[Senate Hearing 117-950]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-950
THE POSTURE OF UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND AND UNITED STATES
TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 29, 2022
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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Available via: http: //www.govinfo.gov
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
59-654 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TOM COTTON, Arkansas
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia JONI ERNST, Iowa
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia RICK SCOTT, Florida
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
MARK KELLY, Arizona TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
John D. Wason, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
march 29, 2022
Page
The Posture of United States European Command and United States 1
Transportation Command.
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 1
Statement of Senator James Inhofe................................ 2
Witness Statements
Wolters, General Tod, Commander, United States European Command/ 3
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Supreme Allied Commander
Europe.
Van Ovost, General Jacqueline, Commander, United States 14
Transportation Command.
Questions for the Record......................................... 46
(iii)
THE POSTURE OF UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND AND UNITED STATES
TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
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TUESDAY, MARCH 29, 2022
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton,
Ernst, Cramer, Scott, Blackburn, and Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Let me call the Committee to order. Good
morning.
The Committee meets today to receive testimony from General
Tod Wolters, Commander of United States European Command and
NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and General Jacqueline
Van Ovost, Commander of United States Transportation Command.
Thank you both for your service to the Nation, and I thank the
men and women serving under your commands at this critical
time. General Wolters, I would also like to take a moment to
recognize the tragic loss of four marines during a training
accident in Norway. Please convey the Committee's condolences
to their families and fellow marines.
The security challenges for European Command, or EUCOM,
have never been clearer. One month ago, Russia unleashed its
illegal and unprovoked attack on Ukraine, upending decades of
general peace and stability in Europe. Putin's invasion has
inflicted horrific suffering upon innocent civilians in
Ukraine, threatened European security, and caused serious
consequences for the global economy. The Ukrainian military has
performed heroically in the face of this overwhelming violence
and the Ukrainian people have shown the world what true courage
looks like.
If Putin thought his actions over the past month would
drive a wedge between NATO members and within the international
community, he was badly mistaken. The conflict in Ukraine has
reinvigorated the NATO alliance and, as NATO Secretary General
Stoltenberg noted recently, this is a ``pivotal moment'' for
European security. Since the start of the conflict, the
international community has implemented a severe and far-
reaching set of economic and energy sanctions, increased
military and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, and reinforced
NATO's military presence along the eastern flank, including the
deployment of four new NATO battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary,
Romania, and Slovakia. Germany has announced historic new
defense spending; additional nations have indicated an interest
to join NATO; and even Switzerland has announced an intent to
freeze Russian financial assets. The international community
has united in a way not seen in generations.
EUCOM and TRANSCOM are playing a critical role in this
effort. American troops continue to operate enormous forward
logistics centers to receive, identify, and transport the
majority of security aid intended for Ukraine from across the
international community. This has been a herculean task
executed with admirable skill on very little notice.
I would ask our witnesses to provide the Committee with any
updates, and also to help place the current Ukraine crisis in
the larger context of our long-term competition with both of
our strategic competitors, Russia and China.
Keeping an eye to the future, an important reality we are
seeing in Ukraine is that any potential adversary is going to
attack our logistics support systems. This idea of ``contested
logistics'' will include obvious threats to our forward bases,
as well as the aircraft and ships that resupply those bases. It
could also include cyberattacks against the information
technology systems that support our deployments, government and
commercial, and possible kinetic attacks against ports and
airfields supporting our deployments.
I am concerned that our thinking about logistics during
conflict has defaulted to our experiences dating back to
Vietnam, that we have owned the sea and air lines of
communication and have only had to worry about logistics
efficiency, not effectiveness. General Van Ovost, I would like
to know what steps are being taken to prepare for such threats
to our logistics, and how the military services can alter their
acquisition programs to take these concerns into account.
Thank you, again, to our witnesses. I look forward to your
testimonies. Now let me recognize the ranking member, Senator
Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and General
Wolters and General Van Ovost, it is nice having you here and
we are always proud of you and the contributions that you make.
As I have said many times, this Committee's top priority
has been ensuring the effective implementation of the 2018
National Defense Strategy. It is still good today. It told us
China is our pacing threat and that we need much more effort
from our military to take on that threat.
The threats have only gotten worse since then. Yesterday,
the Administration sent us the classified 2022 National Defense
Strategy. I hope the unclassified version is public soon.
I understand this strategy was late in part because the
Biden administration revisited what were likely rosy
assumptions about Russia. It is a good reminder that we must
deal with the world as it is, and not as we would have it to
be.
Our plan to deal with that world must rest on a strong
foundation of military power, and it must focus on actions, not
words, for credible deterrence.
Four months ago, Secretary Blinken justified not
sanctioning Russia by saying, quote, ``The President believes
that sanctions are intended to deter.'' Last week, the
President himself said, and this is a quote, ``Sanctions never
deter.'' Nothing about this makes sense.
Deterrence failed in Ukraine. We must ensure it does not
fail anywhere else. The costs of war are far greater than the
costs of preventing war.
We must ensure that our combatant commands have what they
need to credibly deter our adversaries and address the
challenge of strategic competition.
These threats highlight the need for real growth in the
defense budget and a sense of urgency and willingness to take
risk both at the Pentagon and here in Congress.
We just received the President's fiscal year 2023 budget
and it does not request the real growth we need. We will do our
due diligence and our constitutional duty, as we did last year.
General Wolters, I look forward to hearing your assessment
of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and how the United States and
our NATO allies will bolster European defenses while continuing
to support Ukraine's ability to defend itself.
I am troubled by lackluster funding for the European
Deterrence Initiative in recent years and concerned about the
ability of our industrial base to support re-arming ourselves,
our NATO allies, and the Ukrainians.
General Van Ovost, I would like to know if you have the
resources you need to support not only General Wolters in
Europe but also our INDOPACOM commander.
Additionally, I look forward to hearing your views of our
current sealift readiness and how that impacts your ability to
support your combatant command counterparts.
Thank you both again for testifying today. Senator Reed.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
General, you may begin.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL TOD WOLTERS, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES
EUROPEAN COMMAND/NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION SUPREME
ALLIED COMMANDER
EUROPE
General Wolters. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
distinguished Members of the Committee, on behalf of the men,
women, and families who serve our Nation we extend our thanks
for your steadfast support. It remains a privilege to serve
alongside these dedicated patriots and our allies and partners.
It is also an honor to testify alongside my longtime
shipmate, General Jackie Van Ovost. Her TRANSCOM team continues
to deliver miracles at the point of need.
We are fully aligned with the Department of Defense
priorities to defend the Nation, take care of our people, and
succeed through teamwork. Every day we work to generate peace
with our allies and partners by strengthening the deterrence
and defense of the Euro-Atlantic.
This is a pivotal moment in Europe with generational
implications. When testifying before this Committee last year,
Russia was already on the path to further intimidate and
threaten Ukraine while testing the will and resolve of the
Transatlantic Alliance. Russia's premeditated and unprovoked
invasion of Ukraine has galvanized our allies and global
partners. We admire the courage and tenacity of the Ukrainian
armed forces and citizens, and so respect their sovereign
democracy.
In the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO remains the cornerstone of
deterrence and defense. As we face the largest conflict in
Europe in three generations, our Transatlantic Alliance has
responded in all warfighting domains. In the air, NATO has
established an air defense architecture along the eastern flank
that includes contributions from 11 allies. On land, allies
continue to deploy additional forces to enhance its forward
presence from Tallinn in the north to Sofia in the south. At
sea, our standing maritime forces are infused with additional
capabilities to ensure freedom of navigation spanning from the
Arctic to the Aegean. Aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean
dramatically increase the inherent air combat capability and
NATO's air defense architecture along the eastern front.
NATO's capabilities in space and cyberspace are more
closely integrated than at any other time in the alliance's
history. The sum of these modern, multi-domain capabilities
underwrites the security of NATO's Article 5 guarantee.
A protagonist of our commitment to NATO begins with our
efforts in the United States European Command. Our primarily
mission is to compete, deter, and prepare to respond to
aggression with the full weight of the NATO alliance. Our
investments in military-to-military relationships, training,
and readiness build unity, resolve, and combat-credible
deterrence.
USEUCOM, with support from forces in the continental United
States, has sparked allies to enhance posture along the eastern
flank, rapidly deploying three brigades of European-based and
CONUS-based combat forces, a carrier strike group, and fourth-
and fifth-generation fighters. This effort is America's effort,
with soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, guardians, and Defense
Department civilians from all 50 states and territories, some
based in Europe, others rotating into Europe from across the
Nation.
This build is enabled by years of focused investment
through the European Reassurance and Deterrence Initiatives,
commonly referred to ERI and EDI. These enhancements, including
facilities, pre-positioned equipment, rotational deployments,
and all-domain exercises improve our speed and agility. As a
brief example, thanks to EDI and ERI, we were able to deploy
the entirety of an armored brigade combat team from Georgia in
the United States to Germany in just one week. That level of
speed and agility is unmatched. On behalf of the men and women
of European Command, we thank Congress and the American people
for their contributions to this effort.
The capabilities the Department has brought to bear in
response to this acute security environment have required
critical partnerships with USTRANSCOM, USCYBERCOM, USSTRATCOM,
and the intelligence community. These partners are vital to
establishing and sustaining our current deterrence and defense
posture.
We are witnessing a generational moment, a historic
demonstration of unity and will, and an unprecedented effort by
allies to strengthen defense while simultaneously helping those
in need. Just an example, but it is a critical one. We have
seen Germany commit to meet the alliance 2 percent benchmark,
and we expect other allies will follow and redouble efforts to
adequately invest in defense to generate peace.
From Turkey in the southeast to Norway, Sweden, and Finland
in the north, in air, land, sea, space, and cyber, allies and
partners are committing.
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, we thank you again
for this opportunity, and I look forward to answering your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Wolters follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Tod D. Wolters
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of
the Senate Armed Services Committee, on behalf of the dedicated men,
women, and their families preserving peace in the European theater, it
is an honor to testify before you today for a final time a United
States European Command (USEUCOM) Commander. It has been a privilege to
continue to serve alongside our dedicated patriots in a mission
essential to our national security. Their selfless service and
determined commitment is an inspiration. Together, with allies and
partners, our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, guardians, coast
guardsmen, and civilians work tirelessly to deliver peace and secure
the United States' interests.
For the last eight decades, European nations have been key Allies
and Partners for the United States, and today, they collectively serve
as exporters of global peace and security. The Interim National
Security Strategy articulates how a free and prosperous Europe,
defended by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance,
remains foundational to our security in a competitive geopolitical
environment. USEUCOM aligns operations, activities, and investments to
meet the challenges of Strategic Competition with the Russian
Federation and the People's Republic of China. Through our strategy, we
compete for long-term sustainable advantage, deter attacks from
potential aggressors, and prepare with our Allies and Partners to
respond decisively. Standing alongside our teammates, USEUCOM remains
ready, should deterrence fail, to fight and win. We value collaboration
across the Joint Force to implement U.S. and Allied strategic
direction, and express gratitude for your continued Congressional
interest and support.
In Europe, malign activity and direct military aggression, energy
competition, and forced migration stress the rules-based international
order and strain the resources of states. Strategic competitors use all
instruments of national power to exploit these conditions to gain
advantage and create instability. This nexus challenges governments and
institutions like NATO and the European Union (EU) to develop
coordinated and complementary policies to counter malign activity. To
address these issues, USEUCOM's strategy prioritizes supporting NATO's
deterrence and defense of the Euro-Atlantic area, countering malign
influence, strengthening strategic relationships, and enabling U.S.
global operations. We have seen NATO, EU, and global partners unite to
collectively push back against Russia's invasion of Ukraine and efforts
to undermine the rules-based international order.
risks and challenges in the useucom area of responsibility (aor)
USEUCOM's geographic region encompasses 50 countries and
territories. It contains a vast maritime domain, encompassing a large
part of the Arctic region, the North and central Atlantic, the
Mediterranean Sea, and multiple strategic chokepoints. We work
diligently across the Euro-Atlantic to secure our common interests and
to deter and respond to aggression.
Russian Federation
Russia's nuclear arsenal and strike capability remains an enduring,
existential threat to the United States, democracy, and our peaceful
Allies and Partners. A central concern is Russia's non-strategic
nuclear weapons stockpile and the Kremlin's potential to use these
weapons in crisis or conflict.
Russia pursues malign activities, including military aggression,
aimed at undermining democracy, the rules-based international order,
and has a willingness to use force to achieve its aims. Russia pursues
these activities despite widespread international condemnation and
economic sanctions. President Putin leverages coercive and aggressive
policies to counter Western influence and threaten peace and stability
in Europe.
Russia employs grey area activities to maintain its purported
sphere of influence, and attempts to coerce neighboring sovereign
nations and form fractures between Allies at NATO. Russia meddles in
European politics, abrogates its responsibilities under the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, engaged in an unprovoked and
unjustified armed attack against Ukraine, and retains a military
presence on sovereign soil in Moldova and Georgia against the will of
those nations. Russia maintains a large conventional force presence
along NATO's borders and conducts snap exercises to increase
instability. Russia employs unconventional tools, ranging from
disinformation campaigns, malicious cyber activities, and the
manipulation of energy markets to support Moscow's efforts at political
subversion and economic intimidation. These tools and others are
intended to coerce, weaken, and divide our Allies and Partners in the
European theater and beyond. Russian leadership habitually
misinterprets warnings and has directly instigated armed conflict with
Ukraine, while continuing to expand the space below the level of armed
conflict in other Allied and Partner nations.
Beyond Ukraine, Russia continues its military modernization while
displaying its destabilizing capabilities during operations in Syria,
and Libya. As a result, the Russian government has growing confidence
in its military leadership and menu of hybrid, conventional, strategic,
and non-strategic nuclear capabilities needed to underwrite its 21st
century security approach. Today, Russia underpins its military with
Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS), tactical undersea warfare
capabilities, cyber and electromagnetic systems, anti-satellite weapons
and counter-space capabilities, unmanned aerial and ground systems, and
long-range hypersonic and precision fire capabilities.
People's Republic of China (PRC)
The PRC seeks to increase its access, presence, and influence in
Europe and globally to achieve its objective of being socially-stable,
economically prosperous, and militarily powerful by 2050. The PRC
engages in aggressive and subversive economic and diplomatic activities
in the USEUCOM AOR not only to find markets to strengthen the Chinese
economy, but also to establish presence at key transportation nodes and
increase its political influence. China's foreign direct investment,
government-backed business ventures, and infrastructure deals not only
secure the PRC's advantage in global trade, market access, and
technological standards, but also provides Beijing an avenue to assert
influence at the expense of enduring U.S., Allied, and Partner
interests. The PRC primarily pursues bilateral deals, as well as
engagements, through PRC-led forums such as the 16+1 Cooperation
Framework (Lithuania withdrew in 2021) with Central and Eastern
European nations. European nations are growing increasingly skeptical
of these engagements and have identified the formats as divisive.
The PRC focuses on seizing the ``high ground'' in critical and
emerging technology sectors with military application, including
Artificial Intelligence, advanced robotics, quantum technologies, and
hypersonic systems, and at the same time it seeks to export its
national technology standards globally. The PRC's efforts to expand 5G
networks throughout Europe via state-backed firms, such as Huawei and
ZTE, pose significant security risks to the interests and military
forces if the U.S., Allies, and Partners. These networks place
intellectual property, sensitive information, technology, and private
personal information at heightened risk of acquisition and exploitation
by the Chinese government. PRC continues to invest significantly in
European ports and transportation nodes, as well as other critical
infrastructure in Europe.
USEUCOM works closely with our European defense counterparts to
articulate risks and establish a shared understanding of the security
environment. We also support the U.S. interagency in highlighting the
shared values, interests, and equitable business practices that
distinguish the current rules-based international order. European
nations are becoming increasingly aware of, and concerned about, the
strings attached to capital and investment from the PRC, and are
recognizing that the PRC is a systemic rival. Together, we must hold
the PRC accountable for its predatory and unfair practices and ensure
that Western technologies do not facilitate the PRC's military buildup.
Several countries have removed Huawei from their networks, imposed new
investment screening mechanisms, and have decided not to choose Chinese
investments particularly because of the threat this poses to European
security. More than at any time in recent years, our European Allies
and Partners recognize the risk PRC presents to European security.
Eastern Flank
NATO's Eastern Flank remains a strategic focal point. It remains at
risk of Russian aggression and lies on the territorial periphery of
Russia's invasion of peaceful Ukraine. The geopolitical alignment of
the Bucharest 9--Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia--reminds Russia of its
limited sphere of control and NATO's appeal to regional states. These
states have made significant contributions to assist Ukraine against
Russia's aggression. Collectively, they have provided both lethal and
non-lethal assistance, have opened their borders to Ukraine refugees,
closed their air space, and supported economic sanctions against
Russia.
In the Baltics, the Russian government actively targets ethnic
Russian population with extensive propaganda and malign influence
operations, while conducting cyber operations to weaken Alliance
resolve. Russian forces along NATO's periphery in its Western Military
District and Kaliningrad hold a geographic and numerical advantage over
regional military and NATO enhanced Forward Presence forces. This
imbalance emphasizes the importance of timely indications and warnings
that enable the positioning of combat-capable forces to deter and
respond if deterrence fails.
NATO Allies continue their commitment to collective defense.
Enhanced Forward Presence bolsters NATO's posture in the east with four
multinational battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.
Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia are all currently working on
additional posture plans within a NATO context. In the face of Russia's
aggression, the United States and our NATO Allies have committed
additional forces demonstrating our collective resolve. NATO air and
missile defense forces reinforce collective security and stability
through Baltic air policing operations and air defense exercises. Each
of these states contributes to their own defense and the three Baltic
States have expanded their efforts to control the maritime domain in
their littoral.
Poland continues to meet Alliance commitments through defense
budget increases, infrastructure improvements, and logistical support
via the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, and its modernization
efforts include Abrams tanks, Patriot air defense, and F-35 weapon
system acquisitions. Poland also hosts the United States Army's Fifth
Corps forward headquarters in Poznan, providing a needed level of
command and control to synchronize multi-national tactical formations
operating in Europe. Poland also demonstrates its commitment to
collective security by hosting additional U.S. Forces during the
current crisis.
Black Sea Region
Russia continues to exert malign influence and demonstrate its
willingness to use overt force in the Black Sea region to include use
of its Black Sea fleet to attack Ukraine. The war in Ukraine,
instigated solely by Russia, continues to destabilize Ukrainian
security and the entire region. In addition to armed attack against
Ukraine, Russia continues to subvert the Ukrainian government through
malicious cyber activities and information operations, illegally
recognizing Ukraine's eastern areas of Donetsk and Luhansk as sovereign
states, and continuing to illegally occupy Crimea. Contrary to Russia's
intent, these coercive actions reinforce Ukraine's aspirations of
membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions. Russia's aggression also led
to a deployment of United States forces in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary.
The Russian government exerts influence over South Caucasus
countries by exploiting regional tensions and unresolved military
conflicts, and employing economic levers and provocative information
activities. Russia maintains leverage over Georgia by occupying the
Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, blocking free movement
of people and goods within Georgia's territory, detaining and harassing
civilians living in and near occupied areas, and undermining the NATO
membership aspirations of Georgia and other partner nations. After
brokering a ceasefire arrangement between Armenia and Azerbaijan in
November 2020, Russia increased its military presence in the region by
deploying 2,000 troops to Nagorno-Karabakh as ``peacekeepers.'' Since
the early 1990s, Russia has continued to occupy the Transnistria region
of Moldova with 1,500 ``peacekeepers'' without host nation consent.
Moldovan President Sandu has called for the withdrawal of Russian
troops and we continue to support a peaceful resolution to the
Transnistrian conflict and full reintegration of Transnistria with
Moldova.
Atlantic and the Arctic Region
As part of the global ocean, the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans must
remain open and free to facilitate commerce between Europe, North
America, and other international markets. We ensure these vital sea
lines of communication remain open by securing the Greenland, Iceland,
United Kingdom gap, enabling access between the Atlantic and Arctic.
USEUCOM coordinates with U. S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) in these
regions ensuring a comprehensive approach between Euro-Atlantic and
homeland security. Collaborating with our European defense
counterparts, we work to enhance interoperability and proficiency,
while demonstrating collective resolve to counter malign behavior.
In the Arctic, Russia continues to develop its Northern Sea Route
and the PRC seeks increased access to expand its Polar Silk Road
initiative. The Chinese government continues to invest in Russian
energy and seeks economic footholds among Arctic nations to gain
influence over regional governance. To ensure openness, USEUCOM joint
forces maintain near persistent North Atlantic and Arctic presence
while strengthening all-domain relationships with Allies and Partners.
Alongside our UK, French, Norwegian, and Canadian counterparts, United
States maritime forces continue to demonstrate maritime capability and
credibility presence in the region.
The existing rules-based international order benefits all Arctic
nations by facilitating sustainable economic development, fostering
cooperation, and promoting a stable, conflict-free region. As a
strategic corridor, a more open and active Arctic region will
increasingly connect the United States Homeland, Europe, and the Indo-
Pacific. In concert with other Arctic advocates, via a whole-of-
government approach, USEUCOM must continue to maintain a credible
Arctic deterrence to ensure that growing competition in this dynamic
region does not lead to conflict.
Western Balkans
The Western Balkans remains a strategically significant region as a
nexus for strategic competition where Russia, and now PRC, use malign
influence to roil existing ethnic tensions and seek to foster
instability. Russia uses social and political pressures to impede these
countries' Euro-Atlantic alignment and integration. Since Russia's
attack on Ukraine, Balkan NATO members and partners have joined efforts
for assistance and support. PRC's emergence as an alternative patron
for economic and defense cooperation, under suspect terms, further
disrupts the region. With our four newest NATO Allies, North Macedonia,
Montenegro, Croatia, and Albania, we have expanded bilateral defense
relations to the benefit of European collective security on NATO's
southern flank.
Despite Kosovo declaring independence in 2008, Russia, the PRC, and
some other states have failed to recognize its sovereignty. Kosovo and
Serbia have to make more significant progress towards the normalization
of relations. We support the EU-facilitated dialogue between the
parties as it works for a peaceful, lasting solution. NATO's Kosovo
Force (KFOR) retains a small but significant United States contribution
that continues to bolster regional stability. KFOR enables the security
conditions required for a safe and secure environment and conducive to
reaching a political solution on normalizing of Serbia-Kosovo
relations. The United States continues important work assisting the
Kosovo Security Force's planned 10-year transition to a limited,
territorial defense force.
Serbia has maintained its strategic goal of joining the EU, while
seeking balance between East (Russia and the PRC) and West. However.
Serbia recently joined 140 other nations of the United Nations General
Assembly in condemning Russia's aggression in Ukraine. Serbia has a
long road to its eventual EU accession, and its full alignment with EU
foreign policy remains an important part of that. The United States and
our Allies have improved bilateral defense ties with Serbia in recent
years, with increasing cooperation in military exercises, training, and
cooperation on international peacekeeping. Bosnia and Herzegovina
continues to face political and ethnic instability. Fueled by Russian
influence, obstructionists seek greater autonomy for Bosnia and
Herzegovina's Serb-majority political entity, Republika Srpska, to
weaken state authorities and frustrate further alignment with Western
institutions. Nationalist politics and narratives of ethnic divisions
between Bosniaks, Bosnian-Croats, and Bosnian-
Serbs challenge Bosnia and Herzegovina's ability to chart a path of
lasting stability and eventual NATO membership. Nevertheless, the
United States maintains robust ties with the Armed Forces of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, assisting its progress toward NATO-standard capability
targets.
PRC seeks to expand influence in this region primarily through
economic means. PRC investments focus on large-scale transportation,
energy, and information infrastructure. USEUCOM is concerned about PRC
motives as these initiatives expose EU and NATO member states to
coercion and adversely affect the security of critical infrastructure.
Furthermore, the PRC continues to expand its defense and security ties
with Serbia, particularly via high-level visits, arms sales, and
exercises.
Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO)
We continue to support United States interagency counter-VEO
initiatives and those of our European counterparts. VEOs remain a
transnational threat with decentralized command and control, finance,
and facilitation networks spreading from conflict zones into Europe. In
particular, VEOs threaten to attack the United States and European
Allies, with the actions of lone actors presenting the primary
terrorist threat to Europe. Extremists also exploit instability in
Afghanistan, North Africa, Iraq, and Syria to prepare for possible
attacks in Europe. Successful VEO-inspired and organized attacks in
Europe complicate integration efforts, potentially isolating refugee
and migrant communities and increasing the possibility for VEO
recruitment. Despite diminished capabilities, the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria and other VEOs desire to conduct external operations,
requiring global vigilance to prevent a resurgence and preclude future
attacks against the United States Homeland and the Euro-Atlantic area.
Climate Change
Climate change will exacerbate risks to security as the physical
impacts increase and geopolitical tensions mount on how to respond.
Increasing physical effects such as droughts, ice melts, sea level
rise, and extreme weather events will strain national governance,
budgets, and stability in Europe. This year, we supported Humanitarian
Assistance and Disaster Response efforts in Germany, providing war
stock bridges following flash flooding, as well as air support in
Turkey and Greece in response to widespread forest fires. For
populations most vulnerable to climate change, migration can serve as a
form of adaptation, further challenging international stability and
governance. In the Arctic, melting sea ice increases maritime access to
this resource-rich region for exploration and commerce while thawing
permafrost increases vulnerabilities to existing infrastructure,
including forward operating locations and military bases. Working
across the region, USEUCOM will prioritize adaptation strategies that
promote resilience to climate change effects. Additionally, we are
integrating climate change considerations into strategy, plans,
budgeting, and exercises to ensure we are able to train, fight, and win
in an increasingly complex environment.
useucom operations, activities, investments, and opportunities
Strategy Implementation
Along with Allies and Partners, USEUCOM confronts challenges by
competing to secure long-term sustainable advantage, deterring
aggressors, and preparing to respond decisively. As the coordinating
authority for the Russia Problem Set, USEUCOM advises the Secretary of
Defense on force structure, resources, and synchronization of
Department of Defense activities to deter Russia and counter its global
malign activities. We work tirelessly with our defense cohorts and the
U.S. interagency to address the evolving challenges posed by our
adversaries. We display vigilance in this complex security environment,
and--should deterrence fail--we remain ready to respond with lethal and
resilient force in all domains.
