[Senate Hearing 117-960]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-960
WORLDWIDE THREATS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
May 10, 2022
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http: //www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
59-770 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TOM COTTON, Arkansas
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia JONI ERNST, Iowa
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia RICK SCOTT, Florida
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
MARK KELLY, Arizona TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
John D. Wason, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
may 10, 2022
Page
Worldwide Threats................................................ 1
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 1
Statement of Senator James Inhofe................................ 3
Witness Statements
Haines, The Honorable Avril, Director of National Intelligence... 3
Berrier, Lieutenant General Scott, Director, Defense Intelligence 8
Agency.
Questions for the Record......................................... 43
Appendix A
Document provided by The Honorable Avril Haines in lieu of a 51
written statement.
Appendix B
The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Scott Berrier....... 82
(iii)
WORLDWIDE THREATS
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 10, 2022
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Manchin,
Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Blackburn, and Hawley.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Good morning. The Committee meets today to
receive testimony on the worldwide threats facing the United
States and our international partners.
I would like to welcome Director of National Intelligence
Avril Haines and Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
Lieutenant General Scott D. Berrier. Thank you both for joining
us, and please convey the committee's gratitude to the men and
women of the Intelligence Community for their critical work.
We must start by addressing the illegal war Vladimir Putin
is waging in Ukraine. Over the past 2\1/2\ months, Russia's
unprovoked aggression has inflicted horrific suffering upon
innocent civilians in Ukraine, threatened European security,
and caused serious consequences for the global economy. In the
face of this senseless violence, the Ukrainian military has
performed tremendously, supported by the United States and the
international community. A formidable array of our global
allies and partners have joined in solidarity to impose severe
sanctions on Russia and provide support to Ukraine. We cannot
overstate the scale and importance of this unity.
I want to commend the Biden administration and the leaders
of the Intelligence Community for the unprecedented and
skillful release of intelligence over the last several months
that exposed Russia's aggressive intentions and deceitful
activities ahead of its invasion of Ukraine. Intelligence
officials are understandably cautious about revealing hard-won
insights on adversaries, but this strategy has proven highly
effective in strengthening the international community's
response and creating dilemmas for Vladimir Putin. This is a
great example of competing effectively in the information
domain, and I hope we will continue to make use of this kind of
creative tradecraft.
With that in mind, Russia's strategy in Ukraine seems to be
evolving. Director Haines, General Berrier, I would ask for
your assessment of the Ukraine conflict in the larger context
of the evolving international order, as well as the
implications for the United States' approach to security in the
European theater going forward.
We must also stay focused on our long-term strategic
competition with China. In addition to its economic and socio-
political growth, China has studied the United States' way of
war and focused on offsetting our advantages. Beijing has made
concerning progress in this regard and holds its own expansive
geostrategic ambitions. As we speak, China is watching how the
nations of the world respond to Russia. In considering a
potential invasion of Taiwan, President Xi is scrutinizing
Putin's playbook and the international response.
However, there is broad consensus that our comparative
advantage over China is our network of partners and allies in
the region and globally. Strengthening that network should be
at the center of any strategy for the Indo-Pacific region, and
the maturation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or
``Quad,'' involving the United States, Japan, India, and
Australia, presents a strategic opportunity to establish a
durable framework.
I would ask our witnesses to share what military and non-
military factors are most likely to impact Chinese decision-
making with respect to potential action against Taiwan.
Turning to Iran, in the 4 years since then-President Trump
pulled out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA,
Iran has made key nuclear advances. It has decreased ``breakout
time'' to several weeks, from a year under the agreement. It
has increased uranium enrichment to 60 percent, instead of just
under 4 percent allowed under the agreement. Iran has hardened
its infrastructure and replaced damaged equipment with more
advanced models, and while negotiations to return Iran to the
JCPOA are in the final stages, the final outcome has not yet
been determined.
Beyond its nuclear advances, Iran and Iranian proxies
continue to mount drone and rocket attacks in the region,
including against bases in Iraq and Syria with a United States
military presence. Saudi Arabia, and now also the United Arab
Emirates have also come under attack. Director Haines, given
these current dynamics I would like your thoughts on how to
best de-escalate tensions with Iran while preserving space to
return to the JCPOA.
Finally, this year's threat assessment again highlights the
challenges posed by environmental degradation from climate
change. I understand it is the DNI's [Director of National
Intelligence] view that climate change will increasingly
exacerbate risks to United States national security interests,
as issues like rising temperatures, poor water governance,
pollution, changing precipitation patterns, and other climate
effects are likely to lead to an array of human challenges,
such as food and water insecurity and threats to human health.
We live in a complex and dangerous global security
environment. From Russia's aggression in Europe to China's
influence in the Indo-Pacific to countless other malign actors
around the world, prevailing in this environment will require
resolute, thoughtful strategies.
I look forward to our witnesses' insights into these
issues, and I thank them again for their participation.
Let me now turn to the Ranking Member, Senator Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in
welcoming our witnesses.
When our witnesses testified before this committee last
year, they provided a dire assessment of the threats to our
national security. It is clear and, I really cannot overstate
this, the security situation we face today is significantly
more dangerous and complex than it has ever been, or certainly
was a year ago. The Chinese threat is beyond anything we ever
dealt with before. This year, Beijing announced a 7.1 percent
defense budget increase. They have had two decades of real
growth with no signs of slowing down and, as the chairman
alluded to, Putin's unprovoked aggression against Ukraine shows
the danger posed by the nuclear-armed Russia to our security,
those of our allies, and international order.
Iran's malign behavior continues throughout the Middle
East, and terrorist groups like ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria] and al Qaeda are growing in strength across Africa.
Despite this reality, President Biden's budget request is
inadequate. It does not deliver the real growth the military
needs, and that is the 3 to 5 percent increase that we
established some 5 years ago. As I have said it before,
inflation is the new sequestration that we consider today, and
it is making everything we do more difficult.
So I look forward to hearing from both of you about how our
threats have evolved ever since last year and how the
Intelligence Community is changing to respond to the national
security strategy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Now let me recognize Director Haines.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE AVRIL HAINES, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
Ms. Haines. Thank you very much, Chairman Reed, Ranking
Member Inhofe, and Members of the Committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to speak with you today and to provide testimony
alongside General Berrier on the intelligence community's
annual assessment of worldwide threats to United States
national security.
Before I start I just want to take a moment to publicly
thank the men and women of the Intelligence Community for their
extraordinary work to keep us safe. I know how privileged I am
to be part of this community of truly talented people, to be
given a chance to do something useful in service to my country,
and I thank you for support for their work.
Broadly speaking, this year's assessment focuses, much like
last year's assessment, on adversaries and competitors,
critical transnational threats, and conflicts and instability,
and these categories often overlap. Cybercrime, for example, is
a transnational threat while also being a threat that emanates
from state actors. One of the key challenges of this era is
assessing how various threats and trends are likely to
intersect so as to identify where their interactions may result
in fundamentally greater risk to our interests than one might
otherwise expect or where they introduce new opportunities.
This year's Annual Threat Assessment highlights some of these
connections as it provides the IC's baseline of the most
pressing threats to United States national security.
The assessment starts with threats from key state actors,
beginning with the People's Republic of China (PRC), which
remains an unparalleled priority for the Intelligence
Community, and then turns to Russia, Iran, and North Korea. All
four governments have demonstrated the capability and intent to
promote their interests in ways that cut against United States
and allied interests.
The PRC is coming ever closer to being a peer competitor in
areas of relevance to national security, is pushing to revise
global norms and institutions to its advantage, and is
challenging the United States in multiple arenas--economically,
militarily, and technologically. China is especially effective
at bringing together a coordinated, whole-of-government
approach to demonstrated strength and to compel neighbors to
acquiesce to its preference, including its territorial and
maritime claims and assertions of sovereignty over Taiwan.
A key area of focus for the IC is President Xi Jinping's
determination to force unification with Taiwan on Beijing's
terms. China would prefer coerced unification that avoids armed
conflict, and it has been stepping up diplomatic, economic, and
military pressure on the island for years to isolate it and
weaken confidence in its democratically elected leaders. At the
same time, Beijing is prepared to use military force if it
decides this is necessary.
The PRC is also engaged in the largest-ever nuclear force
expansion and arsenal diversification in its history. It is
working to match or exceed United States capabilities in space
and presents the broadest, most active and persistent cyber
espionage threat to United States Government and private sector
networks.
Russia, of course, also remains a critical priority and is
a significant focus right now in light of President Putin's
tragic invasion of Ukraine in February, which has produced a
shock to the geopolitical order with implications for the
future that we are only beginning to understand but are sure to
be consequential. The IC, as you know, provided warning of
President Putin's plans, but this is a case where I think all
of us wish we had been wrong.
Russia's failure to rapidly seize Kyiv and overwhelm
Ukrainian forces has deprived Moscow of the quick military
victory that it had originally expected would prevent the
United States and NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]
from being able to provide meaningful military aid to Ukraine.
The Russians met with more resistance from Ukraine than they
expected, and their own military's performance revealed a
number of significant internal challenges, forcing them to
adjust their initial military objectives, fall back from Kyiv,
and focus on the Donbas.
The next month or two of fighting will be significant as
the Russians attempt to reinvigorate their efforts, but even if
they are successful we are not confident that the fight in the
Donbas will effectively end the war. We assess President Putin
is preparing for prolonged conflict in Ukraine, during which he
still intends to achieve goals beyond the Donbas. We assess
that Putin's strategic goals are probably not changed,
suggesting he regards the decision in late March to refocus
Russian forces on the Donbas as only a temporary shift to
regain the initiative after the Russian military's failure to
capture Kyiv.
His current near-term military objectives are to capture
the two oblasts in Donetsk and Luhansk with a buffer zone,
encircle Ukrainian forces from the north and the south to the
west of the Donbas in order to crush the most capability and
well-equipped Ukrainian forces who are fighting to hold the
line in the east, consolidate control of the land bridge Russia
has established from Crimea to the Donbas, occupy Kherson, and
control the water source for Crimea that is to the north. We
also see indications that the Russian military wants to extend
the land bridge to Transnistria.
While the Russian forces may be capable of achieving most
of these near-term goals in the coming months, we believe that
they will not be able to extend control over a land bridge that
stretches to Transnistria and includes Odessa without launching
some form of mobilization. It is increasingly unlikely that
they will be able to establish control over both oblasts and
the buffer zone they desire in the coming weeks.
But Putin most likely also judges that Russia has a greater
ability and willingness to endure challenges than his
adversaries, and he is probably counting on United States and
EU [European Union] resolve to weaken as food shortages,
inflation, energy prices get worse.
Moreover, as both Russia and Ukraine believe they can
continue to make progress militarily, we do not see a viable
negotiating path forward, at least in the short term. The
uncertain nature of the battle, which is developing into a war
of attrition, combined with the reality that Putin faces a
mismatch between his ambitions and Russia's current
conventional military capabilities likely means the next few
months could see us moving along a more unpredictable and
potentially escalatory trajectory. At the very least, we
believe the dichotomy will usher in a period of more ad hoc
decision-making in Russia, both with respect to the domestic
adjustments required to sustain this push as well as the
military conflict with Ukraine and the West.
The current trend increases the likelihood that President
Putin will turn to more drastic means, including imposing
martial law, reorienting industrial production, or potentially
escalatory and military actions to free up the resources needed
to achieve his objectives as the conflict drags on or if he
perceives Russia is losing in Ukraine. The most likely
flashpoints for escalation in the coming weeks are around
increasing Russian attempts to interdict Western security
assistance, retaliation for Western economic sanctions, or
threats to the regime at home.
We believe that Moscow continues to use nuclear rhetoric to
deter the United States and the West from increasing lethal aid
to Ukraine and to respond to public comments that the United
States and NATO allies that suggest expanded Western goals in
the conflict. If Putin perceives that the United States is
ignoring his threats he may try to signal to Washington the
heightened danger of its support to Ukraine by authorizing
another large nuclear exercise involving a major dispersal of
mobile intercontinental missiles, heavy bombers, strategic
submarines.
We otherwise continue to believe that President Putin would
probably only authorize the use of nuclear weapons of he
perceived an existential threat to the Russian state or regime,
but we will remain vigilant in monitoring every aspect of
Russia's strategic nuclear forces. With tensions this high
there is always an enhanced potential for miscalculation,
unintended escalation which we hope our intelligence can help
to mitigate.
Beyond its invasion of Ukraine, Moscow presents a serious
cyber threat, a key space competitor, and one of the most
serious foreign influence threats to the United States. Using
its intelligence services proxies, wide-ranging influence
tools, the Russian Government seeks to not only pursue its own
interests but also to divide Western alliances, undermine
United States global standing, amplify discord inside the
United States, and influence United States voters and decision-
making.
To finish with our state actor threats, the Iranian regime
continues to threaten United States interests as it tries to
erode United States influence in the Middle East and trends its
influence and project power in neighboring states and minimize
threats to regime stability. Meanwhile, Kim Jong-un continues
to steadily expand and enhance Pyongyang nuclear and
conventional capabilities, targeting the United States and its
allies, periodically using aggressive, potentially
destabilizing actions to reshape the regional security
environment in his favor and to reinforce its status quo as a
de facto nuclear power.
The assessment continues to focus on a number of key global
and transnational threats, including global health security,
transnational organized crime, the rapid development of
destabilizing technologies, climate, migration, and terrorism.
I raise these because they pose challenges of a fundamentally
different nature to our national security than those posed by
the actions of nation states, even powerful ones like China and
Russia.
We look at the Russia-Ukraine war and can imagine outcomes
to resolve the crisis and the steps needed to get there, even
though unpalatable and difficult, and similarly we view the
array of challenges Chinese actions pose and can discuss what
is required, how we think about tradeoffs. But transnational
issues are more complex, require significant and sustained
multilateral effort, and though we can discuss ways of managing
them all of them pose a set of choices that will be more
difficult to untangle and will perhaps require more sacrifice
to bring about meaningful change. This reflects not just the
interconnected nature of the problems but also the significant
impact increasingly empowered non-state actors have on the
outcomes and the reality that some of the countries who are key
to mitigating threats posed by nation states are also the ones
we will be asking to do more in the transnational space.
For example, the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic
is putting a strain on governments and societies, fueling
humanitarian and economic crises, political unrest, and
geopolitical competition. Low-income countries with high debts
face particularly challenging recoveries, now exacerbated, in
some cases, by increasing food security resulting from the
Russia-Ukraine crisis, and these shifts will spur migration
around the world, including on our southern border.
