    [Senate Hearing 117-960]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                           S. Hrg. 117-960

                               WORLDWIDE THREATS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                  May 10, 2022

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

    [GRAPHC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                     Available via: http: //www.govinfo.gov

                                    __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    59-770 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2025

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman	JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma

    JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire		ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York		DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut		TOM COTTON, Arkansas
    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii			MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
    TIM KAINE, Virginia			JONI ERNST, Iowa
    ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine		THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
    ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts		DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
    GARY C. PETERS, Michigan		KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
    JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia		RICK SCOTT, Florida
    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois		MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
    JACKY ROSEN, Nevada			JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
    MARK KELLY, Arizona                  	TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama

    		    Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
      		John D. Wason, Minority Staff Director

                             C O N T E N T S

    _________________________________________________________________

                                  may 10, 2022

                                                                       Page

    Worldwide Threats................................................     1

                               Member Statements

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................     1

    Statement of Senator James Inhofe................................     3

                               Witness Statements

    Haines, The Honorable Avril, Director of National Intelligence...     3

    Berrier, Lieutenant General Scott, Director, Defense Intelligence     8
      Agency.

    Questions for the Record.........................................    43

                                   Appendix A

    Document provided by The Honorable Avril Haines in lieu of a         51
      written statement.

                                   Appendix B

    The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Scott Berrier.......    82

                                     (iii)

                               WORLDWIDE THREATS

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, MAY 10, 2022

                                  United States Senate,
                                    Committee on Armed Services
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Manchin,
    Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
    Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Blackburn, and Hawley.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. Good morning. The Committee meets today to
    receive testimony on the worldwide threats facing the United
    States and our international partners.
        I would like to welcome Director of National Intelligence
    Avril Haines and Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
    Lieutenant General Scott D. Berrier. Thank you both for joining
    us, and please convey the committee's gratitude to the men and
    women of the Intelligence Community for their critical work.
        We must start by addressing the illegal war Vladimir Putin
    is waging in Ukraine. Over the past 2\1/2\ months, Russia's
    unprovoked aggression has inflicted horrific suffering upon
    innocent civilians in Ukraine, threatened European security,
    and caused serious consequences for the global economy. In the
    face of this senseless violence, the Ukrainian military has
    performed tremendously, supported by the United States and the
    international community. A formidable array of our global
    allies and partners have joined in solidarity to impose severe
    sanctions on Russia and provide support to Ukraine. We cannot
    overstate the scale and importance of this unity.
        I want to commend the Biden administration and the leaders
    of the Intelligence Community for the unprecedented and
    skillful release of intelligence over the last several months
    that exposed Russia's aggressive intentions and deceitful
    activities ahead of its invasion of Ukraine. Intelligence
    officials are understandably cautious about revealing hard-won
    insights on adversaries, but this strategy has proven highly
    effective in strengthening the international community's
    response and creating dilemmas for Vladimir Putin. This is a
    great example of competing effectively in the information
    domain, and I hope we will continue to make use of this kind of
    creative tradecraft.
        With that in mind, Russia's strategy in Ukraine seems to be
    evolving. Director Haines, General Berrier, I would ask for
    your assessment of the Ukraine conflict in the larger context
    of the evolving international order, as well as the
    implications for the United States' approach to security in the
    European theater going forward.
        We must also stay focused on our long-term strategic
    competition with China. In addition to its economic and socio-
    political growth, China has studied the United States' way of
    war and focused on offsetting our advantages. Beijing has made
    concerning progress in this regard and holds its own expansive
    geostrategic ambitions. As we speak, China is watching how the
    nations of the world respond to Russia. In considering a
    potential invasion of Taiwan, President Xi is scrutinizing
    Putin's playbook and the international response.
        However, there is broad consensus that our comparative
    advantage over China is our network of partners and allies in
    the region and globally. Strengthening that network should be
    at the center of any strategy for the Indo-Pacific region, and
    the maturation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or
    ``Quad,'' involving the United States, Japan, India, and
    Australia, presents a strategic opportunity to establish a
    durable framework.
        I would ask our witnesses to share what military and non-
    military factors are most likely to impact Chinese decision-
    making with respect to potential action against Taiwan.
        Turning to Iran, in the 4 years since then-President Trump
    pulled out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA,
    Iran has made key nuclear advances. It has decreased ``breakout
    time'' to several weeks, from a year under the agreement. It
    has increased uranium enrichment to 60 percent, instead of just
    under 4 percent allowed under the agreement. Iran has hardened
    its infrastructure and replaced damaged equipment with more
    advanced models, and while negotiations to return Iran to the
    JCPOA are in the final stages, the final outcome has not yet
    been determined.
        Beyond its nuclear advances, Iran and Iranian proxies
    continue to mount drone and rocket attacks in the region,
    including against bases in Iraq and Syria with a United States
    military presence. Saudi Arabia, and now also the United Arab
    Emirates have also come under attack. Director Haines, given
    these current dynamics I would like your thoughts on how to
    best de-escalate tensions with Iran while preserving space to
    return to the JCPOA.
        Finally, this year's threat assessment again highlights the
    challenges posed by environmental degradation from climate
    change. I understand it is the DNI's [Director of National
    Intelligence] view that climate change will increasingly
    exacerbate risks to United States national security interests,
    as issues like rising temperatures, poor water governance,
    pollution, changing precipitation patterns, and other climate
    effects are likely to lead to an array of human challenges,
    such as food and water insecurity and threats to human health.
        We live in a complex and dangerous global security
    environment. From Russia's aggression in Europe to China's
    influence in the Indo-Pacific to countless other malign actors
    around the world, prevailing in this environment will require
    resolute, thoughtful strategies.
        I look forward to our witnesses' insights into these
    issues, and I thank them again for their participation.
        Let me now turn to the Ranking Member, Senator Inhofe.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES INHOFE

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in
    welcoming our witnesses.
        When our witnesses testified before this committee last
    year, they provided a dire assessment of the threats to our
    national security. It is clear and, I really cannot overstate
    this, the security situation we face today is significantly
    more dangerous and complex than it has ever been, or certainly
    was a year ago. The Chinese threat is beyond anything we ever
    dealt with before. This year, Beijing announced a 7.1 percent
    defense budget increase. They have had two decades of real
    growth with no signs of slowing down and, as the chairman
    alluded to, Putin's unprovoked aggression against Ukraine shows
    the danger posed by the nuclear-armed Russia to our security,
    those of our allies, and international order.
        Iran's malign behavior continues throughout the Middle
    East, and terrorist groups like ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and
    Syria] and al Qaeda are growing in strength across Africa.
    Despite this reality, President Biden's budget request is
    inadequate. It does not deliver the real growth the military
    needs, and that is the 3 to 5 percent increase that we
    established some 5 years ago. As I have said it before,
    inflation is the new sequestration that we consider today, and
    it is making everything we do more difficult.
        So I look forward to hearing from both of you about how our
    threats have evolved ever since last year and how the
    Intelligence Community is changing to respond to the national
    security strategy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
        Now let me recognize Director Haines.

     STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE AVRIL HAINES, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
                              INTELLIGENCE

        Ms. Haines. Thank you very much, Chairman Reed, Ranking
    Member Inhofe, and Members of the Committee. Thank you for the
    opportunity to speak with you today and to provide testimony
    alongside General Berrier on the intelligence community's
    annual assessment of worldwide threats to United States
    national security.
        Before I start I just want to take a moment to publicly
    thank the men and women of the Intelligence Community for their
    extraordinary work to keep us safe. I know how privileged I am
    to be part of this community of truly talented people, to be
    given a chance to do something useful in service to my country,
    and I thank you for support for their work.
        Broadly speaking, this year's assessment focuses, much like
    last year's assessment, on adversaries and competitors,
    critical transnational threats, and conflicts and instability,
    and these categories often overlap. Cybercrime, for example, is
    a transnational threat while also being a threat that emanates
    from state actors. One of the key challenges of this era is
    assessing how various threats and trends are likely to
    intersect so as to identify where their interactions may result
    in fundamentally greater risk to our interests than one might
    otherwise expect or where they introduce new opportunities.
    This year's Annual Threat Assessment highlights some of these
    connections as it provides the IC's baseline of the most
    pressing threats to United States national security.
        The assessment starts with threats from key state actors,
    beginning with the People's Republic of China (PRC), which
    remains an unparalleled priority for the Intelligence
    Community, and then turns to Russia, Iran, and North Korea. All
    four governments have demonstrated the capability and intent to
    promote their interests in ways that cut against United States
    and allied interests.
        The PRC is coming ever closer to being a peer competitor in
    areas of relevance to national security, is pushing to revise
    global norms and institutions to its advantage, and is
    challenging the United States in multiple arenas--economically,
    militarily, and technologically. China is especially effective
    at bringing together a coordinated, whole-of-government
    approach to demonstrated strength and to compel neighbors to
    acquiesce to its preference, including its territorial and
    maritime claims and assertions of sovereignty over Taiwan.
        A key area of focus for the IC is President Xi Jinping's
    determination to force unification with Taiwan on Beijing's
    terms. China would prefer coerced unification that avoids armed
    conflict, and it has been stepping up diplomatic, economic, and
    military pressure on the island for years to isolate it and
    weaken confidence in its democratically elected leaders. At the
    same time, Beijing is prepared to use military force if it
    decides this is necessary.
        The PRC is also engaged in the largest-ever nuclear force
    expansion and arsenal diversification in its history. It is
    working to match or exceed United States capabilities in space
    and presents the broadest, most active and persistent cyber
    espionage threat to United States Government and private sector
    networks.
        Russia, of course, also remains a critical priority and is
    a significant focus right now in light of President Putin's
    tragic invasion of Ukraine in February, which has produced a
    shock to the geopolitical order with implications for the
    future that we are only beginning to understand but are sure to
    be consequential. The IC, as you know, provided warning of
    President Putin's plans, but this is a case where I think all
    of us wish we had been wrong.
        Russia's failure to rapidly seize Kyiv and overwhelm
    Ukrainian forces has deprived Moscow of the quick military
    victory that it had originally expected would prevent the
    United States and NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]
    from being able to provide meaningful military aid to Ukraine.
    The Russians met with more resistance from Ukraine than they
    expected, and their own military's performance revealed a
    number of significant internal challenges, forcing them to
    adjust their initial military objectives, fall back from Kyiv,
    and focus on the Donbas.
        The next month or two of fighting will be significant as
    the Russians attempt to reinvigorate their efforts, but even if
    they are successful we are not confident that the fight in the
    Donbas will effectively end the war. We assess President Putin
    is preparing for prolonged conflict in Ukraine, during which he
    still intends to achieve goals beyond the Donbas. We assess
    that Putin's strategic goals are probably not changed,
    suggesting he regards the decision in late March to refocus
    Russian forces on the Donbas as only a temporary shift to
    regain the initiative after the Russian military's failure to
    capture Kyiv.
        His current near-term military objectives are to capture
    the two oblasts in Donetsk and Luhansk with a buffer zone,
    encircle Ukrainian forces from the north and the south to the
    west of the Donbas in order to crush the most capability and
    well-equipped Ukrainian forces who are fighting to hold the
    line in the east, consolidate control of the land bridge Russia
    has established from Crimea to the Donbas, occupy Kherson, and
    control the water source for Crimea that is to the north. We
    also see indications that the Russian military wants to extend
    the land bridge to Transnistria.
        While the Russian forces may be capable of achieving most
    of these near-term goals in the coming months, we believe that
    they will not be able to extend control over a land bridge that
    stretches to Transnistria and includes Odessa without launching
    some form of mobilization. It is increasingly unlikely that
    they will be able to establish control over both oblasts and
    the buffer zone they desire in the coming weeks.
        But Putin most likely also judges that Russia has a greater
    ability and willingness to endure challenges than his
    adversaries, and he is probably counting on United States and
    EU [European Union] resolve to weaken as food shortages,
    inflation, energy prices get worse.
        Moreover, as both Russia and Ukraine believe they can
    continue to make progress militarily, we do not see a viable
    negotiating path forward, at least in the short term. The
    uncertain nature of the battle, which is developing into a war
    of attrition, combined with the reality that Putin faces a
    mismatch between his ambitions and Russia's current
    conventional military capabilities likely means the next few
    months could see us moving along a more unpredictable and
    potentially escalatory trajectory. At the very least, we
    believe the dichotomy will usher in a period of more ad hoc
    decision-making in Russia, both with respect to the domestic
    adjustments required to sustain this push as well as the
    military conflict with Ukraine and the West.
        The current trend increases the likelihood that President
    Putin will turn to more drastic means, including imposing
    martial law, reorienting industrial production, or potentially
    escalatory and military actions to free up the resources needed
    to achieve his objectives as the conflict drags on or if he
    perceives Russia is losing in Ukraine. The most likely
    flashpoints for escalation in the coming weeks are around
    increasing Russian attempts to interdict Western security
    assistance, retaliation for Western economic sanctions, or
    threats to the regime at home.
        We believe that Moscow continues to use nuclear rhetoric to
    deter the United States and the West from increasing lethal aid
    to Ukraine and to respond to public comments that the United
    States and NATO allies that suggest expanded Western goals in
    the conflict. If Putin perceives that the United States is
    ignoring his threats he may try to signal to Washington the
    heightened danger of its support to Ukraine by authorizing
    another large nuclear exercise involving a major dispersal of
    mobile intercontinental missiles, heavy bombers, strategic
    submarines.
        We otherwise continue to believe that President Putin would
    probably only authorize the use of nuclear weapons of he
    perceived an existential threat to the Russian state or regime,
    but we will remain vigilant in monitoring every aspect of
    Russia's strategic nuclear forces. With tensions this high
    there is always an enhanced potential for miscalculation,
    unintended escalation which we hope our intelligence can help
    to mitigate.
        Beyond its invasion of Ukraine, Moscow presents a serious
    cyber threat, a key space competitor, and one of the most
    serious foreign influence threats to the United States. Using
    its intelligence services proxies, wide-ranging influence
    tools, the Russian Government seeks to not only pursue its own
    interests but also to divide Western alliances, undermine
    United States global standing, amplify discord inside the
    United States, and influence United States voters and decision-
    making.
        To finish with our state actor threats, the Iranian regime
    continues to threaten United States interests as it tries to
    erode United States influence in the Middle East and trends its
    influence and project power in neighboring states and minimize
    threats to regime stability. Meanwhile, Kim Jong-un continues
    to steadily expand and enhance Pyongyang nuclear and
    conventional capabilities, targeting the United States and its
    allies, periodically using aggressive, potentially
    destabilizing actions to reshape the regional security
    environment in his favor and to reinforce its status quo as a
    de facto nuclear power.
        The assessment continues to focus on a number of key global
    and transnational threats, including global health security,
    transnational organized crime, the rapid development of
    destabilizing technologies, climate, migration, and terrorism.
    I raise these because they pose challenges of a fundamentally
    different nature to our national security than those posed by
    the actions of nation states, even powerful ones like China and
    Russia.
        We look at the Russia-Ukraine war and can imagine outcomes
    to resolve the crisis and the steps needed to get there, even
    though unpalatable and difficult, and similarly we view the
    array of challenges Chinese actions pose and can discuss what
    is required, how we think about tradeoffs. But transnational
    issues are more complex, require significant and sustained
    multilateral effort, and though we can discuss ways of managing
    them all of them pose a set of choices that will be more
    difficult to untangle and will perhaps require more sacrifice
    to bring about meaningful change. This reflects not just the
    interconnected nature of the problems but also the significant
    impact increasingly empowered non-state actors have on the
    outcomes and the reality that some of the countries who are key
    to mitigating threats posed by nation states are also the ones
    we will be asking to do more in the transnational space.
        For example, the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic
    is putting a strain on governments and societies, fueling
    humanitarian and economic crises, political unrest, and
    geopolitical competition. Low-income countries with high debts
    face particularly challenging recoveries, now exacerbated, in
    some cases, by increasing food security resulting from the
    Russia-Ukraine crisis, and these shifts will spur migration
    around the world, including on our southern border.
        The economic impact has set many poor and middle-income
    countries back years in terms of economic development, and is
    encouraging some in Latin America, Africa, and Asia to look to
    China and Russia for quick economic and security assistance to
    manage their new reality. We see the same complex mix of
    interlocking challenges stemming from the threat of climate
    change, which is exacerbating risks in United States national
    security interests across the board but particularly as it
    intersects with environmental degradation and global health
    challenges.
        Terrorism, of course, remains a persistent threat to United
    States persons and interests at home and abroad, but the
    implications of the problem are evolving. In Africa, for
    example, where terrorist groups are clearly gaining strength,
    the growing overlap between terrorism, criminal activity, and
    smuggling networks has undermined stability, contributed to
    coups and an erosion of democracy, and resulted in countries
    turning to Russian entities to help manage these problems.
        Global transnational criminal organizations continue to
    pose a direct threat to the United States through the
    production and trafficking of lethal, illicit drugs, massive
    theft including cybercrime, human trafficking, and financial
    crimes, and money-laundering schemes. In particular, the threat
    from illicit drugs is at historic levels, with more than
    100,000 American drug overdose deaths for the first time
    annually, driven mainly by a robust supply of synthetic opioids
    from Mexican transnational criminal organizations. In short,
    the interconnected global security environment is marked by the
    growing specter of great power competition and conflict while
    transnational threats to all nations and actors compete not
    only for our attention but also for finite resources.
        Finally, the assessment turns to conflicts and instability
    highlighting a series of regional challenges of importance to
    the United States. Iterative violence between Israel and Iran
    and conflicts in other areas, including Africa, Asia, and the
    Middle East, have the potential to escalate or spread, fueling
    humanitarian crises and threatening United States persons.
    Africa, for example, has seen six irregular transfers of power
    since 2020, and probably will see new bouts of conflict in the
    coming year as the region becomes increasingly strained by a
    volatile mixture of democratic backsliding, intercommunal
    violence, and the continued threat of cross-border terrorism.
        Finally, most important of all we are focused on our
    workforces and their families. The IC continues to contribute
    to the government-wide effort to better understand potential
    causal mechanisms of anomalous health incidents and remains
    committed to ensuring afflicted individuals receive the quality
    care they need. The safety and well-being of our workforce is
    our highest priority, and we are grateful to Members of this
    Committee for your continued support on these issues.
        Thank you for the opportunity to present our assessments,
    and I look forward to your questions.

