[Senate Hearing 117-889, Part 1]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-889, Pt. 1
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR
APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022
AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 2792
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION,
TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
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PART 1
U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND
U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. CYBER COMMAND
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND AND U.S. SPACE COMMAND
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA CAMMAND
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE
ARMY POSTURE
AIR FORCE POSTURE
NAVY POSTURE
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATIONON
ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
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MARCH 9, 16, 25; APRIL 13, 20, 22; JUNE 10, 15, 17, 22, 24, 2021
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
----------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
56-721 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
=======================================================================
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii TOM COTTON, Arkansas
TIM KAINE, Virginia MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine JONI ERNST, Iowa
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois RICK SCOTT, Florida
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
MARK KELLY, Arizona JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
John D. Wason, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
march 9, 2021
Page
United States Special Indo-Pacific Command....................... 1
Members Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 1
Statement of Senator Roger F. Wicker............................. 3
Witness Statements
Davidson, Admiral Philip S., USN Commander, United States Indo-
Pacific
Command........................................................ 5
Questions for the Record......................................... 61
march 16, 2021
United States Southern Command and United States Northern
Command........................................................ 83
Members Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 83
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe............................. 85
Witness Statements
Faller, Admiral Craig S., USN Commander, United States Southern 86
Command.
VanHerck, General Glen D., USAF Commander, United States Northern 96
Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command.
Questions for the Record......................................... 147
march 25, 2021
United States Special Operations Command and United States Cyber 171
Command.
Members Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 171
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe............................. 173
Witness Statements
Maier, Christopher P., Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense For 174
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.
Clarke, General Richard D., USA Commander, United States Special 180
Operations Command.
Nakasone, General Paul M., USA Commander, United States Cyber 186
Command; Director, National Security Agency; and Chief, Central
Security Service.
Questions for the Record......................................... 224
(iii)
april 13, 2021
Page
United States European Command and United States Transportation 233
Command.
Members Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 233
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe............................. 235
Witness Statements
Wolters, General Tod D., USAF Commander, United States European 236
Command/North Atlantic Treaty Organization Supreme Allied
Commander
Europe.
Lyons, General Stephen R., USA Commander, United States 246
Transportation Command.
Questions for the Record......................................... 288
april 20, 2021
United States Strategic Command and United States Space Command.. 307
Members Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 307
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe............................. 308
Witness Statements
Richard, Admiral Charles A., USN Commander, United States 309
Strategic Command.
Dickinson, General James H., USA Commander, United States Space 323
Command.
Questions for the Record......................................... 372
april 22, 2021
United States Central Command and United States Africa Command... 387
Members Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 387
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe............................. 389
Witness Statements
McKenzie, General Kenneth F., Jr., USMC Commander, United States 390
Central Command.
Townsend, General Stephen J., USA Commander, United States Africa 400
Command.
Questions for the Record......................................... 438
(iv)
june 10, 2021
Page
The Department of Defense Budget Posture......................... 447
Members Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 447
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe............................. 449
Witness Statements
Austin, The Honorable Lloyd J., III, Secretary of Defense........ 450
Milley, General Mark A., USA Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 462
Staff.
Questions for the Record......................................... 533
june 15, 2021
Army Posture..................................................... 549
Members Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 549
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe............................. 551
Witness Statements
Wormuth, The Honorable Christine E., Secretary of the Army....... 551
McConville, General James P., USA Chief of Staff of the Army..... 553
Questions for the Record......................................... 590
Appendix--Army Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Overview.................. 610
june 17, 2021
Air Force Posture................................................ 623
Members Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 623
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe............................. 624
Witness Statements
Roth, The Honorable John P., Acting Secretary of the Air Force... 626
Brown, General Charles Q., USAF Chief of Staff of the Air Force.. 644
Raymond, General John W., USSF Chief of Space Operations......... 645
Questions for the Record......................................... 683
(v)
june 22, 2021
Page
Navy Posture..................................................... 703
Members Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 703
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe............................. 705
Witness Statements
Harker, The Honorable Thomas W., Acting Secretary of the Navy.... 706
Gilday, Admiral Michael M., USN Chief of Naval Operations........ 715
Berger, General David H., USMC Commandant of the Marine Corps.... 727
Questions for the Record......................................... 783
june 24, 2021
Page
The Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security 811
Administration on Atomic Energy Defense Activities.
Members Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 811
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe............................. 812
Witness Statements
Granholm, The Honorable Jennifer M., Secretary of Energy......... 813
Questions for the Record......................................... 848
Appendix--Special Report
Meeting Medical and Research Needs for Isotopes Derived from 854
Uranium-233.
(vi)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022 AND
THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 9, 2021
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Peters, Manchin,
Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst,
Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, and
Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing to order.
This morning the Committee will receive testimony from
Admiral Davidson, the Commander of the United States Indo-
Pacific Command. Admiral, I understand this is likely to be
your last appearance before the Committee prior to your
retirement, and I want to thank you and your family for your
decades of service to the country. We also ask that you extend
our thanks and gratitude to the men and women under your
command who each day sacrifice and serve the Nation. Thank you
very much, sir, for your distinguished service.
Due to the coronavirus pandemic, you have not appeared
before the Committee since February 2019. There have been many
regional developments since that time, and we look forward to
your updates.
At his confirmation hearing, Secretary Austin accurately
described China as the ``pacing threat'' for the Department of
Defense (DOD). Under President Xi Jinping, China has moved away
from greater integration with the liberal world order and
instead created a style of authoritarian capitalism that it now
seeks to export throughout the region and the world.
Additionally, China seeks to co-opt into national institutions
or create parallel organizations to supports its strategic
interests.
The challenges posed by China require a truly whole-of-
government approach, but the Department of Defense and Indo-
Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), in particular, play a key role in
seeking to deter increasingly aggressive behavior by the
Chinese military.
China seeks to use its superior military power to suppress
smaller countries' sovereignty claims in key regions. Nowhere
is this more evident than in the South China Sea, which is why
international freedom of navigation operations, including
regular passage by United States warships through strategic
waterways, are essential for maintaining internationally
recognized transit routes and pushing back against China's
excessive claims.
Recognizing the challenges posed by China, on February
10th, President Biden announced the establishment of a China
task force to examine the Department's strategy, operational
concepts, technology and force structure, posture,
intelligence, United States alliances and partnerships, and
other matters relating to China. Admiral Davidson, I look
forward to hearing your thoughts on this task force and the
wide range of issues it is considering.
Deterrence is key to avoiding an unnecessary and costly
armed conflict with China. Unfortunately, as has been widely
recognized by national security leaders and scholars alike, the
foundations of United States deterrence in the Indo-Pacific
have steadily eroded over time. That is why this Committee led
the way in the creation of the Pacific Defense Initiative, or
PDI, in last year's National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
We created the PDI to better focus DOD resources on key
military capabilities necessary to deter China, reassure United
States allies and partners, and send a strong signal to the
Chinese Communist Party that we are committed to defending
United States interests in the Indo-Pacific. Maintaining
momentum behind the PDI will be a key focus of this Committee
as we begin work on this year's NDAA. Admiral Davidson, we look
forward to hearing your assessment of the PDI, how it is being
implemented, and what additional requirements you have
identified for the upcoming fiscal year and beyond.
At the same time, we must guard against treating the
Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) and China as ten feet
tall. As an emerging power, China faces a number of challenges
that it must contend with, both domestically and
internationally. Deterring aggressive military action should
certainly be our objective, but we must also seek to exploit
China's weaknesses in other areas, including by exposing its
suppression of human rights at home and lack of alliances and
partners abroad. The world is rightly alarmed by Chinese human
rights abuses and threats to democratic movement.
Earlier this year, the State Department appropriately
labeled the wide-scale abuse of Uyghur and other predominantly
Muslim ethnic minorities by Chinese security forces as a
genocide. Additionally, Chinese anti-democratic crackdown in
Hong Kong signals an increasing willingness by the Chinese
Communist Party to impose its will through force. These
actions, coupled with continued rhetoric and aggressive
military exercises directed at Taiwan, should give us pause.
While I expect to hear separately from the Commander of
United States Forces Korea in a few weeks, it is important to
note the near-term threat posed by North Korea to the region,
and potentially the United States. Many observers believe Kim
Jong Un may seek to test the Biden administration with
provocative actions in the coming weeks or months. The
challenge posed by North Korea can only be addressed through a
unified strategy with our allies, and particularly with South
Korea and Japan.
We must also seek to coordinate, to the extent possible,
with China, if possible, and that is something we should
investigate. Admiral Davidson, I look forward to hearing your
assessment of the security situation in the Korean Peninsula
and your assessment of what more can be done to effect a change
in North Korea's course.
Perhaps most importantly, our network of regional allies
and partners is critical to confronting the challenges posed by
China and North Korea. The Biden administration is rightly
focused on re-invigorating our alliances with Japan, South
Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand. These
alliances certainly are not without challenges but remain
indispensable to our efforts to ensure a stable and open Indo-
Pacific region. At the same time, we must continue growing
sustainable partnerships with India, Indonesia, Singapore,
Vietnam, and others. These allies and partners are our
comparative advantage in the region and will be critical to
protecting and advancing our collective interests in the coming
years.
I would also like to take a moment to stress my concern
about the recent military coup and ongoing violent security
crackdown in Myanmar. President Biden has made clear that
respect for human rights will be a centerpiece of United States
foreign policy, and I strongly support efforts to achieve a
return to democratic governance, peace, and rule of law in
Myanmar as soon as possible.
Finally, the ongoing coronavirus pandemic and climate
change will continue to shape INDOPACOM's operations in the
region and engagement with partners and allies for the
foreseeable future. We are interested in hearing more about how
each of these challenges is impacting INDOPACOM activities in
the region today and how you are working to prepare the command
to better prepare and address them in the future.
Again, Admiral Davidson, thank you for your service, and we
look forward to your testimony.
Senator Wicker, please.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Davidson,
Senator Inhofe has duties in Oklahoma this morning and wanted
me to enter a statement on his behalf. He also wants me to
thank you for your decades of service and leadership that you
have provided for the Department of Defense, and also to
observe that this may be your last appearance before the
Committee. From my standpoint, I hate to see you go, and I
think these will be big shoes to fill.
This is Senator Inhofe's statement:
The Senate Armed Services Committee's top priority over the
last 3 years has been to ensure the effective implementation of
the National Defense Strategy (NDS). To implement the NDS,
Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks said China is the
pacing threat for the Department of Defense, and General Milley
said the Pacific is the number one regional priority for the
United States military. Competition with China is our top focus
and has overwhelming bipartisan support.
As Commander of INDOPACOM, you are on the front lines of
military competition with China. Your job is to ensure that
there never comes a day when the Chinese Communist Party
leadership concludes it can achieve its goals through the use
of military force.
However, even with the progress our military has made over
the past 4 years to rebuild readiness, the reality is that the
conventional military balance of power in the Indo-Pacific is
getting worse, not better. General McMaster told us last week
that since the Cold War, China has undertaken the largest
peacetime military buildup in history.
At the same time, America grew more complacent. For
example, under Obama, from 2010 to 2015, while Chinese military
spending grew by 83 percent, we decreased our military spending
by 25 percent. As China invested in military capabilities, many
Americans naively assumed that China's entry into the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and the global integration of its
economy would somehow make the Chinese Communist Party more
friendly and open to the West.
The result now is America's military advantage and the
credibility of our deterrent is eroding. That is why the 2021
NDAA was the toughest bill on China ever, with several national
security committees involved, and that is specifically why this
Committee put the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, or PDI, into
last year's NDAA, to stop aggression from the Chinese Communist
Party.
In Europe we have made a lot of progress on posture through
the European Defense Initiative, or EDI, by investing over $20
billion in the last 5 years. We need to apply a similar level
of focus, effort, and resources to our posture in the Pacific
through PDI. We know we need advanced capabilities like
hypersonics and artificial intelligence (AI), but that is not
enough. It is clear we need the right posture to ensure our
forces can be in the right place, at the right time, with the
right stuff. This is what PDI was designed to accomplish.
In reading your assessment of what we need PDI to do, some
other focus areas include integrated air and missile defense,
hardened and dispersed bases, expanded training ranges,
improved joint exercise, and increased security cooperation
with the allies and partners. Admiral Davidson, we hope you
will expand on this today and give us details of exactly what
you need and where we must invest.
It is a dangerous time in the world but especially in the
Indo-Pacific. For example, at last week's hearing, General
McMaster told us that ``Taiwan may represent the most dangerous
flashpoint for war.'' That is a quote. Admiral Davidson, we
must win this competition for the security of our Nation as
well as our partners and allies.
I look forward to hearing from you about strengthening
deterrents and regaining the advantage in the Indo-Pacific. So
thank you very much for your attendance and your leadership and
your great service to the United States of America, and thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Admiral Davidson, you are recognized for your testimony.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL PHILIP S. DAVIDSON, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND
Admiral Davidson. Chairman Reed, Senator Wicker,
distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Indo-Pacific
region today.
Today I am joined by Indo-Pacific Command's senior enlisted
advisor, Command Sergeant Major Shane Shorter, a Special Forces
warrior with decades of experience in the Indo-Pacific Theater,
operating and training alongside our most critical allies and
partners.
I can report that Indo-Pacific Command is laser-focused on
the Secretary of Defense's immediate five priorities, beginning
with the initiatives centered on the health and well-being of
our people. Indeed, investing in our most critical and
resilient resource, our people, is a national security
imperative.
For the past 12 months, we have worked to support the
protection and sustainment of our Joint Force readiness while
mitigating the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally,
our team has worked extensively with local, state, and national
leadership to help defeat the disease and minimize the impact
on our ability to perform our missions. We also remain deeply
focused on cultivating a safe environment for our DOD
professionals to learn, to thrive, to execute their mission,
and to fulfill their oath to the Constitution.
In doing so, we must also work to eliminate sexual assault,
sexual harassment, racism, and extremism, which have no place
within our ranks. Such abhorrent behaviors are inconsistent
with our values and the principles we are sworn to defend. Our
greatest military strength is our people. Therefore, operating
in an environment free of discrimination, free of hate or
harassment, while accomplishing our mission, is paramount to
our success. Indeed, it is paramount to ensuring we can
accomplish our mission to meet the greatest challenges of the
21st century.
The Indo-Pacific is the most consequential region for
America's future and remains the United States' priority
theater. The region itself contains four of the five priority
security challenges identified by the Department of Defense--
China, Russia, North Korea, as well as violent extremist
organizations. The Indo-Pacific region also experiences
frequent natural and man-made disasters--the negative impacts
of climate change, rapid population growth, drugs and human
trafficking, and, of course, disease and pandemics.
That said, the region accounts for 60 percent of the
world's current gross domestic product, and it contributes more
than two-thirds to the present global economic growth. In 10
years, the region will host two-thirds of the world's
population and two-thirds of the global economy.
Our nation's vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific serves
as an important reminder to all nations that the United States
remains committed to free, fair, and reciprocal trade, shared
access to global markets, good governance, and human rights and
civil liberties.
Now, if you would, let me focus my remarks on the greatest
long-term strategic threat to security in the 21st century,
China. In stark contrast to our free and open vision, the
Communist Party of China promotes a closed and an authoritarian
system through internal oppression and external aggression.
China's pernicious approach to the region includes a whole-of-
party effort to coerce, corrupt, and collapse governments,
businesses, organizations, and the people of the Indo-Pacific.
As China continues to increase the size of the People's
Liberation Army and advance their own joint capabilities, the
military balance in the Indo-Pacific is becoming more
unfavorable for the United States and our allies. With this
imbalance, we are accumulating risk that may embolden China to
unilaterally change the status quo before our forces may be
able to deliver an effective response.
The greatest danger the United States and our allies face
in the region is the erosion of conventional deterrents, vis-a-
vis the People's Republic of China. Absent a convincing
deterrent, China will be emboldened to continue to take action
to supplant the established rules-based international order and
the values represented in our vision for a free and open Indo-
Pacific.
Our deterrence posture in the Indo-Pacific must demonstrate
the capability, the capacity, and the will to convince Beijing,
unequivocally, the costs of achieving their objections by the
use of military force are simply too high. Indeed, we must be
doing everything possible to deter conflict. Our number one job
is to keep the peace, but we absolutely must be prepared to
fight and win should competition turn to conflict.
I want to thank this Committee for your deep commitment to
defending United States values and interests in the Indo-
Pacific through your efforts to establish the ground-breaking
Pacific Deterrence Initiative, or PDI. PDI provides the
foundation for establishing a forward-deployed, defense in-
depth posture that defends the U.S. Homeland and our interests
abroad, deters aggression, assures our allies and partners, and
provides the flexible response options should deterrence fail.
So on behalf of the men and women of the United States
Indo-Pacific Command, I thank you for your time today, for your
continued support, and for your desire to improve the
prosperity and security of the Indo-Pacific, indeed, the most
critical region on the planet. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Davidson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Admiral Philip S. Davidson
introduction
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of
the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to
discuss the Indo-Pacific Region. The Indo-Pacific is the most
consequential region for America's future and remains the Department of
Defense's priority theater. This region contains four of the five
priority security challenges identified by the Department of Defense
and includes frequent natural and man-made disasters, the negative
impacts of climate change, rapid population growth, and of course,
disease and pandemics.
The Indo-Pacific accounts for 60 percent of the world's current
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and contributes more than two-thirds to
the present global economic growth. Trade and investment in this
dynamic region are vital to the security and prosperity of the United
States and reflective in more than $1.9 trillion in two-way trade with
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), serving as the
number one destination for United States foreign direct investment
(FDI). In 10 years, the region will host two-thirds of the world's
population and two-thirds of the global economy.
Our Nation's vision for peace and prosperity in a Free and Open
Indo-Pacific continues to resonate in the region and serves as an
important reminder to all nations that the United States remains
committed to free and fair trade, shared access to global markets, good
governance, and human rights and civil liberties. The region's economic
prosperity and security are inextricably linked and part of the
competitive landscape.
The greatest danger for the United States in this competition is
the erosion of conventional deterrence. A combat-credible, conventional
deterrent posture is necessary to prevent conflict, protect U.S.
interests, and to assure our allies and partners. Absent a convincing
deterrent, the People's Republic of China (PRC) will be emboldened to
take action to undermine the rules-based international order and the
values represented in our vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. The
combination of the PRC's military modernization program and willingness
to intimidate its neighbors through the use, or threatened use of
force, undermines peace, security, and prosperity in the region.
United States Indo-Pacific Command's approach for addressing Great
Power Competition centers on advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific by
focusing on four critical areas:
1. Increasing Joint Force Lethality
2. Enhancing Design and Posture
3. Strengthening Allies and Partners
4. Modernizing our Exercises, Experimentation, and Innovation
Programs
In 2019, I reported to this Committee we had lost a quantitative
advantage and our qualitative advantage was shrinking across several
domains as the People's Liberation Army (PLA) fields higher quality
systems.
However, with this Committee's efforts to establish the Pacific
Deterrence Initiative (PDI), along with resourcing our advanced
undersea warfare capabilities and 5th generation fighters, I am
optimistic you have created the opportunity to Regain the Advantage,
but we must remain diligent. PDI provides the foundation for
establishing a forward-deployed, defense-in-depth posture that defends
our interests abroad, deters aggression, assures allies and partners,
and provides flexible response options should deterrence fail. PDI also
provides the requisite budget transparency and oversight to ensure
resources are prioritized appropriately. Thank you for your continued
support.
On top of PDI support, investing in our most critical and resilient
resource--our people--is a national security imperative. USINDOPACOM is
staunchly committed to promoting the health and well-being of our
teammates. In addition to providing necessary warfighting tools, we
remain deeply focused on cultivating a safe environment for our DOD
professionals to thrive, execute their mission, and fulfill their oath
to the Constitution. We must take deliberate action to protect and
sustain the force to meet the demands of strategic competition. Indeed,
our Defense-wide priorities--dedicated to combating COVID-19,
extremism, and sexual assault and sexual harassment within our force--
are at the foundation of our efforts to Regain the Advantage.
For the past twelve months, protecting and sustaining joint force
readiness began with our efforts to mitigate the effects of the COVID-
19 pandemic. We have worked extensively with the local, state, and
national leadership to combat this contagion and successfully minimized
the impact on USINDOPACOM's ability to perform its mission in the short
term. However, COVID-19 has had a moderate effect on the readiness and
budgets of our allies and partners. We will continue to support their
efforts to maintain readiness and minimize any further negative impact.
USINDOPACOM conducted a Headquarters-wide Stand-Down to address
extremism within the ranks of our force in line with guidance from the
Secretary of Defense (18 Feb). The program included virtual training
modules featuring subject matter experts, presentations by our most
senior leaders, and facilitated small-group discussions to build
awareness and help prevent actions associated with extremist behaviors
that go against the fundamental principles of our oath. The message
provided a clear reminder that we are required to obey all lawful
orders, support civil authorities to protect lives and property, and
ensure public safety in accordance with the law. There is more to be
done in our endeavor to eradicate extremism and the corrosive impact it
has on our entire force. The senior leaders at USINDOPACOM will
continue to host regular one-on-one listening sessions with volunteers
from across the Headquarters to perpetuate this meaningful dialogue. We
will capitalize on well-established, routine activities to broadly and
frequently communicate/interact with our workforce to better educate
our team about the scope of this problem and to develop sustainable
solutions. Indeed, operating in an environment free of discrimination,
hate, and harassment while accomplishing our mission is paramount to
our success.
USINDOPACOM is fully committed to the prevention of sexual assault
and sexual harassment--something we absolutely must get right and
cannot afford to fail. Over the past 3 years, we have improved our
sexual assault and sexual harassment prevention efforts through a
number of initiatives based on feedback received from several Command-
wide surveys. To fully back-up this leadership imperative, I committed
Headquarters resources and established a fully dedicated, on-site
Sexual Assault Prevention Response (SAPR) program and a newly created
Equal Opportunity (EO)/Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) program. This
novel approach is unique to USINDOPACOM and it transforms the
traditional design--which relies on individual services to provide
external SAPR and EO/EEO support to combatant command personnel--into a
more immediate, more insightful, and more involved response mechanism.
As a result of these initiatives, we have built trust, credibility, and
awareness in these vital programs throughout the Headquarters. We
continue to seek every opportunity to combat, prevent, and eliminate
sexual assault, harassment, and violence to keep safe all those who
keep America safe.
For the future, combat credible deterrence depends on our ability
to achieve four specific outcomes: 1) develop an agile and distributed
Joint Force designed to deter and deny our adversaries of their
objectives in the first and second island chains; 2) regain positional
advantage by evolving our posture and balancing key capabilities across
South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania resulting in a more dynamic and
distributed presence; 3) establish a network of compatible and
interoperable allies and partners who are willing and able to protect
their sovereignty from coercion; and 4) reassure our allies and
partners of our commitment by revealing the capacity to conduct complex
operations and concealing capabilities that provide a decisive
advantage. A strategy of deterrence supported by a command climate that
places the dignity and respect of each individual as a vital aspect in
how we train, maintain, and sustain the force is an imperative for the
Joint Force's ability to deploy and perform assigned missions.
increase joint force lethality
Integrated Air and Missile Defense
For the past 3 years, I have repeatedly stated the most important
action we can take to increase the joint force's lethality is to
introduce a 360-degree, persistent, air and missile defense capability
on Guam (Guam Defense System (GDS)). This system and the associated
architecture must be robust enough to address the emerging threats,
including hypersonics and the ability to integrate existing weapon
control systems within this decade.
The GDS could be established cost effectively with mature Programs
of Records consisting of Aegis Baseline (B/L) 10, solid-state radar
(SPY-6 or SPY-7 variant), MK-41 VLS, Aegis Ashore, and SM3/SM6. This
system is critical for defending the Homeland, including our most
important American operating location in the western Pacific. America's
day begins in Guam, and it is not only a location we must fight-from,
but one we must also fight-for given the threats we face in the near
term and the foreseeable future.
NDAA-2016 directed the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), Army, and Navy
to evaluate Aegis Ashore (A.A.) capabilities and costs worldwide to
provide the Homeland's adequate protection. The MDA report identified
several Indo-Pacific locations where fixed and persistent integrated
air and missile defense (IAMD) are desired. Of the four sites
identified, one is a test site (Hawaii), two are facilities in Japan,
and the fourth site is Guam.
Any recommendations for additional studies, including a requirement
for only mobile systems, disregard the immediacy and complexity of the
threat (2026) and the absolute need to integrate fires across the
region from a forward multi-domain command and control node west of the
International Date Line (IDL).
The GDS would provide a foundation for a joint solution to this
warfighting problem. No individual service can include decentralized
architecture, automated processes using standard fire control functions
across the Joint Force, and a force-wide perspective in managing
resources. In January 2021, the MDA was directed by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense to reprogram up to $29 million in fiscal year 2021
RDT&E funding to begin the architecture design for the GDS. The
critical metric of success is the ability to shrink the decision-to-
execution cycle for U.S. Forces fighting inside--or close to--the
enemy's traditional safe-havens, thus improving the joint force's
survivability.
The Army's Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System
(IBCS) and the Air Force's Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) are
not yet fully developed and do not currently enable joint
interdependencies or satisfy the requirement to integrate fires across
domains, services, or weapon platforms.
Funding provided by Congress in 2021 for Homeland Defense Radar-
Hawaii as a fixed sensor capability supports the best-programmed
solution to enable a credible, in-depth, under layer defense for our
forces in Hawaii. This perspective is consistent with independent
assessments from the MDA and supported by U.S. Northern Command
(NORTHCOM) and requires sustained funding throughout the FYDP.
The persistent Tactical Multi-Mission Over-the-Horizon Radar
(TACMOR), located in Palau will dramatically increase our air domain
awareness by providing persistent, long-range, detect and track
capability of air and surface targets in the western Pacific and
increase our ability to ``shoot the archers.''
Long Range Precision Strike
In addition to Homeland defense in Hawaii and Guam, USINDOPACOM
requires highly survivable, precision-strike fires featuring increased
quantities of ground-based missiles and improved air and long-range
naval fires capable of ranges over 500 km. These fires must be
supported by electronic warfare, space, cyber, and over-the-horizon
radar capabilities. They must also be operationally decentralized and
geographically distributed to provide a credible, offensive, and
conventional deterrent to assure U.S. freedom of action.
Our adversaries continue to field advanced Anti-Access Area Denial
(A2AD) systems, aircraft, ships, space, and cyber capabilities that
threaten the U.S. ability to project power into the region. Increasing
joint force lethality means developing and fielding systems and
capabilities to ensure U.S. freedom of action or access to vital
waterways and airspace, while preserving our critical asymmetrical
advantages to deter aggression and prevail in armed conflict should
deterrence fail.
Joint Fires Network
The advances being made in long-range, precision fires are
significant and will require an integrated cross-service/cross-system
network architecture to exploit the full spectrum of capability these
programs provide the Joint Force. The desired end state is a combined/
joint-integrated environment where ubiquitous battle management and
automated engagement decision-making using standard target, track-
quality, control functions, and a joint force approach for managing
weapons resources can occur.
A network of sensors that fuse information using actionable and
distributed fire control data must support Integrated Air Missile
Defense (IAMD) and long-range, precision-strike weapons systems. This
Joint Fires Network enables any sensor from any platform (air, land,
sea, space, and cyberspace) to provide targeting guidance to any
weapon.
USINDOPACOM requires a warfighting architecture that fuses the
maritime, land, air, cyber, and space domains to enable timely and
actionable delivery of our emerging weapons. This capability, coupled
with the lethality of current and future munitions, underpins
conventional deterrence and provides the Joint Force with the necessary
distributed lethality to maintain combat credibility in a contested
environment.
enhance force design and posture
Our enhanced force design must enable the convergence of
capabilities from multiple domains, and our posture must create the
virtues of mass without the vulnerability of concentration. This
scenario is accomplished by distributing a forward-deployed, joint
force across the battlespace while balancing lethality and
survivability. It requires a deterrent posture that possesses the
sustainment and force protection to be resilient, survivable, and
supportable.
Persistent presence through forward-based and rotational joint
forces is the most credible way to demonstrate our commitment and
resolve to potential adversaries while simultaneously assuring allies
and partners.
A force posture and joint force laydown west of the IDL correctly
positioned to defend in-depth while possessing the capabilities and
authorities is needed to decisively respond to contingencies across the
region. More distributed combat power increases survivability, reduces
risk, and ensures our ability to Fight and Win.
Infrastructure projects must enhance resilience and support multi-
domain, joint operations vice service-prioritized activities. U.S.
ground formations must have long-range weapons in the western Pacific
to include SM6 and Maritime Strike Tomahawk. Additionally, the Army and
Marine Corps should employ High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
(HIMARs) outfitted with Precision Strike Missiles (PSM) and Naval
Strike Missiles (NSM) specifically for the Army and Marine Corps,
respectively.
The ability to deploy an integrated Joint Force capable of
employing the full spectrum of capabilities across all domains remains
the joint requirement. The repositioning of Marines from Okinawa, Japan
is ongoing and must ensure a preponderance of combat power remains west
of the IDL. Continuing the Defense Posture Realignment Initiative
(DPRI), while understanding how USMC modernization will affect its
foundations, should proceed without delaying execution based on the
dynamic nature of the theater.
Additionally, forward-based air and naval forces need to be able to
disperse to expeditionary airfields and ports as part of a distributed
force posture. This requires adequate command and control, munitions,
and fuel distribution to create temporary windows of localized air and
maritime superiority to enable maneuver, while amphibious and ground
forces create and exploit temporal and geographic opportunities to
impose costs.
The critical investments necessary to provide adequate dispersion
to preserve deterrence options include:
United States Territories. Key strategic locations to
project power, deter adversaries, and respond to crises across the
Indo-Pacific. Investments are focused on divert and dispersal locations
as part of a distributed joint force laydown and new training
facilities.
Oceania and the Pacific Island Countries (PIC).
Investments focused on alternative facilities for training and
dispersion opportunities that increase airpower capacity.
Southeast Asia. Investments focused on alternative
facilities to support modernized and dispersed power projection
airfields, sustain forward forces, and enhance logistics capability
with prepositioned stores and infrastructure.
These specific requirements are outlined in USINDOPACOM's
Independent Assessment directed by the Committee report accompanying
Section 1251 of NDAA-21.
strengthening allies and enhancing partners
Strong alliances and partnerships represent the most essential
components of U.S. national power beyond our Nation's economic and
military strength. One of the significant advantages these
relationships provide is a common foundation based on the core
principles of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. This foundation fosters
long-term mutual trust, understanding, respect, interoperability,
information sharing, and a common view of the regional security
landscape.
Our relationships are the building blocks for establishing an
enhanced, networked security architecture that promotes
interoperability and coordination from the strategic to tactical
levels. The critical investments necessary to strengthen our alliances
and enhance our partnerships to enable this increased interoperability
include:
Mission Partner Environment (MPE). In fiscal year 2021,
PDI authorized $50M as the critical investment for providing resilient
and redundant joint/multinational command and control that delivers the
same functionality of a data center and hosts multiple, unique mission
sets. MPE provides universal battle management and automated decision-
making by accessing a multi-domain sensor network. This environment
uses cloud-based technologies, integrated systems, and secure access
controls to command, control, and communications (C3).
Fusion Centers. In fiscal year 2021, PDI authorized $2M
for partial funding of the fusion centers needed to improve information
sharing and build trust. We are amplifying these resources to one of
three fusion centers identified by USINDOPACOM as part of Regain the
Advantage. Each of these fusion centers is a crucial enabler for
strengthening our alliances, enhancing partnerships, and utilize MPE
for contextual analytics and computing model assessments to extrapolate
conclusions and identify patterns of life associated with transnational
threats and other pernicious behavior.
- Southeast Asia (Counter Terrorism Information Facility, CTIF),
hosted by Singapore, represents USINDOPACOM's first participation in an
operational partnership in Southeast Asia to identify trends and
anomalies that could lead to a terrorist event or other transnational
threat. The multi-lateral facility has commenced operations and has
brought together like-minded countries to share information and provide
early warning, monitoring and analysis capabilities in a centralized
and coordinated manner.
- Indo-Pacific Maritime Coordination. Navy is exploring
additional concepts with allies and key partners to increase
situational awareness in the maritime domain across the Indo-Pacific
and Indian Oceans.
- Oceania Fusion Center represents an initiative to provide
Pacific Island nations, including the Freely Associated States--the
Republic of Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), and the
Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI)--a means to improve common
understanding of challenges such as climate change; illegal,
unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing; transnational crime; and
other specific Oceania-based challenges.
For almost 36 months, I have spent much of my time focused on
strengthening our current alliances and enhancing our emerging
partnerships across the region. This effort begins with the five
bilateral treaty alliances where we have mutual defense
responsibilities:
Japan. The United States-Japan Alliance is the
cornerstone of peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific Region. The
alliance reassures the region by setting the example through our
operations and collaborative efforts to build partnership capacity with
other like-minded partners. As the most recent National Defense Program
Guidelines (NDPG) indicate, Japan has embarked on expanding its
military capabilities to better align United States and Japanese
defense strategies by liberalizing rules for military equipment export,
expanding the scope of possible Self Defense Force (SDF) missions to
facilitate integration and interoperability, and advancing the DPRI.
Increased defense spending purchasing some of our most advanced systems
is a clear indication Japan seeks to improve its national defense
posture and the United States-Japan alliance.
Republic of Korea (ROK). The United States and ROK
alliance remains the linchpin in maintaining a stable, security
environment and ready to address the North Korean regime's threats. The
ROK's purchase of advanced platforms and munitions, such as F-35A,
Global Hawk, P-8A, and upgraded PAC-3 missiles improves our combined
interoperability and enhances ROK's defense posture. Seoul has made
progress toward transitioning wartime operational control (OPCON) to a
Future-Combined Forces Command led by a ROK Commander. The United
States and ROK are currently addressing a lapse in the Special Measures
Agreement (SMA), which we expect to be finalized in the near term. The
lack of an SMA negatively impacts USFK's ability to ``fight tonight.''
Australia. Australia is a critical ally, partner, and
leader contributing to international efforts promoting a Free and Open
Indo-Pacific. Australia actively supports U.N. Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) enforcement operations to curb illicit North Korean
activity while making substantial efforts to improve relations with
India and increase engagement to build open and resilient societies in
ASEAN. Under its ``Pacific Step-Up'' policy, Australia is enhancing its
assistance and infrastructure investments in Fiji, Papua New Guinea,
and the Solomon Islands. They also assist the United States in
maintaining a strong force posture, hosting the seventh Marine
Rotational Force-Darwin (MRF-D) deployment and Enhanced Air
Cooperation, where we reached the agreed upon deployment number in 2019
(2500) and a reduced target in 2020 (1290) due to COVID-19. This has
provided the U.S. Marine Corps opportunities to train and integrate
while displaying significant combat power west of the IDL. In July
2020, Canberra released two major national security documents that
complement U.S. national security objectives: the 2020 Defence
Strategic Update and the 2020 Force Structure Plan. Along with the
subsequent release of the classified Defence Planning Guidance, these
documents confirm our strategic alignment, highlight the challenges in
competition, and place greater emphasis on deterrence across the Indo-
Pacific.
The Philippines. The Republic of the Philippines remains
a strategic treaty ally and partner. The Government of the Philippines'
decision to temporarily suspend the termination of the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) presents opportunities to address mutual concerns and
reinvigorate joint and interoperability training opportunities as we
seek full reversal of the VFA termination process, which would
facilitate deeper military cooperation and integration. The AFP is
committed to investing in high-quality U.S. defense equipment as they
modernize their force and conclude a General Security of Military
Information Agreement (GSOMIA). The Philippines are partnered with the
Guam and Hawaii National Guards in the State Partnership Program.
Thailand. The United States-Thai alliance has the
opportunity to expand in substantial ways since a democratically
elected government took seat in 2019, as outlined in the United States-
Thai co-signed ``Joint Vision 2020.'' To modernize its force, Thailand
has purchased more than $2.5 billion in United States foreign military
sales with over 200 active foreign military sales cases. Additionally,
the reinstatement of international military education and training
funding (IMET) encourages increased mil-mil engagements as our
militaries train and exercise side-by-side. Our exercise program
provides an opportunity to explore new access agreements as part of our
bilateral and multilateral exercises such as COBRA GOLD, HANUMAN
GUARDIAN, COPE TIGER, and Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training
(CARAT). Even during COVID-19, U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) conducted
Exercise COBRA GOLD 2020 supporting readiness training for
approximately 6,560 U.S. troops along with 26 participating nations.
Thailand is also partnered with the Washington State National Guard in
the State Partnership Program.
Enhancing multilateralism is a critical aspect of USINDOPACOM's
engagement in the region. We operate with Australia and Japan
extensively during multilateral exercises and are working diligently to
expand this collaboration to other like-minded nations to increase
their level of interoperability and cooperation.
We also continue to advance strategic partnerships with India and
Singapore:
India. The current state of the United States-India
relations presents a historic opportunity to deepen ties and solidify
what I consider the ``defining partnership of the 21st century.''We
concluded several agreements, including the Communications
Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in 2018, which has
greatly enhanced information sharing and interoperability; the
Industrial Security Annex (ISA), signed in December 2019 that allows
for the transfer of technologies in support of defense production; the
Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) to share unclassified
geospatial information; and the agreement on Navy-to-Navy Information
Sharing in October 2020. The United States and Indian navies are now
securely sharing information, and India has substantially increased its
acquisition of United States defense equipment. Defense sales are at an
all-time high with India operating United States-sourced platforms such
as P-8s, C-130Js, C-17s, AH-64s, CH-47s, Precision Guided-Excalibur
Munitions, and M777 howitzers. In February, India agreed to acquire
Apache and MH-60R multi-mission helicopters worth $3.1 billion and is
considering other United States systems. The United States strongly
supports India's establishment of an information fusion center focusing
on maritime domain awareness, which will improve maritime security in
the Indian Ocean Region and Bay of Bengal. USINDOPACOM defines the
security relationship with India as a strategic imperative. We expect
substantial progress on interoperability and information sharing,
service-level and joint military-to-military cooperation and exercises
like TIGER TRIUMPH and MALABAR, and an increase in quadrilateral
collaboration between India, Australia, Japan, and the United States as
the relationship continues to mature.
Singapore. Military to military relations with Singapore
are excellent, with an average of 300 Distinguished Visitor engagements
and 40 operations, activities, and investments (OAIs) taking place
annually. Over the last 20 years, no other Southeast Asian country has
done more to facilitate United States presence in the region. In
December 2019, the United States and Singapore announced the
establishment of a permanent Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF)
fighter detachment on Guam and foreign military sales exceeding $7
billion, including Singapore's request to purchase F-35s. Singapore and
the United States worked together multilaterally with five other ASEAN
nations, Australia and New Zealand, to establish a fusion center
focused on countering terrorism. In 2019, the United States and
Singapore reinforced their commitment to this partnership when they
renewed the Memorandum of Understanding regarding Facilities' Use in
Singapore. The combination of continued support for a United States
presence in Southeast Asia, a deep and broad defense relationship based
on shared principles, and a strong desire for continued defense
diplomacy enables the United States and Singapore to focus on shared
regional challenges.
Other Indo-Pacific Nations (Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom,
France). USINDOPACOM is working with the FVEY-Plus (United Kingdom,
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and France) to explore how we can build
on bilateral and multilateral relationships to align our various
efforts to assist Oceania in addressing the transnational challenges
that present a significant threat to their way of life.
Canada. Canadian policy in the Indo-Pacific focuses on
expanding cooperation and partnership building throughout the region.
Through consistent engagement with its regional partners and allies,
Canada is advancing relationships in the region, especially with the
other FVEY-Plus construct participants to assist in Oceania and
Vietnam. Ongoing support and troop contributions to the Republic of
Korea and North Korea-focused UNSCR enforcement operations remain
priorities for Ottawa.
New Zealand (N.Z.). New Zealand remains a steadfast and
key partner that continues to increase investment, foreign assistance,
and infrastructure support in the South Pacific. Wellington's ``Pacific
Reset'' policy highlights a reinvigorated focus in the Southwest
Pacific. These efforts provide valuable leadership and expertise to the
region. New Zealand also provides ongoing support to North Korea-
focused UNSC Reinforcement operations in the region. We are committed
to deepening our partnership to advance the vision for a Free and Open
Indo-Pacific.
United Kingdom (U.K.). The U.K. remains committed to the
region as a champion of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. They continue
to sustain a healthy defense posture in the region, having renewed the
Brunei Garrison Agreement to maintain around 700troops in the Sultanate
(at H.M. Sultan's expense) since September 2019 and establishing a
Royal Navy presence with HMS Enterprise. The U.K. also continues to be
a primary contributor of personnel and assets for North Korea-focused
UNSC Reinforcement operations. This year, the U.K. will deploy a
Carrier Strike Task Group spearheaded by its new aircraft carrier, HMS
Queen Elizabeth, with United States Marine Corps F-35s embarked,
joining an international group of ships that includes the Five Eyes
Defense Arrangement, Netherlands, Denmark, Japan, Republic of Korea,
and Indonesia.
France. France has increased operational activities
across the Indo-Pacific under their own Indo-Pacific strategy
emphasizing rule of law and freedom of movement. It is a pivotal
contributor to FVEY-Plus multilateral efforts on IUU fishing; drug and
human trafficking; and community resilience related to natural
disasters and climate change. France maintains an active role in
regional security, protecting fisheries, and countering transnational
crimes, including narcotics destined for Australia and New Zealand.
Additionally, France exercises and operates in the South China Sea and
supports North Korea-focused UNSCR enforcement activities.
Germany. In 2020 Germany adopted new guidelines for
engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. These guidelines include a
willingness to support the international rules-based order. In the most
visible demonstration of this commitment, the German Ministry of
Defense announced the 2021 to 2022 deployment of a German frigate to
the region. This frigate will support UNSCR sanction enforcement
activities against North Korea and cooperate with the United States
Navy.
Oceania. Oceania is critical to ensuring a Free and Open
Indo-Pacific, as it contains strategic sea lines of communication
linking us with our allies and partners in the Oceania region and Asia.
We prioritized key leader engagements during the pandemic to offer
assistance to Pacific Island Countries (PICs) and ensure coordination
on pressing challenges including IUU fishing; drug and human
trafficking; addressing the effects of climate change; natural
disasters; and a range of health issues that plague these nations. We
have also used security cooperation programs, such as Woman, Peace, and
Security (WPS) assistance, to build resilience across the region. In
contrast, the PRC is actively engaged in coercive economic and
diplomatic tactics in Oceania. These predatory activities undermine
good governance and promote corruption. While we continue to strengthen
our bilateral relationships with countries that have militaries (Fiji,
Tonga, and Papua New Guinea), our engagement begins with the Freely
Associated States (FAS)--the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the
Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), and the Republic of Palau
(heretofore Palau), with which the United States has signed Compacts of
Free Association (COFA). We are also working on an additional
multilateral effort with like-minded nations (FVEY, France, and Japan)
to synchronize and improve the alignment of our security cooperation
efforts across Oceania.
Compacts of Free Association. The FAS are small island
countries located along our strategic lines of communication and are
critically important to the U.S. ability to project power, sustain
forward presence, conduct commercial trade, defend the Homeland, and
ensure access. The 2019 meeting between the United States President and
the Presidents of Palau, Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of
Micronesia, and the subsequent visits by several cabinet members and
senior United States officials to these countries, demonstrate the
importance our Government places on these relationships and our
commitment to greater cooperation to ensure a Free and Open Indo-
Pacific.
Papua New Guinea (PNG). USINDOPACOM's engagement with PNG
improves regional posture and demonstrates the U.S. commitment to the
region. PNG plans to grow its defense force from 3,600 troops to an end
strength of 10,000 by 2030. The USINDOPACOM team and State Partnership
Program (SPP) partner (Wisconsin National Guard) will help the PNGDF
achieve this goal by identifying force development, enlisted training,
and education opportunities.
Fiji. We are expanding the defense relationship with Fiji
through exercises, ship visits, defense dialogues, and the ongoing
discussions with the Nevada National Guard to formalize a State
Partnership Program relationship. United States and Fijian forces are
collaborating with Australia and New Zealand to develop the Black Rock
Integrated Peacekeeping Center to help advance the capabilities of
Fiji's armed forces. United States support to Fiji includes helping to
build a more capable, resilient force by supporting the State
Department's provision of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for small
patrol boats and dive equipment. Additionally, DOD established two
seats each at West Point and Annapolis for Fijian candidates, expanded
the Defense Attache Office and the Office of Defense Coordination in
Suva, and added a Ministry of Defense Advisor. In 2019, USINDOPACOM
hosted a defense dialogue with Fiji in Suva to solidify our defense
relationships and provide guidance for security cooperation efforts
over the next 5 years. In 2020, Fiji co-hosted the USINDOPACOM Chief of
Defense (CHOD) Conference, held virtually, and will co-host the 2021
CHOD Conference in Suva.
Tonga. In 2019, USINDOPACOM hosted the first formal
Trilateral Defense Talks between the United States, Tonga, and Fiji.
Both Tonga and Fiji expressed a clear desire for increased United
States engagement tailored to their needs, scaled to their capacity,
and coordinated with Australia and New Zealand. Tonga is partnered with
the Nevada National Guard in the State Partnership Program.
Southeast Asia. We must strengthen the region's ability
to deny adversaries' attempts to dominate or disrupt the gateway
between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The DOD defines Southeast Asia
as the ten Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member
states, plus Timor Leste. The ASEAN member states under Brunei's
leadership in 2021 continue to seek ways to improve multilateral
security engagements and advance stability in the Indo-Pacific.
USINDOPACOM participates in ASEAN exercises, key leader engagements,
and practical multilateral cooperation related to the spectrum of
shared transnational challenges such as the ASEAN-United States
Maritime Exercise conducted in 2019. USINDOPACOM also co-chairs, along
with Thailand, the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus Experts'
Working Group on Maritime Security from 2020 through 2023. We continue
to express our concern over the PRC's pressure on ASEAN members to
conclude negotiations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea in
a way that contradicts international law and accedes to Beijing's
territorial and maritime claims, and pressures ASEAN member states to
limit activities with third-country partners. We are working with the
State Department on the United States-Mekong Partnership to address
environmental degradation and the related concerns with water and food
insecurity caused by upstream damming operations. Our engagement with
Southeast Asia and with ASEAN strengthens relationships and conveys the
United States' commitment to the region.
Burma. The United States stands firmly with the people of
Burma in their aspirations for democracy, peace, and respect for human
rights. We are alarmed regarding the military's coup against the
democratically elected government in Burma, and the detention of State
Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and other government
officials, as well as political leaders, journalists, human rights
activists, and members of civil society. Prior to the military coup,
USINDOPACOM had minimal interaction with Burma's military due to a
number of restrictions based on Burma's human rights record, and
USINDOPACOM will continue to monitor the developing situation, and
specifically how the Burma military responds to the peaceful protests.
Indonesia. Indonesia's status as the globe's third-
largest democracy, the world's largest Muslim population, the fourth
most populous country, and its significant economy all underscore its
essential role in the regional security architecture. USINDOPACOM is
committed to enhancing its partnership with Indonesia through robust
exercise and training programs that take advantage of our shared
interests and common platforms. We continue to support the Indonesian
military's focus on external threats to national defense, particularly
maritime domain awareness and security regarding Beijing's excessive
maritime claims around Natuna Island. USINDOPACOM is well-positioned to
support increased demand for enhanced military-to-military bilateral
cooperation and emerging multilateral training opportunities in 2021.
Indonesia is partnered with the Hawaii National Guard in the State
Partnership Program.
Laos. After decades of stagnation in the bilateral
relationship following the Vietnam War, we have seen some signs of
progress since the United States and Laos signed a Comprehensive
Partnership. Engagements focus on unexploded ordnance clearance, POW/
MIA recovery, and military medicine. Laos actively supports the DPAA in
the search for 286 missing United States servicemembers to conclude war
legacy issues honorably, and aims to address unexploded ordnance issues
by 2030. In October 2020, the United States Government delivered Laos'
first FMF case for field ambulances, building trust and confidence in
the relationship. To continue building trust, we will focus on English
language training and work to expand security cooperation.
Malaysia. Last year marked our 35th iteration of the
Bilateral Training and Consultative Group discussions between
USINDOPACOM and the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF). This forum continues
to serve as the bedrock for security cooperation between our two
militaries. USINDOPACOM continues to execute essential exercise and
training opportunities with Malaysia. We have a robust security
cooperation relationship with over $850 million in ongoing U.S. foreign
military sales cases. USINDOPACOM engagements in Malaysia focus on
maritime security, counterterrorism, Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster
Relief (HA/DR), peacekeeping, transnational crime and border
protection, and educational exchanges such as the International
Military Education and Training program (IMET). We support OSD and the
Malaysian Ministry of Defense's effort to develop a Memorandum on
Defense Cooperation and future opportunities to support the new
administration's security priorities. Malaysia is partnered with the
Washington State National Guard in the State Partnership Program.
Cambodia. In early 2017, Cambodia suspended all military-
to-military exercises with the United States. However, USINDOPACOM
continues to cooperate in: humanitarian mine clearance actions, medical
research, and MIA personnel accounting engagements through the DPAA.
During these limited engagements, the command reaffirms the importance
of Cambodia strengthening its democratic institutions and maintaining
an independent foreign policy. In September 2020, Cambodia razed a
United States-built facility on Ream Naval Base that served as the
headquarters for the National Committee on Maritime Security,
reportedly in order to make way for a PRC naval base. The United States
and other countries in the region are concerned about the expansion of
PRC influence in Cambodia and its implication for regional security.
Vietnam. USINDOPACOM's defense partnership with the
Vietnamese military is among the most substantial aspects of our
growing bilateral relationship. In 2019, USINDOPACOM and the Vietnam
Ministry of National Defense (MND) agreed to renew our terms of
reference; update our 2011 Memorandum of Understanding; and finalize
negotiations for our GSOMIA. Our military-to-military engagements
prioritize enhancing Vietnam's maritime capacity to include the
delivery of 24 Metal Shark boats, the upcoming delivery of the Scan
Eagle unmanned aerial system, and the imminent completion of the Region
3 Coast Guard center. Vietnam sent a cadet to the Air Force Academy who
will graduate in 2024 as the first-ever Vietnamese cadet to attend a
Service Academy. Vietnam shares our concern with PRC actions in the
South China Sea, and remains a vocal supporter of United States Freedom
of Navigation operations. Vietnam is partnered with the Oregon National
Guard in the State Partnership Program.
Timor-Leste. While not a part of ASEAN, Timor-Leste
remains strategically located as a bridge between Southeast Asia and
the Pacific. The Government of Timor-Leste has formally requested
United States co-development of Baucau Airfield, which will offer the
opportunity to build partner capacity with Timor-Leste to support its
nascent air component and maritime security capabilities. To date,
funding for project scoping, approval, and global training and
equipment has been allocated to support the completion of minor
improvements. Timor-Leste was selected for the State Partnership
Program and is assisted by the Rhode Island National Guard. The SPP
will help Timor-Leste build capacity to address transnational threats
and counterterrorism, as well as help them to provide maritime
security, and deliver HA/DR.
Northeast Asia. Northeast Asia continues to benefit from
long-term economic growth, and this prosperity remains dependent upon
free trade, free navigation, and open communication. At the same time,
Northeast Asia is at a crossroads where historical and geopolitical
forces weigh on mutual security cooperation. As the region becomes more
stable, we will encourage Japan and South Korea to take a more
significant role in the alliances related to their security and
contribute to the broader security efforts across the Indo-Pacific
region.
Mongolia. Mongolia is a strong partner and contributor to
United States regional and global policy objectives. Mongolia supports
missions in Afghanistan and other regions of the world through United
Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UNPKO), making Mongolia a model for
emerging democratic countries that want to be more active globally.
Ulaanbaatar's ``Third Neighbor Policy'' intends to balance Russian and
PRC influence by developing relationships with the United States and
other like-minded countries. In the past two decades, more than 50
percent of Mongolia's senior leadership attended International Military
Education and Training courses creating an influential cadre of United
States educated officers. USINDOPACOM components and Mongolia held
inaugural Land Forces Talks and Airman-to-Airman Talks, while also
developing a five-year security cooperation plan. The United States is
helping Mongolia improve its special operations forces, peacekeeping
operations, and air mobility. Mongolia is partnered with the Alaska
National Guard in the State Partnership Program.
Taiwan. The United States and Taiwan maintain a
substantive relationship consistent with the One China Policy, based on
the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), three United States-China Joint
Communiques, and the Six Assurances. Taiwan's values reflect our own--
an open economy with a free and democratic society that respects human
rights and the rule of law. The United States continues to support the
peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues in a manner consistent with
the wishes and best interests of the people of Taiwan. The United
States provides Taiwan defense articles and services in such quantity
to allow Taiwan to main sufficient self-defense capabilities---and in a
manner commensurate with the threat that Taiwan faces. To help
accomplish this, USINDOPACOM focuses on improving the Taiwan military's
joint interoperability, training, readiness, and professional
development. Beijing is pushing across the globe to diplomatically
isolate, economically constrain, and militarily threaten Taiwan. Taiwan
has only fifteen diplomatic partners remaining, recently losing
Kiribati and Solomon Islands in 2019. General Secretary Xi Jinping's
2019 New Year's speech made it clear that Beijing is focused on
achieving unification as a part of the PRC's national plan of
rejuvenation, stating ``We do not promise to renounce the use of force
and reserve the option to use all necessary measures.'' The United
States has a deep and abiding interest in peace and stability in the
Taiwan Strait and welcomes steps from the PRC to reduce tensions and
improve cross-Strait relations. The cross-Strait situation is of
increasing concern given the harsh rhetoric from Beijing toward Taipei.
Taiwan is strengthening its reserve forces and continues to fund
foreign and indigenous acquisition programs and near-term training and
readiness.
South Asia. USINDOPACOM's goal in South Asia is to
identify and seize opportunities to broaden critical partnerships and
ensure that shared domains remain free of coercion and open to all. In
conjunction with India's contributions to regional security and the
free and open international-based order, United States actions are
aimed to prevent adversaries from establishing an adequate military
presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and the Bay of Bengal.
USINDOPACOM will continue to help these nations develop
economically, resist threats to their sovereign interests, provide
sufficient security to their land borders and maritime boundaries, and
contribute to global peace and stability.
Bangladesh. Bangladesh is an important security partner
with the potential to enhance regional stability and advance United
States interests in South Asia on maritime security, counterterrorism,
HA/DR, and support to UNPKO. Over the past decade, steady and
significant economic growth has enabled more foreign military sales as
it pursues middle-income status by 2024. Transnational terrorism and
crime remain internal security issues, as evidenced by five ISIS-
claimed IED attacks in 2019. In August 2019, Bangladesh took receipt of
the first of five C-130J aircraft from the United Kingdom. Bangladesh
also signaled its interest in buying advanced United States military
aircraft in the near future. Over the next year, there is potential to
expand United States-Bangladesh maritime security cooperation through
navy-to-navy engagement and security cooperation programs that enhance
Bangladesh's maritime domain awareness. We intend to deepen our
interoperability with Bangladesh once our two countries move forward on
two important foundational agreements: a General Security of Military
Intelligence Agreement (GSOMIA) and an Acquisition and Cross Services
Agreement (ACSA). These would strengthen our bilateral relationship,
deepen defense cooperation, and generate opportunities for
interoperability. Bangladesh is partnered with the Oregon National
Guard in the State Partnership Program.
The Maldives. The Maldives sits along crucial sea lines
of communication. A highly dispersed population spread across 200
islands and an immense exclusive economic zone (twice the size of
California) make the Maldives vulnerable to transnational threats and
illicit trafficking. The United States executed nascent security
cooperation activities and engagements with the Maldives from 2015 to
2018, and the PRC substantially increased economic and security
investments during this time. The Solih Government is a strong
supporter of upholding the international rules-based order and desires
improved relations with the United States, especially related to
addressing transnational crime. USINDOPACOM's areas of interest for
engagement include counterterrorism, maritime domain awareness, IUU
fishing, counternarcotics, and combatting human trafficking. In
September 2020, we signed the ``Framework for United States Department
of Defense-Maldives Ministry of Defense and Security Relationship''
setting forth both countries' intent to deepen engagement and
cooperation in support of maintaining peace and security in the Indian
Ocean. The most significant United States-Maldives military interaction
occurs during the Joint Combined Exchange Trainings that take place
twice a year to enhance Maldives' ability to respond to terrorism.
Nepal. The United States maintains a robust and growing
relationship with Nepal's security apparatus. Internal unrest
continues, owing in part to unresolved grievances from the 1996 to 2006
Maoist insurgency. PRC influence is growing, with Nepal agreeing to
become a member of China's Belt and Road Initiative. Also, natural
disasters such as earthquakes, flooding, and melting glaciers threaten
the livelihood of this democracy. USINDOPACOM orients our programs
against these challenges. The Nepal Army continues to improve its
institutions and professionalize its force. Through capacity-building
programs from the DOD and USINDOPACOM, the Ministry of Defense,
historically separate from the Army but now responsible for it, is
growing its ability to lead and improve civil-military relations.
USINDOPACOM's primary focus areas for engagement remain HA/DR capacity
building, peacekeeping operations (PKO), and strengthening the military
and civil security institutions. Nepal is the world's sixth-largest
contributing nation to United Nations Peacekeeping, deploying over
5,600 troops to 13 different missions. Nepal hosts an UN-certified
international PKO training center, primarily funded by the State-DOD
Global Peace Operations Initiative. In December 2019, the State
Department delivered the first two C-146J Skytrucks to Nepal, a small,
fix-winged cargo aircraft that immediately improved their HA/DR
capacity. Nepal is partnered with the Utah National Guard under the
State Partnership Program.
Sri Lanka. Maintaining, and in certain areas expanding,
military-to-military engagement with Sri Lanka will continue to be an
area of USINDOPACOM focus. Sri Lanka shows a continued willingness to
seek security cooperation with the United States; however, the
bilateral defense relationship will encounter challenges, particularly
given allegations of senior military officers' involvement in gross
violations of human rights during the country's civil war. The United
States must continue its defense cooperation with Sri Lanka and assist
in professionalizing its military and further building its maritime
security capacity. There is potential to increase collaboration with
maritime and air forces on various issues, including counterterrorism,
counter narcotics, human trafficking, HA/DR, and maritime domain
awareness. The transfer of an excess United States Coast Guard cutter
to Sri Lanka in August 2018 and additional platforms from the United
States, Japan, and India, provides the Sri Lankan Navy greater
capabilities to contribute to regional maritime domain awareness
initiatives. Sri Lanka is partnered with the Montana National Guard in
the State Partnership Program.
modernize exercises, experimentation, & innovation
Currently, the Joint Force lacks the training capacity to integrate
Service recommended weapons and capabilities into a warfighting concept
that deters the adversary and aligns positional advantage. U.S. Forces
must be capable of fighting in highly contested environments against
technologically advanced opponents while also preserving our freedom of
action across all domains. We must continue to expand the capability of
our ranges the same as we advance our platforms and weapons.
NDAA-21's $2 million authorization for the Pacific Multi-Domain
Test and Experimentation Capability (PMTEC) clarifies the requirements
for the development of the necessary, fully--instrumented, live-virtual
training areas throughout the Indo-Pacific by networking the test and
training ranges from the west coast of the United States, across the
Pacific, to Japan and Australia.
This capability begins the process to develop the training capacity
to integrate Service recommended weapons and capabilities into a joint
warfighting concept that deters the adversary and trains our most
capable warfighting force while expanding the breadth and scale of
experimentation.
Many of the ranges in the Indo-Pacific have the potential for
addressing USINDOPACOM's requirements:
Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC), Elmendorf,
Alaska, U.S. Air Force--allows for all domain integration.
Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF), Barking Sands,
Kauai, Hawaii, U.S. Navy--the world's largest instrumented multi-
environmental range complex capable of supporting surface, subsurface,
air, and space operations simultaneously.
Pohakuloa Training Area (PTA), Hawaii Island, Hawaii,
U.S. Army--provides a quality joint/combined arms facility that
supports company level live-fire and battalion level maneuver training.
If we prioritize further investments here, PTA could support battalion-
sized live-fire, brigade maneuver, and most importantly provide a
training environment for a Division to synchronize joint and multi-
domain effects.
Kwajalein Ranges, Kwajalein Atoll, United States Army--
provides missile and missile-interceptor development, space
surveillance, and satellite tracking.
Combined/Joint Military Training (CJMT) Commonwealth of
Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), United States Marine Corps--would
allow company size units to conduct training. We continue to work with
key CNMI leaders to develop a way ahead.
PDI also authorized $128 million in fiscal year 2021 for
USINDOPACOM's Joint Exercise Program that will begin to transition into
Operation Pacific Resolve--a series of coalition and joint exercises
deliberately linked over time and space in the western Pacific to
provide a persistent presence in the form of an Integrated Joint Force.
Operational Pacific Resolve will provide the platform to integrate
the existing ranges, training areas, and test facilitates to support a
coherent Joint Exercise Program. This platform will generate force
readiness, test emerging capabilities, and drive theater-appropriate
requirements in a fully instrumented live-virtual training area.
Special Enablers and Authorities.
Building Partner Capacity (BPC) Authorities. USINDOPACOM
relies on these authorities to support security cooperation initiatives
or activities, such as counterterrorism and bolstering our partners'
land, maritime, and air forces to resist coercion and protect their
people's critical information. We also rely on State Department
authorities such as FMF, IMET, and the Global Peace Operations
Initiative (GPOI) to meet capacity-building requirements that promote
the tenets of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.
Title 10, Section 333--Global Man, Train and Equip. In
fiscal year 2021, USINDOPACOM received $254.6M for building partner
capacity for our allies and partners. This amount accounted for
approximately 26 percent of the total funding for global Title 10
(Section 333) activities. While the United States is still the
preferred partner of choice for the vast majority of countries, PRC's
soft power will continue to negatively influence Indo-Pacific
governments without additional direct investment. Congress' continued
advocacy, support, assistance, and constructive oversight are critical
for these tools to be used to their maximum potential.
Maritime Security Initiative (MSI). MSI continues to be
one of the most popular enablers with partner nations and is currently
over prescribed based on the associated progress partner countries are
now making. Security cooperation in the maritime domain remains one of
our highest priorities. MSI is our primary tool for building
partnership capacity with governments to advance our allies and
partners' ability to sense a threat, share the information, and
contribute to a coordinated interagency and sometimes multilateral
responses.
Joint Interagency Task Force--West (JIATF West).
Transnational organized crime (TOC) has strategic implications for
United States national interests and for our allies and partners. I am
concerned about the destabilizing impact of organized crime, its impact
on our Nation, and indications that China is using TOC to
surreptitiously advance its agenda across the region and beyond. In
response to the growing TOC threat in the Indo-Pacific, JIATF West has
expanded its counter narcotic operations and activities and is well-
positioned to carry out broader counter TOC activities. Through the
Section 1022 authorities, JIATF West works with an interconnected
network of U.S. and foreign partners to counter networks that traffic
illicit drugs, goods, and commodities, to include precursor chemicals.
However, I am concerned with the potential lapse of DOD's Section 1022
authority, which will expire at the end of fiscal year 2022. This
authority allows our counter-threat finance analysts at USINDOPACOM to
continue helping our law enforcement partners disrupt the finances of
terrorist groups and transnational criminal organizations, including
those that operate in Asia and the Pacific. Congress has provided
annual extensions of the Section 1022 authority ever since it first
provided the authority in the fiscal year 2004 NDAA.
China's unwillingness to address the illicit trade and
distribution of fentanyl into the United States represents a clear and
present danger to our national security. JIATF West is now using new
processes that analyze, illuminate, and identify threat networks for
U.S. and foreign law enforcement for action. The drug trafficking and
transnational crime supply routes pass through multiple countries in
Southeast Asia and across the vast Oceania region before reaching
destinations in Mexico and the United States. JIATF West is a vital
instrument in aligning a significant interagency effort--not only to
counter drugs--but to fine-tune our ability to disrupt transnational
criminal networks that are inflicting immense harm on our country.
Center for Excellence on Disaster Management (CFE-DM).
USINDOPACOM works with other nations to build partnership capacity to
engage where our unique military capabilities can help develop our
partners' military capacity in the area of HA/DR. A U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) Mission Civilian-Military Coordinator
is paired with our Security Cooperation Officers to ensure security and
development activities are aligned in each country they operate in.
Infectious diseases like the novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), Tuberculosis
(the most significant global killer), Dengue Fever, and Measles are
examples of growing threats to stability in the region. USINDOPACOM's
efforts in health security promote the U.S. Government's commitment to
the Global Health Security Agenda for promoting community health and
capacity through numerous engagements and interactions.
Natural & Man-made Disasters. The Indo-Pacific remains
the most disaster-prone region in the world. More than 75 percent of
the earth's volcanoes and 90 percent of earthquakes occur in the ``Ring
of Fire'' surrounding the Pacific Basin. The U.N. estimates economic
losses in the region due to disasters could exceed $160 billion
annually by 2030. Other regional and global threats, including climate
change, pandemics, and IUU fishing, further threaten our precious
shared natural environments and economic sustainability. Many countries
across the region still lack sufficient capability and capacity to
manage large-scale disasters; however, some have made steady progress
building capacity to deal with small-scale events. USAID leads federal
responses to international disasters and preparedness and mitigation
efforts. A key element of USINDOPACOM's global engagement strategy in
the region, through the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management
and Humanitarian Assistance, is building capacity with our allies' and
partners' militaries to improve their resilience capability to conduct
their HA/DR.
Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Program. USINDOPACOM is
grateful for Congress' continued support for WPS programming, and
USINDOPACOM remains committed to integrating WPS goals into
USINDOPACOM's framework for security cooperation. From conflict
prevention, stabilization, peacekeeping, to HA/DR, WPS is a unique
smart power asset that advances a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. In
support of the DOD's WPS Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan,
USINDOPACOM's Office of WPS promotes a gender perspective across our
theater plans, programs, and policies to develop security strategies
inclusive of the entire population. WPS builds resilience capacity,
particularly through civil-military disaster response planning,
coordination, and response. USINDOPACOM and partner nations highlight
the significance of a gendered security approach to both steady state
and emergency operations through programs such as the Women's
Mentorship Program and the Rural Women Changemakers Program. These
programs emphasize the unique protection needs of women, children, and
other vulnerable populations but also underscore women's distinctive
contributions to strengthening disaster preparedness and response.
Furthermore, USINDOPACOM continues to engage with our Pacific Island
Nation Partners through WPS and recently held a virtual summit focused
on the nexus of gender, climate, and disaster risk and resilience
through a Pacific lens. WPS promotes the values and norms desired by
all people: dignity, human rights, and equality under the law. The
meaningful inclusion of women in peace processes has led to longer
lasting peace agreements, and factoring the perspectives and needs of
an entire population into INDOPACOM's security cooperation framework
ensures a sustainable and practical approach to achieving lasting
security outcomes.
COVID-19 and Infectious Disease Response. Natural and
man-made disasters do not recognize national boundaries, as evidenced
by the measles outbreak in Samoa, an outbreak of Dengue Fever in the
Freely Associated States in 2020, and the global COVID-19 pandemic.
These events remind us how interconnected and dependent the world is
and the need to work together to solve some of our most challenging
humanitarian problems.
We continue to carefully evaluate all operations, exercises, and
training events to ensure we can safeguard our personnel, maintain the
joint force's readiness, and conduct our defense support to civilian
agencies and foreign humanitarian assistance missions. The proactive
actions of the USFK and USFJ commanders' led to the mitigation of risks
commensurate to their circumstance. Our forward-deployed personnel work
closely with national and local governments to coordinate definitive,
enforceable actions to combat the Coronavirus spread. Within the
Department and across the Department, we have taken many far-reaching
measures to slow the virus's spread by closing schools, restaurants,
and on-base businesses. We implemented preventive measures to restrict
the virus's spread with a telework program and flex schedules, modified
meeting protocols, and increased sanitation in communal areas. We have
also implemented aggressive quarantine measures that range from
individual Restriction of Movement procedures to hospitalization in a
local treatment facility if a servicemember tests positive. To date,
our forward stationed troops in Korea and Japan are maintaining
appropriate levels of readiness.
This is an unprecedented effort, and we remain flexible to meet the
evolving challenges the spread of this virus presents. Lab-testing was
established in Tripler Army Community Hospital (Hawaii), Brian Allgood
Community Hospital (South Korea), United States Naval Hospital (Japan),
and the Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Science (Thailand).
We will continue to proactively mitigate the negative impacts of this
and all future cases.
The COVID-19 outbreak is a staunch reminder a ready medical force
should not be exclusively designed to manage traumatic injuries;
indeed, even in armed conflict, disease, and non-battle injuries still
comprise the most significant number of casualties.
key adversarial challenges
As we pursue a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, we face significant
challenges from four key adversaries. The PRC represents our greatest
strategic threat. Its rapidly advancing capabilities and increasingly
competitive posture underscore its drive to become a regionally
dominant, globally influential power. Beijing is growing increasingly
confident, and PRC leaders have demonstrated a willingness to accept
friction to pursue a more expansive set of political, economic, and
security interests. This growing assertiveness is particularly acute
concerning sovereignty disputes, as Beijing seeks to steadily and
incrementally shift the regional status quo to their advantage.
The United States' other great power competitor, Russia, also seeks
to assert itself as a significant military, economic, and diplomatic
power in the Indo-Pacific Region. Moscow pursues broad regional
engagement, including military engagement, to advance its strategic
interests and oppose, challenge, and thwart United States and allied
interests.
Meanwhile, until the nuclear situation is resolved on the Korean
Peninsula, North Korea will remain our most immediate threat. Pyongyang
continues to develop Weapons of Mass Destruction and asymmetric
capabilities-- including nuclear weapons and associated delivery
systems, as well as advanced cyber operations--that threaten our allies
and the United States Homeland.
Finally, the regional threat from terrorism and violent extremism
continues to evolve with global conditions. Global networks such as the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) inspire attacks motivated by
ISIS' ideology or tactics remain a significant concern.
People's Republic of China. The PRC is pursuing rapid,
comprehensive military modernization across land, sea, air, space,
cyber, and information domains, with a clear focus on systems intended
to expand its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) envelope across the
region and enhance the country's force projection and strategic
deterrence. This far-reaching strategy aligns with the stated goals for
People's Liberation Army (PLA) modernization, which PRC leaders remain
highly resolved to achieve. In October, Beijing announced it would seek
to accelerate military modernization initiatives in time for the PLA's
100th anniversary in 2027, advancing the PRC's progress toward its
previously-stated milestones of completing military modernization by
2035 and transforming the PLA into a ``world-class'' military by the
end of 2049. The PLA is pursuing several initiatives toward this end,
including developing highly capable, advanced weapons systems,
enhancing its training and exercise program's scope and complexity, and
expanding the breadth of its operational space across the Region.
PLA Modernization. The PRC focuses particular attention on PLA Navy
(PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) modernization, which it sees as key to
projecting power and achieving great power status. The PRC maintains
the world's largest naval force, which has tripled in size over the
past two decades. The PLAN commissioned more than 25 major ships in
2020 alone, including combatants, amphibious warfare ships, and two
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.
The addition of these new platforms--which include two new classes
of modern warships, the RENHAI guided-missile cruiser, and the LUYANG
III MOD guided-missile destroyer--provides the PLAN greater
maneuverability and flexibility to perform a diverse set of missions,
ranging from littoral warfare to far-seas operations. Meanwhile, the
PLA has operationally fielded its first 5th generation stealth fighter,
the J-20. It is advancing the development of its first aerial-
refuelable bomber, the H-6N, which will complete the country's nuclear
triad's final leg. The PLAAF's Y-20 heavy-lift transport aircraft also
conducted its first overseas missions in 2020, advancing the PLA's
ability to quickly deploy forces and sustain operations across multiple
fronts.
PLA Long Range Weapons Development. The PRC is simultaneously
developing several modern, long-range weapons intended to strengthen
the PLA's standoff precision strike and nuclear deterrence and
counterattack capabilities. The PRC is pursuing a range of advanced
weaponry, including electromagnetic railguns, hypersonic glide
vehicles, and land-attack and anti-ship supersonic cruise missiles, and
the PLA Rocket Force conducts more ballistic missile live-fires every
year than the rest of the world combined. The PRC is also expanding and
maturing its space and counterspace programs. Beijing continues to grow
its space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
constellation and is developing reusable launch vehicle and heavy space
lift capabilities that facilitate the insertion of more and larger
satellites into orbit. The PLA is also pursuing counter-space
technologies such as satellite jammers and directed-energy and direct-
ascent kinetic weapons. Significantly, the PRC's Beidou-3 global
satellite system reached full operational capability in June 2020,
providing the PLA an indigenous system for global positioning,
navigation, and timing coverage. Collectively, these developments--
particularly as they reduce the PRC's reliance on the United States'
space-based infrastructure--facilitate the militarization of space and
increase the threat that the PRC will employ counter-space weapons that
deny the U.S. and allied access to space during a conflict or crisis.
PLA Training and Exercises. Notably, the PRC is not merely
developing advanced weapons systems but is increasingly employing them
in training and exercise scenarios to hone PLA warfighting skills and
send an unmistakable message to regional and global audiences. In
August 2020 for example, the PRC conducted coordinated DF-21D missile
launches into the South China Sea. These mid-range, anti-ship ballistic
missiles are capable of attacking aircraft carriers in the western
Pacific, and their employment during a large-scale PLA exercise
demonstrates the PLA's focus on countering any potential third-party
intervention during a regional crisis. Likewise, the PLA conducts joint
amphibious landing and maritime strike training to simulate a Taiwan
invasion scenario and performs large-force maneuvers to demonstrate its
ability to intervene in a Korean peninsula crisis. Through complex,
realistic training and exercises that emphasize joint tactics and
incorporate advanced technologies, the PLA continues to refine
organizational and process changes initiated as part of 2015's sweeping
reforms. These reforms compensate for the lack of recent combat
experience, both critical steps as the PLA prepares for modern warfare.
PRC Threats in the Region. The PRC has adopted an increasingly
assertive military posture to exert pressure and expand its influence
across the region. This is particularly stark concerning Taiwan. Over
the past year, Beijing has pursued a coordinated campaign of
diplomatic, informational, economic, and--increasingly--military tools
to isolate Taipei from the international community and if necessary,
compel unification with the PRC. Throughout 2020 the PLA has amplified
its force posturing near and around Taiwan, to include using H-6
bombers to circumnavigate the island and conduct Taiwan Strait
centerline crossings and flying military aircraft into Taiwan's air
defense identification zone (ADIZ) at the highest rate in nearly 25
years. Over the past 2 years, the PRC has incorporated highly-
publicized amphibious assault training into national-level exercises,
almost certainly to exert pressure and signal resolve.
Beijing's authoritative messaging has also grown increasingly
confrontational and has linked the PLA's military activities near the
Taiwan Strait to ``separatist'' activities in Taiwan. On the diplomatic
front, Beijing continues to impede Taiwan's meaningful participation in
international organizations. In 2020 for example, Taiwan was blocked
from participating as an observer in the annual World Health Assembly
despite its success in managing the COVID pandemic. Such consistent
employment of pressure tactics undermines the Chinese Communist Party
claims that it desires a peaceful unification with Taiwan.
Hong Kong experienced a significant decline in autonomy following
the PRC's imposition of the Hong Kong National Security Law in June
2020. At Beijing's behest, Hong Kong authorities used mass arrests to
silence pro-democracy activists and curb further dissent by eroding the
pro-democracy movement's political power, weakening Hong Kong's free
press and promoting pro-Beijing education in Hong Kong's schools.
Meanwhile, PRC security organizations have established an official
presence in the city under the auspices of the Office for Safeguarding
National Security, enabling Beijing to closely monitor Hong Kong
residents and enforce the National Security Law. Through these heavy-
handed efforts to impose authoritarian control over Hong Kong affairs,
the PRC has demonstrated the hollowness of its ``one country, two
systems'' model.
The PRC's expansionary territorial ambitions are also on display
along its western border, where the PLA has been engaged in a standoff
with Indian forces along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) since May
2020. The standoff was predicated by clashes over construction
activities near the disputed border PLA ground maneuver and support
elements subsequently forward-deployed roughly 50,000 soldiers along
the LAC, leading to a counter-deployment by the Indian Army.
The PLA has not yet withdrawn from several forward positions it
seized following the initial clash, and the consequent escalation of
tensions between the PRC and India has resulted in casualties on both
sides. This large-scale PLA mobilization--which is particularly notable
considering the elevation, terrain, and distance involved--has stoked
regional concerns that the PRC will increasingly use force to achieve
desired outcomes.
The South China Sea (SCS) situation remains unsettled in light of
the PRC's provocative behavior and expansive and unlawful maritime
claims. The PRC continues to militarize the region, deploying new
equipment to its artificial outposts in 2020 and using forward
airfields to support a growing level of military operations by heavy
transport, intelligence, and anti-submarine aircraft. The PLA also
conducts large-scale exercises in the SCS with an emphasis on
amphibious landing, joint fires, and maritime strike scenarios. PLA
ships and aircraft maintain a consistent SCS presence and are augmented
by an armada of China Coast Guard ships, fishing boats, and other para-
military forces that serve as force multipliers. These actions--which
are inconsistent with President Xi Jinping's and Defense Minister Wei
Fenghe's assurances that the PRC would not militarize the SCS--threaten
our allies and partners' autonomy, jeopardize freedoms of navigation,
overflight and other lawful uses of the sea, and compromise regional
peace and stability.
Meanwhile, the PRC continues to use intimidation to inhibit other
claimant nations' access to offshore resources. Beijing maintains its
excessive and unlawful maritime claims over a massive area in the SCS,
contrary to international law as reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention. The PRC sought to further bolster its unlawful maritime
claims last April, unilaterally renaming over 80 SCS geographic
features and establishing two administrative districts with alleged
jurisdiction over the region. The PRC is also attempting to solidify
its claims by imposing domestic laws across the disputed waters of the
SCS. In April, its Coast Guard led an eight-month campaign-- dubbed
``Blue Sea 2020''--that seized nearly 700 vessels for violations of PRC
laws, and in early 2021, the PRC passed legislation that expanded the
Coast Guard's legal authority to use force against foreign vessels and
destroy other countries' economic structures in disputed areas.
Moreover, PRC ships and aircraft continue to harass and disrupt other
nations' commercial fishing and resource exploration and extraction
activities, even when conducted in areas where China cannot assert a
lawful maritime claim within the respective countries' exclusive
economic zones (EEZs). The PRC's pursuit of excessive maritime claims
at the expense of neighboring states' EEZ rights negatively affects the
economies of Southeast Asian nations and threatens to weaken the
effectiveness of international laws and norms.
Beijing similarly seeks to advance its territorial ambitions in the
East China Sea (ECS), and consistently uses its Air Force, Navy, and
Coast Guard to press its sovereignty claims vis-a-vis the Japanese-
administered Senkaku Islands, test Japanese and United States resolve,
and ratchet up tensions in Northeast Asia. China Coast Guard vessels
routinely enter the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands to assert
PRC sovereignty, despite lacking international standing on the dispute.
PRC ships conducted presence operations in the contiguous waters around
the Senkakus for a record 333 days in 2020, an increase of nearly 20
percent from 2019. In a reprise of its earlier SCS maneuvering, in June
2020, Beijing unilaterally renamed 50 geographic features in the East
China Sea, a number of which are near the Senkaku Islands. The PRC's
simultaneous employment of military and administrative measures to
pursue its ECS claims is indicative of its broader efforts to steadily
and incrementally shift the regional status quo in Beijing's favor.
Beijing is increasingly using all instruments of national power to
fundamentally remake the rules-based international order into one more
aligned with, and amenable to, the PRC. Its signature ``One Belt, One
Road'' (OBOR) strategy, is predicated on building a global economic
system that enforces PRC preferences and ideologies while eschewing
transparency and internationally-accepted investment practices. Beijing
utilizes loans, grants, and monetary gifts to establish economic
dependence, corruptly capture elite allegiance, and in some cases,
consolidate control. The PRC also leverages OBOR projects and economic
pressure as part of a broader strategy to develop overseas PLA bases
and support facilities; the naval base currently under redevelopment at
Ream, Cambodia, is the latest example of the PRC's global basing
ambitions.
To foster a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, the United States,
alongside our allies and partners, must stand up to Beijing's coercive
economic strategies while providing viable assistance and alternatives
to borrowing countries.
Russia is building a better, more capable force in its Far East
that is increasingly active across the Indo-Pacific Region. Ongoing
Russian Federation Navy improvements include new platforms with
advanced weapons systems, and we expect the Russian Pacific Fleet will
add its first Kalibr cruise missile-capable ships and submarines to its
inventory in 2021, giving it substantially increased anti-ship
capabilities and the ability to conduct long-range strikes against land
targets for the first time. Russia is also modernizing its Eastern
Military District capabilities with air defense and land-based anti-
ship cruise missiles, advanced fighters, and upgraded bombers capable
of delivering improved and longer-range strikes. These improvements are
designed to restrict access to regions of the Pacific Ocean near
Russia's coast, while simultaneously expanding Russia's ability to
project power across the Region and into the Arctic.
In the Arctic, Russia seeks to increase and routinize its presence
through exercises and increasing military deployments. During Naval
exercise Ocean Shield 2020, Russia tested its ability to defend the
Eastern Arctic via amphibious landing training and a series of coastal
defense cruise missile and artillery live-fire events. Russian
strategic bombers regularly conduct long-range flights off the Alaskan
coast and across Russia's northern periphery. In mid-2020, it flew for
more than 25 hours in the most prolonged continuous bomber operation
over the Arctic.
By late 2020, Russia deployed MiG-31 fighters and associated
infrastructure to Anadyr airfield in the far northeast, enabling a
continuous air defense, alert, and duty posture in the Arctic. This
dynamic military posture underscores Moscow's determination to
establish itself as the preeminent Arctic power, capable of controlling
foreign access to Arctic resources and transportation routes.
Russia is pursuing military, political, and economic engagement
across the Indo-Pacific Region, though the PRC is increasingly Russia's
most important partner. This relationship has grown steadily closer
since 2019, when the pair agreed to pursue a ``comprehensive strategic
partnership for a new era.'' In late December, Presidents Putin and Xi
reaffirmed their desire to maintain strong bilateral ties in 2021,
which marks the 20th anniversary of the pair's ``Treaty of Good-
Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation.'' The PRC and Russia conducted
a combined bomber patrol over the Sea of Japan and East China Sea in
late 2020, representing the second such mission for the two countries,
following an initial patrol in July 2019. In mid-2020, the PLA also
participated in Russia's capstone strategic exercise for the third
consecutive year, demonstrating both countries' commitment to messaging
bilateral military ties despite COVID concerns. Notwithstanding these
symbolic engagements, we have yet to see true integration between
Russian and PLA elements. We have no evidence Moscow and Beijing seek
to build an interoperable military capability, and both nations have
stated publicly they do not intend to create a formal, mutual defense
alliance. Instead, we expect Russia and the PRC to continue pursuing
limited, coordinated military operations that support both nations'
interests.
North Korea poses a significant security risk to the United States
and our partners in the Indo-Pacific Region. The country has taken no
meaningful steps toward denuclearization, despite promising signs of
de-escalation in 2018, and it continues to advance its strategic
weapons program. Pyongyang maintains a diverse and growing missile
inventory, and North Korea unveiled several new ballistic systems
during military parades in late 2020 and early 2021, including two
SLBMs and an ICBM. Meanwhile, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has re-
adopted a bellicose posture toward the United States. In December 2019,
Kim declared he was no longer bound by a self-imposed moratorium on
nuclear and long-range missile tests. In early 2021 he characterized
the United States as the North's biggest or principal enemy as he vowed
to strengthen its nuclear arsenal. Kim also identified several new
weapon modernization goals in early 2021, to include developing
tactical nuclear weapons and hypersonic glide vehicles and improving
the readiness and accuracy of North Korea's ICBMs. Pyongyang's missile
research and development efforts, coupled with its ongoing pursuit of
nuclear material and technology, are consistent with the regime's
stated objective of being able to strike the United States Homeland.
Kim Jong Un has historically shown a willingness to undertake
provocative, escalatory behavior that foments persistent regional
tensions. In 2020, Pyongyang increased its bellicose rhetoric and
posturing by destroying the inter-Korean Joint Liaison Office and
threatening further retaliation for perceived South Korean
transgressions. North Korea pursued a more moderated approach later in
the year as it diverted attention toward flood recovery and COVID
mitigation efforts.
Nonetheless, it continues to develop new--and upgrade existing--
conventional weapons systems that threaten our regional partners'
safety and security. At its October 2020 military parade, North Korea
unveiled an anti-tank guided missile system, self-propelled artillery,
a new SAM system and accompanying radar, and large-caliber rockets/
missiles. Further, Kim continues to call for unilateral South Korean
adherence to the 2018 Comprehensive Military Agreement--and has
reiterated a reduction of United States-South Korean military ties as a
precondition of improved inter-Korean engagement--while maintaining a
provocative stance toward the South.
In defiance of the United Nations Security Council Resolution
(UNSCRs), North Korea continues to import refined petroleum through
illicit ship-to-ship transfers and unreported direct deliveries by
foreign-flagged vessels. USINDOPACOM supports UNSCR enforcement and
works closely with our partners and allies to disrupt the illicit ship-
to-ship transfers.
Unfortunately, Pyongyang has been able to mitigate this effort's
effects due to Beijing and Moscow's relatively lax sanctions
enforcement. Pyongyang's sanctions-evasion strategy relies heavily on
PRC shipping networks, and many of the illicit transfers occur in or
near PRC territorial waters.
Further, North Korea mitigates the effect of UN-imposed sanctions
through a variety of other illicit evasion tactics. Pyongyang exports
coal in contravention of U.N. prohibitions, and North Korean laborers
continue to work around the world, including in the PRC and Russia--
either illegally or through visa loopholes--beyond the December 2019
repatriation deadline provided in UNSCR 2397. Additionally, malicious
cyber activity remains a significant source of revenue for the regime.
Through cyber-enabled financial theft, extortion campaigns, and
cryptojacking--wherein North Korea uses compromised computing resources
to mine digital currency--North Korea raises illicit revenue to support
its weapons development programs.
Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs). The Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (ISIS) remains the most active and deadliest terrorist threat
in the region, with branches in the Philippines and India and networks
of supporters in Indonesia, Maldives, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Sri
Lanka. The group's Philippines-based branch, ISIS East Asia, has
conducted several high-profile attacks in recent years, including
August 2020 twin suicide bombings in Jolo that killed at least 15
people. However, the group lacks the operational capability to plan
sophisticated attacks, and its
loss of key leaders caused it setbacks in 2020. Notably, these
disparate ISIS and ISIS-inspired groups are not cohesive; they do not
collaborate or fall under the same command and control structure. They
lack substantial connections to the ISIS core in Iraq and Syria.
Although ISIS is the most pervasive VEO in the region, al Qaeda (A.Q.)
has historical ties to and followers in several countries. However, the
group's priorities remain concentrated in Afghanistan, and regional
A.Q. supporters mostly refrain from operational planning due to limited
capabilities and a focus on facilitation and recruitment activities.
Local groups--such as Indonesia-based Jemaah Anshorut Daulah (JAD) and
Jemaah Islamiyah (J.I.), who are aligned to ISIS and A.Q.,
respectively--continue to operate in the region, but pose a limited
threat to United States interests.
However, self-radicalized, ISIS- or AQ-inspired extremists remain a
cause for concern.
Meanwhile, regional counterterrorism (CT) capabilities continue to
improve. Several countries have modernized their CT legislation,
empowering law enforcement to conduct more arrests that lead to
convictions. Additionally, in places like the Philippines, host-nation
security forces have maintained consistent pressure on extremist
networks, further degrading the groups and disrupting planning and
attacks. Looking ahead, regional cooperation initiatives, such as the
Singapore-based Counterterrorism Information Facility (CTIF), will be
critically important to lessening the threat from violent extremism on
a multilateral basis.
conclusions and implications
The greatest danger for the United States is the erosion of
conventional deterrence. Without a valid and convincing conventional
deterrent, the PRC will be emboldened to take action in the region to
supplant United States interests. As the military balance in the Indo-
Pacific becomes more unfavorable to the United States, we are
accumulating additional risk that may embolden our adversaries and
competitors to attempt unilaterally changing the status quo.
USINDOPACOM's focus is to ensure access, freedom of maneuver, and
our ability to project power in the shared domains, which enables
USINDOPACOM to deter and deny our adversaries' and competitors' ability
to engage in acts of aggression, coercion, or other malign behavior
towards our allies and partners along the First Island Chain.
Ultimately, the steps we take must convince our adversaries and
competitors they simply cannot achieve their objectives with force.
PDI provides a pragmatic and economically viable approach for
implementing a deterrence strategy for defending U.S interests in the
Indo-Pacific while mitigating risk and avoiding escalation. Funding
levels in PDI for fiscal year 2021 equates to seven-tenths of 1 percent
of the DOD's Total Obligating Authority in fiscal year 2021, and just
two-thirds the amount spent on the European Defense Initiative in
fiscal year 2020 ($5.9 billion).
USINDOPACOM must field an integrated Joint Force with precision-
strike networks along the First and Second Island Chains; an integrated
air and missile defense in the Second Island Chain; and an enhanced
force posture that provides the ability to preserve regional stability,
and if needed, disperse and sustain combat operations for extended
periods.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Admiral. Before we begin
questions let me remind everyone how we will proceed with
remote participants. Since it is impossible to know exactly
when our colleagues who will be joining via the computer
arrive, we will not be following our standard early bird timing
rule. Instead, we handle the order of questions by seniority,
alternating sides, until we have gone through everyone. Once we
reach the end, if there is anyone we missed we will start back
at the top of the list and continue until everyone has had
their turn.
We will do the standard five-minute rounds. I ask my
colleagues on the computers, and at their desk, to please keep
an eye on the clock, which you should see on your screens.
Finally, to allow for everyone to be heard, whether in the
room or on the computer, I ask all colleagues to please mute
your microphone when not speaking.
Admiral, again, thank you for your service and thank you
for your testimony. As you indicated, one of the principal
initiatives of this Committee over the last several years was
the PDI, and I would ask you, in your view, how is the
Department, and in particular the services, responded to the
establishment of PDI?
Admiral Davidson. Thank you, Senator, for the question. I
am quite encouraged, as you know, the budget for fiscal year
2022 alone is under review by the new administration, and I was
quite encouraged by the Deputy Secretary of Defense's memo of
two weeks ago, where she articulated that the PDI was
absolutely a priority that would be addressed during the budget
review.
I think the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, funded in fiscal
year 2021 for about $2.2 billion, was a good first start. I
recognize that the Committee has put a cap of $5.5 billion on
the fund going forward. I understand from the draft budgets
that there is certainly recognition of the funds that need to
go into PDI. I have been encouraged by much of the draft
material I have seen, but there is a long way to go before the
budget is finalized, and we'll continue to engage with the
Department to see it through.
Chairman Reed. Let me shift focus. How have our allies and
partners responded to PDI?
Admiral Davidson. I think quite positively. Our allies and
partners in the region are looking for the surety that the
United States is a reliable partner in the region and is here
to stay. The investments that we make specifically towards the
PDI will be recognized, and I think are being recognized, at
least as we have talked about them, in their own advances and
their own defense budgets, where you see Japan, Korea, and
Australia, for example, all increasing their defense budgets.
Chairman Reed. Well, thank you, Admiral. In your
independent assessment, you suggested a $4.7 billion Federal
funding level. Would that be sufficient for all your needs?
Admiral Davidson. As we have articulated for fiscal year
2022, sir, if that was to be fully resourced it would assess
our needs to put in place the deterrent posture that I am
advocating for.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. One of the big
challenges, not just in the Pacific but across the military
services is joint capabilities, particularly secure and
uninterrupted communication. I do not think it takes a lot of
expertise to understand that the first wave of assault will
probably be cyberattacks on communications and other sensitive
instruments. We have problems getting our services jointly
connected, and you can allude to them, but our greatest
comparative advantage in the Pacific is our allies, and so not
only do we have to solve the problem of joint communications
with our forces, we have to extend that to our allies. If we
do, that investment, I think, would probably be the most
fundamental one we could make, because a fully integrated force
that can fight together is probably the greatest deterrent in
the Pacific.
Can you comment on that, sir?
Admiral Davidson. Thank you, Senator. Indeed, I agree. One
of the things that we have advocated for in the PDI and our
1251 assessment that we submitted last week is the need for a
mission partner environment, which is information technology
that is available to us today, that extended to our allies and
partners in the region would give us confidence in the
cybersecurity of all those systems and the resiliency against
attack, and it would greatly enhance our ability to plan, our
ability to collaborate in operations and planning, certainly in
peace time but then in crisis and conflict as well.
Chairman Reed. Is that your number one priority?
Admiral Davidson. After the defense of Guam, Mission
Partner Environment (MPE), and then advancement for our ranges,
absolutely, sir. Those are the three big requirements I have
for this fiscal year.
Chairman Reed. Just a final question and a quick response.
Most of our relationships, going back several decades, have
been bilateral in the Pacific, and we have to move to a
multilateral approach. Is there any progress in that direction?
Admiral Davidson. I am quite encouraged by the potential
power of an organization like the Quad might bring. In my view,
India, Japan, Australia, and the United States, that is a
diamond of democracies that could bring so much more, not only
to the region but to the globe, not in terms of security alone,
but in terms of how we might approach the global economy,
critical technologies like telecommunications and 5G,
collaboration on the international order. Just much to be done
diplomatically and economically, and I have great hope that our
ministerial-level meetings with the Quad, as it is known and
returned, will build into something much bigger for the sake of
the globe.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral. Senator
Wicker, please.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much, and at this, Mr.
Chairman, I want to enter into the record three unclassified
documents which amount to Appendix 1 of the 1251 report.
Chairman Reed. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Wicker. Basically, Admiral, we talked about this
earlier, it shows, in an unclassified way, the balance between
the communist Chinese and the United States in 1999, currently,
and projected for 2025, four short years from now. With regard
to the projected 2025, it shows that at that point, China will
have three aircraft carriers to our one in the region. Is that
correct?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir.
Senator Wicker. With regard to amphibious assault ships, it
is projected in 2025 that they will have six to our two.
Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir.
Senator Wicker. Then with regard to modern multi-warfare
combatant ships, 54 to our 6. Is that correct?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir.
Senator Wicker. What is the significance of that last
figure, Admiral?
Admiral Davidson. Really, the three charts work together,
Senator, one to show the change in capability and capacity that
the Chinese have undertaken during the course of the 21st
century, and the relatively static nature of our own forward-
positioned forces. As I described, our effort to do a
deterrence, to sustain a deterrence posture in the region is so
important on our ability to respond in time, and without
question, you know, as an old novel in the 1970s used to say,
the importance of United States presence forward is incredibly
important. Perfect speed is being there. It is to show that if
we do not make changes in our posture forward, it will
demonstrate that the Chinese have much greater capacity than we
have.
Senator Wicker. Now let's look at it on a little brighter
side. If you take everything projected that our allies in the
area will have, and also you consider what we have in Alaska,
which is not west of the International Date Line but it is
still fairly close, can you tell us what that does, say, to the
amphibious assault ships, which is projected to be six Chinese
and two for us?
Admiral Davidson. Certainly that gap closes with us and the
Japanese, with our ambition, but the important factor here is
time. It takes almost 3 weeks to respond from the West Coast of
the United States and 17 days to respond from Alaska, to get
all the way to the first island chain and to conduct operations
within the second island chain.
Senator Wicker. Now----
Admiral Davidson. So--go ahead, sir.
Senator Wicker. No, go ahead.
Admiral Davidson. But clearly, Japan brings amphibious
capability. They have combatant capability, fighter aircraft,
maritime patrol aircraft. To me, the Japanese are the number
one ally in the region and they are critically important to the
security of the region as well.
Senator Wicker. Can you supply us then with another map,
taking those considerations that I mentioned into account?
Admiral Davidson. Absolutely.
Senator Wicker. You will do that for the record?
Now the Chinese are projecting a 6.8 percent defense budget
increase for the next fiscal year. Is that correct?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir.
Senator Wicker. We are not prepared to match that, are we?
Admiral Davidson. Not from what I have heard so far, sir.
Senator Wicker. So we are going to have to spend our money
smarter.
Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir.
Senator Wicker. I am afraid to get what you say you need in
the PDI, we are going to have to take money from somewhere else
in the defense budget, at this point. Is that correct? Is that
your assessment?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. The way the PDI is constructed,
it will have to come out of the base budget, yes.
Senator Wicker. With regard to the PDI, I think you are
telling us there are three things that are yet unfunded in the
budget plan. Is that correct?
Admiral Davidson. Again, sir, the budget is not final, it
is undergoing a review, but I am certainly advocating for Aegis
Ashore in Guam, the mission partner environment as well as the
Pacific Missile Test Center (PMTC)--the Pacific Missile--excuse
me, the Pacific Range improvements that I seek for our
structure in Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, and so forth.
Senator Wicker. In a nutshell, how do you feel about our
ability, right now, to defend Taiwan?
Admiral Davidson. Well, sir, as I articulated in my opening
comments, I think our conventional deterrent is actually
eroding in the region, and it is because of the vast advances,
on the charts that you were just looking at, that the Chinese
have undertaken in both terms of capacity over the last 20
years, and then in the next few years, the improvements they
will make in their capabilities as well. We need to work more
forthrightly.
We have described, in that 1251 assessment that you
referenced, which is reflective of our regaining advantage
brief, that improvements in capability, our joint lethality out
there, enhancements in our design and posture, where we are,
our ability to operate from more dispersed places, a
strengthened, allied and partnered network, and improvements in
our exercises, experimentation, and innovation will make vast
improvements for really less than 1 percent of the defense
budget, going forward, and help regain the advantage for us,
put that conventional deterrent in the field, and prevent
Chinese designs on its neighbors.
Senator Wicker. Thank you so much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Now, via Webex,
Senator Shaheen is recognized.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Hopefully you can
hear me at this point.
Chairman Reed. We can hear you, Senator.
Senator Shaheen. Great. Admiral Davidson, thank you for
your testimony this morning and for your amazing service to the
country.
I would like to change the topic a little bit and talk
about information and the challenges that information warfare
presents. In Europe, disinformation, cyber hacking has been so
important in Russia's ability to make inroads that North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has developed a center to
respond to that.
Can you talk about what you are seeing in the Indo-Pacific
region with respect to cyber warfare and disinformation, from
both Russia and China, and how INDOPACOM is responding to that?
Admiral Davidson. Thank you very much for that question,
Senator. Without question, China has a vast disinformation
machine. They use both regular media and social media, and have
nearly a million people in their propaganda machine, to
undermine United States interests, to capture the narrative to
their own benefit, and to, as I mentioned in my opening
remarks, you know, corrupt the environment in a way that
creates doubt amongst our allies and partners in the
reliability of the United States.
Russia, in the region, acts much more like a spoiler. As
opposed to putting forth their own vision, they look to deny
the visions of others, and are very active as well, especially
in the diplomatic space but in social media. We see the same
kind of effects that, you know, the rest of the globe has seen
from the Russian machine.
In terms of our INDOPACOM capability and return, you know,
we are highly dependent on what is a military function, the
Military Information Support Operation (MISO) operations. We
are engaged deeply with the State Department on the kind of
messaging that would reinforce what the United States does in
the region, and as opposed to providing disinformation, would
highlight the ills that others have in the region. I think
that's supportive of the kind of normalized information needs
that any nation has. Back to you.
Senator Shaheen. So as you are talking about the effort
that is underway, do we need to do more? Should there be more
collaboration with the State Department? You and Senator Reed
discussed the Quad as being one of the multilateral potential
institutions that could respond to particularly the Chinese
threat. Is this something that the Quad should take up in a
major way, as we look at the threats? Because as you describe
it, our threats are not just from conventional weapons. They
are also from that cyber warfare and disinformation space.
Admiral Davidson. To your point, Senator, you know,
disinformation is part of the new geostrategic fabric that is
making the competition so difficult. So a return of capability,
to the State Department primarily, but certainly to the
interagency, and what it's able to message across the globe I
think is critically important. It has immense power, just as a
historical example, back during the Cold War. I am not trying
to imply that this is--and I don't want you to infer that this
is a Cold War advocacy again. But truth, as it moves around the
globe, is critically important in everything we do and should
be part of this competition that is being articulated from the
White House. Back to you.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you very much. I am out of
time. But thank you also to INDOPACOM for your support for the
Women, Peace, and Security Act. I hope we will hear more about
next steps in that area.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Let me recognize
Senator Fischer via Webex.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Admiral, for your dedicated service to this country and your
constant vigilance in defending our security and keeping us
safe.
Last year, the Strategic Forces Subcommittee authorized an
additional $77 million to begin fielding a persistent air and
missile defense on Guam. Unfortunately, this funding was
removed in conference and replaced with language requiring the
Department to study the issue. Can you walk us through the need
for this system?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question. I
am a key advocate for persistent, fixed, 360-degree air and
missile defense that would be capable of meeting cruise missile
threats, ballistic missile threats, certainly anything to be a
cruise missile launched from a bomber, from the land, from the
sea, and from the air in the region. The structure that is out
there right now, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) radar, is not capable of meeting the current trajectory
of threats from China, as I have articulated, nor the size of
those raids. A persistent capability, given what we are
observing in the theater, advancements in Chinese capability,
are critically important, and it must be delivered in a 360-
degree fashion to protect from the kind of activities we are
seeing China conduct, which is circumnavigations of Guam, the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana, et cetera.
Most importantly, we all have to understand, Guam is a
United States territory. We have 170,000 United States citizens
living on Guam. Their defense is homeland defense. We have
21,000 U.S. service men and women and DOD employees as well,
plus their families. It is a deep-water strategic port, major
fuel stores, munitions stores, command and control. It is a
major power projection airfield for us in the region. It has
been evidenced, by me, and displayed by the Chinese, in a
propaganda video of their own bomber forces attacking Andersen
Air Force Base on Guam.
Guam is a target today. It needs to be defended and it
needs to be prepared for the threats that will come in the
future, because it is clear to me that Guam is not just a place
that we believe that we could fight from, as we have for many
decades. We are going to have to fight for it in order to be
able to do that.
Senator Fischer. We've already developed systems that can
meet this need. Is that right? We are not talking about any
kind of new development program here, are we?
Admiral Davidson. In partnership with the Missile Defense
Agency, we believe that the Aegis Ashore system, as is being
put to sea right now, and has been constructed previously in
Romania and Poland, delivers the kind of capabilities that
would meet the threat that is extant here, by mid-decade, and
will help us pace the threat into the future. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. We always talk about missile defenses as
having a deterrence by denial effect. Do you see that applying
here, and would this make the conflict less likely by
undermining the adversary's confidence that they could achieve
their goals?
Admiral Davidson. Absolutely. We have to demonstrate that
any ambition that China might have, and any threat it might put
forth towards Guam, would come at cost, and that would be
really by the collection of not only this defensive capability,
which I think is so critical because it prevents a cheap shot,
but also the rest of the capabilities that I have described in
the 1251 assessment, which includes some offensive
capabilities, to let China know that the costs of what they
seek to do are too high and to give them doubt in their
success.
Senator Fischer. Admiral Davidson, in 2018 you testified,
quote, that ``PACOM only has about a quarter of the
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) it needs
in the area of responsibility (AOR)''. Does that remain the
case today? I can say that in visiting with all of our
combatant commanders there is never enough ISR to meet the
needs in your area. Is that true? Can you compare what we have
to the investments that China is making in their ISR?
Admiral Davidson. We have a continued need for ISR to
monitor the day-to-day activities in the region, certainly, but
also to understand Chinese designs in the region, what they are
doing in the training sphere, and things like that. My ISR
posture has improved slightly since 2018. There has been some
action taken in just the last few months to restore some of
that ISR capability. But if Indo-Pacific Command is indeed the
priority theater, we need to continue to look at our total
intelligence apparatus--signals intelligence, communications
intelligence, our imagery that comes from space, for airborne
assets and all that we gather there--to make sure that we have
the warning that is required to get our forces to respond,
alert our allies and partners, and prevent any kind of Chinese
external attack in the region.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you for your
service. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Let me recognize
Senator Gillibrand via Webex.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, the
Department of Defense has recently outlined China's military
strategy known as Military-Civil Fusion, aka Civil-Military
Integration, to develop the PLA into a world-class military by
2049. The 2019 DOD report on China stated that, quote, ``China
uses a variety of methods to acquire foreign military and dual-
use technologies, including targeted foreign direct
investments, cyber theft, in expectation of private Chinese
nationals' access to these technologies, as well as harnessing
its intelligence service, computer intrusions, and other
illicit approaches.''
Because these efforts by China will certainly affect
business and people across the region, what would you recommend
we work with, with our allies, to counter this strategy while
maintaining the principles of a free and open Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Davidson. Thank you for your question, Senator. To
your point, the Chinese Military-Civil Fusion approach, which
is underpinned by Chinese law that says any state or commercial
business enterprise with concerns in China must provide any
information that the state seeks for its benefit. That has made
for particularly, you know, complex global engagement and
global economic scenario, I think, for not only the United
States, but as you said, our allies and partners.
It has been very important that, you know, laws like
Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA), the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)
process that has been established in the United States, is
meant to help deny that fusion within China. I know that many
of our allies and partners in the region have begun to pass
laws in that direction and are debating them as well.
Senator Gillibrand. Well, related, in last year's NDAA we
included language requiring the DOD to look into better
cooperation with our allies in the Pacific. Specifically, we
recognized our cooperation is to, quote, ``enhance through more
proactive planning and cooperation with allies and partners
that capitalize on each country's comparative strengths.'' The
study requires determining what comparative advantages our
allies have and what barriers exist to fully realize them.
So what barriers did you face in working with our allies,
and what could Congress to do facilitate these relationships?
Admiral Davidson. Well, one, there has to be not just an
explanation from the security side but on the economic side as
well, you know, complete clarity in what China's military-civil
fusion threat does to partnered multinational companies and
things like that, that might have a presence or subsidiaries in
China. So I think there needs to be, you know, clear dialogue
about that.
Transparency and the kind of laws we have passed and the
rationale for them, like CFIUS and FIRRMA, and we need to drive
understanding with our allies and partners that this threat is
real and that if we do not see change from our allies and
partners that we may have to determine whether many of our
technologies can be shared with them, to prevent their just
outright conveyance to China alone.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. I also want to continue on
this line of question from Senator Shaheen. As new technologies
have been developed rapidly, and nontraditional threats such as
COVID and climate change begin to bear greater relevance, it
has been crucial that we are able to work in a proactive manner
to coordinate and respond to their allies. What lessons would
you say the COVID-19 pandemic has taught INDOPACOM about
coordinating with allies in the face of emerging nontraditional
and transnational threats? Further, do we balance our approach,
or how do we balance our approach to these particular threats
in contrast to the traditional ones that we face in the Indo-
Pacific?
Admiral Davidson. Thank you, Senator. I absolutely agree
there's opportunity for deepened relationships with our allies
and partners on transnational issues. This is a whole-of-
government opportunity for us, because, you know, there are
economic components of the government, law enforcement, health
and human services, et cetera, when combined with some of the
capabilities we can bring to deliver, add capacity in
diagnosing and delivering vaccines, for example, collaborating
with our allies and partners in the region for those nations in
need is hugely powerful. I think there should be deepened
relationships across the whole U.S. Government with their
counterparts in these other countries.
I am finding, just, you know, in the transnational threat
alone, that some nations have legal means and relationships
with countries that would be incredibly effective to help
undermine things like Chinese corruption on the Belt and Road
Initiative, for example. So deepening partnerships there with
our allies and partners across our whole-of-government I think
is a key part of the competition that we are all talking about.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Senator
Cotton, please.
Senator Cotton. Admiral Davidson, thank you for your
appearance again here today. Thanks for your service to our
Nation. I want to talk a little bit about the balance of power
in the Western Pacific when it comes to missiles. For decades,
the United States belonged to something called the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which
prohibited us and Russia, the only two parties, from building
ground-based, intermediate-range missiles, roughly speaking
like 300 to 3,000 miles of range.
China was never a party to this. That is why they have
stockpiled thousands of these missiles that, as you have
testified, can threaten not only our allies in places like
Taiwan and Japan and South Korea, but also our own troops and
citizens in places like Guam and other islands in the Western
Pacific.
We finally left the INF Treaty a couple of years back, in
part because Russia was cheating on it for years, in part
because of this imbalance of power. How important is it that
the United States continues to build up our missile forces so
that we can hold China, you know, in deterrence and at risk in
the Western Pacific?
Admiral Davidson. I think it is very important, Senator. I
think a wider base of long-range precision fires, which are
enabled by all our terrestrial forces, not just sea and air but
by land forces as well, is critically important to stabilizing
what is becoming a more unstable environment in the Western
Pacific.
I have been encouraged by the enthusiasm by the Army and
the Marine Corps to embrace some of the capabilities that Navy
and Air Force have already developed. I think that is a low-
cost way to quick capability that can be fielded potentially in
the region and I think we ought to stay after it.
I say to people all the time, missile defense is the
hardest thing we do, and if I am the manager of a baseball
team, you know, I could have the best defenses in the world,
but if I cannot score some runs I cannot win the game. We have
got to have offensive capabilities that threaten--you know,
that cause a potential adversary to think twice about any
malign activities that they might take in the region,
militarily, and that is where offensive fires come into play.
Senator Cotton. To drive this home again, the importance of
ground-based precision fires. The Navy and the Air Force have
great capabilities, but you can only put so many missiles on a
ship or on an aircraft. Ground-based fires allow you to build
up a stockpile, the same way China has done on its mainland,
where they have thousands of missiles aimed at Taiwan or Japan
or Guam, and that is one reason why it is so important to
continue to build up those ground-based fires. Is that correct?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, Senator. The U.S. fights as a joint
force, and long-range precision fires delivered to the ground
force I think are critically important to enhance the maneuver
and positional advantage of U.S. forces in the theater.
Senator Cotton. Let's turn from missiles to payloads. Do
you agree with Admiral Richard at Strategic Command that China
could triple or even quadruple its nuclear weapon stockpile in
the years ahead?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Cotton. Presumably, if they are going to build all
those nuclear warheads they are also going to build the
delivery systems for those warheads as well. Correct?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. They have quadrupled their
nuclear capability since the turn of the century and they will
at least double it during the course of this decade, and I have
seen the same estimates that Admiral Richard is talking about.
Senator Cotton. Whereas the United States, because we just
gave a no-strings-attached extension to the New Strategic Army
Reduction Treaty (START), is limited to 800 deployed nuclear
weapons. So China, unconstrained by this treaty, if they triple
or quadruple their stockpile, could possibly have nuclear
overmatch against the United States before the end of this
decade. Is that correct?
Admiral Davidson. If they were to quadruple their
stockpile, yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. When you combine the strategic forces of
both Russia and China, then they certainly would have overmatch
against the United States when it comes to our nuclear arsenal.
Admiral Davidson. Yes, Senator.
Senator Cotton. It is very expensive and hard work to win
an arms race, but it is much better to win an arms race than to
lose a war.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator
Blumenthal, please.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that
the thrust of this hearing and your testimony is to emphasize
the ongoing and increasing threat and danger of Chinese
military buildup and potential aggression. We have been
talking, I guess, mainly about the conventional threats and
nuclear threats, but recently the Chinese launched a
cyberattack on this country. What should the American public
know about that attack involving Microsoft, recently disclosed?
Admiral Davidson. I am sorry. I will have to take that one
for the record, sir. I have not had direct conversations with
Microsoft about that.
Senator Blumenthal. Would you agree that China represents a
threat in the cyber domain?
Admiral Davidson. Oh, absolutely.
Senator Blumenthal. Would you agree also that what you just
said about nuclear capacity applies to cyber as well, namely
that defense is not enough. You need offense and you need to
draw lines so that adversaries will know what they cannot do,
lines they cannot cross, and offense is necessary to deter them
from crossing those lines.
Admiral Davidson. I absolutely agree, Senator. China is
advancing its cyber capability in leaps and bounds. I do not
think I could articulate it in a quantified manner like the
discussion we just had with Senator Cotton. But they are vastly
improving that cyber capabilities, and we are witnessing some
of that malign activity amongst our own capabilities here in
the country, as you implied.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you continue to believe, as you said
in 2019, shifting to another domain, the undersea domain, that,
quote, ``Continuing to build submarines is critically
important,'' end quote, and, quote, ``It is our most
significant advantage in all domains right now,'' end quote,
referring to submarines.
Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. Our advantage in the undersea,
our submarine force, absolutely. But also what we can do in
what we call anti-submarine warfare to deny other nations use,
and that is the use of maritime patrol aircraft, that is the
kind of sonars and sensors we put on our surface ships, we have
to absolutely sustain that advantage going forward.
Senator Blumenthal. So you would strongly endorse, I hope,
the continued construction of two Virginia-class submarines a
year, and the continued development and construction of the
Columbia-class as well?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. The Virginia-class, what is
coming with the Virginia payload module, I think are critically
important to continue U.S. deterrence in the theater, and there
is no doubt that the strategic deterrent needs to be
recapitalized, and the Columbia is the way to do that for our
Ohio-class submarines.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. You know, I would like to
turn to a nontraditional source of concern, first of all, the
COVID pandemic. I understand that the ship, the USS Theodore
Roosevelt has had several coronavirus cases recently, following
the outbreak that occurred. Is that true? To what extent is
COVID a continuing danger in your command?
Admiral Davidson. Thanks for that, Senator. Yes, a few
weeks ago the Theodore Roosevelt identified three positive
cases out of their normal surveillance testing. Those three
positive cases were sent ashore in Guam. There were some 40-odd
close contacts that were in quarantine. They have continued to
test negative in that time frame, and the ship remains at sea,
and continues at sea. In the meantime, we have tested the whole
of the crew and there are no other positive cases.
Senator Blumenthal. So it is a relatively contained,
isolated outbreak.
Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. Yeah, the three positive cases
are off the ship and ashore at this point.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, and in the closing short
time I have left, do you regard climate change as a security
threat in the command that is under your control?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. It is something I hear about
quite frequently from my peers, particularly in the Pacific
Island chain, who can describe for you, during the course of
their own lifetimes, you know, the changes that they observe
and have observed in their island nations.
Much of what we do at Indo-Pacific Command helps enable
their ability to combat some of the ill effects that are
immediately manifested, whether it is severe storm. We have an
organization called the Center for Excellence in Disaster
Management that helps train not only our military folks,
certifying my own military folks to do disaster management, but
we make it available to non-governmental organizations as well
as other governments, and we do it virtually, we do it in
person, we bring them to Hawaii, all kinds of methods. It is
very important for us.
Senator Blumenthal. I thank you for your testimony today
and for your service to our Nation. I am not going to be able
to follow up now on the climate change question but I will
submit more for the record. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator
Sullivan, please.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Admiral, for your service. You mentioned about deterrence
eroding in the region, and in your testimony this morning in
the classified session and then also in this focused on the
Pacific Deterrence Initiative. That was a bipartisan initiative
that came out of this Committee, actually. So I think most of
the Members of this Committee, Democrats and Republicans, are
certainly supportive.
So is it your testimony today that you need full funding of
that $4.6 billion as something that can help with regard to
this eroding deterrence? Can you explain about that a little
bit more?
Admiral Davidson. I would say absolutely yes, sir. I think
it fulfills what the law has asked for in the entablement of
the PDI.
Senator Sullivan. That was in last year's NDAA, so we all
agreed to it.
Admiral Davidson. In last year's NDAA, and meets the
strategic vision that I have in the theater to present a
conventional deterrent that would give China pause from any
malign military activity that they would undergo against any of
our allies and partners in the region.
Senator Sullivan. Well, I really appreciate that. If there
was one kind of takeaway from this hearing, you have the Indo-
Pacific Commander, the entire Armed Services Committee, the
NDAA, all pushing for this. I certainly hope the Biden
administration is focused on this hearing and recognizes that
they should fully fund the PDI, which is what most of us wanted
and what we all voted for last year when we passed the NDAA.
Let me next talk about the issue of the force posture in
the region. You know, I just started my second term here as a
senator and I was asked, 6 years ago, by our former chairman of
this Committee, Senator McCain, to really focus on this issue
of force posture, which I have been doing a lot. I just got
home from Alaska, so that is actually being out in the region,
as you know, when I am home in the great state of Alaska.
One of the things I have noticed is that our force posture
seems to be somewhat, I would say, stale, when you look at
where our forces are--Okinawa, Korea, Guam--because they have
been there for so long, and we have this issue that you have
talked about, first and second island chain, the
vulnerabilities. What is the right mix as you look at dispersal
of forces, wanting them to be there quickly, in the region, but
also the vulnerabilities that you have, first, second island
chain?
I will give you an example. Alaska will soon have over 100
fifth-generation fighters stationed there. If you have the
right mix of tankers, those assets could be in, for example,
the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait within hours, with the
right tankers. How do you think about dispersal of forces and
the different vulnerabilities that we have when it comes to
force posture?
Admiral Davidson. Thanks, Senator. I think about it much
like I have described in the Regain the Advantage, that a more
dispersed design and posture in the region is going to be
required in order to achieve the positional advantages that we
seek. That is done through permanently based forward-deployed
forces--Japan, Korea, Guam, and elsewhere in the theater--and
the use of contiguous United States-based forces, Hawaii and
Alaska forces, that will rotate through the theater.
That combination of rotating presence and permanent
presence has to be robust enough in order buy us the time to
deny any quick action going forward. That is a mix of
capabilities, and certainly the fifth-gen fighters, I would
tell you, are the backbone of any of our planning for a crisis
forward in the theater, and would be needed at dispersed
locations within the first and second island chain.
But it also means maritime forces, it means ISR, you know,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance forces, things
like that, that have to be made available as well.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask, you know, when I talk to
officials, and I would love your view on this, our intel
community, the common theme I hear with regard to China's
actions under Xi Jinping's leadership is alarm. That is a
phrase that is used a lot--alarm, and they point to things,
just within the last year, the COVID outbreak and the non-
cooperation that China has had with the rest of the world; the
border conflict with India, and cyberattacks that were probably
launched by China against India, major cyberattacks; an
economic embargo against one of our most important allies in
the region, Australia; crushing dissent in Hong Kong; very
aggressive military actions in the Taiwan Strait, South China
Sea; Japan's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Do you agree these
are alarming maneuvers? This is within the last year.
Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. What does this kind of do to your
timeline if you are extrapolating out with regard to any
potential conflict or timeline in the Taiwan Strait, when you
look at how aggressive Xi Jinping's leadership has been?
Admiral Davidson. I think our concerns are manifest here
during this decade, not only on the development, the numbers
of, you know, ships, aircraft, rockets, et cetera, that they
have put in the field, but the way they are advancing those
capabilities as well, in combination with everything that you
just cited--Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet, and the Line of
Actual Control, and the South China Sea and the East China Sea.
I worry that they are accelerating their ambitions to supplant
the United States, and our leadership role in the rules-based
international order, which they have long said that they want
to do that by 2050, I am worried about them moving that target
closer. Taiwan is clearly one of their ambitions before then,
and I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact,
in the next 6 years.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Let me
recognize Senator Hirono via Webex.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Davidson,
welcome. This is probably going to be the last time that you
will be testifying before our Committee, so I want to add my
thanks to you for your service, and, of course, we will miss
you in Hawaii.
Admiral Davidson, do you support Homeland Defense Radar-
Hawaii as an important part of the region's layered missile
defense system to protect Hawaii from long-range missiles fired
from rogue states such as North Korea?
Admiral Davidson. Absolutely, Senator. It raises the
confidence of any employment of a ground-based interceptor, and
will help as any advancement in North Korean capabilities might
put forth. It is critically important to the overall defense of
the country.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. You focused on two areas in your
recent PDI report that, in my opinion, are vital to our
national security strategy in the Indo-Pacific area. One,
strengthening our allies and partners, and two, funding joint
coalition military exercises and updating and networking our
tests and training ranges in this area of responsibility,
including two major training areas in Hawaii, the Pacific
Missile Range Facility, or PMRF, and the Pohakuloa Training
Area, PTA.
I noticed that you significantly increased the requested
amount from last year's PDI report to this year's report to
strengthen our allies and partners over the next 5 years in the
region, from over $300 million to about $2.8 billion. Can you
discuss your rationale for this significant increase and what
that additional funding is intended to do, or where will it go?
Admiral Davidson. Well, you highlighted the key aspects,
ma'am. It is to enhance and make improvements in our joint
exercise program, and that is principally because not only the
United States but our key allies and partners--Japan, Korea,
Australia, as just three examples--are buying important
capabilities that match ours--integrated air and missile
defense, for example, fifth-generation fighters like the F-35.
They are being actually delivered in the theater.
We have got to advance our exercise program in a way that
allows us to exercise those capabilities deliberately. That is
going to require not only changes in our joint exercise
program, and I will come back to that in a minute, but also
changes in our range structures, to make sure that we can put
forth the threats in a live, virtual, constructive format, that
will stress the force and stress a coalition force, if it were
to come about.
But additionally, that joint exercise program needs to be
improved to do precisely what Senator Sullivan was talking
about, to help us put more robust forces quickly in the field,
to test them under concepts like contested logistics, in which
we might have our cyber connectivity restricted and things like
that. We have really got to advance from what I view as kind of
20th Century exercises into the 21st century capabilities and
concerns we need to be worried about.
Senator Hirono. I assume that some of the money that you
are requesting to enhance or exercise capabilities will, of
course, go to PMRF and PTA in Hawaii.
News reports have indicated that around 15 percent of the
persons involved in the recent riots at the Capitol had
military experience, either currently or were on active duty,
retired, or recently separated. Secretary Austin recently order
a 60-day stand-down to address troubling reports of extremism
in the ranks, and the DOJ IG is currently investigating violent
extremism within the armed forces after myself and several of
my colleagues sent a letter asking for action.
As you finish over 35 years of service, Admiral Davidson,
in your opinion, are there steps, other steps that the DOD
should take to root out violent extremism in the ranks?
Admiral Davidson. Well, I think certainly, Senator, the
stand-down was intended just to be the first step on this.
There is absolutely no place for extremism in the United States
military.
I can tell you, at my own headquarters, we have already
conducted the stand-down. We came together not only to have the
leadership discuss what our expectations are, which is, you
know, well guided by DOD instruction alone, you know, beyond
the oath, but also to bring in other experts. We even had the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) Joint Terrorism Task
Force come in to talk to us about the kind of behaviors we
might see, as leaders and as peers, and as subordinates and
others, that might indicate extremist behaviors. We also
recommitted to our oaths, and then we broke down to small
groups.
We are going to have to continue to communicate on this
with the force, to make sure that our expectations are well
known. There is just absolutely no place for that in the United
States military.
Senator Hirono. I am considering legislation to create a
standalone punitive article in the Uniform Code of Military
Justice to address violent extremism in the ranks, and to send
a message of deterrence that this kind of conduct will not be
tolerated in the military. Do you think that this kind of
legislation is warranted?
Admiral Davidson. I think it should be certainly part of
the discussion to examine. You know, I would have to defer to
the Department, ma'am, about the approaches that we would take
going forward.
Senator Hirono. Yeah. I just want to note that there are
certain entities such as the Oathkeepers who actively recruit
from the military to join their extremist ranks.
I think I am out of time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Let me recognize
now Senator Tillis.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Davidson,
thank you for being here and for your years of service. Just a
question, and I apologize. I have three hearings going on at
the same time, so if someone has covered this it probably still
bears repeating.
Talking specifically about protection of U.S. troops and
bases in Indo-Pacific and our low-density, high-demand
rotational capabilities are what we are relying on today. So if
China were to initiate a kinetic operation somewhere in the
Indo-Pacific, do you believe the relatively short notice and
the warning timelines would make it particularly either very
difficult or virtually impossible to defend critical locations
like Guam?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. One of the reasons that we have
made a point of advocating for sufficient ISR--intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance--that buys us that warning in
order to respond, is critically important. We have capacity
needs there, and our war gaming has shown that if it is
insufficient we cannot respond in time.
Senator Tillis. In the INDOPACOM report, section 1251 of
the fiscal year 2021 NDAA, you all state, ``The most important
action the U.S. can take to increase joint forces' lethality is
to introduce a 360-degree persistent and integrated air defense
capability in Guam. Guam is our most crucial operating location
in the Western Pacific and its defense remains the number one
unfunded priority.'' I think you are requesting somewhere
around $350 million for that purpose.
Can you explain how China's missile arsenal threatens
Taiwan and why Guam is so important to defend, and how a
missile defense system permanently stationed in Guam, would
help towards that end?
Admiral Davidson. I think the most visible means that we
have seen is China's own air force has put out a propaganda
video showing their H-6 bomber force attacking Andersen Air
Force Base at Guam, and distributed that quite publicly. We are
seeing Chinese naval deployments of surface task groups and
submarines that make circumnavigations of Guam and the
Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, and, of course, you
know, we see the vast asymmetry, the very large ballistic
missile force that China has.
As one component of our deterrence strategy, but again, my
number one priority, because it has been unfunded and I think
critical to our needs, is a defensive system that would defend
against all those threats. In our work with the Missile Defense
Agency, only one system can do that, meet the threats as they
will be evident in mid-century, and help us leap to the future
as well, and that is an Aegis Ashore-like system there on Guam.
You know, I am not Pollyanna-ish about this. It is not the
sole solution. We had discussions about offense capabilities,
earlier warning, the ability to disperse fighter aircraft--all
that is critical components as well. But I have been very
encouraged by the individual services' transformation
approaches, what their support is in the theater, but one of
the key shortcomings is not having this defensive system, and
we need it going forward.
Senator Tillis. Maybe in my time remaining you can talk a
little bit about the need for permanently stationed forces in
the region. Do you think it is adequate now? I think the answer
is no, but what does it look like if we were at some level of
critical mass with actually personnel west of the International
Date Line?
Admiral Davidson. Because so much dialogue would have to
happen with allies and partners in the region, sir, although
there is one modification in effect that would result in more
troops, Marines, actually relocating from Japan to Guam and
elsewhere, I am pretty satisfied with the permanent stationing
of forces in the region right now.
If situation were to avail us, I think more capabilities in
Southeast Asia and South Asia would be a priority. But in the
meantime, what is achievable is to help with dispersal
locations and with the accommodation of rotational forces
within U.S. territories and the freely associated states in the
region, principally, as well as our key allies in the region.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Admiral.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tillis. Senator Kaine,
please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and Admiral Davidson,
I want to echo Senator Hirono's comments. We will miss you. I
have really enjoyed working with you, being on this Committee,
and in your various capacities.
You answered a number of great questions this morning in
our classified briefing that my colleagues put on the table and
so I am not going to repeat those.
In your military judgment, would it be in the United
States' security interest if we were to ratify the U.N.
Conference on Law of the Sea?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. I am on record saying that that
would be good for us. I think you would be hard-pressed to find
a Navy admiral that's said otherwise.
Senator Kaine. The convention would allow us to assert, for
example, defensive claims in international tribunals to Chinese
island-building or Russian activity in the Arctic, and it would
also allow us to assert some offensive claims to, for example,
mineral rights in the Arctic, that we cannot currently do. I
would hope that the Committee might revisit whether we should
finally do this, to try to gain a better footing in the
INDOPACOM and elsewhere.
Second, with respect to China and the competition with
China, as much as they are worried about any innovation,
weapons system that the United States is developing, wouldn't
you say that in some way their greatest worry about the U.S. is
the network of allies and alliances we have, in their region
and elsewhere?
Admiral Davidson. Absolutely. I think the network of
alliances, the partnerships that we have, not only in the
region but across the globe, are hugely powerful, and the
potential of deepening relationships strategic to defense
partnership with a country like India, or in a multilateral
formation like the Quad--India, United States, Japan, and
Australia--I think is a key strategic opportunity for the
United States, and those three other countries. But it could be
so much more than just a security apparatus, and I think we
ought to be thinking about it in terms of all the capabilities
that it might help the globe with.
Senator Kaine. It is interesting because I think China and
Russia, though very different nations, both are very afraid of
the United States' network of alliances, and they have not yet
been able to cobble together the kinds of alliances that are
based upon mutual regard and mutual work. You know, China uses
debt diplomacy to get folks in hock to them, but that is not
the same thing as a significant alliance, and Russia uses, you
know, availability of natural gas in sort of the same way. But
the networks of alliances, they just are not anywhere near
where we are.
So I hope as we are trying to maintain strategic match or
overmatch in tactical weapons systems, we never lose sight of
the fact that strengthening alliances is ultimately about the
best guarantee we have against aggression by China.
The last question I will ask you is this. Sometimes on this
Committee, and in Congress generally, we get into a mindset
where we think about the defense budget as very different than
the non-defense budget, and on budgetary matters we assume that
the sort of non-defense budget is not as critical in national
security as the defense budget. I was struck by your testimony
in the classified setting this morning--this is not classified.
Again and again you said it is not just defense. If we are
going to be strong in the INDOPACOM, vis-a-vis China, it has
got to be defense, and diplomacy, and humanitarian aid, and
trade, and economic aid. These are items that are not included
in the defense budget but I gather you think they are every bit
as important to maintaining a robust American presence and
leadership in the INDOPACOM, they are as important as the
defense budget.
Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. When I engage with any of the
countries in the region, whether they are an ally or it is part
of the partner network, their assessment of U.S. reliability is
not based on the military presence alone. It is based on our
interactions, diplomatically, in the information sphere, where
we are economically, our foreign direct investment, our trade.
All those elements is how the allies and partners want to
engage with the United States and how they view our
reliability.
Indeed, to do a competition like we are talking about with
China, it is going to take a whole-of-nation approach, not just
a whole-of-government approach, and all of those elements come
into play.
Senator Kaine. One program that I was not really aware of,
but I am sure other Members of the Committee were, the
Department of Interior has a program that provides financial
assistance to American Samoa, Guam, Virgin Islands,
Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, and the freely
associated states of the Federated States of Micronesia,
Republic of Marshall Islands, and Palau. The compact with Palau
will expire in 2024. These are non-defense budget items within
Interior, but they can have a significant effect upon this
question that you mentioned, our reliability, which is really,
really important.
So as if we did not have enough work to do on this
Committee, we have to also pay attention to the non-defense
budgetary items that are strong evidence of America's desire to
be a leader in the region.
Again, thank you, Admiral Davidson. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Let me recognize
Senator Cramer via Webex.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Admiral, for your service and for being with us today. This has
been most interesting.
I am going to drill down maybe a little bit on some of the
things related to the allies and their trust in us and how we
build a stronger alliance of free people that are concerned
about China. I do not think there is any question China is the
topic of the day in lots of places, not just here. But I also
know that a lot of these matters get out there on the fringe a
little bit, sometimes things we may not think about.
So I want to ask you specifically, there was a recent
Reuters story that said Iran has quietly moved record amounts
of crude oil to its top client, of course, China, in recent
months, at the same time that India, India's state refineries
added Iranian oil to their annual import plans on the
assumption that the United States is going to lift their
sanctions.
Does INDOPACOM, do you guys track Iranian oil shipments
within your area of responsibility, and if so, does that
information get back to the Pentagon, the White House,
decision-makers that are making lots of big decisions about
things domestically and around the world that might have an
impact on our relationships?
Admiral Davidson. Certainly, Senator. We track the Iranian
trans-shipment of oil across the theater. You know, the
interactions with China are indicative of China's willingness
to ignore sanctions and international norms to do that kind of
thing.
Senator Cramer. But with regard to India, then, do you see
a risk if we lift the sanctions on Iran, that they are able to
now sell oil to an important ally, I mean, obviously very much
in the region. I am just, again, thinking about all of the
relationships and all of the factors that enter into the
relationship. I know I am asking you now to probably opine on a
policy question as opposed to whether or not you are tracking
it. But it seems to me that these decisions, things like
lifting sanctions on Iran, could have ramifications that we
maybe have not thought of yet. If you want to comment, you can.
Otherwise, I can move on.
Admiral Davidson. No. Sir, it is an important policy issue
for the United States. Iran is, no doubt, a net exporter of oil
and it will have to be considered.
Senator Cramer. Thank you. I want to follow up on a line of
questioning that Senator Fischer asked as well, about ISR and
the importance of it, and I will probably just skip some of the
easy stuff that she was asking about, easy for me, not
necessarily for you.
I will just ask this. Adding on to her line of questioning,
do you think that the sale of ISR platforms to allies in the
region might help our ISR needs in the region? In other words,
I know that there have been some restrictions, there are some
sales pending, there is, I know, a lot of desire by both allies
and some of our American contractors. Could we help the ISR
picture a little bit by opening up sales, maybe speeding them
up a little bit to allies in the region?
Admiral Davidson. I would say it depends on some of the
exact capabilities that we are talking about. But I will tell
you, broadly, we share information with our allies in the
region and many, many partners. They benefit from the
information that we generate. I can tell you, in the East China
Sea, in the South China Sea, we, the United States benefit from
much of what our allies and partners do there as well.
So it would certainly add capacity to the picture, and as
we deepen our information-sharing agreements, which is
dependent on a lot of factors, we will share that information
amongst us. It is going to make us better.
Senator Cramer. I do not know if you are hearing me but I
stopped hearing you suddenly. I will ask one more question, in
case you are listening and can hear it, and it is a pretty
basic one. Do you consider China a developing country or a
developed country? That is a question I just started exploring.
What is the difference, whether we consider it developing or
developed?
Admiral Davidson. Sir, I imagine economists, you know, have
a standard for that description. I mean, certainly they have
lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty just since
the turn of the century, but I would say that they still have
hundreds of millions to go. But I would have to defer to an
economist to give you the exact characterization.
Senator Cramer. Yeah, and you are right. There are some
standards that economists use relating to, you know, gross
versus net and all these economic points. They are relevant--do
not get me wrong. But what I am more concerned about is how the
rest of the world treats a developing nation versus a developed
nation, and I guess I would submit to you whether they are
considered developed or in transition, they are, as the
chairman said in his opening comments, an emerging threat and a
near-peer ally prepared for some pretty serious confrontations.
So anyway, all of that said, again, thank you for your
service and thank you for being with us today, and I see my
time is up, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cramer. Let me recognize
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, you spent a
lot of time in this region in the last several years. You have
thought a lot about China, as you have indicated today. Here is
a kind of mind-reading question. Why are they militarizing? Why
are they suddenly spending so much money? Is it because of
paranoia about being attacked or is it because of preparing for
aggression? Do you see the difference?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir, absolutely. I appreciate the
question. That is exactly the issue at hand. I see them
developing systems, capabilities, and a posture that would
indicate that they are interested in aggression, and what they
have committed, in their nearest abroad--Hong Kong, Line of
Actual Control, Xinjiang, the kind of pressure they are putting
on Tibet and others in the region--I think it is dramatically
misplaced. The West has greatly assisted in the development of
China, to the last conversation that we have had, over the
course of the last 35 years or so. I cannot, for the life of
me, understand some of the capabilities that they are putting
in the field unless it is an aggressive posture, and frankly, I
think they have told us that with their ambition to supplant
the rules-based international order and replace it with one
with Chinese characteristics, which they said they intend to do
by mid-century.
Senator King. I think that is a key question we have to
continue to examine--what does China want?
Next question. What do you see, strategically, militarily,
technically, in terms of cooperation between Russia and China?
In the '50s and '60s, they were considered a monolith. Then
they split. Are they moving toward a greater degree of
cooperation? Is that something we should be concerned about?
Admiral Davidson. In a tactical and operational space I
have seen some collaboration there. China has participated in
Russia's Pacific/Eastern Military District capstone exercise
for three straight years. We have seen co-bomber flights as
recently as last fall, where Chinese and Russian bombers joined
on each other and flew through the Sea of Japan, East China
Sea, and into the Philippine Sea. We are seeing some exchanges
like that.
I think that there is less cooperation, although frequent
discussion, at the strategic level. Through all of it, I view
it with some alarm. While we could consider some of the
tactical and operational cooperation nascent, they are building
towards improvement. There is no doubt in my mind.
Senator King. Which it seems to me, if that continues is a
matter of serious concern.
Admiral Davidson. I would agree, absolutely.
Senator King. Developing a higher level of cooperation.
Speaking of alliances, I spent some time in Asia a few
years ago and met, bilaterally, with a whole range of countries
in that region. I came away with the conclusion, we have
allies; China has customers. One of my questions is, you have
mentioned India several times. India has always been a neutral
country, if you will. Are we developing a stronger alliance
with them? You mentioned them as part of the Quad. Do they
consider themselves a member of something of that nature?
Admiral Davidson. India has long had an approach called
strategic autonomy, you know, a non-aligned approach with
others. But I think certainly the activities along the Line of
Actual Control with China has opened their eyes to what
cooperative effort with others might mean for their own
defensive needs. We have provided some information to India in
that crisis--cold weather closing, clothing, some other
equipment, some things like that--and over the last several
years we have been deepening our maritime cooperation.
I think you will see India, in the very near term, you
know, remain committed to their non-aligned approach, but I
think they will deepen their engagement with the Quad, and I
think that is a key strategic opportunity for us, Australia,
and Japan.
Senator King. That would be a geopolitical major
development if India were closely aligned with those other
countries.
One final short question. My concern is accidental
conflict. A destroyer is in the South China Sea. A Chinese
pilot miscalculates and runs into the destroyer. There is
escalation from there. What do we have in place in the way of
mil-to-mil contact or other mechanisms for defusing accidental
conflict? Some very serious worldwide conflicts have begun with
accidents.
Admiral Davidson. Thanks, Senator, for that. You know,
first, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and all of our service
chiefs, as well as the Secretary of Defense, have routine
communications with their counterparts in China. There is no
doubt about it. But I would assure you that, you know, 99.xx
percent of the encounters we have with the Chinese, at sea and
in the air, are safe and professional. That goes down all the
way to the communications that transpire between our two
nations when we are occupying the same tactical space. Those
remain safe and professional.
The repeated narrative of miscalculation, you know, was
really borne from China, because I hear it through diplomatic
means. They are threatening other nations of a miscalculation
in order to deter us from doing what is rightfully the
international operations that we do in the East China Sea and
South China Sea. We will continue to endeavor to keep our
aviators and our mariners properly informed of the risks that
were out there. But make no mistake about it, our expectation
is that China conduct themselves safe and professionally at
sea, and should going forward.
Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Scott,
please.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman Reed. Admiral, thank you
for your service and the men and women you command for what
they do every day to defend the freedom of this country.
My first question is about Taiwan. I think you agree that
we have got to prevent Communist China from controlling Taiwan.
It is a strategic necessity for the United States, and the loss
would devastate our ability and the ability of Japan to counter
China's aggression. You agree with that, right?
Admiral Davidson. As a combatant commander out there in the
Indo-Pacific, I have an obligation to support the Taiwan
Relations Act, and in a geostrategic sense I think it is
critically important to the United States' global status, yes.
Senator Scott. I introduce the Taiwan Invasion Prevention
Act to end the United States strategic ambiguity about Taiwan.
I think it is time for the United States to state clearly that
we are not going to allow Communist China to invade and subdue
Taiwan, and that both in Taiwan and the United States we have
got to invest the right resources--weapons, training, and
dialogue--to ensure that General Secretary Xi understand that
he is not going to gain anything.
So what are your thoughts on that?
Admiral Davidson. Sir, I wake up every day, you know,
trying to assess the dynamic nature of the geostrategic
environment, and, you know, frankly, we ought to be thinking
about these things every day. I would submit that we have got
more than 40 years of the strategic ambiguity has helped keep
Taiwan in its current status. But, you know, these things
should be reconsidered routinely. I would look forward to the
conversation.
Senator Scott. Do you feel comfortable that both the United
States and Taiwan are moving forward in a manner that they are
going to be able to defend, with our support, if there was an
invasion?
Admiral Davidson. I think it takes our continued support,
Senator, and key to that is consistent and persistent arms
sales to Taiwan in order for them to continue their capability
going forward.
Senator Scott. How much effort or time do you put into
Indonesia, and can they be a check on Communist China's
aggression?
Admiral Davidson. I am sorry. Could you say the question
again?
Senator Scott. On Indonesia, can they be much of a check on
Communist China's aggression?
Admiral Davidson. I have cooperative efforts with
Indonesia, in the maritime especially, and a deepening
relationship. We do a number of exercises together. I would say
Indonesia is very concerned about Chinese activities,
particularly when they infringe in or around the waters of
Indonesia going forward, and I think that Indonesia is an
opportunity for the United States to deepen our relationship
with. With China, it is just one of the things we need to be
thinking about together.
Senator Scott. How well is the ability to communicate being
done with our allies there, whether it is Taiwan or South Korea
or Japan? I mean, like what Senator King was talking about, the
chance that there would be an inadvertent mistake, and is there
the ability to, even on our side, share information well enough
to help prevent something?
Admiral Davidson. We proposed, in our 1241 assessment for
the PDI, a multi-partner environment, which is information
technology (IT) that I think would raise the surety of the
cybersecurity of what we transmit back and forth between our
allies and partners in the region. It would enable us to, as
well, not only protect information but deepen collaboration on
key strategic and military issues like this as well, yes.
Senator Scott. How well is Huawei or other companies,
Chinese companies, been able to infiltrate the communications
systems in these countries that we rely on as allies? Or are we
giving China the ability to be able to shut down communications
pretty easily, which would impact our own ability for our
military to discuss things with our allies?
Admiral Davidson. That is certainly something that we have
to be on the lookout for. We have been deeply engaged over a
couple, 3 years about the vulnerability that Huawei equipments
would present in any kind of allied structure. To be frank,
given what I know of the threat I would want to withhold any
information-sharing or equipments that would rely on that.
Senator Scott. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Let me now call on
Senator Peters via Webex.
Senator Peters. Admiral, thank you for being with us today.
Thank you for your continued service to our country, as well. I
appreciate all of your efforts.
Admiral, Chinese hostility towards Taiwan and of aggression
in the South China Sea and certainly the military growth that
we are seeing from the Chinese requires a conventional
deterrent. But unrestricted warfare also requires comprehensive
deterrence, as you know. I think Admiral Mullen described it as
``two challenges and one fleet.''
So to my question to you, Admiral, is, where do information
warfare and low-intensity conflict fit into your priorities
within your command? I ask because the PDI does not appear to
project growth for the Joint Task Force Indo-Pacific (JTFIP),
and the question, is it simply a low-cost endeavor or does it
reflect a more limited role in the overall strategy that you
are pursuing?
Admiral Davidson. Well, it is not meant to be a limited
role at all, Senator. I do think it is a low-cost effort. That
said, much of what we have accomplished with Joint Task Force
Indo-Pacific, looking backwards, in the years past, has been
taken out of hide in order to properly man it and equip it. I
am trying to round out the investments there so that the
shortcomings I have taken in the rest of the portfolio, you
know, that JTFIP does not come at that expense into the future.
But I think it is actually key to our deterrent approach going
forward.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Admiral. You know, a partner of
government that shares our view on regional security landscape,
that may not necessarily reflect the majority view of its own
society, even when it is combined with security cooperation, so
a constant tension for those governments. So my question is
related to how INDOPACOM can actually bridge this gap through
civil-military initiatives. So my question for you, Admiral is,
to what extent do you see initiatives such as Pacific Angel and
the Embassy Civil-Military Support elements playing a role in
your command strategy towards China, specifically?
Admiral Davidson. I think they are key efforts as well,
Senator. We were talking earlier about a whole-of-nation
approach to meet these challenges, and those two organizations
you highlighted help knit together multi-agency efforts in that
particular regard.
Senator Peters. So a U.S. Army Pacific element, Task Force
Oceana, has a continuous presence on ten Pacific islands, using
two-person augmentation teams that kind of shape the physical
and the informational environments in those places. How do you
believe we can better enable these units to make sure that our
strategic message is having the impact that we would like it to
have?
Admiral Davidson. Well, it is an element in my 1251 request
for the PDI. We call it Operation Pacific Resolve writ large.
But the proper resourcing of it is to do precisely what you
have asked for, to deepen, first, our interagency
relationships, and then, as well, to deepen our partnerships
with other nations on matters of concern to those other
nations, because that is really the basis of our relationships
across the region. The Army's involvement, and indeed, all the
service components have an approach out here that is very
similar. Their execution of it is critical to our overall
strategy in the region, and frankly, it is the day-to-day
connectivity with counterparts on the ground, in the air, and
in the maritime, and all those places.
Senator Peters. Well, thank you, Admiral. I appreciate
those responses. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Peters. Now let
me recognize Senator Blackburn via Webex.
[No response.]
Chairman Reed. It appears that we have some communications
issues, and I will recognize Senator Tuberville.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, thank
you for your testimony today. I am glad to hear you call it
Indo-Pacific. You know, I am sure China would prefer we not use
that word because of a democracy and how big of an ally they
are for us. I have heard several people, even in this building,
call it something else.
But, you know, we heard for years the United States needs
to turn its attention to the Indo-Pacific, and the U.S. has
invested $20 billion since 2014 in the European Deterrence
Initiative, but we have not done much in the Pacific.
Here are my questions. Explain very briefly, the Aegis
Ashore system. Could you explain that, explain the Aegis Ashore
system? Could you explain that?
Admiral Davidson. Thank you for the question, Senator.
Aegis Ashore is a system that has, in fact, already been
developed. We have built and are employing one actually already
in Romania, and there is one building and imminently
operational in Poland as well, and it is to help NATO with the
defense of Europe. It is, essentially, a radar. The command and
control, the information technology, communications
connectivity, and the interceptors, missiles, that are capable
of defeating ballistic missile, cruise missile threats in and
around today.
