which is the warhead, to make more, then you have to
ask yourself, well, what else are you giving up in the context
of our overall arsenal. So, you know, there is a lot that needs
to be understood with respect to this before there is a
decision to really build and field this.
Mr. Miller. So I think it is important to understand that
SLCM-N, if it exists, is in the out years. Clearly, building
the triad systems now is the priority. And Ms. Creedon just has
talked about the warhead issues. But in fact, from the early
1980s until the end of the Cold War, we deployed nuclear armed
cruise missiles on our submarines and for some period of time
on our surface ships, and the Navy was perfectly capable of
doing that. So the Navy could, if it was in the national
interest, do that again. That decision again remains in the out
years.
Senator Hirono. Thank you for that clarification. I just
want to mention, Mr. Chairman, that I really appreciate the
fact that our panelists have said that the nuclear arms
discussion is not just about parity, that it is basically a
whole-of-government approach that we need to employ, and that
this requires very strong diplomatic efforts as we add intel
efforts, as we try to determine what is actually going to deter
China, North Korea, or Russia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Peters,
please.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to
each of our witnesses here today for an interesting
conversation. I want to talk a little bit about cybersecurity,
which has been raised. Ambassador Edelman, in your joint
statement with Mr. Miller, you discuss the potential of cyber-
attacks to disrupt our second strike retaliatory capability,
interfering with nuclear command and control.
This obviously adds a whole new dimension to the concept of
deterrence and warfare generally. If you could talk a little
bit about that, and specifically, do you believe that cyber
warfare will also impact initial launch sequences and potential
vulnerabilities that our adversaries would have?
Mr. Edelman. Senator Peters, thank you for the question. I
mean, there are a lot of unknowns about how cyber warfare will
interact with, you know, nuclear weapons systems. But one of
the reasons why I am such a strong advocate of modernizing the
ICBM leg of our triad with the new Sentinel ICBM is that when
we built the Minuteman III in the late 60s, it was in the pre-
internet age. And so to be able to have confidence that we have
a system that is, you know, not only fit in a cyber
environment, that we can preserve our command and control of
it, but also electronic warfare and other things, we need to go
ahead and modernize. You know, I am not an expert on cyber, so
I don't want to, you know, pretend that I know that much about
how it might interact.
But obviously, we have to be very vigilant about that
aspect because, again, going back to earlier discussion,
nuclear command and control is absolutely essential to underpin
deterrence.
Senator Peters. Well, as we talk about that--and Ms.
Creedon, I think you answered a question with one of my
colleagues that related artificial intelligence and the new
systems that go forward.
One thing we know about the future of warfare is the speed
of decision making will continue to advance rapidly,
particularly when you get autonomous weapons systems that will
be flying and may make kill decisions by taking a human out of
the loop because speed will be the difference between staying
alive and dying.
What happens is we see the integration of AI systems not
just in our systems, but in systems that the Russians or North
Koreans or other will put into effect. It seems to me that that
opens up the opportunity for a catastrophic miscalculation that
may be hard to unwind. What are your thoughts, Ms. Creedon, on
that?
Ms. Creedon. Well, I certainly agree with that. And just as
a very fundamental philosophy, I would certainly hope that AI
was, in terms of autonomous warheads, autonomous weapons
systems was never applied to nuclear, because I think it is
absolutely essential that there remain people in that loop for
nuclear. If I could, though, I also would like to point out
something different.
And that is really the internal cyber thing that we have to
worry about. And that is in the context of our industrial base
of new warheads. That making sure that as we build our own
systems, that they are sufficiently robust from attacks and
that we are sufficiently cognizant of all of the electronics
that go into these so that we know their pedigree, and that we
are not setting up our vulnerabilities for future cyber-attack.
Senator Peters. Yes. Yes, please.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Just a quick comment, Senator Peters. I
agree with what Ms. Creedon had to say about never having the
absence of a man in the loop for nuclear decision making. This
is an area that I think is very important to pursue in
discussions with the Russians and the Chinese. We need some
normative standards set here. Of course, it is something you
can never monitor and verify in the way you can an arms control
treaty. But just having them agree with us that this is an area
that should be immune to attack I think is very important.