        [Please see the document provided by Ms. Haines in lieu of
    a written statement in Appendix A.]

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Madam Director.
        General Berrier, please.

       STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL SCOTT BERRIER, DIRECTOR,
                      DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

        General Berrier. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
    distinguished members of this committee, it is a privilege to
    testify today as part of the Intelligence Community's 2022
    assessment of worldwide threats to United States national
    security. On behalf of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) I
    want to express how much we appreciate your support and
    partnership. Thank you.
        DIA fills a unique intelligence role by providing strategy,
    operational, and tactical intelligence to our warfighters,
    defense planners, policymakers, and the acquisition community.
    We examine conflict across all warfighting domains to assess
    foreign capabilities and understand our adversaries' intent.
    DIA's dedicated professionals, in partnership with our
    Intelligence Community colleagues, allies, and foreign
    partners, deliver timely and relevant intelligence on the
    threats and challenges facing our Nation. DIA has a highly
    resilient workforce that has overcome difficult challenges
    posed by the pandemic. Today my goal is to convey DIA's
    insights to you, and the American public, on the evolving
    threat environment as we understand it.
        As I look at the global landscape today, I want to begin
    with Russia and its invasion of Ukraine, which is now in its
    third month. Russian military capabilities have been used to
    violate the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and they
    pose an existential threat to United States national security
    and that of our allies. The invasion has demonstrated Russia's
    intent to overturn the United States-led, rules-based, post-
    Cold War international order, expand its control over the
    former Soviet Union, and reclaim what it regards as its
    rightful position on the world stage.
        Moscow's underestimation of Ukraine's effective resistance,
    Russia's substantial battlefield losses, and Western resolve to
    support Ukraine, has undermined Moscow's assault on Kyiv and
    improved prospects that Ukraine can successfully defend its
    sovereignty. Moscow has now shifted its focus to eastern
    Ukraine, where it appears to be prioritizing defeating
    Ukrainian forces in the Donbas. In response to stiff Ukrainian
    resistance, Russia has resorted to more indiscriminate and
    brutal methods that are destroying cities, infrastructure, and
    increasing civilian deaths. Negotiations remain stalled as both
    sides focus on the outcome of the battle in the Donbas, while
    partnerships with Ukraine and warning of potential escalation
    remain key priorities for DIA.
        Turning to China, it remains a pacing threat and a major
    security challenge. Beijing has long viewed the United States
    as a strategic competitor. China is capable of combining its
    economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to
    mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international
    system. The PLA [People's Liberation Army], which has already
    fielded sophisticated weapons and instituted major
    organizational reforms to enhance joint operations, is nearing
    the status of a global competitor to the United States, its
    allies and partners, and is a credible peer competitor in the
    region. China's current nuclear force expansion is historic.
        The United States faces military and intelligence threats
    from competitors, particularly Russia and China, who have and
    are developing new capabilities intended to contest, limit, or
    exceed United States military advantage. State and non-state
    actors are selectively putting these capabilities into play
    globally and regionally. These capabilities also span all
    warfighting domains--maritime, land, air, electronic warfare,
    cyberspace, information, and space. They include more lethal
    ballistic and cruise missiles, growing nuclear stockpiles,
    modernized conventional forces, and a range of gray zone
    measures such as the use of ambiguous unconventional forces,
    foreign proxies, information manipulation, cyberattacks, and
    economic coercion.
        Strategic competitors and other challengers are exerting
    increasing military pressure on neighboring states. Russia has
    invaded Ukraine, China is threatening Taiwan, and Iran, through
    its proxies, threats neighbors in the Middle East and United
    States forces while also enriching uranium to new levels. North
    Korea continues to threaten South Korea, Japan, and the United
    States with nuclear-capable ballistic missiles of increased
    range and lethality.
        Transnationally, the terrorist threat will also persist,
    and we need to understand more about the lessons learned from
    our experience supporting military and intelligence operations
    in Afghanistan and the Middle East.
        Turning back to my own organization, I take the health,
    safety, and well-being of my workforce very, very seriously.
    DIA remains actively engaged in investigating Anomalous Health
    Incidents, AHIs. My agency has the process and procedures in
    place to quickly respond to reports from employees or their
    families who believe that they have been impacted by AHI. We
    are also partnering with other members of the IC to determine
    the origin and cause of the reported events.
        I am honored to lead DIA. My intent in this hearing is that
    this helps Congress and our Nation better understand the
    threats and challenges we face from foreign adversaries and
    competitors. I look forward to your questions, and thank you
    for your continued support.

        [Please see the prepared statement of General Berrier in
    Appendix B.]