You know, an Aegis Ashore system on Guam, a fixed site on
Guam, would enable 360-degree defense of Guam from any military
attacks from China, whether they come by sea, by air, or by
ballistic missile, in the future. It is technology that is
available today. We have built it ashore, we have built it at
sea, and it is our number one priority for funding in Guam.
Senator Tuberville. I am sure Putin is real fired up about
us putting one in Poland, but that is all right. That is one of
your priorities. Is that still going to be your priority for
Guam?
Admiral Davidson. We need to have a mix of operational and
defensive capability out there, and in my own analysis and my
work with the Missile Defense Agency it is the key shortcoming
for the defense of Guam at this point.
Senator Tuberville. Yeah. Thank you, Admiral. I yield.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Tuberville. I
will now call upon Senator Manchin. Senator Manchin, please.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Admiral, for your service, and I am sure you are looking
forward to your retirement. That has to be good for your
family, but I know we will be seeing more of you in a different
light, I am sure.
Sir, basically on Japan, has Japan changed its position on
Aegis?
Admiral Davidson. Japan has reconsidered its pursuit of two
Aegis Ashore sites. It has already committed funds to it. They
are still working their way through really a base of
alternatives that I think include both a disaggregated posture
between land and sea as well as sea and land options.
Senator Manchin. Was it mostly from just public opinion,
public discourse with it, more so than military decisions?
Admiral Davidson. The reason to roll it back?
Senator Manchin. Uh-huh.
Admiral Davidson. The siting of the initial Ashore sites
that they established I think ran into some local political
concerns that had not been worked through before they made the
decisions, so they are trying to work through those local
politics.
Senator Manchin. Beyond the Aegis Ashore system in Guam,
what further missile defense capabilities do we need in the
Pacific, and where do you believe they should be located?
Admiral Davidson. You know, for fixed sites, I mean, that
is the one I am advocating for. You know, one of the benefits
it provides us is it frees up our sea-based assets, our
destroyers, to move with the maneuver forces, protect the
carriers, protect the amphibious forces, and to protect more
widely dispersed land sites that we might be operating from, on
behalf of the Air Force, the Army, the Marines, et cetera. That
is why I am pursuing that, and that is the sole major structure
at this point.
We do have existing capabilities, as do our allies and
partners, when it comes to some shorter-range air defense
threats.
Senator Manchin. Hypersonic weapons may be one of the
biggest threats, based on Russian and Chinese development and
the lack of defenses against these types of weapons.
Acknowledging that we are not in the classified portion of our
hearing, which we were this morning, can you tell us, are
United States capabilities in hypersonic weapons sufficient,
based on the capability of Chinese defenses against our
conventional assets? How are we able to defend ourselves
against hypersonics?
Admiral Davidson. If you do not mind, Senator, I would like
to take that one for the record and do it in a classified way,
so that it is clear.
Senator Manchin. So I do not know whether this might be in
the same category. How vulnerable are we to Russia and Chinese
hypersonic weapons in the Pacific theater, and are you
satisfied with the capabilities being developed to counter the
threat? Do we consider that a threat in the Pacific theater,
and are we developing anything that we can help protect in that
area?
Admiral Davidson. Both China and Russia are developing
hypersonic weapons. We are in the research and development
(R&D) stages of development as well, and much more work needs
to be done to provide for the defenses, you know, an
operational system that would provide for the defenses.
Frankly, it is going to take a mixture of what we put on land
and at sea as well as what we can put in space to actually
defend against those going forward.
Senator Manchin. According to the World Economic Forum, by
2030, your area of responsibility, or that you have had, your
area of responsibility, will be home to many of the world's
megacities, that will continue to present vast, complicated
governance issues, and my fear is that these governments will
look to an authoritarian China as a model, rather than the
United States. So my question would be, from a military
perspective, what are some meaningful steps that can be taken
to help leaders in India, Indonesia, Japan, and the Philippines
so that they don't start looking at authoritarianism as the way
to go?
Admiral Davidson. I think we have to recognize we are in a
competition here, Senator. China's Belt and Road Initiative
actually has a component that is trying to enable smart cities
globally, where all cyber connections would lead back to China,
which we have to highlight the threat that that presents to
others. Again, a whole-of-government approach--have to be
willing to compete in that environment to help the
infrastructure and advances in these other cities, even if it
is only advice.
Senator Manchin. Where do we need to expand the programs to
ensure allies are capable and that we have appropriate
interoperability in the case of a conflict in the Indo-Pacific
region?
Admiral Davidson. My key objective in this year's budget is
to pursue this mission partner environment, to help raise the
information technology connections between our allies and
partners in the region, build collaborative efforts in
operations and planning, highlight concerns to these individual
nations, and have the kind of resiliency in the networks that
we need.
Senator Manchin. Has any thought been given to increasing
those programs with India and our partners in the Indo-China
peninsula, to provide a barrier and distraction to China's
efforts in the South China Sea?
Admiral Davidson. Absolutely. That is at the core of our
effort.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Admiral.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin. Now I would like
to recognize Senator Blackburn via Webex.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Admiral,
thank you for your time this morning. I know that we are
talking a lot about the Indo-Pacific and China and the problems
that we have there, and I am going to stay kind of with the
same line of questioning that you have had with Senator
Manchin.
Our nuclear triad, do you agree that we should be
modernizing, that that would be a valid and convincing
deterrent?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, absolutely, ma'am.
Senator Blackburn. Taiwan, let's talk a little bit about
that. I know you mentioned that earlier, in one of your
responses. What should we be doing to increase our bilateral
military exercises with Taiwan, or multilateral exercises with
others in the region or professional military development?
Admiral Davidson. You know, to your last point first,
ma'am, I think there is opportunity to help in professional
development when it comes to Taiwan. We think that they have
some specific issues that could help provide for their defense,
you know, better reserve corps, for example, better response. I
can tell you, Sergeant Major Shorter, who is sitting behind me
here, has had a longstanding professional development dialogue
with his counterparts in Taiwan as well.
When it comes to exercises, we at U.S. Indo-Pacific
Command, we do periodically provide--actually, it is annually
provide some exercise support to Taiwan's major exercise, Han
Kuang, during the course of the year. We help provide some
observers to help understand how Taiwan thinks about their
defense, what their exercises exercise, you know, what that
exercise contribution is to the advancement in their doctrine
within Taiwan, and then to deepen our relationships as well.
Senator Blackburn. On the fusion centers, I had included
some language in the 2021 NDAA to support an increased funding
for these regional fusion centers. I would like for you to talk
just a little bit about what opportunities arise for China if
we do not continue an aggressive support for these, and then if
you want to highlight the changes that you think we should be
making as we look at the Indo-Pacific region in helping to
strengthen our allies using these fusion centers.
Admiral Davidson. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question.
Setting China aside, which really is not at the core of these
fusion centers, what we envision in the region is three
collaboration networks, one focused mostly on the Indian Ocean,
one focused on counterterrorism and centered in Southeast Asia,
and then one to be sited somewhere in the Pacific as well. But
it is really to knit together--as we have articulated earlier,
we do not have a multilateral alliance network. We have a
series of bilateral alliances and partnership, and some of the
concerns of the Nations that would be involved in these
individual centers, you know, there is kind of a common concern
that would enable dialogue and cooperation.
So, you know, just speaking of the Counter-Terrorism
Information Facility (CTIF) in Singapore, the Counter-Terrorism
Information Facility, they are concerned about Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in East Asia, ISIS in the Philippines,
the potential of some ISIS foreign fighters returning to that
area. It is just an opportunity for military and civilian
entities in Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei,
with United States and Australian support, to come together and
speak about it.
In the Pacific, as just one other example, it is really to
focus on illegal, unregulated, unreported fishing and other
trafficking threats in the region, like narco-trafficking and
human trafficking and things like that, and to provide a
reliable network where multiple bilateral partners can come
together and speak in these area.
You know, because of the very bilateral nation-to-nation
nature of the region, finding areas of common cause I think are
critically important, and we are trying to fill that need.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blackburn, and now let me
recognize Senator Duckworth via Webex.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral
Davidson, it is good to see you again. I am sorry I was not
able to come visit in 2020, but hopefully 2021 I will be back
in the Indo-Pacific region.
I don't have to tell you about the unique challenges, the
tyranny of distance in the Indo-Pacific's geography and great
power competitors and what they present to our supply chain and
logistics enterprises. I know we have to invest in long-range
fires and other critical capabilities, but I hope that you
share my concern that we will not be able to build a combat-
credible deterrence if we do not have the logistics capability
and capacity to realistically support our complex military op
plans.
Admiral Davidson, please elaborate on your request for
funding for a Pacific movement and coordination center. What
would this funding provide for you and why is it critical for
achieving your objectives in the Indo-Pacific region?
Admiral Davidson. Thank you very much, Senator. We had
hoped to see you out in the Indo-Pacific as well.
You have laid the basis for this quite well. We have added
a fifth pillar into the 2022 budget because we did not think
that joint logistics and sustainment was getting the requisite
focus as we talked about all these other issues.
So the movement center, in and of itself, is to enable our
ability to work with the tyranny of distance, have more
resiliency in all the multiple processes that go into
logistics, from multiple sources. Some are governmental, some
are commercial, et cetera, and then to start to deal in the
contested environment, the kind of threats that we might see
disrupting our logistics writ large.
So we have highlighted it in the 1251 report for this year
and we will keep joint logistics on there as a pillar that we
need to focus on, going forward.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. So let's go further into
this. How can the military services and other DOD agencies play
a role in developing the logistics systems capabilities and
capacity required to support these op plan? You know, I am
thinking of everybody can play a part in this. Can you speak a
little bit to what the other agencies can do? What can we do
right now to address these issues?
Admiral Davidson. Well----
Senator Duckworth. I speak to things like, you know, U.S.
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), and we do not have enough
tanker aircraft, we do not have enough hulls in the water, that
sort of thing.
Admiral Davidson. Yeah, no, you have got it exactly right.
I mean, there is deep need to recapitalize the military sea
lift and anything that--plus those assets, not anything, those
assets that Maritime Administration provides. I think
recapitalization there is necessary. We are closely partnered
with TRANSCOM on the tanker network around the globe. I think
writ large you will see the Air Force and TRANSCOM working
together, trying to figure out where new capability like the
KC-46 should be added, what is the best positioning for it in
order to make its availability and sustainability sound while
contributing to the overall transportation network as well. You
know, that needs to be recapitalized--excuse me, examined. The
posture needs to be examined as it goes forward as well.
There is a deep focus on the issue of contested logistics
as well. It is one of the doctrinal concepts that the Joint
Staff is trying to advance. We are deeply involved in that
conversation and look forward to its output here during the
course of this year.
Senator Duckworth. Could we carry out the op plans for the
Indo-Pacific region without the fifth pillar that you are
proposing?
Admiral Davidson. Oh, ma'am, all the combatant commands
depend highly on logistics. In our theater, I do not have the
benefit of internal lines of communication. We have got to be
able to protect these external lines of communication, you
know, deliver some actually to our allies and partners in the
region as well, and then defend it all in order to maintain the
posture that we have out there in the region.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Duckworth. Let
me recognize Senator Hawley via Webex.
Senator Hawley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Admiral,
thank you for being here and congratulations on your many
decades now of outstanding service. On behalf of your fellow
Missourians I just want to say thank you for all that you have
done for the country, and we are very proud of you in the state
of Missouri, so thank you for your service.
Let me ask you a question that I posed to Deputy Secretary
of Defense Kathleen Hicks in her testimony a couple of weeks
ago. She testified that it is essential for the United States
to maintain the ability to defeat a Chinese fait accompli
against Taiwan in order to strengthen deterrence against China.
Do you agree with Deputy Hicks on this point?
Admiral Davidson. Absolutely.
Senator Hawley. Do you agree with Deputy Hicks that a
strategy of denial is essential for deterring Chinese
aggression?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, and that is core to our approach in
the 1251 report.
Senator Hawley. Yes, it is. Let me just give you a second
to explain to the Committee why it is important you think to
strengthen our forces west of the International Date Line in
order to effectively achieve deterrence by denial.
Admiral Davidson. Thanks, Senator. You know, our posture in
the region must be demonstrative of the capabilities that the
United States could and would bring to bear in a crisis--its
capacity, numbers, and the will of the United States to prevent
the fait accompli that you highlighted.
We fulfill that not only through--and this goes back a
little bit to what Senator Duckworth had to say--not only
through people focused so much on fires and platforms, but it
is the whole of the apparatus that makes that sound. It is the
logistics, it is the intelligence and warning, it is all that
stuff that buys you the time in order to present options to the
national security apparatus here, and the Nation, should the
day-to-day competition turn to crisis.
Importantly, what we are trying to do is every day that
China gets out of bed and peels back the curtain and sees the
United States and its allied and partner network out there in
the Western Pacific, assuring its own access, that it thinks I
do not want to mess with that capability and that capacity and
what I know to be the will, and closes the curtains, and is not
going to fight. You know, that is what we are trying to
achieve.
Senator Hawley. Yeah, let me just ask you about the window
of conflict with regard to China. Some are saying that we do
not really need to worry about potential conflict with China
until 2035, or even later. You said last week China could
achieve military overmatch in the region as soon as 2026, and
that if it does--and I am quoting you now--it could like choose
to forcibly change the status quo in the region.
Can you just elaborate on those comments?
Admiral Davidson. Yeah. We have indication that the risks
are actually going up. I have to be a little delicate here,
Senator, because of the classified nature of some of the
material, but I think, demonstratively, what you are seeing
China do in the region--in Hong Kong, in the South China Sea,
and the East China Sea, some of the malign military actions
that have taken in and around Taiwan and elsewhere in the East
China Sea and South China Sea, are indicative that China's pace
is quickening, and we need to be postured to prevent that
quickening from happening.
Senator Hawley. You also said that if China does succeed in
changing the status quo that that change would likely be
permanent. Tell us what you meant by that.
Admiral Davidson. Well, they have made it quite plain that
they would wish to supplant U.S. leadership around the globe. I
am seeing a whole-of-government effort in trying to fulfill
that ambition, and they are trying to do that by mid-century.
They are knocking down waypoints that they think stand in their
way of achieving that. I would say the most waypoint that they
have knocked down is the establishment of the--or the
revocation of the national security law in Hong Kong, and the
obliteration of one country and two systems there. That,
fundamentally, is, you know, I think sending a chill across the
region about what Chinese ambitions might be and who might fall
ill of Chinese design.
Senator Hawley. I have got just a few seconds here. Let me
ask you--actually, give you the opportunity actually to comment
about the Guam defense system. You have spoken about the need
for this on a number of occasions. Just give us a sense of what
will happen to our ability to deter Chinese aggression if we do
not strengthen Guam's air and missile defense systems.
Admiral Davidson. It is the key piece that we are missing
that signals to the region that the U.S. is a reliable and
committed security partner, that we are there to defend not
only U.S. territory but our interests abroad, and in
combination with other capabilities. A more distributed
posture, a higher level of lethality in our air and maritime
and ground forces that might be rotating or present in the
region puts forward that total deterrent posture that helps the
deter-by-denial objective, that they cannot knock Guam out with
an easy shot and keep us out of the fight to present that fait
accompli that Deputy Secretary Hicks talked about.
Senator Hawley. Great. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley. Now via Webex I
would like to recognize Senator Rosen.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Admiral, for being here, for your service, you and your team,
all the work that you have done.
I would like to focus today a little bit on how using
technology can potentiate our strategic planning and, of
course, the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. So let's talk about
regional data-sharing for a moment. America's longstanding
advantage in the Indo-Pacific relies on our network of
alliances with regional democracies. These partnerships are the
cornerstone of promoting a free and open region. As part of the
mission partner environment, U.S. INDOPACOM seeks to develop an
integrated architecture to expand data-sharing amongst like-
minded nations through the use of information fusion centers,
joint centers where allies can share information using cloud-
based technologies, integrated systems, and secure access
control.
So, Admiral Davidson, can you outline your plans to
establish an interoperable, digital network in the Indo-
Pacific, and how does an integrated IT architecture strengthen
our ability to share information and really fight together with
our allies and partners?
Admiral Davidson. Thank you for the question, Senator, very
much. We have described the MPE in our 1251 assessment, and we
hope it will be resourced by the PDI initiative. It is
technology and capability that is actually evident, you know,
now. It is not new development that we need to do.
But sharing with our allied and partner network around the
region would do a few things, to your last point. One, raise
the cyber resiliency of the information that we share and
others share with us and with each other, and then, in turn,
provide reliable connectivity for us to collaborate, to
cooperate, to plan, to highlight threats in the region to the
level of concern that the Nations participating would have, all
the way from illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing on to
the higher threat concerns in the region with other partners.
But it would give us the assurance that the information that
were being shared couldn't be disrupted or could not be shared
outside the confines of the network as well.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I would like to move to, and we
spoke about this a little bit earlier, but virtual military
exercise, because we have to overcome the challenge of joint
training across long distances in the Indo-Pacific. So U.S.
INDOPACOM, I know that you are seeking to initiate Pacific
Multi-Domain Training and Experimentation Capability, or PMTEC.
This initiative would include creating virtual coalition
training complexes, linking together testing and training
ranges in the United States, like Nellis Air Force Base and
Fallon Range Training Complex in my home state of Nevada, with
allies like Japan and Australia.
So can you talk a little bit about how the virtual training
environment can transform the way U.S. Forces train with allies
in the region, how it allows us to model and try different
things out in a virtual setting with our allies and partners,
and maybe even increase the frequency of these training
missions.
Admiral Davidson. Yes, ma'am. Thank you very much. As our
own joint force has brought in now what we call multi-domain
capabilities, meaning space and cyber capability as well as
what we see in the terrestrial environment, right--air, land,
and sea--as well as adapt the capabilities, or modernize the
capabilities in the terrestrial environment, fifth-generation
fighters like the F-35 and the F-22, integrated air and missile
defense like our Aegis ships, THAAD radars, and things like
that. We need to be able to stress the joint force in a dynamic
training range in a way that cannot occur in what was 20th
century-developed ranges.
Each one of these ranges that we have talked about--Alaska,
what you have highlighted in Nevada at Fallon and Nellis, what
we have in Hawaii, for example, at PTA and PMRF in Kauai, and
what we hope for at the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands, Joint Military Training Initiative (CJMT), the
training range out in Guam, and Commonwealth of Northern
Mariana Islands (CNMI)--we want to deliver some connectivity,
range to range, and the ability to inject, you know, computer-
generated, virtual and constructive, as we call it,
capabilities in there so that we can more widely stress the
joint force, test it, train it, and, oh, by the way, if we
wanted to keep anything secret that we did not want a satellite
or an intelligence-gathering ship to observe, do it in an
entirely virtual environment.
We need to extend PMTC as we have developed it to these
ranges. We think it is transportable, we think it is sharable
between these ranges, and we think it will bring a much higher
level of fidelity of training to the very disparate forces we
have over vast areas, from Alaska to California to Hawaii and
westward, going forward.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that. I look forward
to working with you on developing all the new skill sets that
our military needs to perform these operations. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Now let me
recognize Senator Kelly.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Admiral, for joining us today. I have got a couple of questions
here about command and control and communications, and we rely
heavily on satellites to do that.
In January of 2007, China conducted an anti-satellite test
against one of their own nonoperational weather satellites with
a kinetic kill vehicle, and it has been reported that in the
years since China has an operational capability that can attack
satellites in low-earth orbit and that they are developing the
capability that goes all the way out to geosynchronous orbit.
So how does this affect the strategic balance of power in
the region, from your perspective?
Admiral Davidson. Thanks for that, Senator. Yes, both China
and Russia have demonstrated capability to disrupt satellites,
you know, testing capabilities on their own assets in the past,
as you have articulated. It clearly, I think, demonstrates that
space, which we have long considered a domain in which would be
unthreatened for the United States, the potential is there,
actually, for it to be threatened.
We have to build resiliency into our space apparatus. That
happens with other space assets, it happens with creating
airborne and other terrestrial alternatives to fulfill that,
and it changes the calculus in space as well. We have to
recognize that, again--and this goes back to some earlier
comments I made about deterrence theory. We are not going to be
able to play defense alone in this particular regard. If we
cannot demonstrate to others that their capabilities in space
might be at risk, then we run the risk of a deterrence failure.
That said, the space layer is critically important to how
we sense in the strategic nuclear deterrent, how we communicate
across the joint force, and even how we sense and distribute
information to the conventional forces as well. Its resiliency
is incredibly important to us.
Senator Kelly. As you are gaming out scenarios with the
PLA, do you consider this capability that they have obtained?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, absolutely.
Senator Kelly. Okay, and then do you have sufficient
intelligence and surveillance capability to keep up with the
changes that they are making with regards to their space
systems now?
Admiral Davidson. I would have to allow General Raymond at
the Space Force and General Dickinson to respond at Space
Command (SPACECOM) as well. But writ large, over all the
capabilities that we see China developing there is a need for
more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of their
test and development, in particular, and then, you know,
observing what they are doing in the training and exercise
realm as well, writ large. I would be surprised if General
Raymond and General Dickinson did not agree that that was
necessary in space too.
Senator Kelly. All right. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Kelly. Admiral
Davidson, thank you again for your distinguished service in the
Navy and the Nation, to your family who endured as much as you,
in many cases, and once again, please convey our appreciation
and profound respect for the men and women under your command.
Thank you, Admiral Davidson. This is the end of the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
submarines
1. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, how important is it for
your forces to have the most advanced technological capabilities in the
undersea domain?
Admiral Davidson. It is critical for USINDOPACOM to remain on the
leading edge of advanced undersea technology. The Virginia and
Columbia-class submarines ensure the United States maintains its
advantage in undersea warfare for the foreseeable future. The Virginia-
class represents our most advanced asymmetrical advantage in countering
the PRC's anti-access area denial strategy, guaranteeing the United
States ensures access to the sea-lanes of communication in the first-
island chain. The Virginia-class submarine's advanced technology is
difficult to detect and has the offensive capability to hold any
maritime or terrestrial target at risk.
Meanwhile, the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine provides
the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad and provides an invaluable
multi-mission platform as a replacement for the aged Ohio-class
submarine.
2. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, what has China been doing,
that you are aware of, to close the technological gap in undersea
capabilities with the United States?
Admiral Davidson. China recognizes the importance of the undersea
domain and is pursuing a range of capabilities to close the gap. China
is fielding and integrating dedicated anti-submarine patrol aircraft
and surface ships, installing and operating undersea monitoring
systems, and investing heavily in unmanned I autonomous sensors to
improve situational awareness. Many modem PLA Navy multirole surface
warships feature advanced anti-submarine weapons and sensors.
Additionally, the PLA Navy continues to field improved submarines, such
as the Type 039A/B Yuan-class diesel-electric air-independent-powered
attack submarine, and will add its first guided-missile nuclear attack
submarine by the mid-2020s. In combination, these developments provide
the PRC with improved undersea awareness, more lethal anti-submarine
warfare capabilities, and a greater offensive strike capability.
3. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, do we have the capability
to counter these emerging threats from China?
Admiral Davidson. Based on current threat reporting, USINDOPACOM is
poised to counter the emerging threats from China provided we fulfill
our current requested force requirements within the AOR. Currently,
United States Anti-Submarine platforms are more technically advanced
and provide the ability to counter Chinese submarine emerging threats.
The United States must continue to resource all Anti-Submarine warfare
platforms, including submarines, cruisers, destroyers, and maritime
patrol aircraft. The United States must also maintain funding for new
platforms such as the Virginia-class submarines to ensure adequate
margin as new Chinese threats emerge.
non-traditional national security threats
4. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, what steps would you
recommend the Department of Defense (DOD) take in the Indo-Pacific to
swiftly respond to emerging nontraditional national security
challenges, including global health and climate change issues?
Admiral Davidson. The United States should leverage DOD
capabilities as an important player to address the global health
security issues we currently face. While DOD can provide unique
capability for rapid response to a global threat, this must be
carefully regulated with our capacity to maintain the readiness of the
joint force. This requires the United States to leverage existing
global health security mechanisms such as the Global Health Security
Agenda (GHSA) and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons
and Materials of Mass Destruction with U.S. national security
priorities.
5. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, in your view, are the
installations in your area of responsibility (AOR) prepared to face
non-traditional threats such as extreme weather due to climate change?
Admiral Davidson. Our installations need work to mitigate the
impacts from natural disasters and extreme weather. In particular, the
DOD must invest in critical infrastructure that is used to store and
maintain our most critical weapon systems and platforms.
6. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, DOD's 2019 Climate Change
report mentioned that ``at Naval Base Guam, recurrent flooding limits
capacity for a number of operations and activities . . . that support
mission execution.'' How does this flooding jeopardize U.S. Indo-
Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) operations?
Admiral Davidson. The 2019 DOD Climate Change Report states that
recurrent flooding impacts operations and activities in Guam not only
at the Naval Base, but also at Andersen Air Force Base.
Degraded mission capacity can affect submarines, air mobility and
combat aircraft, security forces, and communication units. Guam is a
critical element for United States Homeland defense in terms of
deterrence, crisis planning, and response to potential adversary
actions. Climate change mitigation, protection, and preparedness
measures are essential in supporting DOD mission assurance and
minimizing the impact to INDOPACOM operations.
7. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, do you require additional
resources to effectively combat the effects of climate change?
Admiral Davidson. Yes. The Indo-Pacific region experiences frequent
natural and manmade disasters, including the negative impacts of
climate change. Our Center for Excellence and Disaster Management
collaborates with our partners throughout the Inda-Pacific to increase
disaster resilience, to include climate change resilience, through
humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR). I welcome
additional resources to expand science and technology (S&T) in areas
such as food, water, environmental security, waste treatment, marine
environmental management, renewable energy, and HADR.
8. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, what can be done to
further increase that resiliency of critical installations, such as
those in Guam?
Admiral Davidson. To increase resiliency, the DOD must fund
critical infrastructure projects on installations consistent with
service-prioritized installation MILCON requirements. In addition, the
DOD must leverage Energy Savings Performance Contracting (ESPCs) and/or
Utility Energy Service Contracts (UESC). These services enable budget-
neutral facility improvements options that build resilient base load
co-generation power plants to sustain critical mission loads in the
event of outages.
china
9. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, recently the Chinese
launched a large scale cyber-attack on Microsoft's email service, what
should the American Public know about that attack and what does that
tell you about China's ability and intent to attack the United States?
Admiral Davidson. [Deleted.]
10. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, you recently stated that
by 2026 the Chinese military could reach the point of ``strategic
overmatch'' with the United States--what do you think needs to be done
to counter that projection?
Admiral Davidson. My 1251 assessment lists five focus areas to
counter PRC ``strategic overmatch'':
1) Increase joint force lethality, including investments in
integrated Air and Missile Defense, like the Guam Defensive System,
which is my number one priority; long-range precision fires; and ISR
augmentation.
2) Enhance design and posture, including investments in strategic
locations to project power, and dispersal locations to distribute
forces.
3) Strengthen our allies and partners, principally by increasing
interoperability and information sharing.
4) Modernize exercises, experimentation, and innovation to
integrate Service recommended weapons and capabilities that deters
adversaries and trains the force.
5) Improve joint logistics and sustainment, including munitions
provision, fuel distribution, recapitalization of lift assets, and
command and control of those capabilities.
11. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, how can we prepare to
counter the potential threat of Chinese aggression in all domains,
including less kinetic domains such as cyber and disinformation?
Admiral Davidson. Great Power Competition requires USINDOPACOM to
compete across multiple domains simultaneously, and none are more
competitive than the information and cyber domains. This requires
USINDOPACOM to provide a resilient, secure, adaptable, and
interoperable information architecture for the United States and its
Allies and Partners. This can be achieved by fully resourcing the
Mission Partner Environment and accelerating the pursuit of information
advantage to include, but not limited to: technologies and concepts
that embrace artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning (ML),
quantum computing, and more discretion with regard to executing
Military Information Support Operations (MISO).
f-35 and strategic capabilities
12. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, when you look at the
strategic challenges in the INDOPACOM area of responsibilities, is a
5th generation fighter capability like the F-35 is critical to mission
success?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, 5th generation fighters, in particular the
F-35, are critical for USINDOPACOM to deter its adversaries. 4th
generation fighters do not provide the capabilities needed in combat
against a near peer adversary or the multi-domain superiority required
in the Western Pacific. The integration of stealth and advanced sensors
provided by 5th generation fighters is essential in an Anti-Access/Area
Denial (A2/AD) environment. Additionally, 5th generation fighters
contribute to the necessary multi-domain superiority and increased
interoperability with allies and partners.
13. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, do you believe the Joint
All-Domain Command and Control concept is going to be the most
effective way to counter China's emerging technology and enhanced
defense posture?
Admiral Davidson. The DOD is still developing the Joint All-Domain
Command and Control concept and Services are rapidly developing
required capabilities. However, the joint force will likely not fully
implement the concept by 2026, which is when China could achieve
military overmatch within the region. Regardless of system, USINDOPACOM
requires the capability to sense, make sense, and act at all levels
across all domains with allies and partners to maintain an advantage
over adversaries.
14. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, what role does the Air
Force play in strategic deterrence, including within the Pacific
Deterrence Initiative?
Admiral Davidson. The Air Force plays a significant role in
strategic deterrence, most notably in the context of the nuclear triad.
Within the context of the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), the
requirements I identified in my Independent Assessment enhance key
strategic power projection locations, and improve survivability through
divert locations that enhance a distributed force posture. The
Independent Assessment also identifies improvements to ranges in the
Indo-Pacific that will provide fully instrumented, live-virtual
training areas that will enhance all domain integration and improved
functional ranges.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
free and open indo-pacific strategy
15. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, China's navy has rapidly
grown in recent years--they currently have two operational aircraft
carriers in their fleet with a third under construction. At the same
time, they have undertaken increasingly provocative actions in the
South China Sea, after decades of building artificial islands there.
Can you talk about the importance of routine freedom of navigation
operations in the South China Sea to support our ``Free and Open Indo-
Pacific'' strategy?
Admiral Davidson. Implemented in 1979 to protect U.S. navigation,
overflight, and related interests on, under, and over the seas against
excessive maritime claims, the Freedom of Navigation (FON) program
combines diplomatic action and non-confrontational, operational
assertions of navigation and overflight rights to maintain U.S.
operational flexibility around the globe. FON operations, including
regular passage by U.S. warships through strategic waterways, are
essential for maintaining internationally recognized rights at sea.
U.S. national security and commerce depend upon the freedoms of
navigation and overflight of the seas and international law. A
significant number of coastal states assert maritime claims that are
inconsistent with international law, which-if left unchallenged-could
evolve into customary use and thereby limit navigational freedoms that
are vital to U.S. national security and global economic prosperity.
pacific deterrence initiative
16. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, in what ways does the Pacific
Deterrence Initiative (PDI) incorporate environmental security issues
into its relationships with key regional allies and partners?
Admiral Davidson. PDI requirements incorporate environmental
security objectives in the Significant Security Cooperation Initiatives
(SSCI) with our key regional allies and partners. SSCis include
capacity building activities as the primary vehicle to inform and
educate the intended audience. Typically these activities consist of
symposiums, training forums, and subject matter exchanges. PDI
requirements will also include fusion centers that promote advanced
information sharing and interoperability intended to address common
security challenges, including environmental issues.
17. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, how would proposed PDI
spending address the range of environmental challenges facing the
United States and our allies and partners, to include sea level rise,
coastal erosion, destructive invasive species, and illegal, unreported,
and unregulated fishing in the AOR?
Admiral Davidson. According to the NDAA, the PDI intends to enhance
deterrence and defense posture in the Indo-Pacific. Current
requirements identified in my 1251 Independent Assessment include a
networked architecture of fusion centers to address common challenges,
such as the effects resulting from climate change and illegal,
unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing. Reinvigorating funding for
the Defense Environmental International Cooperation (DEIC) and aligning
within PDI would enhance and strengthen our Environmental Security
Program that influences partner nations in the competition sphere. DEIC
has been without funding since 2017 causing our Environmental Security
Program to compete with Security Cooperation efforts under the Asia
Pacific Regional Initiative.
18. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, thank you for emphasizing the
importance of our allies and partners in the AOR--as a follow-up to
your answer during our colloquy on this subject in the hearing, can you
also discuss in detail how the PDI funding you are requesting would
support the Freely Associated States (FAS) and why our FAS partners are
so critical to our collective security in the region?
Admiral Davidson. The Freely Associated States (FAS) are
strategically located across our economic and defense sea lines of
communication. The requirements I identified for PDI effecting the FAS
include the Tactical Multi-Mission Over-the-Horizon-Radar (TACMOR) and
multiple facilities at airfields and ports. Identified PDI requirements
will improve information fusion and data-sharing initiatives that
address the effects of climate change; illegal, unregulated, unreported
(IUU) fishing; human and narcotics trafficking; transnational crime;
and other security threats that are key security challenges for our
regional partners. Finally, identified PDI requirements will provide
for Security Cooperation programs to build ally and partner
capabilities.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
intermediate range missiles
19. Senator Warren. Admiral Davidson, you recently submitted a
report of your investment priorities for the INDOPACOM theater that
included $3.3 billion for ``highly survivable, precision-strike fires''
with a range greater than 500km. You were recently asked at the
American Enterprise Institute about access to allied territory west of
Guam for these missiles and you said, ``there would have to be a policy
interaction to do these things going forward.'' I recognize that the
State Department would be formally responsible for leading these
negotiations, but have you had any discussions, formal or informal,
with your counterparts amongst our Western Pacific allies and partners
specifically on their willingness to host a new class of intermediate
range missiles? Based on your experience working closely with our
allies and partners, do you believe that there are any who will be
willing to host this new missile system(s)?
Admiral Davidson. Expanding ground-based fires helps to enable the
maneuver of our maritime and air forces in the Western Pacific, deters
our adversaries, improves the stability in the region, and,
operationally, forces our adversaries to work harder to find, fix, and
finish our maneuver forces. Any formal negotiations to posture ground
based long-range precision fires west of Guam is Department of State
led. USINDOPACOM routinely conducts military-to-military consultations
with allies and partners and welcomes conversations about specific
posture initiatives in the Western Pacific. Japan's leadership is
anticipating approval of a new missile defense policy that might open
the door to increased deterrence cooperation with the United States. It
is too early to determine if Japan will host United States missiles;
however, any increase in opportunities with Japan for bilateral
defense, deterrence, and combined capability development supports
efforts to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific.
20. Senator Warren. Admiral Davidson, among possible ground-
launched missile options with a range beyond 500 km, do you believe
that missiles with a longer-range and higher speed capable of striking
deep within China would be more contentious with allies than shorter-
range anti-ship missiles?
Admiral Davidson. For allies and partners potentially interested in
hosting missile strike capability, short-range anti-ship systems are
less contentious because these largely represent coastal defense -
defending a nation's territory and territorial waters. My 1251
Independent Assessment does include the requirement for long-range
strike capabilities to establish a credible deterrent in the Indo-
Pacific. Long-range precision strike capabilities, when combined with
defensive capabilities, reassures our allies and partners and gives our
adversaries pause.
china
21. Senator Warren. Admiral Davidson, during your testimony you
asserted that China ``quadrupled their nuclear capability since the
turn of the century and they will at least double it during the course
of this decade.'' You also said that if China were to ``quadruple their
stockpile'' they could possibly have nuclear overmatch over the United
States by the end of this decade. The United States maintains a total
of approximately 3,800 nuclear warheads in its active stockpile
according to open source estimates, approximately 1,500 of which are
deployed in accordance with New START [Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty]. According to last year's China military power report, China
currently has an operational nuclear warhead stockpile in the ``low
200s''. Can you clarify what you meant in stating that China has
``quadrupled their nuclear capability since the turn of the century''?
Has China quadrupled the size of its warhead stockpile? Has China
quadrupled the number of nuclear or nuclear-capable delivery systems?
Has China quadrupled the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBM) that can target the United States Homeland?
Admiral Davidson. China has at least tripled and probably
quadrupled its nuclear warhead stockpile since 2000, from 70 to 200-
300. According to a Congressional Research Service report, in 2000 the
PRC had approximately 70 nuclear warheads. The China military power
report estimate of ``low 200s'' would represent a three-fold increase.
United States Strategic Command estimates the PRC has up to 300 nuclear
warheads, representing a four-fold increase.
China has tripled the number of nuclear delivery systems since
2000, from 70 to 210. The same CRS report estimated China had
approximately 70 delivery systems (50 silo-based nuclear-capable ICBMs
and 20 mobile nuclear-capable MRBMs). Since then, the PRC has greatly
expanded the number of mobile missile launchers and added ballistic
missile submarines. The China military power report states China's
current nuclear arsenal includes all of its land-based ICBMs, some
nuclear-capable IRBMs and MRBMs, and JIN-class SSBNs. This equals an
estimated 210 delivery systems.
China has doubled the number of ICBMs that can target the Homeland
since 2000, from 50 to 100.
During my Senate Armed Services Committee appearance, the terms
``stockpile'' and ``delivery systems'' were used, sometimes
interchangeably. To clarify, over the next 10 years, the PRC will
substantially increase both its nuclear stockpile (i.e., warheads) and
delivery systems. However, it is only in the latter category that China
could exceed the United States.
Stockpile (Warheads): If China quadruples its warhead inventory
(800-1200), it would remain below the U.S. total of 1500 deployed
warheads under New START.
Delivery Systems: If China quadruples its inventory of delivery
systems (840), it would exceed the United States total of 675 deployed
systems under New START by 165.
22. Senator Warren. Admiral Davidson, do you believe that China
intends to at least double the size of its warhead stockpile? If so,
why do you assess that leaders in Beijing feel the need to pursue a
larger store of nuclear warheads?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, I agree with DOD estimates that China will
at least double its nuclear capability over the next decade. This is
part of Beijing's broader focus on expanding and diversifying its
nuclear force, to include developing a nuclear triad with land-, sea-,
and air-based delivery platforms. These developments highlight China's
strategic intent to maintain a survivable nuclear force as a global
power and may portend a shift away from what it has previously termed
as a ``minimum deterrent'' capability.
Beijing's lack of transparency regarding the scope and scale of its
nuclear program should be a concern to all nations. I strongly support
continued efforts to encourage Chinese participation in nuclear arms
control discussions.
23. Senator Warren. Admiral Davidson, given your assessment of
China's nuclear force plans over the next decade, do you believe the
United States should increase the number of nuclear warheads in its
stockpile? If so, how do you think leaders in Beijing would respond?
Admiral Davidson. Any reduction in U.S. nuclear delivery
capabilities to include reduction from a triad, stagnation of the
development of modern delivery systems, or reductions in the United
States nuclear stockpile could prompt China to question our commitment
to safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent capabilities. As the
threat and associated defenses evolve, our capabilities to defeat those
targets must evolve as well.
Beijing believes the United States is pursuing a strategy of
containment, and will evaluate any change to U.S. strategic force
posture, placement, or quantity through this lens as it determines
whether and how to reconfigure its own nuclear forces. Regardless of
U.S. actions, China will continue its nuclear modernization
initiatives.
24. Senator Warren. Admiral Davidson, you have repeatedly said,
including in your hearing testimony, that the greatest danger to the
future of the United States continues to be an erosion of conventional
deterrence with respect to China. In its fiscal year 2021 Budget
Request, the Trump administration proposed to cut the Navy's
shipbuilding account--in particular a second Virginia-class attack
submarine--to fund an unplanned, multi-billion dollar cost overrun for
the National Nuclear Security Administration's nuclear weapons program.
Did you support that decision?
Admiral Davidson. Maintaining the build rate for the Virginia-class
submarine should remain one of the United States' top DOD priorities.
The Virginia-class submarine provides significant conventional
deterrence through its capability to help control the seas and project
power in a highly contested environment and has a high rate of
survivability, which is absolutely necessary in an Anti-Access/Area
Denial (A2/AD) environment. These innovations must be balanced with
other top DOD priorities such as the erosion of the United States'
nuclear deterrence capability.
25. Senator Warren. Admiral Davidson, you believe that mitigating
an erosion of conventional deterrence with respect to China should be
the Defense Department's top priority?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, I do. The erosion of conventional deterrence
is the greatest danger for the United States in its strategic
competition with the People's Republic of China (PRC). History shows
that the People's Liberation Army typically undertakes military
operations when it has a size and capability advantage. As we see U.S.
conventional deterrent erode, the PRC will likely take on more risk to
challenge the United States and its allies in the region.
26. Senator Warren. Admiral Davidson, do you believe that the
United States can safely mitigate an erosion of conventional deterrence
by relying more heavily on nuclear weapons?
Admiral Davidson. No, the United States needs to reestablish its
conventional deterrence capacity. A conventional deterrent posture is
necessary to prevent conflict, protect U.S. interests, and to assure
allies and partners. The PRC has a growing nuclear arsenal. The
expansion and modernization of their nuclear arsenal carries with it a
growing risk of inadvertent escalation, underscoring the need to
maintain and improve conventional deterrence. To simply rely on nuclear
deterrence could effectively remove all other options short of nuclear
exchange, should conflict occur.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
role of f-35 in indopacom scenarios
27. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Davidson, some Members of Congress have
recently expressed skepticism on the need for and value of 5th
generation fighter aircraft--specifically the F-35. Meanwhile, China
has established a formidable integrated air defense network,
particularly across the Taiwan Strait, and has operationally fielded
its first 5th generation stealth fighter, the J-20. Your written
testimony highlighted 5th generation fighters as helping create the
opportunity to ``Regain the Advantage'' vis-a-vis China. Given China's
expanding anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, can you tell us
what you've seen in the intelligence estimates and/or war game results
when 4th generation vice 5th generation aircraft attempt to operate
inside of the A2/AD bubble. In your estimation, how important are 5th
generation aircraft like the F-35 to deterring Chinese aggression?
Admiral Davidson. In war-gaming, 5th generation fighters
exceedingly out-perform 4th generation fighters in an Anti-Access/Area
Denial (A2/AD) environment and suffer significantly less losses. The
lack of advanced sensors and stealth in 4th generation fighters makes
them vulnerable in the A2/AD environment. 5th generation fighters,
specifically the F-35, are therefore vitally important in deterring
Chinese aggression. Furthermore, Japan, Korea, Australia, and Singapore
have all purchased F-35s, which will inevitably increase
interoperability with the United States and the ability to share
information in time of crisis.
pacific deterrence initiative
28. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Davidson, Secretary Lloyd Austin,
Deputy Secretary Kathleen Hicks, and General Mark Milley have all said
the Indo-Pacific is the priority theater. If that is true, you would
expect the Biden administration budget to fully fund the $4.6 billion
PDI request for fiscal year 2022 as outlined and justified in the
section 1251 report you submitted this year. In your opinion, if the
President's budget request for fiscal year 2022 in early May does not
reflect the priorities you've said you need for PDI, does that
undermine the policy that the Indo-Pacific is the ``priority theater''?
Admiral Davidson. I am encouraged by the Armed Services Committees'
efforts to establish and resource the PDI. I am equally encouraged that
the Deputy Secretary of Defense articulated that PDI is a priority and
that the Department will address this initiative during the budget
review. I provided recommended capabilities and a funding profile in my
Independent Assessment to inform PDI. We will continue to provide the
prioritized requirements for PDI to inform the fiscal year 2022 budget.
I anticipate that the Department will take deliberate action to
resource the needed investments.
29. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Davidson, some Members of Congress have
publicly commented they are undecided about what, if any, additional
investments need to be made to improve U.S. military posture in the
Indo-Pacific. The worry expressed is that improving our posture in the
Indo-Pacific overemphasizes that the only way to deal with China is to
build a military large enough to dominate them, which is
``unnecessarily provocative'' and impossible in the modern era of
warfare. Meanwhile, the Associated Press (AP) reported that China
announced last week an increase in defense spending by 6.8 percent. How
do you answer the question from skeptics that we don't need PDI to
improve our posture in the Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Davidson. PDI requirements focus on vital military
capabilities needed to deter China. Deterrence is the combination of
will and capability, communicated in such a way that the adversary
assesses the cost of initiating hostilities outweighs potential gains.
PDI requirements modernize capabilities required for 21st century
warfare and communicate the United States' dedication to the region.
The investment cost is much less than the costs should deterrence fail
and conflict result. Diplomatic leaders must be able to rely on the
strength of the U.S. military and collective militaries of allies and
partners as a credible last resort to complement diplomacy,
development, and economic statecraft.
30. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Davidson, if we maintain our status quo
posture rather than improving, in your opinion, does that make military
conflict more likely or less likely?
Admiral Davidson. Maintaining our status quo posture makes military
conflict more likely because we will cede the initiative to our
competitors and adversaries in the region and fail to deter aggression.
Conversely, increasing our persistent presence through forward-
based and rotational joint forces inside the first island chain is the
most credible way to demonstrate our commitment and resolve to
competitors, deter unwanted aggression, and assure allies and partners.
Current capacity and capability gaps related to force protection,
homeland defense, joint force lethality, long range fires, ISR,
training, and logistics enablers should be a part of our future efforts
to make military conflict less likely in the Pacific.
guam defense system
31. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Davidson, the top item on your unfunded
requirements list is missile defense capability for Guam, which you
call the ``Guam Defense System''(GDS) and that you requested $350
million to begin acquiring in fiscal year 2022. Can you please explain:
A) why protecting Guam is important to defending allies and partners
like Taiwan; B) how China's missile arsenal threatens Guam, and C) how
the Guam Defense System would provide protection?
Admiral Davidson. A) Guam is a United States Territory and is part
of the United States Homeland. Guam provides the most capable and
important force projection and logistics capabilities in the Western
Pacific. Guam enables our ability to mitigate the tyranny of distance
in the Indo-Pacific' s geography as a critical hub in our supply chain
and logistics enterprise. It also provides a deep-water strategic port,
major fuel stores, munitions stores, command and control, and is a
major power projection airfield for the United States in the region.
Guam is essential to deterring China's aggression and assuring United
States allies and partners in the region.
B) China understands the importance of Guam to the United States'
ability to project power in the Westem Pacific and has developed a
credible missile force capable of attacking Guam and all of the United
States' major allies in the region. In September 2020, the PRC
showcased this capability in a propaganda video of their own bomber
forces attacking Anderson Air Force Base in Guam.
C) The nucleus for the Guam Defense System is the Aegis Combat
System (ACS). ACS provides point and area defense. It can integrate
Navy and Army current Programs of Record land-based sensors,
interceptors, and command and control systems to provide 360-degree
defense of Guam from the full range of PRC threats.
32. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Davidson, your Fiscal Year 2021
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) section 1251 report proposes
to use a version of Aegis Ashore as the solution to defend Guam against
Chinese ballistic, cruise, and advanced cruise missiles. What are the
reasons you selected the Aegis Ashore system over other options?
Admiral Davidson. The solution I recommend represents the only
capability within our current inventory of systems that will meet a
2026 delivery timeline.
33. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Davidson, the cost of the Guam Defense
System as proposed in the Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA section 1251 report is
about $1.65 billion over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), $350
million of which would be in fiscal year 2022. What components of a
full missile defense capability does the cost include (e.g. does it
include the interceptors, launchers, and other components)?
Admiral Davidson. The Guam Defense System (GDS) initial
configuration, includes Aegis Baseline (B/L) 10, solid state radar
(SPY-6 or SPY-7 variant), MK-41 VLS, Aegis Ashore, and SM3/SM6 missiles
to mitigate known defensive and offensive gaps for the defense of Guam.
It also incorporates a separate elevated sensor, Naval Integrated Fire
Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) capability, and Cooperative Engagement
Capability (CEC) that provides a baseline architecture to set the
'standards and protocols' for a 21st century Joint Fires Network (JFN).
taiwan
34. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Davidson, Xi Jinping has been clear he
does not rule out the use of force as a potential means of achieving
the unification of Taiwan. Oriana Mastro, a respected scholar on China,
recently wrote that ``For the first time in Chinese history, Xi will
have at his disposal a military capable of forcing unification.'' She
goes on to say that while many Western observers think China will able
to take the island in the next 5 to 8 years, Chinese military leaders
have told her that they will be ready within a year. When does the
Communist Party leadership in Beijing believe the Chinese military will
be ready to invade and successfully occupy Taiwan?
Admiral Davidson. We do not know when Xi or other Party leaders
believe the PLA will be ready; however, they are clearly pressing the
PLA to be ready ``sooner'' rather than ``later.'' The recent
announcement that 2027 is a new milestone for PLA modernization may be
a reflection of increased urgency. 2027 is a notable year because it
will mark the centennial of the PLA and the end of Xi Jinping's
presumed third term. Xi also stated that they cannot prolong the Taiwan
issue indefinitely, and the only acceptable resolution is unification.
PLA leaders are undoubtedly looking at all aspects of the problem--
capacity, capability, readiness, level of training, and will to fight
for the PLA, Taiwan, and the United States--to determine when
conditions are likely to lead to PLA success. Under certain
circumstances, the PRC would almost certainly order military action
immediately, regardless of assessed risk, such as a Taiwan declaration
of independence.
35. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Davidson, how is China using its
exercises to prepare for a Taiwan conflict?
Admiral Davidson. China focuses much of its training on preparing
for a military contingency against Taiwan. PLA leaders, especially
those in the Eastern Theater Command--which is responsible for Taiwan--
design exercises to rehearse and improve critical aspects of a Taiwan
contingency, including amphibious landings, air and missile support,
maritime interdiction, electronic warfare, and space and cyber support.
Many of these exercises occur in the Taiwan Strait or nearby for
realism and to familiarize PLA forces with the operational environment.
China attempts to amplify such training with heavy media coverage,
touting PLA proficiency and overmatch against Taiwan. PRC state media
said a September 2020 event was ``not a warning, but a rehearsal for a
Taiwan takeover.''
36. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Davidson, as General H.R. McMaster said
last week at a hearing on global security challenges, ``Taiwan may
represent the most dangerous flashpoint for war''. He then went on to
say because of that very real threat, ``it is immensely important to
keep forward positioned capable forces [in the Indo-Pacific]''. As Co-
Chair of the Taiwan caucus, I'm worried that a Chinese invasion of
Taiwan would present a hard test for United States military response
times. Can you talk about why United States forward positioned forces
are so important, and what you mean by forward positioned--where do
those forces need to be?
Admiral Davidson. Forward positioned forces includes permanently-
based and rotational joint forces that are west of the International
Date Line. The combination of forward-based and rotational forces
provides persistent presence that is the most credible way to
demonstrate U.S. commitment and resolve to potential adversaries while
simultaneously assuring allies and partners. In the event of crisis or
conflict, forward forces are able to respond more quickly.
37. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Davidson, at a Senate Armed Services
Committee hearing last week on global security challenges, General
McMaster said ``There's a race ongoing right now to help Taiwan harden
its defenses to make itself indigestible prior to the period of . . .
greatest danger which is from 2022 onwards, based on the conclusion of
the Beijing Winter Olympics and based on the Communist party
congress.'' The Trump administration removed many obstacles to
cooperation and engagement with Taiwan. It's now up to the Biden
administration to build on this new opportunity. What kind of
activities and arms sales should be pursued to help Taiwan ``make
itself indigestible''?
Admiral Davidson. Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, the
United States provides Taiwan defense articles and services to allow
Taiwan to maintain sufficient self-defense capabilities commensurate
with the threat that Taiwan faces. Given the growing disparity in the
cross-Strait balance of military power, we encourage Taiwan to purchase
large quantities of asymmetric systems that are highly mobile, lethal,
and survivable, to include coastal defense cruise missiles (CDCMs),
short-and medium range air defenses, and sea mines. I also believe
Taiwan needs to modernize and sustain critical conventional
capabilities like F-16V; Patriot missiles; and modem ships, submarines,
and aircraft. We also encourage Taiwan to expand Reserve Forces
integration, improve irregular warfare capabilities, prioritize service
interoperability, and develop and implement joint doctrine and a
professional non-commissioned officer corps.
indopacom security assistance
38. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Davidson, on 4 February 2021, President
Biden said ``our alliances are our greatest asset'' and that they have
``atrophied'' over the past few years. One of the primary PDI lines of
effort is to strengthen allies and partners. As I understand it, you've
requested about $425 million for security assistance in fiscal year
2022 to help strengthen allies and partners. We have been ``pivoting to
the Pacific'' for many years now. There is bipartisan support for the
statement that ``allies and partners are our asymmetric advantage''
against China. But somehow the percentage of security assistance that
goes to Indo-Pacific to strengthen allies and partners has, at best,
remained level. Do you agree it ought to be growing? Why do you think
it hasn't?
Admiral Davidson. USINDOPACOM works closely with our allies and
partners on proposals and potential solutions that address their
security concerns in an achievable and maintainable way. The annual
requested amount for USINDOPACOM security assistance increases at a
measured rate year to year, in keeping with what our allies and
partners can take on, and what USINDOPACOM can reasonably execute in
one to two fiscal years. As our ally and partner political, military,
and/or logistics infrastructure situations improve, USINDOPACOM
requests will increase commensurate with the security challenges.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
graphic depicting force laydown of united states and pacific allies vs.
china
39. Senator Wicker. Admiral Davidson, Appendix 1 to Enclosure (1)
of your section 1251 report includes a graphic comparing Chinese forces
and United States Forces (stationed west of the International Date
Line). Can you provide a similar graphic that contrasts Chinese forces
with both United States and Pacific ally forces?
Admiral Davidson. I provided the requested graphic to SASC staff on
16 March 2021. They will control or disseminate the document in
accordance with the appropriate procedures for the applicable
classification.
taiwan
40. Senator Wicker. Admiral Davidson, your third command focus area
is ``strengthening allies and partners.'' A key strategic partner who
shares our interest in deterring Chinese aggression is Taiwan. Although
they benefit from foreign military sales, we do not conduct bilateral
training exercises or personnel exchanges with Taiwan that we do with
other important partner nations. Admiral, would you like to see greater
official coordination between our military and Taiwan?
Admiral Davidson. USINDOPACOM will continue to advise Taiwan on
military capabilities, interoperability, readiness, and professional
development through security cooperation and foreign military sales in
accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act. Greater official coordination
between the United States and Taiwan through bilateral or multilateral
military exercises could prove beneficial. I would look forward to the
discussion.
41. Senator Wicker. Admiral Davidson, what measures do you think
could be taken in the near term to strengthen the United States-Taiwan
military partnership?
Admiral Davidson. Consistent with the Taiwan Relation Act, in the
near term USINDOPACOM will provide Taiwan defense articles and services
that allow Taiwan to maintain sufficient self-defense capabilities.
Given the growing disparity in the cross-Strait balance of military
power, we encourage Taiwan to purchase large quantities of asymmetric
systems that are highly mobile, lethal, and survivable, to include
coastal defense cruise missiles (CDCMs), short- and medium-range air
defenses, and sea mines. I also believe Taiwan needs to modernize and
sustain critical conventional capabilities like F-16V; Patriot
missiles; and modem ships, submarines, and aircraft. We will also focus
on improving the Taiwan military' sjoint interoperability, readiness,
and non-commissioned officer corps professional development through
subject matter expert exchanges, key leader visits, steering groups and
working groups.
amphibious warships
42. Senator Wicker. Admiral Davidson, the Marine Corps is shifting
their operational concepts to focus on smaller, more distributed
forces. Part of their proposal includes building large numbers of what
is being called the Light Amphibious Warship--a much smaller, lightly
armed ship than our current amphibious classes. I'm concerned that
these shorter range vessels, in addition to being less survivable, will
create a need for more forward bases. These forward bases would
themselves be vulnerable to attack, especially by ballistic missiles.
This vulnerability seems to be exactly one of the concerns the Pacific
Deterrence Initiative (PDI) is trying to address. Are you comfortable
with your ability to protect these widely dispersed Marine Corps
forces?
Admiral Davidson. With the right investments we can protect our
forward-based and rotational forces. Operating from dispersed locations
requires a sophisticated balance of distributed locations to sustain
the Joint Force. A more distributed, smaller footprint is better to
defend against adversary efforts to find, fix, track, and ultimately
target our forces operating from large, fixed bases in contested
environments.
43. Senator Wicker. Admiral Davidson, what role do you foresee the
larger amphibious classes of ships playing in future competition with
China?
Admiral Davidson. U.S. amphibious ships are key enablers. They
provide a specific capability that can be used both during peacetime,
such as to enable Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
operations, and in armed conflict, to provide a rapidly deployable
forcible entry capability and visible deterrent. Based on the large
number of island and archipelago nations in the AOR, the large
amphibious ships will support operations across the spectrum of
conflict. The United States must continue to procure new large
amphibious ships, while also modernizing our existing platforms.
destroyers
44. Senator Wicker. Admiral Davidson, you have established the Guam
air and missile defense system as your top priority for PDI funding. I
understand that at present we rely on the DDG 51 class ships to provide
much of the missile defense in that area. The terrible collisions
involving the destroyers USS Fitzgerald and the USS John S. McCain in
2017 highlighted how hard we are working those ships and their crews.
With the quantitative imbalance growing every year between our naval
forces and China's, have we been able to reduce the operational demands
on the crews of our forward deployed ships?
Admiral Davidson. The Comprehensive Review on USS Fitzgerald and
USS John S. McCain collision led to an Optimized Fleet Response Plan
Japan (OFRP-J) for the Forward Deployed Naval Force Japan (FDNF-J)
ships assigned to Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet. OFRP-J mandates
dedicated time for maintenance, training, and certification prior to
operational employment. OPNAV has issued updated PERSTEMPO I OPTEMPO
policy for all operational units to include FDNF-J ships. The OFRP-J
and PERSTEMPO I OPTEMPO Policy supports the overall readiness of an
FDNF-J ship that is sustainable. However, it does not reduce the
overall operational demand for ships.
The deployment of a fixed Guam Defense System would help alleviate
the operational demands that ships now undertake in their ballistic
missile defense of Guam mission, and the three likely required during
any conflict.
45. Senator Wicker. Admiral Davidson, do you have enough DDGs to
carry out your missions today?
Admiral Davidson. No. We have some shortfalls in availability, and
there are challenges to scheduling because of worldwide requirements.
electronic warfare improvements
46. Senator Wicker. Admiral Davidson, what is the importance of the
Navy Growler to the survivability of our forces and the fielding of the
Next Generation Jammer to the Indo Pacific Theater?
Admiral Davidson. The Navy EA-18G Growlers are a critical part of
our airborne electromagnetic attack (AEA) capability supporting
Operation Plan (OPLAN) and scheme of maneuver survivability. The
complex threat of emitters produced by near-peer competitors contest
freedom of maneuver in the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). The Growler
and Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) are required AEA capabilities for the
foreseeable future, to include supporting 5th and 6th generation
aircraft. To maintain U.S. military overmatch in the EMS, NGJ provides
new capabilities to ensure spectrum dominance.
47. Senator Wicker. Admiral Davidson, are you concerned about the
extended use of the legacy jammer system (ALQ-99)?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, I am concerned. The sole Airborne
Electromagnetic Attack Tactical Jamming System replacement -Next
Generation Jammer (NGJ) -must not fall behind in fleet delivery. NGJ
will provide new capabilities to the fleet to ensure spectrum
dominance. The Airborne Electromagnetic Attack community has been
relying on the ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System for decades but is facing
material and technological obsolescence that cannot counter all current
threats.
48. Senator Wicker. Admiral Davidson, is there an acceptable level
of risk between continuing to operate the legacy system and
accelerating new technology deliveries like the ALQ-249 mid band pod?
Admiral Davidson. There is always a balance between fiscal
realities and developing/fielding advanced capabilities. Our current
schedule for the ALQ-249 (Next Generation Jammer [NGJ]), if it remains
on-plan, will balance the risk against our adversary's pace of
technological development and our advantage in airborne electromagnetic
tactical jamming capability. The Engineering and development for the
NGJ includes three increments: #1 mid-band, #2 low-band, #3 high-band.
The three increments take into account assessed capabilities of
developing threats, shortfalls of the legacy system, and risk
mitigation.
49. Senator Wicker. Admiral Davidson, would you support a more
accelerated and cost effective solution to field the high band
technology?
Admiral Davidson. Yes. I would support a cost-effective approach
that accelerates the timeline for the Next Generation Jammer increment
#3 high-band capability. I do not support changing the order of
increments, delaying the current schedule, or reducing capability of
mid-band or low-band to accelerate high-band. While the high-band
capability remains a priority to cover a portion of the threat, mid-
band and low-band remain the preeminent capability to cover the most
critical threats.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
force design
50. Senator Tillis. Admiral Davidson, noted China scholar Oriana
Skyler-Mastro postulates that ``if Beijing thinks the U.S. will
intervene on Taiwan's behalf, then time becomes crucial. Chinese
military strategists believe that if you let the United States fight
the way it is used to, which includes time to mobilize and amass
firepower in theater, then victory is unlikely.'' Given that Chinese
strategists do not intend to let the United States build up military
power in the Indo-Pacific if they decide to use military force in the
region, how important are U.S. Forces west of the international
dateline and can you defend those forces as currently postured?
Admiral Davidson. My primary responsibility is to deter adversary
aggression and prevent conflict. Persistent presence through forward-
based and rotational joint forces is the most credible way to
demonstrate our commitment and resolve to potential adversaries and
deter aggression. With the right investments we can protect our
forward-based and rotational forces. In the most austere environments,
forces may rely more on inherent capabilities and passive defensive
measures. In more established environments, forces may rely on a
balanced mixture of passive defensive measures, active defenses, and
hardening of critical infrastructure. Finally, we are implementing many
measures to allow for more agile and distributed operations from
multiple smaller locations to increase survivability.
51. Senator Tillis. Admiral Davidson, the Department of Defense is
prioritizing contested logistics as part of the forthcoming Joint
Warfighting Concept. From your seat as commander of INDOPACOM, how big
of an issue is contested logistics and can you give us some examples of
how investments could improve our ability to conduct contested
logistics operations?
Admiral Davidson. Current INDOPACOM posture and Joint Logistics
Enterprise capabilities are neither agile nor resilient enough against
a peer competitor, such as the PRC. The Indo-Pacific is a vast,
archipelagic theater with long lines of communication (LOC). We must
transition from an obsolete North East Asia-heavy posture to a more
forward, lethal, distributed and robust presence throughout the region,
ideally including the Philippines and Oceania. This will require
significant investments in basing infrastructure especially at key
ports of debarkation.
We must invest in intra-theater airlift, sealift, and land-based
distribution that utilize an array of capabilities to include a mix of
autonomous, shallow draft, and surface and submersible vehicles, as
well as the ability to rapidly and selectively self-discharge. Intra-
theater sealift must be able to swiftly facilitate cargo transfers to
other vessels, and ground transports.
These vessels also must be able to onload and offload in degraded
or non-existent infrastructure and must have resilient, secure
communication and navigation suites to mitigate cybersecurity
vulnerabilities. Finally, more flexible and responsive bulk fueling
capabilities is required. Refueling vessels must conduct fast
replenishment at sea, and delivery to port fuel terminals and units
over the shore.
52. Senator Tillis. Admiral Davidson, Marine Corps Force Design
would possibly reduce the number of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters per
squadron from 16 to 10. There has been no official change to the
program of record, however, General David Berger is signaling to the
industry that we have to be prepared to adjust as the operating
environment adjusts. Facilitation of contested logistics depends
largely on operational enablers that allow maneuver within the
battlespace. One such enabler in the region is the 5th generation
fighter, specifically Marine Corps F-35s. Service level force design
initiatives look to reduce the number of Marine Corps F-35s per
squadron. Can you address how this reduction in aircraft may affect
operations within your area of responsibility?
Admiral Davidson. USINDOPACOM maintains the requirement for the F-
35, in all its variants. 5th generation aircraft provide the most
advanced ability to access, maneuver, and survive in Anti-Access and
Area-Denial (A2/AD) environments. We incur severe risk to executing
joint operations without 5th generation capability.
ground-based long-range precision fires
53. Senator Tillis. Admiral Davidson, one of your top unfunded
priorities is ground-based, long-range precision fires. Can you discuss
why this is a key priority and explain some of the specific
capabilities you believe the new system will need to have?
Admiral Davidson. Long-range Chinese air-to-air, air-to-surface,
and surface-to-surface weapons currently challenge United States
freedom of maneuver. Ground-based, precision fires will help enable
maneuver in the air and maritime domain. New capabilities must include:
anti-ship capabilities; survivable ISR that can track large numbers of
mobile targets; resilient Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2);
new, Joint, advanced, distributed battle management systems with rapid
sensor-to-shooter timelines; and a range of land, sea, and air deployed
long-range weapons able to target ships and mobile and fixed land
systems.
54. Admiral Davidson, which of the current service long-range
precision fire research and development (R&D) programs do you believe
hold particular promise in meeting your combatant command requirements?
Admiral Davidson. We support all the Services' R&D efforts for
long-range and hypersonic weapon systems. Critical for the Army and
USMC long-range fires capability is the development of Tomahawk and SM6
missiles, capabilities advocated for by USINDOPACOM since the
introduction of Regain the Advantage. USINDOPACOM's priority for
hypersonic systems include Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW),
Navy Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS), and Long Range Hypersonic Weapon
(LRHW). Other systems of interest in development are the Hypersonic
Air-launched Cruise Missile (HACM); Southern Cross Integrated Flight
Research Experimentation (SCIFiRE), a bilateral partnership with
Australia; Ground Based Anti-Ship Missile (GBASM); and Contender
Torpedo. In addition to R&D programs, we are strong proponents for our
Pacific Multi-Domain Test and Experimentation Capability (PMTEC) to
enable advanced experimentation, testing, training, and coupling of
capabilities.
defense posture realignment initiative (dpri)
55. Senator Tillis. Admiral Davidson, DPRI is the program of record
negotiated with the Government of Japan, which also provided $3.1
billion, to relocate Marine Corps Forces from Okinawa to Guam. The
executive summary of the INDOPACOM report for section 1251 of the
Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA indicates that getting INDOPACOM's force design
and posture `` . . . begins with completing the Defense Posture
Realignment Initiative (DPRI), the current program of record enables
sustainment operations and provides the necessary lift for Marine
forces scheduled to relocate from Okinawa to Guam.'' Japan is providing
$3.1 billion in contributions (in fiscal year 2012 dollars) or about 1/
3 of the estimated cost. On 6 January 2021, the Navy awarded $990
million of Government of Japan funded multiple award construction
contract for work primarily in Guam. INDOPACOM has indicated that
forward-based forces within the second island chain are important to
deterring Chinese aggression, and if necessary, responding to it. From
your interaction with the Japanese, how important is the execution of
the DPRI program as negotiated with and partially funded by the
Government of Japan--how closely are they watching the execution of
this program?
Admiral Davidson. The Government of Japan (GOJ) strongly supports
the DPRI program's relocation of Marines from Okinawa to Guam, and has
committed significant financial contributions toward this end. Since
its inception, successive GOJ administrations have prioritized
execution of the DPRI program. The GOJ views DPRI's moves as critical
to improving local support for the Alliance in Okinawa. The GOJ works
collaboratively with all USG execution and planning agencies to include
United States Forces Japan, Naval Facilities Command, U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, and Marine Corps Installations Command, among others.
56. Senator Tillis. Admiral Davidson, there are some concerns about
the ability of Marine Corps to train for full spectrum combat when they
are moved to Guam. Does the program of record adequately addresses this
concern and mitigate potential issues from your perspective?
Admiral Davidson. Relocating Marines from Japan to Guam requires
significant investment in training ranges for full-spectrum training.
Those requirements include all forms of training, from static small
arms to aerial gunnery and convoy live fire. To address these
requirements, USINDOPACOM developed the Combined Joint Marianas
Training (CJMT) concept and the Pacific Multi-Domain Test and
Experimentation Capability (PMTEC). These two efforts, when resourced
and complete, combined with training in Northwest Australia provided by
Marine Rotational Forces-Darwin (MRF-D), will adequately meet the full-
spectrum training requirements for the Marines in Guam.
57. Senator Tillis. Admiral Davidson, so the Committee can better
understand some of the tradeoffs involved, what would be the impact, in
your opinion, of moving those 5,000 marines and their dependents to
locations east of the international date line rather than putting them
in Guam on: a) deterrence, b) their ability to do full spectrum
training, and c) the confidence of our partners and allies in the
region?
Admiral Davidson. Time and lift capacity are critical for enabling
the Joint Force with a Marine force capable of responding to a crisis.
Allies and partners would likely interpret moving the Marines and their
dependents east of the International Date Line as a lack of United
States commitment to the region given the distances to the South and
East China Sea. Meanwhile, our adversaries could be emboldened by
decreased United States presence. Keeping expeditionary training in
Guam while maintaining a solid footprint in Japan provides for
responsible, politically stable, and timely options to maneuver inside
the First Island Chain during crisis. Presence matters--both permanent
and rotational.
58. Senator Tillis. Admiral Davidson, what is the current status of
Futenma base relocation, the current challenges as you see them, and
how worried are you that the construction won't be successfully
completed?
Admiral Davidson. The 2013 Okinawa Consolidation Plan designates
the target date for completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility
(FRF) program as 2022 or later. In 2020, the Okinawa Defense Bureau
estimated completion in 2032, but that is a best-case estimate given
current progress and anticipated obstacles. Currently, the FRF has
approximately 10 percent of an estimated 206 projects complete. Another
13 projects (6 percent) are currently under construction. Approximately
4 percent of the total landfill required is complete. The Government of
Japan is also resolving local construction and engineering issues. We
are confident in the Government of Japan's ability to complete the
project and the Government of Japan has repeatedly and publicly
committed to doing so.
59. Senator Tillis. Admiral Davidson, what would be the impact if
the project is not completed?
Admiral Davidson. The FRF will have significant deterrence
capability in the AOR and will also provide for enhanced defense of
Japan. This FRF gives USINDOPACOM a substantial power projection
platform for Marine forces. Any barriers to completion inhibit United
States treaty obligations with Japan and negatively impact credible
deterrence in the region.
taiwan
60. Senator Tillis. Admiral Davidson, due to People's Liberation
Army's (PLA) escalating military coercion against Taiwan over past
years, this Committee has strongly supported maintaining the stability
and prosperity across the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, the exchange of
senior officers and military personnel in all levels between the United
States and Taiwan are critical to the development of Taiwan's
asymmetric defense strategy and capability. Does INDOPACOM plan to
support future personnel exchanges?
Admiral Davidson. USINDOPACOM will continue engagements with Taiwan
that focus on improving joint interoperability within Taiwan's
military, enhancing Taiwan training and exercises, improving Taiwan's
readiness, and supporting Taiwan's military professional development.
Current and planned engagements include virtual key leader engagements,
senior leader visits, institutional dialogues and steering groups at
the Flag/General Officer level; academic and professional military
education exchanges; subject matter expert working groups; conferences
and symposia. Taiwan personnel also attend a variety of United States
intermediate and senior service schools and enlisted professional
military education courses.
5th generation fighter
61. Senator Tillis. Admiral Davidson, can you confirm that 5th
generation airpower is a requirement for your mission in INDOPACOM, and
can you explain how 5th generation aircraft, like F-22 and F-35, meet
that requirement?
Admiral Davidson. The F-35 and F-22 aircraft are vital to our
USINDOPACOM mission to counter a near-peer's highly advanced, multi-
dimensional, integrated defense networks. Stealth technology, combined
with other formidable 5th generation capabilities, increases
survivability and effectiveness in an A2/AD environment. The F-35
combined with the F-22's air dominance allows the US the ability to
achieve air superiority in a contested environment.
62. Senator Tillis. Admiral Davidson, many of our key allies in the
Indo-Pacific region are participants in the F-35 program. In your
opinion, has the F-35 program had a positive impact on both military
and diplomatic relations with these key allies?
Admiral Davidson. The F-35 program demonstrates the positive
impacts of working with allies and partners on modem weapon platforms.
The F-35 program has allowed the United States to increase its level of
collaboration and interoperability, which is also increasing ally and
partner willingness to be net security providers. Furthermore, this
level of shared technology improves interoperability with our allies
and partners, which will enhance our combined exercises, training,
operations, and ability to enhance coalition and joint force readiness.
63. Senator Tillis. Admiral Davidson, China's advanced air defenses
and fighter capabilities are rapidly increasing in capability and
capacity. These capabilities are pushing 4th generation aircraft to
greater stand-off ranges, often times beyond the targeting ranges of
their weapons and sensors. Can you explain the importance of stand-in
capabilities, such as 5th generation aircraft, and what advantages they
provide if an engagement with China were to occur?
Admiral Davidson. 5th generation fighters provide deterrence and
operational capabilities like stealth and advanced avionics
specifically designed to operate in an Anti-Access and Area-Denial (A2/
AD) environment. 5th generation capabilities allow for better
detection, targeting, and jamming of threats to achieve air
superiority, suppression of enemy air defenses, and precise air-to-
surface targeting. All of these requirements are essential to minimize
losses if an engagement with China were to occur.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
operating in an a2/ad environment
64. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, the People's Republic of
China has the capability, capacity and reach to employ thousands of
missiles within the first island chain and hundreds of missiles in the
second. This vast, asymmetrical arsenal will likely increase over the
next several years. With that in mind, what do you consider to be the
right mix of forward, blunt forces west of the International Date Line
(IDL) and surge forces east of the International Date Line?
Admiral Davidson. The force posture recommendations identified in
the Section 1251 Independent Assessment provide the foundation for
fielding an integrated joint force west of the IDL and a sophisticated
improvement in interoperability with our regional allies and partners.
The permanent forces currently located in Japan; rotational forces
sequenced through viable locations in the Philippines and the Ryuku
islands; and command and control, logistics, integrated air missile
defense and Marine Littoral Combat Regiments in Guam provide the
foundation for blunt forces needed west of the IDL.
65. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, considering the robust Anti
Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) environment of the Indo-Pacific, and the
over 100 combat coded 5th generation fighter aircraft postured in
Alaska, does it not makes sense to also base the next generation tanker
(e.g. KC-46) in that state to serve as an air bridge to rapidly surge
those fighters to the forward edge of a conflict in the Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Davidson. USINDOPACOM needs the most modem, capable
platforms strategically positioned to best support forces west of the
International Date Line to ensure a ready and responsive deterrent
force posture. This includes a distributed force posture that ensures
rapid employment and survivability of joint forces. Given the force
posture and robust training activities in Alaska, which will be further
enhanced by the Pacific Multi-domain Training and Experimentation
Capability (PMTEC), the need to distribute logistics capability as well
as the 5th generation fighters also exists.
66. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, what concerns do you have
regarding our ability to resupply and sustain operations--especially
across a distributed posture--in an A2/AD environment?
Admiral Davidson. The tyranny of distance requires a distributed
capacity to sustain the Joint Force across the islands and archipelagos
of the first island chain and the Pacific Island Nations in the second
and third island chains. The right composition of logistics platforms,
nodes, ports, and supplier networks, along with appropriate protection
is critical. The Joint Force must have sufficient visibility and
interoperability within the network to prioritize and sustain the Joint
Forces. We must achieve the same level of integration and
interoperability with our allies and partners to conduct anticipatory
logistics sustainment in every domain.
67. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, what recommendations do you
have to mitigate those concerns?
Admiral Davidson. PDI requirements provide the foundation for
establishing a distributed posture designed to deter aggression, assure
our allies and partners, and if needed, transition to crisis or combat
operations. We should continue to increase our joint force lethality by
fielding systems and capabilities such as highly survivable, precision-
strike networks along the first island chain, 5th generation F-35
capabilities, resilient and redundant joint/multinational command and
control networks, enhance logistics capability with prepositioned
stores and Service agnostic infrastructure, and investments to re-
posture fuel in the theater at point of need. These investments are key
to ensuring U.S. freedom of action or access to vital waterways,
airspace, and other lines of communication in an A2/AD environment.
68. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, what concerns do you have
regarding operational concepts--such as agile combat employment--the
Services are developing to achieve a theory of victory in the region?
Admiral Davidson. I am encouraged by the Service operational
concepts but concerned with the ability of the Joint Force to integrate
the Service-specific capabilities. The three functional areas we must
address to close the gaps and make these Service operational concepts
viable include the need to address the joint iterdependencies in the
areas of command and control, integrated fires (offensive and
defensive), and theater logistics.
69. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, what risk are we assuming
provided the services cannot execute those concepts for a sustained
period of time today?
Admiral Davidson. As the Indo-Pacific's military balance becomes
more unfavorable, the United States is assuming significant risk of an
outcome that is unfavorable to the United States and our allies and
partners.
defense posture realignment initiative (dpri)
70. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, DPRI is the program of
record negotiated with the Government of Japan, which provided $3.1
billion or about 1/3 of the estimated cost, to relocate Marine Corps
Forces from Okinawa to Guam. The executive summary of the INDOPACOM
report for section 1251 of the Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA indicates the
force design and posture effort: `` . . . begins with completing the
Defense Posture Realignment Initiative (DPRI) . . . '' From your
interaction with our host nation counterparts, how important is the
execution of the DPRI program to the Government of Japan?
Admiral Davidson. The Government of Japan (GOJ) strongly supports
the DPRI program's relocation of Marines from Okinawa to Guam, and has
committed significant financial contributions toward this end. Since
its inception, successive GOJ administrations have prioritized
execution of the DPRI program. The GOJ views DPRI's moves as critical
to improving local support for the Alliance in Okinawa. The GOJ works
collaboratively with all USG execution and planning agencies to include
United States Forces Japan, Naval Facilities Command, U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, and Marine Corps Installations Command, among others.
71. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, there are some concerns
about the ability of Marine Corps to train for full spectrum combat
when they are moved to Guam. Can you outline what shortfalls currently
exist if the move were to occur today?
Admiral Davidson. Relocating Marines from Japan to Guam requires
significant investment in training ranges for full-spectrum training.
Those requirements include all forms of training, from static small
arms to aerial gunnery and convoy live fire. To address these
requirements, USINDOPACOM developed the Combined Joint Marianas
Training (CJMT) concept and the Pacific Multi-Domain Test and
Experimentation Capability (PMTEC). These two efforts, when resourced
and complete, combined with training in Northwest Australia provided by
Marine Rotational Forces-Darwin (MRF-D), will adequately meet the full-
spectrum training requirements for the Marines in Guam.
72. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, does the current DPRI
program of record adequately address these shortfalls?
Admiral Davidson. The current DPRI program includes development of
the CNMI Joint Military Training (CJMT) complex. The Government of
Japan is contributing approximately $300M (33 percent cost sharing with
the United States) to the development of CJMT. Upon completion, CJMT
will provide the joint force its most robust, multi-domain training
capability in the Western Pacific. In an unprecedented way, it will
build readiness while simultaneously retaining viable deterrent forces
west of the International Date Line. CJMT will address forty-two joint
training opportunities, to include amphibious assault, combined arms
maneuver, and individual skills training, including military operations
in urban terrain. This training, along with the lift capabilities
described in my 1251 report, will improve current-training capabilities
and will introduce all-new joint and multi-national training
opportunities in the Western Pacific.
73. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, so that I can better
understand some of the tradeoffs involved with respect to: a)
deterrence, b) ability to do full spectrum training, and c) the
confidence of our partners and allies--what would be the impact, in
your opinion, of moving those 5,000 marines and their dependents to
locations east of the International Date Line--say for instance,
Alaska?
Admiral Davidson. Time and lift capacity are critical for enabling
the Joint Force with a Marine force capable of responding to a crisis
or conflict. It would take approximately 15 days to move 5,000 Marines
from Alaska to East Asia by sea compared to approximately five days
from Guam. Allies and partners would likely interpret moving the
Marines and their dependents east of the International Date Line (IDL)
as a lack of United States commitment to the region given the distances
to the South China Sea. Meanwhile, our adversaries could be emboldened
by decreased U.S. presence. Keeping expeditionary training in Guam
while maintaining a solid footprint in Japan provides for responsible,
politically stable, and timely options to maneuver inside the First
Island Chain during crisis or conflict. Presence matters -both
permanent and rotational.
north korea missile capabilities and cooperation with iran
74. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, in your statement for the
record, you highlight: `` . . . North Korea will remain our most
immediate threat.'' You go on to state: ``Pyongyang maintains a diverse
and growing missile inventory, and North Korea unveiled several new
ballistic systems . . . including two SLBMs [submarine-launches
ballistic missiles] and an ICBM.'' Finally, you conclude that:
``Pyongyang's missile research and development efforts . . . are
consistent with the regime's stated objective of being able to strike
the U.S. Homeland.'' Can you broadly discuss how North Korea's missile
program has advanced over the course of your assignment as the
INDOPACOM commander?
Admiral Davidson. When I assumed command in May 2018, the tensions
that had spiked in 2017 when North Korea conducted a series of long-
range missile launches had subsided greatly. However, at no time did
Kim Jong Un reduce his support for his missile program or continued
ballistic missile development. North Korea resumed short-range missile
tests in mid-2019, likely for research and development purposes and to
remind the international community of the North's capabilities. During
parades in October 2020 and January 2021, North Korea displayed several
previously unseen new missiles, including several short-range missiles,
two submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and a larger, possibly
longer-range ICBM, as well as several previously tested missiles. In
all, North Korea paraded 10 ballistic missile systems, all of which
they have developed in the past 5 years.
75. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, how would you characterize
North Korea's missile program advancement--in terms of risk--to both
our regionally based forces and the U.S. Homeland?
Admiral Davidson. North Korea's missile program is a clear threat
to the region and a growing threat to United States Homeland, including
Guam, Hawaii, and the continental United States. The risk to regionally
based United States Forces and our allies and partners has increased in
recent years with the testing and fielding of short-, medium-, and
intermediate-range ballistic missiles. North Korea has demonstrated
improved mobile missile launch tactics, improved missile accuracy, and
rapid-fire capabilities. Kim Jong Un maintains modest, but almost
certainly growing, inventories of theater-strike missiles. His
intercontinental-range missile program is still only partially proven,
but Kim Jong Un is committed to developing a nuclear-armed ICBM capable
of threatening the continental United States.
76. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, provided you are able to
answer in this forum--how long would you estimate until North Korea's
missile capability and range can reach the continental United States?
Admiral Davidson. North Korea is committed to developing a nuclear-
armed ICBM capable of posing a direct threat to the continental United
States. Pyongyang conducted its inaugural series of ICBM flight-tests
in 2017, marking a significant developmental milestone, and during an
October 2020 military parade unveiled a new and larger ICBM that has
not yet been flight-tested.
ICBMs are complex systems that require multiple flight tests to
identify and correct defects and ensure the survivability and
operational performance of the reentry vehicle and warhead. As such,
while we lack confidence in the reliability and accuracy of North
Korea's ICBMs, we must assume that they are capable of reaching the
continental United States and plan accordingly.
77. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, the United Nations provided
a report to the Security Council in February that confirmed North Korea
and Iran resumed cooperation on development of long-range missiles last
year. This reporting followed shortly after North Korea showcased their
largest ICBM, believed capable of carrying a nuclear warhead across the
United States. To me this is exceptionally concerning as both countries
would greatly benefit from the leveraged gained in being able to strike
our Homeland. In your personal opinion, are we doing enough to develop
and field both regional/homeland missile defense systems?
Admiral Davidson. The ballistic missile threat facing United States
interests in Northeast Asia remains significant and we are well
postured to protect against existing threats from North Korea. However,
we must prioritize investments in capabilities that address the
aggregated challenges in the Indo-Pacific. Guam Defense System, an
integrated air and missile defense capability on Guam, is required to
defend against both North Korea and PRC missile threats. The Homeland
Defense Radar-Hawaii is the most capable sensor available to defend
Hawaii against North Korea's advanced long-range ICBM.
78. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, how would you suggest we
blunt the corrosive cooperation between these rogue nations?
Admiral Davidson. The best way to blunt this sort of cooperation is
to strengthen and expand the security architecture with our allies and
partners to expose malign behavior and coercive tactics. These efforts
increase information sharing and reinforce the common understanding of
the regional security landscape.
india: high-altitude, cold-weather training
79. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, the U.S. Army will host
Indian forces in Alaska this year to exercise high-altitude, cold-
weather combat skills. A Chinese military expert recently claimed that
the Indian Army: ``has the world's largest and most experienced troops
trained for high-altitude battles''. From my understanding, the same
exercise will occur in the Himalayas in 2022. First, let me commend the
efforts of INDOPACOM and U.S. Army in Alaska (USARAK) for cultivating
this strategic partnership. Second, how can we advance it further to
continue rebuilding robust Arctic capabilities that have atrophied
significantly over the past decade?
Admiral Davidson. We have much to learn from the Indian Army, which
has a long history of operating at high altitudes and in extremely cold
conditions. In 2018, for example, USARAK deployed personnel to visit
the Indian High Altitude Warfare School (HAWS), the primary training
institution for the Indian Army in cold and mountainous regions.
Opportunities such as these allow United States and Indian forces to
exchange best practices and lessons learned, improve interoperability,
and further develop the United States-India bilateral relationship. We
intend to seek similar exchanges and training in the future to improve
our capabilities in austere mountainous environments.
fostering indo-pacific military expertise
80. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, given the Department of
Defense's shift in priorities from violent extremist organizations in
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to great power competition in
INDOPACOM--as laid out in the 2018 National Defense Strategy and
expressed by incoming DOD officials in the Biden administration--do you
think Service Academies and other DOD educational institutions are
adequately focused on educating our military officers and enlisted
members to best understand and operate in the Indo-Pacific region? If
not, in your personal opinion, how do we get after this knowledge and
expertise shortfall?
Admiral Davidson. The 2018 National Defense Strategy acknowledged a
gap in professional military education (PME). In May 2020, The Joint
Chiefs published ``Developing Today's Joint Officers for Tomorrow's
Ways of War,'' and the Service Academies and other DOD educational
institutions have been adjusting and aligning PME and talent management
systems to further develop our military leaders for 21st century
challenges.
I believe there is still more to be done. Military leaders require
more education on topics such as deterrence theory, innovation and
experimentation, and a deeper understanding of the logistical and
sustainment challenges operating in the Indo-Pacific Theater.
section 1251 report and range upgrades
81. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, in your section 1251
report, you identified range investments--which included the Pacific
Multi-Domain Training and Experimentation Capability (PMTEC)--with the
objective of creating a fully instrumented, live-virtual constructive
(LVC) training areas throughout the Indo-Pacific. How would upgrading
ranges--like the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex--with a Secure,
Synthetic Inject to Live LVC (SITL LVC) air combat training capability
help INDOPACOM meet its requirement to provide forces capable of
fighting in highly contested environments against technologically
advanced opponents?
Admiral Davidson. PMTEC is critical for developing the training
capacity to integrate Service-recommended weapons and capabilities into
a joint warfighting concept that deters the adversary and trains our
most capable warfighting force while expanding the breadth and scale of
experimentation.
LVC is integral to PMTEC and will offer the Joint Force more
effective, realistic, all-domain training and experimentation training
at the tactical and operational levels. Fully modem range complexes and
analytical tools will provide the foundation of the Joint Fires
Network.
82. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, how would providing SITL-
LVC at the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex, or other ranges, help
increase overall readiness and combat capability of both INDOPACOM and
allied forces?
Admiral Davidson. LVC capability is critical to large scale,
distributed training and enables our warfighters to train in a threat-
representative environment. LVC simulates the highly contested threat
environment of a near-peer conflict or operation. LVC is a must for
enabling real threat emulation and live force-on-force training and
provides the efficient means to increase and improve threat-
representative, high-end training.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
china's nuclear capacity
83. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, in testimony you said that
``China has quadrupled their nuclear capability since the turn of their
century, and they will at least doubled it during the course of this
decade.'' Assuming no nuclear modernization and no additional
production, when would you approximate a credible Chinese nuclear
overmatch?
Admiral Davidson. At its current pace of development, China's total
nuclear arsenal will remain below United States levels over the next
decade. However, China's improvements to effectiveness, reliability,
survivability, and technical performance-including hypersonic
capabilities--of nuclear forces, coupled with Beijing's lack of
transparency, underscore the threat China's capabilities pose to the
United States and our allies and partners.
When considering the issue of overmatch, it is important to assess
more than just the number of warheads. China continues to make rapid
progress in training, command and control, operations, doctrine, and
strategic intent while also increasing the number of warheads and
launchers.
independent assessment
84. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, you mentioned that
``Taiwan is the immediate ambition of the Chinese'' and that this would
be a problem ``within the next 6 years''. What components of your
Independent Assessment would prioritize addressing this ambition?
Admiral Davidson. To address the Chinese ambitions, the most
important action the United States can take is increase Joint Force
lethality by introducing a 360-degree persistent and integrated air
defense capability in Guam (Guam Defense System). This system must be
able to integrate existing weapons control systems and must be robust
enough to address emerging threats, including hypersonics. The defense
of Guam remains USINDOPACOM' s number one unfunded priority.
85. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, as aptly stated in your
testimony, ``Partner Forces' assessment of U.S. reliability is not
based on the military presence alone . . . It's going to take a whole
of nation approach.'' How are we pursuing concentric lines of effort
with other Federal Agencies in a ``whole-of-government approach''?
Admiral Davidson. USINDOPACOM coordinates and leverages the unique
expertise from 60 interagency and intra-DOD Liaison Officers embedded
in the USINDOPACOM Headquarters. We routinely integrate interagency
representatives into steady-state operations, joint military operations
and strategic planning, the USINDOPACOM Joint Exercise Program, and
contingency and crisis response. We also conduct outreach to the
interagency teams embedded in each U.S. Embassy in the Indo-Pacific and
in the National Capital Region for those agencies who do not have
Liaison Officers in the Pacific.
law of the sea
86. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, can you please frame what
ratification of United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) would mean for you generally as the INDOPACOM Commander and
what it would enable the joint force to do in that AOR?
Admiral Davidson. Accession to UNCLOS will put the Joint Force in a
better position to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law
allows, including throughout the Indo-Pacific. China is asserting its
interests off its coast and in the South China Sea in ways that
threaten foundational standards for the world's oceans as reflected in
UNCLOS. China's attempts to restrict the rights, freedoms, and lawful
uses of the sea available to commercial and military naval and air
traffic is inconsistent with customary international law as reflected
in UNCLOS. Accession to UNCLOS would help our position legally across
the globe and would do nothing to limit our military operations in the
manner in which we're conducting them now.
logistics/ mobility
87. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, with respect to rotational
forces under your command; do you assess the current amount of intra-
theater mobility to be adequate?
Admiral Davidson. No. USINDOPACOM requires new, smaller, and more
distributed intermediate staging bases across the theater. Doing so
allows for sea and air trans-loading to smaller intra-theater platforms
that are more survivable and readily available.
88. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, are we resourced to
maximize bi-lateral and multi-lateral engagement opportunities in the
AOR given our current connectors?
Admiral Davidson. No. By law, approximately 75 percent of Security
Cooperation funds go to USCENTCOM for Israel and Egypt, leaving the
other five geographic combatant commands to compete for the remaining
25 percent. To supplement, USINDOPACOM leverages Asia Pacific Regional
Initiative (APRI) resources and the National Guard's State Partnership
Program with 15 Indo-Pacific nations to further enable military-to-
military and military-to-civilian activities in the region.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022 AND
THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 16, 2021
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND AND UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Manchin,
Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, and
Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing to order. Good
morning. Today the Committee will receive testimony from
General VanHerck, Commander, United States Northern Command and
North American Aerospace Defense Command, or NORAD, and from
Admiral Craig Faller, Commander, U.S. Southern Command. General
VanHerck is appearing for his first posture hearing in his
current command, and Admiral Faller is returning to testify as
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) Commander, and this could be your
last hearing before the Committee, Admiral. Thank you for your
dedicated service to the Nation and the Navy. We appreciate it
very much.
I want to thank both of you, indeed, for your decades of
service and also, obviously, thank your families for the
sacrifices that they have made to support you. On behalf of the
Committee, I also want you to thank the men and women under
your commands for their selfless dedication and service to the
Nation.
The security environment we face today is fundamentally
different than even a decade ago. Near-peer competitors China
and Russia have significantly narrowed the technological
advantages that the United States military previously enjoyed,
and they threaten to contest our military operations across all
domains, including land, sea, air, cyberspace, and space. The
2018 National Defense Strategy shifted our defense priorities
to focus foremost on strategic competition with China and
Russia, but we need to better define what our objectives are
for out-competing our adversaries in this geopolitical rivalry.
General VanHerck, you are responsible for protecting the
Homeland, and over the last year that mission has centered on
the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. At the request of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Northern Command
(NORTHCOM) has deployed more than 2,200 personnel at part of 25
vaccination support teams at 17 sites in nine states,
administering more than 50,000 doses daily. I understand that
FEMA has discussed with you ramping up to 100 vaccination
support teams, with the capacity to vaccinate over 400,000
people per day. This is in addition to the more than 30,000
National Guard members supporting civil authorities across 46
states and 3 territories. General VanHerck, I hope you will
share your views on the challenges in scaling up this effort
and any lessons learned regarding what we need long-term for
addressing future pandemic threats to our Nation's health
security.
NORTHCOM is also tasked with operating our Homeland
ballistic missile defense, the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
system, to protect the United States against an
intercontinental ballistic missile attack from rogue states.
The threat from North Korea has only grown in recent years, and
I would be interested in hearing your assessment of what
additional steps can be taken to better integrate our domain
awareness and modernize our missile defense systems, including
plans for the Next Generation Interceptor, and the so-called
``underlayer'' of missile defense protection for the Homeland.
NORTHCOM is designated as the advocate for capabilities in
the Arctic, and plays a leading role in bringing together the
combatant commands that share responsibilities for this
increasingly critical region. As Russia and China become more
assertive in the Arctic, it is essential that we develop a
unified response across combatant commands and across the
interagency, as well as in coordination with our allies and
partners. General, I would appreciate any updates you can
provide on this critical region.
The situation along our southern border has implications
for both NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM. Despite President Biden's
termination of the declaration of a national emergency along
the border, and ending of the diversion of funds for the border
wall, roughly 3,600 military personnel remain deployed in the
region in support of the Customs and Border Patrol. This raises
questions about what the Defense Department's role should be in
a whole-of-government response to the situation at the southern
border. In addition, recent weeks have seen an increase in the
number of unaccompanied children arriving at the southern
border seeking to escape instability and violence in their home
countries. While these children need to be cared for in a human
and safe manner on a case-by-case basis, I also believe we need
to address the migration problem at its source, including the
conditions causing adults and children to seek asylum at our
border. Admiral Faller, I would be interested in your thoughts
on how the Department can use security cooperation
strategically to build partner capabilities and institutional
capacities to counter the drivers of instability in Central
America.
SOUTHCOM's traditional mission has focused on countering
the scourge of narcotics and the threat from transnational
criminal organizations. The growing influence of China and
Russia, however, threatens to further destabilize the region,
as these geopolitical rivals take advantage of corrupt
governance in the region to advance their own strategic
interests. China's malign financial influence, and Russian
disinformation amplified on Russian-controlled Spanish language
media outlets, threatens to undermine democratic governments.
In Venezuela, the Maduro regime, propped up with external
support from Russia, China, and others, has caused millions of
Venezuelans to flee into neighboring countries, with Colombia
bearing the brunt of this exodus. Admiral Faller, I am
interested in your assessment of the threat from near-peer
competitors in the SOUTHCOM area, and how we might work
strategically with partners in the region to build resilience
to China and Russia's malign activities.
I want to thank you again for being here this morning and I
look forward to your testimony. I also just want to note, for
my colleagues, that there will be an informal classified
briefing by Admiral Faller in SVC-217 immediately following
this session, until 12:30, when we must cease, and the subject
will be the increasing Chinese influence in the SOUTHCOM area.
With that, let me recognize Senator Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
calling this important hearing. I want to also thank our two
witnesses, NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM. As you know, my top priority
remains ensuring the effectiveness and implementation of the
National Defense Strategy--we have all agreed this is our
roadmap. This is what we are supposed to be doing. It is as
true today as it was 2 years ago--which identifies competition
with China and Russia as the central challenge to the United
States' prosperity and security.
However, the growing influence of China and Russia is not
limited to Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Most people, when they
think about that they talk about the South China Seas and other
places where there are problems. Both countries have shown
their way that they view the Western Hemisphere as critical
terrain for fulfilling their global ambitions in challenging
the United States. Admiral Feller, China and Russia are
expanding their access and influence in your area of
responsibility (AOR), through increasing arms deals, military
deployments, and economic and diplomatic coercion.
At the same time, much of the drugs poisoning American
cities are coming from Latin America through the vast illicit
networks operated by multi-billion-dollar criminal
organizations. General VanHerck, you have operational
responsibility for the defense of the United States Homeland.
We are facing a lot of challenges from the growing Chinese and
Russian missile capabilities, including advanced cruise
missiles and hypersonic missiles. I hope you will discuss any
emerging gaps you foresee in our Homeland defense and offer
your recommendations for addressing these challenges.
Specifically, I am interested in your views on whether waiting
another decade for a new ground-based interceptor makes any
sense or if we need to act sooner, given the growing threat
from our adversaries.
Meanwhile, we are seeing a new crisis brewing on the
southwest border. According to The New York Times,
approximately 78,000 immigrants tried to cross the border in
January. That is double the number that were there from the
year before. So we know that is happening. We know that his
increasing. We do not have the numbers yet of the--I tried to
get them this morning--of February. We do not have those
numbers yet, but we will get them, and we see that this thing
is getting worse.
I have always said border security is a national security,
and my visit to the border in August of 2019 confirmed this
belief. These new statistics are alarming, so I hope you will
address whether NORTHCOM's border support mission is sufficient
and what we can do to better ensure that our laws are enforced.
You know, we talk around this thing, and nobody wants to
talk about it. No one wants to admit it. We have got a new
President now and the new President has a different mission.
You know, he wants everyone to love him, and I understand that.
I have a picture here that I want to be made part of the
record. This is all these people coming across illegally,
wearing their Biden t-shirts. Now this is going on, you guys.
Do not act like it is not. Anyway, we need to face this
problem.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe, and now
let me recognize Admiral Faller for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CRAIG S. FALLER, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
Admiral Faller. Good morning, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
Inhofe, distinguished Members of the Committee. I thank you for
the opportunity to testify before you today. I am honored to be
here with my friend and shipmate, General Glen VanHerck from
the United States Northern Command.
Now more than ever, I feel a sense of urgency about the
global threats we face here in our neighborhood, this region,
our home. This neighborhood is our home. It is a shared
neighborhood. It is a hemisphere which is of vital national
interest to the United States.
Two of the most significant threats we face are China and
transnational criminal organizations. The Chinese Communist
Party, with its insidious and corrupt influence, seeks regional
and global economic dominance, in its own version of a rules-
based international order. Our strategic competition with China
is global, not just in the Taiwan Strait or the South China
Sea. China is quickly growing its influence here, in our
hemisphere, working on over 40 port deals, dishing out
significant loans for political and economic influence, pushing
for information technology (IT) structure, and engaging in
predatory practices like illegal, unregulated, and unreported
fishing. We have seen many of these tactics in Asia and Africa,
and we cannot let them prevail here in our neighborhood.
Transnational criminal organizations pose a direct threat
to our national security. They traffic in arms, humans, drugs,
and they claim tens of thousands of lives in America every
year. These murderous tactics have resulted in 43 of the 50
most violent cities in the world being here in this hemisphere,
and they drive illegal migration and they allow bad actors like
China to gain influence.
COVID-19 has hit this hemisphere hard. According to the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the economies of Latin
America and the Caribbean shrunk 7.4 percent in 2020. The
impacts of the pandemic, like a perfect storm, will alter the
hemisphere for years to come.
In the midst of all this, two back-to-back hurricanes
devastated Central America, causing even greater instability.
The pandemic and these unprecedented storms struck on top of
this already vicious circle of threats, creating strong push
factors for people in the region seeking a better life, seeking
security, to come with their families to the United States.
Despite an economy in a tailspin, more than five million
refugees have fled Venezuela and the illegitimate Maduro
regime. Maduro continues to cling to power with the support of
Cuba, Russia, Iran, and China.
We cannot face such daunting challenges alone. The only way
to counter these influences, these threats, is to strengthen
partnerships. That is how we will in the strategic competition.
I have been impressed with nations who have worked
shoulder-to-shoulder with us, despite the pandemic, to counter
threats. Nations like Colombia, whose professional forces have
stepped up in the midst of the pandemic to conduct counter-
transnational criminal organizations with dozens of other
nations, and nations like Brazil, who sent their airborne
company to our high-end training with the United States Army at
Fort Polk, Louisiana.
Good neighbors are here when you need help, and that is
what the United States did in SOUTHCOM when COVID hit. We
stepped up with our humanitarian assistance program,
contributing over 450 projects in 28 countries. Overall, the
United States is the leader in humanitarian assistance in COVID
in Latin America and the Caribbean.
SOUTHCOM works every day to build readiness with our
trusted military and security partners. We do this through
security cooperation. This includes institution capacity-
building, legal training, education, international military
education and training (IMET), and exercises. We focus on
developing professional military forces that know how to fight
and use the lawful use of military force. We focus on human
rights training, Women, Peace, and Security programs, and non-
commissioned officer (NCO) development. Modest investments in
these programs and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance, and our presence, our posture, go a long way in
this hemisphere and will help our partners counter these global
threats.
Finally, our success would not be possible without the men
and women of our SOUTHCOM team. We are taking proactive steps
to protect them from unacceptable behaviors, like sexual
assault and harassment, racism and extremism. We take these
threats seriously. They are a cancer to our readiness, and it
is the right thing to do.
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Inhofe, on behalf of the
SOUTHCOM team thank you for the trust you place in us, and I
look forward to our discussion and questions today.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Faller follows:]
Prepared Statement by Admiral Craig S. Faller
Over 2 years ago, you entrusted me with the great responsibility of
leading the men and women of the United States Southern Command
(USSOUTHCOM) in working with our partners to secure our hemisphere. At
the time, our region faced a seemingly insurmountable crisis of illicit
drugs killing tens of thousands of Americans every year, institutional
instability and corruption in the region, and external state actors
(ESA), like the People's Republic of China (PRC), looking to exploit
the conditions posed by these threats. I committed to tackling these
challenges by building trust with the Nations of this region and within
our own interagency--by being the best partner we can be and by
strengthening and complementing U.S interagency and partner nation
capabilities to address these threats together. With your support, we
have made notable strides, but much work remains to be done. I welcome
this opportunity to discuss the significant national security
challenges and opportunities we still face in Latin America and the
Caribbean. This region is our neighborhood, directly tied to us in
every domain. A threat to our neighbors is a threat to the United
States; and an opportunity for our neighbors is an opportunity for us
to make our neighborhood stronger together.
In fact, after 2 years in this position, I feel an incredible sense
of urgency. This Hemisphere in which we live is under assault. The very
democratic principles and values that bind us together are being
actively undermined by violent transnational criminal organizations
(TCOs) and the PRC and Russia. We are losing our positional advantage
in this Hemisphere and immediate action is needed to reverse this
trend. The intervention goes well beyond economic influence, the PRC's
strategic outlook with over 40 ports in progress, significant loans
that are used as political leverage and predatory practices
demonstrated in illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing are
weakening democratic institutions and leveraging the future of this
Hemisphere. We have seen many of these same tactics in Asia and Africa
over the last few decades and we are well aware of the results. We must
act now to avoid those same results in our own hemisphere.
strategic environment
The National Defense Strategy (NDS) identifies defending the
Homeland as a critical defense objective and recognizes that our
Homeland cannot be safe without a stable and secure Western Hemisphere.
USSOUTHCOM's primary mission is to keep our neighborhood safe from
those seeking to do us harm so that our home remains secure. The
threats in the Western Hemisphere are persistent, they're real, and
they represent a formidable risk to our national security. Perhaps most
urgently, this region has been one of the hardest hit by COVID-19; the
health, economic, and social impacts of which will alter the hemisphere
for years to come. In the midst of this pandemic, two back-to-back
major hurricanes devastated Central America creating even greater
economic strain. The pandemic and these unprecedented storms struck on
top of an already challenging vicious circle of threats that jeopardize
a secure, stable, and democratic Western Hemisphere. These threats
include ESAs like the PRC, Russia, and Iran that actively seek to take
advantage of the nascent, fragile democracies in this region and look
to exploit the region's resources and proximity to the United States;
TCOs that run all forms of illicit activities to turn a profit, at the
expense of the rule of law, and more importantly, of the lives of all
who are impacted along the way; and malign regional state actors--those
countries within our own neighborhood, like Cuba, Venezuela, and
Nicaragua, that perpetuate corruption and challenge freedom and
democracy by opening the door to ESAs and TCOs at the expense of their
own people. TCOs are a direct threat to the United States Homeland. We
cannot face such daunting challenges on our own. The only way to
counter these threats is to strengthen our partners in the region--we
must build OUR team to win this strategic competition. If our neighbors
are stronger, we're all stronger.
threats and opportunities
COVID-19 and Fragility in the Hemisphere. There is an accelerating
spiral of instability gripping the region as the pandemic has increased
the region's fragility. Latin America and the Caribbean have suffered
among the highest COVID-19 death rates in the world, and during my
trips to the region, I witnessed the profound physical and emotional
strain nations are experiencing. With only about 8 percent of the
world's population, Latin America and the Caribbean are
disproportionately impacted with nearly one fifth of global cases.
Though nothing compares to the toll on human life, there will also be a
significant socioeconomic impact on our neighbors for years to come.
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), per capita income
in Latin America will not recover from the pandemic until 2025--later
than any other region in the world. Coming on the heels of widespread
public protests against governments throughout the region at the end of
2019, these COVID-19 losses coupled with longstanding socioeconomic
grievances and corruption have created the conditions for even greater
instability and unrest among our partner nations. These conditions
create a more fragile region that serves as fertile ground for our
competitors to advance their own interests, both malign and legitimate,
making this challenge even more complex. Even some of our strongest
partners are at risk of instability due to this confluence of factors.
Our partners' military and security force budgets are facing
extreme pressure as governments use their limited resources to address
the pandemic. Security forces are increasingly focused on the very
near-term need for tactical items such as fuel, food, personal
protective equipment (PPE), and vaccines at the expense of security
operations. They are concerned that TCOs will gain even more freedom of
action in their countries as conditions for corruption and illicit
activity grow.
In order to gain more access, presence, and influence in the
region, the PRC and Russia are taking advantage of the pandemic,
deploying medical diplomacy and disinformation campaigns--often
overpromising and under delivering. The PRC is offering $1 billion in
loans to the region for their COVID-19 vaccine and improvements to
medical infrastructure, securing agreements with Argentina, Brazil,
Peru, and Venezuela. This will further indebt the region to the PRC,
which already holds $165 billion in loans. The PRC aims to enhance
medical exchange programs, exploiting the pandemic to advance its One
Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative in trade, technology, and
infrastructure. Beijing is also using COVID-19 as a pretext to donate
Huawei technology that integrates with its 5G networks and Safe City
programs--touting its social monitoring model as an effective and
inexpensive contact tracing solution.
Russia, too, is seizing the pandemic as an opportunity to increase
its influence in countries where it previously had limited access.
COVID-19 has also provided Russia with another avenue by which to
expand its campaign to outcompete the United States in the information
domain, pushing narratives about United States mismanagement of COVID-
19 and claiming United States Government sanctions are choking the
Venezuelan people at their most vulnerable time.
What we're doing about it: Good friends are consistent and
committed. While maintaining force health protection as a priority,
USSOUTHCOM immediately responded to the needs of our partners in this
crisis by providing humanitarian assistance to alleviate the burden on
health systems throughout the region. Since April 2020, USSOUTHCOM has
executed over 485 of these projects in 28 countries, with a total
investment of more than $56 million, in addition to the humanitarian
assistance delivered by State and USAID. Our efforts range from
deploying field hospitals to providing critical PPE. \1\ The U.S.
Government has delivered $226 million worth of aid, with an additional
$35 million on its way, which is more than double what the PRC has
donated. As part of overall U.S. Government humanitarian efforts, DOD's
humanitarian assistance program is making an important difference in
these nations and helping to build trust and bring stability to the
region. In every conversation with my counterparts in the region, they
lead with ``your assistance has been critical as we face COVID-19.'' If
the U.S. wants to be the partner of choice--that means being first to
respond in a crisis. Missions like the 2019 deployment of the USNS
Comfort provided world-class medical care to over 68,000 people in 12
countries and enhanced the medical readiness of our U.S. and partner
medical personnel. We work closely with State and USAID to find
innovative ways to deliver this kind of relevant and timely support to
our partners and demonstrate our commitment to the region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Only PPE that was available within the partner nation or for
purchase from a third party were donated due to the simultaneous
shortage we faced in the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
external state actors (esas) and malign regional actors.
People's Republic of China. The NDS's central idea of ``expanding
the competitive space'' must be applied globally, not only in the
Pacific, but also in our own neighborhood. The NDS requires us to
``sustain our advantages in the Western Hemisphere'' and maintain a
favorable balance of power in this region, while bolstering partners
against coercion.
The PRC continues to increase its self-serving activities to gain
global influence and leverage across all domains in the USSOUTHCOM AOR:
cyber, space, extractive and energy industries, transportation hubs,
roads, infrastructure, telecommunications, legal and illegal fishing,
agriculture, and military training--Spanish and Portuguese-language
military education modeled after United States professional military
education. The PRC is also ``gifting'' security supplies and equipment
as a way to gain access and win favor with regional security forces. As
already discussed, COVID-19 has brought on a new era of medical
diplomacy that the PRC seeks to leverage to its advantage. All of these
overtures, to include the OBOR initiative, are part of a concerted
effort by Beijing to indebt fragile countries in the region, impinge on
our partners' and allies' sovereignty, and use its influence to extract
concessions when needed. The PRC also thrives on and enables the
corruption and lack of transparency in business and political deals
exhibited in some of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.
Beijing pairs these engagements with aggressive information operations
that spread disinformation--emblematic of how the PRC's actions are
guided by different values than those of the United States and our
regional partners.
The PRC is rapidly advancing toward their goal of economic
dominance in the region within the next ten years. In 2019, the PRC
surpassed the United States as the leading trade partner with Brazil,
Chile, Peru, and Uruguay and is now the region's second-largest trading
partner behind the United States. From 2002 to 2019, PRC trade with
Latin America soared from $17 billion to over $315 billion, with plans
to reach $500 billion in trade by 2025.
The PRC is also seeking to establish global logistics and basing
infrastructure in our hemisphere in order to project and sustain
military power at greater distances. Outside our region, Beijing
consistently abuses commercial arrangements at host country ports to
support military functions and obfuscate the true purpose of its
overseas installations.
Chinese Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing just
outside or within the outer limits of South American Economic Exclusion
Zones (EEZ) is another predatory practice that poses a threat to the
livelihood of coastal nations. The Chinese Government admittedly
subsidizes this activity and is reluctant to curtail it because of its
importance to PRC's food security and economy, with IUU fishing costing
the region about $2.7 billion in lost revenue annually. In August,
activity of a fleet of approximately 350 Chinese operated vessels posed
a threat to the Galapagos Marine Reserve and endangered species
resulting in an international outcry, exposing this malign activity.
Russia. Russia is increasingly asserting itself in Latin America
and the Caribbean, pursuing a strategy intended to grow Moscow's
influence and undermine United States leadership in the region over the
long term. Russia is actively engaging in this region to counter what
it views as the United States meddling in its near-abroad. Expanding
air and sea access to project military power, it has agreements with
Venezuela and Nicaragua that allow Russian warships to visit on short
notice. Moscow has executed three strategic bomber deployments to the
region since 2008 and made more than 40 port calls since 2010. Russia
doubled its naval deployments in this region, going from five (2008-
2014), to 11 (2015-2020). Russia is trying to make inroads in the
hemisphere by providing security training and has conducted $2.3
billion in weapons and military equipment sales in the last 10 years.
At the same time, Moscow is working to discredit the United States by
flooding the region's information space with disinformation, to include
hundreds of articles distorting United States security actions. In
2020, Russian Spanish-language media outlets more than doubled their
social media followers from 7 million to over 18 million.
Iran. Iran uses both formal and informal instruments to expand its
influence in Latin America and the Caribbean and prepare for any
potential contingencies. Tehran seeks to expand its economic ties to
the region, and leverages its security expertise and well-established
diaspora in the region to expand trade and its overall influence. The
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force, Tehran's primary external
operations unit for exporting the Islamic Revolution, maintains
operatives in foreign embassies, charities, and religious and cultural
institutions to enhance ties globally. In the past year, Iran has
expanded economic and security cooperation with Venezuela on fuel
transfers, food staples, and military assistance, possibly expanding
the Qods Force's presence in the region. Tehran also relies on a system
of Iranian state-sponsored and non-state facilitated media outlets to
shape the information domain to generate empathy for Iran and Shia
Islam and diminish Western influence in the hemisphere. Tehran
maintains a Spanish-language channel that reaches 17 countries in the
region.
Venezuela. The Venezuelan people continue to suffer under the
illegitimate Maduro regime. They lack basic services, clean water,
food, and health care. The impacts of COVID-19, gas shortages,
increasing levels of unemployment and inflation (at over 3000 percent),
and human rights violations all compound one of the most severe
humanitarian crises in the history of this hemisphere. The illegitimate
regime is even struggling to provide basic services within Caracas, to
which it previously diverted most of its resources to avoid threats to
its control. Venezuelan migration continues to destabilize the region,
straining the health systems and economies of Venezuela's neighboring
countries. As of December 2020, approximately 5.5 million refugees and
migrants from Venezuela were displaced globally, with some 4.6 million
remaining in Latin America and the Caribbean. Venezuela is also the
primary foothold and access point in the region for ESAs, enables TCO
activities, and gives refuge to regional terrorist groups.
Cuba. Cuba remains a regional corrosive influence that enables and
inspires autocratic regimes in the hemisphere and is the primary
supporter of the illegitimate Maduro regime in Venezuela. Cuba is the
entry point for ESA influence in the region and its reach extends
beyond this hemisphere. Like the PRC, Cuba uses medical diplomacy to
build international goodwill and gain back door access to undermine
fragile democracies. Havana has fully exploited the COVID-19 pandemic
to reinvigorate its medical outreach, a key revenue generator for the
island at a time when it is desperate for income.
Nicaragua. Nicaragua's current political crisis that began in 2018
continues, with President Ortega's policies still leading to calls for
his resignation. We are already seeing a concerning suppression of the
opposition, in advance of this year's election. Managua maintains close
ties with Moscow, whose security assistance to Nicaragua focuses on
Professional Military Education, donations, and the provision of
humanitarian assistance in a strategy to subjugate the Nicaraguan
Government and counter United States regional goals. Over the past
decade Russia built a joint counternarcotic training center in
Nicaragua, trained at least 500 Latin American and Caribbean officers,
and conducted multiple maritime and air deployments to the country.
What we're doing about it. We work to effectively posture U.S.
Forces to ensure we can achieve NDS objectives. USSOUTHCOM remains
committed to maintaining our advantage and to our allies and partners
to protect and advance mutual security interests. We, along with State
do this through a wide range of security cooperation and assistance
activities aimed at building partner capacity such as DOD's Joint
Exercise and Humanitarian Assistances Programs and State's Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education Training
(IMET) programs, as well as information and intelligence sharing. To
put it simply, we outcompete bad guys by being the good guys. While our
adversaries look for opportunities to extract, we look for ways to
build up. We work with partners to understand where their capability
gaps are and how we can help fill those in--stronger partners are
better equipped to secure our hemisphere, our neighborhood. Our
training is responsive to the needs of our partners, it's the highest
possible quality, and includes emphasis on professionalism to include
values like respect for human rights and the rule of law as an inherent
element of professional military and security forces. It emphasizes the
importance of a strong non-commissioned officer corps and empowering
women as part of the entire force. At USSOUTHCOM, we are committed to
integrating gender perspectives into all of our activities, and we
encourage our partners to create structural changes in their militaries
to allow for the same through our Women, Peace and Security in the
Western Hemisphere Initiative. For a nation's defense and security
forces to be sustainable, legitimate, and respected, the meaningful
inclusion of women is imperative. Our Human Rights Office, the only
such program at any Combatant Command, actively promotes building
stronger military human rights programs with partner nation militaries.
Our exercise program is designed to counter threats, build
readiness, and enhance our partners' capabilities, interoperability,
and domain awareness. This is a vital component of our strategy,
allowing us to conduct multi-domain exercises with our partners and
build interoperability and readiness that improve our collective
ability to secure the region.
Being on the field, with a presence at Cooperative Security
Locations in El Salvador, Colombia, and Curacao, and a Forward
Operating Site in Honduras, home of Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-Bravo),
enables us to answer the call and build trust, when our neighbors ask
for help in a crisis, as they did following the back-to-back major
hurricanes that devastated Central America late last year. In the
aftermath of Hurricanes Eta and Iota, our forces at JTF-Bravo, with
support from our components and allies, responded immediately,
conducting search and rescue operations and delivering lifesaving aid
to areas isolated by the storms, delivering over 1.2 million pounds of
life-saving humanitarian aid and rescuing 852 people. There is no
better way to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the region than to respond
to our neighbors' needs in times of crisis.
Through our security cooperation program, we focus on building our
partners' capacity to conduct ground and maritime interdiction, defend
their cyber networks, secure their borders and sovereignty, and
maintain domain awareness. The Near Coastal Patrol Vessel (NCPV)
program is a USSOUTHCOM initiative to address selected Caribbean and
Central American partners' requirements for a maritime patrol vessel
with the capacity to conduct sustained Maritime Interdiction
Operations. Fielding these vessels in key partner nations will increase
interoperability and regional ability to counter regional threats, the
nefarious activities of which pose an existential threat to many of our
partners.
Another important capability to outcompete our adversaries in the
region is intelligence-driven--we must gather information across all
domains and share it as widely as possible with our partners. We shine
a light on the PRC's predatory and corrupt actions so our partners can
recognize the PRC's malign activities and make well-informed decisions
on engaging Beijing. We continue to convey to our partners and allies
that Beijing and Moscow seek to undermine their national sovereignty
and fosters instability that allows TCOs a foothold within their
borders. We also highlight that partnering with the PRC requires
turning a blind eye to malign behavior that ranges from corruption and
human rights abuses to environmental degradation and natural resource
depletion.
transnational criminal organizations (tcos) and violent extremist
organizations (veos).
TCOs. TCOs are violent and they pose a national security threat to
the United States Homeland. They share the goal of PRC, Russia, and
other malign actors to advance their self-interests at the expense of
our partners' sovereignty. TCOs engage in a wide array of illegal
activities including drug and weapons trafficking, human smuggling and
trafficking, and money laundering. TCOs make up an approximately $90
billion a year life-threatening enterprise through cocaine profits
alone and are responsible for thousands of deaths in the United States
each year, forging a trail of violence, corruption, and instability
through our region in route to our Homeland. In many cases, TCOs are
better funded than partner nation security forces. In 2020, drug
traffickers likely attempted to move an estimated 2,300 metric tons of
cocaine, departing from the source zone toward the United States,
Europe, and other markets. Their efforts persist despite combined
security operations and COVID quarantine measures (such as border and
port closures), indicating these traffickers are bent on undermining
security and prosperity for us, our allies, and partner nations all for
the sake of profit. The COVID-19 environment has caused some
traffickers to stockpile cocaine, and complicated coca eradication
operations in the Andean Ridge. Traffickers have adapted to the COVID
environment, cocaine flow has increased and rebounded to pre-pandemic
levels. We must remain ready with increased U.S. and partner nation
presence and pressure to stem this flood.
Narcotrafficking is a scourge throughout the hemisphere and TCOs
aren't the only ones who benefit--the Maduro regime is heavily involved
in trafficking narcotics, overtly supporting narcoterrorism while the
innocent citizens of Venezuela continue to suffer under extreme
oppression and grinding poverty. From 2015 to 2019 the known drug flow
out of Venezuela increased by 145 percent. Over the last few years, the
illegitimate Maduro regime has collaborated with National Liberation
Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Dissidents
(FARC-D) to move hundreds of metric tons of cocaine from Colombia
through Venezuela via non-commercial aircraft and commercial cargo
ships. This relationship also extends to illicit gold mining, a
critical commodity that Maduro uses to sustain his illegitimate regime
and military loyalty at the expense of the Venezuelan people.
Regional Terrorist Organizations. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia Dissidents (FARC-D) and National Liberation Army (ELN) are the
two main organized armed terrorist groups and drug trafficking
organizations in the region whose actions pose a direct threat to our
Homeland and partners. The FARC-D is composed of remnants of the FARC,
who traffic drugs and engage in extortion and illegal mining to
generate revenue. The FARC-D targets Venezuelan nationals for
recruitment, using money, food, and safe passage to encourage or coerce
desperate Venezuelan migrants to support their cause. The ELN also
remains committed to fighting the Colombian Government and does so
violently through the use of improvised explosive devices and vehicle-
borne explosives. This group fundraises primarily through the drug
trade and illicit mining, as well as by imposing ``war taxes'' on drug
labs and other businesses in its control. The ELN and FARC-D benefit
from unchallenged freedom of movement and protection in Venezuela, with
much of their leadership operating with impunity from within Venezuelan
borders. Venezuela has become a paradise of impunity for
narcotraffickers, while the Venezuelan people are forced to endure a
nightmare of insecurity.
Al Qaeda and ISIS maintain some sympathizers in the region. After
ISIS's intense propaganda campaign from 2014 to 2017, as many as 200
Trinidadians left the Caribbean islands to join the fight in Iraq and
Syria. Several family members who traveled with the fighters are still
in the Middle East and seek to return to the region, which will
challenge the region's security services at a time when they are
already overstretched due to the pandemic. Hizballah leverages the
region's Lebanese diaspora throughout Latin America and the Caribbean
for fundraising, recruiting, and logistical support. Operationally,
Hizballah's Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO), its external operations
arm, is responsible for at least three high-profile attacks in the
region and three other planned operations that were disrupted.
Special Interest Aliens (SIAs). In 2020, United States and partner
law enforcement, with support from the intelligence community, arrested
66 Latin American human smuggling facilitators involved in moving non-
United States citizens who potentially pose a national security risk to
the United States or its interests. These facilitators move SIAs from
countries like Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen--
areas with pronounced VEO activity--through Latin America and toward
the United States for fees ranging from $10,000 to $50,000 per person.
This business is dangerous, but lucrative, generating between $150 to
$350 million a year for the facilitators.
What we're doing about it. Our regional partnerships are vital to
security and prosperity in this hemisphere and to our collective
ability to confront global challenges including ESAs, TCOs, and VEOs.
The men and women of USSOUTHCOM work hard every day alongside our
strong interagency and international partners to disrupt and degrade
these adversaries, while maintaining U.S. presence, access, and
influence in our hemisphere. The Joint Interagency Task Force-South
(JIATF-S) in Key West, conducts our statutorily-directed mission to
detect and monitor illicit narcotics, delivering a high return on
modest investments. Last year, this international and interagency
``team of teams'' helped keep 264 metric tons of cocaine off U.S.
streets. JIATF-S-facilitated interdictions historically account for
almost four times the cocaine seized by all domestic and border
enforcement efforts combined. In an operating area that is 11 times
larger than the United States, JIATF-S provides the best bang for the
taxpayer buck when it comes to keeping drugs from arriving on our
shores.
Last year, recognizing the seriousness of the TCO threat to the
United States Homeland, the Secretary of Defense authorized an all
domain enhanced counternarcotic operation to reduce the flow of illicit
drugs, degrade TCOs, and increase interoperability and readiness. In
the past year, the U.S. Navy stepped up, providing more ship presence
and maritime patrol aircraft. These assets have achieved significant
return on investment as well as provided readiness building
opportunities for our Fourth Fleet and Navy crews. This initiative
included an increase in surface and air platforms, other intelligence
assets, and a Security Forces Assistance Brigade to work with our
partners. We are putting these assets to good use, integrating with
interagency and international partners across all domains to ensure
long-term success. Through the employment of these additional assets we
increased the targeting of known air and maritime illicit trafficking
events by 65 percent. Our whole of Government and partner nation
approach has disrupted over 240 metric tons of cocaine and almost
100,000 pounds of marijuana. We have detained over 700 suspected drug
smugglers, denied almost $6 billion of profits to TCOs, and most
importantly, saved the lives of more than 2000 Americans. A Security
Forces Assistance Brigade is currently training Colombian and Honduran
forces to more effectively fuse their intelligence to inform manual
eradication and lab destruction efforts----helping to stop the drug
threat closer to the source, before it begins its journey to the United
States. We plan on expanding this effort into other nations in Central
America with a focus on capabilities to counter TCOs.
With this increase of U.S. all domain presence and pressure--a sign
of U.S. leadership and commitment to the region--our partner nations,
who could have easily turned inward to focus on the COVID-19 crisis,
instead stepped up their participation to counter TCOs, demonstrating
their commitment to countering this threat. Key partners like Colombia,
Costa Rica, Panama, Guatemala, El Salvador, and others have been
involved in almost 60 percent of drug disruptions during this
operation. Years of sustained security cooperation with our partners
throughout our hemisphere is really paying dividends--we have helped
build the capability of these nations to operate with us to disrupt
drug shipments before those loads enter the Homeland.
We have very willing partners in this hemisphere, and they
demonstrated their commitment throughout the year, despite the
increased challenges of COVID. Colombia kicked off Operation Orion V in
April 2020, just as COVID was beginning to impact their country,
stating that if the United States is committed to the drug fight during
COVID, they would stand with us. Operation Orion V was a multi-national
(26 countries), all-domain operation that resulted in 50 metric tons of
cocaine disrupted, 72 drug labs destroyed, and $1.5 billion in profits
denied to TCOs. The U.S. provided maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) and
analyst support to this operation. Colombia just concluded the follow-
on Operation Orion VI, in which this coalition disrupted another 76.5
metric tons of cocaine and detained over 400 traffickers. This is just
one example of the large return on investment gained by combining a
willing and able partner with a committed United States presence in the
Western Hemisphere.
While the Secretary of Defense agreed to continue sourcing this
mission with traditional military assets, this mission also benefits
from non-traditional resources. Congressional support to the
counternarcotic mission has been instrumental in the success of these
operations. We are filling capability gaps through innovative solutions
like the Multi Mission Support Vessel (MMSV). The MMSV has supported
the disruption of almost 8 metric tons of cocaine and 15,000 pounds of
marijuana, denied over $180 million in profits to TCOs, and detained 48
drug traffickers, while also keeping three low profile vessels carrying
tons of narcotics from reaching our shores. It also extends the reach
of our partner nation interdiction vessels as they launch in support of
these counterdrug operations. We are applying commercially-available
technology like unmanned aircraft systems to increase the MMSV's
ability to conduct detection and monitoring and provide information to
partner nation interdiction assets.
SOUTHCOM employs less than 1 percent of DOD Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) resources to counter ESAs and
TCOs in this region. To meet the mission, we are pushing the envelope
with innovative techniques, focusing on a 21st century, non-traditional
approach to intelligence that integrates publicly available
information, advanced analytics, artificial intelligence and machine
learning, and open collaboration with allies and partners to disrupt
threats. These emerging tools offer persistent, AOR-wide coverage
without risk to personnel at a relatively low cost and puts us in a
position to better compete against adversaries. Our Technical Network
Analysis Cell (TNAC) and Asymmetric Target Acquisition Center (ATAC)
are just two examples of our approach. For an investment of $1.2
million the TNAC at JIATF-S denied TCOs of $817.1 million in revenue by
providing actionable intelligence, in cooperation with our law
enforcement partners, that is shared with partner nations and
interagency partners leading to numerous disruptions. The ATAC, run by
our Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH), is supporting law
enforcement efforts to counter TCOs. The Congressional support we have
received for ISR has been critical to sustaining the innovative
capabilities that support our unique mission, making our non-
traditional approach to ISR possible. USSOUTHCOM ISR activities are
optimized for return on investment with a mix of traditional platforms,
purpose-built sensors, and increasingly non-traditional collection
methods. USSOUTHCOM will continue to work with the Department to ensure
we can meet our vital mission to disrupt transnational criminal
organizations, as well as work in concert with regional partners to
confront shared threats.
While we are making strides, we are but one part of the solution.
This problem set requires a whole-of-government and whole-of-society
solution to address both the supply and demand sides of this threat.
Drugs have killed 840,000 Americans since 1999, \2\ and continue to
kill 70,000 Americans a year. Drugs cost our Nation billions each year
in criminal justice, healthcare, and productivity losses--in addition
to the suffering caused by shattered and lost lives. We must continue
and further enhance the tremendous interagency and international
cooperation we have fostered over recent years against this common
enemy.
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\2\ https://www.drugabuse.gov/drug-topics/trends-statistics/costs-
substance-abuse
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As the U.S. Coast Guard provides the bulk of our counterdrug
forces, the acquisition and deployment of their Offshore Patrol Cutter
will be critical to keeping drugs off our streets and countering TCOs.
Each additional force package (maritime patrol aircraft, flight deck
capable ship, embarked helicopter, small boat (US Coast Guard over-the-
horizon boat or U.S. Navy 11 meter RHIB), and law enforcement
detachment) enables the disruption of 35 more metric tons of cocaine
and the strong presence reinforces to our partners that we are all-in
with them--building trust.
On the counterterrorism (CT) front, our Special Operations
Command--South (SOCSOUTH) maintains persistent presence in several
countries in the region, working and training with partner militaries.
Our focus is on improving partner nation CT response capabilities,
interoperability, and information sharing. The DOD Rewards Program has
again provided tremendous return on investment in the fight against
terrorism. In 2020, USSOUTHCOM paid $979,000 in rewards to 54
informants that resulted in the neutralization of a record 107
individuals who were terrorists or force protection threats and seizure
of 26 weapons/explosive caches and $952,000 in cash. Although this is a
counterterror and force protection program, it also yielded significant
counternarcotic effects including the seizure of 14 metric tons of
cocaine and the destruction of 12 drug labs. We also continue to focus
efforts on assessing the financial underpinnings of national security
threats in the region and have deepened our counter-threat finance
related collaboration with the U.S. Treasury Department and interagency
partners. This includes providing direct analytic support to the
development of sanctions against Central and South American-based
transnational organized crime groups that launder money, traffic drugs,
and corrupt government officials in the region. An area requiring more
emphasis is TCO network mapping and holistic interagency and partner
nation efforts to dismantle key TCO centers of gravity such as
logistics and finances.
USSOUTHCOM also takes a total force approach to these challenges,
taking full advantage of the Reserve component, composed of Guard and
Reserve Forces. With fewer apportioned forces and a smaller budget than
most regional combatant commands, I have a great appreciation for the
importance and critical support they provide to our interagency and
international partners. The ability of the National Guard, to work
directly with host nations and local institutions through the State
Partnership Program is a force multiplier for engaging our partners.
Over one third of those State partnerships are in our AOR,
strategically complementing our security cooperation efforts.
Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay (JTF-GTMO). JTF-GTMO continues to
conduct safe, legal, and humane detention operations. In an effort to
do so in a more efficient manner, the JTF has taken steps to right-size
its force and consolidate operations. To date, we have safely reduced
military personnel by over 20 percent. This is part of an ongoing
effort to continually assess all USSOUTHCOM operations to ensure we are
maximizing use of resources.
what more can be done/what we need
Quality of Life. People are our most important resource and our
absolute priority. None of the initiatives described above would be
possible without the tremendous work of our men and women. South
Florida, including Miami and the Florida Keys, is a high cost-of-living
area that poses many challenges to our personnel. The housing market is
so competitive that personnel pay upwards of $10,000 of up-front fees
in order to secure a rental unit. We are working with the supportive
local community to find immediate relief options for our servicemembers
and civilians on housing and other factors that contribute to the high
cost of living. We are also appreciative of the Department of the
Army's support to find a permanent, cost effective housing solution
here in Miami. We have also established TEAM SOUTHCOM, a family
readiness group, to support all of our families, especially as they
transition to this high-cost area and a non-standard military
installation.
Congressional Support. We appreciate your support of our security
cooperation program in the USSOUTHCOM AOR as a continued recognition of
the importance of these programs in our hemisphere. We also appreciate
the increased flexibility that Congress included in the Fiscal Year
2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act by increasing the percentage of
333 funds that may be used over 2 years. Greater funding flexibility
increases our ability to plan and execute multi-year programs to build
partner capacity. Congress also continued support to USSOUTHCOM's ISR
program and the MMSV--two investments that will increase our domain
awareness and ability to stop threats bound for our Homeland.
Infrastructure. The Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization
Act authorized planning and design funding for a new Command and
Control Facility for JIATF-S, recognizing what the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers determined was a compelling need to replace its current
1950's constructed facility. We appreciate this support and are working
to complete the design for a resilient facility built to enable
interagency and international collaboration for this critical mission.
USSOUTHCOM is also working closely with the Defense Health Agency to
replace the hospital at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay (NSGB), which is
experiencing severe structural deterioration. This medical treatment
facility (MTF) is the only strategic medical hub to support the full
spectrum of mission personnel operating in the USSOUTHCOM AOR! It is
also the only MTF for personnel at NSGB, as there are no civilian
options available. It is also important to note that NSGB is a
strategic asset as the only U.S. base in the USSOUTHCOM AOR.
Supporting our Partners. The U.S. military has established programs
that help our partners develop diverse and inclusive militaries that
respect the rule of law and human rights. These are the characteristics
of a professional force that has legitimacy in the eyes of its
population. Consistent engagement with our partner militaries and
security forces through programs like our human rights training and
women, peace, and security programs, as well as through the range of
security cooperation and assistance programs, is essential to our
ability build their institutional capacity and resiliency to the range
of threats we all face together.
conclusion
The security threats in the Western Hemisphere, our shared
neighborhood, demand a sense of urgency. TCOs threaten our United
States Homeland. We also see the rise in the PRC's leverage and
influence is not just a South China Sea problem, it is a global
problem, and it requires a solution that includes our partners and
allies. When our neighborhood is strong, so is our national security.
We no longer have two oceans to keep our adversaries at bay--their
malign activity is knocking on our door, creating instability in an
already fragile region, enabling TCOs to take hold in an attempt to
weaken democracies and perpetuate corruption. We must stand by our
partners.
We hold ourselves to a high standard. We have strong values as
Americans. We ensure our partners respect human rights; we train them
on the responsible use of military equipment; we help build the
institutional capacity to maintain professional military and security
forces; and we operate transparently and in accordance with civilian
leadership, international norms, and the rule of law. U.S. security
cooperation with our partners ultimately bolsters our own national
security and has done so for over 70 years. Investing in our
neighborhood is an investment in national security and we are at a
critical juncture where focus and attention are essential to
maintaining positional advantage.
I look forward to discussing our efforts to capitalize on the
opportunities for shared security that exist in strengthening our
partnerships.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Admiral. General VanHerck,
please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL GLEN D. VANHERCK, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE
COMMAND
General VanHerck. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
the distinguished Members of the Committee, it is a privilege
to testify with you here today. I am honored to serve as the
Commander of the United States Northern Command and North
American Aerospace Defense Command, and I am grateful to appear
alongside Admiral Faller, as SOUTHCOM is a crucial partner in
Homeland defense.
USNORTHCOM and NORAD are separate commands charged with the
critical mission of defending the United States and North
America, respectively. USNORTHCOM is the United States
geographic combatant command responsible for the defense of the
Homeland, defense and support of civil authorities, and theater
security cooperation for Canada, the Bahamas, and Mexico. NORAD
is the bi-national command that provides aerospace warning,
airspace control, and maritime warning for the United States
and Canada.
USNORTHCOM and NORAD's servicemembers and civilians are
executing the Secretary of Defense's top priority by standing
watch to defend our Nation against all threats, whether posed
by competitors, natural disasters, or a pandemic. Over the last
year, NORAD fighters, tankers, and airborne early warning
aircraft responded to multiple incursions into our Air Defense
Identification Zones, multiple ships sortied under USNORTHCOM
Operation Control to defend our maritime approaches, and
USNORTHCOM synchronized the Department of Defense's support to
lead Federal agencies as thousands of servicemembers deployed
within the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility to aid states and
local communities in the fight against coronavirus.
Today, thousands of servicemembers are providing lifesaving
vaccinations to our citizens. No matter the threat, we are
always ready to defend the lives of our citizens and our
Homelands.
Right now, as we confront the scourge of this pandemic, the
threats we face and the pace of change in the geostrategic
environment continue to advance. We have entered an era of
renewed global competition, and this time we are facing two
peer competitors, both nuclear armed. We must adapt to the
challenges posed by this reality.
Since the first Gulf War, the United States military has
focused on projecting power forward to confront rogue regimes,
violent extremist organizations, and other potential
adversaries who threated American interests. We trusted in our
nuclear deterrent and an assured power project capability, as
well as the blessings of geography, to prevent an attack on our
soil.
In parallel, our competitors expanded the definition of
competition into economic and informational areas, and have
aggressively advanced their own military capabilities to hold
our Homelands at risk, both kinetically and non-kinetically.
Those efforts were predominantly focused on long-range strike,
improved delivery platforms, cyber capabilities intended to
circumvent our defenses from all directions and in all domains,
and exploiting a perceived gap between our foundational nuclear
deterrent and our conventional Homeland defense deterrent
capabilities.
Concurrently, the rise of transnational criminal
organizations and the subsequent strains on governance and the
instability they create has created additional opportunities
for our competitors that they are working to exploit today.
We must outpace our competitors by accelerating our own
efforts to transform our culture, investing in our people to
grow both talent within the ranks and counter extremist and
destructive behaviors anti-ethical to our values. We must
invest early and often in relationships with allies and
partners to develop a global team of like-minded nations, and
we must factor Homeland defense into every strategy, plan,
force management, force design, as well as all aspects of
acquisitions and budget, so we deter in competition, de-
escalating crisis, and defeat in conflict. To do this both
USNORTHCOM and NORAD are concentrating efforts on building our
capability to deter, and, if needed, defend against
increasingly advanced all-domain threats.
Together with the Canadian Armed Forces we are in the early
stages of NORAD modernization and building additional military
capabilities in the Arctic. In coordination with the Missile
Defense Agency, United States Strategic Command, and United
States Space Command (SPACECOM) we are maintaining and
improving our ballistic missile defense capability.
In order to balance our readiness for crisis and conflict,
while also staying in global competition, we are placing
significant emphasis on left-of-launch framework. This
framework will increase decision space, uncovering more
deterrents and de-escalation options vice end-game defeat. We
are advocating for investment in all-domain awareness, to
generate a layered sensing grid and a layered defense approach
that emphasizes the use of an open sensor data architecture and
machine-enhanced processing in order to achieve information
dominance and decision superiority. Through information
dominance, we will grant decision-makers increased decision
space and build flexible response options to deter, deny, and
defeat every threat to the United States and Canada.
I am grateful for the trust that you place in United States
Northern Command and NORAD, and both commands take solemn pride
in our responsibility to defend our Homelands. We will forever
have the watch.
Thank you for your support and time, and I look forward to
answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of General VanHerck follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Glen Vanherck
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of
the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and for
allowing me the honor of representing the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen,
Marines, Guardians, Coast Guardsmen, and civilians of United States
Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD). I am especially privileged to represent the members of
the Canadian Armed Forces who are a vital and essential part of the
NORAD team.
USNORTHCOM is the U.S. geographic combatant command responsible for
defense of the United States Homeland. USNORTHCOM is also tasked with
providing defense support of civil authorities and engaging in theater
security cooperation with regional allies and partners. NORAD is a
distinct, bi-national command responsible for three missions in defense
of the United States and Canada: aerospace warning, aerospace control,
and maritime warning. Canadian Armed Forces personnel, to include my
three-star NORAD Deputy Commander, are essential to our NORAD missions.
Since I assumed command of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, each day has
afforded me the opportunity to lead a workforce of dedicated,
innovative, and resilient warfighters and public servants. That
fundamental commitment to our vital missions is clearly evident as
USNORTHCOM and NORAD have kept the watch and defended our Nations in
what is certainly the most dynamic and complex strategic environment I
have encountered in my 33 years in uniform.
Our competitors continue to take increasingly aggressive steps to
gain the upper hand in the military, information, economic, and
diplomatic arenas. USNORTHCOM meets each of those challenges head-on--
and we have done so while supporting whole-of-government efforts to
safeguard our citizens through the coronavirus pandemic and
historically severe hurricane and wildfire seasons, and also
simultaneously synchronizing the deployment of troops to support
federal law enforcement personnel on the southwest border. The
cascading events of the past year placed unprecedented strain on our
people, our interagency partners, and our institutions, and I am proud
that we overcame each of those challenges and emerged more resilient.
That steadfast commitment is more important than ever as our
competitors continue to target the Homelands through multiple means in
all domains. Defending our Nations, our citizens, and our way of life
requires constant vigilance, and USNORTHCOM and NORAD have demonstrated
time and again that our commands remain determined, focused, and ready.
But we must keep moving forward. Looking to the future, we will
continue to pursue innovative new capabilities and strategies to
detect, deny, deter, and, if necessary, defeat the mounting threats
posed by peer competitors, rogue nations, transnational criminal
organizations, and foreign and domestic violent extremists. No matter
the challenge or circumstance, this Committee should rest assured
USNORTHCOM and NORAD are always on guard.
threats
The global geostrategic environment continues to evolve rapidly.
While the United States has spent the last 30 years projecting power
forward to combat rogue regimes and violent extremists overseas, our
global competitors pursued capabilities to circumvent our legacy
warning and defensive systems and hold our Homeland at risk. Peer
competitors like Russia and China are undermining the international
rules-based order and challenging us in all domains. Further, rogue
states like North Korea and Iran are also pursuing capabilities to
nullify our military advantages, threaten our networks with cyber
weapons, and--in the case of North Korea--develop nuclear weapons.
Meanwhile, violent extremist organizations continue to devise plots to
attack our citizens and our way of life.
During the Cold War, we were overwhelmingly focused on defending
the United States and Canada from a single nation-state threat. After
the Soviet collapse, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and later the September
11, 2001 attacks shifted our focus to non-state and rogue actors.
Today, we don't have the luxury of focusing regionally or on only one
threat at a time. In the last decade, we've seen a sharp resurgence in
the Nation-State threat as our global competitors deploy increasingly
sophisticated capabilities to hold the United States and Canada at risk
and limit our options in a crisis. Concurrently, the terrorist threat
continues to evolve in ways that challenge our Homeland defense
capabilities. As a result, today's threat environment is likely the
most complex we have ever faced, as potential adversaries threaten us
in all domains and from all vectors.
Russia
Russia presents a persistent, proximate threat to the United States
and Canada and remains the most acute challenge to our Homeland defense
mission. Russian leaders seek to erode our influence, assert their
regional dominance, and reclaim their status as a global power through
a whole-of-government strategy that includes information operations,
deception, economic coercion, and the threat of military force.
In peacetime, Russian actors conduct sophisticated influence
operations to fan flames of discord in the United States and undermine
faith in our democratic institutions. In crisis or conflict, we should
expect Russia to employ its broad range of advanced capabilities--non-
kinetic, conventional, and nuclear--to threaten our critical
infrastructure in an attempt to limit our ability to project forces and
to attempt to compel de-escalation. Offensive capabilities Russia has
fielded over the last several years include advanced cyber and
counterspace weapons and a new generation of long-range and highly
precise land-attack cruise missiles--including hypersonics. These
capabilities complicate our ability to detect and defend against an
inbound attack from the air, sea, and even those originating from
Russian soil.
Russia also continues to modernize all three legs of its nuclear
triad. In December 2019, Russia fielded the world's first two
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) equipped with a hypersonic
glide vehicle payload that will challenge our ability to provide
actionable warning and attack assessment. In the coming years, Russia
hopes to field a series of even more advanced weapons intended to
ensure its ability to deliver nuclear weapons to the United States.
These include the Poseidon transoceanic nuclear torpedo and the
Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile, which--if perfected--could
enable strikes from virtually any vector due to its extreme range and
endurance.
Finally, Russia continues to conduct frequent military operations
in the approaches to North America. Last year, NORAD responded to more
Russian military flights off the coast of Alaska than we've seen in any
year since the end of the Cold War. These Russian military operations
include multiple flights of heavy bombers, anti-submarine aircraft, and
intelligence collection platforms near Alaska. These efforts show both
Russia's military reach and how they rehearse potential strikes on our
Homeland. Last summer, the Russian Navy focused its annual OCEAN SHIELD
exercise on the defense of Russia's maritime approaches in the Arctic
and Pacific. The multi-fleet exercise, intended in part to demonstrate
Russia's ability to control access to the Arctic through the Bering
Strait, included amphibious landings on the Chukotka Peninsula opposite
Alaska, as well as anti-submarine patrols and anti-ship cruise missile
launches from within the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone.
China
China continues to pursue an aggressive geopolitical strategy that
seeks to undermine United States influence around the globe and shape
the international environment to its advantage. In the USNORTHCOM area
of responsibility, China has made deliberate attempts to increase its
economic and political influence with our close partners in Mexico and
The Bahamas. While the United States remains the economic and military
partner of choice in the region, China is seeking to grow its trade and
investment in Mexico and, over the past few years, has invested in The
Bahamas' vital tourism sector through marquee infrastructure projects.
Militarily, China is rapidly advancing a modernization program that
seeks to erode our military advantages and deter us from intervening in
a regional conflict.
