    [Senate Hearing 117-889, Part 7]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                     S. Hrg. 117-889, Pt. 7

                    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR
                     APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2022 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 2792

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022 FOR MILITARY
          ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CON-
          STRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
          ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR
          SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

                                   __________

                                     PART 7

                                STRATEGIC FORCES

                                   __________

                            MAY 12, 19; JUNE 9, 2021

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

                     Available via: http:// www.govinfo.gov

                                  __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    56-725 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2024

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

     JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman	JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire		ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York		DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut		TOM COTTON, Arkansas
    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii			MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
    TIM KAINE, Virginia			JONI ERNST, Iowa
    ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine		THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
    ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts		DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
    GARY C. PETERS, Michigan		KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
    JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia		RICK SCOTT, Florida
    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois		MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
    JACKY ROSEN, Nevada			JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
    MARK KELLY, Arizona                  	TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama

    		    Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
      		John D. Wason, Minority Staff Director

    _________________________________________________________________

                        Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

        ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine,
                 Chairman
    ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts		DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
    JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia		TOM COTTON, Arkansas
    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois		MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
    JACKY ROSEN, Nevada			DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
    MARK KELLY, Arizona      		KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
                                        	TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama

                                      (ii)

                             C O N T E N T S

    _________________________________________________________________

                                  May 12, 2021

                                                                       Page
    Nuclear Forces Posture...........................................     1

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator Angus King..................................     1

    Statement of Senator Deb Fischer.................................     2

                               Witness Statements

    Tomero, Ms. Leonor, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for         2
      Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy.
    Walter, Mr. Andrew, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for         8
      Nuclear Matters.
    Ray, General Timothy M., USAF, Commander, Air Force Global Strike    12
      Command.
    Wolfe, Vice Admiral Johnny R., Jr., USN, Director, Navy Strategic    25
      Systems Programs.

    Appendix A--DASD Lenor Tomero Interview with Asahi Shimbun.......    54

                                  May 19, 2021

    Department of Energy's Atomic Defense Activities and Programs....    61

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator Angus King..................................    61

    Statement of Senator Deb Fischer.................................    62

                               Witness Statements

    Verdon, The Honorable Charles P., Acting Administrator, National     62
      Nuclear Security Administration.

    White, Mr. William, Acting Assistant Secretary of Energy for         69
      Environmental Management.

    Caldwell, Admiral James F., Jr., USN, Deputy Administrator for       74
      Office of Naval Reactors, National Nuclear Security
      Administration.

                                     (iii)

                                  June 9, 2021

                                                                       Page
    Missile Defense Strategy, Policies, and Programs.................    95

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator Angus King..................................    95

    Statement of Senator Deb Fischer.................................    96

                               Witness Statements

    Soofer, Dr. Robert M., Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of          96
      Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy.

    Panda, Mr. Ankit, Stanton Senior Fellow, Nuclear Policy Program,    103
      Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

    Tomero, Ms. Leonor Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for        123
      Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy.

    VanHerck, General Glen D., USAF, Commander, United States           129
      Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command.

    Karbler, Lieutenant General Daniel L., USA, Commander, U.S. Army    136
      Space and Missile Defense Command/Joint Functional Component
      Command for Integrated Missile Defense.

    Hill, Vice Admiral Jon A., USN, Director, Missile Defense Agency.   169

    Questions for the Record.........................................   190

                                      (iv)

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022 AND
                        THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, MAY 12, 2021

                      United States Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                             NUCLEAR FORCES POSTURE

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:33 p.m. in room
    SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Angus King
    (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: King, Warren, Manchin, Rosen,
    Kelly, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Sullivan, Cramer, and
    Tuberville.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS KING

        Senator King. This is a hearing of the Department of
    Defense budget posture for nuclear forces in review of the
    Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2022 and Future
    Years Defense Program. First I want to thank our witnesses for
    appearing at today's hearing.
        The Department of Defense's efforts to maintain a safe,
    reliable, and effective nuclear deterrent are at the basis of
    all of our defense strategies. Let me also thank Ranking Member
    Fischer for her work with me on the Strategic Forces
    Subcommittee. Two weeks ago, Senator Fischer and I visited
    Minot Air Force Base and the U.S. Strategic Command. Together
    we saw the two land legs of our strategic triad, the Minuteman
    III and the B-52 heavy bomber. We both went down in the silo,
    on the Minuteman III silos, and I have to say, as an Easterner
    I have never seen a place so flat in my life. Your dog could
    run away in Minot, North Dakota, and it would take 3 days
    before you would lose sight of it.
        Both of these arms of our triad are increasingly showing
    signs of age--we saw that ourselves--for a nuclear deterrent
    mission that constitute what former Secretary Ash Carter refers
    to as ``the bedrock of every mission of the Department of
    Defense.'' At Strategic Command we received an in-depth brief
    on the planning and use of nuclear weapons and the development
    of those weapons by our near peers.
        As the Department continues the task of modernizing the
    triad, I hope at today's hearing we can help the Subcommittee
    to understand the key risks, given that this effort will span
    multiple administrations and serve well into the 2070s. I note
    that we often focus on cost, which is clearly important, but
    perhaps the bigger policy issues to consider are whether the
    triad we are modernizing today will continue to effectively
    deter our adversaries, as their capabilities, characteristics,
    and intentions evolve in the future. These non-monetary risks
    pose existential threats to our Nation and should serve as our
    North Star, to ensure we continue the bipartisan approach we
    have maintained on this singularly important topic.
        Let me conclude by thanking General Ray for his 36 years of
    service to our Nation. I understand you will relinquish command
    of the Air Force Global Strike Command and retire this summer.
    I wish you the best in your future endeavors.
        After Senator Fischer's opening statement, each witnesses
    will have 5 minutes, and then we will alternate among our
    Members for question rounds of 5 minutes each.
        Senator Fischer?

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Chairman King, and welcome to
    all of our witnesses today. I appreciate you being here with
    us.
        This is a budget request hearing, and so I want to
    associate myself with the concern expressed by many in Congress
    that we are in the second week of May, more than halfway
    through the fiscal year, and we still do not have a budget
    proposal from the administration. This limits our ability to
    conduct oversight, and increases the likelihood of a continuing
    resolution. None of us would like to see that happen. That is
    especially concerning because many of the program that we will
    be discussing here today are replacing capabilities that will
    begin aging out over the next decade and are expected to be
    delivered just in time.
        As we have been hearing for many years, there is no margin
    for further delay. I hope the Department is thinking ahead and
    preparing to request anomalies for these programs so that the
    fragile modernization schedule is not disrupted by a CR.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Hopefully we can have the budget as soon as
    possible so that these hearings can do their job.
        We have with us Ms. Leonor Tomero, Deputy Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy;
    Mr. Andrew Walter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Nuclear Matters; General Timothy Ray, Commander, Air Force
    Global Strike Command; and Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe, Director,
    Navy Strategic Systems Programs.
        Ms. Tomero, you are going to lead off. Thank you.

     STATEMENT OF MS. LEONOR TOMERO, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
             DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY

        Ms. Tomero. Thank you, Chairman. Chairman King, Ranking
    Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of the Committee,
    thank you for the opportunity to testify today. May I request
    permission to submit my written statement for the record and
    provide brief opening remarks.
        Senator King. Without objection.
        Ms. Tomero. Thank you. Let me begin with the threat. The
    United States faces a complex global security environment where
    strategic competitors are expanding and modernizing their
    nuclear capabilities to achieve strategic advantage. China,
    Russia, Iran, and North Korea have all demonstrated the
    capability and intent to advance their interests. China is
    rapidly becoming more capable and assertive, and its nuclear
    modernization is concerning. China's comprehensive
    modernization of its convention and nuclear capabilities are
    adding new dual-capable systems that threaten the United States
    and its allies and partners.
        Moreover, we are confronted with multifaceted deterrence
    challenges across domains, which add increased escalation
    risks, all making deterrence more challenging.
        The Department is beginning a set of strategic reviews that
    will include U.S. nuclear posture and policy. This process will
    be informed by security and fiscal environment. It will align
    and be closely integrated with the U.S. National Defense
    Strategy. The Department began the NDS review on May 3rd, and
    plans to deliver it to Congress by January of 2022.
        As reflected in a recent speech 10 days ago at INDOPACOM,
    and in a recent Washington Post op-ed, Secretary Austin's
    priority has been to focus on integrated deterrence to address
    threats and opportunities to strengthen deterrence across
    conventional, cyber, space, hybrid, and nuclear domains. We are
    contributing to that work.
        With regard to deterrence policy, as Secretary Austin also
    stated, nuclear deterrence is the Department's highest priority
    mission. Our nuclear forces remain essential to ensure that no
    adversary believes it can ever employ nuclear weapons for any
    reason, under any circumstances, against the United States or
    our allies and partners without risking devastating
    consequences.
        We plan to begin a specific review of our nuclear posture
    and policy soon and will process with its analysis this summer
    and fall. In the coming months, in line with the Interim
    National Security Strategic Guidance and the goal of reducing
    the existential threats posed by nuclear weapons, we will also
    explore what steps can be taken to reduce the role of nuclear
    weapons in our National Security Strategy, while continuing to
    ensure our strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, and
    effective, and that our extended deterrence commitments to our
    allies remain strong. Our upcoming strategic reviews will play
    a critical role in this effort.
        We must sustain and modernize the nuclear triad to maintain
    credible deterrence in the face of 21st Century threats. The
    President's fiscal year 2022 discretion request supports the
    ongoing nuclear modernization programs while ensuring that
    these efforts are sustainable. Our reviews will assess the U.S.
    nuclear modernization programs to ensure that they deliver on
    time and are aligned with policy.
        Importantly, the reviews will include a renewed focus on
    strategic stability, including risk reduction and arms control.
    President Biden has already demonstrated his commitment to re-
    establishing U.S. credibility and leadership on arms control by
    extending the New START Treaty for 5 years, which provides
    stability, predictability, and transparency and maintains its
    verification measures. We must look to build on this
    foundation.
        We are harnessing our greatest strategic advantage, our
    network of allies and partners, both globally and regionally.
    We will engage and consult with our allies to ensure robust
    extended deterrence and credible assurances. Extended
    deterrence remains a critical element of our regional and
    strategic stability.
        Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by thanking the Subcommittee
    for its previous support for nuclear deterrence and the
    opportunity to testify, and I look forward to your questions.
    Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Leonor Tomero follows:]

                      Prepared Statement by Leonor Tomero
                                  introduction
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
    the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the
    Department's nuclear weapons policy, strategy, and capabilities in
    support of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2022.
        As Secretary Austin has stated, nuclear deterrence is the
    Department's highest priority mission. Our nuclear forces provide the
    bedrock of our national defense, and remain essential to ensure no
    adversary believes it can ever employ nuclear weapons for any reason,
    under any circumstances against the United States or our allies and
    partners without risking devastating consequences. The Department will
    continue to maintain and field safe, secure, survivable, and effective
    nuclear forces to deter adversaries and to respond if deterrence fails.
    As Deputy Secretary of Defense Hicks has stated, ``Maintaining a
    credible nuclear deterrent is critical to our Nation's defense.''
        Today, the United States faces a complex global security
    environment, in which the critical challenges to our prosperity and
    security include strategic competition with an increasingly militarily
    capable China and Russia, increasingly dangerous regional powers, and
    accelerating technological changes with potentially strategic effects.
    In this competitive global environment, the risk of interstate conflict
    may rise because of advances in technology and new frontiers for
    conflict with a variety of actors--all making deterrence more
    challenging.
        China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea have all demonstrated the
    capability and intent to advance their interests at the expense of the
    United States, its allies, and their regional neighbors. China has
    rapidly become more capable and assertive, and its military
    modernization, including of nuclear forces, is increasingly concerning.
    Russia's comprehensive conventional and nuclear modernization programs
    are adding new systems that threaten the United States and its allies
    and partners.
        We are confronted with multi-faceted deterrence challenges
    including cyber, space and nuclear domains, and increased escalation
    risks. In a security environment where assertive strategic competitors
    are expanding and modernizing their nuclear capabilities to achieve
    strategic and potentially escalatory effects, we must maintain credible
    strategic deterrence against adversaries and protect the American
    people and our allies and partners.
                               the nuclear threat
    China
        China is continuing its rapid expansion and platform
    diversification of its nuclear arsenal. In this decade, China intends
    to at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile and will soon
    field a nuclear triad. The 2021 Threat Assessment Report from the
    United States Intelligence Community notes that ``China is building a
    larger and increasingly capable nuclear missile force that is more
    survivable, more diverse, and on higher alert than in the past,
    including nuclear missile systems designed to manage regional
    escalation and ensure an intercontinental second-strike capability.''
        China is examining how lower-yield nuclear weapons and air-launched
    ballistic missiles fit into its expanding nuclear arsenal--an arsenal
    that includes a mix of strategic-range systems capable of striking the
    United States as well as theater-range forces capable of threatening
    U.S. allies and partners as well as U.S. bases, and forces in the
    region. China is fielding a new generation of mobile missiles, with
    multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and
    penetration aids to overcome perceived missile defense capabilities.
    China has also developed a new road-mobile strategic intercontinental
    ballistic missile (ICBM) and is planning to arm its ballistic missile
    submarine with new submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Like
    Russia, China is also committed to the development of hypersonic strike
    systems, including nuclear-armed missiles.
        In addition to its land-and sea-based components, China has
    announced development of a new nuclear-capable strategic bomber
    designed for stealth. China has also deployed a nuclear-capable
    precision-guided DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of
    attacking land and naval targets. Although China maintains its ``No
    First Use'' policy publicly there is some doubt as to whether it
    intends on abiding by it, and China's new nuclear weapons provide it
    with coercive options in a crisis or conflict.
    Russia
        According to the 2021 Annual Threat Assessment, Russia will remain
    the largest and most capable nuclear rival to the United States for the
    foreseeable future as it expands and modernizes its nuclear weapons
    capabilities and increases capabilities of its strategic and non-
    strategic weapons.
        Russia's comprehensive nuclear modernization program not only
    includes replacement of legacy systems, but includes fielding new, so-
    called ``novel'' nuclear systems. To date, Russia has recapitalized
    more than 80 percent of its strategic nuclear forces, including an
    array of modernization efforts and novel weapons programs. Some of
    Russia's stated drivers of its modernization for its newer systems
    include perceptions of United States missile defense and Western
    conventional superiority.
        Russia has also modernized and improved the capabilities of its
    theater and tactical nuclear forces. It has 1,000-2,000 non-strategic
    nuclear weapons of more than a dozen types. Moreover, according to the
    Defense Intelligence Agency, the number of Russia's non-strategic
    nuclear weapons is expected to grow significantly over the next decade
    and the number of which are not limited by any arms control agreement.
        According to the 2021 Annual Threat Assessment, Russia ``believes
    such systems offer options to deter adversaries, control the escalation
    of potential hostilities, and counter United States and allied force
    near its border.'' Although Russia may claim these weapons are
    defensive in nature to address conventional imbalances with the United
    States and its allies, this nuclear arsenal provides Russia with a
    multitude of options to coerce or threaten the NATO alliance and our
    Asian allies and partners. These options include the employment of
    limited nuclear first use in a regional context where Russia maintains
    the right to use such weapons in response to an existential threat.
    North Korea
        North Korea continues its unlawful production of nuclear weapons
    and ballistic missile capabilities in direct violation of United
    Nations Security Council resolutions. North Korea's nuclear
    capabilities constitute a significant and evolving threat to our allies
    and its tested ICBMs are designed to strike anywhere within the
    continental United States.
        Between 2006 and 2017, North Korea conducted six progressively
    sophisticated nuclear explosive tests and three ICBM flight tests that
    demonstrate its ability to reach the United States Homeland. It
    continues to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. Most
    recently, in January 2021, North Korea unveiled a new type of
    submarine-launched ballistic missile, which it declared to be ``the
    world's most powerful weapon.''
        North Korea's continued development and deployment of nuclear
    weapons threatens its neighbors and the United States.
    Iran
        Iran continues to destabilize regional stability, pursue advanced
    military capabilities and technologies, and threaten United States
    allies and partners. Iran has developed and fielded a substantial
    arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles that can strike targets
    throughout the region up to 2,000 kilometers. According to the Defense
    Intelligence Agency, Iran continues to deploy an increasing number of
    more accurate and lethal theater ballistic missiles, as well as pursue
    technical capabilities that could enable it to produce an ICBM if it
    chooses to do so.
        The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) effectively blocked
    Iran's potential pathways to a nuclear weapon and enabled robust
    international monitoring of all aspects of Iran's nuclear fuel cycle.
    Under the arrangement, Iran committed to dismantle much of its nuclear
    program, including significantly curtailing uranium enrichment
    activities and cutting its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 98
    percent, and opened its nuclear program to the most comprehensive and
    intrusive verification regime ever negotiated.
        Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-
    development activities needed to produce a nuclear device, according to
    the Intelligence Community. However, since the United States exited the
    JCPOA in May 2018, Iran has taken steps to expand its nuclear
    activities in excess of the JCPOA's limits and now is much closer to
    the fissile material required for a nuclear weapon than it was prior to
    taking these steps. Iran is also advancing its research and development
    on other capabilities of concern, such as the production of uranium
    metal, and is now doing so without the full benefit of the intrusive
    verification and monitoring measures that were in place when Iran was
    complying with its commitments under the deal. The Department supports
    the Administration's strategy of pursuing principled diplomacy to again
    constrain Iran's nuclear capabilities. The President has been clear
    about returning to compliance with the JCPOA if Iran resumes full and
    strict compliance with its commitments under the deal.
        In addition, Iran's development of more capable ballistic missiles
    makes it critical that the United States closely monitor developments
    in Iran to ensure our ability to deter its destabilizing and aggressive
    behavior.
                               deterrence policy
        As the 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance states,
    ``we will address the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons'' and
    the United States ``will take steps to reduce the role of nuclear
    weapons in our national security strategy, while ensuring our strategic
    deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective and that our extended
    deterrence commitments to our allies remain strong and credible.''
        In keeping with past practice for incoming administrations, the
    Department is beginning a set of strategic reviews that will include
    U.S. nuclear posture and policy. This process will be informed by the
    21st Century security and fiscal environment. The reviews will align
    with the U.S. national defense strategy and will include an integrated
    approach to deterrence, across several domains--conventional, cyber,
    space, and nuclear--to strengthen U.S. national security and our
    extended deterrence commitments. They will consider and assess U.S.
    strategy, posture, and policy adjustments, and consider program
    execution risk--all with a goal of maintaining a safe, secure, and
    effective strategic deterrent, ensuring strategic stability, and
    reducing risks of mistake and miscalculation in crisis and conflict.
    Reducing the Role of Nuclear Weapons
        As the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance notes, the
    proliferation of nuclear weapons poses profound and existential dangers
    which cannot be effectively addressed with the United States on the
    sidelines. In the coming months, we will begin to explore those steps
    that can be taken to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national
    security strategy, while continuing to ensure our strategic deterrent
    remains safe, secure and effective and our extended deterrence
    commitments to our allies remain strong. Our upcoming strategic reviews
    will play a critical role in laying the groundwork for this effort by
    allowing us to examine areas where we can make progress toward this
    goal.
    Ensuring a Safe, Secure, and Effective Strategic Deterrent through
            Nuclear Modernization
        As Secretary Austin testified, we must sustain and modernize the
    nuclear triad to maintain credible deterrence in the face of 21st
    Century threats. This Committee is well aware of the age of our nuclear
    systems and DOD's challenge in sustaining them as we simultaneously
    proceed with modernizing U.S. nuclear forces after decades of deferred
    recapitalization. As Secretary Austin has stated, ``U.S. nuclear
    weapons have been extended far beyond their original service lives, and
    the tipping point, where we must simultaneously overhaul these forces,
    is now here.'' Although the Administration is reviewing the U.S.
    nuclear posture, the President's fiscal year 2022 discretionary request
    supports ongoing nuclear modernization programs while ensuring that
    these efforts are sustainable. Secretary Austin has further noted that
    the Department will ensure that ``our modernization program is being
    executed in the most cost effective and judicious manner.''
        Effective deterrence requires a robust and credible nuclear
    command, control and communication (NC3) system that ensures the
    President has the ability to direct U.S. nuclear forces at all times,
    even under the most challenging circumstances. As the Department
    replaces an aging NC3 and considers future architectures, NC3 will
    continue to be a top priority.
        The United States is making significant investments in
    modernization of nuclear delivery platforms. The Department has
    embarked on several on-going concurrent programs, many of which plan to
    deliver by 2030, to replace aging systems including: the Columbia-class
    ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBNs); modernization of the
    associated D5 missile and new reentry vehicles; the replacement and
    modernization of land-based ICBMs (Ground Based Strategic Deterrent;
    GBSD); a nuclear long-range stand-off (LRSO) cruise missile; a modern
    bomber (B-21); and nuclear capable fighters (F-35).
        The U.S. stockpile strategy must continue to evolve to enable the
    United States to field a modern deterrent fit for 21st Century
    challenges. The Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA) life-extension, modifications, and nuclear
    weapons programs are designed to address DOD military requirements.
    Today's dynamic security environment requires a mix of weapon
    attributes, and weapons modernization and sustainment programs--all of
    which must be backed up by world-class personnel and a resilient
    infrastructure. The United States has adopted a stockpile strategy that
    will ensure our nuclear weapons remain safe, secure, and effective
    against current and future threats. The imperative behind this strategy
    is to meet current and future military requirements with higher
    confidence and without explosive nuclear testing.
        Our review of U.S. nuclear strategy and posture will assess the
    U.S. nuclear modernization programs to ensure that they deliver on time
    and are aligned with policy and requirements.
    Renewed Focus on Strategic Stability, Risk Reduction, and Arms Control
        The 2021 Interim Strategic National Security Guidance stated that
    ``we will endeavor to head off costly arms races and re-establish our
    credibility as a leader in arms control.'' President Biden has already
    demonstrated his commitment to re-establishing U.S. credibility and
    leadership on arms control by extending the New Strategic Arms
    Reduction Treaty (New START) for five years. The New START Treaty
    extension provides stability and predictability in addition to
    retaining limits on Russian systems that pose an existential military
    threat to the United States.
        It ensures legally binding constraints on a substantial portion of
    Russia's nuclear warheads, with an upper limit of 1,550 nuclear
    warheads on deployed ICBMs, on deployed SLBMs, and counted for deployed
    heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments (each such heavy bomber is
    counted as one warhead toward this limit). The Treaty also limits both
    deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers and launchers of ICBMs and
    SLBMs, and it keeps in place an important verification system, to
    ensure that Russia remains in compliance with its treaty obligations.
        As we pass the 11th anniversary of the signing of the New START
    Treaty in April 2010, we must look to build on its foundation. The
    scope of Chinese and Russian nuclear modernization and expansion makes
    the task of seeking progress on further arms control, nuclear security,
    and risk reduction measures all the more necessary. In addition, the
    increasing potential for conduct in the cyber, space, and information
    domains to have strategic effects (with consequent escalatory risk)
    underscores the importance of meaningful dialogue with Russia and China
    on the range of emerging military technological developments that could
    threaten strategic and regional stability. Presidents Biden and Putin
    have already agreed to hold strategic stability discussions. Similarly,
    we will work to engage China with the goal of having it accept its
    responsibility as a nuclear-armed, technologically advanced power,
    which includes increased transparency and progress on nuclear risk
    reduction. The Department will support efforts to negotiate agreements
    and arrangements that make the United States and its allies and
    partners more safe and secure.
                       commitment to allies and partners
        As strategic competitors continue to invest in efforts to challenge
    the United States, we are harnessing our greatest strategic advantage--
    our network of allies and partners--both globally and regionally to
    deter aggression from China and Russia, and to contend with persistent
    threats from North Korea and Iran.
        The extended deterrence assurances we provide to our allies and
    partners are a critical element of regional and strategic stability. No
    country should doubt the strength of our extended deterrence
    commitments or the strength of the U.S. and allied and partner
    capabilities to deter, and, if necessary, respond should deterrence
    fail.
    NATO
        In his January 26, 2021 call with NATO Secretary General Jens
    Stoltenberg, President Biden emphasized the importance of shared
    values, consultation, and capabilities to strengthen deterrence. With
    regard to nuclear deterrence specifically, NATO Allies reiterated in
    the London Declaration in December 2019, that ``as long as nuclear
    weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance'' and that ``we are
    fully committed to the preservation and strengthening of effective arms
    control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, taking into account the
    prevailing security environment.'' The fundamental purpose of NATO's
    nuclear capabilities is to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter
    aggression. The United States continues to make available its strategic
    nuclear forces for the defense of NATO, and they remain the supreme
    guarantee of the security of NATO Allies. The independent strategic
    nuclear forces of the UK and France have a deterrent role of their own
    and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance.
    The forward deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in NATO countries and
    the capabilities and infrastructure provided by Allies concerned also
    support NATO's nuclear deterrence and defense posture, and provide a
    political and military link between Europe and North America.
    United Kingdom
        Our support to the UK and its Continuous-At-Sea-Deterrent
    contributes to NATO's defense and has underwritten our collective peace
    and security from nuclear threats since the signing of the bilateral
    Mutual Defense Agreement in 1958. We maintain regular dialogue through
    Biannual Staff Talks and other technical engagements. The UK uses
    United States Trident missiles, equipped with UK warheads, onboard its
    Vanguard-class SSBNs; and the new United States Columbia-class and UK
    Dreadnought-class SSBNs will share a common ballistic missile
    compartment. The UK will also utilize United States technology through
    the W93 program to support its parallel replacement warhead program.
    The UK's nuclear forces are a key contribution to NATO's nuclear
    deterrent posture.
    France
        The independent strategic nuclear forces of France also contribute
    significantly to the overall security of the NATO Alliance. The United
    States maintains a formal dialogue with France through Annual Staff
    Talks to facilitate understanding of each other's threat perceptions
    and on other issues related to nuclear security.
    The Republic of Korea, Japan, and Australia
        In Asia, our formal relationships with important allies such as the
    Republic of Korea and Japan are critical to regional security and
    stability and provide a critical deterrent to North Korean and Chinese
    threats. We have long-standing extended deterrence dialogues with the
    Republic of Korea (ROK) through the Deterrence Strategy Committee (DSC)
    of the Korea-United States Integrated Defense Dialogue and with Japan
    through the Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD). Through regular
    bilateral meetings, site-visits, and table-top exercises, both the EDD
    and DSC have helped us to develop a common Alliance understanding of
    deterrence principles, and to test application of those principles to
    scenarios we may face in the Indo-Pacific region. We also have
    meaningful consultation with Australia through the Strategic Policy
    Dialogue (SPD). The evolving nature of the SPD continues to be a venue
    that deepens our understanding of allied concerns on strategic and
    nuclear threats in the region. Moreover, we continue to use all of
    these venues to regularly assure our allies of the continued importance
    of U.S. extended deterrence commitments as a crucial part of our
    collective national security.
                                   conclusion
        Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by stating that as the Department
    plans to begin its strategic reviews, enhancing deterrence and
    addressing strategic threats remain the highest priority. As long as
    nuclear threats exist and in an increasingly complex and threatening
    security environment, the United States must have a modern nuclear
    deterrent that is safe, secure, and credible to keep America and its
    allies and partners safe. We will continue to address the existential
    threat posed by nuclear weapons, strengthen strategic stability, pursue
    efforts to reduce nuclear risks and engage with our allies.
        Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

        Senator King. Thank you. Mr. Walter.

     STATEMENT OF MR. ANDREW WALTER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
                      DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR MATTERS

        Mr. Walter. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, Members
    of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to join my
    colleagues to testify before you today regarding matters
    related to the U.S. nuclear enterprise.
        With the understanding that the administration is embarking
    on the review of nuclear policies and posture that Secretary
    Austin discussed during his confirmation hearing, and my
    colleague just mentioned, I will provide a few framing comments
    on the strategic environment and current program of record from
    my perspective in my responsibilities for certain programmatic
    and technical matters in the Department.
        While the U.S. nuclear deterrent is and will remain safe,
    secure, effective, and credible, the strategic threat
    environment in which it must do so has worsened considerably
    over the past decade. China, in particular, is pursuing and
    fielding major quantitative and qualitative improvements to its
    nuclear capabilities that significantly change the strategic
    threat they pose to the United States and our allies and
    partners.
        For its part, Russia is completing its longstanding plan to
    modernize its legacy nuclear forces, and is aggressively
    pursuing new, advanced nuclear capabilities. Both China and
    Russia are also actively pursuing advancements in ballistic
    missile defense and air defense systems.
        At the same time, the systems and infrastructure that
    comprise the United States' nuclear deterrent were largely
    built during the Cold War and are increasingly difficult to
    sustain. As Secretary Austin has said, ``Although effective
    today, U.S. nuclear deterrence systems remain dependent on
    aging systems that have been extended far beyond their original
    service lives, and the tipping point where we must
    simultaneously overhaul these forces is now here.''
        These combined developments are resulting in long-lasting
    challenges that require the United States to focus and maintain
    long-term attention and resources on ensuring we have a modern
    and credible nuclear deterrent. To be clear, this focus must be
    on the entire U.S. nuclear deterrent. This includes not just
    the nuclear weapons and their delivery systems but also the
    nuclear command, control, and communications system, the
    supporting infrastructure across both the Department of Energy
    and the Department of Defense, and the people in both
    Departments who are the true backbone of the Nation's
    deterrent.
        As we do this, we must be mindful that our current
    timelines for nuclear modernization programs are 10 to 20 years
    from concept to capability, and the capabilities produced will
    be in the field for 3, 4, even 5 decades. While both
    Departments continue to seek opportunities to shorten delivery
    time frames and find efficiencies, we know that programmatic
    decisions made today have repercussions that last for decades.
    This is why the nuclear enterprise always seeks to anticipate
    future threat environments and, more importantly, to create
    flexibility and resiliency across the nuclear deterrent.
        The four largest acquisition efforts in the Department of
    Defense's current nuclear modernization program--the Columbia-
    class submarine, the B-21 bomber, the ground-based strategic
    deterrent, and the long-range standoff cruise missile--were all
    started 5 to 10 years ago. We are beginning to see these
    programs come to fruition, and all are currently on track.
        But the successful execution of these programs, and
    complementary programs in the National Nuclear Security
    Administration, requires enduring commitment over long
    timelines. As President Biden's 2010 nuclear posture review
    stated, ``An effective strategy must be sustained over time
    with support from a long succession of U.S. administrations and
    Congresses.'' This sustained national commitment will ensure
    that no adversary ever believes it can carry out a strategic
    attack on the United States or our allies for any reason, under
    any circumstances, without risking devastating consequences.
        This Committee is a central stakeholder in that commitment.
    I thank you for the Committee's longstanding and continued
    bipartisan support, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, for our
    nuclear deterrent mission and for the men and women, both in
    and out of uniform, across the nuclear enterprise.
        On behalf of these national security professionals, as they
    continue to work to ensure the U.S. nuclear deterrent continues
    to keep the peace for generations to come, thank you. I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Andrew T. Walter follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Mr. Andrew T. Walter
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
    the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
    today regarding matters relating to the U.S. nuclear enterprise. I am
    pleased to join my colleagues to discuss what five successive
    Secretaries of Defense have called the Department of Defense's (DOD)
    highest priority mission: ensuring that the United States has a safe,
    secure, effective, and credible nuclear deterrent--now and in the
    future.
        As we continue to persevere through the COVID-19 pandemic and the
    long-term modernization of our nuclear enterprise, we want to assure
    you that U.S. nuclear forces remain ready and capable. Our nuclear
    deterrent underwrites every U.S. military operation across the world
    and is the foundation and backstop of our national defense. It has
    preserved peace and stability by deterring aggression against the
    United States and our allies for over 70 years and has received strong
    support from Congress and multiple Administrations throughout those
    decades. Furthermore, assuring allies and partners depends on their
    confidence in the credibility of our extended nuclear deterrent
    capabilities and commitments.
        As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters
    (DASD(NM)), I am responsible for directing and overseeing a wide
    variety of activities that underpin and advance DOD's nuclear related
    missions. We lead and participate in activities across the nuclear
    enterprise: from executing the statutory responsibilities of the
    Nuclear Weapons Council; to coordinating stockpile management
    activities between DOD and our partners at the Department of Energy's
    (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA); to overseeing
    policies and actions that ensure the security and safety of our nuclear
    weapons, as well as prevent and respond to nuclear weapon incidents and
    accidents; to working closely with allies on nuclear issues. We succeed
    in our mission when our partners and stakeholders across the nuclear
    enterprise succeed in the execution of their own missions--our role in
    many activities is to serve as the focal point of coordination, and our
    goal is to ensure the enterprise as a whole is aligned in what needs to
    be done to support this highest priority mission.
        The most vital piece of that mission is the modernization of the
    U.S. nuclear enterprise. Although decades-long sustainment efforts have
    allowed us to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent based on weapons and
    forces fielded many decades ago, sustainment alone cannot ensure that
    these capabilities continue to deter into the future--especially as
    threats continue to exist and evolve. Nearly all the systems that
    compose the current nuclear deterrent--our weapons; delivery systems;
    Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) systems; and
    supporting infrastructure and facilities--were built during the Cold
    War and are facing sustainment challenges that require modernization to
    ensure a viable deterrent. Ultimately, we know that programmatic risks
    in nuclear acquisition and sustainment programs, if realized, flow back
    to U.S. Strategic Command and put in danger its ability to meet
    deterrence and assurance objectives laid out by the President and the
    Secretary of Defense. To prevent this, the Department is carefully
    examining and taking action on both risks and opportunities as we
    transition from our current, legacy nuclear forces to their modern
    replacements.
        Carrying out the Nation's nuclear deterrence mission is a
    responsibility shared by DOD and our partners at NNSA. Similar to DOD,
    NNSA is addressing challenges as United States nuclear warheads and
    their key production infrastructure continue to age well beyond their
    original design lives while challenges posed by China, Russia, North
    Korea, and Iran continue to grow. Due to the long post-Cold War pause
    in nuclear weapons acquisition programs, we no longer have many of the
    production capabilities that built our current nuclear arsenal. Key
    nuclear facilities in NNSA's production enterprise date to the late-
    1940s or 1950s--51 percent of this infrastructure is rated as being in
    no better than poor condition. NNSA is developing and executing plans
    to address these longstanding challenges by building modern replacement
    facilities, but we know that if NNSA production infrastructure
    investment is not prioritized the Cold War-era stockpile cannot be
    maintained or modernized before it ages out.
        Core to this critical partnership between DOD and NNSA is the
    Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), a coordinating body established by
    Congress to facilitate the alignment of requirements and to establish
    priorities as the two Departments fulfill their shared responsibility
    for providing the Nation's nuclear deterrent. The NWC convenes monthly
    to maintain alignment of efforts between DOD and NNSA on the vision,
    strategy, and execution of nuclear programs. The NWC's current
    structure and processes enable regular, senior-level attention and
    proactive decisions on capabilities and capacities needed to maintain
    and modernize an effective nuclear weapons stockpile that meets the
    requirements of an increasingly challenging international security
    environment. The NWC fully supports NNSA's efforts to establish a
    responsive and resilient nuclear security enterprise to meet U.S.
    deterrence and assurance needs. A responsive enterprise also ensures
    that NNSA can attract and retain a world-class workforce capable of
    responding to the dynamic and uncertain security environment we face.
        The President's Fiscal Year 2022 Budget ensures a strong, credible
    nuclear deterrent for the security of the Nation and our allies. While
    the Administration is conducting a review of nuclear policy and
    posture, the President's Fiscal Year 2022 Budget supports ongoing
    nuclear activities and programs while ensuring that these efforts are
    sustainable. Within the Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition
    and Sustainment, we are mindful that we must ensure our legacy nuclear
    programs remain safe, secure, and effective up to the day they are
    replaced and retired. We must not lose sight of the need to sustain
    these aging capabilities even as we fund and prioritize delivering
    their modern replacements on schedule. As such, all nuclear programs
    remain on track. To continue to meet military requirements and better
    mitigate future risks, tracking sustainment and modernization programs
    across both DOD and NNSA--and their interdependencies--will continue to
    be a top priority.
        As the Committee requested, although I will refer you to my
    colleagues from the Services for specifics, I'd like to provide a brief
    status update on several major modernization programs. I provide this
    update with the recognition that the Administration has expressed its
    intent to take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our
    national security strategy, while ensuring our strategic deterrent
    remains safe, secure, and effective and that our extended deterrence
    commitments to our allies remain strong and credible. As the
    Administration conducts this review of nuclear policy and posture over
    the coming months, I provide the following status on the Department's
    major nuclear modernization programs of record.
        The Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program is intended to
    deliver the next generation Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
    weapon system to support the nuclear deterrent. The objective of the
    GBSD program is to deliver a low technical risk, total system
    replacement of Minuteman III to address sustainment challenges, close
    capability gaps, and ensure the U.S. maintains an effective land-based
    nuclear deterrent through 2075. The development of a modern ICBM system
    seeks to reduce the total cost of ownership over sustaining the legacy
    Minuteman III by increasing system reliability and adopting specific
    design features focused on increasing maintainability. In addition, the
    implementation of a modular open system architecture, coupled with the
    Air Force's plan to own the technical baseline, greatly enhances the
    ability of the weapon system to adapt to future threats and sustainment
    modifications. The Air Force has assessed that there is no margin to
    delay development and fielding of GBSD; its legacy counterpart, the
    Minuteman III is 40 years beyond its designed life expectancy and will
    begin experiencing attrition and age-related component degradation
    resulting in the number of available ICBMs falling below military
    requirement levels in the late 2020s. Additionally, Minuteman III is
    becoming increasingly difficult and expensive to sustain, and will not
    meet military effectiveness requirements in the 2030s as adversary
    threats advance. The GBSD program is currently in the Engineering and
    Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase with Milestone C planned for
    fiscal year 2026.
        The Long Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO) will replace the early-1980's
    AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) with a missile capable of
    penetrating advanced air defenses long into the future. LRSO will
    maintain the viability of the B-52 in the nuclear triad and support the
    long-term effectiveness of the bomber leg, while imposing costs on our
    adversaries by greatly complicating their air defense strategies. LRSO
    also represents the first simultaneous integrated nuclear weapons
    program that the DOD and NNSA have executed since the 1980s. This means
    that the DOD-provided LRSO cruise missile and the NNSA-provided W80-4
    refurbished warhead are being developed as an integrated system.
        The B-21 will support the Nuclear Triad with a visible and flexible
    deterrent capability, and provide operational flexibility across a wide
    range of military objectives in fulfillment of national objectives. The
    B-21 Raider provides the ability to penetrate modern adversary air
    defenses and will replace aging B-1 and B-2 bombers and complement
    modernized B-52 bombers. The Air Force plans to procure a minimum of
    100 B-21 Raider aircraft in support of its full range of nuclear and
    conventional missions. The first two test aircraft are currently being
    manufactured and the first flight for the B-21 is estimated for 2022.
        The Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) is the U.S.
    Navy's number one acquisition priority. Columbia will replace the
    nearly 40-year-old Ohio-class SSBNs. SSBNs are critical, stabilizing,
    and efficient elements of U.S. nuclear deterrence and assurance and are
    the most survivable leg of the triad. Twelve Columbia-class SSBNs are
    required to meet strategic nuclear deterrence requirements. The
    Columbia is being designed to have a longer service life, better
    operational availability, and better survivability than their
    predecessors.
        Not only will Columbia provide the United States with 21st Century
    capability, it will do so at a responsible cost. Full ship construction
    is planned to begin in fiscal year 2024 with a first strategic patrol
    in fiscal year 2031. The Navy has started a weapon system modernization
    program (D5 Life Extension 2 (D5LE2)) to support the Columbia-class
    deterrent for its full service life. Columbia-class SSBNs and the D5LE2
    program will provide a credible and survivable at-sea deterrent while
    facing a future dynamic threat environment. Additionally, the Navy and
    NNSA have initiated the W93/Mk7 program to meet U.S. strategic
    deterrence modernization needs. The program is also vital for
    continuing the longstanding United States commitment to support the
    United Kingdom's Continuous at Sea Deterrent. The W93/Mk7 provides the
    opportunity for aligning our independent programs and collaborating,
    within the constraints of existing treaties and agreements, to allow
    both countries to responsibly address challenges within their legacy
    nuclear forces.
        Finally, the United States requires a robust NC3 system. The
    modernization of our NC3 systems will address 21st Century threats and
    ensure the President has the ability to command control U.S. Forces at
    all times, even under the most extreme circumstances.
        Our nuclear modernization efforts--including delivery systems,
    warheads, infrastructure, and NC3--will take decades to complete but
    are critical to our Nation's security. These efforts will help ensure
    that no adversary ever believes it can carry out a strategic attack on
    the United States or our allies for any reason, under any
    circumstances, without risking devastating consequences. I thank this
    Committee for its longstanding, bipartisan support for our nuclear
    deterrent mission and for the men and women--both in and out of
    uniform--across the nuclear enterprise. I look forward to your
    questions.

        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Walter. General Ray.

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL TIMOTHY M. RAY, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE
                         GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND

