[Senate Hearing 117-945]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-945
THE POSTURE OF UNITED STATES INDO-
PACIFIC COMMAND AND UNITED STATES
FORCES KOREA
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
March 10, 2022
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
59-661 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii TOM COTTON, Arkansas
TIM KAINE, Virginia MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine JONI ERNST, Iowa
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois RICK SCOTT, Florida
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
MARK KELLY, Arizona JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
John D. Wason, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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march 10, 2022
Page
The Posture of United States Indo-Pacific Command and United 1
States Forces Korea.
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 1
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe............................. 3
Witness Statements
Aquilino, Admiral John C., USN, Commander, United States Indo- 4
Pacific Command.
LaCamera, General Paul J., USA, Commander, United Nations 20
Command/ Combined Forces Command/ United States Forces Korea.
Questions for the Record......................................... 56
(iii)
THE POSTURE OF UNITED STATES INDO-
PACIFIC COMMAND AND UNITED STATES
FORCES KOREA
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THURSDAY, MARCH 10, 2022
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in Room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Blumenthal, Hirono, King, Warren, Peters, Manchin, Duckworth,
Rosen, Kelly, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis,
Sullivan, Scott, Hawley, and Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. I will call this hearing to order.
Good morning. The Committee meets today to receive
testimony from Admiral John Aquilino, Commander of United
States Indo-Pacific Command, and General Paul LaCamera,
Commander of United States Forces Korea. Gentlemen, thank you
for your service to the Nation, and please convey my thanks to
the men and women serving under your commands at this critical
time.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has appropriately
identified China as the ``pacing threat'' for the United States
military. In the next decade, the Indo-Pacific region is
projected to generate two-thirds of the global economy and be
home to two-thirds of the global population, and we must
calibrate our strategy accordingly.
For the past several decades, China has studied the United
States' way of war and focused its efforts on offsetting our
advantages. Beijing has made concerning progress in this
regard, especially with respect to disruptive technologies and
weapons like hypersonics, artificial intelligence, 5G, and
biotechnology. China does not accept United States global
leadership or the international norms that have helped keep the
peace for the better part of a century. Maintaining our
competitiveness in this region will take a concerted, whole-of-
government effort, but the U.S. military, specifically United
States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), will play a central
role. As we speak, the importance of getting our approach right
is on full display as another near-peer competitor, Russia,
continues its brutal and illegal invasion of Ukraine.
Even as China has made progress, however, there is broad
consensus that our comparative advantage over China is our
network of allies and partners in the region and globally.
Strengthening that network should be at the center of any
strategy for the Indo-Pacific region, and the maturation of the
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, involving the United
States, Japan, India, and Australia, presents an opportunity to
establish a durable framework. It is my hope that the Quad, as
well as Korea, will provide a platform for engaging other
regional partners.
The most likely flash point that could turn our competition
with China into a conflict is Taiwan. If China is the pacing
threat for the Defense Department, Taiwan is the pacing
scenario. Following the brutal repression of pro-democracy
demonstrations in Hong Kong by China over the past 2 years and
the unprecedented number of aggressive Chinese military
incursions into Taiwan's airspace, the world has a right to be
concerned.
There has been discussion in the last year regarding
whether we should be more explicit about coming to Taiwan's aid
militarily if they are attacked by China, the so-called
``strategic ambiguity; versus ``strategic clarity'' debate. In
my opinion, we should maintain the policy of strategic
ambiguity that has helped to maintain the peace in the Taiwan
Strait for decades. More than anything, changing our policy to
strategic clarity could actually lead to escalation and the
very conflict we are working so hard to prevent.
Admiral Aquilino, faced with these wide-ranging challenges,
I would like you to assess INDOPACOM's preparedness to carry
out the United States' strategy in the region.
As we seek to more effectively compete with China, we must
also manage the threat posed by North Korea. North Korea has
vexed both Republican and Democratic administrations for
decades. Maintaining peace and stability on the Korean
Peninsula must remain a priority for the Department of Defense,
though solving the long-term challenges posed by North Korea
will require all elements of national power.
Through various intelligence reports, we know that Kim Jong
Un views nuclear weapons as ``the ultimate deterrent against
foreign intervention,'' and, over time, intends to gain
``international acceptance and respect as a nuclear power.''
The ultimate goal of United States policy remains the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but we are not taking
an all-or-nothing approach. Instead, the Biden administration
has pursued what it describes as ``a calibrated, practical
approach to diplomacy with the North with the goal of
eliminating the threat to the United States.''
This approach will require smart and firm engagement with
the North Koreans, but, more importantly, it requires
coordination with our allies and partners in the region,
particularly South Korea and Japan. General LaCamera, I would
ask for your views on the partnership between the United
States, Japan, South Korea, and other regional partners in
addressing North Korea's destabilizing activity.
Similarly, General, the highest priority of any military
commander is ensuring the readiness of the forces under their
command to perform their mission. I hope you will share your
views on how United States Forces Korea can maintain readiness
through training and exercises with their South Korean
counterparts while avoiding miscommunication or an
unintentional escalation in tensions with the North.
Finally, Secretary Austin announced earlier this week that
the Navy's Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility on the island of
Oahu will be closed within the year following a series of major
fuel spills. I believe that closing this facility was the right
decision, and I would like to know, generally, what steps are
being taken to ensure the safety and health of the military
families and civilians in the affected communities. More
broadly, the closure of Red Hill is a significant change for
our fueling and logistics approach in the Indo-Pacific, and
that should be recognized by INDOPACOM.
Thank you again to our witnesses. I look forward to your
testimonies.
Senator Inhofe could not be here today, so I am submitting
his opening statement for the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator James M. Inhofe
follows:]
The prepared statement by Senator James M. Inhofe
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Aquilino and General
LaCamera, thank you both for your distinguished service to our
country, more now than ever.
The 2018 National Defense Strategy stated that the Chinese
People's Liberation Army (PLA) is our pacing threat. I expect
the 2022 National Defense Strategy will say much the same.
As many of our military officials have testified, the scale
and scope of China's conventional and nuclear military
modernization is unprecedented in modern history. The
capabilities the North Koreans develop continue to surprise us,
as well.
Every day, it becomes clearer that the Chinese Communist
Party is fundamentally opposed to our core United States
interests and values. Watching their support of Russia in
Ukraine has crystallized that.
So, there's no getting around this competition and
confrontation. Last week, this Committee received a briefing
from the Office of Net Assessment with a comparative analysis
of United States and PRC [People's Republic of China]
capabilities. It's two decades of bad trends, with two more
coming.
While it's a sobering brief, it's no surprise that we find
ourselves where we are.
For a decade, we've been cutting defense on and off, and
now we're losing buying power to historic inflation, while the
PLA has enjoyed real growth every year. Just last week, they
announced another 7.1 percent defense budget increase in 2022.
First, we know we need to get to real growth in the defense
budget. I know President Biden would prefer to focus on other
issues, but he needs to be the president for the world we live
in. So we need to stop admiring the problem, stop making
excuses and start thinking about the price we'll pay if
deterrence fails. It most certainly will be much higher than if
we invest more now.
Already, President Biden has failed to deter Russian
aggression in Ukraine. Americans are already feeling the
effects of that conflict here at home, and a deterrence failure
against the PRC will be far, far worse--not to mention the
effects for our allies and partners. That goes similarly for
the effects of a conflict on the Korean peninsula. We cannot
allow deterrence to fail in either case.
Second, we must have a laser focus on the things we can buy
and do in the near term that will add credibility to our
deterrent and sharpen our warfighting capability.
As an example, the European Deterrence Initiative sent $25
billion for new posture activities to European Command,
starting after the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014. That's
allowed for rapid reinforcement of NATO throughout Russia's
invasion in a way that wasn't possible before.
However, we can't do that in the Western Pacific, because
we haven't made the investments. That's why we wrote the
Pacific Deterrence Initiative in the fiscal year 2021 National
Defense Authorization Act, and why a bicameral, bipartisan
coalition continues to push for a more resilient, dispersed,
and robust posture for United States Forces in the First and
Second Island Chains.
The Ukraine conflict has shown us the value of putting in
the work and making the right investments with allies and
partners before conflict erupts, not after.
We've got a lot of work to do with the Quad countries, with
Southeast Asia, with the Pacific Islands and with Taiwan.
With more resources, smarter choices, bolder political
support, and additional authorities, we can give you the tools
you both need to ensure deterrence never fails in your theater.
Thank you both for testifying today. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. With that let me recognize Admiral Aquilino.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JOHN C. AQUILINO, USN,
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND
Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, Chairman Reed, distinguished
Members of the Committee. I want to thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Indo-
Pacific region. I sincerely appreciate your dedicated support
to INDOPACOM, our servicemembers, and their families, and we
wish Senator Inhofe well.
The People's Republic of China (PRC) is the most
consequential strategic competitor to the United States. The
PRC is executing a dedicated campaign that utilizes all forms
of national power in an attempt to uproot the rules-based
international order to the benefit of themselves and at the
expense of all others.
In the region, Russia also presents serious risks. As
evident from their unprovoked and unjustified attack on the
Ukraine, Russia has no regard for international law, its own
commitments, or any principles that uphold global peace.
Similarly, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and
violent extremist organizations also pose acute threats to
peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.
To address these threats, Secretary Austin has articulated
clear priorities: defend the homeland, deter our adversaries,
and strengthen our allies and partners. These priorities are
advanced through integrated deterrence, which is the
Department's approach to preventing conflict through the
synchronization of all elements of national power, coordinated
with the joint force across all domains, together with our
allies and partners.
INDOPACOM's mission is to prevent conflict through the
execution of integrated deterrence and, if necessary, be
prepared to fight and win. ``Seize the Initiative'' describes
INDOPACOM's approach to accomplish these missions. This
approach requires the joint force to think, act, and operate
differently. We do that by realigning our posture, advancing
our warfighting capabilities, providing both the Secretary and
the President with options across the spectrum of competition,
crisis, and conflict.
Effective deterrence requires significant investment to
defend the homeland, protect the joint force, operate in
contested space, provide all domain battlespace awareness, with
an integrated fires network to deliver those effects.
These initiatives are incorporated into a theater campaign
plan facilitated by agile logistics, a robust exercise and
experimentation program, and regular and consistent
collaboration with our allies and partners to promote peace in
the region. We must make concerted efforts to increase our
resilience and strengthen our capabilities through sustained
investments generated by predictable budgets, as strong
industrial base, and reliable supply chains.
I am optimistic we will see a strategy-based fiscal year
2023 budget that takes the appropriate initial steps to address
key adversarial challenges and increase our warfighting
advantages. The resource we commit now and in the future will
help preserve a free and open Indo-Pacific, it will strengthen
our deterrence posture, and provide us the ability to fight and
win, should deterrence fail.
Thank you, Chairman, and I look forward to the questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral John C. Aquilino
follows:]
Prepared Statement by Admiral John C. Aquilino
introduction / opening statement
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of
the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to
discuss the Indo-Pacific Region. I also want to extend my thanks for
your dedicated support to United States Indo-Pacific Command
(USINDOPACOM), our service members, and their families.
The Department has identified the People's Republic of China (PRC)
as the most consequential strategic competitor to the United States and
our allies and partners throughout the world. The PRC is in execution
of a dedicated campaign utilizing all forms of national power to uproot
the rules-based international order in ways that benefit themselves at
the expense of all others. Their will and their resources to contest
long standing international norms are evident across every regional and
functional domain.
Russia also presents serious risks to the United States as well as
our allies and partners, and has the ability to threaten the homeland.
As evident from their unprovoked and unjustified attack on the Ukraine,
Russia has no regard for international law, its own prior commitments,
or any principles that uphold global peace. The Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK), and Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs)
also pose acute threats. I am optimistic we will see a strategy-based
fiscal year 2023 budget that takes the appropriate, initial steps to
address these key adversarial challenges.
Secretary Austin has articulated clear priorities: defend the
Homeland, deter our adversaries, and strengthen our allies and
partners. These priorities are advanced through integrated deterrence,
campaigning, and actions that build enduring advantages. Integrated
deterrence is the Department's approach to preventing conflict through
the synchronization of all elements of national power, with joint force
actions in all domains, together with our allies and partners. We will
work to implement the Indo-Pacific Strategy to advance a free and open
Indo-Pacific.
USINDOPACOM's mission is to prevent conflict through the execution
of integrated deterrence, and should deterrence fail, be prepared to
fight and win. Seize the Initiative describes USINDOPACOM's approach to
accomplish these missions. This approach requires the joint force to
think, act, and operate differently by synchronizing our operations,
re-aligning our posture, and advancing our warfighting capabilities.
Seize the Initiative establishes the necessary linkages between
operations, activities, and investments (OAIs) to enable the joint
force, deter aggression, and provide the President and Secretary of
Defense with options should deterrence fail.
Effective deterrence of threats in the Indo-Pacific requires
significant investment to defend the Homeland, protect the joint force,
operate in contested space, and provide all-domain battlespace
awareness with integrated fires enabled by a joint fires network. These
initiatives are synchronized as part of a theater campaign plan
facilitated by agile, robust logistics and cooperation with allies and
partners, including a robust exercise and experimentation program and
deep collaboration to develop future capabilities and technologies that
will support stability and deterrence in the region.
Seize the Initiative is the first step in building enduring
advantages that ensure U.S. Forces are postured in the right place,
with the right capabilities to deter our security challengers in near-,
mid-, and long-term competition. Predictable budgets, sustained
investments, a strong industrial base, and reliable supply chains are
needed to maintain the United States ability to defend the homeland,
deter aggression, and build a resilient joint force.
key adversarial challenges
The Indo-Pacific is the most consequential theater and home to four
of the five identified national security threats. As stated by the
Secretary of Defense, the most comprehensive and urgent challenge to
U.S. national security interests is the increasingly provocative
efforts to subvert the international system to suit its authoritarian
preferences. Russia's modernization of Pacific military forces presents
serious risks to the United States and our allies and partners through
nuclear and conventional threats, malign cyber activities, information
operations, and counter-space threats. The DPRK continues to expand its
nuclear and missile capability to threaten the United States Homeland
and our allies and partners. Violent extremism remains an ever-present
threat, and global effects of climate change are already increasing
demands on the joint force for disaster relief, defense support to
civil authorities, and affect security relationships with Indo-Pacific
allies and partners.
People's Republic of China (PRC)
Strategic Intent
The PRC seeks to become a global military power and acquire the
ability to seize Taiwan, while developing conventional weapons that can
reach the United States Homeland. The PRC also seeks to establish a
network of overseas military installations that would extend its reach,
allowing support for an increasingly global People's Liberation Army
(PLA) capable of power projection far beyond the Indo-Pacific.
Beijing's entwined economic and military influences are apparent in
the coercive economic actions the PRC has taken against United States
allies and like-minded partners. President Xi's signature One Belt, One
Road (OBOR) initiative (more widely known as the Belt and Road
Initiative or BRI) is one of Beijing's attempts to increase its
influence and access globally. The PRC's military-civil fusion makes
even academic research cooperation with PRC entities in certain sectors
fraught with potential national security risk.
Modernization
The PLA is developing capabilities to project power outside of the
PRC's immediate periphery. Xi Jinping has publicly directed the PLA to
complete most elements of military modernization by 2027, and they
continue to execute the most extensive military build-up since WWII
with a comprehensive modernization program across land, sea, air,
space, cyber, and information domains. PLA modernization emphasizes
systems that expand the PLA's anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy
across the region to enhance the country's force projection and
strategic deterrence capabilities.
The PLA Navy (PLAN) boasts a battle force of 350 ships and
submarines, including more than 130 major surface combatants. Already
possessing the largest navy in the world, the PRC is expanding this
formidable force by adding new capabilities to a fleet expected to grow
to 420 battle force ships by 2025. The PLAN's priorities are delivering
aircraft carrier groups, building expeditionary warfare capabilities
with Marine-like forces, expanding their surface force, and increasing
undersea capacity.
The PLA's aviation force is the largest in the Indo-Pacific. More
than half of its operational fighter force utilizes 4th generation
aircraft or better, and the PRC commenced mass production of its first
5th generation J-20 aircraft. The PLA Air Force is also fielding the
nuclear-capable H-6N, the first PLA bomber capable of aerial refueling.
Overall, aircraft modernizations and improvements are increasing PLA's
offensive air capabilities.
In addition to an extensive arsenal of advanced ballistic missiles,
the PLA Rocket Force is pursuing land-attack, supersonic cruise
missiles and other advanced weapons. The PLA's new generation of mobile
missiles uses multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs)
and highly capable hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) designed to evade
United States missile defenses.
The PLA is developing a nuclear triad designed to ensure a
survivable, second-strike capability. This capability includes JIN
submarines equipped with long-range sea-based nuclear missiles, H-6N
bombers with air-delivered nuclear weapons, and a growing land force of
mobile and silo-based nuclear missiles.
The PRC is expanding and maturing its space and counter-space
programs, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) constellations, particularly its Beidou-3 global satellite
navigation system. The PRC conducted 55 space launches in 2021, the
most launches by any nation. The PLA is also developing a robust
counter-space program by delivering directed-energy weapons, jammers, a
direct-ascent kinetic kill capability, and on-orbit capabilities with
the intent to employ these capabilities to deny United States and our
allies access to space during a conflict or crisis.
PLA development of cyber capabilities are in direct support of
intelligence collection against the United States, advanced PLA
modernization goals, and intellectual property theft. From denial-of-
service attacks to physical disruptions of critical infrastructure, the
PRC desires to shape decision-making and disrupt military operations at
the initial stages and throughout conflict.
Actions of Concern
The PRC's pressure campaign against Taiwan, deliberate undermining
of autonomy in Hong Kong, activities along the Sino-Indian Line of
Actual Control, and excessive maritime claims are creating instability
and increasing the risk of unintended incidents.
Taiwan
Unification with Taiwan is among the PRC's top priorities. PLA
forces have long exercised in areas around Taiwan, but the scale and
sophistication of this training has drastically increased. Beijing has
intensified pressure on Taiwan, using diplomatic, informational,
military, and economic tools to isolate Taiwan from the international
community in an attempt to force submission and weaken resistance.
Throughout 2021, the PLA amplified its force posturing near and
around Taiwan. Over the past 2 years, the PLA continued flying aircraft
into Taiwan's air defense identification zone, and incorporated highly
publicized amphibious assault training into national-level exercises in
or near the Taiwan Strait. While the PRC claims to still prefer a
peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences, it has never
relinquished use of force as an option.
Line of Actual Control
Tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between the PRC and
India are the worst in over four decades. In October 2021, PRC's
legislature passed a land borders law that asserts ``sacred and
inviolable'' sovereignty and territorial integrity and provides a
domestic legal framework for greater PLA involvement in border
security. This law took effect on January 1, 2022, representing a
continuation of PRC's use of domestic law as a pretext to the use of
force to resolve territorial disputes.
Excessive Claims
The PRC continues to challenge the rules-based international order
through expansive, illegal maritime claims, and assertive security and
economic actions. One particularly egregious example is the PRC's
ambiguous nine-dash line claim of islands and ``adjacent waters'' in
the South China Sea (SCS) as subject to their indisputable sovereignty.
President Xi made public assurances the PRC would not militarize the
SCS. However, the PLA has deployed anti-ship cruise missiles, surface-
to-air missiles, and jamming equipment to its artificial Spratly
Islands features since 2018 and flown aircraft from those locations
since 2020. The PLA has emplaced expansive military infrastructure in
the SCS by building aircraft hangars sufficient to accommodate multiple
fighter brigades, protective shelters for surface-to-air and anti-ship
missiles, and significant fuel storage facilities.
The PRC uses their domestic law to threaten and intimidate other
nations into actions beneficial to the PRC. China's Maritime Traffic
Safety Law, implemented in September 2021, limits nations' ability to
exercise certain rights and freedoms in the SCS in an attempt to
convince nations to submit to Chinese law as if it were international
law. Additionally, the PRC's new Coast Guard Law grants sweeping
enforcement powers to the China Coast Guard (CCG) including the
authority to use force to police international waters which they view
as under the PRC's ``jurisdiction.''
These domestic laws are inconsistent with international law, norms,
and standards, and they are intended to justify any action the PLA may
take to achieve PRC objectives. This approach further increases the
likelihood of a clash with another South China Sea claimant, as we
witnessed in the November 2021 incident between the PRC and the
Philippines at Second Thomas Shoal. The PRC's excessive maritime claims
infringe on regional EEZs and negatively affect Southeast Asian
economies while undermining navigational freedoms reflected in the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Hong Kong
Beijing's actions undermining the 1982 Sino-British Joint
Declaration concerning Hong Kong clearly and unequivocally demonstrate
a significant disconnect between the CCP's commitments and actions. The
PRC's relentless campaign has further dismantled democratic
institutions in Hong Kong. During the December 2021 Legislative Council
elections, Pro-Beijing candidates won all but 1 of 90 seats in an
election marked by the lowest number of votes cast since the 1997
handover. The PRC's heavy-handed approach to ``One Country Two
Systems'' in Hong Kong has sent up warning flares about how Beijing
would likely treat Taiwan.
Xinjiang
The PRC is actively involved in the suppression of ethnic and
religious minorities, most notably in Xinjiang. According to the United
States Department of State's 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices in the PRC, ``Genocide and crimes against humanity occurred
during the year against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other
ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang.'' Authorities
reportedly detained more than one million civilians in internment camps
and committed abuses such as torture and enforced sterilization.
Russia
Strategic Intent
Russia seeks to maintain its global power status and retain
influence relative to China and the United States by using all
instruments of national power. Like the PRC, Russia aims to establish
itself as a center of gravity in a multipolar world order by
undermining democratic, free, and open societies in favor of
authoritarian structures. While most evident in the European theater of
operations, recent examples in the Indo-Pacific include Moscow's
decision to support the Burmese military junta and its ongoing
assistance to the DPRK to evade and undermine U.N. Security Council
resolutions.
Modernization
Russia's Eastern Military District continues to field new and
improved weapons and platforms across all services. These expanding
capabilities threaten the United States and our allies, including
Japan, particularly in connection with its territorial dispute with
Russia over the southern Kuril Islands.
The Russian Pacific Fleet increased its precision land attack and
anti-ship cruise missile capacity in 2021 with two new upgraded Kilo-
class submarines, one guided-missile frigate, and the modernization of
one guided-missile destroyer. Eleven more new ships and submarines are
expected to arrive in the next 4 years, including at least two
Severodvinsk II-class nuclear cruise missile submarines and four more
advanced Kilo submarines. The Russian Pacific Fleet employs Kalibr
cruise missiles and the newly tested Tsirkon hypersonic cruise
missiles.
In the air domain, Moscow recently announced it would station its
most advanced fighter aircraft, the fifth generation Su-57, in the
Eastern Military District. These aircraft will join an air defense
structure already boasting significant numbers of fourth-generation
fighters, interceptors, and advanced air defense missiles, including
the state-of-the-art S-400 surface-to-air missile system.
Since 2016, Russia has stationed coastal defense cruise missiles
(CDCM) in the disputed Kuril Islands, expanding its capability to
threaten Japan and potentially United States forces. Moscow announced
in late 2021 formation of a new CDCM unit to make their presence
permanent.
Russia maintains a modern nuclear triad with upgraded Tu-95MSM
bombers, armed with new Kh-101/102 land-attack cruise missiles. New
capabilities will include at least one Dolgorukiy II-class nuclear
ballistic submarine, which will join two Dolgorukiy I missile
submarines already in the Pacific Fleet, and a special purpose
Belogorod nuclear submarine that Moscow announced would arrive in 2022.
