[Senate Hearing 117-959]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-959
THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COUNCIL
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 4, 2022
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
_______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
59-769PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii TOM COTTON, Arkansas
TIM KAINE, Virginia MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine JONI ERNST, Iowa
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois RICK SCOTT, Florida
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
MARK KELLY, Arizona JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
John Wason, Minority Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine, Chairman
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia TOM COTTON, Arkansas
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
MARK KELLY, Arizona KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
may 4, 2022
Page
The Nuclear Weapons Council...................................... 1
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Angus King.................................. 1
Statement of Senator Deb Fischer................................. 2
Witness Statements
Hruby, The Honorable Jill M., Under Secretary of Energy for 3
Nuclear Security Administrator, National Nuclear Security
Administration.
Richard, Admiral Charles, Commander, United States Strategic 3
Command.
LaPlante, The Honorable William, Under Secretary of Defense for 4
Acquisition and Sustainment.
Shyu, The Honorable Heidi, Under Secretary of Defense for 5
Research and Engineering.
Plumb, The Honorable John, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 7
Space Policy.
Grady, Admiral Christopher, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 7
Staff.
Questions for the Record......................................... 33
(iii)
THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COUNCIL
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 4, 2022
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:37 p.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Angus King
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Committee Members present: King, Reed, Warren, Rosen,
Kelly, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, and Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS KING
Senator King. The subcommittee will come to order. We are
involved in a series of votes today so there will be a lot of
back and forth. They are supposedly 10-minute votes but I would
advise the witnesses, if St. Peter ever says to you you have 10
minutes to live, you should respond, ``I would like it to be
during a 10-minute Senate vote,'' because that will give you a
lot more time.
Let me thank the witnesses for agreeing to appear today
before our Strategic Forces Subcommittee. Thank you all for
your service.
The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the processes
and procedures of how the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC)
coordinates Department of Defense (DOD) requirements for
nuclear weapons with the Department of Energy's (DOE) National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and their budgets. We
have as witnesses the principals of the Nuclear Weapons
Council, except for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
This hearing is a historic one, tracing its roots to
actions that occurred 76 years ago and reflective of tensions
that exist between the manufacture and utilization of nuclear
weapons. The Nuclear Weapons Council once was called the
Military Liaison Committee and it was established in the 1946
Atomic Energy Act, after the Manhattan Project was just
established.
The committee was the result of an amendment to the 1946
act by Senator Vandenberg of Michigan, who, after a much-heated
debate on the civilian versus military control of nuclear
weapons--at the time consisted of nine such weapons, by the
way, in our entire stockpile--Senator Vandenberg referred to
this debate as a tempest in a teapot. I would note that Senator
Vandenberg worked with President Truman to form NATO [North
Atlantic Treaty Organization] and the Marshall Plan, and is
quoted as stating that ``partisan politics should stop at the
water's edge. Senator Vandenberg's portrait hangs in the
reception room to our Senate chamber.
Section 2C of the 1946 act authorized the Military Liaison
Committee to be staffed with representatives of the War
Department and the Navy. It directed the civilian commissioners
of the Atomic Energy Commission to advise and consult with the
committee on all atomic energy matters which the committee
deems to relate to the military applications and the
manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons.
The provision then goes on to state that if the committee,
at any time, concludes that any action, proposed action, or
failure to act of the commission on such matters is adverse to
the responsibility of the Departments of War or Navy, the
committee may refer such action or proposed action to the
Secretaries of the War or Navy. If the Secretary concurs, they
may refer such action to the President, whose decision shall be
final. Amazingly, that debate which Senator Vandenberg referred
to as a tempest in a teapot, still occurs today.
The Military Liaison Committee was renamed the Nuclear
Weapons Council after the 1986 Blue Ribbon Task Force on
Nuclear Weapons Management found that the Department of Defense
and the Department of Energy should be coordinating more
tightly on nuclear weapons programs and budgets. I am hopeful
that today we can examine the relationship between the
Department of Defense and the NNSA and how requirements and
budgets are coordinated. And we keep in mind that the debate
that occurred in 1946 really revolves around the civil-military
control of nuclear weapons. It is an important and healthy
tension but one we must respect as fundamental to our laws and
Constitution.
We have just finished another nuclear posture review.
Russia is making reckless statements about nuclear use, and the
NNSA is executing its highest workload since the 1980s, as we
rebuild our aging triad. Now more than ever we need the
Department of Defense and the NNSA to closely coordinate, in a
unified way, their requirements and budgets so that our nuclear
deterrent continues to be, as Secretary Ash Carter described
it, ``the backbone of every national security action we
undertake today.''
Again, let me thank today's witnesses for you all agreeing
to appear, and after brief opening statements we will have
rounds of 5-minute questions to the witnesses.
Senator Fischer?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will keep my
statement short so that we can save time for more questions.
First of all, welcome to all of our witnesses. We
appreciate the effort it took to align your schedules and
appear before us today. I am sorry that Secretary Kahl could
not be with us, but Dr. Plumb, we are glad to have you here.
Thank you.
I also want to thank the staff, Jon Epstein, in particular,
for their effort to bring this hearing together.
We have before us today the most senior panel that I can
recall ever appearing before this subcommittee, and we look
forward to your testimony and about the Nuclear Weapons
Council's work to ensure our deterrent remains safe, secure,
effective, and credible, as the geopolitical landscape becomes
less stable and nuclear threats increase. I remain concerned
that we are not doing enough and that we continue to accept
greater risk in our policies, plans, and programs.
Russia's increasingly overt nuclear threats should remind
all of us of the importance of nuclear deterrence and the risk
of deterrence failure. This is the Department of Defense's most
important mission, and we must ensure it has the capabilities
and resources necessary to succeed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Ms. Hruby, if you would begin?
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JILL M. HRUBY, UNDER SECRETARY OF
ENERGY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Ms. Hruby. Chairman Reed, Chairman King, Ranking Member
Fischer, and Members of the Subcommittee, it is my pleasure to
be here today with my colleagues from the Nuclear Weapons
Council.
The Nuclear Weapons Council serves an indispensable
coordination role between NNSA and DOD for the design,
development, testing, and production of U.S. nuclear weapons
and delivery systems. It also serves a critical role for
anticipating future needs and managing priorities and risks.
The biggest challenge NNSA faces today is conducting five
stockpile modernization programs while simultaneously
revitalizing our infrastructure. NNSA is fully committed to
executing programs as efficiently and quickly as possible while
managing risks. However, the risk will persist until we
complete the enterprise recapitalization efforts.
Steady progress is being made. The W88 Alt 370 and the B61-
12 are on track to meet DOD operational schedule. NNSA is also
developing the modernized W80-4, W87-1, and W93, in partnership
with DOD. I am proud of how well NNSA is working with the Navy,
Air Force, USSTRATCOM [United States Strategic Command], and
the Nuclear Weapons Council during this demanding time.
The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) laid out some clear
initiatives that impact the NNSA. We are committed to
implementing production-based resilience and warhead science
and technology innovation. We are also diligently working to
recruit, develop, and retain our workforce.
Lastly, I would be remiss if I did not mention NSSA's
equally strong commitment to our responsibilities to promote
nonproliferation, reduce nuclear risk, and enhance
counterterrorism and counter-proliferation efforts. We
appreciate your sustained, bipartisan support.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Senator King. Admiral Richard?
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CHARLES RICHARD, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES
STRATEGIC COMMAND
Admiral Richard. Chairman Reed, Chairman King, Ranking
Member Fischer, distinguished Committee Members, it is a
pleasure to be here again as the operational commander
responsible for our nation's nuclear forces, and being able to
testify beside my Nuclear Weapons Council colleagues.
Given Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine, I will have to
limit my responses in this unclassified forum.
Let me begin with this observation. We are facing crisis
deterrence dynamics right now that we have only seen a few
times in our nation's history. When I testified to this
committee in March I expressed concern regarding three party
deterrence dynamics that we face today. The nation and our
allies have not faced a crisis like Russia's invasion of
Ukraine in over 30 years. President Putin simultaneously
invaded a sovereign nation while using thinly veiled nuclear
threats to deter United States and NATO intervention.
The PRC [People's Republic of China] is watching the war in
Ukraine closely and will likely use nuclear coercion to their
advantage in the future. Their intent is to achieve the
military capability to reunify Taiwan by 2027, if not sooner.
STRATCOM has been preparing for this class of threat for
years, developing theoretical deterrence concepts and putting
them into action. Yet my ability to maintain strategic
deterrence is limited. As stated in my fiscal year 2023
unfunded priorities memo, the war in Ukraine and China's
nuclear trajectory, their strategic breakout, demonstrates that
we have a deterrence and assurance gap against the threat of
limited nuclear employment. To help close this gap, pursuing a
low-yield, non-ballistic capability that does not require
visible generation, should be re-examined, in my opinion, in
the near future, along with other measures to address this.
Weapons program delays have driven us past the point where
it is possible to fully mitigate operational risks. In some
cases we are simply left to assess the damage to our deterrent.
Further programmatic delays, budget shortfalls, or policy
decisions to lower operational requirements to meet
infrastructure capacity will result in operational
consequences. However, the Nuclear Weapons Council, I believe,
is well-positioned to assess and meet these challenges.
I applaud my Secretary, Secretary Austin's Integrated
Deterrence Initiative, to confront the three-party deterrence
dynamic. However, I ask us not to forget that the foundation of
the nation's integrated deterrent is a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear enterprise. Without this foundation,
integrated deterrence simply does not work.
I look forward to your questions.
Senator King. Thank you. Mr. LaPlante?
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM LaPLANTE, UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION AND SUSTAINMENT
Mr. LaPlante. Thank you, Chairman King and also Ranking
Member Fischer, and thanks to my colleagues here from the
Nuclear Weapons Council for this really important subject. It
was very daunting to hear the history and the provenance of
this very committee. Thank you, Senator.
Nuclear deterrence, as has been said, is the top priority
and is the backbone of everything we have. It is the backbone
of every operational plan the Department of Defense has, as was
pointed out by others. And for over 60 years the bedrock of
that, of course, has been the triad, and we need it to be with
us for many decades to come.
And as the admiral just said, we have pushed the
modernization of those platforms and those capabilities as long
as we can. So in addition to having the five programs that the
administrator just talked about, the five programs of the
stockpile that are being modernized, we are recapitalizing
three legs of the triad at the same time--as you all know,
Columbia-class, SSBN, the B-21 bomber, the GBSD [ground-based
strategic deterrence] ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile]
replacement. So we are doing a lot right now because we have
to, in many ways because we have waited to do this, as a
country.
So if there ever was a need for a Nuclear Weapons Council I
would think it would be today and with these colleagues here.
As you know, they play a critical and unique role in the
deterrence mission and had all the purpose that the chairman
mentioned in this opening remarks.
It is a joint DOD/NNSA forum, and it is designed to
facilitate priorities to make sure we are going across these
seams and understanding the interdependencies, which are many,
between all these different pieces. This is the time, as much
as anything else, for this to happen, and I welcome the
transparency and the strong commitment that colleagues at the
Department of Energy as well as Administrator Hruby have given
us.
We had our first, at least for me, my first session I
chaired yesterday, and I can tell you we are all on the same
page. We are all on the same page. So as was mentioned, the NPR
is out. We now know what our guidance is to do. We have to get
on and execute. So that is our challenge, and a lot of this
also, the backdrop is reconstituting capabilities and a
workforce that has atrophied. These systems that are being
modernized or recapitalized, the workforce we are using to do
it is largely a workforce that was not there when their
predecessor systems, that we have today, were built. So this is
really a big challenge for us, and I look forward to engaging
with this committee and with the Nuclear Weapons Council. So
thank you.