        General Ray. Good afternoon Chairman King, Ranking Member
    Fischer, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you
    for inviting me to appear before you today and represent the
    men and women of Air Force Global Strike Command.
        After nearly 3 years as the Commander of Air Force Global
    Strike Command, and as the Joint Force Air Component Commander,
    which is the operational air commander to U.S. Strategic
    Command, I have had a front row seat in the opening stages of
    the long-term strategic competition unfolding around us. During
    this time, it has become abundantly clear we must bring about
    significant transition in how we do our job--how we lead, how
    we think, how we operate, and especially how we develop our
    combat capabilities, both legacy and future systems.
        As we transition from two decades of counterterrorism
    operations to the long-term strategic competition, we face
    potential adversaries with increasingly more capable and
    abundant military technologies, matched with their own
    determined regional and global ambitions. Air Force Global
    Strike Command and Air Force's Strategic Air have a central
    role in delivering what the Nation needs--a safe, secure,
    reliable, effective, affordable long-range precision strike
    force, both nuclear and conventional. As the only force of its
    kind, this force is not only for the American people but for
    our allies.
        Part of presenting the long-range precision strike force
    needed is fostering the right climate and culture for the best
    of America's sons and daughters. Our airmen are the linchpin of
    the force our Nation needs most, and as we modernize we must
    also prioritize the development of the right leaders with the
    ability to lead any airman from any walk of life, to build the
    unity and the trust our units need to prevail in any challenge.
        While our adversaries focus on the division of our American
    public, we must labor to instill in all of our teammates the
    dignity, respective, diversity inclusion that are critical to
    the paths of unity and trust. Without it, we miss out on the
    tremendous talent from every corner of our country, the
    innovation and the boldness we need.
        American public's trust in the nuclear forces as safe,
    secure, reliable is a non-negotiable requirement, and must
    remain a bedrock of how we operate. What must change, however,
    is the manner in which we train, prepare, sustain, and
    modernize. The Air Force nuclear arsenal must evolve beyond a
    collection of aging programs, and must be grounded in relevant
    operational concepts and modern capability development
    techniques. This results in affordable acquisition programs and
    it improves sustainment practices and dynamic training
    underwritten by robust and survivable nuclear command and
    control.
        Transitions are difficult, but we have a unique opportunity
    to partner with Congress, the combatant commanders, the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense to advance affordable and
    innovative solutions supporting the long-range precision strike
    mission. The effort we undertake will ensure our
    intercontinental ballistic missile and bomber forces are ready
    and adaptable for the challenges of the 21st Century.
        Lastly, I want to thank you for your continued support. I
    cannot articulate enough how credible the on-time funding is to
    restoring readiness. Predictable, reliable, and flexible
    budgets, with the right authorities to drive the competition,
    are critical to our future success.
        Chairman King and distinguished Subcommittee Members, I
    want to thank you for your dedication to our great Nation, to
    your very thoughtful approach to these very difficult
    challenges, and certainly for the opportunity to appear before
    the Committee. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Timothy M. Ray follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by General Timothy M. Ray
                                  introduction
        First and foremost, I want to thank the Committee for the
    opportunity to appear before you and testify on behalf of the 33,700
    men and women of Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) that I am
    privileged to lead. I would also like to take the opportunity to thank
    the men and women of AFGSC for their successful work in leading and
    taking care of each other during a time of national crisis. Even in the
    toughest of times, this command continues to develop the world's most
    respected and feared long-range strike force, ready to respond anytime
    and anywhere to ensure the success of the Department of Defense's
    highest priority mission.
        AFGSC plays a central role in delivering a safe, secure, reliable,
    effective, and affordable long-range nuclear and conventional precision
    strike force. This is made possible every day because of the amazing
    people in our command and the phenomenal relationships within the
    enterprise. After nearly two decades in the counter-terrorism fight,
    the global context continues to shift. The 2018 National Defense
    Strategy (NDS) and President Biden's Interim National Security
    Strategic Guidance acknowledge the reemergence of long-term, strategic
    competition as a central challenge to our Nation's prosperity and
    security. We are facing an increasing number of nuclear threats from
    near-peer competitors, as well as new challenges to our legacy weapon
    systems, leveraged by modern capabilities. We recognize the importance
    of restoring margin ahead of our competition by developing the right
    leaders and the right processes to prepare, sustain, and modernize our
    nuclear weapon systems. Our Nation's legacy bombers and
    Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) are not aging gracefully.
    We are behind on modernization with no margin in the schedule. There
    are no allied bomber forces or ICBM forces, and the only production
    line for the B-21 is in its infancy. Our command is committed to
    delivering improved weapon systems as efficiently and affordably as
    possible by pursuing mature technologies, stabilizing requirements, and
    owning the technical baseline of our weapons systems; a formula that
    has proven successful in our acquisition efforts thus far.
        Building on our proud heritage, we stand on the shoulders of
    giants. AFGSC continues this great legacy as we construct the long-
    range precision strike force our Nation needs. In order to create the
    lethal, competitive force we need in the future, our nuclear enterprise
    must be driven by innovative leadership underpinned by a dedication to
    quality of life for our airmen and families. We owe it to America's
    sons and daughters to train and equip them with the absolute best we
    can provide. Furthermore, we must ensure these Airman are part of a
    larger effort, linking them to their organizations and to their local
    communities. As we seek to achieve excellence in all our endeavors, we
    invite Congressional input to advance affordable, cost-effective, and
    innovative solutions, which ensure our strategic deterrent capabilities
    meet the challenges of the 21st Century.
    Our People--Developing Strong Leaders & Communities through Transition
        Over the past year and through the most challenging of times, AFGSC
    has made significant progress in leading transition and improving the
    quality of life for our airmen. Through the COVID-19 pandemic our team
    has risen to the challenge and adapted our battle rhythm, implementing
    the necessary measures to ensure the safety and wellbeing of our airmen
    and families during times of uncertainty.
                              covid-19 management
        AFGSC's nuclear mission is the cornerstone of our Nation's defense
    and the defense of our allies around the world. As the command
    responsible for two legs of the nuclear triad, we are ready to execute
    the mission under all circumstances and at any time. Every challenge
    presents an opportunity and the men and women of AFGSC continually rise
    to the occasion, displaying exemplary leadership, resilience, and
    problem-solving prowess in the most challenging situations. Our long-
    range strike bombers and ICBMs continue to operate and achieve what is
    needed, when it is needed. With the emergence of COVID-19, we employed
    the necessary precautions to include the isolation of crews and other
    mission essential personnel. Missile wings took proactive measures
    early on to preserve combat capability and guarantee combatant command
    requirements could be met for the duration of the pandemic. We also
    took preventative measures to preserve the capacity of our bomber
    forces and to minimize the potential impact to mission readiness. In
    fact, our combat mission readiness rates among our bomber aircrews is
    at its highest in the history of the command.
        Recognizing the need for a ``whole of community'' approach to
    COVID-19, AFGSC leadership closely monitors the effect of COVID-19 on
    the AFGSC community, to include clinics, schools, and child care
    centers. We also work with medical professionals to monitor the health
    of our airmen, to assess the impacts on the healthcare network's
    capacity, and to ensure implementation of preventative measures while
    continuing efforts to vaccinate our forces. Along with protecting our
    medical teams and contingency planning, our priorities are focused on
    sustained 5 to 7-day ICBM alerts, maintaining E-4B National Airborne
    Operations Center (NAOC) capabilities, coverage of our operational
    commitments, bomber modernization, and Nuclear Command, Control, and
    Communication (NC3) sustainment. Looking ahead, we will leverage
    lessons learned to ensure we employ the best practices for a post-COVID
    command.
    STRATEGIC NARRATIVE & CONTEXT
        Our 2018 NDS and President Biden's Interim National Security
    Strategic Guidance acknowledge the complex global security environment
    and the reemergence of long-term strategic competition with China and
    Russia as a central challenge to United States prosperity and security.
    We must now consider multi-polarity with potentially dangerous
    adversaries like North Korea, Iran, and extremist organizations. As we
    think broadly about our current global situation and transition to the
    future, there are new considerations we must continue to explore, to
    include how we better equip our airmen and develop our leaders to
    prepare for the future fight. This strategic shift in our defensive
    posture requires us to focus on three critical areas within our
    mission:
          Improving quality of life for our airmen and families
    through a culture of community, authentic leadership, innovation, and
    cross-functional collaboration will ensure our competitive advantage,
    will maintain adaptability through transition, and will ensure
    retention of our most important assets--our people. Retention of this
    talent is an imperative.
          Sustainment of our long-range precision strike
    capabilities and building margin in the force is critical to our role
    in the NDS. Congressional support will also ensure our budget is driven
    by strategy and facilitates our ability to execute the critical long-
    range strike mission.
          Overcoming adversarial challenges in a competitive
    environment will require sustained modernization and improvement,
    leveraged by enterprise relationships and empirically-driven data that
    ensures readiness for the future fight.
        Future challenges dictate we be bold in our considerations and
    rethink how we build leaders in an all-volunteer force - retention and
    development of our talent is our competitive advantage. AFGSC
    leadership will continue its commitment to retaining talent and
    improving the quality of life for our airmen and families.
    QUALITY OF LIFE
        The importance of this can't be stressed enough. The men and women
    of AFGSC have proven time and time again that they are up for any
    challenge and dedicated to the nuclear mission, but to keep them
    successful we must invest in their futures and that of their families
    every single day. We owe it to America's Sons and Daughters to support
    them to the level they support our Country.
                                   facilities
        We continue improving the quality of life for our airmen and our
    families at each of our wings. With strong advocacy from base
    leadership, the Air Force secured additional funding for CY20 Operating
    and Capital Replacement and Repair to address the most significant
    structural issues in our base housing communities. In addition, AFGSC's
    role in the Air Force-led Child Care Capacity Initiative continues to
    show great results; a critical component in the everyday lives of many
    of our airmen. AFGSC has also improved quality of life for our ICBM
    force through improved internet connection at our missile alert
    facilities (MAFs). This past year, our team increased Wi-Fi capability
    by 1000 percent for our nearly 630 ICBM personnel to ensure optimal
    communication while serving in remote alert locations.
                               health & wellness
        Women comprise 23 percent of AFGSC. Therefore, we stood up
    lactation rooms for nursing mothers at each of our units and continue
    to create the spaces necessary to meet this crucial need for many of
    our families. In March 2020, we purchased resources to outfit each of
    our launch control facilities (LCCs) with dedicated lactation areas.
    Additionally, over the past year we collaborated with the Air Force
    Surgeon General and the Defense Health Agency (DHA) to improve policy
    on Nuclear Enterprise Medical, Behavioral, and Mental Health practices.
    In fiscal year 2021, Minot and Whiteman AFBs will add an additional 110
    health care professionals to increase accessibility to care, a critical
    component to suicide prevention, for our airmen and families.
        AFGSC remains focused on our commitment to help airmen and their
    family members thrive professionally and personally in order to ensure
    optimal readiness and steadfast mission execution. We are encouraged by
    the progress we have made in improving certain quality of life aspects
    for our people, but we acknowledge this is an ongoing effort and we
    still have more to do.
    SUSTAINMENT--Building Margin in Our Capabilities for the Future Fight
        With improved prioritization with in the Air Force Budget,
    conditions have greatly improved for building margin in our current
    forces. As the Air Component to United States Strategic Command
    (USSTRATCOM), we maintain a holistic view of readiness as an ecosystem,
    encompassing operations, maintenance, equipment, training, weapons,
    test, and security.
                                eighth air force
        Eighth Air Force (8 AF), located at Barksdale Air Force Base,
    Louisiana, is responsible for the B-1B, B-2A, B-52H bombers and the E-
    4B National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC). Our bombers provide
    decision makers the ability to demonstrate resolve to our adversaries
    through generation, dispersal, deployment, and if directed, employment.
    While are heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments are constrained
    by the limits set out in the New START treaty, the overall size of the
    bomber force is driven by the significant contribution to conventional
    campaigns, now more of a concern in this era of strategic competition.
        Based on NDS objectives as ordered by the Secretary of Defense, we
    have transitioned to the Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) model to help
    balance readiness and long-range strike capability. Our forces continue
    to operate globally in alignment with the NDS as Bomber Task Forces
    (BTFs), executing DFE missions in order to remain operationally
    unpredictable and strategically predictable. The Air Force has
    conducted continuous combat operations with 46 percent fewer aircraft
    than we had in 1991 while supporting continuous rotations in the United
    States Central Command (USCENTCOM) and United States Indo-Pacific
    Command (USINDOPACOM). In addition, 8AF bombers have also provided
    episodic support to United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), United
    States European Command (USEUCOM), and United States Southern Command
    (USSOUTHCOM) areas of responsibility (AORs). During this period, the
    demand for bombers increased resulting in a growing toll on airmen and
    readiness of the aircraft and equipment. Currently, AFGSC provides
    bomber forces to the combatant commanders through the Global Force
    Management process and BTF operations orders (OPORDs). These
    opportunities enhance our support to our allies and display our resolve
    to potential adversaries. We will continue to leverage BTF missions
    from CONUS in order to meet NDS requirements while building readiness
    and flexibility for our personnel.
        The core of AFGSC assurance and deterrence is our unwavering
    commitment to USSTRATCOM and our nuclear mission. While the effects of
    an extremely high operational tempo have reverberated throughout the
    bomber fleet, AFGSC continues to balance global force posturing with
    our nuclear mission, ensuring readiness and the health of our fleet.
      B-1B LANCER
        The B-1 remains a critical component of long-range strike as we
    transition to the B-21. Based at Dyess AFB, Texas and Ellsworth AFB,
    South Dakota, the B-1 is the most versatile, conventional-only, multi-
    mission weapon system and carries the largest payload of guided and
    unguided weapons of all three bombers. Multiple wartime deployments,
    high operations tempo, and harsh environmental exposure have proven the
    aircraft's combat effectiveness, but have taken a toll on aircraft
    availability. The B-1 has flown beyond its certified designed service
    life without full-scale fatigue testing to extend it. We must preserve
    the remaining structural life to maximize aircraft availability as we
    transition to the 2-bomber fleet (B-52 and B-21) of the future.
        The B-1 was built as a low-level penetrator and was engineered for
    flight profiles different than the close air support profiles flown in
    support of USCENTCOM. The stand-off weapons currently employed by the
    B-1 today include the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM),
    the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER) and
    is the only Air Force delivery platform of the Long-Range Anti-Ship
    Missile (LRASM). This long-range precision strike capability plays a
    critical role for the B-1 in assuring our allies and deterring
    potential adversaries now and into the future.
        Seventeen years of steady deployments characterized by repeated
    max-weight takeoffs, heavy-weight landings, and heavy-weight areal
    operations in the close air support role has stressed the B-1 beyond
    its designed structural limits. Consequently, this resulted in the need
    for increased structural inspections and repairs and an unwavering
    commitment by the B-1 community to successfully restoring fleet health
    and operational capability over the past year. Innovative maintenance
    practices such as Condition Based Maintenance Plus (CBM+) sustainment
    processes will help the Air Force achieve the service life goal for the
    B-1. This predictive approach to identifying aircraft subsystem
    degradation has minimized scheduled down time for the B-1 fleet. By
    concurrently making deferred repairs and by changing near end-of-life
    components, unscheduled breaks can be avoided, resulting in improved
    aircraft availability. Furthermore, in fiscal year 2020, AFGSC stood up
    a dedicated depot-level structural inspection and repair line at the
    Oklahoma City Air Logistics Complex to assure the highest standard of
    aviation safety.
        Another way we have preserved structural integrity of the B-1 is
    through the termination of low altitude-high speed (LAHS) flight
    profiles. Over time, LAHS maneuvers have over-stressed the Forward
    Intermediate Fuselage (FIF) causing significant fatigue damage and
    shortening the remaining structural life of the aircraft. Terminating
    LAHS flight operations reduces this stress, delays the need for certain
    structural repairs, aids in the preservation of service life, and
    extends B-1 operations as a bridge to B-21 employment. In shaping this
    decision, we conferred with all Joint Force Air Component Commanders
    (JFACCs) and determined LAHS operations were no longer a priority for
    the B-1. However, we maintain the ability to return to this flight
    profile if and when it is needed.
        B-1 upgrades and improvements are planned to ensure relevance,
    lethality, and survivability, making it a viable platform until
    retirement. Avionics and weapons upgrades are critical. The Integrated
    Battle Station includes the repair infrastructure of the upgraded
    Central Integrated Test System, Fully Integrated Data Link, Vertical
    Situation Display, and flight simulator upgrades. These capabilities
    provide aircrew with a more flexible, integrated cockpit and achieved
    full operational capability in September of fiscal year 2020. In
    addition, mandatory upgrades to Radio Cryptographic Equipment,
    Identification Friend or Foe, and Link-16 will ensure the B-1 remains
    assimilated with the Joint force.
        In 2019, the 412th Test Wing at Edwards AFB, California, along with
    AFGSC and industry partners, held an expanded carriage demonstration to
    showcase the feasibility of increasing B-1 weapons capacity and
    integrating future advanced weapons. External Carriage and Long Bay
    options were successfully tested in CY20 and proved the modifications
    would increase the bomber's magazine capacity for munitions and add
    larger, heavier munitions, such as hypersonic weapons. Increased weapon
    carriage allows for fewer overall sorties, reduces air refueling
    requirements and flying hour costs, while increasing aircraft
    availability for follow-on missions. Additionally, these expanded
    carriage options will gap on our maintenance and aircrew shortfall by
    requiring fewer combat sorties to get the same effect. Current
    estimates to enable initial expanded carriage on the B-1 is 160 million
    dollars.
        Sustainment and limited B-1 modernization remains on the critical
    path as we transition to the B-21. We are carefully balancing
    structural repairs and fleet health with needed combat capability while
    we continue the retirement of 17 structurally challenged B-1s in fiscal
    year 2021. Retiring 17 B-1s in fiscal year 2021 frees an estimated 1.2
    billion dollars in operations, maintenance, sustainment, and
    modernization costs, allowing the Air Force to concentrate resources on
    the remaining force, set the right conditions for B-21 transition, and
    invest in other NDS required capabilities. These efforts build margin
    by striking a balance between sustainable B-1 improvements while
    working toward a more manageable fleet.
        Lastly, reducing 17 B-1s in fiscal year 2021 will not result in the
    closure of any squadrons nor cut any maintenance manpower. We intend to
    sustain readiness through limited aircrew reassignments, improve the
    maintainer-to-aircraft ratio in the near-term, and posture sufficient
    maintenance personnel for initial B-21 retraining in the long-term.
    This divestiture plan will shape the B-1 fleet so it remains healthy
    and effective, provides margin across the bomber transition, and incurs
    cost savings to reach the future B-21 force faster.
      B-2 SPIRIT
        For 30 years, the B-2 has served as the Nation's only stealth
    bomber capable of penetrating air defenses anywhere in the world. Based
    at Whiteman AFB, Missouri, the B-2 holds targets at risk with a variety
    of nuclear and conventional weapons that no other platform can execute
    while providing deterrence against our enemies and stability for our
    allies. The B-2's conventional accomplishments are numerous and
    incontrovertible. The bomber provided precision attacks during the
    Kosovo and Iraq Wars, strikes on the Taliban and al Qaeda in
    Afghanistan, and strikes on forces in Libya.
        B-2 modernization efforts are addressing a nuclear command and
    control need by bringing a survivable very low frequency communication
    capability to the aircraft. Additionally, with the proliferation of
    anti-access/area denial threats, we must ensure the B-2's ability to
    penetrate enemy defenses until the fielding of the B-21 bomber.
    Moreover, the B-2 is being upgraded to carry the JASSM-ER and the B61-
    12 nuclear gravity weapon. These upgrades are critical to ensuring the
    bomber leg of the nuclear triad remains a viable and relevant
    warfighting capability.
        Small fleet dynamics continue to challenge our sustainment efforts
    primarily due to vanishing vendors and the diminishing supply chain.
    There is an ongoing effort to maintain the proper balance of fleet
    modernization and sustainment while maintaining combat readiness.
    Lessons learned from the difficulty of sustaining and modernizing the
    B-2's small fleet, and an ever-decreasing technological advantage, are
    critical drivers for B-21 requirements.
      B-52 STRATOFORTRESS
        The B-52 may be the most universally recognized symbol of American
    airpower. Based at Minot AFB, North Dakota and Barksdale AFB,
    Louisiana, the B-52 is able to deliver the widest variety of nuclear
    and conventional weapons and boasts the best aircraft availability and
    mission capable rates of all three bomber platforms. The B-52 will
    remain a key element of our bomber force until the 2050s. Therefore, it
    is paramount we continue to invest resources into this aircraft. The
    modernization and sustainment of the B-52 should not be based on how
    long it has been in service, but rather, based on its capacity to
    remain in service. AFGSC is looking at B-52 modernization holistically
    in order to optimize, prioritize, and deliver affordable, on-time
    modernization.
        Modernization programs will be prioritized and integrated in an
    effort to make deliberate decisions on timing for concurrent programs.
    Integration of the existing programs with smart and efficient
    development and test schedules is critical to deliver affordable,
    lethal combat capability. Current modernization programs include the B-
    52 Radar Modernization Program has entered execution in the pre-
    Milestone B phase. The Air Force is also funding an effort to integrate
    and deploy replacement B-52 engines. A successful commercial engine
    replacement will realize significant savings in fuel and extend the
    aircraft's range while improving reliability and sustainment.
    Additionally, B-52 training simulators require integration of various
    programs such as Combat Network Communications Technology (CONECT),
    Internal Weapons Bay Upgrade (IWBU), data link capabilities, air
    refueling, and information technology refresh. Supporting the
    revitalization of these critical training tools will create high
    fidelity training environments in-line with Air Force priorities such
    as Pilot Training Next, and directly increase the readiness of B-52
    crews in support of nuclear and conventional missions.
        Another initiative is the 1760 IWBU, which increases B-52 smart
    weapons capacity by 67 percent and adds JASSM and JASSM-ER capability.
    There are also 75 B-52s that have been converted to the new CONECT
    configuration completed in fiscal year 2019. CONECT moves the B-52 into
    the digital age for the first time, providing an on-board local area
    network allowing the aircrew to share a common battlespace picture.
    CONECT is also integrated with the Advanced Targeting Pod to provide
    Digitally Aided Close Air Support; a robust enhancement available to
    combatant commanders today. Communications remain the cornerstone of
    our long-range strike capability as the ability to re-task or retarget
    bombers while in route to the battlespace is a powerful force
    multiplier. The addition of Link-16 and Joint Range Extension
    Applications Protocol-ALPHA (JREAP-A) has enhanced the B-52's
    operational picture allowing it to integrate with the Joint force from
    beyond line-of-site ranges in real-time.
        Multiple B-52 test activities are expected to begin in fiscal year
    2023. The B-52 enterprise, in coordination with the 412 Test Wing,
    conducted an in-depth capacity analysis to determine the most efficient
    method to test B-52 modifications while tailoring aircraft available to
    Combatant Commanders. Modifying aircraft in a common production flow
    manner (multiple modifications during a single modification window)
    will allow the most cost efficient and timely option to get these
    critical capabilities tested and field.
      E-4B National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC)
        The E-4 is a key component of the National Military Command System
    for the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff. Based at Offutt AFB, Nebraska, the E-4 provides a highly
    survivable command, control and communications center to direct U.S
    forces, execute emergency war orders, and coordinate actions by civil
    authorities. The E-4 operates throughout all phases of the threat
    spectrum and retains the ability to respond to national emergencies
    despite the destruction of ground communication centers. In addition,
    the E-4 provides overseas travel support for the Secretary of Defense
    and his staff to ensure Title 10 command and control connectivity.
        The E-4 fleet undergoes continuous modifications and modernization
    at home station. The small fleet dynamics make it challenging to
    maintain combat readiness while supporting operational test and
    evaluation (OT&E) requirements. The operational units accomplish OT&E
    with no additional manpower that necessitates a delicate balance
    between operational missions, quality of life considerations, and
    modernization and sustainment efforts. The DOD must recapitalize this
    critical capability with a more robust and sustainable platform.
                          twentieth air force (20 af)
        Twentieth Air Force (20AF), headquartered at F.E. Warren AFB,
    Wyoming, is responsible for the Minuteman III (MMIII) ICBM, the UH-1N
    and MH-139 helicopters, the Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance
    and Storage Complex at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, and the ICBM Flight
    Test Squadron at Vandenberg AFB, California. The 450 dispersed and
    hardened Launch Facilities (LFs), are controlled, maintained, defended,
    and supported by AFGSC airmen each and every day, providing the bulk of
    our day-to-day nuclear alert force. The ICBM forces presented to
    USSTRATCOM preserve strategic stability by providing the Nation a
    credible and responsive nuclear option in a contested environment. The
    responsiveness of these weapons present adversaries a near
    insurmountable obstacle should they consider a disarming attack on the
    United States. AFGSC's ICBM forces remain compliant with all U.S.
    obligations under the New START treaty.
      MINUTEMAN III INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE (ICBM)
        AFGSC is committed to the sustainment of MMIII ICBM, its NC3
    systems, and its support equipment until replaced by the Ground Based
    Strategic Deterrent (GBSD). To sustain the existing fleet of large
    missile maintenance vehicles, the Transporter Erector Program (TERP)
    and the Payload Transporter Replacement (PTR) remain a priority. This
    support equipment is critical to the eventual MMIII deposture and the
    transition to GBSD. In the meantime, MMIII Launch Control Centers
    (LCCs) will be equipped with modernized communications systems to
    improve reliability and replace technologically obsolete systems. The
    LCC block upgrade, expected to deploy in 2021, is a modification effort
    that replaces multiple LCC components to include modern data storage, a
    weapon system console printer, and oxygen regeneration units. A
    significant security upgrade to the remote visual assessment capability
    at our LFs will also increase situational awareness and security. This
    program began deploying in fiscal year 2020.
        Minuteman III weapon system effectiveness is a function of key
    performance parameters: accuracy, availability, reliability and
    survivability. A comprehensive, scientifically rigorous test and
    evaluation program, driven by DOD requirements, continually assesses
    the system against each performance parameter's threshold and drives
    sustainment efforts to maintain compliance. Nevertheless, indefinite
    sustainment is impractical, unaffordable, and ineffective due to age-
    related deterioration, the evolution of the industrial base, and the
    expanding technical capabilities of our adversaries.
        To further improve the nuclear capability of our ICBM force, the
    ICBM Programmed Depot Maintenance program began in fiscal year 2016,
    but only offers 80 percent coverage due to parts availability. The
    program places operational LFs and LCCs on an 8-year depot-level
    maintenance cycle that increases ICBM effectiveness by ensuring
    sustainment is executed in an engineering-based, systematic manner.
    Successful prototyping of the program was accomplished in fiscal year
    2016 and from fiscal year 2016 to fiscal year 2018, 100 LFs and 15 LCCs
    went through the first maintenance cycle with an additional 57 LFs and
    6 LCCs in fiscal year 2020. This program is key to ensuring MMIII
    viability through the GBSD transition.
      UH-1N HELICOPTER
        The Air Force's UH-1N helicopter supports several critical
    missions: security of our ICBM fields, transport missions in the
    National Capitol Region, Fifth Air Forces (Japan), and critical
    Continuity of Operations missions. Additionally, the UH-1N fleet
    supports Air Force survival training with helicopter and hoist
    familiarity, vectoring training, and rescue operations. They also
    participate in the Defense Support of Civil Authorities program with
    units across the country and are frequently called upon to conduct
    search and rescue activities for missing or injured civilians.
        AFGSC developed a comprehensive sustainment plan for the UH-1N
    while transitioning to the MH-139. The UH-1N will continue to operate
    in AFGSC through the mid-fiscal year 2020s and within the USAF until
    the mid-fiscal year 2030s. AFGSC is responsible for the life-cycle of
    all UH-1Ns in the USAF and some modernization will be necessary for the
    aircraft to remain effective. Currently, all future modifications will
    be completed in early fiscal year 2020s and will only apply to a
    limited number of UH-1Ns selected for longer life spans. This
    modernization strategy will ensure mission effectiveness until platform
    retirement while remaining fiscally responsible.
        The planned acquisition of 80 total MH-139 helicopters to replace
    the aging UH-1N fleet will be a significant shift in acquisitions and
    missile field security capabilities. With an estimated cost avoidance
    of $1.7 billion, the selection of a modified civilian helicopter using
    the current generation of technology will bring a significant increase
    in payload, speed, and endurance, ensuring compliance with all DOD and
    USSTRATCOM security requirements.
               nuclear command, control, and communications (nc3)
        As the NC3 lead for the Air Force, AFGSC supports CDRUSSTRATCOM's
    priorities of sustaining current NC3 systems and replacing legacy
    systems with next generation NC3 technology to ensure NC3 capabilities
    to the President and our Nation's warfighters.
        Sustaining current NC3 systems includes developing maintenance
    performance indicators to track the reliability of communications
    systems and to predict maintenance actions and spare parts needs.
    Unfortunately, many components suffer from diminishing manufacturing
    sources and material shortages across the NC3 enterprise; such as the
    decades-old Miniature Receive Terminal (MRT) on the B-52. The B-52 MRT
    receives Emergency Action Messages (EAMs) over Very Low Frequency
    (VLF). Given the importance of the MRT, and considering its high rate
    of failure, AFGSC sought out a commercial vendor capable of
    manufacturing unique band-pass filters required to sustain MRT
    receivers. Now, there are enough band-pass filters in supply to sustain
    the aging system until replaced.
        Continuing its sixth decade as the backbone of the Nation's bomber
    fleet, the B-52 was funded in fiscal year 2020 for installation of a
    VLF receiver that leverages the technology recently installed on the B-
    2 fleet and provides NC3 receive-only capability. To further modernize
    VLF capability across multiple platforms, we are moving forward with
    development of a Common VLF Receiver (CVR) capable of using emerging
    waveforms for improved EAM reception. We envision employing this
    receiver on both airborne and ground-based weapons systems. The Space
    Force develops, and the Air Force integrates, the Family of Advanced
    Beyond line-of-sight Terminals (FAB-T) and the Force Element Terminal
    (FET), which will enable the B-52 access to the Advanced Extremely High
    Frequency (AEHF) satellite network. AEHF will also be integrated into
    the ICBM's LCCs, further enhancing NC3 redundancy in the force. At this
    time, we are assessing options to leverage other programs' investments
    in AEHF technology to enable rapid fielding across bombers and
    supporting tanker aircraft.
        Communications upgrades to the E-4 National Airborne Operations
    Center (NAOC) will ensure a reliable, airborne NC3 platform for senior
    leaders. The Low Frequency Transmit System (LFTS) replaces the existing
    dual trailing wire antenna and reduces aircraft weight by almost a ton.
    The Survivable Super High Frequency (SHF) system provides reliable and
    sustainable voice and data capability in scintillated and jammed
    operational environments. Tactical UHF radios will be upgraded to
    Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) capability to meet CJCS
    requirements. Finally, the FAB-T Command Post Terminal (CPT) is being
    installed on the E-4B fleet and will enable Presidential National Voice
    Conferencing (PNVC) that replaces legacy MILSTAR capability and
    provides connectivity to the AEHF satellite network.
        As the E-4 is modernized, the Nation must look ahead to replacing
    the aging aircraft within the National Military Command System. The
    joint-service NAOC, Executive Airlift (EA), Airborne Command Post
    (ABNCP), and Take Charge and Move Out TACAMO (NEAT) Analysis of
    Alternatives (AoA) is completed and the results received a Sufficiency
    Review from the Office of Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and
    Program Evaluation (OSD CAPE) in November 2020. The AoA evaluated
    whether mission realignments could improve the operational value of the
    airborne layer and examined potential synergies in acquiring a common
    platform. The AoA results, endorsed by the Joint Requirements Oversight
    Council (JROC), determined a common platform for the twelve missions
    performed by the three aircraft was not feasible, mission realignment
    was not recommended, and the Air Force should begin the E-4 replacement
    program known as the Survivable Airborne Operations Center (SAOC). The
    SAOC program is postured to pave the way forward to achieve a FOC in
    early-mid 2030's. Additionally, after researching potential changes to
    Doctrine, Organization, Training, materiel, Leadership and Education,
    Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTmLPF-P), we will transition to
    experimenting and prototyping in order to drive technological solutions
    to enable a more effective NC3 system. This effort is dedicated to
    integrating future NC3 into Joint All-Domain Command and Control
    (JADC2) utilizing technologies embedded in the Advanced Battle
    Management System (ABMS).
        Planning efforts to develop the next generation of NC3 systems, 30
    years from now, have started. In order to better manage the transition
    from legacy systems to the NC3 weapon system of the future, AFGSC
    directed a significant change in the way we steer our NC3 modernization
    efforts. A brand new NC3 Concept of Force Development will explore and
    demonstrate how and where the modernization capabilities will enable
    the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) battlespace of the
    future. Air Force NC3 experts are analyzing the threats and risks
    inherent in our current NC3 systems and recommending mitigating actions
    to achieve assured nuclear communications for the future.
                                    security
        Security is one of the most fundamental competencies the Nation
    demands of the military. Ensuring security is more than just placing
    Defenders at our gates. It is about the safety of our nuclear arsenal
    to include preparing for hostile unmanned aerial systems, cyber-
    attacks, and other potential threats across multiple domains.
    Warfighting domains continue to expand, challenging the Nation's
    collective understanding and application of warfare, national defense,
    and theories of victory. Emerging and existing cross-domain threats
    hold AFGSC nuclear and conventional power projection platforms and our
    bases at risk. AFGSC continues to cultivate innovative teams to
    determine the best ways to secure our installations and assets.
      ``FIGHT THE BASE'' CONCEPT
        Over the past year, applying the Fight the Base concept has allowed
    us to realize AFGSC's vision of ensuring the uninterrupted production
    of long-range strike from its installations when sanctuary is not
    guaranteed. Moreover, AFGSC has made significant strides in the
    counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS) security initiative. This
    includes improved detection capabilities near critical resources and
    the fielding of necessary capabilities such as fixed-site, mobile
    vehicle-borne, handheld, and portable C-UAS systems. These capabilities
    provide a necessary added layer of security to ensure continued weapons
    systems safety and operability. The command also initiated a friendly
    forces blue-unmanned aircraft systems (B-UAS) pilot program. Originally
    intended for use in testing against our defenses, these B-UAS will also
    be used to enhance battlespace awareness and assist in meeting emerging
    threats. C-UAS is a rapidly developing technology and will require an
    ongoing evolution to utilize this capability and defend against the
    threat.
      2020 SECURITY FORCES ENTERPRISE PLAN
        In line with AF initiatives to reconstitute the health of our
    security forces, AFGSC remains focused on establishing requirements,
    updating policy, and advocating and programing for necessary resources
    in order to restore full spectrum readiness and retain our tactical
    advantage. Over the past year, AFGSC worked to reinvigorate our
    Security Forces culture, specifically taking deliberate steps to
    improve recruitment, equipment, continuum of learning, career
    development, and policy. Our efforts successfully implemented 15
    officer and 500 enlisted funded Security Forces positions annually.
    These efforts also enabled the assessment and approval of female body
    armor, the accelerated fielding of the M18 and M4A1 weapon systems, and
    the creation of a new Defender training curriculum. Lastly, the
    implementation of the new Security Force Development Tours at nuclear
    units have increased overall manning to 100 percent and have
    contributed to the decrease in the number of disciplinary issues within
    certain units.
        These are a few examples of how AFGSC is taking Security Forces
    training and operations in a more relevant, realistic direction. These
    efforts continue to ensure the robust integration of existing and
    developing technologies to provide cost effective and robust battle
    space awareness to AFGSC defense forces.
    MODERNIZATION--Maintaining the Competitive Edge
        The rapid rate of technology advancement requires us to maintain
    the competitive edge through smart acquisitions, strong industry
    relationships, and owning the technical baseline. Led by cross-
    functional teams, modular and adaptable systems with established
    digital engineering has proven foundational in our efforts to
    modernizing our forces and ensuring the critical capabilities required
    to meet future challenges of the Great Power Competition.
                               the bomber roadmap
        The 2018 National Defense Strategy and the updated Defense Planning
    Guide predicated the need to update the 2017 bomber vector. AFGSC
    updated the plan to reflect current conditions, ensure continued
    support to operational plans (OPLANs), and facilitate the transition
    from the current 3-bomber fleet to a 2-bomber fleet of 175 B-52Hs and
    B-21s.
        In the analysis of how we best transition to the two-bomber fleet
    of 175--aside from a successful B-21 program--we determined there are
    two interrelated critical elements; effective and on-time B-52
    modifications and sustainment of a sufficient number of B-1 and B-2
    bombers until an adequate number of B-21s are available.
                                  b-21 raider
        The Nation needs at least 100 B-21 Raiders to support the nuclear
    triad, deter aggression, fight and win in a contested environment, and
    replace our aging B-1 and B-2 bombers, and in my best military
    judgement many more B-21s could be used to mitigate risks. The B-21
    will form the backbone of the bomber force in both conventional and
    nuclear roles for the decades to come, providing an unmatched ability
    to penetrate future air defenses and support joint military operations
    using long-range strike capabilities, large and mixed payloads, and
    survivability. The B-21 Raider will also outpace future threats and
    provide combatant commanders with operational flexibility. Its open
    systems architecture will enable rapid, innovative and affordable
    technology insertion as threats evolve.
        The Air Force is preparing to base the B-21 at three existing
    bomber bases. In March 2019, following a deliberate process that sought
    to minimize mission impact, maximize facility reuse, minimize cost, and
    reduce overhead, the Air Force announced Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota,
    Whiteman AFB, Missouri, and Dyess AFB, Texas as preferred locations for
    B-21 Main Operating Bases. The selection of the preferred basing
    locations leveraged the strengths of each base to optimize the B-21
    beddown strategy while simultaneously meeting warfighter demands for
    bomber airpower. The final basing decision for the first location is
    expected in 2021, following compliance with the National Environmental
    Policy Act (NEPA) and other regulatory and planning processes.
        Enacted fiscal year 2021 funding of $2.8 billion maintains our
    ability to deliver initial capabilities in the mid-2020s and assures
    the Air Force commitment to an Average Per Unit Cost (for 100 aircraft)
    of $550M. The program is a national security imperative and ensures the
    Air Force can provide both the conventional and nuclear capabilities
    the National Defense Strategy demands.
    Long Range Stand-Off Missile (LRSO)
        The LRSO is the replacement for the aging Air Launched Cruise
    Missile (ALCM). The ALCM is currently 29 years past its design service
    life and has significant capability gaps that will only worsen through
    the next decade. The LRSO will be a reliable, flexible, long-range, and
    survivable weapon system that complements the nuclear Triad. LRSO will
    also ensure the bomber force (B-52 and B-21) can continue to hold high
    value targets at risk in an evolving threat environment.
        LRSO was designed with a focus on reliability and manufacturing as
    foundational tenets of the acquisition strategy. This strategy sets the
    LRSO apart from previous cruise missile programs that focused on
    achieving reliability after Initial Operational Capability (IOC). The
    structure of the LRSO program drove industry competition through
    preliminary design review (PDR) and acted as a forcing function which
    encouraged industry behavior to yield desired results.
        LRSO has completed the Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction
    (TMRR) phase and is on track for Milestone B. This Milestone will begin
    LRSO's engineering and manufacturing development phase. To date the
    contractor's use of digital engineering has resulted in a pioneering
    first use of factory produced missiles for testing purposes.
    Consequently, the program is on schedule, and properly staffed. Flight
    test events have begun and the first powered flight is scheduled for
    Aug 2021 to support warhead Baseline Design Review. Following a
    successful engineering manufacturing and development phase, production
    should begin in 2026.
        Enacted fiscal year 2021 funding ensures future LRSO development
    and enables the schedule to meet a planned IOC of 2030 while ensuring
    the Air Force commitment to an Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) of
    $4.9 million per LRSO (1020 total missiles).
                    ground based strategic deterrent (gbsd)
        To ensure continued lethality and affordability of the most
    responsive leg of the triad, GBSD successfully awarded a $13 billion
    engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) contract last
    September. The EMD contract is a nine year effort with five years of
    development and four production options. Program analysis has revealed
    GBSD is the most effective strategy to mitigate capability shortfalls,
    enhance future warfighting effectiveness, replace aging infrastructure,
    and is designed to stand alert for multiple decades. A focus on
    developing a competitive edge is evident in the leveraging of Model
    Based System Engineering (MBSE) where there is an estimated potential
    to save several billion dollars of acquisition and lifecycle costs that
    are difficult to accurately model due to the uniqueness of our
    approach. This is possible due to MBSE's decreased design cycle
    timelines ensuring and fully realizing design modifications subsequent
    impacts without the need for traditional prototypes or extensive
    paperwork reviews.
        Furthermore, the key acquisition tenet of modular design reduces
    the need for specialized or comprehensive system overhauls throughout
    the 50-year operational lifecycle. The value proposition of this
    program is unprecedented - the Air Force will save money on
    maintenance, operations, and personnel. Physical access and modularity
    of the designs makes GBSD simpler and provides more affordable
    sustainment than any of its predecessors. The security requirements
    will change dramatically; there will be fewer convoys on the roads,
    fewer open launcher configurations, and fewer defenders needed to guard
    the site during maintenance. Additionally, there is collaboration with
    the Department of Engergy's National Nuclear Security Administration
    (NNSA) and the W78 warhead replacement program, the W87-1. As of this
    calendar year, that program is in development. The replacement warhead
    will use the MK21 aeroshell and will deploy on GBSD after fiscal year
    2030.
        Continued Congressional support will mitigate risk for the
    transition from MMIII to GBSD. Maintaining GBSD schedule momentum and
    reducing schedule risk is critical to avoiding capability shortfalls to
    warfighter requirements during transition.
                                mh-139 grey wolf
        AFGSC is the lead command for the Air Force's newest helicopter
    fleet, the MH-139. The MH-139's revolutionary predictive maintenance
    database, logistics, and parts distribution are taking the Air Force
    into a new era using civilian processes and technology to enhance
    military weapon systems. The MH-139A is a multi-mission helicopter
    tasked with nuclear security at our ICBM bases, transportation of our
    Nation's leaders within the National Capitol Region and Fifth Air Force
    (Japan), and rescue and training support at the USAF Survival School.
        In order to continue supporting critical national missions and
    fully comply with DOD and USSTRATCOM requirements, the Air Force is
    committed to replacing the UH-1N fleet, as the legacy platform falls
    short of missile field operational needs; notably speed, range,
    endurance, payload, and survivability. The acquisition of 80 MH-139
    helicopters to replace the aging UH-1N fleet is a significant shift in
    both acquisitions and missile field security capabilities, and is
    needed to help modernize our force.
        The timely fielding of this platform will enable the Air Force to
    meet nuclear security requirements and fully support missions in the
    national capital region.
                      weapons generation facilities (wgf)
        Our Weapon Storage Areas (WSA) are no longer considered just
    storage facilities. Renamed Weapons Generation Facilities (WGFs), these
    dedicated areas support rapid generation of nuclear aircraft and
    routine maintenance operations for the ground-based and air legs of the
    nuclear triad while significantly improving security. WGFs facilitate
    the growth of new technology and bombers, while also sustaining our
    current fleet. Deliberate recapitalization of weapons storage capacity
    via the WGF construction program is critical to ensuring the safety,
    security, and effectiveness of strategic capabilities in the future.
        In 2019, AFGSC organized a cross-functional team to re-examine the
    design plans and identify more affordable options. The team identified
    options that allowed for the recapitalization of existing facilities
    where possible and were able to identify and challenge outdated or
    irrelevant processes and operating instructions. As a result, we were
    able to bring down the cost of new facilities from 599 million to 228
    million dollars while improving the necessary security requirements. We
    were able to accomplish this only because our external partners went
    through the process with us and had buy-in. The result is a fiscally
    responsible but modern and secure facility for the country's nuclear
    weapons.
        Two ICBM wings are planned to receive modernized WGFs. Bomber WGFs
    are needed to accommodate mission growth and improve current capacity,
    and with the right number, will provide national leadership more
    strategic decision space. WGFs at B-21 bases will enable nuclear
    capability in the future, while the WGF at Barksdale ensures B-52s
    remain viable and competitive. Of note, because WGFs only ever contain
    non-deployed nuclear warheads, and not heavy bombers or ICBMs, they do
    not meet the ``facilities'' definitions under the New START treaty
    (NST), and are not subject to declaration or inspection under the
    treaty. Therefore, the standup of WGFs at ICBM and bomber bases will
    not impact NST implementation.
        In May of 2019, F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming broke ground
    on the first WGF. In August 2019, AFGSC briefed the Acting Secretary of
    the Air Force and received approval on the way ahead for bomber WGFs,
    subject to budgetary decisions within the Air Force, Department of
    Defense, and the Office of Management and Budget.
        B-21 WGF construction will be timed to coincide with projected B-21
    acquisition and fielding timelines, but location and funding decisions
    are not yet final. Locations that do not have existing facilities
    capable of recapitalization, the design characteristics have been
    scaled back for more affordable construction. A more detailed update
    will be available after a final decision is made on the plan for bomber
    WGFs.
                                   conclusion
        AFGSC remains committed to affordable modernization and sustainment
    of our Nation's nuclear triad and conventional weapon systems, and the
    development of our airmen to lead in the long-term strategic
    competition ahead of us. As the world's most lethal, respected, and
    feared long-range strike professionals, we are dedicated to improving
    near-term readiness. Predictable, reliable, and flexible budgets,
    leveraged with the right authorities, have proven successful in
    sustaining and modernizing our long-range strike force while ensuring
    proper mission focus within the NDS.
        We have reoriented, reinvented, and reimagined our organization in
    order to build expanded capacity down to our operational wings as we
    innovate in the space that remains. Inspired by our Striker heritage,
    and driven by the speed of relevance, authentic leadership and cross-
    functional collaboration remains at the heart of our efforts as we
    build the nuclear force our Nation needs. In light of the COVID-19
    pandemic, we are thankful for the support we have received from our
    senior military, community, and civic leaders in prioritizing the
    health and wellbeing of the great airmen of AFGSC.
        Our defense Committees understand the significance of maintaining
    our competitive edge as we face the threats that great power
    competition presents to our national interests. We are grateful for the
    opportunity to partner with Congress, our combatant commanders, and the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense to move forward with affordable,
    cost-effective, and innovative solutions to ensure our ICBM, bomber,
    and NC2 capabilities are ready for 21st Century challenges. We are
    thankful for the continued support and advocacy from Congress and I
    look forward to updating the Committee on our progress.

        Senator King. Thank you, General. When I got home from the
    trip my wife said, ``What most impressed you? Was it the
    missiles or the bombers?'' I said, ``No. It was the people.''
    The young men and women that we met in Minot were exceptional
    people, and when I say young, I mean, early 20s, with enormous
    responsibility. But I hope you will take that back. Senator
    Fischer, I am sure you agree. That was the highlight of the
    trip, I think, for me, so please convey that.
        I know we have airmen. How about all those females. Are
    they still airmen? What is the----
        General Ray. Yes, sir. They are airmen.
        Senator King. All right. I just wanted to be sure.
        General Ray. Female airmen, and just as tough as the rest
    of them.
        Senator King. I got that impression. Thank you.
        Admiral Wolfe, please. Thank you.

    STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JOHNNY R. WOLFE, JR., USN, DIRECTOR,
                    NAVY STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS

        Vice Admiral Wolfe. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer,
    and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
    the opportunity to testify on the Department of the Navy's
    budget priorities for nuclear forces. I would like to thank
    this Subcommittee for its continued support of the Navy's
    nuclear deterrent mission, and I respectfully request my
    written statement be submitted for the record.
        Senator King. Without objection.
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. As you heard from Admiral Richard last
    month, nuclear deterrence underwrites every U.S. military
    operation and capability on the globe, and serves as the
    backdrop for both our national defense and the defense of our
    allies. That Nation's nuclear triad of intercontinental
    ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, and ballistic missile
    submarines serves as the bedrock of our ability to deter major
    power conflict, assure our allies and partners achieve U.S.
    objectives should deterrence fail, and hedge against an
    uncertain future.
        The Navy has provided unwavering and singular mission-
    focused support to the sea-based leg of the triad for over six
    decades. We must maintain today's deterrent while modernizing
    for the future. This falls into four concurrent lines of effort
    for the Navy.
        First, we must maintain the current D5LE missile inventory
    and provide the necessarily operational support to sustain
    Ohio-class submarines through their service lives. This is
    being accomplished through an update to all of our sub systems.
    All of our life-extension efforts remain on track, and our
    current program will support the deployment of all existing
    warheads. We must also recapitalize or strategic weapons
    facilities to continue to support and sustain SSBN operations
    that enable our continuous at-sea presence.
        Second, we must continue to work with our partners at PEO
    Columbia to assure that the transition between Ohio-class and
    Columbia-class submarines stays on schedule. For SSP, this
    requires a seamless transition of the current D5LE weapons
    system and missile inventory onto the new Columbia-class.
    During this time of transition, we will ensure that the Navy's
    portion of the nuclear triad remains credible by introducing
    the W93/Mark 7 to rebalance the stockpile of W76 and W88s and
    meet STRATCOM requirements.
        Third, it is imperative that we start the work on a future
    missile and corresponding weapons system now. This next
    generation of the current D5LE missile, a missile in service
    since 1989 and boasting a remarkable history of 182 successful
    flight tests, is called D5LE2. D5LE2 will yield multiple
    benefits in missile performance to include extending its
    service life. D5LE2 is required to completely outload the
    Columbia-class SSBNs and ensure that Trident remains credible
    in the face of a dynamic threat environment. A D5LE2 missile
    must be developed, tested, and produced with the lead time
    sufficient to deploy on Columbia-class hull number 9 no later
    than fiscal year 2039. It will then be backfitted for the first
    eight hulls of the class.
        Lastly, one of the greatest advantages the United States
    has is its alliances and partnerships. As the U.S. Project
    Officer for the Polaris Sales Agreement, I will continue to
    support the UK's sovereign deterrent for today's Vanguard-class
    submarines and their successor, the Dreadnought-class.
        For decades, United States policy has recognized that the
    independent British nuclear deterrent adds to global security.
    Under the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement and the 1982 Polaris
    Sales Agreement, the United States has provided assistance and
    material, consistent with international law, to the UK
    deterrent program. Without this assistance, the cost and
    schedule risks to maintain the UK's independent deterrent would
    rise significant, thus creating additional challenges for the
    UK in sustaining its nuclear contribution to NATO alongside the
    United States.
        None of these four lines of effort are possible without an
    investment in our people, our infrastructure, and our
    industrial base. Military, civilian, government, and
    contractor, the men and women of SSP are working hard to
    deliver a safe, secure, and effective strategic weapons system
    today that will serve us well into the latter half of this
    century. They remain my number one priority in order to ensure
    continued program success.
        Nuclear modernization will take time to complete, so work
    towards these ends must start now, and it cannot be delayed. It
    is only through your continued support that the Department's
    top modernization priorities can be achieved.
        As the 14th director, it is my highest honor to represent
    the men and women of SSP, comprising approximately 1,700
    sailors, 1,000 marines, 300 coast guardsman, over 1,300
    civilians, and over 2,000 contractor personnel. It is my most
    critical goal to ensure that they are poised to execute the
    mission with the same level of success, passion, and rigor,
    both today and tomorrow, as they have since our program
    inception in 1955.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of
    the men and women who make deterrence of major power conflict
    their life's work. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe
    follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe
                                  introduction
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
    the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the
    sustainment and recapitalization of the sea-based leg of the nuclear
    triad. It is an honor to testify before you today representing the
    Navy's Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) and the contributions the Navy
    provides to our national and global security.
        The Nation's nuclear triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles,
    heavy bombers, and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) equipped with
    submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) is essential to the very
    foundation of our Nation's security and survival. The nuclear triad is
    the bedrock of our ability to deter aggression, to assure our allies
    and partners, to achieve U.S. objectives should deterrence fail, and to
    hedge against an uncertain future. While we are actively working to
    modernize our forces, U.S. modernization efforts lag behind those of
    our adversaries. As our Sea-Services leadership noted in December
    2020's Advantage at Sea, ``China's and Russia's aggressive naval growth
    and modernization are eroding United States military advantages.
    Unchecked, these trends will leave the Naval Service unprepared to
    ensure our advantage at sea and protect national interests within the
    next decade.''
        President Biden's Interim National Security Guidance reminds us
    that ``[w]e must contend with the reality that the distribution of
    power across the world is changing, creating new threats. In today's
    threat environment, strategic deterrence is foundational to our
    national defense. Every Operational Plan across the Department begins
    with the assumption that strategic deterrence will hold. A safe, secure
    and effective nuclear force remains the most credible combination of
    capabilities to deter strategic attack and execute our national
    strategy. We must stay the course with nuclear and conventional force
    recapitalization commitments to ensure the Joint Force can operate
    when, where, and as required to defend our national interests. China,
    in particular, has rapidly become more assertive. It is the only
    competitor potentially capable of combining its economic diplomatic,
    military and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a
    stable and open international system. Russia remains determined to
    enhance its global influence and play a disruptive role on the world
    stage. Both Beijing and Moscow have invested heavily in efforts meant
    to check United States strengths and prevent us from defending our
    interests and allies prioritize China as our number one pacing
    challenge and develop the right operational concepts, capabilities, and
    plans to bolster deterrence and maintain our competitive advantage.''
    Indeed, Great Power Competition has returned--and with it the need to
    recapitalize each essential and complementary component of the nuclear
    triad. This new framework demands we be ready for any threat, in any
    domain, at any time. Potential adversaries are exploiting seams below
    the level of armed conflict in an attempt to gain strategic advantage.
    We must account for the possibility of a conflict leading to conditions
    which could very rapidly drive an adversary to consider nuclear use as
    their least bad option. Given these conditions, I encourage you to draw
    one conclusion:
          Our Nation's nuclear modernization initiatives must be fully
    funded.
        The Navy provides the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad with
    the interdependent Ohio-class SSBNs and the Trident II D5 Strategic
    Weapon System (SWS), which comprises both flight and shipboard systems.
    SSBNs are responsible for more than 70 percent of the Nation's
    operationally deployed nuclear warheads that are subject to the New
    START Treaty. As the Chief of Naval Operations stated in his 2021
    NAVPLAN, ``[o]ur ballistic missile submarines provide an assured
    response to any strategic nuclear attack on the United States. Ohio-
    class boats are nearing the end of four decades of service and must be
    replaced, making Columbia-class program our top acquisition priority.''
    Furthermore, ``[p]rojecting power and influence from the seas is vital
    to deterring aggression and resolving crises on acceptable terms. Our
    power projection capabilities alongside our strategic deterrent provide
    the surest guarantee of security for America and our allies''--this
    starts with deterring a nuclear attack against our Nation with our
    ballistic missile submarines.
        Concurrent with the delivery of the Columbia-class is the need to
    develop the next generation of Trident II D5 SWS that will ensure the
    credibility of the sea-based strategic deterrent for the life of the
    Columbia-class. SSP's core mission comprises two fundamental lines of
    effort: the safety and security of our Nation's strategic assets
    entrusted to the Navy; and the design, development, production, and
    sustainment of the Navy's SWS. We strive to maintain a culture of
    excellence, underpinned by rigorous self-assessment, to achieve the
    highest standards of unremittingly on our tremendous responsibility for
    the custody and accountability of our Nation's nuclear assets. The men
    and women of SSP, our sailors, our marines, our Navy masters at arms,
    our coast guardsmen, and our industry partners remain dedicated to
    supporting the strategic deterrence mission, to responding to the
    emerging needs of our warfighter, and to protecting and safeguarding
    our Nation's assets with which we are entrusted. We certainly could not
    do this without the support from this Committee.
        The men and women of SSP and their predecessors have provided
    unwavering and mission-focused support to develop, sustain, and secure
    the sea-based leg of the triad for over 65 years. However, SSP's
    critical modernization bow wave is no longer part of the future--it is
    today. We are heading down a path from which we cannot turn away. Our
    workforce must evolve from years of sustainment efforts to the dual
    responsibilities of sustainment and development. Our industrial base
    has eroded under years of sustainment with minimal focus on future
    technologies. Investment in critical workforce skills, the industrial
    base, and complex technologies unique to strategic systems is essential
    to the Navy's ability to sustain not only today's sea-based strategic
    deterrent but to respond to emerging warfighter needs with cost-
    effective, creative, and timely solutions through the life of the
    Columbia-class SSBN.
        As the fourteenth Director, it is my highest honor to serve as the
    program manager, technical authority, safety and security lead,
    regulatory lead, and Polaris Sales Agreement Project Officer for the
    Navy's nuclear weapons program. Most importantly, I am honored to
    represent the men and women of SSP, comprising approximately 1,500
    sailors, 1,000 marines, 300 coast guardsmen, 1,400 civilians, and
    thousands of contractor personnel. It is my most critical goal to
    ensure they are poised to execute the mission with the same level of
    success, passion, and rigor both today and tomorrow as they have since
    our program's inception in 1955.
     sws sustainment on ohio-class ssbn and procurement for columbia-class
                                      ssbn
        Today's fragile relationship between sustainment of legacy systems
    and their replacements remains omnipresent in the calculus of
    effectively deterring adversaries. As previously stated, the Navy's
    highest priority acquisition program is the Columbia-class submarine,
    which replaces 2020s, and the Columbia-class must be ready to begin
    patrols no later than October 2030. Recapitalizing our SSBNs is a
    significant investment that only happens every other generation, making
    it critically important that we do it right and on time. Delays to the
    Navy's SSBN modernization plan are not an option. The continued
    assurance of our sea-based strategic deterrent requires not only a next
    class of ballistic missile submarines, but equally critical, a credible
    SWS--to include not just the weapon system itself, but the
    infrastructure and the people as well. The Navy is taking the necessary
    steps to ensure that the next generation deterrent is designed, built,
    delivered, and tested on time and provides flexibility and adaptability
    in the dynamic threat environment that ADM Richard mentioned before
    this Committee at an affordable cost.
        To lower development costs and leverage the proven reliability of
    the Trident II D5 SWS, the Columbia-class SSBN will enter service with
    the same functionality and performance of the currently deployed
    Trident II (D5) SWS including the life extended Trident II D5 missile,
    which resides on today's Ohio-class submarines. Maintaining a common
    SWS during the transition between existing and successor submarine
    platforms allows the Navy to leverage a mature material and knowledge
    enterprise, thus reducing programmatic costs and risks. Life-extended
    missiles will be shared with both the Ohio and Columbia-class
    submarines in the United States and with the UK Vanguard-class and
    Dreadnought-class submarines into the 2040s.
        Another major initiative to reduce risk associated with the
    overhaul of the sea-based strategic deterrent is the SSP Shipboard
    Modernization Program, which manages obsolescence and modernizes SWS
    shipboard systems through the use of open architecture design and
    commercial off-the-shelf hardware and software wherever feasible. The
    Shipboard Modernization Program refreshes shipboard electronics
    hardware and upgrades software, which will extend service life, enable
    more efficient and affordable future maintenance of the SWS, all while
    ensuring we continue to provide the highest level of nuclear weapons
    safety, security, and performance for the deployed SSBNs in order to
    meet U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) requirements. The in-progress
    incremental upgrades to the SWS shipboard systems resident on the Ohio-
    class are also linchpins to the timely delivery of the Columbia-class
    SSBNs. Modernization of the model-based engineering design practices in
    order to effectively respond to today's ever changing environment. The
    Navy's strategy of addressing obsolescence while simultaneously
    providing warfighter capability highlights the unique complexity of
    sustainment and modernization of our Nation's nuclear deterrent.
               trident ii d5 life extension and life extension 2
        The Trident II D5 SWS capability has been deployed on the Ohio-
    class ballistic missile submarines for nearly three decades and is
    planned to be deployed more than 50 years. This demand for service life
    from today's high-performing systems has resulted in a missile life
    extension effort to match the Ohio-class submarine service life and, in
    concert with the Shipboard Modernization Program for shipboard systems,
    to serve as the initial SWS for the Columbia-class SSBN. The D5 Life
    Extension (D5LE) will ensure an effective and credible SWS on both the
    Ohio-class and Columbia-class SSBNs into the 2040s. Our initial life
    extension of missile and guidance flight hardware components was
    designed to meet the same form, fit, and function of the original
    system, maintain the deployed system as one homogeneous population,
    control costs, and sustain the demonstrated performance of the system.
    The Navy's D5LE program is executing on schedule to continue to meet
    deterrence requirements and will complete deployment by fiscal year
    2024.
        As the Navy carefully manages the approach to end of life of our
    Ohio-class SSBNs, we must address the viability of the SWS throughout
    the life of the Columbia-class SSBNs. Twelve Columbia-class SSBNs will
    replace today's 14 Ohio SSBNs and beginning in fiscal year 2030 D5LE
    missiles will support initial load-outs on Columbia (Hulls 1-8).
    Production of additional D5LE missile is not practical due to
    unavailable technologies and lack of an industrial base. The Trident II
    D5 Life Extension 2 (D5LE2) program is required to modernize and
    replace D5LE to support later Columbia-class missile inventory starting
    in fiscal year 2039 (targeting Columbia Hull 9 and will backfit Hulls
    1-8 during their Extended Refit Period) to continue to meet USSTRATCOM
    requirements. D5LE2 will ensure the weapon system maintains
    demonstrated performance and remains survivable while facing a dynamic
    threat environment until Columbia end of life. D5LE2 is a hybrid of
    pull-through cost-effective technology (e.g. solid architecture). D5LE2
    is structured to maintain today's unmatched reliability and
    demonstrated performance, while unlocking untapped system potential to
    efficiently respond to emerging needs and to maintain a credible
    deterrent throughout the life of the Columbia-class.
        In fiscal year 2020 and continuing in fiscal year 2021, SSP began
    system architecture studies to evaluate solutions to problems
    associated with emerging threats, supportability, and adaptability
    required to address challenges in an uncertain future. Additionally,
    these studies focused on missile and guidance technology to determine
    the effective composition of redesign, remanufacture, and pull-through
    of highly reliable components. This ensures longer lead unique SLBM
    subsystems are mature in fiscal year 2028 and fiscal year 2029 to then
    be able to support large facility proofing and flight testing off a
    manned platform in the mid-2030s and Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP)
    in fiscal year 2034.
        Unlike SLBM programs of the past, D5LE2 does not have the benefit
    of a healthy industrial base that comes from maintaining continuous
    development. These early efforts will be critical to reconstituting the
    SLBM industrial base to restart production on critical components whose
    production lines were shut down over the last decade. In short, full
    support of D5LE2 today is vital to achieving 2039 Initial Fleet
    Introduction (IFI) and to embarking on a path that maintains an SLBM
    deterrent capability through the service life of the Columbia-class
    SSBN.
     warhead and reentry body activities and npr supplemental capabilities
        The Navy also works in partnership with the Department of Energy's
    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to refurbish our
    existing reentry systems and development of new reentry systems in
    response to USSTRATCOM requirements. The Trident II (D5) missile is
    capable of carrying two types of warhead families, the W76 and the W88,
    and the W93 warhead will be designed for use on both the D5LE and D5LE2
    missiles. In 2019, NNSA completed the W76-1 Life Extension Program,
    marking the U.S. stockpile's first full-scale warhead refurbishment
    program. The Navy is now working on modernizing integrated aeroshells
    that house these warheads through the Mk4B program with the inclusion
    of a Shape Stable Nose Tip, which reduces reentry variability and
    improves performance margins.
        The W88 warhead continues to undergo its refurbishment program on a
    revised timeline based on capacitor component issues that did not meet
    reliability requirements. The Navy and NNSA coordinated on tightly
    coupled schedules for the fleet, the nuclear enterprise weapons
    complex, and production of affected non-nuclear components to propose
    an 18-month delay to the original schedule that was approved by the
    Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC). The program remains on track for
    reaching a First Production Unit in July 2021. I am confident that our
    teams will work together to manage the delay, as we have historically
    addressed refurbishment challenges with a mission-focused attitude and
    rigor. The Navy will prioritize meeting our warfighters' requirements
    and minimizing disruption to the operational fleet to ensure that the
    sea-based leg of the triad continues to fulfill its deterrence mission.
    However, this program setback is indicative of the pervasive and
    overwhelming risk carried within the nuclear enterprise as
    refurbishment programs face capacity, historical funding, and schedule
    challenges.
        In 2021, the Navy entered Phase 1 of the joint DOD-DOE Nuclear
    Weapons Lifecycle Process with NNSA for the W93/Mk7. This effort will
    address evolving ballistic missile warhead modernization requirements;
    improve operational effectiveness for USSTRATCOM; and mitigate
    technical, operational, and programmatic risk in the sea-based leg of
    the nuclear triad while simultaneously reinvigorating the atrophied
    industrial base and modernizing a Cold War era stockpile. W93/Mk7 will
    provide flexibility and adaptability to meet future warfighter needs.
    With the near simultaneous age out of the deployed stockpile in the
    2040s, the W93/Mk7 will help address production concerns in the weapons
    complex and ensure a continuous at sea deterrent for the sea-based leg
    of the nuclear triad. Fiscal year 2021 initial investment supports the
    reinvigoration of critical, niche national skillsets and capabilities
    uniquely associated with harsh reentry environments, and therefore, is
    applicable to both the Navy and Air Force future needs. Even with the
    addition of the W93 to the stockpile, we will not increase the deployed
    stockpile. The Navy will work in close coordination with the Department
    of Defense, NNSA, the NWC, and the Congress as this effort matures, but
    we cannot continue to life extend our leftover Cold War era weapons and
    systems and successfully carry out our national strategy.
        Finally, SSP will continue to support the Navy's Fiscal Year 2021
    Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) for the 2018 NPR-directed nuclear-armed
    Sea Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N). The initial study for this AoA
    has been submitted to the DOD's Office of Cost Assessment and Program
    deterrence.
                       industrial base and infrastructure
        The Nation requires a fully modernized nuclear force and supporting
    infrastructure to execute our national strategy. Our modernization
    needs cannot succeed without investing in the research and development
    (R&D), critical skills, and facilities needed to produce, sustain, and
    certify our nuclear systems. Ensuring robust defense and aerospace
    industrial base capabilities--such as radiation-hardened electronics,
    strategic inertial instrumentation, and solid rocket motors--remains an
    important priority in conjunction with R&D investment. SSP has placed
    particular emphasis on the solid rocket motor industry and its sub-tier
    suppliers and appreciates the support of the Congress to allow for the
    continuous production of these vital components. Essential to the
    nuclear deterrent, is a national aeroshell production capability. The
    Navy has not delivered an integrated aeroshell since the 1980s and
    needs to reinvigorate a production capability that only resides in a
    small cadre of highly skilled experts in an exceptionally niche
    industry. Aeroshell investment supports the Navy but will also be cost-
    effectively leveraged by our colleagues in the Air Force--and also our
    strategic partners in the United Kingdom as they pursue their
    independent reentry program endeavors. Finally, R&D investment is
    critical to today's nuclear modernization needs to ensure that we
    advance necessary technology ahead of design needs and to train our
    workforce during the early years of development. If the Nation does not
    continue to address these concerns, no amount of money will be able to
    adequately mitigate the risks associated with key stockpile and
    infrastructure losses for as many as 5 to 10 years.
        From an infrastructure perspective, our program is entering
    unprecedented times. Existing facilities are reaching their 30-year
    recapitalization windows while we simultaneously face weapons systems
    modernization periods in order to meet future requirements. Investing
    in facility sustainment and modernization is required for cradle-to-
    grave operations. Appropriate Military Construction (MILCON) and
    Facility Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (FSRM) resourcing
    is critical to the Navy maintaining a credible deterrence to include
    providing more than 70 percent of the Nation's operationally deployed
    nuclear warheads. We will make smart investments to address through-put
    constraints and build in surge capacity to address process missiles and
    outfit the SSBNs. Maintaining and sustaining facilities is critical to
    meeting USSTRATCOM and Fleet mission requirements. Our Nation, and the
    Navy, will continue to prioritize and resource the sustainment and
    modernization of its nuclear infrastructure enterprise to provide an
    effective and flexible deterrent now and into the future.
        As the Navy executes the modernization and replacement of the SSBN
    and associated SLBM leg of the nuclear triad, DOD and NNSA's
    infrastructure must be prepared to respond in tandem to the evolving
    needs of the Nation. Of most importance, we must have an effective,
    resilient, and responsive plutonium pit production capability. This
    capability can address age-related risks, support planned
    refurbishments, as well as prepare for future uncertainty.
    Additionally, tritium, lithium, and uranium, and high explosives and
    energetics, among other strategic materials, are vital to ensuring the
    Navy can continue to meet its strategic deterrent requirements. Efforts
    to sustain and modernize deterrent forces must continue. Our strategic
    forces underpin every military operation around the world, and we
    cannot afford to delay given the increasing threats facing our Nation.
                                   workforce
        History reminds us that the swift, successful creation and
    execution of the Fleet Ballistic Missile program in the 1950s was truly
    a result of national commitment, congressional support, and cadre of
    hand-selected scientists, engineers, and inspirational leaders. Though
    process will always underpin our efforts, our dedicated predecessors--
    civilians, military, and industry partners alike--responded to the
    national need with focused determination and drove this program with a
    vision. People are as fundamental to our nuclear deterrent as the SWS
    itself. Today, SSP and its industry partners are focused on inspiring,
    growing, and retaining a generation of workforce that did not live
    through the darkest days of the Cold War. Connecting a new workforce to
    this fundamental global security mission remains an important task
    shared among the entire nuclear enterprise. A capable, credible, and
    affordable strategic deterrent for our Nation for the next 60 years
    requires not only technical, policy, management, and financial acumen--
    it requires passion and a commitment to making this our life's work.
        Truly, 2020 was an unprecedented year. I would like to take this
    opportunity to highlight some of the outstanding work the SSP team has
    done to continue to execute on our mission despite the uncertain
    environment:
        SSP took an aggressive COVID-19 Testing and Vaccination posture for
    our Security Force commensurate with Tier 1 units to ensure their
    availability and to maintain the Nuclear Weapons Security Standard
    (NWSS). Additionally, we developed contingency plans to reinforce our
    security teams in order to mitigate COVID19 impacts. To date, we have
    not had to implement any of the contingency plans. We worked with
    nuclear policy leadership for the Secretary of Defense and Chief of
    Naval Operations staff to provide relief to some of the administrative
    training and PRP requirements in order to allow the force to remain
    focused on maintaining the NWSS and minimize interactions required
    across the force. We worked with our Marine Corps counterparts to
    adjust our Concept of Operations to maximize social distancing and
    minimize transmission by addressing guard rotations, reduction of
    security posts where possible based on operational requirements (ex.
    reduction of entry / exit lanes and associated guards commensurate with
    reduction of operations and personnel due to COVID (more people
    teleworking, less people have to enter area)), barracks berthing
    assignments, cleaning cycles, Personal Protective Equipment
    requirements, and aggressive contact tracing that minimized interaction
    between individual cohorts. Finally, we maximized the use of virtual
    inspections or using personnel already at that geographic location with
    the appropriate subject matter expertise in order to minimize external
    vectors that could negatively impact the security force. The
    combination of common sense measures and innovative tactics have
    enabled SSP to continue to deliver results despite the pandemic, and I
    am confident we will emerge from these tragic and unprecedented events
    stronger and more resilient than we were a year ago.
                   polaris sales agreement: support to the uk
        Development of the future SWS not only addresses known United
    States risks, it also supports the UK's critical need to recapitalize
    its deterrent. This is essential to our NATO partners' overall defense
    posture. Under the auspices of the Polaris Sales Agreement and the
    Mutual Defense Agreement, the paths and tools are in place to ensure
    each nation's sovereign needs are met. A critical component of the
    Columbia-class Program is the development of a Common Missile
    Compartment (CMC) with the United Kingdom. Today, the United States
    Navy shares the Trident II (D5) SWS with the UK aboard its Vanguard-
    class of ballistic missile submarines, through the Polaris Sales
    Agreement (PSA). Similar to the United States Navy, the UK's Royal Navy
    is recapitalizing its four aging Vanguard-class SSBNS with the
    Dreadnought-class SSBN. the CMC will support today's Trident II D5 SWS
    that will be deployed as the initial loadout on both Columbia and the
    UK Dreadnought-class SSBNs. Our partnership with the UK also supports
    production of these two new classes of SSBNs in both United States and
    UK build yards. Ensuring that the Columbia-class program remains on
    schedule supports not only our Nation's operational requirements, but
    also the ability of the UK, one of our most important allies, to
    maintain its Continuous at-Sea Deterrent. For decades United States
    policy has recognized that the independent British nuclear deterrent
    adds to joint efforts to deter aggression and attack against NATO and
    thereby positively contributes to global stability. Under the 1958
    Mutual Defense Agreement and the 1962 Polaris Sales Agreement, the
    United States has provided assistance and material, consistent with
    international law, to the UK deterrent program. Without this
    assistance, the cost to the UK associated with maintaining its
    independent deterrent would rise significantly and would certainly have
    a negative impact on the UK's ability to maintain conventional and
    intelligence capabilities which the United States and NATO rely on to
    deter aggression and attack.
                                   conclusion
        In keeping with the Administration's Interim National Security
    Guidance, the United States must renew its enduring advantages so that
    we can meet today's challenges from a position of strength. Our
    Nation's sea-based strategic deterrent has been a critical component of
    our national security since the 1950s and must continue to assure our
    allies and partners and to deter potential adversaries well into the
    future. SSP ensures a safe, secure, effective, flexible, and tailorable
    strategic deterrent, with a steadfast focus on the proper stewardship,
    custody, and accountability of the nuclear assets entrusted to the
    Navy. Sustaining and modernizing the sea-based strategic deterrent
    capability is a vital national security requirement. I am privileged to
    represent this unique organization as we work to serve the best
    interests of our great Nation. I thank the Committee for the
    opportunity to speak with you about the sea-based leg of the nuclear
    triad and the vital role it plays in our national and global security.

        Senator King. Thank you, Admiral. We will now proceed to 5-
    minute question rounds, and let me begin.
        Ms. Tomero, you caused a disturbance in the force by an
    interview with a Japanese newspaper, where you referred to the
    modernization programs as ``costly,'' but I note that you went
    on to say, ``Nuclear deterrence continues to remain the number
    one priority for the Department of Defense.'' Do you want to
    expand on that, because as you know it raised some furor.
        Ms. Tomero. Senator, thank you. Chairman, thank you for the
    question and the opportunity to clarify that interview. The
    interview with a Japanese newspaper was heavily editorialized.
    My comments and remarks during the interview were about the
    upcoming reviews, the importance of extended deterrence, and
    the issues that would be looked at as part of these review,
    including looking broadly at nuclear modernization, at our
    declaratory policy, and again, the intent was to assure our
    allies, and particularly Japan in this instance, that we would
    consult with them and that extended deterrence remains strong.
        I am happy to provide the transcript of the interview that
    more accurately reflects what my remarks were, and during the
    interview I did not talk about reductions or express concern
    about cost. It was as an answer to a question about the $1.2
    trillion nuclear modernization. My answer was some of these
    programs are very expensive, as a statement of fact, not as a
    concern.
        Senator King. I think it would be helpful to supply the
    transcript. None of us are familiar with the phenomenon of
    giving an interview and not having it come out exactly as we
    thought. We never heard of that before.
        Ms. Tomero. I would be happy to, and again, to reiterate,
    nuclear modernization of the triad will be one of our top
    priorities.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Ms. Tomero. I am enclosing a copy of the transcript of my
    interview with the Japanese newspaper, Asahi Shimbun. As I
    testified, the interview with the Japanese newspaper was
    heavily editorialized. My comments and remarks during the
    interview were about the Department's strategic reviews, the
    importance of extended deterrence, and the issues that would be
    looked at as part of these reviews, including nuclear
    modernization and U.S. declaratory policy. The intent was to
    assure our allies, particularly Japan, that our extended
    deterrence commitments remain strong, that no decisions have
    been made yet, and that we look forward to engaging with allies
    on these issues. Please see Appendix A.