Senator Peters. Appreciate that. And I agree. And it should
probably be a part of an arms treaty. Obviously, verifying that
may be very difficult, but there is certainly a big movement to
figure out how we deal with lethal autonomous weapons, because
we know that other countries may not be constrained by some of
the ethical constraints that we place. But at some point, if
they go that distance, we will be under a lot of pressure to
make sure that we can respond.
Otherwise, we put our men and women at great risk to a
system that can operate in a nanosecond. So to what extent
should that be part of nuclear treaties that we think about
this? Because clearly this is coming. This is not--this is not
if, this is when.
Ms. Gottemoeller. I think going forward we should be
looking to many different instruments, treaties and agreements
constraining nuclear weapons, but also agreements with regard
to normative principles of this kind. But it probably doesn't
need to be in the same document, but we need to have a set of
documents that--and one of them must clearly address this kind
of issue.
Senator Peters. Okay. Thank you. Oh, yes, Ms. Creedon.
Ms. Creedon. I just want to add something, because earlier
we had a discussion about where is the future of arms control
and whether we need one very large treaty or more new bilateral
treaties. This is one, I think, that really does lend itself to
a much larger bilateral international agreement, that countries
could agree that this is not, in other words nuclear AI,
nuclear autonomous vehicles, is not somewhere to pursue,
somewhere to go.
Senator Peters. Great. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters. Senator Sullivan,
please.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to
thank our panel, many of whom I have gotten to know well over
the years. Served with some. And Dr. Gottemoeller, nice to see
you again after our Aspen meeting. I want to continue this
discussion on the trying to break out--but I want to ask the
question in the context--I have been focusing a lot on the
implications of a war in the Taiwan Strait.
One thing, I think that a lot of people are missing, but I
would like your review on it or your views on it, is this
breakout, I think is actually very related to Taiwan. Meaning
if the Chinese are going to look to possibly invade Taiwan at
the end of this decade or earlier, they are going to want to
have some kind of nuclear deterrent posture with us.
So I think it is actually driven by that. But what do you
think? And maybe we will start with you, Mr. Miller, and just
go down the line quickly. The breakout hasn't been discussed in
the context of an invasion of Taiwan, and I think it is
directly related.
Mr. Miller. I believe it is directly related, but I think
that today China already has the capability to destroy our
population base, our cities. The question is, where is Chinese
strategy going in the future? Are they seeking to have some
sort of a counterforce capability in that overall deterrent
threat against us into intervening in Taiwan? But I think that
is the driver. I think you are absolutely correct. And there is
a bit of their needing to have force to deter Russia as well,
because the there is a rivalry there.
Senator Sullivan. Ambassador.
Mr. Edelman. Senator Sullivan, I agree with you. And this
is something that Frank and I addressed in our formal statement
submitted to the committee. The attention in the Chinese
buildup has gone largely to the strategic and particularly the
FOBS, which we had a discussion of earlier.
But there is also a buildup of tactical forces opposite
Taiwan. And I think we have to pay attention both to the
strategic balance, you know, globally, but also the theater
balance, in part because I think the Chinese are trying to do
what the Soviets did in the Cold War, which is put stress on
the reliability of our extended deterrent guarantees and
intimidate our allies and intimidate us with a essentially an
effort to make sure we don't exercise a counter intervention
capability if they try and invade Taiwan.
Senator Sullivan. Let me let me follow up with the question
again for the whole panel. And if you get--the two who didn't
get to answer, my first question, I want to take it in order,
but because it is a follow up, Ambassador, to your question. I
was kind of dismayed to see that President Biden is, like
President Obama was at the end of his tenure, is toying with
this no first use idea. Biden's nuclear review omits no first
use. But it seems like they are still toying with this idea.
What do you think that does, as it relates to our allies,
particularly our allies in Asia, related to your point with
regard to not just Taiwan, but an administration that once
again is toying with this concept?
And can I get each of yours definitive answer, it can just
be one sentence, on whether you agree with a no first use
doctrine, or you think it would undermine deterrence and our
allies? So, Ms. Gottemoeller, can I start with you, doctor----?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, certainly, Senator. Good to see you
again after our meeting in Aspen. By the way, I am not a
doctor, so you can just say, Ms. Gottemoeller or just Rose.
Senator Sullivan. You never go wrong when you call someone
doctor or ambassador, I found in this job.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Well, thank you very much. I would just
underscore what you had to say about what is evidently in the
nuclear posture of view of the Biden administration. It hasn't
been publicly released yet, but the fact sheet we have out of
the DOD clearly does not refer to any kind of no first use
policy.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. So, you are against that? You would
be against----?