Congress provides critical support to the USEUCOM area of
responsibility through the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) in our
baseline appropriation. EDI enhances our posture to deter adversaries
and compete in a contested logistics environment alongside our European
defense counterparts. Increases in forward-stationed and rotational
forces strengthen our contact, blunt, and surge layer capabilities,
providing an ability to compete and win in a multi-domain crisis or
conflict. EDI investments improve theater infrastructure and
prepositioned stocks. Funding for exercises, training, and building
partner capacity strengthens the readiness, architecture, and
interoperability across the Euro-Atlantic area. These advances enable
our deterrence and defense efforts through rapid deployment and
sustainment of forces.
Support NATO's Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area
USEUCOM's primary mission is to compete, deter, and prepare to
respond to aggression with the full weight of the NATO Alliance. NATO
adapts continuously to meet the challenges and complexities of our
dynamic security environment. Together, we continue improving our
posture, transparency, alignment, and speed of response. Through new
strategic concepts, establishing new commands, investing in critical
military capabilities, implementing enhanced readiness, and pursuing a
robust array of operations, missions, and activities, we demonstrate
our combined ability to deter and defend. The cohesion of these efforts
has strengthened NATO, bolstered deterrence, and brought the Alliance
even closer together.
In 2020, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) released
the Concept for the Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area
(DDA). This concept guides the Alliance's approaches to competing with
Russia and to countering international terror groups during peacetime
and crisis, uniting national, regional, and theater-wide military
efforts towards a common purpose. DDA outlines how NATO competes with
Russia and directs the development of SACEUR's AOR-wide Strategic Plan
(SASP). SASP provides the foundation for USEUCOM's efforts towards
further contingency plans convergence. This architecture provide
maximum military coherence at the operational and strategic levels,
across all domains, in both everyday peacetime campaigning and if
required, through periods of potential crisis and conflict.
NATO nations continue to invest in critical military capabilities,
contributing to common defense and support of the Alliance. For the
past seven years, Allies have increased their total defense spending,
and future projections remain positive despite the COVID-19 pandemic.
NATO Allies and Partners are increasing interoperable combat power
through major acquisitions to include cyber capabilities; M1 Abrams and
Patriot Missiles in Poland; fourth and fifth-generation aircraft in
Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Slovakia, and Switzerland; and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
(HIMARS) capability in Romania and Poland. Within USEUCOM, integration
of Fifth Corps' forward headquarters and the establishment of the 56th
Field Artillery Command and the 2nd Multi-Domain Task Force increases
U.S. and NATO capabilities across multiple domains. Also, the 4th
Security Force Assistance Brigade's deployment to Georgia, Latvia,
North Macedonia, Poland, and Romania strengthens Allied and Partner
capabilities.
USEUCOM demonstrated joint capabilities during the United States-
led exercises DEFENDER Europe and ASTRAL KNIGHT. In February, USEUCOM
began exercising the ability of the United States and Allies to deploy
into the Eastern Flank and conduct defensive operations during exercise
SABER STRIKE, which will continue during the BALTOPS exercise with NATO
and partner defense of the Danish Straits and Baltic Sea. This month,
we will participate in the Norwegian-led multi-national and multi-
domain cold weather exercise, COLD RESPONSE, focused on
interoperability, the ability to fight in the Arctic, and demonstrating
Allied resolve. These multi-domain exercises directly complement NATO-
led exercises that maintain maritime air defense, anti-submarine
warfare, and maritime interdiction capabilities. Ongoing enhancements
to multinational information sharing systems enable USEUCOM execution
with NATO and our Partners. Ultimately, military exercises with our
Allies remain an integral part of demonstrating Alliance readiness,
interoperability, and capability.
USEUCOM participation in NATO activities further demonstrates U.S.
commitment to the Alliance. Our soldiers serve in Poland as part of
NATO's enhanced Forward Presence mission in one of four battlegroups
deterring Russian aggression in Poland and the Baltics. Allied nations
will host Enhanced Vigilance Activity and battlegroups in Central and
South-East Europe operating alongside host nation defense forces as a
powerful statement of will and Alliance cohesion. These Battle Groups
will demonstrate improved readiness, military equilibrium, and posture
coherence force. United States Air Forces in Europe support NATO
Enhanced Air Policing and Icelandic Air Surveillance missions,
safeguarding the sovereignty of Allied airspace against Russian
incursions. We plan to support Standing NATO Maritime Group Two in 2022
with U.S. naval capability to counter maritime challenges in the
Atlantic, Mediterranean, and the Baltic Sea. Operation ATLANTIC SENTRY,
conducted by United States Aegis destroyers based in Rota, Spain, and
the Aegis Ashore system in Romania provides the foundation of NATO's
ballistic missile defense capability.
We leverage Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) to demonstrate
operational unpredictability to adversaries, improve deterrence, and
support Allies. Recent DFE operations include posturing a guided
missile destroyer to the High North, Bomber Task Force missions, and an
F-35 deployment with Allies. Each force presence and operation
demonstrates our ability to generate significant combat power across
the AOR, while improving posture and warfighting readiness. This
operational flexibility enhances cross-combatant command coordination
and resource sharing, allowing for seamless transition and handover
across Unified Command Plan boundaries to deploy forces for emerging
requirements.
Rotational Army, Marine, and Special Operations Forces (SOF)
maintain a presence across the theater. These forces work alongside
Allies and Partners to deter aggression, counter malign activities,
build host nation defense capability, and enhance interoperability. For
example, in Eastern Europe, a rotational armored brigade combat team
and combat aviation brigade participate in Operation Atlantic Resolve
to hone Alliance warfighting skills and increase NATO's deterrent
posture. Additionally, deliberate deployments of Marine Forces in
Norway reinforce NATO's Northern periphery while training in Arctic
conditions with our Norwegian allies. Rotational forces are critical to
our ability to deter Russia and assure Allies.
Counter Russian Activities and Malign Influence
Every day, USEUCOM and NATO work to deter the large and
increasingly capable military underwriting Russia's power.
Simultaneously, we counter Russian malign activities that undermine the
rules-based international order. Aside from USEUCOM's own capabilities,
we leverage European defense initiatives and the unique attributes our
United States interagency team brings to deterrence and defense.
As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO must remain a nuclear
Alliance. NATO's nuclear capability preserves peace, prevents coercion,
deters aggression, and instills confidence in the transatlantic bond.
The United States continues to make available its strategic nuclear
forces to the defense of NATO and they are the supreme guarantee of the
security of our Allies. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the
United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and also
contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance. In
addition to strategic forces, the United States continues to forward
deploy nuclear weapons to Europe. These weapons combined with U.S. and
Allied dual-capable aircraft and supporting infrastructure tangibly
demonstrate Alliance cohesion and resolve through an equitable and
sustainable distribution of roles, responsibilities, and burdens. NATO
continues to adapt its nuclear posture to ensure these capabilities
remain credible, resilient, and adaptable. USEUCOM fully supports
modernization and recapitalization of our nuclear forces. Sustained
Congressional funding for these programs demonstrates commitment to our
operations and NATO solidarity.
In the ground domain, we expect to establish a U.S. division-sized
capability through forward-stationed forces, rotational forces, and
Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS). Continued investment in APS equipment
facilitates increased agility and lethality by enabling rapid
integration of rotational combat units into USEUCOM and NATO
operations. During Exercise Defender-Europe 21, United States Army
Europe and 26 participating nations demonstrated readiness to command
and control large-scale operations by exercising at the battalion and
brigade levels while building interoperability. In Exercise Defender-
Europe 24, we plan to assemble a divisional formation on NATO's eastern
flank for the first time since the end of the Cold War, conducting a
multinational command post exercise with U.S. and multinational
divisions and brigades operating under U.S. Army Europe leadership.
These prepositioned stocks enabled us to respond swiftly in response to
Russia's aggression in and around Ukraine.
In the maritime domain, we will execute integrated, all-domain
naval operations and theater security cooperation alongside our Allies
and Partners. Our operational maritime forces provide an essential
capability in Strategic Competition. In addition to our forward
deployed Naval Forces, we will continue to leverage Carrier Strike
Group and Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Units to
contribute to the maritime force. U.S. Sixth Fleet provides maritime
command and control capability across the USEUCOM AOR while U.S. Second
Fleet complements and contributes to reinforce NATO's western flank. In
exercise NORTHERN VIKING, we will enhance our partner capabilities and
further deter Russian aggression while sharpening our competitive edge.
We are committed to a robust prepositioning program in coordination
with our Allies, further building our agility and resilience in the
maritime domain.
In the air domain, we are improving our assortment of sensors,
fighter aircraft, and ground-based air defense systems to enhance
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), support Allies' air defense
efforts, and increase long-range strike capability for deterrence.
During Astral Knight 22 in May, the U.S. Air Force will lead a joint
and combined IAMD exercise with our Allies in Poland and the Baltics.
This exercise will assess the execution of an enduring regional IAMD
architecture and our ability to transfer authority to NATO during the
follow-on, NATO-led IAMD exercise Ramstein Legacy. In recent Bomber
Task Force missions, U.S. bombers launched from bases in the United
States and Europe fly vast distances across the AOR while integrating
with NATO and partner nation forces. Through Agile Combat Employment,
we seek to enhance current posture, complicate adversary decision-
making, and impose costs while assuring our NATO Allies. Agile
operations, supported by Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control,
and improved communications and domain awareness capabilities, will
demonstrate a credible, networked combat deterrence from potential
airfields across the continent. This expansion of European contingency
air operation and deployable air bases enhances the survivability of
our forces.
In the space domain, we coordinate across the Department of Defense
and NATO to protect U.S. and Allied interests. Maintaining assured
access to space capabilities and stability within the space domain are
vital to USEUCOM and NATO operations. We coordinate with U.S. Space
Command (USSPACECOM) to leverage space capabilities that ensure our
ability to execute multi-domain operations, and protect Allied space
capabilities from malign actors. We synchronize our messaging on
responsible behavior in space and seek to deter unsafe or provocative
actions in space by our adversaries. Additionally, we work with the
United States Space Force (USSF), along with USSPACECOM, and our Allies
and Partners to expand space partnerships within our AOR and further
integrate space capabilities into joint and combined operations and
activities.
In the cyber domain, USEUCOM coordinates with Joint Forces
Headquarters--Cyber and United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) to
counter Russian malign cyber activities and enhance our Allied and
Partner capabilities. USEUCOM synchronizes USCYBERCOM's persistent
engagement activities with USEUCOM operations, activities and
investments (OAIs) to enhance warning of adversary actions, enable
defense, and build trust with Allies and Partners. In coordination with
USCYBERCOM, USEUCOM identifies cyber options to compliment OAIs and
support response actions should deterrence fail. Recognizing the
worldwide cyberspace capabilities of Russia, China, Iran, and North
Korea, USEUCOM works with other combatant commands and interagency
partners to enhance global cyber defenses and our ability to impose
cost on malicious adversary behavior. USEUCOM has also invested in
sharing information on foreign malign cyber activities with Allies and
Partners to enhance collective cyber defenses.
In the information environment, USEUCOM conducts activities to
promote both deterrence and assurance, contest Russian malign
narratives, and build resilience among foreign audiences to counter
malign influence and disinformation. USEUCOM generates effects in the
information environment through the Russian Influence Group (RIG), a
State Department led interagency network focused on countering Russian
malign influence. Congressional funding for unique cybersecurity and
hybrid warfare programs (i.e., electromagnetic warfare, special
operations, and operations in the information environment),
particularly through the State Department's Countering Russian
Influence Fund--Foreign Military Financing (CRIF-FMF), enables the RIG
to challenge adversary narratives and disinformation. Congressional
funding for these unique information operation capabilities enables
USEUCOM to challenge adversary narratives and disinformation.
Our Special Operations forces (SOF) work with European Allies and
Partners to build capacity, counter malign activity, and improve
resilience. These unique capabilities enable USEUCOM to identify,
attribute, and counter Russian malign influence. Furthermore, our
Special Operations personnel provide invaluable contributions in
sensing the operational environment, enhancing our ability to deter
through indications and warnings. USEUCOM's Theater Special Operations
Command (TSOC), Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR), provides a
persistent Special Operations presence throughout Europe. SOCEUR
regularly leads and participates in bi-lateral and multilateral
exercises to improve interoperability with Allies, build partner
capacity, and strengthen deterrence messaging. SOCEUR is preparing to
lead TROJAN FOOTPRINT 2022, a regional exercise focused on mission
command for SOF that rotates between the Baltics and the Black Sea.
Exercises like TROJAN FOOTPRINT set conditions for better integration
between SOF and conventional forces during combined, joint, and multi-
domain warfare.
As part of a whole-of-government approach, our Joint Interagency
Counter Trafficking Center supports interagency efforts to combat
Russian malign activities, primarily by assisting federal law
enforcement activities. This initiative provides USEUCOM with
additional areas for competition. Through these partnerships, USEUCOM
leverages a range of interagency-driven efforts, including criminal
investigations, convictions, seizures, sanctions, and designations.
Lastly, our approach in competition considers escalation management
and control to maximize deterrence and defense. We make use of
authorized military-to-military channels with Russia to safely de-
conflict activities, when necessary, in order to maintain strategic
stability.
Advance and Strengthen Strategic Relationships
Allies and Partners bolster U.S. initiatives through their own
national contributions and by providing critical host nation support to
forward-stationed U.S. forces across the region. Since the start of
Russia's invasion against Ukraine, we have seen Allies strengthening
defense budgets to include Germany's announcement to increase military
spending above 2 percent of gross domestic product. Allies and Partners
contribute forces to ongoing NATO and U.S.-led coalition missions,
advancing our common interests in Kosovo, Iraq, and Syria. Furthermore,
Allies underwrite infrastructure investments and defray costs of United
States military construction through the NATO Security Investment
Program. Additionally, we expect improvements by individual European
nations and the EU to enhance military mobility, increasing their
responsiveness and combat capability. The EU, in consultation with
NATO, projects it will invest 1.69 billion euros over the next seven
years for civilian and military dual-use transportation infrastructure
improvements across the continent.
Turkey remains a key, strategic United States and NATO Ally. We
recognize Turkey's critical leadership role in hosting United States
servicemembers conducting a wide array of NATO, bilateral, and
unilateral missions including radar and tanker support to ongoing
operations, and strong bilateral cooperation on Afghanistan.
Additionally, Turkey directly contributes forces to NATO missions in
Iraq, Kosovo, Baltic Air Policing, and Standing NATO Maritime Group 2
in the Mediterranean Sea. Turkey has supported United States Bomber
Task Force missions in the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean regions
with tanker and fighter assets. Turkey's military capability and
geographic location make it a key stakeholder in United States
responses to regional events and within NATO. We must continue to
execute and advocate for fundamental security cooperation activities
with Turkey such as Professional Military Education, exercises, and
Foreign Military Sales. These actions will strengthen NATO
interoperability and enable U.S. force projection.
Turkey possesses the second largest military in NATO, borders a
volatile region, and retains a pivotal role in countering Russia. The
Turkish and Russian government's relationship remains competitive and
transactional, with Turkish engagement often aimed at constraining
Russian behavior. Both nations view the Black Sea region within their
natural spheres of influence, and each continues to oppose the other in
Ukraine, Libya, and Syria. Turkey can best counter Russia through close
cooperation with the United States and NATO. We laud Turkey's strong
support to Ukraine up to and during Russia's invasion, and we will
continue to find ways to increase our cooperation with Turkey
bilaterally and within NATO.
In the South Caucasus, Georgia remains a steadfast partner in
regional security and the effort to counter Russian malign influence.
Georgia's status as the largest non-NATO contributor to NATO's Resolute
Support Mission in Afghanistan demonstrated the enduring strength of
our strategic partnership. In October 2021 in Tbilisi, Secretary Austin
announced sunsetting the Georgia Defense Readiness Program (GDRP) and
transforming into the Georgia Deterrence and Defense Enhancement
Initiative. This initiative will build upon GDRP's success to further
develop capabilities and capacities required for effective deterrence
and territorial defense, and foster interoperability with NATO.
We strengthen our strategic relationships through security
cooperation initiatives. U.S. National Guard forces maintain vibrant
relationships and unique access with Allies and Partners through the
State Partnership Program (SPP). USEUCOM now has 23 active programs
with the addition of the Austria and Vermont partnership. The SPP
conducts over 500 engagements annually in EUCOM's AOR, cultivating
regional expertise and strengthening personal relationships to improve
readiness and alignment across the AOR. Programs such as the Black Sea
Maritime Domain Awareness Initiative and enhancing Baltic IAMD
represent potent, regionally-focused components of a resilient theater
posture.
Enable U.S. Global Operations
Europe and the United States remain the foundation for upholding a
free and open international order. Our unique geographic location
enables global operations, including U.S. interagency and multinational
operations, through synchronization and agreements for access, basing,
and overflight permissions within Europe. We work within a whole-of-
government framework to maintain essential access and permissions under
bilateral agreements and to resist Russian and Chinese strategic
investments. Absent these agreements, the United States could not meet
treaty obligations or effectively protect vital national interests. The
shared ideals, values, trust, and longstanding relationships we have in
Europe enable the U.S. to generate coalitions for worldwide operations
in support of shared national interests.
Last year, Allies and Partners proved essential during Operation
Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome, the evacuation of at-risk
civilians from Afghanistan to the continental United States. Germany,
Italy, Spain, Kosovo, and Slovakia--among other Allies and Partners--
collaborated with the United States both in the evacuations and by
accepting refugees into their countries. Close coordination with
Germany, Italy, and Spain enabled us to temporarily shelter and care
for thousands of evacuees at United States airbases in these respective
countries. Our close bonds with European Allies and Partners, forged
over two decades of conflict in Afghanistan, facilitated the safe
movement of over 42,000 evacuees through USEUCOM air bases to safe
havens in Europe and the United States. We worked tirelessly with U.S.
Central Command, U.S. Transportation Command, and U.S. Northern Command
to support the Department of State and Department of Homeland Security
to enable this monumental U.S. global operation.
Conclusion
Maintaining a capable U.S. presence in Europe strengthens our
national security by generating peace, unity, and cohesion among
Europe's sovereign nations. Russia and China present formidable,
enduring challenges to preserving a free and peaceful Europe.
Nevertheless, the West is more united than it has been in years. NATO
is stronger, not weaker, and we are ready to respond decisively. Our
strategy addresses the dynamic security environment by ensuring we
effectively compete for long-term sustainable advantage, deter attacks
from potential aggressors, and prepare our Allies and Partners to
respond decisively.
We appreciate Congressional interest in these challenges and your
continued pledge to meet them through engagement, funding, and
authorities. Your continued support for the European Deterrence
Initiative and International Security Cooperation Programs remains
critical to our overall strategy. These authorities and funding enhance
U.S. and Alliance readiness and posture to respond in crisis or
conflict. We stand in a strategically critical part of the world, and
the dedicated men and women of USEUCOM are deeply humbled by the trust
our Nation places in us. Together with the soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, coast guardsmen, guardians, and civilians of USEUCOM, your
support demonstrates our Nation's continued commitment to defend the
Homeland forward and protect the peace for the one billion people
living in the Euro-Atlantic region.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, General Wolters. General Van
Ovost, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JACQUELINE VAN OVOST, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
General Van Ovost. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe,
and distinguished members of the Committee, good morning. It is
my honor to join you today with my senior enlisted leader,
Fleet Master Chief Donald Myrick, to represent the men and
women of the United States Transportation Command. Every day I
am immensely proud of their contributions to national defense.
As I sit here today, we are in lockstep with General
Wolters in providing critical aid to Ukraine, and assuring our
NATO allies through troop deployments and exercises. TRANSCOM
coordinates the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise,
creating a strategic comparative advantage through logistics
that no other nation can achieve. Our success would not be
possible without the steadfast support of this Committee and
the whole of Congress.
TRANSCOM operates an agile and resilient logistics
enterprise, comprised of our military components, commercial
partners, and industry teammates deliver for our nation, our
allies, and partners around the world. We project and sustain
the world's most capable military force. The speed and
reliability at which we execute these missions demonstrates our
nation's resolve and serves as a deterrent to our adversaries.
However, the world is evolving, and the complex contested
environment that is emerging will test the future readiness of
our enterprise and challenge TRANSCOM's ability to deliver a
decisive force when needed. It is imperative that we evolve
into a more agile, resilient mobility force through focused
modernization and recapitalization of our capabilities to
ensure we remain ready now and into the future.
My top readiness concern remains sealift, as 70 percent of
our government-owned surge sealift ships will approach the end
of their service life in 10 years. I greatly appreciate your
support on the authorization and funding of the first steps of
our sealift recapitalization effort. The funding for five new
ships in the fiscal year 2022 omnibus appropriations will
enable us to continue this vital process, and we look forward
to working with the Navy to satisfy restrictions in current law
to execute these purchases.
Next, air refueling is critical to the joint force's
ability to deploy and employ an immediate force. I appreciate
your continued support to funding the KC-46 recapitalization
program and critical modifications to the KC-135 aircraft. We
must continue to modernize and recapitalize our aging air-
refueling assets to ensure that they remain agile, resilient,
and relevant to the future fight.
One last and very critical thought. Cyber is an area of
significant vulnerability for TRANSCOM. As we are inextricably
linked to our commercial industry and 90 percent of our systems
operate outside the Department of Defense information network,
we remain focused on strengthening our partnerships with our
transportation providers to mitigate cyber vulnerabilities. As
such, cyber resiliency and digital modernization initiatives
are a top priority.
Just as we are engaged globally in supporting the DOD's
operations, we have vital responsibilities to take care of our
DOD employees and their families. Among the most important is
the management of the Defense Personal Property System,
responsible for the movement of household goods. Our continuing
overhaul of this system, to include the recently awarded Global
Household Goods Contract, strives to deliver both the high
quality our servicemembers, Department employees, and families
deserve as well as the accountability Congress demanded.
I am honored to join General Wolters in his last appearance
before this Committee and thank him for his nearly 40 years of
service to our country and his commitment to our nation's
security. Together, with all combatant commands, TRANSCOM
routinely demonstrates the nation's ability to fight, deliver,
and win.
I would like to thank you once again for your leadership
and for the support you provide our servicemembers. I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Von Ovost follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Jacqueline D. Van Ovost
strategic environment
The 2020 Unified Command Plan clearly articulates TRANSCOM's
responsibility for the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise
(JDDE) within the current and future global environment. The Interim
National Security Strategy Guidance describes a global security
landscape at an ``inflection point'' of shifting power dynamics and
global crises, specifically calling out the need to work with allies
and partners to strengthen and defend the global commons, freedom of
navigation, and rights of overflight. This complex new security
environment will test the future readiness of our JDDE, and challenge
TRANSCOM's ability to deliver a decisive force for high-end conflict
when needed. We must ensure the Joint Force is ready to defend our
Homeland, support our allies and partners, protect our interests
abroad, deter potential adversaries, and defeat any threats that may
emerge. For TRANSCOM, this means we will continue to integrate with the
other Combatant Commands, the Services, other federal and state
agencies, and our commercial industry partners to ensure the JDDE
remains a credible deterrent, ready to respond tonight if called upon
by our nation.
TRANSCOM's vital contribution to integrated deterrence is evident
in the ongoing support to Ukraine and the EUCOM effort in support of
our NATO allies. The JDDE's agility and responsiveness allowed for the
rapid deployment of troops and equipment to the EUCOM AOR as an assure
and deter effort, as well as the delivery of security assistance to
Ukraine authorized under the Presidential Drawdown Authority.
TRANSCOM's ability to execute these complex moves within days and even
hours of authorization clearly communicates our nation's resolve to our
allies and adversaries alike.
Every operation the Joint Force participates in starts and ends
with TRANSCOM and is facilitated through the global networks and nodes
made available to us through the JDDE. Our locations around the world,
in cooperation with our allies and partners. As TRANSCOM evolves to
match the strategic environment, we are posturing our forces for the
complexity of future operations and the increased demands on our
warfighting framework. The contested environment will present
challenges that degrade our ability to exercise command and control of
our forces, delay integration of our commercial partners in a timely
manner and disrupt the steady tempo of mobility operations. In
addition, our adversaries are coercing other nations, causing them to
make economic, diplomatic, and military decisions that can adversely
affect our forward posture and reduce our freedom of maneuver. In light
of these challenges, TRANSCOM's focus is on a more agile, resilient
force while relying on integration, both internally and externally,
with commercial industry as well as our allies and partners. This will
ensure the JDDE remains united in effort and purpose as we illuminate
the need for change necessary to defeat the pacing threat.
delivering for our nation
TRANSCOM's enduring purpose is to project and sustain military
forces anywhere on the globe at a time and place of our nation's
choosing. Our ability to rapidly move forces transoceanic distances is
a strategic comparative advantage that provides a wide range of options
in support of the National Defense Strategy (NDS) while creating
multiple dilemmas for our adversaries. As 1 of 11 Combatant Commands,
TRANSCOM is responsible for operating the Defense Transportation System
and integrating the entire JDDE. Our assigned Unified Command Plan
responsibilities are executed through three component commands (U.S.
Army's Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, U.S.
Navy's Military Sealift Command, and U.S. Air Force's Air Mobility
Command) and one major subordinate command refueling, aeromedical
evacuation, sealift, domestic rail, and motor freight, all of which are
enabled by a global posture that provides the United States with
positional, temporal, and psychological advantages to respond as needed
across the operational spectrum. In addition to these tasks, Fiscal
Year 2022 NDAA language designated TRANSCOM the Department of Defense's
(DOD) element responsible for bulk fuel management and delivery on a
global basis. Finally, none of this could happen without our total
force and civilian personnel, who are critical to our daily capacity
and ability to seamlessly transition to a wartime footing.
The DOD's ability to project military forces is inextricably linked
to commercial industry. These industry partners provide critical
transportation capacity and global networks to meet day-to-day and
wartime requirements. On behalf of the Department, TRANSCOM spends
approximately seven billion dollars with industry partners each year in
transportation services to execute DOD mission requirements.
Additionally, TRANSCOM manages several emergency preparedness programs
that call on industry to specifically support wartime requirements.
They include the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), Voluntary Intermodal
Sealift Agreement (VISA), and the anticipated to be renewed Voluntary
Tanker Agreement.
year in review
The events of 2021 further demonstrated how important logistics is
to the DOD's global operations. TRANSCOM exercised deployment
capabilities, sustained combat operations and managed the expansive
JDDE, all while surging assets to facilitate the Afghanistan drawdown
and the Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) that followed.