China remains among the world's most capable and brazen cyber
actors, stealing volumes of sensitive data from United States
Government, military, academic, cleared defense contractors, and other
commercial networks each year. In a crisis, China is postured to
transition rapidly from cyber exploitation to cyber attack in an
attempt to frustrate our ability to flow forces across the Pacific, and
globally. China also continues to advance its counter-space
capabilities that could threaten our space-based communications and
sensors. In the foreseeable future, China will likely be able to
augment its cyber-attack capabilities with a new family of long-range
precision-strike weapons capable of targeting key logistical nodes on
our West Coast that support United States mobilization and sustainment.
China also continues to expand and modernize its strategic nuclear
forces to rival those of Russia and the United States in
sophistication, if not in numbers. Over the last decade, China fielded
dozens of road-mobile ICBMs and several ballistic missile submarines
designed to enhance the survivability of China's nuclear deterrent and
ensure its ability to retaliate following any attack. In the next
decade, China will deploy a new generation of advanced weapons--some of
them hypersonic--that will further diversify their nuclear strike
options and any attack. In the next decade, China will deploy a new
generation of advanced weapons--some of them hypersonic--that will
further diversify their nuclear strike options and any attack. In the
next decade, China will deploy a new generation of advanced weapons--
some of them hypersonic--that will further diversify their nuclear
strike options and
North Korea and Iran
The Kim Jong-un regime has achieved alarming success in its quest
to demonstrate the capability to threaten the United States Homeland
with nuclear-armed ICBMs, believing such weapons are necessary to deter
U.S. military action and ensure his regime's survival. In 2017, North
Korea successfully tested a thermonuclear device--increasing the
destructive potential of their strategic weapons by an order of
magnitude--as well as three ICBMs capable of ranging the United States.
In October 2020, North Korea unveiled a new ICBM considerably larger
and presumably more capable than the systems they tested in 2017,
further increasing the threat posed to our Homeland. The North Korean
regime has also indicated that it is no longer bound by the unilateral
nuclear and ICBM testing moratorium announced in 2018, suggesting that
Kim Jong-un may begin flight testing an improved ICBM design in the
near future.
Iran continues to advance its military technologies and threaten
the security of United States Forces and allies throughout the Middle
East. Iran adheres to a self-imposed range limit on its ballistic
missile force that prevents it from directly threatening the United
States. Nonetheless, Iran is developing and testing ICBM-relevant
technologies through its theater missiles and space launch platforms--
including its first successful orbit of a military satellite in April
of 2020--that could accelerate the development of a Homeland-
threatening ICBM should Iran's leaders choose to pursue such a system.
Iran retains the ability to conduct attacks via covert operations,
terrorist proxies, and its growing cyber-attack capabilities, which it
has already employed against United States financial institutions.
Violent Extremist Organizations
The terrorist threat has grown more diffuse, typified by simple
attacks inspired from afar and carried out by individuals or small
networks that are difficult for our law enforcement partners to detect
and interdict. Foreign terrorist groups remain committed to attacking
the United States, either directly or by inspiring homegrown violent
extremists (HVEs) to act in their stead. Despite their territorial
losses over the last several years, ISIS leaders--along with their more
patient counterparts in al-Qa'ida--remain highly adaptive foes who are
largely immune to traditional means of deterrence. Commercial and
general aviation persist as preferred targets due to the
disproportionate economic and psychological impact of such attacks.
Meanwhile, foreign terrorists and HVEs continue to target U.S. military
personnel both on and off base, as exemplified by the December 2019
shooting at Naval Air Station Pensacola.
Transnational Criminal Organizations
Transnational Criminal Organizations undermine the security of the
United States, and that of our allies and partners, through
increasingly violent and destabilizing activities that threaten the
rule of law and our shared democratic institutions. These organizations
have increased their collaboration with criminal groups beyond North
America, which has increased their resilience. In our interconnected
Western Hemisphere and globally, we must minimize the negative effect
of organized criminal activity by aligning strategies, policies, plans,
and authorities with the associated personnel and resources--across the
United States Government and with allies and partners--to significantly
diminish this proximate threat. All of this requires a coordinated
whole-of-government effort to understand and manage these networks, as
well as shared domain awareness across our government, allies, and
partners. This national security imperative is integral to contesting
peer competitors.
defending the homeland
USNORTHCOM's defense of the Homeland provides the foundation for
the full spectrum of the Department of Defense's worldwide missions and
supports the missions of every other combatant command. The ability to
deploy forces overseas, support allies, deliver humanitarian
assistance, and provide presence and reassurance around the globe
relies on our ability to safeguard our citizens, as well as national
critical infrastructure, transportation nodes, and leadership. As
competitors field highly advanced and agile long-range weapons systems
and seek to act on growing territorial ambitions, we are adapting our
thinking, evolving our own capabilities, and enhancing our operations
and exercises to accurately reflect a changing world while remaining a
relevant force.
The United States has long relied on our nuclear arsenal to serve
as the strategic deterrent against an attack on our Homeland. In
today's threat environment, strategic deterrence remains foundational
to our national defense. A safe, secure, and effective nuclear force
remains the most credible combination of capabilities to deter
strategic attack and execute our national strategy. The U.S. strategic
deterrent has helped to maintain a careful balance between nuclear
powers and remains the bedrock of our national defense, as the
longstanding doctrine of deterrence by punishment makes clear to
potential adversaries that a large-scale attack on the United States or
our allies would result in an overwhelming and devastating response.
However, over the last decade, our competitors have adapted new
techniques and fielded advanced weapons systems with the potential to
threaten the Homeland below the nuclear threshold. Simply stated, the
missiles and delivery platforms now in the hands of our competitors
present a significant challenge to our legacy warning and assessment
systems and defensive capabilities. Advanced systems posing threats to
the Homeland have already been fielded in large numbers, and our
defensive capabilities have not kept pace with the threat. The notion
that the Homeland is not a sanctuary has been true for some time, and
that will remain the case for the foreseeable future. Therefore, we
must ensure effective nuclear and conventional deterrents are in place
to defend the Homeland and ensure our ability to project power where
and when it is needed.
Highly advanced cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles, and stealthy
delivery platforms provide our competitors with the ability to hold
targets in the Homeland at risk with conventional weapons. That fact
has led us to emphasize improved all-domain awareness and the
development of a layered sensing grid to provide warfighters and
decision makers at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels with
increased awareness and decision space.
The reality of a vulnerable Homeland and the risks associated with
rising global competition are driving our commands to collaborate with
interagency and industry partners to find and deliver smarter, more
affordable technology. To outpace our competitors, we cannot be
satisfied with incremental steps; instead, we must continue to increase
the pace and tempo of our technological advancements. This work is
essential, and we are proud of our close collaboration with a host of
interagency and industry partners and international allies as we work
together to outthink our competition, outpace threats, and defend what
we hold most dear. That global focus and cooperation is also reflected
in our growing wargaming capacity, including major Homeland defense
exercises such as VIGILANT SHIELD and our participation in the Large
Scale Global Exercise series.
the path to decision superiority
I believe our future success in USNORTHCOM, our fellow U.S.
combatant commands, and NORAD requires all-domain awareness,
information dominance, and decision superiority. Our competitors have
invested heavily in weapons systems that can be launched against
distant targets with little to no warning, as well as stealthy delivery
platforms specifically designed to evade detection by existing sensors.
As a result, the successful execution of USNORTHCOM and NORAD missions
in the digital age relies on significantly improving global all-domain
awareness through the development of a fused ecosystem of networked
sensors extending from space to the seafloor.
This network will pull data from an array of repurposed systems,
legacy sensors enhanced through low-cost software modifications, and a
limited number of new sensors to provide robust indications and warning
and persistent tracking of the full spectrum of potential threats to
the Homeland from the seafloor to on orbit. Integrating and sharing
data from this global sensor network into common platforms will allow
leaders to observe potential adversaries' actions earlier in the
decision cycle, providing more time and decision space at all levels.
That decision space is where the true value of improved domain
awareness resides. Harnessing the capability of distributed multi-
domain sensors, machine learning, and artificial intelligence will
provide military leaders, the intelligence community, and senior
civilian officials with the information necessary to anticipate, rather
than react to, competitors' actions.
All-domain awareness is the first critical step on the path to
decision superiority, and USNORTHCOM and NORAD require and have
prioritized capabilities that improve our domain awareness and global
integration with our fellow warfighters. Sensors and systems such as
Over the Horizon Radars, polar satellite communications, Integrated
Underwater Sensor Systems, and space-based missile warning and tracking
sensors are essential to our missions. While the benefits to
continental defense are clear, these capabilities will also help every
U.S. combatant commander around the world while enhancing USNORTHCOM
and NORAD's collective ability to defend the United States and Canada.
In September 2020, just after I assumed command of USNORTHCOM and
NORAD, the commands partnered with the United States Air Force and
United States Space Command in the second onramp demonstration of the
Air Force's Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS). This large-scale
joint force demonstration established a network with embedded machine
learning and artificial intelligence to rapidly detect, track, and
positively identify a simulated cruise missile threat, while providing
a common operating picture and all-domain awareness for commanders at
multiple levels.
The ABMS onramp demonstration provided a brief but exciting glimpse
into the future of USNORTHCOM and NORAD. By creating potential pathways
for accessing and distributing data in ways that allow leaders to
think, plan, and act globally rather than relying on outdated regional
approaches, we are significantly amplifying the capability of the joint
force. Through these and other efforts, USNORTHCOM and NORAD are
actively working to deliver information dominance by fusing new
technologies to increase decision space for commanders and senior
civilian decision makers. Ultimately, our objective is to enable
leaders and commanders all over the world to quickly assess any
situation and take the steps necessary to stay well ahead of an
adversary's next moves in order to deter and deny in competition, de-
escalate in crisis, and defeat in conflict.
The prototype Pathfinder data analytics project provides another
example of how USNORTHCOM and NORAD are working to leverage existing
but stovepiped data streams to the benefit of both operational and
strategic decision makers. In our ongoing prototype efforts, Pathfinder
gathers data from multiple distinct military and civilian air domain
sensors and, through automation and machine learning models, produces a
fused common operating picture to improve the reliability of the data
and increase the decision space that will someday soon be available in
real time to our assessors and watch-standers. This low-cost, rapidly
developed system will have long-term benefits for our domain awareness
and has already shown some of the advantages that information dominance
will provide to warfighters around the world.
Information is power, but only if it is accessible, sharable, and
actionable. Unlocking the enormous potential of the data currently
being collected by a global layered sensor grid will allow us to gain a
decisive advantage over competitors and potential adversaries.
Currently, vast quantities of data are trapped by incompatible systems
and antiquated organizational structures. Breaking down these
stovepipes is achievable, but doing so will require innovation and
coordination across various agencies, to include technology that allows
for timely exploitation of the massive volume of data collected by our
sensor networks. More importantly, it will also depend on breaking away
from a culture that favors compartmenting and isolating information, in
order to fully realize the full potential of our capabilities--
including those that reside with our allies and partners. As the
defense and intelligence communities connect systems and sensors,
consideration of national electromagnetic spectrum management policies
is needed to ensure that necessary connections and bandwidth are
accessible.
As our competitors rapidly develop and deploy advanced capabilities
with clear intent to overcome the U.S. technological advantage, the
Department of Defense and the U.S. Government as a whole must also
modernize our requirements and acquisition processes to stay ahead.
Given the current pace of technological advancement, the limitations of
the 2-year budgeting process and protracted acquisition timeframe
simply do not allow us to take full advantage of the forward-thinking
solutions our industry partners can offer. To succeed in this era of
Great Power Competition, it is essential to rapidly deliver
capabilities to the warfighter by streamlining the processes for
prototyping, testing, and moving promising technologies into
production.
The success of USNORTHCOM and NORAD's Pathfinder program, along
with much of the work done by DOD's Defense Innovation Unit, show what
is possible when we provide innovators and technical experts the
resources and flexibility to tackle even the most daunting challenges.
The same approach should also be applied to software development and
acquisition. Success in competition and in conflict will increasingly
depend on the ability to field software-based capabilities faster than
our adversaries. For that reason, I am encouraged by the new model
championed by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Sustainment that will enable the Department of Defense
to acquire software through modern development practices and deliver
needed capability at the speed of relevance.
Armed with timely and accurate information, equipped with modern
sensors and software, and backed by a flexible and responsive
conventional deterrent that provides defeat mechanisms below the
nuclear threshold, commanders will achieve decision superiority with
the options and time necessary to allocate resources wherever needed to
deny or deter aggression in competition, de-escalate potential crises,
and defeat adversaries should conflict arise.
missile defense
Ballistic Missile Defense
The need for a robust and modern ballistic missile defense system
has been strongly reinforced over the past year. Despite United States
efforts in 2020 to reach an agreement with Kim Jong-un, North Korea
continued its development of ICBMs capable of striking targets in the
United States. As North Korea continues its pursuit of advanced long-
range strategic weapons--including the new systems displayed during
their 10 October 2020 parade--USNORTHCOM remains committed to
maximizing the capability and capacity of our ballistic missile defense
systems.
USNORTHCOM is focused on developing and fielding advanced sensors
capable of tracking potential missile threats and providing improved
discrimination capability to our warfighters and assessors.
Simultaneously, USNORTHCOM is collaborating with our partners in the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to ensure that the Next Generation
Interceptor (NGI) is fielded and operational as soon as possible. Of
note, USNORTHCOM worked hand-in-hand with MDA to ensure all of our
operational requirements are addressed in the NGI acquisition process.
When fielded, NGI will add 20 interceptors to the current inventory,
and will provide greater reliability and capability.
As competitor missile technology advances, USNORTHCOM is also
working with MDA toward a layered missile defense capability that will
allow for a more flexible and responsive defense of the Homeland
against both ballistic missile and cruise missile threats. The
successful engagement of an ICBM-class target by an SM3-IIA interceptor
on 16 November 2020 was an historic achievement and a critical step
toward establishing this layered capability. Defending the United
States Homeland against the ballistic missile threat remains a complex
and technically challenging endeavor, and I am grateful to the
Committee for your continued support as we take the steps necessary to
ensure the success of this critical mission.
Cruise Missile Defense
NORAD is devoting significant attention and resources toward
mitigating the current and emerging threat presented by advanced, long-
range cruise missiles. These sophisticated weapons are difficult to
detect and can be launched from significant distances against targets
in the United States and Canada from launch sites on Russian soil and
by long-range bombers, attack submarines, and surface vessels. Whether
subsonic or hypersonic, these missiles can range targets in the
Homeland and present a very real challenge for our defensive
capabilities. Russia has already amassed an inventory of both nuclear
and conventional variants, while China is expected to develop similar
capabilities in the next decade.
The proliferation of these systems creates all the more incentive
for focused investments in improved sensor networks, domain awareness,
and information dominance capabilities. Those investments, coupled with
the development of layered denial, deterrence, and defeat mechanisms
capable of addressing current and emerging threats, are fundamental to
the defense of our Homeland.
the arctic
The Arctic provides an avenue of approach to North America as well
as a representation of the changing physical and geostrategic
environment that is actively shaping our future plans and requirements.
The escalation of Russian activity and Chinese ambitions in the region
demonstrates the strategic importance of the Arctic. Competition will
only increase as sea ice diminishes and competition for resources
expands. Now and into the future, meeting the full scope of our mission
requirements will require USNORTHCOM, our Service and fellow combatant
command partners, and NORAD to devote attention, resources, and
capabilities to the Arctic.
Improving our domain awareness, communications systems, and our
ability to conduct and sustain multi-domain operations in the high
north are all important priorities for both USNORTHCOM and NORAD. We
are fortunate to be able to draw on the experience and expertise of the
Arctic warriors found in the Canadian element of NORAD, as well as the
soldiers and airmen of Alaskan Command and the Alaska National Guard.
Multi-command Arctic exercises like ARCTIC EDGE, ICEX, and NORTHERN
EDGE provide valuable experience and lessons learned for conducting
multi-domain operations in the high north, while the Joint Pacific
Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) offers expansive and demanding training
opportunities for the Total Force.
USNORTHCOM and NORAD are expanding our knowledge base and ensuring
that warfighters and partners are developing the skills and experience
needed to overcome the significant challenges presented by the extreme
climate and physical environment of the high north. We are also moving
forward with our Canadian partners to fulfill mutual objectives to
modernize NORAD by leveraging industry advances in infrastructure and
expeditionary capabilities that will strengthen our ability to sustain
operations in and through the Arctic.
Every successful military endeavor is dependent on reliable
communications. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are working closely with United
States Space Force, each of the other military Services, United States
Space Command, and industry partners to establish space-based
communications networks that will provide greater reach, more
flexibility, and the ability to communicate with every element of the
joint force operating in the high north.
I want to thank the Committee for your support for improving Arctic
communications though a commercial constellation of proliferated low
earth orbit communication satellites. This effort is well underway and
will dramatically improve communications for military users in the
Arctic, as well as for civilians in remote, high latitude communities.
The capability will pay lasting dividends for all users and will
enhance our defense of the Homeland, as well as our ability to provide
defense support of civil authorities.
partnerships
Our successes as a nation have long been due in large part to close
collaboration with partners and allies. With history as our guide,
USNORTHCOM and NORAD are building and fostering the critical
interagency, interdepartmental, and international relationships that
are so vital to any strategic endeavor. Just as we are knocking down
stovepipes that impede the flow of critical data between organizations,
we are also striving to expand our collaboration and communication with
our partners.
Canada remains our essential ally in the defense of North America.
For over 62 years, the extraordinary and irreplaceable relationship
between the United States and Canada has been demonstrated through the
constant vigilance of the world's only bi-national command, NORAD. That
bond remains as vital as when the command was first established in
1958. Meeting NORAD's crucial missions to provide aerospace warning,
aerospace control, and maritime warning in the United States and Canada
has required the command to adapt and evolve to address new challenges
and emerging technologies that threaten our Homelands. Canada remains a
true and trusted partner in our common defense and continues to share
the economic and manpower costs associated with sustaining and
modernizing vital NORAD capabilities.
Over the past year, our competitors repeatedly tested NORAD, but we
have stood firm in our resolve and capability to defend the United
States and Canadian Homelands. The year 2020 saw Russian military
aircraft entering the Canadian and Alaskan Air Defense Identification
Zones (ADIZ) on multiple occasions to measure our responses to
increasingly complex operations. As Russia continues to modernize its
bomber fleets and improve the proficiency of its long-range aviation
units, NORAD must maintain the ability to detect and respond to all air
domain competitors.
In addition to our aerospace control mission, NORAD provides
warning of potential maritime threats to the United States and Canada.
This critical mission requires uninterrupted contact with U.S.
geographic combatant commands, the intelligence community, and NATO
partners to detect and track maritime vessels of interest well before
they cross into the NORAD area of operations.
The importance of this mission was illustrated in September 2020
when Russia conducted portions of its Exercise OCEAN SHIELD in the
Bering Sea off the coast of Alaska. NORAD (and USNORTHCOM) monitored
the exercise, noting that although the Russian vessels remained in
international waters, they were in close proximity to United States
civilian fishing boats operating in the United States Exclusive
Economic Zone. That Russia would conduct a complex military exercise so
close to our shore demonstrates the necessity for a robust and capable
NORAD today and well into the future.
As further evidence of both the global nature of the threat and the
implicit trust in our bi-national command, NORAD is developing the
requirements for the defense of the United States and Canada against
advanced cruise missiles. In this capacity, NORAD works closely with
the U.S. Military Services, the Canadian Joint Operations Command, and
a host of other dedicated DOD and Canadian Defence Ministry partners to
share costs and ensure a clear, common understanding of the threat and
what will be required to mitigate the risk to our Nations.
Mexico is a vital partner in our cooperative defense, and the
USNORTHCOM relationship with our Mexican military partners remains
robust. While the COVID pandemic has forced both countries to cancel a
number of in-person engagements and planned training events, USNORTHCOM
and our Mexican military counterparts have ensured we maintain routine,
close contact through virtual engagements. From leaders at the tactical
level, to the Mexican military liaison officers assigned to our
headquarters, and up to the Secretaries of National Defense (SEDENA)
and the Navy (SEMAR), USNORTHCOM is proud of the military-to-military
cooperation and the personal relationships fostered over the years with
our Mexican counterparts. Through well-established forums such as the
Bilateral Military Cooperation Roundtable, USNORTHCOM and our Mexican
partners have remained in close contact throughout the pandemic, and we
continue to make substantive progress toward mutual security goals. The
Mexican military faces significant challenges from violent drug cartels
and from the effects of the pandemic, but USNORTHCOM and our Service
components will continue to stand by our partners and work to enhance
our domain awareness in the common defense of North America.
The Bahamas is an important partner that has faced extraordinary
challenges over the last 18 months. The Bahamas continues to address
the severe economic impacts resulting from Hurricane Dorian in 2019 and
markedly decreased tourism resulting from the coronavirus pandemic.
Even so, we continue to work closely with our Royal Bahamas Defence
Force (RBDF) partners to improve regional maritime security in the
southeast approaches to the United States. USNORTHCOM directly supports
RBDF efforts by enhancing their domain awareness with maritime
surveillance system radars currently being deployed across The Bahamas
island chain. USNORTHCOM is firmly committed to our lasting
collaboration with the RBDF and will continue to support our neighbors
and valued partners.
USNORTHCOM has also worked with our partners in Mexico and The
Bahamas to address our shared challenges in responding to the impacts
of COVID-19. Since April, USNORTHCOM has been actively supporting
response efforts to COVID-19, using Overseas Humanitarian Disaster
Assistance and Civic Aid funds approved by Congress. To date, we have
conducted 63 projects in support of the Mexican and Bahamian COVID-19
response, totaling $7.29 million. A portion of that amount consists of
reprogrammed CARES Act funds which Congress approved for that purpose.
USNORTHCOM and United States Embassy support to Mexico and The Bahamas
solidifies our position as the partner of choice for these nations and
is critical to countering nation states, especially China, which
continues its attempts to make inroads in both countries through offers
for COVID-19 medical support, large-scale economic investments,
information campaigns, and material support for infrastructure
projects. Our relationships with Mexico and The Bahamas enhance
regional security and stability and directly strengthen our ability to
defend the Homeland through continued close cooperation with these key
partner nations.
defense support of civil authorities
USNORTHCOM provided defense support of civil authorities at an
unprecedented pace in 2020, and many of those support missions continue
today. As the Commander of USNORTHCOM, I serve as the DOD synchronizer
for the federal pandemic response led by the FEMA and the Department of
Health and Human Services. In that role, we remain tightly integrated
with the interagency effort to assist health care providers and our
fellow citizens around the country. As we have supported our federal
interagency partners throughout this difficult national effort, members
at every level of our command have demonstrated extraordinary
commitment to meeting every mission requirement while diligently
safeguarding the health of our own civilian and military workforce.
The 2020 hurricane season saw 11 hurricanes make landfall in the
United States, impacting countless Americans, while catastrophic
wildfires ravaged millions of acres and displaced entire communities in
multiple western states. The Commander of USNORTHCOM was designated as
the DOD synchronizer for the federal responses to each of those
disasters, and the Command stood ready to support FEMA and the National
Interagency Fire Center with title 10 assets.
conclusion
As USNORTHCOM and NORAD look to a future marked by rapid shifts in
the geopolitical environment and technological advancement, we are
guided by the lessons of the past. Key among those is that we cannot
overcome challenges in isolation. By viewing changing conditions and
competitor actions from a global perspective, our problems become more
solvable and the solutions more affordable. USNORTHCOM and NORAD will
continue to build our partnerships, collaborate with fellow
warfighters, and work toward overcoming shared problems rather than
continuing to focus on point solutions to isolated threats.
To that end, I look forward to working with the Committee and with
all of our innovative industry and interagency partners as we move
quickly to develop and field the systems required to defend our Nations
now and well into the future. Together, I believe we can eliminate
outdated barriers that only serve to stifle information sharing, and
simultaneously foster a mindset that favors creative, forward-looking
approaches over unproductive reliance on legacy systems.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we will continue to
prioritize our most vital asset: our people. With that in mind, I would
like to take this opportunity to publicly recognize the select group of
USNORTHCOM and NORAD personnel responsible for standing the operational
watch 24 hours a day, every day. Their mission is crucial to our
defense, and these military and civilian watch-standers have spent much
of the last year under strict but necessary isolation protocols to
mitigate the risk of a COVID outbreak. They and their families have
endured long periods of separation during an already difficult time,
and they have done so without any expectation of public recognition. I
am honored to lead men and women of such selflessness and
professionalism, and our citizens should rest assured these
extraordinary defenders have the watch.
Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much, General, and
before we begin I want to remind my colleagues of the
procedures.
Since it is impossible to know exactly when our colleagues
who will be joining via the computer arrive, we will not be
following our standard early bird timing rule. Instead, we
handle the order of questions by seniority, alternating sides,
until we have gone through everyone. Once we reach the end, if
there is anyone we missed we will start back at the top of the
list and continue until everyone has had their turn.
We will do the standard five-minute rounds. I ask my
colleagues on the computers, and at their desk, to please keep
an eye on the clock, which you should see on your screens or
right before you.
Finally, to allow for everyone to be heard, whether in the
room or on the computer, I ask all colleagues to please mute
your microphone when not speaking. Thank you.
Admiral Faller, again, thank you for your distinguished
service over many years. The Northern Triangle--Guatemala,
Honduras, and El Salvador--is a particular unstable region, and
many of those who are seeking relief and moving towards our
border are coming from this area. Security and human rights
have deteriorated there significantly, increased violence by
criminal organizations and narcotics distributors. We can
continue to provide security assistance to these countries, yet
corruption remains rampant and international efforts to build
capabilities are not effective.
In Honduras, in particular, the corruption appears to have
reached the highest level of the government. The criminal trial
in the Southern District of New York of the Honduran
President's brother unearthed evidence of the Honduran
President and other senior officials taking millions of dollars
in bribes from drug traffickers. Honduran security forces are
also documented as having engaged in gross human rights
violations for years.
Given all of this, Admiral, do we need to reconsider
whether our approach to security assistance in the Northern
Triangle countries is achieving our national objectives?
Admiral Faller. The perfect storm of conditions that you
outlined, Senator, of violence, the impact of the pandemic, the
impact of the hurricanes has created untenable security for the
citizens, and that is why we are seeing this flood of migrants
to our borders.
Our focus at SOUTHCOM should and remains in support of U.S.
Government hold efforts. Our diplomats in our embassies, and
that security cooperation is a long-term investment on the
professional militaries. So institutional capacity-building, we
have a longstanding human rights training program that has been
effective in developing forces that know how to use force in a
professional manager.
Our Women, Peace and Security Program (WPS) has proven to
be a game-changer. Those nations want to model and emulate our
success. Our NCO development, our IMET, there is an appropriate
place, moving forward, Senator, for our long-term engagement
with our partners. They model their professionalism after us,
and I can trust elements of the Honduran and Guatemalan forces.
We vet them. We work with our interagency.
Chairman Reed. It seems, in those areas, and other areas
around the world, we have invested a great deal in the
military, and we have developed effective military forces, but
so much of this is a law enforcement issue and a judicial
issue. Again, this is outside your lane, but a whole-of-
government approach would seem to need more of an investment in
training police, in providing judicial remedies that are
actual, not fictitious. Is that your view also? Do we need more
help through our other agencies?
Admiral Faller. One of the successes I have seen is
watching our other agencies actually engage in judicial
training programs and moving that forward. One of our own
programs is the Defense Legal Security Cooperation Program, the
Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS)
program, out of Newport, Rhode Island, where we work with
partners on how they can develop and effective judicial system.
I think these programs are effective, Senator. It takes
time to see the results of that effectiveness. But in the past
year, when there was a lot of opportunity for our partner
militaries to commit human rights violations because they were
deeply involved in helping with internal security, they stayed
on the field in a professional manner, and they did model their
professional behavior after the training that we have been able
to provide.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. General VanHerck, I am sorry, I
have but a few minutes, but could you give us quickly sort of
your takeaways from the COVID virus situation, what fundamental
changes we might have to make?
General VanHerck. Chairman, absolutely. COVID has given us
great opportunity to reflect and learn on our planning, as we
were ready. What we have done is continued to adapt. What we
have found is that the support functions, the emergency support
function process through the interagency is crucial, working
with local and state authorities to ensure that we are synced
up to provide that response. We worked closely with Department
of Homeland Security (DHS). We worked closely with Health and
Human Services (HHS), public health services, to ensure we are
ready.
In addition to that, we are going back and changing and
updating our global pandemic and infectious disease plan to
ensure that we are ready and have adapted the lessons learned,
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much, General. Thank
you both for your service.
Senator Inhofe, please.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, there is
a crisis on the border. I think we all know that. The number of
migrants trying to cross more than doubled in January 2021 from
the year prior to that, and the number of migrant children in
custody has tripled.
Now we have come a full circle. We do not like to talk
about it. We had weak enforcement of our immigration laws under
President Obama, and strong enforcement under President Trump,
and now the expectation of a weak enforcement under President
Biden is driving a surge of illegal migrants. That is where I
have this picture here. They are all coming across the border,
you know, they are coming fast, and they are all wearing Biden
t-shirts.
So we have got a problem down there, and I just have to ask
the question. Admiral Faller, do you agree that a strong
enforcement of the immigration laws serves as a deterrent
against illegal migration?
Admiral Faller. Senator, all nations deserve secure
borders, and our focus has been on the heinous insecurity in
Central America, caused by transnational criminal organizations
that have no respect for the rule of law, rain violence on
their population. They market in drugs and people and guns and
illegal mining, and one of the prime sources that underwrites
their efforts is Chinese money-laundering.
So our focus has been on the source, working with----
Senator Inhofe. Okay, but just a specific question. Do you
agree that strong enforcement of immigration laws serves as a
deterrent against illegal migration?
Admiral Faller. The number one deterrent that I hear, when
I speak to all our partner nations, is the United States
judicial system. I agree, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Okay, and do you agree with that also,
General? Simple question.
General VanHerck. Chairman, as previously stated, border
security is national security. I agree that we must consider
our laws that are in place. What we are doing right now is we
are supporting the lead Federal agency from NORTHCOM, which is
Homeland Security, that allows them to enforce the laws that
are on the book. We are providing support in the form of
aviation support, ground support through detection and
monitoring as well.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. But you do agree then----
General VanHerck. I do----
Senator Inhofe.--strong enforcement of those laws. You can
have all the laws on the books you want but if you do not
enforce the laws, it is not going to work. Do you agree with
that?
General VanHerck. I do agree with that.
Senator Inhofe. Very good, and Admiral Faller, I am a
little concerned about something in terms of resources down
there. In your opening statement, or it was in the written
statement, I guess it was, you said that you only receive less
than 1 percent of all Department of Defense (DOD) intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), only 1 percent of all
DOD ISR. Is that right?
Admiral Faller. Senator, intelligence drives everything.
That allows us to have the domain awareness that General
VanHerck spoke about, so we can then inform our other
interagency partners what the threats are up to, and we have
less than 1 percent of the ISR.
Senator Inhofe. You know, I read that some time ago, and we
had a visit. I tried to figure out how that could be. Maybe I
am missing something here. Less than 1 percent of ISR comes
into that area, and I do not understand. That is not adequate,
right?
Admiral Faller. Senator, we are short in ISR, in
intelligence assets and security cooperation, and we have, in
general, our posture is thin. We have got to be on the field to
compete, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Mm-hmm. Yeah, I agree with that.
You know, I know the border. Back in the days when I was
enjoying life I can remember I was a builder and developer down
there. People on the East Coast do not understand this, but
there is an island down there called South Padre Island. It is
actually--now do not leave because you need to hear this--the
island down there is 140 miles long and one block wide. I was a
builder and developer down there. I know the border, and they
talk about the tough border security and what is necessary.
So I just want you to know I am familiar with that down
there, and I think it is doing a disservice not to talk about
it. We need to enforce the border, and I do want to have this
picture made a part of the record at this point.
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Senator Inhofe. With that I will yield the floor.
Chairman Reed. Senator Shaheen, please.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
both of you for your service and for being here this morning.
Admiral Faller, I want to start with you because I find the
maps that you have given us and the statistics on these
alarming, to say the least. On the map that shows Chinese
influence, if you were going to give us a map that said
``United States influence,'' how many, for example, countries
could we site that are hosting American infrastructure
projects, and how many countries are enjoying training and
military support or other economic support from the United
States, and how many heads of state meetings could we cite
since 2015?
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Admiral Faller. Senator, our influence is eroding, and that
margin is shrinking, and we would be best able to show that
with arrows that have downward trends. It is important that we
remain engaged in this hemisphere. It is our neighborhood that
proximity matters, and as you pointed out, the Chinese see
that.
We hosted a conference last week at SOUTHCOM with our
allies--United Kingdom (U.K.), Canada, France, and the
Netherlands--who have significant interest in ensuring a
stable, secure neighborhood. One of the foreign participants
said that the region is in a lifeboat and it is sinking in the
violence and it is sinking in Chinese influence.
What I hear from my partners is, ``We hear you, Admiral
Faller. We know that the United States military is the best. We
want to partner with you, but when you are drowning and you
need a life ring, you are going to take the life ring from
whoever throws it.''
Senator Shaheen. That is disappointing. I appreciate what
you are saying and that was my reason for the question, because
it is very clear that we are not keeping up in the way that we
should in terms of influence and support in Latin America.
Can I ask, when you talk about--Senator Inhofe raised the 1
percent of resources that you have for SOUTHCOM, and one of the
operations that you are responsible for is counternarcotics
operations. In New Hampshire we have been dramatically impacted
by the opioid epidemic, and obviously drugs coming in across
our southern border come up Interstate 95 all the way to New
Hampshire and northern New England. If you were going to define
what percentage of your operations are counternarcotics, can
you describe that, and if you had more resources would you be
able to address more of what is happening with the
transnational criminal organizations?
Admiral Faller. Senator, I would like to start by thanking
the New Hampshire National Guard, our state partner for El
Salvador, a critical partner, and National Guard across our
region. That is our number one force provider. They have stayed
engaged despite the pandemic in a way that builds trust and
partners, and helps train them. What our real goal is here is
to train our partner nations to take care of their own security
problems.
We cannot interdict our way out of the narcotics problem.
We have got to get our partners in the game, and this past
year, despite a pandemic, they actually increased their
performance, their involvement up to 60 percent of all our
disruptions.
But that is still not enough. We have got to focus on the
source and the destination. One of the key areas that needs
more emphasis--and we have really worked hard this past year
with our partners--is in countering the money supply. I talked
about the importance of that, really getting to break the back
of these organizations. I would that, in that regard, the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) has cited Chinese money-laundering as
the number one underwriter of transnational criminal
organizations.
So it has got to be a whole-of-government effort, and we
have got to work to build our partners' capacity.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you, and thank you for your
nice comments about the New Hampshire National Guard. I agree,
they have had an excellent partnership with El Salvador.
General VanHerck, I only have a little bit of time left,
but I wanted to ask you about the impact that you are seeing
from climate change on the Arctic, which we know is melting a
lot of the ice there and opening up routes through the Arctic.
What potential impact is that having on our national security,
and what do we need to do to respond?
General VanHerck. Senator, environmental change is having a
significant impact, as it creates opportunities and it also
creates vulnerabilities. The question is, are we postured to
seize on opportunities and to defend against potential
competition and vulnerabilities. This creates access, access to
resources. Twenty-five percent of Russia's gross domestic
product (GDP) is dependent upon resources in the Arctic, and
both Russia and China are trying to establish new norms and
rules and behavior for international law.
I understand the time is out here. I would love to talk
more to you about this subject.
Senator Shaheen. I would love to hear that, and I would bet
if we joined the Law of the Sea Treaty we might be able to
better address some of the influences that China and Russia are
doing. You do not need to respond to that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Wicker,
please.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Faller,
could you supplement, on behalf of Senator Shaheen and me, the
three charts that she mentioned? There is a Chinese influence,
Russian influence, and Iranian influence. Can you get back on
the record and just do one that says ``U.S. influence"?
Admiral Faller. The U.S. remains a partner----
Senator Wicker. No. Will you supplement, on the record, a
chart? I am asking you to do that.
Admiral Faller. Yes, Senator.
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Senator Wicker. Okay. Very good. Let me ask you then,
Admiral, about the involvement of the Coast Guard in what you
do. I am also on the Commerce Committee where we have oversight
there, and I have grown concerned that the Coast Guard is not
sufficiently resourced to conducts its own missions, much less
support what seems to be a growing demand for having Coast
Guard units supporting DOD missions to SOUTHCOM and other AORs.
Do I have correct information there? How much do you rely
on the Coast Guard not just to counter drug and illegal fishing
missions but also for theater engagement with us and our
allies?
Admiral Faller. The Coast Guard is a tremendous asset for
us, and they are on the field in a meaningful way. They are a
top priority for all our partners, building capacity and
countering the threats. Despite the pandemic, the national
security cutters, the fast response cutters, these are well-
manned, well-trained ships, making a difference, day in, day
out, including their aircraft. We could not do our mission
without the United States Coast Guard. They are a principal
source to counter threats in this hemisphere.
Senator Wicker. Do we have enough ships to meet your
theater requirements?
Admiral Faller. We do not. We do not have sufficient Coast
Guards or Navy ships to meet the requirements. We need
additional assets and planes.
Senator Wicker. Okay. General VanHerck, let's transition
then to NORTHCOM, and once again I have the same interest as
Senator Shaheen about the Arctic. I was pleased that the
previous administration released an updated strategy for the
Arctic. I am afraid that we lag behind our peers, particularly
Russia. Is that correct?
This year the Coast Guard begins construction of the first
of a new class of icebreakers, the Polar Security Cutter. Six
total ships have been authorized, a vast improvement over the
two aging ships we have, but a far cry from Russia's fleet of
40.
Can you explain why icebreaking capability is so critical,
and do you believe it is important to advocate for a larger
fleet of Coast Guard cutters and icebreakers?
General VanHerck. Senator, yes, thank you, and I agree with
your assessment. We are lagging behind. Why it is so important
is you have to be on the field to play. It is about
persistence. Not only do we need to have access through
persistence to break ice, to ensure that we can have Coast
Guard cutters or potentially Navy destroyers or cruisers in the
area, we have to have communications as well for persistence.
I am thankful to the Committee for $46 million that got us
started with polar communications. North of 65 latitude it is
really tough to communicate. That will get us an initial start.
But I also have a require for fuel north of Dutch Harbor,
Alaska, which will also contribute to the persistence of
competing in the Arctic.
This is about persistence. We are in competition, as I said
in my opening statement, and to be competitive with Russia and
China, specifically in the Arctic, you have to be part of the
on-the-field, if you will. So it is crucial that we do that and
continue producing capabilities that will allow us to be in the
Arctic.
Senator Wicker. So fuel capabilities and communications
capabilities are not where they ought to be. Last year the Navy
was investigating the possibility of establishing a new base in
the Arctic. Have you been involved in any discussions with the
Navy regarding establishing a permanent base in the Arctic, and
how could a Navy base improve your ability to execute U.S.
Arctic strategy?
General VanHerck. Senator, to answer your question directly
I have not been involved in any discussions with the Navy. I am
aware of the study that was done for a potential port,
specifically with regards to Nome, Alaska, which will get after
the requirement for fuel north of Dutch Harbor. That report was
completed by the Army Corps of Engineers and submitted for
congressional awareness.
Senator Wicker. Would this be helpful?
General VanHerck. Yes.
Senator Wicker. Do you have an opinion?
General VanHerck. It would be helpful to meet my
requirement to have fuel for that persistence to compete with
the Nations that are interested in the Arctic.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Now via Webex,
Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral
Faller, as you noted in your written testimony, Russia has
eagerly flooded online communities in Latin America with
disinformation intended to undermine faith in democratic
institutions and in the United States. Separately, China is
investing heavily in information technology that can be easily
manipulated by the Chinese Government through discretion for
espionage or cyber intrusions.
Do you feel that SOUTHCOM is adequately equipped to do its
part to handle the separate but overlapping risks posed by
these efforts?
Admiral Faller. Recently, in a visit to one of our partner
countries, I had the leader of that country lean over and say,
``How do I get rid of the Chinese information technology that
was sold to get after the violence in the city, but then oddly
appears outside the United States Embassy and other places,
which are in the most secure parts of the city?'' These efforts
have got to require a whole-of-government, whole-of-world
approach where we offer safe technology and safe, affordable
solutions, moving forward.
For our part, we have really participated with U.S. Special
Operations Command in standing up appropriate information
capabilities to counter in the information space, and I think
that effort is nascent. It is having some effect, but is very
small scale, given the volume. In Russia alone, they had over
17 million disinformation hits last year in social media.
Outside Russian language, their Spanish language social media
is their biggest effort, and they increased it three-fold last
year, particularly trying to discredit everything the United
States did to help our partners recover from the pandemic.
Senator Gillibrand. Admiral, as you pointed out earlier,
while China's economic coercion practices are only one element
of its strategy to exert influence in the region, it is
certainly an important one. Is there a way for SOUTHCOM and
other U.S. entities to facilitate opportunities for economic
engagement, where we can highlight the benefits of working with
the United States as opposed to China?
Admiral Faller. There are some great efforts that Congress
has championed, the Developmental Finance Corps and others, in
support of that. I think it is incumbent on all professionals
like myself to learn as much about the economic elements as
power as possible.
But then to focus on what we do best, which is working with
our partner militaries, supplying them professional training,
professional education, and exercise programs. They want to
partner with us. That is their North Star, and we have got to
have the right security conditions so that we can have
sustainable economics. Businesses are fearful when they cannot
invest in a safe environment.
Senator Gillibrand. Understood. General VanHerck, as the
Admiral noted, it is clear that one of our biggest challenges
in the Western Hemisphere will be China's technological
engagement that threatens our security. Are we beginning to see
any signs that China's growing technological presence in the
SOUTHCOM region is forcing NORTHCOM to rethink its strategy of
how it defends its domain, given the close proximity between
the two regions?
General VanHerck. Senator, we look closely at China's
influence. They are absolutely in the NORTHCOM AOR, attempting
to influence in the Bahamas, working through 5G, for example,
the same thing in Mexico. We continue to defend all domains.
NORTHCOM defends our critical cyber infrastructure with
allocated cyber protection teams, and we work closely with
Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) and National Security Agency (NSA) as
well. We are the disc synchronizer for cyber if there is a need
to provide defense support of civil authorities. We continually
work with civil authorities as well to assess the needs for
homeland security, as well as other agencies across the
government.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. In your written statement
you indicated Russia and China had developed hypersonic and
nuclear warhead-tipped cruise missiles. North Korea is also
advancing its intercontinental ballistic missile program. These
weapons put our allies and our own national security at risk.
The current missile defense is based at the Ground-Based
Interceptor, or GBI, which was fielded 16 years ago.
Since that time we have improved the system and grown the
size of the available arsenal. Last year, we appropriated money
for the Next Generation Interceptor, the NGI system, to improve
our defenses.
While I am clear-eyed about the threat posed by enemy
states' missiles, it is currently a time of competing
priorities, particularly in light of COVID. In your opinion,
can we still rely on the GBI for the foreseeable future, and
two, assuming we need to push back on the NGI system, how long
can we rely on the current arsenal?
General VanHerck. Senator, I am comfortable with my ability
to defend the Homeland, including Hawaii, against a limited
state actor such as Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(DPRK), which the system is designed for, for the foreseeable
future. The key thing is to maintain the timeline of no later
than 2028 for NGI, to ensure that we maintain capacity and
capability to defend against a ballistic missile threat.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Now via
Webex, Senator Fischer, please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General VanHerck,
I appreciated our discussion last week and I would like to
revisit our conversation on the NGI. Senator Gillibrand was
just touching on some points of that as well.
When you talk about the threat that we are facing and the
advancing threat that we are seeing, do you believe that the
additional capabilities that NGI will provide the warfighter
over our current interceptor fleet are absolutely necessary?
General VanHerck. Senator, I do. It gives us extra capacity
to go against threats that are developed that could exceed our
current GBI inventory. In addition to that, it will give us
capability, because the threat continues to advance their
capabilities, such as decoys and diversion with that
capability. So the NGI is crucial to give us that capability.
It also provides us a foundation for our deterrence. It
provides deterrence by denial. The nuclear deterrent is the
foundation, but the NGI and the GBI give us deterrence by
denial, Senator.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir. Also, you and I discussed
the increasingly capable cruise missile arsenals that our
adversaries possess and the very real threat they pose to the
Homeland. In your opening statement you talk a lot about the
concept of domain awareness. Can you talk about what that means
for you, how it relates to the threats that are posed, say, by
cruise missiles?
General VanHerck. Senator, yes. Thank you for the
opportunity. Cruise missiles challenge our legacy warning
system significantly. They have generated very long-range
capabilities. They can actually shoot cruise missiles--they,
being Russia--today from over their homeland, which will
challenge our legacy systems.
We do not want to be in a situation, my personal opinion,
where end-game defeat is our only option. We need to get
further left, and that starts with domain awareness, left of
the archer, if you will, before they take off, whether that be
in a submarine, whether that be in a sea vessel, or whether
that be in a bomber, to have decision space for our senior
leaders.
Decision space starts with that domain awareness. Once you
take that domain awareness, whether that be from undersea, to
space, to cyberspace, and everything in between, and you use
machine learning and artificial intelligence capabilities, what
I call information dominance, now we are able to get further
left and give our decision-makers deterrence capabilities
beyond the foundation, which is our nuclear deterrents, and an
end-game kinetic attack, which would require a response, very
escalatory in either one, Senator.
Senator Fischer. You know, you are using all sorts of
technologies now that you are applying on your demonstrations
that NORTHCOM has conducted in this area. Do you have other
examples you can share with us?
General VanHerck. Absolutely, Senator. So we have a program
called Pathfinder that we have moved out on over the last year,
that takes information data. I am a believer that the future of
competition, crisis, and conflict, he or she with the data and
the information will win.
What we have taken is an example. So you will remember, in
2015, when the gyrocopter actually flew down from north here in
the National Capital Region and landed on the Capitol lawn,
that situation, none of the sensors in the area, whether they
be the NORAD sensors that we have or other sensors alone
detected that target. But when we took the Pathfinder
capability and we analyzed the information, we took information
that was left on the cutting room floor that was not previously
analyzed, there that gyrocopter was.
That is what I am talking about, information today that
exists in stovepipes in government agencies, even within the
Department of Defense, that is not shared more broadly. We have
to take advantage of data and information going forward,
Senator.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, General.
Admiral Faller, Nebraska's RC-135s are frequent guests in
your part of the world, and we know that the Air Force is doing
what it can, but there are shortfalls. Last year, you told the
Committee you only have 20 percent of the ISR that you need,
and the bulk of that amount comes from Customs and Border
Protection assets.
As a commander, you said that only 8 percent of SOUTHCOM's
overall ISR need is met by military assets. Is that still the
case?
Admiral Faller. Senator, compounding that 8 percent figure
we received a 46 percent cut to our ISR-related budget this
year, in year, so that will significant challenge our ability
to understand the threats of all types in the hemisphere.
Intelligence drives everything.
Senator Fischer. So what gets left on the table as a result
of your inability to get that ISR coverage?
Admiral Faller. A significant amount of movement of
transnational criminal organizations, our understanding of what
our competitors are up to--Russia, China, Iran. A lot gets left
on the table that is contributing to this violence, that is
driving the instability here in the United States and in our
partner nations.
Senator Fischer. We see their presence growing in your
combatant command area, so I understand the need for that.
Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator
Blumenthal, please.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both
for your service and for being here today. As you know, the
COVID-19 pandemic has hit the Caribbean and South America very
hard. I am concerned that we need to continue to stay vigilant
against attempts by Russia, and most especially China, to
exploit the suffering of our neighbors to the south to increase
their influence in the region.
Admiral Faller, in your posture statement you stated that
China and Russia are using the COVID-19 pandemic to gain
greater influence in South America. Can you explain how that is
occurring, and what would you recommend the United States do to
maintain American influence in the region in the face of that
public health threat during that time?
Admiral Faller. The conditions that the pandemic has caused
in Latin America and the Caribbean rival those of the Great
Depression here in the United States. It will take years for
the region to recover. The IMF has estimated it as the region
with the longest recovery time.
We have seen, and there was a New York Times article today
on this, China particularly move in with a heavy-handed mask
and vaccine diplomacy, that they are using the vaccines to
leverage deals for their IT, their 5G, and they are using it to
try to drive a wedge between some nations like Taiwan and
others in the region. This is indicative of Chinese global
coercive, insidious behavior. We are seeing it play out. We
need to stay on the field, with a whole-of-government effort,
and once we have taken care of the United States, be first with
a concerted plan to take care of our neighborhood with the
vaccines here.
Senator Blumenthal. I hear you saying that we need a much
more aggressive and, frankly, humanitarian effort in this part
of the world, our neighboring region, in fact, part of the
Western Hemisphere family, to take care of people in our own
enlightened self-interest.
Admiral Faller. Senator, to date I have been very proud of
the U.S. Government effort in personal protective equipment
(PPE) and other COVID-related supplies. We are not taking much
credit for it, but by far and away the single donator in this
hemisphere, and the Department of Defense using our
humanitarian assistance authorities, we moved out with small
projects at speed, over 400 projects, $54 million, and it made
a real impact. But the next phase is going to be in vaccines
and long-term recovery, and we have got to be as aggressive and
forward-leaning in that phase, I would say particularly in this
hemisphere, because the proximity here matters to the security
of the United States.
Senator Blumenthal. It is not only a public health crisis,
it is really a very deep-seated economic crisis linked to the
pandemic, I hear you saying.
Admiral Faller. Senator, in October I traveled with my
Civilian Deputy Commander, Ambassador Jean Manes, a wonderful
diplomat, great civ-mil relationship, in our headquarters. We
went on our first multiple-day trip. We traveled to Central
America, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica. The
hollow look in the eyes of our partners, they are struggling to
fill their gas tanks and find food for their security forces,
because of the stress the pandemic, and the violence, has
placed. This creates real opportunities for our competitors who
are more than willing to step into that violent sauce and take
advantage of it for their own interests.
Senator Blumenthal. It has ramifications in terms of
generating flow of migrants, the drug trade, all kinds of other
ramifications that are disruptive to our country, potentially.
Admiral Faller. Yes, Senator.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator
Cotton, please.
Senator Cotton. Admiral Faller, I want to speak about the
legal conditions on the ground in the Northern Triangle--
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Do the governments of
those three countries systematically persecute their own
citizens on the basis of race, ethnicity, sex, political views,
religious beliefs, or other such categories?
Admiral Faller. Senator, when I go I am lockstep with our
embassies, and we have got great diplomats. We do not see a
systematic exploitation. I work with the militaries, and the
elements we work with are vetted and trusted, and I find they
are doing the right thing, whether it is Honduras, Guatemala,
or El Salvador.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. I think that is a very important
point. The governments of Honduras and El Salvador and
Guatemala do not persecute their own citizens systematically on
the basis of race, sex, ethnicity, religion, or political
views, which is the basis for asylum and refugee status under
our laws. An economic migrant is not eligible for asylum. They
are not eligible for refugee status. Asylum is designed for
people, let's say, a Hong Konger whose student visa expires and
does not want to return to Hong Kong now that the Chinese
Communist Party has cracked down on that country.
The reason we have a crisis at our border is because
President Biden and his administration opened the border and
ended the policies of the Trump administration that made it
clear you could not make the very dangerous journey across
Mexico, you could not pay smugglers and traffickers thousands
of dollars to get to our southern border and then expect to be
let in. If you let them in, more will come. That is why we have
a crisis at the border.
General VanHerck, we have been supporting the Department of
Homeland Security at the border for some time now with DOD
personnel. The most major adjustment of numbers was in 2018. Is
that right?
General VanHerck. That is correct. In 2018 and this year we
are up to nearly 4,000, total numbers.
Senator Cotton. Has the status of the border changed from
2018 to March of 2021?
General VanHerck. When you say ``status of the border,''
can you clarify?
Senator Cotton. The conditions there and whether or not we
are closer to having a secure border or do we have a less
secure border now than we did when this major personnel change
first started.
General VanHerck. I would defer to Homeland Security for
the security of the border. We are in direct support of
Homeland Security for that mission. I can tell you the numbers
of migrants coming across had dramatically increased here in
recent months.
Senator Cotton. What kind of strain does that put on our
personnel at the border?
General VanHerck. Our personnel being DOD?
Senator Cotton. DOD personnel.
General VanHerck. DOD continues to provide support to
Homeland Security and Customs and Border Protection, mainly in
the detection and monitoring. Total number of 4,000 does not
place an incredible strain on the force, and has not shown
significant strategic readiness of our ability to accomplish
our missions.
Senator Cotton. I have seen some media reports that suggest
in addition to economic migrants, who are not eligible for
asylum, showing up at our border from Latin America, that we
are now beginning to see foreign nationals from other countries
in Africa and Asia. To you knowledge, is that correct?
General VanHerck. Senator, I am aware of intelligence
reports that corroborate exactly what you just said.
Senator Cotton. What kind of threat does it pose to our
country that persons might be traveling from the old world to
the new world to join these migrant flows?
General VanHerck. I believe that we must continue to
monitor anybody who has nefarious desires for our country.
Homeland defense, border security is national security which
equals Homeland defense. There will be people take advantage of
the opportunity to come across that border.
Senator Cotton. Yeah, I could not agree more, General
VanHerck. I mean, if our border is open, anyone from around the
world could get to Mexico and try to cross our border, not just
to seek a better life here but to harm or ultimately try to
kill our own people. I go back to this simple point: if you let
them in, more will come.
All the controversy you see in the media are misplaced,
talking about how faster we are processing migrants through
these detention facilities, or whether they have enough showers
or beds or cots. If you do not let them in in the first place,
you do not have to worry about the conditions in the detention
centers.
The Biden administration has to reverse course. There are
three simple solutions. First, it should reapply the public
health declaration under title 42 to all foreign nationals, to
include minors, just like the Trump administration did, as the
Biden administration still does for adults. Second, it should
renegotiate a new migrant protect protocol with Mexico, which
it tore up for no reason on its first days in office. Third, it
should re-enter a safe third country agreement with Guatemala.
If you are seeking asylum at our border, there is no reason you
cannot seek asylum in Guatemala. That was the lesson of the
last administration. Those three things alone will solve our
crisis at the border, and they could all be done tomorrow.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Kaine,
please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and Admiral Faller, I
want to follow up on the comments made about the border crisis.
It is a crisis and there are important things that we must do.
I want to puncture the partisan finger-pointing that has been
done, because it is a crisis, I think that we all have to
solve. The notion that this was bad under the Obama
administration, fine under the Trump administration, and now
bad again is just not realistic.
During the Obama administration, we worked together in
Congress on a comprehensive immigration reform bill that would
have poured tens of billions of dollars into border security.
It was bipartisan in the Senate. It could go nowhere in a
Republican-dominated House. It would not even get a Committee
hearing.
During the Trump administration, we came up with a plan
that was bipartisan in February of 2018, that would have
protected Dreamers and put $25 billion into border security,
every penny that the President had asked for, and when the bill
was introduced with 16 co-sponsors--8 Democrats, 8
Republicans--the Trump administration, having said that they
would sign the bill--"You put it on my desk, I will sign it,''
is what the President told many of us--they decided, within a
day, that they so did not like Dreamers that they were willing
to turn away $25 billion in border security.
We missed an opportunity in 2013 to put about $40 billion
into border security because of a Republican House. We missed
an opportunity in 2018 to put $25 billion into border security
because the President did not like Dreamers.
Now I do not say that to suggest that the problem at the
border is the fault of one party or another. It is a challenge,
we all have to deal with it, and we have to find solutions. I
share my colleagues' views that one of the solutions is putting
some tough laws in place and enforcing them. I think the asylum
rules maybe need to be tightened up.
I want to correct my colleague. He asked you a question
about asylum rules, and asked if there was persecution for
another reason, but he left out persecution based on political
status. I can assure you, in the Northern Triangle, having
lived there, there is significant persecution in the Nations in
the Northern Triangle against political dissidents, against
journalists, against environmental activists, and there has
been a history of persecution against indigenous people. There
are some other groups--my colleague is right. They are not
being persecuted directly now, but political opponents are.
In Honduras, where I lived, the Organization of American
States (OAS) said, after the last presidential election, that
the election should be re-run because they were so corrupt.
Instead, the U.S. recognized the corrupt government and then
cut off aid to the corrupt government, and then what we see
today, as you said, Admiral Faller, is sort of a perfect storm.
If we do not invest in security and economics there will be
economic refugees, and my colleague is right, an economic
refugee is not entitled to asylum status. But nevertheless, if
we are not working to promote security and economic
improvement, there is a natural consequence to that.
So we need tougher border security, we need to increase
investments in security assistance in the region, and we need
to hold authoritarians accountable rather than turn a blind eye
to their misdeeds. These are things that we can do and we can
do together.
General VanHerck, I want to ask you a question. Canada is a
pretty good ally of the United States militarily, aren't they?
General VanHerck. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Kaine. In my conversations with the Canadian
Foreign Minister and the Canadian Minister of Defense, it has
been a sore point with them that the U.S. uses national
security waivers against them to impose tariffs. We have trade
disputes with Canada over milk, over lumber products, over all
kinds of things. That is not unusual given the sizeable border
that we share. But they expressed to me a particular concern
when the previous administration labels them a national
security threat, and they point out, ``Hey, we fight with you
in every war. We are side by side with you in military
hospitals, at Landstuhl and elsewhere.''
Have you heard a similar concern expressed, dissatisfaction
from the Canadian side about United States using national
security, labeling them a national security threat in order to
impose tariffs?
General VanHerck. Senator, my discussions with the Minister
of National Defense, the Deputy, and also the Chief of the
Defense Staff, I have not been engaged or had that discussion.
Senator Kaine. Okay. Thank you for sharing that. Thank you,
Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Now via Webex,
Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, good
morning. I thank you for both of your continued dedication to
our country and for your previous service.
Let me begin. I would like to start with Admiral Faller.
Understanding and combatting Russian and Chinese influence
operations truly is critical to our national security. Senator
Gillibrand began this discussion with you a little while ago,
talking about what is happening in our southern regions.
Admiral Faller, I would like to talk a little bit about what
our options are, what the tools are that are available to you
to counteract that misinformation, and what tools you may need
right now, or what additional assistance you need, in order to
be able to counteract some of the misinformation that currently
is occurring.
Admiral Faller. I cannot stress enough the full-court press
that China has on to gain their economic dominance in their
version of a world order globally and in this hemisphere, which
I look at this hemisphere as the front line of competition, and
we have to approach that as such, as a United States
Government, across all elements of power, with the diplomats
and in the lead, clearly.
Military plays a role. Our principal method to block
Chinese military interests, the People's Liberation Army (PLA),
is by staying engaged with our partners in our exercise
program, our IMET program. These are world class. China has
tried to copy them. They have tried to replicate Leavenworth in
Spanish and Portuguese. We need to remain the best at what we
do and ensure we provide the volume that is needed to allow our
hemisphere partners to be professional and partner with us.
In the IT space, we have to stay engaged to understand what
they are up to. That goes back to intelligence resources.
So I would sum this up by saying additional intelligence
assets, continued security cooperation, and increased volume of
IMET and exercises, and then enough assets to stay on the
field. That includes our small special operations force teams,
which are very effective. Last year we received great support
from the United States Army to put some small security force
assistance teams in places like Colombia and Honduras, which
are having great effect, to train, and it is only training, not
accompany, our partners.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Admiral. General VanHerck, right
now you have got, on a day-to-day basis, you clearly have more
individuals trying to cross the border into the United States.
There is no question about that, and clearly that is something
which most certainly, in your supporting role, will take up a
fair part of your day. But at the same time you have one of the
most critical responsibilities out there, defending the
Homeland against those possibilities of strategic attack.
Today we have this discussion going on about the need for
the triad, the continuation of our triad, and also the need to
provide specific defense protection against incoming weapon
systems. Can you talk about the connectivity, or the connection
between having all three legs of a triad available and also
needing to still have the ability to defend the Homeland, and
if we were to take away any one of the legs of the triad what
that would do, in terms of increasing the challenge for you of
defending the Homeland with missile systems set up to protect
against incoming weapon systems?
General VanHerck. Sure, Senator. First, the nuclear
deterrent and the triad remains the foundation of homeland
defense. I would defer to Admiral Richard on specifics about
the triad. I know that the triad today was designed for
specific capabilities to basically take the calculus of any
threat and create deterrence options because of the flexibility
that the triad creates. The most reactive forces are
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the most flexible
force is the bombers, and certainly the most survivable force
is the submarines. Each of those contributes significantly to
homeland defense. We have not had a great power conflict since
World War II, and the triad and the nuclear deterrent has been
part of that.
With that said, our competitors today are trying to
circumvent the nuclear triad and have developed, and stated
intent, to attack the Homeland because they assume they can be
successful to destroy our will, below the nuclear threshold. I
am concerned about having the ability to give decision-makers
key decision space in that realm, but not all end-game defeat.
So deterrence by denial is what I talk about, and that is
giving options to senior leaders to create doubt in a
competitor or adversary's mind about their ability to achieve
their objectives with a strike on the Homeland, Senator.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. My time has expired. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Now let me
recognize Senator King via Webex.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and General, I would
like to follow up on a comment made at the end of her question
by Senator Shaheen, and ask in your professional military
opinion, would it be in the interest of the United States to
accede to the Law of the Sea treaty?
General VanHerck. Senator, yes, it would be. It gives us a
better posture, a seat at the table, more credibility when we
work many of the issues that we have to work around the globe
with allies, partners, and potential competitors.
Senator King. That is particularly true in the Arctic,
isn't it? That is where the Russians are staking claims as we
speak.
General VanHerck. Senator, I agree with your assessment,
and as Russia takes over the Arctic Council in May, it has
never been more crucial for us, with our like-minded nations
and allies and partners that we come to agreement to not allow
Russia and China to exploit any seams and gaps.
Senator King. Thank you. I would like to turn for a moment
to the immigration question and the crisis at the border, which
everyone recognizes. Admiral Faller, I think at the beginning
of your testimony you pointed out that there were significant
what I call push factors as well as the change of
administration, which is a pull factor. But the combination of
the impact of COVID, the two major hurricanes, and the
transnational gangs is making life intolerable for people in
those Northern Triangle countries. Is that not also true?
Admiral Faller. Senator, I have met with folks who have
walked all the way to the border and come back, and their drive
was the violence, the fear for their life, their lack of food
for their families, the insecurity. In this past year, we have
had that perfect storm of additional factors, COVID and then
back-to-back major hurricanes. The region is fragile, the
conditions are on par with our Great Depression, and our
engagement is critical to help our partner nations overcome
this challenge.
Senator King. It strikes me that whatever we do on border
security, and I am fully supportive of a secure border, as long
as we have these three countries near our border that are in
such terrible shape, people are going to continue to try to
find ways to escape. I have heard the term ``we need a Marshall
Plan'' for that region in order to try to stabilize these
countries in terms of their own internal security, their own
economies. Does that ring any bells for you?
Admiral Faller. Senator, I think a Marshall Plan would be a
wonderful model as we look at the entire hemisphere, really,
and look at the sources of instability across the hemisphere.
In addition to Central America, we see Haiti, Cuba, and
Venezuela, all sources of illegal migration to the United
States, and Venezuela alone, five million migrants now have
swelled out of their borders. We need the big ideas. We need
the sustained engagement of the all-of-nations and whole-of-
government of the United States, and the Department of Defense
plays a role, particularly in that professionalism and
institutional capacity-building so their security forces do the
right thing and contribute to overall sustainable security.
Senator King. You mentioned in your testimony the Russian
and Chinese disinformation campaigns in these countries. Are
they also encouraging migration as a way to undermine the
United States? Do they see this as a weapon, just as they did
with the Syrian migration into Europe several years ago?
Admiral Faller. The disinformation by Russia seeks to
discredit every act of goodness, and we do many that the United
States provides in the hemisphere, and to the extent that
drives migration there is no doubt. China seeks their own
influence, their own economic dominance, and they seek clients
while we seek friends and partners. I think their information
campaign, best exhibited by a recent visit to a country where I
was asked about the illegal and unregulated, unreported fishing
in the region, and I cited the example of Chinese involvement
off of Ecuador, where their fleets would, for great periods of
time, go silent and sweep into the ecological preserve. Then
within minutes after my facts-based statement, which is based
on various credible sources, the Chinese proceeded to attack me
and the media. That is just typical of their disinformation
globally, Senator.
Senator King. Well, I am out of time, but I think your
testimony that you (a) do not have adequate ISR resources, and
(b) there are not enough ships to interdict the drugs that are
coming and killing Americans, including more than one a day in
my home state, is very powerful, and that is within our
control. That is a matter of allocation of resources, and I
hope this Committee can bring some pressure on the
administration to allocate adequate resources for ISR and for
interdiction, because we are not even interdicting the drug
shipments we know about, let alone finding ones that additional
ISR could provide. So that is something that I hope this
Committee can work on.
Gentlemen, thank you both for your testimony. It has been
very illuminating today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Let me recognize
Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and gentlemen, thank
you so much for being here today and for your service to our
great nation and the men and women within your commands. We
truly appreciate everything they do for us every day.
Admiral Faller, we had a great conversation last week, and
you really stressed to me the importance of our neighborhood,
and I want to continue visiting about that today because we do
need to be very aware, and I think this Committee is, but that
we have a lot of nefarious influencers within our own
neighborhood, and I would like to talk a little bit about those
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) as well as those
that maybe influencing those TCOs and where that is coming
from.
You have provided the placemats for us today--China, Iran,
Russia. They are all influencers in our neighborhood, and they
are all operating. We see the TCOs as well. They are operating
to our south, and they are bringing about $90 billion of
revenue annually. That is very concerning to me. Then the
increase of movement across our borders is something troubling,
that we have all been talking about today, and we have to make
sure that we are defending that border and pushing back against
these influencers.
So let's talk a little bit about the TCOs and what they are
doing in the SOUTHCOM AOR, and are they working alongside
China, Russia, and Iran?
Admiral Faller. The transnational criminal organizations
are just murderous, violent organizations. They are murdering
people, driving migration, and they are fueled on corruption,
and so when I look at the interconnection of these
organizations and the China-Russia players in our hemisphere, I
look at corruption as a common element. It fuels both. Then we
look at lack of regard for human rights, and there is a
commonality there. Then we look at lack of regard for rules-
based international order, or rules in general, and there is a
commonality there. So there is an interconnection.
The money-laundering connection is the most significant,
where Chinese money-laundering underwrites TCOs a significant
portion, and that is something that we are tracking as part of
all interagency effort here in the United States. This
corrosive influence undermines our democracies and contributes
to the fragility and the security concerns we have right in
proximity to the United States. Location, location, location
drives everything, and that location is so important in this
neighborhood.
Senator Ernst. So Senator Shaheen was asking about Chinese
influence. So there is above-the-board operations going on with
China, where they may be engaging in legal activities. But then
you are saying they engage in these criminal activities as
well, and under the radar type of criminal organizations.
Admiral Faller. So the National Defense Strategy and our
Secretary's guidance cites China as the pacing challenge, and I
side with what the Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) commander
said. It is the most significant threat we face in the 21st
century. We want this competition to work out peacefully and
not end in conflict and not be adversarial. But Chinese, in
addition to the illegal, unreported, unregulated fishing is
involved in illegal mining, illegal logging. They are at least
tacitly supporting the money-laundering. They are using COVID
and vaccines as a hammer to further Chinese Communist Party
interests, particularly to get better deals for Huawei and 5G,
and to try to drive a wedge between the remaining countries
that support Taiwan, and the majority of those are here in this
hemisphere.
So yes, Senator, their corrosive, insidious influence is
being felt right here in our neighborhood.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Admiral, and I appreciate our
discussion to that effect last week. General VanHerck, in the
remaining time that I have, we have had a number of our own
troops working the southern border, which I think has been
extremely important. They have been supporting United States
Customs and Border Patrol. Are they still playing a vital role
in the defense of our Nation at our southern border?
General VanHerck. Senator, probably answered by customs and
border protection (CBP) and DHS. My recent visit would tell you
that we are playing a role to enable them to do their law
enforcement role by providing support.
When I look at the challenges the transnational criminal
organization create on the border, the symptoms that we are
seeing are the migration, the human trafficking, the
counternarcotics. From a homeland defense perspective, Mexico,
being in the United States NORTHCOM AOR, and two major
transnational criminal organizations with the Sinaloa and New
Jalisco, we have a national security imperative with regards to
the instability that they create, the tragedies they create,
and the opportunities they create for nefarious actors such as
China or Russia, right on our own southern border, to have
access and influence, and so it concerns me very much, Senator.
Senator Ernst. Yeah. Thank you, gentlemen, very much, and I
appreciate you safeguarding our neighborhood.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Let me recognize
Senator Warren via Webex.
Senator Warren. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you to Admiral Faller and General VanHerck for being here
today. We appreciate the work that you are doing.
General VanHerck, COVID-19 vaccinations are well underway
all across our country, and the DOD is helping people get
vaccinated. Each day, millions more Americans are receiving
hope in the form of these vaccines as we move closer to
defeating this pandemic.
But the data show that the vaccines are not reaching every
community equally. Death rates for Black Americans and Native
Americans, Native Alaskans are nearly twice as high as the
death rates in white communities. But the vaccines have
disproportionately gone to white Americans. Although vaccine
demographic data are incomplete at this point, it appears that
only about 7 percent of the 65 million administered doses have
gone to Black Americans.
So, General VanHerck, several thousand of the troops you
command have been deployed to assist the Federal Government's
vaccination efforts. Can you explain how Northern Command made
decisions about the deployment of vaccine teams to ensure that
communities of color are getting the vaccines that they
desperately need?
General VanHerck. Senator, absolutely. The United States
Northern Command does not make the decision where teams go.
That is done through the FEMA process, and we answer to their
mission assignment and go to the locations determined by that
interagency process.
Senator Warren. Fair enough. Do you know if FEMA is
prioritizing communities of color?
General VanHerck. In my discussions with the Acting
Director, Mr. Fenton, they do take all considerations in, from
state and local officials, governors that are asking for
support, and factoring in those specifics, and based on the
need of where the transmission rates are the highest they do
take all that in, from my discussions.
Senator Warren. Well, it is hard then to explain why we are
down at 7 percent vaccination rate for Black Americans. Can I
ask you to commit that in future discussions, as you are
talking about how to deploy these teams, that you will support
making sure that we are making adequate vaccination efforts in
communities of color?
General VanHerck. Senator, I commit to you that I am
agnostic with regards to where we provide support, and I will
work closely with the FEMA team to make sure we do that.
Senator Warren. Well, I would like to hear that you are not
agonistic but that you are really committed to helping in the
communities of color that are being hit hardest, and where we
are seeing the highest death rates.
General VanHerck. I apologize----
Senator Warren. I am sorry. Go ahead.
General VanHerck. I apologize. I am fully committed. I
thought I said that, the second part.
Senator Warren. Okay.
General VanHerck. Absolutely.
Senator Warren. I hope so. I am also concerned about
reports of Russian misinformation campaigns against the vaccine
that are aimed at reducing the number of Americans willing to
get vaccinated. Can you just say a word about what strategies
is Northern Command using to combat this misinformation?
General VanHerck. Senator, it is an information and
education campaign, primarily within our own forces. I am happy
to report to you that we have approximately 85 percent
acceptance rate within the command. In my discussions with the
Secretary of Defense and within the interagency we have talked
and shared the lessons learned about how to educate and also
exploit or expose the disinformation. So I think that is
crucial to combine both the education aspect and exposing the
disinformation.
Senator Warren. Well, thank you. This pandemic has not
affected all Americans equally. Black and brown communities
have disproportionately suffered from COVID-19, and its effects
will likely be felt for years. Northern Command and the Federal
Government's vaccination efforts must prioritize the hardest
hit communities, and I hope that you will continue to work hard
to ensure that the vaccine goes to those who need it most.
Thank you very much, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren. Senator Tillis,
please.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
you for your decades of service.
General VanHerck, I want to go back and just finish, or
make sure I understood, with respect to any DOD resources
supporting local mission objectives around vaccine
dissemination. You are there to basically provide personnel
support after the decisions about where to administer the
vaccines, which populations should be prioritized. You are not
actively involved in that prioritization process. Is that
correct?
General VanHerck. Senator, that is exactly correct.
Senator Tillis. Okay. Thank you. Admiral, I had just maybe
an addendum to the request that Senator Wicker made, following
on to Senator Shaheen's comments. This one graphic that shows
China influence, I think what would be helpful in there is just
to show American influence but also to show the trend lines. My
guess is based on a comment you made, they are trending in the
wrong direction. So I think it would just be helpful, when you
provide that graphic, to show us the heat map on where we
really need to muster more resources.
On the TCO graphic, you all summarized the disruption in
terms of narcotics, I think 313 metric tons in fiscal year
2020. How does that compare to fiscal year 2019, and what are
the trend lines for fiscal year 2021?
Admiral Faller. In overall amounts, Senator, it is
comparable. But what is significant about fiscal year 2020 is
the impact of the global pandemic. So we know that, for a time,
the narco traffickers went to ground and did not push as much
of their product, and then when they did, because a lot of
border controls were tighter and the methods of delivery were
harder because economies had shut down, they ride their
traffics on the backs of the economies so they were having
difficulty getting precursor chemicals and so on. When they did
start pushing it, it was in smaller loads, in different routes.
What is significant about the DOD's performance, and as
part of the whole-nation effort, really what we do is we detect
and monitor and pass that off to law enforcement is that we
never step back. We stepped up on the face of pandemic. We
accounted for a significant increase of the amount that we
targeted. So while the total amount was the same, our
percentage of getting at effective targets was up, and that was
because we did have a modest increase in resources throughout
the year. The United States Navy stepped up, at the direction
of the Sec-Def, with Navy ships, additional P8's, and the Coast
Guard sustained their always excellent support. What we saw is
when the U.S. stayed on the field, our partners stayed on the
field.
So overall we held the line, as part of the effort. We will
never interdict our way out, but we have got to keep pressure
on that part of the supply chain. The Colombians did their
part. They had a record eradication year. Where we need to go
next is in the finances, into their data, into that source of
their power, and really break the center of gravity of these
organizations, and I think we can do that more effectively with
a better, effective targeting and whole-of-government approach
here in the U.S., and training our partners to do the same.
Senator Tillis. Thank you. Something that would be helpful,
if you do not have it available I would also be interested in a
similar update on human trafficking disruption. If we could
just get that submitted for the record I would appreciate it.
At the southern tip of your area of responsibility, General
VanHerck, and Admiral, the northern, what is the change in
posture? What is the environment like now as compared to, say,
this time last year? I mean, military presence--I know even at
the southern border, the southwest border of the United States,
we had stepped up Mexican military presence. How would you
summarize that today, and then also the southern Mexico border
and our border states, what is their posture there, trying to
manage flow of immigrants moving across those borders, now
compared to a year ago?
General VanHerck. I will go first. From Mexicans'
perspective, they are tremendous partners. We have a fantastic
military----
Senator Tillis. Are they maintaining the same sort of
operations tempo that they have for the past year or so?
General VanHerck. They are. They have been great partners.
Admiral Faller. Same for Guatemala. They are committed,
they are committed to doing the right thing here, but they are
stressed with COVID and the other insecurity by the
transnational criminal organizations. So their ability to surge
more in the migrant problem set is limited.
Senator Tillis. Thank you. As we move forward with funding
and National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) this year I would
also be interested in maybe you submitting for the record key
funding flow that are trending in the wrong direction that we
should focus on when we get back to appropriations discussions,
and any sort of authorities you may need in the NDAA. Thank you
very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tillis. Let me recognize
Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank both of
our panelists for their service to our country, and we
appreciate very much you being here today.
Admiral Faller, I do not think it is possible to overstate
the threats are adversaries are posing in your area of
responsibility and Africa Command (AFRICOM), because they know
whatever investments they make in South America and Africa are
cheap and will pay dividends in the future.
At the end of February, United States Army South finished
pre-deployment training for Operation Alamo Shield, to prepare
1st Security Force Assistance Brigade personnel for future
missions in Colombia, Honduras, and Panama. In addition to our
state partnership program's ongoing training and advising,
operations like this one are crucial for promoting
interoperability and relationship-building in your area of
responsibility.
So my question would be, what specific training programs in
SOUTHCOM are you going to develop to increase the capabilities
and the capacity and to further combat the growing concern for
corruption within the ranks of our partners, and especially
with the migration that we have going on right now? Can't they
play a bigger role in that, sir?
Admiral Faller. Senator, I would like to commend the West
Virginia Guard, which does fantastic work through the state
partnership program with Peru, and has been an active
participant in our exercise program. You cited the security
force assistance teams that the United States Army has
developed. That is exactly the right capability. It is small.
It is small teams that focus on training, think four or five
people, and our partners want to emulate the professionalism of
the United States Army, the United States Navy, the Coast
Guard, Air Force, Marines, and that is the way forward, staying
engaged on the team, on the field, with the small teams that
train our partners' trainers in the professional use of force,
that involve Women, Peace, and Security training, that involve
human rights training. This is the way to go, and we continue
to emphasize and strengthen those programs, Senator.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, sir, and to General VanHerck,
our current major ballistic missile defense assets around the
globe include the ground-based midcourse defense (GBMD),
thermal high altitude area defense (THAAD) batteries, Aegis
systems, and PAC-3 missile capability. As China and Russia
continue to increase their influence abroad I am concerned that
their objectives provide them with the ability to deny us
access, break apart our relationships, further corrupt
governments, and ultimately place threats closer to the United
States.
However, as we begin to think in terms of hypersonic
threats, geographical location does not mean much anymore, and
the importance of early detection and coordination between the
combatant commandments becomes an even more crucial concern.
So my question is, as we continue to develop space-based
sensor layers, what role do you see for NORTHCOM and NORAD in
tracking threats in North America as well as interfacing with
other combatant commands to track threats such as hypersonics?
General VanHerck. Senator, wearing my NORAD hat, we are
directly responsible for integrated threat warning and attack
assessment, so that is crucial. We will continue to play a
crucial role for assessment of threats to the Homeland,
specifically from missile threats. I am concerned about the
ability going forward to track and assess hypersonics, and so
we must go to space, and in my recent discussion just this
Friday, talking with Jon Hill at the Missile Defense Agency,
they are moving out.
What we have to provide is space-based capabilities to
track hypersonics, especially as they maneuver, and those
space-based capabilities have to provide fire control
capability data to systems that will be able to engage
hypersonics. That is crucial for that deterrence by denial
aspect that I mentioned earlier, that also contributes to
overarching deterrence.
Senator Manchin. Is there a requirement for [inaudible] at
each of our combatant commands that represents the other
commands in order to build situational wellness to coordinate
the efforts?
General VanHerck. Senator, I believe homeland defense
starts forward, and that means all combatant commands must be
engaged and part of the overarching solution for homeland
defense and missile defense.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin. Let me now
recognize Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
you for your service. Good to see both of you again. Admiral,
it has been a while. Thank you for all you are doing down
south.
General, I want to focus on some issues I know that have
already been mentioned. First, on missile defense. One, I
think, a good news story, that does not make a lot of press.
But in the last few years this has been a strong bipartisan
support in this Committee, in this Congress, on building up our
missile defense I think, in part, because of the threats from
North Korea. However, there have been challenges. Right now we
have 20 empty silos at Fort Greely, which makes no sense. Some
estimates are it is going to be 10 years before we have
missiles in there.
Can you talk to me about that, and why in the world aren't
we filling those silos as soon as possible?
General VanHerck. Senator, my goal would be to have
additional capability and capacity as soon as possible. I
continue to work closely with Jon Hill at the Missile Defense
Agency. My top priority is to stay on timeline, to field
additional capabilities against ballistic missiles that could
attack our Homeland.
Senator Sullivan. Isn't that in part because there is intel
that given the rate of what North Korea is producing in terms
of nukes and intercontinental ballistic missiles that their
capability could overwhelm our capabilities as early as 2025?
General VanHerck. Senator, I would like to have that
conversation in a classified environment. I remain extremely
concerned about the capacity of the ballistic missile defense
system going forward.
Senator Sullivan. Would quickly fielding the NGI help with
addressing that challenge?
General VanHerck. The sooner we can field the NGI, the
better for addressing that challenge.
Senator Sullivan. There was an article in a defense media
news source recently saying that the NGI decision is on the
Deputy Secretary of Defense's desk and yet it is being delayed.
Some are thinking that she might kind of use this as a budget-
cutting tool to say maybe we do not need it. Is that a good
idea to delay this and have the Pentagon say we do not need NGI
right now?
General VanHerck. Senator, I will stay out of the policy
aspect of that.
Senator Sullivan. Well, you kind of are already dumped into
it, so let me get your personal opinion on that. Is that a good
idea for the Deputy Secretary, or the Secretary, to say let's
figure out where we can cut the budget. Let's cut the budget on
the system that protect the entire United States of America
from a clear and growing threat. Is that a good idea?
General VanHerck. Again, that is a policy decision. My
perspective is about the risk, and I remain very concerned
about the risk of having a capable ballistic missile defense
system against future capacity changes and capability changes
by threats.
Senator Sullivan. Would the risk increase if we cut the NGI
program----
General VanHerck. My assessment----
Senator Sullivan. In your personal opinion?
General VanHerck. In my opinion, cutting that would reduce
our capability to defend against increased capacity and
capability of any threats.
Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, this is a huge issue and I
think we, as a Committee that has been very bipartisan, need to
send a message to the Pentagon, like, hey, fund this now. It is
clear it would be a risk to the country.
Let me turn to the Arctic. I know there has been a number
of discussions already. The good news is, in his confirmation
hearing, Secretary Austin, Deputy Secretary Dr. Hicks, both
said they were committed to this Committee to fully fund new
Arctic strategies--I think the Army is going to introduce it
today--with regard to fully funding the different service-
oriented strategies.
Senator Wicker talked about icebreakers. It is good we are
finally building them. It is taking too long. There is this
leasing option that the Trump administration was looking at, at
the end of the administration, and now the Biden administration
is looking at. Do you think that is a good idea to close this
icebreaker gap with the opportunity to lease icebreakers, get
them homeported in America's Arctic, which is Alaska? What is
your thought on that?
General VanHerck. Senator, that is a policy decision. I
have a requirement for capability. I am agnostic to what
provides that capability.
Senator Sullivan. But you think we need the capability.
General VanHerck. Absolutely.
Senator Sullivan. Good. So do I. So does this Committee, by
the way.
Let me ask one final thing. There is going to be a high-
level meeting between our diplomats and Chinese diplomats in
Anchorage Thursday and Friday. We talk about Alaska in terms of
the Arctic, but as you know, General, Alaska also is critical
for the Asia-Pacific, particularly as we look at dispersing of
our forces. We had the Pacific Command (PACOM) commander here
last week talking about challenges, perhaps in the Taiwan
Strait, as early as 5 to 6 years from now.
Now important is it, do you think, that the Chinese, when
they come to Alaska, see that there is, within the end of this
year, going to be over 100 fifth-generation fighters based in
Alaska, that can get to the Taiwan Strait probably in 6 hours?
General VanHerck. Senator, Alaska is a strategic location.
It is a strategic location for homeland defense, something that
we must preserve and preserve that capability. I think it is
important that they see our capabilities. It is part of our
overarching deterrence.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Let me
recognize Senator Peters, please.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, gentlemen,
thank you for your testimony here today and for your service
every day.
General VanHerck, a seldom-discussed area of the civil
support mission is chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear response, and this is good considering the subject
matter, but as long as supporting units are resourced
appropriately we can be more assured.
So my question to you, sir, is, the Command and Control
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Response
Element B has experienced a cumulative 25 percent decrease in
funding over the past 3 years, and I understand these are title
32 funds, and I know that you do not control those funds. But
the effect should at least be of concern to you because the
unit augments Northern Command for CBRN, and Defense Security
Cooperation Agency (DSCA), more broadly.
So my question to you, General, is, does the decrease for
the Guard and Reserve C2 element reflect your priorities or
those of the Army North and Joint Task Force Civil Support?
General VanHerck. First I would say I remain confident in
my ability to provide support in case there is an incident--
chemical, biological, radiological--in the continental United
States, and with regards to the specific prioritization, I
would say that I need to get further detail on the cut for
title 32. I am not tracking that. But we are well integrated
with state and local authorities and have our capability ready
to go, some of it on an hour's notice, others on a day's
notice. So I am confident in my ability to perform that
mission.
Senator Peters. Well, I appreciate that, and you are
willing to take a look at that and get back to us? We could
follow up with you?
General VanHerck. I will.
Senator Peters. I appreciate that. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
General VanHerck. Well, first, I would say I remain confident in my
ability to provide support in case there's an incident chemical,
biological, radiological, in the continental United States. With
regards to the specific prioritization, I would say that I need to get
further detail on the cut for title 32. I'm not tracking that, but
we're will--well integrated with state and local authorities in have
our capability ready to go some of it on hours' notice others on days'
notice. I'm confident in my ability to perform that mission.
I understand that National Guard Title 32 funding for Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Element B (CBRN Response
Element B) has been slightly reduced, but I maintain full confidence in
the National Guard's ability to perform this critical mission.
USNORTHCOM is in routine contact with the Department of the Army and
the National Guard Bureau regarding CBRN Response Element B's mission
and associated requirements, and I will continue to place heavy
emphasis on ensuring their ability to respond quickly and effectively.
Admiral Faller, the Southern Command takes a nontraditional
approach to intelligence, integrating public information with
advanced analytics, artificial intelligence, and machine
learning. My question is, is this in-house research,
development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) effort unique to the
Southern Command?
Admiral Faller. The nontraditional efforts that you speak
of, through our special operations force, looks at big data and
what the enemy is doing in big data's commercially available
information and machine learning, artificial intelligence. It
is a unique effort that is now being replicated, and it is a
key area that we need to emphasize in our intelligence efforts
going forward, appropriately working within the U.S. whole-of-
government.
This data, it is data that my shipmate, General VanHerck,
talks about, and stovepipes in that data that we create with
our own policies have to be broken down so we can leverage that
to understand what the threat is doing. Certainly our malign
actors that are working in this hemisphere, China and Russia,
they do not respect laws when they look at exploiting that type
of data for their own benefit.
Senator Peters. You mentioned some of that is being
replicated. Are you aware of some similar successful methods
with other combatant commands or the intelligence community?
Admiral Faller. We have a pilot program that we have
worked, to look at cryptocurrency. In this hemisphere, with
only 8 percent of the world's population, 60 percent of the
cryptocurrency is being leveraged, and that is because of the
plethora of transnational criminal organizations that are
wreaking violence in the hemisphere. So that is a concern.
So how do we get at that center of gravity to break the
backs of these threats, working with Treasury and other
partners, in support of. We are not looking to take the lead
here. We are looking to play the appropriate role. So there are
efforts, and those efforts are, frankly, funded every year on
the unfunded request or through additional support from
Congress. So we need to appropriately sustain that going
forward.
Senator Peters. Thank you. On Thursday, NORTHCOM will begin
Global Information Dominance exercise, and I understand that 9
of the 11 combatant commands are planning to participate in
this exercise, which is meant to prototype and test a set of
artificial intelligence (AI) tools, and I know there was some
discussion about Pathfinder earlier. But the intent is to
support joint all command and control implementation.
So my question for you, General, is, can you explain why
these types of exercises are absolutely critical to our
modernization and readiness efforts and why NORTHCOM is leading
this initiative?
General VanHerck. Absolutely, Senator. From the NORTHCOM
and NORAD perspective, we view data and information as a
strategic asset. So we are conducting these exercises to bring
everybody together to show the true value and importance of the
strategic ability that we can utilize information and data. So
we look forward to continuing to partner with the combatant
commands, the services, and bringing them together to
demonstrate capabilities that can not only help us in conflict
but, more importantly, help us de-escalate in crisis and to
deter in competition.
Senator Peters. Great. Thank you, General.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters. Senator Cramer,
please.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank both of
you for being here. I appreciate your service, Admiral and
General.
I am going to start with you, Admiral, because early on, in
a response to a question from Senator Inhofe, you had cited the
fact that you only get 1 percent of the ISR, and that was
fairly stunning to me, especially since the Air Force has been
trying to retire their RQ-4's and cut the production of the MQ-
9's, two systems that we are very familiar with in North
Dakota, of course. They are operated quite effectively out of
our state, one by the Air Force and the other by our Guard in
Fargo.
One of the reasons that they use for wanting to cut
production or retire, and realizing some of it is that they
want to save money for new systems, and that is noble. We need
to make some tough decisions about that. But one of the reasons
they use is these platforms are not survivable in near-peer
competition.
So my question to you, Admiral, is could you use our RQ-4's
and MQ-9's in your theater, and is there significant threat to
the survival of these platforms in SOUTHCOM?
Admiral Faller. As you mentioned, Senator, we receive less
than 1 percent of the DOD ISR, and it is a prioritization, and
there are global challenges and I recognize how that plays out.
But this is a good environment in SOUTHCOM for unmanned. We
have had, for the first time ever, an MQ-9 through the past
year, and we have Customs and Border Protection MQ-9 as well.
They have proven their utility because they can stay on station
for a long time and stare at the threats. They can also learn,
in general, about the environment beyond the transnational
criminal organization threat, so we have the understanding that
we need to ensure that we are appropriately postured moving
forward.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Admiral. General, thank you for
our discussion last week. I enjoyed it very much. I found it
very interesting, and I learned a lot, as is often the case,
and one of the things that you and I talked about, of course,
was the fact that NORAD and NORTHCOM participated with the Air
Force Research Laboratory in an over-the-horizon study that
included some testing at Camp Grafton, North Dakota, our
National Guard Camp. That is part of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) Coalition Warfare Program-funded
Arctic high frequency (HF) surveillance program. We were told,
of course, that the results exceeded expectations.
My question to you is, do you still the need for an over-
the-horizon radar system and capability, and do you expect
further, more advanced testing any time soon?
General VanHerck. Senator, my focus and top priority is
domain awareness, and over-the-horizon radar would certainly
contribute to domain awareness. My understanding is right now,
with regards to the test that you are talking about, the
current Northern Strategic Approach's study is with the Air
Force. We are waiting for that to come out. I talked to General
Brown on Friday about that. Once that report comes out we will
in a better position to see, on the way forward, with the
Research Lab, or however we are going to pursue that. But
domain awareness is at the top of my integrated priority list.
Senator Cramer. Thank you for that and thanks for that
answer, and thanks for following up with General Brown.
One other question for you, General VanHerck. There is a
lot less military presence between Michigan and Montana,
obviously along the northern border, than there used to be
during the Cold War, even though, I mean, one could argue that
there are more threats in the Arctic and from missiles coming
over the Arctic even than there were during the Cold War.
If there was a threat coming over the Pole, through
Saskatchewan, say, do have enough fighters, tankers, missile
warning, missile defense systems to meet that threat?
General VanHerck. Senator, day to day I am confident in my
ability to defend against the threat that we have. Day to day,
I am postured primarily against a 9/11-type of response. If
indications and warning or a crisis evolved, I would go ahead
and ask for additional forces. At that time, if I was allocated
additional forces or not I would have to make a broader
assessment in my ability to defend.
Senator Cramer. Well, and as you mentioned, obviously
domain awareness is the critical aspect of being prepared. Is
the radar coverage for that area modern enough to track any
threat reliably, do you believe?
General VanHerck. Senator, I remain concerned about domain
awareness in the north, with the legacy North Warning System.
If we apply capabilities such as Pathfinder, that will increase
my capability. But more broadly, we need to get after it with
more modern systems, systems not designed to go after a
stovepipe, single domain, single threat. We need systems
capable of going after everything from small counter-unmanned
aircraft systems (UAS) to ballistic missiles, that are able to
be efficient and effective.
Senator Cramer. Excellent. Thank you. You are both awesome.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cramer. Now I would like
to recognize Senator Rosen via Webex.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed, and I want to
thank the witnesses for being here and for your great service
to our Nation. I would like to speak a little bit about
Hezbollah in the Western Hemisphere, because for decades Iran's
proxy has long maintained an active presence in the Western
Hemisphere, engaging in terrorist activities, drug trafficking,
and money-laundering. In 1994, Iran and Hezbollah bombed Jewish
community center in Argentina, killing 85 civilians and
injuring more than 300. The Treasury Department has sanctioned
numerous Hezbollah-linked operatives and entities in the
Western Hemisphere for links to transnational organized crime.
So, Admiral Faller, in your written testimony you stated
that Hezbollah's external operations are responsible for at
least three high-profile attacks in the region and three other
planned operations that were disrupted. Can you elaborate on
the threat that Hezbollah poses to United States interests in
the Western Hemisphere, and if its presence is growing where do
you see it growing?
Admiral Faller. Senator, these threats go right back to
Iran, the single largest state sponsor of terror in the world
and the long arm or Iranian malfeasance is felt globally and in
this hemisphere. Significant Lebanese diaspora. Lebanese
Hezbollah receives funding support, and they are intertwined
with Iranian state-sponsored terrorist in ways that undermine
global security and security in this hemisphere.
We have seen an increase in presence of Iran activities in
Venezuela to support the illegitimate Maduro regime, increasing
the readiness of some of their defense systems, and we have
seen the continued involvement with the diaspora and economic
fundraising particularly down in the tri-border region,
neighboring Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil.
Senator Rosen. Well, you know, you are speaking of the
diaspora that is extremely important. So how can we improve
information sharing with our regional partners to identify and
disrupt Hezbollah's activity in Latin America?
Admiral Faller. One of the very positive things that I have
seen over the last couple of years is the extent to which we
have increased our information sharing with key partners,
Brazil and Colombia. We rely on them, they are like-minded
democracies, to share information so that we understand the
threat. We have expanded that information sharing significant
this year. It is key to moving forward and it is built on
longstanding trust that we have, that is borne out of
professional military education.
We have security cooperation programs that work to build
professional intelligence services. We do this through our 333
program, and sustaining those programs are very important.
During the past year we have been able to expand, modestly,
those programs in cybersecurity, and that will really be
critical to understanding both the threat that is posed by Iran
and their state-sponsored terrorist organizations and other
nation-state actors like China.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I would like to move on and ask
General VanHerck a little bit about our COVID response and
support. You have been so terrific. You have deployed Navy
hospital ships at the start of the pandemic. You have cared for
coronavirus patients at Army field hospitals. Now, of course,
President Biden is directing states to open up vaccination
appointments to all American adults by May 1st.
So I am curious what your role may be in this new mission.
How is NORTHCOM generating and deploying forces to support the
vaccine distribution and administrative mission, and
specifically, as members of the military and their families get
vaccinated, and once military installations are covered, do you
have coordinated plans or have you had preliminary
conversations with local civil authorities to leverage the
capacity you have on the bases and refer to local communities
to get the vaccines deployed?
General VanHerck. Senator, we work with not only the local
communities, state authorities, and our local bases to ensure
that we follow the DOD's published guidelines along with the
Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as well. I am
confident going forward that we will continue to provide that
support. We have worked with the Department. I have put in a
request for 100 teams, 50 Type 1 teams, the most capable,
capable of delivering about 6,000 shots per day, and also 50
Type 2 teams. As far as sourcing those, the Joint Staff works
with the services and the departments to calculate and come up
with sourcing solutions. The Secretary approves those and
allocates them to me, and we work through Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) for the actual location and mission
assignment on how we are going to continue executing President
Biden's mission to get where he needs to be on 1 July.
Senator Rosen. Thank you very much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator Scott,
please.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman Reed. Admiral Faller,
thank you for the conversation last week. As we all know, the
fundamental problem in our hemisphere is Cuba. They are the
root of all the instability in Latin America. They terrorize
their own citizens, they steal from their own citizens, and
they support dictators in Latin America, such as Maduro in
Venezuela and Ortega in Nicaragua.
How important is it, in your role, for the Cuban regime to
not have resources, to do everything we can as a country to
make sure that the Castro regime does not have the resources to
terrorize their own citizens and be involved in these other
countries?
Admiral Faller. In addition to the nefarious activity you
cite, Senator, Cuba and Russia and China are actively engaged
just miles from our home state, and it is concerning as we see
that relationship going forward. So to the extent to which we
can prevent those kinds of relationships from developing and
from Cuba enhancing its capabilities, it is very important. One
of our assets, one of our real strategic toeholds in that
effort is our naval station at Guantanamo Bay.
Senator Scott. Is it important that they do not have
resources?
Admiral Faller. I think it is extremely important that we
prevent the Cubans and the communists from doing what they are
doing in Venezuela, where they are keeping Maduro in power, and
where they are undermining. We see them actively undermining
free and fair elections in democracies across the hemisphere.
So yes, Senator.
Senator Scott. What is their involvement in Venezuela now,
and are they part of provoking Venezuela's aggression against
Guyana?
Admiral Faller. Cuba's Praetorian Guard keeps Maduro in
power. They are there in the thousands. They own the
intelligence service alongside Russia primarily, and Iran, and
China to a lesser extent. They are supporting, maintaining
Maduro's defense systems and security forces, and undoubtedly
that then gives Maduro the capacity and capability to rattle
the saber and threaten the neighbors, and also, frankly, allows
a safe haven for narco traffickers and narco terrorists, which
is what Venezuela has become. It is hell for its citizens and
it is heaven for the terrorists.
Senator Scott. So what can your command do to confront the
reports of illegal shipping activity out of Venezuela?
Admiral Faller. We are actively involved with all of our
interagency partners to track that and learn as much as we can
about it, and then provide that information to our diplomats
who can call it out and come up with solutions that support the
whole-of-government efforts to shift Venezuela to a democracy.
Senator Scott. Have you or our government through sanctions
been able to do much to stop the flow of oil from Venezuela to
Cuba?
Admiral Faller. The pressure has worked. The Maduro regime
has been denied resources. But in any of these things they are
very clever. When you have no regard for rule of law and
corruption fuels everything you do and you are supported by
nation-state actors like Russia and China, you can circumvent
rules and laws, and they have been able to keep the follow up
just enough to maintain their economy, particularly the
regime's grip on that economy and its people on life support.
Senator Scott. Can you talk a little bit about the
humanitarian crisis, both in Cuba and in Venezuela, as a result
of the Castro and Maduro regimes?
Admiral Faller. Well, the United Nations Human Rights
Report lays it out. The atrocities that the regime has
committed on the people are beyond compare in this hemisphere,
and they have created the largest migrant crisis this
hemisphere has ever seen, some five million migrants that have
swelled the services, of all the social services. That is why
we deployed Hospital Ship Comfort twice in a year's period
prior to the pandemic. It is a credit to Colombia and Brazil
and other democracies that they have been able to handle it as
effectively. I commend them.
Similarly, in Cuba, we have had past migrant crises and we
have a mission set to prepare with Homeland Security for that.
We have seen a slight uptick this year in migrants coming out
of Cuba. We are watching it very closely, and undoubtedly,
again, it is due to the brutal economic conditions and the
repression that we see. We study that intensely in our
intelligence and information-sharing efforts.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Admiral Faller. Thank you,
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Let me recognize
Senator Kelly, please.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Faller, you
and I had an extended discussion last week about activity in
the region as well as some of the push factors contributing to
migration flows that are exacerbating the challenging situation
at the southern border. I would like to focus on the strength
of criminal organizations in the region.
A recent report by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies found that the countries of the Northern
Triangle lose more than 3 percent of their GDP to organized
crime each year. These TCOs also contribute to outsized
homicide rates and undermine governance and security in the
region. The bottom line is they are, in some ways, better
resourced than state actors, and have proven capable of
trafficking guns, money, drugs, and people. It is a major
problem.
Given these dynamics, do you feel you have the authority
necessary to conduct operations that will effectively disrupt
their activity in the long term?
Admiral Faller. As you mentioned, Senator, they control
territory. They are well funded. They have a strength of close
to 200,000 when you look across the region, which is on par
with all the police and military forces in total. So a powerful
enemy to host nations' democracies and direct impact on our
homeland defense here in the United States.
Our role is appropriately in support, detection, and
monitoring, which means we find out as much as we can, and
where we have authorities we pass that off to law enforcement
to interdict, and then we work at building our host nation
partners' capacity. We are short in intelligence assets. We
have less than 1 percent of those assets. We need additional
capacity to build our partners so that they can take care of
this problem themselves. We have received about the right
amount of presence, but it is important we stay on the field.
An example of that is our Joint Task Force-Bravo, which is
a small team of about 700 soldiers and airmen and Marines at
Soto Cano, Honduras, that can support law enforcement with
lift, with some intelligence, but more importantly can rapidly
respond. We saw it this past fall with two back-to-back
hurricanes, major hurricanes, and we saved hundreds of lives
rapidly. What that does is it builds trust and actually helps
us build the case for these partnerships in sustainable
security long term.
Senator Kelly. Earlier you stressed, and you did again,
that the 1 percent of ISR funding goes to SOUTHCOM. Is that
correct?
Admiral Faller. It is 1 percent of the overall----
Senator Kelly. Of the overall.
Admiral Faller.--assets and capabilities, Senator.
Senator Kelly. But beyond that, if you wanted to ramp up
the effectiveness of disrupting their activity, what other
resources would you need?
Admiral Faller. Senator, we have got to come up with a more
effective whole-of-government effort in the United States and
really get at mapping these networks. We are doing that but it
is nascent. It needs more effort, and then finding the center
of gravity, what is key to each organization, and then going
at, disrupting, defeating or deterring that. Most of that is
law enforcement or judicial or a partner nation effort with
SOUTHCOM in support. So we play a critical role but it has got
to be more holistically designed in the U.S. We cannot
interdict our way out of this.
Senator Kelly. Well, thank you, Admiral. General VanHerck,
you mentioned in your testimony the Pathfinder program as a
complement to the work done by the Defense Innovation Unit, and
also the importance of being able to rapidly field capabilities
of the future. As Chair of the Emerging Threats and
Capabilities Subcommittee, this is something I have been
thinking a lot about.
Are you looking into technologies like artificial
intelligence to asset in processing the increasingly large
volumes of data that come from our sensor systems?
General VanHerck. Senator, absolutely. As a matter of fact,
Pathfinder does exactly that, uses machine learning and
additional capabilities. We must go down that path to operate
in a timely and efficient and effective manner.
Senator Kelly. Any sense if our adversaries are doing the
same thing, using these technologies?
General VanHerck. Absolutely, Senator, especially China.
They are actively moving forward with artificial intelligence.
Senator Kelly. Then finally, are there any research gaps
that you see that you think we should be investing more in?
General VanHerck. Not specific to research. I would say we
must go to space sooner, and space-based capabilities that give
us persistent domain awareness. That is where I would be
focusing my efforts right now.
Senator Kelly. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Let me recognize
Senator Hawley, please.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
gentlemen, for being here.
General VanHerck, let me start with you, and let me thank
you on behalf of all Missourians. It is great to see a fellow
Missourian here, as before, and we are very proud of you and
your service, so thank you for being here.
Let's come back to this question of the border. Customs and
Border Patrol issued a new batch of operational statistics last
week that showed that CBP had encountered more than 100,000
persons attempting entry across the southern border in
February. That is about a 200 percent increase over this time
last year. They also show that the number of unaccompanied
minors attempting to cross our border--that is children--has
doubled since January, and the number of family units has more
than doubled from January to February.
Give us a sense of how this surge of migrants is helping or
hindering the cartels' operations along the border.
General VanHerck. Senator, I am not aware of necessarily
how it hinders or helps. I think it is a symptom of the
transnational criminal organization problem that we actually
see. As Admiral Faller pointed out, you know, hurricanes,
transnational criminal organizations, all the murders,
contribute directly to what we are seeing on the border, which
includes the migration that you are alluding to.
Senator Hawley. I think it is today that the Secretary of
Homeland Security said that we are on pace now for a 20-year
high in border encounters, a 20-year record, which is pretty
astounding considering some of the previous surges we have
seen, for instance in 2014. Is it fair to say that we have got
a crisis now at the southern border, General?
General VanHerck. Senator, I will stay out of the politics
of whether it is a crisis or not. It is absolutely a homeland
defense issue that I am concerned about. I am concerned because
it creates opportunities, it creates vulnerabilities, and we
have to be postured for each of those. The vulnerabilities that
it creates for us is instability, and it creates instability in
governance, it creates instabilities in the rule of law, if you
will, in neighboring countries. Those will be exploited by
countries such as China, Russia, and Iran. So for me it is a
Homeland defense and a national security imperative to take a
look at that.
Senator Hawley. Yeah, I think you are absolutely right. It
is also a humanitarian crisis, and I, for one, am not afraid of
the word ``crisis.'' I cannot understand why this
administration is afraid of the word ``crisis.'' Given the
unbelievable humanitarian issues we are seeing at the border
and record surge that we are on pace for, I think this
administration's inability to admit that their own policies are
causing this crisis, and the effect it is having in terms of
emboldening the cartels, as you are saying--we know that nobody
crosses that southern border without the permission and indeed
without the profit of the cartels. Nobody. It is a wholly run
criminal enterprise on the southern end of the border, and this
administration's inability to grapple with that and do
something about it I think is frankly astounding. We are seeing
it just day on day on day grow worse and worse.
Let me ask you this, General. We sent billions of dollars
in security and money, security assistance, to the Mexican
Government over the past 14 years, yet we are seeing, as you
just alluded to, escalating violence. Even more drugs headed
northward. Those drugs make their way into every state of the
union, including our home state, my home state of Missouri. In
your assessment, why has our security assistance to Mexico
fallen so short of its security objectives? I mean, why have
not we been able to achieve more, considering the prodigious
sums that we have invested?
General VanHerck. First, I would talk to Homeland Security
about the problem. It is a law enforcement issue, much of it
coming across the border. But I would tell you that the Mexican
military, we have an incredibly close partnership and they are
doing incredible things down there.
With that being said, I think, as Admiral Faller alluded
to, we need a whole-of-government strategy. You know, the arms
that are arming these transnational criminal organizations come
right here from the United States of America and they flow
south. In addition to that, the money that they are creating is
being generated by precursors coming from Asia, from China
businesses and industry, if you will, that flows in there.
So we have to take a broader approach to get after this,
which includes a whole-of-government effort and prioritizing
and putting resources to the problem.
Senator Hawley. Speaking of China, Admiral, let me come to
you in just the little bit of time I have got remaining. You
wrote in your testimony that China is seeking to establish
global logistics and basing infrastructure in our hemisphere in
order to project and sustain military power. What kind of
presence do the Chinese forces maintain in the Western
Hemisphere today, that we ought to be concerned about?
Admiral Faller. We have to ask ourselves the question, why
is China trying to achieve deep-water ports in the Dominican
Republic, Jamaica, El Salvador, Panama--Panama Canal is a key
strategic ground--Argentina. They are using economic influence
and access to set the conditions for the blue-water navy that
they have built.
Senator Hawley. Very good. I think we are going to have
closed session, aren't we, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Reed. We are planning that, yes.
Senator Hawley. Okay. I will have a few more questions for
you then. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley. Now let me
recognize Senator Tuberville.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both
for being here today and what you have done for our Homeland
and our hemisphere. General, it has been 20 years since we have
had an attack on our Homeland. Thank you for that, and
everybody at NORTHCOM, the hard work that you have done. I very
much agree with you, what you said about outpacing our
competitors. I am proud to say that in Alabama we are working
to leap ahead in the area of hypersonics. We are working very
hard on that, and right now the world's largest and fastest
hypersonic wind tunnel is under construction in Huntsville, and
I know they are working at a fast pace.
Admiral, I enjoyed our conversation last week and I enjoyed
your straight talk. I hope the American people will start
getting a sense of urgency. You have your hands full in
SOUTHCOM, no doubt about it. Between transnational criminal
organizations and Russia and China you are a busy man.
I do believe, for a moment, that the People's Republic of
China (PRC)'s plan in our hemisphere are benign, and I hope
that it will not take a Chinese aircraft carrier sailing
between Florida and the Bahamas for Americans to wake up to the
fact that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) wish to dominate
the world stage. I hope it does not take something like that.
You know, the work that both of you have done for SOUTHCOM
and NORTHCOM for our Nation is incredible, important to
maintaining our strategic military objectives. Many of the
items for both of you in the areas of responsibility strongly
impact my home state of Alabama.
Admiral, following the 2018 National Defense Strategy is
something I personally believe in a good way to position our
forces to thinking towards the future. Can you explain how
SOUTHCOM is important to this strategy, and specifically, how
would you describe China's strategic objectives in a 5- or 10-
year timeline?
Admiral Faller. Well, I think China seeks economic
dominance globally, and their strategic objective is to be the
dominant global power, unquestionably, and they will do that in
whatever way possible to ensure they have the preeminence of
the Communist Party.
In this hemisphere it is across all fronts. It is not just
economics. Typically we think about that and we have this
fallacy that it is just economics. In the military realm, they
have recognized that partners in this hemisphere cannot afford
a lot of equipment, so they have upped the game in gifts. When
they do offer military equipment it is often through corrupt
deals that we cannot compete with.
They have replicated our professional military education.
They have ubiquitous IT solutions. They have created
engineering and cyber scholarships for military personnel that
goes beyond the kind of education and training that we offer in
our IMET programs. They have expanded their defense attache
presence. They have at least turned a blind eye to a range of
illegal activity, unregulated fishing, unreported fishing,
illegal mining and logging. All this is done in an environment
fueled by corruption, with no regard, or little regard for
human rights, in trying to write their version of the rules of
the game.
We have got to stay on the field to compete. We do that
well. No one is better than the United States military,
Department of Defense. But we have got to work hard and
tirelessly, with a sense of urgency that you mentioned, to stay
number one in the game and to be the best.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. General, in regards to our
southern border security we hear all the negatives. What do you
think has improved the most in the last four years, and then
what worries you most looking forward at the southern border?
General VanHerck. I think the coordination between the
Department and the interagency with regards to since 2018, has
been probably the biggest improvement. With regards to what
worries me most, it is about having domain awareness and the
opportunities and vulnerabilities that I already talked about,
in our own Western Hemisphere, for state actors such as China,
Russia, or Iran, in our own neighborhood, due to instability,
due to ungoverned areas and spaces. So I am significantly
concerned about what is going on right here in our own
hemisphere and neighborhood.
Senator Tuberville. Do you think we need a wall?
General VanHerck. I will stay out of the politics of a
wall. Border security----
Senator Tuberville. Not politics. Do you think we need one?
General VanHerck. Border security is national security. We
need to ensure that we have policies in place, laws are
enforced to ensure that homeland defense does not become a more
strategic issue from the borders.
Senator Tuberville. Yeah. One thing I noticed coaching for
40 years and being in education is just the influx of drugs.
You know, just take away everybody coming across the border, it
is just the influx of drugs are killing our kids. We are losing
60,000 a year to overdose. I mean, that right there should be
just an alarm that we have got to have something different.
General VanHerck. Senator, I agree with you. Actually, I
believe the number this past year was approximately 80,000.
That is unsatisfactory, and we have to get after that, and that
is a symptom of that broader problem that I talked about,
transnational criminal organizations, that we can apply
priority and resources to, to get after it.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Now let me
recognize Senator Blackburn via Webex.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We so
appreciate having the hearing today and getting the update, and
Admiral Faller, thank you for the time that you spent with me
on the phone last week.
General VanHerck, I want to go back to your statement on
Pathfinder, the prototype Pathfinder data analytics project.
This is the kind of project that I think attacks two primary
concerns with DOD data streams. One is the stovepiping and the
other is the need for modernization, and many times I sound
like a broken record, if you will, by talking about what has
happened with DOD through the years as things have become so
stovepiped, and the need for this modernization, because
information is power. We all know that. But you have to be able
to analyze to share and to make actionable that data.
So my question for you is, how could the Pentagon better
utilize some of these emerging technologies such as artificial
intelligence, such as the data that we are getting via ISR, and
the AI that is used by Pathfinder to really make that
information accessible, sharable across platforms and
divisions, and actionable when you are looking at how you
implement plans for the future, how you change plans based on
the information that you are getting?
General VanHerck. Senator, first I would tell you that I am
encouraged by the joint warfighting concept, which also has a
supplement for information advantage that will help us move
down this.
As far as utilizing the data, I agree, it is a strategic
asset, if you will, data. We can utilize it to not only
dominate in conflict but to create deterrence day to day. So,
for example, as an operational commander, this data that is
available to me, if I utilize it, with applying artificial
intelligence and machine learning, and then disseminate it to
key decision-makers, I am able to position forces ahead of a
competitor or adversary's actions, which creates deterrence. It
is deterrence by denial.
But we must go faster in the Department. Thirty years ago,
the Department led the way with innovations. Today, I think
that paradigm has flip-flopped to where much of industry and
Silicon Valley is leading the way forward, especially with
regard to data, and so we need to take a look at our
acquisition processes, our modernization processes, and
potentially flip the paradigm to stay competitive.
Senator Blackburn. Do you feel like that the Pentagon
itself is flexible and agile enough to make these changes,
utilize this data, make a change in a game plan immediately,
and apply what they are learning from that intel?
General VanHerck. I believe that the Pentagon has proven,
over history, to be incredibly successful in adapting when we
need to. It has not always been as fast, and that is one of the
reasons I talk about it. We have to have some culture change.
I would also tell you this may require some looks at
policy. It may even require some looks at law, to utilize data
differently as we go forward. What we do not want to do is
create capabilities that we can utilize, and the policies that
we have and the laws that we have do not allow us to be
successful with the data and the information that is available.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you for that. I may come back to
you for some specifics.
Admiral Faller, we have talked a lot about China this
morning and the transnational organizations. But as you look at
dealing with China, whether it is through fentanyl and drugs or
Belt and Road or great power competition, what do you not have
access to in SOUTHCOM that you need?
Admiral Faller. As we have discussed, China is a global
threat and we have got to address that challenge holistically
across the United States Government. In the SOUTHCOM AOR we
have to be appropriately postured, so we need the right
footprint of forces, working with our embassies and our
interagency team to stay engage with our partners. So
additional locations for presence, not permanent, but access is
really critical moving forward.
Senator Blackburn. So it is the teamwork concept with our
allies. Correct?
Admiral Faller. Correct, Senator.
Senator Blackburn. Okay. Thank you all for that. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator, very much, and
gentlemen, thank you for your testimony and your service to the
Nation. Let me remind my colleagues that upon adjournment we
will immediately move to SVC-217 for a classified briefing by
Admiral Faller about increasing Chinese influence in the
SOUTHCOM area. There also is a vote scheduled for noon, so we
will accomplish both. I will see you shortly over there,
Admiral Faller, and General, thank you for your distinguished
service at NORTHCOM.
No further business before the Committee, I will adjourn.
[Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
women, peace and security (wps)
1. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Faller, as your command continues the
promotion of gender inclusion with allies and partner nations, can you
share the overall impact you have witnessed across the region?
Admiral Faller. As we have started holding gender-focused
roundtables and events in Colombia, Honduras, and El Salvador, and
numerous other countries, leaders from across the region have seen how
powerful it is to integrate gender perspectives and are requesting that
we collaborate and assist them with gender integration. We have seen
more women fulfilling key roles and positions and they have achieved
greater presence in decision-making spaces as a result. Notably, we
have seen more female International Military Education and Training
(IMET) graduates taking leadership roles within their countries.
2. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Faller, how has implementation of the
program contributed to the advancement of U.S. Southern Command's
(SOUTHCOM) long term mission within the region?
Admiral Faller. Part of our mission within the region is to work
with our partner nations to build professional military and security
forces that are legitimate in the eyes of their populations. This
includes fostering respect for human rights, the rule of law, and the
importance of integrating all perspectives--to include NCOs and women.
A legitimate and professional force will be resilient to any threats it
faces--transnational criminal organizations, corruption, violence, and
meddling from external state and non-state actors.
3. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Faller, what gender programs have you
seen be successful, and what has been learned from those successes?
Admiral Faller. In addition to creating standalone WPS events,
SOUTHCOM demonstrates its commitment to WPS by ensuring it is part of
every key leader engagement in the region. We seek ways to collaborate
with, and assist, partners in their own efforts to advance WPS, such as
our support to Colombia as they work to meet NATO WPS standards.
One key success that stands out is our new ``Breaking Barriers''
podcast, hosted by our Civilian Deputy to the Commander, Ambassador
Jean Manes. The purpose of this podcast is to amplify WPS principles
and recognize women leaders in defense and security forces across our
Hemisphere. The most senior woman in the Trinidad and Tobago Defense
Force, Lieutenant Colonel Jozette McLean was the first guest featured
on the podcast. In addition to the regional partners, SOUTHCOM has
strengthened academic partnerships as well. In collaboration with the
William J. Perry Center, SOUTHCOM published a book called ``Twenty
Years, Twenty Stories: Women, Peace, and Security in the Western
Hemisphere,'' which included essays from 25 authors from 13 countries
in our hemisphere. Themes from the book included cyber security,
peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. I have
personally distributed this book to Ministers and Chiefs of Defense
across the region. SOUTHCOM uses all social media platforms to
regularly highlight the achievements and contributions of women across
the Western Hemisphere, part of the overall effort to ``make the
invisible, visible.'' We are also working toward increasing the number
of women participating in the IMET program and in our multilateral
exercises.
Breaking Barriers Podcast: https://www.southcom.mil/Lines-of-
Effort/Strengthen-Partnerships/SOUTHCOMs-Women-Peace-and-Security-WPS-
Program/?audioid=6 5826
4. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Faller and General VanHerck, WPS is
intended to not only foster foreign and defense policies that proscribe
the incorporation of women for partner countries, but it is also
designed to ensure that our own systems, chains of command and
decision-making processes include gender-oriented considerations. The
2021 defense appropriations act included funding for full-time gender
advisors across the combatant commands (COCOM). Can you discuss how you
are utilizing those funds?
Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM elevated this program and made it a
strategic priority under the leadership of AMB Jean Manes, Civilian
Deputy to the Commander. We allocated a field grade officer to lead the
program and a contractor, who is a lawyer, to assist with its
implementation.
SOUTHCOM has three WPS priorities for fiscal year 2021: 1) Train
our force; 2) Increase women participation in IMET; and 3) Integrate
WPS into exercises. For example, in January 2021, WPS was injected into
Exercise MERCURY conducted by JTF-Bravo and the Panamanian National
Border Service. WPS is also being integrated into exercises TRADEWINDS
and UNITAS, hosted by Guyana and Peru, respectively.
SOUTHCOM has received $250,000 for fiscal year 2021. This funding
is directed to pay for one full-time gender advisor as well as the
development of training and strategic messaging initiatives.
General VanHerck. Funding for Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) in
fiscal year 2021 enabled USNORTHCOM to hire a full-time contract WPS
subject matter expert, while also supporting the training of a network
of military and civilian gender advisors who are responsible for
Command implementation of the WPS Act and DOD WPS Strategic Framework
and Implementation Plan. In addition to these efforts, USNORTHCOM
utilized fiscal year 2021 WPS funds to conduct a WPS-focused analysis
of USNORTHCOM mission sets, sponsor WPS events tied to USNORTHCOM
missions, promote training and awareness regarding how WPS informed the
USNORTHCOM responses to COVID-19, and develop WPS training content in
collaboration with our partners in Canada and Mexico. USNORTHCOM is
also proud to have partnered with eCornell University and USSTRATCOM on
training that resulted in over 20 military and civilian personnel
receiving a certificate in Gender and Women in Leadership. Finally, the
funding is providing the opportunity for USNORTHCOM to begin WPS data
collection and reporting.
5. Senator Shaheen. General VanHerck, how has U.S. Northern Command
(NORTHCOM) incorporated gender advisors into the structure of decision-
making and the chain of command?
General VanHerck. In December 2020, I signed WPS implementation
guidance for USNORTHCOM that established a gender network of 20+
formally appointed representatives from USNORTHCOM directorates and
component commands. These advisors, called Gender Focal Points, also
include a NORAD volunteer, and are trained and empowered to advance
implementation of WPS principles and approaches in all areas and
functions. In March 2021, USNORTHCOM's WPS leadership team, with
support of the Joint Staff, delivered the Level 100 Operationalizing
WPS course throughout our USNORTHCOM WPS network. This network convenes
monthly to discuss initiatives, identify opportunities and
requirements, and also to track and implement WPS guidance; it provides
progress reports to me semi-annually.
counter-narcotics and transnational criminal organizations (tco)
6. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Faller and General VanHerck, given the
scope and persistent nature of the drug trafficking threat, how are
your combatant commands prioritizing its limited enforcement resources
to effectively target the trafficking activity that may be most
detrimental to U.S. interests?
Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM works hard to make sure that 1+1=3. This
means we look for innovative approaches to acquire information and
intelligence on transnational criminal organization (TCO) activities,
applying advanced analytics, artificial intelligence and machine
learning techniques. We then share that information as quickly as
possible with our strong and willing partners--both U.S. Law
Enforcement Agencies and partner nations--to target the greatest
threats. We also focus our limited assets in areas where the
preponderance of drugs are flowing toward the US, currently the Eastern
Pacific. We know that we will never be able to interdict our way out of
the drug crisis, so we also focus on understanding the TCOs themselves
so we may work with law enforcement to dismantle the organizations that
will traffic in any commodity to turn a profit at the expense of
American lives.
General VanHerck. In a support role to federal partners, USNORTHCOM
prioritizes resources based on law enforcement partner requests and
assessments of significant threats. At this time, Mexican cartels are
increasingly focused on trafficking synthetic drugs such as fentanyl
that are fueling record numbers of drug overdoses in the United States.
In response, I directed our Joint Task Force North and Special
Operations Command North to support law enforcement and regional
partners by identifying new approaches, in coordination with law
enforcement, to reduce the trafficking of illicit synthetic drugs. To
fully get after the resourcing process, I believe the United States
needs a whole-of-government strategy with directed prioritization to
enable optimum resource application of limited resources.
7. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Faller and General VanHerck, can you
discuss how your combatant command coordinates with the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), civil law enforcement, State governments and
other Federal Agencies to respond to an evolving drug threat that
requires aggressive enforcement to interdict illicit narcotics and root
out TCOs?
Admiral Faller. USSOUTHCOM works very closely with the interagency
on the counternarcotic mission, as this is a true team effort. DHS, and
specifically the US Coast Guard (USCG), working with Joint Interagency
Task Force-South (JIATF-S), is our primary law enforcement partner for
drug interdictions at sea. The USCG regularly provides USSOUTHCOM with
surface and air assets for this mission, with their medium endurance
and fast response cutters being critical to this fight. In return,
USSOUTHCOM provides regular support to USCG movements and Panama Canal
transits through designated authorities. We have increased our support
to US and partner nation law enforcement by sharing information and
intelligence to help develop law enforcement target packages aimed at
dismantling the TCOs and their leadership. We supported the State
Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL)
Affairs with the movement of 13 helicopters to Colombia and Peru, moved
80 MTs of cocaine from Costa Rica to a destruction site in Florida in
support of the Drug Enforcement Agency, airlifted four INL interdiction
boats for delivery to Guatemala, and moved the Customs and Boarder
Protection Unmanned Aircraft System into Panama to support regional
counter narcotics, detection and monitoring efforts. We also continue
to focus on efforts to assess the financial underpinnings of national
security threats in the region and have deepened our counter threat
finance support with the Department of Treasury Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC) with intelligence analysis as they work to impose
sanctions on drug kingpins.
While we must continue to prevent as many drugs from entering our
Homeland as possible, we must also look toward a whole-of-society
approach to address this scourge. For our part, USSOUTHCOM can directly
impact the supply side by continuing to work with our partners to stop
the TCOs who will traffic in any commodity to turn a profit. It's not
just about stopping the flow of drugs, we must go after their logistics
chains, their profits, and all sources of their power.
General VanHerck. At the national level, I engage with my DHS and
law enforcement (LE) counterparts through regular personal meetings and
through semi-annual meetings of The Interdiction Committee (TIC). This
senior interagency forum provides opportunities to discuss and resolve
issues related to drug interdiction efforts from an interdepartmental
perspective. At the Command level, USNORTHCOM hosts liaison officers
(LNOs) at USNORTHCOM headquarters and also embeds LNOs across the
interagency community. These open lines of communication assure my team
understands DHS and LE requirements, and that DHS and LE in turn fully
understand the support UNORTHCOM can provide. It is only through a
whole-of-government approach that identifies transnational criminal
organizations (TCOs) as a priority and National Security imperative
that the United States can successfully counter TCOs and their illicit
activities.
8. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Faller and General VanHerck, despite
decades of interdiction and diligent enforcement efforts by military
forces and Federal Agencies, the drug threat has gotten worse not
better. Do you believe we need any new and innovative capabilities and
strategies to address this problem?
Admiral Faller. As I stated earlier, we will never interdict our
way out of the drug crisis. TCOs are constantly innovating and changing
their tactics to avoid disruption. Theirs is a lucrative business with
almost limitless resources. TCOs make approximately $90 billion a year
so we must continue to innovate--looking for non-traditional ways to
crush their money. Capabilities like our operation Mortal Mint
(artificial intelligence/machine learning program for foreign adversary
financial targeting) that focuses on following the money, Asymmetric
Target Acquisition Center that looks to harness publicly available
foreign information and Technical Network Analytics Cell that uses data
analytics for actionable intelligence are low-cost, high-return
activities in which we should be investing more.
General VanHerck. Yes. I believe countering transnational criminal
organization (TCO) activities and their influence is a national
security imperative because of the impact on U.S. citizens and the
pressures they create in partner nations, as well as the opportunities
they create for exploitation by our strategic competitors. TCOs
continually adapt their tactics, techniques, and procedures, which
undermine U.S. Government and USNORTHCOM efforts to degrade them, and I
believe the U.S. Government must become more agile and adaptable to
meet this challenge. Existing tools and applied resources are not
enough, and it is increasingly necessary to leverage emerging
technologies and non-traditional partners, such as the U.S. Postal
Inspections Service to track and identify illicit drug shipments, as
well as to leverage local law enforcement interdiction of precursor
materials or supplies originating in the United States. We must have
unity of effort across defense, law enforcement, and policy
organizations to effectively address the TCO threat to the Homeland.
I also believe the United States needs a whole-of-government
strategy with directed prioritization to enable optimum resource
application of limited resources. This will enable the Federal
Government to go after the TCOs and their network enablers that are the
true source of the problem, rather than a focus on drugs, human
trafficking, and migration challenges that are just symptoms.
9. Senator Shaheen. General VanHerck, similarly, do you think there
is an opportunity to partner more closely with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Department of Justice broadly to track the money
that funds these operations?
General VanHerck. Yes. Closer partnerships with the FBI and other
federal law enforcement agencies are critical to defending our
Homeland, but that is only part of the answer. I view countering
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) from a homeland defense
perspective and also as a national security imperative, and I believe a
whole-of-government strategy addressing illicit TCO funds and the TCO
activities generating those funds is absolutely essential. This effort
requires a single lead organization that can bring the whole-of-
government together to prioritize and manage requisite resources to
tackle Transnational Organized Crime, as USNORTHCOM and the Department
of Defense in a support role cannot do this alone. I am encouraged by
the plan to establish the U.S. Council on Transnational Organized Crime
(USCTOC) to streamline and align law enforcement requests with
available DOD support. USCTOC, once formalized, could provide a whole-
of-government approach to denying criminal organizations the proceeds
of their illicit activities while simultaneously helping to counter
their activities and influence.
10. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Faller, what are some of the
capabilities or authorities that you think would allow your combatant
command in partnership with DHS and others to stem the flow of illicit
narcotics?
Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM is pursuing non-traditional approaches to
go after TCOs' money and logistics. Working closely with our partners
in this hemisphere is also critical to stemming the flow of illicit
narcotics--both to prevent them from ever beginning the journey north,
as well as to stop them once they're already on the high seas. SOUTHCOM
leverages the security cooperation program to increase the capacity of
our partner nations to operate alongside us and counter our shared
threats. Our significant security cooperation initiatives focus on
developing critical functional areas that include improving maritime
domain awareness and information sharing; increasing interoperability
between partner nations and U.S. Forces, and building institutional
capacity through professional military education. Programs like those
commonly referred to as section 333 are key to increasing our partners'
capacity and capability, making them force multipliers in our
counternarcotic efforts and integrating them seamlessly into our
operations. As an example of how we can successfully integrate our
partners into our operations, at the end of March, a United States
maritime patrol aircraft detected a suspect vessel 15 nautical miles
from the Costa Rican and Panamanian border. JIATF-S notified the Costa
Rican and Panamanian Coast Guard, who then launched maritime vessels in
pursuit. Panamanian forces intercepted the vessel with Costa Rican
support. Panama seized 900 kgs of cocaine and detained 3 persons.
While one might expect to see a decrease in partner nation
participation in counternarcotic operations due to increased domestic
demands created by COVID-19, our partners have stayed in the drug fight
with us. The modest increase in DOD resources and assets during our
enhanced CN operations last year demonstrated US leadership in the
region and our partners responded to that by increasing their presence
as well. Key partners like Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, Guatemala, El
Salvador, and others have been involved in 60% of drug disruptions
during the operation.
In order to ensure our trusted partners in the region are able to
continue to support to our enduring Counter Transnational Criminal
Operation, I believe we will need to provide additional economic
support to those countries that are still willing to conduct counter-
narcotics operations while experiencing economic pressures imposed by
COVID-19. In order to stay on pace with China and other authoritarian
regimes who are increasing their investments in the region, we will
look to strengthen our already solid relationships by providing
resources to the security sectors, enabling them to conduct all-domain
operations with the equipment (Boston Whalers, Maritime Patrol
Aircraft, Midnight Express boats, helicopters) that have been donated
or procured through the United States Foreign Military Finance system.
russian influence:
11. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Faller, Russia received a positive
review of their vaccine by Britain's leading medical journal, ``The
Lancet'' and Russia is a provider of COVID-19 ``SPUTNIK V'' vaccines to
Latin America. Six countries across the region--Argentina, Bolivia,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Venezuela--have authorized use of the
Sputnik V vaccine and others are considering authorization requests.
What consequences does this have as we approach a post-pandemic world,
and how does it impact our overall influence in the region?
Admiral Faller. We are rightly focused on getting our own
population vaccinated to the greatest extent possible. However, once we
offer all Americans the vaccine, we, too, should offer our partners
help, because it's the right thing to do. Countries like Russia and
China offer vaccines to gain advantage. Since our partners are
desperate to protect their populations against COVID, they will turn to
Russia and China for help and perhaps become beholden to them once the
pandemic is behind us. If we can provide vaccines, we can prevent
Russia and China from gaining undue influence here in our hemisphere.
This is about being a good neighbor.
12. Senator Shaheen. General VanHerck, you stated that, ``Russia
presents a persistent, proximate threat to the United States and Canada
and remains the most acute challenge to our Homeland defense mission.''
I am in agreement with that statement. You also shared that, ``Last
year, NORAD responded to more Russian military flights off the coast of
Alaska than we've seen in any year since the end of the Cold War.'' Are
we postured with the necessary capabilities to anticipate and
effectively defend against Russian hostilities?
General VanHerck. I am concerned about my ability to defend the
Homeland as our competitors continue to develop capabilities to hold
the Homeland at risk. Specifically, during crisis or conflict,
USNORTHCOM and NORAD will require significant additional capabilities
to defend North America and our Homeland. Many of these capabilities
are the same as those that would be sought out by other combatant
commanders for operations overseas, creating an internal competition
for resources within the Department. Additionally, as Russian and other
competitors' capabilities grow, it will be increasingly important to
establish global all-domain awareness and increase our sustainable
presence in the Arctic. These capabilities will allow us to achieve
information dominance and decision superiority to provide leaders at
all levels with the options, time and space necessary to deter
competitors in competition, de-escalate in crisis, and if necessary,
defeat in conflict.
13. Senator Shaheen. General VanHerck, have our defensive
capabilities kept pace with the threat? If not, what are the primary
concerns with our legacy warning and assessment systems and defensive
capabilities?
General VanHerck. No. The Department's warning, assessment, and
conventional defense systems have not kept pace with the threat. In
particular, legacy systems are challenged by competitor advancements in
systems designed to avoid detection, including low radar cross section,
long-range cruise missiles and bombers, and a new generation of very
quiet submarines. While nuclear deterrence remains the cornerstone of
homeland defense, the challenges posed by competitor conventional
advances have created a growing gap between U.S. nuclear and
conventional deterrent capabilities that could be exploited by our
competitors to hold the Homeland at risk below the threshold of nuclear
war.
Investments in persistent homeland defense and deterrent
capabilities are needed to close the gap between the United States'
nuclear and conventional capabilities, which will force competitors to
question the efficacy of their strategy, and ultimately to change their
calculus. DOD homeland defense investments must begin with improving
domain awareness sensors in the approaches to North America from below
the surface of the ocean to space, and in the cyber domain.
Investments must then continue with development of artificial
intelligence networks enabled by machine learning to fuse data from
military, intelligence, partner nation, and commercial sources in order
to create information dominance and provide awareness of competitor
intent and action much sooner than today. Through all-domain awareness
and information dominance, military commanders and senior civilian
decision makers will gain decision space and the ability to employ a
greater range of options to deter in competition, de-escalate in
crisis, and deny and defeat in conflict.
While USNORTHCOM and NORAD are responsible for defending certain
non-DOD assets and infrastructure in the United States, designating and
prioritizing potential targets that must be defended with kinetic
systems must be determined through an interagency process that is not
solely a DOD responsibility. To ensure that our commands' defensive
planning accurately reflects national priorities, USNORTHCOM and NORAD
have requested Department policy guidance and are seeking unity of
effort within the interagency regarding vulnerable critical assets. The
commands are working to ensure that those defensive requirements are
appropriately resourced to ensure continuity of operations and a
deterrent effect.
north warning radar system
14. Senator Shaheen. General VanHerck, during your confirmation
hearing last July we discussed the importance of new technologies that
can improve our military's ability to operate in cold weather
environments. A few years ago, I had the opportunity to visit with then
NORTHCOM commander General Lori Robinson in Colorado and I was briefed
on the North Warning System. I was pleased that section 1651 of the
Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) requires a
report to Congress that includes an assessment of the North Warning
System, including the operational integrity of its infrastructure and
of its current technology compared with technology deemed necessary, as
well as a plan for mitigating vulnerabilities and modernizing the
capabilities of the North Warning System. Can you speak to the
importance of the North Warning System in the defense of the United
States and the need to develop modernization plans outlined in the
report required by the NDAA?
General VanHerck. NORAD is the United States and Canadian bi-
national command charged with the missions of aerospace warning,
aerospace control, and maritime warning for North America. These
missions require air and maritime domain awareness to detect and track
potential air and maritime threats, including Russian long-range
bombers and cruise missiles. NORAD's legacy North Warning System
provides radar coverage of the northern approaches to North America in
support of aerospace warning and aerospace control missions. However,
the current architecture is a Cold War-era design with radars that are
limited to line-of-sight range coverage with minimal capability to
detect or track small radar cross section, low-altitude, long-range
maneuverable weapons and their associated delivery platforms.
A modernization plan for all approaches to North America is
critical to achieve all-domain awareness against the advanced threats
we face today. NORAD is aggressively working within the DOD, along with
Canada and other partners, to assess and identify new capabilities to
provide domain awareness. Capabilities include over-the-horizon-radars
that may complement terrestrial, airborne, and space-based technologies
to improve early warning capabilities against current and future
threats. NORAD looks forward to continuing efforts to achieve the
modernization required in support of NORAD missions.
15. Senator Shaheen. General VanHerck, can you discus the need to
utilize new technologies that can operate more efficiently and cost
effectively in cold environments, such as new composite radomes, which
are protective covers that house the actual radars?
General VanHerck. NORAD requires continuous domain awareness in
support of our aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime
warning missions. The current North Warning System utilizes radar
surveillance and has radomes designed to withstand harsh climates that
are regularly inspected and evaluated for integrity and necessary
repairs to meet mission requirements. Cold environments provide unique
radome challenges and NORAD strongly supports ongoing industry efforts
to develop new compounds for increased sustainability and resiliency of
legacy North Warning System radars and for the development of future
capabilities.
countering russian and china influence:
16. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Faller, your maps of Russian and
Chinese influence in Latin America asserts that Moscow is executing
military training assistance, port calls, strategic operations and
engagements with head of states in regional countries. Is United States
influence across the Latin American region increasing or declining in
comparison to previous years, in particular prior to COVID-19?
Admiral Faller. Although the United States still maintains a
stronger relationship with most nations in the region than China and
Russia, some metrics show US influence waning. For example, US trade
with the region declined from a high point of 354 billion in 2012 to
$270 billion in 2019. Conversely, trade between China and Latin America
was up from $188 billion in 2015 to $254 billion in 2019. Overall, I
assess our strategic advantage and influence in this region is eroding.
17. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Faller, what strategic actions are
being taken to not only deter Russian and Chinese influence across the
region, but also enhance United States influence?
Admiral Faller. United States leadership, presence, and time are
absolutely critical in countering Russian and Chinese influence and
strengthening our own relationships in the region. I have personally
been engaging with regional leaders, emphasizing the risk of dealing
with countries who do not share like values and principles. To maintain
connectivity in the COVID environment, our Command has been resourceful
using methods commonly available such as video teleconferencing and
even instant messaging to reinforce our regional relationships. Now
that vaccinations are becoming more common and testing is readily
available, I've traveled more in the AOR visiting partners and seeing
for myself the positive impact we are having. SOUTHCOM has used the
Humanitarian Assistance Program to provide donations to help fill
critically needed shortages with PPE, ventilators and field hospitals
at the speed of relevance to our partners. To date, we have executed
498 projects, in 28 countries, totaling $72 million. This is saving
lives and winning hearts and minds.
SOUTHCOM's joint exercise program enables the U.S. to maintain
access, presence, and influence in the region, not just during the
execution of these events but throughout the entire planning process
that spans 12 to 18 months. Our exercises are critical in building
readiness, interoperability, domain awareness, and enhance our ability
to share information and intelligence with our partners. Over the last
6 months we have been able to demonstrate that we can operate in a
COVID environment through the execution of our UNITAS, CENTAM GUARDIAN,
and RESOLUTE SENTINEL exercises. The commitment to planning and
executing in this challenging environment is a testament to the resolve
and resiliency of the U.S. and our partners. Over the next few months
we plan to fully execute our remaining exercises to include TRADEWINDS,
PANAMAX, FUERZAS COMANDO, FUSED RESPONSE, and second UNITAS exercise.
These events will train thousands of United States, Partner Nation
forces and regional organizations sending a strategic message to Russia
and China that we stand ready with our partners even during the most
difficult of times.
18. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Faller, please provide an updated map
of United States influence in Latin America noting humanitarian
assistance, military training assistance, medical diplomacy, WPS
Engagement, port calls and visits to head of state.
Admiral Faller. Below is an updated map of U.S. influence focused
on recent humanitarian assistance to the region to include COVID
response; military education and training; equipment sales and
transfers; and women, peace, and security engagements. Because port
calls can many times involve minimal engagement with the host nation,
we have included information on assistance provided by hospital ships,
to include the USNS Comfort. These naval deployments have made a
significant impact in the nations visited. We have also include
security agreements as an indication of the level of cooperation and
partnership with the nations of this hemisphere.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
DOD ROLE AT THE SOUTHERN BORDER
19. Senator Blumenthal. General VanHerck, why do we still
have active duty military personnel and National Guardsmen
deployed to our Southern Border?
General VanHerck. DOD personnel are deployed to the
southwest border in fiscal year 2021 in response to a request
from the Secretary of Homeland Security that was subsequently
approved by Secretary of Defense authorization for up to 4,000
total DOD personnel on the border. All are currently National
Guard members in title 10 status providing support to the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S Customs and
Border Protection's (CBP) homeland security mission, enabling
DHS and CBP personnel to focus efforts on law enforcement.
20. Senator Blumenthal. General VanHerck, what is the
criteria for withdrawal of troops from the border?
General VanHerck. I defer to the Secretary of Defense
regarding criteria for ending the current title 10 DOD mission
on the southwest border.
21. Senator Blumenthal. General VanHerck, what feedback are
you getting from subordinate Commanders on the impact of border
deployments on mission readiness and concurrent deployment
commitments?
General VanHerck. Service assessments indicate a slight
reduction in unit readiness at the tactical level. This is
likely due to individual members of some units operating below
unit level across a large geographic area, whereas previously
most units were able to deploy together. Unfortunately, the
unique requirements for southwest border support somewhat limit
the opportunity for units to operate together and conduct
recurring training on unit-level mission essential tasks.
FOREIGN INFLUENCE
22. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Faller and General
VanHerck, in both of your testimonies, you note that China and
Russia are increasingly competing with the United States for
influence in your areas of operation. Do you believe military
partnership programs can be a cost-effective tool to counter
the spread of Russian and Chinese ideology and influence?
Admiral Faller. I absolutely do believe military
partnership programs can be a cost-effective tool to counter
Russian and Chinese in the region. I believe that the best way
to counter Chinese and Russian influence is to always model
what ``right'' looks like and strive to be a good partner. That
means working with partner nation military and security forces
to build their institutional capacity and resilience against
all threats, to include external malign influence. At
USSOUTHCOM, we strive to be the partner of choice (or trusted
partner) for the nations of the Western Hemisphere. Security
cooperation and assistance programs are our main battery in
that effort. Programs like those commonly referred to as
section 333 aimed at building partner nation capacity enable us
to train and equip our partners to counter regional and
external threats, to include cyber and disinformation threats
that are increasingly becoming a concern for our partners,
especially those with upcoming elections. International
Military Education and Training (IMET) is also a critical
program for building and strengthening long-term military
partnerships. When a foreign officer or NCO attends a U.S.
school, they learn more than just military strategy; they learn
our democratic values and take that back to their countries.
These programs are all low-cost, high-return tools that
strengthen our partners' democratic institutions and ability to
counter malign influence and ideology.
General VanHerck. Yes. I believe effective military
partnership programs are a low-cost and highly effective means
to counter the growing influence of global competitors. I
regularly engage with the military leadership of Canada, Mexico
and The Bahamas to advance shared military objectives. Our
commands also conduct military exercises with allies and
partners in the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility and NORAD
area of operations to enhance interoperability, hone common
operational skills, and send a strong signal to our competitors
regarding the strength and durability of the relationships we
have with our closest neighbors.
The United States Professional Military Education (PME)
program is another effective tool for countering Russian and
Chinese ideology and influence in the region by integrating
future senior international leaders into United States Service
war colleges, staff colleges, and senior enlisted courses. Most
courses run for an entire academic year, thus creating lasting
friendships between future senior military leaders and
fostering greater mutual understanding of participating
countries and cultures. International PME programs also permit
our partners to bring their families to the United States,
where they often form strong bonds with both military families
and within the local community. These programs pay lasting
dividends and allow us to demonstrate our values,
professionalism, and commitment to our allies and partners.
23. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Faller and General
VanHerck, what can Congress do to support your efforts to
compete with Russia and China in the realm of military exchange
and education programs?
Admiral Faller. Security cooperation and assistance
programs truly are the key to building military partnerships
and strengthening our partners against external influence.
Increasing support to these programs in the Western
Hemisphere--the front line of competition--would be critical to
preserving our competitive advantage. A little goes a long way
in this region. Modest investments in section 333 and IMET, as
well as in multilateral exercises and training would pay
dividends in our efforts to compete with Russia and China.
General VanHerck. Congress can continue to support programs
and funding associated with military exchange and education
programs as we balance priorities in this new era of strategic
competition. As competitors seek to increase their influence
globally, especially in the western hemisphere, USNORTHCOM's
theater security cooperation (TSC) mission plays a key role in
ensuring that the United States remains the partner of choice
for nations in our area of responsibility. Military exchange
and education programs supplement our TSC efforts by fostering
personal relationships between international participants,
exposing attendees to outside cultures and perspectives, and
demonstrating the widespread national benefits of inclusive,
rules-based societies and governments. These programs are
crucial to maintaining trusted relationships and demonstrating
the United States' commitment to regional safety, security, and
cooperation. Continued congressional support is vital to
efforts to deny competitors influence and access in the
approaches to our Homeland.
RUSSIAN AGGRESSION
24. Senator Blumenthal. General VanHerck, in your posture
statement you stated that North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD) has responded to more Russian military flights
off the coast of Alaska than we've seen in any year since the
end of the Cold War--can you speak to the nature of these
flights and the associated responses?
General VanHerck. In the last year, Russian military
flights off the coast of Alaska involved heavy bombers, anti-
submarine aircraft, and intelligence assets. The Russians
frequently penetrate the Alaskan Air Defense Identification
Zone and they have demonstrated increasingly integrated and
sophisticated operational tactics including multi-axis
approaches. NORAD forces consisting of ground-based radars and
aviation assets--including fighters, tankers, and Airborne
Warning and Control Systems--detect, monitor, identify, and
intercept these aircraft at the time and place of our choosing
in accordance with my stated guidance.
25. Senator Blumenthal. General VanHerck, what do you think
the strategic advantage is for Russia's growing investment in
the Arctic?
General VanHerck. More than 20 percent of Russia's gross
domestic product is derived from the Arctic, making the region
of critical strategic importance to Russian leaders.
Diminishing Arctic sea ice could lead to faster and more
efficient shipping routes; access to the region's largely
untapped hydrocarbon, mineral, and protein resources; and
greater operational maneuver space for maritime forces. As
such, Russia continues to invest in capabilities and
infrastructure--both defensive and offensive in nature--to
secure its 13,000-nautical mile Arctic coastline and conduct
influence activities throughout the region, including potential
military operations directed toward North America.