        Senator King. Thank you. Now, there is a statement in your
    prepared remarks that caught my attention, and I just wanted
    you to clarify it. It is in the middle of page 5. It says, ``We
    will begin to explore those steps that can be taken to reduce
    the role of nuclear weapons in our National Security Strategy,
    while continuing to ensure our strategic deterrent remains
    safe.''
        Those steps that can be taken to reduce the role of nuclear
    weapons--can you amplify on that a bit?
        Ms. Tomero. Yes, sir. So that was the direction coming out
    of the National Security Strategic Guidance, the Interim
    Guidance, that the United States would reduce the role of
    nuclear weapons, and so we will be looking at options to do
    that, and present options to be considered, and decided as
    appropriate. It is really in the context of the Strategic
    Guidance saying that we have to look at reducing the
    existential threat of nuclear weapons.
        Senator King. I appreciate that. Will the budget that we
    are about to receive show any substantial change in the
    priorities in terms of modernization?
        Ms. Tomero. Sir, what I can quote at this point is the
    discretionary budget that came over from OMB, the guidance that
    was submitted to the Appropriations Committee, saying that
    there would be support for nuclear modernization and sustaining
    our nuclear forces. At this point I cannot go into the
    details----
        Senator King. I understand.
        Ms. Tomero.--of what the fiscal year 2022 budget will
    cover, and I understand the delay is causing some frustration.
    But I am really happy to come back and brief in more detail and
    meet with you and your staff.
        Senator King. Thank you. We will follow up.
        General Ray, I only have a minute left so we may want to
    come back to this. But the question is, how much longer can we
    life-extend the Minuteman III, and your view on the
    practicality of that approach as opposed to developing the
    ground-based strategic deterrent?
        General Ray. Sir, thank you for the question. We are out of
    time. There are several key components that needed to be----
        Senator King. I am not out of time.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator King. You mean we are out of time--I have got 27
    seconds.
        General Ray. Sir, I will talk as long as you want me to.
    But there were several decisions that would close out the gaps
    that we needed for the Minuteman III extension--2015, 2016
    decisions needed to be made to start programs for our
    propulsion system rocket engines, our missile guidance sets,
    and for our boosters. That is now 6, 7, 8 years beyond, because
    we made the decision to go with GBSD through the JROC and
    through the analysis of alternatives and the milestone decision
    authorities making that decision at the OSD level. We did not
    go backwards. So you actually are out of time. You will buy a
    gap, a significant gap, in ICBM capability if you were to go
    backwards now, and I can come back to that, sir.
        Senator King. Thank you. I think we almost certainly will.
    Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Ray, I would like to follow up a little bit where
    Senator King was headed in talking about the analysis that we
    are looking at on the pursuit of the GBSD as a replacement.
        The Air Force compared costs with the Minuteman and the
    GBSD in 2019, and again more recently. What is current
    estimated cost difference between pursuing GBSD and trying to
    life-extend the Minuteman?
        General Ray. Ma'am, thank you for the question. The bottom
    line up front is it is a $38 billion difference with GBSD being
    the least expensive and more effective option in every category
    that we analyzed it on. So we were given six criteria,
    classified criteria. No version of the Minuteman III ever, in
    that discussion, satisfactorily met those in an affordable
    fashion. GBSD did, and the cost of the Minuteman III life
    extension continues to go up. It was $5 billion difference back
    in 2016, $20 billion difference----
        Senator Fischer. We would still end up with something that
    does not do the job for us in the future.
        General Ray. Exactly, ma'am, and so GBSD is going in the
    right direction, doing everything we want it to do--more
    affordable, meets all my criteria that I need. The Minuteman
    III becomes increasingly more difficult to sustain. I can
    provide more details about what that means.
        Senator Fischer. We are looking at program costs that you
    just spoke about. Are there additional costs that are not
    included there?
        General Ray. Ma'am, I think when we give the numbers I
    believe it does include the de-mil of the Minuteman III, which
    is one of those costs that we need to account for.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. One of the big drivers of the
    difference in cost between the GBSD and the Minuteman are the
    sustainment costs. Is that correct?
        General Ray. Yes, ma'am. I was just at the depot last week,
    at Hill, talking to the team, simply on the propulsion system
    and not the rest. We have about 330 parts that we do not have a
    source for, that we are trying to get. We are going to get--
    probably 40 to 50 percent we will never get a bid from industry
    to go fill those parts.
        Senator Fischer. I thought it was really helpful for myself
    and Senator King where we saw the level of effort that is
    required to maintain the facility. When you do maintenance you
    need to deploy a security team around them because the warhead
    is potentially exposed. Is that correct?
        General Ray. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. Can you explain how with the GBSD that
    would be different, and what it will mean for sustainment
    costs?
        General Ray. Yes, ma'am. Because the Minuteman III was
    built as a single system, every time you need to work on
    anything below the warhead you have to unstack it, which means
    you expose the warhead. With the GBSD, the way it is being
    constructed, we expect two-thirds reduction in the number of
    times we expose the weapon, and two-thirds reduction in the
    number of convoys. Moreover, we think that 95 percent of the
    work that we would do would require less than 6 hours with only
    a handful of people, compared to most of the jobs are 10, 12,
    14, and do require a heavier security footprint.
        Senator Fischer. That definitely will reduce risk because
    there is less exposure of the warhead, for one thing, right?
        General Ray. Emphatically.
        Senator Fischer. You reduce the number of times that people
    are there, so the demands on your personnel, that they are
    accessing the missile. Is that correct?
        General Ray. Yes, ma'am. We will be able to reduce the
    number of people that we have to commit to this mission.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. I was just at a Commerce Committee
    markup today on a bill looking at threats from China, from a
    research viewpoint, basically. As the Global Strike Commander,
    when you look at the acceleration that the Chinese are doing
    with their nuclear program, with their modernization, and their
    growth, what does that mean to you, in your position?
        General Ray. Ma'am, we are in the air component commander
    to U.S. Strategic Command. It means I have a much more
    difficult job balancing all the requirements. It absolutely
    underscores the need to have a modernized triad. So the GBSD
    has got to be how I answer a growing number of threats. You
    heard some of my teammates here talk about growing capabilities
    with ballistic missile defense. Certainly that trend is going
    to continue. As I bring on cruise missiles, it has to be able
    to survive. So it is a fundamentally different set of problems
    that I need to operate in, and there is no margin that remains
    in any of the current systems that will let me carry a couple
    of decades out.
        Now I do believe the beauty of all the systems that we are
    fielding is that they are built to be in this game for a long
    period of time. We have a modular design, open mission systems,
    digitally engineered, so in recent discussions we have been
    able to explain to a lot of those who are very savvy in the
    acquisition world how we will absolutely change the game to
    keep these systems modernized and relevant. There is no margin
    remaining in the Minuteman III or in the current systems that
    we have. Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Senator King. Senator Warren, via Webex.
        Senator Warren. Last month, DOD announced that it is moving
    forward with the development of the next-generation
    Interceptor, a new weapon system which is going to be added to
    the current generation of ground-based interceptors. The Cost
    Assessment and Program Evaluation Office estimates that the
    United States will spend a total of $18 billion on 31
    interceptors. That is almost half a billion dollars for one,
    just one, of these missiles, and that price goes up when you
    consider that 10 of the 31 missiles will only be test units.
        The Northern Command has already warned this Committee that
    North Korea could overwhelm our missile defense system within
    the next few years, so it is not at all clear to me that
    spending billions of dollars on additional interceptors is the
    right call.
        Ms. Tomero, given NORTHCOM's concerns, do you believe that
    spending $18 billion one just 21 interceptors that may be
    overwhelmed in a few years is a responsible way to spend
    taxpayer dollars?
        Ms. Tomero. Senator Warren, thank you for the question. The
    administration recently awarded two contracts for these
    interceptors, and it for the development phase of the
    interceptor. So there are several critical decision juncture
    that will happen along the way that will inform the way
    forward.
        Senator Warren. I appreciate that, but that is not the
    question I am asking. I am just asking whether or not we ought
    to be spending that much money for 21 interceptors, that we are
    already being warned will be overwhelmed.
        Ms. Tomero. The intent, Senator, is to provide an
    effective, limited missile defense capability against threats
    from rogue states, and so the intent is to improve that
    capability----
        Senator Warren. I guess the question I am asking is whether
    or not we think this is effective.
        Look, I understand that your job here is to make the case
    for these weapons, but it is also unclear NGI will represent
    any significant upgrade to our system of defense against
    intercontinental ballistic missile threats. Joshua Pollock, a
    senior research associate at the Middlebury Institute of
    International Studies said, and I want to quote him here,
    ``This is a staggering expenditure for such a modest
    capability,'' end quote.
        Now I understand that $18 billion is a drop in the bucket
    when it comes to DOD's budget, but that is more than what the
    government spends fighting the opioid crisis that killed nearly
    100,000 people last year. I am also worried that the price tag
    could go up, just like we have seen with previous missile
    defense programs. So let me ask, is it possible that the price
    tag for NGI could further increase as DOD moves along in its
    development?
        Ms. Tomero. Senator, we will closely track this. I guess
    there is always a possibility that costs might increase. What
    we are planning to do is provide the incentives, especially
    starting with two awards, which is unusual for the Missile
    Defense Agency to have competition and including have
    incentives on having the most efficient system that we are able
    to have providing value and providing incentives on cost. We
    have that competition and we will be able to make that
    determination in fiscal year 2024 time frame.
        Senator Warren. Well, and you started this by saying costs
    might go up, because that is exactly what has happened in the
    past. The redesigned Kill Vehicle program was meant to upgrade
    our existing missile defenses before it was cancelled in 2019,
    after more than a decade of development. The program's cost
    more than tripled through the development phase. But the
    Government Accountability Office found that DOD repeatedly
    ignored warnings of major issues with the project.
        So let me just ask, this is kind of a simple yes or no.
    Would you agree that more transparent, more methodical, more
    rigorous acquisition practices could drive the cost of these
    interceptors and other projects down, rather than keeping them
    absurdly expensive?
        Ms. Tomero. Senator, we certainly support the incentives
    and have an approach that we believe will drive competition and
    will maximize the opportunities to deliver an effective system
    that delivers on time and on cost.
        Senator Warren. Well, I will just point out that the GAO
    has repeatedly warned about the continued use of high-risk
    acquisition practices that use short development timelines to
    justify spending outrageous amounts of money.
        Look, I think spending nearly half a billion dollars on a
    single missile, that is barely an upgrade on the existing
    system, is absurd. This is just another example of
    irresponsible and out-of-control defense spending that wastes
    taxpayer dollars. We should be prioritizing smart investments
    in capabilities that actually advance our national security and
    not spending billions of dollars on what are, at best, marginal
    improvements.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time.
        Senator King. Thank you, Senator. Now Senator Cotton.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Ray, you testified in response to Senator Fischer's
    question that China is significantly accelerating its nuclear
    modernization. Is that correct?
        General Ray. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cotton. Does China just tell us the pace at which
    it is accelerating that modernization? Does it throw open its
    research labs and its military bases to let us know how it is
    accelerating?
        General Ray. Sir, they do not.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. So we get that from intelligence
    assessments.
        General Ray. Affirmative.
        Senator Cotton. Do you think it is more likely, in
    retrospect, when you back in 5 or 10 years, that those
    intelligence assessments will have overestimated the pace at
    which China is expanding and the volume of weapons they are
    producing, or that we underestimated, and China was actually
    moving faster and getting more weapons systems in place that we
    currently believe?
        General Ray. Senator Cotton, thank you for that question. I
    believe that I can only talk about the last probably 3 or 4
    years, and I will tell you we underestimated the pace.
        Senator Cotton. That has been the common pattern of such
    assessments in the nuclear age, going back 75 years, correct,
    that we usually undershoot the mark of what our adversaries are
    trying to do?
        General Ray. Sir, that could be true going that far back. I
    know that with a good arms control agreement that is verifiable
    and enforceable you have access or the ability to see where the
    Russians are going is much more understandable. We have no such
    agreement with the Chinese.
        Senator Cotton. All right. Thank you, General Ray.
        Ms. Tomero, so we have heard from General Ray that the
    People's Liberation Army is undertaking this massive nuclear
    buildup. Do you believe that is the result of any U.S. missile
    defense deployments?
        Ms. Tomero. Senator, I think there are several drivers for
    China's nuclear modernization. I would be happy to come talk to
    you about it in a classified setting.
        Senator Cotton. So you believe that China may be responding
    to United States missile defense deployments?
        Ms. Tomero. Again, I think it is important to understand
    the drivers for China's nuclear modernization program. We want
    to make sure that we have got effective nuclear deterrence
    against China, and that we clearly communicate that we have
    deterrent capabilities against China. Part of that is
    understanding what drives their modernization programs, and
    again, I am happy to come talk about it in a classified
    setting.
        Senator Cotton. Ms. Tomero, I have been on this Committee
    and the Intelligence Committee now for 8 years. I have never
    seen a single product that suggests that China is responding to
    United States missile defense deployments. So could you or the
    Joint Staff please provide me, by document number, sometime in
    the next 2 weeks, any product that suggests that may be the
    case?
        Ms. Tomero. Sir, we will definitely provide you products
    that show----
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Ms. Tomero. China's plan to expand and modernize its
    nuclear arsenal is a serious threat to the United States and
    its allies and partners. As I testified, there are several
    drivers for China's nuclear modernization and China's rapid
    expansion of its nuclear arsenal. Last year, DoD estimated that
    China had a nuclear warhead stockpile in the low-200s and
    projected that it would at least double over the next decade.
    Since then, China has accelerated its nuclear expansion and
    will almost certainly exceed the intelligence community's
    previous projection. It is important to identify the drivers of
    our adversary's nuclear modernization programs in order to
    understand how we can most effectively enhance nuclear
    deterrence and prevent a dangerous and costly arms race.
        U.S. missile defense is likely one of many factors that
    contribute to our adversaries' perceived force requirements.
    Our adversaries are driven by their perceptions of their
    national interests and strategic objectives, what is required
    to protect and achieve those, and a view of the security
    environment that includes many other threats beyond U.S.
    missile defense.
        China's nuclear strategy has long centered on the ability
    to provide an assured counterstrike against adversary's nuclear
    attack--which requires a sufficient portion of its nuclear
    force be able to survive such a strike. China's efforts to
    expand and diversify its nuclear arsenal are broadly aimed at
    improving the survivability, responsiveness, and effectiveness
    of its nuclear force while also providing China's leaders with
    additional strategic options. The 2020 Department of Defense
    Military and Security Developments Involving the People's
    Republic of China states that: ``The PRC's nuclear weapons
    policy prioritizes the maintenance of a nuclear force able to
    survive a first strike and respond with sufficient strength to
    inflict unacceptable damage on an enemy .... In addition, China
    insists its new generation of mobile missiles, with warheads
    consisting of MIRVs and penetration aids, are intended to
    ensure the viability of its strategic nuclear forces in the
    face of continued advances in U.S. and, to a lesser extent,
    Russian strategic ISR, precision strike, and missile defense
    capabilities.''
        U.S. homeland defenses are designed against a limited rogue
    state threat, not against the nuclear arsenals of Russia or
    China, and we rely on strategic nuclear deterrence to address
    the larger and more sophisticated nuclear threats of China and
    Russia. The size and sophistication of Russian and Chinese
    strategic systems could easily overwhelm the capacity of U.S.
    missile defenses.
        Section 1692 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2020 required a federally funded research
    development center to prepare a study on other states'
    reactions to U.S. homeland defenses. This report was delivered
    to Congress in January 2021 (see attached). The report found
    concern over U.S. homeland missile defenses is one of many
    factors, and that neither U.S. missile defenses nor Russian and
    Chinese modernization have altered the strategic balance as of
    the completion of the report.
        Furthermore, Russia and China are also further developing
    missile defense systems. That said, we must remain cognizant of
    the perceptions of our missile defenses moving forward and
    ensure that their future development does not negatively impact
    strategic stability.
        We expect that the set of strategic reviews will account
    for adversary nuclear forces and doctrine, the effects across
    the cyber, space, and information domains, linking to
    conventional deterrence, and any needed posture and policy
    adjustments.

        The LLNL Study (LLNL-TR-817610) is on file at the Senate
    Armed Services for viewing.

        Senator Cotton. Thank you, and in a classified setting. I
    understand.
        Ms. Tomero, should the United States adopt a no-first-use
    policy?
        Ms. Tomero. Sir, thank you for that question. The
    declaratory policy will be looked at as part of these reviews.
    We will do it in consultation with the rest of the Department,
    with the military, with the interagency. We will plan to start
    consultation with allies more broadly on extended deterrence,
    and so we will look at the pros and cons of our current policy,
    potentially of alternatives, but at the end of the day, this is
    the prerogative of the President.
        Senator Cotton. I am glad that we are going to consult with
    a lot of people. So you are open--you believe that it is at
    least an open possibility we should adopt a no-first-use
    policy? I am asking for your view. You are a key member of what
    is going to be a nuclear posture review. Do you believe we
    should adopt a no-first-use policy?
        Ms. Tomero. Thank you for your question. My role is to
    inform options and inform a decision, and it is not about my
    personal view. Again, this is going to be looked at across the
    Department and across the interagency.
        Senator Cotton. Well, I am not asking your personal view in
    the sense of like your taste about the matter. I am asking your
    considered policy judgment, having worked on these issues, for,
    I think, a couple of decades now. Do you think the United
    States should adopt a no-first-use policy?
        Ms. Tomero. At this point, Senator, before we have even
    begun specific reviews, we are not going to foreclose options.
    We are going to look at what our current declaratory policy is,
    evaluate risks and benefits, and I would be happy to come
    discuss considerations and, of course, decisions made once the
    review is concluded.
        Senator Cotton. What about a sole-purpose policy?
        Ms. Tomero. Again, that relates to declaratory policy and
    what changes might or might not be made.
        Senator Cotton. My time has expired. Thank you. I have to
    say, I am now troubled by the direction of this nuclear posture
    review.
        Senator King. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Manchin on
    Webex.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This will be to
    Mr. Walter and Ms. Tomero. Recently my office met with Northrop
    Grumman's Chief Information Officer to discuss the measures
    that are being put into place to develop a secure nuclear
    command and control and communications, an NC3 system, with the
    modernization of the ground-based strategic deterrent, as we
    are all beginning to realize just how vulnerable we are from
    the cyber domain. I am concerned with the cybersecurity, the
    entirety of our current and eventually modernized nuclear
    enterprise. 0
        So my question would be, what goals has the Department set
    internally with our private industry partners to ensure that
    the NC3 systems remain as secure as possible?
        Ms. Tomero. Senator, I agree that NC3 and having a robust
    NC3 underpins most of our nuclear deterrent. I would
    respectfully defer that question to my colleague, Andrew
    Walter, since it is an acquisition question. Thank you.
        Senator Manchin. Well, I will have a second part. Maybe you
    can answer one part of this. I am sure the Department has been
    considering instituting a zero trust concept for our nuclear
    network. Can you discuss what that will actually look like for
    the cybersecurity professionals that are monitoring these
    systems and what resources will be available for them to verify
    every single user?
        Ms. Tomero. Sir----
        Mr. Walter. Thank you, Senator. The Department takes the
    cybersecurity of the nuclear deterrent force extraordinarily
    seriously. Our legacy forces remain and are secure, often based
    on just how old they are and not connected to external systems.
        As we look towards the modern systems, such as the ground-
    based strategic deterrent and other systems, cybersecurity is a
    paramount priority and requirement within the system, and
    providing the GBSD program office and Northrop Grumman
    sufficient resources to ensure that it remains so throughout
    its life of 30, 40 years, potentially.
        I would like to ask General Ray to chime in on the
    specifics for the system.
        General Ray. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question and the
    opportunity to comment. Sir, what we have done as the air
    component to Global Strike, to Strategic Command, as the team
    that builds this, is we have documented what we believe, at a
    very high level of classification what the roadmap should be.
    Cybersecurity is one of the critical pieces when we designed
    the GBSD, when we looked at that. Cyber operators are part of
    this conversation, and I could tell you, watching the software
    development approach that we are taking is the leading edge
    capability. I have seen first-hand the Kubernetes containerized
    software approach. We have had the red team multiple times try
    to break into the developmental software, and they cannot.
        Sir, we see this as a central issue and it will be part of
    how we deal with encryption, how we deal with AI and quantum
    and all those things going forward. Over.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, General. To both of you, again,
    in the past this Subcommittee has heard about needing
    improvements in our satellite system, such as the advanced
    extremely high frequency satellites in orbit and production.
    These efforts are related to, and often tied directly to, the
    Missile Defense Agency, and now the Space Development Agency as
    our nuclear defense and employment are tied together. Some have
    been critical of this move as it could be interpreted as a
    duplication of effort and reductive to the need of
    interoperability within our forces.
        So given that you come from the different services and both
    require access to our satellite network, do you feel there is a
    united effort between the Missile Defense Agency and the Space
    Development Agency to ensure that seamless access is being
    maintained across the DOD enterprise? Both of you. Either one
    who wants to start on that one can say.
        Mr. Walter. Sir, thank you for the question. Between the
    Missile Defense Agency and the Space Development Agency there
    are often regular conversations regarding the requirements
    needed in the satellite constellation. I would have to take for
    the record the specifics for what those consultations are and
    how we are ensuring there is no duplication of effort, but that
    is a priority across the acquisition system, to ensure that we
    are acquiring the right capabilities without duplicating in
    different program silos.
        Senator Manchin. General?
        General Ray. Sir, at this time the team's application of
    AHF is not directly impacted by that particular relationship.
    So I am grateful to say that we have what we needed in terms of
    this for the here and the now.
        Senator Manchin. So it is working.
        General Ray. Sir, from where I am sitting at this time,
    yes, sir, it is.
        Senator Manchin. That is good to hear. Thank you both. I
    yield my time, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Thank you, Senator. Senator Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, let me
    begin by just saying thank you to all of you for your service
    to our country and your continued dedication.
        I am just curious. General Ray, let me just begin with you.
    I think I understood you correctly but I want to confirm this.
    With regard to the GBSD and the cost comparison between moving
    forward with the GBSD versus a service life extension on the
    Minuteman III, there would actually be cost savings by moving
    forward with the GBSD as opposed to the Minuteman III? Is that
    correct?
        General Ray. Yes, sir, it is.
        Senator Rounds. How much did you say that was?
        General Ray. Sir, the current figure here in 2021 is $38
    billion.
        Senator Rounds. That is $38 billion----
        General Ray. Billion. Yes, sir.
        Senator Rounds.--estimated at this time, in 2021 dollars.
        General Ray. Through the life of 2075, and I believe it is
    fair to offer that parameter.
        Senator Rounds. Very good. Thank you.
        Admiral Wolfe, there has been a discussion about whether or
    not we need all three portions of the triad to continue on.
    There has been a debate out there. Some people say you only
    need two out of the three. I would beg to disagree with that,
    but I think it would be fair to hear from you and from General
    Ray, at least a concurrence as to how these three pieces fit
    together and what it means to adversaries who look at us,
    recognizing if you had two versus three.
        Could you share, just briefly, the reason why we need three
    in the triad?
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question,
    Senator. So I would tell you I absolutely agree, all three legs
    of the triad are critical to the deterrent mission that this
    Nation needs. I will let General Ray talk about to the value of
    the intercontinental ballistic missiles and the bombers. But
    from a submarine perspective, right, we are assured second
    strike, I would tell you that if one of the other two legs went
    away, that makes the Navy's mission even more critical. It puts
    more demand on the submarine force. It puts more strain.
        I would also tell you that as we--and General Ray and I
    were talking about this before this hearing--because we are
    trying to do this very smartly, we leverage what we are doing
    in this very small, critical, industrial base, when we talk
    about critical electronics that are radiation hard, and we talk
    about niche capabilities that just are not required anywhere
    else. When that goes away, with one leg, I would submit to you
    not only does it increase our risk with the industrial base, it
    is going to cause our costs to go up. I would say that STRATCOM
    would have a much, much more difficult mission as well, to make
    sure that the deterrence from the adversaries' eyes remain
    strong.
        Senator Rounds. This is all about deterrence, isn't it?
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. It is absolutely all about
    deterrence. It is not about what we think it is about, what our
    adversary thinks, and what they think is acceptable.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. General Ray?
        General Ray. Yes, sir. I agree with my colleague about the
    interrelated benefits, the survivable dimension, the flexible
    responsive piece, certainly the flexible visible piece of the
    bomber and, of course, the responsive dimension of the ICBM. It
    does present a great deal of challenges for our would-be
    adversaries.
        But as the air component commander to Strategic Command, as
    we think through these scenarios and these options, having a
    range of options that let us give the national leadership the
    tailored approach to this problem, the fewer resources you
    have, the more challenging it becomes.
        Senator Rounds. Definitely about deterrence, though.
        General Ray. Absolutely, sir. It is about a competitive
    dimension in this very strategic environment.
        Senator Rounds. It is not a secret the challenges that we
    have are not just one country. Right now they are basically two
    major near-peer competitors, and a third and a fourth that are
    rogue. Is it fair to say that China and Russia are both
    considered to be near-peer competitors, that we basically have
    to have deterrence in place for today?
        General Ray. Sir, I think there was a lot of thinking about
    the Chinese a few years ago, that they would have a minimalist
    deterrent approach, basically a counter-value approach.
    Everything I have seen from their warhead production, the
    diversity of the delivery systems, and how they are deploying
    things, they are no longer playing that game. They are playing
    a counter-force game, to hold our resources at risk, and their
    accelerated pace is very disturbing.
        Senator Rounds. If we stop from one, is there a possibility
    that as you wargame this, to be able to show appropriate
    deterrence you have to be in a position to respond to one or
    two adversaries, at or about the same time. Fair enough to say?
    Just a quick yes or no. I am accurate in that?
        General Ray. Yes, sir, it is, and because I have ICBMs to
    offer as options, I can be more tailored in my approach to
    provide the very limited number of bombers to the theaters that
    they might help.
        Senator Rounds. Mr. Chairman, I am out of time but I have
    to follow up with one question, if I could, please.
        Ms. Tomero, you have a role to play in determining treaty
    determinations and negotiations in the future. Would it be fair
    to say that as we look at deterrence here it is critical that
    we recognize the need to look at deterrence with the
    possibility of defending against not one but two adversaries at
    the same time, in order to provide appropriate deterrence?
        Ms. Tomero. Yes. That is the first piece of what the review
    will begin to look at, is the threats, and, of course, as I
    mentioned, we are very concerned about the Chinese, increasing
    threat from China, and the novel systems and [inaudible]
    systems from Russia, and so those will underpin the reviews.
        Senator Rounds. That would be included in your recognizing
    that as you discussed, treaties and the need for the full
    deterrence that both of these two officers have shared today,
    and you are in agreement with them?
        Ms. Tomero. Absolutely.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Senator Rosen, via Webex.
        Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman King and Ranking
    Member Fischer for holding this very important hearing, and to
    our witnesses for your work and service and for being with us
    today. I would really like to just focus in on nuclear testing,
    waste disposal, our nuclear stockpile, some of those issues.
        Ms. Tomero, as you know, in 1993, Congress created the
    Stockpile Stewardship Program. It is a science-based program to
    ensure the mission-critical readiness and reliability of our
    Nation's nuclear stockpile. Congress tasked NNSA with ensuring,
    and I quote, ``that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe,
    secure, and reliable, without the use of underground nuclear
    weapons testing,'' end quote.
        The subcritical and physics experiments conducted at the
    Nevada National Security site, the only facility in the Nation
    where subcritical experiments can be executed, combined with
    advances in nuclear modeling reduced the need for explosive
    testing while ensuring the safety and effectiveness of the
    United States nuclear stockpile.
        Last year, after it was suggested by the prior
    administration that they were considering resuming explosive
    nuclear testing, Senator Cortez Masto and I introduced
    legislation requiring congressional approval before any future
    explosive nuclear tests could take place. Nevadans, let me tell
    you, do not want to return to a time when explosive nuclear
    testing put the health and safety of our residents in jeopardy,
    and the states around us.
        Ms. Tomero, as you well know from working with former
    Nevada Senator Harry Reid, former Congresswoman Shelley
    Berkley, and from working on the House Armed Services Committee
    when I served on it, Nevada also does not want to become the
    Nation's nuclear dumping ground for nuclear waste, including
    defense nuclear waste.
        So, Ms. Tomero, could you discuss the potential
    consequences of resuming explosive nuclear testing at the site,
    and could you include, if you might, potential environmental
    impacts and, of course, the potential strategic implications,
    please?
        Ms. Tomero. Thank you, Senator. It is the objective of this
    administration to support the continued moratorium for nuclear
    testing as a policy position, and my understanding is we have
    the nuclear lab directors look at the need for testing and look
    at what would be required to sustain reliable, effective, and
    safe nuclear stockpile every year. But for the details on
    whether we would have to resume nuclear testing for technical
    reasons, I would refer that to my colleague, Andrew Walter.
        Mr. Walter. Thank you, ma'am. I think the Stockpile
    Stewardship Program you mentioned is one of the great success
    stories of the last 30 years in the nuclear enterprise. The
    Stockpile Stewardship Program has invested in the workforce at
    NNSA, the scientists and engineers and technicians, as well as
    the key capabilities needed to certify the stockpile's safety
    and reliability, in the absence of nuclear explosive testing.
        During the Cold War, nuclear explosive testing was used to
    do that. We have invested in the means to do that without
    explosive testing, and the lab directors continue to certify
    that currently nuclear explosive testing is not needed.
        I think for Nevada, one of the key capabilities the
    National Nuclear Security Administration is investing in today
    is the enhanced capabilities for subcritical experiments in
    U1a, and this is a critical capability where the lab directors
    at NNSA will use to gather the data they need from subcritical
    experiments to continue to certify the stockpile and ensure the
    designs we use in the future remain safe and reliable.
        So I think ECSE, in the Nevada Test Site, the Nevada
    National Security Site, is just incredibly important to
    maintaining that unbroken record since the 1990s of not doing
    nuclear explosive testing.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that. I would like
    to quickly just ask my final question here. Ms. Tomero, do you
    share the concerns of the former Secretaries of the Air Force
    that transporting tons of nuclear waste, including defense
    nuclear waste, around or through Nevada test sites, through
    probably over 300 congressional districts across this Nation,
    through the Nevada Test Site, through the Training Range, which
    is the crown jewel of the Air Force, to Yucca Mountain, would
    be detrimental to our strategic testing, training, and military
    readiness? I can just take a yes or no answer, a quick answer.
    My time is up, please.
        Ms. Tomero. Senator, I understand the concerns that--I
    would be happy to get you an answer for the record as it goes
    beyond the lanes of my policy job jar.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Ms. Tomero. As I testified, I understand your concerns and
    the importance of considering and addressing the safety
    requirements and risks of transporting nuclear waste across the
    country; however, my office does not have responsibility for
    this issue. Instead, let me refer you to our colleagues at the
    U.S. Air Force and the Department of Energy to provide you
    additional information about the impacts to strategic testing,
    training, and military readiness of transporting nuclear waste
    around or through Nevada test sites.

        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that. My time is up.
        Senator King. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator Cramer.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I might just say,
    every time I go to Minot I am impressed with those same young
    men and women, and they do get younger every time. But one of
    the things that impresses me the most is that even the
    Southerners never complain about the weather in Minot, and that
    takes incredible discipline.
        Anyway, I want to dig in a little more to the deterrence
    policy issue that the chairman brought up in terms of
    clarifying your statement, and I noted you are quoting the
    Interim Strategic Policy in a couple of places, relating to
    what I think is a goal to reduce, or it seems to be a goal to
    reduce our nuclear deterrence. I want to ask you, Ms. Tomero, I
    mean, how much risk are we willing to accept to reduce our
    nuclear deterrence? The word ``reduce'' is used a couple of
    times.
        Ms. Tomero. Let me clarify. Having a strong nuclear
    deterrence is one of our highest priorities, and so we will
    continue to maintain strong and reliable nuclear deterrence,
    which has been the cornerstone of our national security.
        Senator Cramer. I just get concerned when the word
    ``reduce'' is used several times in your testimony, and it
    seems to conflict. So I hope we can get it clarified on the
    right side of things.
        I guess you would then testify that you don't think the
    deterrent is too great now for the global threats that we face?
        Ms. Tomero. Again, I think we need to maintain strong
    nuclear deterrence, as we have for decades.
        Senator Cramer. Okay. Let me back up a little bit. Maybe,
    General Ray, you could answer this. If we were to, say, go from
    400 to 300, for example, ICBMs, just as an example, because
    that gets talked about, would we need to shore up some other
    conventional system, or how would we fill a gap if there was a
    reduction of some type?
        General Ray. Sir, thank you for the question. When I think
    about how I would answer--how much is enough I think is one of
    those questions--I remind myself of the series of policy
    questions that underwrite everything. The first one is, of
    course, are you a counter-value or a counter-force construct? I
    think because of our capabilities or precision the number of
    threats that hold us at risk, that we would prioritize those as
    the thing to deal with. Obviously the enemy systems begin to
    shape that.
        The second I ask is, no first use, launch under warning,
    launch under attack, and how we go down that path, and where we
    are, I think, is fitting for what we are dealing with. If the
    policy changes then there are ramifications, and then what we
    do with New START, does that really answer all of our problems
    in the strategic environment or is it a pragmatic take that we
    put a very sensible fence around the things that we can control
    and contain or work.
        We should celebrate, as a Nation, that when we put arms
    control alongside very credible modernization, and put a
    credible deterrent on the table, we have removed thousands of
    weapons and we have become a better planet for that.
        So when I just walk through these policy questions, the
    next one, of course, is extended deterrence, which has a very
    clear counter-proliferation dimension. I would turn and go,
    what is your policy, and then what is the threat I am up
    against, and how I would line those up. I think there is the
    discipline that we all have to keep in light of what we are
    dealing with, and particularly with the Chinese growth.
        You know, if I had to deal with the threats, I am sure
    Admiral Richard would ask for me to think through the sources.
    The idea of putting bombers back on alert is something that we
    practice but we do not sustain, because we have been fortunate
    enough to live in an environment, up to now, to where we can
    afford to not have them on alert but have them in a ready
    status. It takes me a certain number of classified hours to go
    back, sir. I do not have the bomber crews. I do not have the
    tankers. I do not have the bombers that go and meet all the
    combatant commands. There is no allied bomber force. This is
    it, and so how we would address that from the air component
    side, you would have to make sure that Strategic Command had
    those other resources to meet the targeting guidance.
        Senator Cramer. Well, thanks for all that, and that is a
    great explanation because I do worry, as I look at what seems
    to be some direction, at least. Ms. Tomero, I understand that
    you do not want to take things off the table in the middle of a
    discussion, and I can appreciate that. But there are certain
    things that have been studied pretty well, you know, to its
    limit, and one of them being the viability of Minuteman III and
    the GBSD. I think it was Senator Cotton that went through,
    starting with 14, or maybe it was you, General Ray, started
    with 14 and all the way through all the administrations, going
    back to that, the Milestone A decision, Milestone B decision,
    all those things that reviewed that. I just wonder, is there
    any reason to believe that any additional reviews would do
    anything to overturn the mountain of evidence that supports the
    conclusion that has already been drawn?
        Ms. Tomero. Sir, let me just start by saying that there is
    very strong support for modernization of the triad, as
    Secretary Austin testified before Congress, as Deputy Secretary
    Hicks testified. So that will be a high priority for our
    review, is to ensure that we continue to modernize the triad.
    Of course, we will look at how the programs are doing, what the
    program risks are, to make sure that we have the capabilities
    we need, when we need them.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Thank you, Senator. Senator Tuberville.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very
    much for all of your service. General Ray, thank you. Getting
    ready to retire. You know, I tried that after 40 years of
    coaching, and after about a year my wife said, ``You either get
    a job or we are going to get a divorce,'' so get ready for
    that.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Tuberville. But thank you. You know, last year or
    so I have been watching our hypersonic missiles being
    developed, a lot of parts and product in Alabama. Mr. Walter,
    how do you think the DOD program is responding or planning to
    respond to the development of hypersonic weapons?
        Mr. Walter. Sir, hypersonics is a bit out of my lane, as
    the DASD for Nuclear Matters. I would offer Vice Admiral Wolfe
    has had more responsibilities in that area.
        Senator Tuberville. Good.
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. When you asked that question,
    is that in relationship to our development or what the
    adversary is developing?
        Senator Tuberville. Our development.
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. Our development. Yes, sir. So in my
    non-nuclear hat I am responsible for our Conventional Prompt
    Strike Program, which is the hypersonic program with the Army
    that we are ready to deploy. I would tell you that we are
    focused on getting the Army's capability first, in fiscal year
    2023. We will follow that by Navy capability. I think you have
    heard the CNO talk about our first priority is getting to the
    new DDG-1000. I think these weapons give our combatant
    commanders a lot of capability that we do not have today.
        So the Department continues to push forward on these
    programs. As a matter of fact, we were just over on the other
    side of the Hill this afternoon, talking about all the
    hypersonics programs. So the Department is committed and moving
    forward with development of all those weapons.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. General Ray, as the Global
    Strike Commander, what does the notable acceleration of Chinese
    nuclear modernization and growth mean to you in that position?
        General Ray. Sir, if I had to take something that kept me
    up at night, this is it. It is a breathtaking pace that they
    are keeping. The diversity and what I see is after watching the
    Russians for many years they are playing a very Chinese game, a
    very hybrid game, a very appropriate game for where they are
    and where they want to achieve their goals, you know, how they
    use hypersonics, dual-use systems, their advances in the
    command and control area. I have to be very careful about the
    classification, but if you have not been briefed, you know, at
    the right level of classification we would be glad to help do
    that.
        I will go back to a little bit of Admiral Wolfe's question.
    The Air Force is working, as well, in hypersonics, the ARRW,
    and ultimately the HACM, which is the air-breathing cruise
    missile. We are hoping to have our tests off the B-52 here by
    the end of the month.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you.
        Ms. Tomero, the Biden administration has shared that, where
    possible, they will pursue new arms control agreements. How
    would this impact reduction agreements with Russia and the
    START Treaty, set to end in 2026?
        Ms. Tomero. Sir, as you know the START Treaty will last for
    another 5 years, and provides legally binding constraints,
    verifiable constraints on Russia's deployed strategic weapons.
    But we look forward to building on the extension, and, of
    course, having a follow-on arms control that further address
    the systems that are not covered by New START, and, of course,
    covering systems beyond New START's expiration.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. I think we have a vote beginning, but I think
    we have more time. If it is a 10-minute vote that means we have
    about a half hour.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator King. If you were ever given 10 minutes to live,
    you should say, ``I would like it to be during a 10-9 minute
    vote in the Senate.'' [laughter]
        So quick question. Admiral Wolfe, there were real problems
    with the welds in the missile silos for the new Columbia. Has
    that been corrected? Are we back on track? Did we lose
    schedule?
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. So you are correct. We did
    have issues with the welds on the missile tubes early on. What
    PEO Columbia has done is they have gotten to the root cause of
    that. They have it under control. We did lose some schedule
    margin. I would say that we did not lose schedule in the
    overall delivery of the Columbia, the first of class. PEO
    Columbia continues to monitor that and continues to watch as
    all of the vendors are producing these missile tubes and making
    sure that we are meeting not just what we need for the
    Columbia-class but also those same missile tubes are being
    delivered to the UK for the Dreadnought-class as well, and we
    have revised the schedule and we are tracking to that schedule.
        Senator King. Thank you. General Ray, we have been talking
    all day about deterrence, and deterrence rests upon two
    things--credibility and will. Would it undermine our deterrent
    posture to not modernize, particularly for the missile systems
    which are now going on 50, 60 years old? In other words, would
    not modernizing itself send a signal that would not be good in
    terms of our ability to deter our adversaries?
        General Ray. Sir, I think that is exactly the case. I think
    our adversaries know exactly what we can and cannot do, and
    they are busy preparing counters to those. To not respond to
    that or let that be the status quo would be very detrimental to
    our deterrent, or basically our capability.
        Senator King. It just seemed to me that would be a signal.
    We are not modernizing and therefore the credibility of the
    deterrent diminishes.
        Let's see. Mr. Walter, we have talked about NC3, and
    Senator Manchin mentioned it. I really think instead of talking
    about the triad we ought to be talking about the quad, because
    without NC3, nothing else works, and if that is a
    vulnerability, I am sure you have read, all the books about
    World War III start with a cyberattack, and so it has got to be
    absolutely bulletproof, and I guess cyber-proof.
        Mr. Walter, reassure me.
        Mr. Walter. Yes, sir. If I could take it a step farther,
    when we speak about the nuclear deterrent we tend to speak
    about five key components. As I mentioned in my opening
    statement, there is the weapons, there is the delivery systems,
    and that is what most people think about. But the nuclear
    command and control system, the NC3 system, underpins all of
    that, and allows the President to exercise the options
    available.
        Senator King. If we have learned anything in the last year
    it is that our systems are vulnerable, even Defense Department
    systems.
        Mr. Walter. Many of our legacy, current systems in the NC3
    world, were also developed and deployed during the Cold War. So
    they remain safe, secure, they remain effective, but as we look
    to modernize them, the services spend an awful lot of time with
    the oversight on ensuring they remain so in the face of cyber
    challenges. We may not even fully understand what cyber
    challenges we may face in 10 years from now.
        If could just add the two other components to the five-part
    nuclear triad, as I said, the infrastructure that underpins all
    of it, including at the National Nuclear Security
    Administration, and their ability to produce weapons, and the
    industrial base on the Department of Defense side; and then
    finally the workforce, the people, which you mentioned and we
    have all mentioned.
        Senator King. Thank you. Admiral Wolfe, I have heard the
    argument that we do not need the missiles because the
    submarines are invulnerable. They are stealthy. They cannot be
    found. My concern is that that may be true today but it may not
    be true in 5 to 10 years with the development of technology.
    Ten years ago, we thought our space assets were invulnerable.
    Now we know they are not. Comment on that, please.
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. So the Navy----
        Senator King. I do not expect an admiral to say, ``My
    submarines are vulnerable,'' but----
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. No, sir. So what I would tell you is
    the Navy continuously monitors, through intelligence sources
    and others, what capabilities the adversary may be developing,
    and we stay ahead of that. We have, within the submarine force,
    security programs, and I would be happy to talk to you at a
    more classified level if you would like, about the things that
    we look at and the things that we monitor. As we look at new
    submarine development, all of that is taken into account, and
    we design those systems so that we can stay ahead of that.
        Senator King. I appreciate that, but it is a question of
    where you are putting all your eggs, and there are still
    technological vulnerability 5, 10 years from now. But I
    appreciate that you are cognizant of this risk.
        Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our
    witnesses. I want to get to the questions--I know that Senator
    Warren was asking some questions about missile defense. I want
    to give you--and I am sure you are familiar with this, but
    homeland missile defense has had a history of being partisan.
    By that I mean Republicans, George W. Bush, President Trump
    were very supportive of it. Democrat administrations, not so
    much.
        We worked hard, this Committee worked hard, to make it
    bipartisan. I had a bill, Advancing America's Missile Defense
    Act of 2017, that had 20 Republican, 10 Democrat co-sponsors,
    and it was the big missile defense build-up. So I was surprised
    by Senator Warren's questioning, particularly of you, Ms.
    Tomero, about, hey, maybe it is not so relevant, maybe it is
    not so needed. I kind of thought we had moved beyond that, but
    maybe history is repeating itself here. I hope not.
        Secretary Austin has said, in his confirmation, that the
    defense of the Homeland and missile defense is a central
    component of DOD's mission, the relationship between missile
    defense, U.S. nuclear arsenals are complementary and mutually
    supportive. Deputy Secretary Hicks said, ``Defense of the
    homeland is top priority, and the Homeland missile defense
    system is an essential component to that mission.''
        So, Ms. Tomero, is that your belief as well? I know Senator
    Warren said, ``Well, North Korea might be able to overwhelm
    us.'' I do not agree with that. It is a little bit fatalistic.
    What is your view--I think it is a strong one--on the
    importance of our Nation's Homeland missile defense right now?
        Ms. Tomero. Yes, I completely agree. Homeland missile
    defense is a high priority.
        Senator Sullivan. You have to turn your mic on.
        Ms. Tomero. Yes, I completely agree, and can guarantee that
    homeland missile defense is a high priority----
        Senator Sullivan. Okay, so----
        Ms. Tomero.--limited homeland missile defense against
    threats from rogue states that continue to grow, especially
    from North Korea, and that will continue to be our top
    priority, from a policy perspective.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. You know, we just completed--it is
    ready to be turned on here any day--the long-range
    discrimination radar system, which will be the most advanced
    ground-based missile discrimination radar anywhere in the
    world. That is in Clear Air Station Alaska, as you probably
    know. We have dramatically built up the missile fields.
        However, as you know, we have 20 silos that are now empty.
    That does not make sense. How quickly can we get missiles, and
    the kill vehicles on top of those, into those silos at Fort
    Greely right now that are empty? I think that should be a
    priority of the Department. Is that a priority, and how quickly
    can we do that? Do you agree with me, that does not make any
    sense, 20 empty silos?
        Ms. Tomero. I am aware that we are increasing and improving
    our missile defense capability, and adding those 20 silos is
    part of the improvement.
        Senator Sullivan. The silos are done. The silos are ready.
    The silos just do not have missiles.
        Ms. Tomero. Right, and so we are investing in a new
    interceptor, as you mentioned, and so looking at ways to
    continue to have a strong homeland missile defense and ways to
    improve will be something we look at as part of the missile
    defense review. But in terms of how fast and the capability I
    would defer you to the Missile Defense Agency to provide more
    details on the acquisition piece.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay. Mr. Chairman, this is a big issue,
    I think, for the country.
        Senator King. I believe we are having a hearing just on
    that subject in several weeks, on missile defense.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Well, with that I yield my time
    back. Thank you.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator King. But as usual, you were effective in stating
    your case.
        The vote has started, but I stole a second round, but if
    any of my colleagues would like to ask follow-up questions.
    Senator Fischer?
        Senator Fischer. I am going to focus on nuclear, although
    we do appreciate Senator Sullivan's passion for missile
    defense, because it is an extremely important part of our
    national security, so thank you, Senator.
        Ms. Tomero, it is my understanding that your office has
    asked CAPE to do an analysis on the Minuteman III life
    extension. Is that correct?
        Ms. Tomero. We have not.
        Senator Fischer. Oh, you have not?
        Ms. Tomero. No. We have been working with CAPE to look at
    what past studies have been done on extending Minuteman III, on
    the cost-effectiveness on looking at GBSD. But no new studies
    are on the way. I expect that we will continue to work with
    CAPE throughout the review.
        Senator Fischer. So you have been in discussions with CAPE
    on analysis, though, on the review. Right?
        Ms. Tomero. We have, but no new analysis has been tasked,
    and as I come up to speed in the Department in my new role is
    understanding what past reviews had been done to inform the way
    forward.
        Senator Fischer. Have you coordinated with STRATCOM at all
    on that, or the Air Force Global Strike Command, or Mr.
    Walter's office in getting up to speed on it?
        Ms. Tomero. I expect that they have access to the past
    reviews, as my office would have. But going forward, certainly
    we will coordinate closely with the Joint Staff, with Strategic
    Command, with the components of Strategic Command as well, and
    so I actually was just accompanying Secretary Austin on his
    trip to Strategic Command. He was there the day after your
    visit, and so close engagement with Strategic Command will be a
    priority.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. Yeah, I would hope you would reach
    out to them, especially as you are preparing for a nuclear
    posture review.
        Ms. Tomero. Yeah. In fact, I stayed behind after the
    Secretary's trip for 2 days of meetings and briefings at
    Strategic Command, and I look forward to continuing our close
    engagement.
        Senator Fischer. As you are working your way into that,
    will you be able to brief our staffs so that we are kind of up
    to date on where you are headed? A lot of times we get the
    book, and that is it. But it would be really valuable if we
    could have information along the way, and not just from your
    office but also with the different agencies that you are
    working with on it, the combatant commands. That would be very
    helpful if you would do that.
        Ms. Tomero. Yeah, I look forward to engaging with you and
    your staff over the summer, and I am also happy to, even before
    we start, to listen to what your interests would be and what
    you would like to see, as well.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you. When we are talking about
    treaties and New START, and we had the extension with New
    START, do you think there would ever be a time in dealing with
    the Russians, since that is who the treaty is with, not the
    Chinese, do you think there would ever be a time that the
    United States would have a proposal for unilateral reductions?
        Ms. Tomero. I am not aware of any proposals for unilateral
    reductions.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you, and one point I would
    like to ask General Ray, when we visited with you up in Minot,
    and you mentioned it in passing here, and I think it is such an
    extremely important point. When we talk about the triad and the
    importance of the triad to our national security, I think we
    missed that connection that in many ways we only have a dyad,
    because of the bombers being on alert. How would you answer
    that?
        General Ray. Ma'am, what I would say is that you have a
    triad. It is in varying degrees of posture, based on the
    current world threat that we have, that I would say is becoming
    more dangerous. I have the ability to rapidly bring up my
    bombers and put them on alert. I will say that the more weapons
    generation facilities I have to do that with allows me to do
    that late. You want to generate at the last minute, not 5
    minutes too early and not 5 minutes too late. But I believe it
    gives a very visible and flexible opportunity, that we have not
    had to leverage in the current world environment. But it would
    become even more difficult in the future.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator Rounds?
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, General Ray,
    I would be remiss if I did not follow up with that other leg of
    the triad that Senator Fischer just brought up, and that is the
    one with regard to our bombers. We have, first of all, a fleet
    of B-1Bs which are not nuclear capable, because of treaty
    determination, to begin with. Second of all, we have the B-52,
    which is 70 years-plus old, and the B-2, which is limited in
    numbers. The weapons generations facilities are limited in
    number right now.
        Ellsworth Air Force Base, which will be the home for the B-
    21, will need a weapons generation facility, which may very
    well mean with regarding infrastructure we will have to find
    the resources. I know that it is on target, but a very critical
    part of the discussion. An item which we sometimes just simply
    are taking for granted lately, and which I do not want to
    because we talk about those areas where we are not being
    successful or we are not satisfied.
        But with regard to the development of the B-21, this is
    probably one of the most advanced weapon systems ever developed
    by mankind. I tell people it is a bad-ass weapon of war and
    peace, but it is a system which clearly, as I understand it, is
    on time and on target, with regard to the budget.
        Would you care to confirm that, and basically give us an
    update on where that B-21 is at?
        General Ray. Yes, sir. I was just out at Palmdale last
    week, on Thursday, and I had a chance to go down the line. It
    is on time. It is incredibly successful. Between the GBSD and
    the B-21, these feature all the attributes that you would want
    to have featured in a modern weapon system--digital
    engineering, modularity in their design, open mission systems,
    mature technology. The digital engineering on both of those is
    giving us an unprecedented degree of capability.
        I believe when we briefed Chairman Smith a few weeks about
    how we are going to bring this on, with a codified methodology
    to rapidly bring on new techs when we had the opportunity, it
    meant that we were never going to change the requirements,
    because we had no incentive.
        So the pledge I have, and, you know, when I talked to Ms.
    Warden at Northrop Grumman, she knows full well I am not going
    to change any requirements, and if the requirements remain
    stable, we remain on cost, we remain on time, and I think we
    have a tremendous ability to rapidly bring on for the B-21 new
    radios, new weapons, new sensors, all those things that give us
    velocity, but also lets us have a very competitive sustainment
    game plan, and that applies to both the B-21 and the GBSD.
        Senator Rounds. Very good. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Senator King. Senator Tuberville?
        Senator Tuberville. How long will it be until we have
    somebody from Space Command in this room, General Ray, for
    nuclear?
        General Ray. Sir, I will be honest. I have no answer to
    that question. I would have to go back to the Chief of Staff of
    the Air Force and to the Chief of the Space Force.
        Senator Tuberville. Do you think it is near future? Just
    any guess?
        General Ray. Sir, I am not going to speculate on that. I
    will take your question for the record.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you.
        Senator King. Thank you to all of our witnesses. Thank you
    for your open and frank discussion today, and for the work that
    you are doing for the country. With that, this hearing is
    adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 6:03 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]

                               APPENDIX A

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022 AND
                        THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, MAY 19, 2021

                          United States Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

         DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ATOMIC DEFENSE ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 5:06 p.m. in room
    SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Angus King
    (presiding) Chairman of the Subcommittee.
        Committee Members present: Senators King, Rosen, Kelly,
    Fischer, Rounds, and Sullivan.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS KING

        Senator King. I foolishly thought a 15-minute Senate vote
    would take 30 minutes. It actually took 50 minutes, and I
    apologize for that naive assumption on my part.
        This is hearing on the Department of Energy's atomic
    defense activities and programs in review of the Defense
    Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2022. First I want to
    thank the witnesses for appearing at today's hearing on your
    defense-related programs to maintain our nuclear weapons
    stockpile, design the reactor to power our Navy's nuclear
    fleet, and clean up former Cold War defense production sites.
        Dr. Verdon, you are representing the NNSA. You are
    undertaking the modernization of five warhead systems to meet
    Department of Defense requirements. This has put a tremendous
    strain on your production plants, and at the same time you are
    rebuilding the infrastructure required to handle nuclear and
    related materials, which, in some cases, dates to the Manhattan
    Project.
        There are single point-of-failure risks to our deterrent. I
    want you to explain to the Subcommittee how you are managing
    these programs and their key risks.
        Admiral Caldwell, you uphold a lineage dating back to
    Admiral Rickover to design and build power reactors for our
    Navy's aircraft carriers and submarine fleet, including the
    Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine whose fuel will last
    over 40 years, the life of the boat. Like Dr. Verdon, I would
    like you to explain to the Committee the challenges you face,
    especially in rebuilding nuclear infrastructure to support the
    Navy's operational fleet.
        Finally, Mr. White, you have perhaps the hardest job in the
    Department of Energy, which is the cleanup of former Cold War
    nuclear production sites. At the Hanford site in Washington
    State alone, you are responsible for 55 million gallons of
    radioactive waste and 177 underground storage tanks, some of
    which are leaking. I will want to know from you what the
    Department is doing to meet the commitments it has made to the
    communities in the region to clean up these sites.
        Again, let me thank everyone for appearing today. After
    Senator Fischer's opening statement each witness will have 5
    minutes for their opening statements and then we will alternate
    with Members present for 5-minute rounds of questions.
        Senator Fischer?

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
    our witnesses today.
        One point that I always find interesting is that the
    witnesses before us today represent about 75 percent of the
    Department of Energy's budget, and yet the important roles the
    Department of Energy and the NNSA, in particular, play in
    supporting our nuclear enterprise is often overlooked.
        But their contributions are absolutely vital. As nuclear
    posture reviews of the last two administrations have affirmed,
    a modern and responsive nuclear infrastructure is absolutely
    necessary to support our nuclear deterrent.
        While progress has been made toward achieving this goal,
    significant challenges remain, and like the Department of
    Defense's modernization efforts, there is simply no margin for
    additional delay. As Admiral Richard noted earlier this year,
    the consequences of failing to modernize our infrastructure are
    immense. In his testimony, he stated, quote, ``If the Nation
    does not continue to address these concerns, no amount of money
    will be able to adequately mitigate operational risks
    associated with key stockpile and infrastructure capability
    losses,'' end quote.
        That is a powerful statement, and it reflect the Department
    of Energy's importance to our national security. So, gentlemen,
    I thank you for the vital work that you each do and for
    appearing before us today, and I look forward to your
    testimony.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Mr. Verdon?