Starting early last year, the Command supported Afghanistan
retrograde operations by moving 14,431 Pallet Position Equivalents and
12,944 passengers from April through June. Moving into the summer,
TRANSCOM moved 600,000 square feet of cargo and 7,212 passengers during
Exercise Defender Pacific, a U.S. Army Pacific exercise designed to
operationalize the NDS through realistic, iterative training across all
domains--air, land, sea, cyber, and space. Concurrently, TRANSCOM
supported all stages of the largest NEO airlift in history. To enable a
rapid and effective planning process, TRANSCOM deployed members of the
Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) to embed with U.S. Marine
Corps Forces Central Command. This team of joint planners, public
affairs specialists and communicators became a vital part of Joint Task
Force--Crisis Response and deployed forward to Hamid Kharzi
International Airport. Additionally, the JECC deployed multiple
personnel to various locations across the United States to plan and
execute the movement of evacuees to include standing up a 30-person
TRANSCOM Coordination Cell led by the JECC Commander at the Department
of State. TRANSCOM air refueling tankers created the air bridge to
enable the airlift of approximately 9,716 passengers and 1,784 tons of
cargo into the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility to
facilitate the NEO. This resulted in the successful movement of more
than 124,000 personnel over 16 days from Hamad Karzai International
Airport in Kabul by all airlift providers, with USAF C-17s evacuating
more than 79,000 people.
Throughout 2021, TRANSCOM conducted extensive global operations,
delivering over 104 million gallons of fuel during air-to-air refueling
missions resupplying nearly 32,000 receiver aircraft and directly
supporting 39 Bomber Task Force missions, ensuring deterrence and
reassuring our partners across all six theaters. Additionally, TRANSCOM
transported over 790,000 passengers, 315,000 tons of cargo, and 24.2
million barrels of DOD petroleum products, all while complying with
COVID-19 preventative measures, testing and restrictions. Many of these
missions would not have been successful without the strong
relationships with our allies and partners, and our commercial
transportation providers.
Globally, TRANSCOM executed 6,680 patient movements, including 129
battle injuries and 402 COVID-19 positive patients. As part of the
Afghanistan NEO mission, TRANSCOM safely executed 187 total patient
movements to include 156 Afghan Nationals. While only a small portion
of our total movements, the importance of taking care of our people and
engendering good will among our allies and partners cannot be
overestimated.
transcom warfighting framework
The success of DOD's power projection capability is contingent on
three critical elements of TRANSCOM's organizational warfighting
framework: Global Mobility Posture; Global Mobility Capacity; and
Global Command, Control, and Integration.
Global Mobility Posture
Global Mobility Posture is the foundation of power projection. It
is enabled by a deep bench of allies and partners, which includes
access to global transportation networks maintained by industry to
support our nation's ability to mobilize and deploy. Diplomatic
alignment with our allies and partners enables access, basing, and
overflight for U.S. Forces and is critically important to the rapid
deployment of personnel and equipment at the time and place of our
choosing. This robust and resilient network also provides the U.S. the
positional advantage required to rapidly advance our national security
interests, deter adversaries, and when necessary, win decisively. While
this provides the U.S. a comparative advantage, it must be continually
assessed and refined, as necessary, to meet the evolving geopolitical
landscape. We must continually strengthen and diversify our global
enroute infrastructure, and agreements to maintain this advantage,
especially as new operational concepts drive us to more distributed
operations.
On the domestic front, TRANSCOM works closely with the U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT) on numerous transportation programs
to include three National Defense Programs: Highways, Railroads, and
Ports for National Defense. Although TRANSCOM assesses that our
nation's infrastructure is currently capable of supporting military
transportation requirements, substantial public and private sector
investment is needed to sustain the current transportation
infrastructure. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act proposes
substantial investments in roads and bridges which would positively
impact the overall condition of the Strategic Highway Network and could
have benefits for national security. Through these National Defense
Programs, TRANSCOM will continue to proactively engage the Federal
Highway Administration to encourage investment to enhance
infrastructure critical to national security.
Global Transport Capacity
Our Global Mobility Capacity includes conveyances and platforms
that move troops, supplies, fuel, and equipment through global
transportation networks. These include rail, motor transport, sealift,
air refueling, and airlift. During times of war, 90 percent of our
personnel are transported via commercially contracted air and 90
percent of our military cargo is transported by sealift vessels. In
addition, more than 60 percent of TRANSCOM's air transport aircrews
reside in the Reserve components--the National Guard and the Reserves,
underscoring our reliance on the Total Force.
Mobility force sizing and shaping are informed by Mobility
Capability Requirements Studies (MCRS). MCRS-20 released in June 2021,
assessed future mobility forces, operating environments, and necessary
conditions to support the NDS's daily competition and wartime missions.
The study found the programmed mobility capacity to be sufficient in
most areas and identified a few areas that will be challenged to meet
wartime demands with acceptable risk or active mitigations. Sufficiency
and risk within our mobility programs will be critically reassessed in
response to a new National Defense Strategy or changes to programmed
capacity. The Fuel Tanker Study quantified the risk of reliance on
foreign flag tankers, with recommendations to mitigate this risk in the
Indo-Pacific. An initial significant step is implementing a 10-ship
Tanker Security Program, along with the renewal of the Voluntary Tanker
Agreement, to provide assured access to an increased fleet of U.S.-
flag, U.S.-crewed tankers during contingency operations. With
appropriations in hand, the Maritime Administration, in coordination
with TRANSCOM, will implement the program later this year.
Global Transport Capacity Modernization Priorities
The DOD's programmed resources maintain our readiness and preserves
strategic decision space. However, without continued Congressional
support for the mobility recapitalization efforts, I am extremely
concerned about our ability to effectively operate in a future
contested logistics environment.
Sealift
By 2032, approximately 70 percent of government-owned surge sealift
ships will approach the end of their service life and must be replaced.
DOD, DOT, U.S. Navy and TRANSCOM made initial progress in executing the
strategy to recapitalize the fleet with used sealift ships from the
commercial market and are working through the process of the initial
purchases. The Vessel Acquisition Manager will also survey additional
ships authorized for purchase in fiscal year 2022. These first ships
are a welcome beginning to the recapitalization of vital square footage
and capacity.
Our current recapitalization authority to acquire used vessels is
limited by previous legislation, hampering the Department's ability to
purchase ships when the market conditions are favorable. Without
authorization changes and stable appropriations, DOD will not be able
to recapitalize the sealift fleet. Instead, we would be forced to
extend service life on existing and aging ships, which is not an
effective means to maintain readiness. As we complete the upgrades on
the first two used roll-on/roll-off ships purchased this year, and
continue the acquisition process for five additional ships, we seek
continuing support for future recapitalization.
Air Refueling
The air refueling fleet remains our most stressed fleet under
wartime conditions. It is critical to rapid global mobility and is the
lifeblood of the Joint Force's ability to deploy and employ the
immediate and surge forces across all NDS mission areas. The current
air refueling fleet is comprised of the KC-135 and KC-10 aircraft, and
the new KC-46. When the last KC-46 is purchased, the average age of the
KC-135s will be 67 years. We ask for your continued support to
recapitalize the KC-135s with a future air refueling platform. TRANSCOM
continues to work with the USAF, OSD, Joint Staff and other Combatant
Commands to ensure sufficient capacity to meet global demands during
wartime at acceptable levels of risk as well as implement potential
mitigation options if needed. TRANSCOM does assess the air refueling
fleet is postured to meet expected future daily global demand using a
combination of KC-46s, with some interim restrictions, along with
existing KC-135s and KC-10s.
Intra-Theater Airlift
From a requirements perspective, intra-theater airlift has
experienced the greatest change of all mobility priorities over the
past few decades. C-130 fleet capacity dropped almost 50 percent from a
high of well over 500 aircraft in Operation DESERT STORM to the current
programmed levels. The elimination of a ``two major war'' sizing
construct, as well as the de-emphasis of other high priority global
missions not associated with a major contingency as a force-sizing
demand, drove reductions to this mission area. However, MCRS-20
highlighted the potential value of this mission area in the future
operating environment, and as such, intra-theater lift is an area of
increased interest to the Department. TRANSCOM is assessing emerging
warfighting concepts and future operating scenarios to evaluate
mobility capacity along with other related variables to better
characterize risk in meeting NDS wartime missions and expect to publish
the results in the Summer of 2022.
Strategic Airlift
The strategic airlift fleet, comprised of our organic airlifters
and commercial partners, stands as the cornerstone of this command's,
and the Nation's, ability to rapidly project the Joint Force with an
immediate response anywhere on the globe. The Afghanistan go-to-zero
and Noncombatant Evacuation Operation were illustrative examples of the
value provided by this critical capability. Given the U.S. asymmetric
advantage in Strategic Airlift, coupled with the continued high demands
placed on this fleet, we should anticipate the need to recapitalize and
modernize this strategic capability.
Global Command, Control, and Integration
Global Command, Control, and Integration remains central to our
ability to align scarce mobility resources with the highest strategic
priorities. Our ability to command and control mobility forces is
enabled by a portfolio of information technology (IT) systems and is
contingent on secure networks and continuous digital modernization
efforts.
Our competitors are actively leveraging the cyber domain to achieve
their national objectives. As a result, cyber resiliency and digital
modernization initiatives will remain a top priority for the Command.
We continue to modernize our IT systems by not only taking advantage of
cloud computing services but also through advancing our ability to
manage data as a strategic asset to advance decision making at all
levels. We also continue to increase our cyber hygiene and harden our
cyberspace terrain to impose costs on an adversary's ability to
compromise our networks and systems. However, as adversaries advance
their capabilities, cyber hygiene alone is not enough. We are also
improving our ability to proactively operate within our terrain and
look for signs of compromise or unusual activity. In addition, in
partnership with U.S. Cyber Command, we are implementing Zero Trust
security model principles on our classified network and expect to
complete implementation no later than the Summer of 2022. These actions
have increased our cybersecurity posture as well as our ability to
detect and mitigate adversarial activity.
As we are inextricably linked to commercial industry, we remain
focused on strengthening partnerships with our transportation providers
to mitigate cyber vulnerabilities. We are in our fourth year of having
contractual cybersecurity compliance requirements in place and
requiring annual cybersecurity self-assessments of National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) security controls. Compliance
continues to improve each year, which highlights our partners'
understanding of the importance of implementing sound cybersecurity
practices. This last year, we began a proof-of-principle contract to
have a third-party assess commercial partner compliance with NIST
security controls, and three companies have partnered with us on this
initiative. The first assessment, on one of our CRAF partners, was
complete this January and confirmed they have robust security controls
in place. The other two assessments will occur later this year. We have
also increased information sharing and collaboration initiatives with
our commercial partners and have a couple of special projects that link
providers with defense intelligence agencies to help them mitigate
risks.
defense personal property program (dp3) reform
The U.S. market experienced tighter-than-normal labor and supply
chain capacity which plagued servicemembers and their families who
relocated this moving season. These conditions also negatively affected
the Services' personnel operating Processing and Shipping Offices
responsible for supporting our DOD customers. These issues further
amplified the flaws in the current personal property system and
highlighted the need for change. TRANSCOM, on behalf of the DOD,
continues to lead this overhaul of the Defense Personal Property
Program (DP3). Over the last year, TRANSCOM re-awarded the Global
Household Goods Contract (GHC) and continued to develop MilMove, a new
IT system, to replace the legacy system.
By transitioning to a single move manager, GHC fundamentally
restructures DOD's relationship with the household goods moving
industry to deliver not only the high quality our servicemembers, DOD
employees, and their families deserve, but also the accountability
Congress demanded. This single move manager construct has already
proven successful through the movement of privately owned vehicles
(POVs). To date, the single move manager for POVs maintains a 99
percent customer satisfaction rating. In contrast, the current
household goods program maintains a 93 percent customer satisfaction
rating. Although 6 percent may not seem like a significant difference,
when you consider the volume of moves, (314,000 households moved in
2021), having a single move manager capable of this higher performance
equates to approximately 18,800 more satisfied families . . . that is
significant!
TRANSCOM's awarding the GHC to HomeSafe Alliance is a crucial step
in the right direction. It will improve access to and management of
quality household goods moving capacity to meet DOD's peak demand;
enhance communication throughout the move process; deliver modern,
digital management tools to customers; simplify the claims process in
the event of loss, damage, or inconvenience; and enable the Department
to affix accountability and responsibility lacking in today's program.
The contract will also provide industry with the confidence and
rationale to invest in capacity and relationships with trusted
suppliers to meet DOD's demand.
TRANSCOM has not waited and is not waiting . . . GHC, although a
critical step in addressing longstanding issues identified by DOD
families, is only one component of a broader reform effort. For the
2021 moving season, TRANSCOM implemented numerous `customer facing'
changes, to include publishing metrics on a Customer Facing Dashboard
via a publicly accessible website, addressing the transparency Congress
requested. Additionally, TRANSCOM provided additional protections for
residential property, improved claim options for families, and improved
requirements for customer communication. Over the next year, TRANSCOM
will continue with numerous reform efforts to include protecting a
customer's sensitive personal information and implementing business
rules that allow greater flexibility in requesting pickup and delivery
dates and filing inconvenience claims. While I am pleased with these
improvements, the current program limits the extent of these efforts,
re-emphasizing the importance behind the GHC award.
I am grateful for your continued support in the Department's
efforts to improve the Defense Personal Property Program and I look
forward to providing you updates as we deliver the quality,
accountability, and transparency our military families deserve.
conclusion
In closing, I'd like to reemphasize the leading role the men and
women of TRANSCOM play in underwriting the lethality of the Joint
Force, advancing American interests around the globe, and providing our
nation's leaders with strategic flexibility while creating multiple
dilemmas for our adversaries. While I know TRANSCOM is ready, our
mobility enterprise will continue to modernize to meet the challenges
of tomorrow, so we will not rest on the achievements of the past. We
will continue to accelerate our momentum to ensure we can surge the
entire enterprise at any moment, to anywhere.
The strategic comparative advantage the Joint Deployment and
Distribution Enterprise provides our Nation is second to none and I am
proud of the empowered, competitive, and resilient team who deliver for
our Nation, every day. I thank Congress for their continued support to
the men, women, and mission of TRANSCOM. We remain dedicated . . . to
fight, deliver and win!
Together, We Deliver!
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Van Ovost.
General Wolters, the initial Russian plan did not work in
their favor, thank goodness, due to the courage of the
Ukrainian people and the support of the international
community. So it appears now that they are engaged, as they
were in Chechnya and other episodes, in a campaign of attrition
and direct attacks on civilian targets rather than military
targets.
The question really, in that context, is can the Ukrainian
forces maintain their efforts and can we continue to maintain
our support for the Ukrainian forces?
General Wolters. Chairman, I think we can and we will
continue to maintain our support for the Ukrainian armed
forces. We will do so with materiel support as well as thought.
As you well know we have made dramatic improvements in our
information sharing and intelligence sharing, and as they
continue to prosecute their campaign our advice and our
assistance with respect to materiel will be very, very
important.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. Now we are in the midst of a
tremendous sort of shift or pivot, as the General Secretary of
NATO said. What areas should we be encouraging our European and
international allies to take to face this not only present
threat but the continuing threat of Russia and China?
General Wolters. Chairman, I think we have to
comprehensively improve our military disposition in all
quadrants and in all domains, and we have a plan in place to do
so. As the Secretary General approaches the leader summit this
June, his overall NATO plan coincides with that military plan
to ensure that we can show greater NATO strength and greater
military strength. As you well know, we are on the appropriate
glidepath to do so as we continue to fortify the eight battle
groups that exist in the proximity of Eastern Europe.
Chairman Reed. Thank you.
General Van Ovost, the issue of contested logistics, which
you touched upon, includes not just the platforms to carry
materiel but getting that materiel through to our forces in the
Pacific, in Europe, or anyplace in the world. With the ability
of our adversaries to detect and to hit targets at long ranges,
how are we planning to do that?
General Van Ovost. Chairman, that is of concern to us, as
we work in the Indo-Pacific, with Admiral Aquilino, we are
looking at a strategy of diverse and disperse. In other words,
we are seeing that we are going to have more distributed
operations in more locations, which will provide us that
redundancy and resilience, and then diversity to have some
capability to move with respect to ships on the water that are
in motion, which are harder to target, than a large, single
location where we stack up our logistics. So we are very much
looking at how we do intra-theater dispersement at a time and
place where we will be able to resupply the forces securely but
keep it moving so that they do not become targets in the
future. That gets back to the agility of the force that we
need, and to do that our forces need to be connected--they need
to be on the network--our ability to securely command and
control and understand where the forces are, where the
logistics are, and where they need to go.
Chairman Reed. So in some respect communications is the
primary tool in your efforts.
General Van Ovost. Yes, Chairman. The ability to securely
command and control and direct the resources to the highest
priorities is a critical capability that we have.
Chairman Reed. Also I think by implication you would need a
significant number of platforms, and probably smaller than the
ones we are customarily used to. In addition, we would have to
take steps to try to electronically hide those vessels. Is that
correct, or airplanes?
General Van Ovost. Senator, we know that now we cannot
afford to simply disperse forces into the field. They have to
be integrated, integrated with all joint functions--fires,
maneuver, force protection. So in that manner we are going to
have to deploy in packages forward, and to your point, it is
not simply large ships or large aircraft. It will be a variety
of capabilities, depending on the scheme of the maneuver and
who we are supporting.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Thank you both.
Senator Inhofe, please.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The recent
emergency supplemental provided an additional $3 billion to
support Ukraine, backfill our allies, and invest in United
States stocks dedicated to this effort. General Wolters, you
have indicated that EUCOM needs significant increases to
sustain efforts to deter Russia, including through the European
Deterrence Initiative that the Biden administration cut last
year.
Okay. General Wolters, credible deterrence only works when
you have a strong national defense backing of our words, and
President Biden's warnings to Putin clearly failed to stop his
invasion. Russia's actions are a wake-up call for this
Administration and for Europe and Russia, and Russia remains a
significant threat.
As your opening statement attests, this crisis has provided
how much of a game-changer the European Deterrence Initiative
has been since it enabled the military to stand up the Army
pre-positioned stock sites that our troops have now fallen in
on. Can you expand on how critical those sites have been to
enable our troops to surge in Europe over the past few weeks?
General Wolters. Senator Inhofe, to take an armored brigade
combat team and launch it from the continental United States
and put it on European turf and have the tanks that comprise
that brigade combat team to shoot, move, communicate, and fire
on range in one week is an amazing accomplishment. That was
facilitated by those Army pre-positioned stocks and it was
practiced in previous exercises, which are very expense and
part of the EDI fund.
So I would just say that when we demonstrated to the
European community and to the NATO community and to the world
how well we can shoot, move, and communication and transition a
large force from CONUS to Europe, at that pace, is something
that demonstrates the great value of EDI.
Senator Inhofe. I think that is right. Are there any force
elements included in the new 20,000 forces that you have in
Europe now that would be extremely useful in your deterrence
efforts in the long run, in the future?
General Wolters. There are, Senator, and most of them have
to do with critical enablers, that you are very familiar with.
We have been able to benefit from their existence as they have
arrived in Europe.
Senator Inhofe. Good, and General Van Ovost, strategic lift
refers to the ability to transport personnel, equipment, and
stores from the continental United States to operational
theaters around the world. General Van Ovost, as we discussed
in my office, could you further describe the current readiness
of the sealift fleet?
General Van Ovost. Thanks, Senator. Look, the sealift fleet
is critical to the execution of our plans. They move 90 percent
of the cargo in wartime. Today, as we stand, about 70 percent
of our roll-on, roll-off capacity is going to exceed its
service life in 10 years. Our ability to keep those sealift
ships in readiness status is costing more and more every year.
So it has been imperative that we embark upon the sealift
recapitalization program, for which I am grateful for the
appropriation and the authorization, which will get us up to
four new ships. Then we are going to work with the Navy to get
beyond four, up to nine, as they submit their sealift build
plan, and hopefully that will satisfy the requirements and we
can continue to purchase sealifts when favorable conditions are
occurring right now in the market.
Senator Inhofe. That is good, and I think they will. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Gillibrand, please.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General
Wolters, Senators Ernst, Rosen, and King, we just returned from
visiting with our troops in Germany and meeting Ukrainians as
they flee across the border into Poland. Can you give us,
consistent with this unclassified setting, an update on what
EUCOM's role is in facilitating both the delivery of lethal aid
but also our humanitarian efforts to support the Ukrainian
people?
General Wolters. Senators, as you are familiar, based off
your visit, we had 18th Airborne Corps and the 82nd, and a
large force put in play in the appropriate geographic region to
assure and deter. Part of that program was, when the conditions
were right, facilitate the flow of citizens back and forth
across the border. That has certainly taken place, and the
utilization of those 5,500 soldiers has enhanced our ability to
secure our European population on the Polish side of the border
and to take into account the disposition of activities inside
of Ukraine by consulting and communicating with those who have
departed.
So that force has been integral to ensure that the 4
million-plus refugees from Ukraine have a soft landing once
they come into Europe. We have still got a lot of work to do,
and we will continue to facilitate that flow and do the best we
can, from a military perspective, to secure those soft landings
for the refugees coming out of Ukraine.
Senator Gillibrand. Can you speak to Special Operations
Command Europe's intention to establish a new forward operating
base in Albania to improve our current ability to operate in
the Balkans, and can you speak to how this has affected our
ability to partner with neighboring forces?
General Wolters. I can, Senator. That advancement is
critical. With Albania we will improve their resiliency, we
will improve their familiarity with other nations on the
peripheries' resiliency, and it will make that region much
stronger and much more ready when it comes to identifying
nefarious activities that start to creep in. The Special Forces
do a fantastic job in the information environment of ensuring
that we are out in front of malign influence in that area.
Senator Gillibrand. I appreciate the chart that you have
given us for the United States force posture in Europe, having
a total of 102,000 forces as of March 24, 2022. Do you envision
additional changes to force posture in the next few weeks to
appropriately stand against Russia?
General Wolters. Senator, we take a conditions-based
approach and we look at the issues second by second, minute by
minute. I would just tell you that based off the dynamic
environment that exists today that number could change. I
suspect that it probably will, and in which direction will be
determined based off conditions in the environment.
Senator Gillibrand. Could you please speak to the issue, as
we are addressing the ongoing situation in Ukraine, China
continues to attempt to cultivate influence in Europe and is
another challenge that EUCOM has to face. Do you feel that
EUCOM is adequately equipped to manage both the acute crisis in
Ukraine as well as the long-term challenges posed by China?
General Wolters. We are, Senator, and this goes back to
Senator Inhofe's NDS from previous years and the new NDS that
is out, that focuses heavily, from a U.S. Department of Defense
perspective, with respect to integrated deterrence and cross-
COCOM activity. I am very, very familiar with the challenges
that Admiral Aquilino faces in INDOPACOM. He is very familiar
with the challenges that we face in Europe. When it comes to
the transactions that take place between Russia-China, and
China-Russia, we are both very dialed into that, as a result of
the architecture and process that is in place in the
Department.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. General Van Ovost, one issue
that my office has heard from servicemembers throughout the
pandemic was how COVID delays negatively impacted their PCS,
including servicemembers being told to handle their own move
due to lack of contractors and services. Do you feel that
TRANSCOM's ability to help servicemembers has improved and that
TRANSCOM has adapted to the new normal since the onset of the
pandemic?
General Van Ovost. Senator, we are also concerned about the
household good movement industry, but writ large, with
essentially contested logistics in here in the Homeland, it has
affected all aspects of what we do. I do believe we are headed
for a more stable future with respect to the labor market, and
frankly, our ability to complete the Global Household Goods
Contract means that I have really good indications we are going
to have the capacity necessary to ensure that this does not
happen into the future.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Wicker, please.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. General
Wolters, in the last few moments we are seeing news reports
that Moscow is committing to withdrawing a majority of its
forces surrounding Kyiv. Of course, it is now afternoon where
the negotiators are. Multiple teams have been withdrawn from
the axis of the attack, and DOD officials are saying they see
this as a major strategy shift, according to news reports.
What is your assessment of the authority and status of the
current Russians who are negotiating at this moment? We had had
reports initially that they were not sending the A-team to
these negotiations.
General Wolters. Senator, I have heard those same reports
but I cannot verify whether or not they are the varsity or the
junior varsity. I can verify that the comments that you made
with respect to the shifting dynamics in the ground domain in
the vicinity of Kyiv are exactly what we see from a EUCOM
perspective.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Well, we will see how significant
that is. I have got my doubts, but we certainly hope for peace.
Let me just ask you, in terms of permanently stationed
forces in EUCOM, is our current posture enough? What are the
numbers there, and should the United States have more permanent
or rotational forces in EUCOM, and specifically in the Baltics?
General Wolters. Senator, the numbers increase. From a
United States perspective, as a result of the incursion into
Ukraine by Russia, have boosted our numbers from 60,000 to
approximately 100,000. What I also examine in my other command
hat is the increase of European involvement, and in specific
targeting of what we are doing with respect to the population
and capability increase in the Baltics, we have seen a dramatic
shift as a result of contributions from multiple nations.
Several have been published in open press. Germany, the United
Kingdom, Denmark have all been very, very generous with respect
to their recent contributions to the EFP battle groups.
Senator Wicker. But sir, what is your recommendation as to
more permanent U.S. Forces?
General Wolters. I think what we need to do, from a United
States force perspective, is look at what takes place in Europe
following completion of the Ukraine-Russia scenario and examine
the European contributions, and based off the breadth and depth
of the European contributions be prepared to adjust the United
States contributions, and my suspicion is we are going to still
need more. Obviously there is always a mix between the
requirement of permanent versus rotational, and there are
plusses and minuses of each one. We will have to continue to
examine the European contributions to make a smart decision
about where to go in the future.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Let me ask you about expectations
when this war began. What we were hearing is the Russians would
defeat the Ukrainians and obtain their invasion objectives
within 5 days or so. Is there an intelligence gap in our
capability that made us overestimate the Russians and
underestimate the defensive capability of the Ukrainians?
General Wolters. Senator, there could be, and as we have
always done in the past, when this crisis over with we will
accomplish a comprehensive after-action review, in all domains,
in all departments, and find out where our weak areas were and
make sure that we can find ways to improve, and this could be
one of those areas.
Senator Wicker. Then finally, what barriers do you see
increasing the number of DDGs in Rota to six?
General Wolters. Senator, the infrastructure is set as a
result of the tremendous EDI contributions over the years, and
as we speak we have temporarily put more destroyers into
EUCOM's portfolio. We have been able to test the infrastructure
receptiveness in Rota to taking on two more cruiser destroyers,
and we are ready, willing, and able to support.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Blumenthal, please.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you both for your service and
thank you for being here today.