Senator King. Thank you for your chairmanship of the
Council.
I just want to state for the record that this hearing was
planned in January, before the invasion of Ukraine, and I do
not want anyone to interpret this hearing as somehow nuclear
saber-rattling on behalf of the United States. This is a
hearing that this subcommittee felt was important, but it is
not related to the events in Ukraine in any specific way. I
think it is important to make that point.
Ms. Shyu, please.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HEIDI SHYU, UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
Ms. Shyu. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and
Subcommittee Members, thank you for inviting us to provide
testimony for the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on
the Nuclear Weapons Council's activities to sustain and
modernize the U.S. nuclear deterrent. I am honored and proud to
be seated beside my other distinguished council members and to
represent all of the incredible military, civilian, laboratory,
and contractor personnel that carry out the work of ensuring
our nation sustains a safe, secure, reliable, and effective
nuclear deterrent.
The Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering is responsible for the Department of Defense's
National Defense Science and Technology strategy, including the
Department's nuclear weapon modernization activities. We share
the responsibility of ensuring an enduring scientific and
technological advantage for the nation's nuclear enterprise,
with the National Nuclear Security Administration. Together we
are tasked with creating innovative ways to ensure that the
modernization of the nuclear triad achieves strategic
deterrence during a period of rapidly evolving threats.
A month ago I testified before the Senator Armed Services
Committee Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities on
how I am working to accelerate innovation for the warfighter.
This mission has never been more important than it is today,
and applies as much to a nuclear force as it does to our
conventional forces.
Strategic competitors to the United States are rapidly
developing their nuclear arsenal in new and novel ways, with a
clear intent of increasing their reliance on these weapons in
their security strategies. The United States must not allow
ourselves to be taken by technological surprise, and we must
have the technological resilience to anticipate and rapidly
respond to emerging threats.
We have a solemn responsibility to ensure that we place our
nuclear delivery systems and platforms in both a timely and
cost-effective manner. My job is to make sure that we bring the
best technological innovation that the nation has to offer.
This includes leveraging emerging technologies and advanced
manufacturing methods, making wise investments in the defense
industrial base, ensuring the integrity of our supply chains,
and increasing focus on exquisite modeling and simulation,
rapid prototyping, and demonstration capabilities.
I have also set for the Department 14 critical technology
areas vital to maintaining our military technological
advantage, some of which specifically applies to the nuclear
enterprise, such as areas surround microelectronics, advanced
materials, quantum science, advanced computing and software,
and integrated network systems assistance.
The Department of Defense is also committed to investing in
retaining a highly skilled nuclear science and technology
workforce. This is the enduring means by which we ensure the
long-term viability of our nation's nuclear deterrent.
These are the current ways my office is contributing to the
Nuclear Weapons Council activities and will work towards
implanting nuclear policy objectives, including supporting the
modernization of the nuclear triad.
Thank you for the invitation to testify before this
committee. I look forward to your questions.
Senator King. Thank you.
John Plumb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
Policy.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN PLUMB, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY
Mr. Plumb. Thank you, Senator King. Chairman Reed, Chairman
King, Ranking Member Fischer, and Members of the Subcommittee,
I am also honored to testify here today with my colleagues on
the Nuclear Weapons Council, where I am proud to represent
policy for most meetings.
In my role as Assistant Secretary of Defense I am
responsible for nuclear weapons policy, and so I thought today
it would be appropriate to use my brief time to discuss the
2022 Nuclear Posture Review.
The Department completed its review of nuclear posture
earlier this year, in close consultation with the interagency,
outside experts, allies, and partners. The NPR represents a
comprehensive, balance approach to U.S. nuclear strategy,
policy, posture, and forces, and as Admiral Richard said,
maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent as
well as a strong, incredible, extended deterrence commitment
remains the top priority for the Department. This top priority
is further reinforced by Russia's invasion of and nuclear
rhetoric regarding Ukraine and by China's rapid nuclear
modernization and expansion.
Committed to that priority, the President's fiscal year
2023 budget request includes $34.4 billion for the nuclear
enterprise. This includes fully supporting the modernization of
the triad, modernizing our nuclear security infrastructure, and
investments in our NC3, nuclear command, control, and
communications architecture.
That $34.4 billion is nearly $7 billion more than the
fiscal year 2022 request. It includes funding for the B-21
bomber and the LRSO for the air leg, GBSD for the ground leg,
and the Columbia SSBN and the Trident II life extension for the
sea leg. At the same time and after considering all viewpoints,
the NPR concluded that the SLCM [sea-launched cruise missile]
should be cancelled and the B-83-1 should be retired.
The NPR underscores the U.S. commitment to reducing the
role of nuclear weapons and reestablishing our leadership in
arms control. We will continue to emphasize strategic
stability, seek to avoid costly arms races, and facilitate risk
reduction and arms control arrangements, where possible.
Our nuclear forces remain the bedrock of our deterrence
architecture. They are foundational to every defense priority
established in the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and they
remain indispensable to our national security. It is my honor
to work with the Nuclear Weapons Council and the Congress and
the committee on these issues.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Senator King. Thank you, sir.
The final witness, Admiral Christopher Grady, Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Grady.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CHRISTOPHER GRADY, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Admiral Grady. Chairman Reed, Chairman King, Ranking Member
Fischer, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to testify today with my colleagues.
For 78 years, since the end of World War II, democratic
institutions and the rules-based order have prevented great-
power war. Since the advent of the nuclear age, our nuclear
deterrent has served a vital purpose in a U.S. national
security strategy and continues to be an essential part of our
strategy to preserve peace and stability by deterring
aggression against the United States, our allies, and our
partners.
However, today we face a complex global threat environment
characterized by increasingly sophisticated and militarily
capable strategic competitors who intend to fundamentally
change the rules-based order, and this, of course, as recently
evidenced by an unprovoked and unnecessary war of aggression by
Russia.
Since the Manhattan Project, a partnership between the
National Laboratories, production facilities, and our
respective departments has provided us with the cornerstone of
our security, the nuclear deterrent, and these relationships
are evolving and growing stronger as we transition from
maintaining legacy systems to producing modern capabilities.
This is why the 2022 National Defense Strategy and Nuclear
Posture Review reinforces our commitment to modernize the
triad.
As the subcommittee conducts its crucial oversight on this
important topic there are three areas that I recommend require
focused leadership. First, everything we do should start with
the threat, and the threat is moving fast, and the Joint Force
requires capabilities that give us the ability to deter and
respond at the time and place of our choosing.
Next, we must accelerate how we buy, develop, experiment,
and field modern capabilities, particularly how we manage the
Phase X process. Moving at the speed of relevance is not a
``nice to have.'' It is a ``must have,'' but many of our
processes and our products are products of the industrial age.
We also require timely and predictable funding to achieve
modernization, and our activities are highly interdependent and
funding gaps disrupt our ability to deliver, and I appreciate
the support of the committee to that end.
In closing, a thank the subcommittee for its leadership and
commitment to the nuclear deterrence mission and all of our
servicemembers, and I look forward to your questions. thank
you.
[The joint prepared statement of Hon. Jill Hruby, Hon.
Heidi Shyu, Hon. William LaPlante, Hon. John Plumb, Admiral
Richard, and Admiral Christopher W. Grady, follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Hon. William LaPlante, Hon. Heidi Shyu,
Hon. Jill Hruby, Admiral Christopher W. Grady, Admiral Charles Richard,
and Hon. John Plumb
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for giving the Members of the Nuclear
Weapons Council (NWC) the opportunity to testify before you today. The
NWC is a joint Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Energy
(DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) organization,
codified in law by Title 10, United States Code Section 179, and
established to facilitate cooperation and coordination and institute
priorities between the two Departments regarding the management,
sustainment, and modernization of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Together,
the Council is proud to represent extraordinary and highly skilled
soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, guardians, civilians, laboratory
personnel, and contractors who are the core of the nuclear security
enterprise. They are professional, mission-oriented, and innovative
problem-solvers charged with ensuring our Nation sustains a safe,
secure, reliable, and effective nuclear deterrent.
The U.S. nuclear stockpile remains the bedrock of our strategic
deterrent. As the United States continues to advance nuclear
modernization programs, the NWC sees an increasing need to collaborate
to best manage risk. It is essential that the stockpile remains
balanced, flexible, and adaptable to address emerging threats and to
remain credible.
We are witnessing one of the largest shifts in global geostrategic
power in recent memory, and the NWC--in support of the nuclear
deterrence mission--has never been more important or relevant than it
is today. The threat we face as a Nation is no longer a projection, it
is here: China is modernizing its nuclear stockpile and strategic
nuclear forces at a rapid pace while Russia's decades-long
modernization program of their strategic deterrent forces is nearly
complete. In addition, Russia's nuclear saber-rattling amid its
unprovoked invasion of Ukraine underscores the nuclear risks that the
United States, our allies, and our partners face amid an increasingly
challenging security environment. As the United States faces these
developments, the modernization of U.S. nuclear forces must continue to
advance to ensure that no adversary engaged in increasingly assertive
and aggressive actions believes that it can prevail through the use of
nuclear coercion, the employment of nuclear weapons, or the employment
of other strategic capabilities for any reason, under any circumstance.
nwc organization
As mandated by Title 10, U.S. Code 179, the NWC manages and sets
priorities for the nuclear weapons stockpile. Our membership includes
the Under Secretary of Defense (USD) for Acquisition and Sustainment
(Chair), the DOE Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator
of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the USD for
Policy, the USD for Research and Engineering, the Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command. To
ensure all equities within the nuclear security enterprise are
represented, we receive consistent, valuable participation from other
organizations including the Military Services, the DOD Comptroller, the
DOD Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) and NNSA
Office of Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation (CEPE), the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and the National Security Council (NSC).
While the NWC is statutorily required to meet quarterly, for years we
have elected to meet once a month at the executive-level. All NWC
Principals believe that this pace appropriately reflects the amount of
work to be done and the level of commitment to the nuclear deterrence
mission at the highest levels of both Departments. A core tenet of the
NWC's process is reaching consensus, and the pace of meetings supports
this important principle.
To ensure that the NWC properly engages at all levels, we use
subordinate committees and action groups to identify and analyze issues
and provide detailed recommendations to the Council. The NWC Standing
and Safety Committee (NWCSSC), co-chaired by the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs and the
Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs at DOE/NNSA, provides senior
executive advice, assistance, information, analysis, and
recommendations on issues for the Council's consideration.
Additionally, DOE/NNSA details members of its staff to DOD and most
importantly, a staff member to serve as the NWCSSC Executive Secretary,
ensuring interagency representation and leadership at the staff-level.
The NWC continually analyzes our current working relationships to
ensure well-informed and empowered teams are preparing and providing
recommendations to the NWC through a streamlined decision-making
process. NWC issues are not only addressed when the Members and
subcommittees meet, our mission is executed every day through this
organizational structure and open collaborations between interagency
partners.
nwc focus on stockpile modernization and its challenges
The NWC recognizes the need for our future nuclear stockpile to be
balanced, flexible, and adaptable to address emerging threats and to
remain credible in a shifting security environment. Due to the age of
our legacy weapons systems, maintenance and sustainment is becoming
increasing costly and ineffective at quickly and efficiently addressing
the future security environment. As a result, the nuclear enterprise
must balance priorities between the maintenance of legacy systems and
the increasing investments in modernization. Through the annual
assessment process, the NWC monitors and advises the Secretaries of
Defense and Energy on all issues facing the aging stockpile. The NWC is
committed to ensuring that U.S. nuclear weapon and delivery system
modernization programs in both Departments are aligned, which will help
in the identification and mitigation of risk across the modernization
portfolio. There are currently four major nuclear weapons delivery
system programs and five warhead programs simultaneously underway, and
the NWC will continue to be intimately involved in their progress.