    STATEMENT OF HONORABLE CHARLES P. VERDON, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR,
                NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

        Dr. Verdon. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and
    Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
    testify today. On behalf of the men and women of the nuclear
    security enterprise I express our appreciation for this
    Subcommittee's strong support, bipartisan support, for NNSA's
    nuclear security mission, as demonstrated most recently in the
    fiscal year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act and the
    fiscal year 2021 budget for the Department of Energy.
        Chairman King, a written statement has been provided to
    this Subcommittee and I respectfully request that it be
    submitted for the record.
        Senator King. Without objection.
        Dr. Verdon. So we meet today against the backdrop of a
    world marked by growing security challenges. China and Russia
    are modernizing their nuclear arsenal, investing significantly
    in resources and delivery platforms, and have made clear that
    nuclear weapons will be a vital element of their state craft.
        At the same time, the risk for proliferation of nuclear
    weapons and weapons of mass destruction pose profound and
    existential dangers. Recognizing these global security
    challenges, the President's Fiscal Year 2022 Discretionary
    Funding Request for NNSA reflect support for the three enduring
    missions which Congress charged the NNSA in the year 2000:
    ensuring the safety, security and effectiveness of the U.S.
    nuclear stockpile; reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation
    and nuclear terrorism around the world; and providing nuclear
    propulsion for the U.S. Navy's fleet of aircraft carriers and
    submarines that are critical to the U.S. national security and
    our allies.
        NNSA continues to focus on ensuring the safety, security,
    and military effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Our
    alignment and synchronization with the Department of Defense,
    coordinated through the Nuclear Weapons Council remains
    essential and continues to improve. The Fiscal Year 2022
    Discretionary Funding Request enables NNSA to execute its
    warhead modernization and infrastructure modernization efforts
    begun under the Obama administration.
        The administration is beginning its undertaking of a formal
    review of the efforts to modernize our nuclear deterrent to
    include the DOD delivery platforms, the nuclear weapons
    required for those platforms, and the NNSA infrastructure
    needed to produce and maintain those weapons. Regardless of the
    review's specific findings, so long as we retain a nuclear
    arsenal we must have the infrastructure and the science,
    technology, and engineering to produce and maintain the nuclear
    weapons stockpile.
        Unfortunately, the NNSA production infrastructure has
    atrophied considerably, both in terms of the physical
    infrastructure and the capabilities needed within those
    facilities. Continued recapitalization is an imperative. The
    potential impacts to the U.S. deterrent, if not addressed, are
    no longer over the horizon. They have become visible.
        Key also are attracting and retaining the personnel needed
    to continue to ensure our stockpile remains safe and effective
    and to operate and maintain NNSA facilities safely and
    securely. As NNSA mission scope increases, so does the demand
    for increased personnel to execute the missions to include
    supporting new facilities and capabilities brought online and
    moving to 24/7 operations at many sites across the complex.
        In addition our mission to ensuring continued effectiveness
    of the nuclear stockpile, nonproliferation also remains an
    important and growing priority. NNSA's Office of Defense
    Nuclear Nonproliferation is critical to implementing the
    President's call to ``lock down fissile and radiological
    materials around the world.'' The Fiscal Year 2022
    Discretionary Funding Request enables NNSA's Office of Defense
    Nuclear Nonproliferation to continue to work worldwide with our
    partners to prevent states and non-state actors from developing
    nuclear weapons or acquiring weapons-usable nuclear or
    radiological materials, equipment, technology, and expertise.
        With regards to our third mission of providing nuclear
    propulsion for the United States Navy, the Office of Naval
    Reactors remains at the forefront of technological development
    in naval nuclear propulsion by advancing new technologies and
    improvements in naval reactor performance. This preeminence
    provides the U.S. Navy with a commanding edge in naval
    warfighting capabilities. Again, the discretionary budget put
    forth for fiscal year 2022 supports the Office of Naval
    Reactors to continue their programs that are so vital to our
    security of our Nation and our allies.
        Then finally, despite the challenges posed by the COVID-19
    pandemic, I am pleased to report that NNSA did not miss a
    single milestone or DOD requirement during this period. This
    achievement is a testament to the professionalism of the NNSA's
    world-class workforce and the leadership of our sites and their
    deep commitment to our national security missions.
        So I thank you again for the strong support of this
    Committee and the opportunity to testify before you today, and
    I stand ready to answer any questions you have.
        [The prepared statement of The Honorable Dr. Charles P.
    Verdon follows:]

     Prepared Statement by Statement of The Honorable Dr. Charles P. Verdon
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and Members of the
    Subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you, on behalf of
    Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration
    (NNSA), with my colleagues William ``Ike'' White and Admiral James
    ``Frank'' Caldwell. NNSA greatly appreciates the Subcommittee's
    bipartisan support for our nuclear security missions.
        NNSA is committed to supporting the President's national security
    strategy. The President's Fiscal Year 2022 Discretionary Funding
    Request reflects the U.S. commitment to maintain a safe, secure, and
    effective nuclear weapons stockpile, reduce global nuclear threats, and
    provide the U.S. Navy's submarines and aircraft carriers with
    militarily effective nuclear propulsion. NNSA is on track to modernize
    the nuclear stockpile with our life extension and alteration programs;
    make substantial progress on maintaining, repairing, and recapitalizing
    NNSA's deteriorating infrastructure; provide policy and technical
    leadership to address all aspects of the nuclear threat reduction
    mission; and deliver nuclear propulsion that meets the U.S. Navy's
    operational requirements.
        The U.S. nuclear deterrent is the foundation of our national
    defense, and its credibility serves as the ultimate insurance policy
    against a nuclear or large-scale conventional attack. We must contend
    with the reality of renewed peer competition, which is creating new
    threats. The world is in a moment of many global challenges. China and
    Russia are modernizing their nuclear arsenals, and the risk of
    proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction
    pose profound and existential dangers. In the face of these challenges,
    it is our most solemn obligation to protect the security of the
    American people. The United States must be responsive to the increasing
    desire for state and non-state actors to reshape the world in their
    favor at the expense of our Nation, allies, and partners, and at times
    in contravention of international norms.
                         a changing threat environment
        The Fiscal Year 2022 Discretionary Funding Request enables NNSA to
    execute its long-standing nuclear modernization efforts begun under the
    Obama-Biden Administration while this Administration undertakes its
    formal review of efforts to modernize our nuclear deterrent, to include
    Department of Defense delivery platforms, the nuclear weapons required
    for those platforms, and the NNSA infrastructure needed to produce and
    maintain those weapons. This will preserve space for future policy
    decisions related to nuclear modernization, nuclear nonproliferation
    and counterterrorism, and naval reactors as the Administration adjusts
    to the changing international threats facing America. Russia, China,
    and our adversaries should make no mistake--America will do whatever is
    necessary to deter our enemies and provide stability in our strategic
    relationships with allies and partners.
        The U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile is currently safe, secure, and
    militarily effective. However, the legacy stockpile systems are aging,
    and NNSA's production infrastructure has atrophied considerably.
    America must invest in the weapons and infrastructure modernization
    programs to provide the capabilities needed to ensure the deterrent's
    viability into the future. Future American political leaders will not
    have the weapons and infrastructure in place to support the nuclear
    arsenal unless we reestablish that capability now.
        The need to modernize the nuclear weapons stockpile and
    recapitalize the supporting infrastructure needed to produce and
    maintain that stockpile has reached a tipping point. Approximately 60
    percent of NNSA's facilities are more than 40 years old and more than
    50 percent are in poor condition. Assessments of facilities throughout
    the enterprise have identified numerous single-point failures.
    Production capabilities allowed to lapse are needed once again and
    reestablishing these capabilities is both a priority and a challenge.
    If not appropriately addressed, the age and condition of NNSA's
    infrastructure will put at risk NNSA's missions, and the safety of its
    workforce, the public, and the environment.
        With support from the Administration and Congress, NNSA is
    undertaking a risk-informed, complex, and time-constrained
    modernization and recapitalization effort. To do so, NNSA must rely on
    its own industrial base within its nuclear security enterprise for some
    critical processes and parts, in addition to using commercial industry.
    NNSA manages eight government-owned, contractor-operated organizations
    throughout the country focused on the nuclear security enterprise. This
    includes national security laboratories, production plants, and sites
    that perform the research, development, production, and dismantlement
    necessary to maintain and certify a safe, secure, reliable, and
    effective nuclear stockpile.
        NNSA's unique and specialized capabilities also extend to global
    nonproliferation efforts. NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation (DNN) supports future arms control negotiations with
    well researched, tested, and evaluated technologies that strengthen
    confidence in verification of treaty obligations. DNN's unique
    capabilities are critical to America's national security and welfare,
    working worldwide to prevent state and non-state actors from developing
    nuclear weapons or acquiring weapons-usable nuclear or radiological
    materials, equipment, technology, and expertise.
        In addition, the U.S. Nuclear Navy remains second to none, largely
    because Congress and the American people have strongly supported and
    invested in the Office of Naval Reactors, which is responsible for the
    U.S. Navy's nuclear propulsion work. Nuclear propulsion for the U.S.
    Navy's fleet of submarines and aircraft carriers is critical to the
    security of the U.S. and its allies, as well as the security of global
    sea lanes.
                                    covid-19
        I am pleased to report NNSA did not miss a single major milestone
    or Department of Defense (DOD) requirement because of the COVID-19
    pandemic. We completed our mission while ensuring the health and safety
    of the workforce during the global pandemic. It is a testament to the
    dedication of the men and women of the nuclear security enterprise that
    NNSA met its major deliverables and reflects our deep commitment to
    protecting America's national security.
        NNSA accomplished this by adopting a policy of maximum telework and
    social distancing to safeguard the health and welfare of the workforce,
    while also identifying mission-critical activities that could not be
    performed remotely. NNSA worked with its M&O contractors to set
    priorities and relied on them to make decisions based on the local
    situation, input from health officials, and regulations to protect
    their workforce.
                               weapons activities
    Stockpile Management
        NNSA's Office of Defense Programs, in coordination with the DOD,
    has supported the nuclear deterrent for almost 30 years without the
    need for additional nuclear explosive testing. In fiscal year 2021, the
    science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program allowed the Secretaries of
    Energy and Defense to certify to the President for the 25th consecutive
    year the nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe, secure, and militarily
    effective. This remarkable scientific achievement is made possible
    through the expertise of NNSA's world-class scientists, engineers, and
    technicians, and prior investments made in the necessary infrastructure
    and tools.
        The B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP) consolidates four variants
    of the B61 gravity bomb and improves the safety and security of a
    weapon that first entered service in 1966. Currently in Phase 6.5,
    First Production Unit, the B61-12 LEP has achieved first production on
    most of its components and will achieve the system's first production
    unit (FPU) in the first quarter of fiscal year 2022.
        The W88 Alteration (Alt) 370 supports the sea-based leg of the
    nuclear triad and is currently in Phase 6.5 with a system FPU date on
    track for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2021. Nearly all major
    components have completed their respective FPUs.
        The W80-4 LEP is currently in Phase 6.3, Development Engineering,
    in support of the U.S. Air Force Long Range Standoff (LRSO) program.
    fiscal year 2022 will see a planned ramp-up of production development
    and design activities as the program transitions to Phase 6.4,
    Production Engineering.
        The W87-1 Modification Program will replace the aging W78-0
    warhead. NNSA has planned first production in fiscal year 2030 to
    support fielding on the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent ballistic
    missile system in the Mk21A reentry vehicle. The program will deploy
    new technologies that improve safety and security and improve
    manufacturability. Efforts in the next fiscal year will focus on
    completion of the Weapon Design and Cost Report, conducting an
    independent cost estimate, and entry into Phase 6.3.
        The W93/Mk7 is a new program of record authorized by Congress in
    fiscal year 2021 and was established to meet DOD requirements. Starting
    the W93 program in fiscal year 2021 ensured coordinated development of
    the warhead along with the Navy's Mk7 aeroshell program. The W93 will
    incorporate modern technologies to improve safety, security, and
    flexibility to address future threats, and will be designed for ease of
    manufacturing, maintenance, and certification. All the key nuclear
    components will be based on previously tested nuclear designs and will
    not require underground nuclear explosive testing to certify. Fiscal
    year 2022 will focus on completion of Phase 1 activities and entry into
    Phase 2, Feasibility Study and Design Options.
    Production Modernization
        The Production Modernization program focuses on the production
    capabilities of nuclear weapons components critical to weapon
    performance, including primaries, secondaries, radiation cases, and
    non-nuclear components. Activities within this program support the
    Primary Capability Modernization, Secondary Capability Modernization,
    and Non-Nuclear Component Modernization programs.
        Primary Capability Modernization includes the plutonium program and
    the high explosives and energetics programs. NNSA urgently needs to
    recapitalize our plutonium pit production fabrication capabilities to
    support our weapons modernization programs, as high explosive and
    energetic materials are required for every weapon system in the
    stockpile and are also under increasing demand.
        NNSA's priority infrastructure need is reestablishing a modestly
    sized production capacity for plutonium pits. This summer, efforts will
    focus on advancing the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility
    through the Critical Decision (CD) process from CD-0 (Mission Need) to
    CD-1 (Alternative Selection and Cost Range) and beginning the process
    toward CD-2 (Performance Baseline) 90 percent design complete. At Los
    Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), the Los Alamos Plutonium Pit
    Production Project achieved CD-1 in April 2021 and work has begun on
    developing the 90 percent design package needed for CD-2. This two-site
    approach is necessary to re-establish the Nation's ability to produce
    plutonium pits in support of defense requirements, and to provide
    needed resiliency against unplanned outages.
        Secondary Capability Modernization includes our Uranium, Depleted
    Uranium, Lithium, Tritium, and Domestic Uranium Enrichment programs.
    All these programs support the nuclear stockpile and face
    infrastructure and lapsed capability concerns. NNSA is continuing its
    progress on the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF), which remains on
    budget. UPF construction will support 2,500 good-paying jobs in 2022
    and 1,100 jobs in 2023. NNSA is also working with its partners to
    increase production of tritium and is in the early phases of designing
    the Tritium Finishing Facility (TFF), to replace a 1950s-era facility.
    The United States no longer maintains a lithium purification capability
    and relies on material recycling as its main source, which will be
    exhausted soon. These operations currently take place in a World War
    II-era building well beyond its design life, putting both operators and
    processing at risk. NNSA plans to modernize lithium purification and
    processing operations in a new Lithium Processing Facility (LPF) built
    to modern standards.
        Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization includes programs to modernize
    production of non-nuclear components for multiple weapon systems. Non-
    nuclear components are a significant portion of the costs for the
    warhead modernization programs due to the number of parts, complexity,
    and testing required to establish confidence the components will
    continue to function over the required 20- to 30-year lifetime.
        This ongoing successful capital project implementation is advancing
    at a critical time. As Commander Admiral Charles Richard from U.S.
    Strategic Command recently testified, ``We simply cannot continue to
    indefinitely life extend Cold War leftover systems...and successfully
    carryout our national strategy. A particular concern is the aging
    nuclear weapons stockpile and supporting infrastructure and we can
    reach a point where no amount of money will adequately mitigate the
    operational risks the Nation will face due to infrastructure and human
    talent capability losses.'' Put another way: time is money. Continued
    recapitalization is imperative, otherwise there will be a point at
    which no amount of money will be able to mitigate the operational risks
    and losses to infrastructure capabilities that accrued over time.
    Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering (SRT&E)
        SRT&E provides the data and tools that underpin science-based
    stockpile decisions, including the knowledge and expertise needed to
    maintain confidence in the nuclear stockpile without the need for
    additional underground nuclear explosive testing.
        SRT&E covers many critical programs for the nuclear security
    enterprise.
        The Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments (ECSE) will
    produce experimental data enabling assessment of the current stockpile
    and certification of the future stockpile, minimizing the future need
    to return to nuclear testing. This capability is needed to help
    underpin confidence in the certification of the W80-4 LEP, W87-1
    Modification, and future warhead acquisition programs.
        The Exascale Computing Initiative (ECI) will provide NNSA with
    next-generation simulation capabilities to support weapons design,
    warhead assessment and certification, and continued development of the
    underpinning science needed to support the nuclear stockpile long-term.
    NNSA remains on track to accept and operate NNSA's first Exascale high
    performance computing system for program use in 2023.
        The Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) program provides high energy
    density (HED) science capabilities and expertise to provide the data
    needed to advance warhead performance and production science, and to
    inform design choices for warhead acquisition programs. In addition,
    activities like the pursuit of ignition provide not only important
    scientific understanding, but a unique training environment for the
    workforce.
        These programs, along with our advanced computing and simulation,
    technology maturation, academic programs, and other SRT&E missions are
    essential to maintaining our confidence in the stockpile.
        NNSA provides significant investment in grants and cooperative
    agreements with top universities across the country every year, through
    programs such as the Stewardship Science
        Academic Alliances Program and the Minority Serving Institution
    Partnership Program (MSIPP) to recruit the next generation of
    scientists and engineers for our nuclear security enterprise, and to
    conduct cutting-edge science in national security and nonproliferation.
    In support of the President's effort to eliminate inequities in
    Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (STEM), MSIPP's mission is
    to create and foster a sustainable STEM-pipeline that prepares a
    diverse workforce of world-class talent through strategic partnerships
    between Minority serving Institutions and the nuclear security
    enterprise.
                         infrastructure and operations
        NNSA's infrastructure needs are greater than the production
    complex. NNSA's infrastructure includes office buildings, light
    laboratories, emergency operations centers, fire houses, roads,
    utilities, and the specialized equipment used to support our missions.
    Infrastructure is the foundation that supports all NNSA missions.
    Modern, efficient, sustainable, and resilient infrastructure is needed
    for the nuclear deterrent, nonproliferation, counterterrorism,
    emergency response, leading-edge research, and solving the climate
    crisis. NNSA's mission execution is threatened by deteriorating
    facilities built during the Manhattan Project and Cold War eras. Today,
    nearly 60 percent of NNSA's $116 billion worth of real property
    infrastructure is beyond its design life, half of all facilities are in
    poor condition, and the average age of NNSA's facilities is 47 years
    old.
        NNSA infrastructure must be resilient and provide the capabilities
    and capacities for executing its vital national security missions into
    the future. This requires an array of complementary strategies,
    including minor and major construction projects, short-term leasing,
    purchases, and timely disposition of excess facilities. We must
    modernize and upgrade antiquated infrastructure and address safety and
    programmatic risks through strategic, risk-informed investments that
    directly support our nuclear weapons and nonproliferation programs.
        Also, key are the personnel needed to safely and securely operate
    and maintain all NNSA facilities. As NNSA mission scope increases, so
    does the demand for increased personnel to support new facilities and
    capabilities being brought on-line, and to support moving to 24/7
    operations at many sites across the complex. These individuals are
    essential to minimizing unplanned outages and to supporting safe and
    secure operations, particularly in high hazard operations.
    Defense Nuclear Security Efforts
        The Office of Defense Nuclear Security's (DNS) primary mission is
    protecting the facilities, people, and assets that are critical to
    achieving NNSA's important national security missions. While NNSA faces
    challenges replacing and refreshing aging physical security
    infrastructure, it is making key investments to recapitalize this
    infrastructure through the Security Infrastructure Revitalization
    Program. Increased security requirements are associated with growth
    across the nuclear security enterprise, including plutonium pit
    production efforts. DNS is focused on countering the threat posed by
    unmanned aircraft systems and aims to complete the installation of
    counter unmanned aircraft systems at Y-12, the Pantex Plant, and the
    Nevada National Security Site.
    Enhancing Cybersecurity
        Information Technology and Cybersecurity enable every element of
    NNSA's missions. To meet future requirements, NNSA must modernize its
    outdated and legacy technology. NNSA must undertake activities and
    projects that will improve the security of NNSA networks and data,
    including recapitalizing and modernizing aging infrastructure,
    executing the IT modernization strategy, and stabilizing inherited
    legacy networks, systems, and applications and finally, the Emergency
    Communications Network (ECN). In addition to modernizing legacy
    networks, NNSA is looking ahead at emerging technologies, which has
    propelled the convergence of IT and Operational Technology. As NNSA
    mission requirements expand in scope, IT and cyber programs require
    modernization, expansion, and innovation in a commensurate fashion.
    Cybersecurity is a defense and deterrence mechanism and a powerful
    tool. In the current threat environment, NNSA cannot afford to neglect
    its cybersecurity capabilities, which serve as frontline assets that
    protect the information, systems, and networks on which NNSA depends to
    execute its mission.
                        defense nuclear nonproliferation
        NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) is critical
    to implementing the President's call to ``lock down fissile and
    radiological materials around the world.'' DNN works worldwide with our
    partners to prevent state and non-state actors from developing nuclear
    weapons or acquiring weapons-usable nuclear or radiological materials,
    equipment, technology, and expertise. Around the globe, DNN has
    eliminated the need for weapons-usable material at over 100 civilian
    sites and removed over 7,200 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU)
    and plutonium from almost 50 countries, achieving permanent threat
    reduction. DNN's unique capabilities are critical to America's national
    security and welfare: from promoting and supporting International
    Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements internationally; to
    supporting diplomatic arms control efforts such as the successfully
    extended New START treaty with Russia; to partnering with U.S. industry
    to support non-HEU based production of the vital medical isotope
    molybdenum-99, which is used in 40,000 procedures every day in the
    United States.
    Nuclear Terrorism and Incident Response
        NNSA's Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response (NCTIR)
    includes two subprograms: Emergency Operations (EO) and
    Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation (CTCP).
        EO provides both the structure and processes the Department uses to
    prevent, prepare for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all-
    hazards emergencies that threaten life and property. In addition, EO
    provides the framework for building, assessing, and improving
    organizational resilience to ensure uninterrupted performance and
    delivery of the Department's Essential Functions under any
    circumstance.
        CTCP provides capabilities to counter and respond to nuclear
    incidents and accidents worldwide. The foundation of NNSA's diverse
    missions is an unparalleled command of nuclear science, which is
    harnessed to understand and contend with global nuclear threats. CTCP's
    expertise influences a wide range of policies to keep nuclear material
    beyond the reach of terrorists, including security standards for the
    storage and transport of such material. The office shares knowledge of
    nuclear and radiological threats with federal, state, local, and
    international partners by conducting training, exercises, and
    information exchanges to strengthen emergency preparedness and
    response. CTCP also develops tools to impede the efforts of proliferant
    states to obtain nuclear capabilities.
        CTCP manages the Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST), a cadre of
    on-call technical specialists who are trained and equipped to respond
    to all manner of nuclear events. Notable NEST capabilities include
    mobile teams that can search for nuclear devices and technical
    personnel whose knowledge of nuclear weapons is used to characterize
    and defeat such threats. NEST features nuclear forensics capabilities
    to identify the origin of nuclear material outside of regulatory
    control or used in a threat device, allowing the United States to
    credibly threaten retaliation against any state that facilitates an act
    of nuclear terrorism, constituting an important element of the U.S.
    deterrence strategy.
                                 naval reactors
        The Office of Naval Reactors remains at the forefront of
    technological developments in naval nuclear propulsion by advancing new
    technologies and improvements in naval reactor performance. This
    preeminence provides the U.S. Navy with a commanding edge in naval
    warfighting capabilities. Naval Reactors has given the United States
    unmatched reach with an unparalleled record of over 169 million miles
    safely steamed on nuclear power and over 7,300 reactor-years of
    operation.
        Naval Reactors' has three major projects--Columbia-class reactor
    plant development, the refueling overhaul of a research and training
    reactor in New York, and the construction of the Naval Spent Fuel
    Handling Facility in Idaho. Naval Reactors is committed to supporting
    the operational nuclear fleet, continue research and development
    efforts for future generations of nuclear-powered warships, and make
    progress on both the recapitalization of laboratory facilities and the
    environmental remediation of legacy responsibilities.
                                 nnsa workforce
        NNSA cannot accomplish its mission without recruiting, training,
    and retaining a highly technical Federal and M&O workforce. In addition
    to the Federal and M&O workforce, NNSA's success depends on leveraging
    all parts of American society to bring the best quality ideas,
    products, and solutions to our shared challenges. NNSA relies on
    American businesses and labor to execute our national security
    programs. NNSA provided over $3.5 billion in funding for contracting
    opportunities with small businesses and over $789 million to socially
    and economically disadvantaged businesses in 2020. This created many
    high-paying, quality jobs for areas of the country where increased
    employment opportunities for disadvantaged communities are greatly
    needed. These investments demonstrate that NNSA's national security
    missions provide opportunities for all Americans--in fact, our mission
    success depends on them.
                                   conclusion
        NNSA's diverse and enduring national security missions are crucial
    to the security of the United States, the defense of its allies and
    partners, and global stability. NNSA appreciates the many years of
    bipartisan support from this Committee to our mission and looks forward
    to continuing to earn that support into the future.

        Senator King. Thank you, Dr. Verdon. Mr. White?

     STATEMENT OF MR. WILLIAM WHITE, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
                  ENERGY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

        Mr. White. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and
    Members of the Subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before
    you today.
        As the largest environmental cleanup program in the
    country, the Department of Energy's Office of Environmental
    Management is committed to cleaning up to the legacy of the
    national defense programs that helped end World War II and the
    Cold War. Even as we grappled with the COVID pandemic, 2020
    represented an inflection point for the EM mission. The
    dedication and resiliency of the workforce, composed of Federal
    and contractor employees, resulted in a ramp-up in
    transformational tank waste capabilities, historic skyline
    changes, and a continued shrinking cleanup footprint.
        EM achieved a first by completing removal of a former
    uranium enrichment complex at Oak Ridge in Tennessee. The last
    major component of the tank waste cleanup system at Savannah
    River was completed, accelerating our ability to tackle a key
    environmental risk there.
        Our work was completed at the Tonopah Test Range in Nevada
    and at Separations Process Research Unit in New York, enabling
    this land to be transferred from EM.
        EM has entered an era of progress built on the
    accomplishment of our workforce. Across this new era, EM is
    well positioned to protect the environment, support broader
    national security missions, and prepare for the future.
        Radioactive waste stored in underground tanks at Hanford,
    Savannah River, and Idaho is among the largest environmental
    challenges and risks facing the Department. After decades of
    preparation and support from Congress, and with construction of
    facilities required for the Direct Feed Low Activity Waste
    approach complete, Hanford is poised to begin tank waste
    treatment in December of 2021.
        In South Carolina, the tank waste mission is accelerating
    through operation at both the Salt Waste Processing Facility
    and the Defense Waste Processing Facility.
        In Idaho, we are working toward startup of the Integrated
    Waste Treatment Unit, which will treat the remaining sodium
    barium liquid radioactive waste there over the next decade.
        EM is also focused on decontamination and decommissioning
    of excess contaminated facilities across the complex. We have
    made significant progress this year with the demolition of the
    Biology Complex facilities at Y-12, and preparations and work
    are underway on similar efforts at Oak Ridge National
    Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore, Lawrence Berkeley, and other
    sites. This important effort reduces risk and it also benefits
    the broader national security and scientific research missions.
        Modernization efforts are also underway at the Waste
    Isolation Pilot Plant to equip the facility to meet mission
    needs into the future. At the same time, EM is pursuing world-
    class technology development as the Savannah River National
    Laboratory develops innovative solutions in the fields of
    environmental cleanup, national security, science, and energy.
        While remarkable progress has been achieved, the EM mission
    has decades to go. EM is undertaking a rational planning
    approach that will boost the ability to make progress in the
    short term and also advance longer-range mission goals. EM has
    an ambitious slate of priorities that span the next decade, and
    these are outlined in our Strategic Vision, a roadmap of
    priorities through 2031. Among the priorities, completion of
    our cleanup at four sites: the Nevada National Security site,
    Moab, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia.
        In order to support sustainable progress, EM is also
    investing in building and sustaining a workforce with future
    talent that promotes diversity and inclusion. We are also
    building on efforts to improve cost and schedule performance.
    In recent years, EM has demonstrated an ability to deliver
    results, completing several projects ahead of schedule and
    under budget. As the GAO indicated in the latest high-risk
    report for the Department, EM has made strides in strengthening
    program and project management capabilities, and based on GAO
    recommendations, we will continue to focus on improving in this
    important area.
        EM is putting the Federal investment in environmental
    cleanup to work. As we advance the cleanup mission for
    communities across the Nation, a safety-first culture is
    paramount. Cleanup decisions will be based on sound science,
    and EM's mission will be informed by input from a diverse range
    of stakeholders, including those most impacted by the
    environmental legacy of the past.
        I sincerely appreciate the Subcommittee's continued support
    for the EM mission, and I look forward to working with you to
    continue to deliver progress.
        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. William White follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by William ``Ike'' White
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer and Members of the
    Subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today to represent
    the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management
    (EM).
        EM is charged with fulfilling the responsibility to clean up the
    environment in communities that supported national defense weapons
    programs and government-sponsored nuclear energy research so they can
    continue to grow and thrive in the future. The mission carried out by
    EM represents a strong commitment to cleaning up the environmental
    legacy of the national defense programs that helped end World War II
    and the Cold War.
                          delivering on key priorities
        As the largest environmental cleanup program in the world, EM has
    played a key role in the Department's overarching mission to protect
    the planet for over 30 years. Over that time, EM has made significant
    progress, completing cleanup activities at 91 out of a total of 107
    sites. EM's significant accomplishments to date have included
    completing the bulk of cleanup activities along the 220-square mile
    Columbia River Corridor at the Hanford site in Washington state;
    completing 25 years of successful operations at the Defense Waste
    Processing Facility to help address tank waste at the Savannah River
    Site in South Carolina; completing the processing of 65,000 cubic
    meters of legacy transuranic waste at the Idaho Cleanup Project for
    off-site disposal; and opening the world's only deep geological
    repository for defense-related transuranic waste at the Waste Isolation
    Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico.
        Even as EM grappled with the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic,
    2020 represented an inflection point for many sites across the program.
    The dedication and resiliency of the EM workforce resulted in a ramp up
    in transformational tank waste capabilities, historic skyline changes,
    a shrinking cleanup footprint and contracts that accelerate progress.
    Key accomplishments were achieved across EM, some years in the making,
    that position the Department for building momentum for continued
    progress. These included:

          Completing the Vision 2020 initiative at the Oak Ridge
    site in Tennessee. This effort entailed the demolition of more than 500
    structures totaling 13 million square feet at the East Tennessee
    Technology Park, and marked the first complete removal of a former
    uranium enrichment complex in the world.

          Initiating operations of the Salt Waste Processing
    Facility (SWPF) at the Savannah River Site. The SWPF is the last major
    component of the tank waste cleanup system at Savannah River, and its
    operation will provide a transformative leap forward in EM's ability to
    address a key environmental risk at the site.

          Completing construction of those facilities at Hanford
    involved in the Direct Feed Low Activity Waste (DFLAW) system for waste
    treatment. This positions EM to be able to initiate tank waste
    treatment at Hanford in the near-term. In addition, EM completed the
    demolition of the iconic Plutonium Finishing Plant, once one of the
    highest-risk facilities in the DOE complex.

          Completing environmental remediation and restoration work
    at the Tonopah Test Range in Nevada and at the Separations Process
    Research Unit in New York state enabling this land to be transferred
    out of the EM program.

        Building on this strong record of results, EM is entering a new era
    of cleanup progress. EM has an ambitious set of priorities for 2021
    that will result in a ramp up in the ability to tackle radioactive
    waste stored in underground tanks, as well as skyline changes at some
    sites; continued progress in key infrastructure improvements at the
    Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) to position the site to continue to
    support DOE's legacy cleanup and ongoing national security missions;
    and progress in a variety of risk reduction efforts.
        Already this year, EM teams on the ground have ensured that three
    underground structures at Hanford are in stable condition, demolished
    one of the final remaining buildings at the former Biology Complex at
    the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge and progressed
    infrastructure enhancements the Nevada National Security Site Area 5
    Radioactive Waste Management Complex.
                          reducing environmental risks
        As EM enters a new era, built on the strong progress of our
    workforce the Department of Energy is well positioned to tackle the
    tough challenges of addressing radioactive waste stored in underground
    tanks, demolishing contaminated buildings, remediate contaminated soil
    and groundwater, safely managing and disposing of waste, and ultimately
    closing out cleanup sites. In this new era, EM is focused on protecting
    the environment by reducing risks, supporting the broader DOE national
    security missions and preparing for the future of the cleanup mission.
        Protecting the environment by addressing radioactive waste stored
    in underground tanks at the Hanford site, the Savanah River site and
    the Idaho National Laboratory site is a top priority for EM. After
    decades of preparations, the Hanford site is on the precipice of
    initiating tank waste treatment in a few short years via the Direct-
    Feed Low Activity Waste (DFLAW) system. EM is on track for initiating
    radioactive tank waste treatment at Hanford by the end of 2023.
    Upcoming activities in advancing the DFLAW system include cold
    commissioning with simulated tank waste, startup of the melters that
    will turn treated waste into glass and other tests needed before
    initiating tank waste treatment. In order to ensure the safe condition
    of all underground waste tanks at Hanford, EM also maintains a robust
    Tank Integrity Program, which is important for monitoring the condition
    of all underground waste tanks at Hanford.
        The EM team at Hanford is also continuing key risk reduction
    activities to protect the Columbia River including groundwater
    treatment systems, work to prepare Building 324 for demolition, and
    steps toward the ultimate stabilization of the final two of nine
    Hanford reactors. The initiative to transfer radioactive capsules to
    safer dry storage is also continuing.
        In South Carolina, the tank waste treatment mission is accelerating
    through operation of the Salt Waste Processing Facility and the Defense
    Waste Processing Facility. A high state of readiness for H Canyon at
    the Savannah River Site is being maintained. Additional risk reduction
    work is continuing including work towards disposition of remaining
    transuranic waste and remediating contaminated soil and groundwater.
        At the Idaho National Laboratory, EM is working toward start-up of
    the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit (IWTU). Once operational, the IWTU
    will turn about 900,000 gallons of liquid waste into a granular solid.
    Other risk reduction work includes progress towards completion of
    targeted waste exhumations at the Accelerated Retrieval Project as well
    as treatment of contact-handled sludge waste. As these projects
    advance, work will begin to start decontamination and decommissioning
    of the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project.
                     supporting national security missions
        In addition to reducing environmental risks at these and other
    sites across the complex, the EM mission benefits the Department's
    broader national security and scientific research missions. Nowhere is
    this more evident than at Oak Ridge. Oak Ridge is transitioning its
    highly skilled and experienced workforce from the successful demolition
    of the former uranium enrichment complex at the East Tennessee
    Technology Park to begin major cleanup operations at the Oak Ridge
    National Laboratory and Y-12 National Security Complex. EM is advancing
    progress on several near-term priorities at Oak Ridge: disposition of
    the remaining uranium-233 inventory at the Oak Ridge National
    Laboratory, addressing transuranic debris and sludges, completing
    remaining soil cleanup activities at the East Tennessee Technology
    Park, construction of the Mercury Treatment Facility at the Y-12
    National Security Complex and deactivation of former process buildings.
        Key modernization and infrastructure recapitalization priorities
    continue at WIPP, a facility that is essential for the disposal of
    defense-related transuranic waste, aiding not only legacy cleanup
    activities but ongoing national security programs. These priorities
    will help ensure WIPP is equipped to meet the needs of the national
    transuranic waste disposal mission today and into the future.
        EM is also pursuing a world-class technology development program to
    help tackle remaining technical challenges and advance and accelerate
    the overall cleanup mission. The expertise of the Savannah River
    National Laboratory (SRNL) is working to develop innovative solutions
    in the fields of environmental cleanup, national security and science
    and energy security. EM, the National Nuclear Security Administration
    and other DOE missions will benefit from anticipated growth of the
    Laboratory under the recently awarded stand-alone Management and
    Operating contract.
                   strategic planning for new era of cleanup
        With a mission that will span several decades at some sites, EM is
    taking steps to ensure a successful and sustainable program that will
    enable mission completion. EM is undertaking a rational planning
    approach that will boost the Department's ability to both continue
    making impactful progress in the short term, and advance toward
    achieving longer-range mission goals.
        EM has an ambitious slate of priorities that cover not only this
    year, but span the next decade as outlined in its Strategic Vision, a
    document that provides a clear, concise roadmap to guide priorities
    through 2031, including completing legacy cleanup activities at four
    sites including the Nevada National Security Site.
        In order to support this long-term sustainable progress, EM is
    investing in our team to support workforce development and building a
    workforce that promotes diversity and inclusion. That includes opening
    up high-quality job opportunities. The Minority Serving Institutions
    partnership program run through the Savannah River National Laboratory
    is a part of this overarching effort.
                         putting em investment to work
        DOE is putting the federal investment in EM to work to continue
    advancing the cleanup mission. As that work is carried out, a safety-
    first culture will be paramount, clean up decisions will be based on
    sound science and informed by input from a diverse range of
    stakeholders and the states, tribes and communities most directly
    impacted by the environmental legacy of the past will have a seat at
    the table.
        The EM program is fortunate to have the strong support of the
    Energy Secretary and the new DOE leadership team. Most important to our
    success in the new era for cleanup are the talented and dedicated men
    and women across the entire EM program. They share the commitment of
    DOE and EM leadership to this vital mission.
        EM will work hand-in-hand with workers, unions, tribal nations,
    states, local communities, and Congress as progress continues and plans
    are developed for this next era of cleanup and beyond.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                        2020         2021
                                                      Enacted      Enacted
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Carlsbad......................................      403,599      420,066
    ETEC..........................................       18,200       12,000
    Idaho.........................................      446,300      444,500
    Los Alamos....................................      220,000      226,000
    Lawrence Livermore............................       66,727       36,764
    Lawrence Berkeley.............................       31,000       30,100
    Moab..........................................       45,000       47,833
    Nevada........................................       60,737       60,737
    Oak Ridge.....................................      682,348      644,344
    Richland......................................    1,001,301    1,024,900
    River Protection..............................    1,616,000    1,645,000
    Paducah.......................................      314,339      315,885
    Portsmouth....................................      493,427      508,864
    Savannah River................................    1,629,924    1,702,870
    SPRU..........................................       15,300       15,000
    Sandia........................................        2,652        4,860
    West Valley...................................       79,611       92,411
    Defense Closure Site Activities...............        4,987        4,987
    Non-Defense Closure Site Activities...........           --           --
    Program Direction.............................      281,119      289,000
    Mission Support Activities....................       14,179       15,079
    Technology Development........................       25,000       30,000
    Excess Facilities.............................       10,000       10,000
    Use of Mercury Receipts.......................           --        3,000
    Uranium Thorium Reimbursements................        5,250        5,000
    D&D Fund Deposit..............................           --           --
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Subtotal, EM..................................    7,467,000    7,589,200
        UED&D Fund Offset.........................           --           --
        15-D-401 Containerized Sludge Removal (RL)     (11,800)           --
        Use of Mercury Receipts...................           --      (3,000)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total, EM.....................................    7,455,200    7,586,200
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. White, and thank you for that
    progress report, and we look forward to probing some of those
    questions with you.
        Admiral Caldwell.

       STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JAMES F. CALDWELL, JR., USN, DEPUTY
     ADMINISTRATOR FOR OFFICE OF NAVAL REACTORS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR
                        SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

        Admiral Caldwell. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer,
    and distinguished Members of this Subcommittee, thank you for
    the opportunity to testify here today. I also thank this
    Subcommittee for consistently supporting Naval Reactors. This
    enables my team to provide the Navy with propulsion plans that
    give our nuclear-powered warships the incredible advantage of
    unmatched reliability, speed, and endurance to conduct national
    security missions around the world. Naval Reactors' historical
    investment in advanced technologies has maintained our
    competitive edge in the maritime environment for decades. The
    Navy's highly capable nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft
    carriers have ensured our warfighting advantage over potential
    adversaries.
        Today's strategic environment is dynamic and increasingly
    complex. Near-peer rivals are pursuing robust military
    modernization programs aimed at eroding our maritime
    preeminence and narrowing the capability gap. I am focused on
    renewing Naval Reactors' investment in cutting-edge
    technologies to deliver enhanced capabilities to the existing
    fleet and for future ships.
        There are three areas vital to our ability to provide 24/7
    support to the nuclear Navy. First is our small but highly
    skilled Federal workforce. It is our most important resource. I
    am focused on ensuring sufficient Federal staffing to meet the
    demands of sustaining today's fleet and growing future
    capabilities.
        Second, we are renewing our investment in Naval Nuclear
    Laboratory research and development so that we can maintain
    superiority over our competitors. These efforts focus on
    technologies with the potential to deliver greater capability
    with lower acquisition and lifecycle cost. Specific areas of
    investment include advanced fuel systems, reactor core
    automated manufacturing and inspection, and next-generation
    instrumentation and control technologies.
        Finally, I am investing in modernizing critical
    infrastructure and reducing my program's legacy environmental
    liabilities. Many of our facilities date back to the inception
    of the program over 70 years ago. We are increasing our
    emphasis on retiring facilities no longer in use, and we will
    do that in an environmentally responsible and cost-effective
    way.
        In addition to these three areas, this Committee's
    continued support has enabled significant progress on our three
    national priority projects. The first is the development of the
    reactor plant for the Columbia-class ballistic missile
    submarine. This supports the Navy's number one acquisition
    priority. We began manufacturing the lead ship reactor core in
    FY 2019. This reactor will serve for the life of the ship for
    more than 40 years. We started construction of the lead ship in
    this year, 2021.
        The second project is the refueling and overhaul of our
    land-based prototype reactor in New York. There is a dual
    benefit to this effort. It enables continued research and
    development to support the fleet and it will provide more than
    20 years of training for the Navy's nuclear fleet operators.
        The third project is the construction of the Naval Spent
    Handling Facility in Idaho, which will enable long-term,
    reliable processing and packaging of spent fuel from the Navy's
    nuclear-powered warships. Your support of this project has
    allowed us to make significant progress. To date, we have
    poured approximately 100,000 cubic yards of concrete. That
    represents nearly 30 percent of the required foundation
    concrete volume.
        In closing, continued congressional support allows us to
    balance the investments in today's fleet with the future fleet,
    it allows us to expand the Navy's ability to project power and
    control the seas, and it allows us to remain ready for the
    high-end fight.
        Thank you for this Committee's longstanding, strong support
    of Naval Reactors, and I look forward to answering your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral James F. Caldwell
    follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Admiral James F. Caldwell
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
    the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
    today. Your strong support for the work we do ensures our nuclear Navy
    has the ability to carry out vital missions around the world. This
    support of Congress is vitally important today as we continue to face
    renewed great power competition and a global pandemic.
        Today's strategic environment is dynamic and increasingly complex.
    Near-peer rivals are pursuing military modernization programs aimed at
    achieving regional hegemony in the near-term, and eroding the post-WWII
    international order and United States' preeminence in the long-term.
    The maritime environment is becoming increasingly contested. To
    preserve freedom of the seas, deter conflict, defend allies, and
    protect our national interests, we must sustain and grow our naval
    capabilities.
        Nuclear propulsion is a key enabler of naval power projection,
    providing unmatched mobility, flexibility, responsiveness, and
    endurance. These key attributes ensure our nuclear fleet can meet the
    demands of forward presence and crisis response worldwide. Today, over
    40 percent of the Navy's major combatants are nuclear-powered (68
    submarines and 11 aircraft carriers). \1\ Advancements in nuclear
    propulsion are needed as the Navy innovates to maintain our competitive
    advantage. Naval Reactors' historical investment in advanced
    technologies has given the Nation an enviable competitive edge in the
    maritime environment; further investments in advanced technologies are
    necessary to maintain this technological edge well into the future.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Major combatants, in this instance, include aircraft carriers,
    submarines, and surface combatants based on the ``Active in
    Commission'' column from the Naval Vessel Register.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Navy's highly capable nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft
    carriers have ensured our warfighting edge over potential adversaries
    for decades. Our ballistic missile submarines provide the most
    survivable leg of our nuclear triad, are essential to our ability to
    deter major warfare, and provide assurance to our allies. Our fast
    attack submarines operate undetected, safeguard vital commercial sea-
    lanes, and stand ready to protect American interests. Our aircraft
    carriers provide our Nation the sustained ability to project combat
    power, deter conflict, and protect our interests around the world.
        Last year, with Naval Reactors support, the Navy continued to meet
    its strategic deterrent mission and executed numerous missions in the
    undersea domain that directly impacted the national security of the
    United States. Our carriers executed the busiest year of deployments in
    nearly a decade to support vital U.S. military operations around the
    world.
        In aircraft carrier shipbuilding, the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78)
    made great progress since I last appeared before the Committee. Last
    year, I had the privilege of visiting the Ford at sea and seeing first-
    hand the significant improvements over the Nimitz-class, highly capable
    in its own right. The John F. Kennedy (CVN 79) was christened last year
    and the crew is testing the propulsion plant. Construction continues on
    Enterprise (CVN 80), the first carrier in a two-ship buy that allows
    the Navy to realize important cost savings, maintain a constant,
    predictable workload within our industrial base, and continue to
    deliver the unmatched capabilities of the Ford-class to our Navy. The
    Ford-class incorporates the first newly-designed aircraft carrier
    propulsion plant in 40 years. These ships not only match the high speed
    of our Nimitz-class aircraft carriers but have room to grow, providing
    25 percent more energy and three times the electrical generating
    capacity. Additionally, the propulsion plant design reduces maintenance
    by 30 percent and manpower by nearly 50 percent.
        In ballistic missile submarine shipbuilding, lead ship construction
    for the Columbia-class is underway, which will allow the Navy to
    continue seamless execution of this vital mission that began over 6
    decades ago. The USS George Washington (SSBN 598) completed her first
    deterrent patrol 60 years ago. This year will mark the 40th anniversary
    of the commissioning of the USS Ohio (SSBN 726), the lead ship of
    today's ballistic missile submarine fleet that, along with three other
    submarines, was later converted to a guided missile submarine. This
    year will also mark 20 years since the inactivation of the USS
    Kamehameha (SSBN 642), the last of the ``41 for Freedom.'' Looking
    forward, the Columbia-class will be a bedrock of our national security
    posture for decades to come. The men and women of Naval Reactors and
    our industry partners are contributing to this mission by building a
    reactor plant with a life-of-ship core to serve in excess of 40 years,
    an accomplishment that builds on the military advantage of longer lived
    cores that enable the Navy to avoid mid-life refueling and reduce by
    two the number of Columbia-class submarines needed to meet the
    strategic deterrence mission compared with the Ohio-class.
        In attack submarine shipbuilding last year, the Navy saw the keel
    laid for the Pre-Commissioning Unit (PCU) Idaho and commissioned the
    USS Delaware and the USS Vermont. This brings a total of 19 Virginia-
    class submarines to our fleet, with Virginias now comprising over one
    third of our attack submarines. The Navy is also assessing improvements
    to capability and lethality for future Virginia-class submarines; these
    improvements not only add capability to today's fleet, but will also
    allow the Navy to prove potential technologies that could influence the
    next-generation attack submarine. Naval Reactors is closely
    synchronized with the Navy on these efforts. In particular, our renewed
    focus and investments in advanced technologies will pave the way for
    improvements in speed, energy density, and stealth.
                            naval reactors overview
        This Committee's support has enabled the safe operation of the
    nuclear fleet, substantial progress on our key projects, and our
    continued oversight and regulation of all areas across the Naval
    Nuclear Propulsion Program. Your support has also enabled significant
    progress on our three major projects--Columbia-class propulsion plant
    development, the refueling overhaul of a research and training reactor
    in New York, and the construction of the Naval Spent Fuel Handling
    Facility in Idaho. Finally, the Committee's support ensures Naval
    Reactors can provide around-the-clock support to the operational
    nuclear fleet, accelerate research and development efforts for future
    generations of nuclear powered warships, and make progress on both the
    recapitalization of our laboratory facilities and the environmental
    remediation of our legacy responsibilities.
                                 major projects
    Columbia-class Propulsion Plant
        The Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine is the Navy's number
    one acquisition priority. Naval Reactors is supporting lead ship
    construction and is delivering the life-of-ship reactor core and the
    electric drive propulsion system for the Columbia-class program. Naval
    Reactors continues lead ship propulsion plant design and safety
    analysis work required to support lead ship reactor testing and
    delivery.
    S8G Prototype Refueling Overhaul
        We also continue to execute the refueling and overhaul of the New
    York land-based prototype, which will enable an additional 20 years of
    Naval Reactors' commitment to research, development, and training. The
    project has been steadily working through performance challenges
    associated with COVID-19 as well as the integration of workforces from
    multiple shipyards. We continue to provide strong oversight to improve
    cost and schedule performance. Progress to date includes the removal of
    all spent nuclear fuel, design, manufacture and installation of a new
    reactor core, construction of a new cooling tower, and installation of
    upgraded instrumentation and control systems. The new reactor for this
    prototype includes Columbia-class type fuel modules as part of testing
    and demonstrating the manufacturability necessary for production and
    delivery of the Columbia-class reactor core.
    Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project
        Naval Reactors is constructing the Naval Spent Fuel Handling
    Facility, located on the Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho. The facility
    is critical to our mission to manage spent naval nuclear fuel and
    support aircraft carrier and submarine fleet requirements. As I
    testified last year, market conditions such as a shortage of skilled
    labor, high construction demand, and a remote location, coupled with
    price volatility for domestic construction materials such as structural
    steel resulted in higher than anticipated costs. Naval Reactors took a
    number of immediate actions to minimize impacts to cost and schedule
    such as deliverable reductions and phase-funding subcontracts when
    possible. The Program also rebaselined the project in fiscal year 2020
    and has continued to work closely with the National Nuclear Security
    Administration and the Department of Energy to ensure adequate
    resources are available for the project. More recently, the COVID-19
    pandemic and the discovery of unexpected bedrock conditions beneath the
    facility's foundations have presented challenges that the Project is
    working through to ensure that the overall Project completion milestone
    remains achievable. We continue to provide robust oversight and
    management of this complex and large-scale infrastructure project.
    Strong support from Congress has enabled the project to make
    significant progress. To date, we poured approximately 100,000 cubic
    yards of concrete for excavation site backfill, representing
    approximately one-third of the required foundation concrete volume, and
    started procurement of facility structural steel.
                             technical base funding
        In addition to our three priority projects, Naval Reactors
    maintains a high-performing technical base. The technical base is the
    set of fundamental skills and capabilities necessary to safely and
    effectively support the nuclear Navy. It includes a foundation of
    specialists in nuclear materials, nuclear physics, thermal-hydraulic
    testing, acoustics, electrical design, software development, system
    development, refueling, and other specialized skills, along with the
    associated facilities. The technical base is leveraged for our
    projects, but also performs independent work to support the operating
    fleet and ensure our technology advantage over our competitors.
    Specifically, the Program: 1) addresses emergent needs and challenges
    of our nuclear fleet, 2) executes nuclear reactor technology research
    and development that supports today's fleet and future capabilities
    and, 3) modernizes critical infrastructure and reduces the Program's
    legacy environmental liabilities. This base also supports the lean yet
    highly effective federal workforce that provides the oversight
    necessary to carry out this important technical work safely and
    efficiently. These activities are vital to our ability to provide 24-7
    support to the nuclear-powered Navy.
    Program Direction
        Our small but highly skilled federal workforce is our most
    important resource. Our talented and diverse workforce strategically
    differentiates us within the current geopolitical environment. As such,
    I remain highly focused on attracting, developing, and retaining a
    talented and diverse workforce to oversee and manage the critical
    programmatic work. This past year also brought longstanding issues of
    racial injustice to the forefront of the national dialogue, which
    served to strengthen my efforts to engage the workforce at every level
    and ensure we are fostering an environment of promise of opportunity,
    respect, and empathy. These are core values and will receive my
    sustained attention.
        Building platforms that have over 40 years of expected life,
    requires staffing continuity to ensure the Nation has a workforce with
    the deep technical knowledge needed to support Naval Reactors' cradle
    to grave management of these robust systems. I must have sufficient
    Federal staffing to meet the demands of sustaining today's fleet and
    growing future capabilities. The cumulative effect of funding
    reductions in prior years, personnel costs growing above inflationary
    rates, and an increase in recent senior level retirements has impeded
    our ability to reach this goal and challenged our ability to maintain
    our staffing levels. It is imperative that we execute our staffing plan
    and avoid any critical gaps in our workforce. I commit to continue to
    communicate with the Committee and your staff on our requirements and
    progress in reaching our staffing goals. I respectfully request
    Congress' support to allow me to recruit, select, develop, and retain
    the talented workforce that was started by Admiral Hyman Rickover many
    decades ago and that has proved to be crucial to the success of the
    Program.
    Research and Development
        Our research and development strategy represents a renewed
    investment in cutting-edge technologies aimed at reversing an eroding
    capability gap with strategic adversaries like China and Russia.
    Technology investment must be reinvigorated today to have new
    technologies ready for future classes of ships and to lower costs,
    reduce construction timelines, and improve the performance of today's
    fleet in light of increasing global competition. The teams of talented
    and dedicated people at our Naval Nuclear Laboratory sites--the Bettis
    Atomic Power Laboratory in Pittsburgh, the Knolls Atomic Power
    Laboratory and Kesselring Site in greater Albany, the Naval Reactors
    Facility in Idaho, and our Washington, DC headquarters--perform the
    research and development, analysis, engineering, and testing needed to
    support current and future Navy requirements.
        Our first priority is always support of today's fleet. Our labs
    perform approximately 4,000 technical evaluations annually that enable
    Naval Reactors to thoroughly assess and respond to emergent issues,
    thereby keeping our ships mission-ready while ensuring nuclear safety.
    These efforts are essential to keep our ships at-sea, such as during
    the extended deployments of several nuclear aircraft carriers over the
    last year. Operating abroad for longer than planned, our carrier strike
    groups demonstrated the U.S. Navy's ability to respond to global events
    and the unparalleled capability nuclear propulsion brings to at-sea
    operations.
        Historically, Naval Reactors also maintained a robust,
    technologically-advanced nuclear propulsion research and development
    program that has enabled substantial gains in warfighting capability
    and affordability, while providing the Nation with safe, capable, and
    reliable nuclear propulsion. Over the past 10 to 15 years, Naval
    Reactors has made tradeoffs to support national priority projects,
    resulting in a reduced investment in mid- to long-term advanced
    technology development efforts. Today, we see our adversaries closing
    the capability gap the Navy has successfully dominated for decades.
    Looking forward, we must invest in advanced research and development to
    meet the increased threats from China and Russia.
        We need advanced technology that can be leveraged for use in future
    nuclear powered warships the same way we were able to do for the
    Columbia-class. While researching and developing certain aspects of
    nuclear technology can take time, we are also leveraging the experience
    of industry and increasing the agility of our research and development
    program.
        Naval Reactors is beginning to identify and develop new
    technologies aimed at delivering enhanced capabilities to the existing
    fleet, meeting aggressive performance and cost requirements for future
    ships, and maintaining the U.S. Navy's superiority over our
    competitors. We are actively pursuing advanced fuel systems, reactor
    core automated manufacturing and inspection, next-generation
    instrumentation and control architectures and sensors, and emerging
    technologies (e.g., advanced power conversion, artificial intelligence,
    data analytics, additive manufacturing, and advanced robotics). These
    advancements have the potential to deliver both greater capability and
    lower acquisition and lifecycle costs. I commit to communicate
    regularly with the Committee and your staff on these advanced
    technology maturation efforts.
        I want to assure the Committee that our investments are supported
    by a comprehensive and rigorous planning effort we undertake with our
    partners at the Naval Nuclear Laboratory. Our annual work execution
    plans are derived from this comprehensive alignment, both of which I
    personally review and approve to ensure we are making the right
    investments and tradeoffs in all areas of our business. Tradeoffs over
    the last 10 to 15 years have hampered technology development were
    unfortunately necessary, and I must now ensure strong investment in
    research and development efforts to advance capabilities into the
    future. This effort is vital for both existing and future nuclear
    propulsion capabilities.
    Facilities and Infrastructure
        Our laboratory facilities and infrastructure are critical in
    carrying out Naval Reactors' mission. The budget request supports
    recapitalizing our Naval Nuclear Laboratory facilities and
    infrastructure systems, many of which have supported the Program since
    its inception over 70 years ago. Without this recapitalization we will
    be unable to effectively support nuclear fleet operations and advanced
    research and development efforts at the level required by this complex
    technology. We are continuing our efforts in decontaminating and
    decommissioning (D&D) older facilities that have been in existence
    since the start of the Program in the early 1950s. We have
    approximately $8 billion in environmental liabilities requiring D&D
    efforts--about one-third of these facilities are no longer in use. We
    are increasing our emphasis on retirement of theses liabilities in an
    environmentally responsible and cost-effective manner to support best
    use of our funding. The Program is also leveraging the Department of
    Energy Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM) experience in
    efficient, safe, and cost-effective remediation of environmental
    liabilities across the complex. I am pleased with the collaboration on
    this effort with my partners in DOE-EM.
    Conclusion
        The COVID-19 pandemic presents unique challenges. We have worked
    hard to keep our workforce safe while accomplishing our mission, and I
    am proud that the Program continues to rise to the challenge. We have
    learned a significant amount from this pandemic and will continue to
    apply those lessons learned in the future. I am continually impressed
    with how my workforce has responded to meet mission requirements with
    dedication, resiliency, and innovation.
        Naval Reactors' mission is critical to our national security and
    contributes to the Navy's ability to maintain mastery of the undersea
    domain and sustain a formidable forward presence. Continued
    congressional support allows us to balance investments in today's fleet
    with the future fleet, expand the Navy's ability to project power and
    control the seas, and remain ready for the high-end fight. I appreciate
    the strong support this program receives from Congress to provide
    effective naval nuclear propulsion.