The Belogorod will carry the Poseidon unmanned nuclear weapon. The
first launch of the SARMAT heavy ICBM is expected by mid-2022.
Russia is rapidly advancing its space and counter-space
capabilities, conducting the third-highest number of space launches in
2021. Russia is also developing a suite of anti-satellite capabilities,
such as the PL-19 Nudol direct ascent missile, high-powered lasers, and
various electronic warfare systems. These capabilities allow Russia to
disrupt or destroy adversary satellites during peacetime or conflict.
Moscow's extensive cyber capabilities are well known and globally
active. Advanced and emerging techniques, including artificial
intelligence-enabled deep fakes, coupled with existing and new
relationships with deniable proxy groups, are expected to expand
Russia's ability to deceive, deny, and destroy adversary networks and
control systems.
Actions of Concern
Destructive ASAT Test
In November 2021, Russia launched a Nudol direct ascent anti-
satellite missile that destroyed a derelict Russian satellite in low
Earth orbit and created a massive debris field. This action was
irresponsible and endangers other space assets and human spaceflight,
potentially for years to come.
Central Pacific Naval Exercise
In mid-2021, the Russian Pacific Fleet completed the largest naval
exercise since the Soviet era, deploying approximately 20 ships,
including the fleet's flagship and other large combatants, to within 20
to 30 nautical miles off the Hawaiian island of Oahu. While in the
area, Russia twice flew Tu-95 strategic bombers into the region as a
further show of force, and an intelligence collection ship operated
near Hawaii before, during, and after the exercise. All these actions
were an attempt to demonstrate expeditionary and long-range strike
capabilities.
Hypersonic Missile Development
In December 2021, Russia announced it had fired approximately 10
Tsirkon hypersonic cruise missiles from surface ships and submarines.
With a claimed range of 1000 kilometers and a speed of Mach 6 or
better, this class of missiles will present significant challenges to
missile defense systems and provide Russia with additional offensive
strike options.
Cyber Operations
The May 2021 cyber-attack on the United States Colonial Pipeline
system and the late 2020 SolarWinds breach are stark reminders of
Moscow's ability and willingness to employ state and proxy cyber actors
to support national objectives. Both of these events underscore the
vulnerability of U.S. and allied networks and systems worldwide.
DPRK
Strategic Intent
The DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile threats aim to preserve
the regime, extract diplomatic concessions, and obtain prominent
international attention. The DPRK's systems can reach targets
throughout the Indo-Pacific, including the continental United States.
Long-range missile research and development efforts, coupled with
nuclear technology developments, are consistent with the regime's
stated objective of achieving intercontinental ballistic missile
capability to pose a credible threat to the United States.
Modernization
Kim Jong Un continues to advance DPRK's conventional and strategic
military capabilities through ballistic missile and nuclear program
development.
The vast majority of the Pyongyang's modernization effort is
focused on ballistic and cruise missiles. Since 2020, the DPRK has
demonstrated several new weapons, including a new intercontinental
ballistic missile, short-range ballistic missiles, three new submarine-
launched ballistic missiles, a ``long-range'' mobile cruise missile,
and a purported hypersonic capability.
In early 2021, Kim Jong Un pledged to build smaller, lighter
nuclear weapons for tactical use and more advanced delivery systems
capable of striking the United States Homeland. The DPRK desires to
become a space nation but has not attempted a space launch since 2016.
As Kim Jong Un proclaims the DPRK's sovereign right to do so,
resumption of space activity is possible in 2022.
The DPRK Navy's primary mission is to defend the coastline and
territorial waters. Limited modernization modestly enhances these
capabilities by developing and fielding land- and sea-based longer-
range anti-ship cruise missiles. Much of Navy's effort, however, is
supporting submarine-launched ballistic missiles capabilities with
specially modified subs.
The DPRK paraded new main battle tanks, anti-tank guns, and rocket
and artillery systems in 2020 that began to enter the force in limited
numbers in 2021. The Korean People's Army's (KPA) oversized ground
force still is primarily equipped with legacy weapons, but the vast
number of available systems largely compensates for performance
shortfalls.
The DPRK considers its offensive cyber capabilities--including
computer network attacks--a low-risk, cost-effective tool to influence
and intimidate adversaries. These capabilities also support military
operations and national security goals to collect information, garner
illicit revenue, and spread propaganda. Cyber-enabled financial theft,
extortion campaigns, and cryptojacking--compromising computing
resources to mine digital currency--fund much of Pyongyang's weapons
development programs.
Actions of Concern
Missile Launches
The DPRK has conducted over 60 missile launch events since 2019,
including seven in January 2022 alone. The vast majority were various
categories of short-range ballistic or cruise missiles. In January
2022, the DPRK launched an intermediate-range missile, the first launch
of that category since 2017. These tests supported research and
development, system testing, crew training and certification, and added
new launch platforms such as containerized rail-based launches. Of
particular concern is apparent advancements in maneuvering capabilities
and claims of achieving hypersonic velocities. These attributes would
complicate defensive actions against the DPRK's small but probably
growing long-range strike capabilities.
Nuclear Enrichment
By late 2021, the United Nations and International Atomic Energy
Agency publicized possible nuclear enrichment and production activity
that would violate UN sanctions. Such action could support an expanded
nuclear testing and weaponization program.
Evasion of International Sanctions
In contravention of U.N. Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR), the
DPRK imports refined petroleum through illicit ship-to-ship transfers
and unreported direct deliveries by foreign-flagged vessels.
USINDOPACOM supports monitoring for UNSCR evasion and works closely
with our partners and allies, as well as multinational sanctions-
related efforts through UNC--Rear installations in Japan, to disrupt
the illicit ship-to-ship transfers. Unfortunately, Pyongyang has evaded
these efforts due to Beijing and Moscow's relatively lax sanctions
enforcement and PRC shipping networks; many illicit transfers occur in
PRC territorial waters. In further defiance of UNSCR sanctions,
Pyongyang exports coal to China, and North Korean laborers continue to
work overseas, including in the PRC and Russia, despite the U.N.'s
December 2019 repatriation deadline.
Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO)
Violent extremism remains an ever-present threat to the peace and
stability of the Indo-Pacific region. VEO actions to date have targeted
host nation governments and local Armed Forces but could expand at any
time.
Security Impacts of Climate Change
A majority of the population within USINDOPACOM's area of
responsibility live in vulnerable coastal regions. Extreme weather
events and rising sea levels pose an increasing threat to food
security, access to fresh water, agricultural productivity, and
commerce in partner nations. Conditions associated with climate change,
such as frequency and intensity of regional storms, continue and could
add risk to internal stability and governance of small island states
and developing countries in South and Southeast Asia.
implementation of seize the initiative
Seize the Initiative is designed to implement the Secretary of
Defense's priorities and posture the joint force in the best position
possible to accomplish USINDOPACOM's assigned missions to address the
key adversarial challenges through the spectrum of competition, crisis,
and conflict. This approach defends the homeland, increases our
warfighting advantage, and strengthens our alliances and partnerships.
Additionally, Seize the Initiative provides the President and Secretary
of Defense with options should deterrence fail.
Defend the Homeland
USINDOPACOM's priority mission is to defend the homeland through
deployed presence operations designed to defend forward as far as
possible from our shores. Accordingly, we are working with the
Department to ensure the ability to defend Guam and protect the joint
force from any potential threats.
Guam's strategic importance is difficult to overstate. The
Department has committed more than $11 billion for military
construction projects on Guam in fiscal year 2022 to fiscal year 2027
to meet our commitment with Japan under the Defense Policy Review
Initiative (DPRI), highlighting the importance of the island for
sustaining the joint force as our main operating base and home to
130,000 Americans.
To effectively deter America's increasingly modern adversaries,
USINDOPACOM requires improved joint warfighting capabilities in the
near, mid, and long term. An improved force posture with an integrated
joint force west of the International Date Line (IDL) improves U.S.
Forces' response time, lethality and combat credibility. Similarly, we
must exploit our advantage to operate in contested space with new
technologies across all domains.
A related effort is necessary to develop and incorporate the
technology required to deliver flawless battlespace awareness,
integrated joint fires on a command and control network with real-time
target quality data in a multi-domain environment. Achieving this
capability requires experimentation and innovation across all program
lines. A theater campaign facilitates synchronization of all domain
forces, including space and cyber capabilities, in the AOR and is an
essential part of transition from competition to crisis to conflict.
Deter Our Adversaries
Force Posture
U.S. Force posture is a warfighting advantage in USINDOPACOM's
operational design. A force posture west of the IDL provides defense
in-depth that enables the Joint Force to decisively respond to
contingencies across the region. More distributed combat power
increases survivability, reduces risk, and enables the transition from
defense to offense quickly should deterrence fail. Forward-based and
rotational Joint forces armed with the right capabilities are the most
credible way to demonstrate resolve, assure allies and partners, and
provide the President and Secretary with multiple options.
A widespread and diverse posture gives us the ability to more
easily exercise and operate with our partners, deliver precision fires,
and sustain the force with a distributed network of stores, munitions,
and fuel to support our operations.
Operate in Contested Space
To effectively deter our adversaries and counter the PLA anti-
access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy, USINDOPACOM requires joint
warfighting capabilities in the near, mid, and long term to ensure we
can continue to operate our force anywhere we desire at the time and
place of our choosing. The joint force currently enjoys the ability to
deliver effects throughout the AOR. We must continue to exploit this
advantage with new technologies across all domains and across all
program lines. This capability will allow the joint force to fight and
win wherever necessary while protecting U.S. Forces, equipment, and
critical infrastructure.
All Domain Battlespace Awareness with a Joint Fires Network
USINDOPACOM requires an upgraded network of all-domain sensors
linked with an integrated fires network to deliver persistent target
custody and to engage all threats in the battlespace. This offers
commanders a simultaneous, shared understanding of the battlespace,
even if geographically separated. This Joint Fires Network enables any
sensor from any platform (air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace) to
provide targeting guidance to any weapon systems. Joint Fires Network,
coupled with the lethality of current and future munitions, underpins
conventional deterrence and provides the joint force with the necessary
lethality to maintain combat credibility.
Campaigning
Persistent and synchronized coalition and joint operations linked
over time and space in the western Pacific contributes to our ability
to deter conflict. A coordinated campaign of all domain operations,
activities, and investments (OAIs) reassures our allies and partners,
builds partner capacity, increases interoperability, and normalizes our
operations throughout the AOR.
Additionally, these consistent and persistent OAI's better
familiarize our forces with the challenges associated with the current
operating environment.
Exercise and Experimentation
Enhanced training requires conducting complex, multi-domain
exercises with our allies and partners to continue to deliver
interoperability and to operate at the high end. A robust theater
exercise program demonstrates our commitment to defending the rules-
based international order, highlights our resolve to our partners, and
builds relationships between our forces. Complex exercises, combined
with innovative joint experimentation, delivers confident warfighting
partners and gives us the ability to rehearse warfighting concepts and
develop capabilities together.
The Pacific Multi-Domain Test and Experimentation Capability
(PMTEC) better prepares the joint force by developing and networking
instrumented, live, virtual, and constructive training areas throughout
the Indo-Pacific. PMTEC links ranges across the Indo-Pacific, including
those of our allies and partners, with our test and training range
infrastructure on the west coast of the U.S. This initiative delivers
the largest coalition range complex in the world with the most advanced
capabilities and expands our Joint Exercise Program (JEP) to a Theater
Exercise Program (TEP). PMTEC allows Joint, Combined, and Coalition
warfighters to build readiness together by rehearsing against peer
adversaries in scenarios that replicate highly contested all-domain
environments.
Integration of Space and Cyber Domains
Seven of the nine nations and one international organization
capable of launching satellites are in the USINDOPACOM AOR.
International and commercial use of space is growing exponentially and
drives competition for limited space-related resources.
USINDOPACOM requires resilient and flexible space and cyber
capabilities to maintain warfighting advantages in all domains. Our
competitors recognize the growing importance of space and cyber domains
and are delivering capabilities to challenge our dominance in these
critical areas. Both domains represent areas we can further integrate
into activities and exercises with our allies and partners. The unity
of effort between USSPACECOM, USCYBERCOM and USINDOPACOM delivers
multi-domain, defensive and offensive options for civilian leadership.
Strengthen Alliances and Enhance Partnerships
A key U.S asymmetric advantage that our security challengers do not
possess is our network of strong alliances and partnerships. Because
these relationships are based on shared values and people-to-people
ties, they provide significant advantages such as long-term mutual
trust, understanding, respect, interoperability, and a common
commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. To strengthen alliances and
enhance partnerships, USINDOPACOM continuously seeks opportunities to
increase mini and multilateral events with allies and partners.
USINDOPACOM's warfighting requirement necessitates rapid,
widespread information sharing to enable partner nations to employ
their security forces in a coordinated manner against common threats.
The delivery of a Mission Partner Environment and fusion centers
provide the opportunity to share a common picture, improve
interoperability, demonstrate U.S. resolve, and deliver warfighting
advantages throughout the region.
Mission Partner Environment (MPE)
Today, USINDOPACOM's information sharing with allies and partners
is enabled by multiple bilateral and multilateral networks. MPE
provides a single joint and coalition environment to share classified
operations and intelligence information with allies and partners in a
resilient, cyber-secure, data-centric environment. MPE creates a
theater-wide information technology infrastructure to facilitate
information sharing, improve interoperability, and enable rapid
coordination to provide universal battle management and share common
operational and intelligence pictures.
Fusion Centers
Fusion centers build partnership capacity and serve as a crucial
enabler for strengthening alliances and partnerships by using
information technology, contextual analytics, and computing model
assessments to illuminate patterns of life associated with
transnational threats and other pernicious behavior.
First funded in fiscal year 2021 and authorized in the fiscal year
2022 NDAA, the Counter-Terrorism Information Facility (CTIF) provides
nine countries (including six from ASEAN) the capability to counter
violent extremism. Similarly, fusion centers could expand partnership
capacity in Oceania to address threats presented by climate change;
illegal, unregulated, unreported fishing; and illicit drugs. High
level, multilateral, information sharing promotes collaboration between
like-minded nations and helps sustain the rules-based international
order.
Joint Interagency Task Force-West (JIATF-W)
USINDOPACOM relies on the Joint Interagency Task Force-West (JIATF-
W) to fight the manufacturing and distribution of illicit drugs. JIATF-
W possesses the unique capability to align a significant interagency
effort to counter-narcotics and disrupt transnational criminal networks
that inflict immense harm on our country. JIATF-W activities consist
mainly of intelligence analysis and support to U.S. law enforcement
partners serving within foreign countries where precursor chemicals are
manufactured or combined to manufacture illicit drugs. JIATF-W's
coordinated training also facilitates access to nations that do not
have standing militaries (Oceania) and through law-enforcement channels
for countries where U.S. relations are sensitive.
Multi-Lateral Relationships
Japan, Republic of Korea, United States Trilateral
Autocratic powers threaten the Indo-Pacific region's stability,
making United States-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation more important
than ever. The United States commitment to the defense of Japan and the
ROK is ironclad, and trilateral collaboration is crucial to ensure
peace and stability in Northeast Asia amid the destabilizing nuclear
and missile threats emanating from the DPRK. USINDOPACOM efforts remain
dedicated to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and we will
continue to focus on strong trilateral cooperation to facilitate crisis
communication, improve combined interoperability, and present a united
deterrent force against our common adversaries.
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
ASEAN is among the most important multilateral forums in the
theater to foster relationships that build trust, prevent
misperceptions, and reinforce the rules-based international order.
ASEAN decision-making is consensus-based, favoring a policy of non-
interference in the internal affairs of member states. The Burmese
military coup in February 2021 has challenged ASEAN to reconcile these
competing imperatives with its effectiveness and relevance as a
regional organization. Our engagement with ASEAN demonstrates U.S.
recognition of ASEAN's importance and our commitment to multilateral
partnerships.
Japan, Australia, India and the United States (the Quad)
The Quad is an important partnership between Japan, Australia,
India, and the United States and primarily strengthens the region's
security architecture through diplomatic and economic channels. For
example, the Quad has committed to produce and deliver a billion doses
of the COVID-19 vaccine to the Indo-Pacific region by the end of 2022.
This goal, along with initiatives to advance emerging
telecommunications technology, build better infrastructure, and improve
cybersecurity demonstrates how four mature and vibrant democracies can
favorably shape the security environment.
Australia, United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS)
Partnership
The AUKUS partnership is a new initiative that capitalizes on
shared values and will deepen cooperation on the capabilities and
technologies necessary to sustain deterrence and stability in the Indo-
Pacific.. A key focus of this trilateral security partnership is
agreement to support the Royal Australian Navy in establishing a
conventionally-armed nuclear-powered submarine force--a key capability
that will enhance Australia's defense posture and bolster regional
security. Additionally, under AUKUS the three nations are deepening
cooperation on additional capabilities and technologies, including
undersea warfare, cyber, artificial intelligence, and quantum, that
will be pivotal to future high-end warfighting and enhancing our
combined force posture. When combined with an increased number of
exercises, these advancements will significantly aid our efforts to
deter conflict throughout the region, promote greater interoperability,
and improve coordination from the strategic to tactical levels.
Partners of the Pacific (POP)
Partners of the Pacific is an emerging initiative that seeks to
bring together like-minded Pacific partners at the strategic level to
forge a common approach towards climate and energy, infrastructure, and
maritime security. Australia, France, Japan, New Zealand, the United
Kingdom, and the United States will develop a shared plan with the
Pacific Island Countries for deepening our collective engagements.
Five Treaty Alliances
Australia
Australia is a leading contributor of international efforts to
promote a free and open Indo-Pacific. In 2021, the United States and
Australia decided to enhance air, maritime, land, space, and cyber
cooperation to increase sustainment capabilities. Additional
initiatives include range integration, posture improvements, and
expanding multilateral operations and exercises across the theater.
Australia's efforts to maintain global security are extensive,
including troop deployments to the Middle East, UN sanctions
enforcement against DPRK, and hosting United States forces and
capabilities in Australian territory. Australia is also increasing its
collaboration with other like-minded nations. The AUKUS enhanced
security partnership adds momentum to our already robust security
cooperation, and Australia's recently signed RAA with Japan exemplifies
the country's priority on such collaboration.
The United States benefits from Australian collaboration to
maintain a strong force posture. In 2021, Marine Rotational Force-
Darwin (MRF-D) conducted its tenth rotation through Northern Australia,
demonstrating combined operational capability despite COVID-19. These
rotational deployments advance readiness goals, address infrastructure
requirements to support required capabilities, and satisfy United
States commitments to Australia.
The United States benefits from Australian efforts to maintain a
strong force posture. In 2021, Marine Rotational Force-Darwin (MRF-D)
conducted its tenth rotation through Northern Australia, demonstrating
combined operational capability despite COVID-19. These rotational
deployments advance readiness goals, address infrastructure
requirements to support required capabilities, and satisfy United
States commitments to Australia.
Japan
The United States-Japan Alliance is the cornerstone of peace and
prosperity in the Indo-Pacific. The most crucial initiative to preserve
our strategic alignment with Japan is to complete the realignment of
United States forces outlined in the Defense Policy Review Initiative
(DPRI). DPRI requires adjustments based on evolving challenges
including the need to complete a MILCON plan on the island of Guam.
Additionally, we must also continue working with Japan to develop its
land-based integrated air and missile defense systems.
Japan views the PRC's expanding military activity and presence in
the Indo-Pacific with increasing concern. Notably, Japan approved a
record-high defense budget for the seventh consecutive year and
continues to procure the most advanced United States defense equipment,
increasing interoperability and strengthening joint force lethality.
Furthermore, Japan and the United States concluded a new multi-year
Special Measures Agreement (SMA) framework which codified Japan's
commitment to increase funding for costs associated with basing United
States forces in Japan by approximately six percent ($8.6 billion) over
5 years, the largest increase in 20 years. These are critical enablers,
not only for the health of the alliance but also for the U.S. to
fulfill its treaty obligations and allow U.S. Forces to respond to
regional crises rapidly.
Australia and Japan recently signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement
(RAA) to help facilitate military-to-military activities. This
represents a deepening partnership between the two nations and will
assist with trilateral cooperation between the United States,
Australia, and Japan.
Republic of Korea (ROK)
The United States-ROK alliance remains the linchpin in maintaining
a stable security environment to address threats from the DPRK and any
challenges that threaten our collective security interests in Northeast
Asia. Our primary efforts with the ROK include integrating space
operations, incorporating ROK ranges into a broader network of allied
ranges, improving maritime domain awareness, and collaborating on
missile defense. A multinational whole-of-government approach is
required to effectively deter DPRK provocation and enforce U.N.
Security Council sanctions.
The ROK's 2022 defense budget increases funding by 3.4 percent over
the 2021 budget. The purchase of advanced platforms and munitions, such
as F-35A, Global Hawk, P-8A, and upgraded PAC-3 missiles, improves
interoperability and enhances their defense posture. Conditions-based
OPCON Transition Plan (COTP) will remain a priority for our two
nations. The alliance has matured to advance strategic alignment,
multilateral cooperation, readiness, and to extend regional deterrence
commitments.
Republic of the Philippines
Our strong relationship with the Philippines is based on common
values, shared history, and long-standing people-to-people ties. The
bilateral defense relationship is a crucial component of our network of
allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.
Following Secretary Austin's visit in July 2021, the Philippines
recalled its notice to terminate the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA),
and we resumed the development of the approved Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites, which will dramatically improve our
ability to exercise and operate with our Philippine partners.
The strong mil-to-mil relationship enables us to prioritize
maritime security as we develop a bilateral maritime framework. The
United States-funded technical training center for the Philippine Coast
Guard recently hosted a ground-breaking ceremony in January and
exemplified our increased partnership with the Philippines. Both
countries agree to improve territorial defense capabilities and
establish a secure mil-to-mil communications network for crisis and
contingency operations.
Kingdom of Thailand
The United States-Thailand treaty alliance is long-standing and
built on a mutual interest in maintaining stability in mainland
Southeast Asia and throughout the region. The alliance has grown even
stronger since Thailand returned to a democratically elected government
in 2019, adapting to address new challenges with military education and
training, increased interoperability, and modernization of our defense
and security institutions.
Thailand's cooperation with the United States is evident in our
numerous exercises throughout the theater. Exercise COBRA GOLD, which
has taken place every year since 1982, increases readiness for
thousands of Thai and United States troops annually. United States
access to Utapao Air Base and other sites enable joint logistics
activities, including initial site surveys for Hat Yai and Namphong.
Thailand has purchased more than $3 billion in United States foreign
military sales (FMS) with over 200 active FMS sales cases. Current
defense spending is approximately $6.2 billion per year or roughly 1.5
percent of GDP.
Other Indo-Pacific Allied Nations
Canada
Canada remains a firm ally and staunch defender of the rules-based
international order. Canada deploys highly capable security forces to
the Pacific to support UNSCR enforcement efforts and ensure freedom of
navigation. Canada executed a combined Taiwan Strait Transit with the
United States in 2021, while also participating in multi-carrier
operations and supporting exercises throughout the region. Canada is
shifting focus and resources towards the Indo-Pacific and is expected
to release an updated Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2022 that reflects these
changes.