The economic impact has set many poor and middle-income
countries back years in terms of economic development, and is
encouraging some in Latin America, Africa, and Asia to look to
China and Russia for quick economic and security assistance to
manage their new reality. We see the same complex mix of
interlocking challenges stemming from the threat of climate
change, which is exacerbating risks in United States national
security interests across the board but particularly as it
intersects with environmental degradation and global health
challenges.
Terrorism, of course, remains a persistent threat to United
States persons and interests at home and abroad, but the
implications of the problem are evolving. In Africa, for
example, where terrorist groups are clearly gaining strength,
the growing overlap between terrorism, criminal activity, and
smuggling networks has undermined stability, contributed to
coups and an erosion of democracy, and resulted in countries
turning to Russian entities to help manage these problems.
Global transnational criminal organizations continue to
pose a direct threat to the United States through the
production and trafficking of lethal, illicit drugs, massive
theft including cybercrime, human trafficking, and financial
crimes, and money-laundering schemes. In particular, the threat
from illicit drugs is at historic levels, with more than
100,000 American drug overdose deaths for the first time
annually, driven mainly by a robust supply of synthetic opioids
from Mexican transnational criminal organizations. In short,
the interconnected global security environment is marked by the
growing specter of great power competition and conflict while
transnational threats to all nations and actors compete not
only for our attention but also for finite resources.
Finally, the assessment turns to conflicts and instability
highlighting a series of regional challenges of importance to
the United States. Iterative violence between Israel and Iran
and conflicts in other areas, including Africa, Asia, and the
Middle East, have the potential to escalate or spread, fueling
humanitarian crises and threatening United States persons.
Africa, for example, has seen six irregular transfers of power
since 2020, and probably will see new bouts of conflict in the
coming year as the region becomes increasingly strained by a
volatile mixture of democratic backsliding, intercommunal
violence, and the continued threat of cross-border terrorism.
Finally, most important of all we are focused on our
workforces and their families. The IC continues to contribute
to the government-wide effort to better understand potential
causal mechanisms of anomalous health incidents and remains
committed to ensuring afflicted individuals receive the quality
care they need. The safety and well-being of our workforce is
our highest priority, and we are grateful to Members of this
Committee for your continued support on these issues.
Thank you for the opportunity to present our assessments,
and I look forward to your questions.
[Please see the document provided by Ms. Haines in lieu of
a written statement in Appendix A.]
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Madam Director.
General Berrier, please.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL SCOTT BERRIER, DIRECTOR,
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
General Berrier. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
distinguished members of this committee, it is a privilege to
testify today as part of the Intelligence Community's 2022
assessment of worldwide threats to United States national
security. On behalf of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) I
want to express how much we appreciate your support and
partnership. Thank you.
DIA fills a unique intelligence role by providing strategy,
operational, and tactical intelligence to our warfighters,
defense planners, policymakers, and the acquisition community.
We examine conflict across all warfighting domains to assess
foreign capabilities and understand our adversaries' intent.
DIA's dedicated professionals, in partnership with our
Intelligence Community colleagues, allies, and foreign
partners, deliver timely and relevant intelligence on the
threats and challenges facing our Nation. DIA has a highly
resilient workforce that has overcome difficult challenges
posed by the pandemic. Today my goal is to convey DIA's
insights to you, and the American public, on the evolving
threat environment as we understand it.
As I look at the global landscape today, I want to begin
with Russia and its invasion of Ukraine, which is now in its
third month. Russian military capabilities have been used to
violate the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and they
pose an existential threat to United States national security
and that of our allies. The invasion has demonstrated Russia's
intent to overturn the United States-led, rules-based, post-
Cold War international order, expand its control over the
former Soviet Union, and reclaim what it regards as its
rightful position on the world stage.
Moscow's underestimation of Ukraine's effective resistance,
Russia's substantial battlefield losses, and Western resolve to
support Ukraine, has undermined Moscow's assault on Kyiv and
improved prospects that Ukraine can successfully defend its
sovereignty. Moscow has now shifted its focus to eastern
Ukraine, where it appears to be prioritizing defeating
Ukrainian forces in the Donbas. In response to stiff Ukrainian
resistance, Russia has resorted to more indiscriminate and
brutal methods that are destroying cities, infrastructure, and
increasing civilian deaths. Negotiations remain stalled as both
sides focus on the outcome of the battle in the Donbas, while
partnerships with Ukraine and warning of potential escalation
remain key priorities for DIA.
Turning to China, it remains a pacing threat and a major
security challenge. Beijing has long viewed the United States
as a strategic competitor. China is capable of combining its
economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to
mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international
system. The PLA [People's Liberation Army], which has already
fielded sophisticated weapons and instituted major
organizational reforms to enhance joint operations, is nearing
the status of a global competitor to the United States, its
allies and partners, and is a credible peer competitor in the
region. China's current nuclear force expansion is historic.
The United States faces military and intelligence threats
from competitors, particularly Russia and China, who have and
are developing new capabilities intended to contest, limit, or
exceed United States military advantage. State and non-state
actors are selectively putting these capabilities into play
globally and regionally. These capabilities also span all
warfighting domains--maritime, land, air, electronic warfare,
cyberspace, information, and space. They include more lethal
ballistic and cruise missiles, growing nuclear stockpiles,
modernized conventional forces, and a range of gray zone
measures such as the use of ambiguous unconventional forces,
foreign proxies, information manipulation, cyberattacks, and
economic coercion.
Strategic competitors and other challengers are exerting
increasing military pressure on neighboring states. Russia has
invaded Ukraine, China is threatening Taiwan, and Iran, through
its proxies, threats neighbors in the Middle East and United
States forces while also enriching uranium to new levels. North
Korea continues to threaten South Korea, Japan, and the United
States with nuclear-capable ballistic missiles of increased
range and lethality.
Transnationally, the terrorist threat will also persist,
and we need to understand more about the lessons learned from
our experience supporting military and intelligence operations
in Afghanistan and the Middle East.
Turning back to my own organization, I take the health,
safety, and well-being of my workforce very, very seriously.
DIA remains actively engaged in investigating Anomalous Health
Incidents, AHIs. My agency has the process and procedures in
place to quickly respond to reports from employees or their
families who believe that they have been impacted by AHI. We
are also partnering with other members of the IC to determine
the origin and cause of the reported events.
I am honored to lead DIA. My intent in this hearing is that
this helps Congress and our Nation better understand the
threats and challenges we face from foreign adversaries and
competitors. I look forward to your questions, and thank you
for your continued support.
[Please see the prepared statement of General Berrier in
Appendix B.]
Chairman Reed. Thank you, General.
Let me remind my colleagues that at the conclusion of this
open session there will be a classified session in SVC-217, and
the witnesses may defer some responses to that classified
session.
Director Haines, your description of the unfolding battle
in the Ukraine suggests that it is moving to a battle of
attrition over a long term and that the objectives of the
Russians are to destroy the Ukrainian forces and also disrupt
the international coalition through economic pressures,
gasoline prices, and other factors we are witnessing.
That leads us to, at least me, to the question of how
effective are our economic sanctions and what more can we do to
bring pressure to the people of Russia so that they are less
supportive of this effort?
Ms. Haines. Thank you, Chairman. I think from our
perspective the economic sanctions and the export controls have
had a pretty significant impact on Russia, and among the
indicators that one might look at are, for example, the fact
that we are seeing close to about, we predict, approximately 20
percent inflation in Russia, that we expect that their GDP
[gross domestic product] will fall about 10 percent, possibly
even more over the course of the year.
We have seen not only the sanctions enacted by the United
States and Europe and other partners around the world having
these impacts but also the private sector taking action on its
own to remove itself. So things like the fact that oil
production services and companies pulled themselves out will
have an impact on Russia's capacity to produce, and that is a
major revenue source, obviously, for Russia. We have seen other
indicators of essentially the private sector impact in these
areas, and on the export controls we are seeing how things like
export controls on semiconductors and so on are affecting their
defense industry.
So I think that is a very significant impact, essentially,
although obviously time will tell as we move forward.
Chairman Reed. Are you sensing any popular unease, perhaps,
in terms of these economic factors that could translate into a
political resistance to the regime?
Ms. Haines. Well, I know many of us saw the protests that
erupted after the invasion and then the crackdown that
occurred, essentially, in Russia, including passing laws that
would provide for very significant punishments in the event
that one protested on these issues. So we have seen those
reduced, actually, and when we have looked at effectively
polling and so on that indicates where it is that the Russian
people are, what we see is that the majority of the Russian
people continue to support the special military operation. I
think it is just very hard, frankly, for information to get
into Russia, to the Russian people. The have a very particular
perspective that they are being fed by the government during
this period.
Chairman Reed. Thank you.
General Berrier, what do you believe the Chinese are taking
away from their close scrutiny of the Russian activities in
Ukraine?
General Berrier. Senator, I think the Chinese are going to
watch this very, very carefully. It is going to take some time
for them to sort out all elements of diplomatic information,
military, economic, that has occurred with this crisis.
I think they are thinking about future operations probably
against Taiwan and how difficult that might be. They are
probably also thinking about the scrutiny that they would come
under should they entertain thoughts or operations like that.
Chairman Reed. Thank you.
Final question, Director Haines. I think you indicated in
your testimony that cyber interference in our elections is a
distinct possibility. Is that something that your agency, or
the agencies, are following and taking preemptive steps?
Ms. Haines. Yes, absolutely, Senator. We are well
positioned to essentially monitor for the potential of election
influence, including efforts through cyber.
Chairman Reed. One other final, final question. Are you
surprised that the Russians have not used cyberattacks against
third parties or against the United States directly up to this
point? I think that was a concern we all had from the beginning
of this operation.
Ms. Haines. I think what we have seen is the Russians have
obviously attacked Ukraine, and we have attributed a variety of
attacks to them in that context, including, for example,
destructive wiper attacks against Ukrainian Government
websites, DDoS attacks against their financial industry. They
also were engaged in attacks intended to get at command-and-
control communications in Ukraine during the invasion. That
attack had an outsized impact. In other words, we assessed that
they intended to focus in on Ukrainian command and control but
ultimately they ended up affecting a much broader set of VSATs,
essentially, you know, very small terminals outside of Ukraine,
including in Europe.
Yet we have not seen the level of attacks, to your point,
that we expected, and we have a variety of different theories
for why that might be the case, including the fact that we
think that they may have determined that the collateral impact
of such attacks would be challenging for them in the context of
Ukraine, also that they may not have wished to essentially
sacrifice potential access and collection opportunities in
those scenarios.
Then in terms of attacks against the United States, I think
they have had a longstanding concern about the potential for
escalation in cyber, vis-a-vis the United States. That does not
mean that they will not attack at some point, but it has been
interesting to see that they have not during this period.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe, please.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For both of you,
the lack of an independent intelligence community significantly
worsened Putin's decision-making in Ukraine. What do you think
President Xi in China is learning about his intelligence
communities? Both of you.
Ms. Haines. Thank you. Senator Inhofe, I think it is a
really interesting question. I would prefer to answer it
perhaps in closed session. Would that be all right, sir?
Senator Inhofe. That is fine. General, any comments to make
in this open session?
General Berrier. Senator, I will take the DNI's lead on
that.
Senator Inhofe. I suspected that. Thank you.
The Biden administration has offered Iran significant
sanctions relief in return to the 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement.
General Berrier, would you expect Iran to spend at least some
of this sanctions relief on its terrorist proxies and missile
programs? Do you agree that if the IRGC [Iranian Revolutionary
Guard Corps] has additional money that they would increase
their targeting of Americans and our allies? Let's say could
they increase that targeting?
General Berrier. Yes, Senator, they could increase
targeting against our partners in the region as well as United
States forces if they had increased funding.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Let me recognize Senator Shaheen, please.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Good morning and thank you both
for your testimony this morning.
I returned a couple of weeks ago from the Western Balkans
with Senator Tillis and Senator Murphy. We visited Serbia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo. One of the things we heard in
that region was a great deal of concern about Russian meddling
and the potential, particularly in Bosnia, for that to further
destabilize the country. Are you all following what is going on
in that part of Europe, and are you equally concerned?
Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. So I will just
start and obviously hand it over to my colleague as well, but
yes, we are concerned about this. This is something we have
been working with NATO on, in particular, to try to help them
be more resilient in this context. Both information and cyber
issues are obviously at stake, but I think managing how it is
that Russia develops and what kind of activities they engage in
worldwide during this crisis and beyond will be a critical
aspect of our work moving forward.
Senator Shaheen. Can I just, before you begin, General, can
I just ask you to speak to NATO and U4 in Bosnia, because as
you know, the authorization for U4 is going to end this fall in
Bosnia, and there is a real concern about Russia's willingness
to allow that to continue. So what are we doing to ensure that
the troops are not taken out of Bosnia and a void left that
provides a real vacuum for instability?
General Berrier. Senator, I think that is a policy question
and I would refer it to the Department of Defense.
Senator, to the earlier portion of your question, I believe
this is a key component of strategic competition, and this is
where I think with our partners and allies and certainly NATO
we have to be able to identify that kind of malign activity and
expose it and help our partners and future partners be aware of
it and do more to counter it. Yes, we are aware of it.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Well, I would say that that
policy decision needs to be viewed very closely by everybody so
that we do not wind up with a vacuum there that we are not able
to address.
I want to go to what is still happening with ISIS because,
as you both know, we have thousands of ISIS family members who
are still being held in camps in northern Syria. They are
posing a persistent challenge, not only humanitarian but the
potential breeding ground for terrorists. So are we watching
closely what is going on there, and what are we doing to try
and address what is happening in those camps?
General Berrier. From the perspective of the Department of
Defense and DIA we are watching very, very closely what is
happening in those camps, what has happened since the break-in,
and really with our CENTCOM partners trying to monitor ISIS
capability as it evolves over time and what is happening with
those families and where they are moving. This is a problem
that we partner with CENTCOM and the Defense Counterterrorism
Center, and really the National Counterterrorism Center. It is
a huge focus for everybody.
Senator Shaheen. Do we have a strategy for how to deal with
it?
General Berrier. We have an intelligence collection
strategy to monitor it.