DOE/NNSA's warhead programs have reached some significant
milestones since the last time the Council testified before this body.
The first production unit of the W88 Alteration 370 was completed in
July 2021, extending the life of the W88 through its planned retirement
in the 2040s. The B61-12 achieved first production in November 2021,
further assuring allies we value our extended deterrence commitment.
The W80-4 cruise missile warhead, which will be mated to the modernized
Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) weapon, is expected to enter the production
engineering phase of development in fiscal year 2023. NNSA and the NWC
are reevaluating the schedule for the first production unit of W80-4,
but NNSA does not anticipate it will affect the initial operating
capability date for LRSO. The W87-1, the first warhead modernization
truly driving the full production enterprise since the end of the Cold
War, is on track to enter its engineering development phase in time to
begin replacing the W78 on alert in 2030. Finally, the W93 just entered
its feasibility study phase, furthering opportunities for both the
United States and the United Kingdom to responsibly address challenges
within their legacy nuclear forces. Although production delays have
impacted our ability to meet key program milestones, the close
coordination between DOE/NNSA and DOD on all of these programs
indicates the tangible progress that both Departments have made through
the NWC to sustain and modernize the stockpile and to provide
deterrence capabilities for decades to come. However, without
predictable, sustained and timely funding of the DOD and NNSA budgets,
this close coordination is not enough to overcome the challenges we
face in sustaining and modernizing the stockpile.
nuclear security enterprise production capabilities and capacities
The United States has not embarked on the production of nuclear
weapons at-scale in over 30 years and will not be fully postured to do
so until the middle of the next decade. The nuclear security enterprise
must continue revitalizing efforts aimed at establishing resilience and
responsiveness in the weapons production complex and defense industrial
base through investments in science and engineering capabilities,
technology innovation, and infrastructure, as well as enterprise
intellectual capital. These efforts are required to maintain the
nuclear stockpile, without underground nuclear explosive testing, and
improve the safety, security, reliability, and effectiveness of the
deterrent into the future. Ensuring the supply chain is flexible,
resilient, and secure will eliminate single-point failures and enable
DOE/NNSA to manufacture nuclear weapons with the speed and in the
quantities required to address evolving threats. Both Departments will
seek opportunities to accelerate the joint acquisition process for
nuclear weapons and evaluate the tradeoffs that they entail during the
annual program and budgeting cycles.
DOE/NNSA is currently working to reconstitute key production
capabilities to deliver the critical components needed to modernize the
stockpile, including weapon primaries, secondaries, and non-nuclear
components, to meet the NWC's stockpile requirements. The NWC remains
committed to NNSA's two-site strategy for plutonium pit production and
recognizes the accomplishment of meeting two key milestones in fiscal
year 2021: the approval of Critical Decision (CD)-1 packages for major
capital acquisition projects that underpin the two-site strategy for
pit production, the Los Alamos Plutonium Pit Production Program (LAP4)
and the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF). NNSA has
informed the Congress and the DOD that meeting the DOD requirement for
80 pits per year (PPY) by 2030 is unachievable. Re-establishing war
reserve pit production at the required rate of 80 PPY as close as
technically and programmatically feasible to 2030 is essential to
executing the stockpile modernization Program of Record and maintaining
the credibility of the Nation's strategic deterrent force. NNSA is
continuously working to mitigate the impacts associated with the
inability to produce 80 pits per year by 2030. We are working to assess
the operational impacts we are accepting as a result of this delay
while still actively exploring options to accelerate schedule and to
deliver on DOD's needed capabilities. DOE/NNSA assesses the equipment
installation and facility construction needed to produce the additional
50 war reserve pits per year from SRPPF is achievable in the 2032-2035
timeframe and is committed to identifying an implementation path to
produce 80 pits per year as close to 2030 as possible. Pit production
is just one of many critical capabilities needed to ensure the Nation
retains a viable and robust nuclear security enterprise.
Today, key production capabilities and needed capacities are at
great risk in large part due to infrastructure challenges. In late
2021, the NWC agreed to pursue a deeper understanding of the issues
associated with production capability and capacity across the nuclear
security enterprise and continues to gather data and evaluate scenarios
regarding key decision points. The NWC continues to fully support
ongoing life extension and modernization programs to deliver on
critical needs for the U.S. deterrent.
2022 nuclear posture review
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy led the 2022 Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR). The Department of Defense transmitted the
classified 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) to Congress on March
28, integrated in the NDS was the 2022 NPR and 2022 Missile Defense
Review (MDR), in support of the President's Fiscal Year 2023 Budget
which was fully informed by these policy documents. In keeping with the
Secretary's vision of integrated deterrence, the NPR and MDR are nested
under the NDS. The NPR takes a balanced approach to strategic stability
in the 21st century--evincing a commitment to a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear deterrent and strong and credible extended
deterrence, while simultaneously taking steps to reduce the role of
nuclear weapons in our strategy through nuclear nonproliferation,
nuclear risk reduction, nuclear arms control, and nuclear
counterterrorism and counterproliferation. Nuclear weapons will
continue to provide unique deterrence effects that no other element of
U.S. military power can replace. Amidst the current security
environment, the NWC will continue to support investments in modernized
nuclear forces that are responsive to the threats we face, to deter
aggression, and preserve the security of the United States, our allies,
and our partners.
conclusion
We cannot overstate the significance of the present moment for
nuclear modernization. Successful, on-time execution of the Program of
Record, and commitment to the development and funding of modernization
programs will ensure no potential adversary ever believes it can carry
out a strategic attack on the United States or our allies for any
reason, under any circumstances, without risking devastating
consequences. We thank this Committee for its longstanding, bipartisan
support for our nuclear deterrent mission and for the professionals
across the nuclear security enterprise. We look forward to your
questions.
Senator King. Thank you, Admiral. Thanks to all of our
witnesses. We will do 5-minute rounds, as per the committee's
custom.
Let me begin. Mr. LaPlante, you are the chair. The most
general question is, how is it working? We have had problems in
the past. There have been, as you know, some controversy over
the last several years. Do you feel that the budget process
this year between NNSA and the Department of Defense worked as
it should? Was it vigorous but smooth?
Mr. LaPlante. Yeah, thanks for the question, Mr. Chairman.
Yes, it is my understanding, and I have done a lot of talking
in my last couple of weeks and listening to a lot of my
colleagues, including on this group, that it was quite thorough
and robust, the work of NWC, in reviewing the budget. In fact,
it was chaired by my colleague who is actually here behind me,
Honorable Rosenblum. And it was very thorough and complete, and
went through, I do not know, several months of it, and seemed
to end up at a place where I think people felt pretty
comfortable that we had looked at things with a good degree of
fidelity, and of course concluded the adequacy of what we were
trying to do, but also agreed with the NNSA conclusion about
getting to 80 pits per year by 2030 is not being, at least as
of today, appears to be possible.
So it appears--and again, as I mentioned in my opening
remarks, I chaired my first meeting yesterday, and I could just
say from that meeting, who knows. We all are on the same page.
I mean, we are also struck by the enormity of what we have to
do. I mean, again, we do not have time to bicker and we do not
have time to go into silos now. We just do not have the time.
And everything is so independent.
Senator King. It is really a triad of modernization. It is
the triad, the delivery. We are modernizing all three legs, we
are modernizing the weapon system, but we are also modernizing
the facilities themselves at NNSA. I have been to Los Alamos
and there are some--I think there are some facilities that date
back to the Manhattan Project. So it is massive undertaking.
Admiral Richard, you touched on this, I think, in your
testimony, and we were talking about deterrence. The budget
defunds the sea-launch cruise missile, and my question is, do
we have a deterrent capability below the level of a massive
response, and if not, is that not a gap in our deterrent
capacity?
Admiral Richard. We do have a deterrent capability, and you
are talking about a class of deterrence challenge that STRATCOM
has been working on since 2015. How do you deter limited
employment?
Nuclear Posture Review, very thorough review. I think as
you all have seen this is an excellent strategy that has
resulted. But I think it is incumbent upon us to learn lessons
as we go along, as the threat changes, both China's strategic
breakout and what we are learning in real time in the crisis
inside Ukraine.
And so not all of your triad is available all of the time.
Day-to-day we have a dyad. And so the question becomes, as we
go forward, what changes, capacity, capacity, and posture do we
need to have to better deter the threats we face? And I do
submit that is a question we need to be looking at, and based
on what we are learning from the Ukraine crisis, the deterrence
and assurance gap--it is important not to leave that out--a
non-ballistic, low-yield, non-treaty accountable system that is
available without visible generation, would be very valuable.
Senator King. And we do not have that today. Is that
correct?
Admiral Richard. That is correct.
Senator King. A different question on deterrence. One of
the things that keeps me up at night is nonstate actors getting
ahold of nuclear weapons. Ms. Hruby, I know that part of your
list of things to do is nonproliferation. The problem with
terrorists having a nuclear weapon is that deterrence does not
work with them. They do not care too much about dying and they
do not have a capital city to be worried about. And I just
commend to all of you, and perhaps I can submit this question
for the record, particularly you, Admiral Richard, I would like
to something about how we deter, how do we deal with the risk
of a proliferation of nuclear weapons to a terrorist, to
nonstate actors, for whom the normal, the theory of deterrence
does not really apply?
Final quick question, Ms. Hruby, and you may want to talk
about this later. Savannah River, 80 pits a year. It does not
look like we are going to make it. Is there a plan to
accelerate that process and get a better handle on costs?
Ms. Hruby. The Savannah River pit production facility would
make 50 pits per year to allow us, as a country, combined with
the Los Alamos 30 pits per year, to make 80.
We are moving as fast as we can on the Savannah River pit
production facility design. That is the phase that we are in.
That design is occurring at about 75 percent of the time that a
non-nuclear design of that same magnitude would take place, so
I feel like that is accelerated. When the design is complete we
will begin construction. When the construction is complete we
will begin trying to make pits at rate. So we have multiple
steps. We will try to accelerate each of those steps, and, in
fact, we are hoping to begin to do some prebuys of long-lead
items to prepare for the construction phase now.
Senator King. Thank you. Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Richard, I would like to ask my first question of
you, and it is a repeat of what Chairman King asked. You
reported to us last year, in your prepared statement, you said,
speaking of SLCM, ``Without this capability adversaries may
perceive an advantage at lower levels of conflict that may
encourage limited nuclear use.'' Is that still your view?
Admiral Richard. Senator, it is.
Senator Fischer. And you believe that we have a deterrence
and an assurance gap without SLCM. Is that correct?
Admiral Richard. Senator, I do. And what I would add is
that one of the takeaways, I think, from Ukraine is there are
certain scenarios that were judged to be highly improbable that
have now materialized in front of us in real life, and I think
that requires us to go back and reassess some of the decisions
we have made in the past.
Senator Fischer. Do you believe that the NPR that just came
out recently from the Administration, does that provide the
Department to have conversations on not just the threats that
are out there but also on the needs that this country must have
to defend the homeland?