Ms. Gottemoeller. What I agree with is the notion that is
in fact sheet that says the possibilities of nuclear use are
extremely remote. And I absolutely agree with that. As far as
what was put down on the Posture Review, it looks like it
doesn't touch the no first use issue.
Senator Sullivan. Ms. Creedon.
Ms. Creedon. So, Senator, I certainly agree that the
conditions are not appropriate for a no first use policy.
Ironically, this was something that the Obama administration
wrestled with at the end and determined that the conditions
weren't there then, and the conditions now are even worse.
Senator Sullivan. It just keeps popping up, though, I mean,
as you know. Ambassador, Mr. Miller, I just want to--and any
other comments on allies, Taiwan, or----
Mr. Edelman. Just a brief one. This is something Frank and
I have actually written about in the past. I don't see the
value of a no first use pledge. I don't think our adversaries
would take it seriously to begin with. I don't think it really
buys us anything. But it would be, I think, discomforting to
our allies and undermine extended deterrence.
Mr. Miller. So I used to joke that Woody Hayes said that a
forward pass would have three things happen, two of which were
bad. A no first use policy has four things that would happen,
and they are all bad. One, our allies would be disheartened
because they would believe the nuclear umbrella is shrinking.
Two, those allies who are capable of building their own nuclear
weapons will take a step closer to building their own nuclear
weapons because they won't believe in us.
Three, the Russians and Chinese will never believe that we
have adopted that policy. And four, the Russians and Chinese
will not change their own first use policies based on a United
States no first use pledge. So I think it is a terrible idea,
and I have opposed it all along.
Senator Sullivan. Excellent answer. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. Great panel.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Senator Rosen,
please.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed. It is really a
great hearing. I want to thank all of our witnesses for their
expertise, your service, and for being here today. But I am
going to talk a little bit about, of course, some things in
Nevada because Nevada National Security Site, of course, right
in our backyard.
So Ms. Creedon, the remote sensing laboratory both at
Nellis Air Force Base and Joint Base Andrews provides
radiological emergency response teams along the West and the
East Coast, respectively, who stand ready to deploy anywhere in
the world. These personnel and those of the Nevada national
security site are the Nation's experts in detecting, locating
dirty bombs, loose nukes, sources of radiation, and determining
the origin and attribution through nuclear forensics.
I was recently speaking with NNSA about the remote sensing
laboratory and the radiological sensors we have provided
Ukraine as Russia has seized control of several Ukrainian
nuclear power plants as part of its invasion, and of course, we
know continues to threaten them.
So, Ms. Creedon, from your time at NNSA and DOD, can you
speak to the interagency and multinational effort that is
occurring to prevent a nuclear disaster from happening in
Ukraine?
Ms. Creedon. Thank you, Senator. As you have noted, the
remote sensing lab is an incredibly capable lab. It is a very
small lab as far as these things go, but it is a very capable
lab.
But it works also in a much larger system of laboratories
at the Department of Energy and the NNSA, as well as with
cooperation from the State Department and DOD, to put together
and develop, do the research, do the deployment, do the
acquisition of a whole suite of sensors for radiation detection
on the ground, on personnel.
We have radiation detectors in space. But it is essential
that we understand what is going on there from a public health
perspective, if the Russians, as Rose mentioned earlier, do
something really awful at these two sites, including the second
one that they have now shot at.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I want to continue on this. So
Ms. Creedon, the United States must deter two nuclear capable
competitors for the first time in history, a fact which is
widely discussed including here today of course. So Ms.
Creedon, how does having to defend against multiple nuclear
capable competitors affect the Nation's strategic requirements?
And should we reorient our postures as a result?
And when you look at the range of diverse and increasing
nuclear risks potentially around the globe, how do we--how
should we be prioritizing these threats? Which ones are most
concerning to you?
Ms. Creedon. Well, certainly taken together, Russia and
China, particularly on the trajectory that they are both on
with respect to their nuclear systems, the variety of their
nuclear systems, and the number of their potential systems do
present a threat to the United States.
But my first priority for the U.S. is to make sure that the
current modernization program is continued on pace, on track,
that it is funded, and that it is supported. And the second
thing is that the systems that we have now, which are very old,
that they be sustained because, you know, my assumption is that
some of the new ones could very well be late.