Senator Shaheen. We are seeing the Taliban in Afghanistan
renege on everything they said they would do post troop
withdrawal. Obviously, one of those is continuing their
relationship with al Qaeda and other terrorist groups in
Afghanistan. How concerned are you that we might see terrorist
activity spread out of Afghanistan to the rest of the world?
General Berrier. Senator, I am more concerned about ISIS-K
[The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Kharasan] in Afghanistan
and the fact that they have had some successful and
catastrophic attacks within Afghanistan, which does not portend
well for the future. Al Qaeda has had some problems with
reconstitution leadership, and to a degree I think the Taliban
have held to their word about not allowing al Qaeda to
rejuvenate so far. But it is something that we watch very, very
carefully.
Senator Shaheen. There was an election in the Philippines
yesterday, and the winner of that election, Mr. Marcos, is not
likely have as positive a view to the United States. Are you
concerned that that is going to have an impact on how China is
going to view activity in the Philippines, and do we expect
there might be any spillover in terms of illegal substances
from the Philippines now that Duarte is no longer doing his
extra legal killing of people suspected of being drug kingpins?
General Berrier. Senator, I think it is early in the
process with the elected Marcos to determine whether or not he
will be anti-United States or pro-United States I know that we
would like to have the Philippines as a key intelligence
partner in the region. I think there is a lot of effort going
on to do that. So we will wait to see what percolates in our
relationship, and I will just end it there.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Fischer, please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to
our panel today.
Last week, in the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Under
Secretary of Research and Engineering Heidi Shyu stated, quote,
``Strategic competitors of the United States are rapidly
developing their nuclear arsenal in new and novel ways with a
clear intent of increasing their reliance on these weapons in
their security strategies,'' end quote.
Director Haines, do you agree with that statement?
Ms. Haines. Yes.
Senator Fischer. General, do you?
General Berrier. Yes.
Senator Fischer. Throughout the war in Ukraine, Putin and
other Russian leaders have overtly threatened nuclear use,
including the Russian state TV airing an animated video showing
the British Isles being completely destroyed by a nuclear
attack.
General, in the United States we view nuclear weapons
primarily as tools of deterrence, but do you think what we are
seeing indicates Russian leadership views nuclear weapons as
tools of coercion and intimidation?
General Berrier. Yes. I believe they view those as tools of
coercion and intimidation.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. General, also, the Defense
Intelligence Agency's 2021 report on China's military power
states, quote, ``The accelerating pace of the PRC's nuclear
expansion may enable the PRC to have up to 700 deliverable
nuclear warheads by 2027. The PRC likely intends to have at
least 1,000 warheads by 2030, exceeding the pace and size the
DOD projected in 2020,'' end quote.
I know what you say is limited in this setting, but is it
your assessment that China's nuclear forces will stop expanding
when it reaches that point of 1,000?
General Berrier. It is my assessment that they would
continue to develop the weapons they have.
Senator Fischer. Director Haines, is that the view shared
by the rest of the IC, that China's arsenal is going to
continue to grow past that point in time?
Ms. Haines. I mean, our assessment basically says that
China will continue to essentially expand their nuclear arsenal
and diversification for a period of time. It is unclear how
long that will be.
Senator Fischer. But do you anticipate it will continue
past the 1,000 warheads that we have looked at in the past?
Ms. Haines. I think for us to get into numbers we should do
that in closed session.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
General, as the statement notes, China's nuclear expansion
is larger and more rapid thank previous assessments projected.
Admiral Richard has made a similar point noting, quote, ``When
I first testified here we were questioning whether or not China
would be able to double that stockpile by the end of the
decade, and they are actually very close to doing it on my
watch,'' end quote.
What are the implications of the fact that this threat is
evolving faster than we have anticipated, and how should we
factor that in our assessments?
General Berrier. Senator, we can get into much more detail
in the closed session, but I would just say from a strategic
competition perspective and nuclear deterrence this makes it
much more challenging for us to defend. When you factor in
Russian nuclear capability with Chinese capability, I think it
is a problem for Strategic Command and the Department.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Also, General, if we can move
to a different theater now. If ISIS and al Qaeda are able to
operate in Afghanistan without consistent or effective CT
[cyber threat] pressure how long does the Intelligence
Community assess it will take for either organization to
reconstitute their external attack capabilities?
General Berrier. We assess ISIS probably a year, slightly
longer, and longer for al Qaeda.
Senator Fischer. Last October we heard from Secretary Kahl.
He told the committee that we could see ISIS-K generate the
capability in 6 to 12 months. Then in March we heard from
General McKenzie that the capability might be 12 to 18 months.
So I look forward to hearing more about how and why these
intelligence estimates have shifted forward. I think that is
important for this committee to know and it is important to
understand when we look at the dramatic reduction we have seen
in our intelligence collection in the region since our
withdrawal. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Gillibrand, please.
Senator Gillibrand. Director Haines, thank you so much for
your testimony. I want to talk a little bit about advanced
persistent threats, and I want to know what type of support are
you providing, critical infrastructure providers, to deal with
APTs [advanced persistent threats]. Specifically, I am
concerned if this war in Ukraine does escalate, that attacks
from Russia will come to American businesses and our critical
infrastructure. I know this is generally the job of CISA, but
in your engagement with critical infrastructure providers what
are the biggest areas of need that they have shared with you,
and are there any additional authorities that would be helpful
to you in enabling you to support critical infrastructure
providers in securing their networks?
Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator, and I know this has been a
major issue focus for you and, in fact, that you have supported
some of the things that have been done in New York with
Reserves, for example, in this area, which have been really
effective. I know that General Nakasone has been looking at
expanding that around the United States in different ways.
I think for us we have, quite obviously, heightened
awareness of cyber threats to critical infrastructure, and it
has been a driving force behind a number of sorts of cyber
defense measures that we have taken in the Intelligence
Community to support, in effect, as you say, CISA and FBI
[Federal Bureau of Investigation] and others in doing their
work.
One is lowering thresholds for reporting. We have asked for
network owners to really lower their threshold for reporting
suspected malicious activity. That is critical from our
perspective in order for us to be able to identify what the
threat is.
Another is just making more information publicly available.
We are increasing the amount of information that we release to
the private sector, both to help combat the rise in cybercrime,
and recently in our efforts to posture industry for potential
Russian cyberattacks, for example, something that we have been
trying to get out to do significantly more briefings on and
help industry, in effect, get ready for things so they can take
action that would make them more resilient in these
circumstances. This includes some close-hold releases so as to
dampen malicious cyber actors warning before mitigations can be
put into place.
Another has been our significant outreach to the private
sector. DHS partners held over 90 engagements with more than
10,000 partners, just even on the Russia piece, and it includes
sharing preventative measures to help these partners mitigate
vulnerabilities. Another has been facilitating hunt teams on
networks. We have also asked company owners to actively hunt
for Russian techniques, essentially, on their networks and to
facilitate those have provided lists of vulnerabilities,
indicators of compromise to look for on a company's networks.
But those are just some of the things that are focused on
helping on the infrastructure piece. Thank you.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Director. Do you need any
additional authorities or resources to amplify this effort?
Ms. Haines. So we have asked for resources in our fiscal
year 2023 budget that are designed to help with this effort,
and so absolutely in that sense. We have not identified
particular authorities that we need, but I will tell you that
we will come to you if we do. Thank you.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Director Haines and General
Berrier, I saw that the Annual Threat Assessment notes that
advances in dual-use technology could, quote, ``enable
development of novel biological weapons that complicate
detection, attribution, and treatment,'' end of quote.
I have advocated for a one-health security approach where
we incorporate people across multiple disciplines, including
the Intelligence Community to increase our biodefense and
prevent the next pandemic.
In the context of ongoing biological threats, how would you
suggest we develop a multidisciplinary approach like this?
Where can we prepare and prevent both naturally occurring
diseases but also deliberate threats?
Ms. Haines. I can start on this. I am very passionate about
this issue. I completely agree with you. I think we have not,
in the Intelligence Community, been able to work with other
parts of, for example, the Federal Government, even in the
scientific community within the Federal Government as
effectively as we need to.
We have been developing mechanisms in the Intelligence
Community to do some more. We are working more with the
National Labs than we ever have before. We are working more
with HHS [Department of Health and Human Service], with CDC
[Centers for Disease Control and Prevention], with others, to
try to make sure that we are also supporting their work and
that we can understand some of the issues that they see as
critical to our work. So that has been a big piece of our
effort in the Intelligence Community within the national
counterproliferation. Senator, we have been doing a major
effort on essentially working with global health and we
actually now have a new national intelligence manager that
works on these issues specifically and is hoping to support
that kind of outreach on this. I would be happy to give you a
brief at some point in more detail if that is useful.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
General Berrier. Senator, for DIA [Defense Intelligence
Agency] I think it is about partnerships. So it is a
partnership between the National Center for Medical
Intelligence (NCMI), the Defense Counterproliferation Center,
as well as NCPC. The role, really, for DIA and NCMI is to
provide warning on these pandemics. So I am passionate about it
as well, and I think it is an area that is going to expand in
the coming months and years as we look forward to this, and I
look forward to engaging you, perhaps at DIA, on this topic.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Cotton, please.
Senator Cotton. General, what is your assessment on the
state of the fighting between Russia and Ukraine in eastern and
southern Ukraine today?
General Berrier. Senator, I think I would characterize it
as the Russians are not winning and the Ukrainians are not
winning, and we are at a bit of a stalemate here. What has been
the most interesting evolution for me, in watching how the
Russian forces have misstepped, is really the lack of a non-
commissioned officer (NCO) corps. When I think about small unit
tactics and how this has unfolded between Ukraine and Russia I
think the NCO corps is a big piece of this, and I think the
Ukrainians have that about right.
Senator Cotton. Who faces greater risk from a stalemate--
Russia or Ukraine?
General Berrier. I think we have to take a wait-and-see
approach on how this evolves and what is in the decision
calculus for Putin and his generals as this unfolds.
Senator Cotton. A stalemate, to be clear, does not mean an
armistice or peace. It means continued but indecisive fighting
in which both sides are losing personnel, equipment, weapons,
and vehicles. Right?
General Berrier. I think it is attrition warfare and it
depends how well the Ukrainians can maintain what they have
going on with weapons and ammunition and how the Russians
decide to deal with that, either through mobilization or not,
and decide to go with what they have in the theater right now.
Senator Cotton. Which side do you think, at this point, is
more capable of generating additional combat power in the form
of trained and motivated troops--Russia or Ukraine?
General Berrier. Ukraine.
Senator Cotton. Even though it is one-third the size of
Russia?
General Berrier. Yes.
Senator Cotton. Why do you say that?
General Berrier. Because I think the Ukrainians have it
right in terms of grit and how they face the defense of their
nation. I am not sure that Russian soldiers from the far-flung
military districts really understand that.
Senator Cotton. Fighting to defend one's own home from a
war of aggression is a highly motivating factor, is it not?
General Berrier. Yes, it is.
Senator Cotton. Russians probably are not terribly
motivated to be the next wave of recruits into Vladimir Putin's
war of aggression?
General Berrier. I would say not, based on what we have
seen.
Senator Cotton. If that is the case, and this stalemate, as
you call it, continues not just for weeks but for months, which
side do you think faces the greater possibility of a decisive
breakout--the Russians, with their ill-trained and unmotivated
troops, or the Ukrainians, with their supremely motivated
troops?
General Berrier. Senator, I think right now with the
stalemate and as it stands, if Russia does not declare war and
mobilize this stalemate is going to last for a while, and I do
not see a breakout on either side. If they do mobilize and they
do declare war, that will bring thousands more soldiers to the
fight, and even though they may not be as well-trained and
competent they will still bring mass and a lot of more
ammunition.
Senator Cotton. What are the prospects of a catastrophic
collapse of morale and will among Russian forces?
General Berrier. It remains to be seen. I think the
Russians still are a learning organization. If appropriate
lessons could be applied with leadership you might see that
turn around.
Senator Cotton. Do you know the current count on how many
generals have been killed in Ukraine, on Russia's side?
General Berrier. I think the number is between eight and
ten.
Senator Cotton. Do you know how many generals we lost in 20
years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan?
General Berrier. Not many.
Senator Cotton. Those we lost were happenstance, right? The
bad guys got a lucky shot at a convoy or helicopter.
General Berrier. Yes.
Senator Cotton. Does the fact that Russia is losing all
these generals, and as you pointed out they have no trained NCO
corps, suggest to you that these generals are having to go
forward to ensure their orders are executed in a way that
General Berrier never would have to go forward if he was in a
combat command because he could count on the captains and
lieutenants and the Sergeant Berriers to execute his orders?
General Berrier. Yes.
Senator Cotton. It sounds to me like the balance of forces
here are moving more decisively in Ukraine's factor and will
continue to over time as long as we continue to support them
with the arms and the intelligence that they need.
General Berrier. Well-led forces that are motivated and
have what they need can do a lot.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator Blumenthal, please.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
pursue Senator Cotton's line of questioning if I may. In my
exchange with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff several weeks ago I commented that our
approach to Ukraine seemed somewhat schizophrenic. We say we
want Ukraine to win but we are afraid of what Putin may do if
he loses. I have urged, since 2014, that we provide more lethal
weapons to Ukraine.
When I visited Ukraine recently with some of my colleagues,
a bipartisan trip, one of them asked President Zelenskyy, ``Are
you fearful about the Russian prospect of invasion?'' It was a
number of weeks before the invasion. He said, ``The Russians
invaded us in 2014. We have been fighting them since then.'' In
my view the implication is that we have failed over a period of
years, under different administrations, to provide Ukraine with
the arms that it needs to counter and deter increased Russian
aggression there.
So my question to you is, do you agree that we should
increase the kind of military aid, as well as humanitarian
assistance and economic sanctions, that we have been providing,
by orders of magnitude that will enable Ukraine to win, and
would you also agree that if we simply provide more of that
kind of aid--tanks, artillery, armored personnel carriers, even
planes, Stinger and Javelin missiles, all of the arms that
Ukraine needs to fight lethally and defensively--that Putin may
engage in sword-rattling and threats and implications of what
he might do, but enabling Ukraine to win ought to be our
objective.
Let me ask you first, General.
General Berrier. Senator, in your statement there it really
gets at national level of decision-making on what our policy
should be with regard to arming Ukraine. My role as the
Director of DIA is to keep an eye on this conflict and provide
information to decision-makers so that they can make those
kinds of decisions.