        Chairman Reed. Thank you, General.
        Let me remind my colleagues that at the conclusion of this
    open session there will be a classified session in SVC-217, and
    the witnesses may defer some responses to that classified
    session.
        Director Haines, your description of the unfolding battle
    in the Ukraine suggests that it is moving to a battle of
    attrition over a long term and that the objectives of the
    Russians are to destroy the Ukrainian forces and also disrupt
    the international coalition through economic pressures,
    gasoline prices, and other factors we are witnessing.
        That leads us to, at least me, to the question of how
    effective are our economic sanctions and what more can we do to
    bring pressure to the people of Russia so that they are less
    supportive of this effort?
        Ms. Haines. Thank you, Chairman. I think from our
    perspective the economic sanctions and the export controls have
    had a pretty significant impact on Russia, and among the
    indicators that one might look at are, for example, the fact
    that we are seeing close to about, we predict, approximately 20
    percent inflation in Russia, that we expect that their GDP
    [gross domestic product] will fall about 10 percent, possibly
    even more over the course of the year.
        We have seen not only the sanctions enacted by the United
    States and Europe and other partners around the world having
    these impacts but also the private sector taking action on its
    own to remove itself. So things like the fact that oil
    production services and companies pulled themselves out will
    have an impact on Russia's capacity to produce, and that is a
    major revenue source, obviously, for Russia. We have seen other
    indicators of essentially the private sector impact in these
    areas, and on the export controls we are seeing how things like
    export controls on semiconductors and so on are affecting their
    defense industry.
        So I think that is a very significant impact, essentially,
    although obviously time will tell as we move forward.
        Chairman Reed. Are you sensing any popular unease, perhaps,
    in terms of these economic factors that could translate into a
    political resistance to the regime?
        Ms. Haines. Well, I know many of us saw the protests that
    erupted after the invasion and then the crackdown that
    occurred, essentially, in Russia, including passing laws that
    would provide for very significant punishments in the event
    that one protested on these issues. So we have seen those
    reduced, actually, and when we have looked at effectively
    polling and so on that indicates where it is that the Russian
    people are, what we see is that the majority of the Russian
    people continue to support the special military operation. I
    think it is just very hard, frankly, for information to get
    into Russia, to the Russian people. The have a very particular
    perspective that they are being fed by the government during
    this period.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you.
        General Berrier, what do you believe the Chinese are taking
    away from their close scrutiny of the Russian activities in
    Ukraine?
        General Berrier. Senator, I think the Chinese are going to
    watch this very, very carefully. It is going to take some time
    for them to sort out all elements of diplomatic information,
    military, economic, that has occurred with this crisis.
        I think they are thinking about future operations probably
    against Taiwan and how difficult that might be. They are
    probably also thinking about the scrutiny that they would come
    under should they entertain thoughts or operations like that.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you.
        Final question, Director Haines. I think you indicated in
    your testimony that cyber interference in our elections is a
    distinct possibility. Is that something that your agency, or
    the agencies, are following and taking preemptive steps?
        Ms. Haines. Yes, absolutely, Senator. We are well
    positioned to essentially monitor for the potential of election
    influence, including efforts through cyber.
        Chairman Reed. One other final, final question. Are you
    surprised that the Russians have not used cyberattacks against
    third parties or against the United States directly up to this
    point? I think that was a concern we all had from the beginning
    of this operation.
        Ms. Haines. I think what we have seen is the Russians have
    obviously attacked Ukraine, and we have attributed a variety of
    attacks to them in that context, including, for example,
    destructive wiper attacks against Ukrainian Government
    websites, DDoS attacks against their financial industry. They
    also were engaged in attacks intended to get at command-and-
    control communications in Ukraine during the invasion. That
    attack had an outsized impact. In other words, we assessed that
    they intended to focus in on Ukrainian command and control but
    ultimately they ended up affecting a much broader set of VSATs,
    essentially, you know, very small terminals outside of Ukraine,
    including in Europe.
        Yet we have not seen the level of attacks, to your point,
    that we expected, and we have a variety of different theories
    for why that might be the case, including the fact that we
    think that they may have determined that the collateral impact
    of such attacks would be challenging for them in the context of
    Ukraine, also that they may not have wished to essentially
    sacrifice potential access and collection opportunities in
    those scenarios.
        Then in terms of attacks against the United States, I think
    they have had a longstanding concern about the potential for
    escalation in cyber, vis-a-vis the United States. That does not
    mean that they will not attack at some point, but it has been
    interesting to see that they have not during this period.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much.
        Senator Inhofe, please.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For both of you,
    the lack of an independent intelligence community significantly
    worsened Putin's decision-making in Ukraine. What do you think
    President Xi in China is learning about his intelligence
    communities? Both of you.
        Ms. Haines. Thank you. Senator Inhofe, I think it is a
    really interesting question. I would prefer to answer it
    perhaps in closed session. Would that be all right, sir?
        Senator Inhofe. That is fine. General, any comments to make
    in this open session?
        General Berrier. Senator, I will take the DNI's lead on
    that.
        Senator Inhofe. I suspected that. Thank you.
        The Biden administration has offered Iran significant
    sanctions relief in return to the 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement.
    General Berrier, would you expect Iran to spend at least some
    of this sanctions relief on its terrorist proxies and missile
    programs? Do you agree that if the IRGC [Iranian Revolutionary
    Guard Corps] has additional money that they would increase
    their targeting of Americans and our allies? Let's say could
    they increase that targeting?
        General Berrier. Yes, Senator, they could increase
    targeting against our partners in the region as well as United
    States forces if they had increased funding.
        Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
        Let me recognize Senator Shaheen, please.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Good morning and thank you both
    for your testimony this morning.
        I returned a couple of weeks ago from the Western Balkans
    with Senator Tillis and Senator Murphy. We visited Serbia,
    Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo. One of the things we heard in
    that region was a great deal of concern about Russian meddling
    and the potential, particularly in Bosnia, for that to further
    destabilize the country. Are you all following what is going on
    in that part of Europe, and are you equally concerned?
        Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. So I will just
    start and obviously hand it over to my colleague as well, but
    yes, we are concerned about this. This is something we have
    been working with NATO on, in particular, to try to help them
    be more resilient in this context. Both information and cyber
    issues are obviously at stake, but I think managing how it is
    that Russia develops and what kind of activities they engage in
    worldwide during this crisis and beyond will be a critical
    aspect of our work moving forward.
        Senator Shaheen. Can I just, before you begin, General, can
    I just ask you to speak to NATO and U4 in Bosnia, because as
    you know, the authorization for U4 is going to end this fall in
    Bosnia, and there is a real concern about Russia's willingness
    to allow that to continue. So what are we doing to ensure that
    the troops are not taken out of Bosnia and a void left that
    provides a real vacuum for instability?
        General Berrier. Senator, I think that is a policy question
    and I would refer it to the Department of Defense.
        Senator, to the earlier portion of your question, I believe
    this is a key component of strategic competition, and this is
    where I think with our partners and allies and certainly NATO
    we have to be able to identify that kind of malign activity and
    expose it and help our partners and future partners be aware of
    it and do more to counter it. Yes, we are aware of it.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Well, I would say that that
    policy decision needs to be viewed very closely by everybody so
    that we do not wind up with a vacuum there that we are not able
    to address.
        I want to go to what is still happening with ISIS because,
    as you both know, we have thousands of ISIS family members who
    are still being held in camps in northern Syria. They are
    posing a persistent challenge, not only humanitarian but the
    potential breeding ground for terrorists. So are we watching
    closely what is going on there, and what are we doing to try
    and address what is happening in those camps?
        General Berrier. From the perspective of the Department of
    Defense and DIA we are watching very, very closely what is
    happening in those camps, what has happened since the break-in,
    and really with our CENTCOM partners trying to monitor ISIS
    capability as it evolves over time and what is happening with
    those families and where they are moving. This is a problem
    that we partner with CENTCOM and the Defense Counterterrorism
    Center, and really the National Counterterrorism Center. It is
    a huge focus for everybody.
        Senator Shaheen. Do we have a strategy for how to deal with
    it?
        General Berrier. We have an intelligence collection
    strategy to monitor it.
        Senator Shaheen. We are seeing the Taliban in Afghanistan
    renege on everything they said they would do post troop
    withdrawal. Obviously, one of those is continuing their
    relationship with al Qaeda and other terrorist groups in
    Afghanistan. How concerned are you that we might see terrorist
    activity spread out of Afghanistan to the rest of the world?
        General Berrier. Senator, I am more concerned about ISIS-K
    [The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Kharasan] in Afghanistan
    and the fact that they have had some successful and
    catastrophic attacks within Afghanistan, which does not portend
    well for the future. Al Qaeda has had some problems with
    reconstitution leadership, and to a degree I think the Taliban
    have held to their word about not allowing al Qaeda to
    rejuvenate so far. But it is something that we watch very, very
    carefully.
        Senator Shaheen. There was an election in the Philippines
    yesterday, and the winner of that election, Mr. Marcos, is not
    likely have as positive a view to the United States. Are you
    concerned that that is going to have an impact on how China is
    going to view activity in the Philippines, and do we expect
    there might be any spillover in terms of illegal substances
    from the Philippines now that Duarte is no longer doing his
    extra legal killing of people suspected of being drug kingpins?
        General Berrier. Senator, I think it is early in the
    process with the elected Marcos to determine whether or not he
    will be anti-United States or pro-United States I know that we
    would like to have the Philippines as a key intelligence
    partner in the region. I think there is a lot of effort going
    on to do that. So we will wait to see what percolates in our
    relationship, and I will just end it there.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Fischer, please.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to
    our panel today.
        Last week, in the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Under
    Secretary of Research and Engineering Heidi Shyu stated, quote,
    ``Strategic competitors of the United States are rapidly
    developing their nuclear arsenal in new and novel ways with a
    clear intent of increasing their reliance on these weapons in
    their security strategies,'' end quote.
        Director Haines, do you agree with that statement?
        Ms. Haines. Yes.
        Senator Fischer. General, do you?
        General Berrier. Yes.
        Senator Fischer. Throughout the war in Ukraine, Putin and
    other Russian leaders have overtly threatened nuclear use,
    including the Russian state TV airing an animated video showing
    the British Isles being completely destroyed by a nuclear
    attack.
        General, in the United States we view nuclear weapons
    primarily as tools of deterrence, but do you think what we are
    seeing indicates Russian leadership views nuclear weapons as
    tools of coercion and intimidation?
        General Berrier. Yes. I believe they view those as tools of
    coercion and intimidation.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. General, also, the Defense
    Intelligence Agency's 2021 report on China's military power
    states, quote, ``The accelerating pace of the PRC's nuclear
    expansion may enable the PRC to have up to 700 deliverable
    nuclear warheads by 2027. The PRC likely intends to have at
    least 1,000 warheads by 2030, exceeding the pace and size the
    DOD projected in 2020,'' end quote.
        I know what you say is limited in this setting, but is it
    your assessment that China's nuclear forces will stop expanding
    when it reaches that point of 1,000?
        General Berrier. It is my assessment that they would
    continue to develop the weapons they have.
        Senator Fischer. Director Haines, is that the view shared
    by the rest of the IC, that China's arsenal is going to
    continue to grow past that point in time?
        Ms. Haines. I mean, our assessment basically says that
    China will continue to essentially expand their nuclear arsenal
    and diversification for a period of time. It is unclear how
    long that will be.
        Senator Fischer. But do you anticipate it will continue
    past the 1,000 warheads that we have looked at in the past?
        Ms. Haines. I think for us to get into numbers we should do
    that in closed session.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        General, as the statement notes, China's nuclear expansion
    is larger and more rapid thank previous assessments projected.
    Admiral Richard has made a similar point noting, quote, ``When
    I first testified here we were questioning whether or not China
    would be able to double that stockpile by the end of the
    decade, and they are actually very close to doing it on my
    watch,'' end quote.
        What are the implications of the fact that this threat is
    evolving faster than we have anticipated, and how should we
    factor that in our assessments?
        General Berrier. Senator, we can get into much more detail
    in the closed session, but I would just say from a strategic
    competition perspective and nuclear deterrence this makes it
    much more challenging for us to defend. When you factor in
    Russian nuclear capability with Chinese capability, I think it
    is a problem for Strategic Command and the Department.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Also, General, if we can move
    to a different theater now. If ISIS and al Qaeda are able to
    operate in Afghanistan without consistent or effective CT
    [cyber threat] pressure how long does the Intelligence
    Community assess it will take for either organization to
    reconstitute their external attack capabilities?
        General Berrier. We assess ISIS probably a year, slightly
    longer, and longer for al Qaeda.
        Senator Fischer. Last October we heard from Secretary Kahl.
    He told the committee that we could see ISIS-K generate the
    capability in 6 to 12 months. Then in March we heard from
    General McKenzie that the capability might be 12 to 18 months.
    So I look forward to hearing more about how and why these
    intelligence estimates have shifted forward. I think that is
    important for this committee to know and it is important to
    understand when we look at the dramatic reduction we have seen
    in our intelligence collection in the region since our
    withdrawal. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
        Senator Gillibrand, please.
        Senator Gillibrand. Director Haines, thank you so much for
    your testimony. I want to talk a little bit about advanced
    persistent threats, and I want to know what type of support are
    you providing, critical infrastructure providers, to deal with
    APTs [advanced persistent threats]. Specifically, I am
    concerned if this war in Ukraine does escalate, that attacks
    from Russia will come to American businesses and our critical
    infrastructure. I know this is generally the job of CISA, but
    in your engagement with critical infrastructure providers what
    are the biggest areas of need that they have shared with you,
    and are there any additional authorities that would be helpful
    to you in enabling you to support critical infrastructure
    providers in securing their networks?
        Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator, and I know this has been a
    major issue focus for you and, in fact, that you have supported
    some of the things that have been done in New York with
    Reserves, for example, in this area, which have been really
    effective. I know that General Nakasone has been looking at
    expanding that around the United States in different ways.
        I think for us we have, quite obviously, heightened
    awareness of cyber threats to critical infrastructure, and it
    has been a driving force behind a number of sorts of cyber
    defense measures that we have taken in the Intelligence
    Community to support, in effect, as you say, CISA and FBI
    [Federal Bureau of Investigation] and others in doing their
    work.
        One is lowering thresholds for reporting. We have asked for
    network owners to really lower their threshold for reporting
    suspected malicious activity. That is critical from our
    perspective in order for us to be able to identify what the
    threat is.
        Another is just making more information publicly available.
    We are increasing the amount of information that we release to
    the private sector, both to help combat the rise in cybercrime,
    and recently in our efforts to posture industry for potential
    Russian cyberattacks, for example, something that we have been
    trying to get out to do significantly more briefings on and
    help industry, in effect, get ready for things so they can take
    action that would make them more resilient in these
    circumstances. This includes some close-hold releases so as to
    dampen malicious cyber actors warning before mitigations can be
    put into place.
        Another has been our significant outreach to the private
    sector. DHS partners held over 90 engagements with more than
    10,000 partners, just even on the Russia piece, and it includes
    sharing preventative measures to help these partners mitigate
    vulnerabilities. Another has been facilitating hunt teams on
    networks. We have also asked company owners to actively hunt
    for Russian techniques, essentially, on their networks and to
    facilitate those have provided lists of vulnerabilities,
    indicators of compromise to look for on a company's networks.
        But those are just some of the things that are focused on
    helping on the infrastructure piece. Thank you.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Director. Do you need any
    additional authorities or resources to amplify this effort?
        Ms. Haines. So we have asked for resources in our fiscal
    year 2023 budget that are designed to help with this effort,
    and so absolutely in that sense. We have not identified
    particular authorities that we need, but I will tell you that
    we will come to you if we do. Thank you.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Director Haines and General
    Berrier, I saw that the Annual Threat Assessment notes that
    advances in dual-use technology could, quote, ``enable
    development of novel biological weapons that complicate
    detection, attribution, and treatment,'' end of quote.
        I have advocated for a one-health security approach where
    we incorporate people across multiple disciplines, including
    the Intelligence Community to increase our biodefense and
    prevent the next pandemic.
        In the context of ongoing biological threats, how would you
    suggest we develop a multidisciplinary approach like this?
    Where can we prepare and prevent both naturally occurring
    diseases but also deliberate threats?
        Ms. Haines. I can start on this. I am very passionate about
    this issue. I completely agree with you. I think we have not,
    in the Intelligence Community, been able to work with other
    parts of, for example, the Federal Government, even in the
    scientific community within the Federal Government as
    effectively as we need to.
        We have been developing mechanisms in the Intelligence
    Community to do some more. We are working more with the
    National Labs than we ever have before. We are working more
    with HHS [Department of Health and Human Service], with CDC
    [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention], with others, to
    try to make sure that we are also supporting their work and
    that we can understand some of the issues that they see as
    critical to our work. So that has been a big piece of our
    effort in the Intelligence Community within the national
    counterproliferation. Senator, we have been doing a major
    effort on essentially working with global health and we
    actually now have a new national intelligence manager that
    works on these issues specifically and is hoping to support
    that kind of outreach on this. I would be happy to give you a
    brief at some point in more detail if that is useful.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
        General Berrier. Senator, for DIA [Defense Intelligence
    Agency] I think it is about partnerships. So it is a
    partnership between the National Center for Medical
    Intelligence (NCMI), the Defense Counterproliferation Center,
    as well as NCPC. The role, really, for DIA and NCMI is to
    provide warning on these pandemics. So I am passionate about it
    as well, and I think it is an area that is going to expand in
    the coming months and years as we look forward to this, and I
    look forward to engaging you, perhaps at DIA, on this topic.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
        Senator Cotton, please.
        Senator Cotton. General, what is your assessment on the
    state of the fighting between Russia and Ukraine in eastern and
    southern Ukraine today?
        General Berrier. Senator, I think I would characterize it
    as the Russians are not winning and the Ukrainians are not
    winning, and we are at a bit of a stalemate here. What has been
    the most interesting evolution for me, in watching how the
    Russian forces have misstepped, is really the lack of a non-
    commissioned officer (NCO) corps. When I think about small unit
    tactics and how this has unfolded between Ukraine and Russia I
    think the NCO corps is a big piece of this, and I think the
    Ukrainians have that about right.
        Senator Cotton. Who faces greater risk from a stalemate--
    Russia or Ukraine?
        General Berrier. I think we have to take a wait-and-see
    approach on how this evolves and what is in the decision
    calculus for Putin and his generals as this unfolds.
        Senator Cotton. A stalemate, to be clear, does not mean an
    armistice or peace. It means continued but indecisive fighting
    in which both sides are losing personnel, equipment, weapons,
    and vehicles. Right?
        General Berrier. I think it is attrition warfare and it
    depends how well the Ukrainians can maintain what they have
    going on with weapons and ammunition and how the Russians
    decide to deal with that, either through mobilization or not,
    and decide to go with what they have in the theater right now.
        Senator Cotton. Which side do you think, at this point, is
    more capable of generating additional combat power in the form
    of trained and motivated troops--Russia or Ukraine?
        General Berrier. Ukraine.
        Senator Cotton. Even though it is one-third the size of
    Russia?
        General Berrier. Yes.
        Senator Cotton. Why do you say that?
        General Berrier. Because I think the Ukrainians have it
    right in terms of grit and how they face the defense of their
    nation. I am not sure that Russian soldiers from the far-flung
    military districts really understand that.
        Senator Cotton. Fighting to defend one's own home from a
    war of aggression is a highly motivating factor, is it not?
        General Berrier. Yes, it is.
        Senator Cotton. Russians probably are not terribly
    motivated to be the next wave of recruits into Vladimir Putin's
    war of aggression?
        General Berrier. I would say not, based on what we have
    seen.
        Senator Cotton. If that is the case, and this stalemate, as
    you call it, continues not just for weeks but for months, which
    side do you think faces the greater possibility of a decisive
    breakout--the Russians, with their ill-trained and unmotivated
    troops, or the Ukrainians, with their supremely motivated
    troops?
        General Berrier. Senator, I think right now with the
    stalemate and as it stands, if Russia does not declare war and
    mobilize this stalemate is going to last for a while, and I do
    not see a breakout on either side. If they do mobilize and they
    do declare war, that will bring thousands more soldiers to the
    fight, and even though they may not be as well-trained and
    competent they will still bring mass and a lot of more
    ammunition.