France
America's oldest ally with the largest EEZ of any country in the
region, France, has increased its operational activities in the region
to support the rule of law and ensure freedom of navigation, including
a patrol by a nuclear attack submarine and support to UNSCR sanction
enforcement against North Korea. It is a significant contributor to
FVEY-Plus multilateral efforts on IUU fishing, drug and human
trafficking, and community resilience related to natural disasters and
climate change. France consistently leads efforts to expand
multilateral cooperation such as exercise LA PEROUSE, which brought
together naval assets from Australia, France, India, Japan, and the
United States to operate in the Bay of Bengal. This year, exercise
MARARA will enhance multilateral Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster
Relief (HA/DR) interoperability in Oceania.
United Kingdom (U.K.)
In 2021 the U.K. published its Defence Integrated Review to deliver
a more prominent and persistent presence in the Indo-Pacific. The
current U.K. defense posture in the region includes the Brunei Garrison
with approximately 700 troops, and two offshore patrol vessels that
will remain in the Pacific for the next 10 years.
The U.K. also demonstrated its immense capacity to project combat
power into the region through the deployment of the HMS Queen Elizabeth
Carrier Strike Task Group, which included embarked U.K. and United
States Marine Corps F-35Bs and escort ships from the Netherlands and
the United States. During its time in the region, the Strike Group
conducted operations in the Indian Ocean, the Philippine Sea, and the
South and East China Seas, participating in multi-carrier operations
alongside Australia, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand assets. Over the
next 2 years, the U.K. intends to deploy more forces to the region as
part of a sustained global Britain policy, including a permanent
amphibious task group and the Littoral Response Group (South), which
will be configured to operate in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
Strategic Partnerships
India
The world's largest democracy, India is a strong, capable partner
with a closely aligned vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Recently, we entered into information sharing agreements, and we
continue to expand our operations together. USINDOPACOM maximizes
cooperation, information sharing, and interoperability in exercises
like SEA DRAGON, TIGER TRIUMPH, and MALABAR. With respect to the Line
of Actual Control, we continue to support direct dialogue and a
peaceful resolution of border disputes.
Over the past decade, India substantially increased its acquisition
of United States defense equipment by purchasing U.S.-sourced platforms
such as MH-60Rs, P-8s, C-130Js, C-17s, AH-64s, CH-47s, and M777
howitzers. India may purchase other United States systems such as F-21s
(former F-16s), F/A-18s, additional P-8s, and UAVs in the future.
Singapore
A capable partner who shares our values, Singapore continues to
support United States military presence in Southeast Asia to deliver
regional stability and underpin economic growth. USINDOPACOM
persistently operates both permanent and rotational forces from
Singapore, a critical sustainment, air, maritime, and command and
control location for the United States We work collaboratively to
strengthen Singapore's defense capabilities to include training pilots
and finalizing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with USCYBERCOM to
advance cybersecurity information sharing, exchange threat indicators,
and engage in cooperation on cyber issues.
As a security leader in the region, Singapore hosts a CTIF with
partners from Australia, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, and
the Philippines. The CTIF is a collaborative, multilateral, operational
partnership that employs network analysis and multilayer analytics to
identify potential terrorist threats in partnership with Singapore law
enforcement and the FBI.
Developing Regional Partnerships
Southeast Asia
Southeast Asia, consisting of the ten members of ASEAN and Timor
Leste, encompasses a vital engine for the world's economy and a diverse
group of people who share our desire for a free and open Indo-Pacific.
USINDOPACOM operates throughout the region, participates in ASEAN
exercises, conducts key leader engagements, and supports mechanisms
that promote practical multilateral cooperation related to the wide
spectrum of shared transnational challenges the region confronts.
USINDOPACOM also co-chairs, along with Thailand, the ASEAN Defense
Ministers' Meeting-Plus Experts' Working Group on Maritime Security to
bolster efforts to promote safe maritime operations in accordance with
international law. We continue to express our concern over the PRC's
pressure on ASEAN members to conclude negotiations on the Code of
Conduct in the South China Sea in a manner that contradicts
international law and accedes to Beijing's territorial and maritime
claims.
Brunei
Brunei consistently advocates for policies that support the rules-
based international order, and it supports United States presence as a
stabilizing force in the region. USINDOPACOM conducts a number of
bilateral and multilateral exercises with Brunei annually to further
security cooperation. We are further negotiating an updated Acquisition
Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) and are developing options to
strengthen our military partnership.
Burma (Myanmar)
The Department of Defense remains deeply concerned over the
February 2021 military coup d'etat and the horrific violence it has
inflicted on the people. USINDOPACOM does not engage the Burmese
military. Nevertheless, we continue to encourage our international
partners, especially those in the region, to press the regime to cease
the violence, release all those unjustly detained, including State
Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, government officials, political leaders,
journalists, human rights activists, and other members of civil
society, and restore Burma's path to democracy. We continue to support
efforts to deny the regime international credibility and to provide
assistance to the people of Burma who have shown they do not want to
live one more day under military rule.
Cambodia
In early 2017, Cambodia suspended all military-to-military
exercises with the United States. The Department maintains serious
concerns about the PRC's military presence and construction of
facilities at Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Thailand. However,
USINDOPACOM continues to cooperate with Cambodia on humanitarian mine
clearance actions and Missing in Action (MIA) personnel accounting
engagements through the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA).
Indonesia
Indonesia, the largest Muslim-majority democracy, possesses an
expanding economy and plays an essential role in the regional security
architecture. The leadership of the Indonesian Armed Forces are
pursuing measures to improve joint capabilities and enhance their
ability to defend their sovereign territory and exclusive economic
zone. USINDOPACOM supports these efforts, and we are taking action to
improve information and intelligence sharing, enhance our exercise
program, and expand access for rotational U.S. Forces. USINDOPACOM is
well-positioned to support increased demand for enhanced military-to-
military, bilateral cooperation, and emerging multilateral training
opportunities in 2022.
Laos
Since the United States and Laos signed a Comprehensive Partnership
in 2016, we have observed Laos seeking additional security cooperation
from partners such as ASEAN and the United States. Progress will remain
slow, but the U.S., allies, and partners continue building trust
through COVID vaccine distribution, English language training, and
security cooperation activities.
Malaysia
Malaysia maintains a staunch policy of support to ASEAN and
regional stability. Their defense efforts focus on maritime security,
counterterrorism, HA/DR, peacekeeping, transnational crime, and border
protection. The United States-Malaysia mil-to-mil relationship is
improving, and USINDOPACOM provides support to Malaysia's defense
efforts through exercises and subject matter expert exchanges.
Timor Leste
Timor Leste is an emerging partner that welcomes expanded U.S.
security cooperation. The 2021 Baucau MOU paved the way for more
significant security cooperation through an airfield rehabilitation
project. United States-provided aircraft support interoperability with
Australia-provided Guardian Class Patrol Boats to build Timor Leste's
Defense Force capabilities.
Vietnam
Vietnam shares United States views on the importance of freedom of
navigation and adherence to the rules-based order in the South China
Sea and consistently seeks to protect its autonomy and economic rights.
Vietnam is a growing security partner for the United States, and
USINDOPACOM is working to strengthen defense cooperation.
Vietnam and the United States are expected to sign a 3-year Defense
Cooperation Plan of Action for 2022-2024 and an updated Defense MOU
Annex codifying new cooperation areas, including defense trade, pilot
training, cyber, and personnel accounting (POW/MIA). Existing areas of
cooperation include an Army HA/DR pre-position initiative, USTRANSCOM
en-route mobility operations, and the delivery of a third Excess
Defense Article (EDA) Hamilton class cutter to Vietnam's Coast Guard
alongside construction of maintenance and training facilities.
Northeast Asia
Mongolia
Mongolia seeks to develop deeper relationships with the United
States and other like-minded countries to advance its security and
policy objectives. The Mongolian Armed Forces (MAF) have been a
reliable contributor to Global Peacekeeping Operations for many years,
and they are now exploring how to strengthen their defense efforts and
further the professionalization of their forces.
We support the MAF's efforts to strengthen their military, which
include developing a professional military education program for
officers and noncommissioned officers, expanding their Special
Operations Forces capability, and reconstituting their Air Force. Our
engagement with Mongolia favorably shapes the regional security
environment.
Taiwan
USINDOPACOM conducts military activities with Taiwan consistent
with our policy as articulated in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) to
support Taiwan's self-defense and in accordance with the United States
on China policy, as guided by the TRA, three United States-China Joint
Communiques, and the Six Assurances.
South Asia
Bangladesh
Bangladesh is an important security partner with a common vision
for a free and open Indo-Pacific. Bangladesh conducts more than 100
security cooperation activities annually in areas such as maritime
security, counterterrorism, HA/DR, and U.N. peacekeeping operations. We
are seeking to conclude agreements that will enable Bangladesh to
exchange logistic support and investigating other ways to strengthen
security cooperation.
Maldives
The Maldives Government is a strong promoter of the rules-based
international order and desires improved relations with the United
States. Our defense cooperation efforts with the Maldives include
counterterrorism (CT) activities, the Maritime Security Initiative
(MSI), Security Forces Assistance Brigade engagements, and information-
sharing. These activities will improve CT efforts, maritime security,
and maritime domain awareness capacity. Additionally, the Maldives is
using $7 million in United States funding to purchase small boats,
radars, and communications equipment, which will expand their Coast
Guard's capabilities.
Nepal
Nepal seeks to expand its HA/DR capabilities while strengthening
its defense institutions and sustaining its support for UN Peacekeeping
Operations. The United States maintains a strong partnership with the
Nepalese Army and supports its institution building efforts through a
variety of exercise, exchange, and educational activities.
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka shows a continued willingness for security cooperation
with the United States. USINDOPACOM seeks an expeditionary logistics
capability in Sri Lanka with infrastructure, prepositioned materiel,
and the agreement structure to ensure its operation and sustainability.
We will seek to conclude agreements to strengthen the United States-Sri
Lanka bilateral defense relationship and enable rotational forces in
support of expeditionary logistics.
Oceania
Oceania is vital to a free and open Indo-Pacific based on sea lines
of communication (SLOCs) connecting the U.S. with our allies and
partners. While the devastating impacts of natural disasters and rising
sea levels caused by climate change pose the greatest security threat
to the Pacific Island Countries (PICs), the most immediate challenge
remains negative economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. The PICs'
secondary security priorities are countering illegal, unreported, and
unregulated (IUU) fishing, transnational crime, and drug trafficking
while improving cybersecurity and maritime domain awareness.
USINDOPACOM continues to strengthen our bilateral military
relationships Fiji, Tonga, and Papua New Guinea. In addition,
USINDOPACOM routinely engages with the Freely Associated States (FAS)--
the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the Republic of the Marshall
Islands (RMI), and the Republic of Palau--with which the United States
have signed Compacts of Free Association (COFA). We are also
coordinating multilateral efforts with other like-minded nations, to
include FVEY and France, to synchronize and improve the alignment of
our security cooperation efforts in Oceania.
Meanwhile, the PRC engages in provocative economic and diplomatic
tactics meant to intimidate other countries throughout Oceania. During
the COVID-19 pandemic, the PRC established new embassies in Kiribati in
May 2020 and the Solomon Islands in September 2020. The PRC is also
moving to increase its Defense Attache footprint with Papua New Guinea,
Fiji, and Tonga. In the Solomon Islands, the PRC entered into a
security agreement with the Islands' Police Force.
The Freely Associated States (FAS)
The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the Republic of the
Marshall Islands (RMI), and the Republic of Palau each have a Compact
of Free Association with the United States. Under the COFAs, the United
States has full authority and responsibility for security and defense
matters in and relating to each of these three countries, including
special and extensive access to operate in these territories and the
ability to deny access to these three countries by any third country
militaries. Our agreements with FAS allow us to sustain a forward
combat credible presence. Ongoing negotiations related to the Compacts
of Free Association (COFA), led by the U.S. State Department, are vital
to the maintenance of our historically good relationships with the FAS
and represent USINDOPACOM's highest diplomatic priority.
USINDOPACOM engages in military construction projects throughout
the FAS to improve air and maritime infrastructure, enhance domain
awareness, and support FAS efforts to protect their economic interests.
Fiji
Fiji is a stalwart defense partner who consistently advocates for
our shared values. We continue to expand our defense relationship with
Fiji through preparations for future exercises, ship visits, defense
dialogues, and the signing of the State Partnership Program with the
Nevada National Guard. Fiji's leadership further strongly supports
multilateral collaboration amongst regional Armed Forces, collaborating
with Australia and New Zealand to develop the Black Rock Integrated
Peacekeeping Center and to professionalize Fiji's Armed Forces.
New Zealand
New Zealand is a highly respected security partner that contributes
to HA/DR efforts, supports UNSCR implementation, and conducts
operations to ensure freedom of navigation in accordance with
international law, such as its multilateral SCS patrol in the fall of
2021. New Zealand consistently supports its neighbors to strengthen
their defense capabilities, improve their ability to respond to HA/DR
crises, and address transnational concerns.
Papua New Guinea (PNG)
Papua New Guinea is an emerging security partner that seeks
expanded United States security cooperation. USINDOPACOM seeks a
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that enhances elements of the
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to support future force posture and
security cooperation activities that will enhance PNG defense
capabilities.
Tonga
Tonga remains an active and consistent contributor to the rules-
based international order and has supported United States security
efforts around the world. Tonga's Armed Forces remain focused on
recovery from the recent volcanic eruption and support to the
government's COVID response.
USINDOPACOM is positioned to resume defense cooperation activities,
including future training and exercises, once repairs are complete and
COVID restrictions are lifted.
Actions to Address Security Impacts of Climate Change
In response to security impacts of climate change, USINDOPACOM is
reinforcing infrastructure, increasing resilience at our own
facilities, and assisting partner nations to do the same. In
coordination with allies and partners, we have established the
Community for Indo-Pacific Climate Security (CIPCS), comprised of
military and civil sector experts to address climate impacts on
security. This network will share information and approaches to
regional collaboration to increase understanding and manage the
security impacts of climate change. Furthermore, the command has
partnered with the University of Hawaii to leverage their expertise and
climate research to promote regional security, stability, and
sustainability.
Actions to Promote an Inclusive Workplace
USINDOPACOM is fully committed to fostering an environment of
dignity and respect where all who serve can perform to their fullest
potential. This includes reviewing the recently concluded command
climate survey to determine if additional actions are required. We
continue to support all recently implemented changes in the
Headquarters to include a fully dedicated, on-site Sexual Assault
Prevention Response (SAPR) office and new Equal Opportunity (E.O.)/
Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) program to show our commitment to
promote an inclusive workplace. In order to demonstrate leadership in
this area, the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) program was highlighted
as one of the three main topics at the 2021 Chiefs of Defense (CHOD)
Conference hosted in Hawaii.
Women, Peace, and Security (WPS)
Encouraging our allies and partners to recognize the potential of
all their citizens and uphold international human rights is an effort
outlined in the Women, Peace and Security Act, and one USINDOPACOM is
executing with our Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) program. WPS
promotes the values desired by all people: dignity, human rights, and
equality under the law. Bipartisan Congressional support for the WPS
Act has enabled the initiative to become a vital part of our security
cooperation efforts. Investment in WPS conveys a strong values-based
narrative, setting the United States apart from our competitors who
fail to promote equal opportunity and gender equality.
This past year at our Chiefs of Defense Conference, Japan's Vice
Minister for Defense, Rui Matsukawa, delivered a powerful speech about
the role of women in the military. All the participants recognized the
importance and are now assessing the expansion of the role of women in
their respective militaries. We remain committed to integrating WPS
goals into our framework for security cooperation.
Our WPS program has expanded because of the growing appetite for
WPS implementation across the region. USINDOPACOM prioritizes
partnering on WPS with other nations to reinforce mutual strategic
objectives, increase common understanding, and promote force
interoperability. Tailored WPS initiatives with partner nations include
Timor-Leste, the Pacific Islands with a focus on Fiji and Papua New
Guinea, the Quad nations, Thailand, and the Philippines, among others,
to advance USINDOPACOM strategic objectives.
conclusion
USINDOPACOM has made significant strides toward improving our
deterrence posture, but there is more work to do. The PRC remains our
pacing challenge and strives to harness all forms of national power to
mount a sustained assault against the rules-based international order.
This competition has expanded in all domains, to include space and
cyber. Executing an effective strategy of integrated deterrence
requires adjusting our force posture and mounting a dedicated campaign
funded by substantial investments to defend the homeland, deliver
deterrence, and strengthen our allies and partners.
The United States must capitalize on our current technological
advantage and equip forces with the world's most sophisticated weapon
systems and use combined, secure networks with our allies and partners
to prevent conflict. This effort requires fielding an integrated Joint
force with precision-strike networks, anti-ship, and anti-air
capabilities inside the First Island Chain; integrated air and missile
defense in the Second Island Chain; and an enhanced force posture that
provides the ability to sustain extended combat operations.
We will work tirelessly to preserve peace, stability, and the
rules-based international order that has benefited all nations for more
than 80 years. We do not seek conflict, nor will we shy away from
robust competition. The resources we commit now, and in the future,
will preserve a free and open Indo-Pacific, strengthen our deterrence
posture, and provide us the ability to fight and win should deterrence
fail.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral. General
LaCamera, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL PAUL J. LaCAMERA, USA, COM-
MANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/ COMBINED FORCES
COMMAND/ UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA
General LaCamera. Chairman Reed, distinguished members of
the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear here
today. I appreciate your leadership and dedication in
supporting our total force and our families who work with our
Korean allies and the United Nations Sending States in order to
man a stable and secure environment on the Korean Peninsula.
I would also like to thank President Biden, Secretary
Austin, and General Milley for their continued leadership and
support, along with Admiral Aquilino, the functional combatant
commanders who support us, my fellow component commanders, and
my interagency colleagues. It is easy to stand on freedom's
frontier with this tremendous support. Finally, I want to thank
our Korean hosts and their professional military.
I am pleased to update you on the great work done by our
dedicated personnel who serve in the Republic of Korea. They
are professionally executing the missions of the United Nations
Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces
Korea. The United States-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance was
forged in the crucible of battle. While the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea continues to pose multiple threats to
regional and international security, this alliance remains the
linchpin of the regional stability and has prevented the
resumption of hostilities that shredded the peace some 72 years
ago. It remains ironclad, and our servicemembers, along with
the Republic of Korea military, are trained and ready to
respond to a provocation or crisis, if called upon.
Our three commands--United Nations Command, Combined Forces
Command, and United States Forces Korea--must remain vigilant,
prepared, and ready. Under one commander, these three commands
are empowered to maintain a stabilized security environment for
the Republic of Korea and our regional allies. We have
international legitimacy through the United Nations Command,
whose mission is to enforce the 1953 Armistice Agreement,
coordinate U.N. Sending State contributions, and execute
assigned functions directed by the U.S. national authorities
through Joint Chiefs of Staff to preserve peace and security on
the Korean Peninsula.
United Nations Command (UNC) ensures a true multinational
effort in support of armistice conditions while maintaining the
utmost respect for the Republic of Korea's sovereignty. We are
proud of the combined teamwork of the United States-Korean
alliance.
Combined Forces Command is the combined warfighting
headquarters, representing the United States-Korea bilateral
military partnership. Formed in 1978, it is a unique entity
that takes policy, direction, and missions from the Combined
Military Committee and is governed by and subject to bi-
national decision-making consensus.
We maintain our strong United States commitment to Korea.
United States Forces Korea is the premier joint force committed
to defending the security of the Republic of Korea. It is
disciplined, trained, and ready to fight tonight, respond in
crisis, and win in conflict. Central to meeting any threats is
resourcing and strengthening our force and best possible care
of our families. I am grateful for your support and leadership
in these no-fail tasks.
I know you are aware of South Korea's powerful economic,
military, and technical standings. No doubt you are aware of
the social impact. All of this is part of the hard work,
discipline, and dedication of the Korean people, all done under
the security umbrella of the United States-Korea alliance. The
Republic of Korea is an incredible ally and it is a privilege
to move into the future together with them in the Land of the
Morning Calm.
I am honored to command and serve this dedicated
multinational combined and joint force in one of the most
significant and dynamic regions of the world. Those who serve
are committed, capable, and well supported. The force is
postured to deter aggression, protect U.S. interests, and if
necessary, defeat any adversary. As long as a threat persists,
the United States-Korean alliance remains vigilant, determined,
and steadfast in defense of the Korean Peninsula and across the
region. As the commander of these incredible servicemembers I
appreciate this committee's continued support to fully prepare
them to fight and win on the most dangerous piece of ground,
the last 100 meters of land, sea, and air.
Finally, it has been an honor to work with the Moon
administration. Congratulations to President-Elect Yoon. We
look forward to working with his administration to strengthen
the U.K.-ROK alliance and take on regional challenges.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide an opening
statement. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Paul J. LaCamera
follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Paul J. LaCamera
introduction
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and Distinguished Members of
the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide you a written
statement. I am pleased to update you on the great work done by our
dedicated personnel who serve in the Republic of Korea (ROK), 7,000
miles away from Washington, DC, professionally executing the missions
of United Nations Command (UNC), Combined Forces Command (CFC), and
United States Forces Korea (USFK). I appreciate your leadership and
dedication in supporting our servicemembers, civilians, contractors,
and their families who work with our Korean allies and United Nations
Sending States (UNSS) and United Nations Command-Rear (UNC-R) elements
in order to maintain a stable and secure environment on the Korean
Peninsula.
The United States-Republic of Korea (U.S.-ROK) Alliance was forged
in the crucible of combat. It is principled on our shared sacrifices,
core values, and demonstrated commitment to deter any adversary who
challenges the international rules-based order and may intend us harm.
This Alliance is the linchpin of regional stability and has prevented a
resumption of the hostilities that shredded the post-World War II peace
on the Korean Peninsula almost 72 years ago. The United States
commitment to the ROK remains ironclad, and our servicemembers, along
with ROK military, are trained and ready to respond to a provocation or
crisis.
We must not forget, however, that the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea (DPRK) continues to pose significant threats to regional and
global security. We have not seen any indication that they have ceased
research, development, and testing of capabilities that threaten the
Korean Peninsula, our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region,
and our collective security interest. The DPRK's recent missile
launches validate this observation. As such, maintaining a high level
of combat readiness, sustainment, and personnel remain priorities at
the Commands so that we can continue to preserve the regional peace
that the United States and ROK, as well as our United Nations Sending
States, fought hard to secure seven decades ago.
This Posture Statement provides an assessment of our security
environment, a discussion of our enduring commitments to the United
States-ROK Alliance, and an overview of our combined and joint training
and teamwork. It also calls your attention to our resourcing needs and
updates you on the no-fail task of strengthening our Force and
Families.
the security environment surrounding the korean peninsula
The Indo-Pacific is the priority theater for the United States. To
effectively operate in this complex and dynamic environment, we must
work with our allies and partners to increase awareness of the
strategic ambitions of China and Russia. For this reason, we will
continue to look to work with the ROK to align our Indo-Pacific
Strategy with the ROK Southern Policy. However, we must simultaneously
remain focused on the fundamental purpose of the Alliance which is the
security of our Republic of Korea ally and to deter the DPRK in order
to support diplomacy and allow for a peaceful resolution of tensions,
while also remaining postured to ``Fight Tonight'' should deterrence
fail.
Using the right mix of technology, operational concepts, and
capabilities, the Department of Defense (DOD) is executing Secretary of
Defense Austin's vision for Integrated Deterrence. Our method of
employing Integrated Deterrence is to weave together all the
instruments of national power, the Alliance, allies, and partners to
make adversaries pause in their desire to challenge or injure us and
our national interests.