In terms of what Putin might do to escalate, I think the
best that we can do, rather than describing what those
escalatory measures would be, would be to understand what they
might do and be ready, in terms of indications and warning, to
be able to notify decision-makers that that was actually
occurring or about to occur.
So I take an intelligence perspective of the conflict
itself and leave the policy to decision-makers.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you--and I will ask Ms. Haines the
same--think there is a serious, immediate prospect that Putin
would engage in the use of tactical nuclear weapons?
General Berrier. Right now we do not see that, and I think
that is a huge warning issue for us and something that we are
very, very focused on.
Senator Blumenthal. Ms. Haines?
Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. I think, on the first part
of your question, you know, as General Berrier said, obviously
we try to provide the intelligence to help policymakers like
you make these decisions. Among the questions that come up in
that discussion are whether or not, frankly, Ukraine can absorb
additional assistance and how much of it, and that is very hard
for us to tell. We have, in fact, more insight, probably, on
the Russian side than we do on the Ukrainian side, but that is
something, obviously, for the Defense Department to work
through as they go through this.
But we also, obviously, get asked this question of whether
or not certain actions will escalate things with Russia, as you
indicate, and if so, how, and that really gets to the second
part of your question, because I think obviously we are in a
position, as you have identified, where we are supporting
Ukraine but we also do not want to ultimately end up in World
War III, and we do not want to have a situation in which actors
are using nuclear weapons.
Our view is, as General Berrier indicated, that there is
not a sort of an imminent potential for Putin to use nuclear
weapons. We perceive that, as I indicated in my statement, as
something that he is unlikely to do unless there is effectively
an existential threat to his regime and to Russia, from his
perspective. We do think that that could be the case in the
event that he perceives that he is losing the war in Ukraine
and that NATO, in effect, is sort of either intervening or
about to intervene in that context, which would obviously
contribute to a perception that he is about to lose the war in
Ukraine.
But there are a lot of things that he would do in the
context of escalation before he would get to nuclear weapons,
and also that he would be likely to engage in some signaling
beyond what he has done thus far, before doing so.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. My time has expired.
Senator King. [Presiding.] On behalf of the chairman,
Senator Blackburn.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
very much to each of you for being here today.
Ms. Haines, I want to come to you. We have talked a lot
about Ukraine and Russia this morning, and I appreciate your
frankness in this. But let me ask you about Wagner and the
proxies and what you are seeing, not only in Ukraine but also
what you are seeing when it comes to Libya and to other areas
and the aggressiveness of the use of the proxies.
Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. We can probably go into
more detail in closed session.
Senator Blackburn. Okay.
Ms. Haines. But I could just say, more generally, that we
do see Wagner being used, in effect, in Ukraine. We see that
that is something----
Senator Blackburn. How about Africa?
Ms. Haines. Yes, absolutely. Wagner has been historically
present in Africa, and it is a more recent event, obviously, in
the current crisis that Russia deployed them effectively in
Ukraine.
Senator Blackburn. Okay. All right.
General Berrier, do you have anything you want to add on
that?
General Berrier. Senator, we track ISIS in Africa, Syria,
other places. I think we will get into a richer discussion in
the closed session about Wagner operations in Ukraine.
Senator Blackburn. Okay. That is helpful. Let me ask you
also--and by the way, thank you for the China map [retained in
Committee records]. I will say this. I think we could have a
picture of the globe and say that is where China is seeking to
be aggressive. It is something that is not lost on me, that
they are anxious right now to expand their reach.
But let's talk about DIA and how is the DIA collaborating
with our allies and our partners to counter Beijing's cyber
espionage operations?
General Berrier. Senator, we are. We are closely
collaborating with our Five Eyes partners, in this case, our
Australian and New Zealand partners, on this very issue, along
with our partners over at the National Security Agency with
General Nakasone.
There is a concerted effort by the Five Eyes to understand
these activities in cyberspace emanating from China. So we are
working that very, very closely and we can provide more details
in a closed session.
Senator Blackburn. Can you provide us with some of the
lessons learned from the Russia-Ukraine conflict that help to
inform some of this work?
General Berrier. Cyber activity?
Senator Blackburn. Yes, sir.
General Berrier. So I think the key there would be
information operations and disinformation operations and their
level of effectiveness on the Russian side, or ineffectiveness
on the Russian side, and then looking at the level of
effectiveness on the Ukrainian side. When I compare and
contrast information operations I think the Ukrainians have
been much more successful in the information operations and
space. Russians have had some success with cyber activities in
the Ukraine, and I think the PRC and Xi are looking at all of
that as they sort of unwind this conflict and learn lessons
from that.
Senator Blackburn. Ms. Haines, how is the intel community
utilizing AI and machine learning as they look at applications,
look at how Beijing is continuing to move forward? So how are
you preferencing some of the new technologies that can help us
in this effort?
Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. We are using artificial
intelligence, and in particular, machine learning, across the
board for our mission set. Just to give you an example of the
kind of things that we are able to do with it, I think it has
been extraordinary in terms of helping us with analysis, being
able to focus in on certain datasets that we are able to
effectively manipulate more easily and without as many human
resources, effectively to identify patterns. We are able to use
that then, have analysts that are educated and experts take
that information and use it in their analysis in different
ways.
We have something called an Artificial Intelligence Unit
Project that is really looking at across the Intelligence
Community at different applications of artificial intelligence
and machine learning and then trying to leverage those so that
we can actually allow other elements to build off of the work
that is being done by another element that they might not have
thought of before and also doing it at sort of a cheaper cost
and so on.
So there are a variety of ways in which we are doing it. It
is hard to talk about it in an unclassified way, but certainly
this is a major area of effort and investment, and we can
provide you with further details if that is useful.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you. My time has expired. I will
come to you for a written response on the recent article that
quoted a senior intel source, about referencing the uptick in
Al-Shabaab activity. So thank you very much.
Senator King. On behalf of the chair, Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Senator King.
It is paramount to our national security that we keep our
most sensitive secrets properly protected and classified,
particularly when protecting sources and methods. But I am very
concerned about the levels of over-classification and pseudo-
classification that we are seeing across the Federal
Government. Everyone understands the need to protect
information about most sensitive capabilities from our enemies,
but our classification system has spiraled out of control, when
it means, for example, that our own four-star generals cannot
share information with their fellow three-stars. It is hard to
see how that level of classification is making America safer.
Over-classification also reduces public scrutiny of
important issues and it can hamper accountability. Director
Haines, you lead the Intelligence Community. You have years of
experience in these matters. Do you think that over-
classification is a national security problem?
Ms. Haines. I do, Senator. I have stated this explicitly. I
do think it is a challenge. As long as I have been in
government, frankly, there have been blue-ribbon commissions
that have looked at this, have said there is significant over-
classification. This is a challenge, as you indicate, from a
democratic perspective but it is also a challenge from a
national security perspective because if we cannot share
information as easily as we might otherwise be if it were
appropriately classified then that obviously affects our
capacity to work on these issues.
It is a very challenging issue, as I know you know well. In
other words, there are technical aspects to it. There are
cultural aspects to it.
Senator Warren. Let us talk about that just a little bit,
and I want to say I agree with you that over-classification has
been a problem across administrations. The Obama administration
put out two different Executive orders aimed at improving
classification and information sharing, but that was more than
a decade ago and obviously the problem persists.
Let me ask this a different way. Director Haines, would you
support the Administration releasing a new Executive order on
classification practices to ensure that we are protecting
national security information while keeping our commitments to
open government?
Ms. Haines. Without knowing exactly what it would say it is
sort of hard for me to say I would support an Executive order
on that subject. I mean, I am constantly looking for additional
ways in which we might try to help address this issue, and we
have a number of ways that we are investing in the Intelligence
Community issues. But, yeah, I----
Senator Warren. I appreciate that, and I am not asking you
to sign a blank check here.
Ms. Haines. No. Fair enough.
Senator Warren. But you are the President's principal
advisor on intelligence matters, and I am just asking if you
would be supportive if the President wanted to take that step.
Ms. Haines. Well, I am supportive of what the President
wants to take steps within his authority, and it is an
appropriate policy to do, so yes, in that sense I would be.
Senator Warren. Okay. Let me ask this then from one more
perspective, and that is during the Ukraine crisis we have seen
that a well-functioning, declassification system can be
incredibly powerful. The work by the Biden administration to
expose what the Intelligence Committee knew about Putin's plans
seriously hurt Russia's credibility and it strengthened our
response to an illegal and immoral war. My understanding is
that it took reshuffling of resources to make that happen, and
I applaud that, but we need more of it.
The most recent numbers that I have seen is that we spend
$18 billion protecting the classification system and only about
$102 million--do the math fast in your head, about 5 percent of
that number--on declassification efforts, and that ratio feels
off in a democracy.
With that in mind, Director Haines, are there any lessons
learned from Ukraine about how we can expedite declassification
when there is a compelling reason to do so?
Ms. Haines. I think there are lessons to be learned from
Ukraine, and it will be easier to talk about this in closed
session, but I think there is some value that we could discuss
in closed session on those issues.
I do think it has helped to help other people understand
the value of ensuring that we are classifying things at the
appropriate level and how declassification can support foreign
policy in different ways. So I think that is all to the good.
Senator Warren. Good. You know, in a democracy we have a
duty to be accountable to the public, and when we keep secrets
from Americans there needs to be a compelling public interest
in doing so. In too many cases it seems that public officials
err on the side of secrecy because the information could be
embarrassing, or even worse, just because it is easier not to
be accountable to the American people.
So I urge all of our agencies to address this problem, and
I look forward to working with you on it. Thank you.
Senator King. On behalf of the chairman, Senator
Tuberville.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Senator. Good morning.
Director Haines, in your best assessment does Russia
intelligence closely monitor our Secretary of Defense?
Ms. Haines. I think Russian intelligence tries very closely
to monitor all of our senior leaders.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. So you believe that, noted,
that when he said that Russia weakened and that the United
States will move heaven and earth to arm Ukraine, do you
believe that is right he should say that?
Ms. Haines. Yes. I think the Secretary of Defense----
Senator Tuberville. Do you believe Russia blames the United
States Intelligence Community for helping Ukraine shoot down a
Russian plane carrying hundreds of people?
Ms. Haines. I am sorry, sir. Can you repeat the question?
Senator Tuberville. Do you believe Russia blames us, our
intelligence agency, for Ukraine shooting down a plane with
hundreds of troops on board? Do you think Russia blames us for
that?
Ms. Haines. Which plane are you thinking of?
Senator Tuberville. There was a plane recently that was
shot down, a Russian plane, that 100 troops. Do you believe
that they blame our intelligence agency for that?
Ms. Haines. I do not know, sir.
Senator Tuberville. Okay. Do you believe that Russia blames
our United States intelligence for sinking their flagship,
Moskva? Do you think they blame us for that?
Ms. Haines. I do not know, sir. We have not seen any direct
reporting.
Senator Tuberville. To what extent do you assess that
Russia believe it is at war with the West and the United
States? Do you think that they believe they are at war with us?
Ms. Haines. Russia has historically believed that they are
in a conflict, in effect, with NATO and the United States on a
variety of issues, including in cyber and so on.
Senator Tuberville. So you believe that they are fighting
us--that they are fighting us as well as they are fighting
Ukraine. Correct?
Ms. Haines. In a sense. Their perception----
Senator Tuberville. Yeah. Yeah, because we are arming them
and we are talking. Okay.
General Berrier, does the United States or Ukraine have air
superiority over the war zone? Which one has air superiority?
General Berrier. Senator, I would call that an air standoff
right now. I mean, the Russians can fly a tactical aircraft
over the line of troops in a local area but they cannot expand
into western parts of Ukraine without coming under an air
threat.
Senator Tuberville. But Ukraine is more than we are, the
United States, obviously, because we not involved in their air
space.
General Berrier. No, we are not involved.
Senator Tuberville. Would you say that Russia possess
strong air defenses?
General Berrier. I think the Russians have very credible
air defense systems.
Senator Tuberville. Does Ukraine have any counter measures
to thwart Russia artillery rockets? Does Ukraine have any air
defenses?
General Berrier. Ukraine has air defenses. They also have
counter-battery radars that allow them to defend themselves
from incoming artillery, or at least see it.
Senator Tuberville. Would you agree that anyone in Ukraine
right now is under serious threat? Obviously they are. Correct?
General Berrier. I would agree they are.
Senator Tuberville. Okay. In the past 2 weeks we have seen
several high-profile visitors take trips to active war zone.
Our Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Speaker of the
House, First Lady. This is for both of you. What is our
Intelligence Community doing to lessen the risk of a high-
ranking official--how are we protecting these people going to
Ukraine, our people going to Ukraine?
General Berrier. Senator, I think that would be a
discussion for the closed session.
Senator Tuberville. Okay. So we could guarantee that the
First Lady was safe when she went to Ukraine. We could
guarantee that, 100 percent. Correct? Both of you. I am just
asking.
General Berrier. I would not say that, no. I would not say
that.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Is it your best advice that
we do not go to Ukraine right now, any of us, any of us in
here?
General Berrier. Senator, I would not say that. I would say
with proper planning and coordination that it is possible.
Senator Tuberville. General, 100 percent. One hundred
percent, can we guarantee going into a war zone--our Secretary
of Defense and Secretary of State went on a train.
General Berrier. Senator, I do not think we can ever
guarantee anything 100 percent.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Well, that is kind of the
point I am making. You know, we are kind of poking the bear
here, saying, you know, we are bragging about it. Even
President Biden said today, ``Wait a minute. We have got to cut
back on this pointing that, how many generals have been killed
and we are part of it.'' I totally agree with that. I totally
agree that, hey, we want to help Ukraine. Obviously, we all do.
But we do not want to take that step forward to where we get a
lot of our men and women involved in this. It looks like to me
we that we are taking way too many changes of sending people
over there for a photo op other than doing the right thing,
which we are doing. But we just do not need to step over that
path.
Thank you for what you are doing, but I think all of us
need to look at that point of, hey, there is a point of no
return here if we cross that line. If we were on the other
side, the same way, and we had somebody helping, we had a plane
shot down, a ship sink, and then bragging about killing
generals, as Senator Cotton said, we are walking a tightrope
here.
That is just the only point I want to bring up. Thank you
very much.