        Senator King. Thank you, Admiral. I will begin with
    questions and we will rote through the Committee.
        Mr. Verdon, something you said caught my ear. A lot of what
    this Committee, the sort of fundamental premise of this
    Committee is deterrence. It is something that we are concerned
    with, and deterrence involves credibility of the deterrent
    itself. You said something about the limitations from not
    modernizing are no longer over the horizon but they are
    visible. My concern is they are also visible to our
    adversaries. Would you agree that that fact alone undermines
    the deterrent?
        Dr. Verdon. I would certainly agree that that is a danger,
    and it is something, why we are moving as quickly as we can to
    address.
        Senator King. Modernization across the nuclear enterprise
    is a part of maintaining deterrence.
        Dr. Verdon. That is right.
        Senator King. The other thing that I think you mentioned
    that is very as part of your work is nonproliferation. One of
    the things that worries me is to flip deterrence on its head.
    Deterrence does not necessarily work with a non-state actor,
    with a terrorist organization. Sometimes they are okay with
    being blown up.
        So in order to prevent attacks of that nature,
    nonproliferation becomes all the more important, so they cannot
    get their hands on the material in the first place. Talk to me
    about your activities in nonproliferation.
        Dr. Verdon. So yes, I totally agree with your assessment
    and we continue to work very, very hard with partners, you
    know, certainly within the United States but with partners
    around the world to make sure that we can track and prevent any
    theft of material, acquisition of material, technologies. That
    is something that we spend a considerable amount of time on to
    try to minimize the chance of any non-state actor getting the
    materials and/or the technologies necessary to do something,
    you know----
        Senator King. I am going to ask you to make a qualitative
    judgment. How good are you at that? Are we able to follow
    nuclear materials with a high level of fidelity?
        Dr. Verdon. You know, it is one of these things that you
    have--I think based on evidence, I think we are doing a good
    job. Ourselves and our partners are doing a good job with this.
    We continue to look to improve. We do not rest on our laurels.
    We are always looking for new ways to see whether we can
    improve on how we do this. But, you know, we run tests, we run
    drills, we run all sorts of, you know--we try to run tabletops
    to make sure that we are really exercising the skills correctly
    and we have everything we need in place. But we continue to
    advance the capabilities in those areas to make sure that we
    never make a mistake.
        Senator King. Are you receiving full cooperation and
    support from all of the agencies of the intelligence community?
    I do not want to hear if we have a problem about stovepipes.
        Dr. Verdon. No. I think this is an area where I think
    everybody works very well together, that everybody recognizes
    the importance of this, and we see strong support and respect
    for roles and responsibilities and sharing of information and
    transparency as required. I think everyone does recognize the
    importance of this.
        Senator King. Well, it is critically important, and I hope
    you will advise this Committee if you feel that there is any
    limitation on the data that you are receiving.
        Admiral Caldwell, I understand we stopped enriching fuel in
    1992, and basically we are working off the stockpile. When do
    you see a need to further enrichment?
        Admiral Caldwell. Sir, we have enough fuel to support our
    nuclear fleet through the mid 2050s, and that will depend on
    the Navy's decisions on force structure. But right now I am in
    good position through the 2050s. So eventually the Nation is
    going to have to figure out how we provide that asset. We are
    working closely with the National Nuclear Security
    Administration and DOE on alternatives, and, you know, so we
    would be looking to have some capability to produce the highly
    enriched uranium that we need by the 2040 time frame.
        Senator King. Fine. I am going to have questions, Mr.
    Verdon, on pit production, and Mr. White, on where the progress
    is, but I am going to yield my time to Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Verdon, at
    our hearing last week, Senator Rosen brought up underground
    testing, and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Matters,
    Mr. Walter, he made the point that investment in NNSA's
    scientific capabilities were essential to help avoid the need
    to ever return to explosive testing, and he noted, in
    particular, the role that the Enhanced Capabilities for
    Subcritical Experiments program plays in that effort.
        Can you talk about the connection between modernizing the
    complex and avoiding the need for testing, as well as the role
    subcritical experiments play?
        Dr. Verdon. Certainly. So in terms of avoiding the testing,
    the examples that you brought up of Enhanced Capabilities for
    Subcritical Experiments as an example of an area where we
    recognized that we had a gap in some experimental data that we
    needed to help better improve our understanding of nuclear
    weapons in the absence of testing. So the subject matter
    experts identified a real state-of- the-art facility that we
    call the Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments
    that, if worked as designed, will actually give us the data
    that we used to acquire through nuclear testing. So if it works
    as designed, it actually will move us further away from the
    technical need for requiring a nuclear test.
        We are working to do that. It will be located in the U1a
    tunnel complex at the Nevada National Security Site, and that,
    coupled with a recognition that we still need higher capability
    in computing, so that we will be putting online our first
    exascale machine in 2023, to address that gap as well.
        So we still do invest in the scientific capabilities that,
    in particular, the laboratories and plants are key in
    identifying as gaps in their understanding that they need to
    fill to support our ability to do the work we need to do in the
    absence of testing. So all of these act to help us to forestall
    the need to technically have to return to testing.
        Senator Fischer. These experiments, they are vital to be
    able to certify the life-extended warheads of the older pits,
    right?
        Dr. Verdon. They are vital for both ongoing and planned
    warhead modernization programs. So again, they are slated to
    come online in time to support, in particular, the W80-4 LEP,
    and the W87-1 modification program. We are using those as
    drivers, the timeline drivers, to get those capabilities up.
        Senator Fischer. Congress created the Stockpile
    Responsiveness Program several years ago in order to ensure
    that our scientists were exercising the full spectrum of skills
    necessary to support all phases of nuclear weapons lifecycle
    process. Dr. Verdon, can you give us your assessment of the
    contribution this program has made so far, and what role do you
    see it playing in the future?
        Dr. Verdon. So, yes. I have been very impressed with the
    work that is being carried out in the Stockpile Responsiveness
    Program. I have seen it firsthand, both when I was still
    present at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory as the leader
    of the weapons program there, and from here, from headquarters,
    that the workforce is exercising skills that are necessary,
    that they normally would not have gotten a chance to exercise.
    Some of the tasks we provided to them, the creativity that has
    come out from it has been impressive to see.
        We do view it as a very important role in the training of
    our workforce, and I think we see very positive results from
    that, in that people can go from that program, train on that
    program and then move into the actual warhead modernization
    programs.
        Senator Fischer. Doctor, what lessons has NNSA learned from
    the delays it has encountered in the B61-12 Live Extension
    Program, and also the W88 Alt, and are there process
    improvements that can be applied to future life extension
    programs?
        Dr. Verdon. So, yes. One of the first things we did, as
    soon as we started it, when we encountered the situations that
    we had in the 61 and the 88, we formed, actually, one inside
    review team and then a congressionally directed review team
    that went out and looked and really scrubbed hard. In fact, the
    Admiral was kind enough to lend us some people from his
    organization to be on one of the teams. We really did a scrub
    of just what occurred, what happened, what lessons did we need
    to learn, and, indeed, very extensive reports and reviews were
    written, and we have embraced them and are actually
    implementing many, if not just about all of the
    recommendations, onto the W80-4 and the W87-1, as we speak.
        So we have taken it very seriously. We are implementing
    changes based on the lessons that were identified, and we are
    already seeing benefit from those lessons being applied.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Senator Kelly.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
    our three witnesses for testifying today. This question is for
    Admiral Caldwell.
        So, Admiral, you have often described the Navy submarine
    force as being in high demand with a high OPTEMPO, and given
    our adversaries' significant investment in undersea
    capabilities, I think it is safe to say that this high demand
    will continue.
        I would like to get your thoughts on the state of our
    industrial base. As you well know, we work closely with the
    private sector to deliver the Navy's nuclear-powered submarine
    capabilities. So how would you assess the health of our highly
    specialized shipyards who support these capabilities?
        Admiral Caldwell. Sir, thanks for the question, and I do
    agree with you that our submarine force and our undersea forces
    are going to remain in high demand. I would like to break your
    question into a couple parts. First I would like to talk about
    the nuclear industrial base that supports my ability to deliver
    reactor cores, components, instrumentation, and the things to
    build the reactor plans.
        As we downsized after the Cold War, we downsized that
    industrial base to the need to support our needs. That is a
    highly capable, small industrial base that I have a lot of
    confidence in. We spent a lot of time engaging with our
    partners in industry. We monitor their performance. We project
    ahead and forecast, as accurately as we can, what the Nation's
    needs are, and they have been able to continue to deliver what
    we need.
        As an example, even during COVID, I am on track to deliver
    all my reactor plant components to the Columbia with margin. I
    think that is a real testament to the strength and the depth
    and the coordination and cooperation we have with the nuclear
    industrial base that supports me.
        On the shipbuilder side, we have some challenges. If you
    think about where we have been as a Nation, in the 1980s and
    the early part of the 1990s we built 30-plus Los Angeles-class
    submarines in about a 10-year period, and we walked away from
    that investment in being able to do that. We built a few
    submarines in the early 2000s. We started again on one Virginia
    per year, and then about the 2014-2015 time frame we started to
    build two Virginia-class submarines per year.
        So in that vendor base you have a lot of things going on.
    First, you have an experienced workforce that was here in the
    1980s and 1990s. A lot of those folks went home. So we have
    inexperienced folks that are now learning new trades, including
    at the supervisory level.
        Additionally, you have existing vendors who we have now,
    with going to two Virginia per year and Columbia and even Ford
    aircraft carrier construction, we have increased the demand on
    those existing suppliers. We have also had to go reach out to
    new suppliers as well. So there is pressure on those suppliers
    to perform.
        We have had some challenges. Senator King asked me, in a
    phone call earlier, about missile tubes. That was an example of
    problems in the vendor base. We have come through that with a
    lot of government oversight and a lot of detailed engagements,
    and we are going to get back on the cadence for that.
        But I think if we are going to continue to build the
    submarine force and the carrier force that we need, we are
    going to have to continue to grow that industrial base. We are
    doing that with an enterprise-wide plan that looks at all of
    the vendors that support all those programs I just talked
    about, and I think what is key we have got to get after the
    basics, we have got to develop the workforce, and we are going
    to have to have the right oversight at the primes and also by
    the government.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, and on the training side, it
    sounds like you are building a new reactor in Schenectady,
    would be my guess there, right?
        Admiral Caldwell. If I could comment on that, sir that is a
    reactor that has been in the program for decades.
        Senator Kelly. Yeah.
        Admiral Caldwell. In fact, I trained there when I first
    entered the Navy back in the early 1980s.
        Senator Kelly. You are still able to use that reactor that
    was from the 1980s?
        Admiral Caldwell. Yes. We are still able to use that
    reactor plant, which I think is an incredible testament to the
    way it was designed and the way it has been maintained. It has
    been refueled once, and we are now refueling it a second time.
    When we complete that refueling we will use that reactor for
    research and development for the U.S. Navy, and we will train
    operators for another 20 years. So if you think about that,
    that is going to be out to the 2040 time frame, and I trained
    on that in the early 1980s.
        Now in that modernization, we are modernizing the
    infrastructure and the instrumentation and control, so it will
    be an incredible asset for us going forward.
        Senator Kelly. I was just assuming that by now you would
    have been building a new one there. Many of my classmates at
    the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy went to work there and are
    instructing, you know, the world's finest nuclear power plant
    operators are in the United States Navy.
        Admiral Caldwell. I am ready to take you up there, sir, and
    show it to you.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you.
        Senator King. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Senator Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, once
    again thank you for your service. Thanks for being here today.
        Admiral Caldwell, the GAO has noted the challenges in
    maintaining ballistic missile submarines, the SSBNs, with
    regard to their operational capability due to unplanned delays
    and extended middle-life maintenance, refueling, overhauls, and
    refit periods. This is kind of following along some of the
    comments that you have just made with Senator Kelly.
        Can you tell us how the efforts of the NNSA's Naval
    Reactors program, with respect to the life-of-ship reactor
    cores for the Columbia-class might address these issues, and
    whether there are other areas where the Naval Reactors program
    can support the Navy in improving turnaround times for SSBNs as
    well as carriers in the future?
        Admiral Caldwell. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question. With
    regards to Columbia, we are building this life-of-ship core,
    which is designed to last 42 years. That is, in my opinion, a
    remarkable technological and manufacturing achievement. When
    you consider where we started with the program in refueling
    Nautilus at the 18-to-24-month point, and all that learning and
    all that growth in technology and manufacturing, we are now
    going to fuel a submarine that will last over 40 years.
        That has tremendous benefit for the Navy. It will take out
    that midlife refueling. It is going to allow us to operate that
    strategic deterrent mission with 12 boats versus the 14 we have
    today. That simple fact saves the U.S. Government $40 billion
    in total ownership costs to buy two additional ships. That is
    really, really important to the Navy.
        Now in addition to that, we are investing in technology for
    today's fleet and the future fleet. So we are trying to get
    after adding capability to the fleet, and do that in a cost-
    effective way that reduces the construction spans, and so to
    get to your point, I am looking to see how can I build even
    more reliable components that last longer? How can I collect
    data and used advanced sensors and data analytics to analyze
    and do condition-based maintenance? Then my time is intimately
    involved with the shipyards in trying to make sure we have the
    right rigor, training, oversight in executing the
    availabilities.
        I would like to say that, to your point about overhauls and
    whatnot, even in the midst of COVID, the shipyard that is
    refueling the Louisiana was able to achieve a best-of record in
    terms of the refueling timeline. That is remarkable, even in
    the midst of COVID.
        Senator Rounds. May I ask, with regard to those such as the
    Boise, which has been in drydock, literally for years, it
    sounds to me like what you are sharing is that the challenges
    for the Boise in terms of the extended delay for its midlife
    refueling and so forth was not because of the need for a delay
    with regard to the refueling of the reactor itself but rather
    the other shipbuilding portions of that refueling and midlife
    rerigging.
        Admiral Caldwell. Fair statement. That is correct, sir, and
    if I could add a little context on that. Boise was headed in
    for an engineered overhaul, not a refueling. The challenge with
    Boise is that we did not have the capacity in the shipyard to
    induct her. Rather than simply induct the ship and have her sit
    idle, we decided to roll her into the shipyard environment when
    we could accommodate that, and also take advantage of the
    capacity in the private sector.
        So we are working hard to improve the capacity and the
    performance in our shipyard, and that will affect the Boise
    outcome as well. But just for the record, she is not being
    refueled, sir.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir.
        Dr. Verdon, could you provide your perspective on the
    legality and practicality of the government entering into a
    partnership with the largest civilian enrichment service
    operating in the U.S., Urenco, for supplying low-enriched
    uranium to the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, to produce tritium for
    weapons. I understand that the GAO wrote a report saying that
    exercising this course of action is a policy question, and that
    national security needs for enriched uranium could be met if
    the government took this approach.
        Could you share with me your thoughts on whether that is an
    appropriate path forward?
        Dr. Verdon. Yes, sir. So we have actually conducted a
    pretty extensive analysis of alternatives of how to provide
    low-enriched uranium for our defense needs, and that was
    certainly one option that we carried forward amongst technical
    options of using centrifuges. So we kept it on the table
    because it was brought up.
        We actually thought it was a pretty big lift to actually do
    it, but since it is potentially achievable, depending on the
    allies, we carried forward with the option on the table. But we
    are pursuing a technological path forward as well, and, you
    know, we are investing in centrifuge technologies so that we
    can offer the country a decision in the future of which way we
    want to go.
        Senator Rounds. My time has expired, but I would like to
    pursue that perhaps at a later time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, gentlemen.
        Senator King. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Senator Rosen via
    Webex, please.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chair King and Ranking Member
    Fischer, for holding these hearings. It is, of course, a really
    important topic and important to us here in Nevada.
        So last week, of course, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Nuclear Matters, Andrew Walter, told this
    Subcommittee that the Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical
    Experiment program, or, much easier to say, the ECSE, will
    enable the NNSA to, quote, ``continue gathering the data to
    conduct subcritical experiments to certify the nuclear
    stockpile and ensure that the designs we use in the future
    remain safe and reliable,'' unquote.
        So, Dr. Verdon, could you provide us with an update on
    upgrades to the ECSE facility in the U1a complex at the Nevada
    National Security Site, and can you tell us how the new
    facility will help to improve our stockpile stewardship
    program, scientific capabilities of course including our
    understanding of plutonium.
        Dr. Verdon. Yes. Thank you for the question. Yes, ECSE--
    easier to say than Enhance Capabilities for Critical
    Experiments--yes, as I mentioned, it is a state-of-the-art
    facility that will give us capabilities that we do not
    presently have within the complex to--in essence, you can think
    of it is take dental radiographs of an imploding primary, and
    getting multiple images of it as well other diagnostics, and it
    is just a capability that we do not have in the complex today.
        So bringing that system up online will provide us data that
    we have not had since we did underground testing, and so we
    identified it as an important gap in our capabilities and we
    are moving out to implement it as we speak. As I mentioned, its
    timelines are driven to support warhead modernization
    activities within the stockpile.
        So it is a very important capability, and we are putting
    all effort into making sure that it comes up on time and within
    budget.
        Senator Rosen. So we have lots going on, of course, in
    Nevada at--I still call it the Test Site. I have lived in
    Nevada over 40 years. But, you know, your mission is to secure
    the integrity of our nuclear stockpile, but what are you doing
    to improve and invest in areas such as resources and support
    for our workers in the site, and also building the people
    pipeline, and do you think that you have the funding that you
    need to bring up your functionality overall, as far as hardware
    and, of course, the people who work there?
        Dr. Verdon. So, as I say, the Nevada National Security Site
    is a very important site for us, not only for the NNSA mission
    but I would for broader national security missions writ large.
    There are a lot of activities that take place at that site that
    are important.
        We have a prioritized list that we revisit every year for
    infrastructure improvements at the site, and we are executing
    infrastructure improvements that range from utilities to road,
    to, as I say, the Enhance Capabilities for Subcritical
    Experiments. They run the gamut.
        You know, clearly we cannot move as fast as we would like
    to move, but I think we have a very methodical way that we are
    moving through it to upgrade, prioritized based on risk to
    program and risk to workforce safety, and we are moving through
    those in a very methodical manner to upgrade them over time.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that, and, of
    course, you know, quickly in the time I have left, we had a
    secret shipment of plutonium that ended up in Nevada, from
    South Carolina, and as a part of an effort to restore trust
    with the people of Nevada we know that NNSA is committed to
    removing that material, starting no later than this year and
    completing it by 2026.
        Can you provide us, of course in this nonclassified
    setting, any updates on the removal of the plutonium?
        Dr. Verdon. So I can't go into details but I will assure
    you that we are honoring the commitment that we made. So we are
    acting on what the commitment was, and we will continue to do
    so.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I see my time is just about up.
    Maybe we can meet in a classified setting and get the latest
    updates on that and some other updates on the pits and what is
    going on down there. Thank you so much.
        Senator King. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral
    Caldwell, I wanted to talk a little bit about the culture of
    the nuclear Navy. I have always been fascinated by it. It is
    quite unique, I think exceptional in many ways. Were you
    interviewed by Admiral Rickover? Are you young enough, or old
    enough?
        Admiral Caldwell. I am old enough to have been interviewed
    by Admiral Rickover.
        Senator Sullivan. How did that go?
        Admiral Caldwell. I did not get to spend much time with
    him. He was unhappy with some of my academic performance and he
    kicked me out pretty quickly.
        Senator Sullivan. Interesting. So it was a short interview?
        Admiral Caldwell. It was a very short interview and I had
    to promise that I would improve my performance. But he accepted
    me, and I have to tell you, as I sit here today I am honored to
    have been in this program for what will be 40 years, and you
    are right, it has got an incredible culture. We hire fantastic
    people, and we work hard to retain them, and they do amazing
    work for us.
        Senator Sullivan. So that is what I wanted to ask about.
    Oftentimes you have hearings when Senators or others think the
    culture has gone bad and something horrible has happened, and,
    you know, I never like talking about the nuclear Navy with its
    exceptional record and then you do not want an accident or
    anything. But it is quite unique, even within the military,
    even within, I think, American society. What is it that has
    enabled generations of naval officers and enlisted to operate
    our nuclear aircraft carriers, our nuclear subs in a way that
    is both focused on operational excellence and attention to
    detail, in an enterprise which is complicated, to say the
    least? But the Rickover culture, I think, some people
    criticize. I happen to think it is pretty remarkable. What do
    you think the secret sauce has been, and how do we make sure we
    continue to do it? Obviously, he is gone, but it is really
    remarkable, I think.
        Admiral Caldwell. It is a remarkable culture, sir, and I
    invite you to have a further, deeper dialogue with you. But if
    I could summarize some of the key points is, first off, going
    out and finding and recruiting the best people that we can.
    Admiral Rickover interviewed all of the officers coming into
    the program. I continue to do that today. In fact, in my job I
    have interviewed over 4,000 people to come into the program.
        Senator Sullivan. So that continues.
        Admiral Caldwell. That continues today, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. You do not throw them out after 5
    minutes, do you?
        Admiral Caldwell. I am probably not as colorful as Admiral
    Rickover.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay. I mean, if you do, that is okay
    too, I guess.
        Admiral Caldwell. We aim to have high standards. We are
    absolutely dedicated to deep technical knowledge. We are
    brutally honest with ourselves in terms of our performance, and
    we expect that from all of our teams. We report when we do not
    do things well, and then we aim to learn from those things and
    roll that back into our culture. We try to manage problems when
    they are very small, before they get big.
        So there are many aspects to this, but it is the self-
    critical culture. It is this commitment to perpetually
    improving your team and continuing to learn from others and
    mistakes and continue to drive your performance. Admiral
    Rickover really set high expectations for his people, and we
    continue to do that today for all the folks in my headquarters
    as well as our officers and our sailors.
        Senator Sullivan. Is there anything we can do? Sometimes
    that is a dangerous question, particularly when things are
    going well.
        Admiral Caldwell. Well, I think the----
        Senator Sullivan. Or should we just keep our hands up? What
    should we do to enable that?
        Admiral Caldwell. The important thing about Naval Reactors
    is its alignment of authorities, responsibilities,
    accountability, and the money that supports us. This
    Subcommittee's continued support for my program enables me to
    deliver what I need to for the U.S. Navy. It allows me to do
    the design and to maintain the high standards and keep our
    ships at sea. All of this stuff is wrapped together. So that is
    key, I think, and I will continue to convey to you what I think
    I need to run the program.
        Senator Sullivan. When Admiral Richardson became CNO, I
    remember that was considered a little, I don't know,
    ``controversial'' may be too strong a word. But it took the
    traditional, I think it is an 8-year, 4- to 8-year billet that
    you currently occupy. Is that a statutory billet, and does that
    help you, and is it 8 yeas and then you are done? Was it
    controversial? I thought Admiral Richardson did a great job
    when he was CNO, but what is your thinking on your billet,
    which is a little bit of a hard question.
        Admiral Caldwell. It is an 8-year responsibility. It was
    outlined in an Executive order 12344. It was later codified
    into law, and it allows the director to gain continuity in the
    program and to live with their decisions.
        Now Admiral Rickover is an extraordinary leader, and I
    think he had the opportunity to go lead our Navy, and I think
    that was great for our Navy. I think for me and for the program
    it is good to have an 8-year director to get fully immersed, to
    make decisions, and then deal with the consequences of those
    decisions. That is part of being a nuclear-trained officer is
    owning the results and owning the path to get to success.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Senator King. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Admiral,
    following up Senator Sullivan's questions, I had the
    opportunity to spend a couple of days and a night on the USS
    New Mexico under the ice in the Arctic Ocean. One of my
    clearest memories was--they were enlisted people who were
    managing that reactor, and it was their reactor. You came away
    feeling that they had an ownership and a commitment to
    excellence that was quite extraordinary. That was a clear
    memory from that trip, right up there with breaking through the
    ice when it was time to go home. But I compliment you on
    maintaining that culture that Senator Sullivan described.
        Admiral Caldwell. Thank, sir. I think you said the optimal
    word: ownership, and when I think about it, we have young
    nuclear operators, maybe a 21-year-old operator at the panel,
    controlling the reactor. It is pretty impressive what they can
    do. We are pretty proud of them.
        Senator King. That was exactly my thinking.
        Dr. Verdon, I have been to several storage facilities of
    nuclear warheads and there seemed to be a lot of them. Let me
    ask a question my constituents might ask if they were sitting
    here. Why do we need new warheads?
        Dr. Verdon. So many times--well, ``new'' is how you want to
    define it. Some of them are basically the modernization
    programs, they are actually replacing like for like, just using
    newer components, replacing, you know, aged materials or aging
    components.
        Senator King. So to be clear, that are not entirely new
    warheads. They are components that are being changed to
    modernize.
        Dr. Verdon. That is for a vast majority of what we have
    been doing to date has been what we call regular Life Extension
    Program, where you basically try to reuse as much of the
    componentry as you can and only replace that which you have to.
    It is driven by age or, you know, in some cases these warheads
    were designed to only be in the stockpile for 20 years. So you
    run out of logistic supplies because the components have gotten
    so old and they are no longer made, so you have to upgrade them
    to the newer technologies.
        So they are not new in that regard. There is no new
    military characteristics associated with the warheads.
        Senator King. Thank you. Pits is a matter of some
    discussion. We have not been making pits, which are an
    essential component of a nuclear warhead, for some time. Number
    one, is it necessary to restart pit production?
        Dr. Verdon. So my assessment, technically, is yes, it is. I
    think there are a number of reasons, one being to mitigate
    risks against what are presently now large uncertainties
    associated with what is called plutonium aging. It is really
    the cumulative impact of plutonium decay, radioactive decay, on
    an existing pit, and then also to address and be able to
    improve the safety and security of the warheads, based on new
    safety and security requirements. Then a third would be to
    potentially respond to what peer adversaries might challenge
    our deterrent for the future.
        So I do assess that manufacturing, having the capability, a
    modest capability, of manufacturing new pits is important for
    our deterrent in the long term.
        Senator King. So they have been manufactured at Los Alamos,
    but I understand that the plan now is to restart the program at
    Los Alamos but also to have a sister facility at the old MOX
    facility in South Carolina. Why two facilities?
        Dr. Verdon. So when we explored the options of how to re-
    establish pit manufacturing we looked at obviously one site and
    we looked at two sites. In particular, because we had the
    existing facility at Los Angeles, the Plutonium Facility Number
    4, PF4, and what we formerly referred to as MOX facility at
    Savannah River, having those two existing facilities identified
    a way to implement pit production at a modest level of around
    80 pits per year, which is the goal, but also having
    resiliency, because we have found at Los Alamos that we have
    had outages that have lasted a few months to 3 years.
        Senator King. What do you mean by an outage? That is not a
    power outage.
        Dr. Verdon. An outage, that a situation occurs at the
    production site that causes it to be offline for 3 years, and
    we have had that. We have actually experienced that, and having
    that kind of issue occur when you are trying to produce the
    warheads is not acceptable. It is hard to recover from.
        So we identified that the two-site solution, particularly
    leveraging the existing facilities, was an efficient schedule
    and cost approach to re-establishing pit manufacturing for the
    United States.
        Senator King. Aside from the resilience issue, was there
    any comparison made of costs of one versus two?
        Dr. Verdon. So we have looked at that, and again, if you
    factor in resiliency, if look at two sites that can produce 80
    pits a year, you have to compare it to one site that is about
    140 pits a year. When we estimate that cost we estimate that to
    be almost twice as expensive as doing the two-site solution
    that have put forward today.
        Senator King. Thank you. Mr. White, I keep promising I am
    going to get the questions, and they are still coming, but it
    is now over to Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to
    follow up a little bit on the pit production. While we know
    that Los Alamos and Savannah River are the primary production
    sites, I got to visit you out at Lawrence Livermore a few years
    ago as well. Can you talk a little bit about the role that
    Lawrence Livermore is going to be playing in this, as we look
    at the efforts, the plutonium efforts of NNSA?
        Dr. Verdon. So the present example is a perfect one of the
    W87-1, where Lawrence Livermore is responsible for the design
    of that warhead and responsible for the design of the pit that
    is going to go into that warhead. So they are actually playing
    a key role as the design agency, working with the Los Alamos
    production agency. It is not enough just to put the equipment
    in. You actually have to show that what is produced with that
    equipment is acceptable for use in the stockpile, and Lawrence
    Livermore will be playing a key role in showing that what Los
    Alamos, and ultimately Savannah River, would produce is
    acceptable for use in the stockpile.
        Senator Fischer. Will the technicians at Livermore be able
    to produce those pits as well? Will you be training them to do
    that?
        Dr. Verdon. Right now there is expertise at Lawrence
    Livermore in pit production that is being used to peer review
    the Los Alamos and Savannah River efforts, but right now there
    is not plans to have them doing hands-on work.
        Senator Fischer. If Livermore was going to start in pit
    production, what kind of investments would have to be made
    there?
        Dr. Verdon. There was a pit production capability at
    Lawrence Livermore but it was decommissioned. So it would be,
    again, a pretty big expense to stand it back up. It was not of
    the size that would be necessary right now. We would have to
    increase the size of it.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you all. I appreciate you
    being here today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Just a couple more questions. Mr. White, I
    mentioned in the opening statement 177 leaking tanks at
    Hanford. Is that the right number, and what are we doing?
        Mr. White. So that is the total number of tanks that we
    have at Hanford, sir, but it is not the number that we believe
    are leaking.
        Senator King. Do you have a number on those which you think
    are leaking?
        Mr. White. Yes, sir. There are two tanks at Hanford that we
    believe are actively leaking. Over the 70-year life of the
    site, we believe over 60 of the single-shell tanks have leaked
    at some point in the past.
        I think this highlights the importance of a couple of
    things in terms of our ability to manage that aging tank
    infrastructure. One is it highlights the importance of the
    mitigation measures that we have taken over the past three
    decades to ensure that we are managing the risk of that aging
    infrastructure. For those single-shell tanks that are the most
    vulnerable, we have pumped out most of the drainable liquids
    from those tanks starting in the 1980s, and so for the actively
    leaking tank we identified recently, for example, most of the
    liquids in that tank had been pumped out.
        Senator King. So you are triaging the tanks according to
    their risk.
        Mr. White. Yes, sir, and we have also installed pump- and-
    treat systems in the tank farms that prevent the contamination
    from the history of operations at the site from reaching the
    groundwater. We have built up a tank integrity program to
    ensure that we are monitoring very closely the levels in the
    tanks and also monitoring the integrity of the infrastructure.
        Senator King. Do you feel confident in your groundwater
    protection efforts, because this site, I understand, is not all
    that far from the Columbia River.
        Mr. White. The tank farms are several miles from the
    Columbia River, so depending on your----
        Senator King. Groundwater travels.
        Mr. White. The groundwater does travel. It takes a number
    of decades for contaminants to migrate from the tanks to the
    groundwater, but we have every indication that the pump-and-
    treat systems that we are putting in place are, in fact, very
    effective.
        I think this does highlight, though, the importance of
    moving forward to the ultimate solution, which is to treat and
    dispose of the tank waste at Hanford.
        Senator King. My understanding is there a glassification
    process for what is coming out of the top part of the tanks,
    but what about the really bad stuff that is in the bottom? Is
    that going to be the same process? There is a grout process, I
    understand. Is that the answer for the more contaminated?
        Mr. White. For the low-activity vitrification capability we
    are standing up now, that treats the low- activity part.
        Senator King. Right.
        Mr. White. The sludge that you are talking about, that
    typically is in the bottom of tanks, will most likely be a
    high-level waste component. There is also a vitrification
    capability that we need to stand up to treat that as well. We
    are currently in discussions with the State of Washington on
    the best approach to use to stand up that vitrification
    facility over the course of the next decade or so.
        Those two capabilities together, however, do not treat all
    of the tank waste at Hanford, and this gets to the need for
    supplemental treatment capability. This Committee, in the past,
    has been very interested and very helpful in pushing us to do
    research and development into options to do that treatment of
    the supplemental waste streams. We had an FFRDC look at those
    in 2017. There were options ranging from grouting to
    vitrification to steam reforming.
        We have not made a decision yet on those options. Last
    year's NDAA asked us to update that R&D effort, and we are in
    the process of doing that. We have contracted with Savannah
    River National Lab to do that update. We are also working with
    the National Academies to look at the study as the labs do that
    R&D effort.
        At some point over the course of the next few decades we
    will begin to also need to stand up those supplemental
    capabilities in order to really get to the bulk of the 50 or
    more million gallons of tank waste that exists.
        Senator King. I sit on the Energy and Natural Resources
    Committee with Senator Wyden and Senator Cantwell, so I am
    channeling them now. But you have used ``decades'' twice. One
    is in the motion of groundwater and the other is finding the
    solution. There is a danger here. I mean, there are some
    deadlines, and do you feel that we are making adequate
    progress?
        Mr. White. I do. I am very impressed with what the site has
    done in terms of our ability to stand up the initial
    vitrification capability on the low-activity side. I believe we
    will meet our regulatory milestone of having that up and
    running by the end of December 2023.
        We are currently working with the State of Washington and
    the EPA, trying to figure out what the next approach is going
    to be on the high-level side. I am hopeful we can come up with
    something that is feasible and practical, from a technical
    perspective. But I agree with you, time is of the essence.
        Senator King. Thank you, and, Admiral, you deal with waste
    at Idaho National Lab. Is that program on track? Can we feel
    some confidence there?
        Admiral Caldwell. Yes, sir, you should feel some confidence
    there. I ship my spent fuel to Idaho, and package it for
    interim storage in steel containers, and then put it in
    concrete overpacks. I have, today, over 75 percent of my spent
    fuel is in a concrete overpack in road- ready storage, and
    additionally, we have responsibilities and commitments to the
    State of Idaho. I have a near-term commitment to have any fuel
    that was in the pool before January 1, 2017, had to be out of
    the pool by January 1, 2023, and I am going to meet that
    milestone 18 months in advance of the milestone.
        So you should have confidence with what we do, and we will
    continue to do that. The spent fuel handling facility that we
    are building out there will allow us to continue to process
    that fuel and also to continue to meet our responsibilities
    with the State of Idaho, and to do so in an environmentally
    responsible way.
        Senator King. Thank you. Senator Fischer, any further
    questions?
        I want to thank all of you for your testimony here today.
    Again, I apologize for being late at the beginning of the
    meeting. But I also want to thank you for the important work
    that you are doing. This is some of the most sensitive and
    important work in our society. Each of you has a different
    aspect of it, and I just so respect your attention to the
    detail, and know that you have the support of this Committee,
    and also know that you are doing a significant service to the
    country. So thank you all.
        Without further questions, the hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 6:11 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022 AND
                        THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, JUNE 9, 2021

                          United States Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                MISSILE DEFENSE STRATEGY, POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:30 p.m. in room
    SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Angus King
    (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
        Subcommittee Members present: King, Rosen, Kelly, Fischer,
    Rounds, Cramer, and Tuberville.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS KING

        Senator King. This is a hearing on missile defense
    strategy, policies, and programs in review of the Defense
    Authorization Act Request for Fiscal Year 2022 and the Future
    Years Defense Program. First let me thank our witnesses, we
    have two panels, for appearing at today's hearing.
        Unlike prior missile defense hearings, we have decided to
    add a nongovernmental witness panel to obtain a diversity of
    viewpoints on the subject matter before us. The second panel
    will be our government witnesses to help explain the fiscal
    year 2022 budget request and answer questions that may arise in
    the first panel.
        The defense of our Homeland and our allies from missiles is
    a technologically complicated and geographically unbounded
    problem. Today most missiles follow a predictable ballistic
    trajectory, based on the laws of physics, and those laws have
    not changed since the of Sir Isaac Newton. They can fly tens of
    kilometers, as the recent conflict with Israel demonstrated, or
    thousands of kilometers, with an Intercontinental Ballistic
    Missile (ICBM) moving at about
    Mach 5.
        We have spent hundreds of billions of dollars fielding
    systems to intercept them, premised on this predictable
    trajectory, and with relatively good success. However, a new
    class of missiles, called hypersonic boost glide missiles, are
    now being fielded with speeds in excess of Mach 20, and with an
    unpredictable, non-ballistic trajectory. We have not fully
    fielded systems to track much less intercept them. These
    missiles bring back issues of technology and strategic
    stability that were once at the forefront of the debates in
    ballistic missile defense decades ago. I hope today's hearing
    can address the policy implications of this new class of
    missiles as well as the advances we are making in intercepting
    ballistic missiles that we have invested so heavily in.
        Again, let me thank all of you for appearing today. After
    Senator Fischer's opening statement each witness will have 5
    minutes for their own opening statements, and then we will
    alternate with Members for 5-minute rounds of questions.
        Senator Fischer.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to
    our witnesses. We look forward to hearing your views on the
    broader missile defense policy, particularly as we hear renewed
    calls for limitations on United States missile defense to be
    discussed in negotiations with Russia.
        General VanHerck and General Karbler, I also want to
    express my gratitude to the men and women under your commands
    who have made some extraordinary sacrifices over the past year
    in order to perform their mission and defend this Nation. We
    are grateful for their service.
        With respect to the fiscal year 2022 funding request, I am
    pleased to see its support for programs like the next-
    generation interceptor as well as space-based sensors and
    hypersonic defense. However, I remain concerned about the
    overall level of funding for missile defense proposed in this
    year's budget. Despite continued testimony and numerous
    classified briefings for Members, where we hear that threats
    are growing and becoming more complex, particularly as
    adversaries increase their development of highly capable
    hypersonic and cruise missile systems, this budget proposes to
    fund the Missile Defense Agency at what would be the lowest
    level since 2016.
        I understand that these are part of the hard choices being
    made across the entire defense budget, and the result of
    adopting the top line that ultimately reduces spending on
    defense. Nevertheless, I am concerned that this level of
    funding, especially if sustained into the future, will be
    insufficient to pace the growing threats facing our Nation, and
    we will be left in a precarious situation as a Nation.
        We rely on the candid testimony of our witnesses to help us
    understand the difference between a lean diet and starvation.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
        Dr. Soofer, would you make your opening statement, please.

      STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT M. SOOFER, FORMER DEPUTY ASSISTANT
      SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY

        Dr. Soofer. Thank you, Chairman King and Ranking Member
    Fischer. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the
    Subcommittee.
        For most of the post-Cold War period we have enjoyed a
    relatively stable, bipartisan consensus on the role of missile
    defense in U.S. national security policy, but that was not
    always the case. Few national security issues provoked more
    debate during the Cold War than missile defense. The argument
    hinged on how one perceived the relationship between missile
    defense and strategic stability. One school of thought held
    that preserving mutual vulnerability by limiting missile
    defenses was the key to stability during a crisis and central
    for avoiding an action-reaction arms race.
        The other school of thought, equally strongly held, argued
    that protection against nuclear missile attack was not only a
    moral imperative but that even imperfect defenses could
    contribute to deterrence of nuclear attack by complicating an
    adversary's prospect of launching a successful disarming first
    strike. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union, United
    States missile defense policy shifted from building defenses
    against near-peer powers to addressing the emerging threat to
    the Homeland posed by smaller, more unpredictable regional
    actors, the so-called rogue states.
        With a return to great power competition, United States
    missile defense policy must also cope with China and Russia's
    growing regional missile defense capabilities, meant to prevent
    the United States from reinforcing its allies during a
    conflict. So by centering on regional missile defense and
    homeland protection against rogue regimes rather than Russia,
    policymakers have been able to avoid those bitter Cold War
    debates about strategic stability.
        So today, if I may, I would like to address three issues
    that seem to be attracting attention in the missile defense
    policy world. One is continued funding for the next-generation
    interceptor, and homeland defense, more generally. Second is
    employing the SM-3 missile in support of homeland defense, and
    third, the relationship between arms control and missile
    defense.
        So to stay ahead of the North Korean ballistic missile
    threat to the Homeland, the Obama administration added 14
    ground-based interceptors to the 30 fielded by the Bush
    administration. They sought to enhance the ground-based nuclear
    defense system through a redesigned kill vehicle, RKV. The
    Trump administration altered that acquisition approach to
    include a fully modernized interceptor, both the rocket and the
    kill vehicle, and plan to add an additional 20 GBIs [ground
    based interceptors], to bring the total to 64. It appears the
    Biden administration has approved the NGI [next generation
    interception] development to proceed.
        So some national security experts criticize the cost, the
    efficacy, and even the necessity for NGI, and GMD [ground-based
    midcourse defense] more broadly. I would like to offer the
    following points in response.
        First of all, while we believe North Korea intends to grow
    its ICBM force in the coming years, intelligence agencies
    cannot know with certainty the pace of that growth. Today it is
    reasonable to assume that an additional 20 GBIs, combined with
    a nuclear vehicle and improved reliability of a GMD system may
    be sufficient to stay ahead of the threat. We also hope to
    eliminate a number of North Korean ICBMs on the ground, easing
    the burden on the GBIs.
        Second, with respect to costs, we need to understand this
    in context. Combined NGI and GMD funding will account for about
    1/2 of 1 percent of the Department of Defense (DOD) budget from
    fiscal year 2021 to fiscal year 2026. These are not
    unreasonable sums to protect a nation against North Korea.
        Third, proceeding with NGI, and Homeland defense more
    broadly, is important for U.S. grand strategy. Modernizing and
    expanding our homeland defense underpins President Biden's push
    to revitalize our ties with allies and friends. An important
    element of reviewing alliances is convincing allies that the
    United States is prepared to run risks on their behalf.
    Strengthening United States homeland defenses provides that
    confidence by reducing our own vulnerability to North Korean
    reprisals. After all, why would our allies expect us to come to
    their defense if we are not first willing to provide for our
    own defense?
        Finally, Russia and China, they are going to complain about
    NGI, despite the fact that they are modernizing their own suite
    of missile defense systems. They deploy more homeland defense
    interceptors than we do, 68 nuclear-tipped missiles, and they
    are modernizing hundreds of regional air and missile defense
    systems, a missile defense posture which exceeds the U.S., in
    some respects.
        My second issue is the SM-3 missile. As you know, the SM-3
    missile is a regional missile, based on ships. When we did the
    Missile Defense Review in the Trump administration we asked the
    question, could we use the SM-3 to provide an additional layer
    of protection for the Homeland, in addition to the GBI? In
    fact, Congress was thinking along the same lines, because it
    directed, in the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA, that we conduct a test
    of the SM-3 missile against a simple ICBM target. That test
    took place last November, resulting in a successful intercept.
        Now while the SM-3 IIA missile deployed on Aegis ships will
    continue to play an important regional defense role, the
    Interceptor may provide a modest additional measure of
    protection for the Homeland against North Korean ICBMs in an
    emergency or during a crisis. The ship would have to be in the
    right place, near our coast, and the right time, and given its
    smaller size, compared to the GBI, the Interceptor would not
    provide coverage of the entire United States. Moreover, the SM-
    3 would not be capable against the more complex Russian and
    Chinese threats, armed with penetration aids and decoys, nor
    would it be able to cope with Russia's nuclear air and sea
    launch cruise missile that can also range the United States
    Homeland.
        For these reasons, it is unlikely this capability will
    upset strategic stability for the foreseeable future, if ever.
    As President Putin himself has noted, by the end of this year,
    90 percent of Russia's nuclear forces will be modernized, and,
    in his words, ``capable of confidently overcoming existing and
    even projected missile defense systems.''
        Now some have argued that Russia's new novel systems are a
    response to our missile defense plans. Well, there is an
    alternative explanation for why Russia is developing these new
    novel nuclear capabilities. According to Rose Gottemoeller,
    Obama's former New Start chief negotiator, she said Putin is
    ``after nuclear weapons for another reason, to show that Russia
    is still a great power to be reckoned with. These exotic
    systems have more of a political function than a strategic or
    security one.'' In my view, it is more likely an improved SM-3
    missile, even in limited numbers, will contribute to collective
    efforts to meet the challenges posed by the North Korean
    regime, thereby enhancing regional and international strategic
    stability.
        In a final analysis, we cannot allow Russia or China to
    have a veto over the protection of the United States against
    rogue state threats.
        Finally, on arms control. There is a suggestion that you
    cannot have both missile defense and arms control, and I think
    history suggests the opposite. The United States has been
    pursuing missile defense seriously since the mid 1980s. This
    was the Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative, and since we
    withdrew from the ABM treaty in 2002. So despite the fact that
    we have been pursuing missile defenses, Russia and the United
    States have signed three arms control treaties that have
    together drawn down nuclear forces by some 85 percent, compared
    to Cold War highs.
        Look, if Russian leaders were seriously alarmed about
    United States missile defenses, they would not have agreed to
    these reductions, or more recently to extend the New START
    Treaty for another 5 years.
        To conclude, I would just add that homeland and regional
    missile defenses provide protection for the Nation, its
    deployed forces and allies, and are critical enablers of a U.S.
    grand strategy that relies on alliances to maintain a favorable
    balance of power and a peaceful world order. For about 2
    percent of annual defense appropriations, missile defense
    provides the United States the freedom of action to respond to
    crises, to shore up allies, to deter adversaries, and, if
    necessary, to defeat them and limit damage should deterrence
    fail.
        Finally, deterrence, to be successful, requires the
    demonstration of resolve. Missile defense is a very tangible
    measure of U.S. resolve. Failure to do what is necessary to
    protect this nation against North Korea, a country with one of
    the lowest-ranked economies in this world, could call into
    question United States resolve and commitment in the eyes of
    ally and adversary alike. This would damage U.S. strategic
    capability and have serious implications for America's broader
    foreign policy objectives.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Robert M. Soofer follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Dr. Robert M. Soofer
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, thank you for the
    opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces to
    discuss U.S. missile defense policy. For most of the post-Cold War
    period we have enjoyed a relatively stable bipartisan consensus on the
    role for missile defense in U.S. national security policy. But that
    wasn't always the case.
        Few national security issues provoked more debate during the Cold
    War than missile defense. The argument hinged on how one perceived the
    relationship between missile defense and strategic stability. One
    school of thought held that preserving mutual vulnerability by limiting
    missile defenses was key to stability during a crisis and essential for
    avoiding an ``action-reaction'' arms race. The other school of thought,
    as strongly held as the first, argued that protection against nuclear
    missile attack was not only a moral imperative, but that even imperfect
    defenses could contribute to deterrence of nuclear attack by
    complicating an adversary's prospect of launching a successful
    disarming first strike.
        Congress was divided on the matter from the outset. In 1969 the
    Nixon Administration requested funding for the Safeguard ABM system--a
    light defense designed to protect U.S. land-based retaliatory forces
    against Soviet attack, protect American cities against China, and
    provide security against accidental attacks from any source. The Senate
    vote was 50 to 50 during an attempt to eliminate funding for the
    system, with Vice President Spiro Agnew casting the deciding vote in
    favor of Safeguard.
        The 1972 ABM Treaty, which limited each side to two ABM sites,
    seemed to settle the issue in favor of the mutual vulnerability school,
    at least until President Reagan reopened the debate in 1983 with the
    Strategic Defense Initiative. This Committee witnessed some heated
    debates during those years, and while these two schools still exist to
    some extent, the end of the Cold War brought with it the opportunity to
    reach common ground on missile defense policy and programs.
        With the collapse of the Soviet Union the focus of United States
    missile defense policy shifted from building defenses against near peer
    powers to addressing the emerging threat to the Homeland posed by
    smaller, more unpredictable regional actors--rogue powers in the
    popular vernacular. With a return to great power competition, United
    States missile defense policy must also cope with China and Russia's
    growing regional missile capabilities meant to prevent the United
    States from reinforcing its allies during a regional conflict. By
    centering on regional missile defense and homeland protection against
    rogue regimes (rather than Russia) policy makers have been able to
    avoid the bitter Cold War debates about strategic stability.
             u.s. policy for homeland and regional missile defense
        The U.S. maintains two somewhat different policies for Homeland and
    regional missile defense that sometimes leads to confusion about our
    policies and intentions.
        Maintaining an ``advantageous homeland defense posture against
    limited ballistic missile threats,'' as noted in the 2010 Ballistic
    Missile Defense Review, has been the guiding principle of U.S. missile
    defense policy across Republican and Democratic administrations since
    the end of the Cold War. Protection of the Homeland against ballistic
    missile attack by regional actors such as North Korea and Iran is a
    goal shared by Congress as well.
        With respect to Russia and China, the United States continues to
    rely on its nuclear forces (as it did during the Cold War) to deter
    nuclear threats against the Homeland. It is not U.S. policy to build
    missile defenses against these much larger and technologically
    sophisticated threats to the Homeland.
        To address missile threats to U.S. deployed forces and allies, our
    policy has been to strengthen regional missile defense capabilities
    against the full range of potential threats while working cooperatively
    with allies to help them better defend themselves. We don't rely only
    on missile defense systems, but rather pursue a comprehensive and
    layered approach that includes deterrence, active and passive defenses,
    and attack operations to destroy offensive missiles prior to launch.
        I would like to address three issues that could kindle debate over
    missile defense policy this year: 1) funding for the Next Generation
    Interceptor (NGI); (2) employing the SM-3 missile in support of the
    homeland defense mission; and (3) the relationship between missile
    defense and arms control.
                        ngi and homeland missile defense
        To stay ahead of the North Korean ballistic missile threat to the
    Homeland, the Obama Administration added 14 ground-based interceptors
    (GBIs) to the 30 fielded by the Bush Administration and sought to
    enhance the Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system through a
    redesigned kill vehicle (RKV) for the GBI. The Trump Administration
    altered the acquisition approach to include a fully modernized
    interceptor (both rocket and Kill vehicle) called the Next Generation
    Interceptor and planned to add an additional 20 NGI/GBIs to the 44
    deployed currently in Alaska and California. The Biden administration
    has approved NGI development to proceed, with Secretary of Defense
    Austin telling Congress that ``with its emphasis on missile defense and
    more sophisticated sensors, our budget will also help counter the
    increasing ballistic missile capabilities of nations like North Korea
    and Iran.''
        Some national security experts and Members of Congress have
    criticized the cost, efficacy, and necessity for NGI or the GMD system
    more broadly, arguing that North Korea could easily overwhelm planned
    upgrades and future deployments. Other critics are concerned that the
    expansion of United States missile defense capabilities, meant to pace
    the North Korean threat, could eventually upset strategic stability
    with Russia and China.
        I would offer the following points in response.
        First, while we believe North Korea intends to grow its ICBM force
    in the coming years, our intelligence agencies cannot know with any
    great certainty the pace of this growth. Today, it is reasonable to
    assume that an additional 20 ground-based interceptors, combined with a
    new kill vehicle and improved reliability of the GMD system, may be
    sufficient to stay ahead of the threat. We would hope also to eliminate
    a number of North Korean ICBMs on the ground, easing the burden on GMD
    (though the prospects of defeating mobile missiles prior to launch
    remains a daunting challenge).
        Second, the costs, while significant, must be understood in
    context. In fiscal year 2021, the funding for NGI ($858 million) is
    about 8.2 percent of the total MDA budget and will be approximately
    one-quarter of one percent of DOD's budget over fiscal year 2021 to
    fiscal year 2026. NGI total program costs amount to approximately 0.18
    percent of DOD's budget from fiscal year 2020 to fiscal year 2030.
    Combined NGI and GMD funding will account for about one-half of one
    percent of the DOD budget across fiscal year 2021 to fiscal year 2026.
    These are not unreasonable sums to protect the nation against North
    Korean and potentially other rogue state ICBMs.
        Third, proceeding with NGI, and homeland defense more broadly, is
    important for a U.S. grand strategy that, according to the White House,
    seeks to ``promote a favorable distribution of power to deter and
    prevent adversaries from directly threatening the United States and its
    allies, inhibiting access to the global commons or dominating key
    regions.'' Adversary offensive missile capabilities are meant to coerce
    the United States, to limit our freedom of action, to discourage us
    from supporting our allies or countering regional challengers, and,
    ultimately, to weaken our alliances. Modernizing and expanding our
    Homeland defense underpins President's Biden's ``push to revitalize our
    ties with friends and partners.'' An important element of renewing
    alliances is convincing allies that the United States is prepared to
    run risks on their behalf. Strengthening U.S. Homeland defenses
    provides that confidence by reducing our own vulnerability to North
    Korean reprisals. After all, why would our allies expect us to come to
    their defense if we are not first willing to provide for our own
    defense?
        Finally, Russia and China are likely to complain about improvements
    to United States Homeland defenses even while each continues to
    modernize its own suite of missile defense systems. Russia deploys 68
    nuclear tipped ground-based interceptors for the protection of greater
    Moscow and hundreds of regional air and missile defense systems, a
    missile defense posture which exceeds the United States in some
    respects. It is also actively selling its regional missile defenses to
    nations across Eurasia. China possesses regional air and missile
    defense systems and has conducted tests of a mid-course defense system
    against intermediate-range ballistic missiles. President Putin, too,
    has said that United States missile defense won't be able to stop
    Russian missiles, which include nuclear air- and sea-launched cruise
    missiles which can under-fly the GMD system. While there may be some in
    Russia who genuinely worry about United States missile defenses,
    Russian leaders more likely use the issue for domestic political
    reasons and to sow dissention between the United States and its allies.
                 layered homeland defense and the sm-3 missile
        As part of its review of missile defense policy, the Trump
    administration examined whether existing technologies or current weapon
    systems could contribute to the missile defense mission. One of those
    approaches included the prospect of employing the SM-3 block IIA
    missile as an underlayer ``to offer an additional defensive capability
    to ease the burden of the GBI system and provide protection for the
    U.S. Homeland against evolving rogue states' long-range missile
    capabilities.'' Congress was apparently thinking along the same lines
    when it directed the Department of Defense to conduct a test of the SM-
    3 against a simple ICBM target by the end of 2020. That test took place
    last November, resulting in a successful intercept.
        While the SM-3 IIA missile deployed on Aegis capable ships will
    continue to play an important regional defense role, the interceptor
    may be able to provide a modest, additional layer of protection for the
    Homeland against North Korean ICBMs in an emergency or during a crisis.
    The ship would have to be in the right place near our coast at the
    right time, and given its smaller size compared to the GBI, the
    interceptor would not provide coverage for the entire United States.
    Moreover, the SM-3 would not be capable against the more complex
    Russian and Chinese ballistic missiles armed with penetration aids and
    decoys--nor would it defend against air and sea-launched cruise
    missiles.
        Russia and China have registered their concerns about this
    development, as has the arms control community, which fears this
    potential expansion of United States Homeland defense will spark an
    arms race or even increase the likelihood of nuclear war--in other
    words, upset strategic stability.
        However, given the limited number of SM-3 IIA missiles programmed
    over the next five years, as well as the interceptor's inherent
    technological limitations against complex Russian and Chinese missiles,
    it is unlikely this capability will upset strategic stability for the
    foreseeable future, if ever. As President Putin himself has noted, by
    the end of this year, 90-percent of Russia's nuclear forces will be
    modernized and, in his words, ``capable of confidently overcoming
    existing and even projected missile defense systems.''
        Some have suggested that Russia's ``novel'' nuclear systems are a
    response to United States missile defense plans and that the recent SM-
    3 test will only exacerbate this. But there is an alternative
    explanation. According to Rose Gottemoeller, former New START chief
    negotiator, Putin ``is after nuclear weapons for another reason--to
    show that Russia is still a great power to be reckoned with. These
    exotic systems have more of a political function than a strategic or
    security one.''
        More likely, an improved SM-3 missile, even in limited numbers,
    will contribute to collective efforts to meet the challenges posed by
    the North Korean regime, thereby enhancing regional and international
    strategic stability. In the final analysis, we simply cannot give
    Russia or China a veto over the protection of the United States against
    rogue state threats.
                        missile defense and arms control
        Another important policy consideration is the relationship between
    missile defense and future nuclear arms control negotiations. There is
    a sort of conventional wisdom, stretching back to the early days of the
    Cold War, which suggests that reductions or limits on offensive nuclear
    forces are made possible through limits on missile defenses. A
    corollary principle is that it is ``wholly impossible'' to reach arms
    control agreements while pursuing missile defenses. This conventional
    wisdom is wrong, or at least more complicated than currently
    understood.
        In the first instance, the 1972 ABM Treaty did not curtail the arms
    race; rather, the Russians added some 10,000 nuclear warheads between
    1972 and 1984, leading a prominent arms control theorist, Thomas
    Schelling, to observe in 1985 that ``since 1972, the control of
    strategic weapons has made little or no progress.''
        History shows that missile defense and nuclear arms control are not
    incompatible. Even though the United States has been pursuing missile
    defenses seriously since the mid 1980s, and withdrew from the ABM
    Treaty in 2002, Russia and the United States have together drawn down
    their nuclear forces by some 85 percent from Cold War highs. If Russian
    leaders were seriously alarmed about United States missile defenses
    they would not have agreed to these reductions or, more recently, to
    extend the New START treaty for another five years.
        To be sure, Russia will want to include missile defense in any
    future nuclear arms control negotiations or strategic stability talks.
    We should offer no concessions, but rather hear them out and explore
    ways to reassure the Russian side, through transparency, technical
    cooperation where practical, and other confidence building measures,
    that United States missile defenses pose no threat to Russia's
    formidable nuclear forces.
                                   conclusion
        Homeland and regional missile defenses provide protection for the
    Nation, its deployed forces and allies, and are critical enablers of a
    U.S. grand strategy that relies on alliances to maintain a favorable
    balance of power and a peaceful world order.
        For about 2-percent of annual defense appropriations, missile
    defense provides the United States the freedom of action to respond to
    crises, to shore-up allies, to deter adversaries and, if necessary, to
    defeat them and limit damage should deterrence fail.
        Deterrence, to be successful, requires the demonstration of
    resolve. Missile defense is a very tangible measure of U.S. resolve.
    Failure to do what is necessary to protect this Nation against North
    Korea, a country with one of the lowest ranked economies in the world,
    could call into question United States resolve and commitment in the
    eyes of ally and adversary alike. This would damage U.S. strategic
    capability and have serious implications for America's broader foreign
    policy objectives.
        I thank the Committee for its time and look forward to questions.

        [Robert M. Soofer is a non-resident senior associate with the
    Center for Strategic and International Studies and an adjunct professor
    with Georgetown University's Security Studies Program. He served as
    Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense
    Policy in the Trump Administration and as a professional staff member
    for the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services
    Committee.]

        Senator King. Thank you. In the interest of time we are
    going to submit the backgrounds of Dr. Soofer and Mr. Panda for
    the record.
        Mr. Ankit Panda, please.

     STATEMENT OF MR. ANKIT PANDA, STANTON SENIOR FELLOW, NUCLEAR
       POLICY PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

        Mr. Panda. Thank you, Chairman King, Ranking Member
    Fischer, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. I am
    honored to be here today before you to offer my views on the
    missile defense strategy of the United States and its
    relationship to strategic stability with our nuclear-armed
    adversaries.
        My name is Ankit Panda. I am a Washington, DC-based scholar
    of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where I
    study nuclear strategy and missile defense, among other issues.
    For the last 20 years we have sought to develop a national
    missile defense architecture capable of defending the Homeland
    against limited missile threats, namely those from North Korea,
    which today possesses a minimally capable, rudimentary,
    intercontinental range ballistic missile capability, and Iran,
    which may one day possess such a capability.
        Today our ambitions for national missile defense remain
    large. Plays to develop a layered homeland missile defense
    architecture, in particular, for a major plank of the Missile
    Defense Agency's near-term efforts. This layered architecture
    stands to take what was once limited plans for a modest, self-
    contained homeland missile defense architecture, captured
    entirely in the Ground Based Midcourse Defense system and its
    44 deployed Ground-Based Interceptors, soon to be 64, deployed
    in Alaska and California, and extended to include sea-based
    Aegis missile defense, and eventually even ground-based
    Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems.
        Allow me now to posit that this country's national security
    could be meaningfully enhance through the tabling of
    limitations on strategic or homeland missile defense, as part
    of a reciprocal process involving Russia, and possibly China.
    Doing so would not only reduce fiscal and opportunity costs in
    ways that would augment both our conventional deterrence
    capabilities and nuclear modernization plans, but also promote
    more stable nuclear deterrence with our adversaries.
        The case for limitations rests fundamentally on a national
    reckoning with the necessities of nuclear deterrence. As the
    last administration's 2019 Missile Defense Review notes, we
    rely on nuclear deterrence to cope with the strategic forces of
    Russia and China, which are objectively too vast to be fully
    absorbed by our existing missile defenses. That I do not
    dispute.
        But Moscow and Beijing reason about our intentions, as we
    often do theirs, based on our actions and not our statements.
    As a result, both fear the ability of our current and future
    missile defense posture to degrade their strategic nuclear
    retaliatory capability, if not to completely disrupt it. This,
    in turn, begets instability.
        To be clear, I do not posit that our missile defense
    programs are the sole drivers of Russian and Chinese strategic
    modernization and force expansion. However, they are salient,
    and considerable evidence suggests that we are seeing precisely
    the kind of action-reaction relationship between strategic
    offense and defense that spurred the first round of United
    States-Soviet arms control during the late 1960s once again
    today.
        As was the case back then, limitations should not be
    unilateral but should nonetheless be on the table, in
    particular, as we seek a follow-on agreement with Russia to the
    2010 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the last treaty of its
    kind to remain in force between our two countries and due to
    expire in 2026.
        Congress, in particular, has led on this issue in the past
    and can do so again. For instance, during the final decade of
    the Cold War it was Congress that limited the Reagan
    administration's desire to reinterpret the ABM treaty in a way
    that might permit for a capacious expansion of the Strategic
    Defense Initiative. This facilitated strategic stability and
    Congress can once again play this role.
        So there are numerous ways in which Congress might lead on
    this issue to forestall what I see is a costly 21st century
    arms race that is already underway and enhance American
    national security in the process.
        First, Congress should ask the Department of Defense to
    study and assess the extent to which our investments in missile
    defense are spurring qualitative and quantitative force
    structure changes by our adversaries. DOD has observed, in
    recent congressional mandated reports, that missile defense is
    driving certain forms of Chinese and Russian modernization, for
    instance. A fuller study could inform our national decision-
    making to ensure a prudent path forward.
        Beyond this, Congress should adopt a resolution
    acknowledging the action-reaction relationship between
    strategic offensive and defensive arms, as the preamble to the
    New START Treaty in 2010 did. In doing so, this body can render
    more credible attempts by this administration, or a future
    administration, to seek limitations on Russian and Chinese
    offensive arms of particular concern that would enhance
    American national security.
        Finally, Congress should remain actively involved in
    ensuring the Missile Defense Agency is subjecting the Ground-
    Based Midcourse Defense system to realistic testing and
    evaluation. This can include mandating testing against ICBM
    target missiles of longer ranges, that would be more
    representative of, say, a North Korean ICBM. Future testing
    should also include more realistic environmental and other
    stressors, including decoys designed to emulate the infrared
    signature of a target re-entry vehicle, something that is
    eminently within North Korea's reach today.
        My written testimony for this Subcommittee discusses these
    and other issues germane to today's hearing in greater detail.
    Thank you for this opportunity today, and I look forward to
    your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Ankit Panda follows:]

