[Senate Hearing 117-948]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
______
S. Hrg. 117-948
STRATEGIC COMPETITION AND SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 23, 2022
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
_______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
59-652 WASHINGTON : 2025
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New Yor kDEB FISCHER, Nebraska
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TOM COTTON, Arkansas
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia JONI ERNST, Iowa
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia RICK SCOTT, Florida
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
MARK KELLY, Arizona TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
John D. Wason, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities
MARK KELLY, Arizona, Chairman JONI ERNST, Iowa
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia RICK SCOTT, Florida
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
march 23, 2022
Page
Strategic Competition and Security Cooperation in the Western 1
Hemisphere.
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Mark Kelly.................................. 1
Statement of Senator Joni Ernst.................................. 2
Witness Statements
Dalton, The Honorable Melissa, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 3
Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs.
Questions for the Record......................................... 26
(iii)
STRATEGIC COMPETITION AND SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 23, 2022
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Mark Kelly
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Subcommittee Members present: Kelly, Gillibrand, Kaine,
Peters, Ernst, Fischer, Scott, and Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARK KELLY
Senator Kelly. The Emerging Threats Subcommittee meets this
afternoon to receive testimony from the Department of Defense
on strategic competition and security cooperation in the
Western Hemisphere.
I would like to welcome our witnesses today, the Honorable
Melissa Dalton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense and Hemispheric Affairs; Mr. James Saenz, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics; Brigadier
General Frank Bradfield, Deputy Director for Political-Military
Affairs for the Western Hemisphere, J5 Joint Staff. I want to
take this opportunity to thank all of you for being here today.
The Western Hemisphere is seeing a growing set of
challenges creating instability, undermining democratic
institutions, increasing corruption, and threatening
longstanding U.S. security relations in the region. Department
of Defense (DOD) operations in the region have traditionally
focused on counternarcotics and countering transnational
criminal organizations, all while the resources for these
missions have decreased.
At the same time, the opioid crisis continues unabated,
with opioid and synthetic drug trafficking returning to pre-
pandemic levels. We are seeing this in Arizona, where fentanyl
seizures at or near the border continue to rise, putting a
greater strain on local law enforcement, that is also
stretched, at the same time, by the migrant crisis.
The Western Hemisphere is also increasingly the focus of
strategic competition as near-peer rivals China, and also
increasingly Russia, seek to expand their influence. China is
using its investments throughout the region to create political
influence it can leverage to weaken democracies. China is also
exploiting the region's resources, including through Chinese
blue water fishing fleets, engaged in illegal, unreported, and
unregulated fishing. Russia is using military assistance and
air and sea access agreements with Venezuela, Nicaragua, and
Cuba to create instability and challenge democratic governance
in the region.
A key tool in this strategic competition is U.S. security
cooperation with foreign military and security forces in the
Western Hemisphere. During today's testimony, I hope you will
address how the Department is using its security cooperation
authorities, including its section 333 capacity-building
authority and bilateral and multilateral training and exercises
to strengthen our longstanding security ties to countries in
the region, and also what more can be done to counter the
growing malign influence of Russia and China in the region.
Lastly, I would be interested in how DOD is engaging with
foreign ministries of defense to build longer-term capacity
within those institutions in order to promote the rule of law,
human rights, and respect for civilian control of the military.
I will now turn it over to Senator Ernst for any opening
comments she may have.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JONI ERNST
Senator Ernst. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and thank
you all very much for appearing in front of the subcommittee
today.
Despite the war raging in Ukraine, this hearing is always
timely because it concerns the security of our own
neighborhood, right here in the Western Hemisphere. The
security of this region is not guaranteed. China clearly views
the Western Hemisphere as critical to fulfilling its global
ambitions and displacing the United States as the global
leader. China's successful inclusion of 21 Latin American
states in the Belt and Road Initiative, its efforts to bribe
and bully countries into lopsided deals that give the Chinese
preferential access agreements, and its significant investments
in dual-use infrastructure like ports, as well as military
capabilities like space tracking sites really should concern
us.
It is clear China's efforts are not purely economic. They
are following their tried-and-true playbook that uses strong-
armed economic and diplomatic efforts to set conditions for an
eventual military buildup. The China Communist Party's
autocratic, oppressive model is not in the long-term interest
of our hemisphere.
Make no mistake. China is on the offense in the Western
Hemisphere, and I am worried our posture and policies are
reactive at best, inert at worst.
During today's hearing I look forward to discussing how DOD
can be more innovative and effective in competing with and
countering our adversaries in the region and strengthening
partnerships with key allies like Colombia.
With that, Mr. Chair, I will turn it back to you.
Senator Kelly. General Bradfield, Ms. Dalton, Mr. Saenz, I
understand that all of you do not have a prepared statement,
but if you have a joint statement I think one of you are
prepared to deliver that.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MELISSA DALTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS
Ms. Dalton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Kelly,
Ranking Member Ernst, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before
you today on how the Department approaches strategic
competition and security cooperation in the Western Hemisphere.
I am delighted to be joined by Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense James Saenz and Brigadier General Bradfield to provide
our joint testimony today, and we would like to make two main
points.
First, the Department is committed to maintaining strong
defense relationships with our key partners in the Western
Hemisphere, including Canada, Mexico, and the majority of the
countries from the Caribbean and Central and South America.
Security cooperation is a vital tool to maintain these
relationships, as Russia and China continue expanding their
influence and actively seek to compete with us in this
hemisphere across multiple sectors.
Second, even as we engage in this competition, we must also
support responses to threats posed by state or non-state
actors, including drug trafficking, trafficking in persons and
weapons, illicit financial flows, humanitarian disasters with
natural and manmade causes, and malicious cyber activity. Our
security cooperation partnerships serve as a critical way to
counter transnational threats as part of a whole-of-government
approach.
As DOD addresses multiple threats to international peace
and stability, we are mindful that a relatively safe and secure
Western Hemisphere helps give us the bandwidth to tackle
challenges elsewhere in the globe. However, we cannot take
security in this hemisphere for granted, especially as our
strategic competitors seek to shift the balance in their favor.
The People's Republic of China (PRC) is the pacing
challenge for the Department, including in the Western
Hemisphere. The PRC continues to expand its diplomatic,
technological, informational, military, and economic
enticements to our partners in the region. We are concerned
that PRC offers of military cooperation, scientific exchanges,
and information technology assistance have nefarious
objectives. We are also concerned that the PRC's economic
investments are predatory in nature and may mask military
purposes.
Russia continues to promote instability in the hemisphere
with disinformation and by providing diplomatic, intelligence,
financial, and military support to authoritarian regimes, and
its activities could enter a new phase if Russia seeks to
amplify these activities in reaction to the United States
response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
Meanwhile, Iran's cooperation with the Venezuelan regime of
Nicolas Maduro, among other countries, remains of great concern
to us.
Responding to these threats requires attention, commitment,
and investments. As the forthcoming National Defense Strategy
will outline, DOD will need to maintain strong bilateral and
multilateral defense partnerships in the hemisphere, enabled by
engagements in presence, intelligence, and information
exchanges, education programs and exercises, and other tools of
security cooperation.
In addition to state competitors, drug trafficking and
other transnational criminal organizations continue to accrue
billions of dollars in illicit profit at the expense of
American lives and regional security. They engage in illicit
activities such as trafficking in humans and weapons and
illegal mining. These organizations undermine stability by
enabling corruption, eroding democratic institutions, and
hindering governments from exercising effective sovereignty
within their countries.
Western Hemisphere nations, particularly in Central America
and the Caribbean, face the threat of extreme natural
disasters, in many cases exacerbated by climate change. These
disasters often lead to a variety of destabilizing effects that
compound economic hardship and insecurity and can help drive
migration.
We have also seen the devastating effects of the COVID-19
pandemic in the hemisphere. The pandemic's effects on political
and economic stability and on public health will resonate
across the region for decades to come.
Finally, there is concern across the hemisphere about the
increasing threat of a range of malicious cyber activities,
including unauthorized intrusions.
Addressing these strategic and transnational threats
requires DOD to closely cooperate with other U.S. Executive
branch partners and with our international partners. Building
and strengthening these partnerships are key to maintaining the
Western Hemisphere's security and stability. Our partnerships
with other hemispheric nations are based on the essential
principles of support for democratic institutions, civilian
control of the military, and respect for human rights and
dignity.
Dedicated training on human rights is a core component of
our security cooperation activities with partners. Senior DOD
officials have led multiple bilateral working groups and other
senior leader engagements with our partners across the
Americas, including several with Caribbean partners as part of
our greater emphasis on cooperation with that vital region. We
continue institutional capacity-building and professional
military education programs with partners nations' defense and
security ministries and militaries, including in Central
America. Our defense and security cooperation with Colombia
remains strong, and is a key component of the United States-
Colombia Bicentennial Partnership that Presidents Biden and
Duque announced on March 10th.