We observed a reduction in tensions along the Demilitarized Zone
between the ROK and DPRK after inter-Korean confidence building
measures were established in 2018. However, the DPRK has not ceased
their activities to develop nuclear and advanced missile systems; we
see this through the missile tests that have occurred over the past
year. The DPRK continues to pursue capabilities to hold our Korean and
Japanese allies at risk with short and medium range missiles, hold
United States strategic bases within the region at risk with
intermediate range missiles, and hold at risk the U.S. with its
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program.
Last October, the DPRK Defense Expo showcased a variety of missile
capabilities with greater range, accuracy, and lethality while
shortening the missile load and launch time from legacy DPRK ballistic
missile systems. In January 2022, the DPRK followed this by launching
an unprecedented amount of missiles--ranging from the tactical-short-
range-, medium-range and intermediate-range systems--that revealed
developmental missile systems including advanced warheads and
demonstrated maneuverability. We must assume that some of these systems
are likely intended to be nuclear capable. In 2020, the DPRK displayed
a new ICBM larger than those tested in 2017.
The DPRK also continues to advance cyber capabilities and other
conventional and emerging asymmetric military technologies. Various
sources reported that the regime stole $400 million in cryptocurrency
last year. The 2021 unclassified Annual Threat Assessment by the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence states that the money the DPRK
secures from cybercrimes likely helps the regime fund its priorities
such as nuclear and missile programs, rather than to reduce the
hardships of its people.
The regime's serious commitment to aggressively pursue a weapons
development program is noteworthy as it occurred during a period of
extreme economic constraint resulting from years of sanctions, recent
natural disasters, and of course the ongoing COVID-19 global pandemic.
The DPRK's lack of transparency has hindered our ability to fully
evaluate the impact of the global pandemic on the regime or its
populace. Nevertheless, based on our limited observation, we assess
that the pandemic has provided an opportunity to the regime's
leadership to consolidate and reorganize their economic activities,
tighten the control over their general population, and enhance its
power structure for the preservation of regime survivability.
Despite all the challenges, the DPRK expended great resources and
effort to advance the full range of its ballistic missiles with the
intent of targeting the United States and defeating Alliance missile
defenses on the Peninsula. We are committed to the complete
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, consistent with the
President's DPRK Policy. Our Integrated Deterrence approach is designed
to deter conflict on the Korean Peninsula while preserving space for
continued diplomatic efforts.
one commander, three commands
Our three Commands--UNC, CFC, and USFK--must remain vigilant,
prepared, and ready. Under one Commander, these three Commands are
empowered to maintain a stabilized security environment for the ROK,
our regional allies, and partners. Each Command has its own separate
set of authorities and chain of command along with different challenges
and opportunities. The common thread that ties these three Commands
together is an ironclad commitment to the defense of the ROK, born in
battle, and maintained with trust.
international legitimacy (unc)
When Communist Forces invaded South Korea in 1950, 22 United
Nations' Member States answered the call of United Nations Security
Council Resolutions (UNSCR 83, 84, 85) to exercise collective self-
defense in support of the ROK and to reinforce the international rules-
based orders. These U.N. Sending States (UNSS) provided forces and
medical support to a unified command, the United Nations Command; UNC
demonstrated an international will against the aggression. Under United
States leadership, UNSS contributed to the fight with their national
resources, and their unrelenting support and commitment to the peace
and stability of the Korean Peninsula.
The mission of UNC is to enforce the 1953 Armistice Agreement,
coordinate UNSS contributions, and execute assigned functions directed
by the United States National Authorities through the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to restore peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.
Maintaining the integrity of the Armistice Agreement is a UNC priority,
as is maintaining UNSS cohesion, situational awareness, and support to
the United States-ROK Alliance.
UNC ensures a true multilateral effort in support of armistice
conditions while maintaining the utmost respect for ROK sovereignty. It
helps lessen tensions across the Korean Peninsula through leading the
UNC Military Armistice Commission, Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission, and UNC-Rear headquarters element in Japan. UNC also
diligently carries out its mission while supporting ROK Government
initiatives such as the Comprehensive Military Agreement with DPRK.
Recently, our most sacred and rewarding mission has been the
repatriation of Korean War remains, which provided closure and some
measure of comfort to the families of our fallen.
UNC is also capable of functioning as a coordinating headquarters
for international contributions in times of crisis. It possesses the
ability to serve as ``a ready-made Combined Joint Task Force'',
demonstrating international legitimacy and support for United States-
ROK responses to DPRK's provocations or aggression. True to UNC's motto
``Under One Flag,'' we believe in the notion that if you want to go
fast, then go alone; if you want to go far, then go together. Our
collective efforts and resolve provide the foundation upon which
progress towards peace on the Korean Peninsula can be built. Key to the
Command's success is maintaining trust with the Republic of Korea
Government.
combined teamwork of the united states-rok alliance (cfc)
CFC is the combined warfighting headquarters representing the
United States-ROK bilateral military partnership. Formed in 1978, it is
a unique entity that takes policy, direction, and missions from the
Combined Military Committee and is governed by and subject to bi-
national decision-making and consensus.
As the ROK military has matured to become one of the world's most
capable militaries, the United States remains fully committed to the
bilaterally Conditions-based Operational Control (OPCON) Transition
Plan. This Plan has three bilaterally-approved conditions that must be
met before a transition occurs: 1) the ROK acquires the 26 critical
military capabilities required to lead the combined defense; 2) the
Alliance must have comprehensive response capabilities against DPRK's
nuclear and missile threats; and 3) the security environment on the
Korean Peninsula and in the region must be conducive to a stable
transition. Since a critical characteristic of CFC is the bi-national
decision-making structure, even after the transition, the structure
will remain to ensure equal representation in the governing body.
The leadership of both countries continue working to realize the
conditions-based OPCON transition, and this remains a priority. We are
also focused on the no-fail mission to maintain the combat readiness
and interoperability of our combined force. The aggregate result of
over seven decades of our Alliance has significantly increased the need
for secure and interoperable systems and the United States and Korean
servicemembers who comprise CFC focus on exercising and improving our
joint and combined interoperability and combat readiness.
Our semi-annual theater-level Combined Command Post Training (CCPT)
is our premier training event to maintain our combined combat
readiness. Over several weeks, United States, ROK, and multinational
servicemembers operate from our command posts, and are immersed in a
realistic and challenging scenario focusing on the defense of the ROK.
This training stresses UNC, CFC, USFK, and ROK systems, improves our
interoperability and defines our processes as well as tactics,
techniques, and procedures.
During CCPT, we also simulate coordination with ROK civilian
authorities, allies, and partners in order to manage the anticipated
magnitude of multinational evacuation operations. Since there are more
than two million citizens from over 30 countries residing in the ROK,
evacuating non-combatants from the Korean Peninsula in a crisis would
require herculean and multinational efforts. Exercising such operations
in a multinational format is crucial for all of us on the Peninsula to
be ready to protect non-combatants while creating a maneuver space for
the military to deter and defeat aggression.
As combined readiness is a no-fail mission, we must maintain our
ability to train at individual, unit, and combined levels through
joint, live, virtual, and constructive formats. Only when we maintain
combined readiness, can CFC, as the heart of the United States-ROK
Alliance, stand as a deterrent to any provocative DPRK behaviors.
Maintaining deterrence allows the Force to maintain the Armistice and
respond in crisis. More importantly, it allows for the diplomatic
process to continue.
united states commitment to korea (usfk)
USFK is the premier Joint Force committed to defending the security
of the ROK. It is disciplined, trained, and ready to Fight Tonight,
respond in crisis, and win in conflict. The Joint Services that
comprise USFK are maintaining a high level of readiness to ensure they
are also prepared to support the mission. The command's leaders and
servicemembers know that combat readiness is perishable; we conduct
rigorous training to maximize unit and individual combat readiness.
However, we do have to contend with challenges associated with our
readiness. As the ROK has developed to be the 10th largest economy in
the world, smaller towns and villages have become vibrant cities, and
their populations have grown. As a result, in some areas local
construction and encroachment have become hindrances and challenges to
training execution. Our personnel turnover rates also provide
challenges to commanders at all levels.
The threats to the Korean Theater of Operations necessitate tough
and realistic training. The physical size of available ranges and
insufficient airspace present challenges for our forces such as aircrew
proficiency and artillery gunnery proficiency. Although three ranges
are currently available for U.S. Forces to train on--Pilsung Range,
Jik-Do Range, and Rodriguez Range--various restrictions that prohibit
flexible and comprehensive training require our Air Component to use
off-Peninsula opportunities to meet training requirements. Given that
the ROK military's readiness is crucial to the overall defense of the
Peninsula, we have opened the door to include ROK forces in off-
Peninsula training opportunities to ensure they are not impacted by
similar range issues. We need a combined United States-ROK solution
that supports robust, day or night, live-fire and force-on-force
training.
Limited access to the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense site at
Camp Carroll also affects several issues linked to our readiness.
Despite significant progress in increasing access to the site over the
last year, unfettered access is required to fully ensure logistical
support at the site, and improve the quality of life for servicemembers
stationed there. Limited access also slows the pace of construction
projects on site which is critical for maintaining the system's
capabilities, crew training, and upgrades. All of this hinders the
Alliance's ability to operate this defensive system and defend the ROK
people, as well as United States and ROK service members.
Another challenge is that we are at the end of the global supply
chain which could impact the combat readiness of our essential
munitions, ballistic missile defense systems, and pre-positioned
wartime stocks. While increased resourcing in 2018 improved our posture
and did help ``Set the Theater'', the improvements were not a permanent
fix to our logistics and sustainment challenges. Careful maintenance of
these resources is an ongoing requirement necessary to sustaining
increased readiness levels.
Additionally, there remain asymmetric threats that require
solutions through additional interoperability and information
processing capabilities. USFK continues to work with DOD to address
deficiencies in deep look persistent/semi-persistent Command, Control,
Computers, Communications, Cyber-defense, Intelligence, Surveillance,
Reconnaissance, and Targeting (C5ISRT), all of which will enhance
situational awareness and inform our critical decision-making.
The United States-ROK Alliance anchors the preservation of peace
and stability on the Korean Peninsula and the mission. It is critical
we maintain a correct mix of highly proficient forces both on and off
the Peninsula, paired with the proper capabilities. The Joint Force
remains fully committed to maintaining high levels of combat readiness
in order to counter any threat that may challenge it.
strengthening the force and families
Servicemembers, civilians, families, and contractors who support
the Forces are our most precious resource, and taking care of our
people is also a no-fail task. This involves continuous assessment and
addressing of systemic issues so that we can provide a safe and
inclusive environment. We continue to look for ways to build our multi-
cultural community to ensure Korea remains an assignment of choice for
our personnel and their Families.
We have zero tolerance for sexual assault, sexual harassment,
discrimination, bigotry, or racism. We continue to strive to eliminate
these corrosive detractors to trust, morale, readiness, and human
dignity throughout the commands with initiatives such as listening
sessions, team building exercises, workforce surveys, education,
enhanced prevention programs, and enforcement. We have reinforced to
our leaders that they have the authorities and responsibilities, in
accordance with Services' regulations, and must foster an environment
of dignity, respect, and trust that is free from discrimination. We owe
our people good leadership and the opportunity to be their individual
and collective best.
Our goal is enhanced collective awareness, dialogue, reporting,
feedback, and support to eliminate all forms of discrimination within
our community. Toward this goal, we will continue to rely and build on
our Strength in Diversity initiative to recognize, enhance, and
appreciate that our strength is our diversity and inclusivity within
our community. Senior United States leaders in the ROK will continue to
stress the importance of these initiatives on their subordinates and
ensure they are incorporated at all levels.
USFK has several infrastructure and garrison installation housing
priorities throughout the ROK. These priorities include managing on-
post housing, addressing aging infrastructure, and meeting new mission
requirements. Of note, we have six new housing tower units under
construction at U.S. Army Garrison (USAG)-Humphreys scheduled for
completion no later than 2023. This will meet the requirement to have
40 percent of command sponsored Families residing on USAG-Humphreys.
DOD's military construction (MILCON) is required for valid mission
requirements that mitigate operational capability gaps in the ROK.
MILCON is also the only source for community support requirements, such
as dorms, family housing, and fitness centers, which enhance Fight
Tonight capabilities. We appreciate the support from Congress for these
DOD MILCON projects as well as ROK funded construction projects through
the Special Measures Agreements and the Yongsan Relocation Program.
The health of our community is important, and the Brian D. Allgood
Army Community Hospital (BDAACH) at USAG-Humphreys is the medical asset
equipped to support 65,000 eligible beneficiaries. BDAACH is an
irreplaceable part of caring for the physical, mental, and emotional
health of our servicemembers, families, and civilians, many of whom are
young, away from home for long periods of time, and combat veterans.
Behavioral health and the well-being of our community is essential
to the readiness of the Total Force. To achieve psychological
readiness, we are proactively taking action to provide the highest
quality of behavioral health care to mitigate the impact of risk
factors on our servicemembers and their Families. This includes
addressing misconceptions and stigma surrounding mental illness,
implementing comprehensive approaches to suicide prevention, and
recognizing the adverse impact of unique stressors, to include the
COVID-19 pandemic.
BDAACH has proven critical to supporting our operations to fully
vaccinate our USFK-affiliated population in accordance with DOD
guidance, including United States retirees and local national
employees, in order to maintain peak operational readiness. At the time
of this writing, 98 percent of servicemembers and 90 percent of our
total population are fully vaccinated. COVID-19 has emphasized that the
health of our force directly links to our overall readiness, and we
continue to manage the impact of this pandemic in accordance with
United States and ROK Government guidelines and requirements.
way forward
I am honored to command and serve this dedicated multinational,
combined, and joint force in one of the most significant and dynamic
regions of the world. Those who serve in the ROK are committed,
capable, and well-supported. The Force is postured to deter aggression,
defend the Republic of Korea protect United States interests, and if
called upon, defeat any adversary.
As long as the threat persists, the ironclad United States-ROK
Alliance remains vigilant, determined, and steadfast in our defense,
not just on the Korean Peninsula but across the region. As the
Commander of these incredible servicemembers, I appreciate this
Committee's continued support to fully prepare them to fight and win,
on the most dangerous distance--that last 100 meters of land, sea, air,
cyber, or space.
Under One Flag! Katchi Kapshida, We Go Together! Fight Tonight!
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General.
Admiral Aquilino, Taiwan has historically purchased
expensive platforms rather than asymmetric systems which may be
more relevant in an actual conflict with China. In addition to
that, Taiwan has one of the most robust economies in the world.
Do you agree that Taiwan should have sufficient budgetary
resources to procure the necessary defense systems?
Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, Chairman. I think I would
leave it to Taiwan to identify the number and amount of
resources that they would like to invest. What I think I would
say is the trend is in the right direction for the capabilities
that we have seen them invest in. So for example, the Harpoon
missile system is a capability that would provide a viable
defensive posture for the people of Taiwan. Additionally, the
F-16 capability for their air force.
So the amount that they would like to invest is part of the
calculus. What they invest in, I think they are on the right
path.
Chairman Reed. We are in a position to help them facilitate
the acquisition of appropriate defense capabilities, and again
they seem to have the resources to be able to support such an
effort. Are there opportunities for us to get involved in co-
development and co-production of systems that will help them?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks again, Chairman. I think there
certainly is opportunity there. As we operate through the lens
of, and in compliance with, the Taiwan Relations Act, anything
that we could do to bolster the defensive capabilities would be
desirable.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. General LaCamera, you are in a
very difficult situation with North Korea right on your front
line and China hovering over everything. To what extent do you
believe the Chinese are targeting our alliance with Korea and
what insights might you share with us in terms of that effort?
General LaCamera. Thanks, Chairman. As you recall, a couple
of years ago when the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) protection was put in there was an economic penalty put
against the Republic of Korea for that. It appears that the
Republic of Korea has been able to come out of that. But it is
still in the news. It is still a concern of the Koreans, and as
I meet with my Korean counterparts it is always a topic of
conversation.
Their influence is--you know, they are neighbors. There is
a diplomatic influence and there is clearly an economic
influence, and they also have about 900,000 Chinese that do
live in South Korea. So there is an influence there that we
have to be paying attention to.
Chairman Reed. Well thank you very much. Admiral Aquilino,
with respect to force posture your prepared testimony states,
``More distributed combat power increases the liability,
reduces risk, and enables the transition from defense to
offense quickly should deterrence fail.'' What are your top
force posture priorities for the region?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Chairman. As we take a look, the
Guam cluster is clearly the top priority to provide
capabilities as well as improving the posture in that place.
Tinian island, Palau, and the cluster there is highly
important. Additionally, Japan is important to ensure that we
get the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) right in
coordination with our Japanese partners. The Philippines, very
strategy terrain, and we are working through the Enhanced
Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites that we have
coordinated with the government of the Philippines to provide
additional capability. Australia is a place there we are
focused, as I would articulate the top four.
Chairman Reed. There is a pending presidential election in
the Philippines. Does that represent a potential change in our
relationship, either positive or negative?
Admiral Aquilino. Chairman, the Philippines are a mutual
defense treaty country. They have gone through many different
elections, as have many of the countries in the region. So
again, I am hopeful that we will continue to be able to
operate. Secretary Austin went over most recently and was able
to solve the visiting forces agreement problem. So the
Philippines is certainly on the proper trend and a great
partner.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral. Thank you,
General, for your testimony and your service.
Senator Wicker, please.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much. Admiral, the Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO) says we need 31 traditional amphibious
warships. That is worldwide. How many do you need in your
command?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, if it is okay I will get back to
you on the record for that as a classified event.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Well, let me just say, we are
learning some lessons these last two or three weeks about
reality and about some of our adversaries view what you call
the rules-based international order. So I am really asking you
to tell us what you need, and I think both sides of the dais
here would do everything we can to make sure that happens.
Now let me ask you this. Every September 30th, this
Congress, House and Senate, is supposed to send to the
President a defense appropriation bill. It is wrapped up in an
omnibus bill now, and we still have not had a chance to pass it
here in the second week of March 2022. How much of a problem is
that? For the two of you, Admiral and General, what can you not
do, what have you not been able to do for this part of the
fiscal year because of the absence of a defense appropriation
bill, and have we spent money needlessly because you are
operating under a continuing resolution from the previous
fiscal year?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. As I stated in my
testimony, our predictable budgets are certainly helpful, both
for the industrial base, the companies that support us, and to
deliver the capabilities, operations and things that we need.
The critical impact is the loss of buying power. I do not know
the exact number that the Department of Defense has estimated
with regard to the extent of the continuing resolution (CR),
but that loss of buying power is significant, in the billions.
It also has a separate effect for me, and I am not an
acquisition authority, but it does have an effect on me, and
that is none of the new starts or requests for capabilities are
able to be delivered or started, begun, under a continuing
resolution. So for my top three priorities--a defense of Guam
system, we have been unable to start or support that; the
delivery of a mission partner environment, my ability to
connect with all of our allies and partners to share
information, plan, coordinate, and execute operations; and then
the Pacific Multi-Domain Training and Exercise Capability
System, in other words our ability to link all of the ranges
that we have to train at the high end, with live, virtual, and
constructive capability. We have been unable to start any of
those.
Senator Wicker. Have you had to spend money on things that,
once this thing gets passed and the President signs it, really
are no longer that important?
Admiral Aquilino. I am not aware of any of those, Senator.
Senator Wicker. How about that, General, and the overall
question.
General LaCamera. I agree with everything the admiral said.
I would add a couple of points. I do not know if we have had to
spend any money on it. It does affect the buying power. It does
affect how much time we have left to spend money going forward.
At a tangible level, it is impacting some maintenance and it is
impacting some new starts with, say, a counter-Unmanned Aerial
System (UAS) program, going forward.
Senator Wicker. Admiral, what do you think the lessons the
leadership of the People's Republic of China are learning from
what is going on now in Ukraine?
Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, Senator. So there are three
that I am watching very specifically. Number one, the loss of
life required to create and execute an illegal war is certainly
something that ought to be taken away. Both President Putin and
President Xi Jinping should learn that lesson. That cost of
life is broad, extensive, and will haunt them both.
Second, the international condemnation that we are seeing
of like-minded nations coming together to articulate the
illegal aspect, the displeasure, and the needless loss of life
needs to continue. The third, the significant economic impacts
that the free world can bring together against a nation who
would take this type of action.
Senator Wicker. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker.
Senator King, please.
Senator King. Admiral, thank you. Thank you both for being
with us this morning.
Admiral, we have learned a lot in the last week or so about
nuclear doctrine in Russia, particularly the idea of escalate
to deescalate. What do we know about China's nuclear doctrine?
We know that they are vastly expanding their nuclear
capability. As I say, do we have ideas about what China's
assumptions are about the use of nuclear weapons?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, thanks. I do not think I would
assume anything, and I would defer to my partner, Admiral
Richard as the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) commander. I
think what I would tell you is what do we see happening in the
theater, and that is an extensive buildup of nuclear
capability, articulated and intended to be delivered by the
PRC--700 warheads by 2027, and over 1,000 by 2030.
Senator King. That is from a base of almost zero. I mean,
their expansion has been dramatic, has it not?
Admiral Aquilino. Extremely, quickly, and as Admiral
Richard most recently testified.
Senator King. Thank you. China calls itself a near-Arctic
nation and is becoming more and more active in the Arctic. One
of my concerns is the extent to which there may be gaps between
U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), U.S. European Command
(EUCOM), U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), given China's
activities in these various areas. Reassure me about your
integration with your fellow combatant commanders, particularly
NORTHCOM, where China is operating in that region.
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. As you know, NORTHCOM is
actually the lead for the Arctic, so we coordinate persistently
with General VanHerck and General Walters. Some of the
examples, you know, when the most recent Russian submarine came
from the North Fleet over to the Pacific Fleet, we monitored
and watched that as it crossed combatant commander lines.
General VanHerck, I support him for the long-range aviation
flights or any threats that emit from the northwestern portion
of either from Russia or China as it applies to the homeland
defense mission, no matter what path they take.
So our cooperation and collaboration is persistent.
Senator King. Well part of our new strategy in the Indo-
Pacific is dispersal. Would not a reinvigoration of Adak make
some sense, and given its strategic position, again, it is in
NORTHCOM but it is pretty darn close to INDOPACOM as well.
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator, and we have used Adak most
recently in an exercise, I think about a year ago, for a
combined Navy-Marine Corps event from that area. So clearly a
strategic location for both defense of the homeland and to be
able to project power forward. We are going to have to take a
look at the length of the runway there for some future
operations.
Senator King. Thank you. I hope that is under consideration
because again, if dispersal is the goal we do not want to
concentrate everything in Guam, for example. We want to present
problems for a potential adversary.
General, I have been concerned on an ongoing basis with the
relationship between South Korea and Japan. A, where does that
stand, and B, does the new administration have any--did they
come into this election season, which concluded yesterday, with
any stated position about strengthening or further weakening
the relationship between two countries which are important
allies to us?
General LaCamera. Thanks, Senator. I am not aware of any
specifics, but I think as President Yoon talks about security
as a top priority, that my best military advice is--and I think
the military leaders and my Korean counterparts truly
understand--the importance of a United States-ROK and a ROK-
Japan relationship, and that is one of my top priorities as a
commander of United States Forces Korea (USFK).