        Senator Cotton. What are the prospects of a catastrophic
    collapse of morale and will among Russian forces?
        General Berrier. It remains to be seen. I think the
    Russians still are a learning organization. If appropriate
    lessons could be applied with leadership you might see that
    turn around.
        Senator Cotton. Do you know the current count on how many
    generals have been killed in Ukraine, on Russia's side?
        General Berrier. I think the number is between eight and
    ten.
        Senator Cotton. Do you know how many generals we lost in 20
    years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan?
        General Berrier. Not many.
        Senator Cotton. Those we lost were happenstance, right? The
    bad guys got a lucky shot at a convoy or helicopter.
        General Berrier. Yes.
        Senator Cotton. Does the fact that Russia is losing all
    these generals, and as you pointed out they have no trained NCO
    corps, suggest to you that these generals are having to go
    forward to ensure their orders are executed in a way that
    General Berrier never would have to go forward if he was in a
    combat command because he could count on the captains and
    lieutenants and the Sergeant Berriers to execute his orders?
        General Berrier. Yes.
        Senator Cotton. It sounds to me like the balance of forces
    here are moving more decisively in Ukraine's factor and will
    continue to over time as long as we continue to support them
    with the arms and the intelligence that they need.
        General Berrier. Well-led forces that are motivated and
    have what they need can do a lot.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
        Senator Blumenthal, please.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
    pursue Senator Cotton's line of questioning if I may. In my
    exchange with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff several weeks ago I commented that our
    approach to Ukraine seemed somewhat schizophrenic. We say we
    want Ukraine to win but we are afraid of what Putin may do if
    he loses. I have urged, since 2014, that we provide more lethal
    weapons to Ukraine.
        When I visited Ukraine recently with some of my colleagues,
    a bipartisan trip, one of them asked President Zelenskyy, ``Are
    you fearful about the Russian prospect of invasion?'' It was a
    number of weeks before the invasion. He said, ``The Russians
    invaded us in 2014. We have been fighting them since then.'' In
    my view the implication is that we have failed over a period of
    years, under different administrations, to provide Ukraine with
    the arms that it needs to counter and deter increased Russian
    aggression there.
        So my question to you is, do you agree that we should
    increase the kind of military aid, as well as humanitarian
    assistance and economic sanctions, that we have been providing,
    by orders of magnitude that will enable Ukraine to win, and
    would you also agree that if we simply provide more of that
    kind of aid--tanks, artillery, armored personnel carriers, even
    planes, Stinger and Javelin missiles, all of the arms that
    Ukraine needs to fight lethally and defensively--that Putin may
    engage in sword-rattling and threats and implications of what
    he might do, but enabling Ukraine to win ought to be our
    objective.
        Let me ask you first, General.
        General Berrier. Senator, in your statement there it really
    gets at national level of decision-making on what our policy
    should be with regard to arming Ukraine. My role as the
    Director of DIA is to keep an eye on this conflict and provide
    information to decision-makers so that they can make those
    kinds of decisions.
        In terms of what Putin might do to escalate, I think the
    best that we can do, rather than describing what those
    escalatory measures would be, would be to understand what they
    might do and be ready, in terms of indications and warning, to
    be able to notify decision-makers that that was actually
    occurring or about to occur.
        So I take an intelligence perspective of the conflict
    itself and leave the policy to decision-makers.
        Senator Blumenthal. Do you--and I will ask Ms. Haines the
    same--think there is a serious, immediate prospect that Putin
    would engage in the use of tactical nuclear weapons?
        General Berrier. Right now we do not see that, and I think
    that is a huge warning issue for us and something that we are
    very, very focused on.
        Senator Blumenthal. Ms. Haines?
        Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. I think, on the first part
    of your question, you know, as General Berrier said, obviously
    we try to provide the intelligence to help policymakers like
    you make these decisions. Among the questions that come up in
    that discussion are whether or not, frankly, Ukraine can absorb
    additional assistance and how much of it, and that is very hard
    for us to tell. We have, in fact, more insight, probably, on
    the Russian side than we do on the Ukrainian side, but that is
    something, obviously, for the Defense Department to work
    through as they go through this.
        But we also, obviously, get asked this question of whether
    or not certain actions will escalate things with Russia, as you
    indicate, and if so, how, and that really gets to the second
    part of your question, because I think obviously we are in a
    position, as you have identified, where we are supporting
    Ukraine but we also do not want to ultimately end up in World
    War III, and we do not want to have a situation in which actors
    are using nuclear weapons.
        Our view is, as General Berrier indicated, that there is
    not a sort of an imminent potential for Putin to use nuclear
    weapons. We perceive that, as I indicated in my statement, as
    something that he is unlikely to do unless there is effectively
    an existential threat to his regime and to Russia, from his
    perspective. We do think that that could be the case in the
    event that he perceives that he is losing the war in Ukraine
    and that NATO, in effect, is sort of either intervening or
    about to intervene in that context, which would obviously
    contribute to a perception that he is about to lose the war in
    Ukraine.
        But there are a lot of things that he would do in the
    context of escalation before he would get to nuclear weapons,
    and also that he would be likely to engage in some signaling
    beyond what he has done thus far, before doing so.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. My time has expired.
        Senator King. [Presiding.] On behalf of the chairman,
    Senator Blackburn.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    very much to each of you for being here today.
        Ms. Haines, I want to come to you. We have talked a lot
    about Ukraine and Russia this morning, and I appreciate your
    frankness in this. But let me ask you about Wagner and the
    proxies and what you are seeing, not only in Ukraine but also
    what you are seeing when it comes to Libya and to other areas
    and the aggressiveness of the use of the proxies.
        Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. We can probably go into
    more detail in closed session.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay.
        Ms. Haines. But I could just say, more generally, that we
    do see Wagner being used, in effect, in Ukraine. We see that
    that is something----
        Senator Blackburn. How about Africa?
        Ms. Haines. Yes, absolutely. Wagner has been historically
    present in Africa, and it is a more recent event, obviously, in
    the current crisis that Russia deployed them effectively in
    Ukraine.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. All right.
        General Berrier, do you have anything you want to add on
    that?
        General Berrier. Senator, we track ISIS in Africa, Syria,
    other places. I think we will get into a richer discussion in
    the closed session about Wagner operations in Ukraine.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. That is helpful. Let me ask you
    also--and by the way, thank you for the China map [retained in
    Committee records]. I will say this. I think we could have a
    picture of the globe and say that is where China is seeking to
    be aggressive. It is something that is not lost on me, that
    they are anxious right now to expand their reach.
        But let's talk about DIA and how is the DIA collaborating
    with our allies and our partners to counter Beijing's cyber
    espionage operations?
        General Berrier. Senator, we are. We are closely
    collaborating with our Five Eyes partners, in this case, our
    Australian and New Zealand partners, on this very issue, along
    with our partners over at the National Security Agency with
    General Nakasone.
        There is a concerted effort by the Five Eyes to understand
    these activities in cyberspace emanating from China. So we are
    working that very, very closely and we can provide more details
    in a closed session.
        Senator Blackburn. Can you provide us with some of the
    lessons learned from the Russia-Ukraine conflict that help to
    inform some of this work?
        General Berrier. Cyber activity?
        Senator Blackburn. Yes, sir.
        General Berrier. So I think the key there would be
    information operations and disinformation operations and their
    level of effectiveness on the Russian side, or ineffectiveness
    on the Russian side, and then looking at the level of
    effectiveness on the Ukrainian side. When I compare and
    contrast information operations I think the Ukrainians have
    been much more successful in the information operations and
    space. Russians have had some success with cyber activities in
    the Ukraine, and I think the PRC and Xi are looking at all of
    that as they sort of unwind this conflict and learn lessons
    from that.
        Senator Blackburn. Ms. Haines, how is the intel community
    utilizing AI and machine learning as they look at applications,
    look at how Beijing is continuing to move forward? So how are
    you preferencing some of the new technologies that can help us
    in this effort?
        Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. We are using artificial
    intelligence, and in particular, machine learning, across the
    board for our mission set. Just to give you an example of the
    kind of things that we are able to do with it, I think it has
    been extraordinary in terms of helping us with analysis, being
    able to focus in on certain datasets that we are able to
    effectively manipulate more easily and without as many human
    resources, effectively to identify patterns. We are able to use
    that then, have analysts that are educated and experts take
    that information and use it in their analysis in different
    ways.
        We have something called an Artificial Intelligence Unit
    Project that is really looking at across the Intelligence
    Community at different applications of artificial intelligence
    and machine learning and then trying to leverage those so that
    we can actually allow other elements to build off of the work
    that is being done by another element that they might not have
    thought of before and also doing it at sort of a cheaper cost
    and so on.
        So there are a variety of ways in which we are doing it. It
    is hard to talk about it in an unclassified way, but certainly
    this is a major area of effort and investment, and we can
    provide you with further details if that is useful.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you. My time has expired. I will
    come to you for a written response on the recent article that
    quoted a senior intel source, about referencing the uptick in
    Al-Shabaab activity. So thank you very much.
        Senator King. On behalf of the chair, Senator Warren.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Senator King.
        It is paramount to our national security that we keep our
    most sensitive secrets properly protected and classified,
    particularly when protecting sources and methods. But I am very
    concerned about the levels of over-classification and pseudo-
    classification that we are seeing across the Federal
    Government. Everyone understands the need to protect
    information about most sensitive capabilities from our enemies,
    but our classification system has spiraled out of control, when
    it means, for example, that our own four-star generals cannot
    share information with their fellow three-stars. It is hard to
    see how that level of classification is making America safer.
        Over-classification also reduces public scrutiny of
    important issues and it can hamper accountability. Director
    Haines, you lead the Intelligence Community. You have years of
    experience in these matters. Do you think that over-
    classification is a national security problem?
        Ms. Haines. I do, Senator. I have stated this explicitly. I
    do think it is a challenge. As long as I have been in
    government, frankly, there have been blue-ribbon commissions
    that have looked at this, have said there is significant over-
    classification. This is a challenge, as you indicate, from a
    democratic perspective but it is also a challenge from a
    national security perspective because if we cannot share
    information as easily as we might otherwise be if it were
    appropriately classified then that obviously affects our
    capacity to work on these issues.
        It is a very challenging issue, as I know you know well. In
    other words, there are technical aspects to it. There are
    cultural aspects to it.
        Senator Warren. Let us talk about that just a little bit,
    and I want to say I agree with you that over-classification has
    been a problem across administrations. The Obama administration
    put out two different Executive orders aimed at improving
    classification and information sharing, but that was more than
    a decade ago and obviously the problem persists.
        Let me ask this a different way. Director Haines, would you
    support the Administration releasing a new Executive order on
    classification practices to ensure that we are protecting
    national security information while keeping our commitments to
    open government?
        Ms. Haines. Without knowing exactly what it would say it is
    sort of hard for me to say I would support an Executive order
    on that subject. I mean, I am constantly looking for additional
    ways in which we might try to help address this issue, and we
    have a number of ways that we are investing in the Intelligence
    Community issues. But, yeah, I----
        Senator Warren. I appreciate that, and I am not asking you
    to sign a blank check here.
        Ms. Haines. No. Fair enough.
        Senator Warren. But you are the President's principal
    advisor on intelligence matters, and I am just asking if you
    would be supportive if the President wanted to take that step.
        Ms. Haines. Well, I am supportive of what the President
    wants to take steps within his authority, and it is an
    appropriate policy to do, so yes, in that sense I would be.
        Senator Warren. Okay. Let me ask this then from one more
    perspective, and that is during the Ukraine crisis we have seen
    that a well-functioning, declassification system can be
    incredibly powerful. The work by the Biden administration to
    expose what the Intelligence Committee knew about Putin's plans
    seriously hurt Russia's credibility and it strengthened our
    response to an illegal and immoral war. My understanding is
    that it took reshuffling of resources to make that happen, and
    I applaud that, but we need more of it.
        The most recent numbers that I have seen is that we spend
    $18 billion protecting the classification system and only about
    $102 million--do the math fast in your head, about 5 percent of
    that number--on declassification efforts, and that ratio feels
    off in a democracy.
        With that in mind, Director Haines, are there any lessons
    learned from Ukraine about how we can expedite declassification
    when there is a compelling reason to do so?
        Ms. Haines. I think there are lessons to be learned from
    Ukraine, and it will be easier to talk about this in closed
    session, but I think there is some value that we could discuss
    in closed session on those issues.
        I do think it has helped to help other people understand
    the value of ensuring that we are classifying things at the
    appropriate level and how declassification can support foreign
    policy in different ways. So I think that is all to the good.
        Senator Warren. Good. You know, in a democracy we have a
    duty to be accountable to the public, and when we keep secrets
    from Americans there needs to be a compelling public interest
    in doing so. In too many cases it seems that public officials
    err on the side of secrecy because the information could be
    embarrassing, or even worse, just because it is easier not to
    be accountable to the American people.
        So I urge all of our agencies to address this problem, and
    I look forward to working with you on it. Thank you.
        Senator King. On behalf of the chairman, Senator
    Tuberville.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Senator. Good morning.
        Director Haines, in your best assessment does Russia
    intelligence closely monitor our Secretary of Defense?
        Ms. Haines. I think Russian intelligence tries very closely
    to monitor all of our senior leaders.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. So you believe that, noted,
    that when he said that Russia weakened and that the United
    States will move heaven and earth to arm Ukraine, do you
    believe that is right he should say that?
        Ms. Haines. Yes. I think the Secretary of Defense----
        Senator Tuberville. Do you believe Russia blames the United
    States Intelligence Community for helping Ukraine shoot down a
    Russian plane carrying hundreds of people?
        Ms. Haines. I am sorry, sir. Can you repeat the question?
        Senator Tuberville. Do you believe Russia blames us, our
    intelligence agency, for Ukraine shooting down a plane with
    hundreds of troops on board? Do you think Russia blames us for
    that?
        Ms. Haines. Which plane are you thinking of?
        Senator Tuberville. There was a plane recently that was
    shot down, a Russian plane, that 100 troops. Do you believe
    that they blame our intelligence agency for that?
        Ms. Haines. I do not know, sir.
        Senator Tuberville. Okay. Do you believe that Russia blames
    our United States intelligence for sinking their flagship,
    Moskva? Do you think they blame us for that?
        Ms. Haines. I do not know, sir. We have not seen any direct
    reporting.
        Senator Tuberville. To what extent do you assess that
    Russia believe it is at war with the West and the United
    States? Do you think that they believe they are at war with us?
        Ms. Haines. Russia has historically believed that they are
    in a conflict, in effect, with NATO and the United States on a
    variety of issues, including in cyber and so on.
        Senator Tuberville. So you believe that they are fighting
    us--that they are fighting us as well as they are fighting
    Ukraine. Correct?
        Ms. Haines. In a sense. Their perception----
        Senator Tuberville. Yeah. Yeah, because we are arming them
    and we are talking. Okay.
        General Berrier, does the United States or Ukraine have air
    superiority over the war zone? Which one has air superiority?
        General Berrier. Senator, I would call that an air standoff
    right now. I mean, the Russians can fly a tactical aircraft
    over the line of troops in a local area but they cannot expand
    into western parts of Ukraine without coming under an air
    threat.
        Senator Tuberville. But Ukraine is more than we are, the
    United States, obviously, because we not involved in their air
    space.
        General Berrier. No, we are not involved.
        Senator Tuberville. Would you say that Russia possess
    strong air defenses?
        General Berrier. I think the Russians have very credible
    air defense systems.
        Senator Tuberville. Does Ukraine have any counter measures
    to thwart Russia artillery rockets? Does Ukraine have any air
    defenses?
        General Berrier. Ukraine has air defenses. They also have
    counter-battery radars that allow them to defend themselves
    from incoming artillery, or at least see it.
        Senator Tuberville. Would you agree that anyone in Ukraine
    right now is under serious threat? Obviously they are. Correct?
        General Berrier. I would agree they are.
        Senator Tuberville. Okay. In the past 2 weeks we have seen
    several high-profile visitors take trips to active war zone.
    Our Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Speaker of the
    House, First Lady. This is for both of you. What is our
    Intelligence Community doing to lessen the risk of a high-
    ranking official--how are we protecting these people going to
    Ukraine, our people going to Ukraine?
        General Berrier. Senator, I think that would be a
    discussion for the closed session.
        Senator Tuberville. Okay. So we could guarantee that the
    First Lady was safe when she went to Ukraine. We could
    guarantee that, 100 percent. Correct? Both of you. I am just
    asking.
        General Berrier. I would not say that, no. I would not say
    that.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Is it your best advice that
    we do not go to Ukraine right now, any of us, any of us in
    here?
        General Berrier. Senator, I would not say that. I would say
    with proper planning and coordination that it is possible.
        Senator Tuberville. General, 100 percent. One hundred
    percent, can we guarantee going into a war zone--our Secretary
    of Defense and Secretary of State went on a train.
        General Berrier. Senator, I do not think we can ever
    guarantee anything 100 percent.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Well, that is kind of the
    point I am making. You know, we are kind of poking the bear
    here, saying, you know, we are bragging about it. Even
    President Biden said today, ``Wait a minute. We have got to cut
    back on this pointing that, how many generals have been killed
    and we are part of it.'' I totally agree with that. I totally
    agree that, hey, we want to help Ukraine. Obviously, we all do.
    But we do not want to take that step forward to where we get a
    lot of our men and women involved in this. It looks like to me
    we that we are taking way too many changes of sending people
    over there for a photo op other than doing the right thing,
    which we are doing. But we just do not need to step over that
    path.
        Thank you for what you are doing, but I think all of us
    need to look at that point of, hey, there is a point of no
    return here if we cross that line. If we were on the other
    side, the same way, and we had somebody helping, we had a plane
    shot down, a ship sink, and then bragging about killing
    generals, as Senator Cotton said, we are walking a tightrope
    here.
        That is just the only point I want to bring up. Thank you
    very much.
        Senator King. On behalf of the chair, Senator Kelly.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Director Haines, again, looking at your office's 2022
    Annual Threat Assessment it is clear there is a lot going on in
    the world right now, and I understand that resources are finite
    and tradeoffs often have to be made. That is in, a large part,
    what makes your job very challenging. Clearly the situation in
    Ukraine is taking up a lot of bandwidth right now, and I would
    presume that INDOPACOM [United States Indo-Pacific Command]
    requires significant amount of resources as well to fully
    understand the threat environment, and these two things are
    obviously related.
        But what about some other regions in the world? In light of
    the worldwide threats you have articulated here today do you
    feel the Intelligence Community has the necessary resources in
    place to confidently understand the threat environment in other
    places, such as Afghanistan, northern Syria, Pakistan, and
    Iran?
        Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. I mean, I think, like all
    good bureaucrats that we could spend more money on these
    issues. There is no question. I think certainly that is true.
    But we are doing our very best, as you indicate, to ensure that
    we are not taking our eye off the ball, essentially across the
    globe, on issues that are also of critical importance among the
    ones that you have identified.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you. I want to ask a specific question
    about the MQ-9, the Reaper drones. So the Air Force has been
    reluctant to invest in upgrading the platform and proposes to
    retire it, potentially like in 2035, even as the demand from
    combatant commanders for the system remains high. You know,
    their argument has been that the platform is not survivable in
    China-Russia scenario. I think it is pretty clear that it would
    be survivable in a Russian scenario now.
        Do you have an opinion on the continued utility of
    reconnaissance platforms such as the MQ-9, particular as we
    face increased activity in the so-called gray zone, below the
    threshold of armed combat?
        Ms. Haines. Yeah.
        General Berrier. Go ahead.
        Ms. Haines. No, no.
        General Berrier. Senator, I have been the beneficiary of
    MQ-9 operations for the last 20 years. It is an outstanding
    platform. It has done great things. With increasing threats
    emanating from China and their ability to reach out and touch
    those kinds of things I totally understand why the Air Force
    wants to divest of that platform. The efficacy of that in the
    coming years in low-intensity conflict, counterterrorism
    operations, it will always be useful in a low air defense kind
    of environment, but in the high-end environment I do not think
    it is very survivable.
        Senator Kelly. But we have looked at the Russian surface-
    to-air missile threat environment as high end. It turns out
    like a lot of things, day 1 of the war is much different than
    day 60 or 90 or 180, of any conflict. I am concerned that not
    only this platform, but sometimes we look at divesting from
    platforms that could provide incredible utility further along
    in the timeline.
        General, I have got another question for you here in my
    last minute, anti-satellite ban on ASAT [antisatellite weapon]
    testing. The Administration recently announced this. It is a
    policy I agree with. Russia, China, they do not share this
    goal, nor do they abide by any kind of similar policy. The
    Russians and the Chinese both, over the last, about decade and
    a half, have performed ASAT tests, the Russians more recently.