The ability to regulate activity in the Arctic has long
been a challenge given its extreme environment and the lack of
established rules and adopted norms for the region. Russian and
Chinese activities in the Arctic, including the recent increase
in Russian military aircraft incursions into the United States
and Canadian Air Defense Identification Zones, Russian bomber
missions into the Arctic Ocean, Russian maritime exercises that
have included operations within the United States Exclusive
Economic Zone, and deployment of Chinese icebreakers to the
Arctic Ocean--are a concerted effort to shift these norms and
patterns of behavior to demonstrate Russian and Chinese intent
to compete in the northern approaches to North America.
On 21 May 2021, Russia will assume the Chair of the Arctic
Council, an official multi-lateral body that attempts to
establish a set of international measures and standards in the
Arctic region. Russia's continued military build-up in the
northern region, its intent to claim a considerable expanse of
the Arctic seabed, and its desire to increase the influence of
observer states like China with the Arctic Council, leaves me
very concerned that Russia will seek to introduce security
initiatives via the Arctic Council and potentially drive a
wedge between Arctic allies and partners. Such actions could
alter the strategic balance in the region and shift the
advantage toward our strategic competitors.
26. Senator Blumenthal. General VanHerck, what would you
recommend that the United States be doing to support NATO
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] activity in the Arctic?
General VanHerck. The asymmetric advantage the United
States has over Russia and China is our network of allies,
partners, and like-minded nations. NATO operations in the
Arctic are critical to demonstrating the alliance's capability
and commitment to deter and respond to regional threats.
USNORTHCOM and NORAD are fully integrated with NATO member
operations, activities, and investments in this vital region.
One of the major tenets of my recently published USNORTHCOM and
NORAD Strategy is that our commands strengthen Arctic
partnerships to include NATO members, interagency partners, and
Indigenous peoples and governments by building Arctic
awareness; enhancing Arctic operations, capabilities and
infrastructure; and ensuring a credible defense presence.
Improved interoperability and timely information sharing with
allies and partners is critical to establishing global all-
domain awareness, information dominance, and decision
superiority. As such, USNORTHCOM and NORAD will continue to
partner with NATO in pursuit of a global approach to an
integrated and layered homeland defense that starts abroad.
USNORTHCOM and NORAD also routinely collaborate with NATO
members on strategic messaging to ensure alliance intent is
clear and to reduce the likelihood of misunderstanding or
miscalculation.
CYBER
27. Senator Blumenthal. General VanHerck, how does NORTHCOM
and NORAD see itself in our common mission to defend the
Homeland against cyber security threats?
General VanHerck. USNORTHCOM is the designated Department
lead for defense support of civil authorities. I see the
primary common mission for USNORTHCOM as working with the
whole-of-government to determine priorities for critical
infrastructure defense and, if needed, responding in support of
civil authorities in support of crisis or contingency
management. On a daily basis, USNORTHCOM's two allocated Cyber
Protection Teams defend USNORTHCOM and NORAD cyber terrain and
mission systems against cyber threats to provide mission
assurance for both Commands, and also closely coordinate with
USCYBERCOM and the Canadian Forces for additional support if
required.
28. Senator Blumenthal. General VanHerck, how does the DOD
ensure that our geographic COCOMs, especially NORTHCOM, are
coordinated on cyber security threats and defending COCOM
infrastructure?
General VanHerck. USNORTHCOM and USCYBERCOM coordinate
daily on potential cybersecurity threats to ensure that we are
at the ready to defend DOD and United States infrastructure
whenever needed. In addition, USNORTHCOM has USCYBERCOM
personnel embedded in our headquarters to further align our
collective cyber threat response actions. USCYBERCOM's
Cyberspace Operations Integrated Planning Element is resident
in our headquarters and synchronizes with USCYBERCOM multiple
times daily on cyber threats to aid in the defense of
USNORTHCOM cyber terrain and command and control
infrastructure. Finally, USCYBERCOM facilitates cyber threat
discussions several times a week with all of the combatant
commands to ensure cyber threat visibility.
29. Senator Blumenthal. General VanHerck, you stated in
your posture statement that you were deeply concerned about the
development of Chinese capability in transitioning from cyber
exploitation to cyber-attack--what do you think is the relative
threat level of additional Chinese cyber-attacks on the United
States Homeland?
General VanHerck. We have seen the impact cyber-attacks can
have on our domestic critical infrastructure in crisis or
conflict, and I believe the threat level of additional cyber-
attacks on the U.S. Homeland and North America is high. Today,
China routinely conducts cyber espionage against United States
military, government, corporate, and academic networks to steal
sensitive data and aid its weapons programs, inform its
diplomacy, and advance its online influence operations. In a
crisis or conflict, China almost certainly will launch cyber-
attacks on military and civilian infrastructure in an attempt
to delay or disrupt a United States response and to destroy
United States will and public support for intervention.
30. Senator Blumenthal. General VanHerck, what are we
currently doing, and what do we need to be doing in order to
successfully counter and deter this threat?
General VanHerck. USNORTHCOM continues to employ allocated
cyber forces to defend our cyber terrain and critical mission
systems. In addition, if a lead federal agency requests DOD
support, as the Defense Support of Civil Authorities
Synchronizer I will provide DOD capabilities as needed to
support whole-of-government efforts to defend U.S. critical
infrastructure. In order to do this, I need a whole-of-
government approach to prioritize U.S critical infrastructure
so I can employ allocated forces needed to protect and defend
critical non-DOD assets against cyber threats. In addition, I
believe cybersecurity and cyber threat information sharing must
continue to increase between the Federal Government and private
sector. Although some progress has been made, improved
information sharing will provide all-domain awareness to
support a whole-of-government approach to countering and
deterring the cyber threat.
----------
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR) ASSETS
31. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, in your statement to
the Committee you point out that SOUTHCOM employs less than 1
percent of DOD's ISR resources to counter external state actors
(ESAs) and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) in the
Region, and then go on to mention your team's embrace of
increasingly non-traditional intelligence collection efforts to
bolster these efforts. In an era of increasingly constrained
DOD resources, are there any additional procurement authorities
or support Congress could grant you in the area of ISR to
increase your collection capabilities, especially via non-
traditional means?
Admiral Faller. We will be submitting a UFR list to
Congress shortly after the President transmits the fiscal year
2022 budget to Congress that will include both traditional and
non-traditional ISR capabilities.
COUNTERING CHINA, RUSSIA, AND OTHER ESAS IN THE REGION
32. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, you highlight all the
additional malign activities China, Russia, and other ESAs are
taking in the area of responsibility (AOR) to undermine United
States credibility and partnerships in the Region. With that,
and similar to ongoing efforts with the European Deterrence
Initiative (EDI) and Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI),
should Congress consider a similar approach to focus lines of
effort and align a whole-of-government approach to address
increasing security threats in your AOR?
Admiral Faller. As I have testified to my increasing
concerns about the challenges in our own hemisphere, various
Members of Congress have raised this concept of a regional
initiative for the Western Hemisphere. Given the perfect storm
of threats I see facing our neighborhood, I would agree that
it's time for a big idea for this region. The President has
publicly voiced concerns about the root causes of migration--
the violence, corruption, and instability in Central America--
and has pledged to work with those countries to address those
challenges.
Many of those root causes are driven by transnational
criminal organizations (TCOs) that traffic in drugs, humans,
arms, and any other commodity that will turn a profit for them.
The corruption, instability, and human suffering that is
fostered by these illicit organizations opens the door for
competitors like China to leverage the dire circumstances in
these countries for their gain. TCOs are violent--43 of the 50
most violent cities in the world are in this hemisphere. With
the added pressure that COVID-19 and two back-to-back major
hurricanes have placed on the region, a whole-of-government
strategy that includes all U.S. elements of national power will
be critical to ensuring security and stability in the Western
Hemisphere--our shared home.
DOD'S ROLE IN ADDRESSING IMMIGRATION ISSUES IN THE AOR
33. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, President Biden
introduced the United States Citizenship Act recently, which if
passed, would include $4 billion over 4 years to address root
causes of migration in the Northern Triangle countries of El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. How might DOD be involved in
this?
Admiral Faller. I believe that DOD does have an important
role to play in such an initiative, in support of greater
diplomatic and development efforts. Any strategy aimed at
stability and prosperity will require basic security in order
to be successful. One of the primary root causes of migration
from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras is the violence and
insecurity facing that region, created mostly by the murderous
TCOs that operate with impunity in those countries. TCOs also
use the incredible profits they earn from trafficking in
humans, drugs, and arms to foster corruption and instability
that drives people from their homes in search of a safe place
for their families.
The military brings capabilities to the table that are
critical to building our neighbors' institutions and resiliency
to the threats they are facing. DOD has established programs to
help partner nations develop diverse and inclusive militaries
that respect the rule of law and human rights. Our programs
help develop the professional forces necessary to secure and
stabilize our hemisphere. Our security cooperation programs
include institutional capacity building in which we assist our
partners in strengthening their basic security institutions to
plan and manage resources. Our exercise program develops
readiness, interoperability, and the ability to respond
regionally to counter these threats. USSOUTHCOM also has the
only Human Rights Office among Combatant Commands and has over
25 years of experience working with partner nations to
institutionalize respect for human rights in military and
security forces. Through professional military education, we
teach our partners what ``right'' and professional forces look
like. If the U.S. military is not present to model the values
of a strong democracy and respect for civilian authority,
others, with less desirable values, will step in.
34. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, has your office done
any pre-planning on the U.S. Citizenship Act?
Admiral Faller. USSOUTHCOM has not been part of the
planning effort for this initiative. However, the work we do
every day in this hemisphere--our shared home--is completely
aligned with the goal of addressing root causes of illegal
migration. Our efforts could easily be incorporated into a
whole-of-government effort to assist our neighbors as they face
the perfect storm of threats all colliding in our hemisphere--
violent TCOs fostering corruption, China and Russia taking
advantage of that corruption, the long-term economic impacts of
COVID-19, and two back-to-back devastating hurricanes.
USSOUTHCOM stands prepared to play a supporting role in this
important effort.
SECURITY COOPERATION WITH ALLIES IN THE REGION
35. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, thank you for
emphasizing the importance of our allies and partners in the
AOR--you specifically mention the flexibility to spend a
greater share of title 10 section 333 funds over multiple years
as an important tool to continue building partner capacity. Are
there any other legislative changes that would further assist
you in the important area of marshaling a stronger coalition of
allies and partners in the Region to counter ESAs and TCOs in
the AOR?
Admiral Faller. USSOUTHCOM is working within current
authorities and will engage the Congress if we find a need for
further legislative changes.
SERVICEMEMBER QUALITY OF LIFE
36. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, I am pleased you
mention in your posture statement a continued focus on quality
of life challenges directly affecting the force like finding
adequate, affordable housing in the Miami area for SOUTHCOM
servicemembers. Can you expound upon some of the efforts you've
taken to combat this issue, including outreach with the local
community, and the status of the Army's efforts to find a
permanent, cost-effective housing solution in Miami?
Admiral Faller. While Miami is a wonderful home for
SOUTHCOM, it is a high cost of living area, which presents
challenges for Servicemembers and civilians alike. Housing in
the local area has been particularly challenging, with some
landlords requiring 3-months rent up front, totaling 8$10,000.
We are working with local communities to create exemptions to
these high up-front costs for Servicemembers. While we work to
alleviate the immediate financial burden, we are also working
closely with the Department of the Army to find a low-cost,
long-term housing solution near our Headquarters on already
federally-owned land.
In addition to these efforts in direct support of lowering
housing costs, we also pursuing other quality of life
initiatives to further mitigate financial burdens on our
Servicemembers. This includes working closely with the Army on
initiating a review of Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) rates
for our local area as well as participating in a DOD cost of
living allowance data collection to ensure our Servicemembers
are receiving adequate compensation for this area. Finally, we
are working with the State of Florida to seek tollway relief
for those Servicemembers who are priced out of living near our
headquarters and instead must commute over 20 miles each way to
work via tollways.
CLOSING THE DETENTION FACILITY AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
37. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, the New York Times
reported in the last year or so that keeping detainees at
Guantanamo Bay costs approximately $13 million per detainee per
year, or over $500 million per year total to house 40
detainees--compare that to the $78,000 per year the United
States spent in 2012 to hold individual prisoners at the ADX
`Supermax' Facility in Florence, CO. Should we finally close
down Guantanamo Bay and use those funds for additional
operations to combat drug traffickers and TCOs in your AOR,
thereby saving hundreds or even thousands of American lives per
year?
Admiral Faller. USSOUTHCOM and JTF-Guantanamo are
responsible for the safe, legal, and humane care and custody of
law of war detainees. Closing the detention facility at
Guantanamo Bay would be a policy decision, as would be any
decision on how best to use any money saved if it were to be
closed.
CYBERATTACKS ON THE HOMELAND
38. Senator Hirono. General VanHerck, you talk about the
increasing sophistication of cyberattacks on our networks and
infrastructure from a variety of adversaries, particularly
Russia and China. You coordinate Defense Support to Civil
Authorities (DSCA) in this area for the Homeland--are you
confident your command has the authorities and tools necessary
to ensure our state and local partners are protected from the
increasing threats posed by nation-state cyberattacks?
General VanHerck. I have the authorities and tools
necessary to execute my role as the DSCA Synchronizer to ensure
that DOD responds appropriately to any approved Request for
Assistance we receive from lead federal agencies. I remain
concerned about whole-of-nation preparedness for attacks from
peer competitors or adversaries in a future crisis or conflict.
We need a whole-of-government approach to prioritize U.S
critical infrastructure in order for me to employ allocated
forces to defend critical non-DOD assets against cyber threats
that place mission assurance at risk. We are also working with
USCYBERCOM to identify where new capabilities may be needed;
for example, the interagency-approved standardized information
template that facilitates rapid sharing of critical information
from state and local levels to the DOD about possible threats
to elections infrastructure is now a core element of our
toolkit.
39. Senator Hirono. General VanHerck, cyberattacks blur the
line between traditional offensive military operations and
operations short of war. What steps is NORTHCOM taking, in
partnership with U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), to continue to
convey to our adversaries how we view cyberattacks and,
specifically, what our significant responses might be in order
to deter future attacks?
General VanHerck. USNORTHCOM closely coordinates with
USCYBERCOM to ensure our strategic messaging efforts and target
audiences are aligned, and to assess possible competitor
reactions and repercussions. We are unlikely to completely
deter all malicious cyber activities, but the Department's
``Defend Forward'' and CDRUSCYBERCOM's ``Persistent
Engagement'' strategies are specific responses that signal that
malicious cyber activities against the United States cannot be
conducted without cost. Even so, Russian and Chinese cyber
activity against the Homeland in the competition phase remains
a significant concern.
I believe national-level policy engagement, beyond DOD,
with Russia and China is needed to establish rules and norms of
expected behavior in cyberspace to reduce the potential for
unintentional escalation or failure of strategic deterrence.
USNORTHCOM and USCYBERCOM are not in the lead for cyber defense
and response, but both commands provide policy inputs regarding
cyber rules and norms to key agencies in the U.S. Government.
The Cyber Response Group--with participation from federal
departments and agencies such as the Department of State, the
Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Homeland
Security, and the Department of Justice--leads policy and
strategy development, coordination, and implementation
procedures for responding to significant cyber incidents.
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
40. Senator Hirono. General VanHerck, while I realize
Hawaii technically falls within the geographic bounds of U.S.
Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), can you talk about the
importance of getting the Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii (HDR-H)
operational to support our overall layered ballistic missile
defense system?
General VanHerck. I believe an operational HDR-H could
contribute to an overall layered defense capability as one of
several potential options that could be considered to provide
additional capacity and capability--in this case, a layered
defense specific to Hawaii--pending a Department decision on
layered defense. I am confident I can defend all of the United
States, including Hawaii and Alaska, with the missile defense
system capability that we have today against a limited number
of intercontinental ballistic missile threats from rogue
nations. I remain concerned about my ability, specifically
regarding future capacity and capability, to provide ballistic
missile defense as the threats continue to adapt and evolve.
----------
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
HOMELAND DEFENSE RADAR--HAWAII
41. Senator Inhofe. General VanHerck, during your
testimony, you highlighted the increasing risks posed by North
Korea's advancing intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
program, and the importance of continuing to update and evolve
Homeland missile defenses in order to meet this threat.
However, in its fiscal year 2021 budget request, DOD proposed
eliminating funding for the Homeland Defense Radar--Hawaii.
While Congress ultimately restored this funding, could you
explain the impact to Homeland missile defense capabilities
should the radar ultimately not be completed?
General VanHerck. Please see response to #40.
MISSILE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY
42. Senator Inhofe. General VanHerck, in your written
testimony, you outlined the growing threat to the United States
Homeland posed by Russia's and China's investments in large
numbers of long-range precision strike weapons, and North
Korea's continued development of larger and more complex ICBMs.
While you highlighted the range of efforts your command and DOD
are taking to address these issues, are you concerned that we
may be on the wrong side of the cost curve, especially since
these countries can produce strike systems faster and cheaper
than we can produce defensive interceptors?
General VanHerck. Yes, a bullet-for-bullet strategy to
kinetically defeat precision strike and ballistic missile
threats to the Homeland is fiscally challenging. Although
USNORTHCOM and NORAD require effective defensive capabilities
to address threats faced by USNORTHCOM and NORAD today, my
belief is that the focus should not solely be on kinetic kill
capabilities. Policy makers must determine what USNORTHCOM and
NORAD must defend with kinetic capabilities, as it is neither
affordable nor realistic to defend every potential target in
the Homeland.
It is my belief we need to change our perspective beyond
kinetic kill to emphasize deterrence by denial. We do this by
drawing attention left of enemy launch by identifying adversary
delivery platforms and preconditions for actions. As part of
this strategy, USNORTHCOM and NORAD are pursuing a globally
integrated defense approach that emphasizes the use of domain
awareness sensors, data and information, and an open data
architecture utilizing machine enhanced processing and
artificial intelligence. This approach is designed to move
decision space left and provide military commanders and senior
civilian decision makers time to assess and act well ahead of
our competitors.
43. Senator Inhofe. General VanHerck, are there defensive
technology areas where you would like to see greater
investment--areas where progress might help the United States
offset the cost imbalance without sacrificing operational
effectiveness?
General VanHerck. Yes. I recommend investments in multi-
mission, all-domain awareness capabilities and capitalizing on
modern processing (machine learning and artificial
intelligence) that is commercially available today to provide
civilian decision makers and military commanders with
information required to quickly assess situations and if
needed, take action. I have communicated my integrated priority
list to the Department, which emphasizes investment in these
priorities. The ability to deter in competition, de-escalate in
crisis, and deny or defeat in conflict requires all-domain
awareness, information dominance, and decision superiority.
MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY AND STRATEGY
44. Senator Inhofe. General VanHerck, in response to
questions posed during his confirmation, Secretary of Defense
Lloyd Austin committed to conducting a review of missile
defense policies as part of the administration's overall
defense strategy development. In the context of such a review,
what would you consider your top three most critical capability
shortfalls that DOD should work to address over the next
several years?
General VanHerck. Our ability to deter in competition, de-
escalate in crisis, and deny or defeat in conflict requires
significant improvements in all-domain awareness, information
dominance, and decision superiority--these are my top three
critical capability shortfalls. A capable and persistent
defense at home is a prerequisite to projecting power to a
globally integrated forward fight. The integration and sharing
of data for a global, layered sensing grid will provide
warfighters and decision makers at strategic, operational, and
tactical levels with increased awareness and decision space
needed to make timely, well-informed decisions. It is my
recommendation that such a missile defense review be part of an
overall strategic deterrence review. Missile defense is
integral to overall strategic deterrence and should be aligned
with the nuclear posture review. If conducted independently,
separate reviews will lead to separate solutions or decisions
that have broader implications, and thus should be considered
as part of overarching strategic deterrence.
INTEGRATED TACTICAL WARNING AND ATTACK ASSESSMENT
45. Senator Inhofe. General VanHerck, over the past several
years, DOD has clearly articulated the urgent need to modernize
and replace all aspects of the Nation's nuclear triad, as well
as the associated nuclear command, control, and communications
systems. However, a critical component that supports our
strategic deterrent, the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack
Assessment (ITW/AA) system, is often overlooked. Could you
provide us your assessment of the condition of the ITW/AA
system?
General VanHerck. The ITW/AA system provides strategic
warning and attack assessment as originally designed against
legacy threats. However, even with the current and future
planned improvements to the ITW/AA system, my ability to
provide threat warning and attack assessment in the future lags
behind our adversaries' rapid development of low radar cross
section, high-speed, maneuverable, long-range weapon systems.
As our competitors' capabilities continue to improve,
USNORTHCOM and NORAD require timely and accurate information
across all domains to counter their advancements in weapons
systems, global influence, and actions.
46. Senator Inhofe. General VanHerck, are there portions of
the ITW/AA system that you believe are in urgent need of
modernization in order to ensure its continued effectiveness?
General VanHerck. Yes, I believe the ITW/AA system has a
pressing need to enhance all-domain awareness through
integrating already-available sensor data. In addition, the
Department must continue investments in service-life extensions
of aging, but still-viable capabilities; development of new
capabilities to include capabilities to hold hypersonics at
risk; and inclusion of non-DOD capabilities to ensure
effectiveness against current and future threats.
----------
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
GRAPHIC DEPICTING U.S. INFLUENCE IN THE U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
(USSOUTHCOM) AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR)
47. Senator Wicker. Admiral Faller, you submitted graphics
depicting Chinese, Russian, and Iranian influence in the
SOUTHCOM AOR. Please provide a similar graphic that shows U.S.
economic and diplomatic engagement in your AOR.
Admiral Faller. Attached is an updated map of U.S.
influence focused on recent humanitarian assistance to the
region to include COVID response; military education and
training; equipment sales and transfers; and women, peace, and
security engagements. Because port calls can many times involve
minimal engagement with the host nation, we have included
information on assistance provided by hospital ships, to
include the USNS COMFORT. These naval deployments have made a
significant impact in the nations visited. We have also include
security agreements as an indication of the level of
cooperation and partnership with the nations of this
hemisphere.
----------
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
MISSILE DEFENSE
48. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, the National
Defense Strategy articulates the top defense objective as:
``defending the Homeland from attack;'' a vital component of
meeting this is robustly investing in our Nation's missile
defense capabilities. Unfortunately, we are trending in the
wrong direction regarding this issue: North Korea and Iran
continue to expand the quantity, range, and lethality of their
arsenals, as do our top great power competitors. Yet, as these
threats trend upward, the budget allocated to missile defense
trends flat or downward. In your personal opinion, how soon do
you think the missile capabilities of rogue nations -North
Korea and Iran--will outpace NORTHCOM's ability to defend the
Homeland?
General VanHerck. There are many variables that challenge
my ability to pinpoint a specific time when our ballistic
missile defenses might be outpaced. While I currently have the
ability to defend against a limited number of ballistic missile
threats from these rogue nations, I am very concerned about
their ability to exceed my defensive capacity and capability in
the near future. My intelligence team keeps me continuously
apprised of North Korean and Iranian efforts to advance their
missile programs. Without improvements to our current system--
such as fielding of the Next Generation Interceptor, on time or
sooner, and a Department decision about a layered missile
defense capability--our defensive capacity will remain
constant, while the threat continues to grow, eventually
exceeding my defensive capacity and capability.
49. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, in a 2020 House
Armed Services Committee hearing, former Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy (USD-P) John Rood agreed with the NORTHCOM
assessment that North Kora's ballistic missile threat could
challenge the capability of the ground-based midcourse defense
(GMD) system as soon as 2025. Unfortunately, the Next
Generation Interceptor (NGI) is not expected to be fielded
until 2030 on the current timeline. How important is it that we
field the NGI?
General VanHerck. While ultimately this will be a policy
decision, I believe that it is extremely important to field the
NGI. My top priority as I work with VADM Hill at the Missile
Defense Agency is to maintain the schedule, and if possible,
seek ways to accelerate the fielding of the NGI to provide much
needed capacity and additional capabilities to maintain or
outpace adversary capability development.
50. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, what level of risk
does NORTHCOM (and by extension our Nation) take on if the
current timeline is not accelerated to keep up with the missile
capability, capacity and reach of rogue nations?
General VanHerck. My top priority for ballistic missile
defense is to maintain or accelerate the fielding of the Next
Generation Interceptor (NGI). While today USNORTHCOM can defend
against a limited number of intercontinental ballistic missile
threats from rogue nations, without NGI, current capability or
capacity could be exceeded in the future and the risk to our
Nation, and overall strategic deterrence failure, will increase
as countries like North Korea continue to advance their missile
programs. The DOD is continuing to evaluate additional options
to mitigate potential capability challenges prior to the NGI
being fielded.
51. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, the missile
capabilities possessed by rogue nations--North Korea and Iran--
continue to rapidly evolve. The New York Times recently
reported that North Korea showcased the country's ``largest-
ever'' ICBM just over a month ago, and revealed a new
submarine-launched ballistic missile even more recently.
Provided the presence of these very real and capable threats to
our Nation's Homeland, are the 44 ground-based interceptors
(GBI) currently postured enough to present a credible defense
of the American people?
General VanHerck. I defer to OSD and the SECDEF on the
overall policy for the total number of ground-based
interceptors. Although I maintain the capability to defend the
Homeland against the current threat today, I remain very
concerned about USNORTHCOM's ballistic missile defense capacity
and capability being exceeded in the future as rogue nations
continue to develop ICBM technology.
POLAR COMMUNICATIONS
52. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, in your statement
for the record, you highlight NORTHCOM's focus on improving
Arctic communications through a commercial constellation of low
earth orbit (LEO) satellites. You describe this effort's
ability to: `` . . . dramatically improve communication for
military users in the Arctic, as well as for civilians in
remote, high latitude communities.'' Congress appropriated $50
million of the $130 million requested for this program in
NORTHCOM's Unfunded Priority List. Can you describe for me the
current status of this program and why LEO satellites--in
support of polar communications--are so important,and, what the
impact would be to NORTHCOM if unfunded?
General VanHerck. I am grateful to the Committee for the
funding authorized in the fiscal year 2021 National Defense
Authorization Act for improved polar communications. In early
May 2021, the Air Force awarded contracts to two commercial
vendors, presenting the opportunity for competition to test
Arctic capability between two different contract providers.
This will enable initial testing of commercial Arctic
communications capabilities, with the testing likely to
commence by late summer 2021. In coordination with the Air
Force Research Laboratory, USNORTHCOM and NORAD have already
deployed terminals to Arctic locations and will begin testing
as soon as the commercial satellite providers are ready. My
expectation is to have reliable capability from multiple
commercial vendors with near-24/7 Arctic coverage in the spring
2022 timeframe.
Commercial proliferated low earth orbit (LEO) satellite
constellations are essential to the Homeland defense mission
due to their high data rates, low latency, and expected lower
costs--particularly in the polar region where there is
currently little to no communications capability. Low latency,
which can only be achieved using satellites in LEO orbits, is
critical to fusing data from the North Warning System, applying
advanced analytics via artificial intelligence/machine learning
capabilities, and maximizing the detection capability of the
system used to protect the United States and Canada. When I
talk about domain awareness and information dominance, and
being able to perceive and respond to complex threats, this
system enables USNORTHCOM and NORAD to achieve those
objectives. If unfunded, extremely limited SATCOM accessibility
and bandwidth will continue to hinder Arctic persistence and
military operations by restricting the ability to provide early
warning and other important communications to USNORTHCOM and
NORAD command and control systems.
ARCTIC CAPABILITIES
53. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, in your statement
for the record, you identify: ``Improving our domain awareness,
communications systems, and our ability to conduct and sustain
multi-domain operations in the high north are all important
priorities for both NORTHCOM and NORAD.'' With this in mind--in
your personal opinion, what capability gaps presently exist
that inhibit your ability to effectively 1) project and sustain
power in the Arctic, 2) compete with Russia and China in the
northern latitudes, and 3) implement the National Defense
Strategy?
General VanHerck. My capability gaps related to
establishing a persistent, sustainable presence in the Arctic
include maritime fueling capability north of Dutch Harbor,
which is necessary to expand the Navy's and Coast Guard's
operational reach; improved infrastructure for our air assets
(e.g. fighters, tankers, and ISR platforms); reliable,
resilient communications systems; and modernized high-north
domain awareness systems developed in coordination with our
Canadian allies.
Additionally, USNORTHCOM and NORAD must have a dedicated
allocation of Arctic-trained forces and Arctic-proven
capabilities via the Global Force Management (GFM) process in
order to effectively implement the National Defense Strategy
and successfully execute the commands' assigned missions in the
Arctic. Recent USNORTHCOM and NORAD exercises in the Arctic
have been accomplished through support of units volunteering
for the training opportunity and expending Military Personnel
Appropriation (MPA) days, instead of being supported through
assignment by the GFM process. In order to deliberately build
capability in the Arctic, the Department must increase the
prioritization of homeland defense and Arctic exercises and
training against other requirements within the larger GFM
process. We cannot execute the Strategy without adequately
trained, equipped, and allocated forces.
54. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, what level of
resourcing would you need to close these gaps?
General VanHerck. USNORTHCOM and NORAD's collaboration with
the Services and industry partners shows we can achieve
affordable but significant capability advancements and
innovative solutions to our most pressing challenges. In a key
recent example, I am grateful for the Committee's support for
initial efforts to operationalize emerging commercial space
internet systems. However, I still require concurrent,
coordinated binational, bilateral, and unilateral investments
by the United States and Canada in NORAD warning systems to
meet current and future threats, as well as NORAD modernization
efforts focused on all-domain awareness in support of achieving
information dominance and decision superiority.
55. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, in your personal
opinion, do we have the necessary infrastructure--like
Strategic Arctic Ports and expeditionary airfields--to project
power and effectively compete in the Arctic?
General VanHerck. No. USNORTHCOM and NORAD do not have the
necessary infrastructure to execute the National Defense
Strategy and Canadian Defence Strategy, compete with peer
competitors day-to-day, or respond in crisis and conflict. Fuel
is necessary for persistence and to support maritime power
projection and sustainment. I am agnostic about what solution
mitigates that capability gap. I do know that if the Port of
Nome expansion as recommended by the 2019 U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers feasibility study comes to fruition, it will increase
Navy and Coast Guard reach and persistence in the Arctic. In
addition, testing and developing Arctic Expeditionary Air Base
Sets are also essential to meeting force laydown and shelter
requirements. Finally, it is also necessary to fix
deteriorating infrastructure in the high north (e.g. hangars,
runways, distribution facilities, and storage for petroleum,
oil, and lubricants) and update communications systems to
modern standards.
56. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, what risk do we
assume if we continue to forego adequate investments in these
types of infrastructure?
General VanHerck. Access to adequate infrastructure in the
Arctic is critical to our ability to effectively defend the
Homeland by deterring adversaries in competition, de-escalating
in crisis, and defeating threats in conflict. Our competitors
are making national investments in their Arctic operational
capabilities; we must make similar smart, targeted investments
to ensure the Joint Force's continued ability to operate
effectively in this critical region while continuing to invest
in training, personnel, and equipment readiness to operate in
this challenging environment.
57. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, in your personal
opinion, do we have the right mix of U.S. Navy surface ships to
visibly contest illegal maritime claims, provide maritime
warning and defense, and ensure a free and open maritime domain
YEAR-ROUND--with surface freedom of navigation operations
(FONOP)--in the Arctic? If yes, please explain how this could/
will be executed with the current inventory.
General VanHerck. I defer to the Navy and DOD regarding
specific Naval force structure. With that said, I believe the
Arctic continues to be an emerging global area of interest with
many unique challenges which require us to constantly review
and improve our technologies, tactics, techniques and
procedures. The demand for future global naval capacity is
likely to increase, not decrease.
INTEGRATING ARCTIC STRATEGIES
58. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, the Department of
Defense released its Arctic Strategy in June 2019, the Air
Force followed suit with its own strategy in July 2020, the
Department of the Navy published their Arctic Blueprint in
January 2021, and the Army's Arctic Strategy was released just
this week. Can you describe to me--as the advocate for Arctic
capabilities and one of two combatant commands with primary
responsibility for Arctic military operations--how you are
integrating these strategies and ensuring their implementation?
General VanHerck. My USNORTHCOM and NORAD Strategy covers
the Commands' entire area of responsibility, including the
Arctic, and aligns with objectives identified in the Interim
National Security Strategic Guidance, the National Defense
Strategy, and the 2019 DOD Arctic Strategy. It directs
USNORTHCOM and NORAD elements to defend the United States and
Canada in and through the Arctic with allies and partners,
including Indigenous peoples and governments, by building
Arctic awareness; enhancing Arctic operations, capabilities,
and infrastructure; and ensuring a credible defense presence.
This Strategy will be implemented through the forthcoming
USNORTHCOM Combatant Command Campaign Plan, which adds fidelity
to my strategic guidance. The Combatant Command Campaign Plan
includes specific objectives and tasking for USNORTHCOM Service
components regarding development and implementation of Arctic-
related Service capabilities and concepts, including
operational test and evaluation for Arctic operations. Because
these objectives and tasks align with, and are enabled by, the
implementation of Service Arctic strategies, USNORTHCOM will be
able to advocate more effectively for resourcing Arctic
requirements.
59. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, do you believe each
Service is assigning adequate attention and focus toward the
Arctic?
General VanHerck. Yes, for now, I am encouraged by the
Services' development of Arctic strategies and attention toward
the Arctic. However, I look forward to reviewing the Services'
Program Objective Memoranda (POM) and the fiscal year 2022
President's Budget to gain a better sense of how the Services
plan to resource those strategies.
RUSSIA'S ``DEFENSIVE'' ARCTIC POSTURE
60. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, several senior
defense officials and nominees have recently characterized
Moscow's approach in the Arctic as: ``largely from a
territorial defense perspective.'' Yet, Russia has increased
its incursions of the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone
markedly over the last year. In fact, the average number of
intercepts of Russian aircraft from 2007 to 2019 was six to
seven. In 2020--through October--there were a total of 14.
Further, Russia has also increased the frequency and scale of
military exercises in the region. Last August, the Russian navy
conducted a major exercise consisting of more than 50 warships
and 40 aircraft in the Bering Sea; which, also encompassed them
expelling United States fishing fleets from our own exclusive
economic zone. Do you view these activities as defensive in
nature?
General VanHerck. No. The Arctic is key terrain for both
Russia and the United States, and Russian military forces
regularly conduct exercises in the region that are likely
designed to accomplish multiple objectives--including training
in the harsh Arctic environment and directing strategic
messaging at the United States, NORAD, and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. More specifically, Russian heavy bombers
are inherently offensive platforms, so I view any of their
flights near Alaska as Russia messaging that it can hold North
America at risk with its inventory of advanced air-launched
cruise missiles. Further, Russia's naval exercise in the Bering
Sea in August 2020 was its first such exercise in that area in
decades and included launches of anti-ship and coastal defense
cruise missiles against targets near the Russian coastline. I
believe these activities are primarily intended to demonstrate
the Russian Pacific Fleet's ability to destroy naval surface
platforms in the North Pacific in the event of escalation of
conflict with the United States.
61. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, what, in your
opinion, would constitute military activity in the Arctic that
could be characterized as offensive?
General VanHerck. In my role as the Commander of USNORTHCOM
and NORAD, I view actions that threaten the United States and
Canadian Homelands as potentially offensive in nature--
including those in the Arctic. In recent years, Russia has
developed and demonstrated advanced air-, sea-, and ground-
launched land-attack cruise missiles, and I see any military
activity that simulates the employment of these systems in the
Arctic as demonstrating offensive capability. This includes
flights by Russian heavy bombers into the Alaska Air Defense
Identification Zone and the Canada Air Defense Identification
Zone. I see large-scale demonstrations of offensive assault
capabilities using airborne or amphibious troops and activities
that threaten to sever or significantly restrict legitimate
access to the Arctic in a similar light.
TED STEVENS CENTER
62. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, last year Congress
appropriated $10 million for the Department of Defense (DOD)
Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies which was
authorized in the Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA. The Ted Stevens Center
will be the first DOD regional center in the Arctic and will
seek to support defense strategy objectives and policy
priorities through an academic forum, while also fostering
strong international networks of security leaders. As the
advocate for United States Armed Forces capabilities in the
Arctic, how do you see this center supporting NORTHCOM
objectives in the Arctic and what topics would you like to see
the center focus on?
General VanHerck. I see a Center for Arctic Security
Studies as having the potential to support USNORTHCOM's
homeland defense objectives by improving cooperation with
allies and partners, promoting shared understanding of Arctic
security challenges, and facilitating international
collaboration on matters of common interest. A center could
also provide significant value in research and development of
software and systems that advance my top priority of providing
global all-domain awareness, improving information sharing with
allies and partners, and creating open architectures for Arctic
sensor and data feeds. Finally, it could also be helpful for
such a center to analyze environmental, strategic, and economic
issues in the region; foster international cooperation; and
promote the value of the Arctic as an international commons.
WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH IN THE ARCTIC
63. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, the Arctic
encompasses a wide range of government institutions to include
the U.S. State Department's role on the Arctic Council and
coordination with allies, the U.S. Intelligence Community's
role in maintaining Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance operations, and the numerous Federal Agencies
involved in research, infrastructure, commerce, and natural
resource development in the Arctic region. Would you agree with
me that the United States must use a whole-of-government
approach to address issues in the Arctic? If so, how would you
suggest the DOD better include other Government agencies in
their approach to Arctic issues?
General VanHerck. Yes. A whole-of-government approach is
critical to success in the Arctic, and I believe the United
States must implement all elements of national power to keep
pace with the rapidly evolving strategic and environmental
situation in the region. To ensure success, the DOD must work
with partners from across the interagency, and with our allies
and partners, to develop a whole-of-government framework for
rising to the challenges of strategic competition, which would
certainly include challenges in the Arctic. Further, continued
interagency participation in international forums such as the
Arctic Council, Arctic Coast Guard Forum, and the Arctic
Security Forces Roundtable, along with close coordination
between the State Department, the DOD, and the intelligence and
scientific communities, are necessary to maintain unity of
effort, consistent messaging, and consensus among our Arctic
allies and partners.
ARCTIC FORCES COMMAND STRUCTURE
64. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, as you know,
NORTHCOM is the advocate for capabilities in the Arctic, United
States European Command (EUCOM) contains much of the threat in
the Arctic, and INDOPACOM is assigned the forces that operate
in the Arctic. In your personal opinion, given its convoluted
nature, what changes would you recommend, if any, to improve
the organization of the command structure to better address
threats in the Arctic? Please elaborate.
General VanHerck. I believe current command structure and
relationships require adjustment to maximize the Joint Force's
ability to operate under a globally integrated construct and
provide effective military options in the Arctic during periods
of competition, crisis, and conflict. In order to develop and
field a modernized defense design for the continent and our
Homeland, USNORTHCOM and NORAD are developing a series of
focused table top exercises and senior leader seminars to
examine the current command and control structure and its
effectiveness in supporting Arctic operations. I have also
directed USNORTHCOM and NORAD to examine and modify our
internal command and control constructs wherever possible under
current authorities. Once that analysis is complete, I intend
to convene a series of discussions with USINDOPACOM, USEUCOM,
the functional combatant commands, the Services, and the Joint
Staff to examine options for adjusting the current construct.
I would add that I welcome opportunities to explore
potential benefits associated with Service retention of Alaska-
based forces to ensure timely and effective employment of
assets wherever they might be needed globally in the event of a
crisis or contingency. My intent is to better support the Joint
Force's ability to conduct integrated operations across the
Arctic region, which, as you note, involves the operational
interests of three geographic combatant commands.
----------
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
MODERNIZATION AND STOVEPIPING
65. Senator Blackburn. General VanHerck, what specific
policy changes would be required for the Department of Defense
(DOD) to improve its efforts to leverage emerging
technologies--e.g., the artificial intelligence used by
Pathfinder--to make data accessible, shareable, and actionable?
General VanHerck. I believe acquisition policies that can
accommodate innovative software and cloud-native approaches
will be increasingly important as technology rapidly improves.
Pathfinder showed us that current acquisition policies, which
are oriented to fielding physical systems, inhibit the agile
development and evolution necessary to fuse data from many
sources and provide the warfighter with actionable information.
As a Department, I believe we can improve the ways in which we
approach security, acquisition, development, and costing in
order to capitalize the strength of cloud-native approaches.
I would also note that USNORTHCOM and NORAD have made huge
strides in our modernization efforts by utilizing direct hiring
authority for Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics
(STEM) positions. By using this authority, our Pathfinder
effort mirrors the hiring standards of industry, allowing the
team to rapidly hire information technology experts from
outside the Department and embed those personnel with the
warfighter. As a result, the work on data feed integration and
artificial intelligence that was originally scheduled to take a
year was completed in less than six months.
66. Senator Blackburn. General VanHerck, what specific
culture changes would be required for DOD to improve its
efforts to leverage emerging technologies--e.g., the artificial
intelligence used by Pathfinder--to make data accessible,
shareable, and actionable?
General VanHerck. I believe the Department should stop
developing a DOD data standard and instead re-vector efforts
towards DOD data governance. The time it takes industry
partners to decode and parse data is measured in days, hours,
and minutes, vice the weeks and months that it often takes
within the Department. Industry has an agnostic approach to
data format and so should the Department--it is what gives
industry their speed and agility. The Department should
standardize governance across the combatant commands and
Services to ease restrictions on data transfer, usage, access,
and sharing.
A two-pronged approach is needed to affect culture change:
top-down and bottom-up. For the top-down effort, combatant
commanders need to work closely with Department support
agencies to articulate how important global integration is to
approaching our greatest threats. Few threats stop at a
geographic boundary or are contained within a domain. This type
of thinking must infuse policy guidance. For the bottom-up
effort, Airmen, Soldiers, Sailors, Guardians, and Marines need
to participate in cloud-native development environments,
allowing and encouraging them to explore and experiment without
over-burdensome rules, to leverage technology and deliver
warfighting capability at the speed of relevance.
67. Senator Blackburn. General VanHerck, does DOD have the
knowledge base necessary to optimize modernization through
emerging technologies? Please explain your answer.
General VanHerck. Yes. The DOD continues to grow its
knowledge base of emerging technologies through partnerships
with commercial, private, and academic groups to ensure the
Department stays abreast of promising developments. Examples
such as the Defense Innovation Board; Defense Innovation Unit;
Space Development Agency; Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency; and Service innovation centers, labs, and sponsored
groups like AFWERX help optimize modernization throughout the
DOD.
68. Senator Blackburn. General VanHerck, what immediate
actions could Congress take to enhance the roles of public-
private partnerships, our national and defense labs, and the
National Guard in supporting DOD's modernization efforts--
especially those relating to emerging technologies and data
science? Please explain your answer.
General VanHerck. Immediate actions Congress could take are
to ensure sufficient research and development funding for
emerging technologies and data science developments, while
continuing to create opportunities for partnerships between DOD
and outside experts. Also, Congress can help to create and
support a culture where failure, when properly managed, is okay
and a natural part of accelerating capability development--the
Department learns the most from failures. Those collaborative
efforts are critical to achieving all-domain awareness,
information dominance, and decision superiority. As threats
continue to advance, it is increasingly important to foster
public-private partnerships, as well as collaboration with
national and defense labs and the National Guard to outpace our
competitors.
INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS
69. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Faller, how is SOUTHCOM
especially adept at ``doing more with less'' to implement the
National Defense Strategy?
Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM continues to learn how best to
leverage capabilities that are not within DOD programs of
record or assets/capabilities in order to stay innovative. We
have very willing partners in this hemisphere, who with a
little assistance via security cooperation become an integral
part of our regional approach to counter regional threats. Our
partners have proven to be an integral part of regional
security--having been critical participants in 60% of our TCO
disruptions over the last year. Our efforts through programs
like section 333 have demonstrated clear return on investment,
building interoperability and operational capacity of our
partners to operate shoulder-to-shoulder with us.
SOUTHCOM will look to continue expanding and investing in
non-traditional ISR utilizing 21st century social media
tradecraft as a means of illuminating and limiting
disinformation/misinformation in a whole-of-government approach
that includes engaging with industry to best compete in a
competitive information environment.
70. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Faller, which of these high-
return-on-investment activities are most effective in
countering Chinese influence campaigns in the SOUTHCOM AOR?
Admiral Faller. Intelligence drives everything. Small
investments in our non-traditional intelligence programs can
help inform us and, just as important, our partner nations, on
the activities of the PRC in this region. With capabilities
like COGINT (Commercial + Open Geointelligence) and Open Source
Intelligence, we are able to understand the impact Chinese
influence campaigns are having in the SOUTHCOM AOR and do so
rapidly, leveraging automated machine learning. For instance,
we have a better understanding of which Chinese companies and
vessels are conducting illegal, unreported, and unregulated
fishing, and are constantly monitoring patterns of activity.
This information is key to help strengthening relationships and
for maritime sovereignty and security throughout the region.
IMET and other International Training Programs build
professionalism and trust, which helps ``box out'' the
competition. The opportunity to bring our partners to the
United States for training provides an invaluable experience
for them and their families and build lifelong friendships with
future regional leaders.
The National Guard State Partnership Program is a low-cost
program that is a tremendous force multiplier for SOUTHCOM. We
have the most State Partners of any region in the world,
recognizing the power of the long-term, habitual relationships
and engagements that this program brings to the table.
The tools available through Security Cooperation allow for
maximum engagement with our partner nation military and
security forces. These tools include Key Leader Engagements,
Subject Matter Expert Exchanges, Conferences, Workshops, Mobile
Training Teams, and Institutional Capacity Building at the
Ministry level, to name a few. A little bit goes a long way in
this theater, time invested through engagements whether in
person, virtual, or a hybrid are invaluable.
MISSILE DEFENSE
71. Senator Blackburn. General VanHerck, the Strategic
Homeland Integrated Ecosystems for Layered Defense (SHIELD)
will employ repurposed legacy systems and newer technology in
tandem. How do you assess the desirability of combining these
systems to address threats from strategic competitors and rogue
regimes?
General VanHerck. I believe the ability to get more
capability out of legacy systems while folding in new
technology is key to the overall capability and affordability
of proposed architectures in a credible layered defense against
strategic competitors and rogue regimes. The architectures
developed must capitalize on current systems to address current
threats, but must also be adaptable to integrate new and
developing systems to counter evolving threats across the full
spectrum of conflict from the tactical to strategic level, from
peer nations to rogue actors. Our nation can no longer afford
stove-piped capabilities that cost billions of dollars and take
decades to deliver. Several current technologies can be
modified or improved to help create a persistent, capable area
defense at home, while also preserving the Department's ability
to contribute to the forward, globally integrated fight.
Building upon our existing legacy systems allows the Services
to maintain current programs of record, as well as increasing
their interoperability with new technology to address the
evolving threats.
72. Senator Blackburn. General VanHerck, are there
additional roles or niche areas in which Canada could take a
more offensive role within the SHIELD ecosystem--e.g., non-
kinetic disruptive capabilities in the cyber domain? If so,
please identify them and explain their desired impacts.
General VanHerck. The United States and Canada have
complementary roles in homeland defense. In the near term,
systems improving all-domain awareness are the top priority for
NORAD modernization, and Canada plays a key role in that
effort. For example, Canada is the leader in polar over-the-
horizon radar (POTHR) research, and recently began work on a
prototype system in the Canadian Archipelago. When fielded,
POTHR will provide an ability to detect approaching aircraft
and missiles at extremely long ranges, closing gaps in our
current legacy warning and assessment systems, and denying the
Arctic as an avenue of approach.
----------
Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
CHINA'S MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
73. Senator Hawley. Admiral Faller, you wrote in your
testimony that China seeks to ``establish global logistics and
basing infrastructure in our hemisphere in order to project and
sustain military power.'' Are you worried that China may one
day seek to establish a more regular or permanent military
presence in the Western Hemisphere?
Admiral Faller. Examples exist around the world of the PRC
establishing dual-use facilities that it initially touted as
strictly commercial, but later used for government/military
purposes. Likewise, the PRC is moving out methodically on its
stated goals in the Western Hemisphere--to expand trade,
presence, and influence--goals that will increase investments
in this region in critical infrastructure like deep water ports
and space tracking facilities.
74. Senator Hawley. Admiral Faller, what would it mean for
United States national security if China were able to regularly
deploy or permanently station forces in the Western Hemisphere?
Admiral Faller. From experience in other regions, when the
PRC comes to town it is rarely ``just economic'' and the PRC
envisions dual use capability. Greater port access will provide
strategic locations for future military presence. We are
currently seeing PRC influence across the full spectrum in this
hemisphere - political, economic, and military.
As the Department's most recent report to Congress on
military and security developments related to China notes, the
PRC is working to establish a robust global network of overseas
bases and logistics nodes to allow its military, the People's
Liberation Army (PLA), to project and sustain military power
globally. A persistent PLA presence in the Western Hemisphere
would present both a broad challenge to U.S. access, presence,
and influence in our own neighborhood and a threat to the
ability of the Department to operate in our own neighborhood.
75. Senator Hawley. General VanHerck, Admiral Faller
testified that China seeks to ``establish global logistics and
basing infrastructure in our hemisphere in order to project and
sustain military power.'' Are you worried that China may one
day seek to establish a more regular or permanent military
presence in the Western Hemisphere?
General VanHerck. Yes. I am concerned China will attempt to
establish a permanent military presence in the Western
Hemisphere. Over the past decade, Chinese naval ships visited
regions very distant from China's shores, including multiple
countries in the Western Hemisphere. The Chinese actively
compete with the United States in this Hemisphere for influence
and economic advantage, pursuing investments in natural
resources and energy to meet demands at home and to finance
interests abroad. China uses its One Belt-One Road initiative
to modernize port facilities worldwide to ostensibly support
trade, and could leverage an expanded presence in this
Hemisphere to deepen its regional influence and to broaden its
security cooperation relationships.
76. Senator Hawley. General VanHerck, what would it mean
for United States national security if China were able to
regularly deploy or permanently station forces in the Western
Hemisphere?
General VanHerck. From a homeland defense perspective, a
permanent or semi-permanent Chinese military presence in the
Western Hemisphere would be a significant concern. It would
erode and undermine U.S. global leadership, constrain our
options in crisis, and create significant challenges during a
conflict. Moreover, it would amplify the influence China has
gained through trade and investment by offering an alternative
to United States security guarantees.
77. Senator Hawley. General VanHerck, you wrote that China
is augmenting its offensive cyber capabilities with ``a new
family of long-range precision-strike weapons capable of
targeting key logistical nodes'' in the continental United
States. What should the United States prioritize doing in the
next five years to strengthen deterrence against Chinese
attacks, kinetic or otherwise, on our critical infrastructure?
General VanHerck. To deter competitors like China, it will
be increasingly important to prioritize our protection of
critical capabilities for homeland defense and power
projection. Our current doctrine of deterrence by denial will
be increasingly challenged by competitors that possess the
capability to strike the Homeland from multiple avenues of
approach and in multiple domains. To outpace these advanced
threats, we must get ahead of our competitors' decision making
by establishing global all-domain awareness and working toward
information dominance and providing our leaders at all levels
with decision superiority.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2022 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 25, 2021
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND UNITED STATES CYBER
COMMAND
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Peters, Manchin,
Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton,
Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, and
Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing to order. Just to
make everyone aware, we have four votes scheduled to begin at
10:45, so we will have to be, yeah, we will be very flexible.
But let me make my opening remarks, and then recognize
Senator Inhofe, and then recognize our panel.
Good morning. Today, the Committee meets to receive an
update on the readiness and posture of both the U.S. Special
Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Cyber Command.
Our witnesses are Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, Christopher
Maier; Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, General
Richard Clarke; and Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, National
Security Agency Director, and Chief of the Central Security
Service, General Paul Nakasone.
Both Special Operations Command, or SOCOM, and Cyber
Command, are at the forefront of addressing the asymmetric
information and technical challenges that transcend the
boundaries of the geographic combatant commands. I hope our
witnesses will convey our appreciation to the men and women you
represent and their families, for their dedication and
sacrifice in carrying out many of our Nation's most difficult
and complex missions.
In 1986, when Congress created SOCOM, to ensure the
readiness of Special Operations Forces, or SOF, it also
established the position of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, or ASD SO/
LIC, to be the service-like secretary tasked with day-to-day
advocacy and oversight of SOF.
In recent years, Congress has sought to further empower the
ASD SO/LIC and optimize the partnership with the commander of
SOCOM through the annual National Defense Authorization Act.
Unfortunately, the Department has not made sufficient progress
in implementing these reforms, particularly with respect to
hiring appropriate personnel and establishing a strong role for
the ASD SO/LIC and all decisions relating to the organization,
training, equipping, and readiness of SOF.
We are pleased Mr. Maier is joining us today as the acting
ASD SO/LIC and look forward to receiving a nominee so the
Department can have a fully empowered, Senate-confirmed
civilian in this important position.
Mr. Maier and General Clarke, I hope you will provide your
assessment of how this Committee can help to ensure that the
SO/LIC reforms are both, fully implemented and effective, in
their ultimate goal of supporting the SOF enterprise.
In recent years, there have been several incidents and
allegations of misconduct involving special operators that, as
General Clarke has noted, jeopardized the trust placed in SOF.
I applaud SOCOM for taking a hard look in the mirror by
completing a comprehensive review of SOF culture and ethics
last year.
Among other things, the review concluded that SOCOM
disproportionately focused on SOF employment and mission
accomplishment at the expense of training and development of
our force. In some cases, this imbalance has set conditions for
unacceptable conduct to occur due to a lack of leadership,
discipline, and accountability.
General Clarke, I am interested in hearing more about the
specific actions you have taken to address the findings of the
comprehensive review and what more must be done.
Turning to Cyber Command, General Nakasone, you have been
working to mature the cyber force, ensuring their readiness,
and overseeing the development of capabilities to conduct
defensive, offensive, and supporting intelligence operations. I
understand there are positive trends in all of these areas, but
the threat to our cybersecurity may be advancing at an even
faster rate.
Indeed, recent disturbing cyber intrusions and attacks,
likely conducted by Russia and China, will command attention in
today's hearings.
In the SolarWinds incident, hackers conducted a
sophisticated operation that installed a backdoor and a
software update that left approximately 18,000 enterprises
vulnerable to exploitation and attacks, including many
government agencies and companies that provide essential goods
and services. We have recently learned that a Chinese entity
exploited multiple previously unknown vulnerabilities in the
software running Microsoft Exchange email servers and there are
hundreds of thousands of these servers around the world. After
Microsoft announced the breach and issued methods to protect
it, multiple Chinese Government-sponsored hacking groups rushed
to compromise thousands of vulnerable servers before they could
be patched.
A third event that merits attention is the reporting that
China attacked the power grid in India during recent physical
clashes the Himalayan border regions.
General Nakasone, in the first two events, paid actors
exploited vulnerabilities to steal data. While some may
consider this tolerable and expected behavior from a competitor
nation, others view the scope and scale of these operations as
reckless and a different class that merits a sharp response,
and I am interested in your views in this matter.
In the matter of China's attack on the Indian power grid,
which followed multiple Russian cyberattacks on Ukraine's power
grid, there is a sense of growing willingness of adversaries to
attack critical infrastructure in any serious confrontation;
again, I am interested in your perceptions on this matter and
if we need to be concerned about our Nation's critical
infrastructure.
I, again, want to thank the witnesses for their service and
willingness to be here today, and I look forward to your
testimony.
Senator Inhofe, please?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Great
statement. I appreciate that and for calling this important
hearing to examine the posture of the U.S. Special Operations
Command and the U.S. Cyber Command.
I also want to thank our witnesses for being here with us
today. They are the right guys for this hearing.
My top priority continues to be ensuring the effective
implementation of the National Defense Strategy. We have been
talking about that at almost every meeting that we have. It
prioritizes competition with China and Russia, while
maintaining pressure on global terrorist groups like ISIS, and
I will have some specific questions on that at question time.
As I said on the floor on Tuesday, we need to match the
budget with strategy. It takes at least 3 to 5 percent real
growth in the defense budget above inflation. It doesn't look
like it is going to be easy to get to that point. We are going
to have to keep trying.
Military advancements and the expanding global ambitions by
China and Russia pose new and increasingly complex challenges
to our national security. In addition to growing their
conventional military capabilities, China and Russia are
expanding their use of irregular warfare tactics, involving
cyber disinformation, proxy forces, and economic blackmail
around the world.
They have proven these tactics are effective in places like
Ukraine, in Syria, in the South China Sea, and now they are
exporting them to Africa and to the Western Hemisphere. As we
discussed before, this reality makes implementation of the
irregular warfare annex to the National Defense Strategy (NDS)
critically important. It also requires that Special Operations
Forces are organized, trained, and equipped to compete in this
domain of warfare.
At the same time, ISIS [the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria] and al Qaeda have proven resilient and still pose a
threat. History has shown us that without sustained pressure,
that threat will grow. I think we all understand that.
I understand that President Biden is reviewing the U.S.
counterterrorism policy, and according to media reports, has
issued interim guidance, requiring the White House to sign off
on operational military decisions that were previously
delegated to the DOD [Department of Defense]. Let me be clear,
I have serious concerns with the decision to return to the
Obama era policies that tied the hands of our military
commanders and made it harder to keep pressure on ISIS and al
Qaeda. I expect this Committee will be consulted often during
the administration's review. I have talked to the President
about this and I believe that is going to happen.
Another critical component of implementing the NDS is
developing robust capabilities to counter growing threats in
cyberspace. The 2018 Cyber Strategy provides a roadmap on how
we are going to do this. Significant efforts have occurred in
recent years across the DOD to implement the strategy and to
build the capabilities of Cyber Command and the cyber mission
forces.
Today, I look forward to our witnesses' testimony in
addressing these critical problems that are out there, and we
are going to do all that we can to try to solve that. So, I
appreciate this hearing and I think we will all benefit from
it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Mr. Maier, please?
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER P. MAIER, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
Mr. Maier. So, good morning, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
Inhofe, and distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you
for the opportunity to testify on our global posture for
America's Special Operations enterprise.
I would also like to thank Congress and especially this
Committee for its strong support for the SOF community and its
mission. I am honored to testify alongside General Clarke and
General Nakasone, who have dedicated their careers to
safeguarding our Nation from complex and unconventional
threats.
I would like to begin by acknowledging the service and
sacrifice of our special operations soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, and civilians. Although SOF make up only about 3
percent of the joint force, over the past 2 years, this
community that has bore over half of all U.S. combat
casualties. Many more have sustained life-altering injuries and
suffer psychological trauma.
As we look forward, Secretary Austin has outlined his three
principle priorities for the Department of Defense. Those are:
defend the Nation, take care of our people, and succeed through
teamwork. The SOF community will measure ourselves against
these priorities.
Representing just 2 percent of the overall DOD budget, SOF
played an essential role within the joint staff in advancing
multiple strategic priorities for the Department and the
Nation. We continue to adapt the unique capabilities and
problem-solving expertise of our special operators through the
challenge of great power competition with Russia and China,
while strengthening the alliances and partnerships that enhance
our ability to compete.
As we innovate to compete more effectively below the level
of armed conflict, we recognize that our counterterrorism
operations, while still critical to protect Americans from the
likes of ISIS and al Qaeda, must become even more sustainable
and focused on the most pressing threats to our citizens and
interests.
Enhancing the readiness and resilience of our SOF warriors
and their families remains a top priority. Despite the COVID-19
pandemic, SOF have continued to maintain a high level of
operational readiness. We remain focused on, and are making
progress in, easing the strain of high rates of overseas
deployments.
I look forward to working with you and your staff to
collectively continue to build the resiliency and culture of
this community that has given so much in protecting us for
nearly a generation.
I also remain concerned about incidents of serious moral
and ethical failings within the SOF community, a concern I know
General Clarke shares. I commend him and Special Operations
Command for leading a comprehensive review of SOF culture and
ethics last year.
Civilian-military partnership on all of these issues
remains a key priority for me and my team. In response to
Secretary Austin's challenge to us, we are also committed to
enhancing diversity within the SOF community. As we compete
against different and more capable adversaries, a more diverse
force empowers us to draw upon broader perspectives, different
lived experiences, and new ideas.
Finally, we recognize the strong interest in Congress in
empowering civilian leadership in the Department. We appreciate
legislation in the most recent National Defense Authorization
Act to codify and strengthen ASD SO/LIC's role. It is our
collective duty to ensure these reforms meet your intents and
serve the interests of the Department and the men and women of
our SOF community.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude by thanking the
Committee, again, for its strong support for our Special
Operations team. Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Maier follows:]
Prepared Statement by Mr. Christopher P. Maier
introduction
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and other distinguished
Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on
our global posture for DOD's Special Operations Forces (SOF)
Enterprise. As Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC), my remarks will focus
on ASD SO/LIC's statutory responsibilities for administrative oversight
of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). I am honored to testify
alongside General Clarke and General Nakasone. I greatly appreciate
their decades of leadership and service in protecting the Nation's
national security interests.
I would like to begin by acknowledging the service, sacrifice, and
success of our Special Operations soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
and civilians. U.S. SOF have played a critical role in every major
conflict since the Second World War, and they remain in the fight
today--conducting operations against ISIS, al Qaeda and its affiliates;
working alongside partners and allies; and providing our Nation's
leaders with flexible and rapid response options to a wide range of
national security emergencies. Since the terrorist attacks of September
11, our SOF community has established a remarkable record of
achievement. From the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in
December 2001, to the complex operations targeting the world's most
notorious terrorist leaders like Osama bin Laden, and to the
extraordinary effort to eliminate the ISIS caliphate in Syria and Iraq,
we owe our SOF community our deepest gratitude.
Despite recent reductions in deployments, SOF remain at the
forefront of U.S. combat operations, often operating in remote and
hostile environments. Over the past 2 years, 15 members of the SOF
formation were killed in combat operations. Although SOF make up only
approximately three percent of the Joint Force, they have endured more
than half of U.S. combat casualties during that period. Many more have
sustained life-altering injuries or suffer from psychological trauma.
The service and sacrifice of these men and women challenge us to live
up to the high standards they embody.
I would also like to thank Congress for your strong support of the
SOF community as well as your predecessors and their foresight in
recognizing the need to build and sustain special operations
capabilities to respond to an increasingly complex threat environment.
The Nunn-Cohen amendment that established USSOCOM and the position of
ASD SO/LIC in 1986 was prescient in recognizing that future conflicts
would be fought by both state and non-state actors and often through
unconventional and irregular means. The authors of these reforms
rightly understood that dedicated resources for Special Operations-
specific purposes were essential to promoting and sustaining these
capabilities within the Department.
My statement this morning will focus on how the SOF community is
supporting Secretary Austin's three principal priorities as outlined in
his March 3, 2021, ``Message to the Force''--1) Defend the Nation, 2)
Take Care of Our People, and 3) Succeed through Teamwork. In the nearly
two decades following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, SOF have continued
to develop new technologies and capabilities to become the most
effective counterterrorism (CT) force in history. Today, the SOF
Enterprise is in the midst of a critical period of transition as the
National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the Interim National Security
Strategic Guidance (INSSG) challenges us to conduct counterterrorism
operations more sustainably as we also adapt to the challenges of great
power competition. At the same time, I am pleased to report that we
have continued to improve the readiness of the force and reduce the
strain of deployment on our SOF warriors and their families. Your
leadership and support and have been, and will continue to be,
essential in this effort.
defend the nation
Representing approximately two percent of the DOD budget, SOF play
a crucial role within the Joint Force in support of multiple DOD
priorities, and the SOF community continues to make progress in
adapting its capabilities to the challenge of great-power competition
with Russia and China. I emphasize the word ``competition'' because
just as the National Defense Strategy calls on us to develop
traditional military capabilities to deter and respond to threats, we
are also called to strengthen alliances, innovate, and compete more
effectively below the level of armed conflict. Revisionist powers,
rogue states, and non-state actors are actively pursuing
unconventional, irregular, and asymmetric strategies to undermine U.S.
strategic interests, erode democratic institutions, and destabilize and
re-shape the post-WWII world order to their advantage, without
provoking a U.S. conventional military response. Indeed, as the
Department continues to strengthen our traditional military
capabilities, we can expect that our adversaries will increasingly
employ indirect and irregular approaches to achieve their strategic
objectives to capitalize on asymmetries that work to their advantage.
Thus, winning the competition is essential to achieving our near-
term strategic objectives, and to precluding a major conflict. This is
not a theoretical battle to prepare for in the future. This is today's
fight, and the SOF capabilities we have nurtured over the past 30 years
are essential to successfully competing--and winning--in today's
unconventional and irregular battlespaces. In close coordination with
the Joint Staff, Services, and Combatant Commands, including USSOCOM,
my office is leading the implementation of the Irregular Warfare (IW)
Annex to the NDS to institutionalize the Department's approach to IW
throughout the Joint Force and to operationalize it for great power
competition and resource-sustainable counterterrorism. The IW Annex
directs the Joint Force to embrace the potential for irregular warfare
to shape great power competitors' behavior proactively to our
advantage, create dilemmas to deter future aggression, and strengthen
alliances and partnerships.
As we adapt to meet the challenges of great power competition, we
remain focused on ensuring CT operations are sustainable and focused on
the most relevant threats to United States national security interests
such as ISIS and al Qaeda and their affiliates that continue to pose a
threat to Americans and United States interests around the globe.
Continued U.S., allied, and partner nation pressure has helped prevent
these groups from attacking the Homeland.
Within this strategic context, and consistent with the INSSG, we
continue to adapt our global posture and develop SOF-unique
capabilities that enable our operators to compete and win in a wide
variety of contingencies, including CT, crisis response, competition
below the level of armed conflict, and as a force multiplier to the
Joint Force if deterrence fails. Although our adversaries increasingly
employ irregular warfare tactics, SOF support can ensure the
Department does not depend only on high-end warfighting and
deterrent capabilities. Today, approximately 40 percent of SOF deployed
forces are tasked with countering malign influence of our great-power
adversaries.
Central to our irregular warfare efforts is a suite of legislative
authorities that underpin our efforts to address these challenges
alongside our international and interagency partners. We appreciate
Congress's support for the extension and expansion of ``Section 1202''
authority to conduct irregular warfare operations and for the
establishment of a new Title 10 funding authority for operational
preparation of the environment activities in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021. Authorities such as these and
Section 127e of Title 10 are cost-effective, agile ways for the United
States to advance our security interests working by, with, and through
partners.
We continue to invest in technologies and capabilities to empower
SOF to operate in denied areas and conduct high-risk operations in
remote and austere environments, operate seamlessly with our general
purpose force counterparts, and produce scalable precision effects. For
instance, USSOCOM is developing next-generation Intelligence
Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities to enhance situational
awareness for the SOF warfighter, even in contested areas. Similarly,
we are making investments to enhance SOF maritime capabilities,
including surface combatant craft, submersibles, and unmanned
underwater vehicles, and working with the Department of the Navy to
ensure integration of SOF operational concepts and capability
investments related to great power competition.
USSOCOM is pursuing technological advancements designed to enhance
network interoperability, enable secure communications for command and
control, and employ data analytics, artificial intelligence (AI) and
machine learning (ML) to enable our SOF to operate more effectively. In
close collaboration with the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center,
USSOCOM is adapting and employing AI to streamline a wide range of
activities, such as intelligence analysis and operational functions.
For instance, USSOCOM is leveraging AI/ML to optimize preventive
maintenance for aircraft of the Army's 160th Special Operations
Aviation Regiment (SOAR) that has demonstrated significant potential
for increasing the operational readiness rate of the unit's fleet of
aircraft.
USSOCOM has also employed innovative acquisition pathways,
including mid-tier acquisitions to execute tailored acquisition
strategies and to streamline capability delivery to the warfighter.
Additionally, USSOCOM is leveraging public-private partnerships and
deepening relationships with academic institutions and non-traditional
partners, including through its pilot project to expand small business
participation in technology development to enhance SOF warfighting
capabilities.
take care of our people
Consistent with the clear priorities outlined in the NDS and the
INSSG, we continue to invest in the readiness of the force and the
resiliency of our SOF warriors and their families. Despite the unique
challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic over the past year,
SOF have continued to maintain a high level of operational readiness in
support of strategic priorities. COVID-19-related restrictions on CONUS
and OCONUS movements have reduced flight hours and training
opportunities, particularly alongside our overseas partners. Although
the number of forces deployed overseas is down approximately 15 percent
over the past year, nearly 5,000 SOF are currently deployed to 62
countries.
In the years following the terrorist attacks of September 11, the
high demand for SOF resulted in a near-constant cycle of deployments
for some capabilities. To address the strain caused by that operational
tempo, we have taken a hard look at the forces that we can responsibly
and sustainably provide to support global demand amid multifaceted and
simultaneous mission requirements. Over the past several years, we have
made considerable progress toward meeting the Department's requirement
of a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio across the force, meaning that a
typical service member would expect to spend twice as much time at home
station as on deployment. We continue to make progress toward achieving
this target with now more than 90 percent of the force at a 1:2 ratio
or better.
The additional dwell time spent at home station is not only
contributing to increased predictability for the force and improved
work-life balance, it is also enabling additional time for training,
screening, rest, refit, and reintegration. USSOCOM has also continued
to meet the Department's goal of fewer than five percent non-deployable
military personnel.
In addition to monitoring metrics of SOF readiness, we are closely
evaluating how SOF posture relates to our ability to sustain CT and
crisis response operations along with high-priority missions. We are
also focused on limiting SOF deployments to those that require SOF-
specific capabilities and training. For instance, the establishment of
the Army's Security Force Assistance Brigade has provided a capable
General Purpose Force option for training and mentoring foreign
security forces. The combination of these efforts has helped ease the
strain of a high and unsustainable rate of overseas deployments for SOF
personnel.
In addition to reducing the strain on the force due to high
operational tempo, the SOF Enterprise is further enhancing readiness by
taking a holistic approach to caring for SOF warriors and their
families. With the strong support of Congress, USSOCOM has continued to
develop its Preservation of the Force and Families (POTFF) program to
address SOF-unique challenges and to optimize physical, psychological,
social, and spiritual performance. The POTFF program leverages a
combination of USSOCOM, Service, and DOD resources to meet the needs of
the various SOF components and individual unit commanders. These
programs include injury prevention/strength training, performance
nutrition, rehabilitative care, improved access to behavioral health
and suicide prevention, family and community programs, promoting
healthy living, and reinforcing resiliency and spiritual fitness.
Participation in the POTFF human performance program and
neurocognitive baselining are now mandatory for all USSOCOM personnel.
Our SOF warriors recognize POTFF as an invaluable resource for their
readiness and career longevity, and data collected from our SOF
commanders indicates that the program is having a significant and
positive impact on the mission readiness of their units. SO/LIC is
currently collaborating with the command to develop standardized and
quantitative outcome metrics to help inform future resourcing
decisions, and we look forward to working closely with the Committee to
ensure we are achieving a solid return on this investment in our
personnel.
Similarly, USSOCOM's Warrior Care program continues to provide
specialized care for soldiers who have suffered physical or
psychological trauma by providing SOF members and their families
support through recovery, rehabilitation, and reintegration. We have no
greater responsibility than to care for our SOF warriors and to provide
them with a path to return to service and/or transition to civilian
careers following their years of service. We appreciate the strong
support of Congress for each of these efforts.
I remain concerned about instances of moral and ethical failings
within the SOF community, and I know General Clarke shares this
concern. Incidents such as these have no place in the military or our
Department, and if not tackled head-on can erode morale and undermine
trust and our moral authority with our partners and allies. I commend
General Clarke for his initiative in directing a comprehensive review
of SOF culture and ethics beginning in August 2019. The review was
directed to address shortfalls and limitations of multiple previous
studies and to build upon them to address enterprise-wide issues and to
analyze data from across the SOF Enterprise.
SO/LIC strongly supported this effort, and SO/LIC personnel
actively participated in the review, which entailed conducting in-depth
interviews with approximately 2,000 personnel of all ranks within more
than 50 SOF commands. Although the comprehensive review did not
identify evidence of a systemic ethics deficiency, it did note that
``in some instances USSOCOM's cultural focus on SOF employment and
mission accomplishment is to the detriment of leadership, discipline
and accountability,'' and it outlined concrete recommendations. My
office is now helping to guide the Comprehensive Review Implementation
Team, established to drive implementation of the review's
recommendations. These recommendations address training and
organization of the force, leader development, and the prevention of
over-exertion on the force that we believe contributes in part to
ethical lapses.
As we address challenges related to SOF culture and ethics,
Secretary Austin has placed special emphasis on combatting sexual
assault and addressing actions associated with extremist or dissident
ideologies within the Department. The men and women who make up the SOF
Enterprise deserve nothing less than a safe and supportive work
environment--free from intimidation, harassment, and racial and
cultural bias of any kind. We recognize that extremist ideology exists
within our military, and we must ensure that our service members honor
the oaths they have taken to uphold and defend our Constitution against
all enemies--foreign and domestic. For this reason, Secretary Austin
directed a Department-wide stand-down to allow senior leaders to
discuss the importance of our oath of office, impermissible behaviors,
and procedures for reporting extremist behaviors. I am committed to
working hand-in-hand with General Clarke in leading this effort on
behalf of the SOF community, ensuring that our efforts are closely
aligned with top-level guidance and actions and policies taken by the
Department and the Military Services.
We recognize that many of the solutions have not yet been fully
implemented and that true cultural change will require a sustained and
focused effort over many years. I look forward to working with you and
your staff as we strengthen the foundation of our culture and ethics
throughout the SOF Enterprise. SO/LIC will continue to support this
effort by focusing on those actions that fall within our administrative
role overseeing the organization and training of SOF personnel and
ensuring these efforts are adequately resourced. Working closely with
USSOCOM and each of the Services, we will continue to develop and
sustain a SOF culture of personal accountability that is worthy of the
men and women that constitute our force.
We are similarly focused on enhancing the diversity within our SOF
formation. As it stands today, our force is not adequately reflective
of the American people. In addition to the moral imperative of
addressing this challenge, we recognize that a more diverse force makes
us more effective operationally by allowing us to draw upon diverse
perspectives and talents and new ideas to enable us to prevail in the
global contest for influence and legitimacy we are faced with today.
Enhancing diversity within the force will become increasingly important
as the Department places greater emphasis on operations in the
information environment against foreign disinformation and malign
influence.
Over the past year, ASD(SO/LIC) served on the Executive Working
Group as part of the Department of Defense's Board on Diversity and
Inclusion. A SOF officer on my staff sat on the DOD Board on Diversity
and Inclusion to ensure that special operations-unique issues were
reflected and considered as part of the overarching DOD efforts. Last
year, SO/LIC, in partnership with USSOCOM's Commander and Senior
Enlisted Leader, issued a memorandum to all SOF personnel emphasizing
that diversity and inclusion is a strategic imperative to the mission
of SOF. I co-chair, along with the USSOCOM Vice Commander, the SOF
Executive Committee on Diversity and Inclusion to oversee and drive the
development and execution of the USSOCOM Diversity and Inclusion
Strategic Plan. I am pleased that USSOCOM has recently hired its first
Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer, and I look forward to working
with the command as we collectively address this challenge.
In addition to addressing racial and cultural diversity within the
SOF formation, we are also working to ensure that all SOF career fields
are open to all who have the desire and meet the rigorous standards.
Women have filled vital roles within the SOF community for many years,
and we are proud that in the past year, two women have for the first
time successfully completed the Special Forces Qualification Course and
are currently serving as Green Berets. Although we recognize that we
have much more progress to make in this area, these talented soldiers
have blazed a path that we expect many others will follow.
Addressing each of these challenges will require a multifaceted,
sustained approach, with a clear strategy, concrete objectives, and
measurable benchmarks. Additionally, the continued institutionalization
of ASD(SO/LIC)'s role in the administrative chain of command will
provide additional avenues to highlight policy and resource issues
affecting SOF, including diversity, ethics, and accountability. For
instance, regularly occurring readiness briefings from USSOCOM to
ASD(SO/LIC) now address sexual assault and harassment prevention and
response, domestic violence, suicide prevention, COVID-19 vaccination
rates, and accession/promotion by sex and ethnicity. SO/LIC brings
unique perspective to these challenges, and you have my commitment that
we will remain fully engaged.
succeed through teamwork
Secretary Austin's Message to the Force challenges us to join
forces with our partners and allies; work in partnership across U.S.
Departments and Agencies, with Congress, and with private industry; and
to build unity of effort and missions throughout the Department,
including strengthening civil-military cooperation. The men and women
of the SOF community excel in building strong and lasting partnerships,
including with our foreign, interagency, and private industry partners.
SO/LIC and USSOCOM continue to deepen our civilian-military
collaboration across a wide range of issues, including SOF personnel
and readiness, budget and acquisitions, special access programs, and
legislative affairs.
Civilian control of the military is a bedrock principle of our
democracy, and strengthening civilian institutions within the
Department is a key priority of Secretary Austin. As the Secretary
testified before this Committee in his confirmation hearing, ``the
safety and security of our democracy demands competent civilian control
of our armed forces . . . the subordination of military power to the
civil.'' We also recognize and appreciate the Congress's strong
interest in empowering civilian leadership, both within the Special
Operations community and throughout the Department.
The continued institutionalization of the ASD(SO/LIC)'s role in the
administrative chain of command, as codified in Title 10, is one of
many examples where the Department is making progress in empowering
civilian leadership, oversight, and advocacy within the Department's
decision-making mechanisms. Over the past year, we have made progress
in strengthening civilian oversight of SOF, but we recognize that more
remains to be done to realize the full intent of recent legislative
reforms to strengthen the ASD(SO/LIC)'s role and to establish the
Secretariat for Special Operations. Recent actions include designating
ASD(SO/LIC) as a Principal Staff Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations administrative matters, establishing a position
of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense to lead the Secretariat and to
assist the ASD with those responsibilities. The ASD(SO/LIC) also has
been added to numerous senior Departmental decision-making bodies, in
many instances marking the first time the SOF Enterprise has had
representation and a voice in these discussions and decisions.
Enhanced civilian leadership and oversight are essential to
advocating for SOF within the Department and tackling key issues
affecting the SOF Enterprise. These elements also help ensure an
independent and objective assessment of military capabilities and
policy issues. Further institutionalization of the ASD(SO/LIC)'s
administrative chain of command responsibilities will require continued
close coordination with senior DOD leadership, USSOCOM, and Congress. I
fully embrace this role, and I also recognize that there is more work
ahead as we fulfill Congress's intent. As these efforts mature, I look
forward to working with you, General Clarke, and other DOD senior
leaders to ensure that these reforms meet the intent of Congress and
serve the interests of the Department and the men and women of our SOF
community.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude by thanking the Committee
again for its strong support for our special operations personnel, who
serve as a critical linchpin in safeguarding our national security--in
wartime and peacetime. As an integral component of the Joint Force, SOF
bring unique capabilities that complement and strengthen those of our
general purpose forces as well as our interagency and international
partners.
I thank the Committee again for the opportunity to testify, and I
look forward to your questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Mr. Maier.
General Clarke, please?
STATEMENT OF GENERAL RICHARD D. CLARKE, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
General Clarke. Chairman Reed, Senator Inhofe, and
distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity, and I am honored to testify with Mr. Chris Maier
and General Paul Nakasone. Also joining me is Chief Greg Smith,
my command senior enlisted leader. Greg marked his thirty-first
year in uniform this month and I am thankful for his continued
counsel and leadership as he represents the almost 50,000
enlisted operators in our force.
USSOCOM, our structure, our authorities, and our purpose
are the direct outcome of Congress and, in particular, this
Committee. We strive to honor Congress' vision by training and
employing the world's finest Special Operations Force, a team
that is inclusive and professional, supremely competent and
trusted, and reflective of American diversity and values, and
most of all, committed to our constitutional oath.
The incredible women and men of this command employ their
unique skills globally, fully integrated with the joint force,
and aligned with national priorities. SOF continue to deter and
disrupt persistent threats by terrorist and extremist
organizations. Twenty years of this fight have honed our
capability and, most importantly, our resolve.
We remain oriented on these threats with approaches that
are both, effective and sustainable, to defend the Homeland and
our American people; additionally, we are well-postured within
the joint force to compete against malign state influence. SOF
provide unique value in this critical endeavor.
Below the level of armed conflict, SOF teams support a wide
range of United States policy objectives and generate options
to counter China, Russia, and other competitors. Often, our
activities to counter violent extremist organizations have
tangible, derivative value to counter terrorist, extremist
organizations.
As SOF forged partnerships and built partner capacity, we
gain access, placement, and influence in contested regions.
Should future conflicts arise, our modernization priorities
will provide interoperable forces that are able to win as part
of the joint war-fighting concept.
Your continued support and the vital trust of the American
people allow this command to support the Nation now and prepare
for the challenges of tomorrow. Today, as we sit here, nearly
5,000 special operators stand vigilant in almost 60 countries.
Their commitment to American security and prosperity is
inspirational, and their enthusiasm to learn, adapt, and serve
is infectious.
It is my honor to lead them and I look forward to answering
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Clarke follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Richard D. Clarke
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of
the Committee, thank you for providing this opportunity to discuss the
posture of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). I am proud to
testify alongside Mr. Christopher Maier, Acting Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/
LIC)), and General Paul Nakasone, Commander of U.S. Cyber Command
(USCYBERCOM).
The unwavering support of Congress, particularly this Committee,
has ensured that our Nation's special operations forces (SOF) are the
most capable in the world. Your support remains essential to our
efforts to defend the Nation, care for our people, and strengthen
alliances and partnerships. Your SOF remain engaged globally, ensuring
violent extremists have no respite, while setting advantageous
conditions across all domains to compete with adversaries. We are ready
to meet today's requirements, while adapting to address tomorrow's
challenges.
Today, I present an account of USSOCOM priorities, activities, and
investments to provide the Nation with peerless SOF talent, tactics,
and technologies. Each of you are keenly interested in how we are
building a professional force, caring for our people, defending our
Nation forward, and modernizing for the future. I will address each of
these concerns.
The current strategic landscape comprises a complex set of problems
presented by nation-state competitors and violent extremist
organizations. Overmatch in strategic deterrence, conventional military
force, and space and cyberspace capabilities are unequivocal
necessities. However, our overmatch compels competitors to seek
asymmetric avenues to attack, erode, or undermine the advantage and
interests of the United States, our allies, and partners. Many of these
challenges take place in the information space, with disinformation
employed as a political weapon at unimaginable speed and scale without
regard for geopolitical boundaries. These concerns are further
amplified by disruptive, destabilizing impacts of climate change,
diminished influence of international institutions, and shifts in
global power dynamics.
SOF are problem solvers, and their enduring value resides in their
ability to adapt and combat asymmetric threats; employ precision and
surprise to achieve strategic effects in conflict or crisis; and build
access, placement, and influence through sustained partnership with
foreign forces--all providing discrete options when conventional action
is impractical. Our team extends beyond operators in the field, to a
wide array of military and interagency support, as well as our
unassailable partnership with ASD(SO/LIC). The oversight, policy
guidance, and advocacy within the DOD provided by ASD(SO/LIC) are
essential for the modernization, readiness, and wellbeing of SOF and
their families.
The COVID-19 pandemic challenged our readiness in unexpected ways.
Disciplined enforcement of DOD risk mitigation strategies has largely
protected our uniformed, civilian, and contractor populations. The
postponement of several major exercises and a majority of fiscal year
2020 Joint Combined Exchange Training events has been unfortunate, but
barring long-term disruption, our joint interoperability and
multinational partnerships remain strong. We appreciate the CARES Act
funding from Congress that enabled us to reduce immediate risk through
distribution of protective equipment and improved telework systems.
To address current and future strategic challenges, SOF are aligned
with the priorities set forth in the 2018 National Defense Strategy
(NDS) and newly published Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.
The full range of USSOCOM's operational and institutional efforts
coalesce within three broad objectives: strengthen our force and their
families, enable the Joint Force to compete and win globally, and
innovate to transform for the future.
strengthen our force and families
The primacy of our people is central to the success of every
endeavor. These competent and creative men and women stand ready to
adapt and evolve to be the SOF the Nation needs to meet any challenge.
Our commitment to advancing professionalism, improving policy to
acquire and groom the right talent, and caring for the health and
welfare of our teammates underpins every organizational decision.
advancing professionalism and credibility
Last year, USSOCOM and ASD(SO/LIC) provided Congress the results of
our Comprehensive Review which identified opportunities to improve our
force and address lapses in leadership, accountability, and discipline.
Our Comprehensive Review Implementation Team used that assessment to
make institutional adjustments that promote active and engaged
leadership at all levels accountable for force governance, leader
development, sustainable tempo, and behavior reflective of
Constitutional and Service values. Our forthcoming report submission to
Congress will provide details on each of our actions thus far. This is
a long-term, institutional approach, and we will see this process
through to make our force better.
Furthermore, the urgent need to remove the scourges of sexual
assault and extremism within the force has our full attention. USSOCOM
supports DOD and Service policies on sexual assault and harassment that
have improved reporting processes and victim advocacy. With maturing
response and victim support systems, we are applying focused leadership
toward prevention. Our SOF components are implementing tailored
programs to promote a climate and culture intolerant of these abuses,
committed to identifying and removing predators, and able to rapidly
identify and address shortfalls.
Extremist and dissident ideologies conflict with our Constitutional
obligations and corrode cohesion, discipline, and public trust. USSOCOM
is fully engaged in DOD's effort to remove behaviors that promote
discrimination, hate, or harassment. We are working closely with the
DOD and Services to engage service members at all levels to ensure the
force is undivided in their commitment to defend the Constitution
against all enemies foreign and domestic.
managing and welcoming diverse talent
In 1999, a RAND study identified barriers to the participation of
women and minorities. Since that study twenty-two years ago, we have
made limited progress in fully opening those doors. The past few years
have provided the momentum and support to correct this problem for
future generations. We continue to see positive movement with the
contributions of women leaders in all four Service Component Commands
and the selection of the first African American officers to command a
Navy SEAL Team and a Ranger Battalion. However, these steps are not
sufficient as we envision a force that better reflects the society it
defends.
We need men and women of all ethnicities and races along with a
diversity of backgrounds and beliefs in our formation. Improving
diversity and inclusion in our force is an operational imperative. In a
force charged with solving multifaceted problems in a complex global
environment, service members who are included, respected, and empowered
are more ready to deter aggression and win wars. We developed a five-
year Diversity and Inclusion Strategy and hired a Chief Diversity and
Inclusion Officer. Together, USSOCOM and ASD (SO/LIC) chair the SOF
Executive Committee on Diversity and Inclusion ensuring senior leader
oversight and engagement to keep us accountable for tangible progress
over time. We are absolutely committed to finding and removing barriers
where they exist, and welcome all service members who have the desire
and aptitude to pursue a career in SOF.
In addition to diversity of background, the current and next era of
competition and conflict require different skills, specifically in
artificial intelligence (AI) and digital technologies. In fiscal year
2020, our AI-Ready Workforce initiative took two steps forward in
growing data-savvy leaders and technology experts inside SOF. First, in
collaboration with Carnegie Mellon University and the DOD's Joint AI
Center, we educated hundreds of senior and midgrade SOF leaders on
basic AI principles and ethics. Second, USSOCOM welcomed our first
cohort of data science interns. The program exposes talented students
and graduates to SOF problems and harnesses their creativity and
technical skill in developing AI solutions for the force. We are
working with DOD to expand these programs and find flexible means to
exchange talent with industry and academia to supplement the organic
growth of AI-ready service members.
growing a healthy and resilient team
USSOCOM continues to build on the successes of the Preservation of
the Force and Family (POTFF) initiative and the Warrior Care Program
(WCP). The POTFF program gained early traction and notice through its
work with physical readiness; however, 62 percent of the POTFF team's
manpower now supports the psychological and cognitive performance of
SOF. Today, the program continues to increase its focus on brain health
and cognitive performance to address the growing cognitive load on
operators facing technologically advanced adversaries and information-
rich battlespaces. Not only must we build resilience, we must care for
those in need, and we have no more sacred duty than to care for our
wounded, injured, and ill teammates.
Since 2005, the USSOCOM Warrior Care Program (WCP), also referred
to as the Care Coalition, has led this vital effort. Over the WCP's 16-
year lifespan, 72 percent of wounded SOF have been retained in military
service, with 61 percent returning to duty inside their original
occupational specialty. This remarkable achievement has only been
possible with Congress's continued support for these programs.
Lastly, USSOCOM has not diverted our attention from the crucial
problem of suicide within our ranks. In 2020, we lost teammates to
suicide and saw teammates hospitalized for suicide attempts. We are
seeing a slight reduction in suicides among SOF; however, any suicide
is an unacceptable loss of life. We continue to work closely with DOD
and the Services to apply engaged leadership, education, and training
resources to prevent these tragedies.
compete and win globally
Special operations capabilities are essential tools to address both
violent extremist threats and strategic competition with other states.
Counterterrorism (CT) and Countering Violent Extremist Organizations
(C-VEO) remains a priority mission for SOF, but we do not allow these
missions to prevent us from also responding to the other threats facing
the Nation. USSOCOM fluidly prioritizes force employment to build
readiness, strategic flexibility, and apply unique SOF capabilities
judiciously, in concert with the Joint Force and Interagency, to
counter and impose cost on the malign activities of adversaries.
Today, we have nearly five thousand SOF deployed to 62 countries.
We continue to streamline direct C-VEO investments abroad and rebalance
SOF to force generation, modernization, and Great Power Competition
(GPC) activities. Our deployed forces are down 15 percent from last
year--the lowest since 2001, and in fiscal year 2021, nearly 40 percent
of our deployed forces will focus on GPC requirements. In the coming
year, we expect to achieve a sustainable balance of deployed forces
across both C-VEO and GPC mission sets and reach the DOD's directed 1:2
deployment-to-dwell ratio for all SOF.
sustainable c-veo pressure
Violent Extremism remains a threat to our national interests and
the safety of our people. Drivers of extremist violence exist in deep,
multigenerational ideological divisions that cannot be overcome quickly
or with military force. This problem will persist, and USSOCOM is
committed to a sustainable approach to C-VEO focused on threats that
exhibit both intent and capability to export violence transregionally,
specifically against the Homeland, while building burden-sharing
partnerships that enable local and regional leaders to manage others.
Additionally, USSOCOM fulfills our role as the DOD's Coordinating
Authority for C-VEO by producing a quarterly VEO threat assessment that
uses our inherently global outlook C-VEO engagement across multiple
Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) areas of responsibility (AORs) to
inform department-wide policy, priorities, and activities.
Over the past year, USSOCOM has assumed moderate but acceptable
risk to C-VEO capacity as we rebalance the force for modernization,
readiness, and strategic competition. Despite these constraints, our
unified action with joint, interagency, and multinational partners
continues to illuminate terrorist attack planning, track illicit
financing, and sustain pressure on transregional networks, all while
meeting directed reductions in troop presence across multiple theaters.
In Afghanistan, our forces continue to dismantle remnants of al-Qaeda
(AQ) and Islamic State (ISIS) leadership and support the ongoing peace
process. In Iraq, we continue to support multinational pressure on
pockets of ISIS leaders and fighters while building the capacity of our
partners in the Iraqi Security Forces. The information sharing model of
Operation Gallant Phoenix continues to enable allies and partners to
prosecute violent extremists. While we realize success on multiple
fronts, challenges linger.
Capable terrorist leaders continue to operate in portions of
Afghanistan. Despite losing territory and momentum, ISIS has avenues to
reconstitute and spread transregional violence if pressure is abated.
Violent extremism among internally displaced persons is a major
security concern in the Middle East. In east Africa, VEOs remain a
destabilizing force, reliable local partners are limited, and remotely
delivering sustainable, effective pressure is problematic. In many
remote areas, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and
close air support assets are stretched thin and come at high cost, and
we continue to work with DOD to address this issue.
sof in strategic competition
Competition among states remains a constant strategic consideration
across multiple regions, and we must adapt to maintain advantage. Since
their inception, modern SOF have contributed to this contest through
the aperture of irregular warfare. These capabilities are as relevant
today as they were at the onset of the Cold War. USSOCOM continues to
rebalance SOF training, activities, and investments to better enable
the Joint Force to compete below the threshold of armed conflict. For
SOF, this requires us to reinforce core competencies in irregular
warfare, foreign partner capacity building, clandestine activities, and
information operations.
As the United States seeks to reinvigorate and modernize our
alliances and partnerships to counter China, Russia, and other powers,
SOF will play a central role. The ``by, with, and through'' approach
inherent in SOF operations, coupled with our global C-VEO partnerships,
information operations, and Counter Threat Finance authorities and
expertise, present opportunities to maintain advantage. Our C-VEO
activities provide cross-cutting value as SOF illuminate adversary
activities, interests, and illicit finances and inform U.S. strategy
and whole-of-government efforts. With U.S. SOF as the partner of choice
for C-VEO, we will continue to capitalize on these investments that
build credible partners and gain access and influence abroad to counter
competitor ambitions and malign activities.
Information technology is another instrument used by our
competitors, allowing countries like China and Russia to exploit and
manipulate populations across the globe. As the DOD's Joint Proponent
for Military Information Support Operations (MISO) and Coordinating
Authority for Internet-based MISO, USSOCOM is positioning our
psychological operations forces for today's environment. The Joint MISO
WebOps Center (JMWC) is our flagship effort to coordinate MISO
conducted via the internet and actively engage foreign audiences to
expose, counter, and compete with hostile propaganda and disinformation
online. In 2021, we will incorporate our first foreign partners and
interagency liaisons.
The collaborative, mutually supporting relationship among the
functional combatant commands is essential to maintaining U.S.
advantage. These commands have global perspective and are well-
positioned to observe our competitors' regional activities and goals
across all domains. One example is USSOCOM's role as DOD's Coordinating
Authority for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD), in which
we focus on improving Joint Force readiness to mitigate risk posed by
WMDs and supporting unified approaches to countering proliferation of
WMDs and related technologies, materials, and expertise.
Finally, we are grateful for a range of authorities granted by
Congress that allow SOF to have outsized impact across multiple mission
sets. Operations conducted under 10 USC Sec. 127e (CT) provide
flexible options to apply CT pressure in otherwise inaccessible or
contested areas, and operations under fiscal year 2018 NDAA Sec. 1202
(Irregular Warfare) are essential for applying SOF capabilities to
illuminate and impose cost on malign actors. Additionally, authorities
under 10 USC Sec. 127f (Intelligence / Counter-Intelligence) and
fiscal year 2020 NDAA Sec. 1057 (Clandestine Operational Preparation
of the Environment) replaced the Emergency and Extraordinary Expense
authorization allowing application of SOF capability with greater
efficiency and transparency.
innovate to transform
Our SOF must modernize to compete and win. Guided by DOD priorities
and operating concepts, SOF are divesting of legacy platforms that fail
to provide increased value across GPC and C-VEO mission sets. Over the
last five budget cycles, USSOCOM has realigned 14 percent (roughly $9B)
of its Total Obligation Authority to modernizing SOF. We are focused on
capability development improvements, digital age changes, and business
administration reforms.
modernizing capability development and acquisitions
The acquisitions authorities given to USSOCOM by Congress are
indispensable in modernizing SOF capabilities. Our SOF Acquisitions,
Technology, and Logistics team works tirelessly to improve the
lethality, survivability, and sustainment of our operators and special-
operations-peculiar equipment. Our research, development, and
acquisition priorities center on adapting emerging technologies to
empower hyper-enabled operators and teams. Our initiatives seek to
accelerate gains in our ability to provide power, protection, and force
projection at the tactical edge.
Over the years, SOF have been an incubator and testbed for new
technology, and USSOCOM continues as a pathfinder for select
capabilities. In fiscal year 2020, we achieved notable returns across
multiple programs, including modernization of AC-130 and MC-130
platforms, fielding of next-generation software-enabled tactical
radios, and successful combat tests of suitable Precision Strike
missile prototypes. For future combat platforms, USSOCOM is working
closely with the Services to introduce SOF requirements into the
development process. Our collaborative work with the U.S. Army's Future
Vertical Lift initiative is an exceptional example. By synchronizing
requirements early, SOF will receive next generation systems that
require minimal modification, and the Joint Force will save on
sustainment and upgrade costs.
Critical SOF capability gaps still exist, and Congressional support
is essential in delivering these assets to reduce risk for our
operators and bolster SOF's ability to complement conventional
capabilities in competition. To provide sustainable support to C-VEO
operations, we are working with the U.S. Air Force to develop the Armed
Overwatch program. This program will provide cost-effective,
multipurpose aircraft to support operations in remote, austere areas
for the foreseeable future. Additionally, we are working with the U.S.
Navy to modernize Naval Special Warfare undersea warfare capabilities
central to GPC. These include wet and dry submersibles, unmanned
options, and offshore delivery solutions to provide coastal subsurface
clandestine activities and access.
modernizing a digital age force
To compete in the current environment, we need world-class talent
enabled by cutting-edge data management, software, and AI. USSOCOM is
committed to serving as a vanguard for the integration of AI in mission
command, intelligence analysis, and operations processes. Our newly
published strategies for data and digital network architecture align
with DOD's vision and advance a path toward greater data processing,
network interoperability, and security in contested environments.
Digital transformation, multi-domain data search and discovery, and
cross-domain data solutions are USSOCOM critical priorities.
Incorporating these capabilities with AI at the tactical edge within a
secure, reliable cloud-computing framework is essential for competing
with our adversaries across multiple domains. We are working closely
with USCYBERCOM, DOD leadership, and the Services to develop and
implement these solutions.
We are building a wide range of partnerships to explore the
potential of data-driven technologies. Our work with the DOD's Project
Maven and multiple service-led initiatives have expanded our
understanding of data collection and algorithm development to support
the warfighter and lay the initial groundwork for future AI
integration. Some of our newest partnerships focus on using AI to study
cognitive performance and brain health. We are investing in AI
technologies with goals to boost intelligence analysis and reduce
overhead for ISR processing, exploitation, and dissemination;
accelerate identification and response to online disinformation;
improve reporting and decision making at the tactical level; enhance
predictive maintenance and logistics; and optimize human performance.
modernizing business administration
USSOCOM is steadfast in improving efficiency, costs, and
transparency in business administration, auditability, and capability
development. In fiscal year 2020, we completed our third financial
statement audit and developed a roadmap aligned with DOD and Service
plans to obtain a clean audit opinion by fiscal year 2028.
Additionally, USSOCOM continues to reduce low-return activities and
reallocate funds toward SOF, Joint Warfighting, and DOD strategic
competition priorities.
We have also taken action to balance the SOF portfolio to address
national priorities and SOF capabilities that will remain in high
demand. In depth reviews of deployed forces and regionally aligned
headquarters are reducing pressure on the force and allowing our teams
to focus on priority tasks to build long-term readiness, assist the
joint force in competition, and experiment for greater
interoperability. Most importantly, these reviews are now integrated
with the DOD's routine force management processes. These changes better
posture USSOCOM to meet the full range of national priorities.
Our acquisitions team continues to be a defense leader in applying
Middle Tier Acquisitions and Other Transactional Agreement authorities
provided by Congress, and we have had continued success in leveraging
our SOFWERX platform via a Partnership Intermediary Agreement. SOFWERX
enhances USSOCOM's ability to collaborate and connect with a diverse
network of small, non-traditional companies, labs, scientists and
academia. The fiscal year 2020 NDAA Sec. 851 authorization to use this
platform to improve our interactions with Small Businesses through the
Small Business Innovation Research pilot program has been especially
effective. Since the pilot implementation, we have awarded 17 contracts
with results that matter to both DOD and industry: a 200 percent
increase in small business participation, 80 percent reduction in total
contracting time, and 60 percent decrease in the time from initial
award to prototype delivery.
conclusion
In closing, USSOCOM is committed to providing the best trained and
equipped SOF to support the Nation. We are actively realigning our
operations, activities, and investments to align with NDS priorities
and the operational needs of the GCCs, maintaining sustainable pressure
on priority C-VEO threats while enabling the Joint Force to maintain
advantage in competition, respond in crisis, and win in conflict. We
are modernizing and innovating for the future, updating our
organizational structures and processes for improved performance and
affordability. Most importantly, we are staying true to our first SOF
Truth--``Humans are more important than hardware''--by investing in our
people, ensuring a trusted, capable, diverse, and committed force that
is ready to meet any challenge. We are thankful to Congress for the
foresight in creating USSOCOM many years ago, for trusting and
sustaining this command as we developed a peerless force, and for your
continued support for this truly special cohort of men and women who
volunteer to undertake the most complex, challenging, and dangerous
missions in defense of our great nation.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Clarke.
General Nakasone, please?
STATEMENT OF GENERAL PAUL M. NAKASONE, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES
CYBER COMMAND; DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY; AND CHIEF,
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
General Nakasone. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
distinguished Members of the Committee, I am honored to be here
and to testify beside Acting Assistant Secretary Maier, and my
good friend, General Rich Clarke. I am joined today by
CYBERCOM's senior enlisted leader, Command Sergeant Major
Sheryl Lyon.
Entering our Army as an Arab linguist, Command Sergeant
Major Lyon's 30-year career with airborne, special mission, and
intelligence and cyber units makes her uniquely qualified to
serve as USCYBERCOM and NSA's senior enlisted leader.
Over the past year, I emphasized the importance of
defending the election against foreign interference. We did
this through the Election Security Group, a combined team from
U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. We built
on the lessons from earlier operations and honed partnerships
with the Federal Bureau of Investigations and Department of
Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency, sharing information with those who needed it as fast as
possible.
We also worked with the National Guard Bureau to create a
mechanism that enabled Guard units to share information about
incidents quickly, easily, and uniformly.
U.S. Cyber Command conducted more than 2 dozen operations
to get ahead of foreign threats before they interfered or
influenced our elections in 2020. Three points stand out to me.
First, U.S. Cyber Command must be, and is, able, ready, and
willing to act. Second, USCYBERCOM's partnership with NSA
remains the foundation of our success, and thirdly, we enable
our domestic industry allies and partners by providing
critical-threat information and insights which improve their
ability to act under their unique authorities.
I am proud of the work the command and the Election
Security Group performed as part of a broader government effort
to deliver a safe and secure 2020 election.
CYBERCOM is building on a recent guidance from the
Department seeking to promote readiness, improve training, and
attract and retain high-end talent. Regarding readiness,
CYBERCOM is improving its ability to monitor the status of
forces provided by the services down to the team, mission
element, and even individual levels.
CYBERCOM is expanding, enhancing the training that our
personnel receive.
As the trailblazer for the Department of Defense's Cyber
Excepted Service, the Command benefits from flexible hiring
authorities to recruit civilian talent. Even with COVID-19
impacts and lengthy security-clearance timelines, that impact
to the entire Department, CYBERCOM has offered and was able to
attract a number of high-end talent to our force.
Diversity is what makes us better. Extremism can tear us
apart. Last week at Cyber Command, we held a Secretary of
Defense-directed stand-down day. Extremism has no place in the
Armed Services and must not be allowed to affect our cohesion
or impact the security of the United States.
At CYBERCOM, I have strived to cultivate an environment
where personnel are empowered to report abuses and reject
participation in activities that demean or harass their co-
workers or neighbors. We owe it to ourselves, our workforce,
and our Nation to set and be the example.
In closing, the cyberspace environment has changed
significantly over the past 10 years. Adversaries are
demonstrating a changed risk calculus. They are undertaking
malign activities in cyberspace at greater scope, scale, and
sophistication. They desire to take on the U.S. cyberspace
below the level of armed conflict.
To defend our security and our interests in this
environment, U.S. Cyber Command must continue to adapt,
innovate, partner, and succeed against such adversaries. The
men and women at Cyber Command are truly grateful for the
support this Committee and Congress has given to our command.
Again, thank you for your support, and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Nakasone follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Paul M. Nakasone
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of
the Committee, I am honored to appear before you today and to represent
the men and women of United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). 2020
presented some unique challenges to USCYBERCOM that will inform our
actions over the next year. Indeed, 2021 is offering opportunities for
USCYBERCOM to build upon.
USCYBERCOM was established in 2010 and became a unified combatant
command in 2018. Our mission is to plan and execute global cyberspace
operations, activities, and missions to defend and advance national
interests in collaboration with domestic and international partners
across the full spectrum of competition and conflict. We direct,
synchronize, and coordinate cyber planning and operations. Our three
enduring lines of operation are as follows:
Provide mission assurance for the Department of Defense
(DOD) by directing the operation and defense of the Department of
Defense Information Networks (i.e. the DODIN) and its key terrain and
capabilities;
Defeat strategic threats to the United States and its
national interests; and
Assist Combatant Commanders to achieve their missions in
and through cyberspace.
In January 2021, our Cyber Mission Force (CMF) comprised roughly
6,000 service members and civilians out of an authorized a total of
6,187 positions. This includes Guard and Reserve personnel on Active
Duty serving at our headquarters and on our CMF teams. For comparison,
the 2018 DOD Cyber Posture Review counted about 238,000 personnel in
the Department's cyberspace operations forces, including the CMF,
USCYBERCOM's subordinate command elements, cybersecurity service
providers (CSSPs), special capability providers, and specialty units.
The DOD depends on USCYBERCOM and its performance. Every
operational plan and every mission across the Department builds from
the assumption that we will be able to assure that the bandwidth and
data that military forces require will be accessible and trustworthy.
A Look Back at 2020
In 2020, USCYBERCOM made progress in the face of significant
challenges.
Operationally, we helped to lead the successful defense of the 2020
elections and played a key role in the Government-wide response to the
SolarWinds breach. We also gained Departmental commitments to enhanced
resources and a better alignment of cyberspace responsibilities and
authorities for the Command (including the Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA
elimination of the $75 million cap on funds available for acquisition
activities).
We saw increasingly capable cyber adversaries target the United
States via influence operations, efforts to compromise sensitive data,
and attempts to gain access to our weapons systems. Adversaries still
seek to exploit gaps and seams between our organizations and
authorities:
China is a sophisticated cyber adversary. Beijing
conducts effective cyber espionage and other operations and has
integrated cyber activities into its military and national strategy.
Despite public exposure and indictments of Chinese cyber actors, China
remains focused on shaping the global narrative and exploiting American
networks and cyber systems.
Russia is a sophisticated cyber adversary. It has
demonstrated its ability to conduct powerful influence campaigns
utilizing the medium of social media. Moscow conducts effective cyber-
espionage and other operations and has integrated cyber activities into
its military and national strategy. Despite public exposure and
indictments of Russian cyber actors, Russia remains focused on shaping
the global narrative and exploiting American networks and cyber
systems.
North Korea has demonstrated the capability and intent to
strike the United States in cyberspace. Its regime sponsors cyber
exploitation of international finance via cyber means to evade United
Nations sanctions.
Iran has demonstrated both the capability and intent to
strike the United States in cyberspace. Iranian cyber actors are
growing adept at exploiting systems as well as delivering disruptive
and destructive attacks, and have attempted to execute a series of
influence campaigns.
Finally, non-state actors and criminal cartels remain
threats to us and our interests, whether by financing, recruiting, and
advertising violent extremist tactics, or through the exploitation of
data for theft or ransom.
All of these actors felt the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic - as
did we. Fortunately, we saw their operational tempo briefly diminish at
roughly the same time that we had to restrict access to our facilities.
COVID-19 mitigations remain in full effect across our enterprise, and
we are vaccinating our personnel as fast as vaccine supplies and local
conditions allow. Overall, I am pleased that the pandemic has not
limited the force's readiness or posture to fulfill its missions.
Last year, I emphasized the importance of defending the election
against foreign interference, in part through the Election Security
Group (ESG), a combined team from USCYBERCOM and the National Security
Agency (NSA). The ESG ensured that intelligence informed whole-of-
nation efforts to harden defenses and prevent or disrupt threats to the
U.S. elections. We built on lessons from earlier operations and honed
partnerships with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), sharing
information with those who needed it as fast as possible. We also
worked with the National Guard Bureau to create a mechanism that
enabled Guard units to share information about incidents quickly,
easily, and uniformly. We called it the Cyber 9-line, given the nine
lines of information a reporting entity would complete. As the election
approached, every state had joined this program. I am proud of the work
the Command and the ESG performed, as part of a broader government
effort, to deliver a safe and secure 2020 election.
USCYBERCOM conducted more than two dozen operations to get ahead of
foreign threats before they interfered with or influenced our elections
in 2020. Three points stand out for me:
First, USCYBERCOM must be ready and able to act. Threats
can arise rapidly, and opportunities can be fleeting. Our ability to
operate successfully in cyberspace is a function of streamlined
processes, mission readiness, and the trust of our various mission
partners.
Second, USCYBERCOM's partnership with NSA remains the
foundation of our success. Working together under one leader again
demonstrated the ability of both organizations to operate with speed
and agility to achieve outcomes for the Nation.
Third, we enable our foreign allies and partners, just as
they remain crucial to our ability to act. Operating with allies and
partners allows each to magnify each other's unique strengths. Our
efforts over the last year highlight the value of not only operating
but training together as well.
USCYBERCOM supported the combatant commands with a wide range of
other operational accomplishments over the last year. Counterterrorism
operations in cyberspace are continuous, helping to protect the force
and prosecute targets in Afghanistan and other regions on behalf of
USCENTCOM and USSOCOM. We are also shifting JTF-Ares' focus (though not
all of its missions) from counterterrorism toward heightened support to
great power competition, particularly in USINDOPACOM's area of
responsibility. Finally, we are working across the board to ensure that
the data links that our warfighters rely on are protected and
resilient.
In recent months our priority has been mitigating the threat to
federal systems from malicious cyber actors compromising widely-used
SolarWinds software and exposing thousands of public and private
systems to targeted exploitation. The U.S. Government learned of the
compromise in December 2020. As an immediate response to this threat, I
directed the creation of a combined USCYBERCOM-NSA team in support of
the U.S. Government's efforts, through the Unified Coordination Group,
to mitigate the compromise. To date, we have yet to identify any
compromise of DOD information networks in the unclassified or
classified domains.
My teams have provided almost 100 days of continuous support to the
whole-of-government mitigation effort. I have organized our efforts
across three lines of effort:
1. Bound the Problem. Using both automated and manual processes, we
worked to determine the scope of SolarWinds Orion software products
employed across the DODIN. Each instance was immediately isolated and
disconnected from DOD networks. Meanwhile, NSA worked to understand the
adversary's intent and illuminate additional tradecraft and
infrastructure to inform threat detection and asset response
activities. Finally, we prepared to support and assist other federal
departments and the Defense Industrial Base in bounding their
respective problems.
2. Expel the Adversary. This is a continuous process driven by
USCYBERCOM's Joint Force Headquarters-Department of Defense Information
Networks (JFHQ-DODIN), which has directed network administrators to
enumerate, isolate, and remediate all affected systems before they are
reconnected to the DODIN. We have yet to find any adversary presence on
the DODIN as a result of the SolarWinds compromise. We continue to work
with federal partners to share best practices and expertise to expel
the adversary from affected systems.
3. Impose Cost. USCYBERCOM and NSA are both planning and informing
the whole-of-government response options to the SolarWinds supply-chain
compromise and the adversary's associated campaign. Policymakers are
considering a range of options, including costs that might be imposed
by other elements of our government.
The SolarWinds incident occurred because highly skilled,
sophisticated actors inserted a malicious cyber capability into a
commercial product that was then downloaded and installed world-wide.
The nature of the tradecraft employed by this actor reinforces the
imperative for government and industry to collaborate in detecting and
responding to malicious cyber activity. We in the U.S. Government,
together with our industry partners, must improve our defensive posture
to prevent and minimize the impacts and the cost in time and money of
remedying such vulnerabilities and incidents, and we must rapidly
expose and respond to malicious cyber activity in the future.
Our Focus for 2021
My focus for the coming year is to broaden the foundation for
operational progress. In particular, we are building on recent guidance
from the Department, seeking to promote sustainable readiness; to
improve training; and to attract and retain high-end talent across our
military, civilian, Active Duty, and Reserve workforces.
Cybersecurity and defensive cyberspace operations mean mission
assurance for the DOD and thus are integral to our Nation's security.
For 2021 and the years ahead, there are several areas where USCYBERCOM
plans to improve. Our growth to date has highlighted certain
misalignments between the responsibilities I have as Commander and the
resources and authorities to execute those responsibilities. The
following initiatives reflect the Department's guidance to align
mission, responsibility, and accountability for the Command:
Accountability: The Secretary of Defense in late 2020 issued a
directive emphasizing accountability by aligning cybersecurity efforts
with operational risk decisions.
USCYBERCOM will improve risk management while also holding
commanders and directors accountable for their risk decisions.
Budget Control: USCYBERCOM's fiscal year 2021 budget is roughly
$605 million, which covers the headquarters staff and the Cyber
National Mission Force. Meanwhile, 27 different components shape the
Department's overall Cyber Activities Budget, which averages about $10
billion a year. USCYBERCOM is working with the Services and the Office
of the Secretary of Defense to direct CMF funding in a more
collaborative effort while allowing for informed tradeoffs (across the
Services) based on operational needs.
Team Realignment: The CMF's original force structure was set in
2012, and several teams were originally aligned to support the counter-
terrorism fight. With the return of great power competition, USCYBERCOM
is realigning some teams to focus on key nations.
Force Growth: Recent demand across DOD has demonstrated that the
original 133 teams in the CMF are not enough. The strategic environment
has changed since the original CMF was designated in 2012. Added forces
will ensure USCYBERCOM can fulfill its responsibility as both a
supported and a supporting command.
Training: USCYBERCOM is centralizing the provision of advanced
training. The Army will serve as the executive agent for advanced
cyberspace training. This will ensure that each Service presents well-
trained personnel to USCYBERCOM who can contribute to our missions as
soon as they arrive in the Command.
Sustainable Readiness: We are improving our ability to monitor the
status of forces down to the team, mission element, and even individual
levels in order to identify and remedy challenges to gaining and
maintaining necessary readiness. We are working to better provide
commanders with the situational awareness they require to assess risks
and make informed decisions, not just in operations but also in
maintaining the force as a whole. I am pleased with the progress here,
but more needs to be done.
Domestic and International Partnerships: Such ties collectively are
a force multiplier when it comes to cyber operations. USCYBERCOM is
enhancing its existing relationships and forging new ones based on U.S.
Government priorities. We have been sending teams to ``hunt forward''
at the invitation of foreign governments, helping them find adversary
malware on their governmental systems. Such persistent engagement in
cyberspace lets the Command deliver outcomes in competition with
adversaries, both by enabling our partners and by acting when called
upon.
Realigning Cyber Protection Teams: USCYBERCOM is working with the
combatant commands to ensure they have dependable defensive support for
their missions while we retain forces to deal with global challenges to
the DODIN.
USCYBERCOM executes its operations employing the Joint Cyber
Warfighting Architecture (JCWA), which is a cyber capabilities
architecture that enables us to act against our adversaries in
competition, crisis, and conflict in cyberspace. When fully realized,
JCWA will provide unified capabilities for Cyberspace Operations
Forces, integrating the data from offensive and defensive cyberspace
operations in ways that help commanders gauge risk, make timely
decisions, and act.
To help drive operational needs and capability development,
USCYBERCOM activated a JCWA Capability Management Office (JCMO). This
promoted unity of effort across the Command, the Services, and
Department in building the many and varied components that together
comprise the JCWA. Those components include:
Improved operational architectures that give our forces
the ability to operate at-scale from multiple locations;
Data sharing and analytics (the Unified Platform) that
provide insight for offensive and defensive operations;
Command and control features that display the readiness
of our forces as well as operational status. One tool in this suite,
Project IKE (soon to be Joint Cyber Command and Control), has ensured
we can measure readiness down to the individual level while informing
exercises, training, recruiting, and even retention;
Tool development capabilities that are responsive to
operational needs and increasingly able to focus talents and
innovations when and where they are needed most;
Realistic collective training (via the Persistent Cyber
Training Environment, or PCTE) that lets us rehearse missions and even
exercise with Reserve Component and foreign partners.
Last year's operational successes would not have been possible
without the Department's Total Force, which includes the National Guard
and the Reserves. Before the 2020 elections, the Guard provided local
connectivity and insight on key events like Super Tuesday. They also
played vital roles during the pandemic. For example, the National Guard
and Reserve provided cyber forces in response to a Defense Support to
Civil Authorities (DSCA) request from the Department of Homeland
Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency in support
of Operation Warp Speed, providing cybersecurity support to the
pharmaceutical industry as it developed COVID-19 vaccines in record
time.
Finally, the Reserve Component's ability to hire qualified cyber
warriors who decide to leave Active Duty upon completion of their
service commitment has proved invaluable. Members of the National Guard
and Reserve have relevant private-sector experience in fields of strong
interest to the Department, and many of them work for some of the
Nation's top-tier technology companies. The Air National Guard, for
example, has built both offensive and defensive cyber units in which
members departing Active Duty can transfer to part-time status while
they pursue careers in the civilian sector.
As the trailblazer for the DOD's Cyber Excepted Service (CES)
personnel authority, the Command benefits from flexible hiring
authorities in filling civilian vacancies and recruiting top cyber
talent. Even with COVID-19 impacts and security clearance timelines
that continue to challenge the whole Department, USCYBERCOM offered
competitive compensation and incentives to our best candidates. We are
also partnering with the National Security Innovation Network (NSIN), a
Defense Innovation Unit program office, to conduct a virtual hire-a-
thon that runs through this month. The most recent hire-a-thon garnered
more than 260 resumes from people eager to join our team, and similar
events are planned for the future. Civilians continue to play an
important role for USCYBERCOM, providing vital continuity in several
areas.
Conclusion
USCYBERCOM is actively engaged in addressing the Nation's
challenges from sophisticated and evolving adversaries in cyberspace.
The Command supports other combatant commanders in every geographic and
functional area of responsibility, while implementing the Department's
Defend Forward strategy and enhancing our capabilities.
For the year to come our priorities are set. We will focus on great
power competition through persistent engagement, especially in support
of USINDOPACOM, and particularly through improving the efficiency and
effectiveness of DODIN operations and defensive cyberspace missions. To
prepare for the approved growth in the CMF, we will enhance our control
over resources for the force, improve its readiness (including the
metrics we require in doing so), and consolidate CMF training. We will
integrate the development efforts ongoing in support of the JCWA. We
will also improve recruitment and retention of top military and
civilian performers. All of these measures will enhance the proficiency
of USCYBERCOM and boost its ability to provide defensive security
assurance and options for policymakers and commanders at the senior
levels of the government and the Department of Defense.
The men and women at USCYBERCOM are grateful for the support this
Committee and Congress in these efforts. I thank you for that support
in the important work that we have undertaken together, and now I look
forward to your questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Nakasone.
Let me make a few points as reminders. Again, at 10:45, we
are scheduled to have four votes and we will continue the
hearing as we go back and forth and vote. There is a closed
session after this hearing in SVC-217 and we will, as soon as
we conclude, go to SVC-217.
This is a hybrid hearing, so the questions will be by
seniority, not by arrival time, 5-minute standard questions,
and please mute your mics so that we can have no disruption of
the questioning.
Mr. Maier, again, what is the status today of the
Department's efforts to empower ASD SO/LIC and what additional
resources or authorities do you believe we need from the
Congress?
Mr. Maier. Thank you, Chairman.
So, the current status is one that is SO/LIC, as a
standalone organization, both its policy components and its
service secretary-like our 922 component outside of Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Policy, Secretary Austin and
Deputy Secretary Hicks are re-looking that to see if that
continues to make sense. I think one of the potential options
is to determine a way to better integrate the policy components
that were removed from SO/LIC towards the end of the last
administration, back more integrated into policy, but under no
circumstances, am I aware of any Courses of Action (COAs) that
are being discussed that would remove the service secretary-
like responsibility from remaining a principal staff assistant
and a direct-report up to the Secretary of Defense. So, I think
your legislation has been very clear on that point.
As to progress to date, we continue to make progress, I
think, on building the capability, in many cases, in the form
of expertise and people, on the components in that
administrative chain of command. So, the SSO, or Secretariat
for Special Operations, that was explicitly directed in the
2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is something we
built to about 40 people at this point and it includes a cross-
section of experts from the budgeting world, the legislative
world, the acquisitions world, really, the, if you will, the
nascent or core group of people that will perform that service
secretary-like function.
But we are not at the point, Chairman, of irreversible
momentum at this point and we are not at the point of having
something that is probably sufficient to do the roles that have
been described in multiple NDAAs at this point.
The last thing I will say is, I do think the relationship
with Special Operations Command is very strong. One of the
things that General Clarke and I benefit from is having worked
together on multiple occasions in the past, and I think that
leadership connection helps to ensure our staffs are proceeding
in that direction of collaboration, partnership, and civilian-
military relationships.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much.
General Clarke, let me, again, commend you from conducting
the review of culture and ethics. These are issues that every
organization and, particularly, military organizations have to
confront. Sixteen recommendations were generated by the panel.
Without going into detail on every recommendation, can you
highlight the key ones and the overall status of those
recommendations, implementation-wise.
General Clarke. Yes, sir, I can, if I can get the mic
working. Sir, the primary finding, as you pointed out, was, in
fact, that the focus on overemployment and mission
accomplishment led to the detriment in leadership
accountability and discipline. To that end, with those 16
recommendations and the findings from that, our focus, first,
was to the overall employment and how many forces were deployed
as we looked at, and we conduct our own zero-baseline review of
forces employed. Through that, have reduced the approximate SOF
employment by about 20 percent.
But we also, probably most importantly, have reduced the
amount of headquarters that were forward that put leadership
forward, therefore, you didn't have the leadership that was
back during the force generation so that the leadership was not
engaged and present.
The other specific aspects that we have looked at is the
training of our forces as they go through the various
pipelines, but also our assessments to improve those. But at
the end of the day, Senator, it's about engaged leadership to
reduce the amount of incidents that SOF has had in the past.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General.
General Nakasone, SolarWinds, the Microsoft hack, they
don't appear to be the garden-variety type of back-and-forth
that we have seen from nation states.
Are we into a new era in which our adversaries are
conducting more and more aggressive attacks that are designed
to be just short of a redline that would trigger some type of
conventional response? Are we in new terrain?
General Nakasone. Chairman, I think that, as you point out,
what we have seen from both, the SolarWinds and the Microsoft
intrusions, is an increasing level of sophistication. This is a
scope, a scale, a level of sophistication that we hadn't seen
previously. This isn't, simply, you know, email phishing
attempts; this is the use of supply chain or this is the use of
vulnerabilities we hadn't seen before.
In terms of this changing risk calculus for our
adversaries, their intent, obviously, we continue to monitor,
but for us, I think it is the clarion call for us to look at
this differently. How do we ensure we have, as a nation, both
the resiliency and the ability to act against these types of
adversaries?
Chairman Reed. We have structurally a gap between our
civilian authorities and our military authorities that is being
exploited by our adversaries?
General Nakasone. Chairman, for both of the intrusions,
what we have seen, I think I would point out would be two
critical areas that we need to address as a nation. First of
all, as you point out, it is not the fact that we can't connect
the dots; we can't see all of the dots. So, my authorities and
my responsibilities, both as the commander of U.S. Cyber
Command and as the director of the National Security Agency,
are rightly outside of the country.
But in terms of internal to our Nation, our adversaries
understand our policies and our laws and the timing to be able
to use our infrastructure to achieve access to these companies
and have an impact.
Thank you very much, General.
Senator Inhofe?
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to go back to a couple of things that I referred
to in my opening statement, and I know that, Mr. Maier, in your
opening statement, you addressed this. I would like to have a
little more detail and maybe aim this at both General Clarke
and at you.
We all understand what history has taught us, that if we
take our pressure off of the terrorist groups, they are going
to rebuild and threaten and all that, so things have to be done
at the same time. The two things that I am concerned with
still, and specifically getting into resources and
capabilities, trying to balance the NDS, and of course we know
what we are supposed to be doing there, the requirements to
modernize our forces to compete with China and Russia, that is
on one hand, but against the need to maintain the pressure on
ISIS and al Qaeda, especially in places like Africa.
Do you really think that you have the resources necessary
to accomplish both of these?
This is a place where you would want to come to, because if
you don't, we need to know about it. Would you respond to that
in some detail.
Mr. Maier. Ranking member, yes, I very much agree with the
idea that we have got to be able to do both and as I think
General Clarke referred to, in some cases, we can do both with
the same forces, but in a lot of cases, we can't.
I mean, in the case of Somalia, there were, as you know, a
lot of changes made over the last few months, including moving
forces out and there is a policy-review underway now, looking
at not only that decision, but how we ultimately posture our
forces to ensure we have the right capabilities there and in
other places.
I think one of the benefits of the beginning of a new
administration is, there are a number of posture reviews and a
lot of assumptions are underway. One of the key elements of
that is just as you described, how do we weigh the need to
continue to protect the American public, citizens, our
interests against the al Qaedas, and ISIS, and their affiliates
that are still out there, even as we look to, in some cases,
change our capabilities or our posture or our focus towards the
peer competitors that we face.
So, this is something that I think I would be happy to
drill down in more specifics as we go issue by issue or place
by place, but I think my take on this is the counterterrorism
fight is not over. The NDS says that, and I think that has been
reinforced in the early reviews coming out of these policy
reviews.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. Now, General Clarke, do you
essentially agree with this?
General Clarke. Senator, I----
Senator Inhofe. Okay. Well, I think we have a mic problem
there.
But let me go back. You brought up Somalia. Now, this
taking some of our resources out of Somalia, going into Kenya
and some other areas, that was actually a policy of the
previous administration and I disagreed with it at that time.
Now that we have already done this, Mr. Maier, what is your
feeling now, was that the right move or was that not the right
move? What kind of results are we getting now?
Mr. Maier. Ranking Member, I think we have a review
underway right now that is weighing all of this. I think from
my perspective, there are probably significant downsides to the
pull-out from the perspective of cost and effectiveness, but
that is my initial look, and this will have to be an
interagency look, but that is something that is being looked at
both, from the counterterrorism perspective and the broader,
regional objectives we have in the Horn of Africa.
Senator Inhofe. Well, I would like to be in on that because
I was pretty outspoken when that decision was made and I would
like to see how we are doing on that.
This was brought up already by the Chairman, the Russian
SolarWinds cyberattack to the Chinese hack into Microsoft, and
all that. We know those problems are there.
DOD began building a total of 133 CMF teams in 2012 and
reached full operational capacity with over 6,200 cyber
personnel in May of 2018.
General Nakasone, SolarWinds and Microsoft Exchange
cyberattacks demonstrate we are vulnerable, we have
vulnerabilities out there. What authorities or resources do you
need, again, it is kind of the same question I asked Mr. Maier,
what resources do you need to accomplish what we have to
accomplish, because this is the place you go to for resources.
General Nakasone. Ranking Member, thank you very much for
the question.
I think, first of all, just taking a step back, we as a
nation right now, are taking a very hard look at both of these
intrusions. I think there are two gaps that are being addressed
right now that have to be addressed and one of them is this
idea of information sharing. These attacks took place within
the United States, these intrusions, and there are, right now,
legal barriers and disincentives for the private sector to
share information with the Government.
We have a difficulty, as a government, understanding the
totality of the actual intrusion, so that is being worked. The
second piece is, as I mentioned to the chairman, we have an
inability to see everything. So, we, as U.S. Cyber Command or
the National Security Agency may see what is occurring outside
of the United States, but when it comes into the United States,
our adversaries are moving very quickly. They understand the
laws and the policies that we have within our Nation, and so
they are utilizing our own infrastructure, our own internet
service providers to create these intrusions.
The resourcing of U.S. Cyber Command right now to include
the 133 teams has been instrumental in us being able to have an
ability to act. Certainly, we are looking as a department, if
further growth is necessary, we will come back to the Committee
if that is a requirement.
But I would say the first two pieces, being able to
identify and being able to fix those areas, are part of the
resilience of the Nation that has to be addressed.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. That is very good.
My time has expired, but we are interested and is it a
work-in-progress right now and you are making headway, I
assume.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Shaheen, please?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
each of our witnesses.
General Nakasone, I want to congratulate you on the work
that Cyber Command did on the elections in 2020 and your also
mentioning of the National Guard. The Guard in New Hampshire
were very helpful in securing our election there.
But as you point out, we still have challenges ahead and
the Defense Intelligence Agency's defense intelligence officer
for Cyber, James Sullivan, recently asserted that Russia right
now is clearly ahead and the more aggressive and practiced
operator in information operations.
So, how should we, do we need more authorities to allow
Cyber Command to respond to what is happening in Russia?
You talked about the gaps between the private sector and
the public sector. Do we need a cyber security czar, someone
who is going to coordinate the activities on both, the defense
side and the private sector side?
What else do we need to do in order to respond to this
threat?
General Nakasone. Senator, I think there are two pieces
that are really important for us to continue to focus on
regarding the threat. First of all, as I mentioned, the
resiliency piece. We can have all the capabilities that we
want, all the teams that we want, but if there is a hole in the
bucket, and we are filling water, and the water is coming out
faster than we can fill it in, there is a problem. That is the
analogy I would use in terms of our resiliency right now. We
have to be able to see what is happening in terms of the broad
depth of our Nation.
The other piece is that we should understand what our
adversaries are doing. They are no longer just launching their
attacks from different parts in the world. They understand that
they can come into the United States, use our infrastructure,
and there is a blind spot for us not being able to see them.
Those are critical pieces.
The other piece that I would come back to, in terms of your
information operations question, that is something that both
General Clarke and myself have taken on, and I think that you
rightly point out that there is work that we have to do here.
We have done a tremendous amount in terms of understanding and
operating against adversaries to our election, but now we are
in the area of great power competition. Is it the ability for
multiple combatant commands, not just U.S. Cyber Command, but
our geographic commands like European Command and U.S. Indo-
Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) and U.S. Special Operations Command
to harness the abilities that we have collectively against
adversaries that are using information against us.
Senator Shaheen. So we have had, I remember several years
ago we had a discussion in this Committee about whether
cyberattacks were an act of war and at what point we should
consider them an act of war and we never resolved that
discussion.
Is that a discussion we should get back to and should we
change policy, with respect to cyberattacks on the United
States?
General Nakasone. So, that is obviously a policy question
that I would leave to, you know, the policy experts in the
Department of Defense and the administration.
In terms of my role in being able to ensure that the Nation
has capabilities and capacities, what we are focused on is
ensuring we understand our adversaries, understand what our
adversaries are attempting to do, and having the capabilities
and the capacity to be able to get after those adversaries.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
I would argue, Mr. Chairman, that we should revisit that
discussion in this Committee.
General Clarke, there is a lot of debate right now about
whether according to the agreement we made in Afghanistan with
the Taliban, that we should withdraw our troops by May 1 and I
have been an opponent of doing that because I question whether
we have the capacity right now within the Afghan forces to be
able to respond to the Taliban.
Can you give us an update on where you think the Afghan
security forces are in terms of their ability to respond to the
threat.
General Clarke. Senator, I was recently in Afghanistan and
met with the head of their new, what they have stood up as a
joint special operations command. While progress has been made,
and I found a very dedicated commander in General Aziz, I think
the capabilities that the United States provides for the
Afghans to be able to combat the Taliban and other threats that
reside in Afghanistan are critical to their success.
Senator Shaheen. I find it particularly troubling that
violence has increased on the part of the Taliban and in the
last couple of months, we have had directed assassinations
against civil society leaders in the country in a way that is
clearly designed to take out the potential for leadership in
the country if western forces withdraw.
Do you think that presents an added risk to Afghanistan?
General Clarke. Senator, it is clear that the Taliban has
not upheld what they said they would do and reduce the
violence. While, on the positive side, they have not attacked
U.S. forces, it is clear that they took a deliberate approach
and increased their violence since the peace accords were
signed.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Now, via Webex, Senator Fischer, please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
gentlemen, for being here today.
General Nakasone, I recall the 2015 Rose Garden
announcement with President Obama and President Xi that a
common understanding had been reached to halt China's state-
sponsored cyber theft of intellectual property. Over 5 years
later, how would you assess that commitment and has China's
actions matched its words?
General Nakasone. Senator, based upon what I have seen over
the past several years that I have been in command of United
States Cyber Command and as the director of the National
Security Agency (NSA), I have seen the Chinese continue to
utilize cyber activities below the level of armed conflict to
steal our intellectual property, to steal our personal
identification, and at times, attempt to influence our
populous.
Senator Fischer. More specifically, did this agreement have
any impact on cyberattacks against our defense industrial base?
General Nakasone. Senator, if I might, I would like to take
that question for the record just because we are learning
things every single day and I want to make sure that it is a
fulsome answer.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you.
What lessons have you learned from the experience,
especially on how we can reduce this hostile cyber activity
that we are seeing in cyberspace?
General Nakasone. I think the first lesson is that we
should all take this as a wake-up call. That this is not
business as usual, as the chairman had mentioned.
These are adversaries that are operating with increased
sophistication, scope, scale, and I mentioned sophistication of
what they are doing.
The second piece is that this is about partnerships for us
as a nation. How do we drive a better partnership between what
the public needs and what the private sector can offer?
That information sharing that I mentioned is really
critical for us to have success in the future.
Then the last piece is that we truly need to look at the
ability for us to see ourselves and right now it is difficult
for us to see ourselves because we have adversaries that are
coming into our Nation and being able to utilize our
infrastructure very timely and very effectively against us.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, General.
General Clarke, your predecessor testified that, quote, our
effectiveness over the last 15 years does not necessarily
equate to success against near-peer competitors. We also
require urgent investments in capabilities necessary for denied
battlefields of the future. This includes submersibles,
terrain-following avoidance and all-weather radar, advanced
electronic attack capabilities, countermeasures, and precision
munitions. We must enhance our effectiveness in partnership
with these services, end quote.
Do you agree with that?
General Clarke. Senator, I do agree with that and I will
tell you since General Thomas, my predecessor, made those
remarks, SOCOM has been on that path to, in fact, ensure that
we are cementing things in place that will allow our force to
modernize for both, competition and for future conflict.
Senator Fischer. What progress has SOCOM made in developing
these higher-end capabilities?
General Clarke. Senator, both team with both, academia and
with industry. We are making sure, first, that we are not
procuring capabilities that can't be used in a sustainable
extremist fight, but that can also be used in near-peer, and we
are focused very highly on next-generation, ISR, mobility, and
putting a significant amount of effort into data and our
networks to ensure that we have precision strike and effects
into the future.
Senator Fischer. In light of the priorities that have been
laid out in the NDS, how is SOCOM balancing its investments to
operate against those near-peer competitors, like China and
Russia, with efforts to fulfill its global counterterrorism
requirements?
I would like to know where, if you could answer that, and
then let me know where you are willing to accept risk.
General Clarke. Senator, first, on the acceptance of risk,
intel drive ops, and where we put our focus on are those most
virulent threats that could actually come back to our Homeland
and the persistent threat against threats like al Qaeda and
ISIS and those networks.
But then as we have looked at those sustainable
capabilities against those threats, what else can come back,
and that goes with both access and placement in other countries
around the globe where counterterrorism can also equate to
great power competition in someplace like the Philippines where
our access and placement in helping the Filipinos fight ISIS
allows us, also, to be involved in great power competition.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, General. Thank you both very
much.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Now, let me recognize Senator Gillibrand via Webex.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, for General Clarke, we entrust the special
operations community with some of our most important missions
and they have truly been the tip of the spear over the last
decade. I wonder if these units are not being overtaxed or
undersupervised. In recent years, we have heard troubling
stories about SEALs [Sea, Air, Land] and Marine Raiders, a
murder of a Green Beret, and allegations of war crimes by Navy
SEALs.
So, first, should we be more concerned about good order and
discipline problems in this community and, second, even if
these cases are being prosecuted appropriately, are we taxing
the operators with too heavy a load?
The chronic stress of these missions lead to post-traumatic
stress, anxiety, and other mental health challenges.
Third, are you adequately resourced to provide the
necessary mental health treatment for these servicemembers and
their families?
General Clarke. Senator, the items that you bring up are
exactly why I directed last year a comprehensive review to look
at our forces, and while, yes, I do believe that we are
overfocused on employment and mission accomplishment, I do
believe that through that comprehensive review, we have taken a
hard look at ourselves and are making the corrective steps to
ensure, I think most importantly is that we have the engaged
leadership present throughout the force at the right time to
reduce those incidents from occurring that have been
highlighted.
I think one specific area that you mentioned which is
important, is in the resources in our preservation of the force
and family, which Congress allocates to us, today, more than 40
percent of our manpower that is associated with that is
actually going to the cognitive and, most importantly, the
psychological efforts to ensure that our special operators and
their families are cared for.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Mr. Maier, as you know, the current special operations
force structure is largely derived from counterterrorism and
foreign internal defense operations in Iraq, in Afghanistan.
Do you think that this structure has created gaps in
Special Operations capabilities to win against global rivals
like Russia or China?
Mr. Maier. Senator, I think it has and I think that has
been recognized, and I think that is where we are laser-focused
on closing that gap. Whether that gap is, as General Clarke
alluded to, having higher-end capabilities that is more data-
driven, more technology, more cutting-edge, but also at the
same time, as has already been highlighted, being able to do
our counterterrorism mission in a sustainable fashion and reap
some of the benefits of those partnerships that give us,
frankly, an asymmetric advantage over our peer adversaries,
because we do work with so many countries in so many different
ways.
So, this is absolutely something that I think the NDS has
highlighted for us and within the SOF enterprise, continue to
be very focused on.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
General Nakasone, I really appreciate your leadership, and
it was great to see you last week. I want to talk a little bit
about sort of where we are, because in February 2020 when you
were at a hearing, you said that you were understanding our
adversaries better than our adversaries understand themselves.
Well, obviously, we just had the SolarWinds hack. Experts
estimate that maybe a thousand software engineers executed that
operation.
What did we get wrong? What do we need to do to make sure
we don't miss those kinds of assaults in the future, and what
do you propose to address long-term concerns?
Specifically, we talked a lot about cyber workforce, about
how to make sure we have the best and the brightest working for
us so that we don't have intelligence gaps like this in the
future.
General Nakasone. Senator, with regards to our adversaries
and understanding them, the comment I was making there was in
reference to what we are seeing with their election influence.
But I agree with you, we have to understand our adversaries
better, particularly, given the recent intrusions that are
ongoing.
Part of understanding our adversaries, though, is being
able to see our adversaries, So, again, if we have a problem
where we only see our adversaries when they operate outside of
our country and we don't see them when they operate inside our
country, it is very difficult for us to be able to, as I say,
connect those dots.
That is something that the administration and obviously
others are addressing right now. In terms of what we are doing
at U.S. Cyber Command, we are very much focused on how do we
ensure that our capacity, our capability remains the best in
the world, and that gets back to your point on people what we
have learned over the past couple of years is that the services
bring in incredible talent for us. We are able to see these
young soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen come
into our force, train them, but then our great challenge is,
how do we retain them?
That is something that certainly I give a lot of attention
to every single day, and it is retaining the best of the people
that we are able to bring in. Now, we have been able to
leverage a number of the authorities that this Committee has
been able to generate for us, and so that is one of the areas
that we are focused on right now, so as we continue to improve
being able to see the adversary in its totality, we have the
people that are able to apply, obviously, the capacity and the
capability to defend the Nation.
Senator Gillibrand. I would like to work with the Committee
on getting you those authorities.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Gillibrand.
Let me recognize Senator Rounds, please.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, good morning, and I thank you all for your
service to our country. I would like to thank your families, as
well, for their sacrifice, as you continue that service.
General Nakasone, I want to work through this issue a
little bit more about whether or not we see our adversaries,
and I would like to just have a discussion with you. I
understand that you have always made it very clear in all of
our discussions that you are not here to tell us how to do
public policy, but in order to make the public policy, we
really do need your professional advice in terms of what is
working and what is not.
You have alluded to it a couple of times today and I would
really like to flush this out. Right now, we have provided the
ability for Cyber Command to use cyber activities as
traditional military activity, and so you can work outside of a
war zone, as long as it is not within the United States. Our
country has always said that our Armed Forces are not designed
to be utilized within our country; they are designed to be used
outside and to defend our country.
Yet now, we face cyberattacks where adversaries, near-peer
adversaries, Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, have figured out
that because of the laws that we have in place to protect our
personal privacy, that they are using internet connections to
literally get into the United States and then to launch attacks
probably from systems that are found within the United States.
It seems to me that most Americans would suggest that if we
have the ability or we have a desire to stop those attacks, we
either have to be able to defend forward, to go on out to find
them and to literally provide a very active cyber defense
outside in an offensive capability, or we have to have the
ability, as I think you are suggesting, to be able to see
inside of our own country and to find where they are actually
launching those attacks at.
I want to take a few minutes here and just allow you to
expand on that and to share with us a little bit so that we
have a better understanding of what the public policy
challenges are that limit your ability to be able to see our
adversaries here within the country.
General Nakasone. Senator, thank you.
So, in terms of my authorities as both, the commander of
U.S. Cyber Command and the director of the National Security
Agency, I operate outside the United States, our forces do. It
is not just a matter of policy; it is also law in terms of we,
as a nation, rightly so, have a very, very determined balance
between privacy and security. So, the authorities within the
United States reside with the Federal Bureau of Investigations
and others to do that type of surveillance.
What I am identifying right now, though, is our adversaries
understand that they can come into the United States and
rapidly utilize an internet service provider, come up and do
their activities and take that down before a warrant can be
issued, before we can actually have surveillance by a civilian
authority here in the United States. That is the challenge that
we have right now.
Now, I would, again, would offer that there are probably a
number of different ways that we can look at this: whether or
not it is greater public-private partnership; whether or not it
is, you know, laws in terms of private sector, understanding
who their customers are. But these are all areas that I think
we, as a nation, have to be able to address.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, General Nakasone.
I just really think it is important that we share with the
American public, this is not a case of where we are not
technically adept. This is a case of where we have made laws
that we think are correct and that we don't use our resources,
our military uses within the United States, but we do expect
that our other law enforcement capabilities are able to
coordinate and to rapidly assist you so that you can go on out
and find and take these folks out before they do it again, so
to speak.
Is that a fair way of looking at it?
General Nakasone. Senator, I would offer this is at the
heart of our Fourth Amendment, and so being able to obviously
look at that in terms of why it is so important that we have
that right balance between privacy and security that is
maintained, so being able to address that, obviously, is the
challenge that we have going forward.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Maier, I just want to bring up an issue that I think is
really important. Secretary Mattis implemented a close-combat
lethality task force in 2018. This was an organization
dedicated to providing resources and policy solutions to the
force who have accounted historically for nearly 90 percent of
all the casualties, yet constitute only 4 percent of the force,
and receive only 1 percent of institutional investments.
This has been and will remain a very important legislative
priority for my office. Nevertheless, despite its noble goals,
this task force has floundered in the bureaucracy over the last
year and I would like to see it get back on track.
Can you give me your perspective on the need for an
effective cross-functional team, such as this task force, that
would be focused on our special operations forces, as well as
Army and Marine infantry units and their enablers.
I know that I am 30 seconds over my time allotted, so I am
asking the question now, but I would ask if you would respond
for the record to that request.
Mr. Maier. Senator, I would be happy to.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Maier. I fully support enhancing the lethality,
mobility, and situational awareness of our tactical forces that
most directly engage with the enemy, those being U.S. Special
Operations Forces (SOF) and infantry. The U.S. Army has
partnered with the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) and U.S. Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM) representatives since the former
Secretary of Defense directed the transfer of the CCLTF to the
U.S. Army in March 2020, culminating in a 1-star general
officer/flag officer steering committee. Going forward, the
CCLTF will operate as a U.S. Army-led cross-functional team,
with joint governance maintained through the U.S. Army-USMC-
USSOCOM Tri-Service Chairs under the direction of the Secretary
of the Army, with reporting requirements to the Secretary of
Defense. This effort is critical to accomplishing our strategic
priorities, minimizing casualties, and increasing combat
effectiveness; particularly among SOF personnel who often
operate in remote, austere, and hostile environments. My team
continues to engage directly with the CCLTF to develop,
evaluate, and recommend improvements to SOF and other squad-
level close-combat formations to ensure an advantage in close
combat. Maintaining an appropriately resourced and effective
cross-functional team ensures that innovative and tailored
technology is fielded to meet these warfighter-unique
requirements.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Now, let me recognize Senator Kaine, please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and Ranking Member
Inhofe.
It is great to have these great public servants before us.
General Nakasone, I would like to begin with you. First, just
congratulations. I just have been so impressed with the work of
Cyber Command over my time on this Committee both, in the 2018
election cycle and the 2020 election cycle, I think that you
have just done a magnificent job and I just wanted to state
that up front.
Here is a concern that I have. I am on the foreign
relations committee and I am the chairman of the subcommittee
that oversees the Western Hemisphere. We had a hearing
yesterday on sort of democracy backsliding in the Western
Hemisphere, and one of the areas of concern is that the next
two years, 2021 and 2022 are kind of, I think one of the
witnesses described it as sort of an avalanche of elections or
a tsunami of elections in Central and South America in nations
where we are partners.
I spoke to the Colombian ambassador to the United States
recently and he talked about increasing cyberattacks that they
are suffering to delegitimize elections, to promote chaos and
division. Most of these cyberattacks seem to emanate from
Venezuela, from probably Cuban or Russian actors in Venezuela,
and other nations in the region that are aligned with the
United States, are seeing the same thing. The Colombian
ambassador to the United States asked if SOUTHCOM and CYBERCOM
could be of assistance in this significant wave of elections in
the next couple of years.
I wanted to ask you, we had our posture hearing with
SOUTHCOM last week, what are you doing or what might Cyber
Command do, together with SOUTHCOM, to try to help our allies
in the region, avoid this escalating trend of disinformation
that destabilizes democratic elections?