Senator King. I appreciate that, and I hope that is a
priority, to try to foster that relationship and improve it,
because in a time of conflict, as we have learned, allies are
essential. Winston Churchill once said, ``The only thing worse
than fighting with your allies is fighting without your
allies.'' Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator King.
Senator Rounds, please.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, let me
begin by just saying thank you very much to you and your
families for your years of service to our country.
Admiral Aquilino, the space and cyber domains are where we
are seeing a lot of activity and pose a real threat to our
national security. With seven of the nine nations capable of
launching satellites in your area of responsibility (AOR), can
you explain how you integrate your operations with U.S. Space
Command (USSPACECOM) and U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM),
recognizing it provides both opportunities for us but also some
real threats?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. As we synchronize our
operations together I have the greatest partners in General
Nakasone from Cyber Command, General Dickinson from Space
Command. As a matter of fact, I have asked them both to meet me
in Australia in about a week and a half to synchronize with our
Australian counterparts and continue to work towards improved
capabilities in space and cyber.
This process is in our headquarters, that again you have
heard me articulate this think, act, and operate differently.
One of the critical aspects of that is how to synchronize all
domain effects, and that includes space and cyber. I have
dedicated people in my headquarters as cyber components and
space components that operate in my headquarters every day, and
I cannot be any more synchronized than that.
Senator Rounds. I also like the fact that it is not just
synchronized in multiple domains but with our allies as well,
which I think is a critical part of our long-term prospects in
the region.
General LaCamera, it has been brought to my attention that
our service men and women and their families are required to
receive a rapid test for COVID for them to return to Korea, but
this test is not covered by TRICARE. I think it is wrong to
charge our servicemembers for medical tests that we are
requiring them to take. Can you perhaps explain to me what this
does to these young men and women and what the costs involved
are, and perhaps give us some reasoning as to maybe why we
should take some action immediately to resolve this?
General LaCamera. Thank you, Senator. If they are on
official travel orders that is covered. They can claim that. If
they are departing on leave, I will test them for any
requirements leaving the Republic of Korea. But coming back in,
there are ways that they can get it from CVS, out on the
economy. The challenge becomes if they do not get it in time
then they have to pay out of pocket to make sure that they can
get back into the country. The requirement is 48 hours right
now, and it is currently not covered under TRICARE. Again
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, they want to do the right
thing. They want to come back in. They are paying out of
pocket, and currently right now I believe I do not have the
capability to reimburse them.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir. I have one more question
for Admiral Aquilino. The Indo-Pacific AOR has been described
as the most consequential region of America's future. As such,
it would appear to me that we should be working very hard to
increase our network of allies and partnerships in the region.
The Army Corps of Engineers has done some remarkable work
building partner capacity in areas of water and environmental
security, disaster risk management, and humanitarian assistance
construction projects. The Corps does a lot of this work from
the civil works perspective and in concert with U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID). Can you speak to the
effectiveness of these programs in building regional
partnerships as opposed to how China does business?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. So the Army Corps of
Engineers is certainly active in the region, as well as the
engineering corps of all the services. We take on projects that
support communities, deliver military warfighting capacity, and
support our allies and partners. That is a vastly different
model than the PRC is using with regard to bringing in workers,
bringing in materials, and then settling in nation. So the
models are completely different.
I was just in Palau. As a part of the Seabee corps that is
forward deployed in Palau, I met with four interns from the
island of Palau that were operating with the Seabees to learn
skills, trade, and to improve the infrastructure of their
island. So drastically different models, and I am confident
that the nation sees which of those models they like better,
and it is the United States' model.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator Hirono, please.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, and Admiral Aquilino and General
LaCamera, thank you very much to both of you.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your opening remarks in
support of the closure of the Red Hill facility and the need
for us to address the INDOPACOM fueling needs in alternative
ways.
Admiral Aquilino, we are going ahead with safely defueling
this massive facility, or these massive tanks, and we are going
to need to provide resources in the out years to deal with the
environmental issues related to the closure of this facility.
What are your major concerns and priorities with respect to the
future fuel storage requirements for INDOPACOM?
Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, Senator. Thanks for the
continued support. In the set of options I briefed the
Secretary, and the decision that he has made with regard to
closing it, was focused on three critical things. Number one,
the top priority was clean, safe water for the people of
Hawaii, servicemembers, and their families. Number two was to
ensure that we could execute our military mission set. The
option that he selected I believe provides a more diverse,
distributed, and effective fuel distribution model that meets
all of my requirements.
Senator Hirono. How do you plan to mitigate any potential
vulnerabilities that an alternate fuel solution may have?
Although in my opinion we reduce our vulnerabilities by not
having all our fuel in one place, but do you have some concerns
about vulnerabilities of distributing this fuel, I do not know,
throughout the Pacific, perhaps?
Admiral Aquilino. I absolutely do not, Senator. Again, I
believe, as you articulated, a much more diverse and
distributed, both land-based and sea-based, is the best model
to ensure we can meet our warfighting needs.
Senator Hirono. The Compact of Free Association Agreement,
COFA, between the United States and the Republic of the
Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and I
know that you visited Palau, which is one of the other nations
that are part of COFA, but as to the other two nations they are
coming up for renewal in 2023, and Palau in 2024. As you noted
in your written statement to the committee these agreements
have significant impact on your ability to advance the
priorities of the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and maintain a
free and open Indo-Pacific.
I am really glad that you visited Palau and that we are
going to be perhaps looking at different ways that we can
jointly be supportive, more supportive of these compact nations
as we go forward. So I hope you will continue to prioritize our
partnerships with these island nations to support our overall
strategy in the Pacific.
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, ma'am. It is absolutely important to
get to the appropriate renegotiation of the compact agreements.
Again, visiting Saipan, Guam, Palau, and Tinian were really,
really worthwhile trips for me. I got to spend some time with
President Whipps from Palau.
As you know, the negotiation of those agreements are led by
State Department in coordination with the Department of the
Interior, and Department of Defense has a representative on the
team, and have articulated my request to negotiate those as
soon as possible in a way that is certainly beneficial to the
United States as the PRC is looking to infiltrate throughout
the region.
Senator Hirono. Exactly, and I think that our country
should be paying more attention and a more supportive role with
regard to our compact nations, because they are there in large
extent because they are very much a part of our national
security priorities.
Regarding North Korea, for both of you, this year alone we
have seen North Korea executing nine rounds of missile tests,
including a purported hypersonic missile, and its first launch
since 2017 of an intermediate-range missile, potentially
capable of reaching Guam. Admiral Aquilino and General
LaCamera, what is your assessment of the credibility of such
threats from North Korea? Maybe we will start with you,
General.
General LaCamera. As I live under that threat, Senator, the
threat is real, and it spears that he is trying to develop
capabilities to defeat our systems and threaten the peninsula
and threaten regional stability.
Senator Hirono. So, Admiral Aquilino, is this one of the
reasons that our protective systems on Guam is your top
priority, or a top priority?
Admiral Aquilino. Absolutely. The ability to defend the
homeland of Guam as well as the military forces that operate
there. What I would say, though, is that the relationship we
have with the South Koreans and the Japanese is critical.
General LaCamera and I synchronize with General Won and General
Yamazaki every time there is one of these launches, and if you
just recently read we have increased the readiness level on
both the peninsula and in support of the defense of Japan
today.
Senator Hirono. Mr. Chairman, I want to note, not to
mention the need to protect Hawaii. As we develop these missile
systems, defense systems in Guam, we do still have the issue of
Homeland Defense Radar--Hawaii.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Senator Cotton, please.
Senator Cotton. Admiral, last year your predecessor,
Admiral Davidson, warned that China may invade Taiwan, in his
words, ``the next 6 years.'' That was a year ago. In your best
military opinion does that forecast still hold?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. I was going to start
with--who said that?
Senator Cotton. Admiral Davidson.
Admiral Aquilino. No, I know I do not even think about that
last guy anymore. [Laughs.] I think that his articulation was
based on a couple of different points, but we would have to ask
Admiral Davidson how he came to that.
One of the things that I have watched is President Xi
Jinping has articulated and challenged his military to be able
to modernize and complete its modernization by 2027. If we look
over the past 10 or 15 years, that target date has moved left
from 2035-ish, persistently. So 2027 is the military task.
I can tell you where I am is I see actions that give me
concern that the timeline is shrinking, and the mission that I
have been given is to be prepared for it. So when you look at
the actions of the PRC as it applies to breaking their
agreement for Hong Kong, taking physical, lethal actions on the
line of actual control with India, completely illegal claims
for the entire South China Sea in every sea space and airspace
inside their self-proclaimed nine-dash line, all of these
actions give me concern. The most recent water-cannoning of
Philippine sailors in the vicinity of Second Thomas Shoal. All
of these things give me concern, and I cannot predict the date,
Senator. I just know I need to be ready now.
Senator Cotton. I agree, Admiral. They give me a lot of
concern as well. It was 6 years last year. It is 5 years now. I
think we should be as concerned that it might be 5 months and
be ready for that.
One way to be ready for that, in the opinion of former
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who I think is one of the
most distinguished statesmen of the region and of his
generation, said that the United States should consider
abandoning so-called strategic ambiguity regarding Taiwan,
which we do not make it perfectly clear that we will come to
their defense.
Given what we have seen in the invasion of Ukraine and what
we understand about China's intentions, based on what you just
said, should we make it clear to Beijing that we will, in fact,
come to Taiwan's defense if Beijing attacks Taiwan?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, as you know we currently are in
execution and support the One-China policy. I think what I
would say is strategic ambiguity has served us very well for
the past 40 years.
Senator Cotton. It has served us well under different
circumstances, when the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was not
capable of executing this mission and Beijing knew that. I
would suggest now that the PLA is capable, the main constraint
on China's leaders is America's intentions, and that is why we
should change from strategic ambiguity to clarity.
Admiral, I want to turn to your opening statement. You used
the phrase ``integrated deterrence.'' The Pentagon defines that
as ``working across warfighting domains, theaters, and the
spectrum of conflict in collaboration with all instruments of
national power as well as allies and partners,'' end quote.
That sounds to me like a bureaucratic word salad, cooked up in
Colin Kahl's office. I do not understand what integrated
deterrence adds to deterrence. Could you explain to me what you
think the difference is between those two terms, because
``deterrence'' is a very simple and long-standing concept that
depends centrally on hard military power, to include nuclear
weapons.
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. So again, in the lane
that I operate, in the military lane, again I believe that that
hard power, credible combat power provides a deterrent value
through the military sphere. I also believe that there are
other forms that actually may be more impactful. As we are
watching in the Ukraine side, the economic impacts clearly have
an opportunity, and I do believe synchronizing those with the
military lane can really have an impactful ability to deliver
deterrence.
Senator Cotton. All dependent, though, on continued
military dominance across all military domains, to include our
nuclear arsenal. Correct?
Admiral Aquilino. Certainly in the military sphere,
Senator, I coordinate with Admiral Richard as we present the
entire spectrum of military capabilities to adversaries. So the
synchronization of conventional and strategic is critical, and
then combining that with the rest is certainly valuable.
Senator Cotton. Yes, and I want to commend you, because you
have been very clear-eyed and sober while you have been in this
command about the need for military power in the Western
Pacific to deter China. I just want to make sure that a bunch
of political apparatchiks in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense are not going to undermine that military power on which
all deterrence is based. Thank you, Admiral.
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator, if I could just make one
comment. The Secretary has been completely supportive of the
approach that we have taken, and not once have I been asked to
throttle back or do anything different.
Senator Cotton. I did not say ``the Secretary.'' I said
``the Office of the Secretary of Defense,'' which is large and
sprawling and has a lot of political hacks in it.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. Senator Blumenthal, please.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both
for your service and for being here this morning.
There was an announcement in December, as you know, that
Australia was planning to build a new naval station on its east
coast to base nuclear submarines planned for under the
Australia, United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS)
agreement. This base could resupply and maintain American
nuclear submarines, increasing the capabilities of both
countries, Australia and our country, in countering China's
influence and threats in the Pacific region. AUKUS allows us to
capitalize on one of our greatest advantages in the Pacific,
namely the strength and capabilities of our submarine fleet,
which is second to none in the world. Sharing this technology
with Australia will be a force multiplier, but those submarines
are not scheduled to be commissioned for another 10 or more
years. There was a lot of hoopla at the time of the
announcement, but not so much a realization that there will be
some delay.
The AUKUS agreement also provides a framework for joint
cooperation and integration of cyber capabilities, artificial
intelligence, and quantum technologies.
Admiral, as you know the United States, the United Kingdom,
and Australia are currently engaged in an 18-month period of
consultation to determine the optimal pathway to nuclear-
powered submarines for Australia. What would you like to see
come out of this process? What themes of inoperability have you
identified for AUKUS, moving forward, and can the timeline be
accelerated?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. So the AUKUS agreement
is really important, and everybody goes right to submarines,
but as you articulated it is more broad than that, and we are
working immediately to increase our space and cyber
capabilities together with the Australians. We are looking at
posture options beyond just submarines and naval bases to be
able to operate together, and right now we are completely
interoperable with the Australians.
On the submarine side, I think the Australians need to see
the result of this initial review. They will have some
decisions and choices to make. Then I think there are ways to
bridge to that development as they work to get to the
infrastructure, and then we review the additional basing
options that you just articulated.
We would love to go as fast as possible. We certainly have
to be mindful of the nuclear reactors and the safety of those
things as we work this forward.
Senator Blumenthal. Speaking to the importance of this
agreement, would you say it is more significant in light of
what we have seen in Ukraine, and if so, for what reason?
Admiral Aquilino. I do not know if I would compare it on
the Ukraine side. I think as I look at the theater that we
operate in, there is vast number of basically multilateral
relationships that are important, when you think about
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), when you think
about a trilateral relationship with South Korea, Japan, and
the United States. This is just another one of those
multinational agreements that provide both a military
capability and capacity that is important for the region.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you think there is the opportunity
or the potential for accelerating the timeline?
Admiral Aquilino. I think we will have to see the results
of this review. I guess what I would say is this really will
not happen quickly. If we can get from 10 years to 8 years,
boy, that would be herculean.
Senator Blumenthal. Where do you think the submarines will
be built?
Admiral Aquilino. I know the Australians certainly would
like to have that industrial capacity. I think having an
additional industrial base in another place for us is possible.
But as you know, all of the United States submarines are built
in Connecticut.
Senator Blumenthal. I know. Rhode Island (Senator Reed),
and Rhode Island (Senator Blumenthal) has a role to play as
well. [Laughter.] Thank you very much, Admiral.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Ernst, please.
Senator Ernst. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and again,
gentlemen, thank you very much for being here.
General LaCamera, let us start with you. We have seen a lot
with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and it just hammers home
how connected the world is and the responses that we see from
democratic nations. We have heard a lot about how EUCOM and
INDOPACOM are totally different theaters, yet the responses
from the Japanese, the Australians, the South Koreans when it
comes to Ukraine have surprised a lot of people.
What do you think about the allied responses to the
invasion of Ukraine, and can you shed some light on how all of
these different regions are interconnected?
General LaCamera. Thank you, Senator. As I sat down with
the Minister of Defense before coming to Washington, D.C., I
told him we were paying attention to what is going on there. It
is not a blueprint but it can be instructive to large-scale
combat operations on the Korean Peninsula and in the region. We
need to be paying attention to that, boil it down to its
fundamental lessons.
But I think as discussed already several times, you know,
our true asymmetric advantages are alliances and having a
coalition. I think it continues to reinforce the importance of
making sure that we have that strategic and international
depth, and we can take everybody's capabilities and put it
together as an asymmetric advantage.
Senator Ernst. I think that is well said. There are so many
connectivities, ways that we work with allied partners around
the globe, that just become force multipliers no matter what
theater. So I am going to continue on some of that
interconnectivity that we have. I know we were having a fuel
discussion earlier, so I am going to direct this one to the
Admiral.
In light of the energy crunch that we have now with the
Russia invasion of Ukraine, it is my understanding that our
military has fuel contracts with the Japanese and South Korean
refiners, but much of their oil does come from Iran and others.
Have you taken a close look at our Defense Logisitics Agency's
(DLA's) energy contracts for INDOPACOM, and is that a strategic
concern?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. We certainly keep a look
at the refinery capability around the globe and how it might
impact. I have not looked down to the second-, third-order
effects as we coordinate with Japan, Korea, and the host
nations. I would be glad to take that on with DLA to see where
those vulnerabilities might be.
Senator Ernst. I would appreciate that, because again,
there is so much that goes on under the surface, and if we are
relying upon Iran and other adversaries, just as we are seeing
in our own economy right now, we are so reliant upon Russia.
Russia is using those dollars to fund their war machine. The
same could be said of a number of other near-peer adversaries
like Iran. The dollars they are generating from their oil then
also goes to fund terrorist activities, proxy activities around
the globe.
So we are all interconnected, going back to what General
LaCamera said. We have various strategic alliances, but we also
need to look at where our adversaries are and how we can rely
on partners for solutions rather than just focusing on folks
like Russia and Iran and others. It is very important that we
look at those secondary and tertiary implications.
So I will yield back my time. Thank you very much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Ernst.
Senator Warren, please.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
our witnesses for being here today.
Admiral Aquilino, I want to ask about the impact of defense
industry consolidation on our ability to compete militarily and
to be able to control costs. So last month the Department of
Defense issued a disturbing report finding that defense mergers
and growing concentration is reducing the number of suppliers
and creating vulnerabilities in our supply chain. Of course,
that is because when only a small number of companies produce
components that DOD needs to buy, a pandemic or a single
company's decision to cease production can leave us without the
parts that we need, or instead of ceasing production those
companies can just jack up prices to make more profits, without
fear of being undercut by competitors.
So let me ask, Admiral Aquilino, do you consider hypersonic
weapons to be an important priority?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Warren. Hypersonic weapons is one area where the
DOD report is particularly alarming, warming that vertical
integration of those contractors and suppliers, quote, ``will
likely lead to reduced competition and may eliminate it
altogether.'' Do you agree that DOD generally benefits from
competition among defense contractors and suppliers?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, let me just start by saying I do
not have any acquisition authority, but competition is
certainly the foundation of our free market.
Senator Warren. Well, it is not only a foundation of our
free market, you are absolutely right, but it is how we assure
that we are going to have supply and we are going to have it at
a price that we can afford. That is why I have been concerned
that DOD is asleep at the wheel when it comes to mergers and
acquisitions. Since the 1990s, we have gone from 51 aerospace
and defense prime contractors down to just 5 today. Controlling
costs for hypersonics is going to be a major challenge for the
Department. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) found
that the costs of one of the Navy's programs nearly doubled in
a single year, and that an Air Force program increased by 40
percent in its first year.
Look, we are planning to invest about $15 billion through
2024, so those kinds of cost increases add up in a hurry.
Overruns in these programs take resources away from other
Department priorities and other needs across the Federal
Government, and the cost issues are significant enough that the
Air Force Secretary Kendall has expressed concerns that they
are not, quote, ``cost effective.''
So let me just ask you one more question in this general
area, if I can. There are a number of factors that drive these
cost increases. I realize that. There is complexity, poor
planning, weak oversight. But do you think it will be important
to prevent further concentration among hypersonics contractors,
Admiral?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, again, not being the person who
actually purchases those things I think what I would say is I
need the capability, and I need it as soon as possible. I
encourage any particular way that we can execute that, with the
most effectiveness for the delivery of the system, at the most
efficient cost to the taxpayer.
Senator Warren. I appreciate that and that is fair enough.
You know, I think the Department's report makes clear that this
needs to be a priority. If we do not have competition in this
sector it is going to be extremely difficult to control costs,
and I am working on legislation to address this right now.
So, Admiral, I hope that you and I can work together on
controlling costs as we go forward. As you may know, your
command submitted the largest wish list of any command, nearly
$1 billion, and these so-called unfunded priorities have become
an extremely pernicious tool to boost what is already runaway
Pentagon spending.
So I am going to be following up with you with more
questions about these lists, but I urge you to be a more
responsible steward of taxpayer dollars than your predecessors
were and to think carefully about your requests for this year.
Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren.
Senator Tuberville, please.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank
you, gentlemen, for being here today and your service.
General, how has the vaccine mandate affected your troops
in your command? Any at all? Any numbers?
General LaCamera. We are sitting at 99 percent vaccinated.
There are some exceptions to policies. I do not control those.
Those go back to the Departments. But it has had no impact to
combat readiness.
Senator Tuberville. Admiral? Any?
Admiral Aquilino. Same, Senator. Again, the services
control it, about the same percentage, maybe a bit higher, but
there has been no impact on mission.
Senator Tuberville. Domestic extremism education courses
are required. Any positive results you have seen out of this,
General?
General LaCamera. Yes. You know, we take on new soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines each week. We have got to integrate
them into the formation, and we have to tell them that any
extremism is not tolerated, and commanders at all levels are
focusing on that. It goes against good order and discipline,
and it makes us less combat ready.
Senator Tuberville. Have you all had to take these courses?
I am just asking.
General LaCamera. I have, yes. I have participated in them,
and I tell you, sitting in there and listening to the different
demographics and age groups, I have learned. It is positive.
Senator Tuberville. Admiral?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, we owe the servicemembers, the
civilian warriors that support us a safe, healthy place where
they can execute their oath that they took for the uniformed
members and for the civilian members, their desire to serve
their nation. We owe them a healthy, safe, comfortable place to
work.
I have taken the same courses. We have actually done some
additional things, and I can tell you I have learned a lot, in
just talking with the servicemembers. You know, they are
willing to tell you some of the things they have experienced,
and to General LaCamera's point, there is zero tolerance for
any discrimination, sexual harassment, and we are learning a
bunch.
Senator Tuberville. That is the reason I am asking these
questions. I am for that, and do we need to make it better? I
come from the education field. Is there ways we can make it
better? Do we need to talk to more people, more commanders,
more officers, enlisted? How can we make it better?
General LaCamera. I think we are a learning organization
and I think we are learning from the junior servicemembers as
they give us their experiences and as we see the different
generational gaps. So, any help that we can get from the
outside, but internally, you know, after-action reports and
sharing lessons learned has made us the military that we are
today.
Senator Tuberville. Good. We have all got to be on the same
team, as dangerous as this world is.
One area I believe we excelled in with this Ukraine
conflict is the information right. We successfully countered
Russian and Chinese disinformation. This is a fight that both
of you in your AOR is going to be important.
What tools do you all need? Do you need any more tools to
get out the messaging effectively, you know, because it will
ramp up as years and days go by? General?
General LaCamera. We have to be able to compete in the
information space. It is easier to put a bullet in someone's
head than it is to put an idea in their head, and we never send
just one bullet or just one bomb. It is constant. We have got
to be prepared to compete in the information space. We have got
to be prepared to make mistakes and react to it. We are not
going to get it perfect, but I think, again, watching Ukraine,
we are watching a country who is able, you know, a leader who
is able to shut off the information to his own people. We have
got to figure out ways to penetrate that and get that message
out.
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. You know, the changing
information space, as you articulated, is really challenging.
Disinformation, misinformation, propaganda. In the Indo-Pacific
command we have initiated Joint Task Force Indo-Pacific (JTF-
IP) in Singapore, and with our partners in Singapore we have
put together an information capability that can lead to the
potential identification of violent extremists. That is done
with, right now, nine countries.
So we are learning how to do this better. I do not think I
have any specific tools right now, but in my 1242 report you
are going to see requests to ensure we can fund those things
that we have today. To General LaCamera's point, as we learn
how to go forward I am certainly happy to share thoughts with
you.