        The DIA's 2022 report on challenges to security in space
    lists orbital debris as a significant challenge to space
    operations and concluded that the debris endangers spacecraft
    of all nations in low-Earth orbit, including astronauts and
    cosmonauts aboard the ISS [International Space Station], but
    also China has a space station as well.
        Given the fact that both the Russians and Chinese conduct
    manned space operations what would be your assessment as to why
    they continue to put their people in harm's way by conducting
    these dangerous tests?
        General Berrier. Senator, I think they value that
    capability in space as an asymmetric advantage over our
    superior technology and continue to pursue those kinds of
    capabilities. Whether or not they would actually use it is
    another discussion.
        Senator Kelly. Do you expect them to do more anti-satellite
    tests?
        General Berrier. We have not seen evidence that they plan,
    in the near future, of doing more, but I would expect as they
    go through their development processes they will do more tests.
        Senator Kelly. All right. Thank you, General, and thank
    you, Director Haines.
        Chairman Reed. [Presiding.] Thank you, Senator Kelly.
        Senator Rounds, please.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by
    thanking both of you for your continued service to our country.
        Director Haines, in April, Secretary Blinken told Congress
    that Iran's attempts to assassinate former Secretary of State
    Mike Pompeo were real and ongoing, and this month Israeli press
    reported that an agent for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard's
    Quds Force was thwarted from an assassination attempt on a
    United States general in Germany.
        Why is Iran apparently so emboldened right now and how can
    the Intelligence Community and national security communities at
    large change this dangerous trend and deter Iran from these
    malicious actions?
        Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. I think we should probably
    pick this up in closed session. What I think I can say in open
    session is a fair amount of their motivation in this area we
    assess to be in relation to Soleimani as part of their sort of
    efforts for revenge, and it is a particularly challenging area,
    I think, to deter them from action in this space. But we can
    discuss more specifics, I think, in closed session. Thank you,
    sir.
        Senator Rounds. Very well. Director Haines once again. The
    crisis at the United States southern border has literally
    exploded under this Administration and continues to
    deteriorate. Reuters reported that United States officials at
    the Department of Homeland Security are preparing for as high
    as 9,000 arrests per day. As the economic and political
    conditions in Latin America continue to spark waves of
    migration that put pressure on our southern border, how serious
    does the Intelligence Community see this as a threat to our
    country, and also, how and to what degree is the Intelligence
    Community shifting resources to address the surge at our
    southern border?
        Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. We have stood up a migrant
    crisis cell, which is essentially a cell that helps to bring
    together intelligence from across the community to support
    DHS's efforts, and it is really looking south of the border at
    effectively migrant movements that may be coming towards the
    southern border, so that we can help them to prepare, in
    effect, for encounters on the border.
        Senator Rounds. Are you in agreement with the assessment
    that there could be as many as 9,000 arrests a day? Is that an
    assessment that you would concur with?
        Ms. Haines. Sir, I do not look at those particular
    questions. That is within the Department of Homeland Security.
        Senator Rounds. I am just curious because when you are
    doing your planning to determine what your needs are, clearly
    in order for you to do the planning you have got to have an
    assessment of what the expected flow would be. I am just
    curious. It is not meant as a gotcha question.
        Ms. Haines. No, no, no. Of course. We do not assess our
    needs along the border because we do not actually have needs
    along the border. In other words, that is sort of the DHS role
    is to figure out how can we plan for the number of incidents or
    encounters that they will have on the border. For us, what we
    are trying to do is understand what are the drivers, what are
    the ultimate flows that are likely to occur, and we try to set
    up intelligence so that we can actually provide some indication
    and warning of here is where you are likely to see an increase
    in the flow, either south or north or how it is and where it is
    coming from, ultimately. Does that make sense?
        Senator Rounds. It does. It just catches me a little bit by
    surprise that in your planning that most certainly you have to
    have a good communication with Homeland Security. I am assuming
    there is a good communication there----
        Ms. Haines. Of course.
        Senator Rounds.--and that based upon what their needs are
    is really what you are doing, is providing them with additional
    resources. You are also, at the same time, gathering intel
    based on the possibility, the strong possibility that
    individuals would try to come in through the southern border.
    Based upon that I was just curious, and I know that we are in a
    public discussion, but nonetheless I think it is something that
    has been talked about publicly, and the fact that we have got
    folks from all over the world that are using that as an
    entryway into the United States, and most certainly you are
    aware of that.
        Ms. Haines. Absolutely. No, I am not trying to sort of duck
    the question or anything. I think, you know, we see a very high
    flow. There is no question. What happens is the Department of
    Homeland Security, we have somebody who is a liaison that sits
    within their sort of spaces that tells here are the
    requirements, and they basically are looking for indications
    and warning of, you know, we are likely to see a flow along
    this part of the border, that sort of thing, as opposed to us
    being able to help them determine, okay, today you are going to
    see X number of people coming through the southern border as a
    whole.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Just one other quick question.
    The Intelligence Community and Congress are working to flesh
    out the Foreign Malign Influence Center's mission, the budget
    and size, among other issues. But with the 2022 midterms almost
    here we are probably behind the curve a little bit.
        What are the major roadblocks stopping the IC from standing
    up this intelligence center?
        Ms. Haines. We have just gotten appropriations, basically,
    through the fiscal year 2022 budget, which has been great, and
    we are currently building up the Foreign Malign Influence
    Center. We already has the Election Threat Executive so we have
    been doing work on what the threats might be to our elections.
    That is now pulled into the Foreign Malign Influence Center,
    and we effectively have the budget for up to 12 people in the
    Foreign Malign Influence Center under this context and we have
    asked for funding for fiscal year 2023, essentially to be able
    to expand it by about three people but also to allow us to
    access expertise and knowledge that we think is critical, and
    really just to help facilitate what the community is doing
    across the board on these issues.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time
    has expired.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
        Senator Kaine, please.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks to our
    witnesses. I want to ask about two items. The first is undersea
    cables. Ninety-five percent of global communication rely on a
    robust undersea cable network, 500,000 miles across the sea
    floor globally. Internet, global banking transactions, the
    SWIFT system, diplomatic cables, encrypted military
    communications are a few of the myriad applications that rely
    on this network.
        Two NATO commands, the Joint Support and Enabling Command
    in Ulm, Germany, and Joint Force Command in Norfolk are
    monitoring threats against undersea cables in the Atlantic, but
    the vast majority of these cables are controlled by private
    sector companies. In the United States, France, Spain, Japan,
    China, these companies and contractors who work with them, such
    as Google and Amazon, oversee the planning, production, design,
    deployment, and maintenance of the cables.
        To what extent is the DOD and IC looking at integrating and
    communicating with these private actors so that we can monitor
    threats to the cables?
        General Berrier. Senator, I am going to take that one for
    action and do a little homework to get you a fulsome answer.
        Senator Kaine. I would like, additionally, to know whether
    China, Russia, or other malign actors have an organic
    capability to map our networks, to cut into or tap into them,
    to listen to military or other government communications. So I
    would like a response back to that.
        Here is my second question, unless, Director Haines, you
    have something to offer on the undersea cable.
        Ms. Haines. Thank you, sir. I actually would love to do it
    in closed session if that is all right.
        Senator Kaine. I will look forward to that.
        Ms. Haines. Okay.
        Senator Kaine. Now a question about intelligence estimates
    of the strength of other militaries. I think there were a
    number of estimates that the Afghan military would perform much
    better than they did, and there were a number of estimates that
    the Russian military was much stronger than it has proven to
    be. What are we doing to assess why we overestimated the
    strength of both of those militaries and recalibrating the way
    we assess military strength of other nations?
        General Berrier. Senator, I will start. We are taking a
    holistic view of how we do analysis and evaluate foreign
    militaries. It starts with the relationships that we have with
    our foreign partners, understanding their militaries,
    understanding their understanding of adversary militaries, and
    working an all-source assessment to have granularity inside the
    capabilities of these militaries.
        Certainly the ANDSF [Afghan National Defense Security
    Forces] was an issue. Certainly the overestimation of Russian
    capability was an issue. But if you back up, if you look at
    Russia's growth since the early 2000s, their war in Chechnya,
    their war in Georgia, what they did in Ukraine, their
    operations in Syria, and you understand the reforms that they
    went through, we saw that from the outside. What we did not see
    from the inside was sort of this hollow force, lack of NCO
    corps, lack of leadership training, lack of effective
    doctrines. So those are the intangibles that we have got to be
    able to get our arms around as an Intelligence Community to
    really understand.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you. I yield back.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
        Senator Wicker, please.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Berrier,
    let me quote from your prepared statement. ``Beijing appears
    willing to defer the use of military force as long as it
    considers that unification with Taiwan can be negotiated and
    that the cost of conflict outweigh the benefits.''
        General Berrier, I believe the United States should prepare
    Taiwan and send a clear message to Beijing that a military
    invasion would be too costly. I also believe the primary
    objective of the United States and its allies, with regard to
    Taiwan, should not be so much to repel a Chinese attack but to
    prevent it from ever occurring.
        General, from your assessment of China's capabilities and
    timeline as well as Taiwan's current defensive posture, what
    needs to be done? What can the United States be doing for or
    supplying to Taiwan in order to prevent a Chinese attack from
    ever occurring?
        General Berrier. Senator, thank you for that question.
    First I would say that I believe the PRC would rather not do it
    by force. I think they would rather do this peacefully, over
    time. There are some things that we can do with Taiwan. I think
    they are learning some very interesting lessons from the
    Ukrainian conflict, like how important leadership is, how
    important small-unit tactics are, how important an NCO corps
    is, and really effective training with the right weapon systems
    and what those system, with the right people, would be able to
    do to thwart that.
        I think we have to engage with our INDOPACOM partners
    within the Department of Defense, the Taiwan military and
    leadership, to help them understand what this conflict has been
    about, what lessons they can learn, and where they should be
    focusing their dollars on defense and their training.
        Senator Wicker. Is their NCO corps where it should be at
    this point?
        General Berrier. They have a largely conscript force. I do
    not believe it is where it should be.
        Senator Wicker. So the volunteer part of their armed
    forces, is that where it should be, the non-conscript?
        General Berrier. They have a very short enlistment period.
    I can provide you additional details in a written response.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. You also have written that the PLA
    Navy is the largest navy in the world and has the capability to
    conduct long-range precision strikes against land targets from
    its submarine and surface combatants. You later have written
    that Russia is fielding its new, quote, ``ultra-quiet''
    submarine, capable of threatening North America from the
    Pacific Ocean.
        General, do you assess that China and Russia will continue
    to grow both of their naval fleets and invest in new
    capabilities?
        General Berrier. Yes, I do believe they will both invest in
    new capabilities and grow their fleets.
        Senator Wicker. Is the United States on pace to build and
    commission as many ships as China is building?
        General Berrier. I would refer that question to the
    Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations.
        Senator Wicker. But surely the Intelligence Community has
    an assessment of that.
        General Berrier. DIA has an assessment of Russian naval
    capabilities and Chinese PLAN [People's Liberation Army Navy]
    capabilities.
        Senator Wicker. DIA is familiar with what the public plans
    of the Navy are at this point.
        General Berrier. Broadly, but I think the Navy will make
    those investment decisions based on how they perceive the
    threat as well, and we will certainly collaborate with our
    partners in the Navy on any of that.
        Senator Wicker. Let me switch to Afghanistan. Director
    Haines, you submitted the 2022 Office of Director of National
    Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment. On Afghanistan, the
    report says that the Taliban takeover threatens United States
    interests, that 500,000 Afghan refugees could attempt to cross
    into surrounding countries, and that almost certainly terrorist
    groups will establish and expand safe havens from which to plot
    attacks.
        Madam Director, given these assessments in your office's
    Annual Threat Assessment, would you assess that the chaotic
    United States withdrawal from Afghanistan has left the Homeland
    more susceptible to terrorist attacks?
        Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. I agreed with what General
    Barrier indicated earlier on about the threat, essentially,
    that we are seeing from al Qaeda and from ISIS-K, which is to
    say that we see ISIS-K as the more concerning threat. At this
    point, we do not assess that they currently have the capability
    to essentially affect external attacks directed from
    Afghanistan to the United States at this stage, but they could
    build that capability over time, and they certainly have the
    intent to do so.
        With al Qaeda, we are not seeing as much of a threat, and
    that does not mean that it could not grow over time, and that
    is obviously something that we are monitoring during this
    period.
        Senator Wicker. General Berrier, has the exit from
    Afghanistan left our Homeland more vulnerable?
        General Berrier. Senator, I would not more vulnerable, but
    this is certainly an issue that the Intelligence Community has
    to keep on the warm plate, if you will, to make sure that we
    can monitor those networks, what they are doing, and where they
    are migrating to.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you both.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker.
        Senator King, please.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Madam Director, I am concerned about the leaks last week,
    the details of intelligence that is being shared with the
    Ukrainians, both in terms of sources and methods, alerting the
    Russians, what we know, perhaps how we know it, and also
    feeding Vladimir Putin's paranoia about conflict with the West.
    Are you actively pursuing the source of those leaks from last
    week?
        Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. We obviously always
    actively pursue any information that we have that indicates
    that anybody may be disclosing classified information, you
    know, without authorization.
        Senator King. I hope you will pursue that because I think
    sometimes leaks are embarrassing. We do not worry too much
    about them. But I think in this case they were harmful, and I
    hope that this will be an active investigation.
        A question to both of you. We all believe that the
    Intelligence Community did a really excellent job of predicting
    the invasion, alerting the world as to what was going on, what
    the disposition of Russian troops were, the involvement of
    Belarus, all of that. What we missed was the will to fight of
    the Ukrainians and the leadership of Zelenskyy. We also missed
    that in Afghanistan. Within 12 months we missed the will to
    fight. We overestimated the Afghans' will to fight,
    underestimated the Ukrainians will to fight.
        I realize will to fight is a lot harder to assess than
    number of tanks or volume of ammunition or something, but I
    hope that the Intelligence Community is doing some soul-
    searching about how to better get a handle on that question,
    because we had testimony, in this committee and in the
    Intelligence Committee, that Kyiv was going to fall in 3 or 4
    days and war would last 2 weeks, and that turned out to be
    grossly wrong. Are you looking at this question of how to
    assess will to fight and domestic leadership?
        Ms. Haines. Yes, Senator. You heard from General Berrier,
    obviously, a number of things that DIA is doing. For the
    Intelligence Community writ large we have a process at the
    National Intelligence Council taking a look at these issues. I
    would say that it is a combination of will to fight and
    capacity, in effect, and the two of them are issues that are,
    as you indicated, quite challenging to provide effective
    analysis on. We are looking at different methodologies for
    doing so.
        Senator King. This is your lane, assessing military
    capability, and a big part, as you testified earlier, the
    reason the Ukrainian war is going the way it is is that the
    Ukrainians are fighting for their land and the Russians do not
    have the same will to fight.
        I hope that this is something you are focused upon, because
    again, I think we failed on this question in Afghanistan, and
    in Afghanistan we had testimony over and over that the
    government would last 6 months or a year beyond the departure
    of United States troops. It lasted minus 2 weeks. Is this
    something that you are focused upon?
        General Berrier. Senator, I am focused on it, and I really
    appreciate this dialogue because I think there is an important
    nuance that we have to discuss. One is the will to fight and
    the other is the capacity to fight. In closed briefings we
    talked about this capacity to fight, and given the correlation
    of forces that the Russians had and what the Ukrainians had, it
    was the thought of senior analysts that it was not going to go
    very well, for a variety of factors.
        But there was never an Intelligence Community assessment
    that said the Ukrainians lacked the will to fight. Those
    assessments talked about their capacity to fight----
        Senator King. Yeah, but there was not an assessment that
    they did either. The assessment was Ukraine would be overrun in
    a matter of weeks. That was grossly wrong.
        General Berrier. Grossly wrong but not a question of will
    to fight. It was capacity at that time, as the DNI [Director of
    National Intelligence] just said.
        So we are taking a look at that, and we are----
        Senator King. Are you saying Ukrainians' will to fight has
    not been an important part of this struggle?
        General Berrier. No, I am not saying that. I think it has
    been everything.
        Senator King. That is what we did not know. Correct?
        General Berrier. Well, we assessed their capacity to face
    the size of the Russian forces that were amassed on their
    border was going to be very difficult for them.
        Senator King. Well, I all I am saying is the Intelligence
    Community needs to do a better job on this issue.
        General Berrier. I think the Intelligence Community did a
    great job on this issue, Senator, and we will----
        Senator King. General, how can you possibly say that when
    we were told, explicitly, Kyiv would fall in 3 days and Ukraine
    would fall in 2 weeks? You are telling me that was accurate
    intelligence?
        General Berrier. We were really focused on the Russian
    forces at the time, and so when we backed----
        Senator King. We were wrong about that too, were we not? We
    overestimated the Russians.
        General Berrier. Well, the Intelligence Community did a
    great job in predicting and talking----
        Senator King. I acknowledged that at the beginning of my
    question. I understand that. Yes, they did. What they failed at
    was predicting what was going to happen after Russia invaded.
        General Berrier. As I look at the totality of the entire
    operation I think the enormity rests on the predictions of what
    the Russians were going to do versus whether or not the
    Ukrainians were going to be successful.
        Senator King. Well, if you do not concede there was a
    problem on this then we have got a problem.
        General Berrier. Senator, I did not say that. We are going
    to take a hard look at this, but I think in the totality of the
    entire operation there were a lot more successes than failures.
        Senator King. I will not argue that point. I am just trying
    to make a point that I think there was a major issue that we
    missed that had a significant influence on how this has
    unfolded, and had we had a better handle on the prediction we
    could have done more to assist the Ukrainians earlier.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King.
        Senator Hawley, please.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Director Haines and General, is it your sense that Beijing
    thinks that it has a window of opportunity to invade Taiwan
    before Taiwan and the United States modernize and get into
    better position to deter any such invasion? Let us start with
    you, Director.
        Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. It is our view that they
    are working hard to effectively put themselves into a position
    in which their military is capable of taking Taiwan over our
    intervention. We can talk in closed session about timelines and
    so on for how quickly they think they may be able to achieve
    that, but I think that is something that they are trying to
    achieve, even as, what General Berrier stated earlier is true,
    which is to say that they would prefer not to have to use
    military force to take Taiwan. They would prefer to use other
    means.
        Senator Hawley. General, do you want to comment on this?
        General Berrier. Well, I know there are a lot of dates out
    there, Senator--2027, 2030, 2049. Certainly it is on their
    mind. We are not really sure what lessons Xi Jinping is taking
    away from this conflict right now. We would hope that they
    would be the right ones. But I think it is going to take some
    time to sort out whether or not he believes this is a window or
    that his timeline would extend.
        Senator Hawley. Let me ask you about something that Admiral
    Davidson said when he was Commander of PACOM [Pacific Command].
    He told the committee last March that he worried about a
    Chinese invasion of Taiwan in the next 6 years. That is his
    testimony. His successor, Admiral Aquilino, has similarly said
    that he views the timeline to be shrinking.
        Based on the indicators--Director, let me start with you on
    this--based on the indicators available to the Intelligence
    Community, do you agree that the threat to Taiwan is acute
    between now and 2030?
        Ms. Haines. Yes. I think it is fair to say that it is
    critical or acute between now and 2030. I think that is
    absolutely fair. What is hard to tell is how, for example,
    whatever lessons China learns coming out of the Russia-Ukraine
    crisis might affect that time, as well as, as you indicated,
    whether or not our capabilities, Taiwan's capabilities, other
    decisions that will have to be made between now and then that
    will affect the timeline.
        Senator Hawley. General, you said just a second ago that
    you hoped China would learn some lessons from the Ukraine
    conflict. What is it that you are hoping that they take away?
        General Berrier. Just how difficult a cross-strait invasion
    might be and how dangerous and high risk that might be. We
    saw----
        Senator Hawley. Sorry. But do you not think that the
    Chinese military is significantly more capable than the
    Russians? As it turns out, just to pick up what Senator King
    was pressing you on, we pretty dramatically overestimated the
    strength of the Russian military. I would be surprised, for
    one, if China's military strength proves to so attenuated. I
    mean, do you not think that we are dealing with a significantly
    more formidable adversary in China?
        General Berrier. I think China is a formidable adversary.
        Senator Hawley. So, I mean, back to lessons learned.
    Unfortunately, I think one lesson they can draw from the
    Ukraine conflict is that deterrence did not work in Ukraine. I