At the same time, we are expanding into new areas of
cooperation to include cyber, climate resilience, and space. We
also cooperate in multilateral settings to include the Inter-
American Defense Board and the Conference of Defense Ministers
of the Americas, which Brazil will host this July. In addition,
to help our U.S. law enforcement and international partners
disrupt drug trafficking and other transnational criminal
organizations, DOD continues to provide detection and
monitoring, intelligence analysis, and other forms of support,
using the counterdrug authorities and appropriations provided
by Congress for more than 30 years.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Ernst, and distinguished
members of the subcommittee, these are just some of the ways in
which DOD employs security cooperation to address strategic
competition and transnational threats. Thank you, and we look
forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of The Honorable Melissa
Dalton, Mr. James Saenz and Brigadier General Frank Bradfield
III follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by The Honorable Melissa Dalton, Mr. James
Saenz and Brigadier General Frank Bradfield III
introduction
Chairman Kelly, Ranking Member Ernst, and distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee: thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today on how the Department of Defense (DOD) approaches strategic
competition and security cooperation in the Western Hemisphere. We
would like to make two main points:
First, the Department is committed to maintaining strong defense
relationships with our key partners in the Western Hemisphere,
including Canada, Mexico, and the majority of the countries from the
Caribbean and Central and South America. Security cooperation is a
vital tool to maintain these relationships, as Russia and China
continue expanding their influence and actively seek to compete with us
in this hemisphere across multiple sectors.
Second, even as we engage in this competition, we also must support
responses to threats posed by state or non-state actors, including drug
trafficking, trafficking in persons and weapons, illicit financial
flows, humanitarian disasters with natural and man-made causes, and
malicious cyber activity. Our security cooperation partnerships serve
as a critical way to counter transnational threats, as part of a whole-
of-government approach.
strategic competition
As DOD addresses multiple threats to international peace and
stability, we are mindful that a relatively safe and secure Western
Hemisphere helps give us the bandwidth to tackle challenges elsewhere
in the globe. However, we cannot take security in this hemisphere for
granted, especially as our strategic competitors seek to shift the
balance in their favor.
The People's Republic of China (PRC) is the pacing challenge for
the Department in the Western Hemisphere. The PRC continues to expand
its diplomatic, technological, informational, military, and economic
enticements to our partners in the region. We are concerned that PRC
offers of military cooperation, scientific exchanges, and information
technology assistance have nefarious objectives. We are also concerned
that the PRC's economic investments are predatory in nature and may
mask military purposes. Russia continues to promote instability in the
hemisphere with disinformation and by providing diplomatic,
intelligence, financial, and military support to authoritarian regimes,
and its activities could enter a new phase if Russia seeks to amplify
these activities in reaction to the United States response to Russia's
invasion of Ukraine. Meanwhile, Iran's cooperation with the Venezuelan
regime of Nicolas Maduro among other countries remains of great concern
to us.
Responding to these threats requires attention, commitment, and
investments. As the forthcoming National Defense Strategy will outline,
DOD will need to maintain strong bilateral and multilateral defense
partnerships in the hemisphere, enabled by engagements and presence,
intelligence and information exchanges, education programs and
exercises, and other tools of security cooperation.
enduring and emerging threats
In addition to state competitors, drug trafficking and other
transnational criminal organizations continue to accrue billions of
dollars in illicit profit at the expense of American lives and regional
security. They engage in illicit activities such as trafficking in
humans and weapons, and illegal mining. These organizations undermine
stability by enabling corruption, eroding democratic institutions, and
hindering governments from exercising effective sovereignty within
their countries.
Western Hemisphere nations, particularly in Central America and the
Caribbean, face the threat of extreme natural disasters, in many cases
exacerbated by climate change. These disasters often lead to a variety
of destabilizing effects that compound economic hardship and
insecurity, and can help drive migration.
We have also seen the devastating effects of the COVID-19 pandemic
in the hemisphere. The pandemic's effects on political and economic
stability, and on public health, will resonate across the region for
decades to come.
Finally, there is concern across the hemisphere about the
increasing threat of a range of malicious cyber activities, including
unauthorized intrusions.
strong relationships and effective security cooperation
Addressing these strategic and transnational threats requires DOD
to closely cooperate with other U.S. Executive Branch partners and with
international partners. Building and strengthening these partnerships
are key to maintaining the Western Hemisphere's security and stability.
Our partnerships with other hemispheric nations are based on the
essential principles of support for democratic institutions, civilian
control of the military, and respect for human rights and dignity.
Dedicated training on human rights is a core component of our security
cooperation activities with partners.
Senior DOD officials have led multiple bilateral working groups and
other senior-level engagments with our partners across the Americas,
including several with Caribbean partners as part of our greater
emphasis on cooperation with that vital region. We continue
institutional capacity-building and professional education programs
with partner nations' defense and security ministries and militaries,
including in Central America. Our defense and security cooperation with
Colombia remains strong, and is a key component of the United States-
Colombia Bicentennial Partnership that Presidents Biden and Duque
announced on March 10.
At the same time, we are expanding into new areas of cooperation,
to include cyber, climate resilience, and space. We also cooperate in
multilateral settings, to include the Inter-American Defense Board and
the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas, which Brazil will
host this July. In addition, to help our United States law enforcement
and international partners disrupt drug trafficking and other
transnational criminal organizations, DOD continues to provide
detection and monitoring, intelligence analysis, and other forms of
support, using the counterdrug authorities and appropriations provided
by Congress for more than 30 years.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Ernst, and distinguished Members of
the Committee, these are just some of the ways in which DOD employs
security cooperation to address strategic competition and transnational
threats. Thank you, and we look forward to your questions.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Ms. Dalton, for your statement. I
will begin our first round of 5 minutes for questions.
Ms. Dalton, the Director of National Intelligence's (DNI's)
latest annual Threat Assessment Report, issued in February of
this year, highlighted the threat from illicit drugs,
particularly synthetic drugs, has reached record levels, with
more than 100,000 U.S. drug overdose deaths annually for the
first time ever.
In Arizona, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has said that
they seized a record amount of fentanyl in 2021, with the
primary source being the Sinaloa Cartel. This has taken the
lives of many Arizonans and many Americans and has put a strain
on local law enforcement.
Secretary Dalton, do you agree that the threat from illicit
drug trafficking is a national security threat and that the
Department of Defense has an important role to play in
assessing this threat?
Ms. Dalton. Chairman, thank you very much for the question,
and yes, I do agree that this is a national security threat
that we must be committed to addressing. It is a tragedy, the
alarming rate of hundreds of thousands of Americans that are
being affected by the illicit drug trade in states across
America. DOD is committed to the important role that we play in
detection and monitoring, in intelligence cooperation in the
broader region as well as through our security cooperation
efforts, to try to address this phenomenon upstream, working
closely with partners in the region and with our interagency
partners, and then also in the Homeland, in support of
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice
(DOJ), DEA, and other relevant civilian-led authorities. We are
absolutely committed to this mission and it is a national
security challenge.
Senator Kelly. I imagine the Chinese and the Russians are
looking at this as a big opportunity for them. Is it your
assessment that our near-peer competitors like China and Russia
are taking advantage of this instability created by this
illicit drug trade and are using this to expand their influence
in the Western Hemisphere?
Ms. Dalton. Chairman, thank you for pointing out this
important nexus. You know, as we look at the threats in the
region and what our strategic competitors are doing and how
they opportunistically may seek to ride upon other drivers of
instability, I think this nexus is going to be increasingly
important to watch, which is why we have dedicated elements
within Southern Command, within the broader Department, to
track the behavior of our strategic competitors and what the
interrelationships might be with some of the transnational
criminal organizations, and would be happy to follow up through
classified channels to share more.
Senator Kelly. Thank you. Mr. Saenz, the Department of
Defense's budget for drug interdiction and counterdrug
activities, as approved by the omnibus for fiscal year 2022, is
over $800 million, and two-thirds of that is focused on the
Western Hemisphere and the U.S. Homeland.
Mr. Saenz, how effective would you say the Department's
counterdrug activities have been in cutting off the flow of
illicit drugs into our country?
Mr. Saenz. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for that
question and this opportunity to meet with all of you today. I
think that the Department of Defense's activities, in
conjunction with all of our partners, both interagency and
international partners, work well together to help stem the
flow of drugs into the United States, given our authorities and
the funding provided by Congress.
I think that the authorities that are provided by Congress
are really what shape what we are able to do, and I would like
to thank all the Members of Congress and Members of the Senate
and Members of this Subcommittee for those authorities that
help assist us in shaping how we provide our part of
interagency, international effort to stem the flow of drugs.