Admiral Richard. Senator, I think it does. The NPR has
produced, in my opinion, a very good strategy. I think as we
implement the NPR what we have to do is take that strategy, and
then as threats change, right--and I would refer to China's
strategic--we do not know where China is going to wind up in
capability and capacity. We are learning probabilities are
different, based on what we are seeing in Ukraine, and the NPR
calls for that. The next step is to actually implement that
process and ask ourselves what posture, what capability, what
capacity do we need to execute that good strategy.
Senator Fischer. And do you feel confident that you and
other members of the Department and the military will be able
to express those views in a very thoughtful manner and the
confidence in the Administration and the possibilities of
looking at change?
Admiral Richard. Senator, I am certainly asking for that.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
Admiral Grady, your predecessor, General Hyten, testified
in support of SLCM many times. He was quoted in one of his
appearances before this subcommittee. He said, ``My job as a
military officer is to look at the threat, understand the
threat, and propose capabilities to this body to deliver to the
military so that we can respond to any threat that exists. It
is all about the threat.''
Have the threats changed, sir?
Admiral Grady. Yes, ma'am. First of all----
Senator Fischer. Would it be your best military advice to
at least continue research and development on the capability
that we have with SLCM?
Admiral Grady. I am aligned with the chairman on this, and
I think consistent with my testimony and with his in that it is
all about providing the President options against a broad
series of contingencies, and in this respect, then, I am in
favor of continuing to assess and evaluate the SLCM end going
forward.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Sir.
Dr. Plumb, welcome. In Section 1641 of the fiscal year 2022
Defense Authorization Bill there was a requirement that the
Department submit the analysis of alternatives conducted for
the sea-launched cruise missile. When will that be submitted?
Mr. LaPlante. Thank you for the question. My understanding
is it is within a matter of days. I think they are putting
together the cover letter and the rest, to send that AOA over
here.
Senator Fischer. The Nuclear Posture Review, it estimates
the total cost for the SLCM program. Can you provide us with a
written breakdown of that cost estimate in the future, please?
Mr. LaPlante. Thank you. To the extent that it is
available. Again, I have not been briefed on the AOA. To the
extent that it is available, absolutely.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you.
Dr. Plumb, maybe this is for you. Over the next 8 years
China is expected to quadruple its stockpile, and Russia's
arsenal, which already exceeds our own, is also expected to
grow further. While this NPR recommends continuing the
replacement of our aging delivery systems, this essentially
recapitalizes a force that is sized and configured along the
lines of the 2010 New START Treaty force structure.
Is this Administration's view that all the developments we
have seen, for example, China's crash nuclear buildup, Russia's
violation of the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces]
Treaty, that they do not have any real impact on United States
nuclear posture, and the modernization plan initially conceived
of in 2010, is sufficient?
Mr. Plumb. Thanks, Senator. China's breakout, if you will,
but certainly their advanced modernization of their ICBMs and
their nuclear posture overall is clearly concerning. As you
well know, Russia's intent to include nuclear weapons
throughout its forces, almost at every level, is also of
concern.
I would just point out two things. One, the three-body
problem we are about to face here, or are facing even now, is
new, and it is going to require serious consideration, and I do
not think there is a single person in the Administration on any
side of these issues that does not realize that and think that
this is a problem that is going to require continued
introspection and review.
And the second thing, not everyone values nuclear weapons
at the same level. Each country has its own approach. I think
we have seen Russia's conventional forces is weaker than
certainly they imagine, and than we imagined, and that explains
further their over-reliance on nuclear weapons. I do not think
we need to match them one-for-one or yield-for yield to be able
to deter each adversary.
Senator Fischer. The 2010 plan, though, that did not really
consider China. You know, China's buildup was after that. How
would you respond to that?
Mr. Plumb. Again, I would say you are correct. China's
acceleration here was maybe thought of but certainly not as
direct of a threat to us right now. I think we are postured to
deter both, but all of these things require continued
reevaluation of the threat and reevaluation of posture.
The one thing to note, of course, and this council is the
place to address this, is we have a huge bow wave of
modernization coming just for these things in the triad that we
need. $34.4 billion is not the largest number. There are larger
numbers coming. We have capacity issues with NNSA as well, and
so we have to take all of these realities into account as we
look at this problem.
Senator Fischer. And the reality of the--one last point--
the reality of the Defense Department's budget is there is a
very small percentage that goes to our nuclear weapons. Is that
not true?
Mr. Plumb. I believe it is 4.5 percent for the nuclear
piece overall. The weapons piece obviously is smaller, Senator.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Senator King. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I had the
opportunity to speak with Administrator Hruby yesterday, and I
am trying to understand two messages. One, Administrator Hruby
wrote to the committee on April 12th, indicating the unfunded
priority of $250 million to $500 million for pit production at
the Savannah River site. Then on April 22nd, the Nuclear
Weapons Council wrote to the committee that additional funding
would not be required. Indeed, the words were ``funding alone
will not enable it to meet pit production requirements.''
So at least in my mind there appears to be a discrepancy
between what NNSA is saying and what the Nuclear Weapons
Council is saying, so let me begin with Secretary LaPlante and
then ask Administrator Hruby to comment.
Mr. LaPlante. Thank you, Senator, for the question. I
understand the question.
The Nuclear Weapons Council stands by the assessment that I
signed on April 22nd, of the adequacy of the budget as well as
that no additional money will get the pits to 80 per year. And
I would say this. The Nuclear Weapons Council has been
tracking, since the fall, this potential idea and concepts of
additional, let's say, early, long-leads items possibilities
that might help bring the pit production to 80 per year by
2030, but just will be assistance in leaning forward. We have
been aware of this for some time. It was not really at a high
degree of fidelity when we reviewed it so we did not consider
it at the time.
I think since then, particularly for the part--and I would
also defer to my colleague in a moment--that involved the $250
million, the three items, the glove boxes and the building
facility as well as the training, it appears that we have
enough fidelity that it looks like it might be sensible to do.
However, we need to review it, and the plan right now is the
Nuclear Weapons Council, in the next few weeks, we are going to
take a look at this proposal and we will make our comments on
it and make it available both to you and to this committee.
I would just say this. We really want to applaud leaning
forward, so our bias is going to be leaning forward. If there
are good ideas that will continue to up, out of our colleagues
at NNSA, we need to make sure we look at them, and if they are
solid we need to implement them. And this is going to be a
continuous process.
Subject to questions, that is my answer.
Senator Reed. Thank you. Administrator, your letter
preceded the commission's letter. You are a member of the
commission. Do you concur with that or do you offer additional
advice?
Ms. Hruby. I concur, but, Senator, if you would let me try
to clarify. So the Nuclear Weapons Council letter made a
comment that no additional amount of money will get 80 pits per
year in 2030. That is a statement that I completely agree with.
The request for additional money, the letter I signed out, was
associated with trying to buy down risks and accelerate
processes to get construction completed faster and to get to
pit production faster, not to get to 2030. So this would still
be post-2030, but it would allow us to have more confidence
that we would not have to stop or stall because we did not have
equipment when we were doing the construction project and to
make sure that the people are ready to make pits when they can
get in the building.
Senator Reed. Well, I would appreciate further advice and
comment as you study this issue going forward. And one other
issue, which might not be appropriate for an open session, is
that we both agree that 2030 target is not achievable. As it
goes back we have to think about what effect it has on our
nuclear deterrence, on our ability to actually arm nuclear
weapons. I am sure you are doing that, and in a classified
session we can pursue that question. Thank you.
I have a brief bit of time, but for the vice chairman,
admiral. The proposal for the submarine-launched cruise missile
would actually involve the attack submarines. Is that correct?
Admiral Grady. That is correct, sir.
Senator Reed. And was part of the analysis the effect on
the operational requirements of attack submarines, vis-a-vis
strategic ballistic missile submarines, and did that factor
into the recommendation by the Nuclear Posture Review?
Admiral Grady. Sir, since my time as the vice chairman I
have not studied that issue nor have I seen that study. That is
not to say it did not happen. So I would like to go back and
determine whether that did happen.
Now the SLCM-N [nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile]
was validated CONOP [concept of operations] and how it might
affect the --
Senator Reed. Admiral Richard, because I am over, but do
you have a quick comment?
Admiral Richard. Admiral Grady's assessment was very
accurate, and I will offer that there are a wide range of
CONOPS that are available to the Navy for the employment of
SLCM-N on a nuclear-powered submarine, not necessarily the
CONOP that we used for the old TLAM-N.
Senator Reed. [Presiding.] Thank you very much.
Let me recognize Senator Cotton, please, on behalf of
Senator King.
Senator Cotton. Thank you all for your appearance here
today. It is good to see the entire Nuclear Weapons Council
here, with one exception, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, Colin Kahl. Mr. Plumb, you are filling in for Mr. Kahl
today. Do you know why he could not be here?
Mr. Plumb. Senator, I do not have a specific but I will say
that on his behalf I attend the Nuclear Weapons Council
meetings. That is my responsibility as ASD [Assistant Secretary
of Defense] Space Policy, the nuclear weapons policy. And so we
have got a close working relationship, but I think from a panel
standpoint, at least in my mind, sir----
Senator Cotton. I am glad you do that, and I am sure you
do. Was he in the Pentagon today, working? Does anybody know?
Admiral Grady, do you know if he was in the Pentagon working
today?
Admiral Grady. I do not know, sir.
Senator Cotton. Is he in the Washington National Capital
region? Do you know that, Mr. Plumb?
Mr. Plumb. Sir, I do not.
Senator Cotton. Mr. LaPlante, you are the chair of the
council. Do you know where one of your council members is?
Mr. LaPlante. I do not. Not right now. Not today. Thank
you.
Senator Cotton. I just want to point out this seems to be
part of a continued pattern on behalf of the Chairman of the
Committee and apparently now the Subcommittee of protecting
Colin Kahl at all costs from appearing in public before this
Committee. And I think it is a pattern that should stop.
Admiral Richard, I know you have already touched briefly on
this. I was gone. I just want to make sure I understand your
testimony. You said on your unfunded priorities list that you
need, quote, ``a low-yield, non-ballistic capability to deter
and respond without visible generation.'' Let's put that in
plain English. ``Low-yield, non-ballistic capability.'' That
sounds a lot like a cruise missile. ``Without visible
generation.'' That sounds like something that is not on an
airplane. So to me that sounds like a sea-launched cruise
missile with nuclear capabilities. Is that right?
Admiral Richard. Senator, a sea-launched cruise missile
would fit those requirements.
Senator Cotton. Okay. So is it your best military advice
that we continue developing this nuclear-capable sea-launched
cruise missile?
Admiral Richard. Senator, yes.
Senator Cotton. So you agree in that regard with Chairman
Milley and General Wolters' testimony?
Admiral Richard. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. Okay.
Admiral Grady, you just heard Admiral Richard's testimony.
Is it your best military advice that we continue with the sea-
launched cruise missile with nuclear capabilities as well?
Admiral Grady. Senator, it is.
Senator Cotton. Okay.
Admiral Richard, given that Russia's arsenal already
exceeds ours and that China's arsenal is rapidly growing, if we
keep our plans exactly the same as they are today will the
STRATCOM commander who comes after you in 8 years, 2030, have a
force that is capable of deterring both Russia and China?
Admiral Richard. That is the number one question that we
need to ask ourselves as this moves forward.
Senator Cotton. That is why I asked you.