Senator King. On behalf of the chair, Senator Kelly.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Haines, again, looking at your office's 2022
Annual Threat Assessment it is clear there is a lot going on in
the world right now, and I understand that resources are finite
and tradeoffs often have to be made. That is in, a large part,
what makes your job very challenging. Clearly the situation in
Ukraine is taking up a lot of bandwidth right now, and I would
presume that INDOPACOM [United States Indo-Pacific Command]
requires significant amount of resources as well to fully
understand the threat environment, and these two things are
obviously related.
But what about some other regions in the world? In light of
the worldwide threats you have articulated here today do you
feel the Intelligence Community has the necessary resources in
place to confidently understand the threat environment in other
places, such as Afghanistan, northern Syria, Pakistan, and
Iran?
Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. I mean, I think, like all
good bureaucrats that we could spend more money on these
issues. There is no question. I think certainly that is true.
But we are doing our very best, as you indicate, to ensure that
we are not taking our eye off the ball, essentially across the
globe, on issues that are also of critical importance among the
ones that you have identified.
Senator Kelly. Thank you. I want to ask a specific question
about the MQ-9, the Reaper drones. So the Air Force has been
reluctant to invest in upgrading the platform and proposes to
retire it, potentially like in 2035, even as the demand from
combatant commanders for the system remains high. You know,
their argument has been that the platform is not survivable in
China-Russia scenario. I think it is pretty clear that it would
be survivable in a Russian scenario now.
Do you have an opinion on the continued utility of
reconnaissance platforms such as the MQ-9, particular as we
face increased activity in the so-called gray zone, below the
threshold of armed combat?
Ms. Haines. Yeah.
General Berrier. Go ahead.
Ms. Haines. No, no.
General Berrier. Senator, I have been the beneficiary of
MQ-9 operations for the last 20 years. It is an outstanding
platform. It has done great things. With increasing threats
emanating from China and their ability to reach out and touch
those kinds of things I totally understand why the Air Force
wants to divest of that platform. The efficacy of that in the
coming years in low-intensity conflict, counterterrorism
operations, it will always be useful in a low air defense kind
of environment, but in the high-end environment I do not think
it is very survivable.
Senator Kelly. But we have looked at the Russian surface-
to-air missile threat environment as high end. It turns out
like a lot of things, day 1 of the war is much different than
day 60 or 90 or 180, of any conflict. I am concerned that not
only this platform, but sometimes we look at divesting from
platforms that could provide incredible utility further along
in the timeline.
General, I have got another question for you here in my
last minute, anti-satellite ban on ASAT [antisatellite weapon]
testing. The Administration recently announced this. It is a
policy I agree with. Russia, China, they do not share this
goal, nor do they abide by any kind of similar policy. The
Russians and the Chinese both, over the last, about decade and
a half, have performed ASAT tests, the Russians more recently.
The DIA's 2022 report on challenges to security in space
lists orbital debris as a significant challenge to space
operations and concluded that the debris endangers spacecraft
of all nations in low-Earth orbit, including astronauts and
cosmonauts aboard the ISS [International Space Station], but
also China has a space station as well.
Given the fact that both the Russians and Chinese conduct
manned space operations what would be your assessment as to why
they continue to put their people in harm's way by conducting
these dangerous tests?
General Berrier. Senator, I think they value that
capability in space as an asymmetric advantage over our
superior technology and continue to pursue those kinds of
capabilities. Whether or not they would actually use it is
another discussion.
Senator Kelly. Do you expect them to do more anti-satellite
tests?
General Berrier. We have not seen evidence that they plan,
in the near future, of doing more, but I would expect as they
go through their development processes they will do more tests.
Senator Kelly. All right. Thank you, General, and thank
you, Director Haines.
Chairman Reed. [Presiding.] Thank you, Senator Kelly.
Senator Rounds, please.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by
thanking both of you for your continued service to our country.
Director Haines, in April, Secretary Blinken told Congress
that Iran's attempts to assassinate former Secretary of State
Mike Pompeo were real and ongoing, and this month Israeli press
reported that an agent for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard's
Quds Force was thwarted from an assassination attempt on a
United States general in Germany.
Why is Iran apparently so emboldened right now and how can
the Intelligence Community and national security communities at
large change this dangerous trend and deter Iran from these
malicious actions?
Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. I think we should probably
pick this up in closed session. What I think I can say in open
session is a fair amount of their motivation in this area we
assess to be in relation to Soleimani as part of their sort of
efforts for revenge, and it is a particularly challenging area,
I think, to deter them from action in this space. But we can
discuss more specifics, I think, in closed session. Thank you,
sir.
Senator Rounds. Very well. Director Haines once again. The
crisis at the United States southern border has literally
exploded under this Administration and continues to
deteriorate. Reuters reported that United States officials at
the Department of Homeland Security are preparing for as high
as 9,000 arrests per day. As the economic and political
conditions in Latin America continue to spark waves of
migration that put pressure on our southern border, how serious
does the Intelligence Community see this as a threat to our
country, and also, how and to what degree is the Intelligence
Community shifting resources to address the surge at our
southern border?
Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. We have stood up a migrant
crisis cell, which is essentially a cell that helps to bring
together intelligence from across the community to support
DHS's efforts, and it is really looking south of the border at
effectively migrant movements that may be coming towards the
southern border, so that we can help them to prepare, in
effect, for encounters on the border.
Senator Rounds. Are you in agreement with the assessment
that there could be as many as 9,000 arrests a day? Is that an
assessment that you would concur with?
Ms. Haines. Sir, I do not look at those particular
questions. That is within the Department of Homeland Security.
Senator Rounds. I am just curious because when you are
doing your planning to determine what your needs are, clearly
in order for you to do the planning you have got to have an
assessment of what the expected flow would be. I am just
curious. It is not meant as a gotcha question.
Ms. Haines. No, no, no. Of course. We do not assess our
needs along the border because we do not actually have needs
along the border. In other words, that is sort of the DHS role
is to figure out how can we plan for the number of incidents or
encounters that they will have on the border. For us, what we
are trying to do is understand what are the drivers, what are
the ultimate flows that are likely to occur, and we try to set
up intelligence so that we can actually provide some indication
and warning of here is where you are likely to see an increase
in the flow, either south or north or how it is and where it is
coming from, ultimately. Does that make sense?
Senator Rounds. It does. It just catches me a little bit by
surprise that in your planning that most certainly you have to
have a good communication with Homeland Security. I am assuming
there is a good communication there----
Ms. Haines. Of course.
Senator Rounds.--and that based upon what their needs are
is really what you are doing, is providing them with additional
resources. You are also, at the same time, gathering intel
based on the possibility, the strong possibility that
individuals would try to come in through the southern border.
Based upon that I was just curious, and I know that we are in a
public discussion, but nonetheless I think it is something that
has been talked about publicly, and the fact that we have got
folks from all over the world that are using that as an
entryway into the United States, and most certainly you are
aware of that.
Ms. Haines. Absolutely. No, I am not trying to sort of duck
the question or anything. I think, you know, we see a very high
flow. There is no question. What happens is the Department of
Homeland Security, we have somebody who is a liaison that sits
within their sort of spaces that tells here are the
requirements, and they basically are looking for indications
and warning of, you know, we are likely to see a flow along
this part of the border, that sort of thing, as opposed to us
being able to help them determine, okay, today you are going to
see X number of people coming through the southern border as a
whole.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Just one other quick question.
The Intelligence Community and Congress are working to flesh
out the Foreign Malign Influence Center's mission, the budget
and size, among other issues. But with the 2022 midterms almost
here we are probably behind the curve a little bit.
What are the major roadblocks stopping the IC from standing
up this intelligence center?
Ms. Haines. We have just gotten appropriations, basically,
through the fiscal year 2022 budget, which has been great, and
we are currently building up the Foreign Malign Influence
Center. We already has the Election Threat Executive so we have
been doing work on what the threats might be to our elections.
That is now pulled into the Foreign Malign Influence Center,
and we effectively have the budget for up to 12 people in the
Foreign Malign Influence Center under this context and we have
asked for funding for fiscal year 2023, essentially to be able
to expand it by about three people but also to allow us to
access expertise and knowledge that we think is critical, and
really just to help facilitate what the community is doing
across the board on these issues.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time
has expired.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator Kaine, please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks to our
witnesses. I want to ask about two items. The first is undersea
cables. Ninety-five percent of global communication rely on a
robust undersea cable network, 500,000 miles across the sea
floor globally. Internet, global banking transactions, the
SWIFT system, diplomatic cables, encrypted military
communications are a few of the myriad applications that rely
on this network.
Two NATO commands, the Joint Support and Enabling Command
in Ulm, Germany, and Joint Force Command in Norfolk are
monitoring threats against undersea cables in the Atlantic, but
the vast majority of these cables are controlled by private
sector companies. In the United States, France, Spain, Japan,
China, these companies and contractors who work with them, such
as Google and Amazon, oversee the planning, production, design,
deployment, and maintenance of the cables.
To what extent is the DOD and IC looking at integrating and
communicating with these private actors so that we can monitor
threats to the cables?
General Berrier. Senator, I am going to take that one for
action and do a little homework to get you a fulsome answer.
Senator Kaine. I would like, additionally, to know whether
China, Russia, or other malign actors have an organic
capability to map our networks, to cut into or tap into them,
to listen to military or other government communications. So I
would like a response back to that.
Here is my second question, unless, Director Haines, you
have something to offer on the undersea cable.
Ms. Haines. Thank you, sir. I actually would love to do it
in closed session if that is all right.
Senator Kaine. I will look forward to that.
Ms. Haines. Okay.
Senator Kaine. Now a question about intelligence estimates
of the strength of other militaries. I think there were a
number of estimates that the Afghan military would perform much
better than they did, and there were a number of estimates that
the Russian military was much stronger than it has proven to
be. What are we doing to assess why we overestimated the
strength of both of those militaries and recalibrating the way
we assess military strength of other nations?
General Berrier. Senator, I will start. We are taking a
holistic view of how we do analysis and evaluate foreign
militaries. It starts with the relationships that we have with
our foreign partners, understanding their militaries,
understanding their understanding of adversary militaries, and
working an all-source assessment to have granularity inside the
capabilities of these militaries.
Certainly the ANDSF [Afghan National Defense Security
Forces] was an issue. Certainly the overestimation of Russian
capability was an issue. But if you back up, if you look at
Russia's growth since the early 2000s, their war in Chechnya,
their war in Georgia, what they did in Ukraine, their
operations in Syria, and you understand the reforms that they
went through, we saw that from the outside. What we did not see
from the inside was sort of this hollow force, lack of NCO
corps, lack of leadership training, lack of effective
doctrines. So those are the intangibles that we have got to be
able to get our arms around as an Intelligence Community to
really understand.
Senator Kaine. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Wicker, please.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Berrier,
let me quote from your prepared statement. ``Beijing appears
willing to defer the use of military force as long as it
considers that unification with Taiwan can be negotiated and
that the cost of conflict outweigh the benefits.''
General Berrier, I believe the United States should prepare
Taiwan and send a clear message to Beijing that a military
invasion would be too costly. I also believe the primary
objective of the United States and its allies, with regard to
Taiwan, should not be so much to repel a Chinese attack but to
prevent it from ever occurring.
General, from your assessment of China's capabilities and
timeline as well as Taiwan's current defensive posture, what
needs to be done? What can the United States be doing for or
supplying to Taiwan in order to prevent a Chinese attack from
ever occurring?
General Berrier. Senator, thank you for that question.
First I would say that I believe the PRC would rather not do it
by force. I think they would rather do this peacefully, over
time. There are some things that we can do with Taiwan. I think
they are learning some very interesting lessons from the
Ukrainian conflict, like how important leadership is, how
important small-unit tactics are, how important an NCO corps
is, and really effective training with the right weapon systems
and what those system, with the right people, would be able to
do to thwart that.
I think we have to engage with our INDOPACOM partners
within the Department of Defense, the Taiwan military and
leadership, to help them understand what this conflict has been
about, what lessons they can learn, and where they should be
focusing their dollars on defense and their training.
Senator Wicker. Is their NCO corps where it should be at
this point?
General Berrier. They have a largely conscript force. I do
not believe it is where it should be.
Senator Wicker. So the volunteer part of their armed
forces, is that where it should be, the non-conscript?
General Berrier. They have a very short enlistment period.
I can provide you additional details in a written response.
Senator Wicker. Okay. You also have written that the PLA
Navy is the largest navy in the world and has the capability to
conduct long-range precision strikes against land targets from
its submarine and surface combatants. You later have written
that Russia is fielding its new, quote, ``ultra-quiet''
submarine, capable of threatening North America from the
Pacific Ocean.
General, do you assess that China and Russia will continue
to grow both of their naval fleets and invest in new
capabilities?
General Berrier. Yes, I do believe they will both invest in
new capabilities and grow their fleets.
Senator Wicker. Is the United States on pace to build and
commission as many ships as China is building?
General Berrier. I would refer that question to the
Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations.
Senator Wicker. But surely the Intelligence Community has
an assessment of that.
General Berrier. DIA has an assessment of Russian naval
capabilities and Chinese PLAN [People's Liberation Army Navy]
capabilities.
Senator Wicker. DIA is familiar with what the public plans
of the Navy are at this point.
General Berrier. Broadly, but I think the Navy will make
those investment decisions based on how they perceive the
threat as well, and we will certainly collaborate with our
partners in the Navy on any of that.
Senator Wicker. Let me switch to Afghanistan. Director
Haines, you submitted the 2022 Office of Director of National
Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment. On Afghanistan, the
report says that the Taliban takeover threatens United States
interests, that 500,000 Afghan refugees could attempt to cross
into surrounding countries, and that almost certainly terrorist
groups will establish and expand safe havens from which to plot
attacks.
Madam Director, given these assessments in your office's
Annual Threat Assessment, would you assess that the chaotic
United States withdrawal from Afghanistan has left the Homeland
more susceptible to terrorist attacks?
Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. I agreed with what General
Barrier indicated earlier on about the threat, essentially,
that we are seeing from al Qaeda and from ISIS-K, which is to
say that we see ISIS-K as the more concerning threat. At this
point, we do not assess that they currently have the capability
to essentially affect external attacks directed from
Afghanistan to the United States at this stage, but they could
build that capability over time, and they certainly have the
intent to do so.
With al Qaeda, we are not seeing as much of a threat, and
that does not mean that it could not grow over time, and that
is obviously something that we are monitoring during this
period.