Senator Kelly. Can you give an assessment of its
effectiveness? Is there any kind of metric that you use, any
way to measure the effectiveness of the $800 million budget,
where most of that goes in the Western Hemisphere and the U.S.
Homeland?
Mr. Saenz. Thank you for this opportunity to clarify. Our
budget that we provide, that $800 million, is divided into
several different areas. Part of that is for our own demand
reduction activities within the Department of Defense. Some of
that is for our primary mission, which is detection and
monitoring, and part of that is for the support that we provide
through intelligence and logistics support. Then a large
portion of that is the support we provide through the National
Guard in supporting local, state, and Federal law enforcement.
Each one of those categories has different metrics in areas
that we look at for how we providing that support in
conjunction with our law enforcement partners. In those various
areas we do have metrics that we look at to see how we are
providing that support, and in general, those metrics show that
the support that we are able to provide is effective and points
out ways where we can become more effective and efficient with
the funds that are provided.
Senator Kelly. I would like to follow up. Maybe we can get
some details on those metrics, and myself and my staff can take
a look at it.
I appreciate that. I will recognize Senator Ernst for 5
minutes.
Senator Ernst. Yes. Thanks again to our witnesses. General
Bradfield, if I could start with you, sir. I am increasingly
concerned about China's investments in our critical mineral
markets in the Western Hemisphere. How could growing Chinese
influence in South American mining become a security risk for
us?
Brigadier General Bradfield. Yes, ma'am. Thank you,
Senator, for the question. The Joint Staff is gravely concerned
about any seemingly economic deals with China in the hemisphere
because of dual-use purposes. Some of these companies could
easily be used for military application later. So any access
that they gain through a business deal in the hemisphere may be
militarized down the road.
Senator Ernst. Mm-hmm. Yes. I do agree with that and I have
grave concerns about it. Is there any coordination with our
Department of State underway presently to counter the
diplomatic pressure that China is putting on South American
leaders regarding these critical mineral markets in South
America, and particularly in Chile?
Brigadier General Bradfield. Ma'am, I would have to defer
specifically to Department of State, but I can tell you that
the Joint Staff works with the interagency to share information
and concerns. As we detect and monitor and establish these
well-founded relationships we have throughout the hemisphere
with our partners and allies, to share that information with
the appropriate entities. It is a whole-of-government approach,
ma'am.
Senator Ernst. Can you maybe explain the risks that are
associated with that as well?
Brigadier General Bradfield. Yes, ma'am. To understand your
question then, the risk for--I am sorry. Can you restate----
Senator Ernst. Well, the pressure that China is putting on
South American leaders to gain access to basically the mining
infrastructure, are there risk then with allowing China to
continue to put pressure on those leaders? Is it blocking any
attempts that the United States might have to work with those
South American leaders, those type of interactions? Are you
able to observe any of that from the DOD perspective?
Brigadier General Bradfield. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for
clarifying the question. So yes, ma'am. They appear to have
different tactics to gain access to, as you stated, minerals
and business deals, but often what we are hearing from partners
and allies and witnessing is that strings attached. So it may
appear to be a business deal but then it turns into something
about longer-term access, or, you know, there are 14 countries
in the world that still recognize Taiwan. Eight of them are in
the hemisphere, and we have heard that some of these deals come
with, ``We will give you this good deal if you denounce
recognition of Taiwan.''
Senator Ernst. Okay, and there is definitely a risk in
that. In particular, I have heard of opportunities for American
companies to engage in some of these mining activities.
However, with the pressure that is coming from China we do not
have that same level of interest from the United States
Government in assisting some of our own companies, and access
to these critical mineral resources are extremely important. I
appreciate your feedback there.
General Bradfield, an increasing People's Liberation Army
(PLA) presence in United States Southern Command's (SOUTHCOM's)
area of responsibility (AOR) has direct implications for DOD
requirements, given the strategic location along critical sea
lines of communication like the Panama Canal and the Strait of
Magellan at the southern tip of South America.
In your professional military judgment then, how could an
increased Chinese military presence near strategic lines of
communication impact DOD's ability to execute contingency
operations, both in the region and in other places like United
States IndoPacific Command (INDOPACOM)?
Brigadier General Bradfield. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the
question. We are watching that closely and working with our
allies and partners throughout the theater, not just Panama.
But certainly your question is how could it impact? It could
certainly impact if China, for example, had control of the port
authority on either or both ends of the Panama Canal. It could
restrict movement. They are also trying to gain access and
strike a port agreement down in southern Argentina, and that
could be of concern as well.
Senator Ernst. [Presiding.] Very good. I appreciate that. I
am going to yield back my time. Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Dalton and General Bradfield, you noted in your written
testimony that one way China attempts to expand its influence
in the Western Hemisphere is strengthened by the PLA's ties
with militaries in the Western Hemisphere. What arguments are
we making to our Western Hemisphere neighbors that they should
engage with our own armed forces over the Chinese? One issue
that is related and not unique to the Western Hemisphere is
corruption amongst the political leaders and other elites. Can
you speak to how our adversaries are exploiting corruption to
their advantage and what tools should we use to counter that?
Ms. Dalton. Senator Gillibrand, thank you so much for the
really important question here. It is an issue that we are
closely monitoring and seeking to counteract, given our
longstanding defense relationships in the region. It is deeply
worrisome to us that China is attempting to make these inroads.
In terms of the arguments that we are using, it is the fact
that we have decades-long defense relationships in the region,
that quality of the security cooperation that we provide in
terms of training and equipment, in terms of sustainment, is
second to none globally, and that are part of, therefore, a
network of global U.S. allies and partners that share common
interests and values. I think that is a really compelling
argument that most of our partners in the region, that
continues to resonate with them.
But I do think we will need to redouble our efforts as
China seeks to make these inroads to ensure that we continue to
live up to our end of the bargain and continue to build the
relationships in ways that are going to be helpful to them. I
do think that, again, there is an interrelationship here, as we
were speaking about earlier, in terms of some of the other
drivers of insecurity. You mentioned corruption. There is also
the Transnational Criminal Organization (TCO) dynamic, where
actors like China and Russia, through disinformation, through
cyber means, are looking to piggyback on some of those dynamics
and foster a sense of disconnection between the government and
their people, potentially. This is an area that we continue to
watch very closely.
Brigadier General Bradfield. Senator, thank you for the
question. The Joint Staff and North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD) and United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
and SOUTHCOM are keenly aware of how China is maneuvering
throughout the AOR and in our backyard.
So what are we doing about it? We stand shoulder to
shoulder with our partners and allies. We are on the field. The
Joint Force is on the field every day with our partners and
allies. We have some longstanding relationships that many of
you on this Committee may be well familiar with as well--a low-
cost but high-return-on-investment program like Security
Partnership Program through the National Guard. Four Members in
this Subcommittee have states that work in the hemisphere, and
we are proud of that. These are longstanding relationships
where we build trust and we have earned the title of ``partner
of choice.''
While China will continue to do what they feel like they
need to for strategy, our biggest strength in the hemisphere
are our partnerships, our friends, our neighbors. So being on
the battlefield and being in the space with them, both in
training, exercises, and persistent engagements, is very
important. We need to meet our partners and allies where they
are, with their challenges. That is very important. The support
of this Committee and Congress to find those activities is very
important.
Senator Gillibrand. Acknowledging that we are in an
unclassified setting, the efforts that China is making to train
foreign militaries, are those efforts successful, and how would
you rate them, and how do you think we should best counter it
with the partnerships that we have forged over several decades
in Latin America?
Brigadier General Bradfield. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. So we
do get feedback from our partners and allies, and some do
continue to send folks to training in Communist China, and
again, you are right, at this level of classification--I could
be more specific for the record later, ma'am. But it is
effective because they keep going sometimes, because it is a
free, paid-for school, but we do get the feedback that because
we have an emphasis on human rights, a respect for civilian
government and democracy, that we are the preferred partner of
choice.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator Ernst. Senator Tuberville.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you very much. Thank you for your
testimony today.
You know, we have got a lot of bad things going on around
the world. You know, we are all worried about Ukraine and the
people there. It is a shame what is going on. We will lose more
in the first 6 months of overdoses in this country than they
will lose, and it does not seem like we are much worried about
it. We do not hear people talking about it, and this is my
second hearing today about drugs. I think we all need to get
more and more concerned about. Senator Kelly obviously brought
it up in his home state of Arizona.
At the end of the day, what have we got to do? I mean, we
are losing. We are losing the war on drugs down at the border,
and it is coming across right and left. We will have people die
around here today, overdose, around our building here.
Ms. Dalton, what do you think? I mean, is there anything
else we can do, any more emphasis? What are we spending--800--
how much do we spend? What is our budget? 800?