                     Prepared Statement by Mr. Ankit Panda
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, Members of the Subcommittee,
    it is my honor to testify before you today on the present and future of
    missile defenses in the national defense strategy of the United States.
    My testimony will cover three matters germane to the matter at hand
    today. First, I describe the full extent of U.S. missile defense
    capabilities today and near-future plans. Second, I explain how
    homeland missile defense--perhaps counterintuitively--harms rather than
    enhances U.S. national security interests by increasing the odds of
    nuclear escalation in a crisis and by increasing the costs of peacetime
    competition with our adversaries. Third, I describe the advantages and
    disadvantages of introducing missile defense as a topic for
    consideration in future arms control negotiations with Russia and
    possibly China. I conclude by recommending potential approaches to
    limitations that maximize U.S. national security interests and with
    suggestions for how Congress may proceed in studying these matters.
                  u.s. missile defense capabilities and plans
        The United States deploys a multi-tiered missile defense system to
    defend against ballistic and cruise missile threats across the full
    array of range classes. Despite the commonplace reference to a
    ``layered'' missile defense system, it is important to underscore that
    most currently deployed systems and interceptors are designed and
    optimized to manage a portion of the full range of ballistic missile
    threats. In other words, specific systems are optimized to defeat and
    destroy missiles of a specific range class, with limited overlap in
    capability across systems. Currently deployed interceptors and missile
    defense systems cover ballistic missile threats in the midcourse and
    terminal phases of their flight trajectories. These systems are
    supported by a complex array of command and control, battle management,
    and communications systems. A diverse array of land-, sea-, and space-
    based sensors provides early warning, tracking, and discrimination for
    the missile defense mission. Air-based sensors additionally support the
    testing and evaluation of missile defense-related test activities.
        The primary missile defense systems in use today are the Ground-
    Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system; the ship-based Aegis Ballistic
    Missile Defense (BMD) and Aegis Ashore platforms; Terminal High
    Altitude Area Defense (THAAD); and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-
    3) and other Patriot variants.
        Each of these systems employs a varying array of interceptor
    missiles and types: GMD relies on the Ground-Based Interceptor, based
    in Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California;
    Aegis BMD relies on the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) Block IA/IB
    interceptors and the Standard Missile 6. The SM-3 Block IIA is being
    procured in limited numbers and will deploy at sea and ashore. THAAD,
    PAC-3, and other Patriot variants use system-specific interceptors. All
    interceptor types in use today rely on direct kinetic impact through
    either a kill vehicle or interceptor--or an interceptor-mounted blast
    fragmentation warhead in the case of older Patriot systems--to destroy
    inbound missile threats.
        GMD is the sole system developed from the ground-up to address
    intercontinental-range ballistic missile threats to the U.S. Homeland,
    but, in November 2020, an Aegis BMD-equipped U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke-
    class destroyer successfully employed an SM-3 Block IIA interceptor to
    destroy what the Missile Defense Agency described as a ``threat
    representative'' ICBM-class target. This test, codenamed FTM-44 and
    carried out as a result of a congressionally mandated test pursuant to
    the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act, set up SM-3 Block IIA as
    potentially the second such system available for potential homeland
    missile defense. It is and has been the policy of the United States
    since the 2002 decision by the Bush administration to exit the Cold
    War-era Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to rely on homeland missile
    defense for ``limited'' ballistic missile threats to the Homeland. To
    this end, the 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) notes ``the GMD system
    is designed to defend against the existing and potential ICBM threat
    from rogue states such as North Korea and Iran.'' \1\ The 2019 MDR adds
    that ``in the event of conflict, [the GMD system] would defend, to the
    extent feasible, against a ballistic missile attack upon the U.S.
    Homeland from any source.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Missile Defense Review, U.S. Department of Defense, 2019,
    https://www.defense.gov/Portals/ 1/Interactive/2018/11-2019-Missile-
    Defense-Review/The%202019%20MDR_Executive% 20Summary.pdf, pp. XII.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Efforts to generate a layered homeland missile defense system,
    incorporating GMD and Aegis with SM-3 Block IIA, remain underway. MDA's
    fiscal year 2022 plans include pursuing a layered homeland defense
    approach that will further assess SM-3 Block IIA's suitability for a
    counter-ICBM mission. MDA further plans to evaluate THAAD's capability
    to participate in the defense of the contiguous United States, with a
    THAAD-specific flight test to this end planned for as early as fiscal
    year 2023.
        THAAD, PAC-3, other Patriot systems, and sea-and land-based Aegis
    BMD systems provide in-theater missile defense in Europe and Asia to
    protect United States servicemembers, military facilities, and allied
    territory from ballistic and, in certain cases, cruise missile threats.
    Successive U.S. administrations have maintained cooperative ballistic
    missile defense programs with key allies. This includes the European
    Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), which features land-and sea-based
    sensor, interceptor, and battle management system deployment to defend
    NATO territory against evolving threats as ballistic missiles
    proliferate. In Asia, successive administrations have cooperated
    extensively with Japan on ballistic missile defense, with Tokyo notably
    having codeveloped the SM-3 Block IIA with the United States. South
    Korea and Australia have also been close partners on missile defense in
    Asia. Finally, for more than 3 decades, the United States has supported
    Israel's indigenous missile defense programs.
        Apart from these existing capabilities, the Missile Defense Agency
    continues to study, research, develop, and evaluate a range of new
    sensors, interceptors, and other missile defense-related technologies.
    Some of these programs cover hypersonic defense, sensor integration,
    new kill vehicles (the Common Kill Vehicle Technology program), and the
    THAAD-PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) integration. In fiscal
    year 2021, MDA requested $9.187 billion to support these activities in
    addition to the sustainment and procurement of deployed missile defense
    capabilities. \2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Missile Defense Agency, Budget Estimates Overview: Fiscal Year
    (FY) 2021, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/budgetfy21.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Since the mid-1980s, Congress has appropriated in excess of $200
    billion \3\ for the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and its predecessors,
    the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (1974-2002; renamed MDA) and
    the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (1984-1993).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ Estimate derived from collating fiscal year 2018, fiscal year
    2019, and fiscal year 2020 appropriation with available MDA historical
    funding data. For more, see Historical Funding for MDA FY85-17, U.S.
    Missile Defense Agency, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/
    FY17_histfunds.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Homeland Missile Defense
        The highest-end missile defense mission today is that of protecting
    the U.S. Homeland from limited nuclear attacks. In 2002--4 years after
    North Korea's first-ever test of a satellite launch vehicle--the George
    W. Bush administration announced the deployment plan for the GMD
    system. As the system was announced, the administration sought to
    achieve an initial operational capability before 2005. This timeline--
    unusually compressed for a program with the ambition and challenging
    technical goals given to GMD--was nominally met, with MDA declaring a
    ``limited defensive capability'' by the end of 2004, though just how
    limited was not admitted. \4\ The nominal claim was not based on any
    realistic testing of the system against ICBM-class targets. In the 16
    years since, GMD has endured delays, unexpected technical hurdles, cost
    overruns, and exhibited irregular successes over its limited testing
    history. \5\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Missile Defense Agency, Annual Financial Statements, fiscal
    year 2004, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/cfs/
    fy2004/FY_2004_MDA_Financial_Report.pdf.
        \5\ Laura Grego, George N. Lewis, and David Wright, ``Shielded from
    Oversight: The Disastrous US Approach to Strategic Missile Defense,''
    Union of Concerned Scientists, July 2016, https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/
    default/files/attach/2016/07/Shielded-from-Oversight-full-report.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        GMD has been tested just twice against what MDA has described as
    ``threat representative'' targets--targets emulating potential ICBM
    threats to the Homeland. Both tests--FTG-15 in 2017 and FTG-11 in
    2019--were declared successful by MDA, but the target missile in both
    did not faithfully emulate the trajectory, velocity, or potential
    countermeasures that might accompany a real North Korean ICBM launch
    against the continental United States. \6\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ Laura Grego and David Wright, ``Analysis of GMD Missile Defense
    Test FTG-15,'' Union of Concerned Scientists, March 15, 2018, 15,
    https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/analysis-gmd-missile-defense-test-ftg-
    15.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Across the 19 intercept tests in the program's history, MDA has
    assessed a success in 11 cases, including the three most recent tests.
    Technical and programmatic hurdles have complicated GMD's planned
    development. For instance, a notable set of technical hurdles were
    found to be associated with faulty divert thrusters--small rockets
    meant to offer fine in-flight trajectory adjustments--across multiple
    tests. \7\ Most notably, plans to replace the program's older, troubled
    exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) with the Redesigned Kill Vehicle
    (RKV) were canceled in 2019. \8\ Instead, the Department of Defense now
    plans to procure a new interceptor--the Next-Generation Interceptor, or
    NGI--to phase-in as a replacement for the GMD system's silo-based
    Ground-based Interceptors (GBIs). According to MDA Director Vice Adm.
    Jon Hill, NGI was ``the result of the first holistic technical
    assessment of homeland defenses the department has conducted since
    initial system operations began in 2004.'' \9\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ David Willman, ``A Test of America's Homeland Missile Defense
    System Found a Problem. Why Did the Pentagon Call It a Success?,'' Los
    Angeles Times, July 6, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/projects/la-na-
    missile-defense/.
        \8\ Jen Judson, ``Pentagon Terminates Program for Redesigned Kill
    Vehicle, Preps for New Competition,'' Defense News, August 21, 2019,
    https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/08/21/dod-tanks-redesigned-
    kill-vehicle-program-for-homeland-defense-interceptor/.
        \9\ ``Contracts Awarded for Next Generation Interceptor Program,''
    U.S. Department of Defense, accessed May 26, 2021, https://
    www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2547665/contracts-
    awarded-for-next-generation-interceptor-program/.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Despite GMD's test record and trouble programmatic history, U.S.
    civilian and military leaders alike have expressed confidence in the
    system. General John E. Hyten, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, has stated that he has ``100 percent confidence in those
    capabilities against North Korea.'' \10\ Lt. General James Dickinson,
    commander of the United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command,
    has expressed ``no concerns'' regarding GMD's capabilities. \11\ While
    these statements appear to be subjective expressions of confidence in
    the system, GMD's actual testing record does not indicate anywhere
    close to a perfect level of system effectiveness. Even the most
    effective U.S. missile defense systems as evaluated through testing--
    notably, THAAD--can be expected to offer a perfect defense.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\  ``A Conversation with General John Hyten, Vice Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff,'' CSIS Event, January 17, 2020, https://
    csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/
    200121_John_Hyten.pdf.
        \11\ Jason Sherman, ``Army's Top Air Defender Remains Confident in
    GBI Fleet after RKV Termination,'' InsideDefense.com, October 22, 2019,
    https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/armys-top-air-defender-remains-
    confident-gbi-fleet-after-rkv-termination.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Arms Control Today and Missile Defense
        No arms control treaty currently proscribes the United States'
    pursuit of homeland or theater missile defense systems. The first and
    last major treaty to do so--the 1972 ABM Treaty between the United
    States and the Soviet Union--was discarded by the Bush administration
    to augment homeland missile defense capabilities against what was then
    seen as a potential North Korean intercontinental-range nuclear threat.
    The ABM Treaty, an outcome of the first United States-Soviet Strategic
    Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I, 1969-1972), did not completely ban
    missile defenses, but limited each of its parties to 200 deployed,
    fixed interceptors at two sites; a 1974 protocol halved this to 100
    interceptors at a single site. \12\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ Protocol To The Treaty Between The United States Of America
    And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Limitation Of Anti-
    Ballistic Missile Systems, available at https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/
    avc/trty/101888.htm#protocolabm.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The 2010 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between the
    United States and the Russian Federation--the sole strategic arms
    reduction treaty in force between the two and due for expiration in
    2026--does not provide for meaningful limitations on missile defense,
    but the preambulatory text to the Treaty notes that both countries
    ``recognize the interrelationship between strategic offensive and
    strategic defensive arms and that this interrelationship would become
    more important as strategic nuclear arms were reduced.'' Since the Bush
    administration's decision to exit the ABM Treaty in 2002, no U.S.
    administration has proposed exploratory talks with any United States
    nuclear-armed adversary--Russia, China, or North Korea--on the matter
    of limiting missile defenses.
                    strategic stability and missile defense
        For any two adversarial states practicing nuclear deterrence,
    strategic stability between them exists when both arms race stability
    and crisis stability exist. These subsidiary conditions for strategic
    stability govern the incentives each side has--in peacetime--to expand
    its available set of offensive weaponry (arms race stability) and, in a
    crisis, to employ nuclear weapons first (crisis stability). Strategic
    stability is desirable because it reduces the financial and opportunity
    costs of competition in peacetime and, in a crisis, lowers the
    probability that either side will seek to deliberately escalate a
    crisis in pursuit of strategic advantage. Ultimately, this reduces the
    odds of a devastating nuclear war.
        Missile defenses--particularly homeland missile defenses--interact
    with these subsidiary requirements for strategic stability in important
    ways.
        First, one side's investments in missile defenses in peacetime will
    prompt the other to reassess its force size and posture. Because stable
    nuclear deterrence depends on a shared acceptance between adversaries
    of a ``balance of terror,'' \13\ the introduction of any new defensive
    capability that is perceived as upsetting this balance will create
    incentives for further investment in offensive capabilities to restore
    balance. This ``action-reaction phenomenon'' between offensive and
    defensive investments was once recognized as the foundation of the
    United States-Soviet arms race during the Cold War. \14\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ Albert Wohlstetter, ``The Delicate Balance of Terror,''
    Product Page, 1958, https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P1472.html.
        \14\ Robert McNamara, quoted in Morton H. Halperin, ``The Decision
    to Deploy the ABM: Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics in the Johnson
    Administration,'' World Politics 25, no. 1 (1972): 62-95, https://
    doi.org/10.2307/2010431.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In the years since withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
    Treaty in 2002 and as early as the National Missile Defense Act of
    1999, \15\ the United States has maintained that existing Homeland
    missile defense capabilities are designed to cope with ``limited''
    threats from so-called rogue states like North Korea, and should not be
    seen as threatening to Russia or China, and therefore causative of arms
    racing. Finally, in 2017 North Korea did acquire a rudimentary
    intercontinental-range nuclear delivery capability. Iran may one day
    acquire such a capability.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ National Missile Defense Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-38, 113
    Stat. 205 (1999).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The origins of United States intentions to focus missile defense on
    countries other than Russia (whose offensive forces are too numerous to
    defend against) can be traced back to the post-Cold War GPALS--or
    Global Protection Against Limited Strikes--program, which was
    introduced by the George H.W. Bush administration as a successor to the
    Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative.
        U.S. messaging on the limited objectives of homeland missile
    defense, however, has been inconsistent at times. Notably, during the
    public unveiling of the 2019 MDR, former President Donald J. Trump
    indicated that it was the goal of the United States ``to ensure that we
    can detect and destroy any missile launched against the United States--
    anywhere, anytime, anyplace.'' \16\ (emphasis added)
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \16\ Remarks by President Trump and Vice President Pence Announcing
    the Missile Defense Review, White House, January 17, 2019, https://
    trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-
    trump-vice-president-pence-announcing-missile-defense-review/.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        This marked an authoritative endorsement of a much more far-ranging
    set of objectives for current and future missile defense plans in the
    United States--even as it appeared to be inconsistent with the
    published text of the 2019 MDR which reiterated the ``limited''
    objective for homeland missile defense and explicitly stated that
    ``nuclear deterrence'' (as opposed to missile defense) would ``address
    the large and more sophisticated Russian and Chinese intercontinental
    ballistic missile capabilities.'' \17\ The 2019 MDR is somewhat
    internally inconsistent on this question. In the case of ballistic
    missile attacks against the United States Homeland from countries other
    than North Korea or Iran, the 2019 MDR notes that GMD would defend ``to
    the extent feasible, against a ballistic missile attack upon the United
    States Homeland from any source'' (implying that GMD would endeavor to
    limit damage in a strategic nuclear war with Russia and China). In any
    case, Russian and Chinese military planners (who like their American
    counterparts tend to plan on the basis of worst-case scenarios) never
    were reassured that United States missile defenses would not be
    directed against them.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \17\  Missile Defense Review, U.S. Department of Defense, 2019,
    https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/2018/11-2019-Missile-
    Defense-Review/The%202019%20MDR_Executive%20 Summary.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Second, beyond stimulating arms racing, once missile defenses are
    developed, tested, and deployed, they can introduce deleterious sources
    of uncertainty in decision-making during a crisis, prompting escalatory
    behavior where restraint might otherwise have prevailed. In a system of
    bilateral nuclear deterrence where survivable offensive systems exist
    under conditions of relative parity, each side might seek to avoid
    deliberate escalation because of the inability to assure the complete
    destruction of the other side's arsenal--thereby subjecting oneself to
    the adversary's retaliatory strike. In broad strokes, numerical parity
    of this kind is stabilizing because it deprives each side of the
    incentive to ever strike first, promoting stability in a crisis.
        The introduction of strategic missile defenses--even in modest
    numbers--can upset this. Whereas one side's first strike would
    otherwise have left the other with an assured retaliatory capability,
    the attacker's defenses would now have the capability to degrade and
    absorb this retaliation. As a result, the victim's retaliatory
    capability would no longer be assured because their ballistic missile
    reentry vehicles (RVs) might be intercepted long before they are able
    to detonate on or near the attacker's territory. In recognition of this
    dilemma, the would-be victim, in a crisis, faces strong incentives to
    employ their nuclear arsenal first--to maximize the destruction of the
    would-be attacker's nuclear arsenal and limit damage to their own
    territory. These dynamics can manifest even if both sides possess
    missile defense capabilities. As a result of the introduction of
    strategic missile defenses, crises are thus prone to instability and
    deliberate escalation.
        It was these dangers that once prompted a shared recognition of the
    dangers of unrestrained investments in defensive homeland missile
    defense technologies by the United States and the Soviet Union. In
    1968, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Soviet premier
    Alexei Kosygin arrived at a shared understanding of these dangers,
    noting that the nature of the offense-defense balance necessitated
    limits on anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems. \18\ This, among
    broader concerns about the costs of peacetime arms racing, laid the
    groundwork for the 1972 ABM Treaty.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \18\ ``Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume
    XIV, Soviet Union,'' Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State,
    February 21, 1968, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
    frus1964-68v14/d238.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Importantly, behaviors and postures that are stabilizing are often
    not those that confer unilateral, absolute advantage. In other words,
    what is most stable for the system of deterrence is not always what is
    perceived to be the best of all worlds for the United States. Because
    stable nuclear deterrence is predicated on a shared investment by the
    United States and each of its nuclear-armed adversaries in the
    ``balance of terror,'' strategic missile defense--even as it might
    mitigate and limit damage to the United States in a nuclear conflict--
    is destabilizing. Even as the U.S. has emphasized the ``limited''
    objectives of homeland missile defense in the post-Cold War era, Russia
    and China harbor anxieties about the future strategic direction of our
    missile defense investments and the potential for technological
    breakthroughs. These nations, ultimately, reason about their own
    security and deterrence needs based on what we do rather than what we
    say.
     russian, chinese, and north korean responses to united states missile
                                    defenses
        Several ongoing investments and modernization processes in Russia,
    China, and North Korea present challenges to current and future United
    States missile defense systems. Each of these countries sees the need
    to assure the ability of its nuclear warheads to penetrate U.S.
    Homeland missile defenses as an essential requirement of nuclear
    deterrence.
    Russia
        Russia's ongoing strategic nuclear modernization includes several
    qualitative investments that are explicit responses to advances in
    United States Homeland missile defense capabilities. These include the
    so-called `March 1' set of systems memorably introduced by Russian
    President Vladimir Putin in speech to the country's Federal Assembly on
    that date in 2018. These systems include a nuclear-powered cruise
    missile and a nuclear-powered autonomous thermonuclear torpedo, among
    others. In his speech, Putin justified these investments as a response
    to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which he described as the
    ``cornerstone of the international security system.'' \19\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \19\ President of Russia, ``Presidential Address to the Federal
    Assembly,'' March 1, 2018, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/
    56957.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Five of the six systems introduced by the Russian president that
    day are designed to either directly evade midcourse missile defenses,
    or support the evasion of midcourse defenses by other systems. The
    under-development SS-X-29 Sarmat heavy ICBM, based in a hardened silo,
    is a traditional approach to countering missile defenses, featuring
    penetration aids and multiple warheads. The thermonuclear warhead-
    toting Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle-- designed for release by a
    submarine--bypasses midcourse missile defenses and potential future
    threats to manned submarines near their ports. The SS-19 Mod 4 Avangard
    introduces a hypersonic glide vehicle payload, which employs a
    nonballistic trajectory to deliver a thermonuclear payload while
    spending the majority of its flight path at altitudes below GMD's
    engagement envelope. Despite apparent difficulties in testing, the SSC-
    X-9 Burevestnik nuclear-propelled cruise missile appears designed to
    leverage its apparent limitless range to introduce unpredictable
    azimuths of attack and possibly even loiter outside U.S. airspace in a
    crisis; as a cruise missile, it could be vulnerable to point defenses,
    but not to midcourse defenses. (It is largely infeasible for the United
    States to develop and deploy point defenses in sufficient quantities to
    defend all valuable targets.) Finally, the Peresvet road-mobile
    directed energy weapon appears designed to `dazzle' and degrade United
    States space-based optical and radar sensors that might be used to
    track Russian road-mobile ICBMs for targeting or possibly cueing
    missile defenses. (The sixth and final system, Kinzhal, is a theater-
    range air-launched aeroballistic missile.)
        One of the above systems, Avangard, is deployed and is accountable
    under New START. Peresvet is also deployed. The others are unlikely to
    be deployed during the remaining treaty lifespan of New START and, as a
    result, may be contentious topics in the pursuit of a follow-on treaty.
    China
        Sequential annual reports on the Chinese military, produced by the
    Department of Defense pursuant to a congressional requirement, have
    emphasized that recent qualitative nuclear modernization efforts in
    China--including the adoption of multiple warheads on certain Chinese
    ICBMs and the development of hypersonic boost-glide systems--are in
    part a response to current and future United States missile defenses.
    In 2014, DOD observed that China was ``working on a range of
    technologies to attempt to counter United States and other countries'
    ballistic missile defense systems.'' \20\ The 2020 iteration of this
    report further observed that Beijing's efforts to develop hypersonic
    and directed energy weapons were, among other rationales, driven by a
    Chinese interest in enabling the ``defeat of missile defense systems.''
    \21\ United States investments in missile defense are also promoting
    China's ongoing modernization from a primarily land-based nuclear force
    to a full-scale triad, incorporating more survivable ballistic missile
    submarines and the PLA Air Force, which has readopted a nuclear mission
    as of 2019 after having no nuclear delivery role since the 1980s.
    Authoritative Chinese documents, including the 2013 edition of the
    People's Liberation Army's Science of Military Strategy, note that the
    ``active development of a missile defense system by the United States
    and some of [China's surrounding nations'' necessitates the
    ``development of sea-based nuclear strength.'' \22\ As Lt. Gen. Scott
    Berrier testified earlier this year before this Committee, the United
    States Defense Intelligence Agency has assessed that China will double
    the size of its nuclear arsenal in the next decade. \23\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \20\ Military and Security Developments Involving the People's
    Republic of China 2014, Office of the Secretary of Defense, https://
    archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DOD_China_Report.pdf, pp. 30.
        \21\ Military and Security Developments Involving the People's
    Republic of China 2020, Office of the Secretary ofDefense, https://
    media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020- DOD-CHINA-
    MILITARY-POWERREPORT-FINAL.PDF, pp. 148.
        \22\  Science of Military Strategy (2013), unofficial translation
    by the China Aerospace Studies Institute, https://
    www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Translations/2021-
    02-08% 20Chinese%20Military%20Thoughts-
    %20In%20their%20own%20words%20Science%20of %20Military
    %20Strategy%202013.pdf?ver= NxAWg4BPw_NylEjxaha8Aw%3d%3d, pp. 269.
        \23\  Scott Berrier, Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat
    Assessment, Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate, 2021, https://
    www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2021
    %20DIA%20Annual%20Threat%20Assessment%20
    Statement%20for%20the%20Record.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Chinese strategists have been particularly concerned about United
    States missile defenses in parallel with the development of
    increasingly precise conventional offensive weapons. Given the
    country's lean nuclear force size--estimated to be in a ``low-200s,''
    \24\ according to an unclassified Department of Defense assessment--one
    of the scenarios that Chinese strategists fear is a United States
    conventional strike, which might succeed in the destroying many of
    China's available land-based nuclear systems and associated command-
    and-control infrastructure, leaving whatever retaliatory capability
    then available subject to absorption by U.S. missile defenses. Chinese
    thinking on the nuclear relationship with the United States concedes
    the vast quantitative and qualitative advantages United States nuclear
    forces enjoy over Beijing's own nuclear capabilities. The predominant
    concerns that appear to have driven Chinese investments in nuclear
    modernization over the last decade are strategic missile defenses and
    advanced convention precision strike capabilities. In addition to its
    concerns regarding strategic missile defense, Beijing has expressed
    strong objections to the United States deployment of theater missile
    defense systems. In 2016 and 2017, Chinese officials strongly objected
    to the United States deployment of a THAAD battery in South Korea,
    pointing to the possibility that the battery's powerful AN/TPY-2 radar
    could be integrated with current and future United States Homeland
    missile defense systems to better enable the tracking and
    discrimination of Chinese nuclear warheads. \25\ Despite its concerns,
    China rebuffed United States invitations to bilateral technical talks
    on the THAAD system. \26\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \24\ Military and Security Developments Involving the People's
    Republic of China 2020.
        \25\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China,
    ``Wang Yi Talks about US's Plan to Deploy THAAD Missile Defense System
    in ROK,'' February 13, 2016, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgla/eng/
    topnews/t1340525.htm.
        \26\ Andrea Shalal, ``U.S. Hopes for Talks with China about
    Possible THAAD Move to South Korea,'' Reuters, March 23, 2016, https://
    www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-usa-missiledefense-china-
    idUSKCN0WO2P2.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    North Korea
        As the most resource-constrained of the three nuclear-armed United
    States adversaries, North Korea's options are most limited for
    qualitatively coping with American missile defenses. However, Pyongyang
    appears to be investing in countermeasures and continues a quantitative
    build-up in its nuclear forces that was called for by leader Kim Jong
    Un directly during his January 1, 2018, New Year's Day address. As of
    May 2021, at least 10 unique launchers for intercontinental-range
    ballistic missiles have been seen in the country--six based on modified
    logging trucks imported from China in 2011 and four apparent indigenous
    ones. North Korea possesses two ICBM designs that have been flight-
    tested three times and has introduced three other ICBM designs that
    have yet to be flight-tested. The newest of these untested designs--
    seen at a military parade in October 2020--may be capable of
    accommodating advanced payloads, including multiple reentry vehicles
    \27\ (MRVs) or a single large reentry vehicle supplemented by ballistic
    missile defense countermeasures. Pyongyang continues to maintain a
    network of survivable shelters, tunnel networks, and underground
    facilities in its mountainous northern provinces to complicate United
    States efforts to track and target its ICBM and other long-range
    missile launchers in a crisis. At the 8th Party Congress of the
    Workers' Party of Korea in January 2021, Kim Jong Un called for the
    development of more responsive solid propellant-based ICBMs and more
    advanced warheads. In these ways, the ballistic missile threat from
    North Korea remains significant and continues to grow.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \27\ MRVs are not to be conflated with MIRVs. The former release
    multiple reentry vehicles along the flight vehicle's ballistic
    trajectory while the latter allows for the independent targeting of
    multiple reentry vehicles at varied targets--through the use of a
    separate, powered ``bus''.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        According to the Missile Defense Agency, 44 of a planned 64 \28\
    Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) for the GMD system--the BMD system
    chiefly designed to cope with the North Korean threat to the Homeland--
    are currently emplaced. \29\ Assuming that four such interceptors are
    available for use against each incoming North Korean reentry vehicle in
    a contingency, North Korea could saturate the existing GMD system in
    its ideal engagement mode with just 11 reentry vehicles. With 10 known
    ICBM launchers--at least four of which appear capable of accommodating
    a larger ICBM capable of delivering multiple reentry vehicles--
    Pyongyang's path to this goal is eminently achievable. At 64 deployed
    GBIs, the saturation point would shift to 16 reentry vehicles. The GMD
    system could cope with greater numbers by relying on two-or three-
    interceptors per incoming reentry vehicle, but this would come at the
    cost of reducing the system's overall expected effectiveness. The lack
    of robust North Korean flight-testing and the lack of any non-lofted
    flight-testing for its RVs lower the probability that all of
    Pyongyang's available ICBMs would perform as desired, but the risk of
    successful nuclear delivery by North Korea to the United States
    Homeland is great enough to merit serious consideration in current and
    future planning. As Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs
    of Staff, emphasized in recent congressional testimony, North Korea's
    ICBMs present a ``real danger'' to the United States Homeland. \30\
    Moreover, as early as 1999--one year after Pyongyang's launch of the
    Taepodong-1 satellite launch vehicle, which birthed current United
    States Homeland missile defense efforts--a United States intelligence
    community National Intelligence Estimate suggested that even resource
    and technology constrained states like North Korea would find the means
    to develop countermeasures. \31\ NORTHCOM is aware of the shifting
    challenge from North Korea and has indicated that new qualitative
    developments in North Korea's missile capabilities could create
    ``increased risk'' for GMD as early as 2025. \32\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \28\ Following the cancellation of the RKV, the next 20
    interceptors for GMD are planned to be of the new NGI type.
        \29\ U.S. Missile Defense Agency, Ground-based Midcourse Defense
    (GMD), https://www.mda.mil/system/gmd.html.
        \30\ Statement of General Mark. A Milley, USA, 20th Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Budget Hearing, House
    Appropriations Committee, Defense Subcommittee, May 27, 2021, https://
    docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/AP02/20210527/112682/HHRG-117-AP02- Wstate-
    MilleyM-20210527.pdf.
        \31\ U.S. National Intelligence Council, ``Foreign Missile
    Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
    Through 2015,'' September 1999, https://fas.org/irp/threat/missile/
    nie99msl.htm. The estimate offers the following assessment: ``Many
    countries, such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq probably would rely
    initially on readily available technology--including separating RVs,
    spin-stabilized RVs, RV reorientation, radar absorbing material (RAM),
    booster fragmentation, low-power jammers, chaff, and simple (balloon)
    decoys--to develop penetration aids and countermeasures.''
        \32\ Jason Sherman, ``NORTHCOM: U.S. to Assume `increased Risk'
    against North Korean ICBMs in 2025,'' InsideDefense.com, January 29,
    2020, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/ northcom-us-assume-
    increased-risk-against-north-korean-icbms-2025.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        North Korea may be exploiting certain perceived gaps in the
    existing GMD system. For instance, GMD has yet to exhibit success
    against a target reentry vehicle in an intercept test carried out at
    ``night''--where the exoatmospheric target in midcourse flight would be
    obscured by the earth's shadow and, as a result, exhibit a differing
    infrared signature from a daytime test, where it would be illuminated
    by the Sun. (Ground-based radar sensors are indifferent to these
    lighting conditions, but sensors on the interceptors' kill vehicle are
    not.) In 2017, North Korea conducted two of its three ICBM tests at
    nighttime (in July and November). These tests may have been designed to
    indicate a North Korean interest in operationalizing an ability to
    launch under conditions that Pyongyang may perceive to be least
    favorable for United States Homeland missile defense capabilities as
    teste d and evaluated.
        Separately, a new suite of quasiballistic short-range ballistic
    missiles in development in North Korea appear to be designed to stress
    United States and South Korean missile defense capabilities. Some of
    these missiles--including a system the United States intelligence
    community calls the KN23--appear to spend most of their flight path at
    altitudes above the maximum engagement altitude of Korean Peninsula-
    based PAC-3 systems, but below the minimum engagement altitude of
    THAAD. These systems could be armed with nuclear weapons should North
    Korea choose to do so in the future.
                 limiting defenses amid great power competition
        The absence of any formal limits on U.S. Homeland missile defense
    plans and deployments is harming U.S. national security interests by
    promoting our adversaries to pursue meaningful qualitative force build-
    ups. Relatedly, a lack of limitations is leading to ever-growing
    peacetime opportunity costs as MDA's ambitions continue to grow in
    response to evolving missile threats. During the Cold War, the United
    States and the Soviet Union were able to arrive at a shared
    understanding on the perils of mutual investment in ABM systems amid
    the arms race of the time in an environment of mistrust and amid
    competition. Matters are considerably more complicated today, for some
    of the reasons outlined above. Because the core source of insecurity
    for American adversaries--and the most likely source of arms race
    instability and crisis instability--is homeland, or strategic, missile
    defense, it would be prudent and sensible for Congress to consider and
    study the role of possible limitations in this area to support United
    States national security objectives, including in future arms control
    processes with Russia and/or China.
    Candidate Approaches for Limitations
        The planned 64 interceptors for GMD--even assuming they perform
    ideally--are wholly insufficient to neutralize anything but a small
    tranche of Russia's strategic nuclear forces. Nevertheless, Moscow's
    concerns about United States Homeland missile defense remain prominent.
    China fears the effect GMD might have in a conventional or nuclear
    first-strike scenario, where its remaining retaliatory forces may be
    small enough to be fully absorbed by available GMD interceptors. At
    North Korea's current known ICBM force size, GMD remains nominally
    sufficient, but the system's less-than-ideal test record raises
    questions about its ability to perform in real world conditions. The
    replacement for GMD's currently deployed GBIs--the Next-Generation
    Interceptor (NGI)--has an uncertain future and independent cost
    estimates have suggested a roughly $13 billion figure. \33\ These
    reasons make GMD the most obvious candidate system for potential
    limitation in exchange for reciprocal concessions from Russia and/or
    China.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \33\ Jen Judson, ``Next-Gen Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
    Interceptor Estimated Cost? Nearly $18B,'' Defense News, April 27,
    2021, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2021/04/27/ next-gen-
    intercontinental-ballistic-missile-interceptor-estimated-to-cost-
    nearly-18-billion/.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Beyond GMD, the November 2020 test of an SM-3 Block IIA interceptor
    from an Aegis BMD guided-missile destroyer against an ICBM-class target
    complicates matters. This congressionally-mandated test has revealed
    that the Block IIA interceptor's latent counter-ICBM capability--a
    capability that had been acknowledged by MDA as early as 2008--may be
    more than nominal. \34\ Because SM-3 Block IIA is designed for basing
    in the widely used and manufactured Mark 41 Vertical Launch System
    canister, which exists on U.S. Navy ships, allied ships, and at Aegis
    Ashore installations alike, verifiably limiting this system will be an
    immense challenge. The United States might voluntarily limit further
    testing of the Block IIA interceptor against other ICBM-class targets;
    such a measure would require a radical rethinking of current plans for
    a layered homeland defense approach. The target missile used in the
    November 2020, despite being described as ``threat representative'' by
    MDA, exhibited a far shorter range and hence speed than the vast
    majority of notional Russian and Chinese ICBMs. (ICBMs are understood
    to be any missiles capable of ranging more than 5,500 kilometers; in
    practice, Russian, Chinese, and North Korean ICBMs would range greater
    distances to reach targets in the 48 contiguous U.S. states.) MDA could
    declassify details about the target used in the FTM-44 test, which
    could demonstrate that its ``threat-representative'' nature may be
    overstated. It could further refrain from testing the SM-3 Block IIA
    against any longer-range target missiles in the future.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \34\ Ankit Panda, ``A New U.S. Missile Defense Test May Have
    Increased the Risk of Nuclear War,'' Carnegie Endowment for
    International Peace, November 19, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/
    2020/11/19/new-u.s.-missile-defense-test-may-have-increased-risk-of-
    nuclear- war-pub-83273.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Despite the verification difficulties associated with the Block
    IIA, one approach could be to explore, as part of an arms control
    process, a formal delineation of strategic and nonstrategic missile
    defense systems through certain technical parameters. One such approach
    was included in the September 1997 demarcation agreement between the
    United States and the Soviet successor states that remained party to
    the ABM Treaty (including Russia), which specified thresholds for
    interceptor and ballistic missile target missile velocities. \35\ Given
    notional divergences between the burnout velocity of an SM-3 Block IIA
    interceptor and burnout velocities for current and future anticipated
    interceptors for the GMD system, such an approach could create the
    means to exclude SM-3 Block IIA from a broader cap on homeland missile
    defense interceptors. It bears noting, however, that SM-3 Block IIA's
    burnout velocity is greater than the 3 km/s threshold negotiated and
    agreed between the former ABM states parties in 1997.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \35\ First Agreed Statement Relating To The Treaty Between The
    United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On
    The Limitation Of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems Of May 26, 1972,
    available at https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/101888.htm
    #sccdocuments.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Neither concession above should be on offer unilaterally or prior
    to the acceptance by either negotiating counterparty--Russia and/or
    China--to serious, sustained talks on the full range of issues that
    merit coverage in a future arms control agreement. Because such an
    agreement is far more likely to materialize with Russia in the short-
    term--given decades of bilateral experience in arms control--than with
    China, Congress and the administration should focus energies here. The
    basic requirement is to recognize that there is little chance to limit,
    let alone reverse, offensive nuclear arms racing if the United States
    is not willing at least to explore trade-offs that could be negotiated
    between offensive and defensive capabilities.
        With Moscow, a willingness to discuss limitations on homeland
    missile defense could be useful leverage to address the matter of
    Russia's large inventory of Treaty-unaccountable nonstrategic nuclear
    weapons. It is possible that beyond the apparent strategic benefits of
    Russia's new `March 1' systems in their ability to challenge U.S.
    midcourse missile defenses, Russia has pursued their development to
    seek leverage in future arms control talks. The Russian position ahead
    of potential talks on a New START-successor agreement has emphasized
    the role of offensive and defensive capabilities alike. Russian Foreign
    Minister Sergey Lavrov emphasized in May 2021 that ``[e]verything that
    affects strategic stability (nuclear and non-nuclear arms, offensive
    and defensive weapons) must be on the negotiating table.'' \36\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \36\ ``Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's Statement and Answers to
    Media Questions at a Joint News Conference Following Talks with
    Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the
    Republic of Sierra Leone David John Francis,'' May 17, 2021, https://
    www.mid.ru/foreign--policy/news/-/ asset--publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/
    content/id/4736245.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        With China, United States national interests could similarly be
    served by leveraging an opening on missile defense to seek additional
    transparency from Beijing on its nuclear and missile activities of
    concern. This is especially the case given the ongoing and future
    anticipated growth of China's nuclear warhead stockpile--a trend driven
    in large part due to anxieties over United States missile defense
    capabilities. Even if China's inexperience in bilateral arms control
    and aversion to transparency regarding its nuclear arsenal stand to
    lower the odds of formal talks, United States willingness to address
    missile defense through such a process can only serve as a useful
    inducement given strong Chinese interest in the matter. Arms control
    manifests out of a mutual interest in restraint, after all.
        Finally, despite the long list of United States concerns with
    ongoing Russian and Chinese nuclear modernization, subjecting missile
    defense to possible limitations will allow for usefully limiting
    adversary investments in these technologies as well. As the United
    States Department of Defense has noted, both China and Russia possess
    and are developing missile defense systems that could pose a challenge
    for United States nuclear delivery systems. \37\ Given that one of the
    core arguments in favor of proceeding with the Ground-Based Strategic
    Deterrent (GBSD) next-generation ICBM concerns its ability to better
    pace evolving adversary missile defenses, limitations could provide
    meaningful flexibility to U.S. nuclear modernization options.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \37\ ``Missile Defense Becomes Part of Great Power Competition,''
    U.S. Department of Defense, accessed May 26, 2021, https://
    www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/ 2291331/missile-defense-
    becomes-part-of-great-power-competition/.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Risks of Limitations
        Given that current homeland missile defenses exist to protect the
    Homeland from a ``limited'' North Korean attack, the most serious
    short-term risk associated with limiting existing homeland missile
    defenses pertains to Pyongyang's force-sizing. Under a hypothetical
    arrangement with Russia that freezes GMD in its current stage and
    results in the cancellation of NGI, North Korea would need to produce
    just two more ICBM launchers to reach a point where its capabilities
    could theoretically, under ideal conditions, overwhelm GMD's optimal
    engagement mode of four-interceptors-per-reentry-vehicle. \38\ (For the
    purposes of simplicity, this assumes no effort to destroy or degrade
    North Korea's launchers and command-and-control early in a conflict,
    and also that United States defensive systems will be effective in
    realistic wartime conditions.) Efforts by Pyongyang to introduce
    multiple warheads or even modestly complex countermeasures and
    penetration aids (in the vein of the United Kingdom's Cold War-era
    Chevaline penetration aid, for instance) could complicate this further.
    This could be assuaged by simply readopting the 1974 ABM Treaty
    protocol quantitative limitation of 100 interceptors, which would allow
    United States Homeland missile defenses to meaningful react to North
    Korean force changes in the coming years. Pyongyang seeks to retain, at
    a minimum, a rudimentary capability to deliver nuclear weapons to the
    United States Homeland and this is unlikely to change short of an
    unlikely transformation in the nature of the United States-North Korea
    relationship. As a result, it is conceivable that GMD interceptor
    constraints could grant North Korea an assured capability to hold the
    U.S. Homeland at risk, which would represent a major source of risk to
    the Homeland should strategic deterrence with Pyongyang fail. However,
    like Russia and China, the United States can seek to manage the risks
    posed by North Korea's growing arsenal by relying on nuclear and
    conventional deterrence. But by retaining a poorly tested homeland
    missile defense system, we risk the worst of all worlds: immense
    spending in peacetime on a capability that cannot perform as required
    in a conflict.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \38\ An ongoing service life extension project is likely to lower
    the interceptor requirement per incoming reentry vehicle. Open sources
    do not indicate whether this has been implemented to date. Jason
    Sherman, ``MDA: GMD SLEP Will Improve Interceptor Fleet While Waiting
    for NGI,'' InsideDefense.com, May 18, 2021, https://insidedefense.com/
    daily-news/ mda-gmd-slep-will-improve-interceptor-fleet-while-waiting-
    ngi.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
           more national security with less national missile defense
        Allow me to conclude with the idea that fewer missile defenses
    might manifest substantially greater national security for this
    country: this is not necessarily intuitive, but if the United States
    continues to be invested in the enterprise of nuclear deterrence and
    seeks stable nuclear deterrence, then it is in our interest to
    contemplate limitations.
        With regard to future investments in missile defense, Congress
    should take a leading role in assessing the consequences of missile
    defense programs on strategic stability. It would be prudent, for
    instance, to ask that the Department of Defense study and assess in
    depth the extent to which U.S. missile defenses are promoting adversary
    qualitative investments in more sophisticated offensive weapons. Such a
    study could better inform U.S. investments in missile defense and the
    pursuit of future arms control.
        Congress should further adopt a resolution acknowledging the
    inherent action-reaction relationship between strategic offensive and
    defensive arms in a global context. This premise already appears in the
    preamble to the 2010 New START Treaty and, as mentioned earlier, was
    the basis of early U.S.-Soviet arms control efforts. Adopting such a
    resolution would not be tantamount to an admission by this country that
    missile defense would have no role in the defense of the Nation; it
    would simply acknowledge, as Republicans and Democrats alike once did
    during the Cold War, that the arms race is fundamentally driven by
    perceived imbalances in offensive and defensive arms. It would also
    empower the ability of the United States to credibly seek limitations
    on existing and future Russian and Chinese homeland missile defense
    systems, reducing the need for the United States to expend additional
    resources on assuring our own ability to penetrate those defenses.
        Finally, with regard to the future development pertaining to GMD,
    Congress should take a more active role in mandating that MDA conduct
    future tests with environmental and other stressors more reflective of
    real-world conditions. Future budgets should additionally demand
    transparency from MDA concerning the types of target missiles used in
    specific tests and the parameters used to evaluate success and failure.
    In particular, MDA witnesses before this chamber should be asked to
    offer technical justifications for why certain target missiles can be
    considered ``threat-representative'' given significant apparent
    divergences with real intercontinental missile threats. More
    specifically, given North Korea's observed flight-testing of ICBMs at
    nighttime, Congress should mandate that MDA fully evaluate the ability
    of the GMD system to cope with nighttime intercepts. \39\ Congress
    should additionally require the testing of GMD against target missiles
    with countermeasures that are likely to be reflective of actual
    adversary practices (such as multiple dummy reentry vehicles exhibiting
    physical and infrared signatures similar to the target reentry
    vehicle). Some of this testing can also be incorporated into budgeting
    for the NGI, if that program proceeds as planned.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \39\ The IFT-10 test in December 2002 for GMD did involve nighttime
    conditions, but resulted in a failed intercept due to the inability of
    the kill vehicle to successfully separate from the booster.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        It strikes me as especially prudent to consider the opportunity
    costs associated with missile defense as we enter this decade. The
    trajectory of our relations with both Russia and China--and to a lesser
    extent, North Korea--remains poor. As a result, minor and major crises
    leading up to and crossing the threshold into war are not unimaginable.
    Given that these crises will be most sensitive to the U.S. military's
    efforts, in conjunction with our allies, in the realm of conventional
    deterrence, any measures that might moderate or slow the nuclear arms
    race can liberate essential resources for allocation elsewhere. In
    addition to their salutary effects on strategic stability, strategic
    missile defense limitations can be fiscally prudent and facilitate
    ongoing efforts to deter, through conventional means, great power
    conflict. Theater missile defenses need not be subject to limitation,
    given their meaningful contribution to augmenting deterrence-by-denial
    in critical theaters.
        In the case of the U.S. Navy and sea-based missile defenses,
    Congress should also be cognizant of the opportunity costs associated
    with the missile defense mission: any Aegis BMD-capable ship armed with
    interceptors and tasked with a homeland missile defense mission is
    unable to fulfill other requirements, including providing in-theater
    missile defense and, for instance, defending a carrier strike group
    against anti-ship ballistic missiles. Congress should, as a result,
    request that the Secretary of Defense report annually on homeland
    ballistic missile defense operations by U.S. Navy assets, including the
    impact of these operations on overall force readiness. These
    opportunity costs are likely to grow especially acute in the Indo-
    Pacific region.
        The above recommendations can ensure that Congress plays a leading
    a role in steering this Nation toward a strategically prudent and
    responsible missile defense policy--one that maximizes our national
    security interests while averting an unnecessary nuclear arms race at a
    time when conventional challenges loom large. In this regard, our
    choices with regard to homeland missile defense in the coming years
    stand to be immensely consequential: not solely with regard to nuclear
    stability, but also with regard to the ability of the United States to
    deter and manage the consequences of intensifying great power
    rivalries.

        Senator King. Thank you both.
        Mr. Soofer, I am trying to understand this. Our missile
    defense system is not designed to intercept missiles from
    either China or Russia. Is that correct?
        Dr. Soofer. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. What is our principal defense against
    missiles from China and Russia?
        Dr. Soofer. The same defense that we had during the Cold
    War, sir, the nuclear deterrent.
        Senator King. Deterrent. If that is effective against China
    and Russia, why isn't it effective, or wouldn't it be effective
    against North Korea or Iran?
        Dr. Soofer. Right. Well, North Korea, arguably, may not
    have the same rational perspective on these issues as Russia.
        Senator King. But wouldn't the leader of North Korea
    understand that if he attacks this country, his country would
    disappear from the map? I mean, that would deter even the most
    unstable leader, it would seem to me.
        Dr. Soofer. Well, the question is who has got more at stake
    at this point. The concern is that he would not believe that we
    would use nuclear weapons against North Korea for fear of his
    reprisal against the United States, and by having missile
    defenses, you take away that consideration.
        Senator King. Let me change the subject slightly to the
    capability of the missiles. The missile defense system that we
    are talking about is principally to deal with the threat of
    ballistic missiles. Is that correct?
        Dr. Soofer. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. My understanding is that it would not deal
    with the threat of hypersonic glide vehicles. Correct?
        Dr. Soofer. Well, currently they do not, but the Missile
    Defense Agency is working on defense against hypersonics, both
    against long-range systems and the shorter-range systems our
    forces would encounter in regional campaigns.
        Senator King. So we believe that there will be a future
    capability. Is that going to be a capability of the new
    missiles that we are talking about authorizing in this process?
        Dr. Soofer. I am not completely familiar with the budget
    requests at this point, but I do know that the Missile Defense
    Agency is working on sensors and an intercept capability
    against hypersonic threats. But that is not what I was
    referring to in the SM-3 IIA missile. The SM-3 IIA is a
    regional missile, a Navy missile, that intercepts ballistic
    missiles on the midcourse phase, and the hope is that we could
    give it some capability to also intercept very simple North
    Korean ICBM missiles that are headed from North Korea to, say,
    Guam or Hawaii, or even the continental United States.
        Senator King. Mr. Panda, you talked about the action-
    reaction. There is a finite number of Interceptors. Right now
    it is 44, and we are talking about going to 64. Can't that
    capability be defeated by North Korea simply by having more
    incoming missiles?
        Mr. Panda. Excellent question, Senator. So I will just
    first note that I am the author of a recent book on North
    Korean strategic nuclear forces, and I spend more time than I
    would like looking at pictures of North Korean missiles.
        As far as I know, North Korea today has 10 ICBM launchers.
    As far as I am also aware, based on open sources, MDA's concept
    of operations for GMD relies on using four Interceptors per
    incoming target re-entry vehicle, soon to become three, but
    currently four, I believe.
        So if we just do the math, North Korea would need to add a
    single additional ICBM launcher to potentially saturate GMD,
    and based on GMD's testing record, the single-shot probability
    of kill, which is the probability that a single GMD system shot
    at an incoming North Korean re-entry vehicle would succeed,
    based on open sources again, that number appears to be just a
    little over 50 percent.
        So based on that assessment, Senator, I would say that
    North Korea can probably today bet on delivering a
    thermonuclear warhead to the continental United States, and I
    believe that that is entirely the reason that Kim Jong-un today
    feels that he has a nuclear deterrent. He declared, in November
    2017, that his nuclear deterrent was complete, before turning
    to negotiations with the United States.
        So I do think that that would be a correct assessment.
        Senator King. But this is exactly what you are talking
    about, is as you build up your missile defense then your
    adversary is incented to build up their side of the offensive
    capability. Is that your position?
        Mr. Panda. That is correct. North Korea, of course, is
    quite resource constrained, Senator, so if we were to go to 64
    GBIs I cannot predict today whether Kim Jong-un would have the
    resources or the wherewithal to keep building ICBM launchers
    and ICBMs to cope with that. I will, however, point out that
    qualitative modernization is also underway in North Korea. In
    October 2020, North Korea demonstrated a missile, the largest
    road-mobile missile anywhere in the world today, because most
    countries do not deploy road-mobile liquid propellant missiles
    like North Korea does. But the missile that they demonstrated
    appears to be large enough to carry multiple re-entry vehicles.
    North Korea is also working on countermeasures, which will
    include sophisticated and unsophisticated decoys.
        So I completely think that even North Korea can certainly
    cope with qualitative advancements to our own missile defense.
        Senator King. Mr. Soofer, I am out of time, but I think you
    wanted to respond?
        Dr. Soofer. Right. You know, we do not just try to deal
    with North Korea and ICBMs with active missile defense. It is a
    combination of deterrence, as you suggest, as well as attack
    operations. We are going to try to find as many of these
    launchers on the ground as possible and take them out before
    they launch, and then there is active defense, right?
        But the bigger point here is if we were not to compete with
    North Korea, if we were not to build missile defenses against
    the North Korean threat, what kind of signal is that going to
    send to our allies? If we are not willing to defend ourselves
    against North Korea, a country that can barely afford to feed
    itself, why would our allies think that we are going to risk
    our own lives to come to their defense?
        Senator King. Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Soofer, I am
    sure you have seen a recent letter by a number of advocates to
    President Biden encouraging him to discuss limitations on U.S.
    missile defenses in the upcoming talks with Putin. The letter
    refers to comments the President made back in 2001, when as a
    Senator he opposed the Bush administration's plans to deploy a
    national missile defense system, and predicted it could trigger
    an arms race with Russia and China.
        So let me ask you, did that prediction come true, and what
    empirical evidence is there linking missile defense to an arms
    race, and more broadly, is there evidence that missile defense
    is incompatible with arms control?
        Dr. Soofer. Thank you, Senator. I do not think that is what
    has happened. So exactly what happened. We withdrew from the
    ABM Treaty in 2002. Everybody had anticipated at the time that
    you had this huge arms race. Both sides would build more
    offenses to overcome defenses. What did we have? We had the
    Moscow Treaty, which took us from 6,000, under START, to 2,200.
    We went down from 6,000 to 2,200, even though we withdrew from
    the ABM Treaty, and then we had the New START Treaty, which
    took us down to 1,550.
        What arms race are they talking about? There has been no
    arms race. In fact, it is just the opposite. When we signed the
    ABM Treaty in 1972, the Russian inventory, the Soviet
    inventory, went from about 2,500 warheads to over 10,000
    nuclear warheads. It was just the opposite. This idea of
    action-reaction, it is too simple. There are many reasons why
    countries choose not to build nuclear weapons.
        But clearly our withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, our
    deployment of 44 Ground-Based Interceptors, has not spurred an
    arms race. The Russians recently agreed to extend the New START
    Treaty by 5 years. If they were so alarmed by our missile
    defenses and our plans to add 20 more NGIs, why would they
    agree to that?
        Senator Fischer. Dr. Soofer, Russia and China have been
    expanding their nuclear arsenals in recent years, but these
    actions have come while United States missile defense
    capabilities have remained relatively unchanged. For example,
    the most significant enhancement of our homeland missile
    defense system has been the construction of the radar in
    Alaska. With the failure of the RKV program, and our GMD system
    has not received the upgrades that were planned for that, and
    then we have seen the expansion, the proposed expansion, of the
    fleet from the 44 Interceptors to 64, which was announced in
    2017, it has not taken place.
        So I think we have demonstrated also that the SM-3 IIA
    missile has some capabilities against the ICBMs, but this
    demonstration was conducted in December 2020, which is long
    after the Russian and the Chinese have undertaken their nuclear
    expansions. That is a comment.
        What is your view of Russia's complaints against United
    States missile defenses and its attempt to portray its actions,
    such as a deployment of a variety of new nuclear systems that
    were announced by Putin in 2018 as responses to our nuclear
    defense programs?
        Dr. Soofer. Senator, as I quote I read by Rose Gottemoeller
    suggests, Russia does this for political reasons. They have
    their own domestic political problems. Putin has to exert his
    control over the oligarchs, right? He is more concerned about
    sowing dissention between the U.S. and its allies. Missile
    defense is a prime vehicle for doing that. Even here in the
    United States, they interfere with our debates by suggesting
    that missile defense is something that alarms them. But again,
    the evidence suggests that despite their talk, they continue to
    negotiate with us. They continue to reach reductions.
        I am not suggesting that we do not talk to Russia about
    this. Even the Trump administration, on at least five
    occasions, spoke to the Russians about the role of missile
    defense and strategic stability. You know, if the Biden
    administration wants to pursue that, then I think it is totally
    appropriate.
        Senator Fischer. Does Russia need a nuclear-powered cruise
    missile to overwhelm our missile defenses?
        Dr. Soofer. Clearly no. Clearly not. They have air-launched
    cruise missiles, sea-launched cruise missiles. So no.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Senator King. Senator Kelly.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Panda, earlier
    you were talking about the probability of kill of our systems.
    I think you said a PK of 0.5, roughly. So where does that data
    come from, if you can say in an open hearing? Then I wanted to
    go back to the number of ICBMs that The Democratic People's
    Republic of Korea (DPRK), that you believe that they have, and
    obviously there are two approaches to this. We can increase the
    number of GBIs. Currently I believe we have 44. But the other
    approach here could be how do we improve on the PK number? So
    can you elaborate a little bit about where we are on that?
        Mr. Panda. Absolutely, Senator. So, first of all, I have
    never been in government. I have never held a clearance, so my
    assessments are entirely based on open sources. The actual PK
    number is, I believe, classified. The assessment that I am
    offering is primarily based on the testing history of the
    system, which allows us to extrapolate reasonably. Of course,
    there have been multiple statements made by officials
    expressing their confidence in the system, which I will just
    point out that that is different from the technical parameters
    of GMD's actual performance.
        So based on your other observation about the two possible
    approaches on how we can get our PK up, I will say, Senator, if
    we are to sustain missile defenses--and when I talk about
    limitations I am not talking about eradicating missile defense
    by any means. I do believe that the ABM Treaty, for instance,
    allows for 100 Interceptors at two fixed sites, per the 1974
    protocol to the treaty.
        What I do want to see if we do continue to invest in
    missile defense, that we do it right, that testing and
    evaluation are realistic. I will point out that GMD has been
    tested against ICBM-class targets that MDA describes as, quote,
    ``threat representative.'' But to my knowledge, the target
    missiles used in these test are far shorter range than an
    actual ICBM that would have to travel from North Korea's
    northern provinces, where they base their ICBM forces, to the
    United States Homeland.
        So I will just emphasize that again, Senator. If we are to
    continue to proceed with maintaining a missile defense, and
    this is regardless of whether or not we pursue arms control,
    our missile defenses should be realistically tested and
    evaluated. If we are going to continue to spend taxpayer money
    on this enterprise, it needs to be realistic. It needs to
    demonstrate a capability that is real. Because ultimately--and
    I believe my co-witness pointed this out--missile defense comes
    into play when strategic deterrence has failed, and ultimately
    no one in this room is in favor of allowing the United States
    to face a nuclear attack.
        So if nuclear deterrence is here to stay, my preference,
    and I am sure the preference of most Americans, will be that it
    works as best as it can, and that means that testing and
    evaluation need to be done properly and done in ways that are
    realistic. Thank you.
        Senator Kelly. So just to follow up on this. So we are
    talking with SM-3 GBIs, we are talking midcourse. If we start
    to look into systems that could intercept in a boost phase, any
    sense for what kind of probability of kill we would have with
    those systems at this point?
        Mr. Panda. Sure, Senator. That is an excellent question.
    Boost-phase defense has been a topic of query for over 20
    years. There have been multiple studies done. The primary
    pitfall with boost-phase defense is that we physically need to
    base our Interceptors, or whatever launch vehicle for the
    Interceptors, be that a drone, a fighter, near the adversary's
    territory, and really the only country with which this would be
    viable would be North Korea, which has ocean and international
    waters on both sides. But again, this would only come into play
    in a crisis. Effectively, it would be simply infeasible to keep
    an F-35 or a drone or any other kind of launch vehicle in the
    air long enough, at all times, to intercept any North Korean
    missile launch.
        Another point that I will point out is that, you know, we
    have been talking strategic stability, and you raised this
    point with boost-phased defense. There are, of course, other
    concepts that we have been looking into--counterforce targeting
    of North Korean launchers before they can launch, left-of-
    launch techniques, including cyberattacks.
        A subcomponent of strategic stability that has not been
    surfaced in today's discussion is crisis stability. We have
    talked about arms race stability, and that mostly refers to the
    peacetime buildups on both sides. Crisis stability refers to
    our incentives in a crisis, and for Kim Jong-un, knowing that
    the United States is so fundamentally qualitatively advanced
    compared to North Korea, the incentives to use nuclear weapons
    first in a crisis grow the more we indicate that we are willing
    to destroy his missiles early in a crisis. Kim Jong-un has
    fundamentally developed these weapons because he thinks that
    using them first gives him the best rational chance at survival
    in a conflict.
        If I could counsel one thing it would be that it is fine to
    pursue missile defense. It is fine to protect the United States
    Homeland from nuclear attacks from North Korea. But we need to
    be careful about the kinds of incentives that we generate for
    the North Korean leadership in a crisis. Because my assessment
    is that fundamentally that Kim Jong-un is rational, but that
    his rationality, ultimately, has manifested in a way that
    favors the first use of nuclear weapons in a crisis.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you.
        Senator King. Senator Cramer.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just kind of
    want to follow up a little bit with that. Given that theory,
    would the same thing apply to, say, missile-tracking
    satellites, and everything else in the value chain? Do those
    have the same impact on possible response?
        Mr. Panda. Thank you, Senator. Missile tracking can
    facilitate counterforce targeting of North Korean assets, and
    ultimately, because these assets will be used anywhere round
    the world where our forces need them, they can simply also be
    used against China and Russia, this has already led to, for
    instance, Russia's development of a ground-based laser, called
    Peresvet, which is designed to disrupt, dazzle our observation
    satellites. The Russians do not want us tracking their ICBM
    transporter launchers.
        We have not talked a lot about China today, so let me just
    offer one observation there. The primary Chinese concern is not
    solely our missile defense. China is also quite concerned about
    our conventional precision strike capabilities. Because Chinese
    nuclear forces are lean, I believe the Defense Intelligence
    Agency has attested to the fact that Chinese nuclear forces are
    currently in the low 200s but expected to double in size by the
    end of the decade.
        One of the things that China is particularly concerned
    about is a conventional campaigned, waged by the United States
    against its nuclear forces, which are primarily land-based. The
    People's Liberation Army Force, for the first time since the
    1980s, has now readopted a nuclear mission, beginning in 2019.
        But all of this means that missile tracking, while an
    important component of facilitating missile defense and
    counterforce, can ultimately be destabilizing.
        Senator Cramer. Dr. Soofer, would you want to respond to
    any of that?
        Dr. Soofer. Well, it can be destabilizing, but it can also
    be very stabilizing if it provides deterrence. If China
    understands that we have these capabilities in place, they will
    not start a war, and you have deterrence at the outset. So in
    that case it can be stabilizing. It depends on your
    perspective.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you. That is all I have. Thank you,
    Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Senator Tuberville.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Sooter,
    you previously stated that a strong missile defense system is
    exactly how U.S. prevents escalation and protects our Nation.
    We are falling behind our peers and near-peers at an alarming
    rate. If U.S. continues down this path, what do you believe the
    outcome would be, and what changes do you believe we should--
    what should happen in the next 5 years?
        Dr. Soofer. Thank you, Senator. I think it is important,
    perhaps, to think of the problem set in two ways. One is the
    threat to the Homeland, right, and that is by Russia and China
    and by the rogues. For Russia and China, we are going to have
    to continue to rely on nuclear deterrent to prevent them from
    attacking us, right? But for the rogues, we have to stay ahead
    of them. If we do not stay ahead of them, again, it shows the
    rest of the world that we lack the will to compete with North
    Korea and China, and that makes our allies very nervous. So
    that is the first problem set.
        The second problem set has to do with regional threats. The
    strategy of Russia in Europe and China in Asia is to keep us
    from reinforcing our allies during war. If they can keep us
    from intervening they feel that they can win, and so they are
    building all these missiles in order to attack our bases, our
    ports, our ships, to keep us from reinforcing.
        Our policy here is to strengthen our regional missile
    defenses, help our allies be able to defend themselves with
    regional defenses, and again, all this provides a deterrent at
    the outset so they do not contemplate even a conventional
    attack. I think there is fairly broad bipartisan consensus on
    that approach to missile defense.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Mr. Panda, GMD dates back 15
    years. Are you supportive of updating the NGI?
        Mr. Panda. Well, Senator, I think it really depends. If we
    proceed with NGI, I will not focus on the cost issue because
    ultimately, at the end of the day, if we have a missile defense
    system that can prevent damage to the U.S. Homeland from
    thermonuclear attack and it works, it is very difficult to
    really put a price tag on that. It is effectively priceless. Of
    course, if we look at the record, reality is a little bit
    different there.
        So once again I will just emphasize that if we are to
    proceed with NGI, and if we are to pony up the big taxpayer
    bill that comes with that, my preference and my sort of counsel
    would be that we proceed and demand that testing is done in a
    way that really does facilitate the development of a missile
    defense system that can work and can provide that level of
    defense. Because ultimately, that map I sort of laid out
    earlier, when it comes to North Korean ICBM--and again,
    recognizing that that is the primary reason we have homeland
    missile defense--the more we can improve that, the fewer number
    of interceptors we can assign to incoming re-entry vehicles,
    the harder it becomes for Kim Jong-un to keep up with that
    pace. Unfortunately, based on our current approach, that just
    does not seem to be viable.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Dr. Soofer, do you want to
    add something?
        Dr. Soofer. I concur.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. I want to thank this panel. You have been
    very thoughtful and provocative, which is exactly what we
    needed to discuss the strategic underpinning of this subject. I
    want to call our next panel to the table.
        I hope that both of you, in light of the questions and the
    discussion today, will file additional testimony if you feel it
    would be helpful to the Committee. I appreciate it.
        Our government witnesses, Ms. Leonor Tomero, this is your
    second time in a couple of weeks, so welcome back to the
    Committee. She is Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy; General Glen VanHerck,
    Commander, U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace
    Defense Command; Lieutenant General Daniel Karbler, Commander,
    U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command and Joint
    Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense;
    and Vice Admiral Jon Hill, Director of the Missile Defense
    Agency.
        I think we will start with Ms. Tomero on the policy
    question, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and
    Missile Defense Policy.