And sustaining these old ones is absolutely essential. But
I also think we need to look broader. So our deterrence is more
than our nuclear deterrent, even though our nuclear deterrent
is at the heart of it.
So we do have to look broader to look at how does the U.S.
present a full deterrence picture to the--to all of our
adversaries, at the same time assuring our allies that we are,
in fact, committed to them and protecting them and that we have
the capability to deter. So it is way more than just the
nuclear part of it.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. Ambassador Edelman, same question
to you. How should we be prioritizing these multiple threats,
in your opinion?
Mr. Edelman. Well, I think we have to prioritize first the
threat that remains the only existential threat to us today,
which is Russia. But China is moving apace. And so, as my
colleague Mr. Miller said, I think we have to rethink what
might be required to hold both at risk simultaneously.
And we do have lesser included cases that, you know, have
been mentioned during the course of this hearing, including
North Korea and Iran, as well as the terrorist threat that
Senator King mentioned. And I would add on that point, it does
seem to me that we need to think about--because nuclear
weapons, while, as Senator King pointed out, you can look up
pretty easily on the internet how to build a nuclear weapon in
theory, we are lucky that it is actually not that easy as an
engineering feat to do. So, the most likely path for terrorists
to get their hands on nuclear weapons is to get them from a
State actor that has them. And I think in that regard, North
Korea is a particular--particularly worrisome threat, but
Pakistan is as well. And in fact, if I had to pick one place
where I would most be worried about it would be Pakistan.
And it is one reason why I, for one, am very sorry that we
no longer have a presence in Afghanistan, because to me that is
the most likely route, the loss of control of nuclear weapons
in Pakistan, that terrorists get their hands on one.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I know I am out of time, so I am
going to be submitting some questions for the record based on
the discussion here today, what legs, for Ms. Creedon, of the
triad do we recommend that we focus our investments on. And of
course, building on Senator Peters' cybersecurity question. So,
thank you.
Chairman Reed. I thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator King has
requested an additional question. Senator King, please.
Senator King. Ambassador Edelman, what is our doctrine with
regard to response to a use of a tactical nuclear weapon? The
President made a statement to Mr. Putin. Is that it or is there
a doctrine? What is our deterrent strategy for the use of a low
yield nuclear weapon, either as a demonstration in the middle
of the Arctic Ocean or in terms of a strike on a city in
Ukraine.
Mr. Edelman. Senator, I think, you know, our deterrent
posture has always been based on the notion of calculated
ambiguity. That we would determine at the time of use, you
know, how we would respond to a weapon and a use of a weapon.
And I think that remains very useful today.
I think this goes back to some of the foundational thinking
about deterrence in the Cold War, and in particular the work of
Thomas Schelling, who famously, in Strategy of Conflict, wrote
in 1960 that the risk that leaves something to chance in the
mind of your adversary, the notion that if they do this, they
are moving down a road the consequences of which they cannot
calculate, is perhaps the strongest deterrent that we have. And
in that regard, I thought the President's statement to Scott
Pelley on 60 Minutes on Sunday was exemplary.
Senator King. Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller. So, Senator, I think it is a great question,
but at the end of the day, it comes down to the President of
United States. All of our jobs, and I have devised for plans, I
have helped make sure that they were implemented correctly, is
to provide the President options, period, full stop. Whoever
the President is--and Mr. Sullivan and I, Senator Sullivan and
I have worked together. We provide the President options, and
you don't box a President in as to what option he is going to
take. So there is no open and shut, black and white answer to
your question.
A President at the time, if an adversary enemy used a
nuclear weapon, would decide what to do, whether it was a short
range weapon, a medium range weapon, or a long range weapon.
Senator King. And I love your comment, Mr. Ambassador, that
your determination of what is tactical depends upon the square
root of your distance from the explosion. I think that is a
very astute observation. Thank you very much. Thanks to all the
panel. Really fascinating hearing and great insights.
Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much, Senator King. And
ladies and gentlemen, thank you for an extraordinarily
informative discussion. The purpose was to reinvigorate and
reengage individuals in a serious discussion of the new nuclear
challenges we face, which are different than the Cold War.
And, but they are just as potentially consequential. And
you have applied some incredibly important insights to this
discussion. This is the beginning, not the end. We have to keep
this topic, as some have suggested, on the front page and
seriously think about what is similar to the Cold War and what
is very much different.