Senator Tuberville. One other question, Admiral. In this
year's National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), we got in an
Aegis system for Guam. We just need to find a way to fund it.
Your thoughts? Is it still a priority?
Admiral Aquilino. Absolutely, sir. It is still my number
one priority.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville.
Senator Shaheen, please.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning.
Thank you both for your testimony this morning.
South Korea has a new president. I guess my question is to
you, General LaCamera, because he has, during his campaign,
appeared to take a more hardline approach with respect to both
North Korea and China. Can you talk about how you see his new
administration continuing to work with the United States and
whether you expect any changes there?
General LaCamera. Thanks, Senator. Working with the country
team, you know, we will reach out to his transition team, and I
look forward to taking what he talked about in his campaign and
continuing to move forward when it comes to protecting South
Korea and maintaining regional stability. It seems very
promising, everything that we have seen on the conservative
side, in his approach and focus on defense, and now we will
have to see what it looks like in execution.
Senator Shaheen. So I do not know if you want to add
anything to that, Admiral, but do we expect him to continue to
collaborate with us in regional alliances, in the Quad, in
looking at things like AUKUS that we are continuing to try and
partner with Asian countries on?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. You know, the alliance
with the South Koreans, it is clearly the linchpin to the broad
set of alliances that go to the region. Really, really
important, no matter who is elected. I see at the mil-to-mil
level, alongside my battle buddy, General LaCamera, they are a
clear, solid, treaty alliance partner. We operate together
every day on the peninsula. So again, I think we will continue
to work together, and I do not expect any changes.
Senator Shaheen. Well, and President-Elect Yoon is new to
politics ,I understand, and has made a number of statements in
his campaign about North Korea and about his interest in seeing
North Korea behave differently. Do we have any concerns about
that? Do we expect to work with him on how South Korea and
North Korea continue to interact, if at all?
General LaCamera. Yes, Senator. To me the alliance, I mean,
it is an intangible relationship here that we have to continue
to work with the Republic of Korea going forward to allow the
diplomatic process to work with the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK) and as the trajectory of peace on the
peninsula. So we expect to work with him. We worked well with
the Moon administration, and I expect that we will continue to
work well with the incoming administration. We do respect the
sovereignty of the Republic of Korea.
Senator Shaheen. Of course. I appreciate that, and I
appreciate the partnership that we have shared with them in the
Indo-Pacific.
Admiral, the Women, Peace, and Security Act requires the
United States Government, for the first time, to strengthen the
participation of women in conflict prevention and peace
negotiations, and I know that INDOPACOM is actually taking a
leadership role in implementing this law, initiating trainings
around gender insecurity. Can you talk about why you see that
as important and how you are seeing that get implemented in
ways that you think will be helpful to us in the future?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. I think I would start at
the foundational level, right. This is about talent, and 50
percent in the United States are our ladies, and there is
talent everywhere. So our role in ensuring that the rest of our
partners understand it, can benefit from it, these are like-
minded nations with like-minded values. So we work hard to
transmit that.
At the most recent Chiefs of Defense Conference that we had
there were 18 representatives from the region, and one of the
specific topics that we discussed was how are we going to more
diversify, specifically as it applies to women, peace, and
security. The Vice Minister of Japan came and gave a
presentation, and she is an amazing lady. It was really notable
to the rest of the participants.
But bottom line is we all agreed, as one of the three
takeaways, is we were going to work towards increased diversity
with our female population through the lens of military
service.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I am really pleased to hear
that. Thank you very much. I look forward to further updates as
you continue to implement the program.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Sullivan, please.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen,
thank you for your service, exceptional service in my view, and
the service of your families.
By the way, you do not have to comment on it. I am going to
take exception to Senator Warren's view of unfunded mandates as
some kind of wish list. I actually read them, I am not actually
sure she has, and I believe they are actually needed
priorities.
Admiral, you have been talking about integrated deterrence,
the economic impacts of the free world coming together on
Ukraine with the sanctions, all instruments of national power.
I think one of the lessons from Ukraine and the brutal invasion
by the dictator, Vladimir Putin, is that comprehensive economic
and financial sanctions have the best chance of deterring
conflict when they are clearly articulated and ready to go,
before the conflict begins. I recently introduced legislation,
Congressman Gallagher in the House introduced companion
legislation that would mandate comprehensive and devastating
economic and financial sanctions against the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP), key sectors of China's economy, and leaders of the
CCP in the event it initiates a military invasion of the island
democracy of Taiwan.
I was in Europe recently, discussing this with many of our
allies and encouraging them to consider similar actions. What
is your thought on legislation like that, particularly as it
relates to all instruments of American power and the deterrent
effect beyond just what you control, which is the military
instrument?
Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, Senator. I will have to go
into detail and take a look at the legislation. I have not read
it to date. I guess I think what I would say it as long as it
is in compliance with the Taiwan Relations Act as a portion of
all forms of national power I would be supportive.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Let me ask, just following up
on that, the Chinese Communist Party has already crushed Hong
Kong, once a bastion of liberty. Unfortunately, I think the
free world barely raised its voice. I believe a violent,
successful takeover of Taiwan by the CCP would be sea change in
how the world is ordered, not just the Western Pacific but the
world. I think it could change the history of the 21st century
in the ways of the ``Guns of August'' of 1914 changed the 20th
century.
What is your analysis of that, especially as it relates to
the trust our treaty allied partners have in the region?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, I think most of the nations in
the region have the same view. The change in the international
world order is at risk. There are economic impacts. Two-thirds
of the global flow of trade flows through that region in the
maritime domain. There is expansive second-, third-order
effects that would be concerning.
Senator Sullivan. You know, you mentioned Philippines,
Guam, Australia. Can you talk a little bit about Alaska in
terms of the fight, in terms of if you need to be ready, our
proximity, which as you know is quite close to Korea, Japan,
Taiwan, our military forces, which you have operational control
over, over 100 fifth-gen fighters, all kinds of other things,
and related to that, are we becoming too militarily
concentrated with our military assets on Guam?
Admiral Aquilino. I do not think we are becoming too
consolidated or too focused on Guam. It is a strategic
location, certainly as Alaska is a strategic location. Senator,
all of those forces that are positioned there would certainly
be needed and expected to join any response options.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask my final question for both the
general and admiral. I believe the Ukrainian invasion has made
it clear that we are in a new era of authoritarian aggression,
led by two dictators, Putin and Xi Jinping. They are driven by
historical grievances. They are often increasingly isolated,
which makes them dangerous. They are very paranoid about their
democratic neighbors because they cannot bring democracy and
freedom to their own people. As you both know, the CCP often
looks at--as a matter of fact, both of them look at historical
grievances as a way to justify current and future claims of
aggression. That is happening in Ukraine right now. But as you
have already mentioned, the nine-dash line, South China Sea,
Taiwan.
In the 13th century, the Yuan Dynasty of China invaded and
occupied Korea for several decades. To both gentlemen, has the
CCP ever mentioned this as a possible pretext for aggressive or
future actions against the Korean Peninsula? They seem to do it
a lot in other areas of Asia, and this is one area that they
have previously occupied.
General, why don't we start with you.
General LaCamera. Thanks, Senator. Again, I think history
is instructive, not a blueprint, but I think the answer really
lies in the head of Xi Jinping.
Senator Sullivan. But have you ever heard that?
General LaCamera. I have not.
Senator Sullivan. The nine-dash line, in my view, is
ridiculous, but they still brought that out as a map and say,
``Here, this is history. Now we are going to make sure
everybody abides by it.'' They did occupy and invade Korea.
Have you ever heard that from them?
General LaCamera. I have not.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. Admiral, how about you? Because,
they are looking at many other areas, and again, a lot of
times, based on historical grievances. Any thoughts?
Admiral Aquilino. I have not seen that yet, Senator. Again,
a lot of focus, obviously, on the reintegration of Taiwan and
the extensive claim through all areas inside the nine-dash
line. I have not seen or heard of them beginning to lay the
groundwork for a Korea issue.
Senator Sullivan. I think it is something we need to keep
an eye on. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
Senator Kelly, please.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral and
General, I have a question for each of you. First, Admiral, it
is about building partner capacity. Security cooperation
programs are an important tool for us to achieve our national
security objectives. It strengthens our regional security
efforts. It assists in combatting shared threats and provides
valuable intelligence to deter potential aggression.
The 2018 National Defense Strategy sought to shift the
prioritization of security cooperation activities away from
counterterrorism and towards great power competition with
Russia and China. Additionally, the fiscal year 2021 defense
bill established the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, in part to
prioritize security cooperation activities in the Indo-Pacific.
So, Admiral, how is INDOPACOM utilizing security
cooperation partnerships to counter Chinese incursions into the
South China Sea and deter potential aggression against Taiwan?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. First of all, when we
continue to work with our allies and partners that by itself is
a huge deterrent value. So that continued exercising operations
that is enabled through the security cooperation funding is
really important.
Second, it helps, in some cases, to deliver some posture
options. So there is an economic benefit and a counter to the
one-belt, one-road as we work with our allies and partners, and
then certainly to build their capacity in the forms of articles
that we can either sell or give, certainly enhances
interoperability and allows us to be able to quickly come
together and operate together. So there are multiple benefits.
Senator Kelly. You mentioned the funding. Are you resourced
adequately?
Admiral Aquilino. We will see when the 2023 budget comes
out, and I have articulated and will highlight my requirement.
Senator Kelly. All right. Thank you.
General, the U.S. Military has not conducted its annual
large-scale exercises, Foal Eagle and Key Resolve with South
Korea since 2018. I myself, I participated, you know, a long
time ago, in Team Spirit, at least a couple of times, and
believe that it is critical that we maintain a deterrent, and
part of a deterrent is to convince the North Korean through
these exercises that despite their larger force, our ability to
operate jointly with our partners is a significant force
multiplier.
You know, North Korea must know that the United States and
South Korean militaries are prepared to operate jointly and
effectively to repel a North Korean attack, and as we look at
the situation unfolding in Ukraine, it is concerning to think
that the cancellation of these exercises could be
misinterpreted to signal a waning commitment.
Do you believe large-scale exercises contribute to
deterring potential North Korea aggression?
General LaCamera. Senator, thank you. I do. You know, in
the information space trying to get us to cancel those
exercises and potentially reduce our readiness works in his
favor, and he does not have to expend any energy.
But while we have not done the field training exercise that
you referred to--Foal Eagle, Team Spirit--we have, last year we
did do our command post exercise in the spring and the fall,
and we are scheduled to do it coming up here. We are also
training at all levels in the field with our ROK allies.
Senator Kelly. When do you expect to be back to doing a
large-scale exercise?
General LaCamera. That will be determined as the new
administration comes in, and working with the Minister of
Defense going forward.
Senator Kelly. Could you just kind of describe the
difference in readiness between pre-2018, in the remaining
time--I only have about 30 seconds--compared to what it is
today, if you can kind of quantify that in a way?
General LaCamera. All the reports are that we are able to
achieve readiness, the same readiness levels. Again, the gold
standard for me at the tactical level are the live fires, and
then force-on-force, we are able to get the Koreans off the
peninsula to our combat training centers and to do that
training there. As a commander, obviously more is better. But
it is hard for me to speak before my time.
Senator Kelly. But your preference is to do the large-scale
exercises on the Korean Peninsula.
General LaCamera. Yes. My preference is to do as much
training as possible at all echelons.
Senator Kelly. All right. Thank you, General.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly.
Senator Hawley, please.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for
being here. Admiral, it is good to see you again. Thanks for
your time a couple of days ago.
I want to start with something that the NDAA from last year
says, section 1247 in particular. It says that it is the policy
of the United States to maintain the capacity of the United
States to resist a fait accompli that would jeopardize the
security of the people on Taiwan, and the NDAA also defined
that term, ``fait accompli,'' to mean the resort to force by
the People's Republic of China to invade and seize control of
Taiwan before the United States can respond effectively.
Tell us why it is important for the United States to be
able to respond quickly in order to prevent a fait accompli.
Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, Senator. Certainly where our
forces are positioned, again, a number forward but much in
reserve on the west coast of the United States. Credible combat
power placed forward has an extremely valuable deterrent value.
A, it can respond with speed; B, it is operating in the area
and can rehearse, and ultimately there is no better training
than operating in the space you would fight in.
Senator Hawley. I just want to underline what you said
there about the necessity for our forces to be postured
forward, combat-credible forces postured forward. That is what
will enable us to respond quickly. Have I got that right, if I
understood your testimony correctly?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Let me ask you this. We recently
heard from a RAND analyst, Dave Ochmanek, who has written that
Taiwan, in his view, ought to prioritize asymmetric defenses
like the following. Here is a non-exhaustive list: smart mines,
anti-ship missiles that are deliverable from mobile launchers,
mobile short-range air defense missile systems and distributed
reconnaissance and communications systems.
In your view, why are asymmetric defenses and capabilities
so important for Taiwan to be able to deter Chinese aggression?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. Again, a defense in-
depth mindset and model that can deliver--we have heard many
cases the defense of Taiwan being described as a porcupine--
those capabilities allow those effects to be delivered in
multiple places, at multiple times, in multiple ways. So I
concur with the capabilities articulated.
Senator Hawley. Let me ask you this. You said earlier today
that anything that we could do to bolster the defensive
capabilities of Taiwan would be desirable. I think that is so
important. I have introduced my own piece of legislation, the
Arm Taiwan Act, which authorizes $3 billion annually to
accelerate Taiwan's deployment of asymmetric defenses and
conditions that aid on Taiwan increasing defense spending and
undertaking key defense reforms.
Here is a broader question for you. We need Taiwan to
strengthen its asymmetric defenses, in particular, as quickly
as possible, do we not? Can you tell us why that is?
Admiral Aquilino. Well, I think, Senator, one of the
lessons learned as we watch what is going on in Europe is,
number one, aggressive nations can take action. So number one,
action against the island of Taiwan could happen, lesson one.
Lesson two, there needs to be a readiness level as soon as
possible.
Senator Hawley. For that reason, is it fair to say that it
is critical for Taiwan to keep increasing its defense spending
and to continue to implement defense reforms in order to
achieve that sort of porcupine state that you were talking
about earlier?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes.
Senator Hawley. Let us talk a little bit about some of the
physical capabilities that you are going to need in INDOPACOM
in order to deter China, and I am thinking of things like
attack submarines, carrier strike groups, high-end munitions,
air-breathing Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(ISR). The thing about all of these physical capabilities is
that they can only be used in one place at one time. Am I right
about that, is it fair to say?
Admiral Aquilino. I would say in some cases. There are
certain domains that capabilities could be brought to bear very
quickly when I think about space and cyber.
Senator Hawley. Right. Got you. But leaving aside space and
cyber and thinking about just the physical capabilities, these
are sometimes called the high-demand, low-density assets that
if they get used in one theater--let's say EUCOM--then they are
not available in INDOPACOM. So there is a tradeoff. Have I got
that right? I mean, we have got to make choices.
Admiral Aquilino. Again, depending on type. So bombers can
move quickly, and we, in many cases, share those in the same
mission, across multiple combatant commands. But most, at the
speed that they can move, can only serve us one at a time.
Senator Hawley. Fair enough. Where I am going with this is
something you and I have already talked about, which is that
while we have a current crisis in EUCOM, I think as we think
about the ongoing challenges that we face in INDOPACOM, both in
the short end and the long term, I want to make sure that DOD
is not taking capabilities from your theater, that we have
absolutely got to have to continue to deter China through a
strategy of denial, and using them in other theaters, unless,
of course, they are backfilling in some way.
So if you want to comment on that, go ahead.
Admiral Aquilino. If you do not mind, Senator.
Senator Hawley. Please.
Admiral Aquilino. Again, I just want to be very clear that
the Secretary has not removed anything that he has allocated to
me at this point to a different theater.
Senator Hawley. Very good. If I could, just one more
question, Mr. Chairman, and it is about the admiral's upcoming
1242 report. Just give us a sense, Admiral, as we anticipate
that report and without commenting on the specifics yet because
it is not out, but how important will it be for Congress to
fully fund the requirements that you have listed in that report
in order to do your job of deterrence in INDOPACOM?
Admiral Aquilino. Sir, I think what I would say is, the
Committee and the Congress has tasked me to provide those
equirements. I think I would leave the legislation and the
legislating up to this team. What I would do is just thank you
for your focus on the Indo-Pacific command, and I look forward
to being able to deliver you those requirements.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
Senator Duckworth, please.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good
morning, Admiral Aquilino and General LaCamera. I appreciate
your service to our Nation and I want to thank those
servicemembers under your commands for their tireless work in
tackling enormous challenges that we now face in the Indo-
Pacific.
As you know, I have been a vocal voice for combat-credible
logistics, and so we are going to talk about that again today.
I have been consistent and loud in this committee about my
concerns because I know how difficult effective sustainment can
be, and I know that outrunning supply lines can result in a
catastrophic loss of tempo for military forces.
Right now we are watching an object lesson in the
importance and challenge of an effective logistics plan with
Vladimir Putin's disastrous invasion of Ukraine, and that is a
neighboring country, with whom he shares a border. You know,
while Putin's ineffective approach to sustainment generally
tracks with his patterns of arrogance and strategic failure, I
hope that we are thinking critically about how much greater the
sustainment problem will be if we are called to defend our
troops and allies in your area of responsibility, a very far
distance from home.
Admiral Aquilino, where do you see the greatest gaps in
INDOPACOM's ability to conduct logistics in a contested
environment, and how are you planning to fill those gaps, and
what areas of upcoming budget requests are most critical for
your success? Whatever you can share in this unclassified
environment, obviously.
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, thanks, Senator. The posture
initiatives that we have laid out--and again, I look forward to
coming, to briefing you at a classified level on the approach,
the plan, the hubs, the spokes, the different legs of our
logistics plan, I would love to show it to you.
But the posture, the places that we are going to have to
set up, critical. The transfer from one place to another and
then into the region, whether it be sealift, airlift, those are
the second set of capabilities that we are interested in.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Same question to you,
General.
General LaCamera. Thank you, Senator. Sustainment
operations is a focus item for me, and it is the commander's
business, and I made it very clear to my subordinate
commanders. My discussions with Admiral Aquilino is when does
strategic movement become operational maneuver and what combat
power is going to have to be used to secure those lines of
communication will be a discussion that we will have in a
crisis and in conflict.
As we get different capabilities on the peninsula, where
that line is we might be able to provide that capability in
working with the ROK navy, ROK air force, et cetera. That will
all be part of the integration going forward. But I can assure
you that sustainment operations, not just getting to the
peninsula and getting those supplies, but also in the fight in
defending the peninsula is a priority.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Gentlemen, last week I met
with General Van Ovost, Commander of the United States
Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), who was visiting from
Scott Air Force Base in Illinois, and she assured me that our
strategic logistic requirements will play a larger role in the
upcoming National Defense Strategy (NDS), and I look forward to
seeing the details when that NDS is released. But I will be
closely watching to see how the Department implements and
resources that strategy going forward.
Admiral Aquilino, I know you have been working closely with
U.S. Transportation Command, which I think is important given
the unique challenges the tyranny of distance poses to TRANSCOM
in your area of responsibility. One particularly concerning
mission I have discussed with TRANSCOM was patient transport,
wounded warriors. It is clear that in a contested environment
in INDOPACOM we will not be able to evacuate patients from
theater as quickly as we were able to in Iraq and Afghanistan.
There are more challenges, and there might need to be a dwell
time of maybe 5 hours, 6 hours, or 12 to 24 hours, before we
can transfer them to the next mode of transport.
In the event of a conflict in INDOPACOM, we will need to
think outside the box established over the last 20 years in
order to effectively care for our wounded. This is an area that
I am ready and willing to support.
Admiral, would you commit to sharing any analysis your
command is conducting on medical mobility with me and this
committee once it is completed, and will you commit to working
directly with my staff on ways we can partner with you to
tackle this potential problem?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, absolutely. So we have been
working through a set of Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) on
what does it look like, and as you articulated, in a really
complex theater, most of it water. We have said again, through
this lens of hubs, spokes, transition stations, so I would be
glad to show you how we are thinking about. But your point is
really valid. This theater and this operation, we will not be
able to meet the golden hour.
Senator Duckworth. Yes. One final question. I would like to
move onto strengthening our partnerships in the region. Senator
Blumenthal did talk about AUKUS and how bold the Australians
are. You know, they are all in. They put all their chips in
with us. As you and I discussed last year, I think we need to
match their bold commitment to the partnership if we are going
to make it successful, especially when it comes to submarines.
Admiral, how can you support implementation of the AUKUS
deal in your operations and planning for the region, and from
your perspective how can Congress support this partnership and
be equally as bold, especially when it comes to components of
the deal such as they are building the capacity to build their
own submarines?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. I think step one is to
let this report run out, right. So they have some decisions to
make which are significant decisions as we work through the
submarine portion. Once they identify a couple of key ways
forward--you heard the other day they decided they are going to
have to have a base on the east coast--I think now we can kind
of step in, partner with them, and work towards some of these
posture initiatives. We will work toward nuclear power school.
We can partner with riders on submarines. There are a bunch of
things we can do, but they really have to make some choices
first, and I am confident they are looking to go as fast as
possible as well.
Senator Duckworth. I am out of time, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Duckworth.
Senator Scott, please.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman. First I want to thank
each of you and everybody in your command for your service.
Admiral, given your unique position in the Indo-Pacific
command you have observed the Communist Chinese regime. Is it
your personal opinion that General Secretary Xi will take over
Taiwan by force if he sees the opportunity?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, I do not think I would try to
predict. I think what I would I tell you is the mission I have
been given is, number one, to prevent this conflict, number
two, if deterrence fails to be able to fight and win, which
leads me to a place that says I need to be ready should he make
that choice.
Senator Scott. Thank you. Admiral, in your personal
opinion, do you believe that this Administration has given
proper attention to the possibility of Communist China invading
Taiwan?
Admiral Aquilino. I think as stated by the Secretary and
the Administration, the priority theater, most consequential
theater for the future of the United States is the Indo-Pacific
theater, and the most concerning strategic competitor is the
PRC. So I think that articulation and that priority has been
well stated, Senator.
Senator Scott. Admiral, has the Pacific Defense Initiative
been properly funded, and does it provide the right counter to
Communist China and its threats in the region?
Admiral Aquilino. I thank the committee for support to the
Indo-Pacific, and as articulated in the law, Senator, I will
continue to provide the requirements as identified and tasked
by the NDAA to identify my critical requirements. Again, I
thank the committee as we work through the legislation process.
As you know, I submitted my unfunded list. It was based on that
report, and I will continue to do so.
Senator Scott. Thank you. Admiral, as we discussed the last
time you were before us, I have introduced legislation that
calls for the building up of Taiwan's defenses as well as
preparations in the United States that will allow us to aid
Taiwan if Communist China attacks or tries to change its
government using military coercion. My bill also calls for a
more transparent, realistic, and necessary policy change. We
must announce clearly that our position toward aiding Taiwan is
not ambiguous. Communist China should know that we will come to
Taiwan's defense, and since we last spoke even the Japanese
Government made clear that it would not tolerate a Chinese
military move against Taiwan.
So here is my first question. Do you believe that
preventing Communist China from controlling Taiwan is a
strategic necessity for the United States?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, I completely support the One-
China policy, operate in accordance with the Taiwan Relations
Act, three communiques, six assurances, and I think that is
going to be a policy decision. I think there are certainly
implications, but I standing by to support the requirements and
tasks as identified by the National Security Council.