General Nakasone. Senator, let me begin by, first of all,
thanking the Committee. What you refer to our successes in 2018
and 2020 are based upon the work that this Committee did in the
fiscal year 2019 NDAA to identify cyber as a traditional
military activity. That allowed us to operate outside of our
networks. It allowed us to do things like hunt-forward
operations, of which, we did 11 hunt-forward operations in nine
different countries for the security of the 2020 election.
In terms of working with Admiral Faller and SOUTHCOM, both
the admiral and I have discussed a series of countries that are
coming up. We have worked together to identify teams that can
assist these countries to provide advice. We know a lot about
what our adversaries are doing in terms of influence and
interference when it comes to elections. So, we want to make
sure that we share that with our allies as well.
Senator Kaine. I think the U.S. has played a good role.
United States European Command (EUCOM) has played a good role
with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European
nations with, you know, cyber defense. It is often centered in
Estonia, a great center there of cyber defense, and I hope that
we might explore what we can do in the Americas, as well. Thank
you for that.
Senator Shaheen asked some questions about war powers that
we have to grapple with and I am going to have one question for
each, General Nakasone and General Clarke.
In the War Powers Resolution, basically, it requires, and
there is some confusion and some good faith argument about the
legality of portions of the 1974 War Powers Resolution, but it
requires notice from the administration to Congress when the
U.S. military is engaged in hostilities or situations that can
lead to hostilities.
One of the things I have noticed on the Committee is over
time, even recently, we will get a notice letter from the
administration, for example, about the strikes that were
carried out in Syria. If my memory is not playing tricks on me,
I don't believe we have ever gotten a notice letter about a
cyber, an offensive cyber action carried out by Cyber Command.
Am I right about that?
General Nakasone. So, we do have a very strict
congressional notification that we do adhere to. I think we had
just recently had published a congressional notification for
the Committee. I will go back and check, though, just to make
sure on that, Senator.
Senator Kaine. Okay. It may be that it goes to some on
intel or other committees and may not go to all the Members of
this Committee, but I would like to explore that.
Secondly, to General Clarke, the War Powers Resolution does
have a reporting exception for deployments which relate solely
to the supply, replacement, repair, or training of forces in a
foreign nation. So, if we deploy forces to do those things,
there is not a reporting requirement under the War Powers
Resolution and yet sometimes those activities, as in the sad
case of the loss of four servicemembers in Niger, I think it
was in 2017, they can lead to military action and even loss of
United States life, and that is something, again, I just think
we need to grapple with.
The notion of what hostilities are might be quite a bit
different than it was in 1974 when Congress drafted the
resolution and passed it, and it may require that we sort of
get into what is the current nature of hostilities and warfare
and grapple with that a bit.
Last, I will just say to you, General Clarke, not a
question, but thank you to you and Secretary Maier. The special
forces community is a really important and valued portion of
our commonwealth and we thank you for the work that you do.
I will yield back, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
I would like to recognize Senator Cotton, please.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.
General Clarke, on January 20, President Biden and his
national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, issued a derivative
that withdrew authority to conduct certain military operations
outside of Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, from our combatant
commanders and reserved it to the White House, itself.
Has that affected Special Operations Command, or is that
simply affecting our regional geographic combatant commands?
General Clarke. Senator, I am aware of that, as it was
reported in the open-source. I would respectfully submit or
request that we talk about that in a closed hearing.
Senator Cotton. Okay. It has been confirmed by the National
Security Council on the record, but I understand the
hesitation.
Maybe I will ask Mr. Maier, do you know the problem that
that decision was designed to solve, because it is not apparent
to me what problem was raised by having combatant commanders or
their subordinate commands make the decision to conduct
military operations outside of Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq.
Let's just get down to brass tacks here, we are talking
primarily, I think Yemen, Somalia, and the African Sahel.
Mr. Maier. Senator, I think it is meant to be an initial
review of this administration in the use of a series of
different actions that, again, we should probably talk about it
in closed session. But I think like a lot of the reviews that
are underway, I already alluded to everybody on the Committee
certainly knows about Afghanistan, Somalia, the posture
hearings and reviews that are underway, those are all part of
an overall series of looking at what has been done and whether
this administration would continue to proceed with those.
Senator Cotton. Okay. We will discuss it in the closed
session. Again, this has been reported and confirmed by the
National Security Council.
To make a point, I will relay a story the past President
told me. I don't think he will be offended if I share his
thoughts. He said early in his administration, he was doing
some reading late one night and he got a call from an action
officer about approving a strike and his response was, well,
what do they expect me to know about it? Don't they have some
captain on the ground near this country that has been following
this target and knows that this is a bad guy and that we should
conduct this strike?
I agree with that sentiment.
General Clarke, I have the highest confidence in you and in
General McKenzie in Central Command and General Townsend in
Africa Command to know whether or not we should smoke a bad guy
overseas. That doesn't need to be decided by civilians at the
White House.
General Clarke, I want to turn to Special Operations
Command and something we discussed in our visit yesterday, and
I just want you to elaborate for us on the record here.
What specific changes in force design and capabilities do
you believe are necessary to attain the force that you need to
accomplish your mission going forward and what do you believe
are the most pressing of those needs?
General Clarke. Senator, in order for us to compete
effectively in the future, we have to modernize both, our
precision strike and ISR. We particularly have to look at data
and data management so that the most specific requirements
enabled at the tip of the spear where our operators are, so
that they can quickly see and sense the battlefield that they
may have to be fighting in, into the time of crisis.
Then we also have to have encrypted and electronic warfare
capabilities so that our forces that could be forward in a
joint war-fighting capacity, reduce the probability for them to
be targeted. So, we are looking at all of these, Senator.
I, personally, changed our modernization priorities and
restructured some of our funding to modernize those
capabilities.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
General Nakasone, in the time we have remaining, I want to
ask a question that may seem to be a boring bureaucratic matter
to some people watching, but it is an important question that
this Committee has addressed in the past and that the
intelligence committee has addressed, as well, and that is the
so-called dual-hat. In addition to being the commander of the
Cyber Command, you are also the director of the National
Security Agency; is that right?
General Nakasone. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Cotton. That is the so-called dual-hat that you
command this military combatant command and also that you run
an intelligence agency.
What do you think are the positive things that result from
wearing that dual-hat?
General Nakasone. Senator, over the past 3 years, what I
have learned as being both, the commander of U.S. Cyber Command
and the National Security Agency is that the ability for myself
to operate in both roles provides the Nation, speed, agility,
and flexible responses to adversaries that are increasingly
modernizing, getting quicker, and getting more sophisticated.
We operate in a domain that changes rapidly and this change
is measured in weeks, perhaps months. Being able to rapidly
react to that, as we have been able to prove in such things as
securities of elections in 2018 and 2020, is empowered by that
relationship.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. Thanks, gentlemen. I will see
you in the closed session.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Let me now recognize Senator King via Webex.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Nakasone, a couple of quick questions about your
staffing. Would it help, in terms of recruitment and retention
if you had the authority, as part of this process, to forgive
student loans, would that be a factor that you think might be
effective in helping to retain and bring on the people that you
need?
General Nakasone. Senator, certainly, that would.
The services have that power as they recruit talent for our
force. We have utilized it also with our civilians, but that is
one mechanism that we get feedback that is very attractive to
our workforce.
Senator King. The second specific question, we have had a
real backup problem in the past with the security-clearance
process. Is that improving or has that been a barrier?
I have heard of people that just get so discouraged they
move on even though they have been accepted for a position.
General Nakasone. Senator, it has improved and it has
improved significantly over the past couple of years. I applaud
the work that has been done by the Department toward that, but
even with that said, for those that operate at U.S. Cyber
Command, it does require a full security investigation. So,
there are times that there are a fraction of our workforce that
takes longer than others.
Senator King. I think that is something we have to continue
to work on, because we don't want to lose good people who are
making the commitment but can't set their lives aside for a
year or more for that process to carry-forward.
You used the term at one point, to change the subject, you
used the term ``risk calculus.'' You have used the new
authorities very effectively in the elections of 2018 and 2020
in terms of defending forward and engaging with the adversaries
in their systems.
Has that had a deterrent effect that you have observed, do
you believe that the adversaries are thinking twice about some
of the things they may be planning against us because they know
of the capacity that you have demonstrated?
General Nakasone. Senator, I continue to see our
adversaries operate rapidly in terms of being able to try to
operate below the level of armed conflict. We have effectively
gone from being a very static to a very active force, as you
refer to, ``defend forward'', the Department's cyber strategy
of 2018 and our instantiation at U.S. Cyber Command of
persistent engagement, how do you both, enable your partners
and act?
We continue to do that. We are operating in a space where
our adversaries are not going to stop. They are going to
continue to look for ways to steal our intellectual property,
to steal our identification, and to try to influence our
populous.
We, at the same time, have to be forward. We have to be
operating, and we have to be engaged with our adversaries, and
that is what has been my focus over the past couple of years.
Senator King. Well, would you agree that we need to develop
a cyber doctrine, if you will, of declared deterrences,
because, as you say, they are going to continue to do this
until they have a risk calculus that tells them that there will
be a price to be paid that they are not willing to undertake.
General Nakasone. So, certainly, Senator, the policymakers
continue to look at this type of doctrine and I know that is
being worked. From my perspective or my responsibilities, I am
very, very focused on operationally how do we ensure that we
can operate against these adversaries that continue to try to
operate below the level of armed conflict.
Senator King. I think there is one point that has been
discussed repeatedly today that really bears a lot of policy
discussion, and that is the gap that you have identified where
you aren't able, either in Cyber Command or NSA, to operate
within the United States, but our Vice President Harris have
learned that if they can hop and use a server or an internet
service provider (ISP) in the U.S., they can evade your
surveillance, and then we have the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), as you mentioned. We are dealing with the
fundamental issue of protection of privacy.
But would you agree that this is a serious issue?
SolarWinds is a perfect example where they operated in this
country for something like a year, 9 months to a year, and were
picked up by the private sector, not by our services.
So, I take it from your prior discussion, this is something
we really need to focus upon; isn't that correct?
General Nakasone. I do think we need to focus on it,
Senator. The only alteration I would make to it, it is not
necessarily that it is U.S. Cyber Command or the National
Security Agency that needs to be doing this. I am saying that
the Nation needs an ability to be able to see what is going on
within the United States.
Senator King. I agree. I am not saying that it is your job,
necessarily, but what I am saying is this gap is an issue that
we have to address and SolarWinds points it out.
I think one other point, and my time is expired, but that
needs to be emphasized is the relationship with the private
sector. You have already mentioned that and that is something
that we are going to be working on, I hope, in this session of
Congress. That is a key part of cyber defense.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator King.
Let me now recognize Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for being here today and for
your command teams and, as well, the men and women within your
commands.
General Clarke, certainly, our Special Operations Force is
probably the most capable military element on the face of the
planet, and as well, General Nakasone, the men and women within
Cyber Command have proven essential to us over the past number
of years. So, thank you very much for being here today.
Mr. Maier, I appreciate the opportunity to sit down with
you recently and discuss our SO/LIC forces. We think it is
really important and General Clarke, as well. I will start the
questioning with you. I appreciate you sitting down a couple of
weeks ago and visiting about our shared commitment to the men
and women of SOF, so thank you.
Senator Inhofe and Senator Fischer touched a little upon
some of the gray zone activities where our SOF covers down and
we know how important that is. As we have seen counterterrorism
actions in the past, and as we move to, you know, the near-peer
competition under the guise of our National Defense Strategy,
we understand there needs be a little shift, but if you can,
just reinforce how important it is that we continue not only to
adjust to that near-peer competition with our special
operators, but also to continually focus on counterterrorism
efforts.
General Clarke. Senator Ernst, as you know, SOCOM has to
enable the joint force in both, crisis, competition, and if
necessary, conflict. In this space, there will remain that
persistent threat and we have to prioritize towards that
persistent threat and that would be groups like al Qaeda and
ISIS.
But there are SOCOM and SOF unique capabilities that can be
used in competition that the rest of the joint force doesn't
have, and that could be things like undersea, seabed warfare
and only we provide, the strategic reconnaissance that our
forces are extremely capable of. So, as we look at that
competition area and as we look to modernize our force for the
future, those are the specific capabilities that we will
continue to work with this Committee to move forward on.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, sir.
Just as a reminder to this Committee, as we are looking at
potentially flat budget for DOD in the future, we just need to
understand the role that SOF plays, that SOCOM has around the
globe, and that we do get a lot of bang for our buck when it
comes to the men and women within your command.
You know quite well that my heart and soul is behind
Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) and how important
it is, and I know, sir, the fifth pillar of your command
philosophy is health of the force, but we go back to the SOF
truth that humans are more important than hardware. So, this is
something that I have long been involved in.
If you could, please explain a little bit about what your
focusing on in the area of brain health.
General Clarke. Thanks, Senator.
I think it is important that the entire Committee
understands when we started POTFF, we focused on the physical,
our men and women who were physically wounded where you could
see the wounds, and in the last couple of years, we have
refocused those efforts towards cognitive and the
psychological, as we saw suicides go up. But then we looked at
the health of our force for 20 years of engaged combat, and now
we have put more than 40 percent of our resources and our
capability specifically to the brain health and the cognitive
domain and the psychological domain to be able to ensure that
our operators are both, physically and mentally capable. So, we
baseline all of our operators with their cognitive piece, so if
there are reductions in their capabilities, if they actually
have some type of concussive event, we can then go back later.
We are working with industry academia and even elements like
the National Football League in this space so we can make sure
that we take care of our operators.
Senator Ernst. Right, and I think it is just important to
stress that the investment into these activities is extremely
important for, again, the preservation of our force. I have had
the opportunity to visit a number of those types of activities
in Coronado with Admiral Green a number of years ago, as we
kind of dove into behavioral health activities, as well as
spiritual activity is very important for our force, but then
also the Tactical Human Optimization Rehabilitation and
Reconditioning (THOR3) facilities that are available for our
men and women of the force and making sure that they are
physically strong and capable of what is expected of them by
the American people.
Again, I will continue advocating on behalf of SOCOM and I
certainly appreciate your wonderful efforts.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
Let me recognize Senator Blackburn, via Webex. Senator
Blackburn?
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Clarke, thank you for the time and the conversation
yesterday. We talked about 40 percent of SOCOM's forces are
aligned to support the great power competition fight. That is a
big increase. So, for the record today, I would like for you to
talk about the resourcing standpoint of what do you need from
this Committee in terms of authority; advocacy, what do you
need to engage in near-peer competition from Beijing; and then
let's talk a little bit about the posture that SOCOM has to
counter these nefarious activities from the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) and where you are positioned there.
I think you can really do more with a lower dollar amount
than the regular force, so I would love to just get your
comments for the record.
General Clarke. Senator, thank you.
You know, as pointed out, with about 2 percent of the
Department of Defense budget, I think we are a very good return
on our investment, with about 3 percent of the force.
The continued resourcing, specifically, you know, for SOCOM
so that we can modernize in this area, where we can provide
unique capabilities for our forces is critical.
We have to balance both, operations, readiness and
modernization, and the continued support of this Committee
remains critical.
You specifically asked about our employment and our
capacity at 40 percent. That is exactly right. We have, in
fact, adjusted our forces to a sustainable presence against the
persistent terrorist threats, while, at the same time,
rebalancing those forces across the globe. Some of our
competitors are now global threats and not necessarily specific
to Europe or INDOPACOM, and so we continue to look at where our
forces are located across the globe so they can counter, you
know, those specific threats.
Then the last thing I would hit in this area is the
specific authority for our forces to conduct unconventional
warfare in this space.
While I can take specific points in closed session, that
authority that allows us to work with partner forces to
increase both, the resistance and resilience, working in the
information space, is absolutely critical.
So, Senator, thank you.
Senator Blackburn. Yes, and we talked a little bit about
the term that you and Admiral Davidson use about slowing down
China's clock. I would like for you to hit just quickly on what
that means and then what we have, what we can do with
operations within that gray zone.
General Clarke. Senator, as you are well aware, we
established the joint task force, Indo-Pacific. It is the first
task force that went and is actually west of the International
Date Line that we developed with INDOPACOM to ensure that we
work with like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific. I think
part and parcel of that is that that element is focused on the
information operations so that China, who works very well in
the space of creating false narratives and not always being up
front with the messages that they send, that we actually are
able to tamp down some of the disinformation that they
continuously sew, and that is an important part to SOCOM and to
CYBERCOM, is working in this information space.
Senator Blackburn. With the time remaining, we talked a
little bit about Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) and the changes
there and the comprehensive review from 2019. Where have you
seen holistic improvement across the force and where would you
like to continue to see improvement?
General Clarke. Senator, through our comprehensive review,
we have now ensured that by this year, all of or forces will be
above a 2:1 deployment to dwell ratio. That will be the first
time that that has happened since September 2001. We continue
to strive toward meeting the 3:1 dwell ratio for all of our
forces, and some of our forces already there and we will
continue to strive in that.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, sir.
General Clarke. Thank you.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Blackburn.
Before I recognize Senator Hawley, I will depart for the
vote. Senator Inhofe will preside, and I will return, and we
will switch off.
Senator Hawley, please.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. It is good to see you
again.
General Nakasone, let me start with you. Many companies use
Chinese hardware like printed circuit boards in their
information systems they provide to the Department of Defense,
including systems that are used to store and to transmit
information. At the same time, DOD and others have warned that
the Chinese Government might be able to tamper with these
Chinese-made products in order to create cyber vulnerabilities
that they can exploit and use against us.
My question is, do you think it is important for the
Department to at least know which systems contain Chinese-
printed circuit boards so that it can address potential cyber
vulnerabilities and contain any exposure or any danger that is
identified?
General Nakasone. Senator, in light of the recent
SolarWinds intrusion, I think this is, as you point out, an
area that we, as a Department, continue to look at very hard.
There are procedures and processes that the Department utilizes
to verify this, but I agree that this is an area that we have
to obviously shine a light on in the future.
Senator Hawley. Do you agree that further steps would be
useful in order to identify vulnerabilities here and, as you
just said, shine a light on this?
General Nakasone. So, Senator, I am a person that every
single day is worried about the vulnerabilities that our
adversaries might exploit, so you can well-imagine that this is
an area that I have a great deal of, you know, focus on right
now.
Senator Hawley. Good. Well, I look forward to working with
you on that.
General Clarke, let me come to you. The Baltic nations have
spent some years honing their ability to conduct irregular
warfare in the event that Moscow attempts to seize a Baltic
territory, so it won't be able to hold it. It has become a key
part of their deterrent strategy, as you know, in the Baltic
region.
What I am asking about this is, do you wonder, do you think
that the Baltic model could be applied in Taiwan; in other
words, would helping Taiwan improve its irregular warfare
capabilities help it deter potential Chinese aggression?
General Clarke. Senator, bottom line, yes.
We have worked closely with the Baltics. I have met with
every Baltic SOF commander personally and we have been engaged
in the Baltics for a long time, but we also, and I can talk
more specifically in closed hearing, we remain close with
capabilities for Taiwan.
Senator Hawley. Do you think that it would be helpful to us
and should we be prioritizing helping Taiwan develop its
irregular warfare capabilities?
General Clarke. Yes, Senator, I do think we should help
them.
Senator Hawley. Let me, still with you, General Clarke, but
switching topics. President Obama's former acting special
representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan recently wrote
that, and I am quoting now, for the long term, the United
States will need a counterterrorism capability in that region
that doesn't depend on a permanent United States military
presence in Afghanistan, which I completely agree with.
My question is, what options has SOCOM provided to the
secretary to allow us to achieve counterterrorism objectives in
Afghanistan without a permanent military presence in the
country?
General Clarke. Senator, we will always provide options. As
you well know, al Qaeda and ISIS are not just in Afghanistan,
but they are a global threat, and we will always provide the
secretary and the Department and the National Command Authority
with options so that if there is a threat, that we can actually
deter or actually disrupt or defeat that threat.
Senator Hawley. Specifically, you are saying, and we can
discuss this more in closed session, as appropriate, but just
to be clear, you are working on providing options to deal with
the counterterrorism threat and with--for counterterrorism
measures that do not rely on a permanent standing military
presence in country; is that right?
General Clarke. Senator, there has been no decision made
for Afghanistan, so I think it would be, you know, a
hypothetical to know what we are going to do at this time, but
we will always provide options, you know, for the Department of
Defense.
Senator Hawley. Good. Well, I look forward to following up
with you more on that.
General Nakasone, I am going to come back to you here in my
few remaining seconds. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) in
their writings often refer to cyber capabilities as the
strategic commanding heights of future warfare.
I am wondering how the PLA's emphasis on information
operations and maintaining the information advantage influences
CYBERCOM strategy for detering China.
General Nakasone. Senator, I think this whole discussion in
terms of where our adversaries are going and in the influence
spaces is among the most important areas that we are taking on
at Cyber Command, and I know General Clarke is addressing at
U.S. Special Operations Command.
This is really the competition that we are involved with
today where our adversaries are, again, trying to influence
ourselves and our people through a number of different means.
So, we have work ongoing today, ongoing both, in our commands
and with other commands trying to address that, as well.
Senator Hawley. Very good. I will look forward to following
up with you on that, as well.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
Senator Kelly is recognized.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Senator.
I understand that in January of 2020, nine combatant
commanders, including you, General Clarke, sent the letter to
the Director of National Intelligence requesting more
assistance from the intelligence community in being able to
publicly illuminate, malign influence, and coercive activities
by China and Russia.
So, to all the witnesses, starting with General Clarke,
what, if anything, has been done in response to this request
from the nine combatant commanders?
General Clarke. Senator, from that request, SOCOM, with the
other combatant commanders, continues to look specifically in
the information space and where we can best effect to provide
capacity against our adversaries. I think that specific memo
led to some sort of concurrence requirements being lifted for
the Department.
Senator Kelly. In your view, would the illumination of
these malign activities help to dissuade or deter China and
Russia?
General Clarke. Senator, at this point, I cannot point to
specific deterrents or detraction of that. I would tell you we
would continue to look, but I think it is most important that
we continue to develop the capacity required to work in the
information space.
Senator Kelly. General Nakasone?
General Nakasone. Senator, to your second point there, I
think that is a really important question. In terms of what our
adversaries are doing today, our most effective response is
being able to respond to what they are doing. We have a number
of different ways upon which we respond. Sometimes we respond
to other means of the power in our government, whether or not
it be diplomatic or sanctions or other ways, but I think it
begins with the idea that we are competition right now and our
adversaries are operating below the level of armed conflict in
a matter of trying to influence us.
Senator Kelly. But in downgrading the classification of
this intelligence, is that helpful in meeting the goal of
dissuading more aggressive action from China or Russia?
General Nakasone. I think we have to think broader than
that, Senator. I think that it is more than just writing to
release or perhaps even downgrading.
It is as General Clarke alluded to, there are other means
upon which we gather intelligence these days. How do we take
the best tools, the best techniques, not only from our
Government, from also from the private sector, to look at what
is occurring and being able to shine that spotlight.
I think a lot of times we look and just say, hey, we will
simply go ahead and downgrade intelligence and provide that
rapidly. Sometimes the better answer is, okay, where are the
other streams of information, how can we use that most
effectively with an audience.
Senator Kelly. Well, thank you, General.
To Mr. Maier, so, Section 1202 of the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA
sought to provide a new tool to counter these challenges by
authorizing the Secretary of Defense to provide support to
regular forces, the regular forces, and individuals supporting
U.S. special forces, but that irregular warfare operation part,
last year's NDAA raised the annual cap on funding for this
authority from ten to $15 million.
Mr. Maier, how would you characterize the demand for this
authority across the geographic combatant commands?
Mr. Maier. Senator, that is a, I think, a very important
tool we have that we haven't yet talked about in the great
power competition. The demand is high. It takes some time, as
you can understand, to build those partnerships to be able to
operate in that partnership-driven approach.
We view this very much as the successful 127 Echo or the
1208 program, where there is a crawl, walk, run element to it,
and I think that started very small. As the progress, and in
many respects, the high return on investment in terms of
dollars and deployments in dwell and impact started to become
apparent to the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs), and
became more and more in demand, we see a similar model for
1202, sir.
Senator Kelly. Thank you.
I yield back.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Kelly.
Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, good to see you again. Thanks for all your work.
General, let me start with you. General Clarke, how are you
feeling, with regard to the resources that you have for your
no-fail mission, you have a lot of no-fail missions, but your
Counter-Weapons of Mass Destruction (C-WMD) mission that SOCOM
was, a couple of years ago, given that mission, as well. It is
not like you didn't have a lot of missions on your plate. That
is a big one.
A number of us, myself, in particular, were concerned that
the Special Operations Command does a lot of things right,
really well, but being given the lead on that one was a whole
other area that is really, really important, but also needs
resources. Are you resourced enough for that mission?
That is a mission that, of course, there is no doubt, you
can't fail on.
General Clarke. Senator, the bottom line is we do have
sufficient resources to do that. The resources from United
States Strategic Command (STRATCOM), that had that coordinating
authority for C-WMD were moved from STRATCOM over to SOCOM. I
will continue to assess if additional resources are required
going forward, but as you point out, the WMD threat is
something that we must pay continuous attention to, because if
we don't, we do it at our own peril.
Senator Sullivan. As I know you know, and you and I have
discussed this, we are reorienting. I think it is the
appropriate orientation for our military and national security
to great power competition with China as a rising threat, but
the WMD threat continues regardless of great power competition
and that could be from violent extremist organizations, which
clearly want to get their hands on that. It could be from North
Korea, who is a well-known proliferator. Pakistan.
Are there any areas, in particular, that you are focused
on, as it relates to the Counter-WMD that is not in the
headlines, but we should be sure we are focused on here, as
well?
General Clarke. Senator, one thing that we put some strong
recommendations for is that is ensuring that our joint forces
actually train to work in a contested environment, so that our
adversary is well aware that they will be denied the benefit of
use of these capabilities. That deterrent principle, I think is
critical.
As you and I discussed yesterday, there are those that
would like to wish this problem away, but we don't think we can
and we have to be prepared for its potential use.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask another issue, which I think
this Committee is very focused on.
You know, the SOCOM enterprise, our Special Operations
Forces have been very focused, appropriately, Post-9/11 in the
Middle East. They have done a great job, a heroic job. Many
have lost their lives in their service to their country.
How are we starting the transition from the focus there,
which we still need to do, but we need to also start focusing
on China and the Asia Pacific and the INDOPACOM region. Are we
doing enough there? Do we have enough experience with special
operators?
It is a very different battlefield, as you know. It is
probably less kill and capture and more gray zone operations.
What is your thinking on that, General?
General Clarke. Senator, this is going back to the future
for SOF. Many of our forces were regionally aligned prior to 9/
11 that had both, the cultural and language understandings and
now as we have actually reduced forces in the places that you
have named, some of these forces are going back to where they
do have that understanding and those capabilities.
So, we have aligned, in one case, I think important for the
employment of our forces, but I think the second and really key
aspect from a SOCOM perspective is that we have actually
reallocated our budget for the modernization towards the
capabilities that are required. So, I have adjusted 14 percent
of my budget in modernization towards great power competition
for those unique SOF capabilities.
Senator Sullivan. Great. That is good to hear.
General Nakasone, I just want to compliment you, sir. I
think you have been doing a phenomenal job. You probably don't
get complimented enough because you can't talk about what you
do, but in my own experience here, I am just starting my second
term in the Senate, there was a hearing that I really remember
in 2015, 2016. It was the Cyber Command. It was some of the
others who were, I called us the cyber punching bag of the
world. The witnesses admitted that we don't retaliate when we
are attacked from a cyber perspective.
I don't think we are the cyber punching bag of the world
anymore and I think it is because of your work. You can't talk
about a lot of that work, but can you just let the American
people know that whether it is on elections or other
cyberattacks, we are not just taking blows; we are going on
offense, we are preemptive. I think it is really important for
people to know that.
That was not the posture 5 years ago. We were just getting
pummeled and we wouldn't do anything about it. Can you talk a
little bit about that, to the extent that you can, in an
unclassified session.
General Nakasone. Senator, I appreciate the question and,
importantly, I appreciate the support of this Committee,
because as I was mentioning, really, 2018 was a watershed year
for us, as we had looked at the future to a midterm election
and knowing that we did not want to experience what we had
experienced two years previously, the ability for this
Committee to pass the NDAA that year that allowed us to operate
outside of our networks, cyber as a traditional military
activity. Moved us from being a static to an active force.
This idea of persistent engagement, always being involved
with your adversaries, whether or not you are enabling our
partners or acting against our adversaries is critical in
underlying to our support in 2018, 2020, and today.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
Let me now recognize Senator Duckworth via Webex.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do join my colleague, the senator from Alaska, in his
admiration for the work that we have done, especially under
your leadership, General Nakasone.
General Clarke, I appreciate our call yesterday and I
wanted to express my support for Special Operations Command's
diversity and inclusion strategic plan. As we discussed on our
call, bringing more people from diverse backgrounds into the
Special Operations community will make it stronger. By infusing
teams with different ideas and perspectives and enabling them
to engage more effectively around the world.
I agree with you that greater diversity in the Special
Operations community is an operational imperative. That is why
I sponsored the ELITE Act in last year's NDAA to identify and
remove barriers to underrepresented groups' participation in
elite communities of the Armed Forces.
I am glad to see that you have taken on the challenge of
increasing diversity and inclusion in Special Operations
Command and it is an important first step in strengthening our
military, and I really look forward to working together with
you on this issue in the future.
My first question, I believe that being able to tap into
the full talent of every perspective of our population makes
our military stronger. I also believe that in order to build
the most capable military possible, we need to capitalize on
the natural advantage of our National Guard and Reserve forces,
namely, that those servicemembers are highly trained in their
civilian jobs, as well as their military jobs.
If we viewed this as a strength, we can benefit from the
expertise that our Guardsmen and Reservists bring from civilian
life, especially infuse in fields that require advanced
technical skills like cyber.
General Nakasone, can you please describe how the National
Guard and Reservists like members of the Illinois National
Guard who are currently working the 176th Cyber Protection Team
are contributing to your mission at U.S. Cyber Command.
General Nakasone. Senator, thank you, and thank you for the
question. The 176th Cyber Protection Team is a team well-known
to us at U.S. Cyber Command. They mobilized, came on Active
Duty, and did a tremendous job in protecting our
infrastructure, the actual capabilities, upon which we utilize
every single day to engage our adversaries, led by, you know,
Major Jaime Marlock, who is the Cyber Protection Team leader.
Really, it starts at the top with the Illinois National
Guard, in general, Brigadier General Neely, who has been
instrumental in being out front, being very supportive of our
efforts, and I think key to your point, attracting those that
leave Active Duty service and continue to want to serve. So,
the 176th is a great example of our partnership with the Guard.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
How will increasing National Guard and Reserve components
participation in cyber operations improve our national
readiness and capacity to combat cyberattacks and how can
Congress support this effort to increase the Reserve forces
participation in our cyber activities?
General Nakasone. Senator, if I might use just an example,
and I would say it is from the state of Connecticut. As we were
operating with the Connecticut National Guard in the early fall
of 2020, on the 2nd of September, Connecticut faced a
ransomware attack on their public school systems. Operating
with the Connecticut National Guard, they provided us
information via a capability that we called a Cyber 9-Line.
That is utilizing a common ID card, being able to obviously
share that and unclassified with us back at U.S. Cyber Command,
we could use the power that we have at U.S. Cyber Command and
at the National Security Agency to look at this malware and to
rapidly provide assistance.
But at the end of the day, it was the Connecticut National
Guard that did the work and, you know, taking an ability to
look at a situation where your school has been shut down
because of ransomware and then in a matter of days, being able
to bring that back up, I think it shows the power of the Guard
and the power of the partnership between the private and the
public sector.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
When I think of complex cyber missions, I do think, in
particular, about the challenges that U.S. Transportation
Command faces in securing its network and safeguarding
sensitive information about our troops, our capabilities, and
our postures, and movement plans while also working with
numerous commercial partners, whether it is ocean-going or
within the aviation community.
General Nakasone, please describe your current work with
U.S. Transportation Command and explain why it is important
that Congress fully resource and support this and future
initiatives like it.
General Nakasone. Transportation Command is really a unique
capability for our Nation. It provides us global logistics. We
are perhaps the only nation that can do that so readily and so
well.
Under General Lyons' leadership at U.S. Transportation
Command, he approached us and said, hey, we operate primarily
off of the private sector with unclassified networks. How can
you help?
There has been a partnership ongoing for the past year and
a half where both, U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Cyber
Command, and the National Security Agency have taken a look at,
how do we improve that public-private partnership, how do we
ensure the security of the data that is being transmitted, and
then, also, how do we look to the future?
Thank you, Senator.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
I am out of time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Duckworth.
Let me recognize Senator Tuberville, please.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen. Thanks for being here today. General
Nakasone, Space Force has already taken great steps in
advancing U.S. national security. In order to provide the
effectiveness needed, it is going to continue to need a strong
backing from our cyber intelligence community.
What role will the cyber mission force and CYBERCOM play in
Space Force?
General Nakasone. Senator, it has been an early and active
role already. General Dickinson has been out to U.S. Cyber
Command to talk about how do we secure the networks upon which
he operates. How do we work, obviously, as we take a look at
our overhead constellation, what are the threats that
USSPACECOM is going to approach in the future, and so, we have
been actively engaged with him over a period of several months
to identify those.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you.
General Clarke, section 922 of the 2017 NDAA, which was
signed into law by President Obama, made clear that the
administrative chain of command for the Special Operations
community runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense,
to ASD SO/LIC, and then to you, the SOCOM commander.
Prior to conducting congressional engagements, do you
obtain approval from ASD SO/LIC?
General Clarke. The secretary, we work very closely with
ASD SO/LIC in that administrative chain of command for
oversight, particularly for our budget, and acquisition.
Mr. Maier and his predecessors provide that oversight. But
it also clear that my chain of command, and Secretary Austin
made this very clear to me, that my chain of command as a
combatant commander runs from the Secretary of Defense to the
President.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you.
That is kind of my next question. Do you support the
implementation of the law and, specifically, ASD SO/LIC's
absolute control over administrative matters, such as
legislative engagements, budgetary resource decisions,
acquisitions, public affairs, personnel, legal accountability,
and other related authorities held by the traditional military
service?
General Clarke. Senator, what I believe is a key role for
ASD SO/LIC is actually to be an advocate for SOCOM within the
Department. So, when decisions are made about services and
service budgets and service personnel decisions, I think ASD
SO/LIC in the room to be able to be that advocate for us, to
me, is the most important aspect that ASD SO/LIC can do for
SOCOM.
It goes back to the old adage if you aren't at the table,
you become the lunch, and having ASD SO/LIC in and at that
table, which has occurred, has been very helpful.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you.
Mr. Maier, I noted a moment ago the law mandates that the
administrative chain of command for SOCOM passes from the
President to Secretary of Defense, ASD SO/LIC, SOCOM commander.
In light of the clear chain of command, have you met with the
Secretary of administrative matters related to SOCOM?
Mr. Maier. Senator, yes, I have, and I participate in the
Secretary's regular service secretary meetings. I also
participate, or my staff participate, in the series of
governance meetings that the Deputy Secretary runs in order to
do, just as was already said by General Clarke, to both
advocate, but for the administrative chain of command.
We are responsible for both, setting direction and ensuring
execution and implementation, consistent with the law.
Senator Tuberville. How often do you all meet, do you
think?
Mr. Maier. The service secretaries meet at least twice a
month. Obviously, a new administration, so a different series
of meetings, but every day, sir, there are meetings that I am
representing ASD SO/LIC in that service secretary-like hat with
the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, or their direct reports.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you.
Thank you for your service.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Tuberville.
Senator Peters, please.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to each of our witnesses here today.
Mr. Maier, in General Clarke's words, if I may use your
words here, General Clarke, they are good words, he says SOF,
quote, strengthens alliances and creates diplomatic options.
These strategic effects ultimately, clearly begin with
actions undertaken by people in those areas. It is our number-
one assets.
I would like to hear from you how you are modernizing
professional development in a way that really reflects this
very unique role of your personnel, how you are basically
bridging the gap between direct action and working in an
embassy across the span of training and education, a very
obviously complex set of skills that are necessary.
Specifically, my question is, how are you broadening mid-
level SOF leaders and how much of that focus is on senior-
enlisted personnel?
Mr. Maier. Senator, that is a very important part of this
pivot, as we described it from being able to still do the
counterterrorism missions that we have been involved in for the
last, really, generation to be able to do that both, and then
be competitive at that level below armed conflict.
A critical component of that, as we have talked about
already, is not only the ability to speak languages and really
engage at the right level of cultural awareness, with not only
the adversaries, but also those third parties, third countries
that those adversaries are attempting to influence.
A lot of that happens in the information space, social
media, as we know. So, a critical component of a professional
military education, but even more specifically, the operational
imperatives that we have to evolve that force. This is the key
part of this.
It was alluded already at the opening statement of General
Clarke, that over 50,000 members of Special Operations Command
are enlisted members. That is where the rubber meets the road.
These individuals, especially in the SOF world, are often
called upon to do things well above what their conventional
counterparts, whether that is operating embassies,
participating on interagency teams, or engaging with partners.
So, we see that as really the crux of progress and where we are
going to be successful in this great power fight.
Senator Peters. So, Mr. Maier, does the SOCOM talent
management then emphasize regional experience, is that
something that you are really seeking out and trying to develop
further?
Mr. Maier. Senator, yes, sir, and I think, specifically,
evolving to those great power concerns, we often forget at
times that a lot of what we have been doing over the last years
in the counterterrorism fight was really focused on fairly
narrow set of adversaries. So, I think as we look more broadly
and diversely at the adversaries we are going to confront, and
in some cases, more importantly, those entities that they are
trying to influence, it is important for us to be able to
engage in those languages with that cultural awareness.
Senator Peters. Yeah, absolutely. Well, that is good to
hear.
General Nakasone, on Tuesday, I asked Admiral Aquilino how
he plans to align security assistance in INDOPACOM with the
nature of our competition with China and Russia and if he
believes that security assistance should include cybersecurity
assistance to help our partners protect their critical
infrastructure or enhance their resilience against information
warfare.
My question to you, sir, is, do you believe that security
assistance to partner nations should include cybersecurity and
information warfare measures, first off, and second, do you
believe we should pursue these types of relationships outside
of the traditional Five Eyes nations that we have talked about
mostly?
General Nakasone. Senator, I believe that in terms of the
theater engagement that you discuss right there, our most
effective means is to begin with the discussion with the
combatant commander. So, if confirmed, we will look forward to
obviously working very closely with Admiral Aquilino.
I do take your point on the idea of a broader partnership.
We do need broader partnerships. We have tremendous
relationships with our Five Eyes. It is a critical capability
that we have as a nation, but we are also looking at how do we
expand those partnerships to bring a degree of competitive
advantage against our adversaries in the future.
Senator Peters. Great. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters.
Senator Blumenthal, please.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your service, all three of our witnesses
today.
General Nakasone, I appreciated our discussion before this
hearing about the contributions of the National Guard in
Connecticut and you were mentioning them in your testimony.
Across the country, the National Guard have really been
integral to many of our cyber efforts. Before this last
election, the Connecticut National Guard, in particular, was a
really invaluable resource to many local officials in
preventing cyberattacks and taking action to deter them, and
then more recently, as you know and we discussed it, the
National Guard was an immense resource to Connecticut in
responding to ransomware attacks against Hartford schools and
in preparing for responses to particular attacks, but also,
again, detering them.
I am also very expedited about the grant that the
University of New Haven received to train more National Guard
members on cybersecurity skills under Project Ironclad. Not
only will the University of New Haven help us train more
cybersecurity talent in New Haven and Connecticut, but it could
also help create a national pipeline to recruit and retain the
expertise in our country that we so desperately need.
Could you explain how the University of New Haven's Project
Ironclad training program fits with our need for more
cybersecurity talent.
General Nakasone. Certainly, Senator, but let me take a
step back and just talk a little bit about the work of the
Connecticut National Guard, because I think that in my previous
statement, I wasn't specific enough on how big a deal this was.
So, if you think about it, a ransomware, and as I
indicated, ransomware on the 2nd of September that is impacting
the school system, but it is also impacting fire, and police,
and emergency medical services. Think about that, if you are
losing that from a capability within your community,
Connecticut National Guard, 24 hours, working with us at U.S.
Cyber Command and National Security Agency, utilizing a
capability called the Cyber 9-Line where they are able to
leverage our expertise back at Fort Meade, and then being able
to deal with the problem.
This is the Connecticut National Guard though that is
solving the problem. They are just getting a bit of assistance
from us. That is a huge deal and I think it is really a great
exemplar of how powerful the National Guard can be not only in
a situation like this, but also, I want to point out the work
that they did during the 2020 election in ensuring its success.
Also, most importantly, and I don't think it is well-known,
their work with the Department of Homeland Security in ensuring
the security of Operation Warp Speed, our ability to bring a
vaccine for COVID-19 to the American populous. This is the work
that the National Guard has done over the past 9 months and I
think it is critical.
In terms of New Haven, this is really a great news story
and being able to, again, generate interest, generating
context, generating an ability for those that have, you know, a
desire, a knowledge, an inkling of what they want to do in the
future and bringing them with the capability to train and then
being exposed to cyber for the future.
Senator Blumenthal. I think that your points are so well
taken. Our National Guard has been such a critical resource in
Connecticut in the elections, in countering ransomware, in
building the kind of intellectual infrastructure that we need.
As I remarked to you in our conversation, the National Guard
draws on the expertise of citizen soldiers who are in civilian
jobs involving information technology (IT). They are experts in
major corporations and they are providing their expertise now
to not only our Nation's military, through the National Guard,
but also to civilian election officials, to local education
efforts to deter ransomware, and I think your point about the
University of New Haven is so well taken, the Ironclad project
offers tremendous promise of recruiting, training, and
retaining the talent that we need in our military, as well as
in our civilian lives for cybersecurity and cybersecurity is
our future.
I thank you for the work that you are doing and that you
are encouraging and promoting by the National Guard. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Now via Webex, let me recognize Senator Rosen.
I thank Senator Kelly for his patience.
Senator Rosen?
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed.
Thank you to our witnesses for your service and, of course,
always for being here today.
As a former computer programmer, I am interested in
learning how DOD's cyber strategy can really strengthen our
Nation's ability to withstand and respond to cyberattacks.
I would also like to recognize today, the role that Nellis
Air Force Base plays in supporting SOCOM mission in the
battlefield. It is really, really important and I am proud of
our men and women there at Nellis Air Force Base.
But I want to talk about information warfare. Despite an
unprecedented level of foreign influence campaigns, we know
they are targeting the United States and other democracies. We
lack a clear strategy to combat information warfare.
As the National Security Strategy makes clear, our
autocratic adversaries are using aggressive, aggressive
information warfare tactics to interfere in our democratic
elections around the world, exploit the pandemic, and erode
trust in the rules-based international order.
So, General Nakasone, and then General Clarke, what is the
appropriate role for the military to play in this environment
of heightened information warfare?
General Nakasone. Senator, I think the appropriate role is
the role that we have begun playing since 2018, which is the
perspective of how do we defend forward. The idea of operating
outside of the United States, being able to both, enable our
partners with information and act when authorized.
This is an active approach to our adversaries. It has been
most effective, as we have seen, with the 2018 and 2020
elections with adversaries attempting to influence us,
attempting to interfere, but not being able to do that. That is
based upon the strategy of defend forward and the instantiation
of persistent engagement. That is the start of it.
As I mentioned earlier today, I also think there is a
broader piece that is being worked right now by the
administration in terms of how do we improve the further
resilience of the United States as we look at adversaries
continuing to avoid our laws and policies and try to use our
own infrastructure in their own attempts.
This is a continual effort that we have to be at. This is
not going to be episodic. This is something that U.S. Cyber
Command and the other combatant commands need to continue to
work at.
Senator Rosen. So, perhaps, General Clarke, you can speak
to this. I want to add one more thing to this question now that
you talk about defend forward.
How do we deter our adversaries' cyber aggression by
changing their cost-benefit analysis? How do we make it not
worth their while to attack us and what policies are we doing
there? When you speak about defend forward, isn't that part of
this equation, too?
General Clarke. Senator, you raised a great point.
Number one, I think we have to work closely with our
Department of State and other agencies in this space. Number
two is that while General Nakasone talks about forces forward,
which I agree with, we also have SOCOM forces for it that are
absolutely the MISO [Military Information Support Operations]
professionals that work closely with the embassies and with
foreign partners, and that ties this ecosystem of forward all
the way back to the capabilities and capacities that exist in
the U.S.
I think by working closely with those partners to ensure
that our adversaries or competitors are not getting that free
pass and to recognize what is truth from fiction and continue
to highlight that through using our intel communities is
critical.
General Nakasone. Senator, if I might add on to that, to
your point with regards to imposing costs, this is not just the
Department of Defense. As General Clarke rightly points out,
this is a Whole-of-Government effort. This is what the power of
Treasury brings to it, the Federal Bureau of Investigations,
Justice, Department of Homeland Security. This is the lesson
that we have learned is that we have to operate together,
because the partnership is where the power is.
Senator Rosen. Well, that is great.
I want to continue on that. We do have a Cyber Strategy. We
have had a lot of cyber espionage.
How often should our cyber strategy be updated to reflect
current threats and the current challenges? How often do you
envision that we need to do that in order to stay relevant?
If it is 2 years old, 3 years old, it is not being
responsive, and so I was wondering what you think would be
appropriate for these kinds of cyber strategy reports to be
updated.
General Nakasone. So, we have an interim National Security
Strategy guidance that is out, that the administration has put
out, that has been very effective for us to start our guideline
with it. It talks about cybersecurity as a key enabler in that.
That is an important piece of what our Nation needs to do.
Senator Rosen. Yeah, but actual threats, how do we let
people stay up to date on actual threats?
General Nakasone. Obviously, that is through the continuing
dialogue in terms of what our intelligence community is talking
about, obviously, what our Government is talking about, and
also, really importantly, what the private sector is talking
about, because they are seeing so many of these threats,
Senator.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I believe my time has expired,
Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rosen.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service to the Nation and
thank you for your testimony today.
This will conclude the open portion of the hearing. We will
reconvene in SCV-217 as quickly as possible.
Thank you very much, again. The open hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:39 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
civilian oversight of u.s. special operations command
1. Senator Reed. General Clarke, at the hearing, you stated, ``What
I believe is a key role for [the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict] (ASD SO/LIC) is actually to
be an advocate for [Special Operations Command] (SOCOM), you know,
within the department, and so when decisions are made about services
and service budgets and service personnel decisions, having ASD SO/LIC
in the room to be able to be that advocate for us, to me is the most
important aspect that ASD SO/LIC can do for SOCOM.'' Do you also
support the ASD SO/LIC's role as the ``service secretary-like''
civilian responsible for the oversight of SOCOM? If so, why?
General Clarke. I absolutely support the intent of Congress for
civilian oversight of USSOCOM from across the Department, including
from the ASD(SO/LIC) for those Special Operations-peculiar
administrative matters relating to the organizing, training, and
equipping of Special Operations Forces (SOF).
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
department of defense cyber strategy
2. Senator Rosen. General Nakasone, to address the challenge of
establishing deterrence in cyberspace, the Department of Defense's
(DOD) 2018 Cyber Strategy outlined the ``defend forward'' approach--
meaning identifying our adversaries' cyber campaigns early on and
engaging in offensive operations to disrupt the attacker's
infrastructure. How often should U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) be
assessing DOD network vulnerabilities to ensure that fixes have been
made in a timely and adequate fashion?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
3. Senator Rosen. General Nakasone, the 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy
calls for retaining the current cyber workforce and finding talented
new people to recruit. Legislation that I introduced authorizing a
Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps science, technology,
engineering, math, and cyber program was included in last year's
National Defense Authorization Act. More needs to be done if we are to
remain competitive on the global stage. Would you support the
establishment of a civilian cybersecurity reserve to cultivate a
qualified cyber workforce that supports the DOD mission?
General Nakasone. Although that is a question for policy makers, I
support any national initiatives that better leverage existing cyber
talent in defense of the Nation or contribute to the expansion and
further development of the Nation's cyber workforce. A talented cyber
workforce is essential to maintaining our competitive edge and our
Government should be proactive in its development.
cyber collaboration with allies
4. Senator Rosen. General Nakasone, our allies are essential to
enhancing U.S. cybersecurity. We rely on our partners to conduct threat
hunting, enable early warning, and harden our collective defenses. How
are you collaborating with our allies to use their unique cyber
capabilities to support our military cyber operations, and use those
capabilities to our collective advantage?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
5. Senator Rosen. General Nakasone, how will you enhance
information-sharing and cooperation with NATO partners to prevent,
mitigate and recover from cyberattacks?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
illicit drug trade
6. Senator Rosen. Mr. Maier and General Clarke, through the illicit
drug trade, transnational criminal organizations are fueling
instability in the Western Hemisphere by crippling the rule of law
through corruption, eroding good governance, and hindering economic
development, which also can serve as root causes of migration in the
region. To counter these threats, I am curious what more U.S. Special
Operations Command (SOCOM) can do to counter the illegal drug trade.
What are the largest gaps in U.S. efforts to reduce the foreign supply
of illicit drugs, and does SOCOM have the adequate resources to
effectively supplement present interdiction operations?
Mr. Maier. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) supports U.S.
law enforcement partners' efforts to interdict illicit drugs, disrupt
the flow of illicit revenue to criminal networks, and counter other
forms of transnational organized crime in the Western Hemisphere,
including human trafficking and smuggling and illicit mining. USSOCOM
provides this support by use of the Department of Defense's counterdrug
authorities and appropriated funds for such purposes. In addition to
providing intelligence analysis support to U.S. law enforcement
partners to illuminate illicit threat networks, U.S. special operations
forces regularly support U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and U.S.
Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) efforts in the region by conducting
training of, or alongside, partner-nation units that are responsible
for combatting drug trafficking and transnational organized crime that
fuel violence and instability in the region.
USSOCOM is currently resourced appropriately to continue providing
intelligence analysis and other support in the Western Hemisphere.
However, I want to highlight that Section 1022 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, which authorizes USSOCOM's
counterdrug-funded support to counter terrorism and other forms of
transnational organized crime, is set to expire at the end of fiscal
year 2022, if not reauthorized before then.
General Clarke. USSOCOM assists in countering illegal drug trade by
providing analytical support to U.S. law enforcement (LE) agencies
through U.S.C. title 10 sect 284(b). Within USSOCOM, Counter Threat
Finance (CTF) analytical resources can shift from supporting current
National Defense Strategy threats to countering drug trafficking
organizations, if directed.
7. Senator Rosen. General Clarke, can you describe how cooperation
with our partner nations supports our mission to weaken transnational
criminal organizations? How can we increase the interoperability with
our partner nations?
General Clarke. USSOCOM supports respective Geographic Combatant
Command Theater Campaign Plans to include approved Security Cooperation
and Security Force Assistance activities (Sec. 333) with our partner
nations. These activities promote interoperability with partner nations
and increase their institutional capability and capacity to weaken
transnational organized crime. Through support to law enforcement
(Sec. 284), combined training (Sec. 321/322), and continued and
enhanced focus on regional interoperability and institutional capacity
building (Sec. 332), USSOCOM assists in enabling our partners to
identify, generate, lead and sustain operations, in coordination with
U.S. Forces, regional partners, or unilaterally.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
hunt forward operations
8. Senator Inhofe. General Nakasone, how do ``Hunt Forward''
Operations complement cooperation with our allies and partners?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
9. Senator Inhofe. General Nakasone, how are these operations
aligned with the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and European Deterrence
Initiative?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
china
10. Senator Cotton. General Nakasone, when you appeared before this
Committee in 2019 you said that you saw Artificial Intelligence as a
critical enabler of CYBERCOM operations and there should be no doubt
that our competitors also recognize the importance of Artificial
Intelligence for their own military use. Can you describe how the
People's Liberation Army is currently militarizing Artificial
Intelligence and Machine Learning, and explain any significant areas we
are already lagging behind China in those technologies?
General Nakasone. As Commander of USCYBERCOM, I would defer to the
Intelligence Community's China and AI experts to provide specific
answers to this question. However, speed, agility, and the ability to
adapt rapidly are critical to operational effectiveness in cyberspace.
China's advances in AI are therefore a significant concern.
11. Senator Cotton. General Nakasone, China has historically been
willing to sell military technology, which in the future will include
artificial intelligence (AI) and AI-enabled weapons, to state actors
with authoritarian aspirations and to non-state actors with anti-
American views such as ISIS. What potential issues do you see the
United States having to contend with from a national security
perspective over the next decade, both strategically and ethically?
General Nakasone. Although I must defer to those elements of the
Department of Defense more closely involved with threat assessment,
policy development and acquisition of autonomous weapons, I do see this
as a significant area of interest, particularly when U.S. cyber
capabilities could be employed as a remediating response.
12. Senator Cotton. General Nakasone, the Chinese military (PLA)
currently recognizes several areas where it lags behind the US, two of
which are technical expertise and semiconductor manufacturing. As the
Chinese Communist Party shores-up these capability gaps, how big a risk
is it to the United States that the industrial base providing us with
the most advanced semiconductor technology is located within range of
PLA weapons?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
13. Senator Cotton. General Nakasone, China has declared their
desire to become the World's leader in AI by the year 2030. What would
that mean for the United States' future should Beijing surpass our own
abilities to develop, field, and responsibly control the use of AI?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
commercial industry
The recent Sunburst and Hafnium hacks have exposed programs that
are clearly operating in a seam in between commercial and governmental
networks and property. We know you have made major progress sharing
with commercial industry.
14. Senator Tillis. General Nakasone, what more can be done, and
what legislation is needed, to make sharing with the commercial
industry more effective?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
capabilities
15. Senator Tillis. General Nakasone, do you need more human
capital to execute your mission?
General Nakasone. Yes, the strategic environment has changed since
the Cyber Mission Force was designed in 2012. In summer 2020,
USCYBERCOM conducted a force growth study as part of the Secretary of
Defense Combatant Command Review. The Command has made recommendations
for.force growth, which were approved by the Department of Defense.
Specific details can be released after the President's Budget is
approved.
16. Senator Tillis. General Nakasone, if so, how many more people
would you need in order to meet your operational goals?
General Nakasone. Yes, the strategic environment has changed since
the Cyber Mission Force was designed in 2012. In summer 2020,
USCYBERCOM conducted a force growth study as part of the Secretary of
Defense Combatant Command Review. The Command has made recommendations
for force growth, which were approved by the Department of Defense.
Specific details can be released after the President's Budget is
approved.
17. Senator Tillis. General Nakasone, what avenues do you recommend
we pursue to get you more long-term forces to execute your missions?
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM and the Services have made progress in
recruiting and retaining the talent we need to deliver joint force
objectives for the Nation. At this time, we are moving forward to
source and field additional teams as approved in the Department's 2020
Combatant Command Review.
18. Senator Tillis. General Nakasone, some suggest that ``cyber vs
cyber'' actions do not work. What do you say to that?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
19. Senator Tillis. General Nakasone, if we refrain from acting in
a ``cyber vs cyber'' framework to disincentive these behaviors, what do
you think we should be doing?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
20. Senator Tillis. General Nakasone, how do you see the balance
between collection opportunities in cyberspace and the need to use
cyberspace for defensive or deterrent activity?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
persistent engagement
The Cyber Strategy lays out an ambitious vision for the Cyber
National Mission Force in particular: disrupting adversary
cyberattacks, providing indication and warning to potential targets at
home, and engaging with adversaries below the level of armed conflict
on a daily basis.
21. Senator Tillis. General Nakasone, nation state actors are
becoming bolder and more destructive within cyberspace. What do you see
as the right strategy to stop these acts?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
special operations command as a model for the joint force
22. Senator Blackburn. General Clarke, I understand that the JAIC
and SOCOM are working together to deliver AI-enabled predictive
maintenance capabilities. Can you describe that partnership, and
whether it has proven effective?
General Clarke. USSOCOM and the JAIC formed the USSOCOM Incubator
in fiscal year 2019 consisting of technical experts from the teams at
the JAIC Joint Logistics Mission Initiative and the 160th Special
Operations Regiment's (SOAR) Digital Integrated Maintenance Environment
(DIME). The USSOCOM Incubator enables rapid development of AI-enabled
capabilities in an agile environment where warfighters and developers
work collaboratively together.
The USSOCOM Incubator orchestrates testing, evaluation,
operationalization, and retraining of AI-enabled capabilities, as well
as developing extensive Technical Solutions documents in support of a
broader playbook within the DOD for AI development. The Work Unit Code
(WUC) Corrector is an example of a powerful AI capability that uses
Natural Language Processing (NLP) to analyze user-generated text within
maintenance records to assign an appropriate WUC to each record. More
than 3 million records have been processed by the WUC Corrector and
routed through the reliability business intelligence (BI) tools,
focusing engineering services to the highest priority issues.
Additionally, the Model at the Edge (MaTE) Kit is designed for
units operating in locations with limited bandwidth networks for all
communications. The MaTE Kit was developed as an ``all-in-one''
solution to enable AI and analytics at the edge, including moving large
aviation maintenance data sets across a network. The MaTE Kit is a
specialized laptop computer running the required processes and services
to conduct data collection, processing, storage, prediction, and a
visualization of the AI-enabled predictions in a custom browser-based
user interface. This capability provides leadership with near real-time
predictions to make timely maintenance decisions that decrease
maintenance downtime, while increasing both capital efficiency and
aircraft readiness. The MaTE Kit was developed to support current AI
models and future AI-enabled capability development. All processes and
services within the MaTE Kit are government-owned and developed by
USSOCOM.
23. Senator Blackburn. General Clarke, as a proof of concept, do
you think this is something that could be applied to the joint force?
General Clarke. Yes. The predictive maintenance partnership between
USSOCOM and the JAIC demonstrates the value of collaboration to solve
complex problems that are designed to scale. The capabilities developed
to address maintenance challenges at the 160th SOAR have numerous
applications and both USSOCOM and the JAIC are committed to scaling
these capabilities to the larger joint enterprise.
The JAIC selected the MH-60 platform as the initial focus area for
predictive maintenance because variations of that platform are used
extensively across USSOCOM, Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Coast Guard.
The software and models developed for USSOCOM's MH-60 are just one
example of joint proofs-of-concept with potential to scale across the
global DOD Enterprise. Internally, USSOCOM is already leveraging some
of these scalable AI-enabled capabilities within Air Force Special
Operations Command to develop software and models applied to the CV-22
aircraft while concurrently exploring similar capabilities for ground,
sea, and surface vehicles.
USSOCOM and the JAIC are also pursuing transition from the USSOCOM
Incubator at the 160th SOAR to a production ready, globally scalable
AI-enabled capability available to the entire Department. The intent of
the USSOCOM Incubator is to rapidly develop AI-enabled capabilities
that scale in a joint environment. The Technical Solutions documents
serve to guide other DOD organizations down the path to a successful
predictive maintenance program.
24. Senator Blackburn. General Clarke, how do you see AI predictive
maintenance applications changing the role of asset management within
some of our technical and man-hour intensive platforms?
General Clarke. Asset management across the Department will
transform significantly through the broad application of predictive
applications. Maintenance issues on our technical and man-hour
intensive platforms are often more reactive than predictive, at times
resulting in significant costs to repair and impacts to downtime.
Simply following a prescribed schedule of maintenance based on time is
no longer sufficient. The more effectively and accurately USSOCOM can
leverage data, analytics, and AI-enabled capabilities, the greater the
opportunity to minimize expenditure and increase readiness. Predictive
maintenance is becoming an integral part of USSOCOM's asset management
strategy, especially for complex and technically intensive platforms
where repairs are cheaper and faster when identified earlier than when
a part or system had already failed.
special operations command talent retention and work force development
25. Senator Blackburn. General Clarke, do those personnel that
comprise ``non-SOF support'' generally receive SOF-specific training to
enable them to perform their support role? What about pay and
entitlement incentives that exceed what their conventional force
counterparts?
General Clarke. USSOCOM ``non-SOF support'' personnel receive SOF-
specific training tailored to support various SOF missions in their
respective units and based on their assignments. Additionally, these
members may receive monetary compensation beyond their conventional
force counterparts depending on assignment location. A few examples are
in U.S. Army Special Operations Command and Air Force Special
Operations Command, where qualified ``non-SOF support'' NCOs receive
Special Duty Assignment Pay or reenlistment bonuses based assignment
location, and Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, where
Specialty Operator Capability Specialists receive $150 in Assignment
Pay based on their role on the tactical team.
26. Senator Blackburn. General Clarke, when recycled back into the
conventional forces after their SOCOM tour is done, do you believe
these types of personnel are inclined to remain in service and why?
General Clarke. USSOCOM nor its Service Components have the ability
to determine whether personnel returning to conventional forces are
inclined to remain in service. However, we encourage all who have
served in the Special Operations enterprise to continue to serve our
Nation and to share and employ the skills they have acquired during
their tenure with USSOCOM.
unconventional warfare in great power competition
27. Senator Blackburn. General Clarke, does SOCOM have the
resources and authorities necessary to pursue the application of
unconventional warfare measures in countering China?
General Clarke. USSOCOM has the forces and authorities available to
conduct congressionally funded and authorized operations such as 1202
projects, Section 333 Security Cooperation / Build Partner Capacity
efforts, and some Military Information Support Operations initiatives.
However, most of our operations conducted by SOF are funded through
USSOCOM Major Force Program-11. As far as the authorities to apply
unconventional warfare measures are concerned, I assess USSOCOM has the
needed authorities to operate within the recently released Interim
National Security Strategic Guidance and current National Defense
Strategy guidelines. USSOCOM would require the commensurate authority
to expand our efforts should the environment change to allow expanded
measures in countering China.
assistant secretary of defense for special operations/low-intensity
conflict
28. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Maier and General Clarke, what have been
the effects of ASD SO/LIC serving in a ``service secretary-like'' role?
Mr. Maier. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) provides oversight
of the SOF enterprise through the administrative chain of command for
USSOCOM. ASD(SO/LIC) oversight has been particularly important in
addressing complex challenges related to special operations forces
(SOF) personnel and the development, resourcing, and sustainment of
SOF-unique capabilities. Senior civilian leadership that is outside a
uniformed chain of command provides an independent voice to the
Secretary of Defense, with DOD senior leadership in the Pentagon, and
with USSOCOM leadership and staff.
Since the Secretariat for Special Operations was established in
2018, the office of the ASD(SO/LIC) has deepened its relationship with
USSOCOM at all levels and has made progress in gaining membership in
senior Departmental policymaking bodies, including participation in the
bi-weekly Military Department Secretary meeting with the Secretary of
Defense. The Department is currently updating relevant guidance
regarding ASD(SO/LIC)'s oversight and management of SOF-related
administrative matters, through which the office reports directly to
the Secretary of Defense as a Principal Staff Assistant, and ASD(SO/
LIC)'s role as a policy advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy and to the Secretary of Defense for special operations,
counterterrorism, and irregular warfare matters.
These efforts strengthen the authorities of the office of ASD(SO/
LIC) and help ensure civilian oversight of the most critical issues
facing the SOF enterprise, including diversity and inclusion within the
SOF community, SOF culture and ethics, and investments in technologies
and capabilities that will enhance our ability to compete more
effectively with great-power adversaries and conduct counterterrorism
operations more sustainably.
General Clarke. The inclusion of ASD(SO/LIC) allows SOF equities to
maintain readiness and ensure SOF is linked with the Joint Force in
support of national strategic objectives. ASD(SO/LIC)'s voice in the
development of national defense strategic guidance will ensure the
inclusion of SOF's unique capabilities as part of the Joint Force.
Likewise, ASD(SO/LIC)'s participation in Service-level fora on the
Department's priorities for countering extremism, prevention of sexual
harassment and assault, and diversity and inclusion enhance USSOCOM's
actions in these areas. Longer-term, I foresee enhanced readiness of
SOF with ASD(SO/LIC)'s inclusion in Department-level fora discussing
joint capabilities given SOF's reliance on the Services as partners in
developing our unique organizations, training, and equipping.
critical infrastructure
29. Senator Blackburn. General Nakasone, what exercises and
activities do you assess to be most important to the success of the
Guard's provision of cybersecurity assistance?
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM conducts extensive exercises to
prepare for Total Force support to civil authorities and responses to
cyber incidents of national consequence. For example, USCYBERCOM has
partnered with the National Guard in a broad span of exercises--Cyber
Flag, Cyber Guard, and Cyber Shield--for almost a decade. Such
exercises are designed to ensure the cyber Total Force, both Active
Duty and National Guard, are trained to the same standard, able to
share best practices, and are prepared to work in mutual support and
collaboration in defense of the Nation's critical infrastructure.
USCYBERCOM also sets the training standards and has leveraged the
National Guard in critical real-world missions, such as securing
critical cyber infrastructure and defending the 2020 elections from
foreign interference.
30. Senator Blackburn. General Nakasone, in what way could the DOD
better develop common architectures, tool suites, and practices for the
National Guard and Cyber Mission Forces to provide cybersecurity
assistance to critical infrastructure companies?
General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM is focused on ensuring that forces
across the Total Force are interoperable. Active duty and Reserve
Component Cyber Protection Teams operate within similar mission
platforms and with similar tool suites. Additionally, we also worked
with the National Guard Bureau to create a mechanism that enable Guard
units to share information about cyber incidents quickly, easily, and
uniformly (the Cyber 9-line). We work in conjunction with sector-
specific agencies to understand requirements and prepare for responses
to appropriate requests for support to civil authorities when required.
defense forward
31. Senator Blackburn. General Nakasone, what good is CYBERCOM's
Cyber National Mission Force doing for the private sector?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
afghanistan
32. Senator Hawley. General Clarke, since you took command in March
2019, has SOCOM provided the Secretary of Defense with options for
pursuing United States counterterrorism objectives in Afghanistan
following the withdrawal of all United States and Coalition forces from
Afghanistan, including in the event of Afghan state collapse?
General Clarke. USSOCOM is a supporting command to United States
Central Command (USCENTCOM) for the conflict in Afghanistan, and
USSOCOM would assist Commander, USCENTCOM to provide options to the
SECDEF. USSOCOM has worked and continues to work closely with the Joint
Staff, OSD, Interagency and fellow Combatant Commanders to develop
United States counterterrorism options in Afghanistan post-withdrawal
of all United States and Coalition forces.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022 AND
THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 13, 2021
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND AND
UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Peters, Manchin,
Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton,
Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Blackburn,
Hawley, and Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing to order.
This morning, the Committee will receive testimony from
General Wolters, Commander, United States European Command
(EUCOM), and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and General Lyons,
Commander, United States Transportation Command, TRANSCOM.
Thank you both for the many decades of military service and
please extend our appreciation to the men and women serving
under your command.
General Lyons, this is likely your last hearing before the
Committee and on behalf of my colleagues, I want to thank you,
and your family, for a lifetime of dedication and service to
the Nation, which continues with your son, who is now a cadet
at West Point. So, the tradition goes forward. Thank you.
The security challenges in the EUCOM area of responsibility
grow more complex each year. Russia continues to subvert the
rules-based international order, including using military force
to intimidate and coerce its neighbors and to undermine their
sovereignty. Russia is also engaged in an ongoing hybrid
warfare campaign just below the threshold of conflict that
would provoke a military response, including disinformation
campaigns targeting democratic processes and formenting
discourse, extensive cyber espionage efforts, and the continued
use of proxy groups to further Russian interests in numerous
countries around the world. Combating the Russian hybrid threat
requires a whole-of-government effort.
General Wolters, I will be interested to hear your views on
the military means required as part of that whole-of-government
effort, as well as what support we can provide our allies and
partners as they seek to counter Russian malign influence.
Last week EUCOM raised its watch condition level in Ukraine
from ``possible crisis'' to ``potential imminent crisis'' in
response to significant Russian military activity in Ukraine
and across Europe. The Committee will benefit from your
assessment of the current security situation and an update on
EUCOM's engagements with partners and allies in response to the
Ukrainian situation.
Consistent with the 2018 National Defense Strategy, EUCOM
continues to refine the operational concepts, plans, and
programs necessary to counter Russia in the strategic
competition that defines this theater. The United States must
ensure a combat-credible military deterrent against Russia's
ambitions to threaten the sovereignty of our allies and
partners.
General Wolters, the Committee would like to hear your
views on the posture and investments necessary to attain and
maintain deterrence.
Turning to TRANSCOM, the men and women of TRANSCOM perform
duties that sustain the whole of the Department of Defense, in
protecting our Nation's security. With the competitive edge in
its ability to deploy and sustain America's armed forces,
TRANSCOM provides Department of Defense (DOD) with unique
capabilities that we have come to expect and, perhaps too
frequently, take for granted. TRANSCOM forces are busy
supporting all of the combatant commanders every day, and
without them, the United States would be at a significant
disadvantage almost everywhere in the world.
General Lyons, last year you were adamant about retaining
air fueling capability because you felt that TRANSCOM was at
the minimum acceptable levels for meeting peacetime demand for
tanker capacity. This year, I understand the Air Mobility
Command believes that TRANSCOM can rely on some contribution of
the KC-46 tankers, even though the KC-46 is not able to conduct
unrestricted operations. I would be interested in any
information you can share on this situation.
Our global transportation capability, owned or managed by
TRANSCOM, has been one of our asymmetric advantages for many
years now. However, we cannot assume that potential adversaries
will allow us free rein in this area in the future. Two years
ago, the Committee decided that the Department needed to
continue the analytical effort to identify requirements because
the studies presented at that time did not reflect
implementation of the National Defense Strategy. General Lyons,
perhaps you could give us an update on where TRANSCOM stands in
updating this analysis.
General Lyons, you have initiated a program to contract out
management of the Defense Personal Property Program (DP3) that
handles the movement of household goods for DOD.
Under this plan, a contractor team would be responsible for
issuing contracts to individual movers and carriers, rather
than the U.S Government.
After a competition last year, TRANSCOM awarded the
contract, but the losing bidders protested the award, and
Government Accountability Office (GAO) upheld the protest.
General Lyons, I would be interested in hearing about the
status of this program.
Finally, TRANSCOM also faces a unique set of cyber threats
because of the command's extensive work with private-sector
entities in the transportation and shipping industries. General
Lyons, the Committee would appreciate an update on TRANSCOM's
effort to improve its cybersecurity posture.
Again, thank you both again for being here this morning,
and I look forward to your testimony.
Before I turn it over to Senator Inhofe, I would just note,
for my colleagues, that there will be an informal classified
briefing immediately following this session in the Senate
Security Building Office in the Capitol.
Senator Inhofe, please?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would just acknowledge both of our witnesses as very good
friends and I would say to General Lyons, it is not too late to
change your mind.
As stated, many times before, this Committee's top priority
is to ensure the effective implementation of the NDS, the
National Defense Strategy, which focuses on China and Russia as
the primary threats to our national security.
That means that we have to ensure that our combatant
commands have what they need to address the challenges in this
strategic competition. We are going to be talking about that
with both of our witnesses, and you have got to be really, and
I am sure you will be, very straightforward with some of the
reductions that, as I see, are not going to be desirable.
I want to highlight that Russia's recent activities
regarding Ukraine are very concerning. At the same time, Russia
and Chinese threats are converging in Europe with an ever-more
aggressive China seeking influence and threatening security
through the economic coercion.
These growing threats, there are three that highlight the
value of our 2018 NDS and, secondly, they illustrate why we
should not be reducing defense spending, and, thirdly,
demonstrate the critical need for more advanced capabilities
like the F-35, to deter Russia, particularly since there have
been some controversy over that from some of the leadership of
this administration.
TRANSCOM is focused on a full-spectrum mobility operations
to meet requirements needed to combat both, Russia and China,
as well as support any other global engagements, from training
to force projection to forward deployed forces.
I encouraged to hear the administration's voice's strong
support for NATO, but, you know, the rhetoric is easy. We want
to make sure we have the resources to support those statements
that are being made.
General Wolters, I look forward to hearing about the
priorities for the European Deterrence Initiative and where
else we need to bolster our defenses to address threats you see
growing every day.
General Lyons, I would like to know the status of our
refueling capability that the chairman has always addressed, as
well as, he has addressed the global household goods contacts.
We have some specific questions about that.
Finally, whether this morning or in our classified session,
I would like to hear from both of you as to how this contested
environment impacts mobility operations.
General Lyons, you have been a friend for a long time, and
as I said, it is not too late.
Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Now, let me recognize General Wolters for your opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL TOD D. WOLTERS, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND/NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE
General Wolters. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe,
distinguished Members of the Committee, on behalf of the men,
women, and families who serve the Nation in the Euro-Atlantic,
we want to thank you one more time for your steadfast support.
It remains a privilege to serve alongside these patriots and
our like-minded allies and partners.
It is great to be lying abreast with our distinguished
USTRANSCOM commander, General Steve Lyons. He has led with
distinction for the last 2\1/2\ years in his capacity and over
the last year, he has been pivotal in not allowing the pandemic
to transform into a security crisis, and we thank him for his
blood, sweat, and tears to the Nation.
We would also like to pass our condolences to those
impacted by COVID-19. The battle against the virus continues
and we must remain vigilant.
We are fully aligned with Secretary Austin's priorities to
defend the Nation, take care of our people, and succeed through
teamwork. Via NATO, we work closely with our allies and
partners to address the evolving challenges posed by our
adversaries to secure peace, and protect our interests abroad.
NATO remains the strategic center of gravity and the foundation
of deterrence and assurance in Europe.
Everything we do is about generating peace. We compete to
win. We deter, and if deterrence fails, we are prepared to
respond to aggression with the full weight of the Transatlantic
Alliance.
The United States' relationships with European allies and
partners remains a key, strategic advantage and we must defend
it. We live in an increasingly complex and contested world.
Political uncertainty, energy competition, and diffusion of
disruptive technology are stressing the established rules-based
international order. Threats and challengers seek to take
advantage of these conditions through aggressive action using
all instruments of national power and they are backed by
increasingly capable military forces. Adversaries amplify these
malign activities and foster instability with disinformation.
Success in 21st century warfare demands that we embrace
competition and all of its associated activities below the
level of armed conflict. This is actually as critical as our
preparation for crisis or conflict, themselves. We are in an
era of strategic competition and winning in this era is all
about ensuring that strategic competition does not morph into a
global conflict.
One notable example of operations, activities, and
investments contributing to competition and deterrence, it is
our robust exercise program. This summer, when we execute our
Defender series exercises, composed of USEUCOM's Defender
Europe, and NATO's steadfast defender, 30,000 United States
servicemembers, allies, and partners from all warfare domains,
will demonstrate their ability to lift and shift massive forces
over large swaths of territory at speed, and at scale, from the
Atlantic, to the eastern periphery of the European continent.
Once our troopers are on station, they will sharpen their
responsiveness, resiliency, and lethality.
Our current security posture is strong, yet challenged, as
evidenced by actions in the vicinity of Ukraine. We possess
combat-credible capability across all domains: air, land, sea,
space, and cyber. We will maintain and work to hone this
capability to deter our adversaries and defensive partners in
our interests.
The soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, guardians, coast
guardsmen, and civilians of USEUCOM, appreciate your support to
defend the Homeland forward and preserve peace for the one
billion citizens living in the Euro-Atlantic.
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, thank you, again, for
this opportunity, and I look forward to fielding your
questions.
[The prepared of General Wolters follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Tod D. Wolters, United States Air Force
Armed Services Committee, on behalf of the dedicated men, women,
and their families preserving peace in the European theater, it is an
honor to testify before you today a second time as United States
European Command (USEUCOM) Commander. It is a privilege to continue to
serve alongside our dedicated patriots in a mission essential to
national security. Their selfless service and determined commitment is
an inspiration. Together, with likeminded allies and partners, our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, guardians, and
civilians work tirelessly to deliver peace and secure the United
States' interests.
For the last eight decades, many European nations have been key
allies and partners for the United States and today they collectively
serve as exporters of global peace and security. The interim National
Security Strategy articulates how a free, and prosperous Europe,
defended by Allied nations and a credible North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) Alliance, remains foundational to our security in a
competitive geopolitical environment. USEUCOM aligns operations,
activities, and investments to meet the challenges of Strategic
Competition with Russia and the People's Republic of China. Through our
strategy, we compete for long-term sustainable advantage, deter attacks
from potential aggressors, and prepare our Allies and Partners to
respond decisively. Standing alongside our Allies and Partners, USEUCOM
remains ready, should deterrence fail, to fight now and win. We value
the collaborative work across the Joint Force to implement this
strategy and express gratitude for continued Congressional interest and
support.
In Europe, political uncertainty, energy competition, malign
activity, and the global pandemic stress the rules-based international
order and strain European states' resources. Strategic competitors seek
to exploit these conditions using all instruments of their national
power to gain advantage and create instability. This nexus challenges
national governments and multi-national institutions like NATO and the
European Union (EU). To address these issues, USEUCOM strategy
prioritizes supporting NATO's deterrence and defense of the Euro-
Atlantic United States global operations.
Risks and Challenges in the USEUCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR)
The USEUCOM AOR encompasses 51 countries and territories, including
Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and the Caucasus. It contains significant
maritime domains, encompassing the Arctic Region, the North and Central
Atlantic, and the Mediterranean Sea. COVID-19 has presented challenges
for nations across the globe, including those in Europe, and our
deepest condolences are offered to all those impacted by this pandemic.
In USEUCOM, we continue working diligently alongside Allies and
Partners to ensure this health crisis does not become a security
crisis. Thus far, our collective team has been successful, and we are
buoyed through recent developments in vaccine production and
distribution across the USEUCOM AOR.
russia
Russia's nuclear arsenal and strike capability provides Russia an
opportunity to remain an enduring, existential threat to the United
States, our Allies, and our Partners. A central concern is Russia's
non-strategic nuclear weapons stockpile and the Kremlin's potential to
use these weapons in crisis or conflict. President Biden agreed with
President Putin to conduct a Strategic Stability Dialogue, which will
allow the United States to raise our concerns about Russia's nuclear
forces and doctrine. Beneath this threshold, Russia engages in malign
activities across the globe, attempting to create instability,
undermining the rules-based international order, and failing to meet
obligations under international agreements. These activities continue
despite widespread international condemnation and economic sanctions.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and his regime's coercive and
aggressive policies suggest Russian leadership will take risks to
maintain power, counter Western influence, and seize international
opportunities to increase the perception of Russia as a great power.
Russia seeks to maintain a sphere of influence by retaining and
employing capabilities above and below the level of armed conflict to
coerce neighboring sovereign nations and fracture its responsibilities
under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and retains an
active presence on sovereign soil in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia
against the will of those countries. To support their efforts at
political subversion and economic intimidation, Russia employs
unconventional tools, ranging from disinformation campaigns, malicious
cyber activities, and the use of private military companies. These
tools support a range of semi-covert, malign actions to intimidate,
weaken, and divide our Allies and Partners in the European theater and
beyond. By probing Western response thresholds to expand the space
below the level of armed conflict, Russian leadership habitually risks
misinterpreting warnings and creating unintended escalation.
Over the past decade, Russia consistently remained among the
world's top five military spenders. Despite a forecasted decrease in
Russian Gross Domestic Product due to the pandemic, Russia will
continue its military modernization efforts. These robust capabilities
and modernized forces have been displayed during operations in Ukraine,
Syria, and Libya. As a result, the Kremlin has growing confidence in
its military leadership and menu of hybrid, conventional, strategic,
and non-strategic nuclear capabilities needed to underwrite its 21st
century security approach. Today, Russia underpins its military force
posture with Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS), cyber and
electronic warfare systems, counter-space, and long-range precision
fires capabilities; all critical to seizing and maintaining the
initiative across the competition to conflict spectrum.
people's republic of china (prc)
The PRC's aggressive economic and diplomatic activities in the
USEUCOM AOR signal Beijing's desire to build influence in Europe and
challenge the established rules-based international order with an
alternative model. Beijing pursues economic leverage over targeted
nations through bilateral deals to build infrastructure, and secures
agreements to its advantage in global trade and market access. Chinese
foreign direct investment and government-backed business ventures
provide Beijing an avenue to assert influence at the expense of
enduring United States, Allied, and Partner interests. Seventeen
Central and Eastern European nations participate in the China-led, 17+1
Cooperation Framework though there are indications that participants
are more skeptical about its merits. Many European countries, including
the 17+1, take part in China's One Belt One Road Initiative.
The PRC is focused on seizing the ``high ground'' in critical and
emerging technology sectors with military application, including
Artificial Intelligence, advanced robotics, quantum technologies, and
hypersonics. In addition, the PRC's efforts to expand 5G networks into
Europe through state-backed firms like Huawei and ZTE pose security
risks. These networks place intellectual property, sensitive
technology, and private personal information at heightened risk of
acquisition and exploitation by the Chinese Government. This ongoing
initiative, coupled with China's growing interest and investment in
European ports and critical infrastructure, complicates steady state
and contingency operations. We articulate this risk to our European
defense counterparts and highlight shared values, interests, and
equitable business practices that distinguish the United States as a
partner of choice. European nations are becoming increasingly aware of,
and concerned about, the risks associated with Chinese capital and
investment from the PRC. We must hold the PRC accountable for its
predatory and unfair practices and make sure that our technologies are
not facilitating the PRC's military buildup or human rights abuses.
poland and the baltics
Poland and the Baltics remain a strategic focal point. For NATO,
this region remains at risk of Russian aggression based on historical
grievances and geographic position. Polish and Baltic geopolitical
alignment with the West reminds the Kremlin of its limited sphere of
control, isolation of its Kaliningrad exclave, and NATO's appeal to
regional states. The Kremlin considers the Baltic's ethnic Russian
population as justification for intervention. Russia actively targets
this population with extensive propaganda and malign influence
operations, while also conducting cyber operations to weaken Alliance
resolve. Because Russian forces in the Western Military District and
Kaliningrad hold a geographic and numerical advantage over regional
NATO forces, it is critical that timely indications and warnings are
available to position combat-capable forces to deter and, if deterrence
fails, blunt attack.
Regional Allies continue to demonstrate their commitment to
collective defense. Enhanced Forward Presence bolsters NATO's posture
in the east with four multinational battle groups in Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, and Poland. NATO air and missile defense forces reinforce
collective security and stability through Baltic air policing
operations and air defense exercises. Poland demonstrates resolve to
meet Alliance commitments through defense budget increases, burden-
sharing with the United States via the Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement, and ongoing modernization efforts, to include Patriot and F-
35 weapon system acquisitions. Poland also hosts the United States
Army's V Corps forward headquarters in Poznan, Poland, providing a
needed level of command and control to synchronize United States Army,
Allied, and Partner nation tactical formations operating in Europe.
black sea region
Ukraine
Following the purported annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia and
its proxies continue to undermine Ukrainian defense, economic, and
political sectors, attempting to pull Ukraine back into the Kremlin's
sphere of influence and obstruct its integration with Western
institutions. The ongoing conflict in the Donbas region, instigated by
Russia, continues to destabilize Ukrainian security. Ceasefire
violations occur often despite the established Minsk agreements. Russia
continues to subvert the Ukrainian Government through malicious cyber
activities, supports illegitimate elections in Eastern Ukraine, and
remains postured for the use of force in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov.
Contrary to Russia's intent, these coercive actions energize Ukrainian
society and reinforce aspirations to membership in Euro-Atlantic
institutions. Ukraine continues to fight corruption and enact defense
reform to meet conditionality requirements associated with the Ukraine
Security Assistance Initiative (USAI).
Turkey
Despite political tensions and disagreements, Turkey remains a
strategic United States Ally, critical to NATO and United States
interests in Europe, Eurasia, North Africa, and the Middle East. Turkey
possesses the second largest military in NATO and borders a volatile
region. In addition to hosting thousands of United States personnel at
sites across Turkey, the Turkish Armed Forces contribute to NATO
missions in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and the Mediterranean Sea. United
States forces in Turkey also support NATO ballistic missile defense and
facilitate regional counter-terrorism operations.
Ankara continues to view the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), the
Democratic Union Party (PYD), and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as
security threats. United States support for the SDF remains an area of
difficulty in our bilateral security relationship. Turkey's purchase of
the Russian produced S-400 air defense system ended Turkey's F-35
acquisition, further integration into NATO's IAMD Command and Control
network, and resulted in sanctions for conducting significant
transactions with Russia's defense industry through the Countering
America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.
However, Turkey retains a pivotal role in countering Russia.
Ankara's relationship with Moscow remains competitive and
transactional, with Turkish engagement often aimed at constraining
Russian behavior. Both nations view the Black Sea region within their
natural spheres of influence, and each continues to oppose the other in
Libya. Turkey can best counter Russia through bilateral cooperation
with the United States and multilateral cooperation with NATO.
south caucasus
The Kremlin exerts influence over South Caucasus countries through
the manipulation of regional tensions and unresolved military
conflicts. The Kremlin believes chronic instability in this area
enables Russian regional hegemony. Russia maintains leverage over
Georgia by occupying Abkhazia and South Ossetia, blocking free movement
of people and goods within Georgia's territory, detaining and harassing
civilians living in and near occupied areas, and undermining Georgia's
NATO membership aspirations. After brokering a ceasefire arrangement
between Armenia and Azerbaijan in November 2020, Russia increased its
military presence in the region by deploying 2,000 troops to Nagorno-
Karabakh as peacekeepers. Russia continues to sell military systems and
hardware to both sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh.
balkans
The Balkans remain a strategically significant region where
Russian, and now Chinese, malign influence and existing ethnic tensions
foster instability. Russia uses social and political tensions to impede
Euro-Atlantic alignment and integration. China's emergence as an
alternative patron for economic and defense cooperation, under suspect
terms, further disrupts the region. Nonetheless, North Macedonia's NATO
accession in March 2020 is a regional success story.
Despite Kosovo declaring independence in 2008, Russia, China, and
other states (including some EU and NATO members) have yet to recognize
its sovereign nation status. Kosovo and neighboring Serbia have yet to
normalize relations. We encourage both parties to maintain dialogue
towards a peaceful solution. Kosovo's principal stabilizing force
remains NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR), which includes a small, but
significant United States contribution that bolsters United States
political leverage in the region. KFOR enables the security conditions
required for normalization of Serbia-Kosovo relations and the planned
10-year transition of the Kosovo Security Force from 2018 to 2028.
Serbia seeks balance between East (Russia and China) and the West,
but finds its EU ambitions hindered by Russian-stoked internal
corruption, structural and economic challenges, EU-Russia sanctions,
and the requirement to normalize Kosovo relations. Bosnia and
Herzegovina continues to face political and ethnic instability. Fueled
by Russian influence, obstructionists seek greater autonomy for Bosnia
and Herzegovina's Serb-majority political entity, Republika Srpska, to
weaken state authorities and frustrate further alignment with Western
institutions. Nationalist politics and entrenched ethnic divisions
between Bosniaks, Bosnian-Croats, and Bosnian-Serbs challenge Bosnia
and Herzegovina's ability to chart a path of lasting stability and
eventual NATO membership.
Chinese investments focus on large-scale transportation, energy,
and information infrastructure. USEUCOM is concerned about Chinese
motives as these initiatives expose EU and NATO member states to
coercion and adversely affect the security of critical infrastructure.
Furthermore, China continues to expand its defense and security ties
with Serbia, particularly via high-level visits, unmanned aerial
vehicle technology dependency, and joint exercises.
central atlantic and the arctic region
The Central Atlantic encompasses the maritime approaches to the
Homeland and the transatlantic Sea Lines of Communication. Rarely
navigated by Russia since the 1990's, advances in its submarine fleet
and expanding maritime strategic goals have reinvigorated Russia's
access to the broader Atlantic Ocean. As a global common, the Atlantic
Ocean must remain open and free to facilitate commerce between Europe,
the United States, and other international markets. It is imperative
that we maintain our competitive advantage in the Central Atlantic
through bolstered U.S. and Allied presence to defend the Homeland
forward and maintain free and open transatlantic sea lines of
communication.
We ensure these vital sea lines of communication remain open by
securing the Greenland, Iceland, and United Kingdom gap, enabling
access between the Atlantic and Arctic. USEUCOM coordinates with
USNORTHCOM in these regions to provide a comprehensive approach to
regional and homeland security. In the Arctic, Russia continues to
militarize the region by introducing offensive capabilities that pose
risks to United States and Allied forces and limit regional access.
Collaborating with Allies and Partners, we work to enhance
interoperability and proficiency, while demonstrating collective
resolve to counter malign behavior. The Arctic remains a geopolitical
zone of competition, driven by the opening of commercial shipping
routes and increased access to resources including energy, minerals,
and fisheries. We expect these activities and region focus to increase
as the effects of climate change continue to be realized.
The existing rules-based order benefits all Arctic nations by
facilitating sustainable economic development, fostering cooperation,
and ensuring a stable conflict-free region. As a strategic corridor, a
more open and active Arctic region will increasingly connect the United
States Homeland, Europe, and the Indo-Pacific. China, declaring itself
a ``near-Arctic'' power, invests in both Russian energy and the
Northern Sea Route and seeks economic footholds among Arctic nations to
gain influence over regional governance. In concert with our Allies and
Partners, via a whole-of-government and whole-of-nations approach,
USEUCOM must continue to maintain a credible Arctic deterrence to
ensure that growing competition in this dynamic region does not lead to
conflict.
violent extremist organizations (veo)
We continue to support United States interagency counter-VEO
initiatives. These organizations remain a transnational threat with
decentralized command and control, finance, and facilitation networks
spreading from conflict zones into Europe. In particular, VEOs threaten
to attack the
United States and European Allies, including through weapons of
mass destruction. Extremists exploit instability in North Africa, Iraq,
and Syria to husband resources in the face of coalition counter
efforts. VEO inspired and organized attacks in Europe further
complicate integration efforts, potentially isolating refugee and
migrant communities and making some members of these populations more
vulnerable to recruitment. Despite diminished capabilities, the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria and other VEOs desire to conduct external
operations, requiring global vigilance to prevent a resurgence and
preclude future attacks against the United States Homeland, Europe, and
our Allies and Partners.
israel
Israel remains a critical United States partner facing complex and
evolving security challenges. Iran continues to expand its regional
influence, to provide lethal support to regional partners including
Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian militant groups, and to develop
options to threaten and attack Israel. Iran and its partners have made
significant gains in asymmetric capabilities, including advanced
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and armed unmanned aerial systems.
Tehran remains committed to modernizing its military and continues to
improve the range, lethality, and accuracy of its ballistic missile
systems. However, Tehran's malign influence also presents opportunities
as regional actors find common ground with Israel in the face of a
common adversary. Recent bilateral agreements with the United Arab
Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan represent notable progress in
normalizing relations and improving the regional security environment.
In compliance with the 2020 Unified Command Plan, we continue close
coordination within the Department of Defense to ensure an orderly and
deliberate transfer of the operations, activities, and investments
focused on Israel to USCENTCOM. Ongoing initiatives include a robust
series of exercises, senior leader engagements with the Israeli Defense
Forces (IDF), coordination with the IDF to maintain Israel's
qualitative military edge over any military threats to Israel, and
naval support to defend Israel against growing Iranian ballistic
missile threats. This assistance demonstrates the United States'
unwavering commitment to Israel, enhances regional stability in the
Levant, and deters the Iranian ballistic missile threat. Ultimately,
our focus on a seamless transition will support United States interests
and assist in the defense of Israel.
USEUCOM OPERATIONS, ACTIVITIES, INVESTMENTS, AND OPPORTUNITIES
strategy implementation
Along with Allies and Partners, USEUCOM confronts challenges by
competing to secure long-term sustainable advantage, deterring
potential aggressors, and preparing to respond decisively. As the
coordinating authority for the Russia Problem Set, USEUCOM advises the
Secretary of Defense on force structure, resources, and synchronization
of Department of Defense activities to deter Russia and counter its
global malign activities. We work tirelessly with Allies, Partners, and
the U.S. interagency to address the evolving challenges posed by our
adversaries. Despite the COVID-19 global pandemic, we display vigilance
in this complex security environment, and--should deterrence fail--
should deterrence fail--remain ready to respond with lethal and
resilient force in all domains.
Congress provides critical support to the USEUCOM AOR through the
European Deterrence Initiative (EDI). EDI enhances our theater posture
to deter adversaries and compete in a contested logistics environment,
while assuring Allies and Partners. Increases in forward-stationed and
rotational forces strengthen our contact, blunt, and surge layer
capabilities, providing us the ability to compete and win in a multi-
domain crisis or conflict. EDI investments improve our response using
more robust theater infrastructure and prepositioned stocks. Funding
for exercises, training, and building partner capacity bolster the
readiness and interoperability of U.S. and Alliance forces. Together,
these advances enable our deterrence and defense efforts through rapid
deployment and sustainment of forces. Support NATO's Deterrence and
Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area
USEUCOM's primary mission is to compete, deter, and respond to
aggression with the full weight of the NATO Alliance. NATO continues
adapting to meet the challenges and complexities of our dynamic
security environment. Together, we continue improving our speed,
posture, transparency, and alignment. Through new strategic concepts,
establishing new commands, continuing investment in critical military
capabilities, implementing enhanced readiness, and pursuing a robust
array of operations, missions, and activities, we demonstrate our
combined ability to deter and defend. The cohesion of these efforts has
not waned during our collective response to the global pandemic.
In 2020, NATO released the Concept for the Deterrence and Defense
of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA), NATO's first deterrence and defense
concept since 1967. Nested with the 2019 NATO Military Strategy, this
concept guides Alliance approaches towards threats from Russia and
international terror groups. To support this effort, NATO bolstered
deterrence efforts in the space and cyberspace domains by establishing
a cyberspace operations center at the Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium and integrating its Space Center into
Allied Air Command at Ramstein Air Base, Germany.
Two new commands, Joint Forces Command Norfolk and the Joint
Support and Enabling Command, enhance Alliance adaptation to the
dynamic geopolitical environment. These headquarters focus on
transatlantic lines of communication and coordinating support
functions, enabling the deployment and sustainment of NATO forces
during crisis or conflict. The EU, NATO, and USEUCOM continue to
sustain progress improving infrastructure and transit permissions
facilitating the rapid movement of forces and logistic support across
the Euro-Atlantic.
NATO nations continue to invest in critical military capabilities,
contributing to common defense and supporting the Alliance. For the
past six years, European NATO nations consistently increased defense
expenditures and future projections remain positive despite the COVID-
19 pandemic. NATO is increasing interoperable combat power through
major acquisitions to include cyber capabilities across the Alliance;
High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) long range fires
capability in Romania; fourth and fifth-generation aircraft in
Bulgaria, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, and Poland; along with embarking
the United Kingdom's aircraft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth.
NATO's ability to compete and win through crisis and conflict
continues to improve with implementation of the Readiness Action Plan
and NATO Readiness Initiative. This effort provides an improved ready,
responsive, and reinforced posture. Complementing the NATO Response
Force, the Readiness Initiative provides additional ready forces able
to respond rapidly to aggression by designating 30 battalions, 30 air
squadrons, and 30 naval combat vessels for potential use in 30 days.
NATO members contribute to theater anti-submarine warfare
operations and provide critical host nation support to forward-
stationed U.S. Forces across the region. Allies and Partners contribute
forces to ongoing NATO and United States-led coalition missions
advancing our common interests in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iraq, and Syria.
Furthermore, Allies and Partners underwrite infrastructure investments
and defray costs of U.S. military construction through the NATO
Security Investment Program. Additionally, we expect improvements by
individual European nations and the EU to enhance military mobility,
increasing their responsiveness and combat capability. The EU, in
consultation with NATO, projects to invest 1.69 billion euros over the
next 7 years for civilian and military dual-use transportation
infrastructure improvements across the continent.
Our Allies responded in solidarity to alleviate suffering during
the COVID-19 pandemic, providing airlift, field hospitals, medical
expertise, ventilators, and other critical supplies. The Alliance
established a NATO Pandemic Response Trust Fund to stockpile medical
equipment and supplies necessary during the second COVID-19 wave in
Europe. Multiple Allies received critical ventilators and medical
supplies from this initiative in late 2020.
USEUCOM plans to demonstrate joint capabilities during the upcoming
United States-led exercises DEFENDER-Europe and ASTRAL KNIGHT. These
multi-domain exercises directly complement NATO-led exercises such as
STEADFAST JUPITER that maintain maritime air defense, antisubmarine
warfare, and maritime interdiction capabilities. Ongoing enhancements
to multinational information sharing systems enable USEUCOM execution
with NATO and non-NATO partners. Ultimately, military exercises with
our Allies remain an integral part of demonstrating Alliance readiness,
interoperability, and capability.
The participation of USEUCOM forces in NATO operations and
activities demonstrates U.S. commitment to the Alliance. Our soldiers
serve in Poland as part of NATO's enhanced Forward Presence mission in
one of four battlegroups deterring Russian aggression in Poland and the
Baltics. United States Air Forces in Europe support NATO Enhanced Air
Policing missions, safeguarding the sovereignty of Allied airspace
against Russian incursions. We plan to support Standing NATO Maritime
Group Two in 2022 with U.S. naval capability to counter maritime
challenges in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and the Baltic Sea.
Operation ATLANTIC SENTRY, conducted by United States Aegis destroyers
based in Rota, Spain, and the Aegis Ashore system in Romania provides
the foundation of NATO's ballistic missile defense capability.
We leverage Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) to demonstrate
operational unpredictability to adversaries, improve deterrence, and
support our Allies. Recent DFE operations include posturing USS
Roosevelt to the High North, Bomber Task Force missions throughout the
AOR, a combined arms battalion deployment for DEFENDER Europe 20, and
an F-35 deployment to exercise with Allies. Additionally, USS
Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group presence in European waters this spring
is a tremendous message to Allies and Partners about our commitment to
deter and a critically important interoperability and training
opportunity. Each force presence and operation demonstrates our ability
to generate significant combat power across the AOR, while improving
posture and warfighting readiness. This operational flexibility
enhances cross-combatant command coordination and resource sharing,
allowing for seamless transition and handover across Unified Command
Plan boundaries to quickly deploy forces for emerging requirements.
Rotational Army, Marine, and Special Operations Forces (SOF)
maintain a presence in strategic locations across the theater. These
forces work alongside Allies and Partners to deter aggression, counter
malign activities, build host nation defense capability, and enhance
interoperability. For example, in Eastern Europe a rotational armored
brigade combat team and combat aviation brigade participate in
Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE to hone Alliance warfighting skills.
Additionally, rotational Marine Forces in Norway reinforce NATO's
Northern periphery while training in Arctic conditions with our
Norwegian allies. Rotational forces are critical to our ability to
deter Russia and assure Allies.
counter russian activities and malign influence
Every day, USEUCOM and NATO compete to deter the increasingly
capable military underwriting Russia's power and counter the malign
behavior that guides efforts to enhance perceptions the Kremlin is a
responsible actor. Aside from USEUCOM's own capabilities, weleverage
our Allies and Partners and the unique attributes our U.S. interagency
team brings to deterrence and defense.
As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO must remain a nuclear
Alliance. NATO's nuclear capability preserves peace, prevents coercion,
deters aggression, and instills confidence in the transatlantic bond.
The Alliance's strategic forces guarantee security and backstop United
States operations in Europe. NATO continues to adapt its nuclear
posture to ensure these capabilities remain credible, resilient, and
adaptable. USEUCOM fully supports modernization and recapitalization of
our nuclear forces. Sustained Congressional funding for these programs
demonstrates commitment to our operations and solidarity with NATO.
In the ground domain, we expect to establish a U.S. division-sized
capability through the combination of forward-stationed forces,
rotational forces, and Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS). APS equipment
facilitates increased agility and lethality by enabling rapid
integration of rotational combat units into operations. During Exercise
DEFENDER-Europe 20, United States Army Europe and NATO Allies
successfully exercised at the battalion and brigade levels, and we plan
to assemble a divisional formation on NATO's Eastern flank in Exercise
DEFENDER-Europe 24, the first since the end of the Cold War.
In the maritime domain, Carrier Strike Group and amphibious
presence are key elements of a lethal and agile theater posture. U.S.
Sixth Fleet provides maritime command and control capability across the
USEUCOM AOR, while U.S. Second Fleet complements and contributes to
reinforcing NATO's Western, Northern, and Southern flanks. Last fall,
the guided missile destroyer USS Roosevelt completed a 50-day patrol in
the High North where it joined five other nations in NATO's Allied
Maritime Command-led anti-submarine warfare exercise DYNAMIC MONGOOSE
20. Additionally, United States and U.K. warships conducted exercises
in the Barents Sea, the first of its kind since the mid-1980s. While
Russia attempts to impose costs with increased out of area deployments
not witnessed since the Cold War, the reality is our crews are gaining
invaluable real-world operational experience, demonstrating operational
flexibility, and developingtactical undersea warfare advances for the
next generation of sailors. The $539 million EDI investments in wide
area search systems, new sonobouy capabilities, and improved
communications systems are enhancing our competitive advantage. This
enables the U.S. and Allies to meet Strategic Competition objectives in
the maritime environment and improve our overall maritime domain
awareness.
In the air domain, we are improving our mix of fighter aircraft to
enhance Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), support Allies'
efforts to enhance their air defense systems, and increase long range
strike capability for deterrence. For example, Exercise ASTRAL KNIGHT
20 integrated United States air and missile defense capabilities with
the Polish Air Force. In Bomber Task Force missions, U.S. bombers
launched from bases in the United States and Europe, fly vast distances
across the AOR while integrating with NATO and partner nation forces.
We seek to enhance current posture, complicate adversary decision-
making and impose costs while assuring our NATO Allies via Agile Combat
Employment. Agile operations supported by Combined Joint All Domain
Command and Control, and domain awareness capabilities with improved
communications infrastructure, demonstrate a credible combat deterrence
force network from potential airfields across the continent. This
expansion of European contingency air operation and deployable air base
sets enhances the survivability of our forces.
We remain laser focused in space, a domain whose importance to
USEUCOM, NATO, and the globe cannot be overstated. Leveraging U.S.
Space Command capabilities, we ensure our ability to plan and execute
multi-domain operations. Additionally, we work with the U.S. Space
Force, allies, and partners to further integrate space capabilities
into joint and combined operations and activities.
In the cyber domain, USEUCOM's Joint Cyber Center coordinates with
Joint Forces Headquarters Cyber and United States Cyber Command to
counter Russian malign cyber activities and enhance our Allied and
Partner capabilities. Recognizing the worldwide cyber capabilities of
China, Iran, and North Korea, we work with other combatant commands and
interagency partners to enhance global cyber defenses and our ability
to impose costs on malicious adversary behavior. In the information
environment, the Russian Influence Group (RIG) provides a key platform
for competing with Russia. We co-chair this effort with United States
Department of State's Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs.
Congressional funding for these unique cybersecurity and hybrid warfare
programs (i.e. electronic warfare, special operations, and information
domain operations), particularly through the State
Department's Countering Russian Influence Fund--Foreign Military
Financing (CRIF-FMF), enables the RIG to challenge adversary narratives
and disinformation. Congressional funding for these unique information
operations enables USEUCOM to challenge adversary narratives and
disinformation.
Our Special Operations forces work with European Allies and
Partners to build capacity, counter malign activity, and improve
resilience. These unique capabilities enable USEUCOM to identify,
attribute, and counter Russian malign influence. Furthermore, our
Special Operations personnel provide invaluable contributions in
sensing the operational environment, enhancing our ability to deter
through enhanced indications and warnings.
Along Russia's border, key United States partners see a brighter
future to the West and resist Moscow's efforts to hold them in the
Russian sphere of influence. Ukraine seeks a closer partnership with
the United States despite an ongoing Kremlin-sponsored malign influence
campaign and violence by Russian supported forces in the Donbas region.
The United States supports the Ukrainian Armed Forces through
mentorship and advice from the Joint Multinational Training Group-
Ukraine and with military and civilian advisors embedded across
Ukraine's defense sector. With Ukraine a recognized operational partner
to NATO, Allies and Partners also assist Ukraine's defense efforts,
including the U.K.'s Operation Orbital and Canada's Operation Unifier.
The United States, U.K., Canada, Denmark, Lithuania, Poland, and Sweden
comprise the Multinational Joint Commission, which coordinates Allied
and Partner FMF and USAI security cooperation funding. This funding,
along with the Joint Military Training Group-Ukraine effort, help build
Ukrainian military capability, competence, and interoperability.
Continued USAI and FMF funding enables Ukraine to defend its
sovereignty against well-armed Russian-backed forces. Department of
State and Department of Defense continue working closely on resource
coordination.
As part of a whole-of-government approach, our Joint Interagency
Counter Trafficking Center supports interagency efforts to combat
Russian malign activities, primarily by assisting federal law
enforcement activities. This initiative provides USEUCOM with
additional areas for competition. Through these partnerships, USEUCOM
leverages a range of interagency driven effects including criminal
investigations and convictions, seizures, sanctions, and designations.
Our approach in competition considers escalation management and
control to maximize deterrence and defense. In conjunction with this
emphasis, we make extensive use of authorized military-to-military
channels with Russia to safely deconflict activities, when necessary,
and maintain strategic stability.
advance and strengthen strategic relationships
Our strong bilateral and multilateral ties with European Allies and
Partners enable advancement of our shared interests. Our military-to-
military relationships across the Euro-Atlantic area remain strong,
signaling the resilience of our collective defense.
Turkey remains a key United States and NATO Ally. We recognize
Turkey's leadership role as a strategic NATO ally. Turkey hosts United
States servicemembers conducting a wide array of NATO, bilateral, and
unilateral missions including radar and tanker support to ongoing
operations. Additionally, Turkey contributes forces to NATO missions in
Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 in the
Mediterranean Sea. In 2020, Turkey supported a United States Bomber
Task Force with tanker and fighter assets.
In the South Caucasus, Georgia remains a steadfast partner and
contributor to global security. Georgia's commitment of approximately
860 soldiers to the Resolute Support Mission, the largest non-NATO
contributor to NATO's Afghanistan mission, indicates the enduring
strength of our strategic partnership. We assist Georgian forces in
preparing for this mission through the Georgia Deployment Program.
Georgia hosted NOBLE PARTNER 20--a Georgian Defense Force and United
States Army Europe exercise--to entrance Georgian, regional partner,
and United States force readiness and interoperability in a realistic,
multinational training environment. We support Georgia's efforts to
generate and sustain capable defense forces through the Georgia Defense
Readiness Program, which enables Georgia to defend its sovereignty and
territorial integrity.
In the Arctic, changing environmental conditions present new
opportunities for exploration, trade, and interaction. USEUCOM supports
whole-of-government efforts to preserve the region, address shared
challenges with other Arctic nations, and secure United States
interests. We leverage close relations with European Arctic nations and
our coordination with USNORTHCOM to build awareness while strengthening
the call for open and non-invasive impacts in the region. These
bilateral and multilateral strategic relationships enhance Alliance
efforts to deter Russian aggression and advance shared interests.
We strengthen our strategic relationships through security
cooperation initiatives. U.S. National Guard forces maintain vibrant
relationships and unique access with Allies and Partners through the
State Partnership Program (SPP). With more than 500 engagements through
22 active programs annually, the SPP cultivates regional expertise and
strengthens personal relationships to improve readiness and alignment
across the AOR. Programs such as the Black Sea Maritime Initiative and
enhancing Baltic IAMD represent potent, regionally-focused components,
of a resilient theater posture.
enable united states global operations
Europe and the United States remain the foundation for upholding a
free and open international order. Our unique geographic location
enables global operations, including United States interagency and
multinational operations, through synchronization and agreements for
access, basing, and overflight permissions within Europe. We work
within the whole-of-government approach to maintain these permissions
under bilateral agreements and to resist Russian and Chinese strategic
investments. Absent these agreements, the United States could not meet
treaty obligations or effectively protect vital national interests. The
shared values, trust, civilian leadership of the military, and
longstanding relationships we have in Europe enable the United States
to generate coalitions for worldwide operations in support of shared
national interests.
Last year, Allies and Partners proved essential in our efforts to
deter Iranian aggression. European support enabled the rapid posture
shift of United States forces in response to potential contingencies in
the Levant. Key partners provided indispensable access, basing, and
overflight permissions enhancing our protection of American citizens
and diplomats. This highlights how allies and partners enable U.S.
global operations that preserve and defend our national interests.
conclusion
Maintaining a capable United States presence in Europe strengthens
our national security by encouraging peace, unity, and cohesion between
Europe's individual nations. Competitors, notably Russia and China,
present formidable, enduring challenges to preserving a Europe that is
free and peaceful. United States servicemembers in Europe continue to
generate global peace alongside our Allies and Partners in the face of
these obstacles. Our strategy addresses the dynamic security
environment by ensuring we effectively compete for long-term
sustainable advantage, deter attacks from potential aggressors, and
prepare our Allies and Partners to respond decisively.
We appreciate Congressional interest in these challenges and your
continued pledge to meet them through engagement, funding, and
authorities; particularly your efforts to support the European
Deterrence Initiative and International Security Cooperation Programs.
These authorities enhance U.S. and alliance readiness and posture to
respond in crisis or conflict. We sit in a strategically significant
part of the world and the dedicated men and women of the command
continually remember the trust our Nation places in us. Together with
the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, guardians, and
civilians of USEUCOM, your support demonstrates our Nation's continued
commitment to defend the Homeland forward and preserve peace for the
one billion people living in the Euro-Atlantic region.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Wolters.
Now, let me recognize General Lyons.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL STEPHEN R. LYONS, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
General Lyons. Chairman, can you hear me okay?
Chairman Reed. Great. Yes, sir.
General Lyons. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
distinguished Members of the Committee, it is my distinct
pleasure, once again, to represent the members of the United
States Transportation Command that are operating around the
globe every day, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
I have the privilege today to be joined by our new senior
enlisted leader, Fleet Master Sergeant Myrick, and it is great
to have him onboard.
Let me just say again that our enduring purpose at TRANSCOM
is to project and sustain military forces globally at our time
and place of choosing. Providing our national leadership with
the strategic comparative advantage and a wide range of options
to enable the advancement of U.S. national interests, assure
our allies and partners, and if necessary, respond with a
decisive force to win.
Given the unprecedented challenges amid the COVID-19 global
pandemic, I could not be more proud of the men and women of
TRANSCOM, who have continued their impressive support to the
joint force and support to whole-of-government efforts to help
American citizens at home.
I would particularly like to highlight our air component's
rapid fielding capability to move highly infectious patients,
which was nation prior to the pandemic.
I appreciate the Committee's continued support on important
global mobility issues, including sealift recapitalization,
aerial refueling, defense personal property, as well as your
acknowledgment of the future challenges and logistics
operations under all domain persistent attack.
Today, I am absolutely honored to join General Tod Wolters
and pleased to play a supporting role in his wide-ranging
European defense initiatives. Thank you for your leadership and
support for our impressive TRANSCOM teammates, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Lyons follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Stephen R. Lyons
strategic environment
The Interim National Security Strategic Guidance acknowledges an
increasingly complex global security environment, characterized by
overt challenges to the free and open international order and the
reemergence of long term strategic competition between nations. These
changes require a clear eyed appraisal of future threats, the changing
character of warfare, and how the Department of Defense (DOD) will
retain the ability to project forces globally to advance security
interests and respond decisively to win if necessary.
delivering for our nation
TRANSCOM's enduring purpose is to project and sustain military
forces anywhere on the globe at the time and place of our Nation's
choosing. Our ability to rapidly move forces transoceanic distances is
a strategic comparative advantage, providing a wide range of options in
support of the National Defense Strategy (NDS) while creating multiple
dilemmas for our adversaries. As 1 of 11 Combatant Commands, TRANSCOM
is responsible for operating the Defense Transportation System and
integrating the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE).
Our Unified Command Plan tasks are executed through three assigned
component commands (U.S. Army's Military Surface Deployment and
Distribution Command, U.S. Navy's Military Sealift Command, and U.S.
Air Force's Air Mobility Command) and one major subordinate command
(Joint Enabling Capabilities Command). Our key mobility mission areas
include airlift, air refueling, aeromedical evacuation, sealift, and
domestic rail and motor freight, all of which are enabled by a global
posture that provides the U.S. with positional, temporal, and
psychological advantage to respond across the operational spectrum.
The DOD's ability to project military forces is inextricably linked
to commercial industry, which provides critical transportation capacity
as well as global networks to meet day-to-day and wartime requirements.
TRANSCOM manages several emergency preparedness programs that call on
industry to specifically support wartime requirements. They include the
Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement
(VISA), Strategic Seaport Program, Strategic Corridor Rail Network and
the Strategic Highway Network. On behalf of the Department, TRANSCOM
spends approximately 7 billion dollars with industry partners each year
in transportation services to execute DOD mission requirements.
year in review
The COVID-19 pandemic posed significant challenges to TRANSCOM's
continual efforts to project and sustain the joint force. At the
beginning of last year, TRANSCOM rapidly deployed a Brigade Combat Team
of the 82d Airborne Division to United States Central Command,
delivering 800 soldiers within 18 hours of notification to deter
Iranian aggression. In total, the Brigade of 3,000 soldiers closed in
under five days. This no-notice deployment underscored the impressive
capability of the Global Mobility Enterprise. In the year that ensued,
TRANSCOM transported 33 brigade-sized units overseas in support of all
six geographic combatant commands. TRANSCOM operated from all seven
continents, delivering over 95 million gallons of fuel during air-to-
air refueling operations resupplying nearly 60 thousand aircraft and
directly supporting 38 Bomber Task Force missions. On short notice, our
Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) established a JTF command
post in support of Special Operations Command--Africa to reposture
forces from Somalia. Additionally, TRANSCOM transported over 790,000
passengers, 315,000 tons of cargo and 24.2 million barrels of DOD
petroleum products, all while complying with COVID-19 preventative
measures, testing and restrictions.
TRANSCOM aeromedically evacuated 6,324 patients (71 having
sustained battle injuries), 350 of whom were COVID-positive. Given the
emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, we are grateful for the exceptional
efforts of the USAF, industry, and academia to deliver a material
solution within 90 days to safely airlift highly infectious patients. I
am extremely proud of the resilience and ingenuity of the aeromedical
evacuation enterprise to meet these challenges this past year.
In support of the whole-of-government response to COVID-19,
TRANSCOM repatriated 3,915 American citizens stranded worldwide and
facilitated movement of over 2,000 ventilators, 4.4 million COVID test
kits, 150 million needles and syringes, and continues to support
vaccine distribution to DOD beneficiaries. TRANSCOM collaborated with
the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency, USAF, and United Airlines
to perform aerosol testing onboard commercial passenger airframes to
determine the transmission risk of COVID-19 between passengers. The
findings revealed a 99.7 percent reduction in aerosolized pathogens
through aircraft ventilation and HEPA filtration systems thereby
informing decisions on cabin occupancy, seating assignments, and
contact-tracing procedures for the Patriot Express contracted rotator
flights.
Throughout the pandemic, TRANSCOM frequently consulted with
industry partners to assess their viability to support National Defense
requirements. Cargo partners within the surface, sealift, and airlift
industries appear to be on the path to recovery. However, the airline
passenger industry will likely take many years to recover given 60
percent reduction in volume, resulting in over $30 billion in lost
revenue, as well as the divestment or parking of over 20 percent of
aircraft inventories.
transcom warfighting framework
The success of DOD's power projection capability is contingent on
three critical elements of TRANSCOM's organizational warfighting
framework: Global Mobility Posture; Global Transport Capacity; and
Global Command, Control, and Integration.
Global Mobility Posture
Global Mobility Posture is the foundation of power projection,
enabled by a robust network of allies and partners, which includes
access to global networks maintained by industry to support our
Nation's ability to mobilize and deploy. Diplomatic alignment with our
allies and partners enables access, basing, and overflight for mobility
forces, critically important to the rapid deployment of personnel and
equipment across the globe. Our robust and resilient network also
provides the U.S. positional advantage to rapidly advance our national
security interests, deter adversaries, and when necessary, win
decisively.
On the domestic front, TRANSCOM works closely with the U.S.
Department of Transportation on numerous domestic transportation
programs to include the administration of three National Defense
Programs: Highways, Railroads, and Ports for National Defense. In order
to ensure national security needs are recognized in civil highway
policies and programs, TRANSCOM is working with the Federal Highway
Administration to encourage investment to enhance infrastructure
critical to national security.
Global Transport Capacity
Our Global Transport Capacity includes conveyances and platforms to
move troops, supplies, fuel, and equipment through global
transportation networks. These include rail, motor transport, sealift,
air refueling, and airlift. More than 60 percent of TRANSCOM's organic
transport capacity resides in the Reserve Components, underscoring our
reliance on the Total Force.
Mobility force sizing and shaping are informed by Mobility
Capability Requirements Studies (MCRS). TRANSCOM is conducting the
Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA-directed MCRS-20 to assess airlift force
sufficiency, as well as air refueling and sealift capacities to meet
NDS missions. In addition, we are conducting a concurrent study to
determine requirements for U.S. flagged fuel tanker vessel capacity and
to assess the necessity of assured access provided by the Fiscal Year
2021 NDAA-authorized Tanker Security Fleet. We will submit reports on
these studies by June 2021.
Transport Capacity Modernization Priorities
Sealift
We are pleased with the progress over the past year working with
OSD, USN, and the Maritime Administration (MARAD) on codifying a viable
strategy to recapitalize the Department's sealift fleet. 33 of 50 USN
Roll-On/Roll-Off sealift ships are forecasted to retire in the next 10
years. DOD, USN, and TRANSCOM endorse a strategy to acquire used
sealift vessels from the open market. The Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA,
authorizes the procurement of the first four used ships, decoupled from
a requirement to build new ships. We are working with MARAD on
selecting a Vessel Acquisition Manager and plan to procure the first
used vessel in CY 2021.
Aerial Refueling
TRANSCOM is aligned with the USAF on the way ahead for the air
refueling portfolio. The fleet is critical to rapid global mobility and
the lifeblood of the joint force's ability to deploy and employ the
immediate and surge forces across all NDS mission areas. The current
air refueling fleet is comprised of the aging KC-135 and KC-10
aircraft, and the new KC-46. We support the USAF's plan to adjust its
force structure in order to meet day-to-day and crisis requirements.
Global Command, Control, and Integration
Global Command, Control, and Global Integration remains central to
our ability to align scarce mobility resources consistent with the
highest strategic priorities. Enabled by a portfolio of information
technology systems, our ability to control mobility forces is
contingent on secure networks and continuous modernization efforts to
retain the competitive edge against our adversaries in the cyber
domain.
TRANSCOM is pursuing several initiatives in the area of cyber
resiliency and digital modernization to mitigate the rapidly evolving
threat in the cyber-contested environment. Mitigation initiatives
include increasing cyber hygiene to harden our terrain and decrease
adversary attack vectors, modernizing and optimizing our IT portfolio
by taking advantage of technical advancements such as cloud services,
and investing in critical data encryption to create trusted
transactions. Additionally, we partnered with the U.S. Cyber Command to
implement a DOD proof of principle using, ``Zero Trust'' on our network
environment to further bolster defenses from capable adversaries. We
also continue to collaborate with our commercial transportation
providers, sharing information as able and facilitating the performance
of annual cybersecurity self-assessments based on National Institute of
Standards and Technology guidelines.
defense personal property program (dp3) reform
TRANSCOM, on behalf of the Department, is leading a number of
efforts to improve the relocation experience for DOD and Coast Guard
personnel and their families. Together with the Services, TRANSCOM
implemented COVID-19 protection protocols to keep families safe while
relocating; enacted common-sense rule changes to address customer
priorities `at the curb,' and published a strategic plan to guide our
collective action in the years ahead. TRANSCOM is currently addressing
the issues the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) highlighted
regarding the award of the Global Household Goods Contract (GHC), and
will re-award the contract no earlier than September 2021. While
TRANSCOM has charted a clear path to restructure its relationship with
the moving industry, we are also taking initial steps to restructure
our relationship with storage providers.
At the close of 2020, TRANSCOM recorded a 96 percent customer
satisfaction rate--five points above 2018's score and above the
Department's target of 95 percent. While I am pleased with this initial
progress, there is still much work to do and it is still early in our
journey to reform the $2.5 billion Defense Personal Property Program.
This initial progress is the product of incredible work from DOD
personnel around the globe, from an active network of military family
volunteers, and from many of our moving and storage providers. However,
the foundation of this progress is leadership. I believe the program's
multi-billion dollar value, consequential impact on servicemembers and
their families, and continual interface with Congress, industry, and
the Services warrant sustained executive leadership to ensure the
success of the reform effort and deliver the quality and accountability
military families deserve.
space mobility
As we look to the future, TRANSCOM has established Cooperative
Research and Development Agreements with leaders in the space industry
to explore the delivery of cargo and personnel via space anywhere on
the globe in less than an hour. While rocket cargo will not replace
current mobility capacity, it has the potential to offer unique and
disruptive capability in the areas of rapid force deployment and
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. We look forward to
continued development of space mobility and logistics in the coming
year.
conclusion
TRANSCOM provides the DOD the ability to project and sustain
military forces at a time and place of the Nation's choosing; a
strategic comparative advantage that allows us to achieve national
security interests. By maintaining favorable global posture, sufficient
transportation capacity, and the ability to command and control global
mobility operations, DOD retains the ability to project immediate and
surge forces required to compete, deter, respond, and win in order to
meet U.S. strategic objectives. We continue to evolve and adapt to a
rapidly changing security environment and address cyber security
challenges. I thank Congress for the staunch and continued support of
the U.S. Transportation Command and the Joint Deployment and
Distribution Enterprise as together we work to defend the Nation and
advance American interests.
Underwritten by our dedicated soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen,
coast guardsmen, civilians, and commercial partners performing
TRANSCOM's mission, I am confident in our ability to deliver, and am
proud to stand with them in commitment to our Nation's defense.
Together, We Deliver!
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Lyons.
Before we begin the questioning, let me just remind my
colleagues, due to the nature of the hybrid format we are using
today, we will handle the order of questions by seniority,
alternating sides until we have gone through everyone, and if
there is anyone we have missed we will go back.
We will use the standard 5-minute rounds. I am going to ask
my colleagues to keep a watch on the clock.
Finally, if you aren't engaged, please keep your
microphones muted. Thank you very, very much.
General Wolters, today, it was reported that Secretary
Austin announced an additional 500 troops going into Europe,
which seems to be a reversal of the Trump administration's
proposals to reduce forces in Europe.
Can you comment on this increase in forces.
General Wolters. I can, Chairman.
We are very excited. They are part of the previous tranche
of forces that were nest underneath DP2, Decision Program 2,
and its focus is to deliver a multi-domain task force in a
joint-theater spy organization to Wiesbaden, Germany, and that
will be approximately 500 soldiers. That will improve our
ability, in all domains, to bring fires from the surface-to-
surface dimension to increase our ability to deter.
Chairman Reed. From your first review of the proposed
budget, do you feel that you will have adequate resources to
meet all of your obligations?
General Wolters. We do, Chairman, but as you well know, we
are always interested in working to increase our competitive
advantage. But we do have the adequate resources.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much.
General Lyons, as I indicated in my opening remarks, we
have asked for the mobility requirement study. It is still in
the works. When will we see that report and can you give us
some initial reactions to date as to what your prognostication
is about the report.
General Lyons. Chairman, let me first say thank you for
your continued advocating and support, as you have directed
multiple Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study. The 2020
study is due to be delivered in June, mid-June.
I can tell you, you know, as a task for the study, it was
to assess the program force. We are looking at that in the
context of our current demands in terms of war plans, but also
in future concepts. As we look at that, there are some areas we
see will require some work in some areas of elevated risk.
I would just ask for your continued support for example,
for sealift modernization, which this Committee has been very
supportive in our efforts to do so, thus far.
Without getting too far ahead of the analysis, because I
want the analysis to drive the conclusions, that report is due
to you soon, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, sir.
One of the issues, and it represents the transition from
benign areas of operations, particularly for logistics to
contested operations, is the problem of potential attrition
during wartime.
Do you feel that that will be adequately addressed in the
study?
General Lyons. Senator, we certainly are looking at
contested environments. There is no question that we can't
assume that we can deploy when we want, and how we want, where
we want, perhaps as we have been able to do in the last several
decades.
But as we look to attrition, per se, in terms of force-
sizing, as a departmental policy, we don't include attrition in
the force-sizing construct, but we do understand the
implications for contested environments on our ability to
support a particular combatant command (COCOM) or the
Department's priorities, and so, we will see that in elevated
risk.
I would just offer, though, that and often is the case, the
solution may not be in more capacity, in mobility capacity, but
may come in better integration of our warfighting functions,
like protection, fires, intelligence, sustainment, et cetera.
So, as we look to the future, we know we have to move in
that direction, and I am very pleased to see the chairman and
the Department, you know, identifying that as a major line of
effort in our joint warfighting concept.
Chairman Reed. Well, thank you.
General Wolters and also General Lyons, this goes to a
point of our effective connectivity that every part of the
operation can talk uninterruptedly and hopefully encrypted.
Is that something that you and General Nakasone are working
on with others, General Wolters?
General Wolters. We are, Chairman.
One of our key pillars in our overall campaign to
effectively win in competition is to continually improve our
command and control and communications, and to do so in all
domains. We are really pleased to report that with General
Nakasone being the sole military commander in United States
military cyber domain. The direction and guidance has been much
clearer over the course of the last 24 months and we have been
able to make improvements in Europe, with respect to our
ability to command and control.
Chairman Reed. Thank you.
General Lyons, quick comments, please.
General Lyons. Yes, sir. I would just reenforce cyber
resiliency continues to remain a top priority for the command.
General Nakasone, the National Security Agency (NSA), Cyber
Command (CYBERCOM) has been extraordinarily supportive; in
fact, we are his test bed for Zero Trust principles, and we
have taken many other initiatives to buy down cyber risk.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, sir.
Senator Inhofe, please.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Wolters, I would just like to ask, I have three
questions that I am going to try to get around in this short
period of time.
In the book, and we have all been talking about this now,
ever since 2018 when this came out, the recommendation said it
is going to take 3 to 5 percent real annual defense spending
growth to implement the NDS and I really believe that is true.
Now, the current budget doesn't even keep even, keep up
with inflation. Now, this is kind of an ``if'' question,
General Wolters. If the defense budget shrinks and the European
Deterrence Initiative gets cut, what would be the impact to
your efforts in Europe, just off the top, if that happens.
General Wolters. Senator, it would slow down our campaign
momentum that we have been able to sustain for the last 4 years
in improving our indications and warnings, our command and
control, and our readiness.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah. Okay. Thank you very much.
Now, General Wolters, I also mentioned, you and I talked
about this in my office, it is unfortunate, but a lot of people
in this administration are talking about the F-35 and some
don't think it is worth the resources that it is detracting
from other areas.
I am so thankful that I have the memory of what happened
back in, actually, it started out when I was in the House of
Representatives, on The House Armed Services Committee, on the
F-22. The F-22 and the F-35 are the only two vehicles out there
in the fifth generation. So, the F-22 was the first one.
We started out with, the goal was 700 copies were going to
come and they started whittling down. It started, actually,
when I was still over in the House side, and it went down to,
from 700 to, incrementally reduced to, ultimately, it got down
to, what was it, 187 F-22s. We knew that was a mistake at that
time, and the reason I bring that up is that right now we have
Russia and China pursuing their own fifth generation programs
like the J-20 and the Su-57.
How concerned are you about our great power competitors'
fifth generation capabilities, and how important is the F-35 to
deter these threats in Europe?
General Wolters. Senator, the F-35 is very important.
As I mentioned in my opening comments, our disposition,
from the military perspective, is strong, yet challenged, and
part of that challenge is the evolution of the Su-37, fifth-
generation aircraft, on behalf of the Russians, and we, in the
United States, need F-35s in Europe, which will begin to show
up in the fall of 2021, to ensure that we have the competitive
advantage necessary to protect our sovereign territory.
Senator Inhofe. All right. That is good.
During last year's posture hearing, General Lyons, you
testified that the Air Force's divestment of the KC-135 and the
KC-10 would put TRANSCOM below its minimum requirements, and
that is in light of the fact that the KC-46 didn't come out the
way we wanted it to, and yet, it took action from the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) from 2021 to reverse the
number of those divestments to ensure that TRANSCOM has enough
refueling capacity to meet the requirements.
Now, I would have to say, and you may want to elaborate on
this maybe for the record, but I look at this and say, what is
wrong with our requirements process when Congress has to step
in to ensure they have enough tanker aircraft to stay the
mission ready.
I mean, your observation was right, that it took us action
to make sure that that happened in our Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA.
Does anything come to your mind as in terms of why it is
necessary for us to do this and why this couldn't have been
done before our action was necessary?
General Lyons. Well, Senator, first, I want to thank you
for your support on the issue of aerial refuel, which is such a
critical force element, and basically the lifeblood for the
joint force, in terms of our weapon systems.
Last year, you asked the question, what was the
implications operationally to delay the Boeing KC-46 delivery?
Based on the retirement profile, the war implications, and
the Active Duty component to respond to day-to-day crisis, I am
happy and pleased to report to you this year that we are in a
much better position. We have a very good alignment between the
Department, between Air Force, and TRANSCOM. The Air Force has
stepped forward with interim capability with the KC-46.
We still have a long way to go, but I am very, very
comfortable with where we are with the Air Force. The Air Force
has really stepped into position.
Senator Inhofe. So, you think that that has been corrected?
General Lyons. I do, sir. It has been.
Senator Inhofe. All right. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Shaheen, please.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you to both of you, General Wolters and General
Lyons, for your service and for being here this morning.
General Wolters, I specially appreciated our conversation
yesterday, and one of the things you mentioned in your opening
remarks that we discussed briefly, is the buildup of Russian
forces on the border of Ukraine.
Do you have any view about what Russia is doing, are they
preparing for potential offensive? Is this consistent with past
Russian posturing? What are they doing?
General Wolters. Senator, we have categorized their actions
into four separate categories and I would enjoy the opportunity
at a different security environment to be able to address that.
But what I can say is, number one, there has been an inject
of a very sizable ground domain force on behalf of the
Russians, a notable Air Force injection, and a notable maritime
force injection. It is of the size and scale and scope that is
of great concern, and it mirrors the size and scope and scale
of the infiltration of forces that occurred back in 2014.
So, we are remaining very, very vigilant, keeping as many
options open as possible, and obviously very concerned.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I look forward to hearing your
comments in the classified session.
As the administration considers the best way forward in
Afghanistan, can you tell us what you think would be the most
significant impact of the withdrawal of American troops by May
1 or shortly thereafter. How would that influence both, NATO's
role and what we might expect on the ground in Afghanistan?
General Wolters. Senator, our number one concern at
USEUCOM, and my number one concern with my NATO head at SACEUR
is the force protection considerations for all of our U.S.
servicemembers and all of our NATO servicemembers in whatever
transaction that we engage in.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I would, again, urge NATO and
everyone who is part of our mission, to include women at the
negotiating table, because we know that has a positive impact
on the stability of negotiations.
General Lyons, last spring, this is really to follow-up on
Senator's Inhofe's comments about the KC-46, because last
spring, you expressed real concerns about the retirement of
legacy refueling tankers, due to the delays with the KC-46, and
you had a brief exchange just know about that. But it sounds
like you may begin to assign KC-46 air crews to operational
missions as early that has summer.
So, what has changed and why do you feel like we should
begin doing that as early that has summer?
General Lyons. Ma'am, a couple of things have changed since
we talked about this last year. The first and probably most
important is that Boeing acknowledged and agreed that they had
the responsibility to fix the category (CAT) 1 deficiencies on
the jet on the weapons system.
So, in that context, the Air Force has gone to work to
deliver interim capability. It will be fully operational, but,
again, certainly conduct missions. They have presented that
capability over time, so that is important. Plus, with an
additional plus-up of Reserve Guard augmentation in a slight
adjustment in the retirement profile against the KC-10, I am
comfortable that we are in a good position, based on the work
the Air Force has done to support day-to-day and crisis
operations today.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I think that is very good news. That
is, obviously, welcomed news to all of the KC-46 crews,
including those at the Pease National Guard Base, where we were
the first recipients of the KC-46. But I want to ask you,
because I understand there is an issue that I had not heard
about with respect to the transportable gallery lavatory
system; essentially, the bathrooms that make missions
problematic.
Is this a new problem or have we known about this and what
is the prospect to fix it?
General Lyons. Ma'am, on those kinds of issues, I don't
want to get in front of the Air Force. I will defer the program
manager.
There is a range of category deficiencies that are being
worked by both, the Air Force and Boeing. I don't know enough
to comment on that particular issue.
Senator Shaheen. Will it impact our ability to fly missions
with the KR-46 as early as this summer as you are hoping?
General Lyons. I am not aware of any impact on initial
capability release, but that doesn't mean that there aren't a
wide range of deficiencies that still need to be remedied you
know, by Boeing, before the jet is fully operational and
capable.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Wicker, please.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Wolters, in a question from Senator Shaheen about
Russia, you mentioned they were increasing their ground, air,
and maritime efforts. In light of that, do you continue to
support the additional two destroyers based in Rota?
General Wolters. I do, Senator.
As you well know for the last 12 months, the activity of
the four destroyers that we have had access to, have been
pivotal in securing deterrence.
We also see increased maritime activity in the Arctic, in
the Barents, to the central portion of the Atlantic Ocean, and
the need for two additional destroyers in the area of
indications and warnings and command and control, as well as,
the lethality that they bring is what we need to continue to
work for to have that competitive edge to ensure that we can
continue to deter effectively.
Senator Wicker. Let's expand on the Arctic.
Now, China is an issue for us there, is it not, and can you
elaborate on that.
General Wolters. They are, Senator. Their investments in
ports is significant.
Senator Wicker. Do we have the capabilities we need to
deter Russia and China in the Arctic presently?
General Wolters. We do, and they are adequate, but our
growth isn't matching theirs.
Senator Wicker. Yeah, I heard you say adequate, in response
to Senator Inhofe's question, also, and you mentioned an answer
to a question that the recent budget numbers will slow down
readiness.
Let me just emphasize that we have in front of us the
leading expert in this area of the world and that sort of
merely adequate response and slow-down readiness is of concern,
I think, to members on both sides of the dais here.
One more thing. General Wolters, with regard to the Coast
Guard, they have a statutory mission, but, also, they are very
vital in assisting you with our national defense requirements;
is that correct?
General Wolters. It is, Senator. As you know, the Coast
Guard actually recently produced an Arctic strategy.
I will tell you as the commander of USEUCOM, there were
many identifications in that strategy that were very, very
helpful for future security in the Arctic region.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
Let's, then, shift, General Lyons, to military sealift and
let you elaborate on an answer that you gave to Senator Reed.
The GAO reported last year that, ``the U.S. flag, fleet
shipyards and workforce have been in decline and the industry,
as a whole, faces significant economic sustainability
challenges.''
Do you agree with this assessment and can you discuss how a
diminished maritime industry impacts sealift during both,
peacetime and conflict.
General Lyons. Senator, thanks for the question, and more
importantly, thanks for being a strong advocate for sealift
modernization and the acknowledgment of how important sealift
is to deliver decisive force.
I think you know that 33 of 50 of our roll-on/roll-off
ships will reach end of life over the next 10 years. Industrial
base is absolutely of critical importance and, you know, we
have advocated for an acquired-use strategy, largely based on
cost. There is a significant difference in cost differential,
but there is also work required in conversion. So, we work
closely with the Navy. I think the Navy has got the best pulse
on the industrial base with regard to sealift.
Senator Wicker. How helpful in your judgment, are the
maritime security programs, stipends, and cargo-preference laws
in supporting the maritime industry?
General Lyons. Senator, I think they are critically
important. We must maintain a U.S. flag that is reliable and
accessible to support the Defense Department needs. So, those
are critical programs.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Chair, I would yield back 23 seconds.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker. We will
put that on your account.
Now, via Webex, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. For General Wolters, I want to just
continue along the questions that Senator Wicker and Senator
Shaheen asked about Ukraine.
The United States began providing lethal aid to Ukraine
based on a 2014 authorization, The Support for Sovereignty,
Integrity, Democracy, Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of
2014. Do you believe that this lethal aid has helped Ukraine to
deter Russian aggression and what changes would you make to our
current lethal and non-lethal assistance to Ukraine to help
further a deterrence?
General Wolters. Senator, I think those contributions have
been very helpful. The other very notable change that has
occurred in the environment was the establishment of the
Multinational Joint Commission, which provided us an
architecture to be able to take an all-domain, whole-of-
government approach to some of the challenge that has occurred
in Ukraine. From that, we were able to establish the Joint
Military Training Group Ukraine that has afforded the Nations
that are signators to the Multinational Joint Commission, and
many NATO allies and partners, to contribute military training
teams to episodically enter Ukraine and help train some of
their forces to better defend their sovereign soil.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
In the EUCOM domain and in many other places, we have seen
over the last decade, an increase in the strength and
engagement with illiberal political forces, including the rise
of totalitarianism, authoritarians, increasing popularity of
far-right political groups and leaders, and we have seen
significant democratic backsliding.
How do you see these forces affecting our efforts to
effectively deter Russia, strengthen our allies, and protect
the values we have shared with our European allies for decades?
General Wolters. They are an impact, Senator, and think we
have to take a whole-of-government, whole-of-alliance, whole-
of-nation approach, and I think inside of NATO, we have done a
better job with that. Number one, we are responsible, given our
support to democratic values to tell the truth and we continue
to profess the truth in the information environment and we are
gaining campaign momentum with nations that want to be part of
the alliance of NATO.
Senator Gillibrand. For example?
General Wolters. Precisely what is going on today in
Ukraine with President Zelensky's open comments with respect to
his desire to look westward and assist towards NATO.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
General Lyons, I want to ask a question about COVID. In the
early stages of the pandemic, some of the early problems were
faced were supply chain issues, including getting personal
protective equipment (PPE) distribution, early-stage vaccine
distribution.
Based off your testimony, TRANSCOM has been instrumental in
ensuring vaccine distribution was able to ramp-up through a
functioning supply chain. As we continue vaccine distribution,
what are some lessons learned that we can apply to, improve our
success to prepare for another pandemic or other world
emergency?
General Lyons. Ma'am, thanks for the question.
I have to say a large portion of the credit goes to General
Perna and the lead at Warp Speed and the Federal Government
effort. They worked through most of those issues. We were a
supporting effort where they needed additional support.
I think there is a task force now, looking from a national
security perspective, that supply chain and implications to
national security and national defense, and I think that is a
worthy effort just to understand the source of many of the
critical manufacturing and supplies and where they come from
and where that supply chain might be vulnerable.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Another question on supply chain. TRANSCOM is the largest
user of oil for the Federal Government and President Biden's
interim national strategic guidance lists the climate crisis as
one of our primary national security threats. From increased
major weather events to migration crisis, due to climate
change, fossil fuels should be at the front of our minds for
strategic planning.
What is TRANSCOM doing to mitigate these massive
expenditures of fossil fuels?
General Lyons. Well, ma'am, I first stated, to your point,
I think the Department clearly understands, we all understand
that climate is a driver of instability. Where there is
instability, there is potential implications for the Department
of Defense and for TRANSCOM.
The Secretary has been clear. He is focused on climate as a
priority and has stood up, a lead in that area. I think most of
the efforts, to date, you know, you can appreciate the level at
the installation, base level.
I think in the operational energy realm, the sheer
consumption of liquid energy is going to be a challenge for us,
but it is something that we are going to have to take a look
at.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
Now, let me recognize Senator Fischer, via Webex.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.
General Wolters, as you know, the 55th Wing is
headquartered in my state and the [inaudible] 135s and their
crews provide a valuable contribution to EUCOM's mission from
their base in Mildenhall. These planes provide a unique
capability, but I am concerned that our overall demand for
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is greater
than the capability that we currently possess.
For that reason, I believe that it is essential that we not
only continue investing in new ISR networks, but also that we
maintain and modernize the high-end capabilities that we
currently have in the RC-135 fleet.
In light of that, how does the RC-135 fit into your current
need for ISR, and if you could tell me overall what the
percentage of EUCOM's ISR requirements are currently being met.
General Lyons. Senator, the RC-135 is pivotal in our
campaign with respect to indications and warnings and what it
does from an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
standpoint to see the environment. As you pointed out, and we
discussed yesterday, I think the concern we all have is when
legacy systems go out and new systems come onboard, it has the
potential to create a vacuum that the enemy can exploit. We
have to be rock-solid in that transition to ensure that we have
the requisite ISR to be successful.
At USEUCOM, we have been very, very pleased over the course
of the last several years with the improvement of the
percentage of ISR that we have received. A lot of that is due
to this Committee and the support through the European Defense
Initiative (EDI).
Right now, we are hovering at about 33 to 35 percent of our
requirements being supported and compared to my brothers and
sisters in other geographical COCOMs, we are in good shape.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you.
General Lyons, in prior testimony, you said, ``we expect
power projection will be contested in all domains.''
Your mission is uniquely challenging to perform in
contested spaces. Given that fact, what steps are you taking to
make TRANSCOM more resilient to these threats?
General Lyons. Senator, thanks for the question.
We fully acknowledge that the way we deployed in the past
isn't the way that we will deploy and sustain the force in the
future, and that we must be prepared to operate under all
domain persistent attack. In that realm, we have looked at a
wide range, as we look at the global mobility enterprise, we
look at our potential vulnerabilities and how to buy down that
risk.
One such area, of course, is cyber, but there is a full
range of areas, and to my point earlier about the integration
of protection and fires and intelligence with the sustainment
warfighting function will be critical as we, you know,
understand that the Homeland is no longer a sanctuary.
I have been very, very pleased with joint staff work on the
joint warfighting concept. That includes an entire line of
effort to elevate the importance of joint contested, a joint
concept on contested logistics.
Senator Fischer. Do you think it is vital that we a start
to rethink or continue to rethink some of the fundamentals that
are out there on how we operate logistics support?
General Lyons. Senator, I believe that is----
Senator Fischer. Really, if you could continue on with that
train on examining the existing platforms and methods that we
are currently using and looking at what is needed in the
future.
General Lyons. Yes, ma'am.
I think what is critical as we look to the joint
warfighting concept, so the character of warfare, as it changes
as we continue to evolve, will drive changes in the character
of logistics in the way that we are able to deploy and sustain
the force on a global scale. We have got to continuously adapt.
As we look at that and we understand those implications, we
may find ourselves changing the way we fight, and I think, you
know, in an all-domain set, we will, and that will change the
character logistics. But we must be able to, as an imperative,
to be able to project and sustain the force over global
distances as a strategic comparative advantage.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
General Wolters, one aspect of the previous
administration's realignment plan announced last year was an
increase in forces around the Black Sea. I know the broader
plan is currently under review, but can you talk about the
importance of the Black Sea region and the rationale for
increasing our presence there.
General Wolters. Yes, Senator. We produced a NATO military
strategy that stresses comprehensive defense and shared
response in all geographical regions, in all domains, and
seeking assistance from a whole-of-government, whole-of-nation.
In Europe, what we discovered is we have, over the course of
the last 3 years, had placed appropriate interests in the
vicinity of the Baltics and we needed to make sure that we were
giving the same due interest in the vicinity of the Black Sea,
because we had to shore up in all geographical areas.
So, that has been our approach. It has been successful and
we will continue to comprehensively defend with shared
response.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Let me recognize Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for your service and thank you for being here
today.
Let me ask, first, on the topic of vaccines, I want to
follow-up on a couple of the questions that have been asked,
most recently, Senator Gillibrand. Do you know how many of the
men and women under your command, General, have been
vaccinated?
General Wolters. I do. Senator. We have a Tier 1
vaccination plan; Tier 1 constitutes those in military uniform.
We are at about 46 percent of that force being completely
vaccinated, those that needed two shots.
We are forecasted, based on the arrival of future vaccines,
that have the entire Tier 1 force, those in military in Europe,
vaccinated by the middle of July.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Have you encountered resistance or hesitancy?
General Wolters. I'm sorry, Senator. I didn't catch all
your question.
Senator Blumenthal. Have you encountered resistance or
hesitancy among the men and women in your command, to being
vaccinated?
General Wolters. We have not. We have the traditional
deferral rate that we have seen across all of DOD, but our
percentages are within the norms and, actually, slightly less.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask both of you, as you well
know, the Secretary of Defense ordered that there be a review
internally of white supremacists and extremist ideology. Could
you give us your assessment of whether there is evidence of
that impact or influence or adherence among the men and women
under your command.
General Lyons. Senator, I will take that, and I appreciate
the question, because I think this is a critically important
issue, not just for today, but into the future.
Anything, I think, right, that degrades or violates our
oath to the Constitution is incompatible with good order and
discipline and military service. I think these first steps that
the secretary has taken, regarding the stand-down, it may
represent a very small percentage, and I guarantee it is a very
small percentage, but it is something that we must contend
with.
I think the leadership of the Department is concerted and
focused to deal with it long term. We are taking early steps
now, and I think we will continue to persist on this issue.
Senator Blumenthal. How widespread do you think it is?
You say it is a small percentage. What is it your evidence?
General Lyons. Senator, you know, my evidence is just 38
years in uniform and now on the force. I am not at all
dismissive of the problem, and I acknowledge that it does
exist, but I would not characterize it as prevalent.
We have an incredibly talented force of volunteers, the
best America has to offer, but even with a small percentage, it
is worthy of our leader effort to eliminate it from the force.
Senator Blumenthal. What steps do you think should be
taken?
General Lyons. Well, Senator, as I mentioned, the stand-
down, I think, is the first step, but out of that, I know the
secretary got briefed just this past week on some of the
insights from the services.