Ms. Dalton. Eight hundred million.
Senator Tuberville. Eight hundred million? Just elaborate
on that a little bit.
Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you for highlighting this
challenge again, and I am really impressed by the focus that
this subcommittee is giving to this issue, and you mentioned
the other engagement going on here today, because I do think it
needs more due attention, given the impact that it is having on
Americans.
Again, I think the Department is absolutely committed to
playing the important role that we do with our partners in the
region to get after some of the upstream drivers of these
illicit networks that are bringing drugs into our country. I
think the Administration is giving a lot of emphasis to trying
to come up with a comprehensive strategy that will address some
of those upstream drivers.
The challenge is that, you know, some of those initiatives
will take some time to manifest because it fundamentally is
about governance, it is about corruption, it is about the seeds
that lay the foundation for those networks to be able to take
hold in the points of origin.
Through our security cooperation efforts in the region,
continuing to work closely on the professionalization and
capabilities and defense institutional capacity-building of our
partners to try to address some of those upstream drivers I
think is really critical, while, at the same time, bringing the
focus here in the homeland to work with state and local
authorities in our support capacity as a department, to support
the important efforts of DHS, DEA, and other actors. I am
grateful for Congress' continued support for our
counternarcotics programs and our security cooperation
programs, and in terms of what more we could do, I think
additional congressional focus and funding for our civilian-led
agencies, like DHS, like the State Department, like DEA, that
need the capacity to get after this challenge.
Senator Tuberville. Well, here is a problem, I see what has
happened over the years. Marijuana, heroin--most of those
things you have to grow, right? This fentanyl is synthetic, and
this can right here of fentanyl could kill everybody in this
city, and they are making it right and left. It is easy to get
across the border, and it is awful. I mean, it is absolutely
awful, and nobody seems to be worried about it. I know that it
is you all's job, but we have got to do something about it or
we are going to have a catastrophe in this country of somebody
putting it in our water supply, putting it in air systems. We
have got to wake up and smell the roses.
A couple other things. On the African continent we have one
military base. In COCOM we have 76 bases in Latin America. Is
there anything else we need to do down there to help? You know,
it looks like we are pretty well targeted, you know, in Latin
America, to helping things like this. We are not concerned
about it in Africa. Any thoughts on that?
Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you. I believe that those key
nodes that we have in the region support the longstanding
defense partnerships that we have been cultivating the last 30-
some years, and those are critical to supporting the ongoing
training, exercising, and capacity-building that we are doing
with our defense partners in the region in support of the
civilian-led law enforcement efforts in the region as well.
So combining that, again, as part of increased support for
our interagency colleagues and their capacities to also work
with our partners I think is the pathway forward.
Senator Tuberville. Yes. One other quick question. We are
hearing at the end of March title 42 is going to expire. Right
now we are seeing 5,000 to 6,000 a week come across the border.
I think that would probably enhance people coming across. It is
going to be tougher to stop the drugs. It is going to be
tougher to stop the human trafficking. It is really going to
get bad. Do you all expect that?
Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank for highlighting that. We are
closely coordinating with DHS and other interagency partners to
anticipate the possible lifting of title 42 order. While we are
committed to providing support at the southwest border, from a
homeland perspective, and again continuing to work closely with
partners in the broader hemisphere, the Secretary has not yet
made a determination for onward support for fiscal year 2023.
But I am happy to work closely with you all as the Secretary
makes that determination.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Kelly. [Presiding.] Senator Kaine is recognized for
5 minutes.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, and thank you to the witnesses
for what you do. You guys do really good jobs at what you do. I
am going to be critical, but I am not going to be critical of
you, because I think my criticisms lie elsewhere. They lie with
successive administrations and with us, Congress.
You do a good job with what you have. We do not give you
very much. We do not give you very much. We have had testimony
again and again before this committee that we can spot an awful
lot of drugs coming to this country, in response to Senator
Tuberville, but SOUTHCOM does not get the resources to
interdict what we know is coming. SOUTHCOM has always been
underfunded, even in terms of the Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance (ISR) they get. SOUTHCOM asks for help for
cyber defense and United States Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) does
not have any resources to give to them. What they say is, ``Use
the South Carolina Guard. They will help you with cyber
defense.'' Good on the South Carolina Guard. That is great. But
CYBERCOM tells SOUTHCOM, ``We do not have resources for you.''
We act like there is an east-west axis to the world and
there is not a north-south axis. This is not just defense. This
is also in the diplomacy space. Vaccines. Eight percent of the
population lives in SOUTHCOM, the global population. Thirty
percent of the deaths were there. How about our distribution of
vaccines? We sent 8 percent of our vaccines there. We sent what
the population was, but not what the death toll was, and you
could argue that because SOUTHCOM is so connected to us through
migration, even if they did not have an unacceptably high death
toll we should have been doing better by them.
Six of us went to Central and South America in July, three
Democrats and three Republicans. We went at the time the U.S.
was delivering vaccines. They were thrilled that we were
delivering vaccines because Sinovac and Sputnik vaccines, China
and Russia were really making a play. They like our vaccines
better. We were giving them. China and Russia were selling
them. They thought our quality was higher. If they said
something good about Taiwan, China would suddenly cancel it.
We have a little open door with vaccine development, but
even then I think we were under-distributing in the Americas
when we could have been really building up powerful goodwill
there because of the death toll there and because they really
want to do business with us.
I am the chairman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee on
Foreign Relations. Again and again, when we meet with heads of
state they tell us, in Spanish, usually, when the translator is
gone, they say, ``We would much rather work with you than with
China or Russia. We would much rather work with you. But they
have resources on the table and you do not.''
You have talked about the security cooperation funding, and
this International Military Education and Training (IMET)
funding. I am going to look really carefully. I think the
President is going to send us a budget next week, and I would
encourage everybody here, you guys have said we should do this
hearing, look at that budget next week and see what happens to
security cooperation funding and IMET in SOUTHCOM. I bet you
are going to see it going down. I bet you are going to see that
we are deciding to prioritize other parts of the world instead
of SOUTHCOM. I am hoping I am wrong about that, and if I am
wrong I am going to say publicly I was wrong. But I have a
feeling we are going to see a continued devaluation of what we
need to be doing in this region.
Now there are some bright spots. Ecuador, where we have
virtually no presence for a very long time because they were
pro-China, a year ago they swept out the president, they swept
out 70 percent of their national assembly because China was
ripping them off--building crummy projects, drying up rivers,
vacuuming up fish around the Galapagos. Even though we really
were not doing much with them, the Ecuadoran population decided
to sweep out an old crew, and they put in a very potentially
friendly United States Government. That is positive.
The Chilean elections have produced somebody who is not
necessarily Mr. Pro U.S. He is a candidate from the left, but
he has been willing to speak out against Cuba, speak out
against Nicaragua, speak out against Venezuela, speak out
against the Russian invasion of Ukraine. There is an
opportunity there for us.
Honduras has replaced a president, one who was corrupt and
complicit in the drug trade in the United States, again, to
somebody who is not necessarily going to be an ally of ours but
at least there is a chapter that is open to us.
The last thing that has happened recently is Panama, Costa
Rica, and Dominican Republican have announced an alliance for
democracy and development to try to counter the democratic
backsliding in the region and lean forward and be more pro-
democracy, and that gives us some opportunity.
But I guess I just want to say to my colleagues, when we
get this budget next week let's take a look at what the
allocation of resources are into this AOR. I think you are
going to conclude that no matter what kind of good people we
have trying to do a good job, it has not been a priority. It
has not been a priority, and it needs to be a priority.
The only question I will ask is, do you agree with me? I
mean, you testified to it essentially, but programs like IMET
and security cooperation, they are not the real expensive ones,
and it is some of the best things that we do in terms of
building up alliances and friendships that can last for
generations. Am I looking at this the right way?
Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you so much for highlighting
that. I think what I would say, in response, is with the
resources that we do get for this region that we will be
creative and innovative and make sure we get the best bang for
our buck in terms of leveraging it through the security
cooperation tools that we have at our disposal.
You know, through the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) the Department also has an opportunity through this
Strategic Competition Initiative to highlight, both for this
region as well as, I believe, for United States Africa Command
(AFRICOM), the ways that we are going to leverage security
cooperation, irregular warfare, institutional capacity-building
going forward, to achieve our objectives.
We will come up with a robust framework to be able to
describe how we are going to innovate with the tools that we
have.
Senator Kaine. Thank you. I appreciate it.
Senator Kelly. Thank you. Senator Peters.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
our witnesses for being here today.
Ms. Dalton, my first question is to you. This comes from my
perspective as chairing the Senate Homeland Security Committee
and overseeing DHS. As you are well aware, many of the security
challenges that we face in Latin America are really more of a
political and economic instability rather than the typical
state-on-state competition. In fact, I think most of the
security challenges that the United States faces in the region
in dealing with Latin America is much more about homeland
security than they are about national security, broadly.