One issue that has come through very clearly, though, is
the need for modernization of our triad together with our
industrial base. And I concur entirely with that. I think also,
too, there was a, I think, discussion about arms control is
something that is a very difficult process, but something that
should be pursued. As I think Ambassador Edelman pointed out,
it took 10 years of--around the table before the Russians
decided that it was in their interest to settle it. It might
take that long with the Chinese. But I think we have to
continue to do that.
With that, let me thank you all for excellent testimony,
and adjourn the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni Ernst
deterrence requirements
1. Senator Ernst. Ambassador Edelman and Mr. Miller, the nominee
for Commander of United States Strategic Command recently committed to
directing a study of strategic deterrence requirements vis-a-vis China
and Russia, if confirmed. What specific questions should a study by
United States Strategic Command consider and address?
Mr. Miller and Ambassador Edelman. It is essential for deterrence
to remain effective and that will require that we continue to study and
evaluate the policies and most valued assets of the leaders of
potential enemy nations. Every administration since the dawn of the
nuclear age has done this. We believe General Cotton will review the
plans we have with respect to holding potential enemy leader's valued
assets at risk, that he will then assess the capabilities of our
current and planned forces against those assets, and based on all of
that work he will make recommendations to his chain of command on any
changes he might deem necessary.
2. Senator Ernst. Ambassador Edelman and Mr. Miller, with regard to
deterrence requirements vis-a-vis China and Russia, what initial
changes would you recommend to United States nuclear force levels,
force structure, and force posture to achieve an appropriate mix of
capabilities, in a resource-constrained environment?
Mr. Miller and Ambassador Edelman. Senator, as we indicated during
the hearing and have suggested in writing elsewhere, we believe that in
the near future we will need to consider increasing United States
strategic force levels to allow us to deter adequately a simultaneous
threat from both Russia and China while allowing for a sufficient
reserve to deal with North Korea.
limited nuclear options
3. Senator Ernst. Ambassador Edelman and Mr. Miller, as you know
credible deterrence requires alternatives to suicide or surrender.
Could you speak to the importance of limited nuclear options in our
future strategic posture?
Mr. Miller and Ambassador Edelman. Senator: limited nuclear options
have been an essential and persistent element of United States efforts
to deter major conventional and limited nuclear attacks against the
United States or its allies for over 40 years going back to efforts
under both Secretaries McNamara and Schlesinger. This will continue to
be the case for the foreseeable future.
4. Senator Ernst. Ambassador Edelman and Mr. Miller, in addition to
those supplemental capabilities recommended by the 2018 Nuclear Posture
Review, what flexible nuclear options should we consider?
Mr. Miller and Ambassador Edelman. Senator: We believe the United
States capability to deter major conventional or limited nuclear attack
would be enhanced by the addition of a nuclear sea-launched cruise
missiles when those systems might become available towards the end of
this decade or the beginning of the 2030s. This would augment existing
options using dual capable aircraft and the B-61 gravity as well as the
AGM 181 air launched cruise missile (LRSO) when it becomes available
later in this decade.
5. Senator Ernst. Ambassador Edelman and Mr. Miller, the National
Defense Strategy Commission concluded that we might ``struggle to win,
or perhaps lose'' a war with China or Russia. Do you agree that the
President must have flexible nuclear options to prevent conventional
defeat?
Mr. Miller and Ambassador Edelman. Yes.
arms control
6. Senator Ernst. Ambassador Edelman and Mr. Miller, to support our
future strategic posture, what changes should we seek in future arms
control treaties with Russia, such as by adjusting constraints on force
levels or force structure?
Mr. Miller and Ambassador Edelman. Senator: it is difficult for us
to envision any possibility for negotiating a new arms control treaty
with Russia for some time to come. Should such a negotiation prove
feasible at some point, however, we believe two criteria must be met:
first, the treaty must constrain all United States and
Russian deployed nuclear weapons, to include short- and medium-range
systems as well as exotic new nuclear systems. The current New START
does not constrain Russian tactical and theater nuclear weapons nor
does it constrain exotic ones such as the trans-oceanic nuclear-tipped
torpedo or a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (which was
constrained under the START 1 but is not covered under New START);
second, the treaty must allow the United States
sufficient nuclear capabilities to deter effectively both Russia and
China simultaneously as well as allowing for a reserve for North Korea.