    mean, Russia invaded Ukraine. I, for one, do not want to be
    having this conversation about Taiwan in any period of years,
    not next year, not in 5 years, not in 10 years.
        So my sense of urgency on this is we better figure out how
    deterrence is going to work in Taiwan, because if China is
    successful in a fait accompli that is going to look a lot
    different than a Russian scenario in Ukraine. Would you not
    agree with that?
        General Berrier. I do agree with that.
        Senator Hawley. So just to that end, Director, let me come
    back to you. One of the things that the Intelligence Community
    was able to give us lead time on was a potential Russian
    invasion of Ukraine. I mean, we are very clear on that, that
    there was a strong likelihood of that, and you had that month
    in advance, actually.
        I am curious if you think that we would get similar
    strategic warning about a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan?
        Ms. Haines. I mean, it is too early to tell, honestly,
    whether or not that would be the case, and obviously, you know,
    in a kind of classic intelligence way we would sure as hell not
    promise anything at this stage.
        Senator Hawley. General, let me ask you about something
    that has long been a concern of mine, and even more so now, and
    that is what I think of as the simultaneity problem,
    simultaneous conflicts in Western Europe, with Russia and with
    China.
        Do you worry that Beijing might see an opportunity to
    invade Taiwan in the very near future, should the United States
    get drawn into an actual conflict, a kinetic conflict with
    Russia?
        General Berrier. I think that is a remote possibility.
        Senator Hawley. Which part is remote?
        General Berrier. The part that China would see that as a
    window to open to take advantage of that, based on the fact
    that they probably are not ready to do that right now.
        Senator Hawley. So you do not think they have the capacity
    right now to invade Taiwan?
        General Berrier. I did not say that.
        Senator Hawley. Well, I am trying to drill down on what you
    mean when you say that they would not do it.
        General Berrier. I think they probably have--actually,
    could we take this into the closed session?
        Senator Hawley. Sure. Yeah, absolutely. My time has expired
    so I will take it up with you then.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
        Senator Manchin, please.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Sir, just real quick, back on Taiwan again. Do you think
    Taiwan is prepared to defend itself? In your evaluation of what
    Taiwan has been doing, the only thing I keep seeing is they
    want more F-16s, and we think they are going to be able to go
    to air war with China and defend Taiwan? I do not think so.
        General Berrier. I think Taiwan could do more, sir.
        Senator Manchin. Are you all strategically giving them
    different things that they can use, whether it be in the sea or
    on land, to protect their island?
        General Berrier. I think they are in close consultation
    with our partners in INDOPACOM and within the Department of
    Defense.
        Senator Manchin. Mm-hmm. How about Ukraine? Can Ukraine win
    now that we have, as Senator King so rightfully pointed out and
    Senator Hawley followed up on, we misread that one. Are we
    reading it now, they have the ability to win if we continue to
    support, without us being pulled into a land war with them? On
    their own, can they win?
        General Berrier. I think that is a difficult prediction to
    make. Right now I think where the agency is at is a prolonged
    stalemate should no factor change on either side. In other
    words, the Russians continue to do what they are doing, and we
    continue to do what we are doing for the Ukrainians. I see that
    as a stalemate, not a----
        Senator Manchin. Director Haines, how do you evaluate this?
    I am sure that you have been kept up to speed on this and
    evaluating them. My other concern you might want to answer is
    our ability to maintain and manufacture the weapons that are
    needed to not only help Ukraine, not only to backfill our
    allies, but also keep our own supply chains up. Are we running
    critically low? Could it be that we could put ourselves in a
    dangerous situation?
        Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. I think a few things. One
    is, just taking your last question first, something we can do
    maybe a little bit in closed session is talk about not just our
    military assistance to Ukraine but also a number of other
    countries that have provided military assistance to Ukraine.
        Senator Manchin.--ask the question, are you concerned about
    the ability to have the supplies that are needed for us, for
    our allies, and what Ukraine is going to need to sustain and
    hopefully win this war?
        Ms. Haines. So that is why I was talking about the allies
    piece. No, I am not concerned because I think, frankly, between
    all of us there is the capacity to provide the kind of
    assistance that they are asking for.
        Senator Manchin. Okay. Can you identify the hot spots we
    are very much concerned about, other than China, because we
    know China is the challenge we have. Other hot spots that we
    are worried about that could rise up during this very difficult
    time, and the geopolitical interests that we have in the world.
    I mean, in Iran? North Korea? Some of the one you are more
    watching and concerned about.
        General Berrier. The agency is worried about North Korea
    for sure, and their ballistic missile development timeline, as
    well as potential nuclear testing. We are always thinking about
    Iran and the actions that they have to pull malign influence
    within the region against our neighbors and certainly United
    States forces there. We are always thinking through how to
    sustain partnerships to be able to keep a beat on these
    threats.
        Senator Manchin. Director Haines, are you concerned about
    basically the tensions that we have with UAE [United Arab
    Emirates] and with Saudis and also their more visual movements,
    intentional movements towards China for support or basically
    the yuan being used now as the currency that they are accepting
    for payment of energy, things of this sort that could also put
    us in a more precarious situation with UAE and Saudis?
        Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. I mean, obviously, as you
    indicate, we are always looking at efforts that both China and
    Russia make to try to make inroads with partners of ours across
    the world, and UAE and Saudi Arabia are examples of that in
    both respects.
        Senator Manchin. Cybersecurity is my final one for you all.
    Right now it seems like it is a convoluted area where people
    would report, whether it is private companies in America that
    are getting hacked and what is going on but also who is in
    charge? Where do they go? What is the chain right now within
    the Federal Government, in military especially, on cyber, that
    you consider the premier spot that we should be working with,
    or are we putting things together? Are we still so fragmented
    throughout our agencies?
        Ms. Haines. I mean, my experience is it has gotten better
    over the years. I would never say it is perfect. It is one of
    those things that continues to be worked through. But there is
    a very clear chain of command with respect to taking action----
        Senator Manchin. Who is taking the lead? Who takes the
    lead?
        Ms. Haines. When it comes to offensive cyber operations to
    defend the country, obviously the Department of Defense does
    so. When it comes to defending, you know, helping to defend the
    infrastructure and critical--right, exactly, resilience--it is
    the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI, and everybody
    has a role to play, and we obviously support, in the
    Intelligence Community, all of them in the work that they are
    doing.
        Senator Manchin. What about the National Cybersecurity--how
    about the center? How do you all evaluate the National
    Cybersecurity Center?
        Ms. Haines. You mean the National Cybersecurity Director,
    the new position----
        Senator Manchin. All the stakeholders are involved in that.
    That is why I am saying it is convoluted. Who is taking the
    lead? Who is the lead person? Who is the lead agency?
        Senator King. CISA [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
    Security Administration].
        Ms. Haines. Yeah, CISA is the main----
        Senator Manchin. How do you evaluate that?
        Ms. Haines. I think they are doing very well, yeah.
        Senator Manchin. Okay. No further questions.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Manchin.
        Senator Sullivan, please.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
    thank the witnesses for their hard work during a challenging
    time. I want to focus a lot on the issue of energy, and I will
    relay a story I had with Senator McCain and a Russian dissident
    who has now been arrested, Vladimir Kura-Murza. He is in jail
    right now in Russia.
        About 4 years ago, I asked him what was the number one
    thing we could do to undermine the corrupt Russian regime, to
    undermine Vladimir Putin, and he said, ``The number one thing?
    That is easy, Senator. Produce more American energy.'' Produce
    more American energy.
        So I want to talk a little bit about that. In your
    assessment, is energy independence--so a couple of years ago we
    were the largest producer of natural gas in the world, the
    largest producer of oil in the world, the largest producer if
    renewables in the world--is that good for America's national
    security, General?
        General Berrier. Senator, thanks for the question. As we
    have watched this conflict unfold what we----
        Senator Sullivan. I have a got a lot of questions. I gave
    you a softball. Can you answer the question? Is that good for
    America's national security to be energy independent and the
    world's energy superpower?
        General Berrier. Certainly energy independence is a good
    thing.
        Senator Sullivan. How about you, Director?
        Ms. Haines. Yes.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay. Thank you for the straightforward
    answer.
        Now, in this conflict with Ukraine, what does our ability
    to produce energy, how do the Russians view that and how do our
    allies view that? We all know Vladimir Putin uses energy as a
    weapon. How are you assessing the ability of the United States
    to fill the void that the Germans and others have with regard
    to getting energy from Russia to now get it from the United
    States? Is there a lot of interest in that and is that a good
    thing for our national security? General?
        General Berrier. I certainly believe that our European
    allies see this as a national security issue for sure, and they
    are thinking through new ways of developing and getting after
    their energy needs, for sure.
        Senator Sullivan. How about getting some from the United
    States?
        General Berrier. If the United States had excess capacity I
    am sure that would be something that they would welcome.
        Senator Sullivan. Do you see that, Director, similarly?
        Ms. Haines. Yes.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask with regard to China. Almost
    70 percent of China's crude oil supply came in the form of
    imports. What is your assessment of how China's energy
    dependence could or would impact its military operations during
    a potential cross-strait conflict? In your assessment, when you
    read up on China's weaknesses, are they concerned about their
    energy dependence with regard to national gas and oil being a
    major, major importer?
        General Berrier. If there is a way we could take this into
    the closed session to discuss that, that would be better,
    Senator.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay.
        General Berrier. I do believe they are concerned about
    their dependence on energy.
        Senator Sullivan. Director?
        Ms. Haines. Yes, absolutely.
        Senator Sullivan. Do you see that as a strategic advantage
    we have in our great power competition with China and Russia,
    the fact that we cannot only produce energy for our own
    country--and I am talking all of the above--renewables, oil,
    gas. Do you see that as a strategic advantage for our Nation?
        General Berrier. I see it as an advantage.
        Ms. Haines. Yeah. I mean, I think, frankly, our capacity to
    work with our allies on this issue has been a strategic
    advantage, and our ability to work with them in order to
    actually help to mitigate against Russia using energy as a
    weapon has been a major issue.
        Senator Sullivan. China's dependence on energy, should
    there be some kind of conflict between us and China?
        Ms. Haines. Yes. The relationship with Russia will be
    relevant under those circumstances, obviously.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask one final question, and it is
    not really a question on intel. You know, we are getting ready
    to vote here on a $40 billion package. My team and I are
    looking through it. It is a lot. How do you assess our NATO
    partners' commitment, finally, to hitting 2 percent of their
    GDP for their annual military budgets? I mean, we have now
    100,000 troops over in Europe. I fully support what the
    President has been doing in that regard. But if there was ever
    a time that countries had to kind of wake up and say, you know
    what, for 40 years we promised it at 2 percent. The wolf is at
    the door, or maybe the bear is at the door, or the dragon is at
    the door, whatever metaphor you want.
        Are you seeing a shift? Because the Germans made a big
    announcement. My understanding is Canada still will not even
    hit 1 percent of GDP for their defense budget. Are you seeing a
    shift in our NATO allies to say, you know what, it is time for
    us to pull our own weight here. The Americans are doing it,
    once again. Look, I support everything we are doing, but, you
    know, $40 billion, that is a lot of money. My constituents have
    got a lot of needs too, and we still have NATO allies, Canada
    one, who just freeload, and it is getting a little tiring.
        What is your assessment of our NATO partners' commitment to
    finally hitting 2 percent now that it is very clear that there
    is a brutal dictator on their doorstep?
        Ms. Haines. I think we have seen, obviously, as you
    indicated in the opening to your question, just a number of
    countries now announce an increase in their defense budget, and
    I think that is something that we are going to see them follow
    through on, at least in part.
        Senator Sullivan. General?
        General Berrier. I think this has had a galvanizing effect
    on our NATO partners, and I think most of them will come
    around.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, and again, I did not start by
    saying the intel you were providing us and everybody else prior
    to the war was exceptional, and the intel ops that you did were
    also really impressive. So I appreciate that.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Peters, please.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Director Haines, the 2022 Annual Threat Assessment states,
    quote, ``China presents the broadest, most active and
    persistent cyber espionage threat to the United States
    Government and private sector networks,'' end of quote. The
    assessment specifically discusses the capacity for China to
    conduct surveillance as well as disrupt critical
    infrastructure.
        My question for you, ma'am, is does the ODNI [Office of the
    Director of National Intelligence] believe that China would use
    their cyber capacity to shape other countries' decisions such
    as the Russians are known to do? Do you believe that is in the
    cards as well?
        Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. Yes. I mean, I think in the
    sense that, in particular, our assessment is that China is
    pursuing significant cyber capabilities, in this area in
    particular, to deter the United States from taking action in
    the event of a conflict, for example, in their region.
        Senator Peters. Thank you. Media coverage during the weeks
    leading up to Russia's invasion often used open-source evidence
    to support the Administration's intelligence estimates.
    Examples here range from images provided by Maxar's commercial
    satellite network to Russian military communications that were
    intercepted by tech-savvy civilians.
        My question for you, General Berrier, is how is the
    proliferation of technology and information accessibility for
    average citizens impacting the realm of professional
    intelligence work within your agency?
        General Berrier. From the perspective of this war between
    Russia and Ukraine the plethora of open-source data that is
    available to enrich our assessments has been amazing. Just
    think of the third-party damage assessment work that is
    happening right now using images because most Ukrainian
    citizens have a cellphone. It has been really, really rich, and
    then you combine it with the other open-source data that is
    available, publicly available, and can be purchased.
        For us it has been enlightening and will probably shape how
    we do intelligence operations and analysis going forward in the
    future. We just have to be careful that we use the right rules
    at the right time to make sure that we are safeguarding
    information and that we are not violating any laws or policies.
        Senator Peters. That actually leads to the next question,
    and you mentioned you are looking at how you integrate that
    into how you collect information. Is there anything that
    Congress should be doing to help you better enable your
    abilities to harness the potential for open-source information?
        General Berrier. I think we are budgeted for it, Senator,
    and we are looking forward to the work ahead as we go forward
    on this issue.
        Senator Peters. Good.
        Director Haines, the Biden administration has done an
    admirable job certainly of crafting a coalition of nations to
    impose sanctions, enforce export controls against Russia for
    their illegal invasion. This includes our trans-Atlantic
    partners, many of them who are now giving up on Russian
    hydrocarbons, something that I think we all would have thought
    was absolutely unthinkable just a short while ago, as well as
    our global partners, Japan and Taiwan, actively engaged.
        What has been noticeable, though, is to see that much of
    the world is still not with us. They may not be with Russia,
    and I am not saying they are with Russia, but they are not
    subscribing to our call for a global coalition of democracies
    to stand against Ukraine. This includes India, Indonesia,
    Nigeria, South Africa, and particularly other nations in the
    global south in which the United States certainly has very
    friendly relations with but we have not yet been able to get
    them to join the Ukrainian cause.
        As the United States will need to certainly build an even
    more robust coalition of nations in the future to counter
    potential Chinese aggression, I believe it is imperative that
    the United States understand how to win over these non-aligned
    nations living certainly in a multi-polar world.
        So my question to you, in your view what steps should the
    United States take to build a broader coalition for potential
    future conflicts, similar to what we are seeing right now?
        Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. From the Intelligence
    Community perspective we have done a lot of thinking about how
    we can help to facilitate, frankly, the policy community in
    this area, to your point, and one of the things that we did in
    the context of Ukraine that I think is possible for us to do in
    other areas, and that we have discussed with the policy
    community about, is basically working key allies and partners
    who are influencers, in effect, within specific regions, to try
    to get out to them as much intelligence as we can, obviously
    being mindful of sources and methods. But just to lay the
    groundwork so that then the policy community can work with
    those countries to effectively provide for the kind of
    coalition that you describe.
        I do think it is an absolutely fundamental piece. I mean,
    the fact that the UN (United Nations) General Assembly managed
    to garner 141 votes, I think it was, against Russia on the
    Russia-Ukraine piece was pretty extraordinary. I do think that
    our capacity to share intelligence in advance of that moment
    was critical to getting that kind of coalition together, and I
    hope we can do that in the future.
        Senator Peters. Great. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters.
        Senator Rosen, please.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed, and I really
    appreciate the witnesses. I appreciate you both for being here
    today and for your service.
        Director Haines and General Berrier, given that the Annual
    Threat Assessment was written before Russia's invasion of
    Ukraine, has Russia's loss and expenditure of military
    equipment, personnel, and resources in Ukraine, coupled with
    their, frankly, poor performance, changed our overall threat of
    Russia and their military capabilities, and--like I said, this
    was written before that--how do you assess we may need to
    adjust our planning going forward, seeing as what we are
    learning?
        General Berrier. I will start with that one, Senator. I
    think, you know, as we have watched the Russians falter here
    and the losses that they have sustained we believe that they
    are going to be set back conventionally for a number of years
    as they try to recoup these losses and replace all of the
    equipment and soldiers that they have lost.
        I think we should back up our assessment really for NATO
    and what that threat really looks like, also factoring in their
    nuclear capabilities and what that means for NATO going
    forward.
        Ms. Haines. I will just add to this. I think, as we talk to
    the analysts about this, and obviously before each of the
    threat hearings we discussed this because the threat hearings
    came after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and as you indicate
    the assessment was done beforehand, and I think the overall
    threat level has not so much changed as it is the question of
    how it is evolving, to General Berrier's point.
        I think our view is that the ground combat forces have been
    degraded considerably. It is going to take them years to
    basically manage, to the extent that they are able, to rebuild
    that, in effect, and that may end up meaning that they have
    greater reliance, in effect, on asymmetric tools during this
    period. So they rely more on things like cyber, nuclear,
    precision, et cetera, and that is obviously a shift in the way
    in which they are exercising their efforts for influence, and
    so on.
        Senator Rosen. Well, and knowing that we also know, to
    everyone else's point here too, that the world is watching. So
    Director Haines, how do you assess the threat level to Taiwan?
    Has it increased? Does China feel more emboldened now that
    Russia has invaded Ukraine? Then I will give the second part of
    that to you, General. Does China see this as an opportunity,
    maybe this period, to invade Ukraine as we might be distracted,
    the world might be distracted with the Ukraine crisis?
        Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. It is hard to tell,
    honestly, at this stage. What we see is evaluating what is
    happening in the Russia-Ukraine crisis. They are still
    evaluating. The crisis obviously still continues. So what
    lessons they learn during this period is not really concluded
    yet, and so it is a little bit harder to tell whether or not is
    an increased threat of accelerating their efforts toward Taiwan
    or less so.
        I would say that thus far the IC has not assessed that the
    Russia-Ukraine crisis is likely to accelerate their plan, vis-
    a-vis Taiwan, and the kinds of lessons that we think are
    possible that are relevant, just to give you maybe two, one is
    they were surprised by the degree to which the United States
    and Europe came together to enact sanctions, and that is
    something, obviously, they are going to be looking at in the
    context of Taiwan.
        The second one, I think, is this point that really General
    Berrier made earlier a little bit, which is to say that one of
    the issues for them is the confidence they have that they are
    able militarily to take action in Taiwan over our intervention.
    That will play into their decision-making over time, we think,
    and seeing what happened in Russia, that might give them less
    confidence, in some respects, over what it is that is likely to
    happen.
        General Berrier. Senator, the only thing that I would add
    is on a day-to-day basis with Chinese military activity I am
    not seeing anything that would tell me that they are thinking
    about trying to take advantage of this time that they think
    that they might have.
        Senator Rosen. Let me ask one additional follow-up on that.
    What is your assessment of our ability to conduct military
    operations in both theaters should something occur?
        General Berrier. We have significant capabilities in both
    theaters. It would depend on what the variables were with each
    situation and what that meant. But that is why we have four-
    star combatant commanders in USEUCOM [United States European
    Command] and INDOPACOM.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rosen, and
    thank you, Madam Director and General. We have a vote scheduled
    at 11:45. We will reconvene in SVC-217 for the classified
    session at noon, 12 o'clock.
        At this time I will recess or adjourn the open session.
    Thank you very much.
        [Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                           anomalous health incidents
        1. Senator Shaheen. Director Haines, I am concerned with the
    seemingly conflicting information provided by the Intelligence
    Community (IC) through the release of unclassified summaries of reports
    by Central Intelligence Agency-led working group and an Intelligence
    Community expert panel in late January and early-February 2022,
    respectively. How is the IC improving coordination within the IC and
    interagency on future releases, increasing transparency with the public
    and enhancing communication with victims?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]