My question to you, as a senior DOD official at the nexus
of homeland security and national defense, how are you working
with your DHS colleagues at home and abroad to proactively
combat issues like human trafficking, drug smuggling, illegal
weapons sales that are taking place in Latin America and impact
us in oftentimes very direct ways?
Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you for highlighting this, and I
think there is actually a great opportunity in terms of the
ethos that this Administration is bringing to trying to break
down the traditional silos of how we think about foreign policy
and domestic policy. This was highlighted in President Biden's
Interim National Security Strategic Guidance as an imperative
for all of us to kind of think differently about some of these
transcendent issues that you illustrated just now so well.
For my part, I talk to DHS on a daily basis on this issue
set, to see how we can work together on both ends of the
equation, and frankly, also in terms of how, now in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) policy office, we are
orienting the assistant secretaryship that I oversee, it allows
us to work with DHS both on the homeland dimension, in support
of their lead activities on the southwest border, but also
working with DHS and other interagency partners in support of
addressing the upstream drivers of migration that brings both
legal and illegal migrants to our borders.
Senator Peters. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Saenz, our Special Operations Forces have a very long
history of working with Latin American partners to combat
transnational criminal organizations, principally those related
to the drug trade. Special Operations Command reorients itself,
like the rest of the defense establishment, towards undertaking
great power competition. I am concerned that this type of
support and training may not be as readily available going
forward.
My question for you, though, is can you discuss what
Special Operations support for counternarcotics will look like
in an era of constrained resources and competing priorities?
Mr. Saenz. Well, Senator, thank you so much for your
question and pointing out that area of concern. The support
that we receive in our counterdrug and counter-transnational
organized crime work that we do across DOD does have a
component of Special Operations which supports those efforts,
and that component looks to continue.
As you are aware, a lot of our Special Operations Forces
are regionally oriented, and so they will continue to work
within those regions. Within each one of those regions there
are different sets of problems and challenges we want to get
at. Certainly in the Western Hemisphere, transnational
organized crime and drugs are a significant concern. There will
always still be an opportunity for them to support.
Currently right now we do have lots of support from Special
Operations Command when it comes to doing our counterthreat
finance work, which really works with the Department of the
Treasury to help identify, through intelligence analysis, ways
where we can get after the financial side of these criminal
networks. That support that they provide is through individuals
who have been specifically trained to do that work, and so they
will always be focused on that type of work, as an example.
Senator Peters. Right. Thank you.
General Bradfield, so much of the Chinese influence in the
region is built on--and we are seeing this elsewhere around the
globe--massive subsidies for construction of infrastructure by
the Chinese Government. We see sea and airports, electrical
grids, roadways. You can name all sorts of projects that are
occurring.
My question for you is, should the United States re-
evaluate the type of material support we provide our partners
and allies in the region to ensure that our offers of
assistance remain attractive in the wake of what we are seeing
in terms of Chinese cash flowing into these countries?
Brigadier General Bradfield. Senator, thank you for the
question, and this is a topic of discussion at many of our
security conferences throughout the AOR. The short answer, sir,
is yes.
You mentioned quite a bit there, and we are monitoring
deals and influence that China has throughout the hemisphere in
areas like 5G, finance, energy, construction, and port
projects, and the list goes on to include foreign military
sales. So the concern and the threat is about any access and
long-term deals and access not only having strings attached,
because typically it is not just about the headline of the
deal. It is what else did they agree to, to get there, and then
it is the enduring presence.
Then there is the dual use, of if it is an economic or a
business entity from China, because of the way they are
structured it could be used for military purposes as well.
So yes, sir, we are working with partners and allies, but
also across the whole-of-government, interagency, private
industry to address that.
Senator Peters. Very good. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Senator Peters. We will now go
into our second round of questions. I will start out here for 5
minutes.
A little bit different topic here. You know, Russia has
been intensifying its outreach in the Western Hemisphere to
both client states--Venezuela and Nicaragua and Cuba--and also
to other states like now Brazil and Argentina, even. We have
had longstanding relations with some of these states,
particularly Brazil and Argentina.
If Russia uses offers of military assistance, bilateral
military exercises, and air and maritime access agreements to
create instability and undermine democratic governments
throughout the region, they also have a strategy of offering a
diplomatic lifeline to isolated states.
Secretary Dalton, how would you characterize Russia's
motivations in aiding proxy states like Venezuela, Nicaragua,
and Cuba, which engage in destabilizing activities regionally?
Ms. Dalton. Chairman, thank you so much for highlighting
this issue. I think, you know, as we look forward as a
Department in looking at the behavior of our strategic
competitors we are trying to be mindful of the different
approaches that the PRC and Russia are taking in the region.
There are some similarities but they are also distinct.
Just to briefly draw that contrast because I think it is
important, I think we would characterize the PRC's approach
more as a long-term strategy that they have been building
towards over the last 20 years, and is, frankly, more
concerning to us. As I framed it in the opening statement, as
the pacing challenge. Whereas Russia is pursuing more of an
opportunistic approach, and some of that has to do with
resourcing, some of that has to do with the appeal and perhaps
even now with Ukraine, global impression that Russia carries
with partners and other actors in the region.
To your specific question, you know, in terms of their
support for authoritarian regimes like Venezuela, Nicaragua,
and Cuba, I think it exacerbates the trend lines and pathways
that these states are already on in terms of the approach and
example that they potentially set in the region, and looking to
counteract that example, if you will, with the strong defense
relationships that we have with the vast majority of countries
in the region I think is so important.
You know, the case of Brazil is interesting. I believe that
we are confident in our defense relationship there, although
Russia and other actors are attempting to make inroads. But we
are building upon a strong foundation there and do have, as I
mentioned in the opening, an opportunity with the upcoming
Inter-American Defense dialogue this summer. Brazil is going to
host it, and I think that is a really important testament to
the strong foundation that we have there.
Senator Kelly. Thank you. General Bradfield, do you have an
assessment from the Joint Staff on the impact of Russian arms
sales in the Western Hemisphere, including weapons to Cuba and
Nicaragua, and aircraft and any missile systems to Venezuela?
Can you speak to that?
Brigadier General Bradfield. Sir, thanks for the question.
I would like to provide a more full answer at a classified
level, so I would like to take that for the record. But I can
tell you that we are watching very closely the current crisis
in Europe, and with embargos and sanctions how it is affecting
partners and allies. Some of our partners and allies did
purchase Russian equipment decades ago, when it was an
economically good deal, but they are using them for good, for
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and security
cooperation. If they are not able to maintain that equipment
and use that equipment that is certainly something of concern
and be seen as both a risk yet an opportunity for those that
might want to step in, but also an opportunity for other
adversaries. We are watching that closely, sir.
Senator Kelly. I will have some more follow-up on this area
here in a second, but I want to recognize Senator Ernst for 5
minutes.
Senator Ernst. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and General
Bradfield, how are the Chinese and Russians using
disinformation and information operations in the region? How
are they doing that, and are they undermining U.S. credibility
and maybe those of our partners? Are they being effective if
they are doing that?
Brigadier General Bradfield. Thanks for the question,
ma'am. So certainly that is part of the campaign,
misinformation, disinformation, and with Spanish-speaking
countries they do have internet and also television and radio
broadcasts. Fortunately, due to the atrocities in Europe some
countries have decided to stop broadcasting, but our
adversaries do find other ways to spread mis- and dis-
information.
I cannot give any kind of metric on how effective, but we
are working hard to work across the diplomatic, information
technology, military, and economic (DIME)--I do mean the whole-
of-government--and the whole DIME. But we are basically,
because we follow the rule of law and we work so closely with
our partners and allies that we are trying to spread the truth
through those relationships and trust.
Senator Ernst. Good. Ms. Dalton, did you have any thoughts
on that as well?
Ms. Dalton. Thank you, Ranking Member. I do think that this
is an important area to watch. We have seen Russia, in
particular, providing support to local media, and Russia Today
is broadcast in the region, I believe, in five different
broadcasting areas, and through that is able to perpetuate
disinformation campaigns through that medium.
It is an important area to watch, and I think Congress'
support for State Department and for United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) and for other mechanisms to
promote the free and open expression of media more broadly in
these societies is really important to counteract that.
Senator Ernst. Right. Thank you, and for any of you, we do
know that Russia and China are actively trying to influence
different elections in the region to put in place leaders that
are more sympathetic their particular interests, and, of
course, those that are hostile to the United States, and
particularly as we look at the upcoming Colombian and Brazilian
elections.
What is your assessment of Chinese and Russian efforts, and
again, are they being effective in doing so?