Senator Wicker. General Berrier, has the exit from
Afghanistan left our Homeland more vulnerable?
General Berrier. Senator, I would not more vulnerable, but
this is certainly an issue that the Intelligence Community has
to keep on the warm plate, if you will, to make sure that we
can monitor those networks, what they are doing, and where they
are migrating to.
Senator Wicker. Thank you both.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker.
Senator King, please.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Director, I am concerned about the leaks last week,
the details of intelligence that is being shared with the
Ukrainians, both in terms of sources and methods, alerting the
Russians, what we know, perhaps how we know it, and also
feeding Vladimir Putin's paranoia about conflict with the West.
Are you actively pursuing the source of those leaks from last
week?
Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. We obviously always
actively pursue any information that we have that indicates
that anybody may be disclosing classified information, you
know, without authorization.
Senator King. I hope you will pursue that because I think
sometimes leaks are embarrassing. We do not worry too much
about them. But I think in this case they were harmful, and I
hope that this will be an active investigation.
A question to both of you. We all believe that the
Intelligence Community did a really excellent job of predicting
the invasion, alerting the world as to what was going on, what
the disposition of Russian troops were, the involvement of
Belarus, all of that. What we missed was the will to fight of
the Ukrainians and the leadership of Zelenskyy. We also missed
that in Afghanistan. Within 12 months we missed the will to
fight. We overestimated the Afghans' will to fight,
underestimated the Ukrainians will to fight.
I realize will to fight is a lot harder to assess than
number of tanks or volume of ammunition or something, but I
hope that the Intelligence Community is doing some soul-
searching about how to better get a handle on that question,
because we had testimony, in this committee and in the
Intelligence Committee, that Kyiv was going to fall in 3 or 4
days and war would last 2 weeks, and that turned out to be
grossly wrong. Are you looking at this question of how to
assess will to fight and domestic leadership?
Ms. Haines. Yes, Senator. You heard from General Berrier,
obviously, a number of things that DIA is doing. For the
Intelligence Community writ large we have a process at the
National Intelligence Council taking a look at these issues. I
would say that it is a combination of will to fight and
capacity, in effect, and the two of them are issues that are,
as you indicated, quite challenging to provide effective
analysis on. We are looking at different methodologies for
doing so.
Senator King. This is your lane, assessing military
capability, and a big part, as you testified earlier, the
reason the Ukrainian war is going the way it is is that the
Ukrainians are fighting for their land and the Russians do not
have the same will to fight.
I hope that this is something you are focused upon, because
again, I think we failed on this question in Afghanistan, and
in Afghanistan we had testimony over and over that the
government would last 6 months or a year beyond the departure
of United States troops. It lasted minus 2 weeks. Is this
something that you are focused upon?
General Berrier. Senator, I am focused on it, and I really
appreciate this dialogue because I think there is an important
nuance that we have to discuss. One is the will to fight and
the other is the capacity to fight. In closed briefings we
talked about this capacity to fight, and given the correlation
of forces that the Russians had and what the Ukrainians had, it
was the thought of senior analysts that it was not going to go
very well, for a variety of factors.
But there was never an Intelligence Community assessment
that said the Ukrainians lacked the will to fight. Those
assessments talked about their capacity to fight----
Senator King. Yeah, but there was not an assessment that
they did either. The assessment was Ukraine would be overrun in
a matter of weeks. That was grossly wrong.
General Berrier. Grossly wrong but not a question of will
to fight. It was capacity at that time, as the DNI [Director of
National Intelligence] just said.
So we are taking a look at that, and we are----
Senator King. Are you saying Ukrainians' will to fight has
not been an important part of this struggle?
General Berrier. No, I am not saying that. I think it has
been everything.
Senator King. That is what we did not know. Correct?
General Berrier. Well, we assessed their capacity to face
the size of the Russian forces that were amassed on their
border was going to be very difficult for them.
Senator King. Well, I all I am saying is the Intelligence
Community needs to do a better job on this issue.
General Berrier. I think the Intelligence Community did a
great job on this issue, Senator, and we will----
Senator King. General, how can you possibly say that when
we were told, explicitly, Kyiv would fall in 3 days and Ukraine
would fall in 2 weeks? You are telling me that was accurate
intelligence?
General Berrier. We were really focused on the Russian
forces at the time, and so when we backed----
Senator King. We were wrong about that too, were we not? We
overestimated the Russians.
General Berrier. Well, the Intelligence Community did a
great job in predicting and talking----
Senator King. I acknowledged that at the beginning of my
question. I understand that. Yes, they did. What they failed at
was predicting what was going to happen after Russia invaded.
General Berrier. As I look at the totality of the entire
operation I think the enormity rests on the predictions of what
the Russians were going to do versus whether or not the
Ukrainians were going to be successful.
Senator King. Well, if you do not concede there was a
problem on this then we have got a problem.
General Berrier. Senator, I did not say that. We are going
to take a hard look at this, but I think in the totality of the
entire operation there were a lot more successes than failures.
Senator King. I will not argue that point. I am just trying
to make a point that I think there was a major issue that we
missed that had a significant influence on how this has
unfolded, and had we had a better handle on the prediction we
could have done more to assist the Ukrainians earlier.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Hawley, please.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Haines and General, is it your sense that Beijing
thinks that it has a window of opportunity to invade Taiwan
before Taiwan and the United States modernize and get into
better position to deter any such invasion? Let us start with
you, Director.
Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. It is our view that they
are working hard to effectively put themselves into a position
in which their military is capable of taking Taiwan over our
intervention. We can talk in closed session about timelines and
so on for how quickly they think they may be able to achieve
that, but I think that is something that they are trying to
achieve, even as, what General Berrier stated earlier is true,
which is to say that they would prefer not to have to use
military force to take Taiwan. They would prefer to use other
means.
Senator Hawley. General, do you want to comment on this?
General Berrier. Well, I know there are a lot of dates out
there, Senator--2027, 2030, 2049. Certainly it is on their
mind. We are not really sure what lessons Xi Jinping is taking
away from this conflict right now. We would hope that they
would be the right ones. But I think it is going to take some
time to sort out whether or not he believes this is a window or
that his timeline would extend.
Senator Hawley. Let me ask you about something that Admiral
Davidson said when he was Commander of PACOM [Pacific Command].
He told the committee last March that he worried about a
Chinese invasion of Taiwan in the next 6 years. That is his
testimony. His successor, Admiral Aquilino, has similarly said
that he views the timeline to be shrinking.
Based on the indicators--Director, let me start with you on
this--based on the indicators available to the Intelligence
Community, do you agree that the threat to Taiwan is acute
between now and 2030?
Ms. Haines. Yes. I think it is fair to say that it is
critical or acute between now and 2030. I think that is
absolutely fair. What is hard to tell is how, for example,
whatever lessons China learns coming out of the Russia-Ukraine
crisis might affect that time, as well as, as you indicated,
whether or not our capabilities, Taiwan's capabilities, other
decisions that will have to be made between now and then that
will affect the timeline.
Senator Hawley. General, you said just a second ago that
you hoped China would learn some lessons from the Ukraine
conflict. What is it that you are hoping that they take away?
General Berrier. Just how difficult a cross-strait invasion
might be and how dangerous and high risk that might be. We
saw----
Senator Hawley. Sorry. But do you not think that the
Chinese military is significantly more capable than the
Russians? As it turns out, just to pick up what Senator King
was pressing you on, we pretty dramatically overestimated the
strength of the Russian military. I would be surprised, for
one, if China's military strength proves to so attenuated. I
mean, do you not think that we are dealing with a significantly
more formidable adversary in China?
General Berrier. I think China is a formidable adversary.
Senator Hawley. So, I mean, back to lessons learned.
Unfortunately, I think one lesson they can draw from the
Ukraine conflict is that deterrence did not work in Ukraine. I
mean, Russia invaded Ukraine. I, for one, do not want to be
having this conversation about Taiwan in any period of years,
not next year, not in 5 years, not in 10 years.
So my sense of urgency on this is we better figure out how
deterrence is going to work in Taiwan, because if China is
successful in a fait accompli that is going to look a lot
different than a Russian scenario in Ukraine. Would you not
agree with that?
General Berrier. I do agree with that.
Senator Hawley. So just to that end, Director, let me come
back to you. One of the things that the Intelligence Community
was able to give us lead time on was a potential Russian
invasion of Ukraine. I mean, we are very clear on that, that
there was a strong likelihood of that, and you had that month
in advance, actually.
I am curious if you think that we would get similar
strategic warning about a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan?
Ms. Haines. I mean, it is too early to tell, honestly,
whether or not that would be the case, and obviously, you know,
in a kind of classic intelligence way we would sure as hell not
promise anything at this stage.
Senator Hawley. General, let me ask you about something
that has long been a concern of mine, and even more so now, and
that is what I think of as the simultaneity problem,
simultaneous conflicts in Western Europe, with Russia and with
China.
Do you worry that Beijing might see an opportunity to
invade Taiwan in the very near future, should the United States
get drawn into an actual conflict, a kinetic conflict with
Russia?
General Berrier. I think that is a remote possibility.
Senator Hawley. Which part is remote?
General Berrier. The part that China would see that as a
window to open to take advantage of that, based on the fact
that they probably are not ready to do that right now.
Senator Hawley. So you do not think they have the capacity
right now to invade Taiwan?
General Berrier. I did not say that.
Senator Hawley. Well, I am trying to drill down on what you
mean when you say that they would not do it.
General Berrier. I think they probably have--actually,
could we take this into the closed session?
Senator Hawley. Sure. Yeah, absolutely. My time has expired
so I will take it up with you then.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
Senator Manchin, please.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Sir, just real quick, back on Taiwan again. Do you think
Taiwan is prepared to defend itself? In your evaluation of what
Taiwan has been doing, the only thing I keep seeing is they
want more F-16s, and we think they are going to be able to go
to air war with China and defend Taiwan? I do not think so.
General Berrier. I think Taiwan could do more, sir.
Senator Manchin. Are you all strategically giving them
different things that they can use, whether it be in the sea or
on land, to protect their island?
General Berrier. I think they are in close consultation
with our partners in INDOPACOM and within the Department of
Defense.
Senator Manchin. Mm-hmm. How about Ukraine? Can Ukraine win
now that we have, as Senator King so rightfully pointed out and
Senator Hawley followed up on, we misread that one. Are we
reading it now, they have the ability to win if we continue to
support, without us being pulled into a land war with them? On
their own, can they win?
General Berrier. I think that is a difficult prediction to
make. Right now I think where the agency is at is a prolonged
stalemate should no factor change on either side. In other
words, the Russians continue to do what they are doing, and we
continue to do what we are doing for the Ukrainians. I see that
as a stalemate, not a----
Senator Manchin. Director Haines, how do you evaluate this?
I am sure that you have been kept up to speed on this and
evaluating them. My other concern you might want to answer is
our ability to maintain and manufacture the weapons that are
needed to not only help Ukraine, not only to backfill our
allies, but also keep our own supply chains up. Are we running
critically low? Could it be that we could put ourselves in a
dangerous situation?
Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. I think a few things. One
is, just taking your last question first, something we can do
maybe a little bit in closed session is talk about not just our
military assistance to Ukraine but also a number of other
countries that have provided military assistance to Ukraine.
Senator Manchin.--ask the question, are you concerned about
the ability to have the supplies that are needed for us, for
our allies, and what Ukraine is going to need to sustain and
hopefully win this war?
Ms. Haines. So that is why I was talking about the allies
piece. No, I am not concerned because I think, frankly, between
all of us there is the capacity to provide the kind of
assistance that they are asking for.
Senator Manchin. Okay. Can you identify the hot spots we
are very much concerned about, other than China, because we
know China is the challenge we have. Other hot spots that we
are worried about that could rise up during this very difficult
time, and the geopolitical interests that we have in the world.
I mean, in Iran? North Korea? Some of the one you are more
watching and concerned about.
General Berrier. The agency is worried about North Korea
for sure, and their ballistic missile development timeline, as
well as potential nuclear testing. We are always thinking about
Iran and the actions that they have to pull malign influence
within the region against our neighbors and certainly United
States forces there. We are always thinking through how to
sustain partnerships to be able to keep a beat on these
threats.
Senator Manchin. Director Haines, are you concerned about
basically the tensions that we have with UAE [United Arab
Emirates] and with Saudis and also their more visual movements,
intentional movements towards China for support or basically
the yuan being used now as the currency that they are accepting
for payment of energy, things of this sort that could also put
us in a more precarious situation with UAE and Saudis?
Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. I mean, obviously, as you
indicate, we are always looking at efforts that both China and
Russia make to try to make inroads with partners of ours across
the world, and UAE and Saudi Arabia are examples of that in
both respects.
Senator Manchin. Cybersecurity is my final one for you all.
Right now it seems like it is a convoluted area where people
would report, whether it is private companies in America that
are getting hacked and what is going on but also who is in
charge? Where do they go? What is the chain right now within
the Federal Government, in military especially, on cyber, that
you consider the premier spot that we should be working with,
or are we putting things together? Are we still so fragmented
throughout our agencies?
Ms. Haines. I mean, my experience is it has gotten better
over the years. I would never say it is perfect. It is one of
those things that continues to be worked through. But there is
a very clear chain of command with respect to taking action----
Senator Manchin. Who is taking the lead? Who takes the
lead?
Ms. Haines. When it comes to offensive cyber operations to
defend the country, obviously the Department of Defense does
so. When it comes to defending, you know, helping to defend the
infrastructure and critical--right, exactly, resilience--it is
the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI, and everybody
has a role to play, and we obviously support, in the
Intelligence Community, all of them in the work that they are
doing.
Senator Manchin. What about the National Cybersecurity--how
about the center? How do you all evaluate the National
Cybersecurity Center?
Ms. Haines. You mean the National Cybersecurity Director,
the new position----
Senator Manchin. All the stakeholders are involved in that.
That is why I am saying it is convoluted. Who is taking the
lead? Who is the lead person? Who is the lead agency?
Senator King. CISA [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Administration].
Ms. Haines. Yeah, CISA is the main----
Senator Manchin. How do you evaluate that?
Ms. Haines. I think they are doing very well, yeah.
Senator Manchin. Okay. No further questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Manchin.
Senator Sullivan, please.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
thank the witnesses for their hard work during a challenging
time. I want to focus a lot on the issue of energy, and I will
relay a story I had with Senator McCain and a Russian dissident
who has now been arrested, Vladimir Kura-Murza. He is in jail
right now in Russia.