Admiral Richard. What we have is the absolute minimum. It
depends on the trajectory of where this goes, and we will not
be able to do it with the same level of risk that we are
carrying today if we do not ask that question.
Senator Cotton. Churchill said, in his Iron Curtain speech,
that you should not engage in temptations in a trial of
strength by merely exceeding your adversary by a small amount
in military power. Do you agree with Churchill's recommendation
that you do not encourage trials of strength?
Admiral Richard. I do, but I would also point out, look, it
is not necessary to match your opponent weapon-to-weapon. We
have a good strategy. You have to have sufficient capability to
execute that strategy as the threat changes, and that is the
question. The triad is the minimum. We are going to have to ask
that question going into the future to execute the strategy.
Senator Cotton. How many road-mobile and rail-mobile
missiles does Russia have?
Admiral Richard. Senator, I need to give you that answer in
a classified forum.
Senator Cotton. Let me ask you this. Do they have road-
mobile and rail-mobile missiles?
Admiral Richard. They have road-mobile missiles, yes.
Senator Cotton. Okay. What about China?
Admiral Richard. China has a significant number of road-
mobile missiles.
Senator Cotton. Okay. How many road-mobile and rail-mobile
missiles does the United States have?
Admiral Richard. We do not have any.
Senator Cotton. Oh, we do not have any at all?
Admiral Richard. No, sir.
Senator Cotton. So that is yet another capacity that we
have refrained from developing over the years, for justifiable
reasons, I understand. My point is that we cannot simply decide
to disarm unilaterally on all these different domains, like a
sea-launched cruise missile or other non-strategic or tactical
or battlefield weapons, however you want to phrase them.
Admiral Richard, one final question. So I am pleased to see
that once again the force is in favor of modernizing our triad,
which, as you say, is the absolute minimum, have succeeded
against the efforts of the Far Left to defund them. I do worry
about some potential single points of failure on these
modernization programs, though, and the operational impacts
that could occur from any delays. Could you share your thoughts
on this risk and how to avoid it?
Admiral Richard. First, Senator, what I want to offer is
three STRATCOM commanders in a row have come here and said we
have no margin. We do not have any operational margin left. We
used that operational margin to delay the recapitalization as
long as we have. What is left inside your triad is its inherent
ability to hedge between legs, inter-leg hedging. That
capability is there for operational, technical, and
geopolitical risk. It was not placed in our triad for
programmatic convenience.
I recommend that we maintain that hedge for the purpose it
was designed for, and we start asking the question, what is it
going to take to get this recapitalization done on time,
because I have very little ability operationally to mitigate
delays.
Senator Cotton. All right. Thank you all for your very
important work on the Nuclear Weapons Council.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator Rosen, you are recognized, and if Senator King does
not appear at the conclusion of your comments could you
recognize Senator Rounds, on behalf of the chair? Thank you.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you all for being
here today and for all your work and your service to our
country. I really appreciate it.
I am going to talk a little bit about the Nevada Test Site.
I am going to keep calling it the Nevada Test Site. It is a lot
easier than the Nevada National Security Site, NNSS. It is a
little easier to say that.
You know, it was ground zero for the majority of our
country's explosive nuclear testing between 1945 and 1992 with
100 atmospheric tests and 828 underground tests being conducted
at the site. As someone who lived in Nevada when our nation
conducted the last explosive testing that shook the ground--the
whole ground would shake, all around Las Vegas on those first
Saturdays of the month when they would do them--I am strongly,
more than strongly opposed to the resumption of explosive
nuclear testing in our state.
So today the site oversees the Stockpile Stewardship
Program, principally, as we know it, the U1a facility and
underground laboratory where scientists conduct subcritical
experiments to verify the reliability and effectiveness of our
nuclear stockpile.
Administrator Hruby, I know we have spoken about this, just
for the record. In your professional opinion do you agree that
there is not a current or foreseeable need for the United
States to resume explosive nuclear testing that produces
nuclear yields?
Ms. Hruby. Yes, Senator Rosen, I do. And I would just go
further to say our entire Stockpile Stewardship Program is
designed around the principal that we will make sure we
understand weapons enough so that we do not have to test.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. And I want to build a little bit
again on our discussion last week about U1a advancements, and
how will the U1a upgrades, the upgrades to the complex, improve
the Stockpile Stewardship Program so that, honestly, we will
never have to return to those days of explosive nuclear weapons
testing?
Ms. Hruby. Yeah, thank you, Senator, for the question. The
U1a complex at the Nevada Test Site--I will follow your lead--
is the tunnel complex where we do subcritical tests to study
the science, and we are investing significantly in upgrading
the infrastructure in that tunnel complex as well as new
experimental capabilities in the Enhanced Capabilities for
Subcritical Experiments project. And with that, when we are
able to do those experiments, we will be able to use weapon-
relevant geometries and materials to study the implosion of a
pit that will allow us to have even better models and assess
the stockpile so that we do not have to test.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I am going to ask one more
question on this to you, Administrator Hruby. The Nuclear
Weapons Council is required to report regularly to the
President regarding the safety and reliability of the U.S.
stockpile and to provide an annual recommendation on the need
to resume underground nuclear explosive testing, like we are
talking about, to preserve the credibility of the U.S. nuclear
deterrent.
And so I am going to ask you, Administrator Hruby and
Secretary LaPlante, what is the position of the council on
renewed explosive testing, for the record?
Ms. Hruby. As you rightly state, the three NNSA lab
directors are required by law to assess the safety and
reliability and performance of our stockpile, and to
specifically address whether or not we need testing at this
time. And to date the statements have been clear that testing
is not needed.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. Mr. LaPlante?
Mr. LaPlante. And I would just add, my understanding,
again, the Nuclear Weapons Council agreed with that assessment
and that testing at this time is not needed.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that.
I am just going to ask quickly, the fiscal year 2021 NDAA
included a provision to ensure that the Nuclear Weapons Council
has an opportunity to review the test site budget early enough
so it can determine whether the budget adequately supports DOD
requirements. It requires the Secretary of Energy to submit the
proposed budget to the council prior to submitting it to OMB
[Office of Management and Budget].
And so, Administrator Hruby, last question. I am sorry, if
you can answer quickly. Has this new review process had any
impacts on the budgets to modernize and recapitalize the test
site infrastructure?
Ms. Hruby. I do not believe so. I have only done the
process once, and in this process the Nuclear Weapons Council
assessed that the DOE budget for the test site was adequate.
Senator Rosen. All right. Well maybe we can talk offline a
little bit more about that. Thank you very much, and let's see,
Senator King. Oh no, Senator Rounds, I believe.
Senator King. [Presiding.] Senator Rounds is next.
Senator Rosen. Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Richard, well, first of all let me just say thank
you to all of you for your service to our country, and I think
it is very special that the entire council be here today. This
is a very special opportunity for us.
Admiral Richard, in August of 2021, at the Space and
Missile Defense Symposium, you described China's explosive
growth and modernization of its nuclear and conventional forces
as breathtaking. You went on to caution, ``Make no mistake.
China's strategic breakout is cause for action,'' and that we
need to understand what we are up against. And I would like to
just have you share with us, or to describe in plain and as
simple English as we can get to, as I call it, third-grade
level here, as the USSTRATCOM commander, what it is that we are
up against so that the American people clearly understand how
grave this threat truly is, and to assure that we continue to
pace this growing threat with our own capabilities for
ourselves and our allies. Could you also speak to how
imperative it is that we do the threat-to-capability need
reviews on a more continuing basis?
Admiral Richard. Senator, let me start by trying to
characterize the speed this way. When I first testified 2 years
ago the great debate was whether China was going to double its
stockpile by the end of the decade. That has already happened
while I have been the commander of U.S. Strategic Command.
Details that you would like to have, the biggest and most
visible one is the expansion from 0 to at least 360 solid-field
intercontinental ballistic missile silos. Significant growth,
and this has occurred over the course of just a few years.
Double number of road-mobile missiles.
China now has a true air leg, nuclear capable with their H-
6N bombers and an air-launched ballistic missile. They are not
capable of continuous at-sea deterrent patrols with their Jin-
class submarines from protected bastion in the South China Sea,
and more are coming. They have a true nuclear command and
control system. They are building a warning system. They aspire
to launch under warning launch, under attack capability. They
have raised the readiness of their forces. They have a
substantial number of theater-range systems, many of which are
nuclear, which have no role in a true minimum-deterrent, no-
first-use policy.
They are changing their command and control, and this is
before we even get into the novel weapon systems. The most
public one of those was the Fractional Orbital Bombardment
System that has an unlimited range, can attack from any azimuth
and comes down in a hypersonic glide vehicle with great
performance. No nation in history has ever demonstrated that
capability.
And, Senator, the rest of the details are actually in my
written posture statement, but that is why I describe this as--
this is easily the biggest expansion in China's history and
rivals the biggest expansion of any nation in history,
including us and the Soviet Union back in the early '60s.
Senator Rounds. And just for the record, they are
continuing to produce nuclear weapons to fill these expected
weapon systems at an ongoing and very rapid rate. I do not know
if we can talk about how quick it is, but it is at a very
significant rate. Correct?
Admiral Richard. Senator, yes. The bottom line, what I have
directed my staff at STRATCOM to do--and you are right, the
details are classified--whatever the intelligence community
tells you about what China is going to do, divide it by 2 in
time and you will probably be closer to what happens.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Admiral.
Administrator Hruby, this is the lead-in to the question
that I would have for you regarding our ability just to produce
plutonium pits. Earlier you mentioned that we are not going to
make the 80 pits per year goal by 2030, which is what the
statutory requirement is. If we are not going to, and
recognizing, not even what all of our near-peer competitors are
doing but just what China alone is doing, it would seem to me
if we are not even going to make this number, what is our Plan
B?
Ms. Hruby. Thank you, Senator, for that question, and we
are actively working this in the Nuclear Weapons Council right
now, is what can we do to have a safe, secure, reliable, and
effective stockpile in light of what we think we can
practically do in terms of making pits? We will look at that
carefully. There may be options, but we are in the middle of
that study.
I just want to remind you that we are making new pits
because we are concerned about pit aging. We do not want to put
old pits in new weapons if we think, in the 30 years those
weapons will be in the stockpile they may have aging problems.
But we do not know for sure that they will have aging problems
because that is a science problem that is very difficult and
that we are studying at NNSA.
Senator Rounds. If I could, what you have suggested then--
and I am out of time, but I would just say, one of the options
for Plan B is that we either rejuvenate or we continue to use
existing pits that already have in inventory.
Ms. Hruby. Right. We reuse pits.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I am out of time.
Thank you.
Senator King. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So it is no secret that I think our nuclear modernization
program is unsustainable and dangerous. I wanted to see
significantly less emphasis on nuclear weapons in the National
Defense Strategy but the Biden administration made the right
call in cancelling the sea-launched cruise missile, known as
the SLCM, or ``slick-em.'' A low-yield nuclear weapon launch
from ships duplicates capabilities we already have and
undermines the Navy's conventional mission.
Even after eliminating this missile, however, our nuclear
modernization program is still incredibly expensive. The
Congressional Budget Office estimated that it would cost $1.7
trillion, and I suspect we are going to find out that that
estimate, once again, is far too low. But we have been hearing
a tremendous amount today from my Republican colleagues who
somehow think we are still spending too little on nuclear
weapons and the process of producing them.
So let's just see if we can clear something up. Admiral
Richard, we have discussed this before, but to confirm again,
was Strategic Command fully consulted and able to fully
participate in the Nuclear Posture Review process?