I think there are other activities in terms of how we do
selection and recruitment, how we transition military members
out of the military so they are not susceptible to being
recruited. I think there is a wide range of activities like
that, that will develop over time as concerted lines of effort.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you think recruits or enlistees
should be taken if they are members of organizations that
espouse views associated with white supremacy or violent
extremism?
General Lyons. Senator, I would say, you know, when you get
into some of the finer policy issues, there is a lot there.
There is a lot packed in and I will defer to the policy experts
on that.
I do know clearly though, as a commander in the force, it
is not consistent, an extremist behavior activity is not
consistent with the values or the good order and discipline of
what we need as a warfighting organization.
Senator Blumenthal. I agree that it may be a small
percentage, under 10 percent, but that is a large percentage in
terms of its potential impact on the readiness and capability
of our military and public support for our military.
I welcome your focus on it and your characterization of it
as a very important issue of policy.
So, thank you for being here today and thank you for your
continuing work on this issue, as well as so many others. Thank
you.
General Lyons. Yes, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Rounds, please.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, let me begin by thanking both of you for your
service to our country, as well as your family's sacrifices.
You dedicate your time to our country.
I would like to begin by just talking a little bit about
the challenge that we see right now, or the possible
challenges, with regard to regional conflicts that could occur,
Let me begin by just pointing out that most recently we have
seen some very aggressive posturing by both, China, their
incursions within Taiwan's airspace with larger and larger air
groups, and second of all, within the European treater and
Russia's aggression that we have been talking about earlier in
the Committee meeting.
Can you describe, briefly, the impact on the ability of
your command in your professional military judgment, to execute
its missions, if the United States became engaged in two
conflicts and was forced to defend friends and allies in the
Pacific and in Europe simultaneously.
General Wolters?
General Wolters. I can, Senator, and it starts with the
appropriate approach. We have been very aggressive in Europe in
making sure that we understand the importance of allies and
partners in the process, and the importance of a comprehensive
approach to regions, and the importance of not getting myopic
in one region and forgetting what is happening in another
region.
Today, when you ask most military members in Europe if they
have a concern, for example, about Russia, it will take at
least 5 seconds to where the follow-on question is, do you have
a concern about China?
So, in the military, and in our Nations, we have don't to
think big and we have to take a whole-of-government, whole-of-
nation, whole-of-alliance approach to the security challenges
that we face, and we have to be willing to look up and out of
each one of our areas of responsibility.
Senator Rounds. General Lyons?
General Lyons. Sir, I think there should be no question to
our commitment, as General Wolters mentioned, to our
longstanding values-based international order, whether that is
in the East or the West.
From a TRANSCOM perspective, we assess, continuously, a
full range of plans and contingencies that we might have to
respond to. We look within the construct of the planning
guidance and the plans themselves.
I would be happy to discuss any of those kinds of questions
in a closed hearing if you would like, sir.
Senator Rounds. Both of you would agree that prior planning
for the appropriate concerns or the different situations is
critical, fair enough?
General Lyons. Yes, sir. Absolutely.
General Wolters. Yes, sir.
Senator Rounds. Let's talk a little bit about what happens
if we actually do have conflicts with either Russia or China.
They would almost certainly attack the ports and the airfields,
where we would load and unload troops and equipment.
General Lyons, what are the implications of a contested
environment on bulk fuel capacity distribution and storage, as
well as traditional lines of communication. Are we effectively
working contested logistics in our planning and taking into
account the attrition into our war games yet?
General Lyons. Senator, we have begun that journey and I
appreciate the support of this Committee on that effort. Again,
I am pleased with the joint staff's work, particularly as a
concept, a joint concept for contested logistics that is under
development to address these kinds of issues that we will then
subsequently, you know, shape forces on, enforce capability
work down the road.
We know that we must be able to sustain and project a force
under all domain persistent attack. That is fundamentally
different than the way we have operated and integrated
logistics in the past.
Senator Rounds. General, the way that you answered my
question, and I appreciate the way that you positioned your
answer, saying that we have begun to look at it, I presume that
would suggest there is a concern about the way that we have
either done it in the past or that we are improving on our
planning for that type of a contested environment.
General Lyons. Well, Senator, I think that is accurate. I
think, you know, as the character of warfare changes, so should
the character of logistics and that we have to adapt to be able
to continue to be successful.
What made us successful previously won't necessarily make
us successful in the future, so we have work to do.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rounds.
Let me recognize Senator King, via Webex.
Senator King. General Wolters, within the last hour since
this hearing has been going on, a story broke about a leading
spokesperson for the Russians, who is also known as an advisor
to Putin, saying that war in Ukraine is inevitable. That it
will start with a major cyberattack that could extend to this
country, and that they have overwhelming conventional forces
and that there is no way that they could be repelled from
taking over the Donbas, if not, the entire country. I view this
situation as extremely concerning.
I guess my first question is, what is your reaction to the
assertion that a Russian invasion of Eastern Ukraine would be
unstoppable. Do the Ukrainians have the weapons, the manpower,
the training, the wherewithal to stop such an attempt at
annexation?
I have got to say, I am mightily reminded of 1938 and the
Sudetenland and the German planes of liberating German-speaking
people, and very similar things we are hearing from Russia.
Talk to me about the preparation and the readiness of the
Ukrainians and our readiness to assist them.
General Wolters. Senator, as we discussed yesterday in our
phone conversation, we are very concerned in Ukraine and their
partners in the region are doing all that they can to improve
their posture with each and every second as we go forward. So,
if, in fact, an incursion does occur there, their best position
for success, not only within their forces, but within their
partners within the region.
Senator King. But, do you believe they could repel an
invasion that started next week?
General Wolters. I certainly do, over time, Senator.
Senator King. Well, I think they, let me follow-up a moment
about the political situation in Eastern Ukraine.
There are many Russian-speaking people there. What is the
political mood in terms of loyalty to the country of Ukraine
versus loyalty to Russia?
General Wolters. Senator, I would categorize it as high
loyalty to the country of Ukraine.
Senator King. So, the claim that Russia would be liberating
these people from Ukrainian control would not resonate in that
region?
General Wolters. I agree, Senator.
Senator King. Have we communicated to the Russians, the
fact that this, an invasion of this type would be met with a
response that would serve as a deterrent?
It seems to me the only thing we have right now is
deterrence.
General Wolters. Senator, I know that our senior civilian
leadership have had conversations with their colleagues in
Ukraine and at the senior level with Russia. I am not privy to
all of the words that were exchanged, but I know that our
senior leaders expressed deep concern about the robust
activities in the Donbas and Crimea.
Senator King. Thank you.
Let me turn for a moment. We mentioned China and Russia
numerous times in this hearing. Do you see evidence in your
area of responsibility (AOR) of increasing relationship
cooperation, if you will, between Russia and China?
Traditionally, at least in the recent past, they have been
adversaries, or at least suspicious of one another. Do you see
a developing cooperation, which would be inamicable to our
interests?
General Wolters. Senator, I see cooperation that is
superficial at best. I think it is higher at the tactical
level, soldier-to-soldier, and I think it is pretty close to
phony at the strategic level.
Senator King. Well, that is reassuring. I hope that is
correct.
General Lyons, you and I had an exchange last year about
the potential gap in coverage for refueling. You have testified
this morning that you feel that that is resolved.
I just want to sort of nail that down, that if called upon,
whether it is in the next 2 years or the next 5 to 7 years,
which is, as I recall, the potential gap was identified, that
we will have sufficient refueling resources to project power.
General Lyons. Senator, I am comfortable and aligned with
the Air Force's position on this. I think that we have to be
clear that Boeing has a long way to deliver a full,
operational, capable weapon system. But in the interim, I am
confident with the capability that exists to meet day-to-day,
competition, and crisis.
Senator King. I am just about out of time, but does Boeing
have, do we have a date for final delivery and deployment of
the KC-46?
General Lyons. Senator, on that, I will defer to the Air
Force from a programmatic perspective. The latest estimate was
in anticipation of at least a remedy for the remote visual
system, next, which is a [inaudible] sometime in the 2023 time
frame, at the earliest.
Senator King. Thank you.
General Lyons. It would take some time to field the
capability after that.
Senator King. Thank you, gentlemen, both for your
testimony.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King.
Let me recognize Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for being here today. We
certainly appreciate your commitment, not only to the men and
women within your commands, but to the furtherance of our
objectives.
So, I will start with you, General Wolters. Thank you very
much. Let's talk a little bit more about our force posture in
Europe.
Senator King had just mentioned Russia and the conventional
forces that they have available, but beyond just their human
resources, they have other capabilities. They continue to
modernize their military. They have a number of advanced
capabilities like ballistic and cruise missiles; certainly,
sophisticated air defenses, as we know, antisatellite weapons,
electromagnetic, and cyberattacks. I could go on and on and on
in this area.
But these capabilities do pose a challenge to the United
States, as well as our allies in that region, and, certainly
our partners in the EUCOM AOR.
They also continue with their operations, short of open
conflict. So, they are operating in that gray zone area.
So, how are we adapting our forces to those capabilities,
to those challenges to push back on Russia and what they might
be able to do in the future?
General Wolters. Thank you, Senator.
We are maximizing our focus to win in the competition phase
and we are doing it through a very deliberate fashion to
continue to improve our ability to see the environment with
indications and warnings, our ability to respond with solid
command and control, and our mission command, which
characterizes the readiness of our forces forward being able to
conduct all domain operations that take into account the
desired effect, at the appropriate time and place of our
choosing, to ensure that we can be most effective. That
approach affords us the opportunity to counter many of the
issues that you just mentioned.
We are also, in accordance with the National Defense
Strategy, working very diligently to increase our competitive
edge in the areas of indications and warnings, command and
control, and mission command.
Senator Ernst. So, with that deliberative approach, you are
working with our allied forces, as well, to make sure that we
are nested, and each able to lean on one another, our strengths
and for our weaknesses to provide pushback?
General Wolters. Absolutely, Senator.
The strategic alignment that is required is also outside of
the military dimensions, so from a whole-of-government, whole-
of-nation approach, whole-of-ally approach, we are doing the
same.
Senator Ernst. Great, and one thing, of course, being a
National Guard member and being, of course, very aware and
supportive of our State Partnership Program, you have mentioned
the Baltics, but I was heavily involved in the Balkans with our
State Partnership Program with Kosovo. I would just like to
hear about how this program has been beneficial through your
area of responsibility and how we can maybe further strengthen
those partnership programs.
General Wolters. Senator, we are very proud of the State
Partnership Program, essentially yours in Kosovo, and as you
well know, the 632 members of the United States that we rotate
into K-4, many come from your state.
It is a success area in NATO. The NATO secretary general is
very, very fond to ensure that we keep a laser focus on the
Balkans. But the biggest challenge that we face, and one that
we have achieved a success with, is to make sure that the lanes
in the road are perfectly understood between K-4 and the
evolving Kosovo security force. The exist on our Kosovo force
has been instrumental in ensuring that we each understand our
lanes.
Senator Ernst. Yes, very good.
Just very briefly, and thank you, sir, General Lyons, I am
going to push on the KC-46s, as well. I was able to go out on a
flight yesterday in a KC-46 with a number of others in a
delegation, and it was a great opportunity to really see this
aircraft in motion and work.
We refueled some F-15s. We have got some great boom
operators that are training a lot of really wonderful airmen
out there.
This is very important to the Iowa National Guard, as well.
We still have the KC-135s. We are anxious to move into the KC-
46, as soon as Boeing does a little more work.
How important are your planning moves involving the
National Guard, are you considering the rotation for the
Reserves, the National Guards, their deployments, and so forth,
as we move those 46s into those areas?
General Lyons. Ma'am, first of all, thanks for taking time
out on Andrews yesterday on the ramp there; really, it just
acknowledges what an important capability aerial refueling is.
I would just say it is largely misunderstood or
underappreciated how much the Guard, and the Reserve, but
especially the Air Guard, contributes every single day to the
output of the aerial refueling force element, whether that be
overseas or here in the Continental United States on short
script alert, day-in and day-out.
I think my own opinion is that the Air Force does this best
in terms of total force integration. It is completely
integrated today. It is absolutely seamless to me. When I see
units out there in the field, I can't tell the difference which
component they belong to.
Senator Ernst. Fantastic.
Gentlemen, again, I appreciate it very much.
Mr. Chair, I yield back. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
Let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Chairman.
I want to thank both of you for your service and your
family's commitment and service to allow you to have the
opportunities you have to serve our country.
General Wolters, the European Union and Russia have built a
strategic partnership in trade, energy, climate-change,
research, education, culture, and security. The crisis in
Ukraine in Crimea increased sanctions from both, the United
States and the European Union (EU) for various violations, but
they seem to have limiting effects.
So, my question would be, understanding that the EU is
Russia's biggest trading partner, and Russia is the EU's
fourth-largest, are sanctions in their current forms, a viable
solution to shaping Russia's actions?
General Wolters. Senator, I certainly agree that they
contribute in shaping Russia's actions. I will also say that
living in Europe, that there is a high degree of convergence at
the strategic level between what the EU does and what NATO
does, and for a military member in charge of military
operations, I will tell you that the EU contributions in the
area of transportation are a significant boost in our ability
to effectively deter.
Senator Manchin. A threat that I have been essentially
concerned with the continuing development of the Nord Stream
Pipelines. Not only do they create a further dependence, they
inure on Russia gas and oil, but they also bypass transit
countries like Ukraine and our former Soviet NATO members,
which could hold them hostage.
Your thoughts on that?
General Wolters. I share your concerns, Senator. It is
disconcerting to see what happens with the Nord Stream 2
Pipeline and to the countries that it reaches out to, and the
fact that several of those countries are going to potentially
be put in the position to where their reliance on Russian fuel
is far higher than it should be. It is of grave concern to me.
Senator Manchin. Do you have any thoughts on how you would
see a potential armed conflict playing out with our allies,
whose economies are closely tied to Russia?
General Wolters. Well, I would promote those nations to do
what we do in the United States, which is to store fuel
appropriately, and we do with other nations within Europe, to
ensure that we have the resources within to be able to execute
whatever it is we need to do to effectively deter and defend.
Senator Manchin. You all are coordinating with them on
that?
General Wolters. We are, Senator.
Senator Manchin. Thank you.
General Lyons, the level of coordination, fleet readiness
in response to combatant commanders in light of the COVID
pandemic that TRANSCOM provided is nothing short of amazing.
You all have done an unbelievable job.
The global threat from rational and irrational states and
actors is ongoing and the rise of humanitarian support and
crisis mitigation is enduring.
What are your concerns, if called today, to support an
armed conflict, force projection, sustainment, and redeployment
in a contested environment, while also potentially called to
support humanitarian missions on opposite sides of the world?
General Lyons. Senator, thanks for the question.
We know that the security environment is changing quite
rapidly. We know that the character of war is changing quite
rapidly, and so should the character of logistics.
So, our ability to project the force and sustain the force
over global distances is a key strategic comparative advantage
that we all understand that we must maintain. As we look at
that ability and we look at it from the lens of a potential
adversary and where there might be vulnerabilities,
particularly vulnerabilities of consequence, we are, in fact,
addressing those and buying down the risk associated with
those.
I am confident in our ability today to continue to project
the force and support the force at our time and place of
choosing. But I do acknowledge that we have work to do, too, in
anticipation of a more sophisticated adversary.
Senator Manchin. Let me follow-up on my final question.
General Lyons, you spoke about the success of the DOD's power
projection capabilities being contingent on three critical
elements: global mobility posture, global transport capacity,
and global command and control integration.
So, what allied shortfalls currently exist to support these
critical requirements if called to surge forces in support of
the EU?
General Lyons. Senator, I have to say I am very pleased
with the enormous constellation of like-minded allies and
partners that support the United States security interests
abroad. We could not operate the global mobility enterprise
successfully without the access, base, and overflight that they
provide in the extension of our broad and far-reaching
logistics networks. So, I am very pleased with our allies and
partners and I am very grateful for their continued support.
Senator Manchin. I know you spoke about Russia's moving on
Ukraine and Crimea, again, and everything, and we wish all of
our allies and under your all's leadership the most success,
because that would be severely critical for all of us if they
continue to do what they are doing right now.
But, again, thank you, both, for your service.
General Lyons. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
Now, let me recognize Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, welcome. Thanks for your service.
I wasn't planning on raising this question, but since it
came up from Senator Blumenthal, you know, I just got back from
a week in Marine Corps Reserve training. It is great to serve
with such fine men and women, but this notion of extremism in
the military, which is thrown about as if we know numbers,
Senator Blumenthal thought 10 percent.
I think that is irresponsible. I have asked from the
military, data. I want data before we besmirch the entire
military.
The under secretary nominee came before this hearing and
said he was going to, ``stamp out systemic racism within the
ranks of the military.''
I asked him, have you ever served in the ranks?
No.
Sir, we need to be careful with this. I am just going to
ask you 2 generals, who have served your whole career, do you
think that we have this giant group of extremists in the
military?
I think it is one of the best group of Americans who aren't
racist. You have knuckleheads in every organization in the
world, including the Congress of the United States, by the way,
but there is this narrative now that we have all these
extremists in the military. I think it is ridiculous and we
need to see data before we start throwing out issues like 10
percent.
How the hell does he know it is 10 percent?
What do you think, gentlemen, do you think you serve in the
military with a bunch of extremists?
General Wolters. Senator, I concur with you. I don't see a
giant portion of the population.
Senator Sullivan. It really makes me mad.
The Washington Post, U.S. Senators besmirching the whole
damn force irresponsibly.
General, what is your experience?
We have bad people, of course, idiots in any organization,
but this is getting ridiculous when a U.S. senator is saying 10
percent. Where the hell did he get that number?
One in ten, is that your experience, General?
General Lyons. Senator, let me be perfectly clear. I think
we have the finest military our world has every known. I think
we----
Senator Sullivan. Me, too. I believe that, and I serve with
them. I just got done serving with them.
General Lyons. Sir, I appreciate that.
We have the best that America has to offer. There is no
question in my mind, after 38 years of service. I believe that
in my heart. I know it to be true.
A very small, very small, and----
Senator Sullivan. Ten percent? Do you think it is 10
percent?
General Lyons. Senator, I don't think it is 10 percent.
Senator Sullivan. Not even close, is it?
General Lyons. As a matter of fact, I don't think there has
been any data on the topic. I can just tell you from
experience, it is extremely small, and even though it is
extremely small, and it might be less that 1 percent, I don't
want to be dismissive of----
Senator Sullivan. No, of course, not.
General Lyons.--potential degradation in the ranks. But it
should not characterize the joint force.
Senator Sullivan. Do you think it is 10----
General Lyons. We have an enormously powerful and
professional joint force.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, General.
Do you think it is 10 percent, General? Anything in your
experience, in your 30, 40-plus years as a general officer in
the military?
General Wolters. Senator, I certainly agree that number is
too high.
Senator Sullivan. Yeah. So, here is what I think the
Secretary of Defense needs to do. Enough of this. We need data.
We need data, okay, and besmirching the whole damn Force,
Reserve or Active Duty, whether it is a U.S. senator, the
Washington Post, which writes a story on this once a day with
no data, or the under secretary, who wants to be under
secretary. I hope he is not going to be under secretary for the
Pentagon.
We need to start using data and not this BS. That is
shameful, because I don't even think it is close to 10 percent.
You know what we are going to do?
This is going to make people not want to join the military.
So, anyway, I was not going to even go on this topic, but when
I hear a U.S. senator throw out 10 percent, it is ridiculous.
Ridiculous. It is really pissing me off.
Sorry, Mr. Chairman. I have had enough of this.
General, can I talk about the Russian Arctic buildup and
what we need to be doing about it. You know, we have this
strange scenes of COCOMs.
The actions in the Arctic, which is kind of EUCOM, but
Pacific Command (PACOM) owns a lot of the forces. Strategic
Command (STRATCOM) has a big responsibility in the Arctic, as
well, with missile defense.
What is happening there, it is even more than what has
happened recently, and what should we be doing about it and how
to think about it?
General Wolters. Senator, I think the campaign momentum is
traversing in the correct direction with your great work over
the source of the last several years, all of the services,
U.S., DOD, and the NATO military strategy, and the NATO concept
for deterrence and defense of the Euro-Atlantic, specifically,
points to the fact that we must have an Arctic strategy of, and
nations' militaries are constructing strategies that must
include considerations for activities in the Arctic.
So, the focus and the architecture and approving the
resources are growing. As you well know, through your
initiatives, we were able to house P-8s and F-35s at Keflavik
for the first time, and most of what they did was contribute to
indications and warnings (I&W) in the vicinity of the Arctic.
Getting the NATO nations, not just the ones that are about the
Arctic, but all involved in the process, is occurring through
the good work of the secretary general.
So, I believe that our campaign momentum is going in the
correct direction from strategy all the way down to
requirements.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Sullivan.
Let me recognize via Webex, Senator Rosen.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate this hearing, and thank you, gentlemen, for
your lifetime of service to this nation. We really appreciate
everything that you do every day and to all of the servicemen
and women that are under your command.
I would like to speak a little bit today about
cybersecurity. Our NATO allies, of course, are essential to
ensuring U.S. cybersecurity. We rely on our allies to Harden
our collective defenses against frequent and sophisticated
cyber threats.
Cybersecurity has increasingly become an area of focus for
NATO. They are holding the largest cyber exercise in the world
to operating a cyberspace operations center in Belgium.
General Wolters, what are the most significant cyber
threats that the NATO alliance is facing and can you
specifically describe to us the cyberthreat our European allies
are facing from Russia.
General Wolters. Thanks for the question, Senator. It is a
great topic.
I will tell you that I excited about the fact that from a
U.S. perspective, our force presentation by selecting one
military commander to lead military cyber, as General Nakasone,
has allowed us to deliver clear direction and guidance to the
Nations that assist us in the cyber arena.
Our manning is much better for all of the organizations and
the organizations have continued to perpetuate the Nations, the
importance of improving the Nations' cyber hygiene in the
network.
As you well know, we still have a long way to go in that
area, but nations have to make sure they understand what it
takes and how to defend their networks, and then they can start
to get into other areas of cyber deliverance of forces. I am
very, very pleased to report that the manning across NATO
nations, with respect cyber activity has improved and the focus
on improving our cyber hygiene has improved across the European
nations.
Senator Rosen. That is terrific, because that was one of my
next questions. What are you doing to prevent, mitigate, and
recover from cyberattacks?
But how can we help you? How should we be coordinating or
what do you think you need to coordinate better with our allies
in this realm?
General Lyons. In Europe, we have had the opportunity to
lead from the front with respect to the U.S.C. 2 in cyber. We
have had the opportunity with the assistance of other European
nations to educate the masses on the appropriate steps forward
in the cyber domain, and we are getting great support from all
nations who want to protect their networks.
I think what we have to do is just continue the campaign
momentum that we are currently on and continue the advocacy
from NATO and the EU in the cyber domain.
Senator Rosen. Thank you.
General Lyons, I want to kind of continue on this and talk
a little bit about cloud migration. TRANSCOM was, of course,
the first DOD organization to move its cyber capabilities and
command and control applications to a commercial cloud
environment.
So, General Lyons, can you provide us with an update on the
migration to the services to the cloud. Are you experience the
benefits and what are you feeling about this?
What are your best practices? Again, what do you think you
need going forward as you move everything to the cloud and
begin to work there?
General Lyons. Well, Senator, thanks for the question, and
I appreciate the topic here because I think we all acknowledge
that cyber is a warfighting domain and the adversary does get a
vote, particularly, across a global mobility enterprise. We
know we have a very large and sometimes vulnerable attack
surface, and so we are working very diligently for that.
One of the areas, as you mentioned, Senator, is our digital
modernization effort, and part of that is moving to the cloud.
We have been able to move well over 20 systems into the cloud.
We are still working on virtualization in some of these areas,
but we are making progress.
I think the cloud does offer some capability and some
security that we don't have today, and so I am pleased with the
progress we have started, but we still have a ways to go.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that, and I actually
would like to move on and talk a little bit about TRANSCOM
COVID-19 operations.
So, General Lyons, can you describe the short-term and
long-term impacts that COVID-19 has had on TRANSCOM's
operations as you are moving forward, and how have you
supported DOD's mission to respond to COVID-19?
General Lyons. Thank you, Senator. I have to say I couldn't
be more proud of the entire TRANSCOM team at the way that they
have been continuing to operate throughout the entire past
year, despite COVID, while taking the appropriate mitigation
measures.
You know, early on, we really didn't know what we didn't
know, but I am so proud that the folks were able to continue
operations. We were able to continue to support the force.
Things like Defender Europe continued to a lesser degree, in
supporting General Wolters. We were able to support the whole-
of-government effort. We were able to conduct aerosol testing
for commercial aircraft, for example, to determine that the
probability for viral spread aboard a commercial airliner with
high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration and high
velocity air exchange is extraordinarily low.
So, we have been able to work a wide range of things to
include trading capability to move highly infectious patients.
So, I really am incredibly grateful for the team to be able to
face that level of adversity and just continue to drive on.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, and I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
Senator Cramer?
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Senator.
Thank you, Generals, both for being here, for your service,
of course.
Right up front, let me just associate myself with the
statements and the questions from Senator Sullivan, and I
appreciate your direct responses.
It is time for Members of this Committee and leaders
throughout our Government, as well as, well we can't expect
much from the media, but to start being accurate in
representing that you represent the best of us, not the worst
of us, the absolute best of us, and that is my observation with
the vast, vast majority of the military men and women that I
encounter. So, thank you for your service.
I will pass on asking you, General Wolters, about ISR. I
appreciate your previous response to that. I have some concern
about the gap being created between the legacy and new
programs. I want to be a part of the solution, so I appreciate
your balanced answer.
I will ask you about our outstanding nuclear deterrent and
its role currently, as well as going forward. We know that our
credible deterrent is our Triad and it is the backstop for most
of our operational plans around the world.
My question for you is, if the United States didn't have
this credible, nuclear umbrella, would that change Europe's
conventional and nuclear posture?
General Wolters. Yes, Senator. I think that it would.
Senator Cramer. What could be the ramifications of them not
feeling safe under our umbrella?
General Wolters. I think that is the precise issue. We are
not certain to the degree that we would be compromising safety
and security.
Senator Cramer. If that happens, could we see, as they
changed their posture, you know, the build-out of more allies,
of course, I guess?
General Wolters. That is possible, Senator.
Senator Cramer. All right. Then, I am going to shift gears
to a question of energy and ask you, specifically, do you
believe that completion of Nord Stream 2 would affect the
leverage that Russia has over our allies in Europe?
General Wolters. Yes, Senator.
Senator Cramer. Because one of the other peripheral issues
that we sometimes get into around here, besides our military
and posture and lethality and readiness is climate, and these
aren't unimportant issues. I don't want to make the case that
they are.
But I want to give you just one example that concerns me a
little bit. I have asked many of your peers about the
monitoring, for example, of Iran's tankers and the movement of
energy, fossil energy in unsafe parts of the world.
But in Europe, we know of a situation a few months ago
where ENGIE Power in France, it made a large contract of
liquid, natural gas from the United States. The French
Government intervened in that.
The French Government used to be a wholly-owned, the sole
owner of ENGIE Power, now they are just like a 49 percent
owner, but they intervened and said, no, we want to continue
buying natural gas from Vladimir Putin. I am not sure that a
lot of people around here grasp the magnitude of a decision
like that.
Now, your issue, of course, is national security, as is our
Committee's, but for those people who want to sort of transfer
their climate guilt to other parts of the world, they should
know that Vladimir Putin's natural gas, sent by pipeline, to
places like France and other European countries and allies of
ours, emits about 40 percent more greenhouse gases than liquid
natural gas produced and shipped from the United States of
America.
So, I guess what I would just request, and you give very
good, direct answers to questions, but we need to help our
public better understand the ramifications of climate change,
globally, and the ramifications of hurting America's domestic
production of fossil fuels that are in high demand around the
world, and not let our allies, much less adversaries, be
dependent more on not as clean, and certainly not as secure
energy resources as the alternatives, the American, clean, good
energy is.
So, with that, I thank you and yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cramer.
Let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Lyons, I have a series of questions for you
regarding sealift recapitalization. In your statement to the
Committee, you point out that 33 of our 50 roll-on/roll-off
sealift ships are scheduled for retirement in the next 10
years.
In last year's NDAA, Congress took steps to bolster the
government's ability to purchase additional, used foreign
vessels currently on the market to augment the ready reserve
force.
First question. How do you assess the progress of
recapitalizing our sealift fleet?
General Lyons. Senator, thanks for that we.
We spent a lot of time on this issue with the Secretary of
Defense over the last year and, in fact, the Cost Assessment
and Program Evaluation (CAPE) issue team was formed around this
specific issue. I think we are headed in the right direction.
We have got good alignment on the strategy. We have good
support here on the Hill with the authorizations, and we have
some money in the program by the Navy.
We are, quite frankly, about a year behind where I wanted
to be. Where I wanted to be is, at the end of last fiscal year,
to be able to buy the first two authorized ships. Those ships
that were authorized by the NDAA a couple of years ago.
So, due to some GAO protest issues with the Maritime
Administration, that has been delayed a little bit, but they
are on track for the end of this year to deliver those first
two ships.
Senator Hirono. Same question, General.
Do the current sealift recapitalization plans sufficiently
address the potential for attrition during a conflict with a
near-peer competitor like China or Russia?
General Lyons. Senator, as we work through the Mobility
Capabilities and Requirements Study, as directed by Congress,
one of the things that we are doing is we are considering the
future joint concepts, as well as the contested environments
that we know in the future that we will face. We were able to
assess and do assess some level of elevated risk in terms of
our ability to deliver the force on the timelines that the
combatant commanders desire, and so we are evaluating that now.
By policy, we don't force size based on attrition, but we
do acknowledge the significant implications of attrition in any
environment and the need to mitigate that largely through the
integration of more warfighting effects.
Senator Hirono. Therefore, is your answer that the
assessments that you are doing currently address the attrition
issue that I asked you?
General Lyons. Senator, we do. We address losses. We do.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
The last question for this series, Section 3511 of last
year's NDAA provided authority to establish a tanker security
program, subject to the results of a mobility requirements
study.
Do you have sufficient results from the study to determine
whether the tanker security program needs to be implemented?
General Lyons. Ma'am, we do. We have looked at this as,
again, a congressionally directed study in concert with some
other agencies.
We do support, and I appreciate the congressional interest
initiative here to create a tanker security program. We think
there is value in that. We think it is important that we have
assured access to U.S. flag tanker capacity in the event we
have to surge the mobility enterprise and the liquid energy
enterprise.
Senator Hirono. Again, General Lyons, I have a question
relating to the fact that TRANSCOM is working closely with
industry partners like SpaceX on the viability of using space-
based vehicles to rapidly deliver time-sensitive logistics
anywhere in the world.
Now, this technology is a potential game changer,
especially in the Indo-Pacific AOR where commanders are
confronted with the [inaudible] of distance and time when
moving people and parts from one location to another.
General Lyons, can you provide me with a general overview
of the progress being made in space mobility and what
additional authorities you need from Congress to help you
accelerate this technology.
General Lyons. Thank you, ma'am, for highlighting this. We
are working closely with a couple industry partners to include
SpaceX, as well as the Air Force and the Space Force on this
particular issue.
If you think about the possibility, and it is a real
possibility, to be able to take a C-17 load, let's say 18 short
tons, and lift it off and deliver it anywhere on the face of
the global in less than 60 minutes, that is a real possibility
in the near term.
Senator Hirono. Uh-huh.
General Lyons. While we can't scale that to the entire
requirement of the mobility enterprise, to your point, Senator,
it offers us great flexibility and I think it creates a
powerful dilemma for potential adversaries to move very, very
rapidly.
Senator Hirono. You will let us know if you need further
support or authorization to move us on this use of this,
development of this technology?
General Lyons. I will, ma'am, and we do not at this time
but thank you for that.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator.
Let me recognize Senator Scott, please.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman Reed.
General Lyons and General Wolters, thank you for your
service. Thank you for your willingness to defend the integrity
of the men and women that put on the uniform and defend the
freedoms of this country.
General Wolters, while my primary concern is our military's
readiness to deal with the threat of Communist China I remain,
of course, concerned about Russia's attempt to destabilize
NATO, harbor allies, harm the United States through
cyberattacks, and catch up to some advanced weaponry, like
hypersonic weapons.
I am also aware of the potential for Communist China and
Russia to cooperate to try and harm us.
How ready do you believe your command is to deal with these
threats and do you have all that you need, and are you
concerned, as I am, about a potential cut to the defense budget
under President Biden?
General Wolters. Senator, we are concerned about all of
those threats. I would certainly agree with every one of the
categories that you pointed out.
As a traditional commander, I will tell you that I have a
force that is getting faster every day and is better postured
every day, but I am never satisfied with our speed and posture.
So, in that light, our current resourcing is adequate to
continue the campaign momentum to improve our indications and
warnings, our command and control, and our readiness.
With a reduction in those resources, from a monetary
perspective, there would be a corresponding degradation in our
capabilities in those areas, but as we speak, it is adequate
and my suspicion going forward is we will have adequate
resources to effectively win in competition, if called upon to
do so, but we must continue to improve our competitive
advantage in all of the areas that you point out and I have
pointed out from an I&W and C2 perspective.
Senator Scott. So, if you saw a cut in the defense budget,
where would you, what could you cut? If you had to cut things,
what would you reduce?
General Lyons. I would have to take an incremental
reduction in ISR that supports I&W and an incremental reduction
in C2 that supports our ability to respond. I would make sure
that we are adequately resourced in the mission command/
readiness area.
Senator Scott. How long would you be able to do that before
you have to say to yourself, you have to say that you are not
ready?
General Lyons. It just depends on the magnitude of
reduction, and I don't have the specifics on what the budget
looks like, but based off the evidence I have today, I think
from an adequacy standpoint, we are in good shape for the near
term, between now and the next 5 years.
Senator Scott. Thank you.
General Wolters, it is clear that Turkey and their
President Erdogan is not our ally and not a helpful member of
NATO. I met with Erdogan during the Trump Administration, along
with some of my Republican colleagues to question him about
Turkey's ongoing relationship with Russia.
I also introduced legislation calling for sanctions against
Turkey for purchasing the S-400 air and missile defense system
for the Russian Federation and questioned their membership in
NATO.
It seems like only Erdogan has gotten worse. So, what are
your thoughts about the value of our relationship, is there any
value today in that relationship with Turkey, and where do you
see it going?
General Wolters. There is, Senator.
I must tell you, they remain a vital NATO partner, and I
will tell you from a military perspective, Turkey being the
second-largest military in NATO, they do assist greatly in the
area of deterrence and competition.
One of the reasons we have such trust, mil-to-mil, is the
fact that the 2300 United States military members that live and
work each day on Turkish soil are appointed and given
tremendous force protection consideration on behalf of the
Turkish military, and that trust, from a mil-to-mil
perspective, remains very, very high.
But, as you said, they are no longer part of the F-35 parem
with the United States. We understand the decisions that they
made with respect to the S-400. We understand that sanctions
are working. We will continue to work with our military
counterparts, but as we move forward, mil-to-mil, they remain a
very vital NATO military partner.
Senator Scott. Did you ever understand why they did the S-
400. I mean, does it make any sense to you?
General Wolters. Senator, it doesn't, unless it was for the
purpose of an easy way out with respect to money.
Senator Scott. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott.
Senator Peters, please.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to both of you for your service to our country.
General Wolters, I would like to begin with Nagorno-
Karabakh and what has happened there. In your opening
statement, you alluded to the conflict only in the context of
Russia's role in brokering a cease-fire agreement in November.
But I would appreciate your thought as the Supreme Allied
Commander in Europe on some of the broader implications for
regional stability. Foremost on my mind is the fact that
Azerbaijan is still reportedly holding an estimated 200
Armenian prisoners of war and civilian captives.
Now, I understand that is a diplomatic endeavor, outside of
your area, but as someone who is in charge of watching that
area very closely, I would like your view on this unresolved
issue.
General Wolters. Nagorno-Karabakh has remained a frozen
conflict. Obviously, the activities over the course of the last
90 days were concerning to all.
One of the things that I will mention, Senator, that I was
proud to report on was the active involvement of many NATO
nations on the periphery to assist in calling for
reconciliation and calming of tensions. When it was all said
and done, I think most of us believed that this was curtailed
sooner, rather than later, as a result of the interests of
nations in the region to be part of the solution in rectifying
the situation.
There still is an unfortunate set of circumstances that
remain with result to the territorial disputes, but there is
goodness in the fact that observation posts have been created
jointly by nations in the region and our ability to see the
environment is greater than it was in the past.
We still have a lot of work in front of us to make sure
that from an observation perspective, nations agree that the
contracts that they signed up to, so that we can achieve more
productive campaign momentum with respect to achieving peace in
the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK).
Senator Peters. Thank you, and from a military perspective,
Azerbaijan's drone fleet certainly highlighted the
vulnerabilities of sophisticated weapons systems, tanks, radar,
surface-to-air missiles. They did not have specific drone
defenses.
Has that affected how you prioritize counter-UAS [unmanned
aircraft system] capabilities in your area of responsibility
and what more do we need to do?
General Wolters. I would tell you, Senator, I wasn't
surprised with any of the actions that took place in the
vicinity of Nagorno-Karabakh with respect to small UAS, and as
you know, based off of many of your good efforts in the past,
we have a dedicated DOD lead with respect to countering small
UAS. I think the campaign momentum, with respect to
comprehensive missile defenses improving so that we can counter
that kind of capability against us.
So, we are traversing in a productive direction with
respect to countering small UASes.
Senator Peters. Well, I had an opportunity to see some of
that just recently down at the Yuma Proving Ground, where I
know you are testing those defenses and opening up a process
from the Department of Army, at large, but clearly, you are
weighing in heavily in the need for that type of technology to
be developed and I appreciate that.
General Lyons, your opening statement reported a
partnership with Cyber Command to implement Zero Trust on your
network environment. But TRANSCOM relies heavily on commercial
shipping, in fact, if I look at the numbers, 95 percent for
steady state sealift operations, 90 percent for ground steady
state and contingency operations, and 90 percent for air
passenger.
So, my question to you is, how do you ensure that your
network environments for your commercial partners are secure?
General Lyons. Yeah, Senator, it is a great question. We
spend a lot of time both, on the Department of Defense
information networks (DODIN) and off the DODIN, non-DODIN
activities that were relied upon to understand the full
spectrum and potential vulnerabilities of the mobility
enterprise.
We work closely with our industry partners. We have
consistent cyber hygiene language in all of our contractual
relationships, but more importantly, we are talking to the
senior leadership of all of these companies. They submit self-
assessments on their own cyber scorecard. We provide insights
on best practices. We are developing a proof of principle for a
third-party verification. Basically, this would be a new
venture for the Department to be able to confirm or deny cyber
compliance.
So, a lot of work going on in that area. The industry
partners are coming along, but I don't want to mislead anybody
to think that we some magic ability to protect commercial
partners, you know, from an advanced, persistent threat.
I would say, though, that it is bigger than cyber. So,
resiliency is bigger than just the network's piece; it is
always the physical redundancy that we have to ensure that we
have many readiness providers. I am confident with our approach
on that.
Senator Peters. I realize you facilitate annual self-
assessments based on just guidelines.
Where do those assessments lead and is there more work that
we need to do?
General Lyons. Senator, there is always more work to do.
They come in at an executive level. We share those assessments.
You know, for example, a concern might be multi-factor
authentication from a cyber hygiene perspective. So, we have
those conversations.
I find that inside the boardrooms today, they are very
cyber savvy and committed and want to improve their cyber
posture. So, we are pushing on an open door.
Senator Peters. All right. Thank you.
General Lyons. Yes, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Peters, and
now, via Webex, Senator Blackburn, please.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To each of you, I say thank you for your service. We are
greatly appreciative of the work that you do every single day.
General Lyons, let me stay with you there on the
cybersecurity issue. TRANSCOM does have a high volume of
strategic mobility missions on a daily basis. There are varying
levels of detail, and so as we move personnel and equipment in
and out of the different theaters, how much of that information
is communicated across classified versus unclassified networks?
General Lyons. Senator, I think you are aware that a great
deal of our information is moved across unclassified networks,
both inside the DODIN and, of course, outside the DODIN. That,
unto itself, isn't the risk, as long as we take the proper
procedures and we take the proper measures of defense and
encryption. But a large volume of our information does move
across unclassified networks.
Senator Blackburn. Yes. I think it would be helpful if we
had a percentage and kind of a threshold at which we need to
classify some information for force protection purposes, but
not others for communicating pertinent details to uncleared
personnel. That is an area that, in my opinion, would deserve a
little bit of a deeper dive and a bit more attention.
General Wolters, the NATO 2030 Report identifies China as a
full-spectrum systemic rival, and that is something that I
agree with.
It is not only, China is not only a security threat, a
national security threat, they are an economic threat. The way
they are pushing the belt and road initiative, the way they are
pushing debt diplomacy, is something that should give us pause,
because it all feeds in to the civil military fusion that they
practice and live every single day.
So, since the last time you were before us at this
Committee and we discussed this issue, what has, and I am
quoting now, your comment, expanding the competitive space,
meant to EUCOM, specifically, for competition with China, and
how does this affect the work we do, the mobility,
interoperability with our NATO allies?
General Wolters. It has a large effect, Senator, and I
think it is an imperative as a result of the way that China
conducts activities for us to take a whole-of-government,
whole-of-nation, whole-of-military, all-domain approach, with
the activities of China, as they bear on the European
continent.
We are obviously very concerned with respect to Huawei 5G.
We are obviously very concerned with respect to the
proliferation of their involvement with sea ports and air
aerial ports, and we are paying very, very close attention to
all of those areas.
In the information environment, as a nation who supports
democratic value as being part of an alliance that supports
democratic values, we have told the truth about some of the
sacrifices that nations would make if they continue to endeavor
in 5G. We have actually seen a little bit of the turning of the
tied with respect to China and 5G Huawei; nations electing to
go in different directions.
As you well know, Senator, the United Kingdom made that
call recently and ran a position on the European continent
where several other nations are doing the same. So, vigilance
remains sky-high and there must be an all-domain approach and a
whole-of-government, whole-of-nation approach to this
challenge.
Senator Blackburn. Well, I agree with you on that, and I
fully believe that if we look at China as a problem set that we
need to solve, that we are going to have to have our allies
working with us as we look at this as a problem set.
So, talk with me for just a couple of minutes, if you will,
about any physical roadblocks that may be there or any
regulatory roadblocks that would prohibit movement of our
forces within your AOR or participation with NATO allies or
their working with us on the China issue.
General Wolters. No roadblocks at this time, but what we
are anticipating is an increase in our demand to share across
secret information lines. As you know, Senator, we are working
very, very hard to make sure that we can open up the aperture
from a policy perspective with our NATO allies and partners to
be able to share certain classified information.
We are achieving success in that area with the assistance
of this Committee, and I would ask for your continued
endorsement in that area to make sure that we can you
adequately share information so that we can make headway
against malign influence on behalf of China.
Senator Blackburn. Well, I agree with you on that issue,
and that goes back to the first question for General Lyons
about the amounts of information that we are communicating over
classified and secure versus unclassified and secure networks
and the dangers that that may put our men and women who are
currently deployed in various areas, that that may open them
to.
Again, we will continue to work with you all on these
issues. I have got a couple of other questions that we will
submit for the record.
But I see Senator Duckworth is there waiting, so I will
yield back my time and allow her to get her questions in, also.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
Let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Duckworth.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
to my good friend from Tennessee.
I have discussed a portion of our supply chain and
logistics enterprise with the Department's civilian leadership
like Secretary Austin; Deputy Secretary of Defense, Kath Hicks;
and former Under Secretary of Defense, Ellen Lord.
I have discussed it with service chiefs like the commandant
of the Marine Corps and with combatant commanders, like Admiral
Davidson. I have discussed advancements and we need to make it
a logistics capabilities in order to face the unique challenges
of the Indo-Pacific's geography and the threat of real great-
power competitors.
I have been dogged in my insistence that we will not be
able to build a combat credible deterrence if we do not have
the logistics capability and capacity to realistically support
our complex military operation, no plans.
My takeaway from all of my conversations with these many
senior defense leaders is that they do recognize the problem
and they do agree with me, and yet, it still doesn't seem to me
like we are adequately investing in Transportation Command and
our strategic logistics capabilities.
General Lyons, it is good to see you today. In this
setting, as much as you can, in this unclassified setting, what
are your biggest capability and capacity challenges,
shortfalls, and how can Congress best resource Transportation
Command to provide the power projection and sustainment
necessary for our operational plans?
General Lyons. Senator, let me just say, thank you for your
strong, unwavering advocacy in understanding the combat
credible deterrence assurance, and really to be able to respond
to when, that is so critical in our logistics enterprise. So, I
really do appreciate that.
I know you are aware of several ongoing initiatives that we
are getting support from the Hill on to include sealift
recapitalization that we talked about. We have alluded to some
work inside the Department on the joint concept for contested
logistics.
I think this begins a very important journey for us across
the joint force as a Department to fully integrate the
logistics just the same, a warfighting function amongst all
warfighting functions that will be critical as we move forward
and evolve to support both, the changing character of warfare
and adjust the character of logistics to support the changing
character of warfare. So, a lot going on there to include some
of discussions you just heard on cyber.
So, we are, in fact, getting good support and good
collaboration across the combatant commands, across the
services, and inside the Department on the things that I think
are most important, and we will continue to push on these kinds
of issues, whether they be mobility or liquid energy to ensure
that we can continue to project and sustain the force well into
the future.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
I want to also follow-up on the discussion on cyber that
you just had with my good friend from Michigan, Senator Peters.
I would like to take it a little bit further and ask, does
TRANSCOM currently have systems in place that will evaluate
compliance with, you know, the cyber requirements in terms of
your civilian partners, and how do you enforce cybersecurity
measures with commercial partners?
General Lyons. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
For the commercial partners, which, we have many, and good
partnerships, that is currently done through a self-assessment
and self-reporting. We are working a proof of principle for a
third-party to be able to validate compliance. That is a
relatively new initiative. We have to work through the
feasibility of that, but we are working in that regard.
I would say, though, today, we have a very transparent and
a good level of coordination with our industry partners.
As I mentioned, I think we are pushing on an open door when
it comes to cyber risk and cyber coaching. So, we are getting
good cooperation, and at the end of the day, we ensure we don't
have any single points of failure inside of our industry
networks.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, General.
By the way, I just want to congratulate you on your
remarkable career, and I happen to think that leaving from the
TRANSCOM is a capstone. It is my personal interests, my
personal, or I consider it critical to our force and I just
want to thank you for how well you have done there and how well
you have moved our capacity, both capacity and capability
forward, when it comes logistics for our national security, and
I just, you know, can't thank you enough for your dedication,
and I hope you have a wonderful early part of your retirement,
where you said you are going to go underground and hide for a
little while. Enjoy that, but then I am sure that we will see
you around again sometime soon.
Thank you so much.
General Lyons. Thank you, ma'am.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you for your services.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
Now, via Webex, let me recognize Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, both for appearing in front of us.
General Wolters, I want to ask you a couple more questions
about Ukraine. An alumni of your organization, General Ben
Hodges, recently said in a television interview on a Ukrainian
television network, that he believes Russia's buildup in the
Donbas area is not specifically about Donbas, but more about
control over the Black Sea coast, and, in particular, trying to
take control of Mariupol and maybe the Sea of Azov to stage
Russia for further incursions onto the northern Black Sea
coast.
Have you seen that interview and, if so, what do you think
about General Hodges' comments?
General Wolters. Senator, I haven't seen the interview, but
I, too, am concerned about the protection of sovereign activity
in the vicinity of the Black Sea.
Senator Cotton. This was a concern back in 2015, was it
not, after Ukraine first made its incursion into the Donbas,
that they were going to try to establish just a little land
bridge to Crimea?
General Wolters. It was, Senator.
Senator Cotton. That would be deeply harmful, not only to
Ukraine, but also to American interests in the Black Sea region
and to Europe, more broadly?
General Wolters. I concur, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
I know that you were asked a question earlier about the
Javelin missiles that we had provided to Ukraine, but to be
very exact, those are in possession of the Ukrainian Armed
Forces and they are entitled to use those anywhere in their
country and in any manner that they need to defend their
territory?
General Wolters. That is correct, Senator, for defensive
purposes, to defend their sovereign territory.
Senator Cotton. The Javelin is, by definition, really, a
defensive weapon, wouldn't you say?
General Wolters. I would, Senator.
Senator Cotton. I will relay one story from the summer of
2015. I was with the former Chairman of the Committee, Senator
McCain in Eastern Ukraine, about as close as they would let us
get to the Donbas, and we met with some troops from there and
then irregular militia forces that had rallied to come to
Ukraine's defense. One had been a former tank commander. He was
a lieutenant in the Red Army and now he was a battalion
commander of this new unit.
He was pleading with us at the time to convince the Obama-
Biden administration to provide Javelins, which they never did,
and he said to us, Mr. Senators, we do not need a hundred
Javelins to use against Russian tanks. We only need one Javelin
to use against a Russian tank and then Russian tankers will
think twice.
Would you agree with that, is that a folk wisdom, from the
battlefield, General Wolters, that one Javelin used in Eastern
Ukraine against a Russian tank would make a lot of Russian
tankers think twice?
General Wolters. I would, Senator, and I think you have
accurately characterized the spirit of the Ukrainian Armed
Forces.
Senator Cotton. All right. Thank you.
Let's move on to another matter about making Russians think
twice. In the wake of Russia's development of new intermediate-
range nuclear forces capabilities, and also our long overdue
departure from the intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty,
how should NATO posture our forces to adapt to Russia's missile
threat and what, in particular, should we do to focus on
missile defense and long-range strike capability in the
European theater?
General Wolters. Senator, as we talked before, we have to
continue to improve in indications and warnings and command and
control so that we can see deeper into the environment and
respond quicker, and if we will continue to improve those
areas, with respect to the integrated air and missile defense
programs that we have in work today, we will keep the campaign
momentum traversing in a productive direction.
Senator Cotton. Are our NATO partners comfortable with the
development of those kind of long-range strike capabilities
that can hold at risk, Russian targets that previously would
have been within the INF prohibited range of missiles?
General Wolters. Senator, I would characterize the
environment as the Nations are becoming more comfortable as
they gain greater understanding of the operational environment.
Senator Cotton. It sounds to me like that is a pretty
strong asymmetric advantage in our favor, isn't it, unless we
think that Russia is going to start putting intermediate-range
missiles in Cuba or the Bahamas or Canada or Mexico, since we
can put them up against Russia's border, and they have a much
harder time doing it on our border?
General Wolters. I concur, Senator.
Senator Cotton. It seems to me like there should be a lot
more of them [inaudible].
Thank you, General.
Thank you, General Lyons, as well, for your service.
Chairman Reed. Well, thank you, Senator Cotton.
Let me now recognize Senator Kelly.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
General Wolters and General Lyons.
I want to talk a little bit about Defender Europe 2020.
You know, we trained, so we are prepared to fight and
prepared to win and, you know, this exercise is one to test our
power projection. I want to hear directly from the two of you,
what were the top lessons learned from Defender Europe 2020,
and then how does that translate into changes in the exercise
in, well, coming up in this year?
General Wolters. Senator, the number one lesson learned was
the value of Army pre-positioned stockpiles and deployable air
base systems. We have studied this issue for a long time.
Moving at speed with large formations across the Atlantic
and getting to point, ultimately, to the appropriately foxhole
with a ready force member is a challenge. Having those pre-
positioned stockpiles in place was very beneficial, more so,
than we could have possibly imagined and Defender Europe 2020
verified that.
Senator Kelly. General Lyons?
General Lyons. Senator, thanks.
It is such a critical exercise. We got a lot out of it. I
would say a couple of things. It demonstrated, clearly, in my
own view that we do, as a nation, have the ability to move
immediately, if required, and as well, as follow it with a
decisive force.
Now, as I looked at that operation and I looked at what
General Wolters was trying to do and our ability to get the
force to him, I felt very confident in our ability to support
his efforts and deliver the decisive force, when needed.
Senator Kelly. So, the sealift capability, was that tested?
I know we had more Air Force and Navy resources. I assume,
some Military Sealift Command (MSC) resources involved. Do you
feel you have the sealift capability you need if this was not
an exercise, but was, if we wound up in a real fight?
General Lyons. Senator, I think you are aware, I mean, we
have a lot of work to do on sealift. On sealift
recapitalization, we have an aging fleet, a fleet that has some
readiness challenges, and we have a plan to remedy that over
the next decade.
But in this particular exercise with multiple vessels
underway, some commercial, some organic, some, frankly, being
integrated in the handoff between the second fleet and the
sixth fleet in Europe, it was a great test of our ability to
coordinate the transatlantic crossing, and I think very
successfully so.
But, to your point, we have work to do on the broader
sealift capacity, because in a surge environment, we are making
quite literally hundreds of turns, as opposed to dozens of
turns, as in this case.
Senator Kelly. General Wolters, further, in Eastern Europe,
the infrastructure was designed for Warsaw Pact, you know,
nations, Russian tanks, vehicles, troops. That infrastructure
was designed for things to be travelling east to west.
Did that come up in part of the exercise in transporting
our equipment and troops to the east through infrastructure
that was not designed for this?
General Wolters. It did, Senator, and with the
contributions of the European Deterrence Initiative over the
course of the last 3 years, we have had the opportunity to
specifically work on road and rail from west to east, Central
Germany to the Baltics, and down to Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria,
and we have made improvements in those areas, but it is still a
challenge and it is something we will continue to work on, but
we were much faster than we had been in the past.
Senator Kelly. Finally, how, in the remaining minute, how
would you like to see this exercise change to make sure we are
as prepared as possible for, you know, real engagements?
General Wolters. We are in the process of executing
Defender Europe 2021, and one of the changes that we are making
is a cyber red team and we want to improve our cyber defensive
posture for the duration of the exercises involved with
Defender Europe 2021.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, and I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly.
Let me recognize Senator Hawley.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here. Thanks for your
service.
General Wolters, let me start with you. Secretary Austin
has reaffirmed the position from the prior administration that
China is our pacing threat. Given that, what is your view on
what you could do in EUCOM to free up military resources that
the Department can use in the pacing theater.
General Wolters. Senator, my first response is, what we do
to effectively compete and deter against the nearest peer
competitor in Europe, Russia, is effective in deterring China,
because of the connectivity between the two nations and the
willingness of both nations to engage in malign influence
against the United States and against NATO.
So, those activities that allow us to continue to be
successful in the competition phase against Russia are also
helpful against China. Whether it is pointing out the poor path
that a nation could take with respect to Huawei 5G or whether
it is pointing out what China is doing, with respect to
equities in sea ports and aerial ports investment in Europe.
Senator Hawley. Let me ask you a little bit about NATO.
There has been a lot of talk about NATO's role in helping
confront China.
Wouldn't it be helpful if European allies did more to bear
the burden of confronting Russia so that we could focus on what
has been identified as our pacing threat, the pacing theater?
General Wolters. No argument that here, Senator, and I am
pleased to report the Nations are. They are very fixated on
Russia. There is no hesitancy on their part, and I say that as
a result of producing the first NATO military strategy in over
six decades. I am finalizing the concept for deterrence and
defense of the Euro-Atlantic area, all of those codify the
challenges that we face against a malign Russia, and the
Nations have been very willing to produce national plans that
take into account Russia as a malign influencer in the region.
Senator Hawley. Let me just ask you about our NATO allies
spending in 2014, I think it was, that NATO members agreed to
spend 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP),
respective GDPs on defense by uh 2024.
Now, the world has changed a lot since 2014 and, then,
particularly, again, our own assessment of what is now our
pacing threat, from a military standpoint and given the changed
security environment, do you think that 2 percent is still the
right target?
General Wolters. I do, Senator.
I will tell you that from 2016 to 2020, the 10 nations
today that meet the 2 percent minimum, all the Nations involved
have allowed us the opportunity to get our hands on $130
billion extra and that makes a big difference with our ability
to effectively compete.
Senator Hawley. Has EUCOM done any analysis as to that 2
percent number, why you still that that 2 percent is still the
right number?
General Wolters. Sir, EUCOM has done an analysis, Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has done analysis, and NATO has
conducted analysis. The feedback we get is the [inaudible]
pledge of 2 percent is still viable with respect to our ability
to build a competitive edge against near-peer competition in
Europe.
Senator Hawley. Would you be willing to share that
analysis, General, in the appropriate setting with this
Committee?
General Wolters. Yes, sir.
Senator Hawley. Thank you very much.
Let me just ask you before I move to General Lyons about
ISR, you mentioned in your opening statement that timely
indications and warning would be key for deterring or blunting
any Russian attack in the Baltics.
Of course ISR is a very scarce commodity. Our forces in the
Pacific also need a timely indication to warnings of possible
Chinese attacks. They are particularly with regard to Taiwan.
So, my question is, how do we minimize the amount of
American ISR that is needed in your AOR so we can monitor
Russian forces effectively, but also continue to bolster our
deterrent posture in PACOM?
General Wolters. Continue to communicate to our allies and
partners that the criticality of ISR and what it contributes
and indications and warnings, and what it affords you the
opportunity to do in the competition phase before you get to
crisis or before you get to conflict. In NATO, we are having
success with that.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you.
General Lyons, in my remaining seconds here, let me ask you
a logistics question. Admiral Davidson has recently warned that
China might attempt a fait accompli with regard to Taiwan, much
sooner than we might otherwise previously have anticipated.
Just from a logistics standpoint, what do we need to do,
what do we need to have in place in the Indo-Pacific in order
to blunt such an offensive as quickly as possible, in your
view?
General Lyons. Well, Senator, you know, Admiral Davidson
has done some great work out there. It still has to continue in
terms of the posture, not just in the Pacific, but the global
posture. So, it is so critical that we think of things globally
and not just Indo-Pacific.
Our global posture that offers us a physical, a temporal,
and a psychological advantage to be able to come when we are
told to come. I have a high degree of confidence that we can do
that.
I know that there is still work to be done as we evolve and
look at the future character of warfare, but I think we are on
the right path to support Admiral Davidson's initiatives.
Senator Hawley. Very good.
My time had expired. I will have another question or two
for you for the record.
General Lyons. Thank you.
Senator Hawley. Thank you both, gentlemen, for your
service.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
Senator Tuberville, please.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Real quick, I know we are running out of time, but I want
to thank you for being here today and your service. Just real
quick, Redstone Arsenal, you know, we have quite a bit of
things at Redstone and you have done a great job for the
American people. It looks like we have a great chance to have
the Space Command (SPACECOM).
General Lyons, how important is that, how important is us
to move up in Space Command? I know we are on the infant ages
of that, but what do you think about Space Command?
General Lyons. Senator, I think space is clearly a
warfighting domain and I think that the creation of SPACECOM,
as well as Space Force was critically important to the way we
are going to operate in the future and, you know, the character
of warfare as we see it.
I really can't comment on the basing issue, whether it is
Huntsville or some other location. I will confirm, just being
an Army officer and knowing what is at Huntsville, how critical
that installation is to Army operations and other operations
and such.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you.
General Wolters?
General Wolters. I couldn't agree more. Space is a
warfighting domain. It is a pretty large domain, compared to
all the others, and it is important that we understand how to
effectively compete and deter and defend in space.
Senator Tuberville. What do you think about laser warfare?
I have seen some examples of that in Huntsville and what we are
developing.
Do you see a future for that?
General Wolters. I do, Senator, and I think we need to
continue down that path. It is not cheap, but the return on
investment due to accuracy and lethality is very powerful and
very compelling.
Senator Tuberville. General Lyons?
General Lyons. Senator, I would just say, you know,
anything that provides us an opportunity to bring lethal
effects on an adversary to compel them to our will on aware
national security, that just has to remain on the table.
Senator Tuberville. Yeah. Thank you very much.
Just a quick comment about earlier about some things that
were said in here. I was disturbed a little bit about using the
word white supremacists.
You know, I am a football coach in trade and I build teams,
and that is what you are doing, you are building a team, and we
have people in here that has never been on a team. They don't
understand, you recruit people and you make something out of
them and you bring them together. You fight together. You live,
you eat, you breathe, and they come from all economic
backgrounds, every culture in the world.
Some people don't understand that. They don't understand
it, and you will eliminate them, as I did when I was coaching.
If you had somebody that wasn't a teach member, they were gone.
You do the same thing in the military. We need to stay out
of that. We need to leave it to the generals, which, to me, are
the coaches, the people that do it, that get it done, that know
these young men and women. Because, listening to our people the
other day that we were interviewing about a draft in the
future, which, you know, we want to draft women. We think they
serve a great purpose, and we are going to need it.
You know, this is a dangerous world. A dangerous world, and
we can't sit back and try to tear our military down from people
that really know nothing about it, about building a team. So, I
want to apologize for that. I mean, that was not a good
selection of questions, I don't think, for this Committee,
because we are here to help. We are here to give advice if you
want advice, but not give you advice so you have to take that.
You know, I was disappointed in Secretary Austin. You know,
he is a Army guy, and first thing we do is we stand-down, stay
out of it, personally.
In terms of publicly, you know, I know being a coach, there
are a lot of things you didn't bring up publicly. You kept it
within, because you have got to build, because you divide if
you start bringing it up publicly.
So, we need a killing machine and we are going to need one,
just looking at what is coming. So, thanks for your service and
your building, and hopefully, we can keep people out of what
you all do and do great, because you are the defense of the
world, not just the defense of this country.
Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.
It is the intention now to adjourn the public hearing and
quickly move to SVC-217 for a classified session.
Senator Inhofe. Can I make one?
Chairman Reed. I will yield to Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Well, let me just thank the coach for his
comments. Right on.
Chairman Reed. If there are no further comments, then the
hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
cybersecurity
1. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, in your posture statement, you
acknowledged both the advantage of partnering with civilian carriers to
meet U.S. Transportation Command's (TRANSCOM) missions, but also the
risks that come from partnering with companies who primarily use
unclassified networks. What is the current status of TRANSCOM's efforts
to harden its networks to defend against cyberattacks?
General Lyons. TRANSCOM has implemented a layered defense-in-depth
construct to harden our networks. We are focused on quickly mitigating
critical vulnerabilities across our portfolio and have invested in data
encryption capabilities to create trusted data transactions, which have
decreased adversary attack vectors. Additionally, our robust network
intrusion detection system, continuous network monitoring program, and
access to third party threat intelligence from industry experts, allow
our intrusion detection analysts to better deter, detect, and respond
to incidents.
In addition, TRANSCOM's continued investment in cloud services led
to a more robust infrastructure, increased our security posture, and
improved the resilience of our mobility systems. TRANSCOM, in
partnership with U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), is implementing a Zero
Trust security model that will enhance TRANSCOM network traffic
visibility and better position the command to secure sensitive data,
systems, and services. TRANSCOM's efforts are informing the way forward
for architecture standards, data analytics development, and assessment
criteria for future Zero Trust security model implementations across
the DOD.
To reduce cybersecurity risks with our commercial partners,
TRANSCOM incorporated the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement Clause 252.204-7012, Safeguarding Covered Defense
Information and Cyber Incident Reporting, language in all Readiness
Transportation Service Provider (TSP) contracts. The contract language
requires Readiness TSPs to implement National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-171, ``Protecting
Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Information Systems
and Organizations,'' to safeguard covered defense information processed
or stored on their internal information system or network.
The contract language also requires each of our Readiness TSPs to
complete an annual cybersecurity self-assessment of the NIST security
controls. 2020 marked the third year of contractually requiring our
Readiness TSPs to submit self-assessments, and self-reporting
compliance has continued to improve each year. Overall, we assess that
most of our TSPs are taking cybersecurity seriously and the NIST
standards will help them improve their security. However, TSPs will
always be challenged to keep out advanced persistent threat actors.
2. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, is your command coordinating with
U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) on this effort?
General Lyons. Yes, TRANSCOM is aligned closely with CYBERCOM on a
wide array of cyber security initiatives designed to harden networks
against malicious cyber activities. We are partnering with CYBERCOM on
a Zero Trust security model implementation. In addition, we routinely
combine efforts on joint defensive cyber operations in response to
emerging threats. We are also members of various CYBERCOM working
groups, such as the Comply-to-Connect and the Operationalizing Cyber
Security Service Providers working groups, focused on improving the
Department's cybersecurity posture.
military moves
3. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, last November, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) overturned DOD's multi-billion dollar
contract award to move servicemembers' household goods around the world
because of pervasive errors in the contracting process. Can you provide
an update on the status of re-awarding that contract?
General Lyons. [Deleted.]
4. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, will the delay negatively affect
any military servicemember and family movements during peak season this
summer?
General Lyons. Yes. The contracting delays translate into delays to
TRANSCOM delivering a more professional, higher-quality moving
experience than is possible in the current program. Whereas we
originally intended to begin operating under the GHC in 2021, we now
don't expect to begin operating under GHC until 2023.
While we've made some marginal improvements to the current program
and incorporated many GHC rules into the existing program, our current
model limits the quality improvements we can make. Our current
construct is a constraint to innovation, as we are tied to the
capabilities of `the lowest common denominators' in the program. The
current model prevents us from capitalizing on existing capabilities in
industry such as near real-time event status updates as shipments are
in-transit and mobile applications to provide Families modern tools to
manage all aspects of the move process (including claims). Indeed, the
GHC is an opportunity to raise the standard for DOD Families, attract
additional quality capacity to the program, and incorporate modern
capabilities (which we take for granted in every aspect of our personal
lives) into the Personal Property Program.
So yes--because the delays prevent us from delivering a better
experience to DOD personnel and their families sooner, I can only
characterize the delays as having a negative effect.
5. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, what steps are you taking to
ensure the contracting errors committed last year don't happen again?
General Lyons. [Deleted.]
vaccinating troops in europe
6. Senator Hirono. General Wolters, last month, shipping delays to
Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany slowed vaccination efforts
in U.S. European Command (EUCOM) for servicemembers, DOD civilians, and
their families. Can you give me an update on the current status of
vaccination efforts in EUCOM?
General Wolters. USEUCOM is vaccinating rapidly across the theater.
Our vaccination efforts are aligned with the Department of Defense
population prioritization schema and over 46,000 eligible (19%) have
been fully vaccinated with almost 51,000 (21%) having received their
first shot.
7. Senator Hirono. General Wolters, will EUCOM be able to meet the
April 19th date set by President Biden and offer vaccinations to
servicemembers, DOD civilians, and adult family members who want one?
General Wolters. USEUCOM is on pace to meet the 19 April date set
by President Biden to offer vaccinations to all eligible adult
beneficiaries. We are also on pace to meet the Department of Defense
(DOD) milestone to vaccinate 70% of the total eligible DOD population,
including beneficiaries, by 15 August.
russia
8. Senator Hirono. General Wolters, Russia has continued engaging
in malign activities across all parts of Europe. Alarmingly, Russian
troops are massing forces along the border of Ukraine while Ukrainian
forces are fighting Russian-backed separatists in the country.
Furthermore, Russia's Navy has deployed additional warships to the
Black Sea in its escalation of aggression and is posturing to gain a
strategic naval advantage in the Arctic. What steps are the U.S. taking
to counter renewed Russian aggression in and around Ukraine?
General Wolters. USEUCOM works within the whole-of-government and
alongside our NATO Allies and Partners to develop response options as
Russia increased its force posture and aggressive stance towards
Ukraine. We remain vigilant and focused on activities in the region as
well as amplify messaging for major exercises. Recent options executed
included Bomber Task Force flights, destroyers operating in the Aegean
Sea and Eastern Mediterranean Sea, and a fly-in of High Mobility
Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) into Romania. We are monitoring Black
Sea region activities and able to modify and add options as
environmental changes necessitate.
9. Senator Hirono. General Wolters, how are EUCOM naval assets
responding to Russia's recent activity?
General Wolters. USEUCOM's maritime assets routinely operate across
the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, Aegean Sea, as well as in the Black Sea
consistent with the Montreux Convention and international law. Four
destroyers recently participated in a Romanian-led NATO exercise. The
USS IWO JIMA Amphibious Readiness Group with the 24th Marine
Expeditionary Unit embarked will operate with the HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH
Carrier Strike Group and other maritime nations throughout the theater.
Through our robust array of operations, missions, and activities with
Allies and Partners, we demonstrate our combined ability to deter and
defend. Russia's recent activities underscore the importance of
conducting these assurance measures, increasing our alignment and
strengthening relationships with like-minded nations.
10. Senator Hirono. General Wolters, is anything additional
required to ensure we can adequately respond to Russian naval
initiatives?
General Wolters. Dedicated Carrier Strike Group and amphibious
presence are key elements of a lethal and agile theater posture. Two
additional destroyers will enhance our seapower projection and
deterrence in the Mediterranean and Black Sea, and all the way up to
the Arctic. Persistent Indications and Warning across the Greenland,
Iceland, U.K. Gap is critical for high-end subsurface threat detection
and defense of the Homeland. Increasing our unmanned systems to allow
us to better surveil critical areas with speed and clarity will
strengthen our ability to defend and deter across the Euro-Atlantic
area.
11. Senator Hirono. General Wolters, in your statement to the
Committee, you highlighted the importance of your partnership with the
State Department on the Russian Influence Group (RIG), which is
designed to counter Russian disinformation. Can you provide additional
information on this program?
General Wolters. The Russia Influence Group (RIG) is a United
States interagency forum focused on taking coordinated actions that
counter Russian malign influence. It is co-led by the Department of
State's Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs and USEUCOM. This
collaborative program supports U.S. national strategy, including
executive and legislative branch policy and guidance.
12. Senator Hirono. General Wolters, do you think more funding for
the RIG program would be beneficial?
General Wolters. Yes, the RIG is currently funded through July
2021. USEUCOM has submitted a request for $2 million of the required
funding to fund the RIG beyond July 2021. This additional funding
request will expand interagency collaboration and enable the RIG to
better contribute towards holistic solutions. This program provides
tremendous value-add towards countering Russian malign influence
through a whole-of-government approach.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
cyber security
13. Senator Rosen. General Wolters, how are you preparing the
Alliance to better defend its networks and operations against the
growing sophistication of cyber threats and attacks, and what more
should the U.S. and our allies be doing?
General Wolters. NATO continues to adapt to the evolving cyber
threat landscape. In 2020, NATO released the Concept for the Deterrence
and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area. To support this effort, NATO
bolstered deterrence efforts in cyberspace by establishing a cyberspace
operations center at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in
Mons, Belgium. Integrating cyber and information effects in joint U.S.-
NATO exercises enhances transparency and alignment and advances
security cooperation. These combined efforts contribute to the
Alliance's ability to address malicious cyber activity in a 21st
century security environment.
The U.S. must continue to support NATO's cyber adaptation efforts
in order to maintain Alliance relevance in Cyberspace. USEUCOM works
routinely with the Alliance to normalize cyberspace operations through
combined exercises that build readiness and a foundation for
deterrence. USEUCOM delivers support to Allies and Partners who are
developing their cyber capabilities through ``train, advise, and
assist'' missions that build cyber capability and capacity. USEUCOM
also invests in Alliance cooperation in cyberspace. The recent Solar
Winds attack illustrates the importance of sharing actionable and
timely information with our Allies to minimize exposure to
vulnerabilities we know our adversaries exploit.
14. Senator Rosen. General Wolters, are we providing assistance to
vulnerable allies to develop and maintain capabilities they could not
afford to develop or procure alone? If so, can you talk about how the
vulnerability of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners
impacts U.S. national security?
General Wolters. USEUCOM trains, advises, and equips Allies and
Partners through security cooperation programs to bolster our
collective self-defense across the Alliance, protecting both NATO and
U.S. national security. For example, USEUCOM assists in provisioning
defensive cyber capabilities to modernize and harden Ally and Partner
networks. USEUCOM also provides assistance on critical gaps in cyber
incident response and cyber workforce recruitment, training, and
retention which is key to developing and maintaining those delivered
capabilities.
15. Senator Rosen. General Wolters, in 2014, NATO made cyber
defense a core part of collective defense by declaring that a cyber
attack could lead to the invocation of NATO's collective defense
clause, or Article 5, meaning that an armed attack against one is
considered an armed attack against all. What is the threshold for a
cyber-attack that could lead to invoking Article 5?
General Wolters. The Alliance stands ready to compete in all
domains, including cyber. Secretary General Stoltenberg has highlighted
the negative impact cyber attacks can have on our Allies' security. His
comments, in light of the increasing threat posed by malign cyber
actors, continues to drive Allied investment in cyber preparedness. The
Alliance focuses on improving resourcing, training, and growing
personnel commitments that enable the collective to compete below the
threshold of war, deter, and prevail in the cyber domain today. Whether
a particular cyber attack rises to the level of an ``armed attack''
would be decided during Article 4 consultations. The Allies maintain a
degree of ambiguity with respect to their national level red-lines
which might invoke an Article 4 request for consultations. In this
regard, it is worth noting that events must reach a threshold that
threatens the security of NATO or a NATO Ally individually.
vaccine distribution to united states servicemembers in europe
16. Senator Rosen. General Wolters, can you describe the challenges
with vaccine distribution at our installations in Europe?
General Wolters. The initial supply-constrained environment
required USEUCOM to follow the Department of Defense (DOD) population
schema to maximize vaccine utilization. As the United States and DOD
increase vaccine supply, we will be able to more rapidly inoculate our
eligible population. USEUCOM is on pace to meet the 19 April date set
by President Biden to offer vaccinations to all eligible adult
beneficiaries. We are also postured to meet the milestone of 70% of the
total eligible DOD population, including beneficiaries, to be fully
vaccinated by 15 August.
17. Senator Rosen. General Wolters, have there been any recent
delays in vaccine shipments? If yes, can you name the installations
that have been most affected by such delays?
General Wolters. There are no current delays in shipments of
vaccines to the USEUCOM Area of Responsibility.
f-35 program
18. Senator Rosen. General Wolters, can you confirm that 5th
generation airpower is a requirement for your mission in EUCOM, and can
you explain how 5th generation aircraft, like F-35, meet that
requirement?
General Wolters. The F-35 is the cornerstone of our global fighter
fleet going forward. This is especially true in Europe as we work
alongside our five currently equipped F-35 Allies to deter and prepare
to respond to adversary aggression. The F-35's integrated, battlespace
information-sharing, and hardened sensors and weapons enable rapid
decision-making and extend the range of integrated off-board systems
across the Joint Force. As more Allies and Partners purchase the F-35A,
with approximately 460 aircraft are expected in theater by 2030, its
high commonality with the U.S. F-35B and C variants allows USEUCOM to
leverage common maintenance practices enabling rapid mobility across
the continent with minimal footprint.
19. Senator Rosen. General Wolters, has the F-35 program had a
positive impact on both military and diplomatic relations with these
key allies?
General Wolters. As more nations partner to invest in the F-35, it
broadens our cooperation and strengthens our ties with key Allies in
Europe. Through this shared platform, maintenance practices,
intelligence preparation, and alignment of tactics, techniques, and
procedures, we are stronger, better prepared, and more lethal together.
The F-35 will reach its full potential, with the inclusion of our
partners, to enhance our deterrence capabilities and better defend the
Euro-Atlantic. Seven countries have purchased the F-35, and with even
more nations within USEUCOM Area of Responsibility expressing interest
in the program.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
ukraine
20. Senator Inhofe. General Wolters, you testified that the lethal
aid the United States has provided to Ukraine through the Ukraine
Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) has been ``very helpful''. What
specific elements of USAI have advanced Ukraine's ability to deter
further Russian aggression?
General Wolters. USAI enables procuring critical equipment and
enhancing Ukraine's combat capability and credibility. Ukraine's
ability to field a combat capable force serves as the greatest
deterrence against further aggression in the region. Under the category
of lethal aid, USAI is funding armed Mark VI patrol boats, counter-
artillery radars, sniper capabilities, and Precision Shoulder-fired
Rocket Launchers. Non-lethal assistance under USAI includes
capabilities across domains such as secure communications, electronic
warfare systems, counter-unmanned aerial systems, cyber and information
technology capabilities, and night vision devices, all of which are
necessary in 21st century warfare.
21. Senator Inhofe. General Wolters, what specific elements of USAI
have supported EUCOM's objectives in the Black Sea Region?
General Wolters. In the Black Sea region, USAI is improving
Ukraine's ability to defend against ongoing Russian aggression, most
notably by funding armed Mark VI patrol boats and armaments for Island
Class Patrol Boats. This fleet of modernized patrol boats enables the
Ukrainian navy to improve its maritime patrol capabilities and
situational awareness, serving as a deterrent to Russian aggression.
f-35
22. Senator Inhofe. General Wolters, you testified that the F-35 is
necessary for you to ``have a competitive advantage necessary to
protect our sovereign territory.'' Please describe in specific detail
how this platform contributes to that competitive advantage.
General Wolters. The F-35 is the cornerstone of our global fighter
fleet going forward. This is especially true in Europe as we work
alongside our five currently equipped F-35 Allies to deter and prepare
to respond to adversary aggression. The F-35's integrated sensors and
ability to share critical information throughout the battlespace enable
rapid decision making, extend the range of integrated off-board weapons
systems, and allow greater degree of maneuverability in contested
environments. The F-35 is a critical enabler of our ability to fight in
the air and target enemy ground systems that would contest our access
to any domain we deem necessary. As more Allies and Partners purchase
the F-35A, with approximately 460 aircraft are expected in theater by
2030, its high commonality with the U.S. F-35B and C variants allows
USEUCOM to leverage common maintenance practices enabling rapid
mobility across the continent with minimal footprint.
european deterrence initiative
23. Senator Inhofe. General Wolters, you testified that reductions
to the defense budget and to the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)
funding would ``slow down our campaign momentum that we've been able to
sustain for the last 4 years in improving our indications and warnings,
our command and control, and our readiness. What investments through
EDI have improved capabilities in each of these?
General Wolters. EDI enables USEUCOM to meet U.S. national security
requirements in concert with our Allies and Partners. Stable,
predictable, and consistent EDI funding is needed to maintain and
improve our ability to succeed in this strategic competition era.
An example of success is building and procuring Army pre-
positioning stock equipment sets and Air Force basing equipment to
increase our speed across the theater to effectively posture at a time
of need. EDI funds continue to improve our Theater Undersea Warfare
operations and build Mission Partner Environment (MPE) command and
control (C2) networks. MPE networks (including the Atlantic Resolve
mission network, Enhanced Forward Presence mission network, Maritime
Mission Enclave, and the Maidan network) facilitate coalition multi-
national C2, training, exercises, and execution at the tactical and
operational levels throughout the USEUCOM AOR.
USEUCOM continues to improve our indications and warning and
intelligence sharing with NATO Allies and European Partners across the
AOR, most recently with Poland and Romania. We are requesting
approximately $84 million to enhance cross-domain interoperable
solutions for air and ground operations in support of theater
requirements. The ability to increase the number of manned and unmanned
platforms based on the changing environment improves situational
awareness and support to Joint and Coalition operations.
An investment of $209 million in European Deterrence Initiative
exercises and training focused in the southern portion of USEUCOM will
provide dedicated opportunities to refine Command and Control (C2)
architecture, increase interoperability, and develop a more ready,
lethal, combat-capable force.
multi-domain task force
24. Senator Inhofe. General Wolters, you testified that the
addition of 500 United States troops to Wiesbaden, Germany will be
focused on a ``multi domain task force in a joint theaters fire
organization . . . that will improve our ability in all domains, to
bring fires from the surface to surface dimension to increase our
ability to deter.'' Could you provide more detail about the elements of
this task force, their capabilities, and how they will integrate into
EUCOM planning and operations?
General Wolters. The Multi-Domain Task Force--Europe (MDTF-E) will
provide Mission Command of forces, integrate and liaise with applicable
organizations, conduct targeting, and synchronize efforts in alignment
with the USEUCOM objectives. MDTF-E will compete for influence and
access to counter malign actors, prepare the environment, enable
defense of friendly forces and critical nodes in competition and armed
conflict, and conduct deliberate targeting. In a conflict, the MDTF-E
will neutralize enemy forces, defend lines of communication, and
provide support to dynamic and deliberate multi-domain targeting.
service budgeting and requirements process
25. Senator Inhofe. General Lyons, the tanker divestments were a
very concerning issue last year. What is wrong with our requirements
process when Congress has to step in to ensure you have enough tanker
aircraft to stay mission ready?
General Lyons. Last year, based on KC-46 delays, the Committee
asked for an assessment of programmed retirements of KC-10 and KC-135
aircraft. At that time, planned aircraft retirements, combined with KC-
46 delays, resulted in a 30% reduction in Active Component capacity,
which would be insufficient to meet day-to-day needs across the Joint
Force.
This was a change from the USAF initial fleet program position,
which retained sufficient air refueling capacity to mitigate risk.
However, in the final days of budget formulation, the USAF was forced
to absorb a significant reduction in funding. In order to protect
future programs, the USAF opted to accept risk in the air refueling
portfolio. This process, as designed, illuminates different risk
perspectives of Services and Combatant Commanders.
Since that date, technical solutions emerged and the Department has
settled on an agreed upon force presentation plan that meets Joint
Force requirements. Overall, though we have taken some ``lessons
learned'' from this experience, I assess no systemic deficiencies in
the requirements process.
26. Senator Inhofe. General Lyons, why can't the Pentagon seem to
provide resources for joint mission requirements, and do you have
similar concerns with any other platforms today?
General Lyons. Unfortunately, the President's Budget 2021
submission adjusted air refueling fleet program quantities at the last
minute, which did not allow for collaboration between stakeholders.
This was an exceptional case. Generally, the budget process adequately
balances risk and resources with involvement of relevant stakeholders.
For the Fiscal Year 2022 President's Budget, the capabilities and
capacity the Military Departments presented meet our needs, avoid
significant risk in the near term, and allow for future mobility force
shaping to meet modernization and operational requirements.
global household goods contract
27. Senator Inhofe. General Lyons, I am concerned about the
household goods contract because, according to reports, it would have
cost taxpayers billions more for a ``best value'' Household Goods
contract. As we have already seen this administration take the first
steps to cut the defense budget, can you say why TRANSCOM felt these
additional costs were worth such an increase in contract value?
General Lyons. As outlined in the cost savings report directed by
last year's Consolidated Appropriations Act, USTRANSCOM projected $210
million in savings across the Future Years Defense Program as compared
to DOD's spending in the current program. Many reports in the public
domain--to potentially include the reports referenced in the question--
compared prices between bidders and did not consider the more than $2
billion DOD spends today in a program no one is satisfied with. While
our first award of the Global Household Goods Contract was not to the
lowest bidder, it was to the company we assessed most capable of
delivering the quality improvements we seek for military families at a
lower cost than DOD spends on today's flawed program. I acknowledge--
and will comply with--the DOD Appropriations language to provide a
report on the impact of the newly awarded contract to Service budgets.
28. Senator Inhofe. General Lyons, what measures has TRANSCOM put
in place to address the concerns that were upheld in the GAO protests?
General Lyons. Last year GAO sustained 6 unique allegations of the
75 total allegations made by two protestors. USTRANSCOM is in the
process of addressing GAO's recommendations, which largely focused on
better documenting the technical aspects of the proposal analysis
process. None of the GAO's protest-related recommendations challenged
the single move-manager construct, nor has GAO recommended any changes
to the acquisition strategy or timeline.
The contracting team significantly heightened its documentation of
proposal evaluations. For instance, USTRANSCOM recorded and transcribed
the in-person oral presentations to satisfy GAO's recommendation to
document that aspect of the proposal evaluation process.
Three offerors submitted new written proposals on 2 December 2020,
and all three offerors are being evaluated from a ``clean slate,''
fully considering all of GAO's recommendations. In addition, three
periods of ``third party'' peer reviews by Defense Pricing and
Contracting professionals and the Department of the Air Force Judge
Advocate General's Acquisition, Fiscal Law, and Litigation Directorate
are woven into the acquisition's process and timeline. While TRANSCOM
is disappointed in the protest-related delays, GAO's findings will make
this acquisition stronger and the protest process underscores
industry's interest in partnering with DOD to deliver this capability.
We expect to award the Global Household Goods Contract in October 2021.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
nato
29. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, the ``4 30s by 2020'' NATO
Readiness Initiative is one of the most important commitments allies
have made in recent years. How are allies progressing in fulfilling the
commitments they've made?
General Wolters. The NATO Secretary General's 2020 Annual Report
stated, ``Allies delivered on the commitment to having 30 mechanized
battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 combat vessels ready to use within
30 days or less. Allies are now working on the implementation of the
initiative by establishing larger formations.''
NATO Allies have continued to improve their readiness of national
forces in support of the Alliance's collective defense, enhancing
NATO's ability to reinforce its Allies with the ``right forces in the
right place at the right time.''
30. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, of naval, air, and land
forces, which readiness commitments are farthest along?
General Wolters. Across all domains, NATO continues adapting to
meet the challenges and complexities of our dynamic security
environment. Since 2020, when all thirty Defense Ministers endorsed
NATO's concept for the Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area
(DDA), we continue to make great strides in driving NATO reform,
primarily through the NATO Readiness Initiative (NRI). In the last two
years, the Alliance has nearly tripled its naval and air activities to
roughly 120 days of operations in the Black Sea region executed by NATO
flagged forces. In the air domain, five Allied and Partner nations are
now equipped with the F-35, broadening our cooperation, increasing the
integration and complexity of national air capabilities into Bomber
Task Force missions, and enhancing our deterrence capabilities while
leveraging common maintenance and support enablers. On land, Allies
deter aggression as part of NATO's four multinational battle groups, as
does our enhanced forward presence in the Black Sea region. We
strengthen these 21st century warfare pillars in events like the
integration of the U.S. DEFENDER and NATO STEADFAST DEFENDER Series
exercises to demonstrate all domain convergence across land, sea, and
air. We will bring together 28,000 U.S. Allied and Partner
servicemembers from 26 countries across 16 nations and for six weeks
will develop future capabilities, build Alliance readiness, and improve
our operational and strategic alignment.
31. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, which do we need to focus on
more?
General Wolters. We continue to improve readiness across all
domains and all regions. There are always some challenges with
supplying high demand, low density capabilities which have readiness
implications. Although each nation maintains responsibility for their
own readiness, USEUCOM works bilaterally, regionally, and through the
Alliance to increase readiness and interoperability to better deter and
defend the Euro-Atlantic. We will continue to pursue a robust exercise
program as funding allows to improve readiness in all domains with
Allies and Partners.
32. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, another key initiative from
the 2018 Summit was to improve NATO's military mobility, which
addresses physical and regulatory roadblocks to movement of U.S. and
Allied forces across the area of responsibility (AOR). What more can we
do, and in what ways can we encourage our allies and European partners
to do more to facilitate our forces' faster movement across the
continent?
General Wolters. Our robust exercise program, including the U.S.
DEFENDER Europe and the NATO STEADFAST DEFENDER series, ensures that
our forces are trained, interoperable, and ready to conduct combat-
credible movement across the European continent. Multilateral forums,
active participation across several NATO committees, and numerous
Allied and partner bilateral engagements serve as our best means to
incorporate lessons learned from these exercises and our rotational
deployments to continue advancing freedom of movement in Europe.
33. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, allied Ministers of Foreign
affairs recently directed NATO to address climate change, including
potentially reviewing the Alliance's operational plans and
capabilities. How will you balance this against ongoing key efforts to
deter Russia and address emerging threats from China?
General Wolters. USEUCOM acknowledges the challenges presented by
climate change and the guidance from the Secretary of Defense. In
today's complex security environment, relations with like-minded
partners across the globe are increasingly important to address cross-
cutting security issues and global challenges, as well as to defend the
rules-based international order. Our European Allies and Partners will
be directly affected by instability, resource competition, and
humanitarian and migration crises caused by climate change. These
threats add to the security challenges in Europe. Maintaining peace on
the European continent is USEUCOM's purpose and we must compliment the
whole-of-government approach to combating climate change.
We will continue to assess the operational environment to determine
the security implications of climate change, such as the opening of the
Arctic Region. USEUCOM will continue to counter aggression by
demonstrating robust capabilities and through extensive collaboration
with our Allies and Partners. Our distinct advantage against any threat
is our unmatched network of Allies and Partners across the European
region. Addressing climate change together provides an even greater
opportunity to bring the United States and our European Allies and
Partners into closer alignment.
34. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, what allies or regions within
the Alliance do you see the U.S. military directing more focus?
General Wolters. USEUCOM continues a balanced focus on security in
several geostrategic regions including the Arctic / High North, Baltic
Sea Region, and the Black Sea Region as well as space and cyber. As the
Arctic continues to open, this region has emerged as a stage for
political, economic, and military competition. Our initiatives in the
Baltic Sea Region defend and deter aggression and enhance
interoperability with our NATO Allies. In the Black Sea Region, we
continue to support Ukraine's sovereignty and work closely with our
Allies in the region to bolster regional stability.
turkey
35. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, as a NATO ally, Washington has
committed America to come to Turkey's defense if Turkey is attacked.
This has not only failed to moderate Turkey's behavior, it has allowed
Turkey's Government to aggressively pursue its own interests at the
expense of American interests. Are Turkey's national objections counter
to NATO and its allies? If so, what are EUCOM and NATO doing to deter
this situation?
General Wolters. The principle of collective defense, often called
Article 5, is at the very heart of NATO's founding treaty. Collective
defense remains a unique and enduring principle that binds NATO
members, committing them to protect one another, and setting a spirit
of solidarity within the Alliance. Turkey, like all sovereign nations
within NATO, pursues its own national interests in addition to those of
the Alliance. They have a pivotal role in regional security and remain
a strategic United States Ally and critical to NATO and US interests in
Europe, Eurasia, North Africa, and the Middle East. They possess the
Alliance's second largest military and contribute to NATO missions in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and the Mediterranean Sea.
36. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, what thoughts do you have on
United States and the European Union (EU) ``whole-of-government''
actions?
General Wolters. The challenges we face today require a whole-of-
government, whole-of-nation and whole-of-alliance approach. One major
benefit of democracies working together is how these governments can
generate peace, both within their borders and abroad. Ultimately, the
NATO Alliance underpins security for the Euro-Atlantic, the European
Union, and the United States.
nato anti-submarine warfare
37. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, in your role as NATO's Supreme
Allied Commander Europe, you have one of the strongest grasps on
military capabilities of our allies and the threats that we all face in
the European theater. It is my understanding that adversarial submarine
threat--in particular from Russia--continues to take significant ally
and U.S. resources. I also understand that the NATO coalition is
considering investments in new anti-submarine warfare capabilities,
which would be a welcome way to relieve some of the burden from U.S.
efforts. Can you talk about the seriousness of the adversarial
submarine threat in the European theater, and do you think it would be
helpful if NATO invested in additional anti-submarine warfare
capabilities?
General Wolters. The Alliance actively deters and competes with
Russia under the sea. Russia has recently demonstrated more significant
submarine capability than any time in the past 30 years. Many of our
NATO Allies recognized this threat and responded by investing in their
anti-submarine warfare capabilities. The United Kingdom and France have
already deployed significant capabilities while Norway and Denmark
continue to explore additional opportunities. Iceland routinely
supports basing of our maritime patrol aircraft. All of this
contributes to the Alliance's ever-increasing capability to deter and
respond to threats.
38. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, the U.S. Navy has a fleet of
P-8A Poseidons supporting the anti-submarine warfare mission in Europe.
Are there ways that the U.S. leadership could encourage or support NATO
investment in a similar capability, either through synergies in
logistics, basing, or training?
General Wolters. Many of our Allies support U.S. P-8 operations in
Europe, most significantly through host-nation support to basing of the
patrol aircraft. The United Kingdom and Norway have P-8 programs of
their own and Germany may potentially develop one as well. United
States leadership and advocacy for European Allied investments in
maritime patrol and anti-submarine capabilities is always beneficial
and contributes to campaign momentum within the Alliance.
joint strike fighter (f-35)
39. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, can you confirm that 5th
generation airpower is a requirement for your mission in EUCOM, and can
you explain how 5th generation aircraft, like F-35, meet that
requirement?
General Wolters. The F-35 is the cornerstone of our global fighter
fleet going forward. This is especially true in Europe as we work
alongside our five currently equipped F-35 Allies to deter and prepare
to respond to adversary aggression. The F-35's integrated, battlespace
information-sharing, and hardened sensors and weapons enable rapid
decision-making and extend the range of integrated off-board systems
across the Joint Force.
40. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, many of our key allies in
Europe are participants in the F-35 program. In your opinion, has the
F-35 program had a positive impact on both military and diplomatic
relations with these key allies?
General Wolters. The F-35 program success in Europe has definitely
made a positive impact. Allied F-35s routinely play a critical role in
generating peace in the Euro-Atlantic through support to bomber task
force missions by escorting B-52s and B-2s. These missions increase our
interoperability, hone our tactics, techniques, and procedures, bolster
deterrence, and validate our integrated approach.
In addition to sharing a common airframe, sharing best practices
and common understanding of employment enhances our transparency and
alignment to train and operate alongside our Allies and Partners. One
example of a long term success story is the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot
Training Program (ENJJTP), soon celebrating its 40th anniversary, which
trains over 50 European pilots a year. The specific capabilities of the
F-35, our partnership with F-35-equipped Allies and Partners, and our
combined investments allow us to effectively compete and defend in the
Euro-Atlantic.
41. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, Russia's advanced air defenses
and fighter capabilities are rapidly increasing in capability and
capacity. These factors are pushing 4th generation aircraft to greater
stand-off ranges, often beyond the targeting ranges of their weapons
and sensors. In addition, in Europe, we see a threat density that
creates a far greater capacity requirement for legacy platforms and
weapons. Can you explain the importance of stand-in capabilities, such
as 5th generation aircraft, and what advantages they provide if an
engagement with Russia were to occur?
General Wolters. The F-35 delivers weapons in highly contested
environments, opening the door for wider access to other air systems.
The platform's combined low observable capabilities (most advanced
fighter aircraft sensor suite) and communication abilities enables the
F-35 to fuse inputs from across the theater. This enables better
indications and warning, providing a more cohesive operating picture
for a whole of alliance action. The strengths the F-35 platform brings
to the fight enable multi-domain operations elsewhere, including on the
ground, in space, and at sea.
air-to-air refueling
42. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, the KC-46A Pegasus aircraft has
yet to achieve full rate production and lacks a remote visual system
that is fully functional during all light levels. Moreover, a KC-46
carries only 2,000 lbs more transferable fuel than a KC-135 and carries
140,000 lbs less than a KC-10. In an effort to reduce cost at the risk
of mission failure, the Air Force seeks to retire legacy aircraft with
fully functional and approved fuel transfer systems; specifically, KC-
10s. In your opinion, are cost savings more important than strategic
mission success? Put differently, should a legacy platform with proven,
capable systems be maintained and utilized over a future system that
has yet to meet primary mission requirements?
General Lyons. While it is true that fully-operational KC-46s are
not available until fiscal year 2024, the Air Force developed an
interim capability release (ICR) process that will make KC-46s
available for tasking as early as this year. This is a critical step to
advance KC-46 fielding and maintain credible capacity. Further, the
global strategic environment has significantly changed. As recently as
2017, USTRANSCOM supported 70 air refueling aircraft deployed to
USCENTCOM. By 2022, this support will drop to about 35 aircraft. That
reduction in demand coupled with the recently developed KC-46 Interim
Capability Release (ICR) process, allows for the measured divestiture
of KC-10s and KC-135s. This allows aircrews to transition to the KC-46,
which is a critical step to advance KC-46 fielding and grow capacity in
that airframe. The KC-135s and KC-10s remain critical as we build
capacity in the KC-46, and even with the fielding of the KC-46, there
will remain 300 KC-135s in the air refueling fleet. Our Mobility
Capability Requirements Study (MCRS)-20 study, which was delivered to
the Congress on 30 June 2021, clearly shows the air refueling mission
absolutely is critical to cover every one of the five NDS wartime
missions, and the air refueling fleet is at elevated risk to performing
those missions in simultaneous timeframes in contested environments.
USTRANSCOM agrees with the U.S. Air Force on a retirement profile for
KC-10s and KC-135s in fiscal year 2022. I assess this is the best
approach to retain sufficient capacity for combatant command support,
provide for full-spectrum readiness training, and hasten use of the KC-
46 for those missions it is capable of supporting without increasing
risk to certain receiver aircraft or high-priority missions.
43. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, how many KC-46A air-to-air
refueling missions are being sourced outside continental United States
(OCONUS) by TRANSCOM?
General Lyons. The following numbers reflect the number of OCONUS
sorties flown for each of the last few years. It includes Active Duty
AMC tails only (not Air National Guard (ANG), Air Force Reserve Command
(AFRC), Air Education & Training Command (AETC), United States Air
Forces in Europe (USAFE), Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), Air Force
Materiel Command (AFMC), or Air Force Special Operations Command
(AFSOC)) that either took off or landed outside of the United States:
Calendar Year 2018: 0 OCONUS KC-46 sorties
Calendar Year 2019: 25 OCONUS KC-46 sorties
Calendar Year 2020: 123 OCONUS KC-46 sorties
Calendar Year 2021: 83 OCONUS KC-46 sorties (thru 31 May)
44. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, how many KC-10 air-to-air
refueling missions are being sourced OCONUS by TRANSCOM?
General Lyons. The following numbers reflect the number of OCONUS
sorties flown for each of the last few years. It includes Active Duty
AMC tails only (not ANG, AFRC, AETC, USAFE, PACAF, AFMC, or AFSOC) that
either took off or landed outside of the United States:
Calendar Year 2018: 4,319 OCONUS KC-10 sorties
Calendar Year 2019: 4,546 OCONUS KC-10 sorties
Calendar Year 2020: 2,927 OCONUS KC-10 sorties
Calendar Year 2021: 983 OCONUS KC-10 sorties (thru 31 May)
45. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, do you support the Air Force's
expedited retirement initiative of KC-10s?
General Lyons. TRANSCOM currently has sufficient capacity to meet
day-to-day and crisis response demands. I support the KC-10 adjusted
retirement profile outlined by the U.S. Air Force (USAF) Legislative
Proposal (FY22), which slows the original retirement profile. With
exceptional support from the USAF, three additional positive
developments occurred over the last year, that allowed TRANSCOM to
retain sufficient capacity to meet mission requirements. First, Boeing
came to terms with the responsibility to fix the KC-46 Category 1
deficiencies, enabling the USAF to present a KC-46 Interim Capability
Release. Second, the USAF funded additional MPA to increase the
Reserve/Guard air refueling capacity/contributions. Finally, we are
seeing a reduction in air refueling demand in the CENTCOM AOR.
46. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, how important is it that
``warfighters train like they fight'' and prepare for future
deployments by tanking from platforms that they will encounter overseas
and in combat?
General Lyons. USTRANSCOM's top priority is warfighting readiness
and ensuring our component commands are capable of supporting their
wartime missions. As such, training for a high-end warfight is an
absolute necessity. As operational activity decreased in Southwest
Asia, a greater focus across the entire Mobility Air Force, including
air refueling forces, shifted to full-spectrum readiness. Since 2015,
the average daily number of global air refueling missions was 139, and
by the end of 2020, the average dropped to 100. This created
opportunity for aircrews to conduct necessary high-end training. Tanker
crew training is certainly necessary, but receiver pilot training
presents a priority in order to maintain their combat edge. Looking to
the future, air refueling workload appears balanced with expected
capacity, especially with the KC-46 interim capability release process.
With the projected balanced workload, the air refueling fleet will be
postured to support global taskings, but also execute the necessary
training to prepare for potential future contingencies.
47. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, the Air Force and TRANSCOM have
previously stated that more than 25,000 hours of aerial refueling
missions are not being supported annually. Given that the KC-46 is
still not fully operational, and the Air Force has already begun
retiring some of the KC-10 fleet, I assume that there is still a
significant shortfall in TRANSCOM's aerial refueling capacity. What is
the current shortfall?
General Lyons. In April 2020, The Secretary of the Air Force
provided the Congress with a report titled, ``Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA
Contractor-Operated Aerial Refueling Aircraft.'' That reported
extrapolated ``as many as 30,000 hours of aerial refueling missions are
not being supported annually.'' That assessment resonates with the
Joint Force's insatiable appetite for aerial refueling. However,
requests for air refueling capability vary in criticality and are often
unconstrained by resources. That said, the air refueling fleet remains
stressed. USTRANSCOM manages the tension between available resources
and requests for capability in order to prevent mission failure.
The transition to the KC-46 created an air refueling capacity
bathtub, meaning the air refueling enterprise is at a low point in
available capacity. However, acceptance of the KC-46 will ameliorate
this capacity low point. Additionally, as forces withdraw from
Southwest Asia, air refueling demands also decrease. As recently as
2017, USTRANSCOM supported 70 air refueling aircraft deployed to
CENTCOM. By 2022, this will drop to about 35 aircraft. Additionally,
the KC-46 crew ratio is higher across the Total Force when compared to
both the KC-135 and about the same as the KC-10. When fully delivered
and manned in 2029, roughly 160 more air refueling crews across the
Total Force will exist, providing 10% more taskable aircraft on a daily
basis than we had in 2019, before any aircraft were retired. While we
have a shortfall today, the trajectory is improving over time and will
accelerate as the KC-46 reaches full operational capability.
48. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, how does this impact training
for aircrews and tanker availability for combatant command (COCOM)?
General Lyons. USTRANSCOM's top priority is warfighting readiness
and ensuring our component commands are capable of supporting their
wartime missions. As such, training for a high-end warfight is an
absolute necessity. As operational activity decreased in Southwest
Asia, a greater focus across the entire Mobility Air Force, including
air refueling forces, shifted to full-spectrum readiness. Since 2015,
the average daily number of global air refueling missions was 139, and
by the end of 2020, the average dropped to 100. This created
opportunity for aircrews to conduct necessary high-end training. Tanker
crew training is certainly necessary, but receiver pilot training
presents a priority in order to maintain their combat edge. While the
number of tasked air refueling missions was about 100 a day in 2020,
USTRANSCOM committed an additional 68 aircraft to receiver training.
Looking to the future, air refueling workload is balanced with expected
capacity, especially with the relief gained through use of the KC-46
interim capability release that can support many non-deployed and lower
priority missions, freeing up fully capable KC-10 and KC-135 units to
provide necessary support and refocus on training.
49. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, last year you testified before
this Committee that the KC-10 and KC-135 legacy tanker retirements
proposed in fiscal year 2021 would ``create a capacity bathtub with
significant impacts to Combatant Command (COCOM) daily competition and
wartime missions, and negatively impact senior leader decision space
for mobilization when confronted with a crisis.'' Congress prevented
some, but not all, of these retirements in the Fiscal Year 2021
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Given that the KC-46 is
still not fully operational, and aerial refueling requirements have
presumably either increased or remained the same, would you support
efforts to increase tanker capacity in order to meet aircrew training
and daily COCOM operational requirements?
General Lyons. USTRANSCOM supports the USAF initiative to employ
Interim Capability Release (ICR) process for use of current KC-46
aircraft with some restrictions, adjustments to the KC-10 and KC-135
retirement profile, and increases to Reserve Component contributions to
mitigate the air refueling ``capacity bathtub'' identified last year.
As you recall, last year there was no agreed upon technical solution to
fix the KC-46 Remote Visual System (RVS) Category 1 Deficiency or a
path forward on usable KC-46 capacity. Both of these issues have been
resolved and given these USAF initiatives, I assess sufficient air
refueling capacity remains to meet global Joint Force demands during
the transition to a fully operational KC-46. No additional air
refueling capacity is needed beyond the President's Budget 2022
position to meet aircrew training and daily Combatant Command
requirements.
50. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, I have serious concerns
regarding the Air Force's desire to retire a significant number of
legacy tankers prior to the KC-46 becoming fully operational. I am
particularly concerned by the potential loss of the KC-10, which
provides significantly more fuel offload than both the KC-135 and the
KC-46. I understand that the KC-10 fleet has many more years left in
terms of potential service life, and am concerned that prematurely
retiring such a strategic asset would result in a loss of warfighter
capability that cannot be regained for many years to come. Please
describe the importance of the KC-10 to TRANSCOM's aerial refueling
capability, and the potential impact to missions for Air Force, Navy,
and Marine Corps pilots and aircrews if we cut additional KC-10s.
General Lyons. The KC-10 delivers necessary and relevant capability
for all NDS wartime missions. Unfortunately, these aircraft are
expensive to maintain. A value-assessment of air refueling systems must
incorporate current utility, future capability and cost. USTRANSCOM
concurs with the USAF decision to divest the KC-10 in order to
facilitate the fielding of a fully operational KC-46 weapon system,
which appears to be on track. In the near-term, the USAF is making KC-
46s available for USTRANSCOM missions via the KC-46 Interim Capability
Release process to ensure sufficient capacity to meet global AR
demands, in combination with existing KC-10 and KC-135 aircraft.
51. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, I understand that, although the
KC-46 has been cleared to conduct some aerial refueling missions, the
aircraft will not be considered to be fully operational until major
deficiencies such as the Remote Visual System are resolved, which
likely won't be until 2023 at the earliest. I was surprised to learn
that, despite this non- or semi-operational status, the KC-46s being
delivered are being coded into the Primary Mission Aircraft Inventory
(PMAI). Please explain why these aircraft are given the same inventory
status as fully operational KC-10s or KC-135s.
General Lyons. Aircraft are coded as PMAI to signify the airframe
has resources to support flying operations, such as weapon system
support, maintenance and flying crews, and flying hours programmed
against it. Using the established PMAI criteria, it is appropriate to
code the aircraft as PMAI especially as the U.S. Air Force looks to
generate the crew force necessary to operate the aircraft. With the
U.S. Air Force making limited KC-46 capacity available for USTRANSCOM
tasking, it is important that weapon system has the resourcing to
sustain and grow operational capacity over time. A trained crew force
allows the growth of the KC-46 capacity to execute additional taskings
to support the Joint Force in the future.
52. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, I understand that there have
been conversations regarding possible uses for KC-10 aircraft prior to
being fully retired and sent to the boneyard. I understand that one
option is to provide the aircraft to industry, either through sale or
as Government Furnished Equipment, for use in a commercial air
refueling program. I understand that the Navy and Marine Corps have
been successfully utilizing a commercial air refueling program for the
last 20+ years. What is the status of those discussions?
General Lyons. As I understand, discussions regarding commercial
air refueling are ongoing and potential options are currently
undergoing further study by the Air Force. I would defer to the Air
Force on the results of their study and whether or not it determines
commercial air refueling as a viable means to meet USTRANSCOM's air
refueling requirements.
53. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, shouldn't KC-10 retirements be
halted until a decision is made on commercial air refueling?
General Lyons. No, in coordination with the Air Force, we have
developed a sustainable way forward that maintains sufficient air
refueling capacity to meet requirements as we bridge to the KC-46. The
Air Force Interim Capability Release (ICR) process that makes KC-46
capacity available for limited USTRANSCOM tasking is a key step forward
that will help with the transition to that platform. USTRANSCOM
supports the KC-10 divestment profile submitted by the Department of
Defense which slows retirement pending KC-46 outcomes.
54. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, do you believe TRANSCOM and the
Air Force should be pursuing a commercial air refueling program to
address current and future aerial refueling shortfalls?
General Lyons. USTRANSCOM will continue to monitor and evaluate
operational requirements. However, we would differ to the U.S. Air
Force, as the force provider, to determine cost-effective, legal, and
operational credible alternatives to their current air refueling
construct.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
china
55. Senator Blackburn. General Wolters, what specific
vulnerabilities--economic, security, or otherwise--is China exploiting
amongst our European partners and allies that it was not exploiting
before the COVID-19 pandemic?
General Wolters. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) aggressive
economic and diplomatic activities in the USEUCOM AOR signal Beijing's
desire to build influence in Europe and challenge the established
rules-based international order with an alternative model. Since the
onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, China has attempted to exploit needs
across Europe for critical health supplies and vaccines, which were
less viable avenues for influence before the pandemic. Beijing has used
the pandemic to expand exports to the region and attempt to elevate its
status as a global power. Beijing has delivered COVID-19 vaccines to
Hungary, North Macedonia, and Serbia, all countries the Chinese Defense
Minister visited in March. Beijing is also publicly advocating for EU
approval of its vaccines, which would allow the vaccines to be used
across the region. China has also paired this economic engagement with
an aggressive disinformation campaign. Chinese officials used
disinformation and state-owned media to counter negative press and
criticism in Europe and are spreading propaganda about its vaccines in
the region.
Coupled with China's growing interest and investment in European
ports and critical infrastructure, these activities complicate our
steady state and contingency operations. We articulate this risk to our
European defense counterparts and highlight shared values, interests,
and equitable business practices that distinguish the U.S. as a partner
of choice. European nations are becoming increasingly aware of, and
concerned about, the risks associated with Chinese capital and
investment from the PRC.
56. Senator Blackburn. General Wolters, what actions could the
United States take to achieve better buy-in from European partners and
allies to cooperatively deter Beijing and to negotiate from a position
of strength?
General Wolters. In Europe, we work on multiple fronts through NATO
to develop a common framework to respond to the challenges posed by
China, which includes engaging with Allies and Partners on the Indo-
Pacific, and working with Allies and Partners to strengthen resilience
in the areas like critical technology and infrastructure. We share
information, discuss common risks, and create a shared understanding of
the challenges to global security and the rules-based international
order which increases U.S. alignment with our Allies and Partners.
In NATO, there is increasing recognition of the impact of China on
the changing international security environment. The NATO 2030 Report
notes that ``[NATO] must show political cohesion and remain a platform
for consultation on China's actions and Allies' reactions; defending
Allies' values and an international order based on rules.''
Active United States engagement with European countries has also
led to a more guarded posture in Europe on 5G and Huawei, balancing and
limiting Chinese influence in USEUCOM. Multiple European nations
enacted restrictions last year on the use of equipment by untrustworthy
Chinese manufacturers in the rollout of mobile networks that use 5G
technology. We continue to emphasize to European nations that the
United States is the security partner of choice.
57. Senator Blackburn. General Wolters, what high-return-on-
investment activities do you identify for the United States and NATO
allies to deter Chinese aggression?
General Wolters. In terms of military return-on-investment, our
first priority is to defend the Euro-Atlantic and deter adversaries.
Many NATO Allies have taken impactful actions to support a free and
open Indo-Pacific and to strengthen cooperation with Partners in the
Indo-Pacific as well. Specifically, France, Germany, and the
Netherlands sent ships to the Indo-Pacific this year to support a
rules-based international order and in some cases conduct multinational
training with the U.S. and Indo-Pacific partners. As part of the UK's
tilt to the Indo-Pacific, the UK Carrier Strike Group 21 (CSG21),
headed by the HMS Queen Elizabeth, will deploy to the Pacific with
stops in India, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore.
Economically, there is increased awareness among Allies of the
threats posed by Chinese investment and infrastructure in Europe, with
industries and governments expressing concerns over doing business with
China and limiting Chinese commercial transactions that threaten
national security respectively. The Baltic nations have all signed 5G
security agreements with the United States, and downgraded their
participation in the annual 17+1 forum with China this year.
58. Senator Blackburn. General Wolters, what are the ``lessons
learned'' from implementing the European Deterrence Initiative that
could inform implementation of the Pacific Deterrence Initiative?
General Wolters. EDI funding has allowed USEUCOM and the Services
to resource key programs needed to deter Russia and support our NATO
Allies, facilitate planning, and greatly enhance our preparedness. As
the EDI program matured, we developed a process to repurpose and shift
funding from contracts or otherwise challenged programs to those that
were ``ready-to-execute''. The repurposing process requires scrutiny
from our EDI planners, including a legal and comptroller review prior
to being sent to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for
approval. This process ensures efficient and effective use of funding.
The OSD Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation's (CAPE)
review and oversight of the EDI program heightened its credibility
within the department and Congress. Additionally, our direct
coordination with the Services is important, as the majority of EDI
procurement initiatives for prepositioned equipment sets is executed at
the Service vice the Component level.
59. Senator Blackburn. General Wolters, how would you characterize
the current China-Russia security partnership in your area of
responsibility? Please explain.
General Wolters. Ongoing interactions between Russia and China
suggest the emergence of a partnership of convenience to advance their
mutual interests, rather than a true alliance such as NATO. The
expansion of Russian and Chinese influence in the Euro-Atlantic region
is detrimental to both United States and European interests. Moscow
continues to sell Beijing high-end fighter aircraft and surface-to-air
missile systems and has announced plans to develop a joint missile
warning system despite the historical distrust between them. Russia
remains sensitive to Chinese activities in the Arctic, Central Asia,
and Eastern Europe. USEUCOM remains vigilant to any changes in this
relationship and utilizes a whole-of-alliance approach to deter and
defend the Euro-Atlantic.
nato security threats
60. Senator Blackburn. General Wolters, in practice, what
activities must NATO implement to satisfy NATO 2030's recommendation to
``enhance the fight against terrorism as part of the hybrid and cyber
conversation''? As necessary, please identify threat assessments,
exercises, lessons learned, etc.
General Wolters. NATO 2030 highlights NATO's role globally, which
is based on working even more closely with like-minded Partners to
defend our values in a world of increased global competition, to
include terrorist activity in cyber and hybrid tactics. We must help
strengthen NATO with building greater cohesion and consultation within
NATO and among Allies. Increased information and intelligence sharing
will enhance situational awareness and a common understanding to
counter terror groups' malign hybrid and cyber actions. A cyber red
team is currently integrating into exercise DEFENDER Europe 2021 to
help strengthen our cyber defensive posture.
transcom cybersecurity
61. Senator Blackburn. General Lyons, in what specific ways has the
implementation of the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC)
mitigated cybersecurity risks within TRANSCOM's commercial provider
base?
General Lyons. Per the interim DFARS case 2019 D-041 Assessing
Contractor Implementation of Cybersecurity Requirements, DOD
implemented a phased rollout of CMMC and the requirement for
contractors to have a current certification for the required CMMC level
will not start until on or after October 1, 2025.
To reduce cybersecurity risks with our commercial partners in the
interim, we have incorporated Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement (DFARS) Clause 252.204-7012, ``Safeguarding Covered Defense
Information and Cyber Incident Reporting,'' in all Readiness
Transportation Service Provider (TSP) contracts. The DFARS clause
requires our Readiness TSPs to implement National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-171,
``Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal
Information Systems and Organizations,'' to safeguard covered defense
information processed or stored on their internal information system or
network.
The DFARS clause also requires each of our Readiness TSPs to
complete an annual cybersecurity self-assessment of the NIST security
controls. 2020, marked the third year of contractually requiring our
Readiness TSPs to submit self-assessments. Self-reporting compliance
has improved over the last three years, and the process continues to
prove beneficial in giving us greater insight into our TSPs'
cybersecurity posture. USTRANSCOM is also in the process of awarding a
proof-of-principle contract to have a third-party assess our commercial
partner's compliance with CMMC Level 3 security criteria. This proof-
of-principle will provide an indication of compliance, identify gaps,
and provide an understanding of our commercial partner's cybersecurity
posture.
In conversations with our TSPs, we know our TSPs are aware of the
DOD's interim rule to amend the DFARS to implement a DOD Assessment
Methodology and CMMC framework to assess contractor implementation of
cybersecurity requirements. Our TSPs are very cognizant of the emerging
requirements and have demonstrated motivation to prepare for the
compliance assessment.
air mobility
62. Senator Blackburn. General Lyons, with respect to Air Mobility
Command--specifically, inter-theater lift missions--what percentage of
the time is TRANSCOM meeting required delivery dates (RDDs) from
requesting units?
General Lyons. Numbers broken out by calendar year:
ULN = Unit Line Number
2019 All-29,115 ULNs (74.1 percent On-time)
2019 Deploy Only-16,715 ULNs (80.6 percent On-time)
2019 Redeploy Only-12,400 ULNs (65.3 percent On-time)
2020 All-28,115 ULNs (78.3 percent On-time)
2020 Deploy Only-14,988 ULNs (81.3 percent On-time)
2020 Redeploy Only-13,127 ULNs (74.8 percent On-time)
2021 All-12,696 ULNs (78.2 percent On-time)
2021 Deploy Only-6,731 ULNs (82.6 percent On-time)
2021 Redeploy Only-5,965 ULNs (73.3 percent On-time)
63. Senator Blackburn. General Lyons, in instances of missed RDDs,
what are the headlining trends with respect to mission variables, such
as weather, maintenance, and crew rest?
General Lyons. For the one-year period beginning 1 April 2020 and
ending 31 March 2021, 1,018 of 2,722 (37.4%) of contingency airlift
missions delivered past the required delivery date (RDD). The top three
drivers for these were aircraft availability (248), efficient asset
utilization (224), and a delay based on the customer's request (177).
Aircraft maintenance accounted for only 109 of the late missions,
weather 36 missions, and crew rest 15 missions.
64. Senator Blackburn. General Lyons, does the inventory and
availability of grey-tail aircraft adequately support the present
demand for inter-theater transportation?
General Lyons. Yes, our grey-tail aircraft adequately support the
present demand for inter-theater transportation. Mobility Capability
Requirements Study (MCRS)-20 will be delivered at the end of June,
provides extensive details on this force element when viewed through
the lens of NDS demands.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
taiwan
65. Senator Hawley. General Lyons, Admirals Davidson and Aquilino
both warned that China might attempt a fait accompli against Taiwan
much sooner than previously anticipated, perhaps even before the end of
this decade. How do the logistics requirements for blunting a Chinese
fait accompli against Taiwan differ from the logistics requirements for
fighting and winning a protracted war against China in the Indo-
Pacific?
General Lyons. Long, contested lines of communications and the
tyranny of distance in the Indo-Pacific region creates dilemmas that
will require the integration of logistics planning across all
warfighting functions to support the joint warfight. The growth in
demand from increasingly dispersed operations, increasingly complex and
lethal kinetic platforms, and extended adversary anti-access/area
denial capabilities place immediate stressors on the Joint Deployment
and Distribution Enterprise to support forward forces immediately, as
we rapidly build capacity to deploy a decisive force.
With the distances involved and geography in the INDOPACOM AOR, the
core mobility assets remain critical in both instances. Our strategic
sea and air lift are crucial and allow us to present a sizeable Joint
Force around the globe. Additionally, air refueling is a key enabler
that allows this enterprise to deploy fighters and bombers rapidly as
well as employ those combat aircraft across great distances. Intra-
theater sea and air lift is also critical to sustain and support the
force across great distances to meet volume and time-sensitive
requirements for cargo, passengers, and fuel.
Both the Mobility Capability Requirements Study (MCRS)-20 and POL
Tanker Study will be submitted to Congress at the end of June and both
studies provide details on this challenge.
66. Senator Hawley. General Lyons, what are the most important
investments we need to make to ensure we have the logistics support
required to blunt a Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan and then
prevail in a protracted war, if necessary?
General Lyons. Two investments come to mind: assets and access.
With the distances involved and geography in the INDOPACOM AOR, core
mobility assets remain critical. Our strategic sea and air lift forces
present a sizeable and credible capability to move Joint Forces around
the globe. We need to sustain efforts to recapitalize our sealift fleet
to improve our readiness and capacity to project the Joint Force.
Additionally, air refueling is a key enabler that allows this
enterprise to deploy fighters and bombers rapidly as well as employ
those combat aircraft across great distances. The KC-46 is another key
investment to recapitalize the aging air refueling fleet. Even when the
179th KC-46 is delivered, 300 KC-135s at 65 plus years of age will
remain. Investments in air refueling will remain necessary. Enhancing
the readiness of our key mobility platforms is crucial to ensure we
maintain the necessary capacity to deploy and sustain the Joint Force
around the globe when needed. In terms of access, our regional posture
enhances the flexibility and warfighting effectiveness of USTRANSCOM
assets. Investments in partnerships that expand access and support
adaptive basing initiatives will remain critical for success. Overall,
we must continue to invest in the readiness of our sealift, strategic
airlift, and air refueling fleets.
china in europe
67. Senator Hawley. General Lyons and General Wolters, how might
Chinese investments in European infrastructure, ports, and
telecommunications impact America's ability to move forces quickly and
reliably across Europe?
General Lyons. It is important to note that strategic competition
with the PRC does not mean confrontation or conflict. The DOD seeks a
constructive, stable, and results-oriented defense relationship with
the PLA that helps put US-PRC relations on a path of transparency and
non-aggression. That said, the DOD remains mindful of the PRC's overt
challenge to the long standing values-based international order. The
DOD monitors Chinese infrastructure investments in Europe and does not
currently assess them to be a significant obstacle to the ability of
the US to move forces rapidly across Europe. USTRANSCOM intentionally
maintains many resilient paths and nodes that would enable us to work
around areas that may be denied or disrupted for any of a wide range of
reasons.
General Wolters. In coordination with our regional Allies and
Partners, United States Forces continue to execute unhindered movements
to, from, and across Europe in support of collective security.
We remain vigilant to the risk of non-European ownership or control
of ports, telecommunications, and critical infrastructure. While these
foreign investments do not currently impede U.S. and NATO operations
and activities, if left unchecked they could pose a threat in the
future. The U.S., in conjunction with our European Allies and Partners,
must continue to execute an all-domain, whole-of-government, whole of
nation and whole of alliance approach to this emerging issue.
russia and china
68. Senator Hawley. General Wolters, there are concerns that the
Russian and Chinese militaries may be growing closer in ways that
suggest a broader and more enduring alignment between those two
countries. How would you describe changes in Russian and Chinese
military cooperation over the last several years?
General Wolters. Our adversaries have increased their military
engagements in recent years, both bilaterally and with other partners
through multilateral partnerships--including members such as the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Notably, China has participated in
Russia's annual capstone military exercise since 2018, they have flown
two bomber patrols they characterized as ``combined'' in the Pacific
region, and the Nations periodically conduct naval maneuvers together.
These events have been highly scripted and probably did not include
combined command and control. Even with these developments, however,
their military integration remains limited and neither Moscow nor
Beijing currently appears interested in forming a military alliance.
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (isr) assets
69. Senator Hawley. General Wolters, you stated during the hearing
that the United States must ``communicate to our allies and partners
the criticality of ISR and what it contributes in indications and
warnings'' and that ``in NATO, we are having success with that.'' How
are our European allies contributing to meeting our shared ISR
requirements in the EUCOM AOR, and how have their contributions changed
over the last several years?
General Wolters. NATO Allies and Partners continue to increase and
improve their theater ISR support to Indications and Warning in the
USEUCOM area of responsibility (AOR). NATO invested in five Allied
Ground Surveillance (AGS) aircraft (RQ-4 Block 40 platforms) and
associated systems to remotely operate this aircraft and analyze the
associated indications and warning intelligence data collected. These
AGS aircraft are actively conducting ISR operations and integrating
direct ISR support and coordination, specifically during focused
collection events in the AOR. NATO Allies and Partners continue to
increase theater airborne collection processing, exploitation, and
dissemination capacity in support of a more federated approach to
addressing mission requirements while also decreasing reliance on U.S.
exploitation nodes.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022 AND
THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 20, 2021
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND AND UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Manchin,
Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds,
Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, and
Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Good morning. Today, the Committee will
receive testimony from Admiral Charles Richard, Commander, at
U.S. Strategic Command, or STRATCOM, and from General James
Dickinson, Commander, at U.S. Space Command, or SPACECOM.
I want to thank Admiral Richard and General Dickinson for
their service to our Nation. I would also like to extend my
thanks to the men and women serving under your commands and
their families.
Maintaining our nuclear deterrent or preserving our ability
operate in space are fundamental to today's great power
competition with Russia and China. There is a reason that we
have asked the commanders of STRATCOM and SPACECOM to testify
together today.
Until 2019, Space Command was part of Strategic Command. As
Space Command stands up as an independent command, I would like
to understand what gaps or seams remain exposed as this
transition moves forward and ensure these gaps are being
addressed; in particular, General Dickinson, I would like to
make sure that SPACECOM is fulfilling the space and ground
functions you inherited from STRATCOM, with respect to missile
warning and nuclear command, control, and communications.
Ensuring we can accurately warn both, Strategic and Northern
Commands and our senior leadership of a missile attack on the
homeland is of the utmost priority.
General Dickinson, I understand that you are also
responsible for integrating and tasking both, ground and space
sensors for better space situational awareness. In essence,
your command has become the DOD's sensor command. I hope you
will share your vision to integrate this myriad number of
sensors, which range are radars on the ground and at sea, to
sensors aboard satellites. Finally, General Dickinson, I would
like to know how your command is standing up and how you are
finding and retaining personnel with the specialized skill sets
associated with the SPACECOM operations.
Admiral Richard, your command is undergoing an intense
period of modernization that began with the ratification of the
new START Treaty. This will be the third modification cycle
since 1960, as part of each leg of our triad ages out. I look
forward to your views on modernizing the entire triad and
implications of altering that plan, especially with respect to
our near-peer competitors.
In addition, I would like to know your views on the efforts
by the National Nuclear Security Administration to recapitalize
their infrastructure to handle uranium and plutonium. Some of
these facilities date to the Manhattan Project and are single
points of failure in supporting your mission. It is essential
that we understand from you the impacts, if any, on your
operations. Finally, Admiral Richard, we have been informed
that STRATCOM will require a submarine warhead in twenty
thirties to replace one of the two you have now. The
replacement warhead is a joint program with the United Kingdom,
as their single warhead begins to age out and it is important
to our NATO Article V commitments. I hope you will explain this
system to the Committee.
Thank you, again, for appearing today and we all look
forward to your testimony. Before I turn it over to Ranking
Member Inhofe, I would like to note for my colleagues that
there will be a classified briefing immediately following this
session in SVC-217 to continue our discussion.
Senator Inhofe, please.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I also want to welcome our witnesses and thank them for
their service. Over the past few years, this Committee's top
priority has been ensuring to implement the National Defense
Strategy, which identifies competition with China and Russia as
the central challenge to United States prosperity and security.
I agree with that more so today than in 2018 when it was
established.
If we are serious about the security of our Nation, we have
got to maintain the capabilities required to deter China and
Russia and we need to be realistic about the level of resources
needed to make that happen, because we have not been in the
past. Two critical pieces of those objectives are modernizing
our aging nuclear deterrent and improving our space capability
in an evolving contested domain.
Admiral Richard, and commander of the U.S. Strategic
Command, your primary job is to ensure that our nuclear forces
continue to deter the most severe threats to the survivability
of our Nation and the security of our allies'. Admiral Davidson
told us some pretty worrying things about Chinese nuclear
expanses just last month. You have been a big supporter of
nuclear modernization and rightly so. We have delayed critical
investments in DOD and the NNSA for too long and now we are
almost out of time.
General Dickinson, as SPACECOM commander, you are
responsible for the planning and execution of the global space
operations and missions. In most DOD war games, the first acts
of aggression from our adversaries occur in the space domain
and directly impact outcomes. This makes improving our
capability to fight and to win in space critical to deterring
China and Russia.
Both of you are responsible for missions with zero margin
for failure, but I am considered that the administration's
defense budget cuts may undermine your ability to develop those
capabilities. It would be important for us to hear your best
military advice as to what resources you need to accomplish
this mission. I look forward to your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Admiral Richard, please.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CHARLES A. RICHARD, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
Admiral Richard. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe,
distinguished Committee Members, good morning.
I am pleased to testify with General Dickinson today and
appreciate the collaborative efforts our commands undertake in
the defense of the Nation. I thank the President, Secretary of
Defense Austin, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Milley for
their leadership and support to the mission of strategic
deterrence. I assure you the command is committed to work the
priorities set forth by the secretary to defend the Nation,
take care of our people, and succeed through teamwork.
We succeed each and every day through the teamwork of
150,000 men and women performing STRATCOM's missions and I will
remind the command it is our diversity, resilience, and
professionalism that sets us apart and makes us even stronger.
It is truly a privilege to represent them here today.
I also thank the Committee for its enduring support to our
national defense and active engagement and interest in the
command's missions.
Strategic deterrents enables every U.S. military operation
around the world. Every operational plan in the Department and
every other capability we possess rests on an assumption that
strategic deterrence and, in particular, nuclear deterrence is
holding. If that fails, nothing else in the Department of
Defense works as planned. STRATCOM sets the most foundational
of operating conditions to allow the rest of the Joint Force to
accomplish its mission.
As a Nation, I would assert, until recently, we have not
fully considered the implications of engaging in competition
through crisis or possible direct-armed conflict with a
nuclear-capable adversary in nearly 3 decades. For the first
time in our history, the Nation is facing two nuclear-capable,
strategic-peer adversaries at the same time, both of whom have
to be deterred differently.
Chinese and Russian advances are eroding our conventional
and strategic deterrence. China, in particular, I submit,
cannot be considered anymore, a lesser-included case in this
context. The remarkable expansion of nuclear and strategic
capability is evidence of their drive to be a strategic peer by
the end of the decade. I would describe this as the strategic
complement to the conventional capability growth that has been
reported by INDOPACOM.
To me, they are at some kind of inflection point and are
rapidly expanding their strategic capabilities. This has
happened within the last year. They are well ahead of the pace
to double their stockpile by the end of the decade, and I would
further submit that the size of a nation's weapons stockpile by
itself is a very crude measure of what they can do with that
capability.
To fully assess the China threat it is necessary to
consider the capability, range, accuracy of their delivery
systems, command and control, readiness, posture, doctrine in
training. In the very near term, China will possess a credible
nuclear triad, rapidly expanding road-mobile capability and
these are intercontinental ballistic missiles on trucks that
they drive around. It is a big country. They can be hard to
find.
They are moving to solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic
missiles, silo based, very responsive, compared to a liquid-
fueled one. They are deploying a strategic bomber and they
possess now, six second-generation, Jin-class ballistic missile
submarines and they are capable of continuous at-sea deterrent
patrol. Developing a dedicated nuclear command and control
capability that includes launch under warning and launch under
attack. By these measures, China is capable of executing any
plausible nuclear employment strategy regionally now and will
soon be able to do so at intercontinental ranges.
I offer for China, it is important to look at what they do,
not what they say, and where they are going, not where they
are. I have no choice but to view China as a significant
strategic threat and share Secretary Austin's assessment, China
is the pacing threat for the Nation and DOD at large.
Russia, however, remains the pacing nuclear strategic
threat, aggressively engaged in conventional and nuclear
capability development and modernization, and are now roughly
80 percent complete, while we are at zero. It is easier to
describe what they are not modernizing, nothing, than what they
are, which is pretty much everything, including several ``never
before seen'' capabilities and several thousand non-treaty
accountable weapons systems.
They have a nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic
missile that has the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle,
Poseidon nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed underwater vehicle,
and the Skyfall nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed cruise
missiles, examples of asymmetric strategic weapons
capabilities, designed to deter us and our allies, offset
perceived conventional inferiority in an effort to terminate
events on Russian terms.
So, given all that, we can no longer assume the risk of a
strategic deterrence failure and crisis or conflict is always
low. The days of power projection in a permissive operational
environment without regard to a possible nuclear response are
over. This is why Secretary Austin testified during his
confirmation, nuclear deterrence is our highest priority.
Given that threat, the Nation requires a fully modernized
strategic force and supporting infrastructure. Every
presidential administration over the past 60 years has
reaffirmed a safe, secure, effect nuclear force, most credible
combinations of capabilities to deter strategic attack, assure
allies. Each element has unique capabilities, but it is the
combined elements of the triad that allow us to execute our
assigned national strategy.
We are at a point where ``end of life'' limitations and
cumulative effects of underinvestment in our nuclear deterrent
and supporting infrastructure against the expanding threat
leave me no operational margin. The Nation simply cannot
attempt to indefinitely life-extend leftover Cold War weapon
systems and successfully carry out the assigned strategy. They
are at risk of losing credibility in the eyes of our
adversaries and if they continue to work at all, they will
likely not be able to pace the threat that they are intended to
deter.
I will just end with, in particular, it is the nuclear
weapons stockpile and supporting infrastructure I think is
hitting the wall first. Without the recapitalization of the
existing weapons, we risk obsolescence and we could reach a
point where no amount of money will adequately mitigate the
operational risks we will be facing.
Final point. The Nation has a longstanding, flexible,
tailored strategy with a ``well thought out'' family of
policies, capabilities, and postures. I welcome and call for a
strategic review, but I advise against any individual policy or
capability decision made, absent a complete understanding of
the overall effects on that strategy, as it could risk a
deterrence failure, which is the underpinning of everything we
do.
Ladies and gentlemen, I thank you again for the opportunity
to be here today and I look forward to your questions.
[The statement of Admiral Richard follows:]
Prepared Statement by Admiral Charles A. Richard
introduction
United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is a global
warfighting command, and as the Commander, I am privileged to lead the
150,000 Sailors, Soldiers, Airmen, Marines, Guardians, and Civilians
who dedicate themselves to the Department of Defense's highest priority
mission. I thank the President, Secretary of Defense Austin, and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Milley for their continued leadership in
this vital mission area. The command is focused on and committed to the
Secretary of Defense priorities to defend the Nation, take care of our
people, and succeed through teamwork. I also thank Congress for your
continued support to ensure USSTRATCOM is equipped with the required
resources necessary to achieve strategic deterrence in any situation on
behalf of the Nation.
USSTRATCOM enables Joint Force operations and is the combatant
command responsible for Strategic Deterrence, Nuclear Operations,
Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) Enterprise
Operations, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations, Global Strike,
Missile Defense, Analysis and Targeting, and Missile Threat Assessment.
Our mission is to deter strategic attack and employ forces as directed,
to guarantee the security of the Nation and assure our allies and
partners. The command has three priorities. First, above all else, we
will provide strategic deterrence for the Nation and assurance of the
same to our allies and partners. Second, if deterrence fails, we are
prepared to deliver a decisive response, decisive in every possible
way. Third, we will do this with a modern resilient, equipped, and
trained combat-ready force. To execute our assigned responsibilities,
the men and women of USSTRATCOM operate globally, as a joint force, in
all warfighting domains, and with our allies and partners to address
strategic challenges facing our Nation.
As Congress is well aware, the past year's pandemic challenged us
in ways we never expected. Within days, the command transitioned from
approximately 30 teleworking personnel to thousands, without missing a
beat. I am pleased to report USSTRATCOM remained, and continues to be
fully mission capable. This is a true testament to the resilience of
our workforce, our command and control (C2) systems, and the support
from our base and local community.
Peace is our profession . . . continues to be the USSTRATCOM motto.
It serves as an acknowledgement that the Nation leads first with
diplomacy as military force should be the last resort. The three dots
are intentional to remind potential adversaries that if tested, the
command enables the President to lead the Nation from a position of
strength. Fundamental to our survival as a nation is a safe, secure,
and effective nuclear triad; a reliable and modern nuclear command,
control, and communications (NC3) architecture; and a responsive
nuclear weapons infrastructure. These elements deter adversaries from
conducting nuclear and non-nuclear strategic attacks against our
Nation, and assure our allies and partners. As Secretary Austin
testified, strategic deterrence, and within that nuclear deterrence, is
the highest priority mission of the Department of Defense.
Strategic deterrence is the foundation of our national defense
policy and enables every U.S. military operation around the world. Any
individual strategic policy or capability decision made absent an
understanding of the effect on the overall strategy could potentially
increase the risk of deterrence failure. If strategic deterrence fails,
little else . . . no plan or capability, works as designed.
USSTRATCOM will fully support ongoing reviews of strategic and
nuclear policy with a goal of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in
our defense strategy while adjusting to the operational implications of
policy choices. Presidential and Departmental guidance defined by the
National Defense Strategy (NDS), National Military Strategy (NMS), and
by our nuclear policy depend on a strategic deterrent required to meet
the challenges of the changing global security environment. This is not
possible without stable, consistent, and on-time appropriations and
support to program modernization by Congress. Sustainment and
modernization of our nuclear forces, weapons complex, and requisite NC3
capabilities has transitioned from something we should do, to something
we must do. Based on current programmatic and acquisition timelines, if
we find out we were wrong, decisions to divest or delay could take ten
to fifteen years to recover and render the Nation unable to respond to
advancing threats. Any decision to delay or defer recapitalization
requires us to be absolutely sure, for the next 40 years, that we won't
need that capability to deter threats, many of which we can't predict.
our people
USSTRATCOM's military and civilian professionals are the driving
force behind Strategic Deterrence. The command is committed to building
a diverse and inclusive workforce with the needed skills to meet
current and future security environment demands, as we pursue
innovative ways to recruit and retain top talent. Workforce
enhancements through internships, development and mentorship programs,
academic partnerships, and our Women in Leadership program are just a
few examples of ways the command attracts software, nuclear
engineering, scientific, and strategy and policy skill sets into
service.
USSTRATCOM works closely with world-class universities and
education systems, through our Academic Alliance--a partnership of over
60 institutions. The command advocates to incorporate deterrence
history and theory, allied perspectives, the importance of treaties and
alliances, an understanding of capabilities, delivery systems, weapons,
and C2 capabilities into curriculums. The aim is to enhance
understanding of our mission and the importance of strategic deterrence
while further developing the Nation's next generation of national
security professionals. Together with Professional Military Education,
this creates a strategic advantage necessary for interoperability
across Joint and Allied forces.
Joint Force interoperability is further enhanced through
USSTRATCOM's joint exercises and wargames. Despite the challenges posed
by the pandemic, the command completed over 350 events specifically
designed to produce trained and ready forces capable of operating
across the spectrum of conflict. Whether done virtually or in person,
exercises and wargames are critical command enablers to sustaining
readiness and enhancing our ability to rapidly project national
military power globally. They are also a primary mechanism in
strengthening relationships with allies and partners.
dynamic strategic environment
Strategic Competition demands we be ready for any threat, in any
domain, at any time. Potential adversaries are building advanced
nuclear capabilities, fielding increasingly capable conventional
forces, and exploiting seams below the level of armed conflict, in an
attempt to gain strategic advantages in pursuit of their national
objectives. China and Russia are challenging our strength through a
wide array of activities that warrant a concerted and integrated whole-
of-government response. For the first time in our history, the Nation
is on a trajectory to face two nuclear-capable, strategic peer
adversaries at the same time, who must be deterred differently. We can
no longer assume the risk of strategic deterrence failure in conflict
will always remain low.
This is not to say strategic competition will end in armed
conflict; rather, in the event of conflict with a near-peer, nuclear-
armed adversary, the risk of a strategic deterrence failure increases.
We must maximize our ability to prevent strategic deterrence failure
and find ways to reduce the risk of miscalculation in a crisis, by
engaging all elements of national power to effectively communicate our
resolve to potential adversaries. The command stands ready to support
diplomatic efforts as a tool of first resort, utilizing innovative and
reliable ways to deter strategic threats and set favorable conditions
to shape the global environment.
China
Under a veil of secrecy, China continues to advance comprehensive
military modernization programs for the People's Liberation Army (PLA),
building a robust lethal force with capabilities spanning all domains.
This modernization includes nuclear weapons and forces, and supports
longstanding goals to establish regional hegemony, deny U.S. power
projection in the Indo-Pacific region, and supplant the United States
as the security partner of choice. While China's nuclear stockpile is
currently smaller (but undergoing an unprecedented expansion) than
those fielded by Russia and the United States, the size of a nation's
weapons stockpile is a crude measure of its overall strategic
capability. To fully assess the China threat, it is also necessary to
consider the capability of the associated delivery system, command and
control, readiness, posture, doctrine and training. By these measures,
China is already capable of executing any plausible nuclear employment
strategy within their region and will soon be able to do so at
intercontinental ranges as well. They are no longer a ``lesser included
case'' of the pacing nuclear threat, Russia.
These capabilities bring into question China's stated ``No First
Use'' policy declaration and implied minimum deterrent strategy. Behind
a complete lack of transparency, China is rapidly improving its
strategic nuclear capability and capacity, with rapid growth in road
mobile production, doubling the numbers of launchers in some ICBM
brigades, deployment of solid fuel intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) silos on a potentially large-scale, an added air leg, and are
well ahead of the pace necessary to double their nuclear stockpile by
the end of the decade. This is all in keeping with Chinese President Xi
Jinping's 14th Five-Year Plan's (2021-2025) call to ``strengthen
strategic forces'' and ``accelerate the creation of high-level
strategic deterrence.''
In the very near-term China will possess a credible nuclear triad,
supported by its growing stockpile and weapon systems capable of
multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV). The PLA is
developing and fielding precision strike nuclear delivery systems such
as the dual use DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and
survivable road-mobile ICBMs with the CSS-10 mod 2 (DF-31A) class
missile capable of striking locations within the continental United
States. The CSS-20 (DF-41) became operational last year, and China has
stood up at least two brigades. Enhancing the PLA Air Force's newly
reassigned nuclear mission, the redesigned H-6N is capable of carrying
a nuclear capable air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) and conducting
air-to-air refueling for greater range and flexibility. China's six,
second-generation JIN-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) with
JL-2 submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) provide a viable sea-
based deterrent capable of maintaining continuous at-sea presence.
While China keeps the majority of its forces in a peacetime status,
increasing evidence suggests China has moved a portion of its nuclear
force to a Launch on Warning (LOW) posture and are adopting a limited
``high alert duty'' strategy. To support this, China continues to
prioritize improved space-based strategic early warning, and command
and control as specific nuclear force modernization goals. Their
networked and integrated platform advancements will enable skip-echelon
decision-making processes and greater rapid reaction. This shifting
posture is particularly unsettling, considering the immature nature of
Chinese strategic forces and compressed timelines needed to assess and
frame a response, increasing the potential for error and
miscalculation. Collectively, China's strategic nuclear modernization
expansion raises troubling concerns and complements the conventional
capability growth reported by INDOPACOM and other Combatant Commands.
Their conventional and strategic initiatives across the air and
missile defense, anti-surface, anti-submarine, cyber, and space
increase its ability to project counter-intervention and control
further from their mainland throughout the Indo-Pacific region. To
deter and deny foreign regional force projection, China is developing a
range of new ballistic missile defense technologies in support of anti-
access/area denial (A2AD) and tested a mid-course interceptor in
February 2021. Within the last two years the PLA launched over 400
ballistic missiles (more than the rest of the world combined for non-
wartime uses) to test and evaluate weapon system performance, and
improve combat force effectiveness.
China recognizes the necessity of survivable command and control
capabilities to more robustly support joint operations, speed of
decision making, and cyber operations in modern warfare. The PLA placed
a high priority on modernizing joint C2, logistics, and command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems in part to resemble Western-style joint
C2 systems. The PLA Strategic Support Forces (SSF) are taking steps to
combine and restructure cyber forces into reconnaissance, attack, and
defense capabilities to better support military operations. Then, while
Beijing insists that the Chinese military does not engage in
cyberespionage, continued theft of intellectual property translates to
significant wealth losses with significant strategic implications.
My best military advice is to offer caution, observe their actions
which speak louder than words, take steps to credibly deter armed
conflict, and reject Chinese policies or actions that threaten the
international rules-based order or undermine regional and global
stability. We must remain postured to counter Chinese coercion and
subversion, assure our regional allies and partners, and protect our
national security interests as international law allows.
Russia
Russia continues to seek ways to enhance and reinforce its great
power status through actions designed to polarize and erode United
States leadership in international affairs. It continues to pursue a
sphere of influence over and beyond its periphery and interfere with
regional states' sovereignty, especially in matters of military
security and economics. Over the last decade, Russia also focused on
national preparedness through strategic civil defense readiness
exercises, demonstrating interoperability between civil and military
organizations through wartime scenarios.
Russia pursued a strategic partnership with China through bilateral
and multi-lateral military exercises such as KAVKAZ-2020, focused
primarily on improved military-to-military relations at the highest
levels. Prudence dictates military planners consider and account for
the complex threat environment, enabled by the strategic cooperation of
these two nuclear-armed States with global military reach and shared
multi-domain offensive capabilities.
Russia's determined military and nuclear modernization campaign
across its strategic triad and dual-use systems is close to completion.
Over the last decade, Russia has recapitalized roughly 80 percent of
its strategic nuclear forces, strengthening its overall combat
potential with an imposing array of modernization efforts and novel
weapons programs designed to ensure a retaliatory strike capability by
all three triad legs. Upgrades incorporate new technologies into
weapons systems, such as the nuclear-armed ICBM launched Avangard
hypersonic glide vehicle. Other weapons programs, such as the Poseidon
nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed underwater vehicle, and the Skyfall
nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed cruise missile, threaten to redefine
Russia's nuclear force with asymmetric strategic weapons capabilities
never before fielded. In October 2020, Russia successfully tested its
multi-role Tsirkon hypersonic anti-ship missile with land attack
capability. These new capabilities are specifically designed to thwart
ballistic missile defenses, challenge deterrence, and target our
capabilities, increasing risk to allies, partners, and the United
States Homeland.
Russia's strategic force includes a broad range of weapons, many of
which are dual use or multi-role, and can be rapidly modified to be
nuclear capable. As many as 2,000 nuclear weapons are not captured by
existing arms control agreements; theater and tactical nuclear weapons
are entirely outside of any treaty framework. While the extension of
New START provides helpful transparency and predictability for much of
Russia's deployed strategic arsenal, a considerable level of
uncertainty remains regarding the scope and disposition of Russia's
nuclear arsenal, including non-deployed nuclear weapons and its novel
systems that are not accounted for under the treaty. This is troubling
given a robust nuclear weapons production complex capable of producing
hundreds of warheads per year, enabling Russia to increase its overall
nuclear stockpile--driven primarily by projected increases in
unconstrained nuclear weapons--while our production capacity remains
essentially non-existent. I stand ready to offer my best military
advice in support of DOD and State Department efforts to make progress
on follow-on arms control agreements.