General Van Ovost, in my visit to the border a couple of
weeks ago I was impressed not only with the incredible courage
and resilience of the refugees coming across the border but
also the work of the 82nd Airborne in that area, enabling the
Ukrainian military to transport many of the resupplies of
weapons, Stinger and Javelin missiles and so forth, to the
forces on the ground, sometimes within hours of the unloading
to actual combat. Would you agree with me that the Ukrainians--
and they are the ones who are transporting. I know that none of
your men and women are involved--but would you agree with me
that they have been extraordinarily agile and effective in
their transporting across Ukraine under fire or potential fire,
to their forces, of those weapons systems and other supplies we
are providing?
General Van Ovost. Thank you, Senator. Look, I absolutely
believe that they have been effective, as you can see, that
none of the lines really have been hit on the way, and it
appears they have been delivering right to the right location
at the right time. I want to thank everyone with respect to
supporting the logistics flow and be able to donate the
security cooperation that has been so successful to date.
Senator Blumenthal. Yeah, the 82nd Airborne has been
extraordinary. I know that other forces of the United States
and NATO allies have been as well.
General Wolters, as very far from the expert that you are
in this area, I think to many of us it looks like the
Ukrainians could win this fight if it were a fair fight on the
ground and if they were not vulnerable from the skies to the
reign of terror that the Russian military has unleashed through
artillery, jet fighters, missiles. The urgent and predominant
need is aerial defense. Could you tell the Committee how many
S-300s, SA-3s, what is the inventory that is available to
provide to Ukraine so that it can defend itself and, in effect,
have a fair fight on the ground, and also protect civilian
targets, which Vladimir Putin has mercilessly and ruthlessly
hit repeatedly?
General Wolters. Senator, in a different setting I would
adore the opportunity to give you specific numbers. What I can
say is from a United States perspective there is consultation
about supply and demand on the Ukrainian armed forces to ensure
that they are getting the right equipment at the right time,
based off their military campaign design, so that they can best
protect their forces.
Senator Blumenthal. In your judgment, are they getting what
they need?
General Wolters. They are, Senator.
Senator Blumenthal. Are we replenishing or backfilling--for
example, as we apparently did in Slovakia--with Patriot missile
systems, the air defense that our NATO allies need, if they are
providing the Soviet-era air defense such as the S-300s?
General Wolters. We are, Senator, and in multiple
portfolios, above and beyond just the surface-to-air missiles.
Senator Blumenthal. One of the lessons, it seems to me, of
the combat so far is that the Russian tanks have been far more
vulnerable than Putin ever contemplated. Are there lessons
about the use of tanks here for future warfare, in your
judgment?
General Wolters. Absolutely, to include the command and
control of those tanks.
Senator Blumenthal. That would involve better communication
systems.
General Wolters. It would, Senator.
Senator Blumenthal. Are you satisfied that the United
States and our NATO allies could and would avoid those same
kinds of mistakes if we had to respond to aggression by the
Russian army?
General Wolters. We can and we could and we would.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thanks, General, and thanks
for your many years of service. To both of you, thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Fischer, please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
General Wolters, for your many years of service. Thank you,
General Van Ovost, for being here today as well.
General Wolters, in your prepared testimony you note the
importance of our nuclear deterrent, and in particular our non-
strategic nuclear weapons that are forward deployed in Europe.
Can you talk a bit more about their importance and the support
that our allies have for this mission?
General Wolters. Senator, what nuclear strategic deterrence
offers is tough to communicate to our European partners, and
over the course of the last several years they have all gained
a greater understanding of the freedom of maneuver that the
strategic nuclear deterrence umbrella provides those nations in
Europe. With contributions from the European nations, with
respect to allowing the facilitation of non-strategic nuclear
weapons I feel that Europe is in a much better place to
effectively defend and deter.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Can you also talk about the
support that our allies have shown for the additional four
battle groups and the level of interest you have seen from them
in participating, please?
General Wolters. The participation has been very, very
strong. The level of interest continues to increase, and it
corresponds with nations' voluntary national contributions that
continue to mount, specifically in those four battle groups in
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia. The campaign momentum
to build those minimum battalion-sized battle groups with all-
domain capability is improving with every day.
Senator Fischer. Also many of our NATO allies are talking
about increasing their defense spending, I think basically in
response to the Russian invasion that we have seen in Ukraine.
We have seen countries in NATO, our allies, comes together and
pledge to reach that 2 percent. Some have even pledged to go
higher.
Can you tell us how you are working with our allies and
partners to ensure that the additional sources are really
focused on the right capabilities that are needed?
General Wolters. I can, Senator. We have a strategy. We
have plans that ultimately allow nations to identify military
requirements that contribute to delivering the appropriate
effect in the environment to ensure that we can better defend.
So now you have, in print, the appropriate connective tissue
that allows the taxpayers in all the European countries to
understand why it is they are committing the euros to what
causes, to generate the appropriate effect to have better
defense.
Senator Fischer. Is the United States participating not
just with the alliance as a whole but with individual countries
in trying to determine just what is needed where, what type of
capabilities are needed where, when you look at the entire
alliance?
General Wolters. Senator, the U.S. is, and so are the other
29 nations of NATO, and that is part of the great aspect of
having an alliance like NATO. There is a lot to be learned when
you are willing to listen to Estonia's needs, and we do, and we
learn a lot, and they listen to ours, from a United States
perspective.
Senator Fischer. Are you hopeful that the alliance will
continue to work well together, that there a new understanding
about the threats that are out there? I have deep concerns
about the classified briefings that we have, and all of that
information is not available to the people of this country. I
think if we could see some material that would be declassified
and be able to share with the citizens of the United States
there really would be a deeper understanding, more concern felt
when the population understands the threats that are out there.
I can see that happening in Europe, but it took an invasion for
it to happen. How are we going to address that?
General Wolters. Senator, I am hopeful and confident that
the degree of cooperation amongst the NATO nations will
continue. Looking back to how we approached this campaign and
the degree of intelligence sharing and information sharing and
the impact that it had on building trust amongst nations was
very, very powerful, and we need to continue that practice.
Senator Fischer. I think we need to continue it in this
country as well, so that the people in the United States
understand the very real threats that we face to our national
security. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Hirono, please.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for
being here.
General Wolters, you mentioned something that definitely
perked my interest, piqued my interest. We know that China and
Russia have a relationship, and China seeks to expand its
influence in Europe. So you mentioned that you are working, I
think, much more closely with Admiral Aquilino because of this
recognition that things do not just stay in one command
theater. So can you talk a little bit more about your
increased, closer working with Admiral Aquilino?
General Wolters. I can, Senator. We have shared thoughts
about what Russia has done with respect to its physical actions
in the vicinity in Ukraine and its activities outside of
Ukraine with its so-called allies and partners, and the impact
that it has on the actual execution. Admiral Aquilino is
obviously very interested in that because he faces a scenario
that is reasonably similar to this with respect to Taiwan, and
how we examine the United States response, the allies' and
partners' response, will help image Admiral Aquilino in working
his way through some of the tough spots that we anticipate that
he will have to work with in the future with respect to state-
on-state activities and state-on-state alliance activities and
state-on-state activities with respect to other partners and
allies on the periphery.
Senator Hirono. It sounds as though this is a more close
relationship that you are having with another combatant
commander. Is that so?
General Wolters. I have that same relationship with all the
other combatant commanders.
Senator Hirono. That is good to know. It makes sense.
General Van Ovost, it is good to talk with you again. As
you are aware, the Department of Defense recently made the
decision to defuel and close the Red Hill storage facility on
Oahu, and so there will be a transition period. It will take a
significant amount of planning and funding for this transition.
Last year's NDAA established TRANSCOM as the DOD bulk fuel
manager of the Department, which will become effective later
this year. As you assume this new role, what will you be
focused on to ensure the Department's fuel needs are met in the
Pacific, and what do you anticipate being the greatest
challenge as Red Hill is closed and we move to a more
distributed laydown?
General Van Ovost. Thank you, Senator. As you are aware,
there are really multiple studies, analyses, and war games
highlighted that our global bulk fuel, our command and control,
our distribution, where it is at, access to it, and the
infrastructure that supports it are inadequate in this
contested environment. Frankly, as the new NDS also states that
the PRC is the most consequential strategic competitor we have.
So we as look to the Pacific we have to do things differently.
So what we are doing right now, under the throes of
providing a strategy back to Congress here on 1 October on how
we are looking at the globe with respect to posture, war
reserves, our ability to maneuver the force both from an inter-
theater standpoint and within the theater, to ensure that we
have dispersed and diverse, specifically with respect to fuel,
to reduce the risk.
Indeed, in the decision to defuel Red Hill we are going to
use that as an opportunity to put a storage afloat so that we
can actually practice techniques and procedures that we would
actually use should we have to go to conflict, with respect to
our inter-theater tankers, doing console operations, and new
intra-theater, smaller tankers that we would need to move the
fuel forward into theater.
So as we look to those conops, in developing them and
resourcing them, it will be something we will be looking
forward in the future as the global bulk fuel manager.
Senator Hirono. Just one more question along those lines.
As we move to a more distributed fuel operations, is there an
opportunity to expand investment in places like the compact
states to build out a resilient fuel laydown while also
building economic cooperation with our compact partners?
General Van Ovost. Senator, I defer to Admiral Aquilino
with respect to specific partners. He has, as you know, a 2B
posture that is laid out that is really looking more south and
in that area, and from my perspective, we could not do what we
do without the commercial partnerships that we have around the
world. So we are looking to thicken our partnerships,
especially out in the Pacific.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Hirono.
Senator Ernst, please.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and General Van Ovost
and General Wolters, thank you so much for your service and for
appearing in front of our Committee today.
General Wolters, you know that I traveled with many of my
colleagues several weekends ago to visit Germany and Poland,
and we were grateful for the time that we had on the ground. We
had Senator Gillibrand, Senator King, and Senator Rosen from
this Committee. So we were able to spend time not only with
significant leaders from Germany and Poland but also with the
tremendous men and women of the 18th Airborne Corps, the 82nd
Airborne All-American, and our armored brigade as well. I want
to thank those men and women for being there on the front lines
and assisting with your NATO mission.
But as we focus on Ukraine we also get very concerned about
movement with Russia and the thoughts that perhaps they would
also engage in other countries as well. This is something we
really have not addressed in this hearing yet. Despite the fact
that Russia is stalling a bit in Ukraine, there are a number of
Russian troops, I believe about 1,500 Russian troops that exist
in Moldova, and we are concerned about that. For folks that
might be watching out there, Moldova is a country on the
southwestern border of Ukraine.
So we are concerned about this community, this country as
well. So what capabilities, both militarily--perhaps you can
speak to humanitarian issues as well--but what have we offered
to Moldova as a way of reassuring their country as well?
General Wolters. Senator, our European strategy calls for
comprehensive defense and shared response, and from a EUCOM
perspective we examine the 51 nations as part of that grouping,
and Moldova is one of them. Whenever there are opportunities to
increase our ability to share more info and share more intel,
we are attempting to do so. So that for all of Europe we are
improving our comprehensive indications and warnings and
command and control and feedback so when problems arise we hear
about it sooner rather than later. If there are information
pieces that need to go to Moldova sooner rather than later, to
help their disposition with respect to participation in a free
Europe, we are doing so.
The number of liaisons and the number of times that we
exchange has certainly grown over the years.
Senator Ernst. Have we seen any movement of those Russian
troops that exist in Moldova to reinforce the actions in
Ukraine, or do we see any movement shifting from Ukraine into
Moldova?
General Wolters. At this point, Senator, neither.
Senator Ernst. Okay. That is good. So we know that Poland
has offered MIG fighter jets, the S-300 anti-aircraft systems,
to support the defense of Ukraine, and to this point the United
States has chosen not to engage and be party to those transfers
or to backfill our NATO allies. My question is not why--I think
there has been a lot of debate about that--but who specifically
is the final authority on making the decision on what gets
transferred to who?
General Wolters. Senator, with respect to my European job,
the national leader is obviously the individual who is
responsible for making that policy decision. I say that
because, as you well know, other nations were involved in this
transaction. The first thing that Secretary General Stoltenberg
was keen on was the fact that nations can make the choice with
this decision and it typically comes from their national
leaders.
Senator Ernst. If we shift back to the United States of
America, with the assumption that those countries are willing
to receive or to transfer if we are to be a party of those
actions, if we are transferring items, who is the ultimate
authority in that decision-making chain?
General Wolters. Our commander in chief.
Senator Ernst. Okay. Thank you. I will yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
Senator Warren, please.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
General Wolters, for your leadership in responding to Russia's
invasion of Ukraine. I support the Ukrainian people and our
allies in this work.
So Congress recently approved $13.6 billion for Ukraine,
including $6.5 for the Pentagon. We also supported NATO
partners against Russian aggression for years through the
European Deterrence Initiative, or the EDI. But because of the
way Congress and DOD set up this fund the Pentagon does not
have to explain how EDI spending supports a long-term plan.
EDI was first funded through the Overseas Contingency
Operations, or OCO, account, which was primarily set up to
support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. But it became a
slush fund for the Pentagon to funnel billions of dollars
towards programs that were unrelated to those conflict.
Now the Biden administration eliminated OCO, and to make
sure that EDI did not turn into the same thing Congress
required your command to provide annual plans for long-term EDI
spending. General Wolters, three of those plans had been due
since the fiscal year 2020 NDAA made this requirement the law.
How many of those plans have actually been provided to
Congress?
General Wolters. Senator, I can tell you that EUCOM has
made a response, and the transaction between the Department and
Congress I am not aware of.
Senator Warren. Okay. Well, I will tell you the answer--
zero. Congress has pumped an additional $13 billion into the
EDI, and it is now highly likely that the EDI will grow in
tandem with our need to support our European allies. So even
though these are required by law, we have not gotten these
reports.
General Wolters, has your command provided the DOD with the
information they need to provide those plans to Congress this
year so that they can finally follow the law and submit a
report?
General Wolters. We have, Senator.
Senator Warren. I am sorry?
General Wolters. We have, Senator.
Senator Warren. You have provided the information. I
appreciate that because I am counting on seeing that report
soon. If we do not, it sounds like the process is breaking down
at DOD, and I will follow up with DOD to make sure that we get
the report we need. I appreciate your cooperation in that.
In addition to requiring plans for how EDI money would be
spent in the upcoming year, the fiscal year 2020 NDAA put in
place requirements for an annual report on how EDI money was
spent. Congress also never received those reports. So General
Wolters, will you make sure that this Committee receives a
report by November 30th of this year on how EDI money has been
spent to date?
General Wolters. I will do everything within my command
authority to do so, Senator.
Senator Warren. All right. Well that one is within your
command authority so I very much appreciate that.
You know, this Committee is being asked to sign off on an
$813 billion in national security spending next year. It is no
secret that I think that level of spending is too high. Our
strong, multilateral response in Ukraine shows how important it
is for us to invest in diplomacy, in helping refugees, and in
using all of our foreign policy tools. But that does not mean
giving the Pentagon a blank check or shrugging when we do not
get the budget information we need to conduct spending
oversight. Tracking these dollars is part of how we keep
America safe and how we work with our allies.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator, and let me
recognize Senator Blackburn, please.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
again to you all for being here.
General Wolters, I know this is not because of you.
Unfortunately, I think you are on the receiving end of a lot of
frustration from people because of the way we have received
information regarding Ukraine. I know that we need to continue
to keep a lot of what is happening on the ground in Ukraine in
a classified space.
But for the second time in less of a year, American is
plunged into a military crisis for which our leadership seems
unprepared and unaccountable. I talk to a lot of veterans. As
you know, we have got Fort Campbell, we have Arnold
Engineering, we have the U.S. Naval Station, we have got Oak
Ridge. So a lot of military in our state. I think that people
really want some transparency. They want some answers. They
want some accountability.
Interestingly enough, silence is a message. Silence is a
very strong message, and it is not a message of strength. I
think that it does not work in concert with the principles on
which this Nation was founded. So I hope that in the near
future this Committee is going to be able to have an open
hearing on the issue of what is happening in Ukraine.
Now, I want to go on to a long-term concern that we have
discussed, and regardless of what is happening in Ukraine I
want us to look at what is happening with Beijing. Maintaining
China as the pacing challenge, not just for DOD but for each
combatant command is of the utmost importance, and it is
something that this Committee needs to assist DOD with as well
as to hold the different divisions accountable for.
So to each of you, very quickly, what are the roles of your
combatant commands in supporting the implementation of the 2018
National Defense Strategy with regard to China?
General Wolters, to you first, and then General Van Ovost.
General Wolters. Senator, I have to do everything within my
power, as the commander of USEUCOM to take a look at the
coordinating authority activities that take place inside of my
territorial boundaries, and find the ones that have any
potential impact with respect to China. As Admiral Aquilino
governs and manages his UCP, he needs to do the same with
respect to Russia. This is a process that has been in place for
several years, and it is improving, but it continues to require
vigilance and scrutiny and iterations to ensure that we can get
better.
Senator Blackburn. Let me ask you this. As you look at what
is happening with the CCP, what are the trends that are of
greatest concern to you?
General Wolters. I would contend that it is the activities
of allies and partners as they apply to those nations, being
able to get what they want or what they should not get.
Senator Blackburn. Okay. General Van Ovost?
General Van Ovost. Thank you, Senator. With respect to
trends that I look at as the Transportation Commander, I
monitor their ability to project power around the globe,
because that is our operating area, and I am monitoring their
investments into ports, and their impact of these investments
on our ability to maneuver around the world, their ability to
disrupt and degrade our ability to project and sustain a force
into the Pacific.
Senator Blackburn. Is that the trend that concerns you
most? You know, take Djibouti. So their work in areas like
that, where they go in under Belt and Road but then they couple
that with their military. Is that kind of at the top of your
list of concerns?
General Van Ovost. On the top of the list of my concerns is
the kinetic and non-kinetic threats in the region. But
secondarily, as I look to them maneuvering around the globe and
influencing other nations' decisions, this is about allies and
partners. So the second main thing we are doing is we are
trying to thicken our relationship with allies and partners
around the world to robust them against these threats.
Certainly from our perspective the military threats but also
the diplomatic and economic threats that they face from China
on a day-to-day basis.
Senator Blackburn. So you consider those in total and not
separately.
General Van Ovost. I do. I do. A whole-of-government
approach for all of these allies and partners to be able to
robust them. I will take it a step further. We are inextricably
linked to commercial industry. So our commercial industry
networks that are around the world right now, we are also
working on thickening and protecting them, because they are
working in these regions day in and day out, delivering around
the world, and we rely on them as well.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you. I have some questions I will
submit to you all, and thank you very much for your time today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
Let me recognize Senator King, please.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Wolters,
Putin has been talking for years about his ostensible claims to
Ukraine and part of Russia and all those kinds of things. One
of his principal strategic goals seems to be a land bridge
between Russia and Crimea. Are they making similar noises about
Kaliningrad, and is this something we need to be concerned
about, or do they accept that Kaliningrad is essentially
landlocked from the east?
General Wolters. Sir, with respect to Kaliningrad it is
something we should always be concerned about, but over the
course of the last 4 to 5 months that has not been an issue,
with respect to Russian activity.
Senator King. Thank you. Quick question. Speed of
shipments, from the time the order is given in Washington to
authorize equipment to Ukraine, how long does it take to get to
the Polish-Ukrainian border?
General Wolters. Senator, it depends. We have been
iterating on this. It is improving, and we have seen cases, for
example, with a large, armored brigade combat team that we have
been able to transact that in weeks as opposed to months.
Senator King. So that is improving, and these are timely
shipments. The Ukrainians need this equipment right now, not a
month from now.
General Wolters. It is improving. We have cases with
smaller force settlements where it would take 28 to 30 days,
and in many of those cases we are down to single-digit days, in
less than a week.
Senator King. I am not talking about necessarily force
elements but materiel, weapons.
General Wolters. That falls into the same category.
Senator King. Same category. Okay.
We heard at the beginning of the invasion that there were
something like 200,000 Russian troops in Belarus and in Russia.
They have committed many, if not all of those. What reserves do
the Russians now have? In other words, what portion of their
entire military force, in terms of people, have been committed
to Ukraine at this point, and what level of reserves do they
have to call upon?
General Wolters. Sir, in a different setting I can give you
a precise number, but in the 70 to 75 percent category are
devoted to this, from a Russian perspective, at this time.
Senator King. So a very substantial portion of their total
force is committed in Ukraine. Can the Ukrainians succeed in
the east as they have around Kyiv? They are going to redeploy
in that direction too, I presume, since the Russians are doing
so. Do the tactics that they have been able to use in the north
and northeast succeed in stalling the Russians or perhaps even
pushing them back?
General Wolters. Senator, I certainly believe that they can
succeed in stalling the Russians.
Senator King. Okay. I understand the comment. But have the
Ukrainians improved over the course of the past month in their
terms of use of the weapons and tactics? They seem to have
shown significant success in the last week or two.
General Wolters. Absolutely, Senator. The Ukrainian armed
forces show a very, very positive learning curve. Hence, I am
optimistic about being able to force additional stalling on
behalf of the Russians.
Senator King. Let me change the subject for a minute. I am
concerned that Russia falls into a number of different COCOMs--
I am sorry, the Arctic--and I am concerned about coordination
between the various COCOMs that have a piece of the Arctic
defense, because Russia is certainly militarizing on their
shore of the Arctic. What steps are there, or do you feel that
there is sufficient coordination? The whole idea of a COCOM is
somebody is in charge, and if you have got, I think it is three
COCOMs that have a piece of the Arctic jurisdiction, do you
feel it is sufficiently well coordinated to respond to a
Russian action in the Arctic?
General Wolters. As you are well aware, Senator, in 2019,
we established NORTHCOM as the capability advocate for DOD, and
in his responsibility today, General VanHerck is doing a
tremendous job of orchestrating the support that supports the
relationships with the other COCOMs.
To the point to where all of us have plans for the Arctic,
being held accountable to support those plans so that we can
improve our indications and warnings on our command and control
and our mission capabilities----
Senator King. So NORTHCOM has the lead.
General Wolters. NORTHCOM is the capability advocate for
DOD for the Arctic.
Senator King. I have never heard the term ``capability
advocate.'' Does that mean they are in charge?
General Wolters. In so many areas it does, especially when
it comes to capabilities, which is ever so important for us in
the military to deliver the appropriate effect in the
environment.
Senator King. General, I will have some questions for the
record on TRANSCOM. The two specifically are, cyber resilience,
which you have cited as a potential problem--or not a potential
but a serious problem--and also what lessons TRANSCOM has
learned from the Ukraine experience, a kind of preliminary
after-action review, if you will. I will submit those for the
record.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Cotton, please.
Senator Cotton. Thank you both for your appearance today
and your service to our nation. General Wolters, I am sure you
deeply regret this will be your last appearance in front of
this Committee, as the combatant commander in Europe.
A couple of weeks ago Russia shot missiles that landed
about 10 miles from Poland's border. You are the combatant
commander for American forces in Europe. You are the supreme
allied commander for NATO forces. What direction or
authorization have you received from the President or from the
NATO council about the immediate action you should take if a
missile were to hit Polish territory?
General Wolters. Continue to fortify the security
disposition from a military perspective in air, land, sea,
space, and cyber, on the eastern portion of Europe.
Senator Cotton. Are you authorized to immediately strike
back at that aircraft that launched the missile or a missile
battery that fired it?
General Wolters. No, I am not.
Senator Cotton. By the time you receive that authorization,
that aircraft and that missile battery probably would have
moved and no longer be susceptible to immediate strike. Is that
correct?
General Wolters. That is correct, and again, this all
applies to activity that occurs in Ukraine, with respect to
Russia, not on NATO territory.
Senator Cotton. I am disappointed to hear that you do not
have that authorization, General.
The President said, while he was in Europe, that we are
training Ukrainian forces in Poland. Is that accurate?
General Wolters. At this time--was that the time setting of
the statement?
Senator Cotton. That is what the President said. Jake
Sullivan said we are not. I am just trying to figure out if we
are or are not.
General Wolters. I do not believe that we are in the
process of currently training military forces from Ukraine and
Poland. There are liaisons that are there that are being given
advice, and that is different than I think you are referring to
with respect to training.
Senator Cotton. A few weeks ago, President Zelensky asked
for the transfer of MIG-29 aircraft from Poland. The Secretary
of State said that we gave a green light to that. Two days
later the Pentagon said it was untenable because they were
afraid that it would be escalatory. Were you asked for your
best military advice about this decision, and if so, what was
it?
General Wolters. I was and I provided that best military
advice to the Secretary of Defense. If Secretary Austin would
like to share that with you I know that he will.
Senator Cotton. Can you help me understand how it would be
escalatory to provide these aircraft to Poland if they came
from us but not if they came from Poland?
General Wolters. I think that nations have to make the
decision independently about whether or not they want to give
aircraft to the Ukraine, and that is certainly the case with
respect to Poland's choice. With respect to what we do, part of
the decision, from a United States perspective, was metered
through the return on investment for the capability of those
platforms versus potential escalation. When that balance was
looked at, the decision was made not to advocate giving MIGs to
Poland.
Senator Cotton. Yeah, I mean, I understand that some people
think that these MIGs would not be that useful for Ukraine, and
I do not believe they will be a silver bullet, but President
Zelensky and the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has asked for
them, and I think this would be a case where we respect their
judgments, even if they just use them for spare parts for their
aircraft. I think they have earned that right. I do not think
if you are a Russian pilot you view old MIGs as any more
escalatory than modern Stingers, if you are the one being shot
out of the sky. I suspect you would not either, General.
Are we still making distinctions between offensive and
defensive weapons that we provide to Ukraine?
General Wolters. Senator, I would expect that we are
examining each and every one of the weapons and making sure
that on a case-by-case basis we are taking into account the
escalatory potential that they present.
Senator Cotton. I just think that Russia invaded Ukraine.
Ukraine is defending its soil. By definition, every weapon it
has is defensive.
Two weeks ago, the President announced the delivery of a
package of arms to include switchblade drones. One week ago,
the Pentagon acknowledged that they had not yet been delivered.
Have those drones been delivered yet to Ukraine?
General Wolters. They have not yet landed in Ukraine. They
are in the process.
Senator Cotton. Do we know why that is taking so long?
General Wolters. I do not at this time, Senator.
Senator Cotton. One final question I have here. This is
about your placemat on the disposition of U.S. Forces. We have
40,000 troops in Germany. That is four times the next-largest
troop presence, almost, and 40 percent of our total enhanced
presence in Europe now. Is there a strategic reason to have so
many troops in Germany, or is that just a historic artifact
that it used to be the front lines of the east-west conflict?