About 4 years ago, I asked him what was the number one
thing we could do to undermine the corrupt Russian regime, to
undermine Vladimir Putin, and he said, ``The number one thing?
That is easy, Senator. Produce more American energy.'' Produce
more American energy.
So I want to talk a little bit about that. In your
assessment, is energy independence--so a couple of years ago we
were the largest producer of natural gas in the world, the
largest producer of oil in the world, the largest producer if
renewables in the world--is that good for America's national
security, General?
General Berrier. Senator, thanks for the question. As we
have watched this conflict unfold what we----
Senator Sullivan. I have a got a lot of questions. I gave
you a softball. Can you answer the question? Is that good for
America's national security to be energy independent and the
world's energy superpower?
General Berrier. Certainly energy independence is a good
thing.
Senator Sullivan. How about you, Director?
Ms. Haines. Yes.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. Thank you for the straightforward
answer.
Now, in this conflict with Ukraine, what does our ability
to produce energy, how do the Russians view that and how do our
allies view that? We all know Vladimir Putin uses energy as a
weapon. How are you assessing the ability of the United States
to fill the void that the Germans and others have with regard
to getting energy from Russia to now get it from the United
States? Is there a lot of interest in that and is that a good
thing for our national security? General?
General Berrier. I certainly believe that our European
allies see this as a national security issue for sure, and they
are thinking through new ways of developing and getting after
their energy needs, for sure.
Senator Sullivan. How about getting some from the United
States?
General Berrier. If the United States had excess capacity I
am sure that would be something that they would welcome.
Senator Sullivan. Do you see that, Director, similarly?
Ms. Haines. Yes.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask with regard to China. Almost
70 percent of China's crude oil supply came in the form of
imports. What is your assessment of how China's energy
dependence could or would impact its military operations during
a potential cross-strait conflict? In your assessment, when you
read up on China's weaknesses, are they concerned about their
energy dependence with regard to national gas and oil being a
major, major importer?
General Berrier. If there is a way we could take this into
the closed session to discuss that, that would be better,
Senator.
Senator Sullivan. Okay.
General Berrier. I do believe they are concerned about
their dependence on energy.
Senator Sullivan. Director?
Ms. Haines. Yes, absolutely.
Senator Sullivan. Do you see that as a strategic advantage
we have in our great power competition with China and Russia,
the fact that we cannot only produce energy for our own
country--and I am talking all of the above--renewables, oil,
gas. Do you see that as a strategic advantage for our Nation?
General Berrier. I see it as an advantage.
Ms. Haines. Yeah. I mean, I think, frankly, our capacity to
work with our allies on this issue has been a strategic
advantage, and our ability to work with them in order to
actually help to mitigate against Russia using energy as a
weapon has been a major issue.
Senator Sullivan. China's dependence on energy, should
there be some kind of conflict between us and China?
Ms. Haines. Yes. The relationship with Russia will be
relevant under those circumstances, obviously.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask one final question, and it is
not really a question on intel. You know, we are getting ready
to vote here on a $40 billion package. My team and I are
looking through it. It is a lot. How do you assess our NATO
partners' commitment, finally, to hitting 2 percent of their
GDP for their annual military budgets? I mean, we have now
100,000 troops over in Europe. I fully support what the
President has been doing in that regard. But if there was ever
a time that countries had to kind of wake up and say, you know
what, for 40 years we promised it at 2 percent. The wolf is at
the door, or maybe the bear is at the door, or the dragon is at
the door, whatever metaphor you want.
Are you seeing a shift? Because the Germans made a big
announcement. My understanding is Canada still will not even
hit 1 percent of GDP for their defense budget. Are you seeing a
shift in our NATO allies to say, you know what, it is time for
us to pull our own weight here. The Americans are doing it,
once again. Look, I support everything we are doing, but, you
know, $40 billion, that is a lot of money. My constituents have
got a lot of needs too, and we still have NATO allies, Canada
one, who just freeload, and it is getting a little tiring.
What is your assessment of our NATO partners' commitment to
finally hitting 2 percent now that it is very clear that there
is a brutal dictator on their doorstep?
Ms. Haines. I think we have seen, obviously, as you
indicated in the opening to your question, just a number of
countries now announce an increase in their defense budget, and
I think that is something that we are going to see them follow
through on, at least in part.
Senator Sullivan. General?
General Berrier. I think this has had a galvanizing effect
on our NATO partners, and I think most of them will come
around.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, and again, I did not start by
saying the intel you were providing us and everybody else prior
to the war was exceptional, and the intel ops that you did were
also really impressive. So I appreciate that.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
Senator Peters, please.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Haines, the 2022 Annual Threat Assessment states,
quote, ``China presents the broadest, most active and
persistent cyber espionage threat to the United States
Government and private sector networks,'' end of quote. The
assessment specifically discusses the capacity for China to
conduct surveillance as well as disrupt critical
infrastructure.
My question for you, ma'am, is does the ODNI [Office of the
Director of National Intelligence] believe that China would use
their cyber capacity to shape other countries' decisions such
as the Russians are known to do? Do you believe that is in the
cards as well?
Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. Yes. I mean, I think in the
sense that, in particular, our assessment is that China is
pursuing significant cyber capabilities, in this area in
particular, to deter the United States from taking action in
the event of a conflict, for example, in their region.
Senator Peters. Thank you. Media coverage during the weeks
leading up to Russia's invasion often used open-source evidence
to support the Administration's intelligence estimates.
Examples here range from images provided by Maxar's commercial
satellite network to Russian military communications that were
intercepted by tech-savvy civilians.
My question for you, General Berrier, is how is the
proliferation of technology and information accessibility for
average citizens impacting the realm of professional
intelligence work within your agency?
General Berrier. From the perspective of this war between
Russia and Ukraine the plethora of open-source data that is
available to enrich our assessments has been amazing. Just
think of the third-party damage assessment work that is
happening right now using images because most Ukrainian
citizens have a cellphone. It has been really, really rich, and
then you combine it with the other open-source data that is
available, publicly available, and can be purchased.
For us it has been enlightening and will probably shape how
we do intelligence operations and analysis going forward in the
future. We just have to be careful that we use the right rules
at the right time to make sure that we are safeguarding
information and that we are not violating any laws or policies.
Senator Peters. That actually leads to the next question,
and you mentioned you are looking at how you integrate that
into how you collect information. Is there anything that
Congress should be doing to help you better enable your
abilities to harness the potential for open-source information?
General Berrier. I think we are budgeted for it, Senator,
and we are looking forward to the work ahead as we go forward
on this issue.
Senator Peters. Good.
Director Haines, the Biden administration has done an
admirable job certainly of crafting a coalition of nations to
impose sanctions, enforce export controls against Russia for
their illegal invasion. This includes our trans-Atlantic
partners, many of them who are now giving up on Russian
hydrocarbons, something that I think we all would have thought
was absolutely unthinkable just a short while ago, as well as
our global partners, Japan and Taiwan, actively engaged.
What has been noticeable, though, is to see that much of
the world is still not with us. They may not be with Russia,
and I am not saying they are with Russia, but they are not
subscribing to our call for a global coalition of democracies
to stand against Ukraine. This includes India, Indonesia,
Nigeria, South Africa, and particularly other nations in the
global south in which the United States certainly has very
friendly relations with but we have not yet been able to get
them to join the Ukrainian cause.
As the United States will need to certainly build an even
more robust coalition of nations in the future to counter
potential Chinese aggression, I believe it is imperative that
the United States understand how to win over these non-aligned
nations living certainly in a multi-polar world.
So my question to you, in your view what steps should the
United States take to build a broader coalition for potential
future conflicts, similar to what we are seeing right now?
Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. From the Intelligence
Community perspective we have done a lot of thinking about how
we can help to facilitate, frankly, the policy community in
this area, to your point, and one of the things that we did in
the context of Ukraine that I think is possible for us to do in
other areas, and that we have discussed with the policy
community about, is basically working key allies and partners
who are influencers, in effect, within specific regions, to try
to get out to them as much intelligence as we can, obviously
being mindful of sources and methods. But just to lay the
groundwork so that then the policy community can work with
those countries to effectively provide for the kind of
coalition that you describe.
I do think it is an absolutely fundamental piece. I mean,
the fact that the UN (United Nations) General Assembly managed
to garner 141 votes, I think it was, against Russia on the
Russia-Ukraine piece was pretty extraordinary. I do think that
our capacity to share intelligence in advance of that moment
was critical to getting that kind of coalition together, and I
hope we can do that in the future.
Senator Peters. Great. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters.
Senator Rosen, please.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed, and I really
appreciate the witnesses. I appreciate you both for being here
today and for your service.
Director Haines and General Berrier, given that the Annual
Threat Assessment was written before Russia's invasion of
Ukraine, has Russia's loss and expenditure of military
equipment, personnel, and resources in Ukraine, coupled with
their, frankly, poor performance, changed our overall threat of
Russia and their military capabilities, and--like I said, this
was written before that--how do you assess we may need to
adjust our planning going forward, seeing as what we are
learning?
General Berrier. I will start with that one, Senator. I
think, you know, as we have watched the Russians falter here
and the losses that they have sustained we believe that they
are going to be set back conventionally for a number of years
as they try to recoup these losses and replace all of the
equipment and soldiers that they have lost.
I think we should back up our assessment really for NATO
and what that threat really looks like, also factoring in their
nuclear capabilities and what that means for NATO going
forward.
Ms. Haines. I will just add to this. I think, as we talk to
the analysts about this, and obviously before each of the
threat hearings we discussed this because the threat hearings
came after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and as you indicate
the assessment was done beforehand, and I think the overall
threat level has not so much changed as it is the question of
how it is evolving, to General Berrier's point.
I think our view is that the ground combat forces have been
degraded considerably. It is going to take them years to
basically manage, to the extent that they are able, to rebuild
that, in effect, and that may end up meaning that they have
greater reliance, in effect, on asymmetric tools during this
period. So they rely more on things like cyber, nuclear,
precision, et cetera, and that is obviously a shift in the way
in which they are exercising their efforts for influence, and
so on.
Senator Rosen. Well, and knowing that we also know, to
everyone else's point here too, that the world is watching. So
Director Haines, how do you assess the threat level to Taiwan?
Has it increased? Does China feel more emboldened now that
Russia has invaded Ukraine? Then I will give the second part of
that to you, General. Does China see this as an opportunity,
maybe this period, to invade Ukraine as we might be distracted,
the world might be distracted with the Ukraine crisis?
Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. It is hard to tell,
honestly, at this stage. What we see is evaluating what is
happening in the Russia-Ukraine crisis. They are still
evaluating. The crisis obviously still continues. So what
lessons they learn during this period is not really concluded
yet, and so it is a little bit harder to tell whether or not is
an increased threat of accelerating their efforts toward Taiwan
or less so.
I would say that thus far the IC has not assessed that the
Russia-Ukraine crisis is likely to accelerate their plan, vis-
a-vis Taiwan, and the kinds of lessons that we think are
possible that are relevant, just to give you maybe two, one is
they were surprised by the degree to which the United States
and Europe came together to enact sanctions, and that is
something, obviously, they are going to be looking at in the
context of Taiwan.
The second one, I think, is this point that really General
Berrier made earlier a little bit, which is to say that one of
the issues for them is the confidence they have that they are
able militarily to take action in Taiwan over our intervention.
That will play into their decision-making over time, we think,
and seeing what happened in Russia, that might give them less
confidence, in some respects, over what it is that is likely to
happen.
General Berrier. Senator, the only thing that I would add
is on a day-to-day basis with Chinese military activity I am
not seeing anything that would tell me that they are thinking
about trying to take advantage of this time that they think
that they might have.
Senator Rosen. Let me ask one additional follow-up on that.
What is your assessment of our ability to conduct military
operations in both theaters should something occur?
General Berrier. We have significant capabilities in both
theaters. It would depend on what the variables were with each
situation and what that meant. But that is why we have four-
star combatant commanders in USEUCOM [United States European
Command] and INDOPACOM.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rosen, and
thank you, Madam Director and General. We have a vote scheduled
at 11:45. We will reconvene in SVC-217 for the classified
session at noon, 12 o'clock.
At this time I will recess or adjourn the open session.
Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
anomalous health incidents
1. Senator Shaheen. Director Haines, I am concerned with the
seemingly conflicting information provided by the Intelligence
Community (IC) through the release of unclassified summaries of reports
by Central Intelligence Agency-led working group and an Intelligence
Community expert panel in late January and early-February 2022,
respectively. How is the IC improving coordination within the IC and
interagency on future releases, increasing transparency with the public
and enhancing communication with victims?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
2. Senator Shaheen. Lieutenant General Berrier, did the Defense
Intelligence Agency substantively contribute to either the Central
Intelligence Agency-led or IC expert panel reports?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
3. Senator Shaheen. Lieutenant General Berrier, does the Defense
Intelligence Agency agree with the findings of those reports?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
4. Senator Shaheen. Lieutenant General Berrier, does the Defense
Intelligence Agency have additional information beyond what is
contained in those reports that you believe would serve to further
inform Congress on this matter and, if so, will you transmit that
information, consistent with the appropriate security clearance
protocols?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King
china commission
I believe we must establish an unbiased and non-partisan commission
to examine a grand strategy for our approach to China, similar in
intent to President Eisenhower's Solarium Project. We need to think of
a holistic approach to create a stable international order in which
China (or Russia) cannot dictate regional developments.
5. Senator King. Director Haines, LTG Berrier, in order to avoid
the US trying to ``spend our way out of conflict,'' what are China's
primary areas of influence the United States and allies should focus on
countering that will provide the most significant impact?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
6. Senator King. Director Haines, LTG Berrier what would be the
greatest benefit this commission could deliver?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
7. Senator King. Director Haines, LTG Berrier what would put us in
the best position to avoid the United States and China from escalating
conflict and careening into a war with China?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
8. Senator King. Director Haines, LTG Berrier, what are the
`toughest problems' OUTSIDE of military imbalances?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
bureau of cyber statistics
Director Haines, in the hearing you stated: ``And these categories
of--often overlap Cybercrime, for example, is a transnational threat,
while also being a threat that emanates from state actors. One of the
key challenges of this era is assessing how various threats and trends
are likely to intersect so as to identify where their interactions may
result in fundamentally greater risk to our interests than one might
otherwise expect or where they introduce new opportunities.'' I believe
that it is time to establish a Bureau of Cyber Statistics.