Admiral Richard. Senator, as far as the process inside the
Department of Defense, yes. And I will also point out Ukraine
and the crisis that we are in happened after the Nuclear
Posture Review.
Senator Warren. All right. But you were part of this while
review, right?
Admiral Richard. I was, Senator.
Senator Warren. And I know that we have to make tough
calls, especially to make sure that nuclear weapon spending
does not cannibalize our conventional capabilities. The Navy
said that pursuing SLCM would be, quote/unquote, ``cost
prohibitive.'' That is the description from the Navy. Our
nuclear weapons modernization plans include constructing new
plutonium pits, which produce the radioactive raw material we
need for nuclear weapons. I remain concerned about the costs
and the risks in the pit production program, which is already
far behind schedule and far over budget.
So Administrator Hruby, both Admiral Richard and your
deputy have told this committee that throwing more money at
this problem is not going to get us to our original goal of 80
pits per year by 2030. The Nuclear Weapons Council has also
concluded that additional funding simply will not get us there.
So, Administrator Hruby, despite the fact that more money
will not solve the fundamental flaws in this program, your
unfunded priorities list, the wish list that you submit to
Congress on top of your $21.4 billion budget request, includes
an additional $500 million more dollars for pit production. Is
that correct?
Ms. Hruby. It is.
Senator Warren. So, Administrator Hruby, when you were
before this committee last week you could not even tell us how
much the pit production program would cost. So why should
taxpayers be throwing an extra $500 million on top of a program
that you do not even have a cost estimate for?
Ms. Hruby. Yes, Senator Warren. We are in the process of
doing the design so that we can have a credible cost and
schedule estimate. That design will be complete in early 2024.
We do know, however, based on other construction projects that
we are currently doing that some items that will be needed in
the pit production facility, like nuclear-qualified piping and
glove boxes, are taking a very long time to buy. So the request
for additional monies has to do with procuring some of the
long-lead items that we will need so that when our design is
complete we can do construction at the fastest possible pace.
Senator Warren. You know, I just have to say it was your
opening line there, when you said, yourself, just now that you
do not have a credible estimate, and you are hoping to have a
credible estimate at some point in the future. I have got to
say, I am really unhappy to have to tell taxpayers that you get
a half a billion dollars on something for which you do not have
a credible estimate yet on what you are going to need, because
the credible estimate actually may guide whether or not we
decide to do this program and how we do this program. So
saying, well, go ahead and throw and extra half billion in
right now just in case is troubling.
Now look, I realize I am out of time. Dr. LaPlante, I am
going to submit some questions for the record for you on where
you see the most programmatic risk for the Department in this.
We can just go back and forth over that when we are not on the
clock.
You know, we are talking about spending trillions of
dollars, and the American people truly, they want to spend what
it takes to keep us safe. But when you cannot answer basic
questions about these programs it does not inspire much
confidence that this is the number that we should be
supporting.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Thank you, Senator. We are going to have a
short second round for those of us who are wishing to follow
up.
Secretary LaPlante, give me an assessment of where the GBSD
program is. Are we on budget, on schedule? This is a big, new
project, and we do not want surprises. So how do you feel about
where that project stands right now?
Mr. LaPlante. Senator, I will start with a caveat that I am
doing a deep dive in the program probably in the next 1 to 2
weeks. The last time I did any bit of a deep dive, I would say
as a citizen, whatever I was, was about 2 years, when I asked
to look at it. So every impression I am going to give you is
what I sent----
Senator King. But when you finish that process I hope you
will inform the committee.
Mr. LaPlante. I will. I will. And what I will just say, as
you know, they are somewhat early, 1 to 2 years, into
engineering and manufacturing development (EMD), try to get to
a first flight. I would say of the three legs and where they
are in their EMD, they are the earliest along, so that means
there still is significant risks. What are the risk areas? The
risk areas are rad-hard electronics. The risk areas are the
infrastructure and all the rest of it. And I intend to look
into it, and I will give you that assessment of where that is.
I am going to do a deep dive on all three of the legs, but I am
starting with GBSD.
Senator King. I would appreciate having that as soon as you
have it available.
Mr. LaPlante. Yes. Thank you.
Senator King. As part of this hearing I would like to
submit for the record a chart that has been prepared by staff
that tracks the financial history of the nuclear enterprise.
[The information referred to follows:]
GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT
Senator King. In 1962, the total triad expense was 17
percent of the defense budget. In 1984, it was 10 percent.
Before the modernization program that started a few years ago
it was about 2.7 percent of the defense budget, and when you
add the recapitalization of the triad and of the nuclear
facilities, and that includes the Columbia-class submarines,
the B-21, and the GBSD, you get to about 6.4 percent of the
defense budget.
So I think it is important to keep these figures in
perspective in terms of this is the bedrock basis of our
strategy to defend this country we are still way below what it
was 50 years ago, way below what it was 40 years ago, and a
relatively modest percentage of the overall defense budget,
that does not mean it is still not a lot of money, and I
understand Senator Warren's questions. Taxpayers are being
asked to pay this money and it is our responsibility to be sure
that it is used well and effectively.
But I think the recapitalization is sort of skewing this
discussion. I refer to it as the pig in the budget python. It
is a very large expenditure that we are going to have to cover
over a few years, frankly in part because we have put off that
expenditure for a number of years and we are having to do all
three legs of the triad at once. So I think that is an
important perspective to have on the record of this hearing.
A final question, and Administrator Hruby, I think this may
be to you, although if others have an answer. It is a little
puzzling to me. Apparently China is expressing no interest
whatsoever in any arms control, nonproliferation, even
discussing it. They are just racing toward a very significant,
and I suspect for them an expensive nuclear enterprise. Why is
that? Why can we not engage them in some mutual discussions
that would assist both countries? And, of course, once we get
through what is going on now, re-engage with Russia on these
issues, nonproliferation is in everyone's interest, it seems to
me, and cutting the expense of these programs is what led to
the agreements 20 years ago.
Ms. Hruby. Senator King, your inclination on this is the
same as mine. First, let me just say it is the primary
responsibility of the State Department to engage in those
dialogues. The NNSA brings to those discussions a potential for
technical collaboration, which worked in the past with Russian
scientists and potentially could work with the Chinese, and
certainly offer that we would be willing to engage in good
technical dialogue and discussion to the extent that it could
help strategic stability.
Senator King. Thank you. For the record, could you give me
your thoughts to the question that I asked Senator Richard
about deterrence of a non-state actor, because that is really a
proliferation question? It may be that if deterrence does not
work we have to fall back on keeping this material out of their
hands in the first place, and I would like your thoughts on
that, for the record, for Administrator Hruby.
Ms. Hruby. I would be happy to.
Senator King. Thank you. Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I just want
to thank all of you once again for being here today for this
extremely important hearing that we are having.
Administrator Hruby, last year the Nuclear Weapons Council
noted significant concern about the long-term funding profile
of NNSA's budget in a letter to this committee. And while this
budget projects continued growth for next year, after that it
would level off and then it would decline, which is exactly
what the Nuclear Weapons Council warns against.
Do you believe this level of funding is sufficient or will
increases beyond what is projected in this budget be necessary
in order to meet our modernization requirements?
Ms. Hruby. Senator Fischer, thank you for that question. We
will be looking at the FYNSP [Future Year Nuclear Security
Plan] again in light of what we know now, what our requirements
are as well as what our infrastructure needs are, and, in fact,
we are just starting the fiscal year 2024 budget bill so will
be doing that in great detail.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Dr. LaPlante, does the Nuclear Weapons Council remain
concerned about the out-year budget for NNSA and continue to
believe that low or no growth, quote, ``will not provide a
sound foundation for the planned capabilities and capacities
needed to meet current and future requirements,'' end quote?
Mr. LaPlante. Senator, thanks for the question. The Nuclear
Weapons Council, my understanding, again, did the deep-dive
review of the 2023 budget, and that is the letter that I sent
over on the 22nd. I believe, you know, as the 2024 budget
starts to be built we are going to be brought in and do the
same thing again, and we will comment on whether we have
concerns, just as we showed, as the law provides. Thank you.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much. I understand that
Senator Reed discussed the plutonium pit production and NNSA's
request for additional funding, but Administrator Hruby, your
unfunded priorities, which have been referenced here, the
letter indicates the request contains $500 million shortfall in
funding for pit production. I appreciate you making the
committee aware of this and your clear testimony that these
additional resources would help minimize any delay in achieving
the target of 80 pits per year.
I would like to ask the rest of the panel their views on
this. Do the members of the Nuclear Weapons Council agree these
funds are necessary and believe it is critical to achieve full
production as close to 2030 as possible? Secretary LaPlante,
let us start with you.
Mr. LaPlante. Yeah, thank you. First is just as a formality
that as the chair of the Nuclear Weapons Council we have not
formally reviewed that, and we will, and we intend to do it in
the next couple of weeks and we will provide to you our
assessment, as a council.
Personal view, from the little that I have seen and
discussed with the administrator, it appears, at least, for the
three items that she has identified, and she talked about this
earlier in this hearing, of long-lead items, they seem very
sensible. And as we find, as the NNSA finds other things that
are sensible to do I think we need to investigate them and not
make it a static process. We should be asking for these ideas
all the time.
I defer to my colleagues for the rest of their reviews.
Senator Fischer. Madam Secretary, did you have a comment on
this?
Ms. Shyu. We first heard about this at yesterday's Nuclear
Weapons Council meeting.
Senator Fischer. A little closer to the mic.
Ms. Shyu. Sorry. How about this?
Senator Fischer. Very good.
Ms. Shyu. So we first heard about this detail yesterday at
the Nuclear Weapons Council, and certainly what Administrator
Hruby talked about made a lot of sense. There are long-lead
items you need to buy when you do construction so you do not
stop the construction, wait for the long-lead item. So we are
eager to take a look at the details of this in the coming
weeks, just as Dr. LaPlante mentioned.
Senator Fischer. Great. Thank you. Secretary Plumb?
Mr. Plumb. Yes, Senator. I just echo the same comments
Secretary LaPlante and Secretary Shyu have made, which is we
are eager to lean forward. We would all like to kind of look at
it, I think, now that NSA [National Security Agency] has got
some good fidelity, on what that approach should be, I think we
are all inclined to. Yes, but we would like to get back to you.
Senator Fischer. Do you agree with the goal of what was
presented, or do you agree that you have to minimize the delay?
Mr. Plumb. The goal--I think we are on the same page with
the goal--is to get to 80 pits per year as close to 2030 as
possible, so if we can find a way to do it. And I think the
argument that I understand it is some of these procurement
items, it is kind of that keeping a line going. So we want to
keep the line going so we do not have to restart it.
Senator Fischer. Keep moving forward.
Mr. Plumb. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. So keep moving forward and do not shorten
a big delay.
Mr. Plumb. And do not add additional delay by not
procuring, I think is a specific concern to the acquisition
community.
Senator Fischer. Good. Admiral Grady?
Admiral Grady. Yes, ma'am. The military requirement is
clear, 80 pits per year as soon as possible. If not by 2030,
then as soon as possible after that. I am looking forward to
reviewing the director's proposals and helping the Nuclear
Weapons Council decide whether this is the right way forward.
But the military requirement is absolutely clear.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Admiral Richard, anything to
add?
Admiral Richard. I would add, STRATCOM supports this or any
other measure that NNSA can execute that minimizes the delay
and ultimately reduce the operational risk that I am going to
have to carry because we cannot meet the requirement.