     STATEMENT OF MS. LEONOR TOMERO, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
             DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY

        Ms. Tomero. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you for
    welcoming me back to the Subcommittee. Chairman King, Ranking
    Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee,
    thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on
    the missile threat and the Department's missile defense policy
    and priorities. I ask permission to submit my opening remarks
    for the record.
        Senator King. So ordered.
        Ms. Tomero. Thank you. Along with left-of-launch
    capabilities in our nuclear and conventional forces, missile
    defense plays a key role in U.S. defense. With regard to the
    threat environment, as missile technology matures and
    proliferates, the threat to the U.S. Homeland, allies,
    partners, and our deployed forces is increasing. The Democratic
    People's Republic of Korea, DPRK, continues development and
    deployment of more capable intercontinental ballistic missiles
    that have destabilized and reshaped the security environment in
    East Asia. Iran's short- and medium-range ballistic missiles
    comprise the largest missile force in the Middle East. Both the
    DPRK and Iran are extending the range reliability and accuracy
    of their missile forces.
        Additionally, Russia and China continue to develop and
    field increasingly advanced and diverse regional offensive
    missile capabilities. These capabilities form the backbone of
    their anti-access aerial denial strategy, intended to deny the
    United States freedom of action to protect military power and
    to protect our allies and partners.
        To address these evolving challenges, the Department will
    review its missile defense policies, strategies, and
    capabilities to ensure that we have effective missile defenses.
    The review will align with the National Defense Strategy and
    contribute to the Department's approach to integrated
    deterrence, and we expect to complete this strategy by January
    of 2022.
        With regard to homeland defense, the Department is
    committed to defending the United States against rogue state
    missile threats. DOD recently initiated the development of the
    next-generation Interceptor, and NGI will increase the
    reliability and capability of missile defense of the United
    States. As this program moves forward, it will align with the
    administration's defense goals and priorities.
        With regard to regional defense, missile defenses would
    also remain central to maintaining the U.S. enduring advantage
    to flow forces into militarily consistent regional environment
    and to safeguard those forces should a conflict arise.
        Additionally, the Department will continue to ensure that
    we bring a more integrated approach to air and missile defense
    that not only assists with defense against various types of
    ballistic missile threats but also enables defense against
    cruise missiles and unmanned aerial systems. IAMD will field
    interoperable and integrated missile defense sensors,
    Interceptors, and command and control to improve capability
    against a range of threats.
        With regard to critical enablers, in addition to improving
    today's operational systems, we are examining new enabling
    technologies. Secretary Austin has noted the importance of
    enhancing our global network of integrated sensors. Space-based
    and land-based sensors enable a variety of capabilities such as
    detection, tracking, and targeting through all phases of flight
    for an incoming missile. U.S. commercial innovation is already
    transforming this field.
        In fiscal year 2022, we will continue to develop the
    prototype Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor, the
    HBTSS, that will allow the tracking of hypersonic threats and
    add resiliency to our sensor architecture. The Department's
    approach for regional hypersonic defense will first focus on
    defense in the terminal phase.
        Information superiority is critical to the future
    battlefield, and is necessary to enable rapid planning and
    employment in a joint operating environment. To that end, the
    Department is developing multiple cyber-hardened, advanced,
    all-domain awareness for our command and control architectures
    that will enable timely and accurate decision-making to address
    emerging threats. We will continue to develop capabilities for
    left-of-launch and missile defeat that will play an important
    role in effectively countering limited missile attacks.
        With regard to cooperation with our allies and partners,
    engaging and working with our allies and partners to enhance
    our collective missile defense efforts is a core focus area for
    the Department. The Indo-Pacific is a model for cooperative
    missile defense efforts with strong allies, including Japan,
    the Republic of Korea, and Australia. NATO continues to form
    the backbone of European joint and combined operations, and in
    the Middle East, United States-Israel missile defense
    collaboration demonstrates the mutual benefits of technology
    sharing with our allies and partners, along with our efforts to
    strengthen missile defense cooperation with key Gulf
    cooperation countries. Additionally, my office leads a series
    of dialogues that share information on regional and global
    missile threats.
        In conclusion, as the Department prepares its strategic
    review, I can assure Members of this Committee that we are
    steadfastly committed to the key missile defense missions and
    priorities, including working with allies and partners to meet
    the challenge of growing missile threats in a cost-effective
    manner that strengthens regional and strategic stability.
        I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Leonor Tomero follows:]

                    Prepared Statement by Ms. Leonor Tomero
                                  introduction
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
    the Sub-Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
    today on the missile threat environment and the Department's missile
    defense policy vision and priorities. It is an honor to appear beside
    VADM Hill. I look forward to answering your questions.
        This Committee's support for missile defense has been vital to the
    progress that U.S. and allied and partner missile defenses have made to
    address current and emerging missile threats from potential
    adversaries; and it will remain essential to support the Department's
    security commitments, as this Administration begins to formulate its
    defense policy.
        The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 demonstrated Congress's
    bi-partisan support for missile defense. Congress also supported key
    initiatives such as the integrated air and missile defense programs
    (IAMD) within the Military Departments and Services by continuing to
    fund enabling programs including the Army's integrated air and missile
    defense battle command system (IBCS), and the Navy's advanced IAMD-
    capable flight III destroyers. The resources requested maintain and
    extend the service lives of our current missile defense assets, promote
    readiness, increase capacity, reinforce deterrence and assurance
    missions, and enable us to invest in critical technologies needed to
    counter the growing spectrum of future missile threats.
                               threat environment
        As missile technology matures and proliferates, the threat to the
    United States, allies, partners, and our deployed forces steadily
    grows. Potential adversaries continue to expand their inventories and
    add new and increasingly sophisticated systems, often for the purpose
    of creating political instruments of regional or global coercion.
        The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues
    development and deployment of more capable intercontinental ballistic
    missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The
    Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) suggests that
    the DPRK may resume ICBM testing to destabilize the security
    environment in East Asia, while seeking to drive a wedge between the
    Unites States and its allies.
        Iran is extending the range, reliability, and accuracy of its
    missile forces at a concerning rate. Although Iran is not currently
    developing nuclear weapons, it has increased the size and enrichment
    level of its uranium stockpile, and has ignored restrictions on
    advanced centrifuge research and development. Even though it does not
    currently possess the capability to launch nuclear payloads at
    intercontinental ranges, Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) programs, such as
    the one that successfully placed a satellite in orbit in April 2020,
    develop similar technologies required for an ICBM capability, should
    they choose to pursue one.
        The regional missile threat is also concerning as potential
    adversaries continue to field more accurate and lethal offensive
    missile systems capable of threatening the United States, allies,
    partners, and deployed forces.
        The DPRK will pose an increasing threat to the United States, South
    Korea, and Japan as it continues to improve its missile force. During
    its January 2021 military parade, the DPRK unveiled a growing and more
    diverse ballistic missile force. Furthermore, recent testing
    demonstrates that Pyongyang continues its efforts to field more
    advanced and reliable short- and medium-range systems.
        Iran's short- and medium-range ballistic missiles comprise the
    largest missile force in the Middle East, which it wields to threaten
    regional stability. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence
    (ODNI) assesses that Iran will take risks that could escalate tensions
    and threaten U.S. and allied interests in the coming year, using its
    missile forces as part of a range of tools to threaten military action
    and advance its goals.
        Russia maintains one of the most numerous and sophisticated missile
    inventories in the world. Its regional anti-access area denial (A2/AD)
    strategies undergird broader strategic goals. The 2021 Annual Threat
    Assessment notes that Russia will continue to use its missile forces to
    undermine United States influence, reshape international norms, and
    divide our network of international alliances and partnerships.
        In 2019, China launched more ballistic missiles than the rest of
    the world combined while also placing a heavy emphasis on testing
    hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV). Missile systems form the backbone of
    the PRC's anti access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy to inhibit U.S.
    power projection capabilities, coerce our allies and partners, and
    reshape the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region.
        Potential adversaries seek to defeat U.S. missile defenses not just
    through advances in offensive missile technology, but also through
    coercive diplomatic campaigns. We have repeatedly seen Russian and
    Chinese efforts to sow disinformation regarding United States missile
    defenses to threaten the strength of U.S. partnerships and of U.S. and
    allied forces; while simultaneously increasing their own homeland and
    regional missile defenses.
        This evolving missile environment informs our missile defense
    efforts moving forward, which are part of a larger strategic framework
    to leverage all elements of national power to prevent and deter
    conflict, and to prevail should conflict occur.
                 policy framework for upcoming strategic review
        To address the evolving challenges to our security and the security
    of our allies and partners, the Department will review its missile
    defense policies, strategies, and capabilities to ensure they align
    with broader U.S. national security and national defense strategies.
    This review will be informed by several principles.
        First, we will work to ensure we have an effective and affordable
    defense to address the rogue state ICBM threat to the United States.
    Missile defenses will provide protection of the United Sates from a
    limited attack from rogue actors. This protection will also contribute
    to diminishing the coercive potential of these states who may seek to
    constrain the ability of the United States to provide credible security
    assurances to our allies and partners during a crisis or conflict.
        Second, we will examine means to enhance our regional posture to
    support our allies and partners and to defend deployed forces abroad.
    Our regional missile defenses will continue to contribute to the United
    States' ability to operate throughout the world. They will enable
    regional and trans-regional military operations and exercises,
    providing force protection in contested environments.
        Third, missile defense will remain an important component of our
    strategy to assure U.S. allies and partners that we stand firm in our
    security commitments. Not only will missile defense partnerships
    reinforce the indivisibility of U.S. and allied joint security
    interests, these relationships will also provide opportunities for
    allied and partner cooperation, co-development, and burden sharing.
        Lastly, as Secretary Austin stated, the Department must maintain
    credible deterrence against advanced threats, and right-size our
    missions around the world in a transparent and principled manner.
    Therefore, we must carefully align the scope of our missile defense
    programs with operational requirements, and clearly communicate their
    intent to help avoid miscalculation.
        In this context, the Department will examine the appropriate mix of
    capabilities and tools to protect our forces, deter our adversaries,
    and address future uncertainty while strengthening strategic stability,
    and reducing risks of miscalculation.
                                homeland defense
        The United States is strengthening its homeland defenses and is
    pursuing more advanced capabilities over the long term. As Secretary
    Austin has noted, defending the Nation is a key priority for DOD, and
    missile defense against rogue state threats is a central component of
    this mission.
        The United States is currently defended from rogue state ICBM
    threats by the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system with Ground
    Based Interceptors located at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air
    Force base, California. The threat is not static and neither is our
    commitment to improving the defense of the Nation. To that end, the
    Department recently initiated the development of the Next Generation
    Interceptor (NGI) in order to augment and potentially replace the
    current GMD interceptors and increase the overall reliability and
    capability of the GMD system when it begins deployment in late fiscal
    year 2028. The fiscal year 2022 budget includes $926 million to support
    NGI development and program risk reduction. As this program moves
    forward, it will do so in a manner that aligns with the
    Administration's defense goals and priorities. The Department is also
    executing the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) Service Life Extension
    Program, which will ensure reliable defense from rogue state threats
    while we develop NGI to improve current GMD capabilities.
        Any future decision to augment the missile defense of the United
    States, will ensure the overall homeland missile defense posture is
    sized to provide effective protection of the United States against a
    limited rogue state ballistic missile attack. As part of our upcoming
    strategic reviews and consistent with direction in National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 Congressional direction, the
    Department will examine potential options and concepts for
    strengthening the defense of the United States. It is important to note
    that the United States continues to rely on nuclear deterrence to
    protect against the more sophisticated and numerically large Russian
    and Chinese intercontinental missile threats.
        Additionally, DOD will continue to look across our ballistic
    missile defense capabilities in order to seek synergies with the cruise
    missile defense (CMD) mission, and maximize investment. Policy and
    NORTHCOM/NORAD are working across the Department to ensure the United
    States is appropriately examining potential approaches to our CMD
    posture and capabilities.
        Another vital component of effective U.S. and regional defense,
    which Secretary Austin has noted, will be to enhance our global network
    of integrated sensors. Space-based and land-based sensors enable a
    variety of capabilities such as detection, tracking, and targeting
    through all phases of flight for an incoming missile. As the rogue
    threat evolves in capability, discrimination remains key to enhancing
    the performance of the GMD system. For this reason the Department is
    requesting an additional $133 million to support the initial fielding
    of the Long Range Discrimination Radar in Clear, Alaska later this
    year; with operational acceptance in fiscal year 2023. As we look to
    space, integrating the Space-based Kill Assessment capability into our
    missile defense architecture and exploring advanced proliferated low
    earth orbit space sensor development, in particular, will be critical
    for the future of homeland and regional missile defeat and defense
    programs.
                                regional defense
        This Administration's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance
    affirms that ``Regional actors . . . continue to pursue game-changing
    capabilities and technologies, while threatening U.S. allies and
    partners and challenging regional stability.'' It is critical that we
    maintain support for regional missile defense systems to address
    missile threats and the A2/AD strategies of potential adversaries. The
    Interim Strategy goes on to say that ``despite these steep challenges,
    the United States' enduring advantages--across all forms and dimensions
    of our power--enable us to shape the future of international politics
    to advance our interests and values, and create a freer, safer, and
    more prosperous world.'' Missile defenses will remain central to
    maintaining the U.S. enduring advantage to flow forces into a
    militarily contested regional environment, and to safeguard those
    forces should a conflict arise.
        Over the past decade, the United States has made progress in
    developing capabilities for protection against regional missile
    threats. The Department plans to explore new regional capabilities and
    upgrade current regional systems such as Patriot, Terminal High
    Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and the SM-3 interceptors to maximize
    their interoperability and the defended battlespace. It is also
    important to increase the capacity of our regional systems to maintain
    credible and capable war-fighting capabilities. For this reason, the
    Department supports: $295 million for SM-3 Block IIA procurement, $352
    million for SM-3 Block IB interceptors, procuring additional SM-6
    interceptors, the continued development and eventual procurement of
    Patriot Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptors, and increasing
    the capacity of regionally deployed THAAD systems.
        The Department will continue to ensure that we bring a more
    integrated approach to air and missile defense (IAMD) that not only
    assists with defense against various types of ballistic missile threats
    but also enables other regional missions, such as defense against
    cruise missiles and unmanned aerial systems. Thus, U.S. geographic
    Combatant Commands, are developing IAMD initiatives that will inform
    future missile defense operational architectures and cooperation
    strategies with allies and partners. The objective of these efforts is
    to field interoperable and integrated missile defense sensors,
    interceptors, and command and control--capable against a range of
    threats and tailored to their unique operating environments.
        A testbed for our IAMD development path will be the missile defense
    of Guam. China's A2/AD capabilities increasingly threaten to erode the
    United States ability to ensure its presence in the Western Pacific and
    reinforce allies and partners in the region. The Department is
    examining the ways in which it can ensure the effective defense of Guam
    from various missile threats. Survivable, scalable, and affordable
    IAMD, in combination with offensive capabilities and passive defense
    measures, provide the means to strengthen deterrence and, if deterrence
    fails, limit disruption to U.S. regional military operations. Lastly,
    as Secretary Austin stated regarding capable regional threats, ``we
    will . . . guarantee freedom of action in contested, complex operating
    environments . . . while using all of our tools to lower the risk of
    escalation with our adversaries.''
                              advanced technology
        In addition to improving today's operational systems, we are
    examining advanced concepts and technologies. Our investment strategy
    and priorities will focus on how best to address more advanced
    adversary missile threats, especially those being designed to
    complicate our current regional missile defense architectures.
        For example, in fiscal year 2022 we will continue to develop the
    prototype Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS). This
    is a priority for the Department to be able eventually to assist with
    fire control for regional defense, and also for hypersonic missile
    warning and attribution, in general. This demonstration will be an
    important step towards building the capability and resiliency of our
    space sensor architecture.
        As part of our future hypersonic defense architecture, the
    Department will also request funds to support a future regional Glide
    Phase Intercept demonstration capability. Our approach for regional
    hypersonic defense is to initially focus on terminal phase defense.
        Another concept being explored for its utility to the IAMD terminal
    defense mission is directed energy. The Department is analyzing various
    directed energy concepts and their application as a complement to
    existing missile defense systems.
        Central to any future battlefield will be information superiority
    to enable rapid planning and employment in a joint operating
    environment. To that end, the Department is developing various cyber-
    hardened, advanced all domain awareness command and control
    architectures that will enable timely and accurate decision-making to
    address emergent threats and coordinate responses. These developmental
    systems will greatly enable the ``any sensor, best shooter'' concept
    that is foundational to effective IAMD.
                      cooperation with allies and partners
        Working closely with key allies and partners in Europe, the Middle
    East, and the Indo-Pacific region to enhance our collective security is
    key priority for this Administration. To that end, engaging and working
    with our allies and partners to enhance our collective missile defense
    efforts is a core focus area for the Department. The Indo-Pacific is
    one of the most important regions of the world, and is a model for
    cooperative missile defense efforts with strong allies such as Japan,
    the Republic of Korea, and Australia. The Department will continue to
    work with Japan to enhance its fleet of missile defense assets as Japan
    works towards its next generation of maritime defense. The United
    States has recently completed upgrading the Republic of Korea's (ROK)
    Patriot batteries and looks forward to shared analysis for enhancing
    the ROK's and Korean-based United States Forces' layered defenses
    against threats from DPRK. Our working groups, interoperability
    initiatives, and hosting of U.S. missile defense systems help to
    maintain our regional security presence.
        NATO continues to form the backbone of European joint and combined
    operations. A few highlights for missile defense include Aegis Ashore
    Poland, which will soon join Romania in providing defense against the
    potential Iranian missile threat; and the procurement of Patriot units
    and the European-produced SAMP-T (Surface-to-Air Missile Platform/
    Terrain), by several countries. Allies such as Germany and the United
    Kingdom are developing their own organic systems, while the U.S.,
    through MDA, continues to execute a range of research and development
    initiatives with our NATO partners. The Department is also pursuing the
    advancement of IAMD interoperability through the Formidable Shield
    exercise series. These efforts will provide important tools and
    capabilities in dealing with regional missile challenges intended to
    undermine or weaken the NATO Alliances ability to respond to
    aggression.
        In the Middle East, United States-Israeli missile defense
    collaboration is at the cutting edge of missile defense technology and
    serves as evidence of the mutual benefits of technology sharing with
    our allies and partners. Our annual contribution to Israel of $500
    million continues our longstanding bilateral cooperation on missile
    defense. We will continue to explore applications for the very capable
    Israeli missile defense systems across the region and beyond. With our
    other allies and partners in the region, the Department's efforts
    center on bilateral cooperation with key Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
    countries. For example, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi
    Arabia have purchased a mix of United States THAAD and/or Patriot
    batteries and radars. Multilaterally, the Department will continue to
    work with our GCC partners to foster a more integrated approach to
    regional missile defense cooperation.
        Additionally, DOD participates in a series of bilateral,
    trilateral, quadrilateral, and multilateral dialogues that share
    information on regional and global missile threats, exchange
    operational IAMD visions, discuss modernization efforts and future
    capability development, and seek new opportunities for joint research,
    training, and co-production/co-development. From a strategic
    standpoint, and as Deputy Secretary Hicks testified, cooperation in
    this area strengthens our common protection, enhances deterrence, and
    provides assurances essential to the cohesion of our alliances in the
    face of growing regional missile threats, coercion, and attacks.
    Operationally, by developing a more coordinated, and where possible,
    integrated approach to air and missile defense, we will improve our
    ability to work with allies and partners to address adversary A2/AD
    strategies and capabilities collectively.
                                   conclusion
        As the Department prepares for its strategic review, I assure
    Members of this Committee that it will remain committed to key missile
    defense missions and priorities. In today's complex operating
    environments we must be prepared to meet the risks and danger from
    missile threats together as allies and partners. Lastly, in an emerging
    multi-domain battlefield, it will be critical to invest in effective
    missile defense technologies in a responsible, cost-effective manner
    that maintains regional and strategic stability and reliably retains
    U.S. advantage long into the future.

        Senator King. General VanHerck.

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL GLEN D. VANHERCK, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
     STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE
                                COMMAND

        General VanHerck. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer,
    and distinguished Members of the Committee, it is a privilege
    to testify before you again today. I am honored to serve as the
    Commander of the United States Northern Command and North
    American Aerospace Defense Command, and I am grateful to appear
    beside my colleagues here as they are crucial partners in
    homeland defense.
        The United States Northern Command and NORAD separate
    commands, yet work seamlessly to accomplish the critical
    mission of defending North America against all threats, whether
    posed by our competitors, natural disasters, or a pandemic.
        We are in an era of renewed strategic competition, and this
    time we are facing two nuclear-armed peer competitors, both
    focusing on circumventing our homeland defenses. Additionally,
    North Korea's recent unveiling of a new intercontinental
    ballistic missile, capable of threatening North America and
    Hawaii, is means to constrain options in a crisis.
        I remain concerned about my ability in the near future to
    defend the Homeland. Potential adversaries continue to develop
    capabilities to hold our Homeland at risk, from all vectors,
    all domains, kinetically and non-kinetically. They seek to
    exploit a perceived gap between our nuclear deterrent, which I
    believe is the foundation of homeland defense, and our
    conventional homeland defense capabilities. To close this
    perceived gap, we must accelerate efforts to transform our
    culture to think and operate globally and digitally across all
    domains, and factor homeland defense into every strategy, plan,
    force management, force design, acquisition, and budgetary
    decision.
        The United States Northern Command and NORAD are
    aggressively pursuing a left-of-launch framework that provides
    the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense
    less escalatory options that increase decision space and
    deterrence in strategic competition, vice end-game kinetic
    defeat and conflict.
        With the Missile Defense Agency leading the effort,
    progress on the next-generation Interceptor is on the right
    trajectory, but further delays will be detrimental to defense
    and deterrence by denial capability. We must also capitalize on
    globally layered, multi-threat detection systems, such as over-
    the-horizon radar, hypersonic and ballistic missile tracking
    space sensor, which can adequately address both my capability
    and capacity concerns of emerging threats.
        Progress is also being made on the information dominance
    capabilities within the Department. The additional capabilities
    USNORTHCOM is pioneering, as demonstrated in the latest Global
    Information Dominance Experiment, are focused on prying data
    from existing stovepipe networks to enable all-domain
    awareness. By ingesting data streams into cloud-based
    architecture, where the power of artificial intelligence and
    machine learning is unleashed, we can drastically reduce
    processing time across the globe and rapidly enable information
    dominance and decision superiority, all 11 combatant commanders
    endorsing and field these capabilities as soon as possible.
        United States NORTHCOM and NORAD will continue to lead and
    accelerate the Department's digital transformation through
    development of global, all-domain awareness, sensors, and
    networks, data standards, and infrastructure to share
    information quickly and efficiently. In doing so, we will
    improve our ability to defend the Homeland against emerging
    threats, including improved ballistic missiles, low-altitude
    hypersonics, and long-range, low-radar, cross-section cruise
    missiles.
        NORTHCOM and NORAD take solemn pride in executing the
    Secretary of Defense's top priority by standing watch to defend
    our Nation. I am grateful for the trust and responsibility you
    place in me as the Commander of NORTHCOM and NORAD. Thank you,
    and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Glen D. VanHerck
    follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by General Glen D. VanHerck
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
    the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and for
    allowing me the honor of representing the soldiers, sailors, airmen,
    marines, guardians, coast guardsmen, and civilians of United States
    Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense
    Command (NORAD), including the members of the Canadian Armed Forces who
    are a vital and essential part of the NORAD team.
        Since I assumed command of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, each day has
    afforded me the opportunity to lead a workforce of dedicated,
    innovative, and resilient warfighters and public servants. That
    fundamental commitment to our vital missions is clearly evident as
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD have kept the watch and defended our Nations in
    what is certainly the most dynamic and complex strategic environment I
    have encountered in my 33 years in uniform.
        Our competitors continue to take increasingly aggressive steps to
    gain the upper hand in the military, information, economic, and
    diplomatic arenas. USNORTHCOM meets each of those challenges head-on--
    and we have done so while supporting whole-of-government efforts to
    safeguard our citizens through the coronavirus pandemic and
    historically severe hurricane and wildfire seasons, and also
    simultaneously synchronizing the deployment of troops to support
    federal law enforcement personnel on the southwest border. The
    cascading events of the past year placed unprecedented strain on our
    people, our interagency partners, and our institutions, and I am proud
    that we overcame each of those challenges and emerged more resilient.
        That steadfast commitment is more important than ever as our
    competitors continue to challenge our Homelands through multiple means
    in all domains. Defending our Nations, our citizens, and our way of
    life requires constant vigilance, and USNORTHCOM and NORAD have
    demonstrated time and again that our commands remain determined,
    focused, and ready. But we must keep moving forward. Looking to the
    future, we will continue to pursue innovative capabilities and
    strategies to detect, deny, deter, and, if necessary, defeat potential
    threats posed by peer competitors, rogue nations, transnational
    criminal organizations, and foreign and domestic violent extremists. No
    matter the challenge or circumstance, this Committee should rest
    assured USNORTHCOM and NORAD are always on guard.
                                    threats
        The global geostrategic environment continues to rapidly evolve.
    While the United States has spent the last 30 years projecting power
    forward to combat rogue regimes and violent extremists overseas, our
    competitors pursued capabilities to circumvent our legacy warning and
    defensive systems and hold our Homeland at risk. Peer competitors like
    Russia and China are undermining the international rules-based order
    and challenging us in all domains. Further, rogue states like North
    Korea and Iran are also pursuing capabilities to nullify our military
    advantages, threaten our networks with cyber weapons, and--in the case
    of North Korea--develop nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, violent extremist
    organizations continue to devise plots to attack our citizens and our
    way of life.
        During the Cold War, we were overwhelmingly focused on defending
    the United States and Canada from a single nation-state threat. After
    the Soviet collapse, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and later the attacks
    on September 11, 2001 we shifted our focus to non-state and rogue
    actors. Today, we don't have the luxury of focusing regionally or on
    only one threat at a time. In the last decade, we've seen a sharp
    resurgence in the nation-state threat as our global competitors deploy
    increasingly sophisticated capabilities to hold the United States and
    Canada at risk and limit our options in a crisis. Concurrently, the
    terrorist threat continues to evolve in ways that challenge our
    homeland defense capabilities. As a result, today's threat environment
    is likely the most complex we have ever faced, as potential adversaries
    threaten us in all domains and from all vectors.
    Russia
        Russia presents a persistent, proximate threat to the United States
    and Canada and remains the most acute challenge to our homeland defense
    mission. Russian leaders seek to erode our influence, assert their
    regional dominance, and reclaim their status as a global power through
    a whole-of-government strategy that includes information operations,
    deception, economic coercion, and the threat of military force.
        In peacetime, Russian actors conduct sophisticated influence
    operations to fan flames of discord in the United States and undermine
    faith in our democratic institutions. In crisis or conflict, we should
    expect Russia to employ its broad range of advanced capabilities--non-
    kinetic, conventional, and potentially nuclear--to threaten our
    critical infrastructure in an attempt to limit our ability to project
    forces and to attempt to compel de-escalation. Offensive capabilities
    Russia has fielded over the last several years include advanced cyber
    and counterspace weapons and a new generation of long-range and highly
    precise land-attack cruise missiles--including hypersonics. These
    capabilities complicate our ability to detect and defend against an
    inbound attack from the air, sea, and even those originating from
    Russian soil.
        Russia also continues to modernize all three legs of its nuclear
    triad. In December 2019, Russia fielded the world's first two
    intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) equipped with a hypersonic
    glide vehicle payload that will challenge our ability to provide
    actionable warning and attack assessment. In the coming years, Russia
    hopes to field a series of even more advanced weapons intended to
    ensure its ability to deliver nuclear weapons to the United States.
    These include the Poseidon transoceanic nuclear torpedo and the
    Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile, which--if perfected--could
    enable strikes from virtually any vector due to its extreme range and
    endurance.
        Finally, Russia continues to conduct frequent military operations
    in the approaches to North America. Last year, NORAD responded to more
    Russian military flights off the coast of Alaska than we've seen in any
    year since the end of the Cold War. These Russian military operations
    include multiple flights of heavy bombers, anti-submarine aircraft, and
    intelligence collection platforms near Alaska. These efforts show both
    Russia's military reach and how they rehearse potential strikes on our
    Homeland. Last summer, the Russian Navy focused its annual OCEAN SHIELD
    exercise on the defense of Russia's maritime approaches in the Arctic
    and Pacific. The multi-fleet exercise, intended in part to demonstrate
    Russia's ability to control access to the Arctic through the Bering
    Strait, included amphibious landings on the Chukotka Peninsula opposite
    Alaska, as well as anti-submarine patrols and anti-ship cruise missile
    launches from within the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone.
    China
        China continues to pursue an aggressive geopolitical strategy that
    seeks to undermine United States influence around the globe and shape
    the international environment to its advantage. In the USNORTHCOM area
    of responsibility, China has made deliberate attempts to increase its
    economic and political influence with our close partners in Mexico and
    The Bahamas. While the United States remains the economic and military
    partner of choice in the region, China is seeking to grow its trade and
    investment in Mexico and, over the past few years, has invested in The
    Bahamas' vital tourism sector through marquee infrastructure projects.
    Militarily, China is rapidly advancing a modernization program that
    seeks to erode our military advantages and deter us from intervening in
    a regional conflict.
        China remains among the world's most capable and brazen cyber
    actors, stealing volumes of sensitive data from United States
    Government, military, academic, cleared defense contractors, and other
    commercial networks each year. In a crisis, China is postured to
    transition rapidly from cyber exploitation to cyber attack in an
    attempt to frustrate our ability to flow forces across the Pacific, and
    globally. China also continues to advance its counter-space
    capabilities that could threaten our space-based communications and
    sensors. In the foreseeable future, China will likely be able to
    augment its cyber-attack capabilities with a new family of long-range
    precision-strike weapons capable of targeting key logistical nodes on
    our West Coast that support U.S. mobilization and sustainment.
        China also continues to expand and modernize its strategic nuclear
    forces to rival those of Russia and the United States in
    sophistication, if not in numbers. Over the last decade, China fielded
    dozens of road-mobile ICBMs and several ballistic missile submarines
    designed to enhance the survivability of China's nuclear deterrent and
    ensure its ability to retaliate following any attack. In the next
    decade, China will deploy a new generation of advanced weapons--some of
    them hypersonic--that will further diversify their nuclear strike
    options and potentially increase the risks associated with United
    States intervention in a contingency.
    North Korea and Iran
        The Kim Jong Un regime has achieved alarming success in its quest
    to demonstrate the capability to threaten the United States Homeland
    with nuclear-armed ICBMs, believing such weapons are necessary to deter
    U.S. military action and ensure his regime's survival. In 2017, North
    Korea successfully tested a thermonuclear device--increasing the
    destructive potential of their strategic weapons by an order of
    magnitude--as well as three ICBMs capable of ranging the United States.
    In October 2020, North Korea unveiled a new ICBM considerably larger
    and presumably more capable than the systems they tested in 2017,
    further increasing the threat posed to our Homeland. The North Korean
    regime has also indicated that it is no longer bound by the unilateral
    nuclear and ICBM testing moratorium announced in 2018, suggesting that
    Kim Jong Un may begin flight testing an improved ICBM design in the
    near future.
        Iran continues to advance its military technologies and threaten
    the security of United States Forces and allies throughout the Middle
    East. Iran adheres to a self-imposed range limit on its ballistic
    missile force that prevents it from directly threatening the United
    States. Nonetheless, Iran is developing and testing ICBM-relevant
    technologies through its theater missiles and space launch platforms--
    including its first successful orbit of a military satellite in April
    of 2020--that could accelerate the development of a Homeland-
    threatening ICBM should Iran's leaders choose to pursue such a system.
    Iran retains the ability to conduct attacks via covert operations,
    terrorist proxies, and its growing cyber-attack capabilities, which it
    has already employed against U.S. financial institutions.
                             defending the homeland
        USNORTHCOM's defense of the Homeland provides the foundation for
    the full spectrum of the Department of Defense's worldwide missions and
    supports the missions of every other combatant command. The ability to
    deploy forces overseas, support allies, deliver humanitarian
    assistance, and provide presence and reassurance around the globe
    relies on our ability to safeguard our citizens, as well as national
    critical infrastructure, transportation nodes, and leadership. As
    competitors field highly advanced and agile long-range weapons systems
    and seek to act on growing territorial ambitions, we are adapting our
    thinking, evolving our own capabilities, and enhancing our operations
    and exercises to accurately reflect a changing world while remaining a
    relevant force.
        The United States has long relied on our nuclear arsenal to serve
    as the strategic deterrent against an attack on our Homeland. In
    today's threat environment, strategic deterrence remains foundational
    to our national defense. A safe, secure, and effective nuclear force
    remains the most credible combination of capabilities to deter
    strategic attack and execute our national strategy. The U.S. strategic
    deterrent has helped to maintain a careful balance between nuclear
    powers and remains the bedrock of our national defense, as the
    longstanding doctrine of deterrence by punishment makes clear to
    potential adversaries that a large-scale attack on the United States or
    our allies would result in an overwhelming and devastating response.
        However, over the last decade, our competitors have adapted new
    techniques and fielded advanced weapons systems with the potential to
    threaten the Homeland below the nuclear threshold. Simply stated, the
    missiles and delivery platforms now in the hands of our competitors
    present a significant challenge to our legacy warning and assessment
    systems and defensive capabilities. Advanced systems posing threats to
    the Homeland have already been fielded in large numbers, and our
    defensive capabilities have not kept pace with the threat. The notion
    that the Homeland is not a sanctuary has been true for some time, and
    that will remain the case for the foreseeable future. Therefore, we
    must ensure effective nuclear and conventional deterrents are in place
    to defend the Homeland and ensure our ability to project power where
    and when it is needed.
        Highly advanced cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles, and stealthy
    delivery platforms provide our competitors with the ability to hold
    targets in the Homeland at risk with conventional weapons. That fact
    has led us to emphasize improved all-domain awareness and the
    development of a layered sensing grid to provide warfighters and
    decision makers at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels with
    increased awareness and decision space.
        The reality of a vulnerable Homeland and the risks associated with
    rising global competition are driving our commands to collaborate with
    interagency and industry partners to find and deliver smarter, more
    affordable technology. To outpace our competitors, we cannot be
    satisfied with incremental steps; instead, we must continue to increase
    the pace and tempo of our technological advancements. This work is
    essential, and we are proud of our close collaboration with a host of
    interagency and industry partners and international allies as we work
    together to outthink our competition, outpace threats, and defend what
    we hold most dear. That global focus and cooperation is also reflected
    in our growing wargaming capacity, including major homeland defense
    exercises such as Vigilant Shield and our participation in the Large
    Scale Global Exercise series.
                        the path to decision superiority
        I believe our future success in USNORTHCOM, our fellow U.S.
    combatant commands, and NORAD requires all-domain awareness,
    information dominance, and decision superiority. Our competitors have
    invested heavily in weapons systems that can be launched against
    distant targets with little to no warning, as well as stealthy delivery
    platforms specifically designed to evade detection by existing sensors.
    As a result, the successful execution of USNORTHCOM and NORAD missions
    in the digital age relies on significantly improving global all-domain
    awareness through the development of a fused ecosystem of networked
    sensors extending from space to the seafloor.
        This network will pull data from an array of repurposed systems,
    legacy sensors enhanced through low-cost software modifications, and a
    limited number of new sensors to provide robust indications and warning
    and persistent tracking of the full spectrum of potential threats to
    the Homeland from the seafloor to on orbit. Integrating and sharing
    data from this global sensor network into common platforms will allow
    leaders to observe potential adversaries' actions earlier in the
    decision cycle, providing more time and decision space at all levels.
        That decision space is where the true value of improved domain
    awareness resides. Harnessing the capability of distributed multi-
    domain sensors, machine learning, and artificial intelligence will
    provide military leaders, the intelligence community, and senior
    civilian officials with the information necessary to anticipate, rather
    than react to, competitors' actions.
        All-domain awareness is the first critical step on the path to
    decision superiority, and USNORTHCOM and NORAD require and have
    prioritized capabilities that improve our domain awareness and global
    integration with our fellow warfighters. Sensors and systems such as
    Over the Horizon Radars, polar satellite communications, Integrated
    Underwater Sensor Systems, and space-based missile warning and tracking
    sensors are essential to our missions. While the benefits to
    continental defense are clear, these capabilities will also help every
    U.S. combatant commander around the world while enhancing USNORTHCOM
    and NORAD's collective ability to defend the United States and Canada.
        In September 2020, just after I assumed command of USNORTHCOM and
    NORAD, the commands partnered with the United States Air Force and
    United States Space Command in the second onramp demonstration of the
    Air Force's Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS). This large-scale
    joint force demonstration established a network with embedded machine
    learning and artificial intelligence to rapidly detect, track, and
    positively identify a simulated cruise missile threat, while providing
    a common operating picture and all-domain awareness for commanders at
    multiple levels.
        The ABMS onramp demonstration provided a brief but exciting glimpse
    into the future of USNORTHCOM and NORAD. By creating potential pathways
    for accessing and distributing data in ways that allow leaders to
    think, plan, and act globally rather than relying on outdated regional
    approaches, we are significantly amplifying the capability of the joint
    force. Through these and other efforts, USNORTHCOM and NORAD are
    actively working to deliver information dominance by fusing new
    technologies to increase decision space for commanders and senior
    civilian decision makers. Ultimately, our objective is to enable
    leaders and commanders all over the world to quickly assess any
    situation and take the steps necessary to stay well ahead of an
    adversary's next moves in order to deter and deny in competition, de-
    escalate in crisis, and defeat in conflict.
        In March of this year, USNORTHCOM and NORAD led a Global
    Information Dominance Experiment (GIDE) that brought leaders from all
    11 combatant commands together in one collaborative environment. GIDE
    demonstrated the strategic value of Joint All-Domain Command and
    Control by allowing combatant commands to rapidly share information
    across all domains and collaborate in near real-time. During this
    experiment, which included a NORAD live-fly exercise, we worked with
    industry partners to fuse all-domain sensing within a common data
    system in order to develop globally integrated courses of action and
    advance the Joint Force's information dominance capability. This
    experiment demonstrated the power of artificial intelligence and
    machine learning tools, which have the ability to expand decision space
    for decision makers. Through GIDE events, we will continue to test
    these capabilities, improve global integration, and help the DOD and
    allies increase all-domain awareness to enable information dominance--
    and ultimately achieve decision superiority.
        The prototype Pathfinder data analytics project provides another
    example of how USNORTHCOM and NORAD are working to leverage existing
    but stovepiped data streams to the benefit of both operational and
    strategic decision makers. In our ongoing prototype efforts, Pathfinder
    gathers data from multiple distinct military and civilian air domain
    sensors and, through automation and machine learning models, produces a
    fused common operating picture to improve the reliability of the data
    and increase the decision space that will someday soon be available in
    real time to our assessors and watch-standers. This low-cost, rapidly
    developed system will have long-term benefits for our domain awareness
    and has already shown some of the advantages that information dominance
    will provide to warfighters around the world.
        Information is power, but only if it is accessible, sharable, and
    actionable. Unlocking the enormous potential of the data currently
    being collected by a global layered sensor grid will allow us to gain a
    decisive advantage over competitors and potential adversaries.
    Currently, vast quantities of data are trapped by incompatible systems
    and antiquated organizational structures. Breaking down these
    stovepipes is achievable, but doing so will require innovation and
    coordination across various agencies, to include technology that allows
    for timely exploitation of the massive volume of data collected by our
    sensor networks. More importantly, it will also depend on breaking away
    from a culture that favors compartmenting and isolating information, in
    order to fully realize the full potential of our capabilities--
    including those that reside with our allies and partners. As the
    defense and intelligence communities connect systems and sensors,
    consideration of national electromagnetic spectrum management policies
    is needed to ensure that necessary connections and bandwidth are
    accessible.
        As our competitors rapidly develop and deploy advanced capabilities
    with clear intent to overcome the U.S. technological advantage, the
    Department of Defense and the U.S. Government as a whole must also
    modernize our requirements and acquisition processes to stay ahead.
    Given the current pace of technological advancement, we must take full
    advantage of the forward-thinking solutions our industry partners can
    offer. To succeed in this era of Great Power Competition, it is
    essential to rapidly deliver capabilities to the warfighter by
    streamlining the processes for prototyping, testing, and moving
    promising technologies into production.
        The success of USNORTHCOM and NORAD's Pathfinder program, along
    with much of the work done by DOD's Defense Innovation Unit, show what
    is possible when we provide innovators and technical experts the
    resources and flexibility to tackle even the most daunting challenges.
    The same approach should also be applied to software development and
    acquisition. Success in competition and in conflict will increasingly
    depend on the ability to field software-based capabilities faster than
    our adversaries. For that reason, I am encouraged by the new model
    championed by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Acquisition and Sustainment that will enable the Department of Defense
    to acquire software through modern development practices and deliver
    needed capability at the speed of relevance.
        Armed with timely and accurate information, equipped with modern
    sensors and software, and backed by a flexible and responsive
    conventional deterrent that provides defeat mechanisms below the
    nuclear threshold, commanders and senior civilian leaders will achieve
    decision superiority with the options and time necessary to allocate
    resources wherever needed to deny or deter aggression in competition,
    de-escalate potential crises, and defeat adversaries should conflict
    arise.
                                missile defense
    Ballistic Missile Defense
        The need for a robust and modern ballistic missile defense system
    has been strongly reinforced over the past year. Despite United States
    efforts in 2020 to reach an agreement with Kim Jong Un, North Korea
    continued its development of ICBMs capable of striking targets in the
    United States. As North Korea continues its pursuit of advanced long-
    range strategic weapons--including the new systems displayed during
    their 10 October 2020 parade--USNORTHCOM remains committed to
    maximizing the capability and capacity of our ballistic missile defense
    systems.
        USNORTHCOM is focused on developing and fielding advanced sensors
    capable of tracking potential missile threats and providing improved
    discrimination capability to our warfighters and assessors.
    Simultaneously, USNORTHCOM is collaborating with our partners in the
    Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to ensure that the Next Generation
    Interceptor (NGI) is fielded and operational as soon as possible. Of
    note, USNORTHCOM worked hand-in-hand with MDA to ensure all of our
    operational requirements are addressed in the NGI acquisition process.
    When fielded, NGI will add 20 interceptors to the current inventory,
    and will provide greater reliability and capability.
        As competitor missile technology advances, USNORTHCOM is also
    working with MDA toward a layered missile defense capability that will
    allow for a more flexible and responsive defense of the Homeland
    against both ballistic missile and cruise missile threats. The
    successful engagement of an ICBM-class target by an SM3-IIA interceptor
    on 16 November 2020 was an historic achievement and a critical step
    toward establishing this layered capability. Defending the United
    States Homeland against the ballistic missile threat remains a complex
    and technically challenging endeavor, and I am grateful to the
    Committee for your continued support as we take the steps necessary to
    ensure the success of this critical mission.
    Cruise Missile Defense
        As evidence of both the global nature of the threat and the
    implicit trust in our bi-national command, NORAD is developing the
    requirements for the defense of the United States and Canada against
    advanced cruise missiles. In this capacity, NORAD works closely with
    the U.S. military Services, the Canadian Joint Operations Command, and
    a host of other dedicated DOD and Canadian Defence Ministry partners to
    share costs and ensure a clear, common understanding of the threat and
    what will be required to mitigate the risk to our nations.
        Modern cruise missiles are difficult to detect and can be launched
    from significant distances against targets in the United States and
    Canada from launch sites on Russian soil and by long-range bombers,
    attack submarines, and surface vessels. Whether subsonic or hypersonic,
    these missiles can range targets in the Homeland and present a very
    real challenge for our defensive capabilities. Russia has already
    amassed an inventory of both nuclear and conventional variants, while
    China is expected to develop similar capabilities in the next decade.
        The proliferation of these systems creates all the more incentive
    for focused investments in improved sensor networks, domain awareness,
    and information dominance capabilities. Those investments, coupled with
    the development of layered denial, deterrence, and defeat mechanisms
    capable of addressing current and emerging threats, are fundamental to
    the defense of our Homeland.
                                   conclusion
        As USNORTHCOM and NORAD look to a future marked by rapid shifts in
    the geopolitical environment and technological advancement, we are
    guided by the lessons of the past. Key among those is that we cannot
    overcome challenges in isolation. By viewing changing conditions and
    competitor actions from a global perspective, our problems become more
    solvable and the solutions more affordable. USNORTHCOM and NORAD will
    continue to build our partnerships, collaborate with fellow
    warfighters, and work toward overcoming shared problems rather than
    continuing to focus on point solutions to isolated threats.
        To that end, I look forward to working with the Committee and with
    all of our innovative industry and interagency partners as we move
    quickly to develop and field the capabilities required to defend our
    nations now and well into the future. Together, I believe we can
    eliminate outdated barriers that only serve to stifle information
    sharing, and simultaneously foster a mindset that favors creative,
    forward-looking approaches over unproductive reliance on legacy systems
    and processes.
        Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we will continue to
    prioritize our most vital asset: our people. With that in mind, I would
    like to take this opportunity to publicly recognize the select group of
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD personnel responsible for standing the operational
    watch 24 hours a day, every day. Their mission is crucial to our
    defense, and these military and civilian watch-standers have spent much
    of the last year under strict but necessary isolation protocols to
    mitigate the risk of a COVID outbreak. They and their families have
    endured long periods of separation during an already difficult time,
    and they have done so without any expectation of public recognition. I
    am honored to lead men and women of such selflessness and
    professionalism, and our citizens should rest assured these
    extraordinary defenders have the watch.

        Senator King. Thank you. General Karbler.

        STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL DANIEL L. KARBLER, USA,
     COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND/JOINT
      FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND FOR INTEGRATED MISSILE DEFENSE

        Lieutenant General Karbler. Chairman King, Ranking Member
    Fischer, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, I am
    honored to testify before you today. Thank you, especially,
    during the unprecedented health crisis of this past year for
    supporting our servicemembers, civilians, contractors, and
    their families, in your continued support to space and air and
    missile defense.
        I am here today as the Commander of the Joint Functional
    Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, and as the
    Army's proponent for Air and Missile Defense, or AMD, Forces
    and Capabilities. I am responsible for providing General
    VanHerck the soldiers who stand ready to defend our Nation from
    an intercontinental ballistic missile attack, as well as the
    soldiers who provide critical missile warning to Army and joint
    warfighters.
        As air and missile threats become more diverse and numerous
    from adversaries worldwide, the Army AMD enterprise continues
    to work hard to ensure our warfighters and our Homeland are
    protected.
        I would like to take this opportunity to briefly thank and
    highlight the mission accomplishments of our team of nearly
    3,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, guardians, and
    civilians in the challenging COVID environment that we continue
    to endure. During this past year, in support of SPACECOM,
    STRATCOM, and NORAD/NORTHCOM, these outstanding men and women
    provide the Army and Joint Force with satellite communications,
    space situational awareness, and missile warning defense, and
    protected our Homeland 24/7, 365, from ballistic missile
    attack. Even in the pandemic environment, they did not miss a
    beat.
        To outline one of numerous examples of putting mission
    first and how Army families have sacrificed during the
    pandemic, members of our ground-based missile defense crews
    adhered to 12 consecutive months of stringent measures ensuring
    the uninterrupted execution of their mission, including
    sequestering crew members from their homes and families.
    Essentially, our missile defense crews lived in a bubble
    throughout their operational rotations on this essential, no-
    fail mission. While they and their families reside in Colorado
    Springs, Colorado, and Fort Greely, Alaska, the crewmembers
    were basically away from their families for extended period of
    time.
        A positive I have drawn from this pandemic is my daily
    realization that I have never been more proud and thankful for
    our greatest asset, our people. Every day I am awed by their
    dedication and unwavering sacrifices to the Nation. I consider
    it an honor and a privilege to lead and serve alongside them.
    The continued support of Congress is critical to our ability to
    recruit, develop, retain, and resource such a highly qualified
    and mission-ready team.
        I look forward to addressing your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Daniel L.
    Karbler follows:]
    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator King. Thank you very much. Admiral Hill.

     STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JON A. HILL, USN, DIRECTOR, MISSILE
                             DEFENSE AGENCY