        2. Senator Shaheen. Lieutenant General Berrier, did the Defense
    Intelligence Agency substantively contribute to either the Central
    Intelligence Agency-led or IC expert panel reports?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]

        3. Senator Shaheen. Lieutenant General Berrier, does the Defense
    Intelligence Agency agree with the findings of those reports?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]

        4. Senator Shaheen. Lieutenant General Berrier, does the Defense
    Intelligence Agency have additional information beyond what is
    contained in those reports that you believe would serve to further
    inform Congress on this matter and, if so, will you transmit that
    information, consistent with the appropriate security clearance
    protocols?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
      Questions Submitted by Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King
                                china commission
        I believe we must establish an unbiased and non-partisan commission
    to examine a grand strategy for our approach to China, similar in
    intent to President Eisenhower's Solarium Project. We need to think of
    a holistic approach to create a stable international order in which
    China (or Russia) cannot dictate regional developments.
        5. Senator King. Director Haines, LTG Berrier, in order to avoid
    the US trying to ``spend our way out of conflict,'' what are China's
    primary areas of influence the United States and allies should focus on
    countering that will provide the most significant impact?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]

        6. Senator King. Director Haines, LTG Berrier what would be the
    greatest benefit this commission could deliver?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]

        7. Senator King. Director Haines, LTG Berrier what would put us in
    the best position to avoid the United States and China from escalating
    conflict and careening into a war with China?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]