Senator Fischer. And I would assume the operational risks
need to be discussed in classified?
Admiral Richard. They will. And, in fact, they will be
discussed as part of the Nuclear Weapons Council deliberations.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think my
colleague, Senator Warren, has asked a question but I am not
sure we have had the opportunity for a good response. I would
like to go into this a little bit, and Admiral Richard, I would
begin with you, sir.
Since you have been in the services, I do not believe that
you have ever served at time in which we did not have a very
strong and well-defined nuclear deterrent. Can you imagine a
world today where the United States did not have a clearly
recognized nuclear deterrent capability that helps to keep
peace in the rest of the world?
Admiral Richard. Senator, I cannot, and I think it is worth
a second to explain why I say that.
Senator Rounds. I think so.
Admiral Richard. Nuclear deterrence is foundational to
integrated deterrence because no other capability to date or
combination of capabilities gets anywhere close to the
destructive potential of nuclear. So if you do not set the
foundation of your integrated deterrent when you are in a
competition with another nuclear-capable opponent, if you
cannot deter their vertical escalation everything else is
useless to you.
The reverse is also true. If you set that strong foundation
then using every military and other instrument of national
power is actually very much to your benefit because it enables
you to resolve conflict at the lowest possible level of
violence. But there is a theoretical reason why we have to have
a strong nuclear deterrent.
Senator Rounds. See, I think sometimes because we live with
it and we have always assumed that we are free because we are
simply strong and economically power, and the rest of the world
simply does not have the desire to dominate us, that somehow
that means that we do not need the nuclear deterrent that we
carry today. And because we have not had a threat to the
homeland since, really, 9/11, and that was not a nuclear
threat, I think there is a misunderstanding that somehow there
is no need for this nuclear deterrent anymore.
And I think the message that you are sharing, one that says
the reason that we have been able to maintain our freedom is
because we have had a clearly recognized nuclear deterrent, but
that also means that generation after generation we have to
improve it and we have to keep up with our competition.
If we had--and once again, I would defer, Admiral Richard,
to you, but Admiral Grady, you are most certainly welcome to
respond to this as well. Our adversaries have become better and
better at, first of all, trying to defeat some of our nuclear
capabilities and to defend basically not only against the
nuclear but some of our conventional capabilities as well.
Would it be fair to say that if you simply said one nuclear
bomb or one nuclear missile or one nuclear long-range weapon
dropped from a B-52 bomber, since we could that our enemies
would fear us? Clearly it would not be the case, and clearly we
have to have enough weapons and modernized enough to where we
can get around, or at least make them think we have the
capabilities of getting around them in order to maintain that
deterrent, and that capability that they have is changing on a
daily basis. Is that fair?
Admiral Richard. Senator, yes it is.
Admiral Grady. Senator, I would just comment that the
number is interesting but it is the effect that that number
generates, and that is that it gives the President many, many
options across a broad range of contingencies, and that is what
drives the number. There is strong analysis in math behind that
number, and that is what we need to have that credible nuclear
deterrent that you and Admiral Richard have been talking about.
Senator Rounds. Admiral Grady, I think you need to lay that
out in a little bit more explainable terms to the American
public and to this committee. What do you mean by that when you
say that when you have the deterrent, the Trident, that you
have multiple options available for the President of the United
States in order to keep peace? What do you mean by that?
Admiral Grady. Chaz, I think I will defer to you on that
one.
Admiral Richard. What you want to be able to do is offer
the President any number of ways at which he might be able to
create an effect that will change the opponent's decision
calculus and get them to refrain or otherwise seek negotiation
vice continued hostility. So ballistic versus non-ballistic. Do
you want it visible? Do you want it not visible? Do you want it
prompt? Do you want it to come in a long period of time? Each
of those is very situational specific.
My recommendation on the SLCM-N, for example, is not an
effort to relitigate the Nuclear Posture Review. It is based on
the conditions we find ourselves in today, when I look at what
I am able to offer to the President, and ask myself what would
do a better job, lower the risk, give us more confidence in our
deterrent capability. that is where that recommendation comes
from. It is a specific example of the broader. That is why you
want a lot of options, Senator.
Senator Rounds. And one last question. Admiral Grady, do
you think Russia would have invaded Ukraine today if Ukraine
was a nuclear capability, if they had a nuclear capability?
Admiral Grady. I think they would have had many, many
second thoughts about that as an option for them if they were
facing a nuclear-armed adversary.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
I want to thank each and every one of you for your
dedication to the country, for your sober-minded approach to
these very difficult issues, for the work that you put in on
behalf of the public, often in quiet and unsung ways. And I
want you to know that we recognize what are contributing to the
defense of this country.
The irony of nuclear weapons is that the reason we have
them is that we never want to use them, and the best way to
ensure that we never use them is to have them, and to have
those who would commit aggression understand that this is
something that has to be, as the admiral said, part of their
decision-making calculus. Evil exists in the world, and we have
to be prepared to defend ourselves and our allies. The work
that you are doing is contributing mightily to that end.
So I want to thank you again for your testimony today,
thank you for appearing before the committee.
Senator Fischer, did you have a closing statement you would
like to make? No.
Again, thank you, and this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6:00 p.m., the Subommittee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth A. Warren
pit production
1. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, what is the current
estimated cost of pit production over the next 30 years?
Administrator Hruby. The answer has two parts: (1) estimated cost
for design, construction, and equipment for the facilities, and (2)
estimated cost for operating the facilities out to the 30-year mark.
For design, construction, and equipment, the preliminary cost estimate
ranges from the ``Critical Decision (CD)-1'' (Approve Alternative
Selection and Cost Range) stage, were $2.7 billion--$3.9 billion for
the Los Alamos Plutonium Pit Production Project (LAP4) and $6.9
billion--$11.1 billion for the Savannah River Plutonium Processing
Facility (SRPPF). Cost estimates will depend on facility and equipment
designs, which have not yet reached 90 percent completion. We will
provide estimates of the costs of operating these facilities after
designs are 90 percent complete in fiscal year 2024. Costs associated
with ongoing production and certification activities and the
installation of equipment to restore Los Alamos' ability to produce 10
pits per year are reflected in the Plutonium Modernization program.
2. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, when does the National
Nuclear Security Administration expect to release updated estimates of
pit production costs?
Administrator Hruby. We will be able to provide updated cost
estimates with reasonable fidelity once design is 90 percent complete
for LAP4 and SRPPF, which is scheduled to occur in fiscal year 2024 for
both projects.
3. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, the fiscal year 2020
National Nuclear Security Administration Congressional budget request
stated that new pits will be ``W87-like.'' Does that indicate that
future pits will be heavily modified? If so, what work has NNSA done to
ensure their reliability?
Administrator Hruby. Current and future modernization plans include
pit types based on previously tested and certified designs, with well-
understood modifications that provide key advantages (such as easier
manufacturing, for example). Discussion of specific modifications can
be provided in a classified setting. NNSA has done a great deal of
science-based stockpile stewardship work during the past three decades
to underpin justified confidence in the reliability of warheads that
include these designs. The pit production capability being established
in NNSA must be capable of making pits other than the W87.
4. Senator Warren. Administrator. Hruby, Mr. LaPlante, is future
pit production scheduled to maintain the safety and reliability of the
existing nuclear weapons stockpile? Why not if so?
Administrator Hruby. Pit production will allow us to maintain the
high reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile while improving
safety and security as needed. Establishing required pit production
capacity as close as possible to 2030 remains a high priority. The
later this capability becomes available, the more we will be pushed
toward returning old pits to the stockpile instead of newly
manufactured pits. The pit production capability will provide
deliberate replacement of older existing plutonium pits with newly
manufactured pits as risk mitigation against the potentially negative
implications of plutonium aging.
Mr. LaPlante. Through the annual assessment process, today's pits
are continually assessed for safety and reliability. These assessments
continue to indicate the pits meet all safety and reliability
requirements. Future pit production is scheduled to replace today's
pits to maintain and improve the safety, security, and reliability of
the stockpile.
5. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, Mr. LaPlante the costs of
pit production are not included in the cost estimates for the W87-1
warhead. This is a key component of nuclear weapons and requisite for
the detonation of a warhead. Why do cost estimates for the W87-1
warhead not include pit production costs?
Administrator Hruby. The cost of producing pits per unit is
included in our W87-1 cost estimates, but the costs to restore the
Nation's ability to produce 80 pits per year are calculated separately
since these investments are required for future systems as well, not
just the W87-1. NNSA's cost estimates for the W87-1 Modification
Program are being updated as the program enters Phase 6.3 this summer.
This will include an Independent Cost Estimate and a Weapons Design
Cost Report to inform NNSA's overall cost estimate for the program.
Mr. LaPlante. As the Nuclear Weapons Council Chair, my
understanding indicates that pit production is a capability necessary
across the stockpile, and, therefore, is not tied to a budget line of
one warhead.
6. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, Mr. LaPlante, will the W93
require a new plutonium pit?
Administrator Hruby. A decision has not yet been made on the type
of pit that will be used in the W93. The decision will be influenced by
the schedule for achieving pit-production capabilities, as this
schedule becomes better known from the increasing maturity of facility
design and the evolution of funding profiles. Additional information
related to W93 plans can be provided in a classified setting.
Mr. LaPlante. The Nuclear Weapons Council is planning for all
warheads to contain new plutonium pits, beginning with the W87-1.
However, given the shortfalls in meeting pit production requirements,
the NWC is reviewing and assessing the requirements demand and
determining where we prioritize new pits, what schedule adjustments can
be made, and where we can accept a reused pit in a program and the
implications for each option.
7. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby, can you provide some
details as to why it will take several years to produce such a more
detailed plan on achieving 80 pits per year when it was requested by
Congress two years ago, if not longer?
Administrator Hruby. Design and construction of nuclear facilities
for pit production is a complex process, partly because these one-of-a-
kind facilities must be designed and built to operate reliably for many
decades while meeting safety, security, and environmental requirements
and achieve a high confidence capability to produce pits qualified to
military specifications. Design efforts at both the Los Alamos National
Laboratory and Savannah River Site are progressing. NNSA previously
communicated information resulting from Critical Decision (CD)-1 for
both LAP4 and SRPPF to Congress. As these projects reach CD-2, Approve
Performance Baseline, NNSA will proactively provide Congress with
updated information based on the 90 percent design for both of these
one-of-a-kind facilities.
8. Senator Warren. Administrator Hruby and Admiral Richard, when
can we expect reporting on the impact on the stockpile if the NNSA
cannot meet the 80 pit per year goal in a reasonable time?
Administrator Hruby. NNSA remains committed to identifying
acceleration pathways to achieve the required pit production rates as
close to 2030 as possible. NNSA is working with subject matter experts
from across the nuclear security enterprise to identify acceleration
options and associated risk mitigation. Pit production rates of 80 pits
per year will require construction and a reliable production process to
produce certified pits to be established.
Per direction in House Report 116-449, accompanying the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260) NNSA is required
to provide an annual report on a contingency plan to meet the needs of
the nuclear deterrent that did not solely rely on the current need
dates for pit production. NNSA developed this plan in coordination with
the Department of Defense and delivered the last report to Congress in
December 2021. The Nuclear Weapons Council continues to evaluate and
increase fidelity of schedule options.