Ms. Dalton. Thank you, Ranking Member. I am happy to take a
start at that and welcome other comments from my fellow
panelists. I do think that there are active attempts, both by
the PRC and Russia, to shape the political debate in
democracies in the region. I believe, though, that among the
two that you mentioned, both Colombia and Brazil, the fact that
we have such a strong defense relationship with both countries
and the fact that the people themselves are committed to their
democratic process I think bodes fairly well in terms of where
things will be headed, vis-a-vis U.S. interests, as we move
forward.
But it is an important area to watch, and I think both
competitors are seeking to be influential and opportunistic in
shaping the debate in these countries.
Senator Ernst. Thank you. General Bradfield, did you have
any thoughts?
Brigadier General Bradfield. Yes, ma'am. I was fortunate
enough to be able to travel in the AOR last year, to include
going to Colombia. The President told the SOUTHCOM commander
that he was very concerned about the elections and the
influence and mis- and dis-information and influence in cyber.
He did say that he was interested in seeking assistance in
countering that, but it is certainly a concern.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, and of course we have watched
everything that is going on in Europe right now with Ukraine,
and our partners there have really been quite effective in
pushing back against the misinformation that is put out there
by Vladimir Putin and the Russian military. They are exposing
what they can, as they can. What lessons should we be taking
from what the Ukrainians are doing and how can we apply that
here in the Western Hemisphere with some of our partners in
Central and South America?
Mr. Saenz. Well thank you, ma'am. I think that is a very
important point you make there, and I think there are lots of
lessons that we can learn from the situation in Ukraine and how
things are evolving and how that can be applied in the Western
Hemisphere.
To the point that you made there about the disinformation
and the misinformation, I think it supports when we have all of
our partners working together instead of just one nation, with
one bilateral partner, us, the United States, trying to work
against whatever that challenge may be, whether it be
disinformation, whether it may be our counternarcotics work.
Whatever we are working against, if we can attack that not only
as a whole-of-government but as a community with all of our
other partner countries in the area working together, I think
we have a better chance of combating these things.
Senator Ernst. Very good. Okay, and with that I will yield.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Kelly. I want to follow up again on Russia. We have
been able to impose some significant economic and financial
costs for their unlawful and unprecedented invasion of Ukraine.
Do you see any way for us to impose additional costs in the
Western Hemisphere, maybe with our partners, you know, for
their destabilizing activities in the Western Hemisphere but
maybe also as a follow-on to what we have been able to do to
their economy through economic sanctions?
Ms. Dalton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it is
worthwhile to think holistically about the approach to Russia
and the fact that, you know, based on, I think, the inspiration
of the Ukrainian people there is this global mobilization to
push back on Russia and what it is doing in Ukraine currently.
You know, I think the sanctions regime that has been put in
place by the United States and our allies is significant and it
is going to have impacts in terms of what Russia is able to do
within the Western Hemisphere and also, frankly, vice versa, in
terms of what our partners are going to be able to do in
certain respects.
In terms of what specific steps we may want to take on top
of that in the hemisphere I think we will want to be able to
walk forward both the cost benefit analysis for horizontal
escalation, vis-`-vis Russia, and how they will perceive it and
ensuring that that is supportive of our overall deterrence
aims, while also ensuring that we are doing that in close
coordination with partners in the region so that it does not
have unintended effects on their economies, their democracies.
Forgive me for not having the specific answers there in
terms of ideas. I would be happy to take that back and follow
up. But I think having an overall framework that is able to
calibrate that cost benefit analysis will be important.
Senator Kelly. Have you seen any change in their activities
in the Western Hemisphere in the last, let's say, 2 or 3
months, just leading up to the invasion, and since then? Has
anything been noticeable in what the Russians have been
involved in?
Ms. Dalton. Mr. Chairman, thank you. What I would say is
that we are closely watching, as a Department and as a
Government. What Russia is doing globally and how it is
posturing its military to be able to be cognizant of potential
escalation factors, and I am happy to follow up more in
classified channels.
Senator Kelly. Okay. I want to switch back to China and on
space competition in the Western Hemisphere. In the past few
years China has built space tracking facilities, including in
Argentina. The purpose of these facilities is unclear to us, at
least unclear to me at this time. You know, I think that this
point we do not have a solid picture of the purpose of their
tracking stations. Under the terms of a bilateral agreement
that the Argentinians have with the Chinese they have no
oversight over what this tracking station does.
Secretary Dalton, are Chinese space-related activities in
the Western Hemisphere a cause of concern for the Department,
and is there a potential use for these facilities for malign
purposes?
Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you for raising this important
question. As I mentioned in my opening statement this is an
area that we are concerned about, so yes, in answer to your
first question, and then the answer would also be yes in terms
of potential dual use or malign purposes, and again, I am happy
to follow up in classified channels.
Senator Kelly. Thank you. Senator Ernst do you have any
other----
Senator Ernst. I am done. Thank you.
Senator Kelly. I have got a few more questions. That does
not mean you have to stay. I know you have got a busy day.
United States Southern Command has announced its intention
to expand space-related engagements in the Western Hemisphere
as a counter to the activities of Russia and China. Potential
partners on space include Brazil, Chile, maybe Argentina, and
Peru. Do you see this as potentially a productive area of
cooperation with these countries?
Ms. Dalton. Mr. Chairman, thank you for highlighting this
area of cooperation. I do think that this is a future pathway
that we are exploring actively with our partners, including
also cyber and information domains and how those are all
interconnected.
Do you want to add anything?
Brigadier General Bradfield. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
Senator, thank you. Yes, we definitely see value, and it is an
important part of integrated deterrence, but also in our quest
for better domain awareness. So it is critically important.
Senator Kelly. Thank you. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for
being late. I was at an Intelligence Committee meeting that
ironically overlaps.
One of the things that was mentioned at the hearing that I
was just at, and I keep running into this, is a lack of ISR.
The testimony was a very limited amount of ISR available in the
Latin American region. I guess my question is, why is that? Why
can we not build more Global Hawks? What is the problem? I
mean, it seems to me that is a very solvable problem that is
not--it is math. You have more resources to watch, whether it
is satellites or other assets. Give me some thoughts on what
appears to be a lack of ISR, particularly in the Southern
Hemisphere.
Brigadier General Bradfield. Senator, thank you for the
question. In my 11 months on the job and working with SOUTHCOM
I have never heard them say that they could not use more ISR.
So to your point, sir, the Joint Staff allocates ISR based on
global priorities, and SOUTHCOM is certainly very important to
the hemisphere.
What they are doing, sir, is through integrated deterrence
and working with partners and allies and also innovation and
private industry and other aspects of the interagency, they are
working very hard to come up with other ways for domain
awareness. But, sir, they have told me repeatedly that they can
always use more ISR.
Senator King. Well here is what is bothering me. If this
were a terrorist cell in Latin America, killing 100,000
Americans a year, we would not be sitting here talking about
not enough ISR and allocating it. I am really absolutely sick
of this. The drug trade is one of the primary threats to this
country. It is killing two people a day in my state. I mean, we
need to think about it as an attack. It is an attack on our
country, just as sure as it is an attack that came from Russia
or Iran or anywhere else, and we are saying, oh well, we have
got other needs. If we have got other needs in other places,
let's buy some more resources to have them here.
I realize this is not your job, but this is, I think, a
gross misallocation of priorities. The reason I seem frustrated
is because I am, because I have been on this for 5 or 6 years
and nothing seems to change. Did you want to comment?
Mr. Saenz. Yes, Senator King. Thank you very much, and you
do raise a very significant point about the need for ISR. When
it comes to the counterdrug work, we are trying to find ways we
can better approach that, and so what we have done with our
funding provided is in the past we have purchased four De
Havilland Dash 8 Pale Ale aircraft to do that ISR mission for
the counterdrug
effort.
What we are doing now is we are looking through our budget
process to see if we are able to buy a fifth aircraft that will
add another 1,800 hours of ISR capability per year, and those
are U.S. Government-owned by run by contractors for us.
Senator King. I understand. I think the problem is,
counterdrug is over here and military challenges are over here,
and they are just separate. No. We have got to change our
imagination here. This is an attack, and we have got to put the
resources on.
The second problem is--and we are going to have testimony
coming up from SOUTHCOM--even with the limited ISR we have, we
are only interdicting 25 percent of the shipments that we know
of--that we know of. That is inexcusable. We know 100 ships are
coming and we interdict 25 of them because we cannot get the
Coast Guard and the Navy and their partner nations together in
such a way as to deal with this.
I am really tired of--this is the sixth or seventh year
this question has come up, and, you know, when you know where
the shipments are, even with the limited ISR, and you cannot
stop them because we do not have enough ships or airplanes that
is inexcusable, given the state of the threat.
Ms. Dalton, what are we going to do about this?