Senator Scott. After the Administration's botched
withdrawal from Afghanistan and the failure to be able to deter
Putin from invading Ukraine, do you believe that this has
emboldened Xi to try to take Taiwan by force?
Admiral Aquilino. I think we are still trying to learn what
President Xi Jinping has learned from this event, and we
continue to watch to try to identify, has he learned the
correct lessons as it applies to the changing world order and
the concern that we see in the Ukraine.
Senator Scott. Thank you. General, with the election
yesterday in Korea, and even before that, have you seen any
change in South Korea's attitude toward Communist China and
concern about the risk of Beijing's aggressive actions?
General LaCamera. Thanks, Senator. There is a relationship
that they have, a diplomatic and economic relationship, and a
cultural relationship that they have with China. I have not
seen any major changes in that relationship. The current
administration has been on a working-towards-peace declaration
as its priority.
Senator Scott. So as we have watched China's aggressive
actions, do you think the general public in Korea is taking
note, and now as they watched Putin invade Ukraine, has that
had any impact on the attitude in South Korea to want to
bolster their defense and support what we are doing to help
defend them?
General LaCamera. It is hard for me to ascertain. I have
been stateside since the invasion began, so I, just
anecdotally, am getting reports on kind of the reaction. The
political reaction is that President Moon has taken action
against the Russians from a sanctions perspective, and it is
costing them economically.
Senator Scott. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott.
Senator Rosen, please.
Senator Rosen. Well thank you, Chairman Reed, for holding
this hearing. Thank you so much to our witnesses here today for
your service to our Nation and really your expertise in these
important areas.
I would like to focus today on cyber, artificial
intelligence, and the importance of maintaining our
technological edge in general, particularly as it relates to
this region. So I want to talk about, first, cyber threats,
because some of the most devastating cyberattacks that have
targeted the United States, well they have originated from
China and North Korea. Just this week a cybersecurity firm
reported that a Chinese state-sponsored hacking group
successfully compromised the networks of at least six United
States State Governments since May of 2021.
So, Admiral Aquilino, what are you doing, what are we doing
to defend against Chinese state-sponsored cyber threats and
what more should or could we be doing to deter these malicious
activities?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. So you have highlighted
certainly a concern that we worry about, not only in our own
networks but in our ally and partner networks. Whether they be
state actors or non-state actors, the potential impact is
significant. In close coordination with my partner, General
Nakasone, who has that responsibility to defend the defense
global information grid, and to work with our allies and
partners, we are linked very closely. He works in lanes both in
the defensive lane and has the ability to work in the offensive
lane as well.
So that partnership is consistent. We have both identified
the critical requirements on both sides, and he continues to
support us.
Senator Rosen. It is important that we work with our
partner countries in a collective, collaborative manner.
General LaCamera, what are the United States forces in Korea
doing to deter and mitigate North Korean cyber threats?
General LaCamera. Thank you, Senator. Again, our concern is
making sure that our networks are protected and making sure
that our alliance networks are protected from those
cyberattacks. We do practice it on a regular basis, and in an
exercise coming up that will be part of the exercise, to make
sure we are protecting it.
Senator Rosen. How quickly do you feel you can respond when
you have that exercise? How quickly do you receive your reports
on those, gentlemen, after your exercises, that you can respond
to the vulnerabilities that you might find?
General LaCamera. I think we can respond fairly quickly.
You know, we know that that is going to be part of their attack
plan, and that protecting our networks and reacting to those
and making sure that we have the redundancy in our plans. The
real question is, we rely heavily on digital, but at what level
can we quickly switch to analog so that we are not vulnerable
from that piece there?
Senator Rosen. You share those with your partner services
so that they can be aware of any vulnerabilities as soon as you
find them?
General LaCamera. Yes, Senator.
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, so General Nakasone is really
good. I will tell you, if it is detected, it is a critical
information requirement for me. I will know within minutes, as
well as all the components.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that. Components, I
have a whole nother discussion on software bill of materials.
We can talk about components another day.
But again, Admiral, as we discussed when you testified
before the committee last year, China is accelerating its
military modernization through its cutting-edge technology, and
they want to close the technological gap with the United States
as quickly as possible. They are making investments in
artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, cyber, hypersonics.
They are procuring commercial technologies we know that can be
adopted for military purposes.
So I want to follow up on my question from your
confirmation hearing last year. Do you believe today that China
has achieved technological parity with the United States in any
of its operational systems, and are there any that you feel
that they are out outpacing us? What should we be investing in
with you to give you the tools to not let that happen?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks again, Senator. So let me start
with intent. The intent of the PRC is to take advantage in
every one of those. We continue to be the greatest military on
the planet, and we need to keep and continue to keep those
advantages. So number one, for protection, whether they be
defense or defense-critical contractors or other sources, we
have to protect those critical communities that you articulated
in order to maintain those advantages.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I see that my time is up. I hope
that we will have a hearing talking about the lessons learned
from the war in Ukraine. As we begin to find out more about any
particular cyber or technological activity we can prepare for
our future adversaries.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
Senator Manchin, please.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, sir,
for your service, and thank you for being here.
Admiral Aquilino, recently this committee had a very
sobering briefing from the Department. In this briefing it was
mentioned that the Marine Corps made the very hard decision to
procure a Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System
anti-ship missile instead of the more traditional equipment,
but Congress made a decision to zero that request out in
exchange for two CH-53K helicopters, and part of that is built
in my state. So I mentioned this example because it is one of
many. I believe the majority of my colleagues agree with me. In
order to compete against China we ought to do the best thing we
can do, not what is politically popular. Let us put it that
way.
With that in mind, what domain of warfare do you believe
the United States still maintains an asymmetrical advantage in
against China, and what weapons systems or equipment do you
believe we should procure to widen that advantage?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. So I will start by
saying that we do have the world's greatest military in all
domains, foundational. There are certainly capabilities that we
want to go ahead and pursue, and I commend the commandant on
making some of those tough choices, right. So land-based, anti-
ship fires is a critical component of the strategy and the
approach, but it will take the entire joint force. So that is
one example. There are some hypersonic capabilities that we
certainly want to continue to pursue and then deliver. We want
to be able to continue to work unmanned capabilities to provide
different alternatives as part of the contribution.
So there are a number of those. Those are just three
examples.
Senator Manchin. General LaCamera, you mentioned in your
opening statement your work towards achieving the bilateral
conditions-based operational control (OPCON) transition plan
between the United States and the Republic of Korea. When fully
implemented, the Republic of Korea will assume direct
operational control over their military in the event of war
with North Korea.
So my question would be, can you explain to the committee
if this transition plan is successfully executed, how will the
immediate nature of our presence on the Korean Peninsula
change?
General LaCamera. Thank you, Senator. As we go through this
bilaterally agreed-upon conditions-based OPCON transition, we
are in the process of working through what are the bridging
capabilities and what are the enduring capabilities. So when
the chalk line is finally snapped it is hard for me to predict
right now, based on the capabilities that the Korean military
has and what the requirements are.
We are also in the process of rewriting our operational
plan.
Senator Manchin. Being the United States Forces Korea
Commander, how would you lead your force in the event of a war
on the Korean Peninsula following the plan's execution?
General LaCamera. How would I lead the forces? It would be
part of the Combined Forces Commander. So I would become the
Deputy Commander of Combined Forces Command, and my deputy
would become the Combined Forces Commander. I would work
underneath him. I would still retain the title of United States
Forces Korea and UNC Commander. Then it is still a binational
decision-making process between both national command
authorities.
Senator Manchin. Admiral, the Marine Corps has taken
significant risk in recent years to reorient the service
towards our pacing threat, China. Among the many initiatives
the Marine Corps is pursuing is orienting the Marine Corps
towards developing the doctrine for Expeditionary Advanced-Base
Operations. What are you doing as the INDOPACOM Commander to
support the Navy and Marine Corps refined and further
operational to this concept?
Admiral Aquilino. I think what I would say, Senator, is
making them prove it to me, right? So it is a concept for a
number of years now, and we are working to rehearse it and
practice it.
Senator Manchin. What challenges do you see with that?
Admiral Aquilino. We see certain challenges in capability
delivery, transportation, placement, and posture, in some
cases.
Senator Manchin. Can I ask you both one final question.
Knowing what you know and the insight that you have on where we
are in the Ukrainian-Russian war--the Putin war. I am not even
going to ingratiate them by calling it the Russian war. It is
the Putin war. The escalation, your concerns about escalating
this war, escalating into bringing us into conflict, chances of
them breaching over into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) allies?
Maybe General LaCamera. The Marines are first to go, so
tell me if you are ready or not.
General LaCamera. Thank you for compliment. I am sure the
commandant would appreciate that I am in the Marine Corps now
sir. [Laughter.] I am watching the impact that it will have on
the Korean Peninsula, and the regional stability is my main
concern. I do not have the insights of what is really going on.
Senator Manchin. Admiral, your thoughts?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, you know, it is part of the
commander's business to assess three things in everything we
do, no matter what theater or where we are. Number one is risk
to force. Are we putting U.S. servicemembers, families, or
supporting people in harm's way? So risk to force, to make sure
I can send everybody back with Mom, Dad, and the kids after the
mission is complete. Number two is risk to the mission itself.
Am I going to achieve what I am trying to do and generate the
effect that I am trying to generate? Then number three, risk to
escalation. We assess it in every single event, every single
operation, and I know my counterparts in EUCOM are doing the
same thing.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
Senator Peters, please.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, from your testimony today and for your service to
our country.
Admiral Aquilino, there has been significant discussion
regarding how our partners in South Asia, particularly India,
have responded to the crisis in Ukraine, and I am concerned
that we may be missing the forest from the trees here, and I
believe that as a country we need to balance some legitimate
Indian concerns with our desire to work closely with them at
the same time, as well as other Quad partners to maintain a
free and open Indo-Pacific.
So my question for you, Admiral, is can you speak to the
relationship you have with our Indian counterparts, and what
more can we do to strengthen our security relationship between
our two countries?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, to start I have no concerns. Our
partners in India are tremendous partners and the mil-to-mil
relationship is probably at its highest point. We continue to
do more together.
Forgive me for a second but I will recognize my partner,
General Rawat, and his wife, who just recently passed in an
unforeseen helicopter incident.
But when you talk about tremendous partnership, it is
there. What more can we do? Continue the information sharing,
continue to support them with the equipment they need up on the
line of actual control, and continue to partner and operate
together throughout the region.
The Malabar exercise with Japan, Australia, the United
States, and India is critical. Increased minilateral and
multilateral engagements with the Indians, and ultimately
continue to sell them equipment so we can be more interoperable
and more effective together in the military sphere.
Senator Peters. Admiral, I would also like to get a greater
sense of what the competition for influence looks like on the
ground in Oceania, using Papua, New Guinea, as an example. In
your posture statement you mentioned that the People's Republic
of China is, ``moving to increase its defense attache footprint
in Papua, New Guinea''. This is happening at the same time as
the U.S. is strengthening our military ties there, including
the 2020 National Guard State Partnership Program expansion.
So my question for you is, how have the people and defense
forces in Papua, New Guinea, responded to our efforts there,
and what more can we do to strengthen our relationship with
some of the smaller nations that are in your AOR?
Admiral Aquilino. Well, the State Partnership Program is
critically implementation, Senator. I have 14 relationships
between the National Guard and the nations in the region. That
is one aspect. As you know, we are also plussing up our
diplomatic capabilities there. In 2019, we put a defense
attache, and in 2021, we just added a security cooperation
officer. So small investments for big payback, to be boots on
the ground and to be able to engage with those critical
partners.
Senator Peters. Just continuing with that concept, and I
appreciate your support for it, your posture statement also
discussed how the People's Republic of China entered into a
security agreement with the Solomon Islands Police Force. Last
month, the State Department confirmed plans to open an embassy
in the Solomon Islands to increase our influence before China
gets more strongly embedded there.
So my question to you is, do you support State Partnership
Program expansion to countries like the Solomon Islands, and if
you do, what conditions must be met before these partnerships
can begin, in your opinion?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. Again, I certainly do
support the expansion, if it is funded, and we can sustain it
in a way that is open, transparent, and in accordance with our
values, which is the critical linkage between these countries
and ours. This generates the people-to-people ties that bring
us closer together. As a matter of fact, I am meeting with
General Hokanson tomorrow to have this exact discussion on
where else might he be able to start putting some support.
Senator Peters. Very good. Well thank you. Thank you for
your response. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters, and gentlemen,
thank you for your testimony today, but more importantly, for
your life-long service and dedication to the Nation and that of
your families. Please, as I suggested initially, pass on our
thanks and gratitude to the men and women in your command and
their families for their dedication and selfless service to the
nation. I think we all feel that both the INDOPACOM and Korea
are in good hands.
With that I will adjourn the hearing. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:28 a.m., Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
kc-46s
1. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Aquilino, New Hampshire is home to the
Pease Air National Guard Base where we are especially proud of our KC-
46s. Last month, the KC-46s participated in the Cope North exercise in
United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) that tested, among other
things, the ability of the KC-46 to operate out of austere airfields.
What was your assessment of the performance of the KC-46 during the
exercise?
Admiral Aquilino. During Cope North the KC-46 met all expectations.
Having the KC-46 training with assets in the Indo-Pacific increases our
readiness and prepares our aircrews to fly, fight, and win. We need
more air refueling capabilities present in the Indo-Pacific at all
times, not just during exercises like Cope North. Persistent forward
presence puts the Joint Force in position to compete and rapidly
transition to respond to crisis.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
united states indo-pacific command force posture
2. Senator Hirono. Admiral Aquilino, as we prepare to keep pace
with China's ambitions in the region, we must be aware of the inherent
risks to our personnel and facilities within arm's reach of China's
strike capabilities in the event of conflict. It is clear that we need
a resilient, flexible, and distributed force posture to support combat
operations where contested logistics will be the expectation. What are
your top force posture priorities for the region?
Admiral Aquilino. INDOPACOM's posture requirements are outlined in
the Section 1242 Independent Assessment that was delivered to the
Committee upon release of the President's Budget.
3. Senator Hirono. Admiral Aquilino, what will be required for you
to have the force layout and logistics structure you deem necessary for
a potential fight with China in the near term?
Admiral Aquilino. INDOPACOM's posture requirements and logistic and
maintenance capabilities are outlined in the Section 1242 Independent
Assessment that was delivered to the committee upon release of the
President's Budget.
multilateral cooperation
4. Senator Hirono. Admiral Aquilino, over the past year, the Biden
Administration has worked to advance several multilateral initiatives
in the Indo-Pacific, most notably the so-called ``Quad'' and AUKUS
partnerships. Additionally, last fall, two United States aircraft
carriers exercised with carriers from the U.K. and Japan. I understand
that the exercise brought together a total of approximately 15,000
sailors from six different nations. How has China reacted to these
initiatives?
Admiral Aquilino. The PRC framed the multilateral aircraft carrier
exercise as evidence the United States is actively engaging regional
and extra-regional actors to ``contain'' China. The regime
characterized America as mired in a ``Cold War'' mentality, hyping the
so-called ``China threat,'' while failing to acknowledge Beijing's
security interests and long-standing relationships in the Indo-Pacific.
In response to AUKUS, the PRC launched an extensive public
messaging campaign to discredit the accord and to portray the transfer
of nuclear submarine technology to Australia as a threat to regional
stability. They also falsely claimed it posed a significant
proliferation risk under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Notably,
the PRC's strongest media criticism was directed at Australia whereby
it suggested their decision to sign on to AUKUS will have damaging
consequences for Sino-Australian relations and could make Australia a
potential target in the event of a regional military conflict.
5. Senator Hirono. Admiral Aquilino, to what extent are we working
to build interoperability and secure communications with our partners
through these multilateral exercises, and will we see more of them in
the coming year?
Admiral Aquilino. As part of our Theater Campaign Plan, USINDOPACOM
collaborates with our regional partners to identify and synchronize
resourcing, fielding, and integration of allies' and partners' C4
capabilities. This synchronization enables and enhances
interoperability with the U.S. Joint Force both in steady-state
operations and theater exercises. This includes Mission Partner
Environment (MPE), information sharing platforms, tactical data links,
and secure communications, which are integrated into bilateral and
multilateral exercises and described in my 1242 report.
north korean missile threat
6. Senator Hirono. Admiral Aquilino, General LaCamera, this year
alone, we've seen a North Korea increasingly resistant to diplomacy
executing nine rounds of missile tests, including a purported
hypersonic missile and its first launch since 2017 of an intermediate
range missile potentially capable of reaching Guam. How have you
prepared your respective commands for the defense of U.S. bases and
territories against the possibility of hypersonic missiles?
Admiral Aquilino. USINDOPACOM continues to encourage and
participate in DOD efforts led by Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to
address the full spectrum of missile threats, including the continued
development of integrated air and missile defense architectures for
both regional and Homeland defense, as well as the accelerated
development of intercept capability for hypersonic missile defense.
These efforts include:
USINDOPACOM Staff and Components participate and support DOD-wide
working groups to pursue new concepts (kinetic and non-kinetic, C2,
etc.) and technologies to stay ahead of growing offensive threats posed
by ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles. Some examples include:
Improving the defense of Guam via the Guam Defense
System--a persistent 360-degree layered IAMD capability--remains my
number one priority.
Identification of capability requirements in support of
MDA's development of Glide Phase Intercept (GPI) to augment Sea-Based
Terminal against hypersonic threats.
Operational acceptance of a JEON PC-0015 prototype
capability in September 2019, enabling real-time overhead tracking and
reporting of advanced hypersonic threats via C2BMC.
General LaCamera. Missile Defense planners at all levels under my
command continuously assess our active defense capability against all
threats, including hypersonic glide vehicles. We are working closely
with the Missile Defense Agency and our industrial partners to ensure
that our Ballistic Missile Defense systems, specifically Patriot and
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), remain at the cutting edge
to defend against all emerging threats. Because of the rapidly
advancing hypersonic threat from adversaries worldwide, a holistic
approach is needed to maintain our advantage. From a passive defense
perspective, we are working with our Republic of Korea and United
States industry partners to harden aircraft shelters and implement
other survivability initiatives to protect against threats of alltypes.
Additional classified information has been provided.
7. Senator Hirono. Admiral Aquilino, General LaCamera, in your
opinion, what capabilities do we need to invest in to ensure adequate
protection from such threats?
Admiral Aquilino. USINDOPACOM requires the ability to constantly
detect, track, and when required, counter these and other missile
threats. These capabilities are detailed in my independent assessment
to Congress required by Section 1242 of the Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA.
General LaCamera. [Deleted.]
training, exercises, and campaigning
8. Senator Hirono. Admiral Aquilino, with respect to campaigning,
your prepared testimony states, ``A coordinated campaign of all domain
operations, activities, and investments reassures our allies and
partners, builds partner capacity, increases interoperability, and
normalizes our operations throughout the [INDOPACOM area of
responsibility].'' Can you further explain your concept for campaigning
in the Indo-Pacific and whether it requires additional resources beyond
what the military services currently invest in their man, train, and
equip activities?
Admiral Aquilino. USINDOPACOM's approach to campaigning in the
Indo-Pacific aligns with the Department's strategy to prevent conflict
through integrated deterrence. Our approach relies on an integrated
joint force that maintains a strong operational presence west of the
International Date Line (IDL). Combat-credible joint forces operating
more forward, and more persistently in a complementary manner deters
potential adversaries and assures regional security partners.
Successful campaigning requires agile, robust logistics, cooperation
with allies and partners, a vigorous exercise and experimentation
program, and the development of capabilities and technologies that
preserve the U.S. warfighting advantage. Predictable budgets, sustained
investments, reliable supply chains, and a strong U.S. industrial base
are also necessary to effectively implement this approach.
9. Senator Hirono. Admiral Aquilino, in what ways can we build
partnerships to ensure access to ports and facilities maintained by our
allies?
Admiral Aquilino. As Secretary Austin has outlined, integrated
deterrence is a vital aspect of our national defense strategy. We
leverage our face-to-face activities in the region, such as bilateral
or multilateral training and exercises, to build relationships at the
unit level, as well as gain access to key training areas and
facilities. Regular operations in the region, including port visits,
are another means for us to engage with our partners. Furthermore, the
concept of integrated deterrence relies on leveraging the capability
and capacity resident in our partners and allies in the region. An
essential tool to develop capacity with these partners is the
assortment of security cooperation authorities that Congress has
provided to the Combatant Commands. Building Partner Capacity (Title 10
Section 333) and Institutional Capacity Building (Title 10 Section 332)
are two great examples. We will continue to work with OSD-Policy on any
necessary agreements with select partners to pursue assured access.
10. Senator Hirono. Admiral Aquilino, how is INDOPACOM engaging in
experimentation when training with allies to develop innovative
warfighting concepts?
Admiral Aquilino. USINDOPACOM is incorporating experimentation in
major exercises with Australia and Japan to improve combined and joint
interoperability via the Pacific Multi-Domain Training Experimentation
Capability (PMTEC) and Mission Partner Environment (MPE). Through these
efforts with our allies and partners, we can increase training efficacy
and provide for integrated deterrence. USINDOPACOM seeks to expand the
number of allies and partners participating in all our joint and
service exercise programs.
11. Senator Hirono. Admiral Aquilino, what range modernization
efforts and expansion of dual-use facilities do you desire to best
support INDOPACOM's training?
Admiral Aquilino. USINDOPACOM is working through the Pacific Multi-
Domain Training Experimentation Capability (PMTEC) initiative to
upgrade the range facilities across the area of operations to improve
instrumentation, expand model and simulation capabilities, and connect
Joint Live/Virtual/Constructive (JLVC) environments, which will enable
us to train combat credible forces forward in theater. Linking Service
facilities from the West Coast of the United States across the Pacific
to countries such as Japan, Australia, and others will allow
USINDOPACOM to provide joint warfighting readiness west of the
international dateline through an all domain approach to warfighting.
seize the initiative
12. Senator Hirono. Admiral Aquilino, your prepared testimony
states that the INDOPACOM ``Seize the Initiative'' concept ``is the
first step in building enduring advantages that ensure U.S. Forces are
postured in the right place, with the right capabilities to deter our
security challengers in near-, mid-, and long-term competition.'' What
are the major elements of your ``Seize the Initiative'' concept?
Admiral Aquilino. In the near-term ``Seize the Initiative''
requires us to employ our assigned and allocated forces differently,
while also familiarizing the Joint Force with additional locations they
will have to operate from during crisis and conflict. In the medium-
term, we must update and modernize our posture, which facilitates
conducting operations across the breadth and depth of the Indo-Pacific,
and develop an enhanced sustainment and distribution network that will
support those operations and set the theater to enable us to transition
rapidly from competition to crisis and conflict.
partners and allies
13. Senator Hirono. Admiral Aquilino, the White House release a new
Indo-Pacific Strategy just last month. One of the focus areas of that
strategy is on adapted and updated alliances and partnerships inside
and outside the region. I believe that this focus should not only be on
what we can get from these countries but how these relationships can be
mutually beneficial. What is your strategy for modernizing and adapting
the existing relationships you have with our partners and allies in the
region?