Clearly, nuclear weapons remain a critical element of Russia's
security strategy and its willingness to contemplate first-use, serves
as a core strategic consideration. Russia's 2020 nuclear deterrence
policy declared it may use nuclear weapons in response to a
conventional attack, if the state's existence is threatened. A
determined pursuit of non-strategic nuclear capabilities indicates a
troubling readiness to rely on these weapons in a conventional
overmatch situation. The aim is to deter the United States and our
allies by offsetting its conventional inferiority and attempt to
terminate conventional conflict on terms acceptable to Russia.
Therefore, our nuclear forces must include a sufficient range of
capabilities and attributes such that Russia never mistakenly perceives
any advantage from using nuclear weapons at any threshold of violence.
North Korea and Iran
North Korea: North Korea remains a security challenge to the United
States and our allies. It continues conducting activities that threaten
regional stability and defy international norms. North Korea has tested
ICBMs designed to strike the entire continental United States and has a
large inventory of theater ballistic missiles. USSTRATCOM supports DOD
and State Department efforts to coordinate with regional partners,
reduce military tensions, and engage diplomatic efforts towards
achieving the complete denuclearization of North Korea.
Iran: Iran's policy of arming and employing proxy forces with
advanced conventional weapons ensures it will remain a destabilizing
force in the Middle East. Iran possesses the largest ballistic missile
force in the region. Robust research and development continues to
extend the range and improve performance of various ballistic missile
types, several of which can range Israel and the Gulf countries. In
April 2020, Iran conducted a space launch incorporating and testing
technology interchangeable with ballistic missiles. It also continues
to exceed low enriched uranium stockpile limits and resumed enriching
uranium at higher than acceptable levels. Iran's actions threaten
global commerce, security, and stability.
strategic deterrence in the 21st century
Deterrence fundamentals against such threats have not changed. We
drive to deny any adversary their aim, or impose a cost greater than
what they seek, such that the benefit of restraint outweighs the
perceived benefit of their possible action. These deterrence
fundamentals apply from gray zone activities through nuclear use. The
spectrum of conflict today, however, is neither linear nor predictable.
We must account for the possibility of conflict leading to conditions
which could very rapidly drive an adversary to consider nuclear use as
their least bad option.
To avoid strategic deterrence failure we must reinstitute a
critical forgotten lesson that deterrence operates continuously from
peacetime, through the gray zone, worldwide, across all domains, and
into conflict. It requires an integrated approach from the entire
Department, across the whole-of-government, and in cooperation with
allies and partners. USSTRATCOM works with the other Combatant
Commands, Services, and Allies to integrate deterrence into all plans
and operations. In 2020, USSTRATCOM executed six combined Bomber Task
Force (BTF) deployments and included Allied participation in our Tier 1
Globally Integrated Exercises, giving us the best opportunity to
strengthen communications, operational relationships, and overcome
unforeseen issues.
safe, secure, reliable and effective nuclear force
USSTRATCOM's requirements are based on what is needed to meet
Presidential direction. As reaffirmed by every Presidential
Administration over the past sixty years, a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear force remains the most credible combination of capabilities to
deter strategic attack. Current programs of record have been repeatedly
shown to be the best way to meet those requirements.
The Nation requires a fully modernized nuclear force and supporting
infrastructure to ensure the solemn obligation to protect the security
of the American people is upheld. Each element of our nuclear force has
unique capabilities, but it is the combined attributes provided by each
leg of the triad that together allow the command to execute our
national security strategic guidance. I want to be clear, each piece of
the triad is essential . . . but they are also complementary,
underpinning U.S. military operations around the world.
Every Operation Plan (OPLAN) in the Department and every capability
assumes that strategic deterrence will hold. Therefore, we must
recapitalize the triad to ensure the Joint Force can operate when,
where, and as required to defend our national interests. We have
reached a point, however, where end-of-life limitations and
underinvestment in our strategic deterrent and supporting
infrastructure--coupled with adversaries who are modernizing and
fielding increasingly capable forces--leave no remaining margin for
capability replacement. We cannot continue to life-extend our leftover
Cold War era weapons and systems indefinitely, and successfully prevail
in strategic competition--their credibility will be questioned. I stand
ready to offer my best military advice to support Secretary Austin in
accomplishing strategic and policy objectives, to ensure strategic
reviews on sustainment and modernization are well informed of the
impacts to strategic deterrence and stability.
land-based triad component
The nation's ICBM force is and remains the most responsive leg of
the triad. ICBM geographic dispersion presents an intractable targeting
problem, complicating adversary strategies. For example, without United
States ICBMs China becomes a strategic nuclear peer. These missiles are
capable of holding a wide range of targets, to include emergent and
time sensitive targets, at risk. They are survivable to all but a
massive nuclear exchange. They are also the least expensive to maintain
and possess the highest day-to-day readiness.
Requirement for Minuteman III (MM III) Sustainment
The MM III continues to provide a highly reliable and secure
deterrent capability. While Minuteman has successfully served our
Nation since 1962, delaying needed modernization for the past 20 years
resulted in aging components, asset attrition, and declining
infrastructure requiring a comprehensive weapon system replacement.
Air Force analysis concluded another life extension would be more
costly than recapitalization and would not address future technical
challenges and threats. USSTRATCOM supports ongoing sustainment
programs necessary to keep the MM III viable and effective until its
replacement, the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), begins
fielding in 2028 and reaches full operational capability in 2036.
Requirement for Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
USSTRATCOM is confident GBSD will meet requirements, reduce
sustainment costs, and maximize day-to-day readiness. It is the best
approach to ensure the most responsive leg of the triad remains
reliable and credible in response to the evolving strategic
environment. During a recent visit to the GBSD Program Office, I was
impressed with the Air Force's pursuit of innovative development
approaches to deploy GBSD on time, as it remains a USSTRATCOM priority.
air-based triad component
Bombers are among the most flexible, visible, and versatile leg of
our Nation's delivery platforms. Bombers offer both nuclear and
conventional deterrence and employment options, enhancing force
availability and execution. As demonstrated by successful BTF missions,
this stabilizing capability provides a wide variety of deterrence
options to the President, signals unwavering resolve to our
adversaries, and assures the Nation's allies and partners.
Over the past year, USSTRATCOM utilized BTF missions as the iconic
example of Dynamic Force Employment. In doing so, we dramatically
increased the operational readiness of the crews, improved integration
with the Joint Force, Allies and partners, practiced procedures for
nuclear weapons and supporting infrastructure employment, and regularly
exercised our NC3 enterprise. Full funding for these strategic
aircraft, and associated weapons and communications systems is
imperative, as many approach or are beyond their planned service life.
Requirement for B-52 and B-2 Sustainment
B52: The B-52H is a 60-year-old platform, projected to remain in
service for another three decades. To address both maintenance and
operational challenges, it must undergo critical modernization upgrades
in response to evolving threats. Its 1960s-era TF-33 engines are
scheduled for upgrade through the Commercial Engine Replacement Program
(CERP), enabling longer unrefueled range while eliminating parts
obsolescence issues plaguing the current engines. The B-52 Radar
Modernization Program (RMP) will replace its increasingly inoperative,
legacy radar with a digital phased array system to allow continued
operations in GPS denied environments. Modernized NC3 systems are also
critical to B-52 operations to ensure communications continuity. Both
RMP and NC3 upgrades require continued support and funding to remain on
schedule.
B-2: The B-2 provides unmatched capability as the only heavy-
payload, penetrating stealth bomber in the world able to hold at risk
heavily defended, hard, and deeply buried targets. These unique
attributes require the execution of planned sustainment programs to
ensure survivability, reliability, and mission effectiveness until the
B-21 is fielded. Ongoing sustainment activities include planned
communication upgrades and low-observable maintenance. In particular,
the Air Force must accelerate integration with advanced enabling
capabilities to support the B-2 in denied environments.
Requirement for B-21
The B-21 Raider will be the future bomber force. When fielded, the
B-21 will provide warfighters with increased survivability and
flexibility to attack high-value strategic targets worldwide. The
Raider will deliver both nuclear and conventional weapons in support of
national objectives. It is critical this major recapitalization effort
remains on schedule and on budget to prevent operational shortfalls
within the bomber force structure.
Long Range Standoff (LRSO) and B61-12
The air-delivered nuclear weapon portfolio enables deterrence of
strategic attack via our bomber force. Currently composed of the Air
Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), the B83 gravity bomb, and the B61
family of weapons, this portfolio provides both standoff and direct
attack munitions to meet operational requirements. Continued monitoring
and stockpile surveillance is necessary to ensure these weapons remain
reliable until replaced.
LRSO: The LRSO missile will replace ALCM as the Nation's only air-
delivered nuclear cruise missile. I want to be clear, this capability
must be protected as it is vital to USSTRATCOM's ability meet mission
requirements. I view LRSO as the most cost-effective approach to ensure
a credible and effective triad. It offers the best opportunity to hedge
against operational risks in the event other triad modernization
efforts are delayed. It will penetrate and survive against advanced air
defense systems to which its predecessor, the ALCM, is losing ground.
When fielded it will outpace threat technologies, enhance deterrence
and assurance, and achieve a wide array of targeting objectives for the
foreseeable future. LRSO allows a single bomber to cover larger
geographic areas which would otherwise require additional B-21 bombers,
KC-46 tankers, B61 gravity bombs, and decades of supporting
infrastructure. Eliminating this critical capability would require
additional land and sea based ballistic missiles to hold required
targets at risk. A calculated yet rapid transition from ALCM to LRSO is
planned to optimize deterrence, service life, and the capabilities of
both weapons.
Tanker Requirements
All bomber missions require a robust and reliable tanker force. The
KC-46 is planned to replace a portion of the aging KC-135 fleet in the
coming years. Despite fielding delays USSTRATCOM strongly supports
ongoing Air Force efforts to correct and mitigate manufacturing and
technical deficiencies, and efforts to modernize and recapitalize the
entire tanker force in response to mission needs.
sea-based triad component
The nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) is the
Nation's most survivable and enduring nuclear strike platform. The SSBN
contributes to deterrence and assurance messaging through partial or
full generation of our fleet. With the intercontinental range Trident
II D5 missile, our SSBNs patrol the world's oceans virtually
undetected, providing an assured response capability in any scenario.
This assured second-strike capability address deterrence gaps in ways
unique from other legs of the triad. When paired with its
survivability, this crucial capability gives the President significant
latitude for response options.
Requirement for Columbia-class SSBN
The Ohio-class SSBN cannot be further extended and will begin
retiring from service in just six years. This submarine class has
already been extended to an unprecedented 42 years (no individual U.S.
Navy submarine has been in service longer than 37 years) and will
continue to face sustainment and readiness challenges until it is
replaced by the Columbia-class SSBNs. While the command could use more,
procurement analysis determined at least 12 Columbia-class SSBNs are
absolutely required. This minimum capability allows USSTRATCOM to meet
our at-sea requirement during the most limiting maintenance intensive
times throughout its service life. On-time delivery of the Columbia-
class SSBN remains the Navy's number one shipbuilding priority.
Requirement for Trident Sustainment and Modernization
Given the importance of an uninterrupted sea-based strategic
deterrent, investment in the future SSBN Strategic Weapon System (SWS)
is vital. The Trident II D5 weapon system has been life extended (D5LE)
to support the remaining years of the Ohio-class SSBN and enable
deployment on the first Columbia-class hulls. A second D5 life
extension (D5LE2) ensures continued sea-based strategic deterrence
through the 2080s. D5LE2 will utilize reliable high performing design
elements and components from the first life extension, to mitigate cost
and technical risks.
SLCM-N
To enhance flexibility and diversity of our nuclear forces,
USSTRATCOM supported the reintroduction of a modern nuclear sea-
launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) to address regional deterrence
challenges from Russian and Chinese nuclear capability advancements.
The SLCM-N complements the low-yield SLBM to provide assurance to our
allies through tailored response options in vast operating areas where
forward basing may not be possible. Limited and graduated United States
response options, such as SLCM-N and low-yield SLBM, provide a more
credible deterrent to limited attack against the United States and our
Allies and partners than relying primarily on the threat of large-scale
nuclear responses. Without this capability adversaries may perceive an
advantage at lower levels of conflict that may encourage limited
nuclear use. An analysis of alternatives (AOA) is underway for SLCM-N.
I anticipate that this AOA will inform discussions in the context of an
anticipated new posture review.
Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS)
To ensure the viability of our current and future SSBNs, it is
imperative to address security threats in the undersea domain.
Advancement in Russian submarine stealth and detection necessitates
continued Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS)
recapitalization efforts. This capability is vital to maintaining
advantages in the undersea domain, ensure survivability of our sea-
based strategic deterrent, and protection of the homeland.
nuclear command, control, and communications (nc3)
NC3 is the critical link required to provide assured communications
between the President and the forces. In 2018, the Secretary of Defense
consolidated and delegated lead NC3 responsibility to the commander,
USSTRATCOM. As the NC3 Enterprise Lead, I execute increased authority
for operations, requirements, systems engineering, and integration
oversight through the NC3 Enterprise Center (NEC). The NEC, operating
as a separate but aligned organization, oversees and manages NC3 to
ensure mission readiness through data-driven, risk-informed operations,
while propelling accelerated development and delivery of a threat-
informed ``next generation'' NC3 enterprise.
Substantial progress has been made in the two years following
designation, in what has been a team effort across the entire
Department. Specifically, the NEC improved the ability to ensure NC3
supports the Nation's Nuclear Command and Control (NC2) at any time, by
improving operational reporting and building a culture of readiness.
The team laid the groundwork for the future enterprise by directing
investments in NC3 programs and cyber defense, creating an engineering
framework for designing and testing new architectures, engaging
industry on best practices and technology, and advancing a broad
intelligence community focus.
The enterprise focus for the coming year remains on sustaining
readiness while pursuing the next generation of NC3 by capitalizing on
integrating concepts, revolutionary changes in technology, innovative
practices, and cyber resilient and protected capabilities.
Strategy to Modernize NC3
The NEC is developing the next generation NC3 system by executing a
multi-pronged strategy approach, organized by four vectors. The first
focuses on programs of record encompassing budget and acquisition
lifecycle processes to deliver, modernize, and sustain future core
capabilities. The second assesses demonstrations, experiments, and
tests aimed at enhancing discovery and development of innovative
technology approaches, to transform existing NC3 programs and
operations. The third reviews and revises policies, postures, Tactics,
Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) to streamline enterprise guidance and
efficiently achieve operational outcomes. The fourth expands the use of
critical technology enablers such as artificial intelligence, digital
engineering, and modeling and simulation.
It is important to understand NC3 modernization is not a product or
a ``thing'' with a long service life like a delivery platform or
warhead--rather it is a process of rapid continuous, incremental
network capability improvements. The first evolution is referred to as
``NC3 Next Generation Increment 1'' and represents currently funded
programs of record. This first increment improves our posture in space,
improves hardness to emerging cyber and cryptographic threats, shifts
our dependency on unsustainable legacy systems, and increases
resilience by enabling dynamically reconfigurable architecture.
Survivable NC3 Legacy Modernization
USSTRATCOM and the NEC are aligned with the Services to modernize
our survivable legacy NC3 systems integrated with our aging airborne C2
platforms such as the E-4B National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC)
and E-6B Airborne Command Post (LOOKING GLASS)/Take Charge and Move Out
(TACAMO) aircraft. Other efforts include our space-based protected
satellite communication (SATCOM) capabilities such as Advanced
Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) that provides survivable communications
for Presidential voice conferencing and nuclear force direction.
Upgrading Very Low Frequency (VLF) and Low Frequency (LF)
survivable communications is also necessary to provide extended range,
greater protection, and more rapid transmission times in response to
emerging adversarial threats. Current efforts seek to modernize and
transform traditional VLF/LF systems to state-of-the-art capabilities
which are interoperable across Service lines and infuse improved
protection features for tactical and strategic applications. The
challenge is rapidly incorporating VLF/LF architecture enhancements to
ensure robust and layered communication services from the President to
fielded forces during all phases of conflict.
NC3 Cybersecurity
I want to be clear, I am confident in today's NC3 enterprise
cybersecurity posture and resilience. However, as recent events
demonstrate, the adversary continues to seek new avenues of attack on
our Nation's critical infrastructure. USSTRATCOM is aligned with
USCYBERCOM, USSPACECOM, NSA, and the Service components to respond to
and operate through adverse cyber conditions. We are taking actions to
enhance cybersecurity resilience for systems under development by
adopting advanced technologies and best practices, and designing in
cyber protections from the start. This forward facing cyber protection
approach enables persistent defense throughout the lifecycle of these
systems.
Cybersecurity must be a prioritized investment to ensure ongoing
modernization initiatives remain operationally relevant. When cyber
protections are complemented with dedicated enterprise-level sensing
and monitoring capabilities, they provide a holistic cybersecurity
posture enabling timely, data-driven responses to emerging threats.
nuclear weapons and supporting infrastructure
I look forward to working with the Department of Energy (DOE) and
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to ensure our weapons
complex and supporting infrastructure remains viable into the future.
Although safe, secure, reliable, and effective today the nuclear
weapons stockpile and supporting infrastructure are rapidly aging into
obsolescence. Today the majority of our weapons exceed or will soon
reach their planned retirement dates. Projected modernization efforts
provide a path to maintain a reliable and effective force, but are not
expected to complete until well into the 2040s. Failure to execute
these programs will continue to transfer programmatic risk to the DOD
as operational risk to fielded forces, adding to the risk the Nation
already faces. If this trend is not reversed, I am concerned the
command will be unable to meet national-level policy objectives.
Infrastructure Improvements
Stockpile modernization depends on the Nuclear Security Enterprise
(NSE) infrastructure. Annual budget deliberations increasingly elevate
concerns about the ability of the NNSA to meet the Nation's nuclear
force requirements. After the closure of the Rocky Flats Plutonium pit
fabrication facility in the early 1990s, the Nation no longer had the
capability to produce key components, turning instead to limited
warhead refurbishments to sustain the stockpile. As a result, component
and materials manufacturing needed to produce new nuclear weapons
effectively stopped and much of the infrastructure atrophied. Then,
shifting budget priorities over the past 30 years delayed needed
weapons and infrastructure modernization programs, contributing to
erosion of critical nuclear force capabilities and capacities. Today's
NSE infrastructure, which the command relies on to sustain strategic
deterrence, continues to decline and requires investments for
sustainment and immediate modernization. Facility condition, loss of
key capabilities, and constrained capacities also limit the NNSA's
timely response to unforeseen technical, geopolitical, programmatic, or
operational developments. As such, the NNSA is now challenged to
simultaneously complete one limited refurbishment (B61-12 LEP) and one
maintenance activity (W88 Alteration). This is concerning as
recapitalizing the remaining force will require the capacity to
concurrently execute up to four modernization programs to meet
operational requirements.
Progress has been made with close NNSA collaboration and budget
transparency, but much of the damage to the infrastructure and
personnel has already been done. As a result, many of the modernization
and sustainment efforts (which typically require 10-15 years to
execute) have zero remaining schedule margin and some are already late-
to-need. If the Nation does not continue to address these concerns, no
amount of money will be able to adequately mitigate operational risks
associated with key stockpile and infrastructure capability losses.
Long lead times needed to field modern replacement infrastructure
require continued investments in future and enduring facilities and
capabilities.
Today's nuclear complex relies on single production points and
vendor sources, putting at risk our plutonium and uranium processing,
high explosives manufacturing, and production of radiation hardened
electronics. This provides few to no alternatives in the event of an
unplanned production facility or vendor shutdown. In such an event,
recovery of those production efforts could take many years.
Plutonium pit production is the biggest stockpile modernization
issue--pits have not been produced at scale since Rocky Flats ceased
production in 1989. As a point of comparison, our adversaries produce
new pits in modern facilities at a rate many times greater than 80 per
year; while most of our stockpile depends on pits that are, on average,
over 50 years old and well past their design life. Accurately
predicting aging plutonium performance with today's facilities and
modeling capabilities is limited at best. We cannot study our way out
of this problem. If we fail to recapitalize plutonium pit production
now, we risk catastrophic failures given an infrastructure incapable of
responding in a timely manner. Bottom line, re-establishing plutonium
pit production is a ``must do'' and is foundational to stockpile
modernization.
Additionally, while uranium component processing limitations are
being remedied by the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) project, we
must also address facilities needed for manufacturing uranium
components and radiation cases, producing lithium, and manufacturing
trusted non-nuclear components.
Updated Stockpile Strategy
I applaud NNSA's initiatives to execute programs of record and W76
modification efforts. Their investment in advanced diagnostics, and key
research and development activities reduce operational risks resulting
from technical issues. Most warheads in today's stockpile are now
scheduled to remain in service well beyond original design lives,
thanks to engineering feats, ingenuity, and NNSA stewardship.
USSTRATCOM appreciates Congressional actions to fund NNSA's Fiscal
Year 2021 Stockpile Management and Production Modernization programs
(fully funding B61-12 life extension, W88 alteration, W80-4 life
extension, W87-1 modernization, and W93 development). I specifically
want to emphasize the importance of the W93 warhead modernization
program. While the command could use it earlier, the W93 is a ``just-
in-time'' development program to mitigate risk to the triad's sea leg.
USSTRATCOM identified operational requirements including a modern
warhead with reduced mass properties that improves operational
flexibility and enables more efficient loading on Columbia with fewer
numbers of missile tubes. Currently fielded SLBM warheads will begin to
simultaneously age-out in the late 2030s, putting the DOD and NNSA in a
position of having to modernize the entire SLBM warhead stockpile at
the same time. To avoid this convergence, starting the W93 program now
is key to maintaining our sea leg capabilities. It is also vital to our
long-standing cooperative relationship with the United Kingdom.
nuclear weapons safety and security
MH-139A Helicopter
I appreciate Air Force efforts to deliver the MH-139A Grey Wolf.
With support from Congress, the Air Force is poised to replace the
existing UH-1N helicopter fleet with improved speed, range, endurance,
and payload capabilities to ensure safe convoy escort and Emergency
Security Response to the ICBM force.
Counter-unmanned Aircraft System
Rapid proliferation and growing technological sophistication of
small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) are an increasing threat to the
Nation's nuclear enterprise. Technology trends easily transform sUAS
into increasingly capable weapons in the hands of state and non-state
actors, and criminals with hostile intent. The Department continues to
field counter-sUAS capabilities and are refining tactics, techniques,
and procedures to address this developing threat.
global strike
Hypersonic weapons show promise to be the conventional complement
the nuclear force needs to continue deterring adversaries and offers an
opportunity to take further steps to reduce the number of nuclear
weapons in our national security strategy. Developing and fielding
hypersonic weapons has long been a USSTRATCOM requirement and a
Department priority.
Conventional hypersonic weapons will fill an important role by
providing options to hold high-value, time-sensitive and other targets
at risk without crossing the nuclear threshold. They will enable
responsive long-range, conventional strike options against distant and
defended threats when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or
not preferred.
Programs such as the Army Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), Navy
Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS), the Air Force Air-launched Rapid
Response Weapon (ARRW), and the complementary intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) field a family of hypersonic
weapon systems in the early-to-mid 2020s. I am pleased with the
progress to field a capability in the near-term and encourage continued
commitment to accelerate production and fielding.
USSTRATCOM is prepared to command and control conventional
hypersonic weapons immediately at initial operational capability. We
will leverage existing planning organizations to integrate and
synchronize hypersonic capabilities with other joint fires across all
domains. Maturing concepts of operation, mission planning, and other
system enablers are underway to ensure this transformational
warfighting capability supports the NDS.
missile defense
Missile defense endures as a critical component for comprehensive
strategic and tailored regional deterrence. USSTRATCOM executes its
responsibilities for coordinating global missile defense planning and
operations support, including advocacy for capabilities and
enhancements, and joint training and education in coordination with
other Combatant Commands, Services, and Agencies. While current
capabilities provide defense of the homeland against a rogue ballistic
missile threat, a concerted effort and commitment is required to expand
and improve existing capabilities for both homeland and regional
missile defense. Potential adversaries continue to improve threat
system capabilities and capacities, blurring missile defense operations
across traditional regional boundaries. Mitigating trans-regional
threats with increased range and lethality requires more than just
active missile defense. Navigating this environment requires a broad
approach and renewed emphasis on leveraging opportunities to negate
missile threats prior to launch, during all phases of flight, and after
impact.
Challenges remain in the Department's efforts to integrate limited
defense resources and architectures for allied and partner
interoperability. These critical assets protect against missile attacks
on deployed U.S. Forces, preserve freedom of action by countering
adversary anti-access/area denial tactics, and assists allies and
partners to better defend themselves through traditional and asymmetric
means. USSTRATCOM's NIMBLE TITAN wargame with participants from 24
countries and three international organizations, continues to advance
multinational collaboration and operational integration efforts aimed
at enhancing deterrence and defense concepts against potential attack.
new missile warning framework and requirements
Two essential elements of strategic deterrence are detection (early
warning of ballistic and advanced missile threats) and integrated
global planning. We are challenged to fully achieve these with current
or planned terrestrial-based radar architectures alone due to
geographic constraints and characteristics of future missile threats.
Advanced Russian platforms challenge our sensor networks and are
designed to operate without regard for the boundaries between United
States combatant command areas of responsibilities. Therefore, it is
essential to move beyond regional approaches to addressing adversaries
and challenges that are increasingly global in nature.
The command in coordination with USSPACECOM, USNORTHCOM, and the
Services continues to examine, evolve, and exploit advanced technical
and operational concepts, and break down institutional barriers
inhibiting information flow. The command is focused on increasing
decision space through a resilient joint all-domain architecture
capable of correlating data from any sensor and using the best C2
system to employ the best-positioned shooter. This highly distributed
and resilient architecture leveraging future space-based sensors, may
be able to provide end-to-end detection, tracking, and discrimination
of hypersonic glide vehicle, cruise and ballistic missile threats
globally.
Layered Missile Defense
I applaud Congress's continued support for active defense
capabilities to pace the threat and exploration of new capabilities
like the Hypersonic Glide Phase Interceptor, high energy laser, and
other directed energy technologies. As the Department pursues
development of complements to existing Ground-based interceptor (GBI)
capabilities, work continues using novel, cost effective options to
counter the ICBM threat. The intercept of an ICBM by an Aegis ship
utilizing the SM-3 Blk IIA missile in November 2020 highlights one
opportunity to recapitalize existing technology. Additional examples
include integrating existing sensors for tracking ballistic,
hypersonic, unmanned aerial systems, and cruise missile threats.
Missile Defense Review--Progress
In accordance with the 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) the
Department updated policies, responsibilities, and procedures for
missile defense research, development, test and evaluation,
procurement, operations, and sustainment. USSTRATCOM, working with the
community of interest re-wrote the Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP)
to incorporate MDR findings. Revisions align with the Department's
budget process to maximize warfighter input to capability development
and acquisitions, and seek timely delivery of missile defense
capabilities. USSTRATCOM will continue to advocate for missile defense
requirements through capability and utility assessments, and ensure
operational tests and evaluations meet warfighter demands.
Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations
USSTRATCOM's responsibility for Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum
Operations (JEMSO) includes advocacy for electromagnetic warfare
capabilities, contingency support, and joint planning and training for
electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) operations. The Spectrum is an infinite
battleground enabling all warfighting domains and functions.
Adversaries like China and Russia have observed our use of and
dependence on the EMS, and seek to challenge us by investing heavily in
counter radar, navigation, communications, and data link technologies
to erode our advantages. To counter this threat, the United States must
regain technological advantages for our EMS systems and execute
capabilities through dedicated organizational elements.
USSTRATCOM coordinated with the Secretary of Defense's
Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO) Cross Functional Team, in
developing the EMS Superiority Strategy Implementation Plan to
``Establish Effective EMS Governance.'' We are actively engaged to
strengthen support and build an EMSO proponent organization for the
Department. Efforts include establishing JEMSO Cells at Combatant
Commands, creating an electromagnetic battle management (EMBM) system,
and integrating fused data into the EMBM through a DOD enterprise
database. The Joint Electromagnetic Warfare Center (JEWC) at USSTRATCOM
established the first-ever Information Analysis and Fusion capability
necessary to provide specific data for combatant command operational
JEMSO cells to conduct battle management in spectrum operations.
Continued Congressional support and sustained investments are critical
to these initiatives.
conclusion
As a global warfighting command, USSTRATCOM integrates strategy and
capabilities to achieve strategic deterrence in today's dynamic threat
environment. The command will continue to pursue success using globally
integrated plans and operations within the Department, the whole-of-
government, and with our allies and partners. I look forward to working
with Secretary Austin to continue to maintain a safe, secure and
reliable nuclear force into the future, and to ensure we strengthen
strategic stability.
USSTRATCOM is home to the majority of the Department's Strategic
Deterrence workforce intellectual capital. These professionals are
dedicated to our national defense and we must continue to foster and
grow this resource. With continued Congressional support and stable
funding, USSTRATCOM will continue pacing the growing threats and
develop the future force needed to execute the Department's top
priority mission.
Efforts to sustain and modernize deterrent forces must continue.
Our strategic forces underpin every military operation around the
world, and we cannot afford to delay given the increasing threats
facing our Nation. Today, we are at a tipping point where the cost of
modernizing our strategic forces is negligible compared to the cost we
will likely incur if our triad and supporting infrastructure are
allowed to age-out completely. Strategic force modernization is an
every-other-generation responsibility . . . today is our generation's
turn to lead.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Admiral Richard.
General Dickinson, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES H. DICKINSON, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES SPACE COMMAND
General Dickinson. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, and
thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and Members of
the Senate Armed Services Committee for the chance to speak
with you today.
In describing the accomplishments of the Nation's newest
combatant command, I am pleased today to represent the nearly
18,000 military, civilian, and contractor personnel supporting
the United States Space Command's mission. In the United States
Space Command, our power is absolutely our people. Having just
finished the command's celebration of the Women's History
Month, we proudly recognize our many female warfighters, one of
whom came to us from the 16th Space Control Squadron, where she
performed remarkably in our space superiority mission set.
Another, a Navy aviator, now part of the Navy's new space
cadre, built U.S. Space Command's analytic foundation for the
development of our space architecture enterprise. A third
established the joint fires element for our Joint Task Force-
Space Defense, to integrate and synchronize space efforts for
combatant commanders, and there are countless others that I
could go on and on and on about this morning, but I will not,
because of time.
Our diverse force will continue balancing combat readiness
in preparing for the future. We will provide our people a
working environment and culture that allows them to thrive
while reaching their full potential. Our ideals reflect those
of our oath to the Constitution of the United States and we
remain committed to providing for the common defense, promoting
the general welfare, and securing the blessings of liberty for
ourselves and our posterity.
Today, I will offer you some insights into our plans for
the future, which are aligned with the President's new Interim
National Strategic Guidance. When I took command of U.S. Space
Command last August, we were still filling out the structures
of our new warfighting combatant command for space.
As I outlined in my written statement, we have made
tremendous progress since then, to include further development
of our two functional component commands and establishment of
all of our service component commands, significantly advancing
warfighting capability in space domain, all while continuing to
support the Joint Force with exquisite space capabilities.
While largely focused from the geosynchronous build to the
last tactical mile on Earth, we are expanding our focus to keep
pace with our Nation's push into the cislunar region and to the
Moon and Mars and beyond.
China's space enterprise continues to mature rapidly,
presenting a pacing challenge for us. They invest heavily in
space with more than 400 satellites on orbit today. China is
building military-space capabilities rapidly, including sensing
and communications systems and numerous anti-satellite weapons,
all the while, China continues to maintain their public stance
against the weaponization of space.
Similarly concerning, Russia's published military doctrine
calls for the employment of weapons to hold United States and
allied space assets at risk. For example, similar to the
Russian space-based weapons test in 2017, Russia recently
conducted another test of a space-based anti-satellite weapon.
Additionally, the December 2020 test of a direct-assent anti-
satellite weapon demonstrates that even as Russia aims restrict
the capabilities of the United States, they clearly have no
intention of halting their own ground-based or on-orbit
counter-space weapons systems. Russia currently has close to
200 satellites on orbit and could double that by 2030.
In addition to this activity, on the part of our
competitors, we are observing exponential growth in the
commercialization of space. We currently track a challenging
32,000 objects in space. Nearly 7,000 of those objects are
active or retired satellite payloads. Among the roughly 3,500
active satellites, the three largest single constellations
belong to the commercial companies: SpaceX's constellation for
broadband internet capabilities, Planet Labs' Earth-imaging
constellation, and Spire Global's space-to-cloud data analytics
constellation.
Overlaying this new global security landscape on the
already complex operating environment of space demands a new
level of awareness on our part. Given that the President's
Interim National Security Strategic Guidance calls for, and I
quote, ensuring the safety, stability, and security of outer-
space capabilities, USSPACECOM is focused on my number-one
priority of enhancing existing and developing new space-
awareness capabilities. Space domain awareness gives us the
insight into activity throughout the space domain, including
potential adversary activities, but perhaps more importantly,
insight into the intent of those potential adversaries, too.
Space domain awareness provides decision-quality information to
combatant commanders and the national command authorities to
ensure we can provide viable military options with the
appropriate decision space throughout the spectrum of
operations from deterrence to warfighting.
In order to most effectively accomplish our assigned
missions, U.S. Space Command has assessed our current
capabilities and developed the requirements necessary to expand
that capability where needed to meet our mission imperatives.
We have passed those requirements along to the services and the
Department of Defense, in general. Our intent is to build the
appropriate space operational architecture designed to achieve
full operational capability, backed by a team of warfighters,
who can outthink and outmaneuver our adversaries.
While engaging daily in a competitive environment, our
primary goal remains to deter a conflict that begins in or
extends into space. So, with the help of this Committee and all
of Congress, we will achieve that ultimate objective and ensure
that the United States and our allies will never have a day
without space.
Thank you very much this morning. I look forward to your
questions.
[The statement of General Dickinson follows:]
Prepared Statement by General James H. Dickinson
introduction
The establishment of United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) as
the Combatant Command solely focused on protecting and defending U.S.
space operations and the American way of life demonstrates the priority
America places on space. Our mission is to assure the delivery of
space-based services to the Nation, our allies and global security
partners, and warfighting superiority for conflict extending to space.
An incredibly talented Joint Force and interagency team operating
around the world accomplishes this unique and critical task. I am
honored and thankful to the President, Secretary of Defense, and the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff for entrusting me with leading this
team of warfighters. I am also thankful for the unwavering support of
Congress in providing the USSPACECOM team with the necessary resources
for this critical mission.
President Biden described his priorities in the March 2021 Interim
National Security Strategic Guidance, including defending the
underlying sources of American strength and promoting a favorable
distribution of power to deter adversaries. I have outlined my key
tasks to support the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance and
accomplish the USSPACECOM mission in my Commander's Strategic Vision.
As always, underpinning this vision is our focus on caring for our most
important asset--our people and their families. Our command attracts
the best and brightest across the Department of Defense, intelligence
community, and civil society, resulting in a dynamic and diverse team
of space professionals. In fact, during International Women's month we
featured many of the amazing women of USSPACECOM--both military and
civilian, including operations leaders, division chiefs, senior
enlisted leaders, and many other key roles. The diversity in our ranks
is one of our greatest strengths. Our people will advance our critical
mission through innovative approaches to accomplishing those key tasks,
which include: (1) understanding our competition; (2) building the
command to compete and win; (3) maintaining key relationships; (4)
maintaining digital superiority; and (5) integrating commercial and
interagency organizations. With our focus on these priorities, we will
achieve our end state goal of a team of warfighters who outthink and
outmaneuver our adversaries and enemies, and if necessary, win through
space combat power--so that there is never a day without space.
the u.s. must respond to a rapidly changing space security environment
The American way of life depends on reliable access to the space-
based capabilities that provide the foundation of our economic security
and enable our Joint Force to conduct sustained military operations in
all domains. Every lever of national power in the new Joint Doctrine
Note 1--18 ``MIDFIELD'' model--Military, Informational, Diplomatic,
Financial, Intelligence, Economic, Law, and Development--is reliant
upon space-based capabilities. Every element of our Joint Warfighting
Concept as executed through Joint, All-Domain Operations is dependent
on space-based capabilities. The ever-increasing challenge posed by
adversaries against those capabilities led to the necessary creation of
USSPACECOM and the United States Space Force. We must continue to grow
the capabilities of these new organizations charged with protecting and
defending our interests in space.
This extensive reliance on space creates potential vulnerabilities
that competitors and adversaries actively seek to exploit. These
adversaries and competitors are increasing their capabilities in space
by developing and demonstrating counter-space systems, and, similar to
what we have seen in the other domains, by engaging in deliberately
provocative behavior to advance their plans to gain control of space.
To safeguard our national interests at home and abroad and to support a
rules-based international order, the U.S., along with our allies and
partners, must promote and protect the peaceful and responsible use of
space.
understanding our competition
The number one priority for the Command is to understand our
competition, which relies on a deep understanding of the space
environment. To achieve this, we prioritize space domain awareness,
which encompasses tracking, identifying, and characterizing objects in
space in a way that enables real-time understanding of potentially
threatening activities. Through this perception of activities that
affect our domain, we can better protect and defend our assets when
there may be only minutes to act. This is our highest priority and we
need Congress's continued support to achieve comprehensive space domain
awareness.
china desires to use space to supplant the united states as a global
economic and military leader
Over the past two decades, an increasingly assertive China and a
resurgent Russia worked to develop advanced technologies to erode core
United States military advantages, such as power projection and rapid,
global, space-enabled precision fires. Their militaries actively
integrate advanced space and counterspace technologies into multi-
domain warfighting strategies to challenge U.S. regional superiority,
position themselves as space powers, and create improved balance of
power dynamics in their near abroad. Both countries reorganized their
militaries to develop deeper competency in technical military fields
such as electronic warfare, cyberspace and space operations. China and
Russia each weaponized space to deter and counter United States and
allied intervention and military effectiveness in future conflicts.
Today, space is a warfighting domain not because we desired it to be;
it is a warfighting domain because our competitors made it so.
the pacing threat--china
China poses a major security challenge and remains a long-term
strategic competitor to the United States. Beijing views the
international environment and China's relationship with Washington as
increasingly adversarial. China continues its decades-long military
modernization campaign in order to build what it terms a ``world-class
military.'' Chinese leaders characterize China's long-term military
modernization program as essential to achieving great-power status.
People's Liberation Army (PLA) modernization focuses on developing and
fielding advanced military capabilities in all warfighting domains--
emphasizing long-range precision strike, cyberspace, electronic
warfare, space, counterspace, and a modern, effective nuclear deterrent
while restructuring the PLA into a combat-capable global joint force.
Looking forward, an increasingly capable and lethal Chinese joint force
will almost certainly be able to hold United States and allied forces
at risk at greater distances from the Chinese mainland.
China developed robust and capable space services, including space-
based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Moreover,
they are making improvements to existing systems, including space
launch vehicles and satellite navigation constellations. Their current
BeiDou navigation system is now globally operational. These
capabilities may mask potential military activities and may be
considered dual-use in nature. Operated collectively, these
capabilities provide their military with the ability to globally
command and control their forces, enhance their situational awareness,
as well as enable them to monitor, track, and target adversary forces.
Today China's ISR satellites are capable of providing electro-optical
and synthetic aperture radar imagery, as well as electronic
intelligence and signals intelligence data. Beijing has a goal of
becoming a broad based, fully capable space power. China's rapidly
growing space program is second only to the United States in the number
of operational satellites.
Beijing actively seeks space superiority through space and space
attack systems. One notable object is the Shijian-17, a Chinese
satellite with a robotic arm. Space-based robotic arm technology could
be used in a future system for grappling other satellites. China also
has multiple ground-based laser systems of varying power levels that
could blind or damage satellite systems. China is developing a broad
complement of jamming and cyberspace capabilities, directed energy
weapons, on-orbit capabilities, and ground-based antisatellite missiles
that can achieve a range of effects. China will attempt to hold United
States space assets at risk while using its own space capabilities to
support its military objectives and overall national security goals.
russia seeks to degrade united states space capabilities in order to
prevail in future conflicts
The Russian military remains an existential threat to the United
States and a potent tool designed to maintain Russia's influence over
the states along its periphery. Russia sees space as integral to
winning modern wars and reorganized their Aerospace Force in 2015 to
incorporate space operations and counterspace capabilities. Russia
views its space program as a longstanding example of its leadership on
the international stage. Moscow concluded that gaining and maintaining
supremacy in space has a decisive impact on the outcome of future
conflicts and is developing space attack systems to hold United States
and allied space assets at risk.
Russia considers United States dependency on space to enable
military power projection as a vulnerability it can exploit in a
conflict. Concurrently, Russia pursues counterspace weapon systems that
can deny, damage, and defeat United States space-based systems in order
to reduce United States military effectiveness and control conflict
escalation if deterrence fails. Russia is also developing and testing
space-based and direct ascent anti-satellite weapon systems.
The Nudol is a Russian mobile ground-based missile designed to
destroy satellites in low Earth orbit. Additionally and already on
orbit are COSMOS 2504 and COSMOS 2536, prototype Russian antisatellite
weapons that could kinetically destroy satellites in low Earth orbit.
Russia also has several ground based low-power lasers designed to
temporarily blind United States missile warning and imagery satellites,
and high-power lasers developed to damage United States satellites.
In 2020, Russia conducted several counter-space weapon systems
tests while also exhibiting unsafe and irresponsible maneuvers on
orbit. It tested an improved, highly survivable ground-based anti-
satellite missile system, and a space-based weapon system that released
a projectile designed to target other satellites on orbit. Both weapon
systems could damage or destroy a satellite, creating a cloud of debris
that would endanger every space-faring nation's satellites, to include
the International Space Station. Such activities are inconsistent with
the safe and peaceful use of space. Meanwhile, Russia continues to
update and modernize terrestrial alternatives to space systems,
creating asymmetries that could enable them to hold United States
space-based capabilities at risk.
iran and north korea continue to develop and expand their counter-space
capabilities
Iran and North Korea continue to advance their own counter-space
threats through cyberattacks, jamming, and electronic warfare. Having
closely observed our ability to harness the advantages from space, Iran
and North Korea actively seek asymmetric approaches to negate our power
projection capabilities.
Iran recognizes the strategic value of space and counterspace
capabilities. Tehran claims to have developed sophisticated
capabilities, including space launch vehicles and communication and
remote sensing satellites. Iran's simple space launch vehicles are
currently only able to launch microsatellites into low Earth orbit.
Iran proclaimed the April 2020 launch of the NOUR-01 satellite to be a
``start of the formation of a global power.'' While Iran claims the
NOUR-01 has imaging capabilities, our persistent observation efforts
prove that it is actually non-operational, tumbling through space, and
unlikely to provide any useful intelligence. However, Iran is using
improvements in the missile launch technology used to put the NOUR-01
satellite on orbit to develop longer-range, more accurate strike
weapons. Iran's counterspace capabilities have centered around jamming
satellite communications and global positioning system (GPS), and Iran
is reportedly making advancements in these areas.
North Korea also maintains a threat to space operations through its
electronic warfare capabilities, with an emphasis on deception
operations and GPS jamming. The technology to evolve and mature their
cyberattack capabilities continues to improve, along with their ability
to develop more advanced long-range missile launch systems.
One way that these less developed adversaries seek to leapfrog or
negate our advantages is by leveraging commercially available
capabilities. These capabilities provide them with partially effective
military support that helps them to navigate, gather intelligence,
communicate, and otherwise achieve competencies that until very
recently were the exclusive purview of more advanced space powers. We
should not assume that our current qualitative advantage in these areas
necessarily ensures the space superiority we previously held.
other nations and commercial expansion are increasing opportunities and
challenges in space
With more than 50 space-faring nations and commercial entities,
space is one of the most interconnected and interdependent operational
domains. Interestingly, as of 2020, six of those nations and one
alliance of nations have demonstrated an inherent Mars exploration
capability through attempts to place a vehicle on its surface. Those
countries include the United States, Russia, China, the United Arab
Emirates, Japan, India, and the European Union. While this is a
positive indication of a rapidly accelerating interest in space that
can benefit a greater number of people, it also highlights the need to
prioritize space development. More significantly, it highlights the
need for good stewardship of the domain, which demands responsible
behavior; a mistake by one could have catastrophic consequences for
all.
Commercial growth in space provides both significant opportunities
and potential challenges to overcome. The commercial space sector
continues to grow, with global revenue exceeding $366 billion in 2019
and 60-satellite per launch missions or advancements in commercial
space tourism from companies like SpaceX and Virgin Galactic
highlighting the importance of the domain. Commercial opportunities
open new possibilities, but can also complicate access to the domain
with the proliferation of mega constellations. As commercial satellite
constellations expand and begin pushing out beyond geosynchronous
orbits, it becomes increasingly important to understand the domain and
to manage burgeoning traffic.
Underpinning this growing congestion is the ability to understand
the environment through shared space situational awareness--tracking
objects in space--and space domain awareness--tracking, identifying,
and characterizing space objects with the appropriate fidelity to
identify threats. USSPACECOM continues to develop partnerships with
allies, within the U.S. Government, and with commercial partners to
advance mission capability in both space situational awareness, and
space domain awareness. As part of this overarching effort, the
Department of Commerce is increasing its role in promoting spaceflight
safety standards and the coordination of space traffic, a critical
component to safe operations in the domain. I appreciate the Department
of Commerce's enthusiasm and dedication to effectively develop,
maintain, and use space situational awareness data from a variety of
governmental, commercial, and international sources in an Open
Architecture Data Repository. I urge Congress to afford the Department
of Commerce the resources they need to accomplish the civil and
commercial spaceflight safety mission. This transition allows
USSPACECOM to concentrate on developing the more precise space domain
awareness capabilities essential to characterizing threats in space
and, in turn, enabling a whole-of-government response. A continuing
partnership between USSPACECOM and the Department of Commerce is a key
enabler of U.S. and allied space superiority, not to mention a
necessary element of a vibrant space economy.
build the command to compete and win
united states space command has unique space domain responsibilities
Where the U.S. once enjoyed a profound technological lead in
developing and fielding space capabilities, strategic competitors now
compete for space dominance. As these potential adversaries have
evolved and proliferated an increasing array of counter-space
capabilities, USSPACECOM relies on its service and interagency partners
to outpace the threats. This requires continued emphasis and focus on
correctly identifying threats and responding rapidly in a threat-
relevant timeframe.
USSPACECOM has two essential tasks--first, to enable the Joint
Force by providing unmatched, dependable space capabilities; and
second, employing combat power in the space domain. Our mission is to
conduct operations in, from, and to space that deter conflict and, if
deterrence fails, deliver decisive space combat power for the Joint and
Combined Force. Our ability to accomplish this mission effectively is
contingent on amassing a variety of capabilities and effectively
integrating them across all domains and in concert with the Joint force
and our allies and partners.
usspacecom is increasing its operational reach and expanding its
capabilities through participation in joint, combined, and integrated
exercises
USSPACECOM continues to grow its operational capability with our
two functional components and five service components. These functional
and service components provide warfighting capabilities for joint
execution in support of USSPACECOM. Through Joint Task Force--Space
Defense, we protect and defend our on-orbit assets, and through
Combined Force Space Component Command, we provide support to
terrestrial forces and integrate with commercial partners, while
defending the domain against aggression. To task these organizations
efficiently and effectively, USSPACECOM published its first campaign
plan and operating order that aligns joint operations and achieves
unity of effort.
To test our plans and operating concepts, USSPACECOM regularly
participates in advanced, coalition-integrated global and regional
exercises and wargames, such as Global Lightning, Austere Challenge,
and Pacific Fury. These events prepare our Joint Force, allies, and
partners to protect and defend our space assets while providing combat
effects in, from, and to space. Through these multiple exercises and
senior level war games, USSPACECOM demonstrates its ability to work
with other Combatant Commands, the Joint Staff, and international
partners to execute globally integrated operations across the spectrum
of warfare.
Warfighting exercises require a multi-service, multi-domain, and
globally integrated approach to national security objectives,
consistent with the Chairman's Joint All-Domain operations directive.
We are also preparing to execute our own tier one multi-combatant
command exercise in fiscal year 2022. In future exercises, we will
continue to integrate fully across regions and domains to protect and
defend U.S. and allied space interests globally.
the united states must improve its defensive and offensive space
warfighting capabilities to deter adversaries and prevail in future
conflicts
The DOD's legacy space architecture and organizations were designed
for a relatively benign and uncontested environment. In past decades,
we invested in vulnerable, space-based platforms while our adversaries
invested in relatively low-cost methods to counter these capabilities.
Our focus was engineering redundancy rather than warfighting
reliability. This left us vulnerable to exploitation--particularly as
our dependence on space-based capabilities to advance U.S. interests
continued to grow. This changing strategic environment resembles the
environment experienced by the United States in the Vietnam War, where
conventional strength dependent on vulnerable supply lines and
centralized forces left troops pursuing a defense strategy, vulnerable
to asymmetric and decentralized attacks.
Today, even as potential adversaries continue their effort to
achieve parity in space capability, they also employ asymmetric
capabilities to deny us the advantages of space. The U.S. must continue
to build resilience in the vital space capabilities the Joint Force
requires to fight and win in space, as well as in the air, land, sea,
and cyber domains, while strengthening its space warfighting capability
to counter these rising peer, near-peer, and asymmetric threats. Such
warfighting capability provides a credible deterrent against
belligerent actions in the space domain as part of a broader U.S.
strategy for deterrence and defense.
USSPACECOM aims to advance our capability and capacity aggressively
by coordinating with the services, leveraging innovative space systems,
and by developing joint warfighters who have the expertise, judgment,
and will to fight and win against a determined adversary. To this end,
USSPACECOM provides warfighter requirements to the Department, which
leads the acquisition of the capabilities we need to achieve our
mission. This is critical to revitalize our aging space architecture,
remaking older, less flexible, and vulnerable systems into a resilient,
redundant, and survivable architecture to cope with evolving threats.
Consequently, we need the continued support of Congress for the
Services as they acquire components of this architecture and work to
streamline acquisition processes and shorten the time from concept to
fielding. USSPACECOM also strongly supports any economical, innovative
solution that increases the defensibility of our space systems and
provides the means to maintain space superiority.
Moreover, in today's threat environment, strategic deterrence
remains the bedrock of our national defense. Every Operational Plan
across the Department begins with the assumption that strategic
deterrence will hold. A safe, secure, and effective nuclear force,
enabled by space-based assets, remains the most credible combination of
capabilities to deter strategic attack and execute our national
strategy. We must stay the course with nuclear and conventional force
recapitalization commitments to ensure the Joint Force can operate
when, where, and as required to defend our national interests.
Moreover, we must defend our space assets and improve our space domain
awareness to present viable options to the Joint Force across the
spectrum of operations.
Just as we must revise our systems and processes, we must also
develop the most critical component of our enterprise--our warfighters.
USSPACECOM is laying the foundation for a warfighting organization and
is reinforcing a spirit of excellence, character, and resolve in our
space experts. In so doing, we will promote coordination across the
entire enterprise and empower our warfighters to act decisively and
win.
United States Space Command is a joint warfighting organization
with uniformed and civilian representatives from all services and the
Nation's Intelligence Community. A year and a half after
reestablishment, we have approximately 430 military and civilian
personnel assigned to the Headquarters, or just over one third of our
authorized end strength. We need the continued support of Congress to
help us achieve our full strength, especially with regard to funding
our civilian personnel, who comprise two-thirds of our workforce and
provide critical diversity, continuity, and skills. This is critical to
our ability to prevent capability gaps in support of the National
Defense Strategy and missions assigned to us in the Unified Command
Plan. To this end, we continue to align our work force to bolster
operational capabilities presented by our joint centers. We use these
forces to achieve our key tasks: understanding our competition,
building the command to compete and win, fostering and maintaining key
relationships, maintaining digital superiority, and integrating
commercial and interagency organizations. By achieving these key tasks,
we will accomplish our mission.
usspacecom focuses on personnel development as a key enabler of mission
success
USSPACECOM works with our joint force providers to acquire the best
and the brightest personnel, helping develop our future space leaders
through training, education, and other aspects of human capital
development. In partnership with the National Security Space Institute,
USSPACECOM develops a cadre of joint space warfighters that ensures an
enduring focus on space power as part of a more lethal and ready force.
This interactive classroom instruction, coupled with individually
tailored online training, allows newcomers an opportunity to build upon
their knowledge base in the context of our directed missions.
Additionally, we continue to integrate space into professional military
education, other combatant commanders' conferences, and throughout
joint education. Investment in human capital improves the development
of joint space warfighters and our lethality in the space domain.
to remain a space power requires consistent and continued resources
commensurate with the value that space provides and that the threat
demands
USSPACECOM's ability to execute its assigned mission depends on the
services' continued rapid development and timely delivery of critical
space warfighting capabilities. Specifically, we require the sensor
architecture necessary to detect and characterize activity in space; a
unified and distributed command and control family of systems that
enable synchronized space effects; flexible capabilities to deter
aggression and deliver decisive effects; and the ability to protect and
defend U.S. and allied interests.
maintaining key relationships
usspacecom is strengthening alliances and attracting new partners,
while working with private enterprises to improve space awareness
As President Biden lays out in the March 2021 Interim National
Security Strategic Guidance, strengthening our relationships with
allies and partners is crucial to maintaining a secure, safe, and
sustainable space environment. To this end, we are expanding our
network of partner nations, international organizations, and commercial
entities that bring situational awareness, mutual support, and
technological innovation to the space enterprise. We are enhancing our
interoperability with allies and partners and sharing information to
unite around a compelling narrative.
In 2020, USSPACECOM expanded space related data sharing agreements,
including new partners Luxembourg, Peru, and Portugal. To date,
USSPACECOM has agreements with 26 nations, two intergovernmental
organizations, three academic institutions, and over 90 commercial
satellite owners, operators, and service providers. By providing this
advanced information and services to space-faring partners, we display
American leadership in the space domain, promote transparency in the
responsible and peaceful use of space, and support the planned
transition of civil and commercial spaceflight safety services to the
Department of Commerce in 2024. In 2020, in coordination with
USSOUTHCOM, we implemented our first ``space-centric'' security
cooperation initiative focusing on institutional capacity building with
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru.
The safety and sustainability of an increasingly crowded space
domain grows more complex as commercial entities plan to launch
thousands of satellites in the next few years. The explosive growth of
nano, micro, and small satellites will further stress our existing
space surveillance networks. Working closely with companies as they
plan, launch, and operationalize these new mega-constellations is key
to our continued ability to provide comprehensive space situational
awareness. As a priority, USSPACECOM warfighters in the Combined Space
Operations Center (Vandenberg AFB), the National Space Defense Center
(Schriever AFB), the Joint Operations Center (Peterson AFB), and at a
variety of other key nodes are working tirelessly with interagency
partners to build and leverage complete and timely space domain
awareness. Along with this battle space awareness, we are also
prioritizing the associated and necessary space command and control
capabilities.
Space domain awareness remains the bedrock of many partnerships and
the top priority for USSPACECOM. The command seeks to develop a more
complete, big picture understanding of activities in the domain. This
goes beyond merely tracking space objects for situational awareness to
a space domain awareness that identifies, tracks, and characterizes
objects that can threaten U.S. and allied space capabilities. This is a
necessary element of acknowledging space as a warfighting domain, which
includes its enabling computer networks, terrestrial sites, and the
electromagnetic links between space and ground systems.
achieving the desired effects in the space domain requires close
coordination with other combatant commands
The command continues to evolve Combatant Command integration and
establish normalized relationships to coordinate, integrate, and
synchronize operations extending beyond geographic areas of
responsibility. To facilitate cooperation, interoperability, and unity
of effort, USSPACECOM created Space-Integrated Planning Elements
comprised of space and intelligence planners embedded within the staffs
of our sister Combatant Commands. These experts integrate space
capabilities and effects into their respective Combatant Command plans
while mutually informing USSPACECOM's operational plan development.
Furthermore, each Combatant Command's space warriors integrate space
effects across all warfighting functions, enhancing the Joint Force's
ability to achieve military objectives rapidly and decisively.
maintaining digital superiority
Underpinning all of these must be a robust cybersecurity
environment that secures our intellectual and technological advantages
from cradle to grave. It is critical to keep building this momentum by
funding these fundamental capabilities: battle space awareness, command
and control, deterrent space capabilities, cybersecurity, and protect
and defend capabilities. Additionally, we must capitalize on machine
learning and artificial intelligence developments to secure our
systems, advance our capabilities, and increase the speed of our
decision-making process. Accordingly, within our efforts to maintain
digital superiority, USSPACECOM is determined to innovate for
competitive advantage, evolve cyber operations for an agile and
resilient posture, and invest in game-changing technologies. The
research and development, acquisition, and operationalization process
relies on innovation at every level, and we must streamline this
process to operate at the growing pace of decision-making. Future years
will require additional resources to accomplish all of this, and to
ensure the U.S. can adequately address the evolving and expanding cyber
threats posed by our strategic competitors and adversaries.
integrating commercial and interagency organizations
usspacecom provides mission assurance for interagency and commercial
space operations
The rapidly accelerating interest in space and associated growth in
the technically oriented industrial base is a key part of continued
U.S. economic prosperity. U.S. commercial space growth aids our
mitigation efforts against threats. One example includes the effort
with commercial partners to design and field a United States-built
engine to power our largest space launch vehicles, thus decreasing our
need for reliance on the Russian RD--180 to propel our Atlas V launch
vehicle. In our interagency space mission assurance role, USSPACECOM
supported NASA and SpaceX for contingency rescue operations for both
the Demonstration Mission Two launch in August and the SpaceX Crew-1
launch in November--the first crewed space launches from U.S. soil in
nearly a decade. USSPACECOM is committed to assuring the safe
exploration of space and is supporting the planned lunar missions.
USSPACECOM is preparing to provide crew and spacecraft recovery for the
upcoming Artemis missions and associated training events to begin late
2021.
conclusion
USSPACECOM plays a crucial role in guaranteeing the American way of
life through the delivery and defense of U.S. and allied space
capabilities and services. We make daily gains in our ability to
protect and defend our assets from our adversaries, and we stand ready
to provide advanced space-based capabilities to our warfighters. Under
the direction of the President and Secretary of Defense, and with the
support of Congress, USSPACECOM is prepared to safeguard our access and
operations outside our atmosphere so that there is never a day without
space.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Dickinson.
Before we begin, let me remind my colleagues that since
this is a hybrid hearing, we will not use the early Byrd rule;
instead, we will ask questions in order of seniority.
They are 5-minute rounds. Please stick as closely as you
can to the 5 minutes. You will see the timer before you, and I
would ask all colleagues to mute their microphones when they
are not speaking. Thank you.
General Dickinson, let me begin with what I think is a
fundamental question. As I suggested in my opening remarks, you
could also be called sensor command, as well as Space Command,
because your responsibilities extend not only to space-based
sensors, but also to many ground-based sensors, and to
integrate them into a system, a coherent system.
So, bottom-line question, what are you doing to ensure that
missile-warning infrastructure of radars and satellites are
capable of determining whether there is a ballistic or a
hypersonic missile attack on the United States?
Admiral Richard. Senator, thank you for that question.
So, what we are doing at U.S. Space Command over the past
20 months or so since we stood up was looking at all the
sensor, the entire sensor architecture worldwide in an attempt
or in terms of understanding what sensors we have doing what
specific missions. What we have done over the past year or so
has been, we have taken the opportunity to take terrestrial-
based sensors that traditionally do missile-defense type of
activities from the different services, the Army and the Navy,
and we have looked at them from the perspective of how can they
contribute to our ability to understand what is going on in the
space domain?
While this is just the beginning of it in terms of making
those sensors interoperable in our architecture, we are driving
towards the future of where we will actually have those
integrated. So, in other words, Senator, we are taking current
capabilities that used to traditionally do missile defense and
seeing if they have capabilities to help us in the space domain
in terms of doing our space domain-awareness type missions. As
we look to further refine our requirements, adding requirements
to those capabilities through the Department to enhance their
ability to do space domain awareness.
So, we have had good success over the last 19 months in
doing that and we have demonstrated a couple of times, with
regards to some of the actions that our competitors have been
doing on orbit with a relative degree of success. So, we have
taken the first step. The steps after that will be further
integration of those capabilities and, again, working with each
of the combatant commands in terms of prioritization of those
sensors to be able to do both, space domain awareness, as well
as missile-defense missile warning.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, General.
Admiral Richard, why do we need to build a ground-based
strategic deterrent, rather than simply extend the life of the
Minuteman-III ICBM?
Admiral Richard. So, Senator, the answer to that
fundamentally starts with the idea that nothing lasts forever.
You cannot indefinitely life-extend anything, and I cannot
deter with the leftovers of the Cold War forever into the
future. That is the fundamental reason here.
I am different from the other combatant commands in that I
don't come up with my own objectives; they are directed by the
President, and as interpreted by the Secretary of Defense and
the Chairman. So, I have a stack of things I have been ordered
to do. I need a certain amount of capability to go do that and
I need weapons systems that will actually work and actually
make it to the target.
So, there are any number of reasons. The ultimate authority
on whether or not Minuteman-III can be extended is the
Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air
Force, as just by the Secretary of Defense. So, I am not the
ultimate authority on that.
I think we have repeatedly reported to Congress why it is
not cost-effective to do that, and from my viewpoint, I am not
sure how they are going to be able to do it at all. It is in
the details. What they are doing to keep that weapons system
functioning, remember, that is a 1970s-era weapons system that
I am going to have to employ against 2030-level threats. We are
down to two of a particular type of switch that is required to
go in the launch-control centers. Nobody knows how to make it
anymore; it is obsolete. It is not worth a company to put their
effort into that. They have repeatedly been pulling rabbits out
of the hat to work through those types of issues.
A simple one, Senator, is if you try to life-extend a
weapons system that was built before the invention of the
internet and then turn around and ask me why it is not cyber
secure, I don't know how to retrofit a full cybersecurity
capabilities forever into the future on a system that wasn't
even designed when we had an internet. So, fundamentally,
nothing lasts forever and we eventually have to get new stuff,
sir. All right.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Admiral.
Just one final question in my remaining time. Would a more
robust arms control effort by the United States and, obviously,
other countries, particularly the United States, complement
your mission to deter an atomic attack or a nuclear outbreak?
Admiral Richard. Absolutely, Senator. I have said I will
support any arms control agreement, less formally, I will take
all I can get, right. If we actually have arms control and we
are confident in it and it is verifiable it reduces the threat,
it simply makes my job easier.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe, please.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In my office, we talked about this, Admiral Richard and I.
I think you covered it so well in your opening statement. I
keep thinking, I am not sure what you might have left out, but
you have done a great job.
We know what Russia is doing. We know what they have been
doing. We know what China has been doing. North Korea, now, is
presenting a growing risk to the United States and our allies,
and yet, our nuclear forces are decades past their designed
lives and will need to be retired soon.
So, I just think it is important that when we are seeing
our primary adversaries, as outlined in our dais, that we are
not doing what we should be doing. We are actually behind our
primary adversaries.
So, I would like to have you, you know, restate. Russia, we
know what they are doing. They have already modernized over 80
percent of its force, and China's nuclear programs are
accelerating.
So, I would like to know how important is it that we
complete the U.S. Nuclear Modernization Program as quickly as
possible. You have outlined that we are not, and where we are
relative to our adversaries, but tell me how important it is
that we do it now.
Admiral Richard. Senator, I will start with--
Senator Inhofe. Mic, we need your mic.
Admiral Richard. I will start with, I want to expand on one
point. I said in my opening statement that China could no
longer be a lesser-included case. What that means is they are
at the point that what it is going to take to deter them is
going to start to be additive to what we have to do with
Russia.
I don't have the luxury of deterring one country at a time.
I am expected to deter all countries all of the time, and then
on top of that, I don't have any remaining operational margin,
right. We have exhausted the operational margin to allow us to
delay this recapitalization as far as we went. I think it is
important to remember that a lot of the quantities that we are
talking about in these requirements were set many years ago
when the threat level was actually much more benign than what
we have seen now, and we have simply no operate, you are
counting now on more and more things having to go right, and we
are counting on more and more that we precisely understand the
threat we are at, and that is a standard we have never allowed
in our history to happen inside the strategic deterrent force.
Then the final point, is we have never had to deter two
opponents at the same time that are different. Most of our
theory doesn't even account for that. We are working very hard
on that, but that is why we have to have these capabilities in
order to execute the direction the President gave me.
Senator Inhofe. That is good.
I know there are a lot of people that are leaning on our
President, a lot of anti-nuke people that are wanting to
minimize the concern that we, that we are expressing today. One
of the things is the no-first-use policy. Now, that is one that
I can't remember one Secretary of Defense who shares, who
doesn't share your view on the no-first policy. I mean, it is
there. It is real, and so, I think even Secretary Gates was
quite outspoken in that area. Can you think of anyone who
doesn't have that policy? One quick word, then, on the no-
first-use, since that is going to come up, that is going to be
a very prominently portrayed and discussed.
What is your feeling on that?
Admiral Richard. Well, Senator, what I would offer on this,
is, and I have testified to this effect before, look, the
Nation can have any policy it wants, right. The Nation can have
any----
Senator Inhofe. Yeah, you did testify. You said, my best
military advice would be to not adopt a no-first-use policy.
You are strong on that.
Admiral Richard. Right, and I still stand by that statement
and here is why. One, we have already run an excursion of what
that would do to strategic deterrence. It will diminish it. You
will remove a level of ambiguity now that has a deterring
effect, short of employment of nuclear weapons. We won't have
that anymore. That will be mitigated by the fact that nobody is
going to believe it anyway, right, it won't be credible.
We already have assurances that cover all, but about 10
nations or so, half of which are our allies. So, you are only
talking to folks who are probably not going to find it
credible. It will have no more credibility than our current
missile-defense policies do.
The catch is some of the allies will believe it. So, it
will have a corrosive effect on our assurance and extended
deterrence commitments.
I think the commander of EUCOM, General Wolters, mentioned,
you will get a mixed response. I think he is correct. But I
don't see the upside to it, is my point, and so, I continue to
recommend we not adopt that.
Senator Inhofe. Well, unfortunately, my time is expired,
but let me just ask you, General Dickinson, all these documents
that we have here that directly address your area, do you think
that those, that the 2018, that was back in 2018, that the NDS
still accurately assesses the strategic environment as it
pertains to space domain?
General Dickinson. Senator, I do. I do, in fact, believe it
does because, you know, space is a warfighting domain. We have
seen the activities by our competitors, both Russia and China,
as they have expanded their capabilities, in particular, China
in the space domain. We see their capabilities from direct-
assent ASAT. Anti-satellite capabilities to on-orbit activity
that they have done with that capability. We have seen the
increase or proliferation of their directed-energy efforts in
terms of electronic warfare in terms of jamming, as well as
laser technology. So, I believe it is absolutely a warfighting
domain that we need to continue to work very closely with.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you so much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Shaheen, please.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, and Admiral Richard and General
Dickinson, thank you for being here this morning and for your
service.
General Dickinson, I want to begin with you. The Air Force
is currently responsible for space traffic management for both,
military and civilian satellites, and as we look at the
proliferation of commercial satellites, that has become more
and more challenging with situational awareness.
But over the next few years, the Department of Commerce is
going to assume responsibility for managing the civilian
component.
Senator Moran and I, as the ranking member and chair of the
Commerce, Justice, and Science Appropriations Subcommittee have
asked for additional information about the funding and
personnel requirements that that kind of transfer would
require. We have not yet received a definitive answer from the
Air Force about how much it spends on the functions that will
be transferred to the Commerce Department.
The fiscal year 2021 omnibus provides $10 million for the
Commerce Department to begin to assume those responsibilities.
Can you talk about how this compares to what the Air Force is
currently spending.
General Dickinson. Senator, thank you.
The space traffic management, as I mentioned in my opening
remarks, you know, we, on a daily basis, we are tracking close
to 32,000 pieces of debris, objects, satellites, whether they
are active or old dead satellites, and that is quite a, that is
a big mission area within U.S. Space Command.
Today, the resources that I use on that provide what I
would term a very administrative type of function in terms of
identifying objects in space so that we are able to provide a
secure and safe space environment for activities on orbit, in
particular, the International Space Station, for example, in
low-Earth orbit----
Senator Shaheen. I am sorry to interrupt, but I understand
that. I think that is a very important function.
That is why we are trying to get some information about how
much you are actually spending so we can figure out as we look
at the budget for the Commerce Department.
I would say that I had a certain amount of skepticism about
whether this should be moved to the Department of Commerce and
there was a study done that came to the conclusion that maybe
it does make sense to move that function there.
So, do you know or can you provide in committee in the
future, with the amount of money that you are currently
spending on that function?
General Dickinson. I certainly can. I can take that back
and get you an answer from the Air Force on how much they
spend.
[The information referred to follows:]
General Dickinson. Based on input from USSF, fiscal year 2020
expenditures totaled $60 million for Operations, Depot and Special
Program Office (SPO) expenses. Included in that figure is $12.4 million
to sustain legacy space capabilities.
Senator Shaheen. Thanks very much.
You also talked in your opening comments about the
importance, you said power is our people, and I certainly agree
with that. But as we look at the proposed relocation of Space
Command headquarters from chief restructuring officer to the
Redstone Arsenal in Alabama, I am some concerns, based on our
past experience with a similar transfer of operations from the
National Capital Region to Huntsville, Alabama, of the Missile
Defense Agency. In that move, the agency lost 80 percent of its
civilian workforce because employees refused to move.
Do you have any estimate as to how much it is going to cost
to move to Redstone from the current location and how many
employees you might lose in that process?
General Dickinson. Senator, so, I don't have exact numbers
on estimates on the cost for the move to Huntsville.
That is actually being determined now by the Department of
the Air Force as the basing decision authority.
With regards to the civilian workforce, I would categorize
that as I don't have a good feel for that right now, because it
will depend. I think the military, we can all agree, we are
somewhat nomadic and we move where the military tells us to.
When dealing with civilians, and I have done that in two
previous jobs at the Missile Defense Agency, actually, in my
last job at Space and Missile Defense Command, it is a little
bit different when you are talking about civilians. They have
made life choices and where they are currently living, and so,
we will do everything we can to incentivize them to make the
move, but I can't give you a percentage on how many that will
be.
[The information referred to follows:]
I will defer basing process questions to the SecAF, who has the
authority for selecting the permanent location for USSPACECOM
Headquarters. Analysis to understand the impact of a transition to
Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, AL is underway. My staff is looking
hard at timelines, anticipated impacts to human capital, facilities,
and mission with a goal of minimizing risk to mission while being good
stewards of the taxpayers' money. Once we have a final basing decision,
we will be able to provide and discuss the full analysis.
Senator Shaheen. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would hope that we
would get some more information before this proposal becomes
final about how many employees we might lose and about what the
difference in cost is, which I think is significant.
Admiral Richard, I was very pleased to see the new Biden
administration agree to extend the New START Treaty for 5 more
years. Can you talk about how STRATCOM uses the information
from New START channels, the inspections and data exchanges and
how they are important to you.
Admiral Richard. Senator, we were also pleased to see the
New START Treaty get extended and it is for that----
Chairman Reed. Your microphone, Admiral.
Admiral Richard. I'm sorry. You would think I have done
this before.
We were also pleased to see the New START Treaty be
extended, right, and so, you are pointing to one of its primary
benefits. In addition to the limits, it is the transparency and
the confidence now that we have in understanding what that
piece of the threat looks like. What I would further encourage
his efforts to get a similar degree of control and
accountability on the remainder of the Russian arsenal, all of
which is something I have to deter.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Fischer, please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
gentlemen for being here today.
Admiral Richard, I would like to thank you for your honesty
and your bluntness of your opening statement in explaining the
expanding nuclear programs of both, China and Russia. Last
week, the Strategic Forces Subcommittee held a classified
briefing on these threats and yet, we continue to hear renewed
calls for unilateral cuts to our nuclear forces, abandoning the
triad, and delaying or cancelling modernization programs.
Sir, are you aware of any intelligence or threat
assessments that would support these courses of action?
Admiral Richard. Senator, I am not. In fact, the threat is
only getting worse rapidly.
Senator Fischer. So, it is your view that taking such
actions would reduce our ability to deter the threats that we
face?
Admiral Richard. Senator, yes.
Senator Fischer. Microphone.
Admiral Richard. Senator, yes.
It is not just the nuclear component. Part of what I am
trying to show is the relationship in all of our elements of
national power and how nuclear underpins that.
Senator Fischer. What about the future, because, as you
know, the impact of cutting modernization programs now, it
wouldn't be felt until the 2030s when our force begins to age
out, as you spoke about, and replacements aren't ready.
Do you see any reason to believe that the world is going to
be a lot safer in 2030 and we won't need a viable deterrent
then?
Admiral Richard. I see no indications of that. That will be
an unprecedented threat that we face in 2030. Hopefully,
perhaps we can change that trajectory, but I can't count on
hope in terms of having the capabilities needed to do my
mission.
Senator Fischer. Admiral Richard, what are your views on
the current distribution of warheads across the three legs of
our triad?
Right now we see about 70 percent of our treaty-accountable
warheads. They are on our submarines, and if significantly cut
the ICBM leg, as some advocates have urged, what number would
go up further, and, of course, our bombers are not on alert.
Do you think there are risks with leaning too heavily on
one part of the triad?
Admiral Richard. Senator, the answer is yes, and I will
give you just one example of that. What is not often recognized
is we don't have a triad day-to-day, right, the bombers are not
available to us. We chose to take them off alert as a type of
peace dividend after the Cold War.
So, day-to-day, all you have is, basically, a dyad. Basic
design criteria in the triad is that you cannot allow a failure
of any one leg of the triad to prevent you from being able to
do everything the President has ordered you to do. If you don't
have intercontinental ballistic missiles, we can't meet that
criteria. You are completely dependent on the submarine leg. I
have already told the Secretary of Defense that under those
conditions, I would request to re-alert the bombers.
Senator Fischer. Sir, you have also talked about counting
the number of strategic nuclear warheads a nation has, that can
be a crude way to measure their capability. Your posture
statement mentions this, as well.
Can you elaborate on why this is such an incomplete way to
assess an adversary and talk a little bit about the other
elements that we need to also be considering.
Admiral Richard. Senator, fundamentally, you don't deter by
accounting. We don't hold up cards and say, I have more, I win.
It is important to know what they can do with that
capability to understand, operationally, the threat that you
face. It is important to remember that both, Russia and China
have a unilateral ability to go to any level of violence that
they choose to if they perceive that the stakes are high
enough. There is a point beyond which unlimited conventional
capability will not be a sufficient deterrent.
So, unless you have a strategic deterrent that will deter
them from that, then everything else in the Department of
Defense is simply going to get escalated past. Knowing what
they are capable of doing is what causes you to come to that
conclusion.
Senator Fischer. Our capability, our production capability
is basically nonexistent, isn't it----
Admiral Richard. Yes, ma'am. That is absolutely----
Senator Fischer.--especially when you compare it to China
and Russia. Can you speak to that.
Admiral Richard. Both China and Russia have significant
capability in their nuclear weapons complexes, I can give you
the numbers in a closed session, to produce more warheads. We
are just barely able right now to life-extend our weapons and
we are just starting to get to the point, we use the two terms
interchangeably, just to be able to re-manufacture the ones we
have. We have no capability right now to actually make a new
weapon.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Dickinson, I would like to turn to statements made
by Secretary Blinken, where he said that the United States will
focus on developing standards and norms of responsible behavior
in outer space. The DOD Defense Space Strategy also noted our
need to promote favorable standards and norms of behavior in
space.
Can you please discuss SPACECOM's role in developing and
practicing those norms and what you specifically believe those
norms should be.
General Dickinson. Thank you for the question.
So, SPACECOM's role in that is, one, our ability to
understand what is going on in the space domain is fundamental
to establishing and deciding what those norms of behavior are.
I mentioned a little bit earlier the fact that our ability to
increase our space domain awareness capabilities on orbit is
very important to just what I described in terms of
understanding what our competitors may be doing in the space
domain.
I believe that, from a military perspective, that the norms
of behavior and what we do in space is very important.
We have seen activity over the last 19, 20 months since
this command has been established, that has shown that we have
had some behaviors in space that are inconsistent with
providing a safe and secure environment for our military
activities, as well as our commercial.
So, in terms of norms of behavior and how we are working,
we work very closely with the Department of Defense and, in
particular, our OSD policy folks, on determining our
recommendations to that process. The developing norms of
behavior is a whole-of-government idea and approach, if you
will, that will dictate our position on what those norms of
behavior should be.
But, in sum, I would tell you that we have to have safe
activities in orbit. We understand those by space domain
awareness, along with what that means in terms of where folks
put, where our adversaries and competitors put their space-
based capabilities and what they are doing.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
In last week's cyber architecture hearing, the subcommittee
discussed the interoperability between our cyber capacity and
space operations. Given that your command and CYBERCOM are both
operating in highly complex and ever-evolving environments, how
integrated would you say your efforts are with theirs, and how
do you plan to maintain a high level of integration with
CYBERCOM as the threat landscape continues to change?
General Dickinson. That is very important in terms of our
integration of space and cyber. We do that through several
means, if you will. General Nakasone has provided to us, as we
has done to the other combatant commands, a cyber-integrated
planning element that is currently residing within my
headquarters that provides us a very integrated approach to
cyber and space operations.
In addition to that, we are standing up a joint cyber
center within the command, as we speak. I also have, as a
result of the command standing up, I have five service
components provided by each of the services to the combatant
command with two of those, my Navy component, as well as my
Marine component, who are dual-hatted for me in space, as well
as cyber. So, I have two service components that cyber is one
of their core competencies, along with space, and in addition
to that, General Nakasone has given me some support from the
16th Air Force.
So, in other words, I have three general ops or
headquarters that provide cyber capabilities to me. I have an
integrated planning element in my headquarters and I also have
a joint cyber center. So, I believe that we are very well
integrated in terms of space- and cyber-type of operations.
We are moving very quickly right now in terms of providing
our requirements for activities in the cyberspace domain, as
well as General Nakasone providing me with requirements of what
he will need in his mission areas, as well.
Senator Gillibrand. In your written testimony, you
mentioned that our adversaries have taken a number of
provocative actions in space in order to test us. One concern
from the Pentagon's 2020 Defense Space Strategy was that it did
not explain in clear, full terms how we would deter adversaries
in space. I am concerned an overemphasis in offensive space
operations would destabilize space as a contested domain,
rather than deter our adversaries.
What do you believe our best tools are to achieve
deterrence in space?
General Dickinson. Thank you. That is a great question.
I would tell you one of our biggest deterrence
opportunities is with our allies and partners. We have, just
since this command has stood up, we have just seen a bow wave,
if you will, of allies and partners who want to come and be
part of the U.S. Space Command and part of the space
enterprise. I think as we have seen in other domains, one of
the greatest deterrence that we have is our allies and partners
and how we can all come together in a very coordinated and
synchronized manner in order to do deterrence.
One example, in particular, was the messaging that we did
last year in 2019 and 2020, in response to Russian on-orbit
activities, as well as their direct-assent ASAT tests that they
did last year. What I mean by that is when we developed our
messaging strategy for that particular, or those events, we had
tremendous participation and integration with our allies and
partners that we had never seen before.
So, one of the powers of this command or one of the
strengths of this command is that we are able to do that 24
hours a day in terms of holding our adversaries and competitors
accountable in the space domain and our allies and partners
provide a big piece to that deterrent message.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I will submit my questions for Admiral
Richard for the record. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Gillibrand.
Let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, first, let me begin by just saying thank you
very much for your service to our country.
Admiral Richard, I believe that our traditional national
defense rests on bedrock of the nuclear triad. I know that you
have hit this a couple of times, but just in plain English so
that folks that don't discuss nuclear triads on a regular
basis, the hard-working Americans that are out there that are
wondering why we have literally hundreds, if not thousands, of
nuclear warheads, can you explain to the average guy that is
working out there why it is that the triad is so important to
our national security and why it is critical to invest in its
modernization.
Admiral Richard. Senator, the simple answer to that
question is that strategic deterrence doesn't hold, nothing
else in the Department of Defense is going to work the way it
was designed. That is it, plain and simple.
I get anxious that somehow, and remember, nuclear and
strategic are two different things. All nuclear is strategic.
Not all strategic is nuclear.
But we want to put it into a box by itself that has its own
threat. You can decide how credible you think that threat is
and somehow there is this independent [inaudible] that we can
take risks over here and somehow that has nothing to do with
what the rest of the Department does, when, in fact, it
underpins it and enables it.
Yes, we like to throw a lot of numbers around. The bottom
line is, what is available to the commander to deter and what
am I deterring against?
We are treaty-limited to 1500 and 50 accountable nuclear
weapons by the New START Treaty. That is what is available to
me to accomplish all of the objectives the President has given
me, and the consequence of failure in this mission is enormous.
That is fundamentally what we are trying to accomplish, sir.
Senator Rounds. Interesting that that particular treaty
applies to one of our adversaries, but not necessarily all of
our adversaries, correct?
Admiral Richard. Senator, that is quite correct.
Senator Rounds. So, let's just talk about one of those
other competitors or challengers in this particular case. I
know that this may be one that may be difficult to do in open
session, but can you talk a little bit about what China's
civilian nuclear-production capabilities are and whether or not
we are factoring that in with regard to their ability to
produce nuclear material and the number of warheads that they
are capable of producing in a very short period of time. I
guess what I am thinking about are the fast reactors that they
have available to them right now.
Admiral Richard. Senator, that is actually a great example
of how rapidly China is changing, or at least how rapidly we
are figuring it out, right. So, the answer to your question is,
yes, but that is only as of about a week ago that we became
aware of that and started the process to understand the
implications of that.
Obviously, with a fast-breeder reactor, you now have a very
large source of weapons-grade plutonium available to you. That
will change the upper bounds of what China could choose to do
if they wanted to in terms of further expansion of their
nuclear capabilities.
We haven't yet run all the numbers. You are right, the
answers would have to come back in closed session, but it has
only been within the last week that we became aware that this
limitation on them has changed in an upward direction.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
General Dickinson, we have been competing against our
adversaries, air, land, sea, cyberspace, and now we see them
most certainly challenging us in space. While they may talk
about having an interest in a military-free space, or at least
one in which we are not actively participating in a military
matter in space, clearly, the threats are there.
I would like to hear your thoughts on our ability to defend
against these new threats and what you need in order to
maintain unfettered access in space. Do you currently have the
equipment and the resources necessary to protect the assets
that we have in space right now from the threats from both,
Russia and China?
General Dickinson. Senator, so I agree, Russia and China
are proliferating in the space domain and one more than the
other in terms of capabilities on space, not just numbers, but
the capabilities, as well, and that, in particular, is China.
So, China is absolutely our pacing challenge right now in the
space domain.
In terms of how I protect and defend on orbit or in the
space domain really boils down to my ability to actually see
and understand what is going on in the space domain. So, in
other words, being able to use a combination of satellites, as
well as terrestrial assets to understand activities on orbit,
not only from an administrative perspective, in terms of
knowing where things are, but actually having the ability to
analyze those capabilities to understand what the threat is or
what those capabilities could do and their intent.
So, space domain awareness, again, my number-one priority
in terms of the command, and we have identified that as a
requirement to both, the Department of Defense and the
services, as well. But in order to do my ``protect and defend''
mission, I must fully understand what is going on in the space
domain.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Let me now recognize Senator Kaine, please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and Ranking Member
Inhofe.
Just today, I am going to be paying a compliment to our
staff at every hearing I am doing. The staffs have really done
a great job of putting these hearings together, where we
combine people attending in person and people, senators and
witnesses, attending virtually, and I don't think we should
take it for granted. So, I just wanted to offer my thanks to
the hard work to make this challenging time work as seamlessly
as possible, and to all the staff involved in that, thank you
for that.
To the witnesses, thank you.
My colleagues have asked very good questions, many of which
I was going to ask, and I am actually just sort of going to
follow-up on Senator Rounds, where he was ending with space
awareness. General Dickinson, we had a posture hearing with
SOUTHCOM recently and Admiral Faller talked about the lack of
dedicated ISR. He has not unique in that.
Anytime we have a posture hearing with combatant commands,
this is a very common theme. Sometimes, it makes me think of,
you know, the old joke about the CEO that said, I gave my legal
counsel an unlimited budget and they overspent it.
I think the demand for ISR is sort of endless, but ISR is
so critical, obviously, to our combatant commanders really
getting a handle on and successfully executing any missions
that they have.
I have a large collection of commercial satellite providers
in Virginia who, when these issues come up, they often say that
they think that they can provide ISR to combatant commanders in
a way that would complement and combine with our DOD ISR
capacities to help us out.
General Dickinson, I am kind of interested to hear your
perspective on whether commercial satellite providers could be
woven into the architecture of ISR to be provided to combatant
commands in a way that would be helpful or do you see
challenges or limitations that would make that difficult?
General Dickinson. Thank you, Senator.
I am an advocate for the commercial ISR capabilities. I
think when we look at the total, as you mentioned, the ISR
requirements, that we may never have enough and we will always
ask for more. I agree with that comment, particularly, as we
look at some of our competitors, in particular, China and how
they are developing themselves into a global projection
capability around the world and the fact that our ISR or our
ability to see them and understand what is going on, not only
them, but other competitors, as well, is very, very fundamental
to our military operations.
I think the intertwining or interweaving the commercial
industry into that is absolutely necessary and I think gives us
a great advantage. I will tell you right now that we do rely on
commercial ISR in terms of what we do each and every day in the
U.S. Space Command. So, I look forward to that. It is very
exciting to watch to see how the commercial market, not only
with ISR, but with other space capabilities, is actually, you
know, developing, maturing, and in my words, kind of exploding.
I mean, if you just look at SpaceX, for example, with the
Starlink constellation, where they are able to put out 60
satellites on one rocket shot. To build a constellation of now,
I think over 1300 satellites in low-Earth orbit is amazing and
really shows what the commercial industry can do in support of
the space domain operation. So, I agree, I think it should be
part of the, or it is today and it should continue to do so.
Senator Kaine. General Dickinson, I am heartened to hear
that, and I will just conclude and yield by time back by saying
that Senator Gillibrand's question about creating norms in
space becomes very important. The more we use either state-
based satellites or commercial satellites, nations all over the
world are doing it, the more the prospect of collisions and
then space debris affecting everybody else's investments become
a real challenge.
It is hard to imagine us continuing to be vigorous
investors in space satellites all around the world without some
kind of international norms where these investments are
protected. So, the DOD's involvement, along with other parts of
the U.S. Government in creating those norms is really
important, and I was glad to hear your answer to Senator
Gillibrand on that topic, as well.
So, with that, thank you, and I yield back, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Let me recognize Senator Ernst, please.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and, gentlemen, thank
you so much for being here today and sharing your testimonies
with us. Your commands do represent very crucial capabilities
for our national defense, so thank you, again, for your input
as we continue to develop different policies, whether it is
strategic, nuclear deterrence, or, of course, space.
So, making sure that we have the resources necessary is
extremely important and, recently, Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Mike Gilday, recently said, we need to innovate and we
need to modernize. Early adoption of emerging and disruptive
technologies, as well as the need to protect our infrastructure
and technologies from strategic competitors is absolutely
critical.
I believe that is true, not only in the Navy, but also to
our nuclear and space programs.
So, Admiral Richard, as we are looking at the modernization
of our nuclear triad, again, going back to those resources,
there is going to be a tremendous price tag. I think we all
recognize that, but can you discuss for us the margins for
delay and the potential costs that we would face if we try to
spread out these recapitalization efforts over a period of
years within the nuclear triad, not really getting to the heart
of the issue.
Admiral Richard. Senator, one, thank you for the question,
and, two, what I would start with is, we don't have an
opportunity to spread these costs out, right. We have life-
extended to the maximum extent possible. So, to maintain the
level of defense that we have historically assumed in this
mission, right, to not take any further risks in this area, I
need the first of these recapitalizations to start showing up
on time. We don't have any further opportunity to do that.
I do want to present that we can afford this as a nation,
right. We only do this every 40 years. If you look at the
context of what these decisions are and costs relative to all
the other things this nation chooses to spend its money on,
these are trivial, compared to that. This is a choice this
nation makes as to how much risk it wants to take in this
mission issue.
I think this exactly what Secretary Madison meant when he
said, we can afford survival.
Senator Ernst. I think that is so brilliantly put.
Not only can we afford it, we must afford this. I think
that is a great way to say that, Admiral.
So, talking a little bit more about the ICBMs, and if we
were allowing the ICBM legs to atrophy, such that it is no
longer a credible leg of the triad, what would that then mean
to Russia and China, but also for our allies, and can you
describe how our allies would react if we no longer had that
viable ICBM leg.
Admiral Richard. Senator, let me put it this way in terms
of what it would do relative to Russia and China. I said that
China is not yet able to execute every plausible nuclear
employment strategy at intercontinental range. If I were to
build a list of the top-five things the United States could do
to accelerate China becoming a strategic peer of ours, number
one or number two on the list is to get rid of our ICBMs,
because you will have solved a problem that they can't
currently solve right now. That would be the implication for
that, and they can do the math and our allies can do the math
and they will see that we are not backing up our words with our
actions. We will lose credibility, and it will affect our
extended-deterrence insurance.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, sir.
General Dickinson, as well, as we talk about, you know,
congestion in space, there are over 50 different space-faring
nations and a number of space ventures, as you outlined in your
opening remarks. Those will continue to climb.
So, the risks and opportunities, what are those risks and
opportunities that space congestion presents to the command and
how do we overcome them?
General Dickinson. Thank you.
So, the risks to the command are that it is becoming more
congested in terms of what I mentioned with the over 1300
satellites, which is a good thing in terms of, you know, free-
market economy, commerce, space commerce, but it is becoming a
more challenging problem. So, the risk becomes that it could
become more unpredictable in space, more things to look at,
more things to make sure that don't collide as they are in each
of the orbits. But the benefit to that, I think, we can see,
you know, the world economy, in particular, for space, is
booming, and so, we need to do that, but we need to look at it
as a domain like we looked in other domains in terms of how do
we manage that to make sure that we have a safe and secure
space domain.
Senator Ernst. Thank you very much.
I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
Let me recognize Senator King, via Webex.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Dickinson, I would like to follow-up on Tim Kaine's
question to a little bit about the security of our space
assets. It seems to me that in a conflict, the very first thing
that an enemy will try to do is a major cyberattack and to try
to blind us.
Senator Kaine talked about commercial satellites. Is
redundancy, itself, a strategy for protecting the assets; in
other words, lots and lots of small satellites rather than
these large, multi-billion-dollar satellites that we have
traditionally depended upon, but a redundant constellation of
small satellites that would be harder to disable.
Because, do you agree with me that going after our
satellites would be one of the first things an adversary would
do in a conflict?
General Dickinson. Thank you, Senator.
So, my opinion on that is I believe the small satellites,
many satellites in orbit provides us a very redundant,
resilient capability. That would be very difficult to degrade
once we have it established. It will provide us the ability to
do many different types of missions, whether it is
communications, whether it is ISR, whether it is missile-
warning; those types of activities, I think, will absolutely be
more redundant, more resilient if we have, what I would call a
mesh network, if you will, in a constellation.
In terms of what would happen first, I believe we are in
competition each day both, space and cyber, and for us, our
ability to compete on a daily basis in the competition phase is
very important to what we are doing. That could very well be
the first, that you mentioned, could be a cyber attack followed
by something in space. But we are watching that each and every
day, and like I said, I think in terms of the redundancy, that
is a great technique or opportunity.
Senator King. Thank you.
Admiral Richard, one of the scariest terms I have heard
recently is escalate to de-escalate, which I understand is a
stated policy of the Russians in terms of the use of tactical
nuclear weapons in order to chock everyone into backing off.
Is that something that concerns you in terms of our
relationship to Russia and their relationship to nuclear
weapons?
Admiral Richard. Senator, yes, the short answer is yes.
Actually, it may be thought of more as escalate to win, but not
to mince words, and so, the whole idea here is for that and
anything else they consider doing, to show that that won't
work, right, that the costs that we could impose are greater
than what they may gain by attempting that strategy, that is
the essence of deterrence here and, in fact, the introduction
of the low-yield ballistic missile weapon, I remind, we have
always had a low-yield capability inside the arsenal. We just
added one now that has a much higher probability of facing the
threats that we have today. We think that that has successfully
improved deterrence against that very strategy.
Senator King. Well, to go back to Senator Rounds' question,
the fundamental strategy here, and a lot of people, we have
gone 25 or 30 years and not thought too much about nuclear
weapons, but the whole idea is that those other countries that
have nuclear weapons know that we do, too, and that we have the
capability to inflict enormous damage on them if they use the
nuclear weapons. That theory of deterrence has worked for 70
years.
I take it from your comments that you believe that
modernization is critical to maintaining the credibility of the
deterrent. It is not a deterrent unless your adversaries
believe it will work, and isn't that the essential case for
modernization?
Admiral Richard. Absolutely, sir.
Fundamentally, a deterrent is not credible unless the
opponent or the other side does the calculation and comes up
with, we can either deny that, missile defense is a good
example of it, or we can impose a cost.
It doesn't have to be a nuclear cost. We are thinking very
hard. We are the only nation that can go all domain worldwide.
I applaud the Secretary's efforts at improving cross-domain
deterrence, but in the end, given the threats that we face,
there has to be a nuclear component to it, because we don't
have a combination of other things, yet, that can deter that.
Senator Kaine. Well, the fundamental theory is that you
have nuclear weapons in order to never have to use them. That
is what it is all about, isn't it, Admiral?
Admiral Richard. It is, and I have said that before, in
that it is the only weapons system you don't have to pull the
trigger on for it to work. The mere destructive potential of
the system changes the way people think. It changes the
decisions they make. That is what we mean by, we use it every
day.
Senator King. A very quick question, I am out of time, but
a very quick question. If there were some serious threat, how
long would it take to get the bombers aloft?
Admiral Richard. Sir, it is a short period of time. I would
prefer to answer that in closed session, if I could.
Senator King. We will follow-up later. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Cotton?
Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and
for your appearance.
Admiral Richard, I want to speak about the Nuclear Posture
Review, which is underway, as is the custom of administrations.
I am concerned that low-level political appointees, a Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense and Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State may be subverting the integrity of Secretary Austin's
review.
Earlier this month, those political appointees gave an
interview in Japanese media, implying the reduction of funding
for our nuclear forces and, perhaps, even the enactment of a
sole-purpose nuclear policy. Neither of those appointees, of
course, have been confirmed by the
United States Senate.
Were either you or Secretary Austin consulted before they
made these public comments?
Admiral Richard. Senator, no. No one at STRATCOM or myself
was consulted.
Senator Cotton. Do you believe that it would be in the best
interest of our Nation to go to a sole-purpose nuclear policy?
Admiral Richard. Senator, no. I think, again, that that
would remove a level of ambiguity that has had useful deterrent
value to us. We have never, as a nation, chosen to do that.
Senator Cotton. That would undermine our ability to deter,
for instance, chemical or biological attacks if we use the
sole-purpose policy?
Admiral Richard. By policy, we would not consider a nuclear
response to those types of threats.
Senator Cotton. Do you think allies like the United Kingdom
or Japan would like the United States to move to a sole-purpose
policy?
Admiral Richard. Sir, you know, in the end, I would have to
defer to OSD policy, but my indications, conversations is there
would be apprehension. It would depend on exactly how we worded
it.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Thank you for that.
I hope the integrity of that Nuclear Posture Review is not
subverted by low-level appointees who have never been reviewed
by the Senate.
I want to move to China. I know you have probably touched
on some of these points, but I think there are a few questions
that are more vital today. We know what Russia has. We know the
threat Russia poses. They have posed it for 60 or 70 years.
But I think China is a menacing and rapidly growing threat
both, in terms of the quantity and the quality of their nuclear
forces. Give a sense just how fast their increasing the
quantity of their nuclear forces.
Admiral Richard. Senator, I just gave an order at STRATCOM
2 weeks ago that any threat brief or any brief that is
discussing China that is more than a month old must be updated
with our intelligence folks because it is probably out of date.
I can't get through a week right now without finding out
something we didn't know about China.
Senator Cotton. In terms of the quality of these forces, it
is true that they are moving rapidly towards having a
functioning nuclear triad, just like the United States and
Russia, which is to say, bombers, submarines, and missiles; is
that right?
Admiral Richard. Senator, that is correct.
Senator Cotton. On those ground-based forces, in some ways,
their quality is more survivable and less detectible than ours
since they are moving towards, say, sold-fuel rockets, which
give you less warning, since you don't have to stand up the
missiles and fill them with liquid fuel or road-mobile and
road-mobile missiles, which can be moved around on the back of
a tractor-trailer or a train, something this country doesn't
use; is that right?
Admiral Richard. Senator, that is correct.
The road-mobiles of both, Russia and China are challenges
to make sure that you can maintain accountability of them.
Senator Cotton. It is hard to find a tractor-trailer with a
missile on it in a country the size of China, which is as big
as the United States, right?
Admiral Richard. Both countries are very good at hiding
them.
Senator Cotton. You spoke something a few moments ago, and
I just want to point out that you said that eliminating our
ground-based missiles would be one of the best things that
could happen to Chinese planners, and is that because the
number of our missile systems complicate their targeting?
Admiral Richard. Senator, that is correct. You would solve
a problem right now that they don't have an answer to.
Senator Cotton. Which is, to use a colloquial term, the
missile sync, with all of our, I know you may not like to use
that term, but with all of those missiles that we have out in
the Midwest and the Rocky Mountain states and just the sheer
quantity of targeted sites if you are Russia or China is very
complicated to hit.
Admiral Richard. It certainly requires a scale of attack
that is, makes it very obvious what is going on, and part of
why I don't like the term missile sync is there are a lot of
things where we have forgotten how we got here. An example is
bolt out of the blue, right. Highly improbable. We all agree
with that. We would be the first to tell you that. We look at
this risk every day.
But we forget why it is improbable, right. We made it
improbable as a nation. We invented the ballistic-missile
submarine. We invented launch under warning, launch under
attack. It is improbable because it probably won't work.
We can easily take steps to make it more probable if we
forget what it is that got us here.
Senator Cotton. That is right, and that would be the case,
not just if you took the radical step of eliminating an entire
leg of our triad, the ground-based missiles, but even if you
substantially reduced the amount of ground-based missiles; is
that correct?
Admiral Richard. Senator, fundamentally, I have got to have
enough capacity, right, and I am now about to face an additive
threat from China. These numbers that we have were based on a
threat situation from years ago.
So, I am apprehensive right now. Well, I certainly need
everything that is in the program of record, if you want me to
do what the President ordered me to.
Senator Cotton. So, I will just conclude with a point I
often make. We hear from some misguided and misinformed people
on the left who might want to eliminate a leg of our triad or
eliminate the entire nuclear forces. This fanciful idea that
somehow we can rid the world of this weapons system.
It is often said we spend so much on weapons we never use;
to the contrary, we spend very little on these nuclear forces
as a percentage of our Defense budget, certainly as a
percentage of our overall economic. Second, we use these, every
single day and we have used them every single day for 76 years
to deter another war like the terrible wars of the first half
of the 21st century.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton, via Webex.
Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
our witnesses for being here.
President Biden has expressed some concerns about the need,
the affordability, and the safety of the Trump administration's
nuclear weapons policy, and for good reason. The previous
administration's modernization plans including items like a new
sea-launched cruise missile and a low-yield warhead. Like any
new administration, the President's team is taking some time to
conduct its own review.
So, Admiral Richard, you are the commander of U.S.
Strategic Command. Whose job is it to determine the nuclear
policy of the United States, your job or the President's job?
Admiral Richard. Senator, it is the President's job. I am
obligated to provide my best military advice.
Senator Warren. I appreciate that.
Do you agree that the new administration should be allowed
to conduct its own review and that it shouldn't feel obligated
or pressured to rubber-stamp the previous administration's
plans?
Admiral Richard. Ma'am, I absolutely agree with that.
I also request an opportunity to make sure that that
review, and in fact, I would broaden it. I, again, state that I
think it is a mistake to think of deterrence in pieces, that
nuclear is somehow separate from conventional, is somehow
separate from space and cyber. You have to look at all of that.
I would ask that it be fully threat-informed, and that I have
an opportunity to provide the operational implications of
potential policy choices.
Senator Warren. But you are going to do the operational
part here. The President does the policy part.
I appreciate your saying this, because you made some
comments early in January that puzzled and, frankly, concerned
me on this score. On January 5, after President Trump had lost
his bid for re-election, you told some reporters that the
purpose of a forthcoming Biden administration review of nuclear
weapons policy should, quote, validation that we like the
strategy that we have.
It also sounded like to me that you were saying that there
was no reason to change course. You stated, quote, this nation
has had basically the same strategy dating back to the Kennedy
administration, end quote.
So, now, it is your job to provide input and recommend
options to the President and the Secretary if you are asked,
but that doesn't mean making public comments to try to box in
the President's decision-making. I understand that you believe
you are operating well within the scope of your
responsibilities, but I am concerned and I want a commitment
from you that you are not going to infringe on or undermine the
administration's review.
Do I have your commitment on that?
Admiral Richard. Senator, you absolutely do, and my
reference to our strategy was not in relation to any one
administration. I also said I can trace the lineage of our
current strategy back to the Kennedy administration.
The Nation can have any strategy that it wants and then
that leads to a commensurate need for a stack of capabilities,
policies, and postures to execute that strategy. I would just
like to make sure that the Nation----
Senator Warren. I appreciate that----
Admiral Richard.--understands the risks it is taking in
those decisions.
Senator Warren. I appreciate that you will make that risk
clear so that the President and the Secretary can work together
to make a decision on this.
You know, we are currently spending $44 and a half billion
a year on nuclear weapons and I know that STRATCOM likes
spending that money, but I don't. The purpose of the ongoing
review is to, quote, reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our
defense strategy, end quote. I agree with that goal and I think
it is incompatible with that staggeringly high level of
spending.
Every administration makes administration makes strategic
decisions about our force structure and modernization and when
it comes to nuclear weapons, those decisions carry tremendous
weight. As STRATCOM commander, your role is to support the U.S.
Nuclear Doctrine that is set by the leaders elected to grapple
with those decisions, not by military officials alone.
So, I look forward to seeing the results of the
administration's review and I know you will swiftly implement
whatever they determine.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren.
Senator Tillis, via Webex.
Okay. Now, Senator Cramer.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Generals, both for your service and for being
here.
I might just, well, I guess I feel compelled to follow-up
on what Senator Warren was just talking about. One of the
things that I have found frustrating often times is that the
self-governed in this country, don't know what we know. A lot
of times that is okay, but a lot of times it is not so okay.
So, Generals, both of you, I appreciate the fact that you
are both, that you both travel a lot throughout the country.
You have both come to my state in your current positions, and
that you both are willing to speak openly, but always, always
respectfully about the threats that we face, because, quite
honestly, I think one of the great threats in this country is
when the people assume we know what we are talking about aren't
aware of the threats. So, thank you for doing that. A well-
informed, several-governed country is the best.
I guess I don't feel the need to ask any more questions
about whether you support a triad versus something else,
Admiral. I have appreciated your opening statement, as well as
your answers to several questions, reaffirming the importance
of all three legs of the triad.
We have talked a lot. You have answered questions,
specifically, of course, about the ground-based strategic
deterrent and I appreciate that, and the fact that a delay in
the modernization will cost both, money and perhaps security.
So, let's move over to the LRSO. You know, our B-52s are
incredible weapons, especially in the hands of our great airmen
like we have in [inaudible], but I am afraid that we will be
risking too much and asking too much of those airmen if we take
away the LRSO and get it off-track.
So, if the LRSO were cancelled or delayed beyond the
service life of the legacy air-launch cruise missile, do you
think our air leg of the triad would be viable or would it be
compromised?
Admiral Richard. Senator, the short answer is no. The
bottom line is that without an LRSO, you, in effect, don't have
an air leg or you have at least put it back to sort of a 1950's
version of an air leg with much less capacity than they had
back then.
I do want to go a bit further. It is not only that it is
almost a miracle that they all can fly, I think my predecessor
General Hyten testified to that a couple of years ago. To think
that a weapons system designed to go against Soviet analog
defenses is going to be able to get through sophisticated
Russian and Chinese defenses, I think is optimistic, and the
outcome on its first day wasn't good enough for what we are
going to need for it to do today. I can give you the details on
that in closed session.
It was designed for a different era. I need a modern weapon
in order to do what I have been ordered to do.
Senator Cramer. With limited time, I am wondering which of
these last questions I want to ask, but I am going to continue
on with the strategic deterrent commander. I know you are
acutely aware that credible U.S. nuclear deterrence relies on
uninterrupted nuclear command, control, and communications, the
NC3 system, and that the mission depends on secure operational
technologies, as well.
The recent hack of the Florida water treatment facility
certainly highlighted the cyber vulnerabilities of our OT
system, a threat that is only exacerbated when you add in the
NC3 component.
Can you update the Committee on efforts of STRATCOM to
ensure that cyber protection both, to the infrastructure and
NC3 are on track.
Admiral Richard. Sir, that is a very extensive answer.
The things that we are doing, I will answer this, and I
have a separate responsibility as the commander of the Nuclear
Enterprise Center with the Department-wide responsibilities for
nuclear command and control. Fundamentally, I am confident in
our NC3 cyber resiliency. It exists in relative isolation. It
has tremendous redundancy. It gets the best intelligence. We
have an intelligence fusion center, thank you Congress for
directing that, General Nakasone.
So, everything that Space Command just mentioned that they
get support for, we get that and additional abilities to
maintain the standards here. The number-one thing I need to do
to be able to say that in the future is that I have to
modernize the system, right. I have to get it out of legacy
modes of operation in order to pace this threat going into the
future, but I am confident today.
Senator Cramer. To both of you, and I will start with you,
General Dickinson, in addition to the Bomber Wing and the
Missile Wing at Minot, of course, North Dakota contributes by
having the 10th Space Warning Squadron at Cavalier. Maybe this
is a good opportunity for me to ask both of you, but, again,
starting with General Dickinson, how do the two commands work
together to enhance the credibility of U.S. deterrence against
adversaries who are competing with us, really, in every domain?
General Dickinson. Thank you, Senator.
So, that missile-warning architecture is a very integrated
capability within U.S. Space Command. We provide that missile
warning to U.S. Strategic Command on a daily basis and we work
very closely together. I mean, in general, as you know,
Senator, we respond out of U.S. Strategic Command when we stood
up U.S. Space Command, and so, our daily interaction, our daily
operations together is very nested and synchronized.
Senator Cramer. I thank both of you.
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cramer.
Via Webex, Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
Thanks to both of you for your service to our country and
the commitment by your families for their service. I think they
need to be commended, also.
The first question I want will go to both of you, but
Admiral Richard, with the current and planned advancements in
missile technology, such as hypersonics from our adversaries,
defense of the homeland can no longer be taken for granted. So,
my question would be, Admiral Richard, would you tell me about
the adequacy of our current missile-defense batteries, like the
Ground-Based Interceptors, the PAC-3 missile, and [inaudible]
platforms.
Admiral Richard. Senator, I would, in the end, defer to the
operational commanders of those systems. For example, for
Ground-Based Interceptor, that is Northern Command; however,
from my vantage point, in terms of my mission sense and my
overall responsibility in missile defense for advocating and
operation support, we have an adequate missile defense today.
We do need to make sure that we pace it into the future against
the threats that we are seeing.
The number-one thing that I would prioritize is both, the
ability to warn and the ability to track birth-to-death,
because it is not only the defensive pieces to it, that is
missile defense. On the missile-warning side, I need to be able
to posture forces and posture people in advance of the threat
or I have to take other operational decisions over.
Senator Manchin. General Dickinson, if you could tell me
how STRATCOM and SPACECOM are working to integrate future
missile-defense technologies, like a Space Sensor Layer with
our current systems to maintain global awareness, and the
quickest reaction possible to these threats.
General Dickinson. Thank you, Senator.
So, we work very closely hand-in-hand with U.S. Strategic
Command and all the other combatant commands in terms of the
integrating, as I mentioned earlier in terms of taking existing
terrestrial-type radars that have not necessarily been used
before, particularly in the space domain, but in this
particular vignette with hypersonics. We continue to look at
the integration of those assets.
We are also working very closely with the Missile Defense
Agency in growing capabilities on orbit that will help us
address that problem, our dilemna with hypersonic weapons.
Senator Manchin. Admiral Richard, your testimony states the
next generation of deterrent forces must encompass responsive
weapons systems, world-class personnel, resilient
infrastructure, and intelligence-informed decisions.
Can you describe the steps that you have taken or
relationships that you have established, to ensure the timely
and initiate flow of intelligence in order to provide decision-
makers with accurate, timely information that is going to be
needed to make these decisions.
Admiral Richard. So, a number of steps. Again, I am
fortunate in terms of the priority that is given to strategic
deterrence intelligence needs by the intelligence community. I
have a number of relationships and a number of liaisons. I
mean, as one example, I have 300 Defense Intelligence Agency
personnel assigned to STRATCOM headquarters as part of our
ability to go do that.
Additionally, we have a specific stack of strategic
intelligence requirements that have been given to the
intelligence community and I receive great support in terms of
that.
Senator, if I could real quick, I just want to add, going
back to the missile-defense piece, because it has been asked a
couple of times. We are very satisfied with the way that Space
Command has taken over the sensor commander function, right, by
utilizing sensors across missile-warning, missile-defense, and
space situational awareness. I am actually getting better
missile-warning data and the Nation is getting better
utilization of the assets that it purchased.
Senator Manchin. Well, that will go right into General
Dickinson. As we all know, the availability of speed and
communicating data are and always will remain a vulnerability
for our forces, and with the ease of optical or tightbeam
communications, utilizing lasers in a space environment, that
speed is increased substantially.
So, the question would be, that is very impressive, but how
is SPACECOM working to bring that speed of communications back
down to Earth as we may speak?
General Dickinson. So, Senator, that is, what we are
currently working with, I think some of the work that General
VanHerck has done in all-domain awareness, I fully support the
efforts that he is undertaking, as well as the Department in
terms of increasing our able to communicate at speed so that we
can make the proper decisions at the proper time.
What we are doing at U.S. Space Command is kind of looking
at the current command and control systems that handle these
volumes of information and we are looking at ways that we can
integrate those capabilities to provide an all-domain
capability where we can see and do and act with speed of
relevance to the situation at hand.
So, we are looking at existing command and control
architectures that we can leverage. We already have a very
robust one in the space domain, but we continue to look and how
we can leverage all of them together in an all-domain fashion.
Senator Manchin. Okay. I just want to thank both of you,
Admiral Richard and General Dickinson. Thank you, both, for
your service, again, and thank you for being here today.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
Now let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Tillis.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here and your years of
service.
Admiral Richard, I want to start with you. I was in the
Committee room when you gave your opening statement and towards
the end you were talking about how we are losing our advantage
and you want on to say that we could reach a point to where no
amount of money would allow us to catch back up.
Would you go back and give a little bit broader context to
the specific areas that you think that that threat is real and
maybe over what sort of timeline if we don't have adequate
resources or authorities, that we could reach that tipping
point.
Admiral Richard. So, Senator, what drives me to say that in
the opening statement is the observation that we have delayed
this recapitalization so long that we are getting to points,
key pieces of infrastructure or key talent areas, human talent
areas where we have not had to do something in 30 years. The
best examples are on the weapons complex side of the house
right now. There will be more in the delivery system and the
command and control that shortly follow.
It is a situation that we don't normally face as a nation.
Normally, when we make a decision, and if we find out we were
wrong, we can come back 2 or 3 years later and buy it back. We
can change our minds. We have to write a bigger check. We try
to avoid doing it, but at least we can.
We are now at the point that if we lose some critical
pieces of infrastructure or we lose some key talent bases, a
specific example would be how you make a nuclear reentry
vehicle heat shield, right, we haven't done it in 30 years.
You would think we had never done it before. If we lose
those talent bases, you can't buy it back. It will take 5 to 10
years to either retrain and redevelop the people or rebuild the
infrastructure. We don't normally face decisions like that.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
General Dickinson, you mentioned 32,000 space objects out
there. I think you said somewhere on the order of about 7,000
are operational.
I have been reading a lot of articles on space junk and the
dangers that they could pose to the International Space
Station, commercial assets. How much of solving that problem,
our emphasis on it, and how many resources are actually
dedicated to that?
I think Senator Shaheen touched on it, but is this the
threat that I perceive it to be, based on publications of the
last month or so?
General Dickinson. So, Senator, that is a mission area
within the command that we do every day. It is about 32,000. It
grows, as we see, with the commercialization, if you will, of
space with multiple [inaudible] companies now moving into the
space domain. It is something that we do and we do a very good
job at that, in terms of making sure that we are able to
predict where we may have a problem with either a conjunction
or a collision on orbit.
We have a very close relationship with NASA. To your
mention of the International Space Station, a very close
working relationship, where we provide them with that
information and they use that information to do, take whatever
actions they may feel is appropriate to maintain a safe
environment for the astronauts and cosmonauts onboard the
International Space Station.
But it is one that we spend a lot of time doing each and
every day.
Senator Tillis. Going forward, I followed Starlink since
they first set up the first dishwasher-sized satellites to
provide broadband, ubiquitous broadband. I read a report
earlier this week that while they are topping a thousand on
orbit now, their goal is to have over 40,000 on orbit.
How are we working in the commercial space to make sure
that we are sequencing more object in space with the goal of
not making it more difficult for you to do your job? To what
extent would you play a role, if any, in the commercial
decisions and permitting to allow more to go on orbit that
create a more complex challenge for you?
General Dickinson. So, Senator, my responsibilities lie in
predicting and understanding where those objects are or the
satellites are. The actual interaction with the commercial
company on how they should conduct a space launch or on-orbit
activities with their satellites really kind of goes back to a
licensing capability or a licensing process that I believe the
FAA actual conducts with each of those companies before they
launch.
Senator Tillis. Then, my remaining time, I am kind of
curious about how SPACECOM and STRATCOM are going to work
together to create a credible U.S. deterrent, particularly,
when we seem to be challenged in every domain. So, how are your
two commands working together to face up against those threats?
General Dickinson. So, Senator, I will answer that first
and then I will turn it over to my shipmate here, Admiral
Richard, but we work every day with that. One of the notable
things within the U.S. Space Command is the stand up of our
joint fires element within the command that actually does that
deterrent-type of work in terms of the space domain.
But we are very integrated with the rest of the combatant
commands to include U.S. Strategic Command and that daily
activity in terms of deterrence, not only in the space domain,
but in all the other domains. Because as the Secretary of
Defense has asked us and told us to do is that deterrence is
not just one domain; it is all domains, all the time, and so,
our synchronization and coordination of those activities, in
particular, on orbit, and then for the other pieces, the other
domains is very fundamental. But our relationship and
synchronization with U.S. Strategic Command is very close.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
Admiral Richard. Yes, Senator, if I could just add, not
only to endorse everything that General Dickinson just said,
but Chairman Milley and Vice Chairman Hyten have made it really
clear, it is not just our two co-coms; it is all co-coms,
right. We are driving hard towards global integration both, in
planning and operations. We see that as a necessary way forward
into the future.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
Let me now recognize Senator Rosen, via Webex.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed and Ranking Member
Inhofe, for holding this important hearing.
I would also like to thank Admiral Richard and General
Dickinson for testifying today and, of course, I am grateful
for their service to our country.
But I would like to speak a little bit about explosive
nuclear weapons testing, because last May, the prior
administration was reportedly considering resuming explosive
nuclear weapons at the Nevada National Security Site, the only
facility in the Nation equipped to accommodate underground
nuclear testing. This is for the first time since 1992.
Nevadans do not want to return to a time when explosive
nuclear testing was allowed in our state. It puts the health
and safety of Nevadans in jeopardy.
So, to prevent this outcome, Senator Cortez Masto and I
introduced legislation requiring congressional approval before
any future explosive nuclear weapons testing were to take
place.
So, Admiral Richard, you told the Senate Armed Services
Committee last year that there is no condition under which you
would recommend the need for renewed nuclear testing.
Can you confirm for me, please, today, that there is no
current need for a resumption of explosive testing in Nevada or
elsewhere, to ensure the reliability of our nuclear arsenal.
Admiral Richard. Senator, as you know, I am obligated by
Congress to report on my assessment of the combat-readiness of
the stockpile. That includes an assessment on the need for
nuclear weapons testing.
So, you are correct. I have certified the stockpile. I do
it annually in writing, and I have stated that there are no
identified conditions at this point that would require nuclear
weapons testing to restore that confidence.
But I further stated in it that I am concerned about the
Nation's test-readiness and that I endorsed the lab director's
calls, the NNSA, nuclear weapons labs, for a national review of
our test-readiness to understand where we sit.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I would like to build on that and
ask if you agree that a resumption in explosive nuclear
testing, which would violate longstanding, international norms,
might provide other nations with an incentive to resume their
own explosive nuclear testing activities and, more broadly,
would impact global peace and security.
So, what are you thinking in that realm?
Admiral Richard. Ma'am, I would defer the political
implications of a nuclear weapons test to OSD policy or the
State Department. I think from a technical standpoint, a bigger
driver in terms of any nation's decision to conduct a test has
to do with what level of confidence do they have that their
nuclear weapons will work to their standards and what other
mechanisms they may have; in other words, how much confidence
do they want and by what means do they want to get it.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I will move on, but I will just
reiterate, we want no nuclear explosive testing in Nevada or
anywhere across this country.
But I would like to build now on what Senator Gillibrand
spoke about earlier, a cyber mission in space. It is no secret,
of course as anyone knows, our adversaries see the value of the
space domain, developing counterspace capabilities to undermine
our interests. So, this week, I plan to introduce with Senator
Blackburn, legislation to build a civilian cybersecurity
reserve to ensure additional cyber capacity at our times of
greatest need.
So, General Dickinson, does the newest branch of the
military, do you currently possess the necessary workforce to
fulfill your cyber mission effectively, and how can we help
support your needs in growing the workforce?
General Dickinson. Thank you, Senator.
In terms of the cyber piece that you mentioned earlier, I
would say that is probably General Jay Raymond's avenue or area
in terms of what the service, the Space Force provides.
But as a combatant commander, I can tell you that I have
the resources that I need right now and I am confident in our
ability to protect my space missionaries, my critical space
missionaries that I do each and every day.
My relationship with Cyber Command in terms of working with
Paul Nakasone and his team, is very close. As the newest
combatant command, I have gotten resource that I have
determined that I need in order to have a resilient cyber
capability or protection within the missionaries, I will have
today.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you.
I was able to, last year, help get the PROMOTES Act passed,
which has a junior ROTC STEM track now and we hope that that
will help grow our young men and women as they join JROTC early
to help build all of our capabilities and technology in the
military. Thank you.
I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rosen.
Let me recognize Senator Scott, please.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman.
Admiral Richard, I read your op-ed from February and I
appreciate your candid assessment of the challenges we face
regarding Communist China.
Have you seen anything with regard to behavior, military
spending, posturing, and public statements that lead you to
believe that Communist China has any interest in cooperating
with other countries on nuclear weapons?
Admiral Richard. Senator, I have not. They have a very
opaque policy. It makes it difficult to determine anything
about what their intentions are, but I certainly have not seen
anything that looks like cooperation.
Senator Scott. If we don't spend sufficiently to modernize
our nuclear forces and Communist China achieves its goal of
having an effective nuclear triad by the middle of this decade,
what are we facing in terms of defending United States
interests in the Indo-Pacific Region and beyond?
Admiral Richard. Senator, it would be two things, one of
which is they could use those capabilities coercively in a way
that would limit our decision space in crisis; additionally, it
will rip out the underpinnings, by which all the rest of our
forces are employed, right. We would not be able to deter China
from simply escalating right past us if the stakes were high
enough in a crisis or conflict.
Senator Scott. So, the value of having forces in South
Korea and Japan would be just wasteful. There would be no
ability to help them.
Admiral Richard. We would be the first to tell you that
those forces are important, but you have to backstop them with
a strategic deterrent to dissuade the opponent from attempting
to do something like that.
Senator Scott. Thank you.
General Dickinson, are we on pace, given what we expect
from the President's budget to be able to defeat Chinese and
Russian goals in space?
There is no question they each want to dominate in this
area, and do you believe that we will be able to stop them,
given our current spending plans and policy?
General Dickinson. Senator, I think at this point, we are
on a glide path to that capability. Our ability to protect and
defend on orbit is that those capabilities and capacities are
growing, and I think that is very important as we look to the
future. But to answer your question, I think we are on a glide
path.
Senator Scott. So, do you believe that going forward, that
we are going to be expected, like the President's budget
doesn't have much of an increase in Defense spending, do you
think we are going to, that is going to be enough to pursue the
goals that you have?
General Dickinson. Well, so, for the command over the last
year, we have done our first analysis of the requirements, if
you will, for the combatant command, and I have delivered those
requirements to the Department of Defense, as well as the
services, and in those requirements, I have identified my
priority in terms of developing better space domain awareness
in terms of being able to understand what is happening in the
space domain, to characterize that, and to understand what our
adversaries and competitors are doing there.
So, in terms of the budget for this year, I think it is
satisfactory for what we are doing right now.
Senator Scott. Admiral Richard, do you think we are clear
enough about our relationship with Taiwan and our interest in
making sure they remain, you know, independent of Communist
China?
Admiral Richard. Senator, ultimately, I would defer to the
Department of State and OSD policy in terms of what is the best
course of action there.
What I am committed to doing is making sure that the United
States military has the ability to set the appropriate
operating conditions and deter Chinese strategic capabilities
to allow us those options for the rest of the force and the
Nation.
Senator Scott. So, if we are in the position that we
believe that we can deter them from doing something, why are
they doing all the flyovers now? Why is Communist China doing,
taking the aggressive action they are taking against Taiwan
right now?
Admiral Richard. Sir, fundamentally, I would defer. You
would have to ask China that question, right, but that is a
point that gets back to deterrences linked, right. We have to
pay attention all the way down into thresholds below
conventional armed conflict to make sure that we are putting
these things on the right trajectory in the long term.
Senator Scott. I want to thank both of you and thank all
the men and women that serve with you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Scott.
Senator Kelly, please.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Richard, thank you for your testimony, General
Dickinson.
I would like to discuss for a couple of minutes, the
ground-based strategic deterrent effort. The program to replace
the Minuteman-III and its command and control system is
significant. Often, large programs like this are threatened
when there is budgetary pressure.
Now, my understanding is that there is not a cost-effective
way to modernize the Minuteman-III and that the 60-year-old
missile needs to be replaced.
Can you explain in detail, Admiral Richard, why that is,
and what new capability are we going to get with GBSD.
Admiral Richard. Senator, first, I would offer the
Department has sent several pretty detailed reports to Congress
that go into that, and so I would refer to those.
But biggest picture, I need a weapon that can fly and make
it to the target. Minuteman-III is increasingly challenged in
its ability to do that. There is almost no possibility of an
upgrade on that, relative to the threat.
In particular, I would draw attention to the cyber
capabilities, right. Minuteman-III is a very old system that we
have to be able to cyber defend, and the GBSD will come with a
great improvement inside its cyber defenses, as well as the
overall operational availability, redundancy and reliability of
its command and control.
Senator Kelly. Well, thank you.
The Russians have been modernizing their systems. Can you
highlight some of the upgrades that they have been making in
delivery system, command and control, and their warning
systems, just top-level.
Admiral Richard. I mean, Senator, they, across the board,
are operating new equipment. They are on their second
generation of a new ballistic-missile submarine. They have a
new ballistic missile for that; it is quite capable. They have
a very impressive, sold-fueled intercontinental ballistic
missile, brand new. They have new road-mobile missiles. They
have up-gunned their bombers. They have new weapons off their
bombers. This is in addition to the novel capabilities that I
described in my opening statement. They have new command and
control. They have new warning. They are exercising at a level
we haven't seen since the Cold War. President Putin plays in
those exercises, and we are seeing readiness levels like we
have not seen before. So, is an across-the-board, comprehensive
improvement in their strategic capabilities; again, about 80
percent complete right now.
Senator Kelly. On the B61 Mod 12 program underway, going to
give us more accuracy of smaller CEP for that weapon and that
weapon system. Do you see this mod of the B61 being able to
last here for the next 20 years or so or do you see a point
where we are going to have to find a new air-launched,
ballistic bomb?
Admiral Richard. So, for the B61, right, I do think that
modernization program will serve our well going into the
future. That is a gravity weapon, as you well know, and that
is, in particular, of importance to NATO, in terms of our
extended deterrence and assurance commitments. So, I am
satisfied that that weapons system is going to serve us well.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Admiral.
General Dickinson, when we spoke last week, we discussed
the importance of cooperation and communication with other
space-faring nations to deal with the common challenges that we
face with orbital debris, a challenge I had to deal with
myself, personally, on a number of occasions. You know, these
communications are critical for advanced warning, as well, test
launches with competitors like Russia and China.
I want to, just in the remaining time in your view, you
know, how good are the current structures for communications
with Russia and China concerning orbital debris, but also, when
they launch unexpectedly, it could be to put payloads in orbit,
and if the communications systems are not adequate, what could
we do right now to improve those?
General Dickinson. So, Senator, we, as I mentioned----
Chairman Reed. Microphone, please.
General Dickinson. So, we communicate with our competitors
in terms of what is going on in the space domain.
Could it be better?
Yes, it could be better. But we communicate to them
electronically through a website called space.org that has a
catalog or has information on there that we can alert them to a
potential collision in space. So, we do communicate in that
way, but I do believe that we could improve upon that as we go
forward.
Senator Kelly. That would be true for a test launch, as
well?
General Dickinson. Yes, it would be for test launches, as
well, so that we can make sure that we understand intention, as
well as what activity they may be doing in the space domain so
that we can ensure that we provide a safe environment for space
operations.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, General.
General Dickinson. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly.
Senator Peters, please.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to both of
you, thank you for your testimony here today and your service
to our country.
General Dickinson, in your opening remarks, you addressed
space-situational awareness in the context of your work with
the Department of Commerce and its open-architecture data
repository. So, my question to you is, could you ever foresee
space-situational awareness being a wholly Commerce function
with Space Command playing a supporting role, and if not, why?
General Dickinson. I think as we look to the future and,
really, the current situation that we have now, as I mentioned,
32,000 pieces of debris, objects on orbit. As we move forward,
I do believe that we will see that as a, or we should see that
as a purely administrative type of function in terms of
tracking objects in the space domain.
My job at the U.S. Space Command is to not only understand
that, but also be able to characterize what we are seeing in
the space domain so we can understand what our adversaries'
intention may be and their capabilities. But I see in the
future that as we move towards that, that that could be a
wholly administrative-type function, similarly to what the FAA
does right now, in terms of making sure the air domain is safe.
Senator Peters. So, if that would be a Commerce function,
you would be supportive of that, as long as you are playing the
role that you mentioned?
General Dickinson. Yes.
Senator Peters. On the same topic, in 2020 alone, I any
Senator Kelly mentioned his involvement with it in space, as
well, but the International Space Station had to perform three
maneuvers to being hit by space debris.
Has the command, your command undertaken any initiatives to
contend with space debris by participating in commercial
efforts, such as the LSAD launch that occurred last month?
General Dickinson. We are looking at those types of
opportunities right now, because that could contribute to our
ability to understand the domain better.
Senator Peters. Very good, and, as well, General, I have
another question for you. Much like the economy at large, our
operations in space are going to be facilitated not by just the
purchase and the operation of hardware, but also the
utilization of services that will allow us to maintain a robust
presence in space.
For example, in Michigan, we have a company called ATLAS
Space Operations in Traverse City that is involved in the
assistance of launch operations, communications, other types of
services, and they are doing very innovative work in that area.
Under your command, how is SPACECOM utilizing private sector
partners, who can provide a variety of these kinds of
capabilities?
General Dickinson. So, Senator, out at Vandenberg Air Force
Base, which is part of the U.S. Space Command, we have a
Commercial Integration Cell where we are working every day with
the commercial industry in terms of understanding capabilities
that they are bringing online, as well as on-orbit type of
activities. I think we have close to 90 different companies
that we work with out there.
Senator Peters. Great.
Admiral Richard, in your opening remarks, you described the
submarine-launched nuclear missile as necessary to address
regional deterrence challenges from both, China and Russia, but
increasing the flexibility, in your words, quote, providing a
more credible deterrent to a limited attack against the United
States, end of quote.
Could you explain what you mean by, quote, more credible,
and does a submarine-launched cruise missile fill that
capability gap to our extended deterrence posture?
Admiral Richard. So, sir, when I say more credible, that
was in relationship to the low-yield, submarine-launched
ballistic missile aspect of that. You can't deter if you can't
get to the target, and that weapons system has a better ability
to do that it. It makes it more credible in the eyes of the
other party.
The second part, on the sea-launched cruise missile, it
goes after more the large disparity that we have in non-treaty
accountable weapons between us and the Russians. I use that
term very specifically. Sometimes, they are used as strategic
versus non-strategic. I think that distinction is increasingly
irrelevant and a large number of so-called strategic weapons
are a direct threat to the homeland, in addition to our forces
regionally, and to our allies.
The sea-launched cruise missile would give us an ability to
not rely on host nation's support and give us an ability to,
again, provide an effective counter to the disparity that we
see in non-treaty accountable weapons.
Senator Peters. Well, as you know very well, deterrence
depends on capability, on credibility, and communication, and
when a Virginia-class submarine launches a Tomahawk cruise
missile into Syria, for example, China, Russia, and other
nuclear powers can now credibly recognize that such launches
are carrying conventional munitions.
My question is, if attack submarines reacquire the
capability to launch nuclear weapons, then, does that mean that
Beijing and Moscow will need to worry about every missile
launch within the range of their territories, and are you
concerned, therefore, that this added ambiguity might lead to
some sort of miscalculation?
Admiral Richard. Senator, what I would offer is I think
that it is a fundamental error to try to determine what the
payload is on any weapons system by assigning it to a
particular trajectory. You can make any trajectory carry any
payload.
The Nation has long had a cruise missile, nuclear cruise
missile capability. Russia and China, or Russia has it today.
So, the idea that we will somehow sort out what a threat
is, based on its profile, I think, is a flawed idea to begin
with and we certainly don't characterize anything based on the
flight profile coming at us.
Senator Peters. Great. Thank you, Admiral.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters.
I recognize Senator Sullivan, please.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, gentlemen,
thank you for your service and your testimony today.
You know, I was in a hearing last week, an oversight
hearing, and one of my colleagues on the other side of the
aisle was kind of putting out this number of 10 percent, his
estimate of the military was extremist, racist. I think in my
experience, and I am still serving in the Marine Corps
Reserves, that number is absurdly high. It wasn't based on any
data. That would make about two hundred or 250,000 members of
the Active force supposedly fitting within that category, which
I think is a disparagement of our men and women in the
military. I got a little heated in that hearing last week,
because I am really tired of hearing about, you know, what,
supposedly is all the bad things about the members of the
military, when I think it is some of the finest young men and
women in America serving, volunteering to serve.
Is that your experience, 10 percent, 1 in 10, 250,000
active-duty forces are somehow extremist, racist?
It is an absurd number, but it gets thrown around in the
newspaper, and I am trying to get the men and women, like you,
who is served for decades to kind of give me your view.
Admiral, General, I know that is not the purpose of the
hearing, but I think it is really important, particularly for
the men and women that you are leading, and that we have
oversight of, to let them know that we don't think a huge
majority of the force is extremist; obviously, some of my
Senate colleagues do, which I think is absurd.
Can I get your view on that.
Admiral Richard. Let me go first on that one. I am very
confident that the number of extremists in my forces is zero
and let me explain why I say that.
The Department has made it clear for decades that we don't
tolerate that. My forces are a little bit different.
We have certainly done everything Secretary Austin has told
us to do. He has made it very clear what the standards are, but
it is reiterating a standard.
Every person in my organization has to have a security
clearance, for starters, right. When you fill that form out,
and I have been filling it out for 40 years, there is an
extensive battery of questions designed to get after that very
point. Then somebody goes and investigates you, and then they
go talk to all of your references, and then they go talk some
more, hunting for that very thing.
We don't care what the source of extremism was. Those date
back to Communism is actually what they were looking for when I
first came in, and today they will even go look at your social
media. If you can't pass that part, I don't even see you. Then
on top of that, in my forces, we have a personnel reliability
program for these. So, you now have peer-monitoring brought in
and a number of other standards.
So, if there are any extremists in my organization, one,
they hide it very well, and, two, it is just a matter of time
until I get to them.
Senator Sullivan. So, you are saying that you agree with
me, these are some of the best men and women in America and to
be besmirched by the media or a senator, 10 percent is
ridiculous.
Admiral Richard. Sir, I will just explain what the standard
is that we uphold. It is contrary to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. It is essential for good order and
discipline, and my forces meet the highest standard of that,
that DOD requires.
Senator Sullivan. Great. General, your view on this?
I know you have a lot of experience, given your decades in
the U.S. Army.
General Dickinson. Thank you, Senator.
So, in my organization, a very similar organization to the
U.S. Strategic Command. So, space, as we all understand, and I
know we have talked about it many times in terms of the
classification or the security clearances that are required
within my organization to be able to do the things that we do
in the space domain and terrestrially. We have the same rigor
in terms of some of the questions that are asked during their
security clearances in terms of getting them to the proper
clearance level so they can perform their duties within my
command.
I would tell you right now that we have done everything
that Secretary Austin has asked us to do in terms of training
and awareness, but in my organization, I would say that number
is zero. We are very keen and aware of these types of
activities or what would lead to those, and we understand that
very well.
So, in terms of years of experience, yes, I would tell you
that in the formations that I have had throughout my career, I
have not seen that. So, I believe that it is close to zero in
my organization, if not zero.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
But nothing nearing 10 percent. Ridiculous, in my view,
but, obviously, you guys, you gentlemen would agree.
Let me just ask one final question. Admiral, it is for you.
As the North Koreans continue advancement of their weapons
systems, what can we do, are you concerned it is going to
outpace our ability to defend the United States Homeland, I am
talking about the GBI system, and what can we do to accelerate
development of the next generation of interceptor, and does it
make sense to have 20 empty silos right now at Fort Greely?
Admiral Richard. Senator, one, I think the Nation has the
right standard and policy when it comes to missile defense
relative to rogue threats, with North Korea right now being the
defining example of that. Obviously, that is something we may
go review, but right now, I would start off with, I think that
is the right pace.
We will have to pace that threat. I certainly support
Northern Command's requirements to be able to do so and would
look for the Department, understanding resource limitations and
other mission sets that are in competition for us to maintain
that standard in terms of our missile defenses.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
Senator Blumenthal, are you prepared? Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here. Thank you for your
extraordinary service.
Admiral Richard, we have interacted before on a number of
submarine-related events and I thank you for your service,
particularly in that area.
General Dickinson, thank you for embarking on this very
promising, important new area.
At a recent hearing, I expressed my concern about white
supremacist actions and extremism in our military and I want to
just be clear that I said at a prior hearing, it was a very
small percentage of our troops that potentially were involved
in these activities.
I am sure it is well under 10 percent, as I believe I
indicated then, but I think any percentage of white supremacist
or violent extremism in our military is intolerable and
unacceptable. I hope you both agree.
Admiral Richard. Senator, I certainly agree with that,
right, that extremism, you are either on team Constitution or
you are not, and if you are not, you have no place in our
military.
General Dickinson. Senator, I agree, as well. There is no
place for it in our military today.
Senator Blumenthal. As you know better than all of us,
General, much of the operational information utilized within
SPACECOM remains very highly classified and is often
restrictive in terms of access. I have been an advocate in many
other areas of sharing more information with the American
public so that they understand the threats and the risks in
this area. Right now, I think there is almost no awareness
among the American public.
What can be done to make the American public better
informed and aware of the challenges, to use a euphemism, that
exists in your domain?
General Dickinson. Senator, thanks for that we.
I would say that is probably, in my words, one of the most
visible things that U.S. Space Command has done over the last
20 months, in that we have been able to articulate and call-out
some of the activities that we have seen in orbit that we would
determine, at a minimum, dangerous; at a maximum, or the other
end of the scale, as threatening.
What I am describing is what we have seen over the last
year, 2019 and 2020, with the on-orbit activities of the
Russians, in terms of conducting an on-orbit anti-satellite
test, as well as a ground-based missile, anti-satellite test
that was threatening or demonstrating a capability that they
have.
In other words, Senator, our ability to be able to discuss
that, like we do in many other domains, air, land, and sea, is
very important to what we do, and really working very closely
with the intel community, we have been able to do that.
So, in terms of classification and being able to declassify
that so that we are able to communicate and talk not only to
the American public about it, but also our allies and partners
around the world to make sure that we understand what they are
building and what their future intent could be.
Senator Blumenthal. That was my next question.
Do you think that there are procedures for declassifying
information that make our ability to share information with our
allies and partners operational?
General Dickinson. So, Senator, we are working that every
day. Just the fact, last year, that we were able to come out
publicly and describe what I just mentioned about their on-
orbit activities is a big step in the right direction.
We continue to work within the Department, as well as
within the intel community, so that we can continue to do that
and do it more frequently.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Hawley, please.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, both of you for being here. Thank you
for your many years of service to our country.
Admiral, can I start with you, and I want to talk about
little bit about the B-2 Whiteman Air Force Base in my home
state of Missouri, of course is proudly home to the B-2 bomber.
In your testimony, you wrote that the B-2, and I am quoting you
now, is the only heavy-payload, penetrating stealth bomber in
the world, able to hold at risk, heavily defended, hard, and
deeply buried targets.
I just want to give you an opportunity to talk about why
this is so important for our strategic deterrence and what it
is we need to do to ensure that the B-2 continues to be
effective until the B-21 comes fully online.
Admiral Richard. Well, sir, that summarized it, in terms
of, that is the only capability that we have to hold certain
targets at risk that are very important in our ability to deter
that, right. It is known that that weapons system can do that.
That changes decision calculus of people that we are trying to
deter.
I applaud Air Force efforts, right, to maintain the B-2 all
the way through, with its full range of capabilities, while
simultaneously taking all the steps necessary to bring the B-21
in on time, such that the Nation maintains this capability
going into the future.
Remember, in addition to its penetration capabilities, one
key aspect that the bomber leg adds is its flexibility; the
fact that we can move it all over the place. That provides a
deterrent benefit.
It certainly provides assurance to allies. You see us doing
that with these forces today, and it is signaling. It is
visible, right. We can directly show our, it is the best way we
have to directly show our resolve as a nation by what we do
with this piece of the triad.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you.
Let's talk about China a little bit. You said earlier today
that what it is going to take to deter China is going to start
to be additive to what we have to do with Russia. Can you just
elaborate a little bit on what you mean by additive.
Admiral Richard. So, fundamentally, I am required to deter
all nations that I am assigned, all the time, right. I don't
get to do it one at a time. I have an obligation, such that we
are able to meet all the objectives simultaneously with
everybody that is involved.
Until recently, it was pretty reasonable to assume that
with the margins, right, for uncertainty that are built into
our strategic forces, it would be reasonable to assume you had
sufficient residual capability to deter any other lesser-
included case. That is about to no longer be true, and that is
what I am talking about. I can give you some specific numbers
in closed session, Senator.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you for that.
Tell me this, what do you think that China's progress from
a nuclear dyad to triad says about their view of a no-first-use
policy?
Admiral Richard. Senator, that, along with everything else
in my mind, is fundamentally inconsistent with a no-first-use
policy and the implied minimum-deterrent strategy.
But maybe more importantly than independent of what their
intent is, it certainly gives them the capability, if they
choose to, to any number of possible employment strategies. So,
even if that was the basis of the decision, it still allows a
very large range of possible employment strategies, independent
of why they got it to begin with.
Senator Hawley. Very good.
Admiral, tell me, many of those who advocate for shrinking
or eliminating our ICBM force are also strong proponents of
international arms control, and I am just wondering from a
Defense point of view, is it your view that cutting our ICBM
force would help or hurt our negotiating position in future
arms-control negotiations with Russia or China.
Admiral Richard. Senator, the way I approach that,
fundamentally, that negotiation is the responsibility of the
Department of State, with input from OSD policy, and I would
defer to them on what the best negotiating strategy is.
I just have to look at what the actual capabilities are now
and what I have to have to deter that. So, my strong advice is
arms control would be excellent. Additional arms control would
reduce the threat. Get the arms control in place first before
we then decide to take reductions in our capability.
Senator Hawley. Let me ask you one final question and here
in my remaining seconds about the danger of a simultaneous
conflict. In your testimony, you wrote that prudence dictates
military planners consider and account for the complex threat
environment enabled by the strategic cooperation of Russia and
China.
Tell me how you are thinking about the threat of
simultaneous conflicts in both, Europe and Asia, and how that
informs your thinking of what we are going to need to maintain
strategic deterrence in the coming years.
Admiral Richard. Deterring opportunistic aggression going
into the future will be a challenge that we haven't faced on
this scale in a long time. So, if we are engaged in one
theater, other folks sensing opportunity, and it is not only
for their own individual aims. We also have to think through
what they might do in cooperation with each other, because
while they both have different national aims, both of them are
inconsistent with us and it is to both of their advantage for
us to potentially give constrain in a particular area.
So, it is not only opportunistic; it is in combination.
This three-party world that we are in is something we have
never faced before, and we have a lot of work to continue to do
to think our way through that.
Senator Hawley. Thank you very much for that and your
testimony.
I will have some questions for you, General, for the
record, and thank you for being here and thank you for your
service.
Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
Senator Blackburn, via Webex.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for the time today to talk a little bit.
General Dickinson, I want to come to you. SPACECOM, the
Southeast is home to three of our Nation's top-12 university
programs for aerospace engineering. So, we are very excited and
think it is appropriately placed, having SPACECOM there in
Huntsville. We look forward to hosting this in the future and
hearing more about SPACECOM. I appreciate some of the vastness
of your area of operations, and it really is, quite literally,
limitless. I see a range of reach in space and look forward to
that.
So, let me ask you this, is there a role for SPACECOM in
traditional Departments of Commerce and Transportation-like
functions, such as the shaping of the domestic ecosystem of
space activity, space traffic management, launch licensing, and
other space activities, because we know that, certainly, the
Chinese are already working on this.
General Dickinson. Senator, I think what you just described
is appropriate. I think as we look at the rapid
commercialization of space, just from the United States'
perspective, in terms of numbers of capabilities and satellites
going into orbit, that the actual administrative piece to that,
which is the licensing and those types of functions, absolutely
are part of the whole-of-government type of activity.
For me at U.S. Space Command, my job is to make sure that I
provide that secure environment through my ability to
understand what is going on in the space domain in terms of
what our competitors, potential adversaries are doing there, in
terms of characterization of that, and understanding what their
intentions might be.
Senator Blackburn. Where are you in working with the
Department of State and our partners and our allies to create
norms of behavior in space, to include beyond near-Earth orbit?
General Dickinson. Senator, I work very closely with OSD
policy and the Department of Defense on helping to characterize
maybe what we would think would be norms of behavior, but the
work there is actually with the Department of State and how
they are characterizing that.
My job in U.S. Space Command is to make sure that I provide
them that type of information that would show them or
illustrate to them what those activities or behaves would be on
orbit, in terms of our adversaries and competitors.
Senator Blackburn. Okay. Now, if there were to be a
conflict that began in or either transitioned to space, how do
you interpret your current responsibilities to defend U.S.
commercial assets?
General Dickinson. So, my ``protect and defend''
responsibilities in the space domain are one of my fundamental
mission sets for this command and I do that in a number of
ways. One is understanding the environment. Two, is
communicating that to, in this case, a commercial entity so
that they are aware of that, and we do that. We are integrated
very well with some of our commercial partners out at
Vandenberg Air Force Base in one of my subordinate commands,
and so we work every day to do that. But we would do that in a
timely manner so that we are able to make them aware of
activities.
Senator Blackburn. So, you believe these responsibilities
are appropriate in scope and scale?
General Dickinson. So, Senator, I would take that in terms
of my responsibilities and direction from the National Command
Authority, on which assets, in particular, to protect, in that
case, and in terms of the resources, I have resources today
that are growing in capacity and capability over the next few
years to help me.
Senator Blackburn. Okay, and then, when it comes to
development and enhancement of our space-based sensor layer,
what would you say is the top threat that we should be hedging
against and what should be our priority investment to counter
that threat?
General Dickinson. So, the pacing threat, the pacing
challenge for, in the space domain is like it is in the other
domains, which is China. They are growing capability and
capacity as we have seen over the last several years. If you
look at just the gross number of satellites that the Chinese
have today, based on what they had just, you know, 10 years
ago, they have gone from, back in 2010, they had about 70
satellites on orbit; today, they have well over 400.
Senator Blackburn. Okay.
General Dickinson. We know that is growing in capability
and capacity to probably be over a thousand by year 2030. So,
they are the pacing threat for us in the space domain, just as
they are in other domains.
Senator Blackburn. Okay. I have a couple questions for
Admiral Richard. I will submit those as a QFR.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Blackburn, and
now let me recognize and salute the patience of Senator
Tuberville.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
I know they are getting tired. Look, they look hungry and
they probably need to go to the restroom, probably, so I won't
be that long.
First of all, thank you for your service. I can't imagine
starting a new team from scratch. I can't imagine that. I never
had to do it in football, and I just had 120 players, and,
General, you have got your hands full, and thank you for your
service, and an important service.