Ms. Dalton. Senator King, thank you for your commitment to
this issue, and it is an absolute tragedy that hundreds of
thousands of Americans are dying and have lives that are being
devastated by this phenomenon, and it is a national security
threat, plainly.
I would say that the Department is committed to playing an
important role, both in the region, in working with our
regional partners to strengthen their own capacity to address
the transnational criminal organizations that are bringing
these drugs into our country, and also we are committed to
working closely with our interagency partners on the southwest
border and within the United States to be able to detect and
monitor and provide intelligence-sharing and support to that
important mission. We are absolutely committed to that.
I do think that when it comes to the ISR question, Senator,
there is not enough ISR to cover China, Russia, Ukraine, Iran.
It is a global challenge.
Senator King. Well let's buy more Global Hawks.
Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you for highlighting that, and I
know through----
Senator King. I will write a letter to the Appropriations
Committee.
Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you, and through the program
budget review process I know that this was an issue that the
Secretary and senior leadership of the Department looked
closely at.
Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kelly. Well, ISR is part of the puzzle. It is like
what do we do after we identify it, right? It seems like
everybody, at least in this room right now, probably agrees, we
need to be doing a lot more. You know, the interagency
cooperation is important, but can we get like to some
specifics? Like what do we think DOD--what more beyond
identifying shipments, what are the other levers we can push on
here through the Department of Defense? What are the other
things that DOD could be doing to undermine these transnational
criminal organizations, to interdict drugs coming into our
country, whether through the southern border or through our
coasts? What more, specifically, could DOD be doing?
Mr. Saenz. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for that
question, and you are absolutely correct that we need to always
continue to look at all the different options we have and what
more we can do to help support getting after this very
difficult, very challenging, and very troublesome problem.
There are different areas in which we support beyond just
the detection and monitoring. We provide a lot of support when
it comes to intelligence support, and we do provide a lot of
support down with our partner nations when it comes to doing
security cooperation work and some other logistical support
work.
We work with the entire interagency and our partner nations
to try and help provide better processes and better tools for
identifying targets and then helping our law enforcement
partners effect those targets.
Some of the things we are looking at right now is we are
looking at how we can take some of the best solutions that have
been developed in different regions and then invest in that
solution so they can provide global support across all of our
COCOMs and across all of our efforts. We are also looking at
new ways of leveraging artificial intelligence and machine
learning to take large amounts of data that is almost
impossible for an analyst to get through in a reasonable amount
of time, using machine learning, so that that can be dealt with
quicker, and taking analysts from a time that took them 6
months down to a time that takes them just a couple of days to
help identify targets that they can go after.
We are looking at ways to be able to leverage. Also a lot
of information that is available in the public sector. We are
trying to use geospatial information that is open to the public
sector, interlay those altogether to produce a product that is
very easy for people to understand and therefore very easy for
us to hand off to law enforcement, both U.S. and international,
who can take that information and quickly act upon it, and also
be able to use it in future proceedings in court, because it is
no longer classified.
There are a lot of different things like that that we are
looking at in how we can best improve the processes that we are
using as a whole-of-government to get after this problem set.
Senator Kelly. Do we feel that DOD has all the authority it
needs to be as effective as it could be with the resources at
the Department's disposal?
Mr. Saenz. Mr. Chairman, thank you. That is a very good
point. Yes, we think we have the authorities that we need to do
what we need to do to support everyone in getting after the
counterdrug problem. We would like to thank Congress
specifically for the authorities of 1021 and 1022, provided
through the NDAA. Those have helped us greater. 1021 helps us
in Colombia to counter illegal armed groups that threaten a lot
of our interests and work to move a lot of the illegal drugs
who may or may not be associated any longer as a terrorist
organization. We appreciate Congress extending that through
fiscal year 2023, and we would like to work with Congress to
extend that through fiscal year 2025.
The 1022 authorities allows us to use counterdrug
authorities and funding to support law enforcement in its
efforts against terrorist organizations, transnational
organized crime organizations that are identified through a
specific process. We appreciate that those have been extended
through fiscal year 2027, and we would like to continue to work
with Congress to see if we can make that a more permanent
authority.
I think all the authorities that we have through U.S. Code
and these additional authorities make a great set that we need
to be able to do our job.
Senator Kelly. Thank you. Senator King?
Senator King. One of my principles of management is that
you always want one throat to choke. Who is in charge? What
individual in the United States Government is in charge of
stopping drugs coming from Latin America? Mr. Saenz, is it you?
Do not worry--I will not choke you.
Mr. Saenz. Senator King, thank you very much for that
question. I appreciate that you will not choke me.
We do work as an interagency and we do work closely
together.
Senator King. See, that bothers me. When I hear
``interagency'' and ``whole-of-government,'' to me that means
nobody is in charge. Is there one person--if the President
calls and says, ``I want to talk to the person who is in charge
of keeping drugs out of the United States,'' who is going to
show up in the Oval Office?
Mr. Saenz. Certainly the President has his Director of
National Drug Control Policy, Mr. Gupta, who is responsible for
our policies for controlling both the supply and demand of
drugs in the United States at a strategic level.
Senator King. The policy. How about operations? That is
what I am after. Who is in charge of the operations, going
after the transnational organizations, going after the drug
shipments? There is not anybody, is there?
Mr. Saenz. The Department of Homeland Security is
responsible for the flow of drugs and those organizations that
flow those drugs into the United States. They certainly cannot
do it alone and they rely on the rest of us to support them and
help them.
Senator King. How do we measure success? Do we have any
metrics? You are getting a fairly sizeable budget. What
constitutes success?
Mr. Saenz. Senator, if you are speaking about success of
the overall problem of the supply of drugs coming into the
United States, certainly a measure of success would be how much
of those drugs we are able to stop from coming into the United
States. That becomes a very challenging question, a challenging
problem, when we are dealing with illicit trafficking, and so
it is hard to put an exact number of what the overall amount of
drugs coming this direction are and how many are stopped.
Senator King. Final question. It appears that a lot of
the--a lot, a great deal of what is coming in is coming through
Mexico, not through the water, although that is something we
can certainly do better on. A lot of the fentanyl is coming in
from Mexico. What authorities or what power or what leverage do
we have over Mexico to force them to take this seriously and
stop this horrible crime in progress? My sense is it is open
season in Mexico.
Mr. Saenz. Senator King, thank you so much for that
observation. Certainly the vast majority of drugs coming into
the United States are coming from Mexico, across our southwest
border.
Senator King. Is the Mexican Government serious about
trying to stop it?
Mr. Saenz. Certainly there are a lot of things that we
would like the government of Mexico to do and to support
countering that flow of narcotics into the United States. I
would have to defer to the Department of State and their
efforts in working with Mexico on how to best motivate the
country of Mexico to do additional efforts, different efforts,
whatever it takes to assist.
Senator King. Thank you. We have got a problem, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Kelly. We do.
I have two final questions and then we will conclude here.
How often does DOD have some kind of direct action with a
transnational criminal organization?
Mr. Saenz. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question about
our direct action with a criminal organization. The Department
of Defense does not have authority to interdict drugs or to
make arrests or to stop any criminal organization. Our support,
our defense-unique support is in providing the information, is
helping to assess that information, and analyze that
information to law enforcement who has that authority and that
capability.
Senator Kelly. If you had that authority do you think DOD
could be effective engaging directly with transnational
criminal organizations (TCOs)?
Mr. Saenz. Mr. Chairman that is a very interesting
question. Thank you for that question. I think that has lots of
areas of opportunity and lots of areas of risk that need to be
considered. When the Department of Defense, when the militaries
start engaging in what would otherwise be law enforcement
activity, when they start engaging on those type of on-the-
ground operations in foreign countries, there are a lot of
different factors that need to be taken into consideration
before we should consider doing something like that.
Ms. Dalton. Mr. Chairman, may I add to that?
Senator Kelly. Yes.
Ms. Dalton. Thank you, and thank you for the question. The
Department of Defense, of course, brings tremendous
capabilities to any equation, but just to complement Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense Saenz's comments, I think we
need to be cognizant too about how that would play out in this
particular region where the role of the military, particularly
in democracies, has had a particularly checkered past. So given
that our efforts in the region would be a by-with-and-through
approach, typically, that could then enhance the military's
role in what is principally a civilian function in democracies
I think is a pathway we would need to be very careful in
walking down, in which I would be very cautious.
Senator Kelly. I want to come back to something Senator
King said, as we have 100,000 Americans dying each year. I
think at the beginning of the hearing we established that this
was a national security threat to our country, so we should be
looking to do more. Just doing the same thing every year, we
should not expect to get a different result. I think we should
be looking for other opportunities to be effective.
Finally, is there anything else you think we possibly could
be doing that we did not bring up during this hearing today?