        8. Senator King. Director Haines, LTG Berrier, what are the
    `toughest problems' OUTSIDE of military imbalances?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                           bureau of cyber statistics
        Director Haines, in the hearing you stated: ``And these categories
    of--often overlap Cybercrime, for example, is a transnational threat,
    while also being a threat that emanates from state actors. One of the
    key challenges of this era is assessing how various threats and trends
    are likely to intersect so as to identify where their interactions may
    result in fundamentally greater risk to our interests than one might
    otherwise expect or where they introduce new opportunities.'' I believe
    that it is time to establish a Bureau of Cyber Statistics.
        9. Senator King. Director Haines, how do you think the IC, DoD, and
    commercial enterprises would benefit from a BCS and CISA compiling and
    analyzing cyberattack and cyber probing activities?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Joni K. Ernst
                               worldwide threats
        10. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier, China continues to
    posture and prepares to invade Taiwan, Russia invaded Ukraine 77 days
    ago, and the threat of terrorism against the Homeland has increased,
    all in the last year. Deterrence by appeasement and negotiation has
    proven in most theaters Since January 2021, have global threats to the
    US decreased in any region of the world?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                                global security
        11. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier where has the United
    States neutralized or slowed the momentum of any great power or violent
    extremist threat?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                           brics security partnership
        12. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier the economic
    partnership of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, known as
    BRICS has increased their share of global GDP threefold in the past 15
    years. Do you have concerns that this economic partnership is a pre-
    cursor for a collective security partnership?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                           brics security partnership
        13. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier what options on the
    table do we have to interdict that?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                             russia/china relations
        14. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier specifically,
    regarding Russia and China going forward - what does the future of this
    relationship look like in your view, and what future security
    cooperation is in their plans?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                              china belt and road
        15. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier, China's military
    basing interests span multiple countries along Africa's Atlantic,
    Indian Ocean, Red Sea, and Mediterranean coasts. What are some of the
    concerns you have with China expanding its military and logistical
    footprints?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                              china belt and road
        16. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier, what steps are being
    taken to counter China and its desire to implement the Belt and Road
    initiative?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                                 china and iran
        17. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier, how will this deal
    deepen China's influence within the Middle East and undercut our
    efforts to isolate Iran and its terrorist proxies, and what can be done
    to disrupt this partnership?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                               critical minerals
        18. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier, the critical
    minerals requirement will increase as much as seventeen-fold between
    now and 2040. If we do not pursue domestic mining or ally-shored mining
    for critical minerals like copper, lithium, and cobalt, we will reach
    an unacceptable level of risk regarding our energy security?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                              transitioning energy
        19. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier, what is your
    assessment of the risks associated with energy transition? How can we
    buy down that risk?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. A globally based clean energy
    transition would shift the primary energy mix away from carbon-
    intensive fuels toward low-carbon energy sources. Although the share of
    fossil fuels in the global energy mix has remained at approximately 80
    percent for decades, the International Energy Agency forecasts a
    decline to about 50 percent by 2050 based on the collective pledges of
    global nations. We anticipate a probable risk will be supply, demand,
    and service shortages because of the scale of the transfer from largely
    centralized energy production systems to a distributed power generation
    model to provide energy during peak use periods.
        Mismatches between the demand and supply reductions could bring
    price and service volatility as hydrocarbon demand declines, according
    to an intergovernmental agency report. Exporters with low-cost
    resources hold an oil and gas production advantage during a demand-
    driven energy transition, which could exacerbate disruptions in major
    producing countries and significantly affect global supply and prices,
    according to the same report. The prospects of social and political
    turmoil in some producing countries probably will increase during the
    energy transition period as lower global oil and gas demand puts
    financial strains on those that rely heavily on hydrocarbon revenues.
        Globally available alternative energy technologies--such as solar
    photovoltaics and wind--are subject to risks arising from trade in
    energy producing and distribution equipment and raw materials,
    according to an intergovernmental agency report. Critical raw material
    supplies are of particular concern because many clean energy
    technologies are mineral intensive and supplies are more concentrated
    in a smaller number of countries than oil and natural gas supplies,
    according to an academic report. China continues to seek and secure
    rare-earth minerals and associated mining rights that are essential in
    these technologies, according to the same report.
        A survey of institutional investors on required rates of return for
    new energy projects found that uncertainties associated with the energy
    transition have already started to alter the risk preferences of
    investors in fossil fuel projects, according to an academic energy
    research institute. Investors are demanding a much higher rate of
    return to justify investments in oil and coal projects. These changes
    in risk preferences probably will affect the volume of available
    supplies if there is insufficient investment into the sector, which may
    lead to potential price volatility depending on demand projections.
        DIA does not provide analysis on how the United States could buy
    down energy transition risks. This question is outside of our defense
    intelligence mandate. We defer this question to other United States
    Agencies, Departments, and U.S. policymakers who may have specific
    recommendations on how to reduce energy transition risks.
                              ally shoring, energy
        20. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier, are other countries,
    particularly in South America, open to working with the United States
    to secure energy supply chains as it relates to oil and natural gas?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                           nuclear threat, iran deal
        21. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, Lieutenant General Berrier, do
    you believe that Iran's threat and aggression toward the Middle East is
    likely to be worse in the context of a renewed nuclear agreement or in
    the absence of one?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
        Lieutenant General Berrier. In the absence of a renewed nuclear
    agreement, Tehran is likely to take more aggressive nuclear, cyber,
    diplomatic, and military steps to impose costs, demonstrate resolve,
    and increase leverage for potential future negotiations. If an
    agreement is reached, Tehran likely would seek to avoid regional
    actions in the short term that it views could jeopardize sanctions
    relief, although the regime will balance such caution with a perceived
    need to respond to adversary action. Over the long term, Tehran almost
    certainly will continue to take destabilizing actions in the region
    consistent with its goal of establishing itself as a leading power in
    the Middle East, including attacks against United States and partner
    interests.
                        counter terrorism in west africa
        22. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, Lieutenant General Berrier, the
    2022 Worldwide Threat Assessment notes that ``al Qaeda remains intent
    on striking United States interests; it is more capable of striking
    U.S. interests in the regions where its affiliates operate rather than
    in the Homeland. The primary threat to the United States abroad from al
    Qaeda emanates from the countries where its strongest affiliates
    currently operate--Yemen, Somalia, and West Africa--and will vary based
    on local circumstances.'' Global counterterrorism pressure is shifting
    as the United States and its allies and partners reprioritize to other
    more pressing threats, including global-power competition. In the Sahel
    region of West Africa, the United States has relied on France as the
    primary partner to contain the al Qaeda and Islamic State threats in
    Mali. The French are now withdrawing. How will the changing
    counterterrorism posture in the Sahel affect the global terror threat?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                           wagner group, west africa
        23. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, Lieutenant General Berrier, how
    is the presence of Russian Wagner Group mercenaries affecting state
    fragility in the Sahel region of West Africa and terrorist recruitment
    in this region?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                             critical technologies
        24. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, Lieutenant General Berrier,
    China continues to steal technologies from United States small
    businesses. What three or four specific technologies do you believe are
    the most important for the U.S. to protect right now? I am asking for
    specific technologies, not broad categories.
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                              intelligence support
        25. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, Lieutenant General Berrier,
    what types of intelligence support your assessments on al Qaeda and
    ISIS-K threat assessments?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                                  intelligence
        26. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, Lieutenant General Berrier,
    what are our intelligence blind spots, especially in regards to
    Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Mali?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                                  intelligence
        27. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, Lieutenant General Berrier,
    what is the intelligence community's assessment on foreign fighter
    flows--are they going into Afghanistan from Syria and elsewhere?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                               non-state threats
        28. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, Lieutenant General Berrier, has
    the United States shift in resources towards geostrategic competition,
    particularly focusing on Ukraine these past six months, created
    opportunities for terrorist and non-state maligned actors to expand or
    strengthen?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                           terrorist uas capabilities
        29. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, Lieutenant General Berrier, are
    terrorists and non-state actors like al Qaeda, ISIS-K, Houthis, and
    Hezbollah seeking UAS capabilities?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                                solomon islands
        30. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, Lieutenant General Berrier, on
    April 19, 2022, China announced it signed a wide-ranging security pact
    with the Solomon Islands. I am concerned that the agreement would allow
    Chinese naval deployments and basing in the region. What is your
    assessment of the additional threat posed by The People's Liberation
    Army Navy should the Solomon Islands be used to refuel or host Chinese
    ships?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                                solomon islands
        31. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, Lieutenant General Berrier if
    the People's Liberation Army Navy gain access and placement in the
    Solomon Islands, what is your assessment of the risk posed to the
    United States in the contingency of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                                solomon islands
        32. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, Lieutenant General Berrier, if
    the People's Liberation Army Navy gain access and placement in the
    Solomon Islands, what is your assessment of the risk for resupply of
    Australia in the event of an emergency, and the additional risk for
    United States forces in the region?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                                     china
        33. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, Lieutenant General Berrier,
    what is your assessment of the risk of Chinese naval basing in the
    Pacific?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                                     china
        34. Senator Ernst. Director Haines, Lieutenant General Berrier,
    what is your assessment of the risk of Chinese naval basing on Papa New
    Guinea to the United States and Australia?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                                     china
        35. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier, China significantly
    expanded military infrastructure in the South China Sea and continue to
    fortify their island bases. For example, the Chinese improved Woody
    Island to accommodate an enlarged harbor. What is your assessment of
    the additional risk posed by these upgrades to U.S. forces in the
    region?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                                     taiwan
        36. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier, what is your
    assessment of the above in a Taiwan contingency?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                                     china
        37. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier, what is your
    assessment of the above as a risk to our allies in the region?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                                  china/taiwan
        38. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Berrier, what is your
    assessment of the likelihood the war in Ukraine is altering China's
    calculus towards military action on Taiwan?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Dan S. Sullivan
                           lessons learned in ukraine
        39. Senator Sullivan. Director Haines and Lieutenant General
    Berrier, the ongoing and illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine has
    profoundly changed the security dynamic in Europe but the
    reverberations of this conflict are being felt in the Indo-Pacific. The
    surprising ineptitude of the Russian military and European solidarity
    manifested in military aid to Ukraine and economic sanctions against
    Russia is no doubt causing planners in China and Taiwan to reevaluate
    their assumptions about what a cross-Strait military conflict would
    look like. As CIA Director William Burns stated this past Saturday, ``I
    don't think for a minute that this has eroded Xi's determination over
    time to gain control over Taiwan . . . But I think it's something
    that's affecting their calculation about how and when they go about
    doing that.'' What is your assessment of how the PRC and Taiwan are
    analyzing and reacting to the Russia-Ukraine conflict?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]

        40. Senator Sullivan. Director Haines and Lieutenant General
    Berrier, do you assess the war in Ukraine is verifying plans and
    assumptions or disrupting them?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]

        41. Senator Sullivan. Director Haines and Lieutenant General
    Berrier, do you assess the PRC's logistics system to be vulnerable to
    disruption in a cross-Strait military conflict?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                            prc energy vulnerability
        42. Senator Sullivan. Director Haines and Lieutenant General
    Berrier, do you believe a global interdiction and blockading campaign
    against these main maritime supply routes would impact and limit the
    PRC's operations in a military conflict?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
                                  proxy groups
        43. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Haines, what impact does Wagner's
    introduction of novel capabilities in Africa have on United States
    operations in the region?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]

        44. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Haines, how effective are Russian
    proxies at anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) with regard to United
    States efforts in prosecuting a counterterror campaign in Africa?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]

        45. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Haines, in July 2020, AFRICOM released a
    rare public statement concerning Wagner's role in Libya, what is your
    assessment of the immediate and long-term impacts of this statement?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]

        46. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Haines, what is your assessment of
    AFRICOM's public statement on potentially delegitimizing Wagner's
    efforts?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]

        47. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Haines, how did other proxy forces react
    to AFRICOM's public statement?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
                                    ukraine
        48. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Haines, what is your assessment of
    reasoning why Moscow's cyber capabilities have not been leveraged to
    the full extent in Ukraine?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]

        49. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Berrier, how is the
    Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) deterring Beijing's ambitions in
    space?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                                    taliban
        50. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Berrier, as Russia and
    Iran collaborate to damage United States credibility, how does the IC
    approach the security landscape in Afghanistan and Central Asia?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]

        51. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Berrier, in the past nine
    months, to what capacity, if any, have we shared intelligence or have
    United States officials met with the Taliban?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]

        52. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Berrier, what is your
    current assessment of Taliban intelligence capabilities in countering
    al Qaeda?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]
                                     cyber
        53. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Haines, what vulnerabilities in the IC
    infrastructure have advances in AI/ML highlighted?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]

        54. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Haines, how is the AI Unity Project
    leveraging existing cyber capabilities within the National Intelligence
    Agency?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]

        55. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Haines, what are the short- and long-
    term visions for interagency collaboration to enhance the AI Unity
    Project?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
                                    somalia
        56. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Haines, a recent article quotes an
    unnamed senior intelligence official saying, ``there is an uptick in
    al-Shabaab activities'' and ``there has been no pressure on al-Shabaab
    at this point, and they have freedom of movement.'' With this is mind,
    what is the importance of countering-ISIS and al-Shabaab to maintain
    our influence in Somalia?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]

        57. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Haines, how have counterterror
    operations been impacted by the reduction in United States troops in
    Mogadishu, and how has this changed al-Shabaab's actions?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Josh D. Hawley
        58. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Berrier, Russia has sent a
    large portion of its military to fight in Ukraine, but there are
    reports that it has withheld certain capabilities in order to deter -
    or perhaps use against - NATO. Can you confirm that Moscow has withheld
    certain forces from the fight in Ukraine, and if so, can you tell us
    here what those forces are and why they're being withheld?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]

        59. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Berrier, the Russian
    military is suffering significant losses in Ukraine not just in
    manpower, but in munitions, logistics, and other critical resources its
    military needs to fight. What is your assessment of how long it will
    take Russia to regenerate in response to these losses, particularly
    given international sanctions on Russia's defense sector?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]

        60. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Berrier, what is your
    assessment of these losses' impact on Russia's ability to execute a
    fait accompli against one of the Baltic states in the next one to five
    years?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]

        61. Senator Hawley. Director Haines, China and Russia declared a
    ``no limits partnership'' just weeks before Russia's invasion of
    Ukraine. Given Russia's performance in the war, how has China
    reassessed its relationship with Moscow?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]

        62. Senator Hawley. Director Haines, do you believe a weakened
    Russia diminishes or strengthens China's hand, given the asymmetry of
    their partnership?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]

        63. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Berrier, as we divine
    lessons from the conflict in Ukraine, what specific observations is
    China making about modern military operations, for example, about the
    premium on logistics, the challenges of defense suppression, or the
    vulnerability of surface ships to cruise missile attack?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]

        64. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Berrier, you are aware of
    press reports that United States targeting intelligence enabled
    Ukraine's killing of Russian generals and the Black Sea cruiser. What
    regulates the type and extent of targeting intelligence that the United
    States will share with Ukraine?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]

        65. Senator Hawley. Director Haines, how are the Russians
    responding to these public leaks of United States intelligence linked
    to the killing of Russian generals?
        Director Haines. [Deleted.]

        66. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Berrier, has Russia alerted
    its non-strategic nuclear forces during the conflict, particularly in
    the vicinity of Kaliningrad?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]

        67. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Berrier, are there any other
    indicators that suggest Russian might conduct preemptive escalation?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]

        68. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Berrier, against what
    targets and with what effects would you expect Russian nuclear
    employment?
        Lieutenant General Berrier. [Deleted.]

                                   APPENDIX A

        The following document was provided by Ms. Haines in lieu
    of a written statement.
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                   APPENDIX B

        [The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Scott Berrier
    follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     [all]