Admiral Richard. In addition to the NNSA Pit Production Contingency
Plans required by the 2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act provided to
Congress in December 2021, the Atomic Energy Act (50 U.S.C. 2525), as
amended by fiscal year 2016 NDAA, also requires the CDRUSSTRATCOM to
submit to the SECDEF an annual assessment of the safety, security,
reliability, and military effectiveness of the Nation's nuclear weapons
stockpile NLT 1 Dec. I expect the fiscal year 2022 assessment will
address the operational implications, risks, and/or impacts on military
effectiveness of failing to meet the statutory 80 PPY by 2030
requirement. The President subsequently provides this assessment to
Congress no later than 15 March of the following year.
slcm
9. Senator Warren. Admiral Richard you have suggested the proposed
new SLCM-N is desirable because it would be a ``low-yield, non-
ballistic capability that does not require visible generation.'' Do you
think our adversaries will interpret this as the United States seeking
an undetectable first strike capability?
Admiral Richard. While I hesitate to speculate exactly how our
adversaries will interpret it, I do not think they will see it as a
first strike capability. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review was clear that
this capability was meant to address the perception that an adversary
might have regarding the feasibility or an advantage in using a limited
number of nuclear weapons in a conflict. That is, to address a
potential deterrence and assurance gap.
The situation in Ukraine and China's nuclear trajectory convinces
me that a deterrence and assurance gap exists. To address this gap, a
low-yield, non-ballistic capability to deter and respond without
visible generation is necessary to provide a persistent, survivable,
regional capability to deter adversaries, assure Allies, provide
flexible options, as well as complement existing capabilities. Such a
capability with these attributes should be re-examined in the near
future.
The United States deployed the Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile-Nuclear
(TLAM-N) for 25 years before it was retired. We have no indications
that deploying this system was perceived as an effort to seek an
undetectable first strike capability.
10. Senator Warren. Assistant Secretary Plumb, how will the
presence of nuclear-armed missiles on submarines affect the ability of
U.S. submarines to pass through allied countries waters or visit their
ports?
Assistant Secretary Plumb. It is the policy of the United States to
neither confirm nor deny nuclear weapons onboard any individual U.S.
submarine. If a new sea launched nuclear cruise missile was developed
and deployed on US fast attack submarines, some coastal Allies or
partners might choose to deny port access to all US fast attack
submarines due to the potential for nuclear weapons being onboard. We
respect the sovereign rights of our allies and partners.
gbsd
11. Senator Warren. Secretary LaPlante, what issues do you expect
to address in your deep dive of the GBSD program?
Mr. LaPlante. Modernizing the delivery systems that compose the
nuclear Triad remains a top acquisition priority of the Department of
Defense. I recently began conducting deep-dive reviews of all three
legs of the Triad. I completed my review of the Sentinel program,
formerly the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent, on May 16, 2022. The
review addressed requirements, schedule, performance, cost, and risk.
It demonstrated that Sentinel is a complex program executing to an
aggressive schedule. The Air Force is actively mitigating risk, but
little to no margin exists. My team and I will remain closely engaged
as the program progresses with a focus on cost, schedule, and
performance.
12. Senator Warren. Secretary LaPlante, here do you see the
greatest schedule, cost, and technical risks in our nuclear
modernization plans?
Mr. LaPlante. Schedule, cost, and technical risks associated with
the nuclear modernization programs have my full attention. Following a
series of deep dives of the nuclear modernization programs, I am
focused on the concurrent execution of these programs. Nearly every
system is beyond its designed service life, and must be modernized and
delivered on time and on specification. This places significant
pressure on the capacity of our industrial base, supply chains,
workforce, and infrastructure. My team and I will continue to assess
trends across the programs and work to mitigate risks. This is a once-
in-a-generation modernization, and it is imperative that these programs
remain on track to ensure there is no gap in our ability to
effectively, reliably, and credibly deter our adversaries and assure
our Allies and partners.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan S. Sullivan
aukus
13. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Hruby and Secretary Shyu, I
understand that NNSA is currently involved in an 18-month study period
regarding the optimal pathway to deliver nuclear propulsion technology
to Australia as a part of the AUKUS agreement. The U.S. has only shared
nuclear propulsion technology once before, with the United Kingdom. Our
Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program is a model of excellence. The same can
be said for the UK. How you are balancing the need to ensure the
Australians have the same level of stewardship for their program, with
the need to move out quickly on the terms of this agreement?
Administrator Hruby. NNSA is part of a broad interagency and
trilateral 18-month study period. Nuclear stewardship is a central
element of the consultation period. The effort will intensively examine
the full suite of requirements that underpin nuclear stewardship with a
specific focus on the following areas: safety, design, construction,
operation, maintenance, disposal, regulation, training, environmental
protection, installations and infrastructure, industrial base capacity,
workforce, and force structure.
We continue to analyze multiple options to identify the optimal
pathway for Australia to acquire a nuclear-powered submarine
capability. However, since nuclear stewardship is such an important
part of the culture and safety of operating this technology, a focus on
stewardship will be foundational to every decision we make as we work
to fulfill the objectives set forth by the AUKUS leaders.
Secretary Shyu. Ms. Shyu respectfully defers to Administrator
Hruby's response, as NNSA is best positioned to provide the answer.
nwc coordination
14. Senator Sullivan. Secretary LaPlante, a recent GAO report
released in January 2022 stated that while the DOD and NNSA generally
have existing joint processes to manage and communicate risks at the
level of individual programs (such as a warhead life extension
program), the two agencies have not established a joint process to
identify, assess, and respond to enterprise-level risks that may affect
the mission across the strategic nuclear triad. How would you
characterize the communication regarding enterprise-level risk
assessment and decision making between members of the NWC?
Mr. LaPlante. In my short tenure as chair of the Nuclear Weapons
Council, I have found communication between the DoD and DOE/NNSA to be
clear and transparent. Recently, the NWC discussed the need to
implement a strategic framework for integrated decisionmaking, and we
are actively working to mature that framework. Additionally, the 2022
Nuclear Posture Review directed the DoD to develop and implement a risk
mitigation and opportunity exploitation framework, designed to allow
senior leaders to understand and act upon the interdependencies of our
nuclear modernization programs. This framework will leverage the long-
standing practices and commitment of the Members of the Nuclear Weapons
Council and the programs of the DOE/NNSA. I am confident that with
these tools, the NWC will become even more effective.
15. Senator Sullivan. Secretary LaPlante, what steps could be taken
to improve coordination between the NNSA and DOD on the NWC?
Mr. LaPlante. Coordination between the DoD and NNSA remains vital
to the success of the NWC and the nuclear modernization programs across
the enterprise, and my short tenure has indicated that while
coordination is strong, steps could be taken to improve. I intend to
continue to review the practices of the NWC and determine areas to
strengthen our coordination.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King
non-state actors
16. Senator King. Administrator Hruby and Admiral Richard, ``I
would like to [know] something about how we deter, how do we deal with
the risk of a proliferation of nuclear weapons to a terrorist, to
nonstate actors, for whom the normal, the theory of deterrence does not
really apply?'' (p. 28, lines 4-8)
Administrator Hruby. The U.S. Government's approach to countering
nuclear terrorism recognizes the difficulty of deterring non-state
actors through the means traditionally used to deter hostile states,
that is, threatening overwhelming reprisal in response to a nuclear
attack.
Consequently, the U.S. strategy for deterring nuclear terrorism
features two central elements:
1. Convincing terrorists that the commodities needed to build an
improvised nuclear device (IND)--chiefly nuclear material--are
prohibitively difficult to obtain and that even if they were to acquire
an IND, a nuclear attack against the United States would be
unsuccessful for a variety of reasons. In particular, we attempt to
persuade terrorists that any nuclear plot will be detected and
disrupted, and that the outcome of a nuclear attack would feature less
death, destruction, and terror than they desire.
2. Deterring foreign governments from providing support to would-
be nuclear terrorists, including by threatening military retaliation
for facilitating an act of nuclear terrorism.
Deterring Nuclear Terrorists
The United States undertakes multiple efforts to (1) prevent non-
state actors from accessing nuclear material and (2) persuade them that
acquiring a nuclear capability is difficult and the probability of a
successful nuclear attack is low.
The U.S. Government expends significant resources around the world
consolidating, securing, and when possible, eliminating the nuclear
materials necessary to construct an IND. To date NNSA has removed,
eliminated, downblended, or confirmed the disposition of over 500,000
kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium from 48
countries and Taiwan. NNSA also works to prevent non-state actors from
acquiring the expertise and equipment needed to assemble an IND through
export controls and support to USG interdiction operations.
Additionally, NNSA develops tools to detect nuclear proliferation
networks. In addition to the intrinsic value of these programs, which
have dramatically improved global nuclear security, a secondary benefit
is to nurture the perception that nuclear materials are simply too
difficult to acquire. This perception may, in turn, persuade terrorists
to pursue less lethal attack modes.
Additionally, the United States fields a variety of domestic and
international defenses against nuclear terrorism and actively messages
these capabilities in various media. For example, internationally the
U.S. Government has installed radiation portal monitors at hundreds of
points of entry and deployed hundreds of mobile and portable systems
for radiation detection along trafficking routes, thereby complicating
the ability of smugglers and terrorists to move nuclear material from
its point of origin to the United States. At home, the U.S. Government
also scans for radiation at airports, seaports, and other ports of
entry. Additionally, NNSA's Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST)
maintains capabilities to search for, interdict, characterize, and
disable terrorist nuclear devices. As part of a conscious strategy to
deter non-state actors from attempting a nuclear attack, NNSA
consistently advertises that these assets are strategically pre-
positioned throughout the country to respond to nuclear incidents.
Deterring State Support for Nuclear Terrorism
The second pillar of the United States' deterrence strategy is to
dissuade hostile foreign governments from providing nuclear material,
equipment, and expertise to would-be nuclear terrorists, wittingly or
unwittingly. This objective requires two parallel efforts: refining
nuclear forensic capabilities to identify the source of material used
in a nuclear device and telegraphing to hostile states the consequences
of facilitating nuclear terrorism.
NNSA invests substantial resources to advance its nuclear forensic
tools to determine the provenance of nuclear material found outside of
regulatory control. In concert with law enforcement and Intelligence
Community capabilities, these scientific tools are part of a broader
U.S. process to attribute responsibility for an act of nuclear
terrorism. Like other U.S. defenses, the existence of nuclear forensic
capabilities is actively messaged using a variety of media platforms.
In addition to deterring hostile state actors, these capabilities may
also induce foreign governments to strengthen their nuclear security
practices, lest an inadvertent loss of material be perceived as an act
of willful assistance to terrorists.
In tandem with forensic tools, the United States has consistently
issued declaratory policy stipulating the severe consequences that
would result if a state enabled a terrorist nuclear attack. Successive
Administrations' Nuclear Posture Review reports have expressly stated
that the United States would hold accountable any actor who facilitated
an act of nuclear terrorism, and similar language can be found in a
variety of other public pronouncements by senior U.S. officials,
military leaders, and lawmakers. Such messaging is intended to signal
unmistakably the United States' resolve to retaliate in response to any
state-supported act of nuclear terrorism.
Conclusion
Although deterrence of non-state actors and potential foreign
patrons is merely one dimension of the United States' strategy to
counter nuclear terrorism, these efforts represent an important element
of the Nation's defense-in-depth against this enduring threat.
Additional information on the U.S. Government's approach to
deterring nuclear terrorism can be provided in a classified setting.
Admiral Richard. [Deleted.]
Within the Department of Defense, United States Special Operations
Command has the primary responsibility for carrying out this strategy.