Admiral Aquilino. In the efforts to create a combined combat-
credible force, we have invested in combined and joint training and
exercises, and just recently approved our Pacific Multi-Domain Test and
Experimentation Capability (PMTEC) plan in order to reduce the cost of
doing combined live and virtual training from multiple locations in the
Indo-Pacific. In addition, improved high-end training with like-minded
partners like the United Kingdom (Queen Elizabeth Deployment), Japan
(PACIFIC FURY), Australia (Marine Forces Rotation Darwin), and India
(MALABAR) have allowed us to strengthen our bilateral security
relationship and improve our access in certain domains. Sustained
multi-lateral efforts like the QUAD and our support to ASEAN countries
will demonstrate a commitment to the region that reinforces our
deterrence goals and reassures other regional partners.
force posture in korea
14. Senator Hirono. General LaCamera, in your prepared testimony,
you describe the need to work with the Republic of Korea (ROK) to align
our Indo-Pacific Strategy with the ROK Southern Policy concerning China
and Russia, but that we must `` . . . remain focused on the fundamental
purpose of the Alliance which is the security of our Republic of Korea
ally and to deter the DPRK in order to support diplomacy and allow for
a peaceful resolution of tensions, while also remaining postured to
`Fight Tonight' should deterrence fail.'' Given this, what are your
force posture priorities for United States Forces Korea?
General LaCamera. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus King
hypersonic defense
15. Senator King. Admiral Aquilino, what capabilities do you need
to adequately detect and defend your Carrier Strike Groups against a
hypersonic weapon attack?
Admiral Aquilino. Defense in depth is the requirement--with sensors
that ensure we are able to detect a launch, capability in the
electromagnetic spectrum to blind a system subsequent to launch, and
kinetic defensive systems that allow us to destroy or disable the
system. These capabilities must be synchronized and integrated
throughout all domains to defeat hypersonics and other advanced missile
threats.
china commission
16. Senator King. Admiral Aquilino, during your testimony you
stressed the importance of utilizing all instruments of national and
allied power to compete with China. We are also a significant trade
partner while we compete in the military domain. I believe we must
establish an unbiased and non-partisan commission to examine a grand
strategy for our approach to China, similar in intent to President
Eisenhower's Solarium Project. We need to think a truly whole-of-
government approach to create a stable international order in which
China (or Russia) cannot dictate regional developments. What are the
`toughest problems' OUTSIDE of military imbalances?
Admiral Aquilino. My singular focus is on the military challenges,
with the goal of ensuring our forces are postured, partnered, and
equipped with sufficient capability to permit all instruments of our
national power to operate from a position of strength. Rather than
single out any one challenge, I agree with the premise of the question
that the PRC presents a wide range of ``tough problems'' across
diplomatic, informational, and economic domains as they seek to compete
with the United States and disrupt the rules-based international order.
17. Senator King. Admiral Aquilino, General LaCamera, what would be
the greatest benefit this commission could deliver?
Admiral Aquilino. A commission to address regional security in the
Indo-Pacific is welcome, so long as it works with common purpose to
reinforce integrated deterrence both now and in the long-term.
General LaCamera. [Deleted.]
18. Senator King. Admiral Aquilino, General LaCamera, what would
put us in the best position to avoid the United States and China from
escalating conflict and careening into a war with China?
Admiral Aquilino. We need to prevent conflict through the execution
of integrated deterrence. Effective deterrence requires significant
investment to defend the Homeland, protect the joint force, operate in
contested space, provide all domain battlespace awareness with an
integrated fires network, and deliver combat credible forces prepared
to fight and win if necessary.
At the same time, we must continue to strengthen our collaboration
and interoperability with allies and partners, while working to
maintain a constructive, stable, and results-oriented relationship with
the PLA to prevent and manage crises.
General LaCamera. [Deleted.]
united nations convention on the law of the sea
19. Senator King. Admiral Aquilino, General LaCamera, do you
support the ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS)?
Admiral Aquilino. I strongly support U.S. accession to the
Convention. Freedom of the seas is an enduring interest of all nations
and is vital to global peace and prosperity. The international
community has long benefitted from the rules-based maritime order as
reflected in the UN Law of the Sea Convention, which the United States
has long committed to abide by and uphold. Accession enhances our
credibility with allies and partners in the region who are parties,
both as a symbol of our shared interests and by providing us greater
standing in Convention matters and processes.
General LaCamera. [Deleted.]
expeditionary tactical operations center
20. Senator King. Admiral Aquilino, General LaCamera, the shift to
more scalable, lethal, and mobile combat elements such as the Marine
Littoral Regiment and Multidomain Task Force is critical to the
countering the dynamic threats in your Area of Responsibility. The
DOD's recent investments in the University of Maine's composites and
advanced manufacturing initiatives has resulted in improving blast and
ballistic resistant structures and materials. Maine small businesses
are the direct benefactor of the growing talent and innovation in this
sector and are concurrently providing critical capabilities to the
warfighter. The Modular Panelized Shelter System (MPSS) is one system
of note and is currently employed by NORTHCOM in Alaska, EUCOM in
Italy, and AFRICOM headquarters. Could your command and service
component commands benefit from an expeditionary, affordable, all
weather, TS/SCI certified structures such as the MPSS?
Admiral Aquilino. As USINDOPACOM moves to a more distributed
footprint across the Indo-Pacific, the ability to support distributed
locations is a key requirement we seek to achieve. While not familiar
with the MPSS system, the capability it provides is of interest.
General LaCamera. United States forces in Korea do not currently
utilize the MPSS. I will work with DOD to assess if this specific
system could meet operational requirements and enhance United States
warfighting capability in Korea. l, like fellow commanders across the
joint force, am always interested in ensuring maximum protection levels
for our forces as they perform their duties during armistice, crisis,
and war.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
people's republic of china (prc), taiwan decision making calculus
21. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, the global security picture
looks drastically different now than it did two weeks ago. NATO is more
united than ever. The European Union is more united than ever. Both
have taken action in concert with the US to respond to unprovoked
Russian aggression against Ukraine through sanctions and the shipment
of weapons and equipment to Ukraine. The Russian economy is staggering
and the ruble has plummeted in value. How are events in Ukraine causing
Xi Jinping to reevaluate his assumptions about how the world would
respond to aggression against Taiwan?
Admiral Aquilino. I would expect the PRC to increase its messaging
that Taiwan is a domestic issue and to posture now to withstand
possible adverse economic and diplomatic measures, including further
integrating China's economy with others, and communicating its
willingness to employ punitive economic countermeasures. The PRC may
look to build alternate means for engaging in international
transactions. China will be watching the severity and effectiveness of
sanctions, and the durability of those sanctions over time. If the
costs become too high for the global community to bear, the PRC may
ultimately conclude China's economic power shields it from many of the
international sanctions that have been effective against Russia.
Chinese leaders are probably most worried about the international
community strengthening an ideological commitment to defend the self-
determination of democratically-elected governments. A willingness to
stand behind--and suffer if necessary--for democratic ideals threatens
the PRC's strategy of using calibrated incentives to demoralize and
divide.
22. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, do you think the Russian
invasion of Ukraine has changed Taiwan's perspective on its need to
prepare for a PRC invasion?
Admiral Aquilino. I cannot speak on Taiwan's behalf, but I expect
the people of Taiwan see significant parallels with the Russian force
build-up conducted just prior to their invasion of Ukraine. In addition
to the heightened concern they no doubt feel, the people of Taiwan
should be able to learn valuable lessons from Ukraine's tenacious
defense.
ukraine lessons learned
23. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, what lessons should we take
away from the failed deterrence in Europe to ensure deterrence doesn't
fail in the Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Aquilino. Russia's unprovoked attack on Ukraine serves as a
reminder that threats to the sovereignty and security of democratic
nations are real. We must take proactive steps to defend the free and
open international order from those who seek to undermine it. We know
deterrence is most effective when all elements of national power are
synchronized and coordination with our allies and partners is robust.
Further, we must continue to modernize and reform our security
cooperation process to ensure it provides critical capabilities when
and where they are needed and that we and our allies must not take our
alliances for granted.
people's republic of china influence on new zealand
24. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, while writing for the
Financial Times in 2020, Mr. Jamal Anderlini authored a piece titled,
``China is taking its ideological fight abroad,'' in which he wrote,
``[t]iny New Zealand may seem like a strange target for Communist party
infiltration, but the country is attractive to Beijing as the soft
underbelly of the `five eyes' intelligence sharing arrangement.'' He
noted that in New Zealand, ``some of the biggest donors to the main
political parties are China-based businessmen with close ties to the
Communist party,'' and that, ``[a]stonishingly, a man who spent at
least 15 years working for China's military intelligence apparatus
remains an elected member of parliament.'' Does the apparent influence
and infiltration of New Zealand's Government by the PRC give you cause
for concern given their status as a ``five-eyes'' nation?
Admiral Aquilino. None whatsoever. New Zealand is a strong and
reliable partner with sufficient safeguards and oversight of the
intelligence apparatus. We continue to enjoy a strong intelligence
relationship with our Kiwi partners.
25. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, does the apparent influence
and infiltration of New Zealand's Government by the PRC concern you
given New Zealand has a liaison officer at INDOPACOM HQ?
Admiral Aquilino. I have no concerns about our New Zealand LNO, or
with any of our liaison officers. These specially picked, extraordinary
officers provide an invaluable link between my headquarters and their
nations. I trust and rely on them all.
amphibious ships
26. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, can Marine Littoral
Regiments operate as required in INDOPACOM without the Light Amphibious
Warship?
Admiral Aquilino. The Marine Littoral Regiments can operate without
the Light Amphibious Warships. I support the naval ship building plan
to increase light amphibious warships and assign them to the Pacific,
as it will maximize the Littoral Regiments' ability to operate in the
INDOPACOM AOR.
27. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, have you had enough
Amphibious Ready Groups/Marine Expeditionary Units to meet your
requirements at any point since you assumed command of INDOAPCOM?
Admiral Aquilino. Since I have assumed command, the Navy has not
been able to generate enough ARG/MEU presence to meet my GFMAP steady
state requirement. The command has received an average of approximately
40 percent of what was required via the GFM process over the last 2
years.
28. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, as you understand their
capabilities and capacities, are L-class amphibious ships and the Light
Amphibious Warship redundant or complimentary in INDOPACOM?
Admiral Aquilino. The L-class and Light Amphibious Warship (LAW)
are complementary to one another. L-class ships typically operate as
part of a larger scale coordinated Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) or
Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), delivering Marine forces ashore via
air and sea on a large scale relative to the LAW, which is smaller and
able to maneuver in to shallow water ports to deliver combat power
pier-side or directly to the beach.
The LAW is also envisioned as an organic intra-theater connector,
transporting personnel and equipment from strategic hubs to the ``last
tactical mile'' where a larger hulled L-class ship would not be
practical. Therefore, the mission sets and capabilities complement and
build upon each other.
republic of korea and the people's republic of china
29. Senator Sullivan. General LaCamera, over the past several
years, Australia and Japan have more frequently and publicly discussed
their shifting perception of the danger the PRC poses to their national
security and to a free and open Indo-Pacific. When discussing a
potential military conflict over Taiwan this past November, the
Australian Minister for Defense stated, ``[i]t would be inconceivable
that we wouldn't support the US in an action if the US chose to take
that action,'' while last June Japan's Deputy Defense Minister stated,
``[w]e have to protect Taiwan, as a democratic country.'' How would you
characterize the Republic of Korea's perception of China as a
geopolitical threat?
General LaCamera. [Deleted.]
30. Senator Sullivan. General LaCamera, what is your assessment of
Korea's role as a security partner, specifically as it pertains to a
potential PRC-Taiwan conflict?
General LaCamera. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
beijing's military modernization
31. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Aquilino, how can the United States
enhance deterrence of Chinese regional nuclear capabilities?
Admiral Aquilino. Deterrence can be enhanced through a persistent,
lethal, forward conventional force integrated with our allies' regional
missile defense architecture. We have demonstrated capability for
intercept of regional ballistic missile threats via Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense and additional capability with an Aegis-ashore
system.
Ongoing research, investment and development of future Precision
Long Range kinetic effects and fires, combined with dispersed land-
mobile and sea-based conventional strike capabilities will also enhance
deterrence.
In addition, integrated deterrence can be further enhanced through
greater conventional and nuclear force integration. I concur with ADM
Richard's view that China's nuclear trajectory creates a deterrence and
assurance gap. A low-yield, non-ballistic capability to deter and
respond without visible generation would provide a persistent,
survivable, regional capability to deter adversaries, assure Allies,
provide flexible options, and complement existing capabilities. A
capability with these attributes should be re-examined in the near
future.
Finally, the U.S. can enhance deterrence by modernizing and
recapitalizing our nuclear triad.
32. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Aquilino, how does INDOPACOM balance
short and long-term security challenges as China strives towards
nuclear parity?
Admiral Aquilino. The challenge for United States Indo-Pacific
Command will be to ensure that China--should it perceive it has
achieved nuclear parity--does not feel it has escalation advantage in
other domains because it might escape a United States response due to
fears of Chinese nuclear reprisal. This means we must enhance our
capabilities to respond and prevail across all domains, especially
space, cyber, and electronic warfare--and ensure we can synchronize and
integrate our capabilities across all domains to achieve integrated
deterrence. We also need to build our integrated missile defense
capabilities in the region, such as the Guam Defense System, to deny
China the option of a limited nuclear strike designed to force us to
discontinue operations in other warfighting domains. Part of China's
pursuit for nuclear parity is to offset the PRC's own perceived
conventional military deficiencies. As such, we must have the ability
to blunt Chinese nuclear coercion while ensuring the Indo-Pacific
Command has the conventional capabilities to deny the PRC its wartime
aims.
33. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Aquilino, what are INDOPACOM's
current shortfalls in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
capabilities? What percentage of your requirements are being met?
Admiral Aquilino. The vast size and complexity of the Indo-Pacific,
combined with the relentless growth of our major threats, certainly
challenges our ISR posture. INDOPACOM works closely with the
intelligence agencies and with our allies and partners to maximize
every available resource to monitor and understand the operating
environment. Even so, we continue to have unmet requirements that vary
depending on which specific capability we are addressing.
34. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Aquilino, what is the Department of
Defense's (DOD) current position regarding the establishment of a
standing Joint Task Force to focus solely on the China threat?
Admiral Aquilino. 1I'll let the Office of the Secretary of Defense
address the Department's position on a standing Joint Task Force, but
from my standpoint as the USINDOPACOM Commander, I constantly assess
the command relationships and organizations in my theater to ensure
their effectiveness in achieving integrated deterrence against all
threats. I adjust them as conditions and resources change, and our
plans are updated.
military civil fusion (mcf)
35. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Aquilino, what are the on-the-ground
security challenges stemming from Beijing's MCF strategy?
Admiral Aquilino. I understand China's Military Civil Fusion (MCF)
strategy is mainly in the economic sphere--to bring private enterprise
in China under the direct influence of the party-state to support the
PLA's ambitious modernization and innovation goals. The synergies
created by connecting the military and civilian sectors into a singular
system reduce redundancies and misallocation of finite resources to
drive simultaneous economic and military modernization. The elimination
of the barriers that used to keep these systems separate is giving the
defense industrial complex access to talent in the civilian economic
system. As a result, China can be more agile and responsive with
emerging technologies than we are, potentially eroding our traditional
qualitative advantage in key technologies.
The other aspect of MCF is the blending of civilian capabilities
into military or paramilitary operations. Two examples come to mind.
First, the PLA can both better hide an invasion fleet and increase
available lift by supplementing existing naval amphibious vessels with
civilian roll-on/roll-off ferries, something we saw used fairly
extensively during training in 2021. Another challenge is the People's
Armed Forces Maritime Militia, a civilian proxy force that obscures
official involvement. The PRC uses these militia vessels in lieu of
China Coast Guard or PLA Navy ships to advance its excessive maritime
claims and hinder regional nation states' lawful access the global
commons.
36. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Aquilino, how are the Belt and Road
Initiative and MCF strategy intertwined?
Admiral Aquilino. Although the two efforts are separate, they are
mutually supportive in that they represent attempts by the PRC
Government to leverage the growth and development of the PRC economy to
enhance the PRC's ability to project power worldwide. Both strategies
are critically reliant on partner participation globally, for Belt and
Road Initiatives, China needs partners willing to participate, while
MCF requires continued Chinese access to the global S&T ecosystem to
drive Chinese military (and economic) modernization in the near-term
through technology acquisition and joint research and development.
gray-zone tactics
37. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Aquilino, how is INDOPACOM
addressing China's gray-zone tactics?
Admiral Aquilino. INDOPACOM is countering PRC's gray zone tactics
through a comprehensive strategy of integrated deterrence. Integrated
deterrence is a whole-of-government approach combining all forms of
national power, across all domains, with the Joint Force, and
synchronized with our allies and partners, to preserve peace,
stability, and the rules-based international order.
Recent examples of Joint Force synchronization with allies and
partners include an October 2021 exercise involving seven nations
(Canada, the Netherlands, U.K., Japan, New Zealand, Australia, and the
United States) and more than 15,000 sailors and Marines, in a four-
carrier strike group. Another example was combined United States--
Canadian naval transit of the Taiwan Strait.
These kinds of activities--reinforced through diplomatic, economic,
and information efforts--are clear and visible evidence of our
commitment to preserve regional peace and stability.
38. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Aquilino, what vulnerabilities
currently exist for our allies and partners in deterring gray-zone
tactics? What about specifically for Taiwan?
Admiral Aquilino. China uses a variety of military, paramilitary,
economic, and diplomatic assets and tactics in the gray-zone, much of
it designed to overwhelm the capabilities other countries have
available as counters. A good example is the China Coast Guard which
already boasts a number of large, capable ships that easily outgun and
overmatch competitors. However, late last year the PLA began
transferring a number of Type 056 (Jiangdao) corvettes from the PLA
Navy to the Coast Guard. These 1500 ton ex-warships bring size, speed,
and agility to their law enforcement mission. Along with expanded
authorities under China's new Coast Guard law, the Type 056-equipped
CCG has greater capabilities and freedom of action. Rivals have few
options to counter these ships except to employ their navies, a
circumstance the PRC media and government will hype as an
``escalation.''
This situation holds true for Taiwan as well as in the South and
East China Seas. China brings overwhelming capability, combined with
liberal interpretations of international law--or increasingly, Chinese
domestic law applied in international spaces--and aggressive economic,
diplomatic, and informational actions, to relentlessly pressure Taiwan
and others. The PRC's intent is to create a perception that it is
futile to resist inevitable Chinese dominance.
defense technology cooperation
39. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Aquilino, in which priority areas
should the United States increase defense technology cooperation with
Japan? With South Korea?
Admiral Aquilino. The Japan Air Self-Defense Force just announced
the establishment of their first Space Operations Group. Likewise,
South Korea has shown progress in their space capabilities with a
domestic space launch last October. In line with strong national
ambitions for space capabilities, the Republic of Korea Air Force began
operating the Korea Space Operations Center last year and is receiving
assistance from other space faring nations. For both Japan and South
Korea, national security space technology cooperation should be done in
alignment with USSPACECOM priorities and with USINDOPACOM emphasis
being proliferated low-earth orbit capabilities for tactical
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; data transport; and
integrated air and missile defense; as well as multi-orbit alternative
communications and positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT).
With respect to hypersonics, Japan has a need for defense against
hypersonic weapons from the People's Republic of China, Russia, and
emerging North Korea threat systems, and we should cooperate with them
to ensure they are protected against these threats. Japan also has the
technological and industrial base to develop its own hypersonic weapons
and has spoken of the possible need to do so for self-defense. If they
choose to do so, the U.S. should offer to cooperatively develop and
produce such hypersonic weapon capabilities that will contribute to our
integrated deterrence.
For South Korea, a long-standing cooperation priority is in the
area of information technology to improve United States-Korean military
communication interoperability and cyber security. In addition, South
Korea's strong industrial base and desire for defense exports
potentially provides strong opportunities to continue collaboration in
the areas of unmanned systems, autonomous technologies, and advanced
munitions.
40. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Aquilino, how can the DOD encourage
more effective cooperation with regional partners on weapons
procurement, weapons systems, and dual-use technologies such as 5G and
microelectronics?
Admiral Aquilino. DOD security cooperation programs--and partners'
weapons acquisition and capability building efforts--could be enhanced
by more efficient management of technology sharing and reviews of
technology transfer. Addressing these areas in a more timely fashion
for trusted partners would allow faster partner acquisitions and
filling of capability gaps. This would also reinforce existing programs
to stimulate the development of foreign defense industrial
capabilities, particularly in emerging technologies like 5G. Shared
efforts in developing dual-use technologies promise to benefit all
participants. Given the accelerating changes in the operational
environment and technological advancements, we must continue effective
cooperation with regional partners through continuous campaign
experimentation and exercises with coalition partners.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
people's liberation army (pla) exercises
41. Senator Hawley. Admiral Aquilino, you wrote in your testimony,
``PLA forces have long exercised in areas around Taiwan, but the scale
and sophistication of this training has drastically increased.'' How
have the scale and sophistication of Chinese exercises near Taiwan
``drastically increased''?
Admiral Aquilino. The past couple years have given us a number of
examples of increasing scale and sophistication. During summer training
we witnessed multiple iterations of integrated training, with two or
more services training together in exercises involving thousands of
personnel and hundreds of vehicles and aircraft. We saw much greater
incorporation of civilian assets in 2021, including several large
commercial ferries to transport or land troops. We also saw more use of
logistics and other support assets in exercises. Since 2020 we've seen
more nighttime training and more realism in scenario development. These
exercises are increasingly planned and executed by the Eastern Theater
Command, the element responsible for planning and executing military
operations against Taiwan.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tommy Tuberville
north korea
42. Senator Tuberville. General LaCamera, from a lot of the
wargames I have heard about and seen, it appears we make the assumption
that if China attacks Taiwan or our forces that the North Koreans will
do nothing. Do you think this a safe assumption?
General LaCamera. [Deleted.]
taiwan
43. Senator Tuberville. Admiral Aquilino, deterring a Chinese
attack on Taiwan takes on greater urgency given what Russia is doing in
Ukraine. Have you considered ways to strengthen Taiwan's armed forces
training and conduct joint military exercises with them?
Admiral Aquilino. USINDOPACOM conducts military activities with
Taiwan consistent with our policy as articulated in the Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA) to support Taiwan's self-defense and in accordance
with the United States on China policy, as guided by the TRA, three
United States-China Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances.
44. Senator Tuberville. Admiral Aquilino, are there ways to
streamline our approach to conducting more training and joint exercises
with Taiwan?
Admiral Aquilino. USINDOPACOM conducts military activities with
Taiwan consistent with our policy as articulated in the Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA) to support Taiwan's self-defense and in accordance
with the United States on China policy, as guided by the TRA, three
United States-China Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. We have
processes in place to ensure that we strengthen and streamline the
defense services we provide Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act to be
commensurate with the threat posed as we monitor cross-strait
stability.
thorium reactors
45. Senator Tuberville. Admiral Aquilino, in July 2021, China
unveiled its plans to complete several thorium-powered nuclear reactors
by 2030. Thorium, unlike uranium, cannot be used for nuclear weapons,
but can provide cheap, clean energy that China can export along its
Belt and Road Initiative. I am concerned that the Department of Energy
has been giving the Chinese this technology via direct server from one
of our national laboratories. These small but powerful reactors could
be used to power China's new Type 003 aircraft carrier. Has INDOPACOM
received any intelligence regarding China's plans for thorium with
their Navy?
Admiral Aquilino. Although we are aware of this capability, we have
not seen any reports of military application.
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