General Wolters. It has to do with mostly the United States
Army and availability of training ranges. So when those force
elements come over they can practice shooting, moving, and
communicating, and when called to go forward you will have a
ready force, and that is because of the long tradition that you
have experienced in your Army career of Hohenfels and
Grafenwohr.
Senator Cotton. Can you tell me how many of those 40,000
troops that we have in Germany have the primary job of shooting
a weapon, driving a vehicle, or flying an aircraft that can
kill a bad guy?
General Wolters. Well over 70 percent.
Senator Cotton. So over 70 percent of those 40,000 troops
have a military occupational specialty or APSC that is about
killing bad guys, not supporting frontline troops?
General Wolters. That is correct. They are the teeth of the
military formation.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator Rosen, please.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed, for holding this
critically important hearing.
General Wolters, I am sure you understand more than most
that the world is watching the United States as we support our
NATO allies and help the Ukrainian people defend their country
from Vladimir Putin's violent, unprovoked war on their
democratic way of life.
So with this in mind, earlier this month I traveled to
Poland and Germany as part of a bipartisan codel to reinforce
to the world that Americans stand united in our support for
Ukraine and the Ukrainian people. Throughout the trip we did
have the privilege of meeting U.S. Forces supporting the EUCOM
mission, we received briefings from commanders on the situation
on the ground in Ukraine, and we saw first-hand the security
assistance and training NATO is providing. This trip
underscored for me that we can and we must do more, taking
additional actions to support Ukraine, helping them to defeat
Putin's forces.
So I want to just turn to a little bit of talking about the
humanitarian aid, because in Poland we visited a refugee center
were displaced Ukrainians were seeking shelter and refuge from
Putin's brutality, and I saw women and children--they were all
women and children, primarily--they fled their homes and the
lives they built. We heard on the ground people in Ukraine are
running out of food, water, medical supplies.
So General, what role is EUCOM playing in supporting the
United States military's humanitarian mission in the Ukraine,
and how concerned are you that potential Russian gains might
complicate your efforts to provide both the military and
humanitarian assistance that they need?
General Wolters. Senator, we are very concerned, and EUCOM
is assisting with inventories, transactions back and forth,
with security assistance as well as humanitarian assistance, to
make sure that from the supply and demand standpoint that the
right stuff goes in at the right time, with the best possible
force protection. We will vary as necessary, based off trends
that exist in the environment to ensure that we can, as best we
can, safely get the right goods to the right people at the
right time, both from a security assistance standpoint and both
from a humanitarian assistance standpoint. As a military
organization we are obviously working side by side with many of
our government partners outside of the Department of Defense as
well as those that represent departments outside of the
Department of Defense in the countries where these transactions
are taking place, Poland and others.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I want to move on to cyber
threats, because obviously you have alluded to it, General Van
Ovost, and of course my colleagues as well. But I want to turn
Russian gray zone tactics. Russia has launched malicious
cyberattacks to target Ukraine's infrastructure, its government
networks, while utilizing disinformation to falsely paint
Ukraine, of course, and I am going to quote here, ``a Nazi
regime.''
So General Wolters, I have a three-part question for you on
Russian hybrid warfare threats. First, have Russian
cyberattacks compromised Ukrainian command and control? Second,
do we have adequate strategies for countering Russia's
information operations in eastern Ukraine? Third, given that
NATO, in 2014, declared that a cyberattack could lead to the
invocation of Article 5, in your view what should be the
threshold for a Russian cyberattack that could lead to invoking
Article 5?
General Wolters. Senator, the first question that has to do
with Ukrainian C2, as I think most of us have seen in the
public domain, Ukrainian C2 is currently in place, from a
whole-of-government perspective, on Ukraine's part, all the way
down to the military. So I would contend that Russia has been
very challenged in that area and Ukraine has continued to be
successful.
I think the strategic implications are profound, and I
believe that when we examine what has taken place up to this
point, and write books about it in the future, we will look
back and conclude and be comfortable with the fact that we have
dramatically, from a U.S. perspective and NATO perspective,
improved our tactics, techniques, and procedures as they
contribute to a campaign in the area of offensive cyber and
defensive cyber, as well as the manipulation of how information
comes out and how we can ensure that the truth still gets to
the appropriate point.
I would just say that when it comes to what NATO does to
declare an Article 5, as a military commander what I am
responsible for is ensuring that we have all of the fact. As
you well know, Senator, we typically wind up in situations to
where the next day after we quickly discover that we did not
have all the facts. What I would owe the North Atlantic Council
and NATO so that they could make the appropriate decision is to
get as many of those facts as I can and provide my best
military advice to the North Atlantic Council that would be
responsible for making that decision, all 30 nations, about
whether or not to enact Article 5. In situations like this,
when it comes to cyber, it is very difficult to get the facts,
and you have to work hard to make sure that you get those, and
that would be my responsibility at the time when that would
occur.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I see my time is up, but General
Van Ovost, I will take this for the record, about investing in
the right cyber talent and modernizing IT capabilities in order
to support all of this.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
Senator Cramer, please.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to both
generals for being here and for your incredible service.
General Wolters, I want to begin with you, go back to a
conversation you had with Senator Wicker, specifically about
the distinction of permanent and assigned forces, as we
obviously see this increase now in force. As I understand--and
maybe I will drill down a little more--he was asking about
permanent and assigned forces. I think the bottom line was you
said we should probably grow them.
What I am wondering is over the last several years, as we
have been drawing down, EUCOM and CENTCOM, to prepare more
forces for other places, specifically the Pacific, and you have
talked a little bit with Senator Hirono about the global issue,
how do we reconcile the need for more forces everywhere? Do we
just grow the force, or does this management of personnel
become much more difficult? By the way, I might also ask, and
how does agile combat play into all of that? We, in North
Dakota, are very cognizant of the B-52s and the role they have
played, exercising, obviously. Maybe just talk a little bit
about ACE and how that fits in as well.
General Wolters. Well, Senator, first, Agile Combat
Employment is very helpful, whether or not you are addressing
permanent or rotational forces, to be able to take a unique
capacity and quickly insert it into a region, and then when no
longer does it deliver the effect that helps enhance peace in
that region pull it out and get it back home where it needs to
be, to refit and be ready to respond globally. It is incredibly
important.
With respect to permanently assigned versus rotational, as
we have seen, what has unfolded in Ukraine with respect to
Russia, it has allowed us the opportunity to take a look at a
whole-of-government, multi-domain force and examine what shifts
we could possibly make in the future. I contend that we would
probably be wise to examine what has unfolded in Ukraine and
Russia and the periphery nations, and certainly from a NATO
perspective and being a commander, with respect to those NATO
forces, those contributions that those allies and partners have
committed impacts the appropriate effect that we can deliver,
which goes all the way back to how smart we need to be with
respect to making the right decision, giving global
ramifications on permanent versus rotational.
The answer is still, I believe it depends. There is always
goodness and badness in both cases, but I think we need to be
smart about it and refit just a little bit and examine what has
unfolded here, to make a prudent decision going forward.
Senator Cramer. Well said, and you actually anticipated my
next question and answered it, so thank you.
Speaking of whole-of-government, General Van Ovost, you
probably are as engaged in the whole-of-government approach as
much, or more importantly, probably, than anybody. There are
two things that you have said, one in your opening statement--I
think it was your opening statement--where you said something
to the effect that ``I look forward to working with the Navy to
satisfy restrictions in current law.'' I think that was
regarding the building of ships, right? Could you just
elaborate a little bit on ``satisfy restrictions in current
law''? Should we be changing the restrictions? Are you implying
that, or are you just saying there is a lot of bureaucracy we
have to work through, and help me help you?
General Van Ovost. Thanks, Senator. The authorization is to
purchase up to 9 used sealift ships, 4 ships without a
requirement for new build, but in order to purchase the fifth
ship the Navy has to submit a plan for 10 new ships being
build, sealift or OSV, general utility type ships, so we can
continue to purchase used number 5 through number 9. So in
2021, we have now purchased two ships, and we have been given
the appropriation to purchase 5 more used ships, but we will
only right now be able to purchase 2 more until either the law
is changed or the Navy submits a plan that is satisfactory to
the Committees.
Senator Cramer. I understand. So we need to work on that.
You also referenced, in a conversation--I do not remember
which Senator it was; it might have been Hirono--you referenced
the term ``thickening partners'' a couple of times, I think.
What I am wondering is, have you seen, in recent months or
recent years, a changing, if you will, or a growing cooperation
among our partners, with our partners in the Pacific,
specifically, to allow, for example, better access to ports and
navigability that maybe was not there in the not-so-distant
past? Are you seeing some improvement?
General Van Ovost. Senator, I would say we are seeing
improvement. The fine points of that improvement I would leave
to Admiral Aquilino. But as we look to both our military and
our commercial networks, as we are increasing our activities
and exercises and interoperability with our allies and partners
in the Pacific, we are seeing an increase.
Senator Cramer. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cramer.
Senator Duckworth, please.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
both General Van Ovost and General Wolters for joining us
today.
As we near the milestone of one month into the invasion of
Ukraine we are hitting a critical moment in our pledge to
support Ukraine and our NATO allies. What were once seen as ad
hoc efforts to gather and distribute aid to the Ukrainian
heroes combatting Russian aggression has become a new normal.
What was once an emergent situation will now test our
commitment and our resilience as the fatigue of warfare sets
in?
This new reality will stress our own logistics networks as
we have to reinforce our delivery mechanisms into Ukraine in
order to deter Russian interdiction, and it will challenge our
industry partners to reopen or accelerate manufacturing lines
to incorporate into the next aid package and to replenish our
own stockpiles.
So I would like to start off by discussing the status of
our inter-theater capabilities, which are critical to the work
that we are doing in Europe, and will be just as critical if
ever needed for a contingency in the Pacific.
During our last meeting, General Van Ovost, we discussed
your plans to reduce the age of your strategic maritime assets
by purchasing used replacement ships. This strategy is clearly
proving successful, but with 34 or your 50 assets set to retire
I am concerned that we are not moving fast enough.
General Van Ovost, what are the biggest obstacles you face
in your strategy to buy used maritime assets, and what can
Congress do to support your efforts during fiscal year 2023?
General Van Ovost. Thank you, Senator, and as we discussed,
the aging ships are costing more to maintain, and even with
that more money we are not getting the readiness bang out of
that buck. So we have had to make some prudent and cost-
effective decisions to accelerate retirements of platforms even
without a backfill.
I think most importantly a stable plan of recapitalization
with used ships to ensure that we get the most value out of it,
and also to stabilize the shipyards, because these ships do go
back and get modifications done as they come into the ready
reserve fleet, so a nice, stable platform for buy, about 4 a
year, would be very helpful to close and be able to mitigate
those gaps.
But I also wanted to just reiterate that, you know, our
organic fleet will never be able to do everything we need to
do, so maintaining a healthy ready reserve fleet is good, but I
also want to thank this Committee for their work on not only on
the continued stipend for the MSP but also for the tanker
security program that we just started, to provide U.S.-crewed,
U.S.-flagged ships for both fuel movement and for our regular
maritime security program. These are force multipliers for us
to ensure that we can continue to project and sustain the force
into the future.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. For my second question I want
to turn back to logistics, but in Europe. I would like to touch
on issues of lessons learned and potential obstacles for the
future. I know we have already had a bit of a discussion on the
EDI with my colleague from Oklahoma, Senator Inhofe. Given that
we are nearly 4 weeks into this conflict in Ukraine and a month
and a half into our increased presence and posture, we must
take the opportunity to evaluate this strategy and look forward
to what logistic challenges may be in our future.
So General Wolters, I would like to give you the
opportunity to sort of discuss what lessons related to
logistics should we be learning from United States operations
in Europe, and what steps should we be taking during this
fiscal year's budget cycle to plan for the enduring logistics
challenge of a prolonged war in Ukraine, as well as the
recovery that will come after that?
General Wolters. Senator, as you well know from your
history this take constant scrutiny, constant iterations,
constant willingness to listen and process and improve. We,
during the start of this campaign, in the vicinity of 27
February, stood up two logistics cells that actually iterate on
all these processes. One is EUCOM-represented and the other one
is internationally represented. At the end of the day you have
got to get the right stuff in at the right time, and it has to
be appropriately defended so that those individuals that are
responsible for what we are putting in and protected, and when
it goes into the actionable area, Ukraine, it is put to good
use. Then you have to track it every second along the way.
We have that data, are maintaining that data, and we
continue to iterate the process and improve, all the way from
acquiring it in CONUS to where it gets to the operator in
Ukraine, to make sure that we are doing the right thing from a
logistics standpoint. That is actually what those two cells are
charged to do, as well as current-day ops. At the end of the
day it takes gigantic elbow grease, every millisecond of the
day, to get right, and you have to wake up the next morning and
tell yourself you are probably not doing it right and be
prepared to iterate one more time, and that is what those two
cells are currently in the process of doing at Stuttgart.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
Senator Tuberville, please.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Good morning. Thanks to both
of you for your service. General Van Ovost, in 2017, China put
their first military base in Africa, in Djibouti. Now it looks
like they are possibly going to put one on the Atlantic side,
Equatorial Guinea. Does that give you any concerns in TRANSCOM?
General Van Ovost. Senator, it absolutely does. As they
begin to elbow their way into these countries they will begin
to effect their economic decisions and their diplomatic
decision, which could disrupt or delay our ability to access
those same areas. So I am concerned about their building
operations around the world as they are trying to protect their
growing interests, not only in South America but in Africa.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. General Wolters, off the
question here a little bit. Do we still have Afghan refugees in
your purview?
General Wolters. Sir, we just closed out the last set that
were at Camp Bechtel. They are safe and secure in another
country right now.
Senator Tuberville. How many do you think you have
processed through your venue?
General Wolters. We actually processed 70,000 through the
four sites in Europe.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Awesome job.
What do Finland and Sweden bring to the table in NATO?
General Wolters. Sir, the first thing they bring is forces
that are ready, and they have a history of doing some wonderful
things against folks that elect to violate their sovereignty.
Their ready forces help lead from the front, many of the other
national forces that represent the NATO nations.
Senator Tuberville. They have a pretty strong military,
considering their size?
General Wolters. Yes, sir.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Why do you think they shot
hypersonics in Ukraine when they did not have to?
General Wolters. I think it was to demonstrate the
capability and attempt to put fear in the hearts of the enemy,
and I do not think they were successful.
Senator Tuberville. Yeah. What did it hit? Or was it one or
two?
General Wolters. There have been multiple launches. Most of
them have been directed at military targets, still TBD based
off the intelligence returns. But what I can say is most of
those strikes have been designated at specific military
targets.
Senator Tuberville. One went from one side of the country
to the other. I mean, that takes a lot of guts to do that, know
that, I guess, they knew it was going to work.
You know, when I was over in Ukraine a few months ago, the
generals there were telling me about the new armor that they
were putting on tanks. Has that been successful for Russia? I
notice a lot of tanks are torn up. Do you have any information
on that? Have they held up, you know, the new armor, to the
Javelins and the Stingers?
General Wolters. Sir, this is pretty anecdotal but the
feedback we are getting is if you have a lot of anti-armor,
anti-tank munitions you can slow down a tank. So even their new
armor has some chinks in their armor, so to speak, with respect
to multiple projectiles being launched at them.
Senator Tuberville. Have we seen any new weapons, other
than hypersonic, used in this war?
General Wolters. No, sir.
Senator Tuberville. I am anxious to see how the
switchblades work. I think that could be a huge benefit for us
down the road, and hopefully to Ukraine.
Let's see. I have a couple more here.
General Van Ovost, Alabama is proud to have been selected
as the permanent home of the U.S. Space Command, in Huntsville.
Recently there have been comments made that question if the
command would be able to easily move from their temporary home.
That obviously would be part of your purview there. I just want
to say that I have every confidence in your ability to guide
TRANSCOM through facilitating this move following the IG's
decision in the near future. If you can pull off the last-
minute Afghanistan evacuation, this should be a piece of cake.
But hopefully we can get that done.
I yield my time, and, General, thank you for your service.
I hope you are looking forward to playing golf and fishing.
Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville.
Senator Peters, please.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Wolters, let me first congratulate you and thank
you for your 40 years of service. Your leadership and
dedication to the men and women of our Armed Forces and our
allies and partners has certainly helped shape the
unprecedented strength and the unity of NATO against Putin's
criminal aggression, so thank you.
In your posture statement you highlight this is a perhaps
the last time you expect to testify as EUCOM commander, and the
history has yet to be written about how the illegal invasion of
Ukraine concludes. We will continue to count on you to remain
steadfast in a difficult challenge until the time as you pass
the mantle of leadership for EUCOM commander and NATO supreme
allied commander of Europe.
General Wolters, in November of 2020, a trilateral
ceasefire agreement was signed between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and
Russia, to conclude the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, and it
seems as if Azerbaijan has taken advantage of the conflict in
Ukraine by launching unprovoked assaults against Armenian
villages. Given Russia's poor military performance in Ukraine,
I am concerned about their ability to keep the peace,
especially as they may need to draw on the 2,000 Russian troops
that are deployed there.
So my question for you sir, is what actions are we taking
and what actions should we be taking to promote peace and
stability in the Caucasus?
General Wolters. Senator, what we have to do first is
ensure that through the defense attache offices in Azerbaijan
is get the facts with respect to the activities in Nogorno-
Karabakh, and as you can well imagine right now there is lots
of finger-pointing taking place back and forth. The facts, as
we know right now, is that Russia's involvement in imposing
good order and discipline in that scenario was very little and
very curious.
So we will continue to gather the facts and then take the
next step forward with respect to Russia's play in this
activity and with respect to Nogorno-Karabakh's activities of
their defense force and the Azerbaijan force.
Senator Peters. Great. General Wolters, nowhere in the
world is the power of our alliance more evident than NATO, and
the Michigan National Guard is proud to play a role in that
alliance at Latvia's partner for nearly 30 years, through the
National Guard's State Partnership Program. In January, members
of the Latvian National Armed Forces trained on air and ground
force synchronization at Joint Terminal Attack Controllers at
Camp Grayling, Michigan.
My question for you, sir, is how valuable is the state
partnership program to your security cooperation initiatives
and do you consider this an area of high return on investment
in your AOR?
General Wolters. Sir, I would consider it an area of very
high return on investment. The disposition of the force
elements in Latvia today are very robust. There are lots of
United States entities in Latvia as we speak, and they are able
to shoot, move, and communicate side by side with Latvian armed
forces to a far more lethal degree than they have in the past,
as a result of the State Partnership Program.
Senator Peters. General Wolters, I understand that one
brigade set of the United States Army's most modern Abrams tank
has been deployed from the Army's pre-position stock in Germany
to Poland, to enhance NATO's deterrence posture. Given the use
of heavy armored forces by Russia in Ukraine is continued, is
rapid mobilization of the Abrams as the most powerful ground
combat vehicle that we have important to you, as a combat
commander in Europe?
General Wolters. It is, Senator. It is a tremendous force
multiplier when it comes to deterrence.
Senator Peters. Is the recent decision by Poland to upgrade
its tanks to the United States Army's Abrams to replace older
Russian-designs a significant development for NATO and allied
nations in Europe?
General Wolters. Absolutely yes, Senator.
Senator Peters. General Van Ovost, in your posture
statement you highlighted the significance of air refueling
mission and stressed the importance of timely recapitalization.
I spoke with Secretary Kendall just last week and we each agree
that it is critical that Congress provides the Air Force with
the right systems needed to deliver needed capabilities. While
the 2006 RAND analysis of alternatives may be somewhat
outdated, it certainly outlined a few recapitalization options.
So my question for you, ma'am, is from a capabilities
standpoint what do you think is the best recapitalization
strategy?
General Van Ovost. Thank you, Senator. As I said the air
refueling is the lifeblood of our ability to project and employ
a force. If I could also mention that we cannot do it without
the total force, so I appreciate the National Guard capacity.
The best way to recapitalize is to have a stable plan that
gets after the capabilities we are going to need in the future.
The KC-46 is the future of air refueling because it can do
multiple things, and it is connected to the battle, both with
Link 16 and ability to be able to get communications offboard
and long-range from that aircraft securely.
So as we look to develop what capabilities we need in the
future, in a contested environment, we will be looking at the
lessons from the KC-46, and I will be working with the Air
Force to describe those requirements into the future.
Senator Peters. Great. Well thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Peters.
I want to thank both the witnesses, General Wolters, not
only for your testimony but for your extraordinary service over
many, many decades. You are in the most, at this moment,
critical position, I think, in the military, and we are all
fortunate that you are there. Thank you very much, and please
communicate that to the men and women, particularly the 82nd
Airborne Division. Yes, sir. All-American.
General Van Ovost, thank you very much for your thoughtful
approach to these problems and your very clear signals to us
that we need to make some significant and difficult decisions
with respect to reconfiguring our logistics, particularly in
conflicted areas.
With that, in the absence of any further questions from my
colleagues here, I will adjourn the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 11:17 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
black sea security
1. Senator Shaheen. General Wolters, what is your assessment of
Russia's expansion in the Black Sea region, particularly in light of
their invasion of Ukraine and do you believe it would be in the best
interests of United States national security to develop and implement
an interagency Black Sea security strategy?
General Wolters. Russia continues to see the Black Sea region as an
area of strategic importance resulting in high level strategic
competition. They seek to increase their regional influence through a
variety of diplomatic, economic, and military means. A whole-of-
government, whole-of-alliance Black Sea security strategy would put
increased emphasis on this strategically important region and ensure a
coordinated United States approach to countering Russian regional
interests.
2. Senator Shaheen. General Wolters, how can the United States
improve our joint training and exercises with allies to improve U.S.-
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interoperability and ensure
the alliance's full capability?
General Wolters. USEUCOM funds Joint training and exercises with
Allies through components' European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) which
has decreased since 2019 levels. Fully resourcing and executing our
Joint training program builds transparency and alignment across command
and control, integrated defense, fires, and logistics. Restoring EDI
training funds improves our combat readiness alongside NATO, enhances
interoperability, and demonstrates Allied and Partner assurance to
deter further Russian aggression.
3. Senator Shaheen. General Wolters, please share any details you
have on the plan to expand the NATO Enhanced Forward Presence/
battlegroup to Slovakia, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria, including
information on force composition, size, capabilities and timeline.
General Wolters. In response to Russia's attack on Ukraine, NATO is
forming battle groups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia.
These battle groups provide a deterrent force across NATO's eastern
front and demonstrate NATO's commitment to interoperability and partner
integration. Currently, the United States provides a company-sized
force in Bulgaria and Hungary, and a battalion-sized force in Romania.
NATO Allies fill out the balance of the forces, including leadership
roles.
At this time, there are no plans to significantly increase U.S.
contributions to the NATO battle groups.
4. Senator Shaheen. General Wolters, in your opinion, how will the
NATO Enhanced Forward Presence/battlegroup expansion impact regional
security and alliance cooperation?
General Wolters. The expansion of the NATO Battle Group construct
into Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia provides NATO a deterrent
force across NATO's eastern flank. The battle groups provide an
opportunity to collectively demonstrate commitment and resolve to
defend NATO territory against Russian aggression. The battle groups
will serve to further increase alliance cooperation and demonstrate
readiness.
kc-46
5. Senator Shaheen. General Van Ovost, how has Russia's invasion of
Ukraine tested the capacity of our tanker fleet and what lessons have
we learned so far?
General Van Ovost. Air operations around Ukraine were managed
carefully to avoid unintentional provocation and escalation. As a
result, the overall tanker demand was modest. USTRANSCOM provided the
support USEUCOM requested with minimal impact to global air refueling
operations.
At the onset of hostilities, the uncertainty of Russia's intentions
caused us to take a closer look at our tanker capacity and posture. The
potential for combat operations in Europe coupled with the requirement
for homeland defense against a nuclear-capable adversary was, and will
continue to be, one of our great concerns. Our Active Duty (AD) force
provided the preponderance of USEUCOM support for this operation;
however, two-thirds of USTRANSCOM's air refueling units reside in the
Air Reserve Component (ARC). Mobilization of ARC personnel is a lengthy
process, so much of the discussion in the days following Russia's
invasion focused on the amount of time the AD could sustain tanker
operations before readiness would be degraded, and ARC capability would
be required. This discussion highlighted the capabilities and
limitations of our AD force and reinforced the need for an early
decision to mobilize ahead of any potential large-scale conflict.
6. Senator Shaheen. General Van Ovost, how important is it to
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) for the KC-46 to be fully cleared to
refuel all TRANSCOM supported aircraft and for the fixes to the Remote
Vision System to remain on schedule?
General Van Ovost. The KC-46 program is crucial to the
recapitalization and modernization of our aging air refueling fleet.
USTRANSCOM supports the agreed upon schedule the U.S. Air Force and
Boeing developed to deliver fully capable KC-46 aircraft for global
missions. As a bridge to a fully capable KC-46, the U.S. Air Force and
Air Mobility Command developed an Interim Capability Release (ICR)
process providing limited KC-46 capacity for USTRANSCOM and Service
tasking. The ICR process exceeded expectations and is ahead of schedule
with the KC-46 providing additional capacity for USTRANSCOM above the
initial projection. The KC-46 is currently cleared to refuel
approximately 85 percent of receiver aircraft. While USTRANSCOM
recognizes the U.S. Air Force and Boeing are invested and committed to
the Remote Vision System remediation schedule, the ICR process provides
a hedge in the event of minor slips in the schedule and ensures
USTRANSCOM can meet daily global air refueling demands. USTRANSCOM
eagerly looks forward to a fully capable KC-46, and based on the
success of the ICR process, in the interim I'm confident the KC-46,
with the current Remote Visual System limitations, could contribute to
wartime missions if required in combination with KC-135s and KC-10s,
acknowledging the normal readiness impacts to units in conversion.
7. Senator Shaheen. General Van Ovost, do you see the KC-46 be able
to provide TRANSCOM support for U.S./NATO assets in the current Ukraine
contingency?
General Van Ovost. The KC-46 has been providing direct and indirect
support to ongoing USEUCOM operations. As examples, the KC-46 provided
an air bridge for troops and cargo across the Atlantic, it refueled
fighter aircraft as they deployed, and it covered worldwide air
refueling missions. Air Mobility Command also sent four KC-46s to
Europe for an Employment Concept Exercise (ECE) in support of U.S. and
NATO operations. During the effort, the KC-46 enabled global bomber
shows of force, supported forward fighter combat patrols, trained with
Aeromedical Evacuation personnel, and completed the first ever KC-46
air refueling with a European aircraft (Spanish EF-18). In the first 60
days of European operations, the KC-46 executed 81 missions in the
European theater and more than 90 non-training missions elsewhere
around the globe. Without the KC-46, each of these missions would have
required support from the already strained KC-135 and KC-10 fleets.