9. Senator King. Director Haines, how do you think the IC, DoD, and
commercial enterprises would benefit from a BCS and CISA compiling and
analyzing cyberattack and cyber probing activities?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni K. Ernst
worldwide threats
10. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier, China continues to
posture and prepares to invade Taiwan, Russia invaded Ukraine 77 days
ago, and the threat of terrorism against the Homeland has increased,
all in the last year. Deterrence by appeasement and negotiation has
proven in most theaters Since January 2021, have global threats to the
US decreased in any region of the world?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
global security
11. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier where has the United
States neutralized or slowed the momentum of any great power or violent
extremist threat?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
brics security partnership
12. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier the economic
partnership of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, known as
BRICS has increased their share of global GDP threefold in the past 15
years. Do you have concerns that this economic partnership is a pre-
cursor for a collective security partnership?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
brics security partnership
13. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier what options on the
table do we have to interdict that?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
russia/china relations
14. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier specifically,
regarding Russia and China going forward - what does the future of this
relationship look like in your view, and what future security
cooperation is in their plans?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
china belt and road
15. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier, China's military
basing interests span multiple countries along Africa's Atlantic,
Indian Ocean, Red Sea, and Mediterranean coasts. What are some of the
concerns you have with China expanding its military and logistical
footprints?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
china belt and road
16. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier, what steps are being
taken to counter China and its desire to implement the Belt and Road
initiative?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
china and iran
17. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier, how will this deal
deepen China's influence within the Middle East and undercut our
efforts to isolate Iran and its terrorist proxies, and what can be done
to disrupt this partnership?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
critical minerals
18. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier, the critical
minerals requirement will increase as much as seventeen-fold between
now and 2040. If we do not pursue domestic mining or ally-shored mining
for critical minerals like copper, lithium, and cobalt, we will reach
an unacceptable level of risk regarding our energy security?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
transitioning energy
19. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier, what is your
assessment of the risks associated with energy transition? How can we
buy down that risk?
Lieutenant General Berrier. A globally based clean energy
transition would shift the primary energy mix away from carbon-
intensive fuels toward low-carbon energy sources. Although the share of
fossil fuels in the global energy mix has remained at approximately 80
percent for decades, the International Energy Agency forecasts a
decline to about 50 percent by 2050 based on the collective pledges of
global nations. We anticipate a probable risk will be supply, demand,
and service shortages because of the scale of the transfer from largely
centralized energy production systems to a distributed power generation
model to provide energy during peak use periods.
Mismatches between the demand and supply reductions could bring
price and service volatility as hydrocarbon demand declines, according
to an intergovernmental agency report. Exporters with low-cost
resources hold an oil and gas production advantage during a demand-
driven energy transition, which could exacerbate disruptions in major
producing countries and significantly affect global supply and prices,
according to the same report. The prospects of social and political
turmoil in some producing countries probably will increase during the
energy transition period as lower global oil and gas demand puts
financial strains on those that rely heavily on hydrocarbon revenues.
Globally available alternative energy technologies--such as solar
photovoltaics and wind--are subject to risks arising from trade in
energy producing and distribution equipment and raw materials,
according to an intergovernmental agency report. Critical raw material
supplies are of particular concern because many clean energy
technologies are mineral intensive and supplies are more concentrated
in a smaller number of countries than oil and natural gas supplies,
according to an academic report. China continues to seek and secure
rare-earth minerals and associated mining rights that are essential in
these technologies, according to the same report.
A survey of institutional investors on required rates of return for
new energy projects found that uncertainties associated with the energy
transition have already started to alter the risk preferences of
investors in fossil fuel projects, according to an academic energy
research institute. Investors are demanding a much higher rate of
return to justify investments in oil and coal projects. These changes
in risk preferences probably will affect the volume of available
supplies if there is insufficient investment into the sector, which may
lead to potential price volatility depending on demand projections.
DIA does not provide analysis on how the United States could buy
down energy transition risks. This question is outside of our defense
intelligence mandate. We defer this question to other United States
Agencies, Departments, and U.S. policymakers who may have specific
recommendations on how to reduce energy transition risks.
ally shoring, energy
20. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier, are other countries,
particularly in South America, open to working with the United States
to secure energy supply chains as it relates to oil and natural gas?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
nuclear threat, iran deal
21. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, Lieutenant General Berrier, do
you believe that Iran's threat and aggression toward the Middle East is
likely to be worse in the context of a renewed nuclear agreement or in
the absence of one?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Berrier. In the absence of a renewed nuclear
agreement, Tehran is likely to take more aggressive nuclear, cyber,
diplomatic, and military steps to impose costs, demonstrate resolve,
and increase leverage for potential future negotiations. If an
agreement is reached, Tehran likely would seek to avoid regional
actions in the short term that it views could jeopardize sanctions
relief, although the regime will balance such caution with a perceived
need to respond to adversary action. Over the long term, Tehran almost
certainly will continue to take destabilizing actions in the region
consistent with its goal of establishing itself as a leading power in
the Middle East, including attacks against United States and partner
interests.
counter terrorism in west africa
22. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, Lieutenant General Berrier, the
2022 Worldwide Threat Assessment notes that ``al Qaeda remains intent
on striking United States interests; it is more capable of striking
U.S. interests in the regions where its affiliates operate rather than
in the Homeland. The primary threat to the United States abroad from al
Qaeda emanates from the countries where its strongest affiliates
currently operate--Yemen, Somalia, and West Africa--and will vary based
on local circumstances.'' Global counterterrorism pressure is shifting
as the United States and its allies and partners reprioritize to other
more pressing threats, including global-power competition. In the Sahel
region of West Africa, the United States has relied on France as the
primary partner to contain the al Qaeda and Islamic State threats in
Mali. The French are now withdrawing. How will the changing
counterterrorism posture in the Sahel affect the global terror threat?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
wagner group, west africa
23. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, Lieutenant General Berrier, how
is the presence of Russian Wagner Group mercenaries affecting state
fragility in the Sahel region of West Africa and terrorist recruitment
in this region?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
critical technologies
24. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, Lieutenant General Berrier,
China continues to steal technologies from United States small
businesses. What three or four specific technologies do you believe are
the most important for the U.S. to protect right now? I am asking for
specific technologies, not broad categories.
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
intelligence support
25. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, Lieutenant General Berrier,
what types of intelligence support your assessments on al Qaeda and
ISIS-K threat assessments?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
intelligence
26. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, Lieutenant General Berrier,
what are our intelligence blind spots, especially in regards to
Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Mali?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
intelligence
27. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, Lieutenant General Berrier,
what is the intelligence community's assessment on foreign fighter
flows--are they going into Afghanistan from Syria and elsewhere?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
non-state threats
28. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, Lieutenant General Berrier, has
the United States shift in resources towards geostrategic competition,
particularly focusing on Ukraine these past six months, created
opportunities for terrorist and non-state maligned actors to expand or
strengthen?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
terrorist uas capabilities
29. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, Lieutenant General Berrier, are
terrorists and non-state actors like al Qaeda, ISIS-K, Houthis, and
Hezbollah seeking UAS capabilities?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
solomon islands
30. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, Lieutenant General Berrier, on
April 19, 2022, China announced it signed a wide-ranging security pact
with the Solomon Islands. I am concerned that the agreement would allow
Chinese naval deployments and basing in the region. What is your
assessment of the additional threat posed by The People's Liberation
Army Navy should the Solomon Islands be used to refuel or host Chinese
ships?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
solomon islands
31. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, Lieutenant General Berrier if
the People's Liberation Army Navy gain access and placement in the
Solomon Islands, what is your assessment of the risk posed to the
United States in the contingency of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
solomon islands
32. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, Lieutenant General Berrier, if
the People's Liberation Army Navy gain access and placement in the
Solomon Islands, what is your assessment of the risk for resupply of
Australia in the event of an emergency, and the additional risk for
United States forces in the region?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
china
33. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, Lieutenant General Berrier,
what is your assessment of the risk of Chinese naval basing in the
Pacific?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
china
34. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, Lieutenant General Berrier,
what is your assessment of the risk of Chinese naval basing on Papa New
Guinea to the United States and Australia?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
china
35. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier, China significantly
expanded military infrastructure in the South China Sea and continue to
fortify their island bases. For example, the Chinese improved Woody
Island to accommodate an enlarged harbor. What is your assessment of
the additional risk posed by these upgrades to U.S. forces in the
region?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
taiwan
36. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier, what is your
assessment of the above in a Taiwan contingency?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
china
37. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier, what is your
assessment of the above as a risk to our allies in the region?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
china/taiwan
38. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier, what is your
assessment of the likelihood the war in Ukraine is altering China's
calculus towards military action on Taiwan?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan S. Sullivan
lessons learned in ukraine
39. Senator Sullivan. Director Haines and Lieutenant General
Berrier, the ongoing and illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine has
profoundly changed the security dynamic in Europe but the
reverberations of this conflict are being felt in the Indo-Pacific. The
surprising ineptitude of the Russian military and European solidarity
manifested in military aid to Ukraine and economic sanctions against
Russia is no doubt causing planners in China and Taiwan to reevaluate
their assumptions about what a cross-Strait military conflict would
look like. As CIA Director William Burns stated this past Saturday, ``I
don't think for a minute that this has eroded Xi's determination over
time to gain control over Taiwan . . . But I think it's something
that's affecting their calculation about how and when they go about
doing that.'' What is your assessment of how the PRC and Taiwan are
analyzing and reacting to the Russia-Ukraine conflict?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
40. Senator Sullivan. Director Haines and Lieutenant General
Berrier, do you assess the war in Ukraine is verifying plans and
assumptions or disrupting them?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
41. Senator Sullivan. Director Haines and Lieutenant General
Berrier, do you assess the PRC's logistics system to be vulnerable to
disruption in a cross-Strait military conflict?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
prc energy vulnerability
42. Senator Sullivan. Director Haines and Lieutenant General
Berrier, do you believe a global interdiction and blockading campaign
against these main maritime supply routes would impact and limit the
PRC's operations in a military conflict?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
proxy groups
43. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Haines, what impact does Wagner's
introduction of novel capabilities in Africa have on United States
operations in the region?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
44. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Haines, how effective are Russian
proxies at anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) with regard to United
States efforts in prosecuting a counterterror campaign in Africa?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
45. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Haines, in July 2020, AFRICOM released a
rare public statement concerning Wagner's role in Libya, what is your
assessment of the immediate and long-term impacts of this statement?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
46. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Haines, what is your assessment of
AFRICOM's public statement on potentially delegitimizing Wagner's
efforts?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
47. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Haines, how did other proxy forces react
to AFRICOM's public statement?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
ukraine
48. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Haines, what is your assessment of
reasoning why Moscow's cyber capabilities have not been leveraged to
the full extent in Ukraine?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
49. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Berrier, how is the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) deterring Beijing's ambitions in
space?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
taliban
50. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Berrier, as Russia and
Iran collaborate to damage United States credibility, how does the IC
approach the security landscape in Afghanistan and Central Asia?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
51. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Berrier, in the past nine
months, to what capacity, if any, have we shared intelligence or have
United States officials met with the Taliban?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
52. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Berrier, what is your
current assessment of Taliban intelligence capabilities in countering
al Qaeda?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
cyber
53. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Haines, what vulnerabilities in the IC
infrastructure have advances in AI/ML highlighted?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
54. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Haines, how is the AI Unity Project
leveraging existing cyber capabilities within the National Intelligence
Agency?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
55. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Haines, what are the short- and long-
term visions for interagency collaboration to enhance the AI Unity
Project?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
somalia
56. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Haines, a recent article quotes an
unnamed senior intelligence official saying, ``there is an uptick in
al-Shabaab activities'' and ``there has been no pressure on al-Shabaab
at this point, and they have freedom of movement.'' With this is mind,
what is the importance of countering-ISIS and al-Shabaab to maintain
our influence in Somalia?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
57. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Haines, how have counterterror
operations been impacted by the reduction in United States troops in
Mogadishu, and how has this changed al-Shabaab's actions?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Josh D. Hawley
58. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Berrier, Russia has sent a
large portion of its military to fight in Ukraine, but there are
reports that it has withheld certain capabilities in order to deter -
or perhaps use against - NATO. Can you confirm that Moscow has withheld
certain forces from the fight in Ukraine, and if so, can you tell us
here what those forces are and why they're being withheld?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
59. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Berrier, the Russian
military is suffering significant losses in Ukraine not just in
manpower, but in munitions, logistics, and other critical resources its
military needs to fight. What is your assessment of how long it will
take Russia to regenerate in response to these losses, particularly
given international sanctions on Russia's defense sector?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
60. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Berrier, what is your
assessment of these losses' impact on Russia's ability to execute a
fait accompli against one of the Baltic states in the next one to five
years?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
61. Senator Hawley. Director Haines, China and Russia declared a
``no limits partnership'' just weeks before Russia's invasion of
Ukraine. Given Russia's performance in the war, how has China
reassessed its relationship with Moscow?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
62. Senator Hawley. Director Haines, do you believe a weakened
Russia diminishes or strengthens China's hand, given the asymmetry of
their partnership?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
63. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Berrier, as we divine
lessons from the conflict in Ukraine, what specific observations is
China making about modern military operations, for example, about the
premium on logistics, the challenges of defense suppression, or the
vulnerability of surface ships to cruise missile attack?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
64. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Berrier, you are aware of
press reports that United States targeting intelligence enabled
Ukraine's killing of Russian generals and the Black Sea cruiser. What
regulates the type and extent of targeting intelligence that the United
States will share with Ukraine?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
65. Senator Hawley. Director Haines, how are the Russians
responding to these public leaks of United States intelligence linked
to the killing of Russian generals?
Director Haines. [Deleted.]
66. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Berrier, has Russia alerted
its non-strategic nuclear forces during the conflict, particularly in
the vicinity of Kaliningrad?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
67. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Berrier, are there any other
indicators that suggest Russian might conduct preemptive escalation?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
68. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Berrier, against what
targets and with what effects would you expect Russian nuclear
employment?
Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
APPENDIX A
The following document was provided by Ms. Haines in lieu
of a written statement.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
APPENDIX B
[The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Scott Berrier
follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[all]