        Vice Admiral Hill. Good afternoon, Chairman King, Ranking
    Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee.
    Thank you for your time today to discuss the important topic of
    missile defense. For present budget 2022, MDA is requesting
    $8.9 billion to develop and deploy homeland defenses against
    the rogue state threat, improve regional defenses against the
    existing and the emerging threats.
        The threat can be summed up, as Senator Fischer mentioned
    earlier, much less predictable today, but they come with
    countermeasures and multiple warheads, potentially with nuclear
    payloads. The hypersonic and cruise missile threats present
    high speeds and global maneuvering challenges. So despite the
    pandemic restrictions, that General Karbler mentioned now, we
    have advanced the program on several fronts this past year, and
    I would like to walk you through some of those.
        From command and control and battle management, we call
    that program C2BMC, we continue with our spiral upgrades to
    integrate across the missile defense system, supporting the
    combatant commands and the Services with tracking, queueing,
    and discrimination data. ``Discrimination'' is our fancy word
    for picking out the lethal object in the complex, and we will
    come back to that in just a bit.
        From a space-sensing perspective, improving our detection
    and our tracking and discrimination, the Hypersonic Ballistic
    Tracking Space Sensor, mentioned earlier, that development
    continues with two competitive awards, focus on an on-orbit
    demo in fiscal year 2023, and we will track dim boosting
    targets and we will track hyper glide vehicles. We need to do
    that soon so we can leverage that capability in the INDOPACOM
    theater where we will first put out our hypersonic defenses in
    the hypersonic missile defense kill chain, and I will come back
    to that in just a moment.
        The other space capability I would like to talk about is
    the Space-Based Kill Assessment, the SKA system. We deployed
    that a couple of years ago. We have a full constellation up.
    What we are doing now is taking what we see as the flashes when
    we get intercept and bringing that to an operational hit
    assessment for the combatant commander, specifically for
    General VanHerck, so that he can control the homeland defense
    war.
        Switching over to land-based sensors, it was mentioned
    earlier the Long Range Discrimination Radar that we have up in
    Alaska, that is being built now. We did have some pandemic
    delays. The Clear Air Force Base closed. We had radar equipment
    shipping there. We had to stop it and hold it up. But the team
    stayed on path, building that radar, and we have both panels
    completed this year. We are now doing radiation, which means
    the radar is up and running, doing low-power calibration, and
    we are going to learn a lot. It started off at a very small-
    scale radar out in Morristown, New Jersey. It is now at its
    full array size, and we expect to have government acceptance by
    the end of this year.
        From a homeland defense perspective, we did not talk much
    about GBI fleet reliability efforts, the Service Life Extension
    Program, and I want to thank Congress for their support there.
    You cannot have a weapons system deployed in 2004 and not
    maintain it, not take those rounds out of the ground and
    upgrade them. We are doing that now, in coordination with
    NORTHCOM and NORAD. Those missiles come out of the ground, we
    change out the boosters, we update the software in them, we
    update the seekers, we update the threat libraries. That builds
    capacity and capability now, so that we can close the gap
    between now and when we actually deploy the first NGI.
        What is also important about that is that hardware that has
    been in the silos for all those years now becomes the basis for
    the analysis that we do to determine reliability. Last year
    when we had this conversation, it was purely analytical based,
    because we did not have that hardware available. So the Service
    Life Extension Program extends the life of the current GMD
    fleet, increases its capability and capacity, but also gives us
    the hardware ability to go and really assess reliability, to
    build the confidence of the warfighter.
        We are also expanding at Missile Field 4. We had some
    fallbacks during COVID, but we leveraged the waterways. We have
    all 20 silos installed and now we are doing integration.
        The next test for GMD, the boost vehicle test 03, BVT-03.
    We are developing the capability to not just fully burn full
    kinematics of the GBI system, you fly it and only burn up to
    the second stage. Why is that important? It allows you to
    engage more and more into the battle space. So there is a lot
    of activity going on with the current GMD fleet that is
    providing the warfighter higher confidence, higher capability
    for the future.
        NGI development, that was mentioned earlier. We are
    underway today with two competitive contracts, and I think that
    is really important, the fact that the Department has stepped
    forward to award those contracts and to have two really great
    teams all the way through critical design review. That is
    unusual, and I am telling you, it is going to be hard. But we
    have the teams that are in place there. They are perfectly
    OCI'd, so no conflicts of interest, as we work that important
    competition. But what did we do that? So that we can manage the
    technical risk in the program and so that we can get to
    emplacement earlier than the government estimate of 2028, and
    both of our contractors are showing that they are going to come
    in earlier, and that is good thing for General VanHerck and the
    warfighters.
        Let me switch to the Aegis program, Aegis integrated air
    missile defense, continues to advance. We are delivering the
    SM-3 Block IB missiles on a multiyear procurement, the Block
    IIA missile, which was a cooperative development with Japan. I
    am very proud of what we have done with that missile. We are in
    production now. The Secretary of Defense just recently gave us
    permission to take the first 11 rounds that were built out of
    RDT&E and deploy those today. So that capability is out in the
    fleet now, and through Global Force Management it will go to
    the right places.
        We are increasing our ability with sea-based terminal--I
    will talk about that in just a second--and continue
    improvements within the combat systems on the ships and with
    the missiles in total alignment with the Navy.
        FTM-44 was mentioned already, executed at the end of last
    year. Another great COVID story. Another great Department all-
    hands-on-deck story. We had it originally planned in May. We
    executed in November, due to the pandemic. We had to do a lot
    of deconfliction on the range. Dan helped me keep the target in
    place on Kwajalein. That is a tough area to have a target go
    into shutdown mode. But we charged the batteries, charged the
    batteries. We made sure that the ship crew stayed safe. We
    worked very closely with the Navy. So the USS John Finn, a new
    construction, integrated and air missile defense ship, could go
    out and execute that mission. That same ship participated in
    the last GMD test and tracked the ICBM.
        So we are all about risk reduction, making sure that we do
    things right, and that was a threat-representative target. It
    was a defense-of-Hawaii scenario, from North Korea to Hawaii.
    That is what it is. If you look at the geography, that is what
    we did. So that was a threat-representative, approved by DOT&E.
    Worked very closely with the intelligence community to ensure
    that we were threat-representative and that we were testing
    like we fight.
        Let me shift out to Europe, Aegis Ashore Poland. This has
    been a tough one. For the last couple of years we have told you
    we were at 90 percent construction completion. Today I going to
    tell you we are at 90 percent or more construction completion.
    But the great news, within the last couple of months, through
    the pandemic, you saw that in Europe, we managed to raise the
    four spy radar rays, put them in place as a forcing function to
    construction. We also put up the fire control director. That is
    really great. Now we are ready to do install and checkout for
    the Aegis Combat System. Very important work.
        We also took the Aegis Combat System out of the CONEX boxes
    they had been sitting in for 2 or 3 years, and we ran full
    digital signal analysis on it to make sure that that system
    works, and we are going to upgrade that system to make sure
    there are no obsolescence. We are in tight coordination with
    the Army Corps, and Aegis Ashore Poland is on track to complete
    its construction.
        A little bit on Aegis Sea-Based Terminal. That is the first
    regional hypersonic missile defense capability that is deployed
    with the aircraft carrier strike groups today, and it is
    important that we have that capability now, because the
    hypersonic threat is there now. What we want to do is move
    further back into that trajectory, engage earlier, make the
    terminal defense even better, and so the glide phase
    interceptor is under acceleration in the President's Budget
    2022, and that is an important capability for the country. It
    ties right into HBTSS. Ties right into the land-based sensors
    and sea-based sensors that can give us the fuse track that we
    need to take a hypersonic maneuvering capability out in the
    glide phase, and then we hit it again in terminal.
        Let me switch to Guam. President's Budget 2022 includes
    funds for the initial development of a survivable and
    operationally effective IMD for Guam, and those capabilities
    that I have talked about, regional from Aegis, and what I am
    going to talk about in just a second in THAAD, are all part of
    that architecture consideration today, and we are working that
    hard so that we can come forward and tell you exactly what we
    are going to do on Guam. Staying very close to INDOPACOM.
        THAAD, we have continued the Interceptor procurement,
    production, and training support, and we are developing the
    capabilities to address the evolving threat in very close
    coordination with the U.S. Army. THAAD and Patriot integration,
    we have been working that for the last 2 or 3 years. We
    completed the first phase, where we separate the launchers from
    the THAAD battery for flexibility for the combatant commander.
    We have done Patriot launch on remote from THAAD data. Pretty
    impressive. Also flexibility for the warfighter. Our next test
    this year is to control the Patriot battery using THAAD. That
    may not all make sense to you but what that means is full
    flexibility where the combatant commands need it, and the Army
    will be working its urgent material release once we finish that
    test.
        So I will wrap up by saying a little bit about technology,
    investing in innovative and disruptive technologies to address
    the emerging threats, including regional, layered hypersonic
    and cruise missile defense capabilities. Space sensors, land-
    and sea-based sensors, networked through the Command and
    Control Battle Management System set the stage for hypersonic
    and cruise missile defense capabilities, and thank you. I
    appreciate everything that you do for this Committee, and thank
    you for your time today.
        [The prepared statement of Vice Admiral Jon A. Hill
    follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Vice Admiral Jon A. Hill
        Good morning, Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer and
    distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. The Missile Defense Agency
    budget request of $8.917 billion for fiscal year 2022 will enable the
    continued execution of the MDA mission to design, develop and deploy a
    layered Missile Defense System to defend the United States, deployed
    forces, allies, and friends from missile attacks in all phases of
    flight. I look forward to your continued support of this mission and
    this opportunity to testify before you today on Missile Defense Agency
    (MDA) programs and activities.
        U.S. adversaries are developing more capable ballistic, hypersonic,
    and cruise missiles, systems with global reach, increased speed and
    maneuverability, greater accuracy, and improved countermeasures. North
    Korea is developing long-range ballistic missiles that threaten the
    United States and our allies in the Indo-Pacific region while also
    testing shorter-range maneuvering missiles. Iran continues to develop
    more sophisticated missiles with improved accuracy, range, and
    lethality. Iran is also fielding an array of increasingly accurate
    short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Iran has demonstrated the
    ability to combine ballistic or cruise missiles with unmanned aerial
    vehicles in complex attacks. Russia and China operate advanced
    ballistic and cruise missile forces, and they are developing and
    deploying advanced air- and surface-launched long-range cruise and
    hypersonic missile capabilities.
        Hypersonic missiles are being developed to bypass perceived U.S.
    missile defense capabilities. Regional hypersonic missiles are capable
    of holding deployed U.S. Forces, allies, and partners at risk.
    Hypersonic glide vehicles delivered by ballistic missile boosters will
    pose new challenges to our regional missile defenses. Moreover, U.S.
    adversaries and strategic competitors will increasingly use cyber
    capabilities to seek political, economic, and military advantage over
    the United States and its allies and partners, including intelligence
    gathering on and disruption of U.S. missile defense systems.
                         improving warfighter readiness
        While the United States relies on nuclear deterrence to protect
    against large and technically sophisticated Russian and Chinese
    intercontinental missile threats to the United States Homeland because
    defending against these missiles is cost-prohibitive and not
    technically feasible, MDA is developing and deploying homeland missile
    defense capabilities to address the limited but growing rogue-state
    offensive missile threats. At the same time, in order to address
    regional missile threats from any adversary, MDA is developing and
    deploying credible capabilities for regional defense. Rapidly advancing
    missile threats require MDA to employ streamlined and agile acquisition
    approaches to pace the threat. The Warfighter Involvement Process
    (WIP), led by U.S. Strategic Command, is essential for cross-
    coordination with all Combatant Commands and Services and results in a
    single set of prioritized Warfighter requirements to drive MDA
    investment. The WIP, coupled with the Department's missile-defense
    governance process, has enabled MDA's ongoing and collaborative
    relationships with Combatant Commands with strong partnerships across
    the Services and Military Departments.
        Over the past year, MDA responded to and supported the Combatant
    Commanders and Services by delivering and sustaining sensors, battle
    management, engagement systems, and sustainment, all while adhering to
    DOD pandemic measures. MDA provides sustainment support to the Lead
    Services around the clock for virtually every individual component of
    the Missile Defense System, including testing, integration, system, and
    software certification, missile maintenance and recertification, and
    technical and logistics support.
        MDA continues to make significant progress in cybersecurity by
    incorporating system-level requirements into system specifications and
    then implementing rigorous evaluation-based testing and assessments. We
    established a Defensive Cyberspace Operations organization, augmented
    the workforce with certified cyber teams to evaluate the effectiveness
    of cyber capabilities and implement structures to enhance our
    cybersecurity posture. MDA is building cybersecurity into next-
    generation software processes by leveraging proven secure software
    development, security, and operations, and establishing continuous
    integration. We are also closely collaborating with our Defense
    Industrial Base partners to protect MDA and supplier information.
     delivering capability to build combatant command and service capacity
        MDA remains committed to developing, delivering, sustaining, and
    improving the nation's missile defenses and delivering capability to
    the Warfighter.
                         space and terrestrial sensors
        We must continue to improve sensor, and discrimination
    capabilities. Space is a critical domain for addressing rapidly
    advancing missile threats across multiple regions. SKA uses a network
    of infrared sensors hosted on commercial satellites to deliver a hit
    and kill assessment capability for homeland defense. On-orbit SKA
    sensors have participated successfully in a variety of MDA flight tests
    and engineering activities. SKA collected hit assessment data during
    the 2019 GMD salvo intercept test Flight Test GMD Weapon System (FTG)-
    11. The effectiveness of SKA during FTG-11 drove the decision to
    accelerate SKA as an operational asset. SKA is currently providing
    situational awareness to USNORTHCOM during declared Periods of
    Heightened Activity. In fiscal year 2022, MDA plans to complete
    development of the operational hit-assessment software code, continue
    developing kill-assessment algorithms and threat models, and finalize
    integration of SKA into the C2BMC operational interface. This will
    deliver an operational hit assessment capability in 2023 and a follow-
    on kill assessment capability.
        MDA is developing a Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor
    (HBTSS) capability to meet critical Warfighter requirements in
    collaboration with industry partners, United States Space Force,
    USNORTHCOM, USSTRATCOM, USSPACECOM, and the Space Development Agency.
    Once deployed, HBTSS will be a key missile defense element by providing
    a persistent, global capability to detect and track dim boosting
    ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, including raids. HBTSS
    will be integrated into the Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR)
    Enterprise Architecture and provide increased sensitivity for missile
    warning. HBTSS will contribute to regional missile defense against
    stressing threats, providing fire-control quality tracking data on
    hypersonic and ballistic threats for hand-over to missile defense
    sensors for engagement. MDA awarded two agreements earlier this year to
    continue the design efforts initiated in previous phases of the HBTSS
    program. Each performer will build an on-orbit prototype-demonstration
    satellite for a planned launch in 2023. In fiscal year 2022, as we
    continue tracking algorithm maturation and commence flight infrared
    sensor payload assembly and integration, MDA also will acquire launch
    services through the United States Space Force's National Security
    Space Launch.
        After over a decade of service, the Space Tracking and Surveillance
    System (STSS) satellites will be decommissioned in March 2022. STSS
    will have supported MDA Space Research and Development for over 12
    years, eight years past its design life. The program surpassed all its
    technical objectives, demonstrating the value of space-based missile
    tracking and serving as the vanguard for the next generation of missile
    defense space systems.
        MDA is developing, deploying, and sustaining ground-based radars to
    counter current and future missile threats, build Warfighter
    confidence, and increase force structure. We are also investing in a
    robust sensor architecture that supports missile defense weapon systems
    by providing highly accurate midcourse tracking, discrimination, and
    battle damage assessment. MDA continues to provide software updates to
    the fleet of TPY-2 radars, the Sea-Based X-band (SBX) radar, five
    Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWRs), the COBRA DANE radar, and mobile
    Aegis Integrated Air and Missile Defense ships equipped with the SPY-1
    family of radars.
        Construction continues on the most advanced ground-based radar in
    the world, the Long Range Discrimination Radar at Clear Air Force
    Station, Alaska. Construction continued this year, despite a work
    stoppage over several months and steps to mitigate the spread of the
    Coronavirus. We completed installation of the primary array panel on
    November 30, 2020 and the secondary array earlier last year, and work
    is ongoing to complete the integration of critical radar components.
    The programmatic impacts of the work stoppage have caused the
    Congressional mandate of Initial Fielding to be delayed until first
    quarter fiscal year 2022. Following operational acceptance in second
    quarter fiscal year 2023, the radar will provide precision tracking,
    persistent long-range midcourse discrimination, and hit assessment to
    support a capability against long-range missile threats in the Pacific
    theater to the U.S. Homeland and conserve the number of Ground Based
    Interceptors (GBIs) required for threat engagement. LRDR also supports
    space domain awareness.
        SBX is an advanced sea-mobile radar that provides precision
    midcourse tracking and discrimination capabilities. This past year the
    vessel supported operations, testing, and data collection while
    receiving numerous resupply and refueling missions on-station in the
    Pacific Ocean. SBX collected critical data from MDA and Air Force
    flight tests, which we use to improve sensor discrimination and
    demonstrate debris mitigation improvements. This capability enables
    higher precision target viewing, especially in highly cluttered scenes.
    SBX remained at-sea for 350 consecutive days prior to entering a
    maintenance period at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii in September 2020. In fiscal
    year 2022, plans are for SBX to spend approximately 305 days at-sea to
    collect flight test data and conduct contingency operations for defense
    of the Homeland. We plan to replace the processors to address obsolesce
    and increase processing capabilities.
        MDA will continue to sustain and provide updates to the Upgraded
    Early Warning Radars (UEWRs). This past year MDA completed upgrades at
    Clear Air Force Station (AFS), Alaska and Cape Cod AFS, Massachusetts,
    joining the UEWRs at Royal Air Force (RAF) Fylingdales, England, Thule
    Air Base, Greenland, and Beale Air Force Base, California. These radars
    support missile defense of the Homeland, detection of ballistic missile
    attacks, and conduct general space surveillance and satellite tracking.
    U.S. Space Force operationally accepted Cape Cod AFS on November 3,
    2020, and Clear AFS is scheduled to be presented to U.S. Space Force
    for operational acceptance by May 2021. Additionally, we completed the
    Digital Signal Processor Upgrade operational testing at RAF Fylingdales
    in March 2021 and will complete the same at Thule Air Base in June
    2021.
        MDA supports operation of two TPY-2 (Forward Based Mode) radars in
    Japan and in Israel, Turkey, and USCENTCOM. We continue to support the
    TPY-2 radar (Terminal Mode) as part of forward-deployed Terminal High
    Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries in USINDOPACOM. Plans in fiscal
    year 2022 include developing TPY-2 advanced discrimination algorithms
    to identify and track advanced threats to support operations and ground
    testing.
       command and control, battle management and communications (c2bmc)
        C2BMC integrates the Missile Defense System and provides multiple
    Combatant Commanders with global, persistent, space-based infrared,
    land-, and sea-sensor acquisition, tracking, cueing, discrimination,
    and fire-control quality data to support U.S. and coalition-partner
    missile defense operations. C2BMC supports Homeland and regional
    missile defense operations as well as space domain awareness. As the
    ``brain'' of the integrated Missile Defense System, C2BMC operates in a
    joint, multi-domain environment, interfacing with Army, Navy, Air
    Force, Space Force, NATO, and international systems. C2BMC provides
    decision makers a common operating missile defense picture capable of
    distributing integrated fire control quality data for external launch-
    and engage-on-Remote sensor operations. This capability supports global
    missile defense situational awareness, coalition operations, weapons
    release authority for homeland defense, and provides the capability to
    control and task a variety of sensors.
        In fiscal year 2022, MDA will continue to sustain the C2BMC fielded
    capability in U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), U.S. Indo-Pacific
    Command (USINDOPACOM), U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Central
    Command (USCENTCOM), U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and U.S.
    Space Command (USSPACECOM) Areas of Responsibility. The next C2BMC
    upgrade, Spiral 8.2-5, builds on the currently fielded spiral to
    provide the integrated missile defense system and the U.S. Space Force
    the capability to command and control the Long Range Discrimination
    Radar (LRDR). LRDR enhances discrimination and fire control tracks for
    Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD). Additionally, this spiral upgrade
    to C2BMC adds advanced threat tracking and reporting while providing an
    initial space sensor tasking capability by tasking TPY-2 radars, Aegis
    SPY radars, and the LRDR for the critical space domain awareness
    mission. Our plans for future C2BMC spiral upgrades will provide
    initial integration with the Army's Integrated Battle Command System
    (IBCS), a Space-based Kill Assessment (SKA) hit assessment feature, and
    a debris-filtering feature from external sensors. C2BMC is also
    expanding support to space domain awareness by partnering with the U.S.
    Space Force to integrate key Space Surveillance Network sensors with
    missile defense sensors and communications architecture, providing
    USSPACECOM with an enhanced, near-real time, satellite tracking
    capability. We will continue risk assessments to identify and mitigate
    vulnerabilities.
                                homeland defense
        The Department is committed to improving U.S. Homeland missile
    defenses to counter limited missile threats from rogue states. The GMD
    system serves as the continuously available backbone of homeland
    missile defenses and is capable of defending against today's rogue
    state ballistic missile threat to the Homeland. We plan to upgrade and
    replace ground system infrastructure, fire control, and kill vehicle
    software to improve reliability, capability, availability, and
    cybersecurity. The entire GMD weapon system is currently undergoing a
    Service Life Extension Program (SLEP), with focus on GBI reliability
    and availability. We will incorporate flight-test lessons-learned in
    future GBI fleet upgrades while modernizing key components of the
    ground systems.
        MDA also is developing the capability to provide the Warfighter the
    option of either flying the GBI using a 3-stage burn trajectory or not
    igniting the third-stage to provide performance similar to a 2-stage
    boost vehicle. This approach will improve homeland defense performance
    by optimizing engagement times. We plan to demonstrate this capability
    in the next GMD flight test, GM Booster Vehicle Test (BVT)-03, in
    fourth quarter fiscal year 2021, and subsequently field it on all boost
    vehicle configurations. The initiation of the Next Generation
    Interceptor (NGI) program and SLEP activities will extend the existing
    GBI fleet service life beyond 2030.
        MDA will improve the interceptor fleet with NGI development, with
    deliveries starting no later than 2028. The program will leverage the
    valuable technical information developed under previous MDA technology
    initiatives. NGI development allows trades between boost vehicle and
    payload, improves system survivability, and increases performance
    against projected rogue-state threats. Pursuing two industry approaches
    through Critical Design Review will reduce technical risk, secure
    competitive production pricing, and create incentives for early
    delivery to the Warfighter. MDA also is pursuing multiple contracts to
    support the growth and sustainment of the GMD Weapon System. As
    replacement for the current sole-source Development and Sustainment
    Contract, MDA is pursuing a competitive acquisition strategy to satisfy
    future GMD weapon system requirements for future, integrated
    increments, enhancing GMD system engineering, integration, test, and
    readiness.
                                regional defense
        We continue to develop new capabilities for regional missile
    defense.
        Globally deployed and land-based Aegis BMD capabilities are
    critical to the Nation's integrated defense for our deployed forces,
    allies, and partners. Aegis BMD is designed to intercept SRBMs and
    MRBMs in the midcourse and terminal phases of flight and IRBMs in
    midcourse. We will continue advancement of Aegis BMD, including
    continued delivery of Standard Missile (SM)-3 Block IB and Block IIA
    missiles, improved sea-based terminal defense, improvements in system
    and missile reliability, and increases in Aegis BMD engagement capacity
    and lethality in alignment with Navy requirements.
        MDA will continue design, development, and integration of the Aegis
    Weapon System (AWS) with the SM-3 Block IB, Block IIA, and SM-6
    missiles. This includes continued spiral development to pace
    increasingly complex threats in more stressing operational
    environments. Utilizing improved radar discrimination, we will increase
    Aegis performance against longer range and more sophisticated threats.
    We will continue adding advanced algorithms to increase lethality to
    our air and missile defense capabilities and developing Aegis BMD
    weapon system software to enhance functionality and leverage more-
    capable radars. MDA is also working with the U.S. Navy to refurbish
    existing shipboard SPY-1 radar arrays to provide increased radar
    sensitivity and discrimination improvements. We also plan to integrate
    missile defense capability with delivery of the Navy's Air and Missile
    Defense Radar, the SPY-6, for enhanced engagement capability and
    increased raid capacity.
        In November 2020, together with the U.S. Navy, MDA conducted Flight
    Test Aegis Weapon System (FTM)-44. During this test, the Aegis Weapons
    System launched a SM-3 Block IIA interceptor from the USS John Finn
    (DDG-113) and successfully intercepted a simple rogue state threat-
    representative ICBM-class target. While the AWS and SM-3 Block IIA
    interceptors were not designed to defeat an ICBM-class target, this
    test demonstrated some potential limited capability. This
    Congressionally directed flight test leveraged residual capability in
    Aegis and SM-3 Block IIA using engage-on-remote sensor capabilities
    through the C2BMC network. We continue to improve layered defense
    robustness. MDA is testing Aegis BMD with all Standard Missile
    interceptor variants, THAAD weapon system improvements, and continued
    C2BMC spiral upgrades. Test results and upcoming Departmental decisions
    will inform the future of these assessments.
        MDA supports the European Phased Adaptive Approach as the U.S.
    contribution NATO's missile defense capability, providing coverage and
    protection of NATO's European territory, populations, and forces
    against the ballistic missile threat from outside the Euro-Atlantic
    region. Currently, there is a fully operational Aegis Ashore site in
    Romania and a second and final European site under construction in
    Poland. With fiscal year 2022 funding, MDA will continue to support
    operations at the site in Romania and completion of construction at the
    site in Poland.
        Aegis Ashore Poland is currently over 90 percent complete site-wide
    and over 95 percent complete for the critical elements of military
    construction required for the Aegis Weapon System. Progress remains
    slow but steady despite the challenges that COVID-19 has presented. MDA
    continues to work closely with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)
    to address the remaining challenges to complete the military
    construction and start the follow-on MDA efforts to deliver Aegis
    Ashore Poland to the Navy, European command, and NATO. In June 2020, we
    achieved the Beneficial Occupancy Date for the Naval Support Facility
    buildings, which we turned over to the Navy. Military construction of
    the Deckhouse Facility continues and the Aegis combat system
    installation efforts may begin as early as spring 2021. MDA and USACE
    continue to monitor site conditions and partner with industry to
    integrate portions of the combat system equipment installation with
    ongoing construction where possible. The combat system installation is
    the first in a series of events leading to operational acceptance of
    the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System Complex in Poland in fiscal
    year 2022.
        MDA activities under the increase joint force lethality category
    include funding for initial development of survivable and operationally
    effective integrated air and missile defenses for Guam to defend Guam
    from ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missile threats. Funding
    includes development activities, such as additional integration between
    Army and Navy assets, designed to support a range of architecture
    options, pending upcoming Departmental decisions.
        MDA also is furthering the ability of partner nations to operate
    seamlessly with U.S. air and missile defense forces to augment our
    international cooperative and FMS efforts. In May 2021, MDA and the
    U.S. Navy will participate in Formidable Shield-21, a joint NATO
    exercise with multiple BMD and IAMD events at the U.K. Ministry of
    Defense Hebrides Test Range, along with allied participants from
    Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the
    Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom. In the Indo-Pacific
    region, we continue to exercise strong bilateral alliances with Japan,
    South Korea, and Australia to improve our collective security in the
    Indo-Pacific. MDA is continuing our longstanding cooperative efforts
    with Japan as it seek to improve its existing missile defense
    capabilities, including acquisition of the SM-3 Block IIA missile, the
    result of United States-Japan cooperative development. MDA continues to
    support Japan's decision to re-align the Aegis Ashore Japan FMS case to
    an Aegis Equipped Surface Vessel. In August 2022, MDA will participate
    in Pacific Dragon-22, a multilateral international exercise at the U.S.
    PMRF in Hawaii, along with allied participants from Japan, South Korea,
    and Australia.
        The THAAD weapon system is a globally transportable, ground-based
    missile defense system that is highly effective against SRBM, MRBM, and
    IRBM threats inside and outside the atmosphere in the terminal phase of
    flight. MDA currently supports forward-deployment of two batteries
    stationed in the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility. THAAD has proven
    increasingly integral to the Defense Department's regional defense
    architecture. MDA received a congressional increase in fiscal year 2021
    for an additional THAAD battery and 30 Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical
    Trucks. This congressional action expands the Army capacity to eight
    THAAD batteries. We will continue THAAD interceptor procurement,
    obsolescence mitigation efforts, production and training support, the
    THAAD Stockpile Reliability Program, and the initial procurement of
    required THAAD Battery Ground Component enhancement modifications to
    meet growing cybersecurity threats. MDA will continue development and
    integration of multiple, independent THAAD software builds to address
    the evolving threat, improve the Warfighter's defense planning, and
    improve system capability.
        MDA is providing a more robust integrated air and missile defense
    capability, one that integrates THAAD, Patriot, and at-sea Aegis ships
    into a seamless network. One focus area is the integration of THAAD and
    Patriot weapon systems. Patriot Launch-on-Remote (THAAD) capability
    will increase Patriot-defended area and engagement opportunities by
    allowing the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement
    (MSE) interceptor to launch using the THAAD radar information, prior to
    the Patriot radar acquiring the threat. On February 20, 2020 we
    demonstrated, with the U.S. Army, functionality required for Patriot
    Launch-on-Remote (THAAD) capability in Flight Test Patriot Weapon
    System-27 (FTP)-27 Event (E)2. We executed FTP-27 E1 on October 1,
    2020, at White Sands Missile Range, NM, demonstrating Patriot Launch-
    on-Remote engagement of a SRBM target using MSE interceptors and THAAD
    radar track and discrimination data. This improved integration
    demonstrated the ability to expand the Patriot battery defended area.
        As the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Implementing Agency for THAAD,
    MDA is executing FMS THAAD cases with the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
    and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). We continue to work the KSA FMS
    case, which includes seven THAAD batteries, 44 launchers, 360
    interceptors, and associated equipment and support. MDA will work with
    the KSA to commence delivery of the THAAD capability by the middle of
    this decade. MDA also will continue work with the UAE to maintain and
    sustain its two THAAD batteries.
        We have a valuable cooperative missile defense relationship with
    Israel. Not only can we help our partner develop systems to strengthen
    its missile defenses and increase interoperability with U.S. Forces,
    but we also learn a great deal from a battle-hardened nation
    experienced in defeating missile threats. MDA and the Israel Missile
    Defense Organization (IMDO) continue to cooperate on engineering,
    development, co-production, testing, and fielding of the Arrow Weapon
    System (AWS), the David's Sling Weapon System (DSWS), and co-production
    for the Iron Dome Defense System (IDDS). In 2020, MDA and IMDO
    cooperatively planned and successfully executed two critical flight
    tests. On August 12, 2020, Arrow System Test-18a (AST)-18a, an Arrow-2
    interceptor flight test, demonstrated system processes, collected data
    for the next upgrades, and allowed for risk reduction testing of the
    DSWS through live intercept of the MRBM target. In December 2020, we
    successfully completed a series of DSWS intercept tests in an advanced
    system configuration against threats simulating cruise missiles and
    theater ballistic missiles. David's Sling Test 7 (DST)-7 proved DSWS
    capability against cruise and theater ballistic missiles, allowed for
    risk reduction testing of the AWS and IDDS, and was a key milestone in
    DSWS development. In fiscal year 2022, MDA will support several flight
    tests across the Israeli portfolio.
                      developing technology for the future
        MDA is investing in innovative and disruptive technologies to
    address the emergence of new and more advanced threats. MDA's previous
    missile defense technology investments have transitioned into weapon
    systems and vastly improved interceptor seeker capability, increased
    the speed and range of intercept with advances in propulsion, and
    increased the probability of single-shot kill using multifaceted
    tracking and discrimination algorithms. To be responsive to evolving
    missile threats, we must continue to sustain, modernize, and expand
    missile defenses by pursuing rapid, yet measured, development of
    advanced missile defense concepts and technologies for homeland and
    regional defense.
        Potential adversaries such as Russia and China continue to expand
    the capability and capacity of their regional offensive missile
    inventories, to include regional hypersonic missile capabilities. The
    altitude at which these weapons fly, coupled with their aerodynamic
    maneuverability, make them a challenge for existing air and missile
    defense systems. We are investing in technology to counter these new
    and emerging threats by upgrading sensors and C2BMC for early warning,
    identification, and tracking of regional and strategic hypersonic
    threats, leveraging existing systems where possible to develop a
    layered defensive architecture against regional hypersonic threats, and
    making technology investments for increasing hypersonic defensive
    capabilities. Consistent with long-standing U.S. policy, MDA is not
    developing or deploying capabilities to defend the U.S. Homeland
    against near-peer strategic hypersonic missile threats, as we rely on
    nuclear deterrence to address these more complex threats.
        A layered hypersonic defense architecture is the most effective way
    to address the regional hypersonic threat. As with ballistic missile
    threats, the more opportunities to neutralize hypersonic threats, the
    better. MDA is taking steps to deliver regional, layered hypersonic
    defense capability to the U.S. warfighter incrementally. We are working
    closely with the Department of the Navy to develop and field SBT to
    provide the U.S. Warfighter terminal phase defense against regional
    maneuvering and hypersonic threats. MDA demonstrated SBT capability at-
    sea utilizing the AWS with SM-6 for defense against advanced ballistic
    missile threats during FTM-27, demonstration events conducted in
    December 2016 and August 2017. Upcoming flight test FTM-31 Event 1 will
    further demonstrate this SBT capability. MDA is anticipating SBT
    Increment 3 upgrade and delivery in 2024, including terminal defense
    capability against some regional hypersonic threats. MDA also is
    augmenting data on hypersonic threats provided by the intelligence
    community by collecting and analyzing data from various sensors
    participating in U.S. hypersonic flight-testing.
        To complement this terminal capability, MDA is taking steps to
    develop an initial glide phase intercept capability leveraging the
    Aegis weapon system to provide the U.S. warfighter with increasingly
    capable and layered regional defensive capabilities over time. In
    fiscal year 2022 MDA will accelerate the development of an operational
    demonstration of a glide phase defense capability against regional
    hypersonic threats using the Aegis Weapon System. We are also
    developing hypersonic target systems to support robust testing.
        MDA is investing in the technology development necessary for the
    next increment of capability, including internally-cooled seeker
    technology, axial upper stage capability, robust and resilient
    materials for hypersonic flight, and novel guidance and control
    capability. We will continue to strengthen efforts to deter and counter
    these rapidly advancing missile threats.
        In response to USNORTHCOM requirements, MDA will analyze the
    current systems architecture for cruise missile defense of the Homeland
    and conduct a demonstration of cruise missile defense capabilities
    using the Joint Tactical Integrated Fire Control (JTIFC) capability
    within the National Capital Region. JTIFC enhances integrated fire
    control capabilities across the Services by connecting existing
    sensors, command and control systems, and weapons at the tactical level
    through real-time sensor networks.
        MDA continually assesses emerging and disruptive technology for
    potential applications to missile defense utilization. We are pursuing
    efforts in artificial intelligence, machine learning, nanosat
    technology, Left-through-Right Integration, cybersecurity, and quantum
    science. Key to this assessment has been the development of testbeds
    that allow us to exercise and demonstrate capabilities and test new
    concepts, algorithms, simulations, and software. We are also expanding
    technology opportunities through cooperative, collaborative engagements
    with DOD partners and our allies.
                                 mda workforce
        During this unprecedented global health crisis, the MDA workforce
    continues to execute the missile defense mission in spite of pandemic
    challenges and restrictions. We were able to ensure the health and
    safety of the workforce while providing tools and platforms enabling
    continued mission success. In line with the 2020 Federal Employee
    Viewpoint Survey results and our initiatives to improve our culture of
    excellence, the MDA workforce has become even more engaged, committed,
    satisfied and confident in our leadership and mission.
                                   conclusion
        Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, Members of the Subcommittee,
    we will continue to increase the readiness as well as the capability
    and capacity of fielded homeland and regional missile defense systems
    while investing in advanced technology to counter adversary ballistic
    and non-ballistic missile threats. MDA will continue to execute a
    robust and aggressive test program critical to system development to
    outpace future offensive missile systems in order to defend the U.S.
    Homeland, U.S. deployed forces, and our allies and international
    partners. We also will continue to work closely with the Intelligence
    Community, the Services, and the Combatant Commands to ensure MDA is
    meeting the demand of the Warfighter.
        Finally, I would like to recognize the men and women who serve in
    our Armed Forces at home and abroad and who operate the integrated
    Missile Defense System. Our Nation benefits greatly from such a highly
    skilled and dedicated fighting force.
        I appreciate your continued support for MDA and the missile defense
    mission, and I look forward to answering the Committee's questions.
    Thank you.

        Senator King. Thank you very much, Admiral. This subject
    gets more and more complicated the more we get into it, because
    I think when we talk about missile defense it is important to
    emphasize we are not only talking about Fort Greely and
    Vandenburg. We are talking about THAAD, Patriot, and Aegis.
        You have to understand that from the point of view of this
    Committee, one of the important considerations we have is
    opportunity cost. This is a tight budget year that we are
    looking at, and so when you spend money on one thing, that
    means you do not have money to spend on something else, and
    that is something that we have to look at.
        You mentioned something very important, and that is we are
    developing hypersonic defense. Could you expand upon that,
    being aware that this is a nonclassified setting? Can we defend
    a carrier against a hypersonic glide missile today?
        Vice Admiral Hill. We have terminal capability today.
        Senator King. ``Terminal'' means in the last stages before
    it hits the ship.
        Vice Admiral Hill. That is typically where you will start
    on taking on that kind of threat. It happens to be in the
    hardest environment. You are in the atmosphere. You are
    maneuvering. But we do have that capability deployed today, and
    we are continuing to improve it.
        Where we need to go is to take it out in that glide phase,
    and that is the Glide Phase Interceptor that you will see in
    the President's Budget 2022.
        Senator King. We are all talking about hitting bullets with
    bullets. What is the role of directed energy, and are we
    putting sufficient resources into directed energy as an
    alternative, and frankly, a cheaper alternative, and perhaps a
    more effective one to deal with a maneuverable incoming
    missile?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Thank, Senator. That is a very tough one
    to discuss in this environment. I would love to come see you on
    that one. There are initiatives there. I just can't talk about
    here, at this session.
        Senator King. Thank you. It is being considered.
        Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. General VanHerck, I think you used a term,
    and I wrote it down. You talked about ``prying the data'' out
    of someplace. Am I correct? Is that what you said?
        General VanHerck. Chairman, that is correct. I did say
    that. There are lots of data from domain awareness sensors
    around the globe that all too often is not shared to develop a
    globally integrated picture that would give us the ability to
    get further left and give decision space to our senior leaders.
        Senator King. I completely agree, and as you know,
    Goldwater-Nichols was a landmark statute which led us to joint
    commands. But we do not necessarily have joint data access and
    capability development. So I hope that is something we might be
    able to address. But when one of our generals says he has to
    pry the data out of another agency in order to do his job, I
    think that tells us we have got a problem we should address.
        General VanHerck. Chairman, I am encouraged with the
    Department. The Secretary just signed the Joint All-Domain
    Command and Control Strategy. We are moving forward going down
    that path. I would also say that we are going to have to look
    at policy and laws as well, especially within the intel
    community, of sharing data to ensure that we get a full global
    picture.
        Senator King. Admiral, are you persuaded that the accuracy
    and the ability of the Ground-Based Interceptors is sufficient
    to justify the cost? Let me put it in a more difficult
    question. Which would you rather have--the Ground-Based
    Interceptors or five additional Aegis destroyers?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Well, for the ballistic threat, the GBIs
    today and the NGIs tomorrow go after that threat. They are
    spec'ed for that. NGI, as you know, it has got a hard
    requirement on it. It is to cover all 50 states. That is why it
    is a 50-foot missile and 50-foot in diameter. It has got a hard
    requirement on it. I would rather have more GBIs and NGIs
    against that threat.
        The Aegis ships and what they do, for a totally different
    mission, and they are multi-mission ships. They have a lot of
    different missions that they are excellent for.
        Senator King. But THAAD, Aegis, and Patriot have a higher
    success rate, do they not?
        Vice Admiral Hill. The way the success rate was mentioned
    earlier, it has always entertained me. If you have a failure in
    a program, you are going to learn from that failure. Talk about
    it all the time. You learn from your failures, right?
        Senator King. Yeah, but if there is an incoming missile
    from North Korea and we miss it, learning from the failure is
    not going to make people feel better.
        Vice Admiral Hill. Absolutely not, and so that is why, over
    time, you want to improve the program, and then your math
    really needs to take a look at the current configuration that
    is in the ground, and the current configuration that has been
    tested against realistic targets. If you add up failures from
    1998 into the number, of course you are going to have a lower
    reliability number, using that right-world information. I will
    tell you that the reliability is much higher, and I think that
    the conference of the warfighter is based on that.
        Senator King. Final question, and my wife says I say
    ``finally'' too much and it gets people's hopes up.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator King. But in this case, final question. You heard
    Mr. Panda talk about more transparency, clarity on testing,
    clearer reporting on what exactly the targets are. I could be
    in a classified setting, but would you support that suggestion,
    because it seems to me we have a responsibility, as the people
    who are funding and using the taxpayers' money, to ensure that
    these things are going to work. So would you support additional
    clarity and transparency with regard to testing?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Absolutely, Senator. If someone has got
    a security clearance I will happily talk to them about that,
    and I will tell you, we have got a great test record that I am
    very proud of. You can't just look at live fire. That is one
    shot, right, in a broad battle space. We have got to look at
    the ground test data. That is where your real numbers and your
    statistics come from. So I would be happy to show that to
    anybody that is interested and has the appropriate clearance.
        Senator King. I think that is something we can follow up
    on. Thank you very much.
        Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. Thank you all. Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Hill, a
    number of news reports have indicated that the Government of
    Israel plans to submit a request for additional assistance so
    that they can replenish their Iron Dome system following the
    recent conflict that we have seen there with Hamas. Has the
    Department received such a request?
        Vice Admiral Hill. I am going to defer that question over
    to Policy, but before I do that I will say they are a great
    partner. We work very closely with Israel on all layers of what
    they do. But beyond that, in terms of the emergency
    acquisition, I will send that over to Policy.
        Senator Fischer. Ms. Tomero, it is good to see you again.
    You are going to be a regular here, I think, from now on.
        Ms. Tomero. I am looking forward to it.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you so much for being here. Can you
    answer that question for me, please?
        Ms. Tomero. Yes, absolutely. The Department is working that
    request, and as Admiral Hill said, we look forward to working
    very closely with Israel as one of our closest partners, and so
    the Department is working that request. What I can do is,
    because it crosses over several departments within DOD, to come
    back to you and give you more detail.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. I would like to know if it is going
    to be a request for supplemental appropriations or if it is
    going to reprogram resources.
        Ms. Tomero. I think if you could allow me to come back and
    give you a better answer for the record on that. But again, the
    Department is looking at that request for $1 billion.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Ms. Tomero. The Department of Defense remains committed to
    working with Israel to ensure that the Iron Dome Defense System
    is capable of protecting Israeli civilians. The Department
    supports Israel's request for additional support for its Iron
    Dome Defense System. The Department of Defense has provided
    Congress with information in support of Israel's request, and
    stands ready to answer any questions, as needed. The Department
    also continues to consult closely with the Israeli Ministry of
    Defense on Israel's security needs.

        Senator Fischer. Okay. Great. Thank you. Also, what are the
    Department's plans with respect to conducting a missile defense
    review? Has that begun? What organizations are involved in it?
    First of all, are you going to have a missile defense review,
    and what is the process going to look like on that?
        Ms. Tomero. Thank you, Senator. We are planning to start a
    missile defense review imminently, in the next few weeks, and
    look forward to working across the Department with Admiral
    Hill's organization, with General VanHerck in NORTHCOM, with
    the acquisition community within the Department. So it will be
    done in a coordinated way across the Department, and we are
    planning to start very soon. We will look at the threat and the
    changing security environment, you know, how do we improve and
    have effective and affordable missile defense for both the
    homeland and regional defense.
        As I mentioned in the opening remarks, we will do that as
    part of the National Defense Strategy, and it will also feed
    into our integrated deterrence review.
        Senator Fischer. Will it be standalone?
        Ms. Tomero. That decision has not been made yet.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. Section 1684 of the Fiscal Year 2017
    NDAA requires the Department to designate a single entity as
    the lead acquisition organization for defending the Homeland
    from cruise missiles. To my knowledge, that designation has not
    been made. Can you update us on what the status of that is?
        Ms. Tomero. Yes, Senator, you are correct. That designation
    has not been made, and is still being worked within the
    Department.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you. Do you think we need it?
    Do we need that designation?
        Ms. Tomero. This is something that the Department is still
    looking at, and I would ask for your indulgence in allowing me
    to look across and work with my colleagues on what the best way
    forward on this is. I know the previous administration also did
    a lot of work on this too.
        Senator Fischer. I am going to put General VanHerck on the
    spot, and Admiral Hill. What do you think? Do we need a
    designation like that?
        General VanHerck. Senator Fischer, I do believe it would be
    best to have a single entity designated within the Department
    for cruise missile defense of the Homeland.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Admiral?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Great, great question. I also agree we
    need a single agency involved.
        Senator Fischer. Good. Thank you. I will try to get another
    one in. Admiral Hill, does the budget support delivery of the
    next-generation Interceptor in 2028, and can you describe the
    life extension program MDA has developed to ensure the current
    Interceptor fleet remains viable until NGI is deployed?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Thank you, Senator. When I mentioned the
    Service Life Extension Program earlier, based on congressional
    support there we kick-started that program, working very
    closely with General VanHerck and his team, and that is going
    really well, and it will increase capacity and capability. I
    mentioned that we will have the old hardware that we can
    assess, and our assessments' reliability are going to bump up,
    and we are going to have a lot more confidence in that.
        So what we are doing--I do not like to live off of plus-
    ups. I always appreciate when Congress does that, but then now
    we are committed to include that in the budget, so you will see
    us including that in President's Budget 2022 as we move
    forward, and that President's Budget 2022 look into NGI,
    absolutely. We are in a good place with both contractors moving
    out to beat the government estimate of first emplacement in
    2028.
        That is going to come to the left. I am going to stay very
    close to General VanHerck. I am going to stay very close with
    all the stakeholders in the building, because what that means
    is flight testing will happen earlier, which means we are going
    to prepare those threat-representative targets and then we will
    be ready to go.
        Senator Fischer. Good to hear. Thank you.
        Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
        Senator King. Senator Rosen, via Webex.
        Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chair King and Ranking
    Member Fischer, for holding these hearings today. I would like
    to thank all witnesses for their service and for testifying,
    and General VanHerck, always great to see you and spend some
    time with you like we did yesterday. That was wonderful.
        I would like to go right into some missile defense
    cybersecurity issues. As MDA works to rapidly deploy missile
    defense systems to, of course, stay ahead of threats, I am
    concerned that we may not be taking potential cyber
    vulnerabilities seriously enough before we field new systems,
    when the 2019 Missile Defense Review software is mentioned,
    only once, and even more alarming, Government Accountability
    Office (GAO) May 2021 report highlights that none of MDA's 17
    operational cybersecurity tests planned for fiscal year 2020
    were conducted, and that cybersecurity testing since 2017 has
    revealed several vulnerabilities.
        So Admiral Hill, in light of recent significant
    cyberattacks, of course I do not have to tell you what they are
    out in the public space, what steps is MDA taking to address
    cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and are you conducting
    cybersecurity testing on all deployed and planned capabilities?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, thanks, Senator Rosen. Part of the
    difficulty of cyber testing with missile defense systems is
    often you have to creep into the networks that are operational.
    So it does require a lot of coordination with the combatant
    commands. When you look at what it takes to execute a cyber
    test in a pandemic, no surprise that there were delays in
    executing those test in 2020. But I will tell you, we have
    conducted a number of adversarial assessments. Those are called
    the AAs. We have also moved out and done the PCO, which is the
    persistent cyber operations. We have an agreement with DOT&E to
    start executing that this next year, so we have the team in
    place and ready to roll.
        I absolutely agree with you that it is something we should
    worry about. When you look at a system as networked as missile
    defense is, 18 time zones, tying all the sensors together,
    fusing data, absolutely. I want to know where those
    vulnerabilities are, so when we execute those tests we take
    action on them. You can see it in our budget exhibits. You will
    see cybersecurity across every single element of the missile
    defense system, and you will see that we are martialing the
    best people on the planet to execute those adversarial
    assessments and the persistent cyber operations.
        Senator Rosen. Well, I appreciate that, and it is a large
    operation. It is difficult to test. I would argue that a lot of
    those tests are also done remotely, in the privacy of offices.
    As we do some of those treat assessments it is important that
    we get back on a regular schedule, because the complexity also
    means it is more vulnerable, because there are many points of
    entry.
        I would like to move on now and build on Senator Fischer's
    question about the Iron Dome. So Ms. Tomero, given the U.S.
    Army's acquisition, of course, of the Iron Dome technology,
    what lessons do you think that you have learned, or we have
    learned from the recent Israel-Hamas conflict, and more
    specifically, are you concerned about the ability of hostile
    actors to launch a massive barrage of rockets designed to
    overwhelm these short-range missile systems? Ms. Tomero and
    General Karbler, you can both respond. Ms. Tomero, you can go
    first, please.
        Ms. Tomero. Thank you. Again, there has been a lot of
    continuity and support for cooperative missile defense with
    Israel and supporting Israel's ability and capacity to defend
    itself, and we will continue to do so. My understanding is,
    according to Israel, their success rate is very high.
        Senator Rosen. Well, and maybe, General, you could talk
    about the lessons learned, because we know, and maybe we are
    still analyzing what just recently happened, but there are
    lessons to be taken from the most recent conflict. So can you
    speak to that?
        Lieutenant General Karbler. Ma'am, I had the opportunity to
    go visit the Army soldiers who are out at White Sands Missile
    Range as we field the new Iron Dome batteries. They are
    training on the systems. I do not know specifically if the
    lessons learned have been shared, but I know that the
    instructors out there, as they go through their certification
    and training, are providing threat-representative scenarios to
    those soldiers as they go through their training. We expect
    that that first battery will be ready for deployment at the end
    of September of this year.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that. I have toured
    those batteries myself, and they are quite impressive, and I
    think there will be a lot of things that we learn, going
    forward.
        I believe my time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
        Senator King. Thank you, Senator. Senator Cramer.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to all of
    our witnesses. I think all but one of my questions has been
    already thoroughly discussed, although I will just add that I
    look forward to an update on Israel's request for emergency
    military aid as well, and more details regarding that.
        But I do have a question for you, General VanHerck, and I
    really appreciated our time together, our discussions about
    over-the-horizon radar, the importance of all-domain awareness,
    and, of course, the hugely successful test of the over-the-
    horizon radar at Camp Grafton a few years ago. I would just ask
    if you could further explain the importance of over-the-horizon
    radar and how it increases the capability to defend the
    Homeland, and why you need the resources, frankly, to fast-
    track some procurement?
        General VanHerck. Senator, thank you. As we look at our
    competitors and potential adversaries, they have developed
    capabilities to hold the Homeland at risk, below the nuclear
    threshold. Those capabilities that they have developed now are
    extremely long range. So, for example, Russian capabilities to
    launch cruise missiles now extend to over Russia, that can
    threaten North America. They can also do that from very far
    ranges, from our 2:00 towards Europe, and the same thing in the
    Northwest as well.
        Today's legacy North Warning System has served its purpose
    and done well, and we are using a system called Pathfinder to
    give us some additional capability. But, you know, physically,
    the system cannot see over the horizon or long distances. So
    over-the-horizon radar gives us the capability to have domain
    awareness much further than we do today, which increases
    decision space for our senior leaders, and that is a top
    priority for me.
        It is also my number one unfunded priority list, is to
    fast-track the site survey, the additional development, so that
    we can get this domain awareness capability of over-the-horizon
    radar sooner.
        Senator Cramer. I noticed that on the unfunded priority
    list, which is why I asked the question, and given, of course,
    my personal interest, what would be the next steps then for
    testing and production?
        General VanHerck. I would have to defer to the Service on
    that one. I am not sure what those next steps are. For us it
    would be to get the additional funding here, which is $25
    million, to move forward to fast-track site development and
    those kinds of things. As far as test of the actual system, I
    would defer to the acquisition authority on that one.
        Senator Cramer. All right. Thank you. That is everything,
    Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
        Senator King. Senator Kelly.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Hill,
    earlier we were talking about terminal phase, protecting the
    aircraft carriers with an Aegis system. My understanding is you
    talked about a terminal-phase intercept. Does that change? I
    mean, this is a relatively new capability. I assume SM-2, SM-
    6----
        Vice Admiral Hill. SM-6 based.
        Senator Kelly. SM-6 based. So to get this capability with
    the Aegis system in an SM-6, does that change the ability for
    the battle group, how it is going to operate, the range of the
    Aegis destroyer/cruiser has to be from the carrier? Does this
    have other operational considerations, and how long have we
    been in this mode, because the hypersonic threat, as we
    understand, is real.
        Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, sir, and it is probably a difficult
    answer. I will say that, you know, all carrier strike groups
    are very dynamic, so you are not going to tether a destroyer to
    an aircraft carrier. The destroyer is going to go do its
    business and it will stay in contact with the destroyer, and
    the strike group commander will determine the positioning of
    those ships.
        Remember, I am the technical developer. There is nothing
    that I see that causes a constraint on where the destroyer or
    the cruiser might operate in order to protect the carrier. It
    is just part of the other many missions that that strike group
    is going to carry out.
        Senator Kelly. Current the fire control solution comes from
    the Aegis system. We were talking a little bit about HBTSS and
    the test in 2023. Once that system is fully developed, with
    regards to our carrier battle groups, does this change the way
    the fire control solution--does it then come from the HBTSS
    system down to the cruiser to launch the SM-2?
        Vice Admiral Hill. So the way Aegis works, and you sound
    very familiar with this, is that the ship is going to control
    the missile. So typically for an organic engagement where it is
    using its own sensor, it is going to drive the missile, because
    you want to give updates to the missile. When you have got a
    maneuvering target there is a lot of uncertainty in that flight
    path, and so the help from the larger, smarter ship to the
    smaller, less capable sensor on the front end, you want to
    drive that missile to get to the collision, or get it within
    what we call ``Region R,'' within its lethal radius.
        When you bring in offboard sensors, which is a proven fact
    with Aegis, we have done launch on remote, which means we are
    launching on that remote sensor, and we have done engage on
    remote, where the ship never sees it with its own organic
    sensors. It is just controlling the missile and giving in
    maneuver commands as it is taking data from another radar.
        HBTSS will follow a very similar pathway. So being able to
    see down from space, warm tracks going over warm Earth, that is
    really tough science, but we have got that licked. We have
    shown that we can do data on the ground. That sort of
    capability gives us that global coverage. But it is going to
    work the same way. That data will come down and come through
    C2BMC to the ship, and then ship is driving the missile based
    on what it is seeing from HBTSS. So it does give you more
    dynamic maneuver within that larger picture, but no big major
    change.
        Now in the future, it would be great to launch the missile
    from the ship and have a space asset take it over. We are not
    there yet, so we are going to crawl, walk, run on that.
        Senator Kelly. All right. Well, I am interested to see how
    the test goes in 2023.
        Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, sir.
        Senator Kelly. General VanHerck, yesterday we were talking
    a little bit about cruise missile defense of the Homeland, and
    in the $247.9 million budget to support development of
    hypersonic defense capabilities, I believe there is about $14
    million in there, or there is a requested $14 million for
    cruise missile defense of the Homeland.
        So General, what progress can we expect to see if that
    money is approved by Congress in the coming fiscal year?
        General VanHerck. I believe that is money that he is taking
    internally in the Missile Defense Agency, that was not actually
    dedicated towards cruise missile defense, but he is taking
    that. Is that correct, Admiral Hill?
        Vice Admiral Hill. That is correct. So I am not the
    designated agent for cruise missile defense of the Homeland,
    but I recognize the need. That threat is real. We stay very
    close with NORAD and NORTHCOM, and so we have learned forward
    to put funding into the budget so we could help with that
    architecture work, do the spectrum analysis, get the radars in
    place. So it is our way to put the foot forward, even though I
    am not the designated agent.
        General VanHerck. I would point out, on my unfunded
    priority list I do have a request for elevated radar here in
    the National Capital region, which would give domain awareness
    for potential cruise missile threats, much beyond what we have
    today. It also gives a warning awareness for a movement of
    senior officials and those kinds of things. That funding is $27
    million.
        Vice Admiral Hill. You will see that same issue in the
    unfunded priority list from the Missile Defense Agency.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you.
        Senator King. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Senator Sullivan,
    we are delighted you are here, and we reached a consensus to
    close Fort Greely.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Sullivan. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am glad to be here,
    and I was actually watching the first panel, so I am sorry I
    did not get down here in time. But I actually do have a comment
    or two. I agree with Senator Fischer on that, the one witness
    who was making the argument that somehow the China-Russia
    nuclear modernization program was driven in part by the GBIs at
    Fort Greely, I think, no offense to our esteemed witnesses, was
    one of the more ridiculous arguments I have heard in quite a
    while.
        But, Admiral Hill, can you just mention--it is not just
    North Korea that we are looking at with regard to our missile
    defense. It is other rogue nations. We have the capability,
    given our location, with regard to rogue nations like Iran,
    don't we?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Absolutely. So when I say rogue nations,
    I mean North Korea and Iran, and so NGI and the GBI fleet today
    was geared to protect us against North Korea and Iran.
        Senator Sullivan. Correct, and I also watched the
    Chairman's discussion of deterrence, and I think it is
    questionable whether Kim Jong-un is a rational actor. I
    definitely think it is questionable whether the Ayatollah is a
    rational actor. I think it is the responsibility of this
    Congress to make sure we do not place that bet on deterrence.
    The whole idea is if either of them want to go out in a blaze
    of glory, we shoot down all their missiles, and then we destroy
    their countries. But we don't get destroyed first. Isn't that
    the whole point of our missile defense?
        Vice Admiral Hill. I will defer to Policy.
        Senator Sullivan. We don't take the punch. We deliver the
    punch, we parry the punch, and then we deliver the punch.
        Ms. Tomero. Right. There has been long consistency that we
    have missile defense against a limited attack against the
    Homeland, but, you know, as----
        Senator Sullivan. We shouldn't take the risk, though, that
    Kim Jong-un and the Ayatollah are rational actors and would be
    deterred by deterrence.
        Ms. Tomero. Again, correct. If they were to launch a
    limited attack against the United States, that is the mission
    of missile defense, and we strongly support continuing that----
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask another question. So the
    history, unfortunately, of missile defense--and I do not want
    to be too partisan here, but typically Republican
    administrations have supported it, Democratic administrations
    have not. We made a good breakthrough in this Committee. In
    2017, my bill, the Advancing America's Missile Defense Act, had
    20 Republican co-sponsors, 10 Democratic co-sponsors. So
    missile defense has become bipartisan, which is really, really
    important to make it sustainable.
        But I will tell you, I am a little bit worried, and Admiral
    Hill, here is why I am worried. There are some Senators who are
    now starting to ask the question, ``Hey, do we need it at
    all?'' That is their prerogative, but I think that is
    indicative of kind of trying to back, hey, now that the other
    party is in charge we are going to get rid of it. I am also
    very concerned about the President's budget, which reflects a
    15 percent cut in the MDA's budget, notably 50-plus programs
    that the MDA administers, over 70 percent are expected to
    realize a cut, including the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
    program.
        So, Admiral Hill, do you have concerns that the requested
    level of funding will result in reduced readiness and
    reliability to defend our Nation?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Senator, thanks. Great question. First,
    I will agree with you that missile defense should always be a
    bipartisan issue.
        Senator Sullivan. Yep, and we have made good strides in
    that regard.
        Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. For me and my team--I always
    call them the stellar team, and we have a noble mission--our
    mission is plain and simple: protect the American people,
    protect our forward deployed forces and our allies and friends.
    So straight on that.
        Senator Sullivan. So the budget.
        Vice Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. So over to the budget. You
    know, like all--and we talked about this before you arrived,
    sir, is there is a top-line reduction, and so we had to
    prioritize, and I think we did it right. So when you see our
    unfunded priority list, where we had to take our risk was in
    production. So you will see at the top of that list the need to
    procure more interceptors, because that is where I had to take
    risk in order to not see the falloff of availability,
    reliability of the current GBI fleet. In fact, we make sure
    that program is rock solid and moving forward with the Service
    Life Extension Program.
        Senator Sullivan. But you would prefer not to have a 15
    percent cut.
        Vice Admiral Hill. I always prefer to be able to have a
    full balance of science, technology, development, testing, and
    sustainment support to the services. Absolutely.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, can I ask one
    final question--I know I am running out of time--and it is one
    that I am going to depart a little bit from the primary purpose
    of today's engagement. It will not surprise you. General
    VanHerck, as the advocate for the Arctic in terms of the
    military's capability, you may have seen the Secretary of
    Defense and the DepSec, in their confirmation hearings, said
    that they were going to fully resource the different Service
    strategies, Arctic strategies. I remain concerned that those
    strategies are not being effectively implemented by the Army,
    Navy, and Air Force.
        How do you see the Services implementing their respective
    Artic strategies as part of this budget's mission, given your
    overall role as the Arctic military advocate as the NORTHCOM
    commander?
        General VanHerck. Senator, I think when I look at the
    fiscal year 2022 budget, I see an inching along in all of the
    Service. I am encouraged they all have strategies, and the
    Department has a strategy, and my strategy heavily relies on
    the Arctic. But we did not move the ball very far down the
    field this year in the budget, with regards to resourcing the
    Arctic.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Thank you. Senator Tuberville.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. General VanHerck, if the NGI
    development is delayed, do we have a good backup plan, or are
    we going to fall so far behind we cannot catch up?
        General VanHerck. Senator, there is not a backup to NGI. As
    I said in my statement, I remain concerned about my capability
    and capacity to defend against a ballistic missile threat from
    DPRK, or even if Iran developed one, and slipping longer than
    2028 would increase my concern and risk to be able to meet the
    mission I have been given.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. General Karbler, have you
    got anything to follow up on that?
        Lieutenant General Karbler. Just with respect to I provide
    the soldiers that do the missile defense mission. We train to
    the threat scenarios. We work very closely with MDA through
    software development, the testing, et cetera, so as the threat
    evolves, as the software evolves, our soldiers stay trained and
    ready for it.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Admiral Hill, for the second
    or third year in a row our number one unfunded priority is a
    defensive system for Guam. If our number one commander and our
    number one command is saying that is his number one priority, I
    believe the best offense is a good defense, and you need both.
    In your opinion, would a defense system for Guam save the
    American people money and free up ships for the Navy?
        Vice Admiral Hill. Senator, thank you. You sound like a
    coach.
        [Laughter.]
        Vice Admiral Hill. Absolutely, right. So when I look at the
    defense of Guam, and anybody looks at it, you have to have a
    sensor architecture, you have the fire control network, and you
    have to have weapons to protect it. If you are going to base
    there, if you are going to leverage offensive power and to
    power projection from Guam, you have to protect it.
        So yes, I believe that we do save money. If there was a way
    for us to free up the ship station so we could give those ships
    back to the maneuver force of the Navy, that is what we want to
    go do. So we are looking at regional system. We are in the
    middle of that study now, and as soon as we have that
    architecture laid down we will come and see you.
        Senator Tuberville. How many ships does it take, moving in
    and out, to protect?
        Vice Admiral Hill. So generally, if you are going to have
    one station, you are going to need four ships. You have got one
    coming, you have got one going, you have got one in the
    training cycle, and one under repair.
        Senator Tuberville. Wow. Does NGI involved with the threats
    we are seeing build from North Korea and other malign actors,
    will we be prepared?
        Vice Admiral Hill. With NGI I believe we will be prepared,
    and I think the reason why, if you take a look at what the
    intelligence sources tell us, the first intelligence, we know
    that those threats are not going to just be unitary, single-
    shot devices. They are flying with countermeasures, they are
    flying with multiple re-entry vehicles, multiple maneuver
    vehicles. So the NGI answer to that, and having two companies,
    two great American companies, moving forward and competing
    against each other to beat the timeline and to reduce the risk
    in the program, we are going to come forward with a capability
    that has multiple warheads on it, that can reduce the shot
    doctrine.
        That is our goal. I want to make the job for General
    VanHerck and his reliefs downstream much easier, to where they
    do not have worry about numbers of missiles in the arsenal,
    that they have the capability they need to take on what is
    coming at us. We know, by looking at the threat projections and
    where they are going, that we have got to take on that higher
    complexity threat.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. That is all.
        Senator King. I want to thank you all very much. Thank you
    for your service and for your dedication to this complex,
    difficult, and important mission. Thank you for your testimony
    here today, and I will make the same statement I did to the
    prior panel. If there are thoughts that you have that you think
    would be helpful to us, please supply them to the Committee
    between now and the beginning of next week.
        Thank you again all for your service, and we will look
    forward to working with you in the defense of our Nation.
        Thank you. The hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 6:07 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                             arctic communications
        1. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, as part of this year's
    budget process your command, USNORTHCOM and NORAD, submitted four
    unfunded priorities totaling $135 million. One of those requirements is
    a carry-over from last year to provide Arctic communications above 65
    degrees north latitude. Last year, $130 million was included in the
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD Unfunded Priority List to support Arctic
    communications, of which $50 million was authorized and appropriated in
    fiscal year 2021, leaving $80 million unfunded. Can you highlight the
    progress made to date on the Arctic communications initiative and
    explain why Congress should fully fund the remainder of this priority?
    What risks will USNORTHCOM/NORAD be accepting if this capability is not
    resourced appropriately?
        General VanHerck. The $50 million appropriated in fiscal year 2021
    enabled the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) to purchase 51
    satellite communications terminals, activate space internet service
    contracts with Starlink and OneWeb, and begin testing and
    experimentation with NORAD and USNORTHCOM terminals. These terminals
    will be deployed this summer to various North Warning System sites and
    Thule Air Base, both Arctic based, for system resiliency and terminal
    operations experiments, as well as data fusion experiments conducted
    with NORAD control centers. Additionally, the U.S. Coast Guard will
    perform system mobility tests while underway on the icebreaker USS
    Healy. While DOD is not buying launches or satellites, the planned
    SpaceX launch schedule will provide a total of 500 polar-orbit
    spacecraft accessible under the AFRL contract by June 2022.
        Congressional support for the fiscal year 2022 $80 million unfunded
    priority would enable development of mobile and fixed-site user
    terminals compatible with current and planned future commercial
    systems. The fiscal year 2022 funding would also allow AFRL to scale up
    its data fusion and C2 system integration efforts, and test advanced
    analytics to maximize the capability of Arctic sensors. Access to
    reliable communications in the high North is key to maintaining a
    persistent presence in the Arctic. Without the improved communications
    provided by this unfunded priority, USNORTHCOM and NORAD will incur
    increased risk to air sovereignty operations due to insufficient
    communications capacity and bandwidth as competitors increase their
    presence and capability in the Arctic. This risk will hinder effective
    command and control of operational missions, complicate search and
    rescue operations, and decrease senior leaders' decision space.
                    missile defense and strategic deterrence
        2. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, Vice Admiral Hill, and Ms.
    Tomero, how does our ballistic missile defense system provide
    flexibility in our strategic deterrence posture and complicate an
    adversary's calculus?
        General VanHerck. The United States ballistic missile defense
    system (BMDS) provides deterrence by denial by causing rogue state
    leaders to doubt their ability to successfully strike the United States
    with a ballistic missile. The deterrent effect generated by the BMDS
    allows U.S. strategic assets to maintain a more flexible and
    sustainable alert posture and complicates potential adversaries'
    calculus by giving them reason to question their own planning and the
    capability of their weapons systems. Deterrence by denial is
    underpinned by the U.S. policy of deterrence by punishment, through
    which the United States possesses the capability and reserves the
    option to respond to a ballistic missile attack by retaliating with
    strategic weapons.
        Vice Admiral Hill. United States (U.S.) missile defenses support a
    comprehensive and layered approach to prevent and defeat adversary
    missile attacks. Currently deployed U.S. missile defenses complicate
    the calculus of rogue states by undermining confidence in the
    likelihood of success of a strike against the U.S. homeland. The U.S.
    relies on nuclear deterrence to address the large and sophisticated
    intercontinental-range nuclear missile threat from strategic
    competitors.
        Ms. Tomero. In a regional context, missile defense is one component
    of the U.S. capability to counter anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)
    missile centric strategies that seek to impede the United States from
    supporting allies and partners in contested regions. In this role,
    effective missile defense provides a critical tool for shaping an
    adversary's risk-benefit decision calculus. It can undermine an
    adversary's confidence in its ability to achieve its intended political
    or military objectives through missile threats or attacks, and provide
    incentives for restraint. If an adversary miscalculates and deterrence
    fails, integrated air and missile defense, along with offensive
    capabilities and passive defense measures, can limit an adversary's
    capabilities to disrupt U.S. regional military operations through
    missile attacks on U.S. forces and infrastructure.
                   russian and chinese nuclear modernization
        3. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Soofer, Ms. Tomero. General VanHerck, Vice
    Admiral Hill, and Lieutenant Karbler, do you believe that Russian and
    Chinese nuclear modernization is the result of the US fielding Ground
    Based Interceptors as part of its ballistic missile defense system?
        Dr. Soofer. Russian and Chinese nuclear modernization is not the
    result of the US withdrawal from the 1972 ABM treaty and the fielding
    of GBIs. In 2014, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated, ``I
    don't think we are on the verge of a new arms race. At least, Russia
    definitely won't be part of it. In our case, it's just that the time
    has come for us to modernize our nuclear and conventional arsenals.''
        Some suggest that Russia's development of a nuclear-powered cruise
    missile and nuclear-powered long-range underwater torpedo is a response
    to United States missile defense plans, but I tend to agree with Rose
    Gottemoeller, former Obama New START negotiator, who says that Putin
    ``is after nuclear weapons for another reason--to show that Russia is
    still a great power to be reckoned with. These exotic systems have more
    of a political function than a strategic or security one.''
        Finally, if United States missile defense was truly a driver for
    Russian nuclear modernization, then we would have expected Russia to
    increase the size of its strategic nuclear arsenal after the United
    States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002. As it turns out, the
    United States withdrawal announcement coincided with the Moscow Treaty,
    which reduced United States and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals from
    6,000 to 2,200 deployed warheads. The initial deployment of GBIs did
    not lead to Russian nuclear modernization or expansion, but rather the
    reduction of Russian strategic nuclear forces.
        Ms. Tomero. United States Homeland defenses are designed against a
    limited threat from North Korea or Iran. We rely on strategic nuclear
    deterrence to address the larger and more sophisticated arsenals of
    China and Russia. The size and sophistication of Russian and Chinese
    strategic systems could easily overwhelm the capacity of U.S. homeland
    missile defenses. Both China and Russia have stated their claimed the
    need for novel systems, including hypersonic glide vehicles, to improve
    missile penetration and counter missile defense systems. However, many
    factors, other than missile defense concerns, also shape Russian and
    Chinese nuclear modernization efforts, including their perceptions of
    their national interests and strategic objectives. Section 1692 of the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 required an
    independent study on other States' reactions to U.S. homeland defenses.
    This report, delivered to Congress in January 2021, made similar
    observations. We will remain cognizant of adversaries' potential
    perceptions of our missile defenses that could impact strategic
    stability while we protect our capacity to defend against missile
    threats from North Korea and Iran.
        General VanHerck. I believe United States Ground-Based Interceptors
    are one of several factors contributing to Russian and Chinese nuclear
    modernization. Based on their public statements, Moscow and Beijing
    fear that United States cyber and precision strike capabilities could
    be used to attack their regimes during a future conflict. They worry
    that U.S. missile defenses incentivize such a strike by degrading their
    ability to retaliate, even though U.S. missile defenses are not
    designed against a peer competitor threat. Another major factor in
    Russian and Chinese modernization efforts is an effort to maintain a
    flexible and survivable nuclear force and replace Cold War-era systems
    that are approaching the end of their service lives.
        Vice Admiral Hill. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) defers to
    OSD(Policy), but recognizes that current and planned missile defense
    capabilities are not designed to negate or undermine the strategic
    nuclear capabilities of Russia and China. The United States relies on
    nuclear deterrence to address those threats.
        Lieutenant General Karbler. No. I concur with the Intelligence
    Community (IC) assessment; they do not believe the Russian and Chinese
    nuclear modernization is a direct result of United States fielding
    Ground Based Interceptors, only an attempt to modernize an aging
    nuclear missile capability. According to the IC, ballistic missile
    proliferation continues to grow as countries acquire a greater number
    of ballistic missiles, including increasing their range, incorporating
    BMD countermeasures and making them more complex, survivable, reliable,
    and accurate.
                       north korean missile capabilities
        4. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck and Vice Admiral Hill, at the
    INDOPACOM posture hearing earlier this year, then-INDOPACOM Commander
    ADM Davidson's statement for the record noted that, `` . . . North
    Korea will remain our most immediate threat.'' ADM Davison went on to
    state, ``Pyongyang maintains a diverse and growing missile inventory,
    and North Korea unveiled several new ballistic systems . . . including
    two SLBMs and an ICBM.'' He concluded that, ``Pyongyang's missile
    research and development efforts . . . are consistent with the regime's
    stated objective of being able to strike the U.S. Homeland.'' How has
    North Korea's missile program advanced over the course of your
    respective command assignments?
        General VanHerck. Since I assumed command last summer, North Korea
    has unveiled a new ICBM design that is probably even more capable than
    the homeland-threatening ICBMs it successfully tested in 2017. It has
    also unveiled two submarine-launched ballistic missiles that--if
    fielded--may be able to threaten portions of North America. Although
    North Korea has not tested nuclear weapons or ICBMs since 2017, its
    continued tests of short-range ballistic missiles provide experience
    with technologies applicable to its long-range missile program.
    Finally, Kim Jong Un has announced his intent to develop solid-
    propellant ICBMs, hypersonic weapons, and nuclear-propelled submarines.
    If successfully fielded, each of these capabilities would pose new
    challenges to my homeland defense mission.
        Vice Admiral Hill. Since mid-2019, North Korea has tested dozens of
    missiles, including three types of new short-range ballistic missiles
    and a new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). It unveiled
    several new ballistic systems during military parades in late 2020 and
    early 2021, including two SLBMs and a new Intercontinental Ballistic
    Missile (ICBM) considerably larger and presumably more capable than the
    systems they tested in 2017. North Korea also identified several new
    weapon modernization goals in early 2021, to include developing
    tactical nuclear weapons and hypersonic glide vehicles and improving
    the readiness and accuracy of North Korea's ICBMs. Pyongyang's missile
    research and development efforts, coupled with its ongoing pursuit of
    nuclear material and technology, are consistent with the regime's
    stated objective of being able to strike the United States Homeland.
                         arctic strategy implementation
        5. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, as you know, the Department
    of Defense and each of the military departments have now published
    their respective Arctic strategies. During their confirmation process,
    I received commitments from SECDEF Austin and DEPSECDEF Hicks that they
    would resource those strategies. During the hearing we discussed the
    progress that has been made on implementation of these Arctic
    strategies and our shared concern that it is not happening at a quick
    enough pace. Can you elaborate on your assessment of the DOD's
    implementation of the Service's Arctic strategies?
        General VanHerck. I am encouraged by the attention the Department
    is paying to strategic competition and homeland defense challenges in
    the Arctic. However, the small resource allocation adjustments the
    Services made in their fiscal year 2022 budgets will not achieve the
    objectives laid out in their Arctic strategies or those of the
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD Strategy. If the Joint Force does not prioritize
    resourcing for Arctic initiatives, the Department will continue to cede
    advantages in operational capability and strategic influence to our
    competitors. I believe the Department must provide clear direction to
    the Services to make substantive annual increases in Arctic-focused
    resourcing in order to re-establish the Joint Force's ability to
    operate persistently in the region and outpace potential adversaries
    across all domains and warfighting functions.

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