Of equal importance was the rapid advancement in international air
refueling clearances resulting from the Ukraine contingency. In
response to the situation, USTRANSCOM, AMC, and the Air Refueling
Certification Agency (ARCA) expedited their processes and delivered
five certifications for the KC-46 to refuel NATO fighter aircraft: the
Spanish EF-18, Spanish AV-8, Italian AV-8, Italian F-35B, and British
F-35B. ARCA also provided an assessment of the technical compatibility
for air refueling between the KC-46 and every known receiver belonging
to U.S. allies and partners in case of contingency operations in
Ukraine.
8. Senator Shaheen. General Van Ovost, how important is Pease Air
National Guard Base to enabling TRANSCOM operations and meeting
strategic requirements?
General Van Ovost. Pease Air National Guard Base (ANGB) is
continually evaluated against posture plan requirements to support
operational plans and contingency missions. The KC-46 aircraft assigned
to Pease ANGB are a key part of the air refueling fleet supporting the
Joint Force's ability to deploy and employ immediate and surge forces.
Those forces are critical to sustaining capacity during steady state,
contingency, and wartime operations.
9. Senator Shaheen. General Van Ovost, do you support investing in
the parking apron repairs that Pease Air National Guard Base in New
Hampshire needs to support current operations and future contingencies?
General Van Ovost. USTRANSCOM works with the Department of the Air
Force and the National Guard Bureau through the military construction
(MILCON) working group process for project prioritization and funding
allocation. While Pease ANGB is an important operational location,
parking apron restoration would be prioritized with all U.S. Air Force
facility restoration, modernization, and repair projects. U.S. Air
Force staffs review, prioritize, fund, and execute these projects on an
annual basis. Pavement evaluations, mission requirements and field
commanders will help inform prioritization of any future Pease ANGB
apron restoration projects.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
closing ukrainian skies
10. Senator Hirono. General Wolters, are the ground based air
defense systems, such as Stinger missiles, being supplied to Ukraine by
the United States and allies meeting their needs?
General Wolters. The ground-based air defense systems delivered to
Ukraine by the United States and Allies provide a critical capability
and are currently meeting Ukraine's low-altitude, ground-based air
defense requirements. Russia's lack of air superiority in Ukraine
provides a tangible example of the effectiveness of these contributions
as well as the Ukrainians' ability to effectively utilize ground-based
air defense systems.
11. Senator Hirono. General Wolters, what more can we do short of
enforcing a no-fly zone to help Ukraine close down their skies to
Russian aircraft?
General Wolters. The ground-based air defense systems delivered to
Ukraine by the United States and Allies have effectively pushed back
Russian aircraft. We have provided, and will continue to provide,
Ukraine with anti-air weapons to assist Ukraine's stance in deterring
Russian aircraft.
chemical/biological weapons attacks
12. Senator Hirono. General Wolters, there are growing concerns
that Russia will resort to using chemical or biological weapons against
Ukraine in the near future, to include the possibility of conducting a
false-flag operation to justify their use. What is your assessment of
the risk of such an attack encroaching on a NATO member and triggering
an Article 5 NATO military response?
General Wolters. Russia has a track record of using chemical
weapons. They have falsely raised the specter of Ukraine using chemical
or biological weapons as a pretext for war with Ukraine for months. We
cannot speculate about hypotheticals, but if a NATO Ally is attacked,
regardless of the type of weapon used, we will consult together as an
Alliance on an appropriate response. We will defend NATO territory with
the full force of American power, and our commitment to Article 5 is
ironclad. NATO is united and determined to defend our collective
security and together we have reinforced NATO's eastern front by
repositioning thousands of United States and Allied troops to reassure
frontline allies and deter Russian aggression.
13. Senator Hirono. General Wolters, the Biden administration has
expressed a willingness to respond to such an attack-with the nature of
the response depending on the nature of use. What options would you
recommend or consider to leadership in the event of such attacks?
General Wolters. The Unites States doesn't have an active chemical
or biological weapons program, but if requested, USEUCOM will provide a
spectrum of military response options across the theater's breadth of
capabilities for the Secretary and President's consideration.
Recommendations will be tied to the scope of Russia's attack and will
consider escalation risks, the laws of armed conflict, and other
factors. Our response will be in close consultation with NATO and our
Allies, and based on a rapid and collaborative attribution process to
hold Russia accountable across the international community.
partners and allies
14. Senator Hirono. General Wolters, in what ways have United
States forces in Europe conducted experimentation with exercises to
ensure we maintain our competitive edge against our adversaries?
General Wolters. USEUCOM's service components conduct unilateral,
bilateral, and multi-lateral exercises to maintain readiness and
conduct large scale exercises with Allies and Partners to ensure
interoperability, expand Allied partner capacity, and integrate
planning to maintain our competitive edge against our adversaries. We
consistently look to advance new tactics, techniques, and procedures to
advance our competitive edge, increase our speed, and become more
lethal.
15. Senator Hirono. General Wolters, how has this experimentation
been beneficial given the ongoing conflict in Ukraine?
General Wolters. The conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated our great
relationships with Allies and Partners across Europe. This crisis has
created a historic moment in which Allied nations have found new ways
to join forces and work together to provide aid to Ukraine. Working by,
with, and through Allies and Partners, we have already delivered an
unprecedented amount of aid to the Ukrainian forces and continue to
find new solutions to move lethal aid into Ukraine to counter Russia's
unprovoked war.
fuel tanker study
16. Senator Hirono. General Van Ovost, I understand that recently
you conducted a comprehensive study concerning the ability of the U.S.
flag and U.S.-owned tanker fleet to meet the demands of our National
Security Strategy. In our recent conversation, you identified that
commercial assets will play a vital role in logistics moving forward
and the Department of Defense (DOD) is looking for additional ways to
support growth in the commercial base. How do you plan to fill the gaps
and mitigate the shortcomings of our current tanker capacity?
General Van Ovost. The Tanker Security Program (TSP) that Congress
has authorized and funded is a key first step to address the tanker
capacity gap. I thank the Congress for their support in addressing fuel
distribution challenges as we clearly see the tension China is creating
in the Indo-Pacific theater.
The Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
required Fuel Tanker Study provided in June 2021 (tanker study)
provides a comprehensive depiction of the looming challenge for fuel
movement in the Indo-Pacific. There are two segments with unique
requirements and shortcomings for the movement and distribution of
fuel: (1) long-range, inter-theater fuel movements, and (2) shorter-
range distribution to many Indo-Pacific locations, many requiring
shallow draft vessels. Today, the U.S. is heavily reliant on commercial
fuel tankers and smaller vessels, the majority being foreign flagged
which increases risk for access during crisis or conflict with China.
The inter-theater segment requires over 50 large fuel tankers
typically involved in international trade. Currently, there are only
six U.S. flagged vessels engaged in international fuel trade, with
almost all operating under contract with Military Sealift Command (MSC)
for the movement of DOD fuel requirements. Anticipated wartime usage of
U.S. commercial Jones Act tankers would require a handful involved in
fuel movements during conflict to locations such as Hawaii, Alaska, and
Guam. The initial 10-vessel TSP will fill a critical gap in the inter-
theater segment where the underway consolidated cargo fuel transfer
requires unique equipment and mariners, with those missions performed
by U.S. flag ships. The Tanker study showed the currently available
U.S. flag tankers, combined with the 10 TSP tankers, sufficiently
satisfy these U.S. flag requirements. Foreign flag tankers from our
allies and partners (``Blue'' tankers) would have to meet the remainder
of the inter-theater bulk fuel requirements, which will be achieved
through agreements and contingency contracts to enhance access to
``Blue'' tankers and companies with a high likelihood to support U.S.
operations.
The area of greatest concern, however, is intra-theater segment for
fuel distribution across many locations in the Indo-Pacific requiring
over 100 smaller fuel vessels to meet our anticipated wartime demands.
While numerous foreign flag general purpose and coastal vessels operate
in the Indo-Pacific, an increased potential exists for their People's
Republic of China (PRC) influence or financial control, making access
uncertain and elevating risk. Currently, there is only one U.S. flagged
coastal tanker under long-term contract to MSC. For even smaller fuel
vessels with shallow drafts to maneuver into austere locations,
numerous suitable U.S. flag commercial assets exist in the Gulf of
Mexico. However, the timing needed to configure and move them in
sizeable numbers to the Indo-Pacific is a significant planning
constraint. Thus, USTRANSCOM is seeking to expand the TSP program by
targeting smaller vessels needed to support intra-theater fuel
distribution. In addition, we have conducted industry engagements to
determine the availability and willingness of U.S. flag carriers and
their associated parent companies operating suitable ``Blue'' foreign
flagged vessels to support the intra-theater fuel mission. Finally, we
intend to seek agreements with specific nations and companies to gain
assured support in time of crisis or conflict, similar to the Korean
Flag Shipping program.
The Department has elevated our focus on fuel as a critical
commodity in a crisis or conflict with China, and Congressional support
will be needed to continue expanding our U.S. commercial fuel capacity
in the Indo-Pacific. While U.S. flagged assets are an important
component of addressing the gaps and shortcomings in this area, we must
still pursue agreements and contractual arrangements to enhance access
to foreign-flagged capacity from allies and partners as major element
in this approach.
17. Senator Hirono. General Van Ovost, how can the department
better leverage commercial companies to ensure increase the number of
tankers available and ensure they are going to be available and willing
to support defense requirements during conflicts?
General Van Ovost. Opportunity does exist to better leverage the
U.S. commercial fuel shipping industry. However, specific steps must be
taken to enhance the economic viability of U.S. flagged ships and
increase opportunities to better access all vessels that may be
provided by commercial companies. As indicated in the Fiscal Year 2020
NDAA-required Fuel Tanker Study (tanker study), the Department of
Defense will continue to rely on friendly foreign flagged (i.e.,
``Blue'') fuel vessels of allies and partners to move and distribute
fuel in the Indo-Pacific. The tanker study indicated the need to
increase the number of U.S. flagged fuel tankers and smaller fuel
vessels to meet wartime requirements. The most significant impediment
to increase U.S. flagged vessel capacity is the unfavorable cost to
operate U.S. flagged vessels in international trade. Like the Maritime
Security Program for dry-cargo vessels, there are two major elements to
create the economic conditions favorable for U.S. commercial shipping
companies to operate in international trade. The first is a direct
stipend to offset the cost of operating a U.S. flagged vessel, and the
second is cargo preference for movement of U.S. cargos at a rate
reflective of the elevated cost to operate U.S. flagged vessels.
To address the first component, USTRANSCOM is grateful for the
support already provided by the Congress through the initial 10-ship
Tanker Security Program (TSP) to address larger inter-theater fuel
tankers. USTRANSCOM, working with the Maritime Administration, expects
the initial TSP program will be in place by the end of 2022.
Additionally, the tanker study indicated elevated risk exists in the
Indo-Pacific intra-theater fuel distribution where over 100 smaller
fuel vessels are required under wartime conditions. To mitigate this
risk, a range of ships will be required, with the likely need to expand
the TSP for a wider variety of fuel vessels to create an U.S.-
international trading fleet in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, to
enhance U.S. fuel tanker viability, changing locations and methods for
fuel procurement as a preference-cargo may be necessary to meet our
wartime fuel requirements
Even with an expanded TSP, access to friendly foreign flagged
vessels of our allies and partners is still required. Most U.S. vessel
companies operate with parent or sister companies, which the Department
must leverage to access and employ an expanded fleet of ``Blue'' fuel
vessels to minimize risk of fully meeting our wartime needs. This
requires a close relationship with the maritime fuel shipping industry
to create the right conditions, such as bi-lateral agreements or
contingency contracts, for their wartime support.
Finally, as an adjunct to the new TSP, USTRANSCOM is implementing a
Voluntary Tanker Agreement (VTA) similar to the Voluntary Intermodal
Sealift Agreement as the primary program to access TSP tankers under
wartime conditions. The VTA provides the venue to engage our fuel
industry partners and expend the necessary operating constructs and
relationships to ensure U.S. commercial fuel industry can meaningfully
contribute to our national security needs. The VTA is undergoing final
review and should be in place by the end of 2022 as part of the overall
TSP implementation.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus King
cyber defense
18. Senator King. General Van Ovost, in your posture statement and
command priorities you cite cyber threats as one of your tops concerns
for TRANSCOM due to the networks 90 percent of your operations take
place one. What has TRANSCOM done to build their cyber resilience?
General Van Ovost. To build USTRANSCOM's cyber resilience and
decrease attack vectors, we have implemented a layered defense-in-depth
construct to harden our networks and remain focused on quickly
mitigating critical vulnerabilities across our portfolio. USTRANSCOM
invested in a robust network intrusion detection system, continuous
network monitoring program, and access to third-party threat
intelligence from industry experts, allowing our intrusion detection
analysts to better deter, detect, and respond to events. In addition,
USTRANSCOM's continued investment in cloud services has led to a more
robust infrastructure, increased our security posture, and improved
resiliency of mobility systems hosted in the cloud.
In partnership with U.S. Cyber Command, USTRANSCOM has made
significant progress towards implementing Zero Trust security
capabilities on our classified network. Zero Trust capabilities will
enhance network traffic visibility and better position USTRANSCOM to
secure sensitive data, systems, and services. In February 2022, a
National Security Agency Red Team completed a validation event that
tested our core capabilities and confirmed our sound implementation.
USTRANSCOM is now finalizing deployment of these capabilities and will
achieve the baseline Zero Trust maturity level, as outlined in the
Department's Zero Trust Reference Architecture, by the summer of 2022.
To reduce cybersecurity risks with our commercial partners,
USTRANSCOM strengthened our commercial partnerships to build cyber
resilience. For example, USTRANSCOM continues to have contractual
cybersecurity compliance requirements in place, as well as the annual
requirement for our commercial partners to assess their compliance with
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-171
security controls. Over the last four years of requiring self-
assessments, USTRANSCOM's analysis of commercial partner self-reporting
showed improved compliance each year. Continuous learning is critical
to staying ahead of the cyber threat. To this end, USTRANSCOM engages
in significant information sharing and collaboration with our
commercial partners. In 2021, USTRANSCOM also put in place a proof-of-
principle contract for a third party to assess our commercial partner
compliance with the NIST SP 800-171 security controls. We offered this
assessment on a voluntary basis to our commercial partners, and to
date, three partners have volunteered for the assessment. The first
assessment was completed in January 2022, and the results confirm this
partner placed an emphasis on cyber security and was compliant with 90
of the 110 security controls. The second assessment is scheduled to
complete in May 2022, and the date for the third assessment is pending.
ukraine lessons learned
19. Senator King. General Van Ovost, what are some of the
preliminary lessons learned from TRANSCOM's efforts supporting
expedited troop and materiel movement to European Command (EUCOM)?
General Van Ovost. Preliminary lessons learned from USTRANSCOM's
support to USEUCOM indicate that our systems-based approach of modal
and nodal analysis coupled with flattened communication enhanced
military and commercial transportation flow. From the outset of
USTRANSCOM's expedited movement of troops and materials to Europe,
USTRANSCOM initiated meetings with industry leaders to provide
transparency and awareness of major objectives and future requirements.
USTRANSCOM successfully communicated with members of the Civil Reserve
Air Fleet to promote the mutually beneficial volunteerism over a
possibly detrimental activation. Moreover, deliberate coordination with
Army Materiel Command, USEUCOM, Joint Staff, and other agencies
optimized information sharing to resolve issues rapidly to meet
capacity and velocity requirements. USTRANSCOM, in coordination with
Joint Staff, will continue to develop lessons learned as operations
continue.
hypersonic defense
20. Senator King. General Wolters, as the first combatant commander
to deal with the detection and impacts of hypersonic weapons, what do
you believe should be the DOD top priorities for hypersonic defense
investment?
General Wolters. The Secretary of Defense is best suited to
prioritize the Department's hypersonic defense investments. In
USEUCOM's area of responsibility, the short flight time of hypersonic
weapons relative to other adversary long-range precision strike
capabilities challenges our current detection capabilities. Investments
to increase capability in ground and space-based sensors, with
correlating processing and exploitation tools across the intelligence
community, would enhance our ability to track and characterize
hypersonic weapons employment.
finland and sweden
21. Senator King. General Wolters, do you believe the time has come
for Finland and Sweden to join NATO and what would they bring to the
alliance?
General Wolters. If Finland and Sweden were to join NATO, it would
enhance their already strong relationships with the U.S. and NATO
Allies. These existing bilateral and multi-lateral defense
relationships promote security in the Baltic Sea region and the Arctic.
They reinforce transatlantic linkages, strengthen stability in northern
Europe, and build interoperability between the United States and two of
its most capable and like-minded partners.
kc-46 basing
22. Senator King. Maine is the proud home of the Air National
Guard's 101st Refueling Wing, the ``MAINEiacs.'' Maine geographic
location and air corridors offer a strategic hub for supporting trans-
Atlantic deployments as well as Arctic operations.
General Van Ovost, would you support modernizing the unit with the
new KC-46 aircraft?
General Van Ovost. USTRANSCOM and I fully understand the proud
heritage of the MAINEiacs. I am extremely grateful for the dedication
and extensive contributions by the men and women of the 101st Refueling
Wing in support of national defense priorities. I support the USAF
strategy of continuous recapitalization and modernization of the tanker
fleet. That said, aircraft basing is a Title 10 responsibility, and I
would defer to the U.S. Air Force on KC-46 basing decisions.
23. Senator King. General Wolters, do you believe having a
modernized and capable fleet of KC-46s at the strategic location of
Bangor, ME is beneficial to the facilitating operations in the Arctic
and trans-Atlantic flights to EUCOM?
General Wolters. A modernized and capable KC-46 fleet is critical
to meet the goals of the National Defense Strategy and our strategy to
compete with and deter Russia in the Arctic and High North. USEUCOM
benefits from the readiness and capability those tankers provide and
would welcome any further capability in the theater, but would defer to
the U.S. Air Force on any specific basing decisions.
unclos
24. Senator King. General Van Ovost and General Wolters, do you
support the ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS)?
General Van Ovost. I support U.S. accession to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Convention codifies navigation
freedoms in a manner beneficial to our operations, to include freedoms
of navigation and overflight, passage rights, and traditional uses of
the sea. These freedoms are essential to executing USTRANSCOM's mission
to conduct globally integrated mobility operations, lead the broader
Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise, and provide enabling
capabilities to project and sustain the Joint Force in support of
national objectives.
General Wolters. Ratification of UNCLOS, as amended in 1994, would
enable the United States to fully protect its navigational rights and
freedoms, economic rights, access to critical minerals, and other
ocean-related interests. U.S. accession is also a matter of
geostrategic advantage, including the Arctic. It would also strengthen
United States credibility when challenging excessive maritime claims by
Russia, The People's Republic of China, and others. Our national
security depends on the global mobility of U.S. forces and the
navigational freedoms codified in the Law of the Sea Convention. As a
Party, the United States would be better able to influence the
interpretation, application, and development of the law of the sea in a
manner that reflects out status as a major maritime power.
china commission
I believe we must establish an unbiased and non-partisan commission
to examine a grand strategy for our approach to China, similar in
intent to President Eisenhower's Solarium Project. We need to think of
a holistic approach to create a stable international order in which
China (or Russia) cannot dictate regional developments.
25. Senator King. General Van Ovost and General Wolters, what are
the `toughest problems' OUTSIDE of military imbalances?
General Van Ovost. Outside of the military realm, U.S. power
projection, a core mission for USTRANSCOM, is dependent upon three
critical elements.
First, access, basing, and overflight to deploy, maneuver, and
sustain the Joint Force on a global scale is dependent upon strong
allies and partners aligned in support of our mutual interests. The
2022 National Defense Strategy clearly indicates the department's
approach for integrated deterrence and campaign activities to counter
forms of competitor coercion, complicate China's military preparations,
and develop our warfighting capabilities together with those of allies
and partners. We must provide a whole-of-government approach to engage
and assure our allies and partners so they can constructively enable
operations. This approach must counter China's efforts to marginalize
allies and partners necessary to ensure our freedom of maneuver; we
observe this developing on a global scale in multiple vulnerable
locations. We must leave no doubt that we can and will provide options
across the full range of military operations and will deny China's
objective to constrain our power projection capability.
Second, a concern is that China and Russia are pursuing kinetic and
non-kinetic capabilities to disrupt, degrade, or delay our ability to
operate. Our dependence on unclassified networks and civil
infrastructure, especially in the Homeland, creates opportunities to
negatively impact power projection during critical periods. A whole-of-
government effort for cyber mission assurance and recognition that
major deployment activities require a nationally coordinated approach
would improve USTRANSCOM's ability to rapidly build and sustain
elevated levels of operational activity. The Homeland no longer is a
sanctuary, and we must think and act with the intent to operate through
disruption, requiring cooperation from multiple federal, state, and
local agencies
Third, our commercial transportation industry partners are both a
great strength and a vulnerability. Beyond our military capabilities,
the U.S. requires a robust network of commercial providers capable of
supporting U.S. operations. As a minimum, our key providers require the
ability to achieve some level of cyber mission assurance in the face of
elevated threats. The ability to anticipate other potential threats to
our commercial partners requires USTRANSCOM to set conditions for them
to operate with federal government agencies, especially with the
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Transportation,
as we confront the reality that adversaries are both capable and
willing to put commercial operations and civil infrastructure at risk.
These topics are of high importance to USTRANSCOM and require concerted
and coordinated efforts to gain advantage over our adversaries.
General Wolters. A whole-of-government, whole-of-nation, and whole-
of-alliance effort is necessary to address China's influence in Europe.
Providing alternatives to China's investments and loans to advance
Europe's infrastructure can mitigate or stall China's One Belt-One Road
projects, reducing Allied and Partner nations' exposure to coercion and
vulnerability of critical infrastructure to PRC influence. The ability
for the U.S., Allied, and Partner nations' ability to secure sensitive
supply chain processes and protect operations and technologies from
malign influence is critical for collective security and
interoperability, and requires a holistic approach.
26. Senator King. General Van Ovost and General Wolters, in order
to avoid the U.S. trying to ``spend our way out of conflict,'' how can
we specifically counter China's major activities in your area of
responsibility (AOR)?
General Van Ovost. Countering China's major activities in the
USTRANSCOM AOR is a complex topic. USTRANSCOM's AOR is global, and we
must always be able to create options to deliver for the nation,
despite the efforts of our adversaries to erode our asymmetric power
projection advantage. USTRANSCOM accomplishes this by demonstrating
that we can conduct operations daily with speed and agility coupled
with ready capacity to scale to major mobility operations, almost
overnight, and operate despite disruptions. This is USTRANSCOM's most
powerful means to deter and counter China's intent to gain advantage in
multiple regions of the world. Four examples illustrate USTRANSCOM's
ability to achieve this outcome.
First, USTRANSCOM, working with our component commands and
commercial partners, responds to crisis such as the Afghan refugee
evacuation in August 2021, or the recent Ukrainian support, with the
ability to rapidly create tailored responses. Beyond these high
visibility events, USTRANSCOM supports the dynamic employment of
military capabilities on a global scale ranging from bomber task force
missions as a show of force to recurring exercises in support of
multiple geographic combatant commands to support our national
interests and demonstrate resolve with our allies and partners
potentially impacted by PRC malign influence.
Second, USTRANSCOM identifies those specific airfields and seaports
of high importance on a world-wide basis to ensure we have access,
basing, and overflight options for the full range of operations from
humanitarian relief efforts to potential large-scale response to
threats in response to aggression or conflict. These efforts are done
in full partnership with the geographic combatant commands to reinforce
their theater posture plans. These efforts also reinforce their
exercise programs or engagement strategies to counter PRC investments
in regions of elevated interest and ensure USTRANSCOM's locations of
significance are proactively addressed to enhance U.S. freedom of
operations.
Third, USTRANSCOM seeks to retain sufficient and ready capacity to
meet the National Defense Strategy wartime missions, which identifies
China as the pacing challenge. USTRANSCOM accomplishes this by
maintaining a total force capability that can quickly employ our highly
ready Reserve and National Guard partners, critical for our airlift and
air refueling overall capacity. USTRANSCOM also conducts large-scale,
no-notice activations of major elements of the sealift fleet from
reduced operating status to underway in approximately five days, with
the largest ever conducted in 2019. The ability to employ our
commercial partners is unmatched, and our National Preparedness
Programs (Civil Reserve Air Fleet and Voluntary Intermodal Sealift
Agreement) provide significant strategic airlift and sealift capacity.
Under these programs, USTRANSCOM conducts recurring engagements with
industry to sustain the healthy and robust relationships necessary to
demonstrate to China the ability to rapidly marshal these capabilities
with high confidence.
Finally, knitting together all the areas above through global
integration of mobility operations and resilient command and control is
USTRANSCOM's center of gravity. Whether the response is for
humanitarian assistance, disaster relief operations, non-combatant
evacuation operations, or responding to a European crisis, this
enterprise has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to direct and
control mobility forces with great effect, which directly confounds
China's perception on the U.S. ability to respond decisively to any
provocation in the Indo-Pacific. USTRANSCOM seeks to ensure our ability
to integrate operations and command and control mobility forces is
resilient under likely disruptions and is expanding our ability to make
sense, decide, and act through increased focus on data and analytics.
General Wolters. A whole-of-government, whole-of-nation, and whole-
of-alliance effort is necessary to address China's influence in Europe.
Providing United States, Allied, or Partnered nation alternatives to
China's investments and loans to advance Europe's infrastructure can
mitigate or stall China's One Belt-One Road projects, reducing Allied
and Partner nations' exposure to coercion and vulnerability of critical
infrastructure to PRC influence. The ability for the United States,
Allied, and Partner nations' ability to secure sensitive supply chain
processes and protect operations and technologies from malign influence
is critical for collective security and interoperability, and requires
a holistic approach.
27. Senator King. General Van Ovost and General Wolters, what would
be the greatest benefit this commission could deliver?
General Van Ovost. USTRANSCOM recognizes that China competes
directly with United States interests and the PRC seeks to exert malign
influence over key allies and partners on a global scale to erode our
freedom to operate. The 2022 NDS lays out a PRC-focused, alliance-
centric approach which outlines that deterring conflict with the PRC is
a generational imperative extending well into the middle of the 21st
century. The Department does not currently have a position on the
creation of a commission, but DOD works with various partners across
the U.S. Government to achieve national security priorities.