Brigadier General Bradfield. Sir, I think it was pointed
out earlier that there is certainly a limit of resources. But I
would like to drive home again that integrated deterrence is
not just a catch phrase. It is a powerful tool and a lever at
our disposal. Empowering our partners, making sure they are
trained and equipped and have the information that they need to
help us, because we cannot do this alone, is a force
multiplier.
I think that is one area that we are making strides. I will
note that so far this year partner nation narcotic
interdictions are up 62 percent, and we hope that trend
continues. But this is just one of the many challenges in the
hemisphere. Thank you, sir.
Senator Kelly. Well thank you, all of you. I really
appreciate you taking the time. This has been an informative
discussion. It is clear that this has national security
implications, strategic importance. I want to thank our
witnesses for participating, and I look forward to some follow-
up from us. I think there is more we certainly can do. That is
clear. We need to continue to find new ways to fight this
threat in the Western Hemisphere.
So with that the hearing is concluded. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 4:02 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
venezuela
1. Senator Blackburn. General Bradfield, how can the United States
and its allies and partners strengthen counterterrorism collaboration
to deter Hizbollah activity in Venezuela?
General Bradfield [Deleted.]
2. Senator Blackburn. Brigadier General Bradfield, what are the
current vulnerabilities in deterring Hizbollah's illicit financial
networks in Venezuela?
Brigadier General Bradfield. Officially, Lebanese Hizballah (LH)
denies involvement with drug trade and when it has discovered intemal
drug operations in the past, it has turned its members over to law
enforcement. LH supporters' activities in Latin America are mostly
limited to illicit financial and criminal activities, including money
laundering-sometimes with Latin American drug cartels-and smuggling.
Weak regional law enforcement enables LH to maintain its illicit
revenue system in Latin America. Exposure of these narcotics networks'
ties to LH could enable local criminal arrests, and encourage LH to
take greater efforts to cease participation in these activities, or
stop accepting donations from supporters publicly associated with the
drug trade.
3. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Dalton, how do Hizbollah's operations in
the region fit into the larger strategic picture of illicit networks
within President Maduro's regime?
Ms. Dalton did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
4. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Dalton, what shortfalls do you identify
in the United States counterterrorism policy in Venezuela that allow
the proliferation of Hizbollah operations and influence?
Ms. Dalton did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
5. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Saenz, how do current counternarcotic
operations in Venezuela mitigate both the government and Hizbollah's
ability to turn the region into a central hub for transactional
organize crime and international terrorism?
Mr. Saenz. DOD supports counterdrug operations in the Western
Hemisphere primarily in three ways: 1) the detection and monitoring of
aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States,
including from Venezuela; 2) supporting U.S. law enforcement efforts to
counter Western Hemisphere-based transnational criminal organizations
(TCOs) that participate in drug trafficking, human trafficking, money
laundering, illegal trade in natural resources and wildlife, and
weapons smuggling; and 3) and security cooperation efforts focused on
key regional security partners, such as Colombia.
hezbollah and crime-terror convergence
6. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Saenz, how do you assess Hizbollah's
External Security Organization (ESO) influence in the Tri-Border Area?
Mr. Saenz. LH's Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO)--also known as the
ESO--is the group's primary overseas unit and remains an integral
element of Iran's threat network. LH sympathizers are concentrated in
the tri-border area (TBA) between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. LH
sympathizers primarily conduct illegal fundraising activities in the
TBA, ranging from drug and weapons smuggling and money laundering to
illegal sales of textile and electronics. The porous borders in the TBA
enable ease of access for traffickers' transport and sale of illegal
items while corrupt officials at the local level allow the free flow of
illicit goods.
7. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Saenz, what vulnerabilities currently
exist in Hizbollah's ESO narcotic operations?
Mr. Saenz. LH activities in Latin America are mostly limited to
illicit financial and criminal activities, including money laundering--
sometimes with Latin American drug cartels--and smuggling, by LH
supporters. LH takes advantage of weak regional law enforcement to
maintain its illicit revenue system in Latin America. LH activities
could be constrained by increased anti-trafficking actions, such as
drug interdictions by regional partners, anti-money laundering
activities, including sanctions and related designations, and law
enforcement cooperation throughout Latin America.
8. Senator Blackburn. Brigadier General Bradfield, to what degree,
if any, are Hizbollah and the People's Republic of China (PRC)
collaborating in Latin America? What are their shared interests, and
what fissures can we exploit?
Brigadier General Bradfield. Lebanese Hizballah supporters'
activities in Latin America are mostly limited to illicit financial and
criminal activities, including money laundering and smuggling. The
PRC's primary engagements in the region are economic and infrastructure
development, and persuading countries to switch their diplomatic
recognition from Taiwan to the PRC. We see little collaboration between
the two in terms of their Latin American activities.
9. Senator Blackburn. Brigadier General Bradfield, to what degree,
if any, are Hizbollah and Russia collaborating in Latin America? What
are their shared interests, and what fissures can we exploit?
Brigadier General Bradfield. Lebanese Hizballah supporters'
activities in Latin America are mostly limited to illicit financial and
criminal activities, including money laundering and smuggling. Russia's
primary engagements in the region are military sales, security
cooperation, and ideology. Both are concerning, but there is little
collaboration between the two in terms of their Latin American
activities.
10. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Dalton, what effective measures have the
United States and its allies and partners taken to mitigate Hizbollah's
ESO globalized outreach and collaboration?
Ms. Dalton did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
china in latin america
11. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Dalton, what global logistics and
infrastructure advancements have China made in Latin America? Which
investment poses the greatest threat to U.S. access and placement in
the region?
Ms. Dalton. The People's Republic of China (PRC), our most
consequential strategic competitor and pacing challenge, continues its
efforts to expand economic, diplomatic, technological, informational,
and military influence in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The Department of Defense is concerned by PRC investments in
potentially dual-use infrastructure. These include deep-water ports and
infrastructure on both sides of the Panama Canal that could enable the
People's Liberation Army to threaten sea-lanes vital to global commerce
and the movement of United States Forces. Equally concerning is the
PRC's pursuit of additional access to regional space infrastructure,
particularly in South America because of its strategic location with
regard to space operations.
12. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Dalton, how can the United States and
its allies strengthen economic and infrastructure security in the
region to deter collaboration with China?
Ms. Dalton. The Department bases its partnerships in the region on
shared values of democracy, respect for human rights, sovereignty, and
respect for the rule of law. The PRC seeks to incrementally undermine
these partnerships with offers of no-cost training and favorably
financed sales of military equipment. The Department remains committed
to strengthening and deepening our bilateral and multilateral defense
partnerships to minimize PRC activities when they occur, and to remain
the most trusted partner in the region.
13. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Dalton, what is your assessment of
recent successes by the PRC in influencing Latin American countries to
abandon diplomatic relations with Taiwan?
Ms. Dalton. The PRC has spent decades encouraging countries that
have diplomatic ties with Taiwan to switch diplomatic relations to the
PRC, often by offering financial and diplomatic incentives. Nicaragua
was the most recent country in the region to switch its diplomatic ties
from Taiwan to the PRC in early December 2021. During the height of the
pandemic, the PRC attempted to use vaccine diplomacy combined with
economic influence to pressure the Government of Paraguay to change its
diplomatic relations. The PRC will continue to seek ways to use its
investments in the region to pressure governments to end diplomatic
ties with Taiwan, since 8 of the 14 partners that have official ties
with Taiwan are in Latin America and the Caribbean. I defer further
questions regarding the diplomatic perspective to the Department of
State.
14. Senator Blackburn. Brigadier General Bradfield, nineteen
governments across Latin America and the Caribbean have joined
Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). What short and long-term
threats does the BRI pose to United States national security and
interests?
Brigadier General Bradfield.
Beijing uses its One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative to
support its grand strategy of national rejuvenation, and the PRC's
overseas development and security interests under OBOR will drive the
PRC toward expanding its overseas military footprint to protect those
interests. The PRC seeks to expand its OBOR infrastructure and
investment mega project, build partnerships, and gain commercial access
to ports in Latin America.
Although the United States remains the prefened defense
partner in most of the hemisphere, the PRC has made repeated overrures
toward United States strategic partners, including Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico, and Panama. The PRC invites military leaders to attend
professional military education, donates military and security
equipment, and offers subsidized arms sales to build closer ties with
potential partners.
15. Senator Blackburn. Brigadier General Bradfield, to what degree,
if any, are China and Russia collaborating in Latin America? What are
their shared interests, and what fissures can we exploit?
Brigadier General Bradfield. The PRC's primary engagements in the
region are economic and infrastructure development, and persuading
countries to switch their diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the
PRC. Russia values its defense relationships and influence in Latin
America, primarily focusing on strengthening relations with its
traditional regional partners of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.