General Wolters. USEUCOM welcomes any opportunity to provide whole-
of-government, whole-of-nation, and whole-of-alliance alternatives to
thwart malign influence, reduce exposure to coercion, and deter threats
to Alliance peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic. Together with our
Allies and Partners, we strive to secure sensitive supply chain
processes and protect operations and technologies from malign influence
to preserve the collective security and interoperability of all NATO
nations.
28. Senator King. General Van Ovost and General Wolters, what would
put us in the best position to avoid the United States and China from
escalating conflict and careening into a war with China?
General Van Ovost. The best position for the U.S. to avoid
escalating conflict and careening into a war with China is described in
the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS), where the central premise
reflects an urgent need to sustain and strengthen United States
deterrence across all domains, theaters, and spectrum of conflict
against the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Department of
Defense's (DOD) principal approach to advancing this end-state is
through integrated deterrence. Integrated deterrence entails developing
and combining our strengths to maximum effect, by working seamlessly
across warfighting domains, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, other
instruments of U.S. national power, and our unmatched network of
Alliances and partnerships. Integrated deterrence is enabled by combat-
credible forces, backstopped by a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
deterrent. Campaigning will strengthen deterrence and enable us to gain
advantages against the full range of competitors' coercive actions. The
United States will operate forces, synchronize broader Department
efforts, and align Department activities with other instruments of
national power, to undermine acute forms of competitor coercion,
complicate competitors' military preparations, and develop our own
warfighting capabilities together with Allies and partners.
USTRANSCOM's contribution to this approach is to enable the DOD's
campaigning activities day-to-day and ensure the United States
asymmetric power projection advantage always provides options for the
Nation to project and sustain the Joint Force on a global scale. There
are two areas that are at the top of my list to ensure DOD is in the
best position to enable the NDS.
First, China has watched and learned from past U.S. success in
large-scale military operations starting with DESERT SHIELD/DESERT
STORM. In a conflict, what China seeks is the ability to achieve their
objectives by disrupting, degrading, or delaying our ability to build
combat power at the speed and scale. To enhance our ability to manage
conflict and escalation, USTRANSCOM ensures we maintain sufficient
capabilities and capacity within the Joint Deployment and Distribution
Enterprise, not only with military forces, but also with our commercial
partners who bring aircraft, ships, mariners, and networks to bear on
our challenges as a core component of our power projection footprint.
Ensuring USTRANSCOM can deploy and sustain the Joint Force and fight
through disruptions is a key element in deterring the PRC aggression
and assuring allies and partners of the United States ability to
respond.
Second, our ability to gain access, basing and overflight with our
allies and partners is being challenged by the PRC in many parts of the
world. Mutually-beneficial Alliances and partnerships are an enduring
strength for the United States, and are critical to achieving our
objectives, as the unified response to Russia's further invasion of
Ukraine has demonstrated.
Answering this ``call to action,'' USTRANSCOM will incorporate ally
and partner perspectives, competencies, and advantages at every stage
of defense planning.
General Wolters. USEUCOM is committed to preserving peace in the
Euro-Atlantic Area and strives to maintain relations that avoid
conflict. The United States and Europe demonstrate political cohesion
and defend our shared values in a rules-based international order.
Maintaining and strengthening trans-Atlantic unity, through NATO,
ensures we have a shared understanding in preserving the values of the
Alliance.
expeditionary tactical operations center
29. Senator King. The shift to a more scalable, lethal, and mobile
combat elements such as the Marine Littoral Regiment and Multidomain
Task Force is critical to the countering the dynamic threats in your
Area of Responsibility. The DOD's recent investments in the University
of Maine's composites and advanced manufacturing initiatives has
resulted in improving blast and ballistic resistant structures and
materials. Maine small businesses are the direct benefactor of the
growing talent and innovation in this sector and are concurrently
providing critical capabilities to the warfighter. The Modular
Panelized Shelter System (MPSS) is one system of note and is currently
employed by Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in Alaska, EUCOM in Italy, and
Africa Command (AFRICOM) headquarters.
General Wolters, how has your command benefitted from utilizing
MPSS?
General Wolters. While not occurring in the USEUCOM AOR, our
understanding is United States Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF)
plans to field test one Modular Shelter System (MINATORS) made in
Brewer, Maine, in Exercise African Lion 22. We recommend engaging with
United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) after the exercise to gain
more insights into the efficacy of the system.
30. Senator King. General Van Ovost, could your command and service
component commands further benefit from an expeditionary, affordable,
all weather, TS/SCI certified structures such as the MPSS?
General Van Ovost. Rapid Global Mobility is reliant upon onsite
processing and dissemination of intelligence information to inform
crews of the most pertinent and timely threat information. The use of
the MPSS (or similar system) directly would enable this capability by
advancing warfighting capabilities, projecting and connecting the joint
force, and ensuring strategic advantage. The MPSS (or similar system)
would facilitate each of these vectors by providing an agile and secure
platform enabling the transfer of real time information at the
appropriate classification level. For example, the Air Mobility Command
would be better enabled to deploy and support assets globally using a
modular and agile system such as the MPSS. Critically, the use of SCI
communications infrastructure is dependent upon the structure meeting
Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 705 standards and the MPSS would
require certification through the Defense Intelligence Agency to
confirm compliance.
arctic
I supported Sen Sullivan's Arctic Security Initiative amendment
last year, and helped get it into law with the Chairman.
31. Senator King. General Wolters, what specific resource
shortfalls does EUCOM have to conduct exercises in the High North?
Please be specific to include operations and sustainment funding for
exercises, equipment shortfalls such as weather gear for soldiers or
unique platforms.
General Wolters. USEUCOM requires additional high-altitude
communication satellite coverage, ``over the snow'' transportation
capabilities, and domain awareness options to effectively detect,
deter, and defeat adversarial forces in the High North. Consistent,
sufficient Joint exercise funding for the largest exercises, including
Cold Response and Trident Juncture will provide opportunities to
exercise our plans to effectively train as we intend to fight.
32. Senator King. General Wolters, how else could EUCOM potentially
benefit from dedicated funding from the Arctic Security Initiative?
General Wolters. Funding from the Arctic Security Initiative will
enhance each Service's capabilities to operate in the Arctic which will
help USEUCOM defend the Homeland, project power in and through the
Arctic, and deter and defeat potential adversarial forces. Increased
investments in dispersed resilient and adaptive basing, pre-positioned
forward stocks, maintenance capabilities, transnational supply lines,
and infrastructure will enhance USEUCOM's interoperability with
European Allies and Partners.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
energy security in europe
33. Senator Manchin. General Wolters, as you know, Vladimir Putin
blatantly used energy as a weapon in an attempt to gain leverage over
our European allies in the months and years leading to the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. In response to Putin's war in Ukraine, our
European allies are working closely with us to lessen Western Europe's
dependence on Russian oil and natural gas. With reduced quantities of
Russian oil and natural gas flowing into Europe, what do you believe
will be the impact on American forces stationed in Europe?
General Wolters. Department of Defense (DOD) installations in
Europe rely on host nation energy providers for power generation and
heating; the source fuel suppliers are difficult to precisely determine
so as a result it is difficult to determine the direct flow of Russian
fuel to United States bases. However, reduced fuel supply will result
in rising fuel costs in Europe and impact petrol, utilities, and
general cost of living for American Forces in Europe.
34. Senator Manchin. General Wolters, I've long advocated for
prioritizing domestic energy production and energy imports from our
trusted allies. One of those trusted allies is Israel who received
notice from the State Department at the beginning of the year that the
United States did not support the construction of a pipeline linking
Israel to Greece and potentially Italy. Everyone has been concerned
about Nord Stream cutting off Eastern European nations from energy, but
I'm also concerned about Russia's Turk Stream pipeline cutting off
Balkan nations, including Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro,
Northern Macedonia, Romania, and Slovenia who are a NATO members. If
we're not supporting the construction of energy infrastructure to
support these nations Russia certainly will. Do you share my concerns
with our Balkan allies, and how can European Command get out ahead of
them?
General Wolters. As part of a whole-of-government approach, USEUCOM
works with the lead Federal agencies (Departments of State, Energy and
USAID) on European Energy Security and Independence efforts in
collaboration with NATO Allies and other Partners. NATO dependency on
Russian crude oil is greater in Eastern European nations than Western
European nations, and there are mitigation options being pursued to
alleviate and address this dependency. Through contracting
requirements, we encourage alternatives to Russia's energy sources, but
ultimately, the EU and the individual nations will decide the future of
European energy infrastructure.
afghanistan retrograde lessons learned
35. Senator Manchin. General Van Ovost, your command just went
through arguably one its most challenging and high tempo periods in its
thirty-five-year history. During the United States withdrawal from
Afghanistan, TRANSCOM was the main effort in the return of our forces
and equipment to the United States. Further, TRANSCOM facilitated the
evacuation of 124,000 civilians from Kabul. Six thousand of this number
were American citizens and we can thank TRANSCOM for their safe return
home. As you know, the withdrawal and the non-combatant evacuation was
a massive undertaking and took a major toll on your command's
capabilities and the readiness of our strategic lift capabilities. I am
sure that there are many lessons learned or capability gaps identified
which the United States can learn from and correct. Understanding the
open and unclassified nature of this venue, can you summarize any gaps
and lessons learned that TRANSCOM identified during and after the
withdrawal from Afghanistan? I am especially interested in any gaps or
lessons learned that can be helped by Congressional action.
General Van Ovost. The USTRANSCOM After Action Report (AAR) on the
Afghanistan withdrawal is part of a larger Department-wide draft AAR
currently in coordination. I will thoroughly review the lessons learned
and work with the Committee on any areas USTRANSCOM needs help with.
turkey and nato
36. General Wolters, Turkey's membership in NATO has been a concern
of mine for a long time. While Turkey has been a member of NATO since
1952, recent activities of the Turkish government have been
problematic. I am especially concerned over Turkey's stubborn desire to
acquire S-400 air defense systems from Russia. This led to the
cancellation of F-35 sales to Turkey. The Erdogan government has also
brutally repressed political opposition and public protest and
maintains hostile relations with Greece--another NATO ally. All of this
suggests that Turkey is not committed to the democratic values NATO is
designed to defend. Despite past problems, I do acknowledge that Turkey
has been a constructive partner in response to Putin's invasion of
Ukraine. Since the invasion, Turkey provided armed drones to Ukraine
and closed the straits linking the Mediterranean and Black Seas to
Russian warships. Can you briefly comment on any recent developments
regarding Turkey's relationship with NATO and how they are
synchronizing their response to Putin's invasion of Ukraine with the
rest of the NATO alliance?
General Wolters. Turkey actively supports Ukraine's efforts to
defend its sovereignty from the weeks leading up to Russia's invasion
and continues to support Kyiv today, holding peace talks in Istanbul.
On 28 February, Turkey activated the Montreux Convention, not employed
since World War II, and closed the Turkish Straits to military ships
from nations involved in the conflict. Turkey has also provided
humanitarian aid and military equipment across a broad range of
military capabilities.
european refugee crisis and eucom response
37. General Wolters, Putin's War in Ukraine has caused untold
suffering that will reverberate in Europe for generations. According to
the UN Refugee Agency, approximately 10 million people, which is about
a quarter of Ukraine's population have been displaced as a result of
Putin's War. Of that, nearly four million Ukrainians have fled to
neighboring countries such as Hungary, Moldova, and Poland. An
unmanaged refugee crisis can exacerbate a growing humanitarian crisis
and present further security challenges to Europe. What is EUCOM doing
to assist in the caring of refugees from Ukraine?
General Wolters. Under a whole-of-government approach, USEUCOM is
prepared to provide Department of Defense resources and material as
required to support refugee operations led by Department of State
country teams, including Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid
funding. To date, the lead Federal Agencies, working in concert with
Border States hosting Ukraine refugees, are managing the humanitarian
situation without requested assistance from the Department of Defense.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
dod cloud migration
38. Senator Rosen. General Van Ovost, as you know, TRANSCOM was the
first DOD organization to move its cyber capabilities and command and
control applications to a commercial cloud environment--which offers
capabilities and security that we didn't have before its adoption. Can
you provide us with an update on TRANSCOM's migration of services to
the cloud? Specifically, how many systems have been moved into the
cloud?
General Van Ovost. USTRANSCOM has moved 25 systems to a commercial
cloud environment. Over the next three years, USTRANSCOM will continue
to execute it's implementation plan to move the remaining 11 systems to
a commercial cloud environment in a phased approach.
39. Senator Rosen. General Van Ovost, can you discuss the key
benefits of migrating TRANSCOM's networks to a commercial cloud and how
it can potentially benefit the rest of the Department?
General Van Ovost. The key benefits of migrating USTRANSCOM's
systems to a commercial cloud are the security, scalability,
resiliency, and application advantages cloud technology provides to
deliver modernized services and warfighting capabilities. Throughout
the migration, USTRANSCOM has shared, and continues to share, lessons
learned and best practices with the entire DOD through group
collaborations. These groups include the DOD Digital Modernization
Executive Committee, the DOD Chief Information Officer Cloud Community
of Interest, and the DOD CIO Cloud Working Group. USTRANSCOM has also
had one-on-one conversations with organizations to provide best
practices as they migrate to a commercial cloud environment.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Kelly
potential delays in kc-y delivery
40. Senator Kelly. General Van Ovost, the delivery of the KC-46 was
delayed by three years following a bid protest on the awarding of the
initial contract in February of 2008. As I understand it, the KC-Y will
serve as a bridge tanker between the 179 planned KC-46 tankers and the
future KC-Z, or ``Advanced Air Refueling Tanker.'' The expectation is
that the KC-Y, like the KC-46, will continue replacing our aging KC-135
fleet and will enter service sometime late this decade. The KC-Y, per
the ``sources sought'' notice released last year, will be a commercial
derivative tanker aircraft, and there is more than one competitor for
this contract. What, in your estimation, would be the operational
impacts, with respect to the current tanker fleet, of a protest and
subsequent delay of the KC-Y contract, similar to what happened with
the KC-46 in 2008?
General Van Ovost. When the 179th KC-46 is delivered, the average
age of the KC-135 fleet will be about 67 years old. Thus, continued
recapitalization of the aging KC-135 fleet is critical to sustain and
modernize this critical force element. As an aging platform, KC-135
availability has declined and lags mission capability rate performance
standards. The operational impact of a delay in recapitalizing the
remainder of the air refueling fleet, would be fewer available aircraft
to meet global missions in both daily operations and, if necessary, in
scaling for crisis or conflict.
41. Senator Kelly. General Van Ovost, what efforts are being made
to prevent delays with the KC-Y contract?
General Van Ovost. The Secretary of the Air Force submitted a
report to congressional committees in March 2022 that provided an
update on the KC-Y draft acquisition strategy. The Air Force is best
suited to provide an update on the program.
finland & nato/state partnership program
42. Senator Kelly. General Wolters, polling in Finland shows that
support for joining NATO is at an all-time high; 62 percent in a March
survey compared with a historical average of 20 to 25 percent. Clearly,
this is a reaction to Russia's aggression in Ukraine. How sustainable
do you believe that support to be?
General Wolters. We welcome Finland's growing aspiration for
joining NATO, and if Finland were to join NATO, it would enhance their
already strong relationships with the United States and NATO Allies.
European nations bordering Russia, including Finland, increasingly
realize that joining NATO's collective defense bolsters their own
security.
43. Senator Kelly. General Wolters, do you believe this is a view
shared by the government and military in Finland?
General Wolters. While unable to speak for the Republic of Finland,
Finland participates with NATO at the highest level possible for non-
NATO nations, under the Modalities for Strengthened Interaction (MSI).
These existing bilateral and multi-lateral defense relationships
promote security in the Baltic Sea region and the Arctic. They
reinforce transatlantic linkages, strengthen stability in northern
Europe, and build interoperability between the U.S. and one of its most
capable and like-minded Partners.
44. Senator Kelly. General Wolters, what is your view on Finland
joining the NATO alliance in the future?
General Wolters. Finland's accession to NATO would be a positive
step for the security situation of the Arctic and the Baltic regions.
Finland has an experienced and professional military, capable of
immediately increasing NATO's capabilities and ability to detect and
deter any regional aggression. Finland would reinforce transatlantic
linkages, strengthen stability in northern Europe, and build greater
interoperability between the United States and a very capable and like-
minded partner.
45. Senator Kelly. General Wolters, what other forms of bilateral
defense cooperation have we pursued with Finland? For example, Finland
does not have a National Guard State Partnership Program partnership.
Is that something that EUCOM is considering?
General Wolters. USEUCOM welcomes discussions with Finland about
pursuing a formalized State Partnership Program, as Finland has
previously worked with the National Guard. For over twenty years now,
the Finnish Staff and Virginia National Guard have formed a special
bond, with peer-to-peer exchanges and regular training together with
the Finnish Defense Forces, including multi-national exercises and
Finnish-hosted cyber engagements.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator James Inhofe
ukraine
46. Senator Inhofe. General Wolters, could you provide additional
detail to us on what NATO Allies are requesting in terms of backfilling
military aid they have delivered to Ukraine, including specific
weapons-systems, whether they are United States-produced systems, what
our inventory and industrial capacity is to meet such requests, and
what other nations, either in NATO or partners globally, might through
the aid they've provided also be candidates for further use of
supplemental funds to backfill their stocks?
General Wolters. NATO Allies and Partners across the globe have
responded with a historic demonstration of unity and will to strengthen
defense while simultaneously helping Ukraine. We have provided Ukraine
with thousands of American-made weapons and capabilities like drones,
anti-tank, and anti-air defense weapons. Through the coordination of
the USEUCOM Control Center--Ukraine, other nations are also
contributing security assistance to provide Ukraine with additional
capabilities they have requested and need to defend their country. The
Department of Defense is actively engaged with Industry to increase
capacity to backfill inventory. As our Allies and Partners seek to
backfill their weapons coffers, we will work collaboratively to
encourage the adoption of NATO standardized systems eligible for
security initiative funding to enhance the shared defense capabilities
of NATO and Partner nations.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
percentages of combat focused soldiers in germany
47. Senator Cotton. General Wolters, in an answer to one of my
questions during the hearing, you testified that 70 percent of Army
troops deployed to Germany were ``the teeth,'' or combat-focused
troops. Could you please clarify if you were referring to the increased
troop presence since the beginning of 2022 or if that was in reference
to the permanently stationed soldiers in Germany?
General Wolters. The 70 percent refers to the deployed numbers
prior to Jan 2022 to include the increased assured and deter presence
supporting the War in Ukraine and other emerging requirements.
48. Senator Cotton. General Wolters, of the United States Army
soldiers permanently stationed in Germany, what percentage of them are
``the teeth'' as you referenced in the hearing? Please provide
documentation of which military operational specialties you are
considering as ``the teeth.''
General Wolters. The ``teeth'' is the core of our operational force
structure, comprised of a cross-section of capabilities and associated
military specialties both organic and deployed. The approximation of 70
percent (28K of the 40K you referenced) denotes several key Operational
Military Occupational Fields: Aerospace, Armor, Aviation, Aviation
Ordinance, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN),
Combat Arms, Engineers, Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD), Field
Artillery, Infantry, Maintainers, Pilots, Special Forces, Special/
Surface Warfare, Submariners and Tankers. The other 30 percent are
aligned to Force and Operational Support capabilities, i.e., staff,
intel, logistical, medical, and services personnel.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
abrams tanks
49. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, in July, 2021, Poland
announced its intent to buy 250 Abrams tanks. In late February 2022,
just before Russia invaded Ukraine, congressional notification was
successfully completed allowing Poland to break its link to older
Russian tanks and become far more interoperable with the United States
and NATO.
I understand that as part of the United States deterrence measures
up to and after the invasion of Ukraine that there are now three United
States armored brigades forward deployed in Europe, the most since the
early 2000's when the United States made a strategic decision to pull
its permanent heavy armored forces out of Europe and bring them back to
the United States
Recently, Army senior leaders have noted that the strain on the
Army's 11 Active Duty armored brigades (ABCTs) is at a highpoint,
noting that rotational units need a 3-to-1 ratio to avoid excessive
operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and that 11 Active ABCTs falls short of
that sustainable ratio.
I also note that while Congress has consistently provided for a
baseline Abrams modernization rate of at least one brigade of tanks
each funding cycle up to and including the recently enacted fiscal year
2022 defense bills, only three U.S. Army brigades have been fielded the
most modern Abrams tank including one brigade set in Army Preposition
Stock in Germany that is now forward deployed to Poland.
So, it came as a shock to me that the Fiscal Year 2023 President's
Budget cut Abrams tank production significantly--by more than half a
brigade.
General Wolters, what signal do you think such a large proposed
reduction in the U.S. Army's production of Abrams tanks sends to NATO
allies seeking to rebuild their ground combat capability and Russia as
it eyes potential further aggression?
General Wolters. While unable to speak to the signal the
President's budget has on other sovereign NATO Allies, USEUCOM and the
Alliance benefits when militaries reduce reliance on aging,
incompatible Soviet-era weapon systems. Poland's modernization
investment towards the Abrams tanks, which will operate in concert with
the United States Abrams tanks in theater, is in line with the NATO
Warfighting Capstone Concept, ultimately enhancing NATO
interoperability and our collective deterrence and defense of the Euro-
Atlantic Area.
50. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, do you think we need more
armored forces available in Europe now than we did last year as this
budget was being developed?
General Wolters. Yes, a second ABCT was deployed to USEUCOM and
resourced via Ukraine Supplemental funding. This force element, along
with additional deployed formations, demonstrates U.S. commitment to
the defense of NATO and provides flexibility to source contributions to
NATO forces along the Eastern Flank. Additionally, the ABCT provides
USEUCOM with the adequate lethality to deter aggression, react to the
uncertainty of the conflict, and ensure it remains contained.
51. General Wolters, do you think OPTEMPO on the 11 ABCTs we have
will be sustainable over the long term given Russia's apparent
expansionist goals in Europe?
General Wolters. USEUCOM conducts deliberate planning to posture
forces and aligns force rotation to maintain sustainability with
minimum risk. Credible deterrence against Russian expansionism will
likely continue to require a NATO force presence that includes U.S.
rotational Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs). Demand for rotational
U.S. ABCTs to contribute to NATO deterrence activities will remain
high, and through United States Army Europe and Africa, USEUCOM will
work with NATO to continually assess the security environment to
posture the right force at speed while maintaining readiness.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
distributed, contested logistics
52. Senator Sullivan. General Van Ovost, in light of the recent
Russian logistics debacle in Ukraine, the importance of a distributed,
resilient, and agile logistics supply chain is clear. Could you provide
your assessment of the Joint Force's ability to conduct sustained and
effective combat operations against our great power adversaries?
General Van Ovost. Today, we are postured for success, but at
elevated risk due to adversary capabilities and intent. In preparation
for the future contested operating environment, we must pursue multiple
approaches to ensure the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise
maintains the necessary agility and resiliency to successfully deploy,
maneuver, and sustain a distributed Joint Force.
At the high end of conflict, adversary kinetic and non-kinetic
attack vectors will threaten the Joint Deployment and Distribution
Enterprise from CONUS to the point of need in a geographic combatant
command's theater of operations. Our adversaries' ability to contest
our transoceanic lines of communications continues to grow. Their
capabilities include improved, complex layers of meshed Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and advanced lethal kinetic
platforms to extend the reach of their anti-access/area denial ability.
Addressing these threats to our ability to project and sustain combat
power will require the fusion of logistics, fires, intelligence, and
command and control to support maneuver in the joint warfight.
The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) highlights the critical
importance of logistics and sustainment with an emphasis on maintaining
agility and resilience in the face of opposition from an adversary. In
support of this imperative, USTRANSCOM continues to work with
Department of Defense agencies, Joint Staff, Services, and Combatant
Commands to ensure that as an enterprise we are postured to remain
agile and resilient in the face of a future contested operating
environment. The three elements identified in the USTRANSCOM
warfighting framework underpin our ability to meet future Joint Force
requirements across the spectrum of conflict.
We must continue to maintain and enhance, where possible, our
global posture as specified in the NDS. Our robust network of partners
and allies that afford us access, basing, and overflight privileges
provide both agility and resiliency in the face of adversary action.
Our aerial ports and seaports provide numerous paths to deploy and
sustain the Joint Force as well as providing the means to disperse the
Joint Force in a theater of operations. Secondly, our mobility capacity
provides our Nation an asymmetric advantage over our adversaries to
rapidly deploy critical capabilities literally overnight via airlift as
well as deploying mass over time via sealift to provide a decisive
force to the theater of need. Maintaining and recapitalizing capacity
is necessary to meet future Joint Force needs. Further, we are working
with the services to identify the intra-theater lift requirements and
platforms that can augment our existing strategic and theater lift
assets.
Finally, the command and control and integration of mobility assets
is the center of gravity that allows us to operate within an
adversary's decision cycle. Gaining and maintaining decision advantage
is essential to achieving agility, and our networks and systems must be
resilient to
sustain operations in the face of adversary cyber threats. Through
robust Joint Force training and exercises we will refine techniques,
tactics, and procedures as well as inform and shape operational
concepts and strategic approaches that provide agility and resiliency
in the future contested operating environment.
strategic fuel sites
53. Senator Sullivan. General Van Ovost, as we increase our
presence in the Arctic to counter competition from authoritarian
aggressors in the region, logistical infrastructure will play a pivotal
role in our ability to remain persistent in this presence. As you are
aware, there is no deep water port north of Dutch Harbor, Alaska at
this time. However, Nome, Alaska is nearly 800 miles north of Dutch
Harbor and has finally been granted money to develop a port. When
discussing the Arctic in his recent testimony before this Committee on
March 24, 2022, the Commander of United States Northern Command,
General Glen VanHerck stated, ``Persistence is also enabled by having a
fuel capability further north than currently in Dutch Harbor, in Nome
as you alluded to . . . [t]hat is strategically important to that
location.'' Do you agree with General VanHerck's assertion regarding
the strategic importance of the Port of Nome?
General Van Ovost. I agree with General VanHerck's assertion that
the Port of Nome is of strategic importance; however, it is important
to differentiate the nature of this port from those designated as
``Strategic Seaports'' in the Strategic Seaport Program. This formal
program, managed through the National Port Readiness Network, chaired
by the Maritime Administration, is explicitly intended to ensure the
readiness of commercial seaports to support large-scale force
deployment from major military installations during contingencies and
other national defense emergencies. The Port of Nome is not required
for this purpose and is not suitable geographically to perform this
role.
54. Senator Sullivan. General Van Ovost, given the Secretary of
Defense's recent order to shut down the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage
Facility on Oahu, Hawaii within the next 12 months, the Joint Force
will need to find a way to replace the 250 million gallons of fuel
storage capacity lost. While not well advertised, the Aleutian Island
chain in Alaska is actually closer to many of our allies in the Indo-
Pacific region than Hawaii, and should warrant serious consideration
for additional bulk fuel storage capacity. What is your assessment of
the potential utilization of the Alaska, specifically the Aleutian
Island chain, for bulk fuel storage?
General Van Ovost. USTRANSCOM recognizes the critical geographic
value of Alaska for almost any potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific
and values the capabilities resident in Alaska. One of USTRANSCOM's
roles is to support USINDOPACOM's future wartime fuel posture which is
best suited to provide sufficient capacity, fuel network resiliency,
and timely distribution to sustain envisioned wartime operations. As
part of the Red Hill assessment to redistribute fuel in the Indo-
Pacific, fuel storage in Alaska was considered but not pursued because
it does not align effectively with the future Indo-Pacific wartime fuel
posture. Certainly, adequate fuel must be located in Alaska to support
robust operations in that vicinity, but additional storage to support
future Indo-Pacific wartime operations would not be advantageous.
55. Senator Sullivan. General Van Ovost, will you commit to look
into the feasibility and strategic implications of bulk fuel storage in
Alaska to augment Joint Force logistics?
General Van Ovost. One of USTRANSCOM's roles is to support
USINDOPACOM's future warfighting sustainment requirements, and
operational demands drive our requirements to array fuel to meet future
needs. USTRANSCOM is willing to evaluate all possible options, but the
wartime fuel posture best suited to providing sufficient capacity, fuel
network resiliency, and timely distribution to sustain envisioned
wartime operations will determine the most effective solutions. Our
most recent analysis, conducted as part of the Red Hill assessment,
indicates increased fuel storage in Alaska currently does not meet
these criteria.
ukraine
56. Senator Sullivan. General Wolters, in his recent Wall Street
Journal article titled, ``A Veteran Putin Foe Sizes Up the Response to
the War in Ukraine,'' Mr. Tunku Varadarajan describes how the rampant
kleptocracy in Russia has contributed directly to the military
incompetence of the Russian Armed Forces. Quoted in the article is Mr.
Bill Browder, a man intimately familiar with the rampant corruption of
the Russian regime, stating, ``[m]y estimate is that 80 percent of the
military budget is stolen by Russia's generals, because 80 percent of
all budgets in Russia are stolen by the officials in charge,'' and that
he believes their army has been ``gutted by corruption.'' Is this
assessment by Mr. Browder similar to the reporting and intelligence
you've seen?
General Wolters. We assessed Russia's forces would struggle to
achieve operational goals in a non-permissive environment against a
near-peer adversary, and their low readiness at the onset of the
invasion into Ukraine can probably be linked in part to corruption.
Russia's inability to achieve air superiority in Ukraine is most likely
due to limited pilot proficiency, years of suspect training, and
failure to prioritize near-peer combat tasks to use their technology to
its fullest extent. Additionally, Russia has invested most of its
defense budget in strategic nuclear forces, resulting in less money for
conventional forces.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
disinformation
57. Senator Blackburn. General Wolters, how specifically is Beijing
competing below the level of conflict in EUCOM?
General Wolters. Beijing uses economic investment, political
engagement, and information operations to compete in the EUCOM AOR
below the level of armed conflict. A whole-of-government, whole-of-
nation, and whole-of-Alliance effort is necessary to address Beijing's
influence in Europe. Providing alternatives to the PRC's investments
and loans to advance Europe's infrastructure can mitigate or stall
China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects, reducing Allied and
Partner nations' exposure to coercion and vulnerability of critical
infrastructure to PRC influence. The ability for the US, Allied, and
Partner nations' ability to secure sensitive supply chain processes and
protect operations and technologies from malign influence is critical
for collective security and interoperability, and requires a holistic
approach.
58. Senator Blackburn. General Wolters, what are the short- and
long-term implications of Chinese disinformation and propaganda
campaigns in Europe?
General Wolters. Most PRC disinformation and propaganda campaigns
in Europe seek to shape positive perceptions of China, build popular
support for China's governance model and international agenda, amplify
Western fissures and anti-NATO sentiment. However, disinformation
surrounding COVID-19 and Russia's invasion into Ukraine has sparked
renewed awareness for protecting democratic institutions, human rights,
and the rules-based international order. PRC messaging could resonate
with a few European countries, population groups, or political
elements, and we welcome opportunities for NATO and the EU to
collaborate on opportunities to reduce Europe's exposure to coercion
and vulnerability of PRC disinformation and propaganda.
59. Senator Blackburn. General Wolters, what are the potential
military implications of Beijing echoing Russian state media stories or
disinformation?
General Wolters. Beijing repeats Russian disinformation and
propaganda about Russia's invasion into Ukraine in an attempt to
undermine European cohesion and Western unity in supporting Ukraine.
However, growing European frustration with Beijing, combined with
stalwart NATO resolve and unity, continue to shield the Alliance from
malign influence and disinformation.
60. Senator Blackburn. General Wolters, how is EUCOM working across
the force to identify instances of Chinese and Russian disinformation
campaigns in Ukraine?
General Wolters. A whole-of-government, whole-of-nation, and whole-
of-Alliance effort is necessary to address disinformation in Europe,
including Ukraine. USEUCOM works closely across the interagency to
focus resources on countering false narratives, exposing criminal
behavior and sharing and amplifying Ukraine's successes in helping
protect its people, defend its territory, and its free and democratic
future.
ukraine
61. Senator Blackburn. General Wolters, how is EUCOM integrating
United States forces with NATO in response to the situation unfolding
in Ukraine?
General Wolters. All NATO Nations remain united through the war in
Ukraine, and our trans-Atlantic Alliance has responded in all
warfighting domains. In the Air, NATO has established an air defense
architecture along the eastern flank that includes contributions from
11 separate Allies. On land, Allies continue to deploy additional
forces to enhance its forward presence from Tallinn in the North to
Sofia in the South. At sea, our standing maritime forces are infused
with additional capabilities to ensure freedom of navigation spanning
from the Arctic to the Mediterranean. Aircraft carriers in the
Mediterranean dramatically increase the inherent air combat capability
and NATO's air defense architecture along the entire eastern flank.
NATO's capabilities in space and cyberspace are more closely integrated
than at any other time in the Alliance's history. The sum of these
modern, multi-domain capabilities underwrites NATO's ability to shield
all Allies because of the biggest adaptation of NATO Strategic Concepts
since the Cold War.
62. Senator Blackburn. General Wolters, how has NATO responded to
Russia purposefully targeting Ukrainian nuclear power plants?
General Wolters. NATO continues to monitor the situation in Ukraine
for Russian attempts to use chemical, biological, and radiological or
nuclear weapons.
belt and road initiative (bri)
63. Senator Blackburn. General Wolters, what are military
implications for NATO concerning the BRI?
General Wolters. In Europe, loans and investment are the PRC's
greatest tools to build influence. Providing alternatives to China's
investments and loans to advance Europe's infrastructure can mitigate
or stall China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects, reducing
Allied and Partner nations' exposure to coercion and vulnerability of
critical infrastructure to PRC influence. The ability for the U.S.,
Allied, and Partner nations' ability to secure sensitive supply chain
processes and protect operations and technologies from malign influence
is critical for collective security and interoperability, and requires
a holistic approach. We welcome opportunities for NATO and the EU to
collaborate on opportunities to provide alternatives to China's
investments and loans to advance Europe's infrastructure, mitigating or
stalling China's BRI projects.
64. Senator Blackburn. General Van Ovost, how does China's European
footprint impact TRANSCOM's air, ground, and maritime missions?
General Van Ovost. To date, China's European footprint has not
impacted USTRANSCOM operations in Europe; however, PRC investments in
ports and infrastructure via state-owned enterprises, as well as their
focus on emerging technologies for tracking cargo, may provide
potential future impacts on USTRANSCOM operations.
65. Senator Blackburn. General Wolters, how do you assess NATO's
current role in offering analysis or recommendations to the EU on the
military implications of foreign investment from countries like China?
General Wolters. Sharing strategic interests and facing the same
challenges, NATO and the EU cooperate to address China's influence in
Europe. We welcome opportunities for NATO and the EU to collaborate on
opportunities to provide alternatives to China's investments and loans
to advance Europe's infrastructure, mitigating or stalling China's Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI) projects, thereby reducing Europe's exposure
to coercion and vulnerability of critical infrastructure to PRC
influence.
transcom
66. Senator Blackburn. General Van Ovost, how is TRANSCOM working
with private sector partners to improve cybersecurity and deter
cyberattacks?
General Van Ovost. USTRANSCOM has strengthened its partnerships
with private sector partners to improve cybersecurity and deter
cyberattacks. USTRANSCOM continues to have contractual cybersecurity
compliance requirements in place, as well as the annual requirement for
our commercial partners to assess their compliance with National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-171 security
controls. Over the last four years of requiring self-assessments,
USTRANSCOM's analysis of commercial partner self-reporting showed
improved compliance each year.
Continuous learning is critical to staying ahead of the cyber
threat. To this end, USTRANSCOM engages in significant information
sharing and collaboration with our commercial partners. We also have
some ongoing special projects that link select USTRANSCOM commercial
partners with defense intelligence agencies to help these commercial
partners identify and reduce their cyber security risk.
In the summer of 2021, USTRANSCOM put in place a proof-of-principle
contract to have a third party assess commercial partner compliance
with NIST SP 800-171 security controls. USTRANSCOM offered this
assessment on a voluntary basis, and to date, three partners have
volunteered for the assessment. The first assessment, on one of
USTRANSCOM's Civil Reserve Air Fleet partners, was completed in January
2022, and the results confirm this partner has placed an emphasis on
cyber security and was compliant with 90 of the 110 security controls.
The second assessment is scheduled to complete in May 2022, and the
date for the third assessment is pending.
When USTRANSCOM engages with our commercial partner top executives,
it is evident they understand the importance of improving their
cybersecurity posture and are making investments to mitigate risk.
Together with our partners, we are making progress on improving our
cybersecurity and ability to deter cyberattacks, while recognizing more
can be done to build collective resilience.
telecommunication infrastructure
67. Senator Blackburn. General Wolters, what is EUCOM's current
message to our NATO counterparts regarding network security and
untrusted vendors in regards to 5G networks?
General Wolters. Sharing strategic interests and facing the same
challenges, NATO and the EU cooperate to address China's influence in
Europe. We welcome opportunities for NATO and the EU to collaborate on
opportunities to provide alternatives to China's investments and loans
to advance Europe's infrastructure, mitigating or stalling China's Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI) projects, thereby reducing Europe's exposure
to coercion and vulnerability of critical infrastructure to PRC
influence.
68. Senator Blackburn. General Van Ovost, how does TRANSCOM's
concept of operations need to change to account for Chinese electronic
warfare and cyber capabilities?
General Van Ovost. Due to the Joint Deployment and Distribution
Enterprise's dependence on cyber critical infrastructure, our
adversaries recognize its importance to our mission. Our China review
focuses on offensive cyber operations and electronic warfare
capabilities to deny us the advantages of modern, information
technology-driven warfare. We have witnessed China establish the
Strategic Support Force (SSF) to reduce or eliminate United States
technological advantages. Emphasizing the SSF's mission is equal to
that of traditional ground, sea, and air forces, the People's
Liberation Army continually seeks to develop its capabilities in
preparation for a potential conflict.
To meet the challenge, USTRANSCOM's concept of operations is
continually reviewed for resiliency and redundancy across the modes and
nodes of operation. It is paramount that we remain vigilant in the
execution of global operations by enforcing information technology and
operational technology cyber domain best practices. Additionally,
USTRANSCOM must continue to explore innovative ways to leverage the
resources at its disposal (e.g., federal labs, industry partners,
academia, other federal agencies, the military departments, and our
coalition partners) to enable and maintain dominance in this domain.
69. Senator Blackburn. General Van Ovost, how do we make our
logistics more agile and resilient in contested environments?
General Van Ovost. Our adversaries' ability to contest our
transoceanic lines of communications continues to grow. Their
capabilities include improved, complex layers of meshed ISR and
advanced lethal kinetic platforms to extend the reach of their anti-
access/area denial ability. As the National Defense Strategy notes,
those kinetic and non-kinetic threats extend to the United States'
Homeland, and we will work with the Department to take necessary
actions to increase resilience--our ability to withstand, fight
through, and recover quickly. Addressing these threats to our ability
to project and sustain combat power will require the fusion of
logistics, fires, intelligence, and command and control to support
maneuver in the Joint warfight.
At the core of the National Defense Strategy is integrated
deterrence. At USTRANSCOM, we have long advocated our own form of
integrated deterrence to counter threats to our logistics enterprise
and maximize our effectiveness. We continue to work to enhance our
world class organizational agility--exploring initiatives to move to
data-driven decisions and to make those decisions in reduced time. We
collaborate closely with our fellow combatant commands to work
seamlessly across warfighting domains and across theaters and brought
in our commercial partners into our exercises and wargames so they can
understand the degree of agility and resiliency that will be required
of them.
I want to highlight the importance of our unmatched network of
alliances and partnerships in facing contested environments. Our robust
network of partners and allies that afford us access, basing, and
overflight privileges provide both agility and resiliency in the face
of adversary action. Our numerous aerial ports and seaports provide
multiple paths to deploy and sustain the Joint Force as well as
providing the means to disperse the Joint Force in a theater of
operations. The robustness of our networks creates dilemmas for our
adversaries.
USTRANSCOM is a strategic competitive advantage for the Joint
Force. For it to remain an enduring advantage for the future Joint
Force requires investing in maintaining and recapitalizing the airlift,
air refueling and sealift capacity necessary to meet future Joint Force
needs. Further, we are working with the Services to identify the intra-
theater lift needs and those platforms that can augment our existing
strategic and theater lift assets.
Finally, the command and control and integration of mobility assets
is the center of gravity that allows us to operate within an
adversary's decision cycle. Gaining and maintaining decision advantage
is essential to achieving agility, and our networks and systems must be
resilient to sustain operations in the face of adversary cyber threats.
Through robust Joint Force training and exercises, we will refine
techniques, tactics, and procedures as well as inform and shape
operational concepts and strategic approaches that provide agility and
maintain resiliency in the future contested operating environment.
fuel cost
70. Senator Blackburn. General Van Ovost, what are the concerns
about fuel costs crowding out other spending priorities?
General Van Ovost. Impacts of execution-year fuel price increases
fall primarily on our customers, most of whom are funded by their
military department Operation and Maintenance appropriations. Year to
date in fiscal year 2022, the fuel increases had an $618 million impact
on transportation costs, $253 million which was offset through targeted
fuel related topline increases in the fiscal year 2022 Omnibus. These
targeted increases matched the impacts of the first Transportation
Working Capital Fund (TWCF) rate increase. I would defer to the
Services on specific spending priority impacts for the $365 million
delta. USTRANSCOM primarily funds its operations through the TWCF which
has been made whole through two rate increases, affording the ability
to maintain transportation operations. To the extent USTRANSCOM is
authorized to adjust TWCF rates commensurate with fuel adjustments, we
assess minimal impact on USTRANSCOM's operational or financial
flexibility.
71. Senator Blackburn. General Van Ovost, what impacts do you
anticipate fuel price volatility will have on TRANSCOM's Defense
Working Capital Fund?
General Van Ovost. The Department has authorized us to increase our
rates in response to unscheduled fuel rate increases over the past two
years, which has resulted in minimal impact to our Transportation
Working Capital Fund viability.
If at some point, however, DLA fuel rates increase, and we are not
permitted to increase our transportation rates at a commensurate level,
it quickly could erode our cash, thereby impacting our ability to
operate. Such an event could hamper our cash reserves, and therefore
our ability to expand capabilities rapidly during a surge in
operations.
turkey
72. Senator Blackburn. General Wolters, what are the potential
shortfalls that EUCOM has identified within the current relationships
with Turkey?
General Wolters. Turkey is a key NATO Ally, actively supports
Ukraine's efforts to defend its sovereignty, and together we maintain a
strong military-to-military relationship. While unable to procure F-35
fighter jets, USEUCOM strongly endorses Ankara's request to procure 40
F-16 Block-70s and 79 VIPER upgrades for its current F-16 fighter
fleet. These new and upgraded platforms would also support Turkey's
dual-capable aircraft capability that provides the Alliance a credible,
resilient, and critical deterrent. In order to maintain NATO's second
largest air force readiness, we support an F-16 Service Life Extension,
ground avoidance, AIM-9 and AIM-120 cases to ensure NATO's southeastern
flank remains poised to shield the Alliance in the Black Sea region.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
security assistance to ukraine
73. Senator Hawley. General Wolters, what have been the most
effective forms of United States security assistance for Ukraine thus
far?
General Wolters. NATO Allies and Partners across the globe have
responded with a historic demonstration of unity and will to strengthen
defense while simultaneously helping Ukraine. The United States has
provided Ukraine with thousands of American-made weapons and
capabilities like drones, anti-tank, and anti-air defense weapons.
Authorities including the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative
(USAI), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Presidential Drawdown
Authority, and Section 331 have been highly effective, helping Ukraine
resist aggression with courage and determination. All of this is making
a difference, helping Ukraine to protect its people, defend its
territory, and its free and democratic future. We thank Congress and
the American people for their contributions in this effort.
74. Senator Hawley. General Wolters, how do you expect Ukraine's
security assistance requirements to change over time?
General Wolters. USEUCOM aims to sustain our support for as long as
necessary for Ukraine to prevail. In the long-term, Ukraine will
require advanced Western-compatible systems along with capability and
capacity to train, integrate, and maintain these systems.
deterring russian attack
75. Senator Hawley. General Wolters, how important are attack
submarines for deterring or, if necessary, defending against Russian
aggression against NATO or the United States, particularly in the North
Atlantic?
General Wolters. USEUCOM benefits from the U.S. Navy's near
persistent presence across the North Atlantic and Arctic, and U.S. and
NATO submarines are a vital component of a 360 degree, all domain
campaign to compete and deter Russian aggression. Maintaining our
undersea advantage requires a comprehensive maritime domain approach
integrating aircraft, surface ships, submarines, satellites,
electromagnetic and cyber capabilities, and unmanned airborne, aquatic,
vehicles and fixed and portable underwater sensors. Working with our
Allies and Partners, USEUCOM welcomes all efforts supporting a secure
and stable Arctic region where U.S. and NATO interests are safeguarded,
the U.S. Homeland is defended, and nations can work cooperatively to
address shared challenges.
76. Senator Hawley. General Wolters, how important are carrier
strike groups for deterring or, if necessary, defending against Russian
aggression against NATO or the United States?
General Wolters. Our operational maritime forces provide an
essential capability in Strategic Competition. In addition to our
forward deployed Naval Forces, we will continue to leverage Carrier
Strike Group and Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Units to
contribute to the maritime force. The presence of Carrier Strike Groups
in the Mediterranean dramatically increase the inherent air combat
capability and NATO's air defense architecture along the entire eastern
flank. With a dedicated, persistent Carrier Strike Group and amphibious
assault presence, USEUCOM assures a lethal and agile theater posture.
77. Senator Hawley. General Wolters, how important are the Long-
Range Anti-Ship Missile or Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile and
the latter's variants for deterring or, if necessary, defending against
Russian aggression against NATO or the United States?
General Wolters. Both the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile
(JASSM) and the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) provide vital
deterrence and defense capability as advanced air-launched, stealthy,
long-range precision missiles. Both missiles enable multi-domain Allied
force freedom of action in an anti-access, area-denial environment
across Europe and beyond.
energy independence
78. Senator Hawley. General Wolters, how would restoring America's
energy independence help to strengthen deterrence against Russia,
including by reducing its coercive leverage over us and our allies?
General Wolters. As part of a whole-of-government approach, USEUCOM
works with the lead Federal agencies (Departments of State, Energy and
USAID) on European Energy Security and Independence efforts in
collaboration with NATO Allies and Partners. Currently, USEUCOM is
collaborating with various NATO-funded Centers of Excellence across a
broad spectrum of energy security and resilience related exercises to
identify alternative energy sources.
logistics capabilities
79. Senator Hawley. General Van Ovost, you testified last year
that, according to the Mobility Capability Requirements Study of 2020,
``we would be stressed to meet the globally integrated requirement for
air refueling and for intra-theater airlift'' during simultaneous
conflicts in Europe and Asia. Your testimony reflects what the Center
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Hudson Institute, and others
have found, which is that our logistics forces will be hard-pressed to
meet requirements in a fight against one strategic competitor, no less
against two at once. What are some of the challenges you anticipate
facing if the United States found itself at war with China in the Indo-
Pacific and Russia in Europe at the same time and TRANSCOM were called
upon to meet logistics requirements in both theaters at once?
General Van Ovost. The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) builds
upon the 2018 strategy, shifting Department of Defense's focus to great
power competition and potential conflict, which was also addressed
thoroughly in the MCRS-20 study. The challenge to deploy and sustain
the Joint Force in a conflict against either China or Russia is
daunting. As the MCRS-20 study indicated, elevated risk exists in
several areas, which I would be glad to discuss further in a classified
setting.
USTRANSCOM assesses both near-term and long-term strategic risk
against China or Russia based on the following three key factors.
First, the ability to deploy and sustain the Joint Force over global
distances remains an asymmetric United States advantage to support
campaigning, deterrence, and war-winning approaches under all
envisioned conditions against either China or Russia. As the DOD
develops new warfighting concepts and approaches, mobility and
logistics remain critical capabilities. It is a USTRANSCOM priority to
maintain sufficient capacity, with the right mix of capabilities.
Second, both Russia and especially China have studied the United States
ability to wage war, and both have developed specific capabilities to
delay, degrade, and disrupt United States power projection through both
kinetic and non-kinetic means, to include cyber and malign influence
over adversaries and partners. USTRANSCOM is working to address
resilient approaches to fighting through disruption and setting the
necessary conditions through access and protection of bases and routes
to sustain the flow of warfighting forces and materiel. Cyber domain
mission assurance remains a high priority for both the DOD and our
commercial providers as we contemplate operating under these
conditions, even in the Homeland. Finally, for a conflict in the Indo-
Pacific, the long-distances and distributed nature of future conflict
in that region will place new demands on the logistics and mobility
enterprise in areas such as dynamic maneuver of forces and distribution
of key commodities such as munitions and fuel. USTRANSCOM continues to
address these challenges to ensure DOD can respond at the speed and
scale future operations may require, regardless of theater.
In alignment with the 2022 NDS, USTRANSCOM addresses the
sufficiency of the mobility enterprise against great power competitors,
with China identified as the pacing challenge. The assessment of
sufficiency includes the requirements to support the critical missions
of homeland defense and nuclear deterrence. ``Deterrence in a second
theater'' employs an integrated deterrence approach as described in the
2022 NDS, which includes some mobility forces to achieve deterrence
outcomes. The MCRS-20 study analyzed mobility capabilities in this
context, and we are aligning a classified assessment of the MCRS-20
results against the 2022 NDS to ensure USTRANSCOM represents a
contemporary depiction of overall mobility enterprise sufficiency and
risk.
force levels and posture in europe
80. Senator Hawley. General Wolters, we have deployed approximately
20,000 forces, based on public reports, from the United States to
Europe in recent months. Assuming the war in Ukraine persists for
months, or potentially even years, is the plan to keep them in Europe
for that entire time?
General Wolters. In close consultation with our Allies and
Partners, we adapt continuously to meet the challenges and complexities
of our dynamic security environment. Together, we continue improving
our posture, transparency, alignment, and speed of response. We are
laser focused and united in having the right posture to shield the
Alliance.
81. Senator Hawley. General Wolters, former Assistant Secretary of
State for European and Eurasian Affairs Wess Mitchell recently wrote:
``The U.S. should also make better use of the large number of troops we
have stationed in Western Europe by moving them East. The Stryker
Brigade recently shifted from Germany to Romania should make its
permanent home there, and the 173rd Airborne sent from Italy to Norway
should make Norway its new home.'' Do you agree that we should move
these units farther to the east, rather than keeping them in central
Europe, and why or why not?
General Wolters. We closely examine our prepositioning requirements
based on operational requirements, regularly training and exercising
across the entire Area of Responsibility to ensure we have a complete
understanding of capabilities and requirements. This enables moving
combat-credible forces at speed while maintaining readiness, responsive
to a dynamic global security environment.
82. Senator Hawley. General Wolters, Dr. Mitchell also wrote, ``The
U.S. also has an inventory of weapons that it is in the process of
decommissioning that could be given or sold to frontline NATO states,
such as the F-15, F-16, and A-10 aircraft.'' Would frontline NATO
states be able to make good use of aircraft, such as those listed by
Dr. Mitchell, that the United States is currently in the process of
decommissioning?
General Wolters. Under a whole-of-government approach, USEUCOM
supports the Department of State and the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency's Foreign Military Sales program, and welcomes opportunities for
NATO Allies and Partners to be recipients of defense articles made
available through that program.
european burden sharing
83. Senator Hawley. General Wolters, our European allies,
particularly Germany, are stepping up their defense commitments as a
result of the war in Ukraine. This is a positive development, but it is
long overdue, and it's imperative that Germany and our other allies
sustain these increases over the long term. Do you agree that it is
imperative for our allies to sustain increased defense spending and
commitments, rather than surging investments now and then letting them
die off in the months or years ahead?
General Wolters. NATO resolve and unity is as great as it has ever
been. We are witnessing a generational moment, a historic demonstration
of will and an unprecedented effort by Allies to strengthen defense,
while simultaneously helping Ukraine resist aggression. USEUCOM
welcomes all efforts of our NATO Allies to commit to meet the Alliance
two percent benchmark and redouble their efforts to sustain long term
defense investments to shield the Alliance.
84. Senator Hawley. General Wolters, assuming Germany follows
through on its commitment to spend more than 2 percent of GDP on
defense from here on out, what capabilities can Germany provide that
United States forces are currently providing in the EUCOM AOR?
General Wolters. Germany's commitment is a welcome announcement and
bodes well for future Alliance capabilities and contributions. As a
sovereign nation, Germany will determine the best place to invest those
resources. Investments in advanced fighter aircraft like F-35 and
fourth generation electronic warfare capable fighter aircraft would
enhance the Alliance's air domain capabilities, and increase readiness
across Allied air forces. Other investments in air defense and anti-
ballistic missile defense technologies, naval warfare, mechanized and
armored land formations would strengthen the deterrence and defense of
the Euro-Atlantic.
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