Admiral, I like your forcefulness in terms of, hey, we need
to modernize at the end of the day. You have had a team for a
long time, or we have had a team that is getting old and we
need new players and we need new equipment.
I like what our secretary says. We can afford survival, and
he is exactly right. All the money we are spending, we can
afford it.
You know, growing up, we were all in a space race, General,
and we are in a new one now. It is a competition that we have
to win. The Chinese have weaponized space, sadly.
Many in our country don't understand that American life
depends on our secure and reliable access to space, whether it
is the GPS on our phones or watching a football game.
Admiral Richard, you are a native of the great state and,
General Dickinson, I know you worked at Huntsville as Army
Missile Command, and you both understand firsthand that
Alabamians stand firmly behind our men and women in uniform.
Alabama's industry stands behind our military.
Alabama and Redstone Arsenal are ready for Space Command,
but many people in this room probably don't understand
Redstone. Redstone has been involved with space operations for
70 years. NASA's only facility on a military base is the
Marshall Space Flight Center. The largest consumer of space
products is the U.S. Army and the Army Missile Command and has
been at Redstone Arsenal since it was established in 1962.
Space technology won't just be developed by the Government
to outpace China and Russia, which is going to be a challenge.
We need private industry. The area around Redstone boasts 800
suppliers and contractors building the very latest in space
technology.
I was at Redstone 3 weeks ago and Redstone has the land for
Space Command to grow as your mission expands. It has dedicated
64 acres behind the fence as Space Command and the base has
temporary spaces for you right now if needed.
So, General, I am looking forward to you calling the Great
State of Alabama your home, and, Admiral, you are welcome to
come any time.
General Dickinson, thank you for your productive call last
week. My colleague asked how much of a civilian workforce we
might move to Huntsville. I would like to follow-up on that
question. First, how much do your civilian workforce have you
hired and how many people do you intend to hire in the future?
General Dickinson. Senator, my approved manning document is
about 60 percent civilian. To date, we have hired probably
about, not quite a third of that into the command. The command,
right now, is about a third of what our in strength will be.
So, we are a little over 600. Some of that is contractor. Some
of that is civilian, and some of that is military.
So, as we look to the future, you know, we are absolutely
looking at incentives that we can provide to our civilian
workforce. They are absolutely the bedrock of the command today
and into the future, and so, we will look at how we can try to
incentivize our civilian workforce in terms of making the move
to Alabama.
But I can't give you, like I said earlier, I can't give you
a prediction on what that percentage will be. There are a lot
of factors that go into it. What we can do, though, is try to
incentivize them through motivation, in terms of wanting to
work with the command, and some other things that we will
consider, as well.
Senator Tuberville. Well, we are proud that the Secretary
of Air Force selected Alabama as the home for Space Command.
How do you see the National Guard implementing into that,
at all? Do you, at all, in the future in Space Command and
Space Force?
General Dickinson. Senator, as we speak now, the Reserve
component is a very important part of the U.S. Space Command.
As a matter of fact, when we stood up or we established about
20 months ago, one of our biggest elements or components within
the command was the Reserve component.
It was the Reserves and the National Guard. That is a very
important part of the command. They bring a great deal of
expertise and knowledge to the command.
I see that in the future, too. We will always, as part of
Space Command, have the Reserve component as an element within
the command.
Senator Tuberville. Admiral Richard, Russia and China are
prioritizing investments to compete and win across the range of
strategic capabilities, especially with regard to nuclear and
space capabilities.
Do you believe that we are behind the curve?
Admiral Richard. Senator, I have what I need to do to
deter, to do what the President has asked me to do, but I need
it modernized, right. There is no remaining margin.
We cannot extend or delay any of the modernization programs
for me to continue to say that in the future.
Senator Tuberville. Do we have the technology we need?
Admiral Richard. Senator, yes, right now.
The one area that we are working the hardest on to make
sure we are fully taking advantage of new technologies is in
the nuclear command and control system. We have got the next 5
years locked in pretty tight.
Trying to make sure that we take full advantage of
technological development both, from the Commercial Sector and
the Government Sector, will be keys to improving that in future
iterations.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville.
Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony.
We will now close the open session, adjourn, as quickly as
possible to SVC-217 for the classified section.
I have a conflict with the Appropriations Committee. If the
ranking member arrives first, he will begin the initiation of
the questions.
With nothing [inaudible] or no other business before the
Committee in the open session, I adjourn the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand
nuclear-tipped cruise missiles
1. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Richard, prior to the previous
President reversing course, two Democratic and two Republican
administrations had agreed that we no longer needed to deploy nuclear
armed cruise missiles on conventional Navy ships. Why is a new nuclear
sea launched cruise missile needed now, particular in times of fiscal
austerity?
Admiral Richard. The military requirement is driven by the
increasing threat; i.e., the dramatic deterioration of the strategic
environment.
Specifically:
Russia has recapitalized roughly 80 per cent of its
strategic nuclear forces, has as many as 2000 nuclear weapons not under
arms control agreements, and is capable of producing hundreds of
warheads per year. Further, Russian strategy, doctrine, and
capabilities call for the limited use of nuclear weapons to coerce
NATO, and to defeat NATO conventional forces through wider use of
nuclear weapons if coercion fails.
China continues heavy investment in nuclear capabilities;
has an intercontinental ballistic missile / submarine launched
ballistic missile (ICBM / SLBM) dyad which will soon become a triad and
is ahead of pace to more than double its nuclear stockpile by end of
the decade. China's actions in the South China Sea, Hong Kong, Taiwan,
and ballistic / hypersonic missile development significantly add to the
threat--and they are likewise unconstrained by treaties or agreements.
Deploying the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) is
intended to deny potential adversaries any mistaken confidence limited
nuclear employment would provide an advantage over the U.S. and its
Allies.
SLCM-N will bring a needed non-strategic regional presence and an
assured response capability. It does not require host nation support
and provides additional diversity in platforms, range, and
survivability. It will enhance our ability to tailor deterrence and
assurance while expanding the range of credible U.S. options.
Reintroduction of the SLCM-N (and other supplements) is intended to
strengthen deterrence by convincing adversaries the U.S. has credible
and effective options at any level of conflict, and they cannot coerce
the U.S., our Allies and partners through the use of nuclear weapons.
2. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Richard, how will deploying these
weapons on conventional navy vessels like attack submarines change
their mission?
Admiral Richard. Deploying such weapons on conventional Navy
vessels would not fundamentally change their mission but they would
augment their capabilities and provide additional options for the
President.
The nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) is intended
to deny potential adversaries any mistaken confidence limited nuclear
employment would provide an advantage over the U.S., its Allies and
partners.
SLCM-N will bring a needed non-strategic regional presence and an
assured response capability. It does not require host nation support
and provides additional diversity in platforms, range, and
survivability. The SLCM-N complements the low-yield submarine launched
ballistic missile (SLBM) to provide assurance to our Allies through
tailored response options in vast operating areas where forward basing
may not be possible. It will enhance our ability to tailor deterrence
and assurance while expanding the range of credible U.S. options.
Reintroduction of the SLCM-N (and other supplements) is intended to
strengthen deterrence by convincing adversaries the U.S. has credible
and effective options at any level of conflict, and they cannot coerce
the U.S., our Allies and partners through the use of nuclear weapons.
the nuclear triad
3. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Richard, Air Force Chief of Staff
General C.Q. Brown, USAF, recently stated ``the number [of nuclear
weapons] might adjust and that may be a part of a dialogue . . .
there'll be a fork in the road at some point.'' Do you agree with his
comments?
Admiral Richard. General Brown was referring to a hypothetical
dialogue that may occur in the future regarding the appropriate triad
force structure, so I would agree and expect many such conversations as
we move forward with modernization. General Brown also stated, ``We
can't stop our work on GBSD [Ground Based Strategic Deterrent].'' In a
recent visit to Minot Air Force Base, General Brown said ``By updating
the missile portion of the nuclear triad, we ensure a credible, capable
and safe nuclear deterrent that provides our Nation and our Allies an
umbrella of deterrence while discouraging others from use of nuclear
weapons . . . Modernization of the ICBM [Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile] program is both strategic and cost-effective.'' I fully agree
with these statements.
4. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Richard, if you agree with General
Brown's recent statements, what kinds of options are you considering in
terms of adjusting our nuclear arsenal?
Admiral Richard. USSTRATCOM will fully support ongoing strategic
and nuclear policy reviews, with a goal of assessing the role of
nuclear weapons in our defense strategy while adjusting to the
operational implications of policy choices, as well as significant
changes to the threat environment.
As such, it is premature to speculate on any potential adjustments
to our nuclear arsenal. Any adjustments to our force structure or
stockpile size should be informed by a comprehensive strategic review,
to evaluate the global threats, followed by a policy and strategy
determination.
ground-based strategic deterrent
5. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Richard, the Air Force recently
awarded a $13.3 billion contract to develop the Ground Based Strategic
Deterrent to replace the existing Minuteman III intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBM). Some critics have questioned whether ICBMs
are necessary for nuclear deterrence or whether the Minuteman III could
be extended for decades. Investing in other programs besides the
ground-based strategic deterrent (GBSD) could save $260 billion dollars
and create jobs. In a time of fiscal constraint, why should we
modernize a weapon system that critics call redundant?
Admiral Richard. The three legs of the strategic triad--ICBMs,
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and heavy bombers--are
complementary, not redundant. Each leg has unique attributes intended
to complicate adversary planning while enhancing achievement of U.S.
strategic deterrence and extended assurance objectives. The flexibility
and responsiveness attributes provided by the ICBM leg are unmatched by
the SSBN or bomber legs, and eliminating ICBMs would allow an adversary
to concentrate resources on defeating the remaining two legs. For
example, without ICBMs China becomes a strategic nuclear peer.
The Air Force's decision point to either continue GBSD or pivot to
a Minuteman III life extension program passed a number of years ago,
when the DOD approved the Milestone-A (approves program entry into the
Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction [TMRR] phase, approval of the
program acquisition strategy, and release of the final Request for
Proposal [RFP]) and initiated the GBSD development phase. GBSD is
timely, cost effective, and ensures credibility of the ground leg of
the U.S. strategic deterrent for decades into the future.
6. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Richard, in your opinion, if we had
to continue to rely on the Minuteman III, how much longer could we rely
on that system?
Admiral Richard. We cannot rely on Minuteman III (MM III) past its
currently planned retirement date. Our MM III force is 40 years beyond
its designed life expectancy; relies on 20-50 year old technology;
requires reverse engineering for costly, inflexible, sustainment
solutions; and faces diminishing manufacturing sources, materiel
shortages, and skilled labor force losses. A MM III life extension
program would be prohibitively difficult, expensive, is already late to
need, and will not address future threats.
Previous decisions to delay needed modernization have resulted in
aging components, asset attrition, and declining infrastructure. The
Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) is a comprehensive weapon
system replacement for MM III and must begin deploying no later than
2028 to prevent negative impacts to strategic deterrence. There is no
margin to delay the GBSD deployment.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
coordination with indo-pacific command
7. Senator Hirono. General Dickinson, in your opening statement,
you noted that Beijing actively seeks space superiority and is
developing capabilities that could hold U.S. space assets at risk. How
are you working with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) to deter
China from attacking our space systems?
General Dickinson. USSPACECOM is actively working with USINDOPACOM,
other Combatant Commands, and the Intelligence Community to improve our
posture, strengthen our alliances, and enhance emerging partnerships
across the Indo-Pacific to deter China.
Posture/Plans: Since USSPACECOM stood-up, we've been aggressive in
our efforts to integrate with the other Combatant Commands, especially
USINDOPACOM and USEUCOM. We have Integrated Planning Elements
supporting each of the 10 other Combatant Commands. These are members
of my staff that are onsite at the other Combatant Commands to
integrate space into planning and operations, including Camp Smith in
Hawaii. Thanks to the collaborative efforts of our Integrated Planning
Elements, USSPACECOM equities are embedded in the other Combatant
Commands' planning processes, just as theirs have been incorporated
into ours. The understanding that space capabilities are both necessary
to enable the Joint fight and are also vulnerable greatly increases
emphasis on space planning among the Combatant Commands for competition
and conflict. These planning efforts include Posture Plans, which
address the necessary forces, footprints, and agreements for the
Combatant Commands to meet their Unified Command Plan (UCP)
responsibilities and our Contingency Plans to which we will transition
if conflict arises.
Strengthening Alliances: USSPACECOM is leveraging our security
cooperation plans to focus collaboration with key allies on space
domain awareness, force support, contingency operations, and strategic
messaging. We are capitalizing on opportunities to increase the
frequency of combined operations, exercises, and training with
Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, and New Zealand, including
leveraging Global Sentinel, Global Thunder, and Global Lightning to
increase resilience and interoperability. We are contributing to
collective security in the Pacific by supporting Exercise Pacific Fury,
Pacific Sentry, Talisman Saber, Northern Edge, and Keen Edge with space
integration experts.
Enhancing Emerging Partnerships: USSPACECOM is working with
USINDOPACOM to identify opportunities for enhancing our space
relationships with non-traditional space partners in the region who are
beginning to show interest in space.
columbia-class ballistic missile submarine procurement
8. Senator Hirono. Admiral Richard, construction of the new line of
Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines started last fall, with the
first boat scheduled to be delivered to the Navy in 2027 and then go on
its first deterrence patrol in 2031 to begin replacing the Ohio-class
submarines. In your discussions with the Navy, has the COVID pandemic
negatively affected the procurement timeline for the Columbia-class
subs?
Admiral Richard. Defer to the Navy regarding the ballistic missile
submarine (SSBN) acquisition schedule.
The Columbia-class delivery timeline remains on time despite the
challenges posed by COVID-19. I applaud continued and focused support
essential to build the workforce required to execute construction of
the Columbia program.
9. Senator Hirono. Admiral Richard, how confident are you in the
procurement timelines I mentioned?
Admiral Richard. Defer to the Navy regarding the ballistic missile
submarine (SSBN) acquisition schedule.
There is no margin in the Columbia-class delivery schedule and any
delay will result in an operational capability gap. The Navy continues
to make every effort to ensure on time delivery and the program must
remain fully funded to replace our aging Ohio-class SSBNs.
10. Senator Hirono. Admiral Richard, why is it important to have a
minimum of 12 Columbia-class submarines in the Fleet?
Admiral Richard. Section 242 of the Fiscal Year 2012 National
Defense Authorization Act directed DOD to submit a report on the
Columbia-class program that included, among other things, an assessment
of various combinations of submarines and number of missile launch
tubes per submarine.
The assessment concluded at least 12 Columbia-class submarines with
16 missile tubes each provided the best balance of performance,
flexibility and cost while supporting the Nation's strategic deterrence
mission and objectives. This is the absolute minimum capability needed
to allow USSTRATCOM to meet our at-sea requirement during the most
limiting maintenance intensive times throughout its service life.
It is important to note the assessment was completed during a
period of reduced tension. Given today's challenges and anticipated
future threats, an assessment completed today would likely recommend
additional hulls, missiles tubes, or a combination of both.
hawaii air national guard space squadron
11. Senator Hirono. General Dickinson, last year, it was announced
that the Hawaii Air National Guard had been selected to have one of
four national offensive space control squadrons. I understand that the
Hawaii Air National Guard is in the process of establishing the 293rd
Space Control Squad based at the Pacific Missile Range Facility on
Kauai. What role would members of the National Guard play in U.S. Space
Command's (SPACECOM) operations?
General Dickinson. (Dir, Reserve Forces and Manpower, Col Lisa
Johnson)
Air National Guard (ANG) Space Control Squadrons have been
providing Space Electronic Warfare in support of Combatant Command
requirements since 2018. There are currently three Offensive Space
Control units in the California, Colorado, and Florida ANGs
respectively. Once all basing actions are completed and the Secretary
of the Air Force (SecAF) provides the record of decision, the ANG will
stand up a fourth Offensive Space Control Squadron along with the first
Defensive Space Control Squadron in the ANG. Specific to the proposed
Space Control unit in Hawaii, the Environmental Assessment (EA) will be
completed on 5 Aug 2021 with a SecAF Record of Decision anticipated
before the end of CY21, Initial Operation Capability (IOC) is projected
for fiscal year 2023. United States Space Command commands and controls
these forces based on theater and global operational requirements.
iran joint comprehensive plan of action
12. Senator Hirono. Admiral Richard, before the Trump
Administration decided to leave the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) agreement, head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and
the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) testified that the JCPOA
extended the amount of time Iran would need to produce enough fissile
material for a nuclear weapon from a few months to about 1 year. This
is why it's crucial to be a part of an agreement with Iran on the issue
of nuclear weapons. The Biden Administration is seeking to rejoin the
JCPOA with the condition that Iran returns to compliance under the
agreement. What are your thoughts on negotiating a return to the JCPOA?
Admiral Richard. Defer to the State Department regarding
negotiations of international agreements.
13. Senator Hirono. Admiral Richard, would rejoining the JCPOA be a
good step toward containing Iran's nuclear weapons capabilities?
Admiral Richard. I support any agreement that enhances the security
of this nation. Defer to the State Department and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense regarding whether rejoining JCPOA would enhance
the security of the U.S., its Allies and partners.
north korea
14. Senator Hirono. Admiral Richard, in your opening statement you
say that U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) is committed to supporting
the efforts of Department of Defense (DOD) and the State Department to
work with Indo-Pacific partners to reduce military tensions and support
the achievement of the fully verified denuclearization of North Korea.
What do you think the next steps are to achieve full denuclearization
of North Korea?
Admiral Richard. As diplomacy is the Nation's tool of first resort,
defer to the State Department in this matter.
15. Senator Hirono. Admiral Richard, what role will STRATCOM play
in achieving the goal of full denuclearization of North Korea?
Admiral Richard. USSTRATCOM supports DOD and State Department
efforts to coordinate with regional partners, reduce military tensions,
and engage diplomatic efforts towards achieving the complete
denuclearization of North Korea.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
cyber mission and space
16. Senator Rosen. General Dickinson, how are you utilizing
technologies like machine learning and artificial intelligence to
maintain our digital superiority and stay ahead of our adversaries?
General Dickinson. Digital superiority is one of my key tasks, and
we are introducing new technologies and linking current ones to
increase our Space Domain Awareness and Command and Control as my top
two priorities. As an example, under my Global Sensor Manager (GSM)
mission, directed in the Unified Campaign Plan (UCP), I must ingest the
sensor data, make the data available and transparent through transport,
and curate the data before applying algorithmic machine learning models
and artificially intelligent applications to aid the decision making
process. The data value chain is foundational to our ability to make
decisions concerning objects in space. As noted in the National
Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) final report,
there are high-data volumes associated with the space domain that make
it particularly well-suited for prioritized integration of AI-enabled
applications. In support of the DOD C3I Modernization Strategy,
USSPACECOM works closely with the DOD CIO, U.S. Space Force (USSF), and
the Space Development Agency and U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) to
deliver SATCOM governance in support of tightly integrated, hybrid
military and commercial, Enterprise SATCOM Architecture.
science, technology, engineering, and math outreach programs
17. Senator Rosen. General Dickinson, the Junior Reserve Officer
Training Corps (JROTC) STEM [science, technology, engineering, and
math] program is funded through the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and
Navy. Is this a program that could help SPACECOM carry out its mission?
General Dickinson. Any program that encourages youth participation
in STEM education and follow-on career opportunities has the potential
to benefit USSPACECOM. The conversion of some Air Force JROTC
detachments to Space Force may be particularly helpful. The JROTC
program promotes patriotism, citizenship, and appreciation for the work
of the U.S. Armed Forces, yet there is no direct guarantee of a career
in the DOD. However, programs which encourage STEM activities have the
potential to enhance the talent base from which the Services recruit,
which ultimately benefits all selective-crewed organizations such as
the Combatant Commands. Moreover, these efforts enrich the talent base
from which USSPACECOM can recruit for federal civilian employment
opportunities following college education.
18. Senator Rosen. General Dickinson, what are SPACECOM's other
STEM outreach programs, and how do you plan to grow them to keep up
with the workforce of the future?
General Dickinson. USSPACECOM has initiated collaboration with
academic institutions in order to encourage STEM careers. In the very
first year of our standup I directed the staff to assess the optimum
ways to do this. Some of these avenues include leveraging students and
graduates in the intern programs we are beginning this summer to
increase our diversity and bring cutting edge thinking into the
command. We intend to grow the opportunities for USSPACECOM internships
in STEM areas where we perceive interest.
stimulating innovation
19. Senator Rosen. General Dickinson, what is your assessment of
the report on the ``State of the Space Industrial Base 2020'' which
concluded (among other things) that ``The very long schedules of many
DOD space programs limit the opportunities for short design-build-test
projects that stimulate interest and innovation within the U.S.
workforce.''?
General Dickinson. In the past, the capability to build, test, and
iterate quickly in space eluded the DOD as the threat did not demand a
better approach for providing space capabilities. Our adversaries
exploited this shortcoming and rapidly developed space and counter-
space capabilities that threaten our space superiority.
Given this new reality, we must regain our advantage through
building capability more rapidly at lower cost. In addition, we must
leverage the opportunity to partner with commercial space companies and
with our Allies and partners in these efforts.
I support any effort that enables the Department and the Nation to
develop and field space capabilities more rapidly.
20. Senator Rosen. General Dickinson, how is the acquisition arm of
Space Command working to decrease the timelines for DOD space programs
and increase the rate of space experiments and prototypes for small
launch?
General Dickinson. In general, CCMDs do not do acquisitions, but
rely on the services, especially the USSF as the primary provider of
space capabilities for our mission needs. As such, while we have
fostered close working relationships with all of the Services, we are
especially linked with the USSF as well as Interagency space capability
development partners. We interact with these stakeholders at many
levels across multiple requirements, integration, and acquisition
oversight and coordination councils.
USSPACECOM, USSF and the larger Space Community, are working to
decrease the timelines for DOD space programs through multiple facets.
For USSPACECOM, our primary acquisition support responsibility is
producing accurate and clear combatant command operational requirements
and focus areas based on component operations, lessons learned from
exercises and gaming, and a sound analytical foundation. This enables
the space enterprise to build and deliver exactly what we need, when we
need it.
Additionally, USSPACECOM is aggressively engaging with industry as
the innovation, speed, and competitive edge resident in the US
commercial market must be woven into the fabric of our operational
warfighting architectures and postures. We are engaging our Science,
Technology, and Advanced Concepts with the space community and
acquisition authorities to accelerate technology maturation in proofs
of concept, developmental and operational prototyping, and
experimentation.
Finally, in coordination with the Space Development Agency,
USSPACECOM is levying space warfighter requirements in support of their
payload technology capabilities for future tranche generations. These
opportunities, starting in 2024, will enable capability insertion
opportunities required by the warfighter, as well as support quick
reaction technology upgrades, resulting in decreased timelines for DOD
space programs, space experiments, and assessing prototypes.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
intercontinental ballistic missile modernization
21. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Richard, one of the criticisms
surrounding ballistic missiles is that, unlike bombers, they're not
recallable should the president reconsider his or her order after
launch. However, several press reports over the years have documented
occasions where range safety personnel remotely destroyed a Minuteman
III ICBM when anomalies were discovered during test flights. Could you
explain any technical, operational, or security reasons why such a
self-destruct mechanism couldn't or shouldn't be installed on deployed
missiles?
Admiral Richard. There is no military value to installing a self-
destruct mechanism on operationally deployed ICBMs. The only reason
such equipment is installed on test vehicles is to ensure safety of
personnel and the general public. A self-destruct mechanism introduces
a potential vulnerability that could impact ICBM force effectiveness
and reliability.
Our ICBM force is controlled through secure, reliable, positive
control measures, which ensures only the President, in deliberate
consultation with senior advisors, can authorize the use of nuclear
weapons. We have a strategic triad so the President is never in a
position where he / she must make a hasty decision to launch ICBMs or
risk losing the capability to respond. The ICBM force will not launch
until the President deliberately issues orders.
22. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Richard, during a recent House Armed
Services Committee hearing, it came to light that certain offices
within the Department of Defense may be advocating for a plan that
would cut the number of operational Minuteman III intercontinental
ballistic missiles from 400 to 200, develop some means of further
extending the life of this system, and cancelling the planned
replacement program, the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent. Could you
outline the operational challenges your successors would face in
deterring two nuclear peer adversaries with a 60+ year old ICBM force
that will be half the size it is today?
Admiral Richard. Our Cold War-era systems were developed and built
to counter a single, peer adversary (Soviet Union). The most compelling
argument against reducing our ICBM force structure is we must now deter
two peer adversaries (Russia and China) and several regional
adversaries (North Korea and Iran). All pose unique threats and
challenges; and must be deterred differently. If we reduce ICBM force
structure in the face of growing adversary threats, USSTRATCOM cannot
meet strategic guidance nor guarantee a credible nuclear deterrent.
Our legacy delivery systems, stockpile, and infrastructure are all
well past their intended operational life and are not designed for, nor
capable of keeping pace with evolving threats. I do not support any
Minuteman III (MM III) force structure reductions (e.g. cannibalizing
assets to keep MM III on alert) or pivoting from the Ground-Based
Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program to a life extension effort. While
``cannibalizing'' the MM III force may defer the asset attrition
problem, it does not halt component aging or address identified
capability gaps. In 2014, the DOD and USAF considered a MM III life
extension program and determined GBSD modernization is the most cost-
effective way to maintain the ICBM force. Switching to a MM III life
extension now is late-to-need, will result in a capability gap, and
adds operational risk to USSTRATCOM's deterrent mission.
strategic deterrence
23. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Richard, those who favor reducing the
size of our nuclear forces often argue that non-nuclear capabilities
can be substituted for nuclear weapons without diminishing our ability
to credibly hold targets at risk, deter adversaries, and assure allies.
For example, some groups argue that conventional or cyber weapons can
be substituted for nuclear weapons. Do you think other capabilities can
be as effective as nuclear weapons in deterring the highest levels of
aggression to the extent that one can be directly substituted for the
other?
Admiral Richard. While new non-nuclear capabilities offer the
opportunity for risk reduction and de-escalation during a crisis, there
is little evidence to suggest a nuclear state would be deterred by
anything other than nuclear weapons. However, new capability
development is one of the few ways to reduce reliance on nuclear
weapons, and hypersonic weapons are the best near-term capability to
achieve this. The range, promptness, and survivability of hypersonic
weapons could provide some effects that today require nuclear weapons.
24. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Richard, in response to a question from
Senator Tom Cotton, you stated that reducing the number of
intercontinental ballistic missiles or removing that leg of the triad
would ``solve a critical problem for China''. Can you elaborate how
that would be the case?
Admiral Richard. The triad must be considered as a whole because it
functions as a whole, with each leg essential to overall effectiveness.
The triad's overlapping attributes ensure the enduring survivability of
our deterrence capabilities against attack and our capacity to hold a
diverse range of adversary targets at risk throughout the spectrum of
crisis or conflict.
The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force is the most
responsive leg of the triad and ICBM geographic dispersion presents an
intractable targeting problem, complicating China's (and Russia's)
strategies. These missiles are capable of holding a wide range of
targets, to include emergent and time sensitive targets, at risk. They
are survivable to all but a massive nuclear exchange and possess the
highest day-to-day readiness.
Reducing the ICBM force by half would be a unilateral reduction in
the face of a deteriorating security environment along with the
detrimental messaging to our Allies and adversaries, and would
facilitate China's rise as a strategic peer. China's currently
intractable targeting problem would be significantly eased and they
would be closer to possessing a credible counter-force strategy (i.e.,
the ability to directly attack our nuclear forces) for the first time
in their history.
For the case without any ICBMs, in addition to the above, the
potential for a strategic attack on our homeland further increases. A
conventional attack on our few (5) submarine and bomber bases would
significantly degrade the Nation's remaining deterrent.
25. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Richard, how would going below 400 to
200, or to even zero, be solving a ``big problem'' that China currently
has?
Admiral Richard. The triad must be considered as a whole because it
functions as a whole, with each leg essential to overall effectiveness.
The Triad's overlapping attributes ensure the enduring survivability of
our deterrence capabilities against attack and our capacity to hold a
diverse range of adversary targets at risk throughout the spectrum of
crisis or conflict.
The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force is the most
responsive leg of the triad and ICBM geographic dispersion presents an
intractable targeting problem, complicating China's (and Russia's)
strategies. These missiles are capable of holding a wide range of
targets, to include emergent and time sensitive targets, at risk. They
are survivable to all but a massive nuclear exchange and possess the
highest day-to-day readiness.
Reducing the ICBM force by half would be a unilateral reduction in
the face of a deteriorating security environment along with the
detrimental messaging to our Allies and adversaries, and would
facilitate China's rise as a strategic peer. China's currently
intractable targeting problem would be significantly eased and they
would be closer to possessing a credible counter-force strategy (i.e.,
the ability to directly attack our nuclear forces) for the first time
in their history.
For the case without any ICBMs, in addition to the above, the
potential for a strategic attack on our homeland further increases. A
conventional attack on our few (5) submarine and bomber bases would
significantly degrade the Nation's remaining deterrent.
26. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Richard, during your testimony, you
noted that due to Russia's and China's aggressive nuclear modernization
activities, the United States, ``for the first time in our history . .
. is facing two nuclear-capable strategic peer adversaries at the same
time, both of whom have to be deterred differently.'' You also stated
that, ``China . . . cannot be considered a lesser included case in this
context.'' Could you elaborate on what you mean by these statements?
Admiral Richard. Russia and China are pursuing extensive military
modernization goals and present different deterrence challenges:
Russia is constrained by the New Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (New START, or NST), but maintains a significant stockpile of
non-accountable weapons. China is not party to NST and is expected to
at least double its nuclear stockpile in the next decade.
Russia has attacked neighboring states, annexed conquered
territory, interfered in foreign elections, and worked to undermine
European institutions.
China cannot be considered a lesser included case as it
is on a trajectory to be a strategic peer with the United States and
Russia. Specifically, China is expanding and diversifying its nuclear
arsenal by rapidly increasing the numbers of land-, sea- and air-based
delivery systems, adding capabilities to include multiple warheads,
pursuing a launch-on-warning posture, and developing methods to defeat
missile defense systems. China continues to invest significant
resources in hypersonic systems and is expanding its space and counter-
space capabilities.
Deterrence is influencing an adversary's decision-making such that
a given adversary is induced to choose restraint over action, i.e., a
strategic attack. China and Russia have unique goals, aspirations,
interests, and objectives as well as distinct histories, cultures,
perceptions and values. Our deterrence strategies must be tailored to
each. Neither country can be deterred individually in a vacuum, given
the multi-polar nature of today's world. Actions taken to deter Russia
will have a measurable impact on China, and vice versa--and this must
be taken into account. The threat posed by China is now additive to the
threat posed by Russia. Previously, we were able to address both with a
force sized for Russia.
27. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Richard, in your best military advice,
could you outline what the implications of this multipolar nuclear
balance could have for the capabilities you and your successors will
need to meet deterrence requirements?
Admiral Richard. A multipolar nuclear environment requires the
application of tailored and flexible strategies to effectively deter
adversaries under various threats and scenarios in all domains during
peacetime, crisis, and across the spectrum of conflict. This requires a
fully modernized nuclear force and supporting infrastructure that is
credible, flexible, adaptable, and resilient.
Our strategic nuclear deterrent underwrites U.S. military
operations around the world, is the foundation and backstop of our
national defense, and assures Allies and partners. As such, the Nation
must remain committed to modernizing and recapitalizing our strategic
forces and supporting infrastructure--and fully resource every program
each year. Nothing else works as planned or envisioned without a safe,
secure, effective, and credible nuclear deterrent.
china's nuclear modernization
28. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Richard, as part of during a recent
House Armed Services Committee hearing, a DOD official submitted
written testimony that stated that Chinese nuclear modernization is
accelerating `` . . . in response to perceived threats, including
potentially first-strike capability from the United States.'' Are you
aware of any intelligence that would support such a conclusion?
Admiral Richard. No. U.S. nuclear capabilities are essentially
unchanged since the end of the Cold War, except for getting smaller in
size and older. We assess the PRC strategy includes advancing a
comprehensive military modernization program to ``basically'' complete
military modernization by 2035 and transform the PLA into a ``world
class'' military by 2049. However, it is difficult to truly know when
China will be complete because, due to their opacity, we do not know
where they are heading. I believe they are at an inflection point with
regard to their accelerated pace of modernization and I know they can
no longer be viewed as a lesser-included strategic adversary.
w93
29. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Richard, with respect to development of
the W93/Mk7 warhead, an analysis of alternatives is underway, with
contributions from DOD and the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA). In the past, both the Pentagon and representatives from the
United Kingdom communicated the urgency of supporting this program, and
the importance of continuing the longstanding cooperation between our
countries on nuclear issues. Has anything changed with respect to the
urgent need to continue progress this program?
Admiral Richard. No. It is neither operationally viable nor cost-
effective to indefinitely sustain currently fielded 1980's submarine-
launched ballistic missile (SLBM) weapons and expect them to remain
militarily relevant against evolving 21st century threats. In addition
to U.S. modernization requirements, the W93/Mk 7 program enables us to
continue our longstanding support to the U.K. and their warhead
replacement program. As an Allied, independent nuclear power
contributing to NATO's nuclear deterrence posture, the U.K.'s
continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent is critical to strategic security.
30. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Richard, when can the Committee expect
the analysis of alternatives to be complete?
Admiral Richard. The scope of the W93 design will be more defined
as we complete Phase 1 (a concept study to explore alternatives to meet
the need), and enter Phase 2 (a feasibility study to evaluate Phase
1concepts deemed viable in Phase 1). Phase 1 is expected to be complete
by the end of fiscal year 2023.
national nuclear security administration modernization programs
31. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Richard, do you believe DOD and NNSA
programs are adequately aligned to meet STRATCOM military requirements
for modernizing the Nation's nuclear forces?
Admiral Richard. DOD's current delivery systems modernization
programs and NNSA's stockpile and enterprise stewardship programs are
tightly integrated and aligned to sustain our current capabilities.
Across the board, NNSA's stockpile and infrastructure modernization
programs required to ensure on-time delivery of weapon capabilities for
an effective and credible nuclear deterrent are projected to be either
just-in-time or late-to-need. This is evidenced by the recent Critical
Decision--One (CD-1) on pit production which projects fielding the 80
pits per year requirement between 5 to 10 years later than the military
and statutory requirement of NLT 2030. On-time fielding of replacement
capabilities depends on meeting established schedules, and as with the
NNSA, DOD's replacement system capabilities are now projected to
deliver just-in-time. There is no schedule margin remaining for either
DOD or NNSA.
32. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Richard, if NNSA programs are not
adequately funded, could you outline the potential operational impacts
that could result if the two Departments' programs become misaligned?
Admiral Richard. The continued, chronic underfunding of the
maintenance and modernization of the Nation's nuclear weapons
infrastructure is the single greatest risk to strategic deterrence.
This significantly degrades the U.S.'s ability to achieve strategic
deterrence, extended deterrence, and non-proliferation objectives.
Not providing the needed resources to recapitalize invites the very
real risk of losing the capacity to field a credible and effective
nuclear deterrent, at a time when our adversaries are modernizing and
expanding their own nuclear capabilities. Once these capabilities are
lost it will take 15-20 years to recapitalize them. In an ever-evolving
world of adversaries and Allies, we must be cognizant of the
operational implications and national risks of any decision to not fund
or divest any capability--and we must have a comprehensive threat-based
strategy review to ensure this capability will not be needed for at
least a generation.
We are already at a point where nuclear modernization programmatic
risks are transferring to me, as the USSTRATCOM Commander, in the form
of operational risk. This impacts my ability to meet national-level
strategic guidance. If NNSA lacks fundamental infrastructure
recapitalization funding, then we will reach the point in less than a
decade when a future USSTRATCOM commander testifies he / she can no
longer certify the effectiveness of the strategic deterrent force to
meet assigned strategic deterrence and assurance mission requirements.
33. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Richard, could you outline the impact
to the operational force in the 2030s if plutonium pit production does
not reach the Congressionally-mandated target of 80 pits per year by
2030?
Admiral Richard. Pit production is a foundational capability, a
leading indicator and symptomatic of larger issues in today's nuclear
security enterprise. No option below 80 pits per year (ppy) by 2030
fully supports achieving assigned Presidential objectives.
Failing to achieve a pit production capability to meet 80 ppy in
2030 will result in the current stockpile of weapons with components
far exceeding intended design life. We will be forced to reuse aged
pits for a longer period of time, ultimately leading to deployed
weapons with 100 year old pits--a situation where we have no scientific
basis to ensure confidence the weapons will function as designed. This
scenario may result in the inability to certify the safety, security,
reliability and effectiveness of the weapons.
Because pit aging impacts are uncertain, this nation cannot afford
to be without the capability to address these concerns--we cannot wait
for an issue in the stockpile to occur before addressing it, and
pausing work on the current program to reassess requirements is no
longer viable. It is in the best interests for the U.S. and Allies to
proactively make the required investments versus waiting until a
potentially catastrophic safety or reliability concern in aged pits
manifests itself.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Deb Fischer
u.s. nuclear force structure
34. Senator Fischer. Admiral Richard, the New Strategic Armed
Reduction Treaty (START) limits U.S. strategic nuclear forces to 1,550
deployed warheads. Currently the U.S. deploys about 70 percent of its
treaty-accountable warheads submarine-based SLBMs, no more than 400
warheads on ground-based ICBMs, with the bomber-leg of the nuclear
triad making up the remainder. Do you support the current force
structure's distribution of treaty-accountable warheads across the
three legs of the triad?
Admiral Richard. Yes. The force structure's distribution of
accountable weapons provides the appropriate diversity, flexibility and
resilience to deter potential adversaries from conducting nuclear and
non-nuclear strategic attacks, assure Allies and partners, achieve U.S.
objectives if deterrence fails, and hedge against an uncertain future.
35. Senator Fischer. Admiral Richard, would it be your best
military advice to preserve the current force structure's allocation of
warheads between the legs of the triad for a force limited to 1,550
deployed warheads?
Admiral Richard. Yes. Under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(New START) limit of 1,550 accountable warheads, U.S. nuclear forces
are sized and postured to deter potential adversaries from conducting
nuclear and non-nuclear strategic attacks, assure Allies and partners,
achieve U.S. objectives if deterrence fails, and hedge against an
uncertain future.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator M. Michael Rounds
space launch options--increased demand signal
36. Senator Rounds. General Dickinson, in 2020 you stated, ``A
mixed architecture increases warfighting resilience by assuring that
the loss of any single platform does not result in serious mission
degradation or failure. This opens up the opportunity for more frequent
refresh of technology and creates an additional demand signal for
appropriately sized launch options.'' Can you elaborate on what you
mean by ``appropriately sized launch options,'' and what type of demand
signal you envision?
General Dickinson. ``Appropriately sized launch options'' means
exploring a wide range of cost, schedule, scale, and supply options as
well as leveraging partnering opportunities to support warfighter space
capability needs. The DOD must take advantage of rapid commercial
development, streamlined operational testing processes, and innovative
technology advancements to deliver immediate and revolutionary space
capabilities on-time.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
missile defense
37. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Richard, the Unified Command Plan
directs the Commander, STRATCOM, to be the advocate for missile
defense. With that in mind, can you outline what homeland missile
defense requirements are needed to meet current and predicted future
threats? Please explain why these capabilities are needed and along
what timeline.
Admiral Richard. Today's missile defense is designed to defend the
homeland against a limited threat. The upward trajectory of future
threats requires the delivery of enhanced missile defense capabilities
as soon as technically and feasibly possible.
Specific improvements include an architecture of persistent sensors
to detect, track and discriminate advanced missile threats, including
hypersonics; improvements to interceptor reliability, capacity, and
lethality; and development of next-generation capabilities such as
directed energy, boost phase intercept, and non-kinetic effects.
38. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Richard, the missile capabilities
possessed by rogue nations continue to rapidly evolve. For instance, as
reported by the New York Times earlier this year, North Korea recently
showcased the country's ``largest-ever'' intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) and revealed a new submarine-launched ballistic missile.
Also, in a 2020 House Armed Services Committee hearing, former Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy John Rood agreed with the U.S. Northern
Command (NORTHCOM) assessment that North Korea's ICBM threat could
challenge the ability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
system as soon as 2025. Provided the continuing advancement of these
weapon systems, do you think it makes good strategic ``sense'' to have
20 empty silos--ready to accept missiles--at Fort Greely, Alaska?
Admiral Richard. Defer to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) for
specifics on their ability to maintain / accelerate Next-Generation
Interceptor (NGI) capabilities and deliveries.
USSTRATCOM's role is to advocate for missile defense capabilities
on behalf of combatant commands. The importance of pursuing additional
missile defense capability on behalf of the warfighter must be
coordinated and adjudicated with MDA and associated stakeholders. MDA
is taking steps to bridge the gap for these additional 20 silos--a
direct result of NDAA language for additional interim Ground-Based
Interceptors--until NGI is fielded.
extended nuclear deterrence
39. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Richard, as you know, we provide
extended nuclear deterrence to a number of allies in Europe, Asia, and
elsewhere. In turn, this assists in preventing the proliferation of
nuclear materials and weapon systems. Great power competitors and rogue
nations are pursuing nuclear modernization while we continue to delay
and defer our own. How will continued delay and deferral impact allies
who rely on us for extended nuclear deterrence?
Admiral Richard. Allies and partners place enormous value on U.S.
extended nuclear deterrence, which is key to nuclear non-proliferation.
Effectively assuring Allies and partners depends on their confidence in
the credibility of our nuclear deterrent.
Since there is no additional margin for postponing our strategic
deterrent modernization programs, our Allies and partners are likely to
interpret any further delay or deferral as an erosion of the U.S.
extended deterrence guarantee and likewise, incur doubt regarding the
credibility of our commitments.
As such, the Nation must remain committed to modernizing and
recapitalizing our strategic forces and supporting infrastructure--we
must maintain the current schedule with full and consistent resourcing.
Nothing else works as planned or envisioned without a safe, secure,
effective, and credible nuclear deterrent.
chinese and russian space development
40. Senator Sullivan. General Dickinson, in your statement for the
record you described various space capabilities China and Russia have
developed that could threaten United States intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR), communication, and navigation capabilities in
the event of a conflict. Can you explain how China and Russia are
attempting to use international treaties and dual-use capabilities to
militarize space and create an advantage over the United States?
General Dickinson. International Treaties:
To counter United States space capabilities, Russia and China
jointly sought international support for binding treaties or UN
resolutions which they likely believe would asymmetrically constrain
United States national security space activities. Generally, these
proposals have no verification or enforcement mechanisms, but would
tend to aid Russia and China in identifying (and acting against)
national security space activities of western democracies, while they
continue to develop counterspace weapons.
The major Russia/Chinese initiative is the proposed
agreement for the ``Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer
Space'' (PPWT for short). The proposed PPWT bans any ``weapon'' [not
fully defined] in orbit or that transits a fraction of an orbit--
something that in practice could, for example limit U.S. ballistic
missile defense activities. The PPWT has no effective enforcement
mechanism, and verification and ``transparency'' are voluntary. Notably
lacking from the treaty's language are prohibitions on Chinese and
Russian direct-ascent (ground to space) anti-satellite weapons and
ground based directed-energy anti-satellite weapons.
In addition, Russia and China have repeatedly submitted a
UN resolution regarding voluntary ``no first placement'' (NFP) of
weapons in space, again without verification mechanisms. As with the
PPWT, the NFP does not define the term ``space weapon''. The irony is
that while Russia claims to seek a ban on ``first placement'' of
weapons in space, it already deployed space weapons, as it demonstrated
with its July 15, 2020 on-orbit test of a space-based anti-satellite
weapon, among other tests of counterspace capabilities.
Ironically, considering Russia and China's public
propaganda against ``weaponization of space'', both rejected last
year's UK-sponsored UN General Assembly Resolution (75/36) ``Reducing
Space Threats Through Norms, Rules, and Principles of Responsible
Behavior''. This resolution encouraged member states to ``study
existing and potential threats to space systems'', a proposal which
could shine a light on both countries' wide-ranging counterspace
efforts.
Dual Use:
China and Russia are likely integrating civilian satellites used
for remote sensing, satellite communications, and navigation with
counterspace capabilities to support their deterrence efforts against
the United States. According to the National Air and Space Intelligence
Center (NASIC), both countries are capable of employing their civil and
commercial remote sensing satellites to supplement military-dedicated
capabilities. China employs a ``whole of nation'' strategy for
military-civil fusion, through which commercial or civilian assets may
be required to support or assist intelligence organizations or the
military, according to open source reporting. China's National
Intelligence Law of 2017 requires Chinese corporations to assist in
``intelligence work'', likely facilitating technology transfer to
military space and weapons development. China is expanding satellite
communications and navigation capabilities, which likely support PLA
operations. China is probably testing dual-use technologies in space
that could be applied to counter-space missions.
Russia also maintains a satellite communications and robust
navigation fleet that provides resilient services Russian to civil,
government, and military users locally and worldwide. According to the
Defense Intelligence Agency, Russia continues to develop sophisticated
on-orbit capabilities that could serve dual-use purposes. For example,
``inspection'' or servicing satellites are capable of closely
approaching satellites to inspect or fix issues; this same technology
could also be used to approach another country's satellite and conduct
an attack that results in temporary or permanent damage. Russia appears
to have carried out a test of an on-orbit anti-satellite weapon in July
2020.
Dual-use capabilities will challenge United States ability to
provide advanced warning of nefarious intentions or discern between
peaceful and potential hostile activity. Both China and Russia's
militaries stand to benefit from fielding viable threats to United
States satellites.
41. Senator Sullivan. General Dickinson, from your perspective as
SPACECOM Commander, how do the Chinese and Russian threats differ
operationally within your combatant command?
General Dickinson. China and Russia each have weaponized space as a
way to deter and counter a possible United States intervention during a
regional conflict and as a means to reduce United States and allied
military effectiveness in a conflict. Beijing aims to build a more
joint, versatile, professional, and lethal force capable of power
projection; space is critical to this goal. Russia's focus is on
integrating space services--such as communications; precision
navigation and timing (PNT); geolocation; and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)--into its weapons and command
and control (C2) systems as a means of enabling strategic defense.
Russia recognizes the importance of military space capabilities;
however, its budget is more limited than China's due to competing
priorities with broader militarization efforts. China and Russia's
counterspace focus is very likely tied to perceived fears of United
States military capabilities. Both countries will likely continue
endeavors in the space domain to deliver electronic warfare, directed
energy, and kinetic capabilities to disrupt U.S. C2 systems and use
space or space denial operations as an integral component to achieve
information superiority in conflict.
42. Senator Sullivan. General Dickinson, a recent study
commissioned by the U.S. Space Force, the Defense Innovation Unit, and
the Air Force Research Laboratory stated, ``China's institution
building and use of space are the key providers of global economic
development reinforcing their . . . Belt and Road Initiative, whereby
infrastructure for economic development wins over and binds new allies
and partners.'' Fittingly during your testimony you stated, ``one of
our biggest deterrence opportunities is with our allies and partners .
. . .we've seen a bow wave of allies and partners who want come and be
part of SPACECOM and part of the space enterprise.'' Understanding that
both the United States and China are actively competing and seeking to
work with allies and partners in the space domain, in your personal
opinion, how could the United States use our existing comparative
advantage in space launch to further collaborate with our allies and
partners on their space-based capabilities?
General Dickinson. Space launch is a key comparative strength for
the U.S., and it is a vital component of our whole-of-government
approach to cooperation with our allies and partners. Beyond our space
launch capabilities, we cooperate with our allies and partners in areas
like Space Situational Awareness data sharing as a part of our holistic
work to deepen and strengthen long-term partnerships.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
hypersonic development
43. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Richard, are you confident that the
United States' hypersonic testing facilities are sufficiently well-
maintained and modern to meet the demands of hypersonic development? If
not, please identify the most concerning areas of insufficiency.
Admiral Richard. Today, the DOD can adequately test current
hypersonic prototypes. However, additional investment is needed to meet
future hypersonic acquisition program and operational test requirements
along with the accelerated prototyping program schedules.
The Test Resource Management Center (TRMC), responsible for
assessing the readiness of the DOD's test infrastructure, anticipated
the increased demand for testing hypersonic systems and programmed
funding to address the most critical hypersonic test infrastructure
capability and capacity needs.
44. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Richard, what additional
investments--including in personnel--are needed to support the testing
needs across the hypersonic spectrum to better compete with Beijing and
Moscow? Please explain.
Admiral Richard. To support developmental and operational testing
across the hypersonic spectrum, DOD is considering enhancements to
hypersonic ground test facilities (to include the Arnold Engineering
Development Complex (AEDC) in Tullahoma, TN), and establishment of
additional long-range flight corridors to support increased hypersonic
flight test demand.
The Joint Hypersonic Transition Office (JHTO) is executing the
workforce development strategy to advance current training, and
leveraging university expertise to accelerate development of the next
generation hypersonic workforce.
nuclear modernization and sustainment
45. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Richard, please provide specific
examples of potential consequences to STRATCOM if we do not modernize
our nuclear enterprise's aging infrastructure. Would STRATCOM be able
to field an effective deterrent?
Admiral Richard. The continued, chronic underfunding of the
maintenance and modernization of the Nation's nuclear weapons
infrastructure is the single greatest risk to strategic deterrence. Not
providing the needed resources to recapitalize invites the very real
risk of losing the capacity to field a credible and effective nuclear
deterrent, at a time when our adversaries are modernizing and expanding
their own nuclear capabilities. This significantly degrades the U.S.'s
long-term ability to achieve strategic deterrence, extended deterrence,
and non-proliferation objectives. Once these capabilities are lost it
will take 15-20+ years to recapitalize them. We must be cognizant of
the operational implications and national risks of any decision to not
fund or divest any capability--and we must have a comprehensive threat-
based strategy review to ensure this capability will not be needed for
at least a generation.
ground-based strategic deterrent
46. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Richard, how--specifically--could
the Air Force best capitalize on the Ground-based Strategic Deterrent's
(GBSD) modularity and open-system architecture when implementing future
program upgrades?
Admiral Richard. Defer to the Air Force regarding the GBSD
program's technical details.
47. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Richard, in what ways could GBSD's
modularity and open-system architecture inform other current and future
DOD systems' approaches to cost savings and mid-life flexibility?
Please explain.
Admiral Richard. Defer to the Air Force regarding the GBSD
program's technical details
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
china
48. Senator Hawley. General Dickinson, Secretary of Defense Lloyd
Austin has written that we need to maintain combat-credible forward
forces in order to deter or, if necessary, deny a Chinese fait accompli
against Taiwan. How do you see our forces in space contributing to
deterrence by denial against China?
General Dickinson. At Secretary Austin's direction, USSPACECOM has
begun establishing the necessary posture to both deter China and
prepare to support the Joint fight, regardless of where our
capabilities are required. Our current and future on-orbit space
capabilities will enable the Joint Force to operate in a contested
environment, increase resilience in our space architecture, and enhance
our on-orbit counter-space capabilities. In addition, we are working
with USINDOPACOM, USCENTCOM, and USEUCOM to address gaps in our
forward-deployed space control posture in their AORs. Concurrently,
we're continuing our efforts to maintain and grow our regional
architecture of key allies and partners, assuring access, space
operations, and capability sharing when we'll need it the most. Apart
from those efforts, we must remember USSPACECOM's AOR is global in
nature, and our warfighters will not only reside in the USINDOPACOM AOR
but positioned in operations centers around the world. Our personnel
provide critical space capabilities from on-orbit and terrestrial
assets ready to support the Joint fight, globally, from the first
moment, unencumbered by the need to deploy or relocate.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tommy Tuberville
u.s. spacecom
49. Senator Tuberville. General Dickinson, once the Inspector
General (IG) investigation and environmental study are completed, can
SPACECOM recruit and hire civilians directly in Huntsville, Alabama and
not have to relocate them from Colorado?
General Dickinson. The Secretary of the Air Force's final basing
decision, which is pending the environmental study, is the determining
factor for recruiting and hiring civilians in Huntsville, Alabama. My
intent is to reach full operational capability at our permanent
location as expediently as practicable, without essential mission
degradation, all within the guidance, direction, and authority of the
Department of Defense leaders involved in the ongoing establishment of
United States Space Command. Mission readiness depends on the
availability of both people and equipment; therefore, I directed my
staff to posture the command for transition to the permanent location
as soon as practicable, without degradation to our missions, after the
SECAF completes the basing decision process. We will not know what
percentage of civilian employees may choose to transfer locations until
after the SECAF confirms the outcome of the basing decision process,
and without that information, we cannot calculate an accurate cost of
relocation.
50. Senator Tuberville. General Dickinson, if we, as a country,
want to accelerate your readiness, save taxpayer money, and prevent
having to relocate employees, would further delay to the final SPACECOM
basing decision be detrimental to those goals?
General Dickinson. The Secretary of the Air Force's (SecAF) final
basing decision will enable initial design of the consolidated
headquarters facility, relocation of personnel, and the hiring of human
capital to the permanent headquarters location. I appreciate that the
Air Force is adhering to the basing process, including compliance with
NEPA, which takes time. Ensuring that we reach full operational
capability is my priority. Therefore, I have directed my staff to
posture the command for transition to the permanent location as soon as
practicable, without degradation to our missions, after the SecAF makes
the final basing decision.
51. Senator Tuberville. General Dickinson, is it true that the
taxpayer savings moving SPACECOM to Redstone Arsenal, AL results in a
35 percent one-time savings for the move and 25 percent annual cost
savings over 20 years?
General Dickinson. I will defer basing process questions to the
SecAF, who has the authority for selecting the permanent location for
USSPACECOM Headquarters. Analysis to understand the impact of a
transition to Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, AL is underway. My staff
is looking hard at timelines, anticipated impacts to human capital,
facilities, and mission with a goal of minimizing risk to mission while
being good stewards of the taxpayers' money. Once we have a final
basing decision, we will be able to provide and discuss the full
analysis.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022 AND
THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 22, 2021
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND AND UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Manchin,
Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis,
Sullivan, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, and Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing to order.
This morning the Committee will receive testimony from
General McKenzie, Commander, United States Central Command,
CENTCOM, and General Townsend, Commander, United States Africa
Command, or AFRICOM. Thank you both for your many decades of
military service, and please extend our appreciation to the men
and women serving under you, and we appreciate very much their
sacrifice and the sacrifice of their families on behalf of the
United States.
Last week, in one of the most challenging decisions facing
President Biden, he announced the withdrawal of all forces from
Afghanistan by September 11, 2021. It appears the President
concluded that more troops might buy more time and casualties,
but more time would not create a government that could defeat
the Taliban and effectively govern Afghanistan. The President's
decision, however, should be seen as a transition, not closure,
and should not mean an end to our counterterrorism efforts.
Most importantly, we must ensure that Afghanistan will not be a
source of planning, plotting, or projection of terrorist
attacks around the globe, including against the Homeland, and,
General McKenzie, I would be interested in hearing your
thoughts on how best to transition to a new counterterrorism
architecture in the region to continue to degrade al Qaeda,
ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] of Khorasan Province,
and other terrorist groups, and prevent their ability to attack
the Homeland.
Additionally, support to the Afghan forces will remain
vital. The intelligence community's Annual Threat Assessment
for 2021 noted, ``The Afghan Government will struggle to hold
the Taliban at bay if the coalition withdraws support.'' I
would like to understand plans to continue training and
assistance to the Afghan forces in light of the transition, and
how we will balance that against the need to conduct robust
oversight of funding that we provide to the Afghan Government
and forces.
General McKenzie, you are also facing a complex challenge
of deterring the threat from Iran and its proxies while the
Administration seeks a diplomatic solution to contain the
Iranian nuclear threat. I would be interested to hear an update
on your progress in meeting these challenges, particularly
against the backdrop of indirect talks in Vienna, and the
recent attack on the Natanz nuclear facility, and Iran's
announcement that they have begun enriching uranium up to 60
percent, which would move it closer than ever before to the 90
percent purity threshold required for weapons-grade uranium.
Turning to AFRICOM, General Townsend, you have said that
Al-Shabab is the largest and most violent of al Qaeda's
branches worldwide, yet the previous Administration chose, with
little notice, to remove the vast majority of United States
troops from Somalia. The Biden Administration is now reviewing
that decision as part of a larger assessment of our strategy in
Somalia. I hope you will share your views on the current
security situation as well as the status of our engagement with
our Somali partners, particularly in light of news this week
that the Somali federal government has extended the mandates of
the president and parliament by 2 years. This move directly
undermines the progress made on democratic processes and
institutional reforms, and may threaten international support.
As you noted in your testimony, Africa is a vast continent
of opportunity and promise, but one that includes many
strategic challenges, many of which are overlapping also.
Population growth, food insecurity, and impacts from climate
change increase instability, drive conflict, and further
threaten vulnerable populations. These challenges do not lend
themselves to geographic or bureaucratic boundaries. They
require well-resourced and well-integrated whole-of-government
solutions. I look forward to your views on the importance of
investing in diplomacy and development to force long-term
stability, as well as an update on AFRICOM's support to the
Interagency in these efforts.
Our competitors recognize that investing in Africa and the
Middle East is in their long-term interests, as evidenced by
Chinese and Russian military and economic activity that
continues to grow in these critical regions. General Townsend
and General McKenzie, I look forward to hearing your views and
how we best leverage U.S. views--U.S. engagement, rather, and
investments to create attractive alternatives and ensure we
maintain key partnerships and access. I want to thank you again
for being here this morning, and I look forward to your
testimony.
Before I turn it over to the ranking member, Senator
Inhofe, I would like to remind my colleagues that there will be
an informal classified briefing immediately following this
session in SVC-217, the Office of Senate Security Center.
Senator Inhofe?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Over the past few
years, this Committee's top priority has been ensuring that we
implement the--there it is--this document. It has been kind of
a surprise that something that was put together back in 2018 by
an equal number of Democrats and Republicans has been so
accurate, and we have been using that as a blueprint. If we are
serious about the security of our Nation, we need resources to
make the--this National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
happen, make it a reality. The President's Budget request does
not meet this standard. Instead, it represents a decline in
defense spending, which will have serious implications for our
national security. It also means our combatant commanders will
have to do more with less, so the standard that was put forth
was not met by the President. Our top military commanders have
testified in unison in recent weeks that the threats to the
United States are growing at an alarming rate. Cutting the
defense budget sends exactly the wrong signals to our allies
and our adversaries alike.
General Townsend, you highlighted China's growth in--
growing use in Africa as a power projection platform for the
military. They have secured their first overseas base in
Djibouti. We have been there. We have witnessed that. They are
aggressively pursuing a base on Africa's west coast, which
would be the first time, giving China an enduring naval
presence in the southern Atlantic. With less than 6,000 troops
on the continent and the continued lack of Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), I hope Department of
Defense's (DOD) Global Posture Review will ensure your resource
shortfalls are being addressed. In CENTCOM, we have the
opposite problem. It gets significant resources to counter al
Qaeda, ISIS, and the Iranian-backed terrorists.
General McKenzie, in the last year, I understand you have
been able to reduce U.S. troop levels in the region, but I
worry this Administration's policies in your region are driven
more by politics than the national security. First, in
Afghanistan, the Administration is, by its own admission,
executing a calendar-based drawdown rather than a condition-
based one. We know this is true, and we have talked about this
for quite a period of time. General McKenzie, you recently
stated that the Taliban still has to take action to meet the
conditions for United States troop withdrawal of the February
2020 agreement. The arbitrary September the 11th deadline for
troop drawdown risks a power vacuum that terrorists will
dominate and use to threaten our Homeland again. I want to add
here that I am extremely disappointed that General Miller has
not yet been scheduled to testify publicly before this
Committee, and I hope that you will work to fix that, General
McKenzie.
Secondly, regarding Iran. The Administration is moving
quickly to negotiate a quick return to the failed 2015 Iran
deal granting Tehran large sanctions relief, even though the
nuclear limitations will begin to expire within the next 5
years. As we saw during the Obama Administration, Iran will use
sanctions relief to fund terrorist groups, including the ones
currently targeting the men and women in uniform that you
command. Third, in Yemen, the Administration is pulling back
from our Saudi partners, while, at the same time, the Iran-
backed Houthis are escalating their attacks. We should not
expect the Saudis to tolerate a perpetual Houthi ballistic
missile that--an armed drone threat on our border. We would not
tolerate one on our border. So the United States arms sales
restrictions could very well lead the Saudis to seek support
from our peer competitors. General McKenzie, I hope you will
address these issues and offer your views on how to heighten
risk of that and manage that in the year ahead.
So I thank both of you for your testimony and your presence
here today, and also in the closed session that we will have,
as the chairman mentioned. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe, and let me concur
with the ranking member. We have been pressing the Department
for General Miller to testify in an open hearing on Afghanistan
well before the decision was made by President Biden with
respect to forces in Afghanistan. Now with that decision, it is
even more important that we receive direct, in-person
communication from General Miller. The last time we had such an
open hearing was, I believe, with General Nicholson in 2017, so
we need to carry out our duties, the direct contact, and I will
once again, General McKenzie, ask for your assistance and relay
that message, and hopefully General Miller will be here very
shortly.
With that, let me now recognize the witnesses, beginning
with General McKenzie. Thank you, sir.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL KENNETH F. McKENZIE, JR., USMC, COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
General McKenzie. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe,
distinguished Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I
appear before you proudly representing the 70,000 men and women
of the United States Central Command. It is a great pleasure to
be with you here today. It is my duty to testify, of course,
but I have to say it is also a privilege to address this body,
and all the greater honor to do so beside the commander of
United States Africa Command, General Steve Townsend. I would
also like to recognize my senior enlisted leader, Fleet Master
Chief Jamie Herdel of the Navy, who is here with me today, as
well as chief legislative assistant, Air Force Colonel Jen
Hlavaty.
Since my last testimony, the region has continued to
evolve, and it remains as dynamic as ever. With the President's
announcement last week, we are focused on working closely with
the Afghan Government and our National Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) allies to responsibly conclude our Resolute
Support Mission in Afghanistan. This is my main effort at
present, but it is not my only responsibility. My prepared
statement addresses our other missions in some detail.
The United States and our NATO allies sent forces to
Afghanistan nearly 20 years ago, and the President has judged
the time is now appropriate to redeploy and reposition these
forces so that they are better arrayed to deter adversaries and
respond to threats globally, including those in the CENTCOM
Command region. Our singular purpose in Afghanistan has been to
ensure that al Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations
would never again plot, prepare, and perpetrate attacks against
the United States and our allies from the refuge of that
country. The campaign has evolved considerably over the years,
from Active combat operations with United States and NATO
forces in the lead, to advisory efforts designed to enhance the
Afghan national defense and security forces' ability to conduct
their own campaigns against violent extremist organizations.
That there has not been another 9/11 is not an accident. It is
the cumulative product of these efforts.
We will now conclude our Afghanistan-based advise and
support mission. We are further planning now for continued
counterterrorism operations from within the region, ensuring
that the violent extremist organizations fighting for their
existence in the hinterlands of Afghanistan remain under
persistent surveillance and pressure. Ever since 12 September
2001 when our allies invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic
Treaty, we have done everything in Afghanistan within a
partnership framework, and that will not change in the months
ahead. We are planning collaboratively with our interagency and
international partners and will take measures to ensure the
safe and orderly withdrawal of all of our forces and those of
our partners. This includes positioning significant combat
power to guard against the possibility that the Taliban decides
to interfere in any way with our orderly redeployment.
I would now like to briefly summarize some other challenges
in the region.
While Iran has itself avoided state-on-state attacks on
United States Forces since last January's strikes on the Al
Asad and Erbil air bases, it continues to menace regional
partners and the free flow of commerce through the use of
proxies and the proliferation of armed, unmanned aerial systems
and other munitions. Its pursuit of regional hegemony remains
the greatest source of instability across the Middle East. In
Iraq and Syria, the campaign to eliminate the threat posed by
ISIS has entered a new phase. In Iraq, we are engaged in a
strategic dialogue with the Iraqi Government to determine the
nature of our security relationship. ISIS' physical caliphate
is no more, but its toxic ideology lives on. The problem is
especially acute in communities ravaged by conflict and its
sprawling camps for displaced persons where ISIS preys upon
vulnerable populations.
What has accelerated in the last year is the influence of
China and Russia, who, each in their own way, are attempting to
subvert the rules-based international order and to gain
strategic influence in the Middle East. China's activity in the
region takes the form of economic investment, arm sales, and
other overtures. Russia has made an 18th century power play in
Syria, propping up the murderous Assad regime. The Middle East
remains key terrain, and I believe China and Russia will
continue to expand their efforts to improve their position in
the region and diminish United States standing wherever
possible.
The CENTCOM area of responsibility is the most cyber-
contested theater in the world. It is also the proving ground
for the proliferation and employment of unmanned weaponized
systems, many emanating from Iran. This difficult and complex
operational environment provides units inside CENTCOM
opportunities to operate and to conduct realistic training
within an environment that exists nowhere else in the world. I
can state as a matter of fact that the units and ships assigned
to CENTCOM are as ready as any in the Joint Force.
The weeks and months ahead will see us execute a very
complicated and demanding military operation to withdraw United
States and NATO forces from Afghanistan. This is presently the
main effort of my command, and we have the tools necessary to
accomplish this task. With that, I look forward to answering
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General McKenzie follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr.
introduction
United States Central Command's (USCENTCOM) mission--to direct and
enable military operations and activities with allies and partners to
increase regional security and stability in support of U.S. enduring
interests--remains as valid and vital to our Nation today as ever
before. While acknowledging military force is not the principal answer
to the region's challenges, our presence in the region provides
advantage, opportunity and leverage for U.S. diplomats to operate from
a position of strength, prevents losing ground to our global
competitors, and protects the security of the American people by
meeting challenges abroad from state and non-state adversaries who
threaten the U.S. and our allies, attempt to destabilize the USCENTCOM
area of responsibility (AOR), and inhibit access to the global commons.
USCENTCOM aligns with the President's Interim National Security
Strategic Guidance (INSSG) to work with like-minded allies and partners
to advance our shared interests to address the four global challenges
that manifest across the USCENTCOM AOR: China, Russia, Iran, and
Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs). Maintaining an effective
posture to meet these challenges requires making hard choices. While
China will remain our Nation's pacing competitor for the foreseeable
future, the main challenges USCENTCOM faces in its AOR occur in the
present. Iran's destabilizing actions reverberate through the region
daily. Iran has not indulged in idle saber rattling against the United
States and our partners. Iran has launched state-on-state ballistic
missile, cruise missile, and unmanned aerial system (UAS) attacks, as
well as attacks through its proxies and aligned groups that have killed
and injured Coalition forces and innocent civilians; those attacks are
increasingly directed at key United States partners. Every day across
the AOR, VEOs like al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS) operate without respect for borders or consequence, creating
instability and human suffering in an attempt to destroy sovereign
nations to remake them in their own twisted vision. Where gaps open,
China and Russia pursue steady economic and military measures that
encroach on United States presence and influence in the region.
None of these current threats to our United States national
interests are approaching sunset, and they all continue to unfold with
speed and unpredictability. Since the beginning of the year, Iranian-
aligned militia groups (IAMGs) in Iraq and Syria likely conducted more
than 50 improvised explosive device attacks against Iraqi-operated,
Coalition-contracted logistical convoys, and nine indirect fire attacks
against United States diplomatic facilities or Iraqi military bases
hosting United States and Coalition personnel. Protracted conflicts
across the AOR and the destruction of government services and
infrastructure have caused large-scale humanitarian crises. More than
20 million displaced people are spread across the USCENTCOM AOR,
representing one fourth of the nearly 80 million people displaced
globally. Millions sought refuge in neighboring countries, many of
which struggle with their own economic and social challenges, while
millions more internally displaced persons (IDPs) struggle to find
daily sustenance. Meanwhile, the underlying socio-economic factors that
sparked the ``Arab Spring'' movements in 2011 persist and contribute to
recurring unrest.
The way forward requires a whole-of-government approach applying
all of the elements of U.S. national power to address the underlying
conditions threatening stability. Alongside our U.S. interagency
partners, USCENTCOM will continue to work with allies and partners to
set the conditions for diplomacy and development. By advancing our
shared interests and coming together to face shared threats, USCENTCOM
develops capable regional partners to act as guarantors of their own
security and sovereignty, able to secure their own borders and ensure
their internal stability.
strategic approach
USCENTCOM's actions and activities across the AOR run the spectrum
from cooperation and collaboration, to competition and conflict. To
ensure synchronization throughout our ongoing missions, we align our
operations, activities, and investments along three lines of effort.
These lines of effort support Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S.
Government priorities and are aligned with DOD guidance and the INSSG.
Recognizing the importance of enhancing stability throughout the
region, USCENTCOM's first line of effort is to deter Iranian aggression
against United States Forces and interests, and strengthen our
partners' capabilities to defend themselves against Iranian and proxy
and aligned group aggression. USCENTCOM's second line of effort is
aligned against the persistent challenge of disrupting and degrading
VEOs that destabilize the region and threaten the U.S Homeland, our
vital interests, and our partners and allies. USCENTCOM considers this
an enduring effort covering a wide range of operations and activities
from active campaigns against al Qaeda, ISIS, and other VEOs in the
region, to supporting whole-of-government solutions to ensure good
governance and to thwart efforts by ISIS and VEOs to radicalize and
make appeals to vulnerable populations, including refugees and IDPs.
Success in this campaign is not defined as the absence of violence. It
is militarily impossible to defeat an ideology, but when force is
required, we will employ it alongside international and local partners
wherever possible to bolster effectiveness and legitimacy, share
burdens, and invest others in success.
Our third line of effort is long-term strategic competition with
China, combined with countering Russia. Both nations leverage their
proximity to the region, historical relations, and a perceived decline
in United States engagement to establish and strengthen opportunistic
relationships. China and Russia each seek ends in their own self-
interest using different approaches. Russia plays the part of spoiler
to the United States, using military means, influence operations and
grey-zone activities to undermine and disrupt U.S. influence and
reassert its own global influence. China uses predominantly economic
means to establish regional in-roads, with a long-term goal of
expanding its military presence to secure vital routes of energy and
trade.
line of effort 1--deterring iran
Iran views the United States presence in the region as the greatest
threat toward achieving its ambition of regional hegemony. The regime
uses a combination of coercion and IAMG violence to bring about the
removal of United States Forces from Iraq, despite United States and
Coalition forces being in Iraq at the request of the Government of Iraq
(GoI). Iran's political maneuverings toward this end have failed to
date, while the United States and GOI continue strategic dialogue to
maintain momentum in the Global Defeat ISIS (D-ISIS) campaign.
Iran currently possesses one of the most capable militaries in the
Middle East, and its offensive capabilities include nearly 3,000 short-
and long-range ballistic missiles as well as an array of land-attack
cruise missiles (LACMs) and UASs. The Iranian regime demonstrated both
the capability and willingness to employ all of these offensive weapons
in complex attacks against Saudi Arabia's oil facilities in 2019, and
again against United States Forces in Iraq in 2020.
Iran provides weapons, parts, and expertise to Houthi forces in
Yemen for the purpose of attacking Saudi Arabia. Since January 2021,
Iranian-aided Houthi forces have launched more than 150 ballistic
missile, LACM, and one-way UAS attacks against military,
infrastructure, and civilian targets in Saudi Arabia. These attacks
have varied in scope and complexity, with UAS detection and
interdiction particularly challenging not just for Saudi forces, but
also for United States and Coalition forces supporting Saudi Arabia's
defense. These small- and medium-sized UAS proliferating across the AOR
present a new and complex threat to our forces and those of our
partners and allies. For the first time since the Korean War, we are
operating without complete air superiority. As a result, USCENTCOM has
made the counter-UAS effort one of its top priorities, and employs a
variety of systems and tactics to defeat these threats. Until we are
able to develop and field a networked capability to detect and defeat
UAS, the advantage will remain with the attacker.
USCENTCOM remains committed to helping defend Saudi Arabia. United
States assistance to the Kingdom focuses on providing information to
Saudi Arabia's armed forces to assist them in thwarting Houthi UAV,
ballistic missile, and explosive boat attacks that contravene
international law and undermine diplomatic efforts. USCENTCOM does not
provide offensive military support to the Saudi-led Coalition. Saudi
Arabia understands that the only way to end the Houthi UAV and missile
attacks is to end the war in Yemen. Deputy Minister of Defense Khalid
bin Salman and other senior Saudi officials have engaged consistently
and constructively with United States. Special Envoy Tim Lenderking and
UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths in an effort to find a negotiated end
to the conflict. Under a proposed UN agreement, which Saudi Arabia has
publicly endorsed, parties would agree to a nationwide ceasefire in
exchange for the opening of Hudaydah Port and Sanaa Airport, then
transition to political talks. USCENTCOM supports these diplomatic
efforts and remains postured to support a UN-backed ceasefire if
directed.
However, international efforts to end the war have been met with
political intransigence and more Houthi attacks, including a sustained
ground Houthi offensive to seize Marib, an attack targeting the
Republic of Yemen Government Parliament while it was deplaning in Aden,
and unprecedented missile and UAS strikes against civilian targets in
Saudi Arabia. The Iranian regime's provisioning of lethal aid to the
Houthis to enable such attacks prolongs the conflict in Yemen,
exacerbates regional tensions, threatens the security of Saudi Arabia,
and extends the suffering of the Yemeni people who are subject to
widespread food and water shortages, malnutrition, and insufficient
healthcare services.
In addition to USCENTCOM's regular force posture, the theater
benefits from Dynamic Force Employment missions (DFE); Agile Combat
Employment (ACE); and a balanced, visible maritime presence. Strategic
bomber task force missions flown no-notice from bases in the United
States to the Gulf from the fall of 2020 to the present and two
fighter-squadron deployments demonstrate DFE over-the-horizon power
projection, exercise seamless and rapid operational coordination
between multiple combatant commands. They also enhance integration with
numerous partners and allies across the region. Developing the
capability to arm and fuel Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps aircraft
from austere, expeditionary air bases in the Arabian Peninsula provides
an example of how USCENTCOM generates and exercises ACE capabilities in
an active combat theater. Meanwhile, U.S. carrier strike groups and
other strategic maritime capabilities operating wherever international
law allows provide USCENTCOM the flexibility of U.S.-sovereign
deterrent options free from access, basing, or overflight restrictions.
As Iran's ballistic missile force is the most formidable in the
region, USCENTCOM's missile defense assets incorporate Patriots,
Sentinel and Avenger systems, and Navy cruisers/destroyers to form a
layered defense, augmented by Theater High-Altitude Air Defense when
ordered. Since Gulf nations field nearly 80 percent of all regional
air-defense systems, USCENTCOM is working to develop a long-term,
regionally-aligned effort focused on a centralized integrated air and
missile defense (IAMD).
Other active and passive defense efforts to safeguard United States
Forces, deter Iranian destabilizing actions, and provide regional
safety and security include:
Critical mine countermeasure capabilities provided with
Avenger-class mine countermeasure ships and MH-53E Sea Dragon heavy-
lift helicopters help maintain freedom of navigation for U.S. and
merchant shipping.
ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance)
platforms, such as our MQ-9s, are highly useful in monitoring and
identifying potential threats or malign activities, providing early
warning and attribution.
Pursuing opportunities to enhance expeditionary basing in
less vulnerable portions of the USCENTCOM AOR.
Conducting analysis on bunker hardening proposals and
implementing blast mitigation measures to improve protective shelters
within missile range and mitigate the risk of traumatic brain injury in
the event of missile and rocket attacks.
Counter Rocket Artillery and Mortar and Patriot missile
systems that provide proven, effective ground-based air-defense
platforms critical for U.S. and partner self-defense.
In addition, as the U.S. footprint in the AOR evolves, legacy KC-
135 and replacement KC-46 refueling capabilities will continue to play
a critical role, enhancing USCENTCOM's ability to execute essential
missions across a vast region with limited suitable airfields.
line of effort 2--countering violent extremist organizations
Countering Violent Extremist Organizations--Afghanistan
The United States strategic objective in Afghanistan, as it has
been since 2001, is to ensure Afghanistan does not again become a safe
haven for terrorist attacks against the United States and our allies
and partners. Success toward this objective and the path to lasting
peace remains an Afghan-owned, Afghan-led process to achieve a
political settlement and comprehensive ceasefire between the Taliban
and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA).
USCENTCOM remains steadfast in support of ongoing interagency and
diplomatic efforts to achieve a negotiated political settlement, and is
committed to working with our regional partners to ensure our ability
to counter a potential reemergence of terrorist threats against the
Homeland.
Pursuant to President Biden's April 14 policy announcement,
USCENTCOM will execute a deliberate and orderly withdrawal of remaining
United States troops in Afghanistan before the 20th anniversary of
September 11. We will execute this withdrawal in lockstep with our NATO
allies and partners in a manner that ensures the safety of our people
and security of our assets. We went in together, adjusted together, and
will prepare to leave together. USCENTCOM's key focus during the
withdrawal will be management of the transition and the safety of U.S.,
as well as NATO ally and partner personnel as they depart the country.
We have told the Taliban in no uncertain terms that any attacks on
United States troops as we undergo a safe and orderly withdrawal will
be met with a forceful response.
The Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) is the primary source
of funds for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF)
and remains a critical resource to Security Force Assistance, enabling
an effective, affordable, and sustainable ANDSF. As the President has
said, while we will not stay involved in Afghanistan militarily, we
will continue to support the government of Afghanistan and keep
providing assistance to the ANDSF. Overseeing the responsible execution
of ASFF has been, and will continue to be, a team effort. USCENTCOM is
committed to working with interagency partners to develop mechanisms
that ensure continued oversight of and accountability for ASFF.
As we finalize this mission, I must express my deepest gratitude to
those Americans who served and sacrificed on behalf of our Nation. I
realize that not all of our troops returned from their deployments
while others returned home wounded and forever changed. My deepest
admiration and respect goes out to our heroes and their families.
Countering Violent Extremist Organizations--Iraq and Syria
United States and Coalition Forces remain in Iraq at the request of
the GOI for one purpose--to ensure the defeat of ISIS. In July 2020,
Coalition forces under command of Combined Joint Task Force-Operation
Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) began Phase IV of the Global D-ISIS
campaign in Iraq and Syria, transitioning from a focus on tactical-
level Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA), to a focus on advising and
enabling partner forces at the operational and strategic levels. This
partnering model in Iraq uses a centralized advising approach toward
the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) at higher echelons of command. The
Coalition established the Military Advisory Group co-located with the
Iraqi Joint Operations Command to provide on-site intelligence,
operations, logistics, fires, and air support from a central location.
Iraqi Security Forces continue to make great progress, due in large
part to the D-ISIS Coalition's investment in training and equipping
thousands of Iraqi troops. Many ISF units are now capable of
independently planning large-scale operations and executing with
Coalition enablers. Operation READY LION was a 14-day Counter Terrorism
(CT) mission conducted in March 2021 to clear ISIS remnants from
mountain strongholds in northeast Iraq. This ISF planned and led
operation, aided by Coalition enablers, eliminated nearly 200 ISIS hide
locations. As our recent Strategic Dialogue with Iraq made clear, the
transition of the United States and other international forces to
training, equipping, and assisting the ISF reflects the success of
their strategic partnership and supports the ISF's continued efforts to
ensure ISIS can never again threaten Iraq's stability.
USCENTCOM also established the Special Operations Advisory Group to
provide similar advisory support to the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism
Service, one of our most effective partners in targeting ISIS
leadership. Other necessary enabling functions include ISR and air
strike capabilities still in nascent development in the ISF.
USCENTCOM recognizes that efforts to stabilize Iraq must go beyond
CJTF-OIR's D-ISIS campaign and address the root causes of instability.
NATO's contribution, through NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) is a separate, but
complementary mission of Security Sector Reform targeting the
institutional capacity of Iraq's Ministry of Defense. This mission is
vital to taking advantage of the Coalition's hard-won gains in Iraq.
Bolstering CJTF-OIR's efforts of advising and enabling partner forces,
NMI is a non-combat mission that seeks to build the institutional
governance of, and professionalize, the ISF at the senior levels. As
CJTF-OIR's mission matures through Phase IV, NMI's role within Iraq
will grow. The North Atlantic Council projects NMI's eventual end
strength to expand considerably, contingent on the GoI's continued
approval. USCENTCOM and NATO staffs collaborate frequently to ensure
close coordination, and CJTF-OIR maintains two planners within the NMI
staff to coordinate future efforts.
In Syria, efforts by Global Coalition partners and the Syrian
Democratic Forces (SDF) were critical in the territorial defeat of
ISIS, and these partners remain essential to the ongoing D-ISIS
campaign. Throughout 2020, the ongoing Syrian civil war, long-term
displacement of civilians, destabilizing influence of Iran, disruptive
role of Russia, and COVID pandemic complicated efforts to bring about
the enduring defeat of ISIS in Syria. Despite these obstacles, our SDF
partners continue to make progress against ISIS as the Coalition
continues to provide enabling support while developing capabilities for
the SDF to operate independently. Partnered operations focus on
enhancing planning, command and control capabilities, and the provision
of key enablers for success to include ISR and medical support.
Notwithstanding significant attrition to its senior leadership and
difficulties generating sufficient revenue, ISIS remains a learning,
adaptive, and committed VEO with a dedicated core. It promotes a global
cyber presence while retaining a cellular structure that allows it to
carry out local attacks--with the ultimate aspiration to reestablish a
physical ``caliphate.''
Constant surveillance and consistent pressure by the ISF in Iraq
and SDF in Syria, enabled by United States and Coalition forces, have
prevented ISIS from conducting or enabling external attacks against the
United States and its allies. As USCENTCOM's D-ISIS campaign continues
we assess attacks inspired, enabled, or conducted by ISIS will continue
in the form of an insurgency. Our objective is to develop and enable
the ability of the ISF in Iraq and SDF in Syria to address and contain
these threats without external assistance. Throughout 2021, our partner
forces will continue to benefit from a range of financial and materiel
support provided through the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF)
program that provided $701 million of critical assistance in 2020.
As noted in the 2020 congressionally-mandated RAND study,
``Strategic Evaluation of the Counter Islamic State Train and Equip
Fund,'' the CTEF program has proven a very effective tool in the Global
D-ISIS campaign, predominantly because of the flexibility and speed
with which it can be applied to dynamic conditions in Iraq and Syria.
Key activities funded by CTEF include the acquisition of niche CT
capacity for the ISF, support to the SDF, stipends for our Syrian and
Peshmerga partners, detention facility support, and the repatriation of
ISIS detainees. CTEF support for Syrian partner forces also facilitates
ongoing operations to find, fix and finish SIS sleeper cells, and
maintain control of key terrain and lines of communication in eastern
Syria.
ISIS Detainees, their Family Members, and Refugees/Internally Displaced
Persons
Two by-products of the Global D-ISIS campaign that cannot be solved
by the use of military force are the repatriation of foreigners from
detention centers and displaced persons camps in Northeast Syria and
the pace of stabilization programs and reintegration of displaced
people across both Syria and Iraq.
Presently, the SDF holds nearly 10,000 ISIS fighters, including
nearly 2,000 hard-core foreign fighters, in more than two dozen
makeshift detention centers across northeast Syria. Although U.S.
Forces do not directly supervise these detention activities, we
mitigate risk using CTEF that helps enable the security of those
facilities. While the SDF remains capable of responding to external
attacks and quelling internal riots, threats persist. The SDF cannot,
and should not be expected to hold these detainees indefinitely.
Outside of detention centers, thousands of foreign women and children,
many affiliated with ISIS detainees, are living in displaced persons
camps. They too need to be repatriated. While several countries have
taken responsibility to repatriate their own citizens, the overwhelming
majority of countries have yet to do so.
Over the last year, increased violence in the Al-Hol displaced
persons camp in northeast Syria has impeded the SDF's access to, and
overall safety in, the camp, having a detrimental effect on
humanitarian conditions. The adverse and insecure conditions create
increased risk for camp populations and camp administration, as well as
humanitarian relief organizations and non-governmental organizations
operating in the camp. Al-Hol, one of the largest displaced persons
camps in Syria holds nearly 61,000 people. Ninety-four percent of Al-
Hol's occupants are women and children, with two-thirds under the age
of 18. Besides the near-term risk of an outbreak of disease or other
conditions that could cause a humanitarian catastrophe, efforts by ISIS
to radicalize elements of this population pose longer-term concerns.
Stabilization programs in northeast Syria implemented by USAID and
DOS have responded to the need for basic services in communities of
origin to incentivize voluntary, safe, and dignified returns of
displaced populations and help maintain stability. Current resources
from all international donors are insufficient to meet demand,
resulting in a sense of community grievance which extremist elements
attempt to exploit. This presents opportunities for ISIS to re-emerge
and increases the risk to the SDF.
Countering Violent Extremist Organizations--Yemen
The critical United States interest in Yemen resides in maintaining
our ability to conduct counterterrorism activities against al-Qaida in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS-Yemen. Without a lasting
political solution and accompanying economic recovery, the conflict in
Yemen will continue to threaten regional security and stability, and
Yemen will remain a safe haven for VEOs aspiring to threaten United
States interests and regional stability. USCENTCOM, in partnership with
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the Republic of Yemen Government, has been
effective in degrading VEO external operations capabilities in Yemen
over the past several years.
strategic competition with china and the destabilizing influence of
russia
The USCENTCOM AOR is, and always has been, a crossroads of global
interests and a historically prime arena for foreign powers to compete
for influence, resources and access. In 2020, China and Russia
exploited ongoing regional crises, financial and infrastructure needs,
perceptions of declining United States engagement, and the COVID-19
pandemic to advance their objectives across the Middle East and Central
and South Asia (CASA) nations to gain or enhance influence in the
region.
China's strategic engagement in the USCENTCOM AOR takes the long
view with short and long-term objectives in mind. China's current
interests and approach in the region are predominantly diplomatic and
economic. China engaged with nearly every country in the AOR in 2020,
using debt traps, the Belt and Road Initiative, and medical diplomacy
to create dependence and expand its influence within the AOR. China's
recent 25-year agreement with Iran could vastly expand Chinese
influence in Iranian banking, telecommunications, ports, railways and
dozens of economic projects in exchange for discounted oil. The
agreement also proposes expanding military cooperation, potentially
providing China an additional foothold in the Arabian Gulf while also
undercutting United States efforts to negotiate with Iran. China has
also emerged as an arms supplier to the region. Attempting to rival the
United States as a ``partner of choice,'' China sells military
equipment at discount prices, unencumbered by United States deliberate
processes, maintenance support packages, and end-use restrictions.
In 2021, China will continue to strengthen defense cooperation
throughout the region through arms sales, exercises, and multilateral
organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, seeking to
establish and strengthen trade relationships across the Middle East,
prioritizing access to energy resources. China's long-term goals are
not just to cultivate trade relationships, economic investment, and
comprehensive partnerships among regional states, but to exert coercive
influence and eventually establish a permanent military presence in an
area from which it imports nearly 50 percent of its crude oil and
roughly 40 percent of its natural gas.
Russia, in contrast, does not play a long game, yet it is equally
disruptive to the region. Russia seeks to undermine and disrupt United
States influence to enhance its own, and improve its position on the
global stage. Russia's engagement in the USCENTCOM AOR is largely
opportunistic and transactional. Fueled in part by a desire to play
``spoiler'' to United States interests but also by a set of economic
factors, Russia maintains oil production agreements and works to expand
nuclear energy markets, trade, and arms sales. Russia increased its
activities in Syria by establishing an enduring military presence where
it regularly interferes with the Global Coalition's D-ISIS campaign,
and obtaining a warm-water base for its navy in Tartus. Russian
military expansion in Syria provides it with a proving ground to test
emerging capabilities, technologies, and fifth-generation equipment
used for electronic warfare, air defense, UAS, and information
operations--all in proximity to United States Forces. In September
2020, USCENTCOM deployed Sentinel radar and Bradley Fighting Vehicles
to the Eastern Syria Security Area, and increased fighter patrols over
United States Forces in response to a dangerous increase in
unauthorized, unsafe Russian interactions threatening Coalition forces.
Russia will seek ways to challenge United States presence as
opportunities present themselves, in an effort to position itself as an
alternative to the West by offering to mediate regional conflicts,
selling arms without end-use restrictions, offering military expertise,
and participating in regional and multilateral organizations and
military exercises. In Central Asia, where proximity to China and
Russia is great and United States presence is comparatively small,
every interaction holds significance. Opportunities to compete with
China and Russia in this region manifest themselves through border
security, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and defense institution
building.
As China and Russia compete militarily with the United States below
the level of combat, USCENTCOM develops capabilities to address and
mitigate gray-zone actions, safeguarding our technology from rivals
operating in the region. USCENTCOM represents the world's most active
electromagnetic battlespace and requires a robust interoperability and
information sharing capability in order to protect U.S., allied, and
partner critical capabilities as we move forward with collective
defense initiatives. Adversary jamming of our commercial satellite
communications allows state and non-state actors to asymmetrically
contest and complicate U.S. Force projection. The increasing
computational power and improvements in rival powers' cryptographic
analysis capabilities makes it imperative that USCENTCOM and our
partners plan, execute, and implement a cryptographic modernization
plan to ensure maximum interoperability, mitigate potential cyber-
attacks, and maintain a secure information exchange environment.
regional cooperation and partnerships
As encapsulated in its overall mission, USCENTCOM will continue to
focus on regional partnerships and cooperation. Two examples of
maritime partnerships that promote regional collective security and
demonstrate U.S. commitment to broad relationships and partners in the
region are the Combined Maritime Force (CMF) and the International
Maritime Security Construct (IMSC). The 33 nation CMF conducts maritime
security operations to ensure the free flow of commerce, actively deny
the use of the high seas to terrorist and illicit networks, and curtail
illegal shipments of narcotics and lethal aid. The IMSC is a
cooperation-based framework ensuring safety of maritime shipping and
the free flow of seaborne commerce through presence, surveillance, and
attribution of malign activities in international waters in and around
the Arabian Gulf and the Bab al Mandeb.
The normalization of relations between Israel and a number of
Muslim-majority Arab states in 2020 and the realignment of the Unified
Command Plan (UCP) moving Israel from United States European Command to
USCENTCOM provide new opportunities for enhancing regional stability
and security cooperation. The UCP change better aligns the combatant
command areas of responsibility with the organizational boundaries of
other federal agencies, creating coordination efficiencies for whole-
of-government efforts in the AOR. USCENTCOM plans to achieve initial
operating capability and the shift of combatant command authority and
responsibility by September of 2021. The normalization of relations
between Israel and other key USCENTCOM partners, manifested initially
in diplomatic and economic cooperation, reduces tensions and holds
potential for eventual expansion of military cooperation and alignment
toward shared threats.
USCENTCOM's senior defense officials and defense attaches (SDO/
DATT) live, work, and develop close relationships with host nation
officials in every country in the USCENTCOM AOR except Iran and Syria.
Our partners place great weight on these relationships, and the
military rank of our SDO/DATTs conveys respect and importance as to how
the U.S. views the partnership we have with each nation.
covid-19 impacts
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, several governments in the
USCENTCOM AOR faced growing economic challenges. Most governments
incurred significant expenditures and revenue losses during the
pandemic that exacerbated pre-existing socioeconomic conditions
contributing to deepening popular unrest. Government officials largely
prioritized efforts to mitigate the spread of the virus over
implementing needed economic policy reforms. Impacts to regional
economies will further fuel issues fomenting unrest to include
provision and equitable distribution of services, medical care, and
employment.
Across the AOR, USCENTCOM rapidly responded to the COVID-19 threat,
implementing non-pharmaceutical interventions, obtaining and
disseminating personal protective equipment, and adapting newly-
developed treatment guidelines to an austere deployed environment.
Despite the pandemic, military operations and medical support for
combat and non-combat casualties remain fully mission capable.
Extensive public health measures and medical support across the AOR
resulted in zero COVID-19-related service member deaths.
In fall 2020, USCENTCOM worked closely with the Joint Staff,
Defense Health Agency, and Defense Logistics Agency to identify
requirements for emerging COVID-19 vaccines released under Food and
Drug Administration Emergency Use Authorization in December 2020.
USCENTCOM prioritized forward-deployed forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Syria for early vaccine delivery and voluntary inoculation efforts.
As of 14 April 2021, over 7,114 cases of COVID-19 were identified
resulting in 276 personnel medically evacuated from theater. Since
March 2020, constraints associated with COVID-19 resulted in
cancellation of 20 Joint or Combined exercises within the USCENTCOM
AOR, impacting mission readiness and partner-nation collaboration.
While many events were cancelled due to COVID-19, partners remain
committed to continuing larger, multinational exercises like Bright
Star and Eager Lion.
Refinement of theater deployment physical standards for all
personnel helped reduce the impact to U.S., Coalition, and partner-
nation civilians. Vaccinations for forward-deployed personnel in
Afghanistan and the Gulf region began in late January 2021. Continued
entry of COVID-19 infected personnel, finite quantities of on-hand
testing consumables, limited quarantine and hospital capacity in
theater, and irregular resupply remain significant obstacles to
outbreak prevention and containment. In March, USCENTCOM significantly
expanded vaccine distribution throughout the AOR with the intent to
provide COVID-19 vaccines for all DOD personnel, dependents, and
contractors willing to receive it to provide maximal force health
protection. We have received a substantial portion of the required
vaccines to meet that objective. Furthermore, USCENTCOM advocates
providing COVID-19 vaccines for Coalition and partner forces working
alongside U.S. Forces. Continuing an aggressive vaccination program for
forward-deployed units, combined with further emphasis on effective
pre-deployment restriction of movement and testing, clean transit
routes into theater, and prioritization of deploying personnel for a
CONUS-based, Service-led COVID-19 vaccination program will ensure
continued mission effectiveness forward.
At USCENTCOM headquarters, restrictions on travel and movement in
both the AOR and the U.S. impacted face-to-face key leader engagements
and regular personnel rotations throughout much of 2020. USCENTCOM
instituted robust teleworking procedures, with on-site staffing reduced
to 25 percent in March 2020. This percentage increased to 50 percent in
September 2020. USCENTCOM remains a warfighting headquarters, postured
to support multiple active campaigns across the AOR. Partial staffing,
teleworking, and effective uses of technology since March 2020 provided
short-term solutions to enable safe operations in the headquarters and
continuous support to forward-deployed formations.
taking care of our people
The USCENTCOM workforce operates at a warfighting tempo, whether
deployed or working in the Tampa headquarters. The mental and physical
stressors associated with the demands of our operational environment,
exacerbated by COVID-19, present significant challenges to our
workforce. Meeting the mental health and spiritual needs of our people
regardless of religious affiliation remains a high priority at
USCENTCOM. Our chaplains provide professional, confidential counseling
across the USCENTCOM workforce addressing essential matters of the
heart and soul to include sexual harassment, extremism, personal
relationships, stress, and suicide prevention.
Sexual assault and sexual harassment, extremism, and discrimination
break down the trust and cohesion necessary for the USCENTCOM workforce
to execute its missions effectively and efficiently. To combat these
challenges, USCENTCOM places command emphasis on programs that build
resilience, readiness, and cohesion. It is a leadership responsibility
to provide a safe work environment, and to hold accountable those who
seek to disrupt it. USCENTCOM leaders understand it is not just what
our people hear their leaders say, but what they see their leaders do
that makes an impact.
Improving diversity and inclusion across the force is an
operational imperative to meet the demands of strategic competition.
USCENTCOM takes deliberate actions to build a diverse workforce
promoting equality and innovation. USCENTCOM established a Diversity
and Inclusion position, singularly focused on advising the command on
all matters relating to discrimination and institutional biases, as
well as barriers to diversity and inclusion across the organization.
USCENTCOM remains fully committed to the prevention of sexual
assault and sexual harassment, improving our command climate and
prevention efforts in both of these areas. We constantly work to ensure
both our military and civilian workforce feel comfortable coming
forward and reporting any concerns, and ensure that leaders at all
levels take appropriate action to build positive workplace climates.
USCENTCOM recently completed a command-wide stand down to address
extremism. These stand downs were led by general/flag rank officers or
senior civilians, and included virtual training modules featuring
subject matter experts and facilitated small-group discussions to build
awareness and help prevent actions associated with extremist behaviors.
USCENTCOM's leaders are charged with the responsibility to continue
this dialogue beyond the DOD mandate to make clear that operating in a
command free of discrimination, hate, and harassment while
accomplishing our mission is paramount to our success.
Taking care of our people is a very high priority for me personally
as the USCENTCOM commander. I speak frequently to my subordinate
commanders on these matters because this is commander's business. It
requires the full attention of the chain of command, and in USCENTCOM,
these critical matters have that full attention.
conclusion
The USCENTCOM AOR remains challenging and dynamic. One constant in
USCENTCOM remains the strength of our people. As nearly two decades and
two of the longest conflicts in U.S. history begin to wind down, our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen, guardians,
civilians, and their families remain steadfast in their commitment to
our mission and the vital roles they serve in U.S. national security.
Their service and sacrifice over many long years of conflict is
humbling and inspirational, benefiting the lives of millions across the
U.S. and the AOR. We honor those who have sacrificed by ensuring the
mission continues, and their sacrifices were not in vain.
USCENTCOM fulfills its missions, appreciative of the efforts and
support of our civilian leadership at the Department of Defense on our
behalf. We acknowledge the teamwork of the interagency and thank the
members of Congress, the Defense Committees, and their staffs, without
whose consistent and timely support we would be unable to accomplish
our missions in support of U.S. national security interests and the
will of the American people.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General McKenzie.
General Townsend, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL STEPHEN J. TOWNSEND, USA, COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND
General Townsend. Can you hear me?
Chairman Reed. Yes, sir.
General Townsend. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
Members of the Committee, good morning, and thank you for the
opportunity to appear today. It is a privilege to represent
America's exceptional men and women at United States Africa
Command, who are dedicated to securing United States interests
and preserving our strategic options on the African continent.
This morning I am accompanied by AFRICOM's senior enlisted
leader, Marine Corps Sergeant Major Richard Thresher, and one
of my key staff advisors, Air Force Colonel Jacqueline Breeden.
I am also here this morning with my colleague and friend,
General Frank McKenzie, the CENTCOM commander, to discuss
shared challenges and opportunities in our areas of
responsibility and the high return the American people give of
their defense investments around the globe.
Historically, America has not been penalized for
underestimating the importance of Africa. Today, we can no
longer afford to underestimate the economic opportunity and the
strategic consequence that Africa embodies, and which
competitors, like China and Russia, fully recognize. Africa is
a crossroads of the globe. The recent blockage of the Suez
Canal not only demonstrated the importance of critical sea
lines of communication flowing through the Mediterranean and
Red Seas, but also around the Cape of Good Hope. Violent
extremist organizations, competitor activities, and fragile
states are among some of the threats to U.S. interests.
Beyond geography, global population growth is largely
African. By 2050, 1 in 4 people on the planet will live in
Africa. Rapidly-growing markets, 60 percent of the world's
arable land, and vast untapped resources, including strategic
rare earth minerals, provide tremendous economic potential.
Thirteen of the world's 25 fastest-growing economies are in
Africa. Africa's tremendous opportunities are offset by
significant challenges, including climate change, food
shortages, poverty, ungoverned spaces, historic grievances, and
other factors, that make the continent also home to 14 of the
world's 20 most fragile countries.
Our strategic competitors are very active in Africa. China
has invested heavily in their second continent, where some
think tanks call it China's fifth island chain. Russia seeks to
exploit instability and fragility for their own gain and at
United States expense. Iran is increasingly active on the
continent. At the same time, African-based violent extremists,
like al Qaeda affiliates, Al-Shabab and ISIS, thrive in the
government's--in the continent's ungoverned spaces. They
provide the greatest threat to many of our African partners and
aspire to kill Americans in Africa, as well as here at home.
Across the diverse continent, United States AFRICOM
operates with .3 percent of DOD's budget and .3 percent of
DOD's manpower. This tiny investment pays enormous dividends as
just under 6,000 servicemembers, civilians, and contractors
work with our partners, both interagency and foreign, to
counter malign actors and transnational threats, respond to
crises, and strengthen security forces to advance U.S.
interests and promote regional security, stability, and
prosperity. AFRICOM works every day to protect America's
security and advance our access and influence. We do this arm
in arm with the U.S. Interagency and through coordinated action
with our allies and partners. What AFRICOM accomplishes with a
few people and a few dollars on a continent three-and-a-half
the size of the continental United States is a bargain for the
American taxpayer and a low-cost insurance policy for America's
security.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thanks for your
continued support to our armed forces, and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Townsend follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Stephen J. Townsend
introduction: strong return on our modest investment in this dynamic
theater.
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of
the Committee, it is an honor to come before you again to represent the
dedicated and professional service members and civilians of United
States Africa Command (USAFRICOM). Since the last time I briefed you,
USAFRICOM participated in a Command review and has developed a new
campaign plan to ensure our alignment with the National Defense
Strategy (NDS). USAFRICOM's Campaign Plan (ACP) aligns with our
Nation's strategic objectives to protect our people and our Homeland,
assure our allies and partners, and counter malign actors. Our national
interests guide our campaign plan and our mission: United States Africa
Command, with partners, counters malign actors and transnational
threats, responds to crises, and strengthens security forces in order
to advance United States interests and promote regional security,
stability, and prosperity. I am confident the American people are
getting a good value for our very modest investment of defense
resources in Africa.
The African Continent is important to the United States
politically, economically, and militarily. It is home to the fastest
growing economies and populations in the world, sits at crossroads of
international commerce, trade and global force flow, and watches over
important sea lines of communication. Our future security, prosperity,
and ability to project power globally rest on free, open, and secure
access in and around Africa. Activities of competitor states, violent
extremist organizations, instability and fragility all challenge our
access. Despite these challenges, this dynamic continent presents a
number of opportunities for the United States to advance our interests.
The COVID-19 pandemic illustrates the coupling of challenges and
opportunities in Africa. Our forces remained in place and continued to
operate within the limits of our force health protection measures. Our
nation's values and long-term whole-of-government commitment to support
and build partner capacity has been our strongest assets over the last
year. To combat and contain the pandemic, African partners have
mobilized medical capabilities built over decades of United States-led
efforts to combat infectious diseases. USAFRICOM supported United
States efforts to provide COVID-19 assistance in 43 countries,
including the delivery of nearly $500 million in medical supplies.
While force health protective measures required us to re-scope many of
our activities, we have stayed connected with our African partners
during their time of need.
strategic environment: incredible potential checked by incredible
obstacles
A Vast Continent of Opportunity and Challenge
The land mass of Africa is larger than the United States, China,
India, Japan, and most of Europe combined. Over half of the world's
arable land is on the continent, along with much of the planet's
untapped mineral resources, \1\ including strategic minerals. Africa is
home to 11 of the world's 25 fastest growing economies, as measured by
gross domestic product data for 2020. \2\ Africa's population is young,
growing fast, and expected to top two billion in 2050, when more than a
quarter of the world's inhabitants will live on the continent. By 2100,
Africa's population could nearly double again. Not only is the
continent's growth rate the highest in the world, but the population is
the youngest, with 41 percent under the age of 15. \3\ The growing size
of the population, illustrates the rising global importance of the
African continent and the momentum of Africa's expanding markets.
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\1\ Grow Africa: ``60 percent of Arable Land is in Africa and it
has Billions in Investment Potential,'' 2020.
\2\ International Monetary Fund, 2020 GDP growth (annual percent)
https://www.imf.org/ (South Sudan, Egypt, Rwanda, Benin, Tanzania,
Ethiopia, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Kenya, Ghana, Malawi, and Niger), 2021
\3\ United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs/
Population Division World Population Prospects, 2019
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Africa's rapid population growth also amplifies several challenges.
Over two-thirds of Africans live in poverty. \4\ Natural resource
exploitation, impacts of climate change, and infectious disease
outbreaks all fuel instability and conflict. Desertification,
particularly in the Lake Chad Basin where the Sahara Desert is
expanding into the Sahel, has dramatically reduced arable land,
threatened food security, and created conditions for instability and
insecurity. Lack of economic opportunities and a search for a better
life lead to migration, which creates compounding challenges. An
increase in migration across Africa, as well as into Europe and North
America, feeds a lucrative market for extremist organizations and
criminal networks. The Fund for Peace ``Fragile State Index'' captures
the aggregation of these challenges. Fourteen of the world's top twenty
most fragile states are in the USAFRICOM Area of Responsibility (AOR).
\5\ Despite these challenges, Africa's potential and strategic location
continue to attract investment and engagement by geo-strategic
competitors.
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\4\ 85 percent of Africans live off less than 5.50 USD per day,
World Bank, 2019
\5\ The Fund for Peace, ``Fragile State Index'' https://
fragilestateindex.org/data/ (Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Chad, Sudan,
Afghanistan, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Burundi, Haiti, Nigeria, Guinea, Mali,
Iraq, Ethiopia, Myanmar, Libya). Three of the top 20 (Afghanistan,
Syria, and Iraq) represent $1.5 trillion in ``war-related'' expenses
from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2019 according to the DOD
Comptroller., 2021
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Strategic Geography
Africa has global strategic importance relative to NATO's Southern
Flank, the flow of commerce through the Red Sea, and protecting access
to the Middle East, Indian Ocean, and South-East Asia. Located at the
crossroads of the world, Africa watches over strategic choke points
including the Strait of Gibraltar, the Strait of Sicily, the Red Sea,
the Bab al Mandeb, and the Mozambique Channel. The sea line of
communication (SLOC) running through the Mediterranean and Red Seas,
and a second, dipping around the Cape of Good Hope, connect the East
Coast of the United States to East Africa, the Middle East, India, and
South East Asia. These pathways are essential to global trade, ongoing
operations and contingency plans of seven other Combatant Commands.
These corridors facilitate one-third of the shipping between North
America and Asia, and one-third of global oil shipping. United States
and global security depend on unhindered access to these waters.
Strategic Competition
The NDS prioritizes geo-political competition due to the
``magnitude of the threats [China and Russia] pose to United States
security and prosperity, and the potential for those threats to
increase in the future.'' \6\ Both Beijing and Moscow have long
recognized the political, military, and economic importance of Africa
and each continues to seize opportunities to expand their influence
across the continent. Unencumbered by international norms and standards
of transparency, our competitors are able to combine both government
and private resources to gain influence. Exploitative practices for
trade, resource extraction, weapons sales, and debt manipulation
ultimately weakens governance, slows economic growth, and fosters
instability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ 2018 National Defense Strategy: Sharpening the American
Military Competitive Edge, 2018, p 7.
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The People's Republic of China leads the international community in
head of state and senior leadership visits to Africa over the last
decade--investing heavily, pledging $60 billion in infrastructure and
development, and increasing arms sales to African countries. Beijing's
activities in Africa are outpacing those of the United States and our
allies as they seek resources and markets to feed economic growth in
China and leverage economic tools to increase their global reach and
influence. The People's Republic of China has 52 embassies in Africa,
three more than the United States, and they continue to expand their
base in Djibouti into a platform to project power across the continent
and its waters--completing a large naval pier this year. The base is
only 12 kilometers from our 3,400 DOD personnel at Camp Lemonnier, the
Department's primary forward operating location in the USAFRICOM AOR.
Beijing seeks to open additional bases, tying their commercial seaport
investments in East, West and Southern Africa closely with involvement
by Chinese military forces in order to further their geo-strategic
interests.
Russian strategy in Africa has long centered on building influence
to facilitate economic opportunity, obtain political support for
Russian initiatives, and increase military presence on NATO's southern
flank. Russian private military companies (PMCs) are a destabilizing
influence in Africa, frequently securing Russian investments at the
expense of African interests. Russian PMCs almost certainly downed an
unarmed, unmanned United States aircraft in Libya in November 2019
using a sophisticated Russian air defense system. This past year,
USAFRICOM exposed the extent of the Kremlin's malign involvement,
despite its continued denial, by identifying and publicizing their
deployment of high performance fighter aircraft to Libya.
Iranian military capabilities threaten sea-lanes through the Red
Sea and our posture locations in the Horn of Africa. Iranian support to
Yemen's Houthis further jeopardizes freedom of navigation in the Red
Sea and increases tensions and instability in East Africa. Camp
Lemonnier's geostrategic location makes it a critical posture location
to support USCENTCOM plans and operations. To mitigate this risk to our
people, this year USAFRICOM requested funding for improving force
protection. I am thankful that Congress has authorized and appropriated
these funds. With the inclusion of the Iranian threat, East Africa is a
nexus of four of the five major threats identified in the National
Defense Strategy: The People's Republic of China, Russia, Iran, and
violent extremist organizations (VEOs).
VEOs are a Primary Threat to Many African Partners
When I meet with African leaders, their primary concern is often
VEOs killing their soldiers, kidnapping their civilians, and
challenging their authority to rule. Transnational VEOs, like al Qaeda
and ISIS, are expanding in Africa at a rapid pace, taking advantage of
weak governance and disenfranchised populations. They threaten our
partners' capacity to govern effectively, protect their populations,
and improve their economies. Their terror attacks on the continent
exacerbate the challenges of vulnerable populations, and some of them
remain committed to strike at U.S. interests in both the region and the
U.S. Homeland.
East Africa is home to Al-Shabaab, the largest, wealthiest, and
most violent Al Qaeda-associated group in the world. In 2019, Al-
Shabaab's leadership publicly identified Americans and United States
interests worldwide as priority targets, mirroring Usama bin Laden's
declaration of war on the United States in 1996. In January 2020, Al-
Shabaab followed through on this threat, attacking our forces at the
Kenyan Naval Base at Manda Bay. This complex and well-resourced attack
killed three Americans and clearly demonstrated Al-Shabaab's
willingness and capability to attack the United States outside of
Somalia. In February 2021, Al-Shabaab emir Ahmed Diriye repeated his
call for violent attacks against Americans. Today, Al-Shabaab is the
primary African VEO threat to American interests.
The Islamic State is rapidly franchising across Africa, becoming
increasingly more capable, violent, and difficult for our African
partners to defeat without international support. In West Africa, the
primary VEO threats are ISIS networks in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin,
Boko Haram, and al Qaeda's Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).
Kidnapping for ransom, targeting Westerners, remains a common tactic
for VEOs and criminal organizations. USAFRICOM's continued engagement
in the Counter-VEO (C-VEO) fight in West Africa has developed the
situational awareness and regional partnerships that sustain United
States access and influence. These relationships enabled USAFRICOM to
rescue Mr. Philipe Walton within days of his abduction in Niger last
October. To conduct this rescue mission, USAFRICOM requested, and
within hours received approval for, armed access, basing, and
overflight from seven countries and permission to conduct a raid in
Nigeria. Continued collaboration with, and support to, our French
African partners as well as our European allies, is imperative to
counter growing extremism with limited United States resources in the
West. Bottom line: Our relationships and our counter-VEO efforts build
U.S. influence over strategic competitors.
strategic approach: an ounce of prevention and cheap insurance for
america
A secure, stable, and prosperous Africa--aligned with the United
States--is an enduring American interest. The U.S. must continue to
work with our allies and partners to advance our mutual interests
within the rules-based international system. Our campaign plan is
focused on achieving four campaign objectives, developed and refined
over the last year: 1) Gain and Maintain Strategic Access and
Influence, 2) Disrupt VEO Threats to U.S. Interests, 3) Respond to
Crises to Protect U.S. Interests, 4) Coordinate Action with Allies and
Partners to Achieve Shared Security Objectives.
USAFRICOM resources offer cheap insurance and an ounce of
prevention for America. Funds to support contracted ISR capabilities as
well as personnel and recovery and casualty evacuation dramatically
improve our ability to help our troops accomplish their missions and
protect them with less impact on high demand military capabilities.
Similarly, modest but sustained funding levels for exercises,
professional education and Section 333and 332 activities are critical
to our ability to build partner capacity to do more for themselves and
to compete effectively with competitors.
Gain and Maintain Strategic Access and Influence
Strategic access to exert influence and project power enables a
broad range of U.S. Government activities. USAFRICOM competes and acts
to maintain or expand U.S. influence and access. Our influence in
Africa provides an advantage over competitors, deters conflict, assures
partners of our commitment, and postures the United States to
transition effectively to crisis or conflict if necessary. In
cooperation with our allies, USAFRICOM builds trust and strengthens
military relationships to allow for the rapid flow of forces and enable
warplans when needed. As competition is increasingly global, Africa is
rich with opportunities to counter, disrupt, tax, and win against
strategic competitors.
USAFRICOM prioritizes access in key geostrategic locations to
disrupt competitor efforts that threaten United States freedom of
action and to check malign activities which exploit our African
partners. While we focus our military activities in key locations, we
stay engaged across the continent to maintain situational awareness,
support partners and allies, and respond to emerging crises.
Disrupt VEO Threats to U.S. Interests
Persistent state fragility in Africa drives instability and violent
extremism, but also invites competitor exploitation. VEOs remain a
significant threat to the shared interests of the United States, our
allies, and our African partners. Many of these VEOs explicitly aspire
to kill Americans. USAFRICOM, working with African and European
partners, monitors these VEOs for indicators and warnings of attacks
against the Homeland, our embassies, and our citizens. Monitoring VEO
capabilities and intentions can be resource intensive but is a vital
first step in preventing successful terrorist attacks.
Regional VEOs are the number one security concern for many of our
partners. Access and influence stem from helping our partners with the
problems they face. Shared efforts against VEOs provide the best
opportunity to strengthen partnerships and to ensure the U.S. is the
security partner of choice in priority countries. In Africa, counter
VEO efforts are strategic competition.
USAFRICOM contributes to multi-national efforts to disrupt VEOs
while also conducting direct actions to degrade VEOs who threaten the
Homeland. In the East, USAFRICOM capabilities support and enable the
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the multi-national effort
to defeat Al Shabaab, an arm of al Qaeda, and build sustainable
security in Somalia as outlined in the 2017 London Security Pact. In
the West, USAFRICOM supports the French-led multi-national coalition,
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in
Mali (MINUSMA), and the African-led G5 Sahel forces against Al Qaeda
and ISIS affiliates. This sustainable, partner-centric approach
protects the Homeland, builds relationships, creates access, and
thwarts competitor advances.
Respond to Crises to Protect U.S. Interests
The DOD often helps set the conditions necessary for subsequent
whole-of-government efforts across Africa. The tremendous work of the
Department of State (DOS), U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), and other organizations has dramatically reduced the impact of
diseases like HIV/AIDS, Ebola, and COVID-19, strengthened educational
systems, supported democratic elections, and encouraged economic
growth. Whole-of-American Government efforts are contingent upon the
ability of USAFRICOM and the DOD to protect our embassies, our
investments, and our people working in Africa to advance United States
interests.
The DOS has designated 30 diplomatic facilities worldwide as High
Threat, High Risk posts, 15 of them are in Africa. USAFRICOM shares
many of our crisis response forces with USEUCOM to maximize savings and
readiness to the department. In the last year, the attack on Manda Bay
in Kenya, diplomatic engagements in Libya, the coup in Mali, recovery
of an American Citizen, the order to reposition from Somalia and
ongoing violence in Ethiopia have all tested our response capabilities
across the spectrum of operations and across tens of thousands of
miles.
As our service members operate in small groups in remote locations
throughout the continent, USAFRICOM is continuously adjusting our
limited collection, medical, transportation, and response assets to
protect our troops. I would like to thank Congress for authorizing and
appropriating funds to dramatically improve force protection, personnel
recovery, and casualty evacuation efforts to provide our troops the
medical care where and when they need it.
Coordinate Action with Allies and Partners to Achieve Shared Security
Objectives
USAFRICOM maintains a well-developed constellation of allies,
multi-national organizations (European Union, African Union, NATO, and
the United Nations), and African partners. \7\ These relationships
enable USAFRICOM to coordinate action, enhance interoperability, and
share costs and risks to achieve mutual security goals.
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\7\ USAFRICOM maintains Foreign Liaison Officers representing 19
countries and multinational organizations.
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USAFRICOM's active participation in multi-national efforts
reinforces cooperation for mutual benefit, assures partners of U.S.
commitment, and denies competitors opportunities to erode U.S.
influence. Enhanced relationships and military activities enable
USAFRICOM to help create time and space for our African partners to
build the governance and economic growth necessary to gain the capacity
to repel malign actors and VEO influences. Building partner capability
is also an important tool in strategic competition, reinforcing the
United States role as Africa's security partner of choice while
furthering American values and influence. A great example of building
relationships and trust is Exercise African Lion. Since 2002, African
Lion has brought together partners and allies to enhance
interoperability, build readiness and strengthen relationships. Trust
is built over time--the relationships made while we develop partner
capabilities provide America with long-term strategic alliances needed
to address future challenges and ensure regional security and
prosperity.
regional assessments: a large, complex, and dynamic theater
East Africa
The strategic geography of East Africa remains vital to United
States National Security. Despite a determined Chinese effort to assert
influence in Djibouti and the region, our relationship with the
Djiboutian Government remains strong. The strength of the relationship
built between the United States and Djibouti was evident in the opening
months of the COVID-19 pandemic. As global travel became more
difficult, senior Djiboutian leaders approved every one of our flight
requests into and out of our three facilities that comprise the
Djibouti Base Cluster. This vitally important base houses approximately
half of the U.S. military personnel in the USAFRICOM AOR and enables
the U.S. to protect the SLOC through the Red Sea and project power
across East, Central, and Southern Africa as well as into the USCENTCOM
and USINDOPACOM AORs. The base cluster supports global force flow,
sustains forward staged response forces, supports strategic
competition, and enables C-VEO activities in both USAFRICOM and
USCENTCOM's AORs.
The recent Operation Octave Quartz demonstrated the agility and
flexibility of the Joint Force. In just over 60 days, USAFRICOM
received the order to reposition from Somalia, planned the operation,
assembled a Joint Task Force of 13,400 service members from around the
globe, and executed this high-risk mission ahead of schedule and
without major incident. Once again, our strong partnerships with
Djibouti and Kenya played a vital role in our successful repositioning.
Our mission in Somalia has not changed, but our posture has.
Ultimately, achieving our shared objectives in Somalia is tied to
reconciliation between the Federal Government in Mogadishu and the
Federal Member States, building institutional capacity across various
sectors, and enhancing support to the troop contributing countries of
AMISOM.
The collective efforts of the United States Government,
international community, and regional partners, has created tangible
progress in Somalia, albeit far slower, far smaller, and far more
fragile than we would like. AMISOM and the Somali National Army (SNA)
have made slow gains in Al-Shabaab strongholds in the south, holding
territory and establishing outposts. However, pre-election political
friction between the Federal Government of Somalia and Somali Federal
Member States has distracted Mogadishu from our common fight against
Al-Shabaab. United States-trained and supported ``Danab'' SNA units, a
result of the USG's commitment at the 2017 London Security Pact, most
often spearhead security operations but it is critical that AMISOM
remain in the fight until the SNA is able to counter Al-Shabaab
themselves. As this is written, USAFRICOM is working with the Joint
Staff and OSD to review our mission, resources and authorities in East
Africa as part of the Global Posture Review.
West Africa
USAFRICOM employs a small footprint in West Africa as part of our
African-led, allied-assisted, and United States-enabled framework to
counter the expansion of VEOs in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin and
to monitor increased strategic competitor activities. We coordinate our
efforts with the larger multi-national security activities in West
Africa (G5-Sahel and Multi-National Joint Task Force) and provide
bilateral support to partner nations. However, progress is slow because
in much of West Africa governance remains weak and populations
disenfranchised. VEOs remain a significant threat and their violence
continues to grow and spread.
Extreme poverty, more frequent and intense weather events,
vulnerable and marginalized populations, separatist movements, and
illicit transnational networks overlap in the Sahel, creating
opportunities for VEOs to establish safe haven, increasingly control
the local populace and grow in strength. JNIM and ISIS associates have
expanded in the region and now threaten the littoral states from the
north--a development of increasing concern. ISIS-Core promotes ISIS-
West Africa as a flagship network, while Al Qaeda supports their global
network using revenue generated in the Sahel, mostly through kidnapping
for ransom. Faced with these growing VEO threats, African countries
seek United States support, making C-VEO efforts one of our most
effective tools to counter competitor influence.
The People's Republic of China's ``Belt and Road Initiative'' is
one competitor initiative that seeks to increase Chinese access and
influence along the Atlantic Coast of Africa. Today, the People's
Republic of China has invested heavily in large-scale industrial
fishing infrastructure in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG), making the People's
Republic of China the primary contributor to a growing food crisis that
will further drive instability in West Africa. This exploitation--much
of it illegal, unregulated, or under-reported illegal, unreported, and
unregulated (IUU)--is not only counter-productive to our shared
security objectives with West African countries, but also provides the
economic pretense the People's Republic of China has previously used to
justify increased military access. The way forward requires continued
efforts with African partners and allies to build capacity to enforce
their own maritime sovereignty. For example, Exercise Obangame Express
is one way we seek to improve regional maritime domain awareness,
capacity and cooperation. But, this annual event is insufficient by
itself. A multinational maritime task force is a good option to address
the plague of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Additionally, piratical
attacks in Gulf of Guinea have become more frequent and violent,
causing risk to international commerce and threatening maritime
security.
USAFRICOM will continue to work with Gulf of Guinea nations and
other international partners to help strengthen regional cooperation
and responses to piracy. Our European allies play critical roles in C-
VEO operations in West Africa. France, who leads C-VEO multilateral
efforts in the Sahel, is committed to security in the region with
approximately 5,500 troops conducting security force assistance and
direct action with support from a number of European allies. We mourn
the loss, in recent months, of five French Soldiers killed fighting to
secure our mutual security interests in West Africa. Our mutual support
and cooperation with the French has had the effect of multiplying the
resources available to advance our shared interests. The European Union
and United Nations maintain multi-national missions in West Africa and
the continued effort of the United States Government help keep these
international partners engaged in this fight and sustain France's
leadership of this effort.
North Africa
The Kingdom of Morocco, first to recognize our Nation in 1777,
remains our strongest partner through exercises, training programs,
foreign military sales, and counterterrorism cooperation. The Tunisians
are also strong partners in the fight against ISIS-Libya and reinforce
our security assistance with national funds. Our military relationship
with Algeria significantly improved in the last year. Once looking
almost exclusively to Russia, senior officials in the Algerian
Government have recently expressed their desire to continue improving
relations with the United States.
In Libya, the election of a new Prime Minister and an Interim Unity
Government mark continued progress. In the last 12 months, USAFRICOM
supported our State Department in formally establishing a diplomatic
link and we appreciate our excellent cooperation with AMB Norland and
his team. Libya has provided Russia access and influence along NATO's
southern flank. The Kremlin has publically denied direct involvement in
the Libyan conflict, while thinly masking their governmental activities
under the banner of the Wagner Group PMC. Continued progress on the
political front is the best chance for long-term stability in Libya.
Central and Southern Africa
The potential exists for stronger partnerships and opportunities in
central and southern Africa. Botswana is a bright spot with its
enduring democracy, continued stability, professional military, and
good relations with the United States. South Africa, the second-largest
economy and our largest trading partner on the continent, has been the
hardest hit by the global pandemic. USAFRICOM provided COVID-19 aid
with the help of the OSD, DOS, and USAID. In northern Mozambique, where
United States and European energy partners have planned an
approximately $50 billion investment in liquid natural gas, we have
seen a rapid increase in sophistication and violence from local groups
that have evolved into the newest African affiliate of corporate ISIS.
\8\
Despite emerging opportunities, the People's Republic of China and
Russia currently have the inside track in much of central and southern
Africa. Russia is testing its playbook for malign activity in the
Central African Republic, where they are employing PMCs, extracting
minerals, and buying influence. Likewise, the People's Republic of
China provided welcome COVID-19 aid diplomacy in South Africa. Without
significant forces in Central and Southern Africa outside of our
embassies, USAFRICOM maintains a limited supporting role to our United
States diplomatic and development efforts in this region.
conclusion: a secure and stable africa is an enduring american
interest.
Economy of Force
A small investment in Africa goes a long, long way. What USAFRICOM
accomplishes with a few troops and a few dollars, on a continent 3.5
times the size of the continental United States, is a bargain for the
American taxpayer. Honest assessments and prudent investments ensure
the U.S. maximizes the impact of every taxpayer dollar spent to secure
American interests and support allies and partners. The locations where
USAFRICOM resources and activities are concentrated represent the
overlapping points where small teams of dedicated Americans can have
outsized impacts on geo-strategic competition, protecting our personnel
and Homeland, and reassuring our partners and allies. Providing our
service members with the support we expect and they deserve, while
operating across a vast continent with limited infrastructure, requires
that power projection platforms, force protection, ISR, response
forces, communications equipment, and medical care be forward deployed
and ready to respond. Our partners and allies already bear much of this
burden through reciprocal support and the relationships developed in
exercises, intelligence sharing, coordination, and engagements. We
could not complete our mission and advance our national interests in
Africa without operating by, with, and through our allies and partners.
An Ounce of Prevention
USAFRICOM remains ready to protect United States citizens, advance
our interests and strategic access, and to respond to crises in Africa.
The men and women of USAFRICOM, our partners on the continent, and our
broad collection of stakeholders understand how important Africa is to
the global economy and security environment. Strategic access to Africa
and its surrounding waters will be even more vital to United States
national security in the future than it has been in the past.
Africa is key terrain for strategic competition with the People's
Republic of China and Russia and our support to C-VEO operations is
necessary to protect the Homeland as well as America's citizens and
interests abroad. Today, we are reviewing our very modest resources to
maximize our ability to protect and advance our national security
interests. Persistent engagement by the United States military, in
areas where our objectives are shared with our African and European
partners, allows the United States to remain the security partner of
choice across much of the continent. Furthermore, the United States has
the opportunity to apply our asymmetric advantages in C-VEO experience,
intelligence collection, and military professionalism in furthering
international norms, good governance, economic development, and
security cooperation against the challenges facing our African
partners. Our investments to improve the security environment in Africa
will pay ever-larger dividends in the future as African states are
increasingly able to harness opportunities of the African continent.
It remains my honor to lead the service members, civilians, and
families of United States Africa Command. Our efforts have made the
U.S. safer, secured United States interests, and preserved America's
strategic options in the region, while helping Africans do more for
themselves. I hope you are as convinced as I am that USAFRICOM is a
good investment in the future--for America, for Africa, and for the
world. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Townsend, and
let me remind my colleagues, because this is a hybrid hearing,
of our procedures. Rather than using the early bird rule, we
will recognize individuals by seniority. We will do the
standard 5-minute rounds of questioning, and I ask my
colleagues to keep track of the clock. Finally, for everyone to
be heard effectively, I would ask all colleagues to please mute
your microphones when not speaking. Thank you very much.
General McKenzie, the intelligence community in the 2021
Estimate indicated that al Qaeda and ISIS remain among the
greatest threats to the United States overseas, and also
continue to have the intent to project power into the United
States. In addition, the Afghan Study Group, led by General
Dunford and Senator Ayotte, concluded that United States
withdrawal--a complete withdrawal, which is--I do not think you
are contemplating--a complete withdrawal would allow al-Qaeda
and other elements to restore themselves within 18 to 36
months. Do you agree with these assessments, one, that al-Qaeda
and ISIS are probably among the greatest threats, and, two, if
unchecked they will revitalize themselves?
General McKenzie. Chairman, I do agree that al Qaeda and
ISIS remain--have aspirational goals of continuing to attack
us, so I completely agree with the intelligence community's
estimate.
Chairman Reed. Director Burns of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) indicated in testimony that the very nature of the
withdrawal will diminish, to a degree, our ability to collect
intelligence. Do you concur with that assessment, too?
General McKenzie. Sir, I do concur with that assessment. We
will lose the abilities to see completely into Afghanistan.
Chairman Reed. So the issue before us, very practically, is
how do we compensate for those facts on the ground and here.
Perhaps you might reserve some more comments to the classified
section. How do you intend to compensate so that we can
effectively disrupt al Qaeda and ISIS?
General McKenzie. Chairman, I will have more pointed
comments in our closed session, but briefly, I would tell you
it will be difficult. It is not impossible to accomplish this
task. A couple of things have changed since 2001 when were last
attacked from Afghanistan. First of all, the United States
itself is a far harder target than we were in September of
2001. It is more difficult to operate in the United States. It
is more difficult to gain access to the United States. So a
variety of things have changed inside the United States, and we
should always keep that in mind. Additionally, although we are
going, in fact, to pull out of Afghanistan, and I am operating
under the concept that for United States military presence,
zero is going to be zero, and we can talk a little bit more
about that in the closed session. We will have an architecture
in the theater that will allow us to look into Afghanistan. It
will not give us the same picture that we have got now. It will
allow us to see in. The ranges will be greater, the resources
will be greater, the risks will all be greater, but it will be
possible to do those things. It is certainly not impossible,
but we will not have the vision that we have now.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General McKenzie.
General Townsend, again, thank you gentlemen for your
leadership and your advice to the Committee. We have withdrawn,
effectively, our forces from Somalia. Can you assess what is
the operational effect? One of the factors that I think you
both recognize is that the terrorist threat once was--seemed to
be solely located in the mountains of Afghanistan, but now it
is dispersed throughout the entire CENTCOM region. Syria has
the capability of generating forces, and Somalia also, with Al-
Shabab, has that capability. So can you give us a sense of the
effect of the withdrawal on your operations?
General Townsend. Thank you, Chairman. So in the last 60 to
90 days of the previous Administration, we were directed, as
you stated, to reposition our forces out of Somalia. We left a
small footprint behind in Mogadishu tied into the embassy there
of less than 100. Since that time, we have been commuting to
work. We work virtually with our partners from bases in the
region, and then we fly in to conduct training and to advise
and assist our partners. We have done four such operations in
the last roughly 90 days. One of them is ongoing right now, and
we are continually revising and improving the way that we do
that to make it as effective as we can.
There is no denying that repositioning forces out of
Somalia has introduced new layers of complexity and risk, and,
as General McKenzie said, our understanding of what is
happening in Somalia is less now than it was when we were there
on the ground physically located with our partners, so we are
working to make this new mode of operation work. At the same
time, we are participating in the Global Posture Review with
the Department of Defense, and we will be presenting options to
the Secretary of Defense on the way ahead. And, of course, I do
not want to get ahead of my civilian leadership to address
that, but we are working to make it work.
I would say that probably, though, the biggest impact to
security in Somalia right now is less Al-Shabab and more so the
political dysfunction that exists between the federal
government of Somalia and the federal member states, and, as
you mentioned in your opening remarks, the extra-constitutional
extension of the president's term in office. That is our
biggest challenge, I think, right now.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. Ironically or coincidentally,
what you are anticipating and actually experience at this
moment is very much the same situation that General McKenzie
might face, having withdrawn forces from the target country,
for want of a better word. You have to operate on the
periphery. You are doing that, and you face political/cultural
issues, and General McKenzie will face political/cultural
issues. So, again, we look forward to the classified session to
get more into detail of these questions. Thank you. Senator
Inhofe, please.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah, thank you, Mr. Chairman. You hit it
right on there. The term that is being used, ``over the
horizon,'' which merely means that you are taking troops out of
the area and conducting your activity from another country, and
that is something that I disagreed with in the previous
Administration. The last Administration pulled nearly all of
the 200 troops that we had in Somalia out, and that was the
previous Administration. I disagreed with that at that time,
and I really think that we were right in disagreeing with that.
History has shown that it does not work as well from an
adjoining country as it does from the country where the
activity is. So I would say--I would ask them the--General
Townsend, I know you are going to be able to do this and will
continue to do it, but does an over-the-horizon
counterterrorism strategy in Somalia not make your job harder?
General Townsend.
General Townsend. Ranking Member, I would agree with the
General McKenzie's characterization. It makes it more
difficult. It does not make it impossible.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah, well, I understand that, and I would
say the same thing. I know that General McKenzie has already
expressed, yeah, it makes it more difficult, but it does not
make it impossible. You guys are soldiers and you have a duty
to do it, and you will do it. Now, General McKenzie, are you
concerned that we will not be able to secure and maintain the
U.S. embassy? Tell me what--if all this happens as it is
designed to happen in Afghanistan, what will be our situation
with the embassy?
General McKenzie. Sir, I believe it is our desire to retain
an embassy presence in Afghanistan.
Senator Inhofe. You got to protect it, right?
General McKenzie. So we do, and of course.
Senator Inhofe. You got to secure it.
General McKenzie. Sir, we do. Of course, protection of an
embassy is the responsibility of the host nation. Most of our
embassies around the world have very little military presence
there because the host nation lives up to their obligations. It
is a matter of very much great concern to me, and I think
everyone, whether or not the future Government of Afghanistan
is going to be able to do that after we leave. That will be
determined here over the next few weeks as we begin our
drawdown and we evaluate the security platform that is there.
Senator Inhofe. Will you be able to make that determination
as the drawdown is occurring? My concern is, if we get to the
point where we do not have that help, we would be depending on
another country to do what we always do on our own, and that is
defend and secure the embassies. That concerns you?
General McKenzie. Ranking Member, it does concern me, but I
would say if we have concerns about the physical security of
the embassy, the United States will take whatever measures are
necessary to ensure the safety of our diplomats. So we will do
that based on the security situation as it exists on the ground
in Kabul.
Senator Inhofe. I would hope that you would anticipate that
if there are going to be problems or signs of problems as the
drawdown continues, that you would be on top of that, and I am
sure you will be. In AFRICOM, General Townsend, the
Administration is conducting a global force posture review.
Now, that actually started in the previous Administration, and
I can remember at that time cautioning the then Secretary of
Defense that we do not have a lot of assets there, and we do
not have a lot of protection there, and that is something that
has concerned me before, and the same concern is out there
right now. We have less than, what, 6,000, I guess, personnel?
We face the shortfalls and ISR capability. These things are
there. What would you say, General Townsend, is your biggest
resource gap that would impact your ability to do your job?
General Townsend. Thanks, Ranking Member. As you pointed
out, we underwent the blank slate review, or a COCOM review, in
the previous Administration, and by the time we got to the end
of that, AFRICOM was still largely intact. I think we removed
about 365 troops from the continent. As you pointed out, there
is just no fat to cut there, and we did lose some funding in
the various programs. Again, I do not want to get ahead of my
civilian leaders on the Global Posture Review, so I will defer
discussing options about forces and posture.
But I would say that wherever we have forces in Africa,
there are three things that we will need there. First would be
the proper amount of personnel recovery and casualty evacuation
of medical treatment to make sure our troops are properly
protected. Second, as you mentioned, is ISR, and with the loss
of the Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) and the ISR
Transfer Fund, that puts at risk one of our primary sources of
ISR, which is contracted ISR in Africa. Then the third thing I
would say would be funding for building partner capacity and
exercises with our partners. We do everything in Africa through
partners. There is no activity that America conducts
unilaterally in the lead for, so building partner capacity is
how we help the Africans and our international partners the
most. So I would say those are the three things we will need
regardless of what our future posture might be.
Senator Inhofe. I agree wholeheartedly with that, and I am
glad that you are coming out forcefully in making those
statements. When you point out that we are in a continent, they
are 3-and-a-half times the size of our country. I had not heard
that before, and we have got to be aware of that. This is a
problem. We need to have resources in there to do the job.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Senator Shaheen,
please.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, and thank you, General McKenzie
and General Townsend, for your service and for being here this
morning. I especially appreciate whoever at DOD heard us when
we said please give us a map that shows not just Russia and
Chinese activity, but also shows United States activity, and it
is pretty dramatic. It does not take much to take a look at
those pictures and see China's influence all in red in Africa
and our influence, and that picture says it all. So I very much
appreciate that and have used the map that we got from United
States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) to make the argument that we
need more investment in Latin America in the Foreign Relations
Committee. Can I just ask for whoever is listening, if there
are acronyms on the maps, that you give us a key to tell us
what those acronyms mean for those of us who are not dealing
with them on a daily basis? I would appreciate it.
General McKenzie, I want to begin with you because in your
testimony before this Committee last year, you indicated that
there had been an increase in Iranian activity in Afghanistan,
and that posed a potential risk to United States Forces.
Obviously, the decision to withdraw American troops, which I
have expressed concern about, has an impact not just on what
happens with Afghan forces and the Afghan people, but it also
creates a vacuum that allows regional actors, like Iran, and
Pakistan, Russia, and China, to fill that vacuum. Can you talk
about what you see happening after the U.S. withdraws and what
the potential is for those regional actors to come in and
influence what happens?
General McKenzie. Certainly. After we complete our
withdrawal, I think the country that is probably going to be
most affected is Pakistan because of their long contiguous
border with Afghanistan, the fact that the Taliban, largely
centered in eastern Afghanistan, nonetheless maintains some
presents in Pakistan as well. So I think Pakistan is interested
in stability in Afghanistan, and I think it is going to be very
difficult for that stability to remain after we leave, so I
think Pakistan will be very concerned by that. I would say,
frankly, that it is a situation they have not been terribly
helpful on over the last 20 years, so that is unfortunate for
them that some of this is now going to come back home in a way
that they perhaps did not anticipate.
As for Iran, you know, Iran does not wish us well, has
always wanted to have the ability in Afghanistan to attack us
or to have others attack us should they choose to do so. That
capability remains, is as extant now as it was last year. Their
interest in Afghanistan is the same as Pakistan's. They want
stability in that region. I think everyone is concerned that,
should we leave, should a civil war ensue, there is the
possibility of a mass refugee movement that could affect all of
the nations around Afghanistan. So I think they are very
concerned by that because they do not see a clear way forward
after we reduce our presence.
Senator Shaheen. You mentioned ISIS camps in your opening
remarks. One of the concerns, having visited Syria, that I
have, given our withdrawal--precipitous withdrawal from Syria,
has been the failure to address those camps from family and
former ISIS members that continue to have thousands of people
in them. Is there any international effort to address those
camps and to try and resolve how the international community is
going to deal with them before they become another threat?
General McKenzie. I wish I could tell you a better news
story there, Senator, but I cannot. It is one of my very
highest concerns. Al-Hol camp, which you are very familiar
with, is probably the poster child for 62,000 people,
principally women, principally young children--and they are at
an immediate risk from disease, cholera or coronavirus. But the
long-term threat is ISIS radicalization which goes on in that
camp, and unless we find a way to pull these children out of
that camp, get them back to the nations that they came from,
find a way to reintegrate them into civil society, and de-
radicalize them, we are giving ourselves a very significant
military problem 10 years down the road.
I know that our diplomats and our people in United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) are working on
this very hard. Nations need to step up, claim their people,
repatriate those that they can bring home. Unfortunately, there
is not a lot of progress on this front. It is one of my very
highest concerns in the region.
Senator Shaheen. We actually created a coordinator through
the defense authorization bill--not last year, I think the year
before--to try and address that. I am not aware that anybody
has been appointed to that position yet, so hopefully the
Administration will move on that. Before I am out of time,
General Townsend, I wanted to ask you about what is happening
in Ethiopia in the Tigray region, and to what extent the
instability there has the potential to create instability in
the surrounding countries, and how concerned you are about
that.
General Townsend. Ma'am, that probably takes longer than
the 10 or 15 seconds I have to give the answer. Ethiopia is in
the midst of several challenges, three or four significant
challenges on multiple fronts. It definitely will affect
security and stability in the region, and I can answer that
more in another venue.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen, and now let me
recognize via Webex, Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, for being here today. General McKenzie, what is your
understanding of the assistance that we will be providing to
the Afghan security forces after we withdraw? Secretary Austin,
he discussed some of this last week at the joint press
conference at NATO. He spoke about training, securing their
borders, and saying we will continue to support them in those
efforts, also about funding capabilities, to continue paying
salaries for the Afghan security forces. So what types of
assistance are you seeing that we are still going to be
providing and be responsible for?
General McKenzie. Ma'am, let me just begin by saying we are
going to go to zero solution in Afghanistan, so whatever we do,
it will largely not be done by people on the ground in
Afghanistan. We can still do some things from remote locations.
We can work the administration of the Afghan security force
funding, which is sort of the bedrock programmatic weapon or
tool that we use to support the Afghan military and other
things. We will not be able to do it as efficiently as we do
now where we have people in the country that can really follow
the money all the way to its destination, but we can still
follow it into the country at least, and we will work tools to
mentor from remote locations that will allow us to work with--
work with the Afghans themselves.
Some of this will be contingent on how big the embassy is
that remains, and that is still something that is going to be
worked out over the next few weeks. So we could have a--we
could have a security cooperation office in the embassy. We may
not have a security cooperation office in the embassy. That
will be ultimately a Department of State decision informed by
our assessment of the security situation that is there. It will
be far more difficult than the way we do business now. Again,
it is certainly not impossible. We will not have the oversight
that we have now just because we will not have the people on
the ground to actually perform those functions.
Senator Fischer. Now, as look at these force posture
options over the horizon, I hope you will certainly keep this
Committee informed about that as plans are finalized. So I
would appreciate that from you.
General McKenzie. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. For both of you, we talk a lot about ISR
shortfalls, and I understand that demand always exceeds supply,
but can you share with us what percentage of your ISR needs are
being met? Also talk a little bit about the operational impact
that this has.
General McKenzie. Sure. I will begin. The majority of my
operational ISR requirements are being met, not all of them.
They are being--and I will give you a little bit more in the
closed session. You know, we use a variety of manned and
unmanned resources to look at our problems, and we are most
particularly concerned with ISR in areas where we have U.S. and
coalition forces in combat. Of course, that is in Afghanistan
and in Iraq and Syria, and occasionally in Yemen. So there, we
very--we work very hard to make sure we have got the ISR needed
to do those things. We take risks sometimes in the ISR that we
apply to the Iran problem, simply because I place a higher
priority on ensuring that Americans--where we have Americans on
the ground, we want to make sure we have got the resources
there that we need to take a look at in order to protect them.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. General Townsend?
General Townsend. Senator, the joint staff has a formula by
which they validate our ISR requests. By that formula, we are
resourced to about 30 percent, a little less than one-third of
our requirement. If I take a hard look at that formula, I could
probably get by with less than that. If I take that into
account, our resourcing levels approach 40 or 80 percent. Every
day in Africa, we have to make decisions about what we will do
and what we will not do based on how much ISR we can apply to
the day. We do not need a tremendous amount of gray tail or
military ISR platforms. We need some of that to protect our
troops, but we can do a lot of our work with contracted
solutions, which are a good bargain for the taxpayer.
Senator Fischer. But do you--I guess, do you both believe
that having that presence of ISR used against hostile nations
or their proxy forces, that that does act as a deterrent?
General McKenzie, would you say that has happened with Iran?
General McKenzie. I can say unequivocally that the maneuver
of ISR assets in the summer of 2019 deflected imminent Iranian
attack planning.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. General Townsend, do you have
any instances of that?
General Townsend. Yes, Senator. So we know that Al-Shabab
looks over their shoulder every day at our--looking for our
ISR, and so we know that they limit their activity because of
the presence of our ISR.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator. Now let me
recognize via Webex, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General
McKenzie, I have several questions for you related to Israel.
What is the status of Israel being moved to CENTCOM, and what
do you see as the benefits for Israeli inclusion in CENTCOM?
Also, Israel and United States European Command (EUCOM)
coordinated very closely on ballistic missile defense,
including Aegis support from the Mediterranean. How will you
ensure continuity of ballistic missile defense with Israel, and
will this continue through EUCOM or move to a different
direction with CENTCOM?
General McKenzie. Senator, we are in a planning phase right
now to move Israel into United States Central Command. We are
on about a 6-month planning timeline for that. There are--as
you have noted, a number of things have to happen in order to
make sure that that move goes seamlessly, and I will address
those here in just a moment. But we work closely with European
Command and the joint staff based on guidance we have gotten
from the Secretary to make sure that that move is--that move is
proceed--that move proceeds very smoothly and nothing falls
through the cracks, particularly those things related to the
defense of Israel.
The principal benefit of Israel coming into the Central
Command Area of Responsibility (AOR) is the fact that most of
Israel's threats--all of Israel's threats really--emanate from
the East, which is in the CENTCOM area of responsibility.
Today, I talk a lot to the Israeli chief of defense. I talk a
lot all throughout my command at all levels of the Israeli
military about the threats that emanate against them because
the threats to Israel have morphed from being, at one time, a
purely ballistic missile threat, now to a Unmanned Aircraft
System (UAS) and a land attack cruise missile threat. So now
the threat is far more diffuse and actually dangerous, so we
need to make sure that we are coordinating fully on all those
matters.
We work with European Command to make sure that we
transition the defense of Israel to CENTCOM when we are ready
to do it. That does involve questions of water space management
in the eastern Mediterranean, questions of what ships are going
to be available and when. I am in close contact with General
Walters actually as we work through those problems, and we will
present a plan to the Secretary a little bit later this year
for an initial date when combatant command authority will shift
for Israel.
The last point I would just like to make is, the other
benefit of bringing Israel into the Central Command AOR is it
allows further normalization of relations between Israel and
various Arab states in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, and
this just recognizes that by placing them all under one
combatant command. We were not able to do that in the past,
particularly because of strains between Egypt and Israel. We
are now well past that. Egypt and Israel function very well
together at a variety of levels, including joint operations
against threats in the Sinai.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. General Townsend, in the
last decade, China has made significant investments in Africa,
and it has been in the form of infrastructure and military
installations, as well as significant investment from private
firms. I am concerned with perceptions of the United States
presence when we are conducting major air operations with
significant collateral damage while China builds roads and
bridges. What is AFRICOM's strategy for breaking this dynamic?
Is this a problem that has a military solution?
General Townsend. Senator, you are right. China has been
aggressively investing in the continent with infrastructure,
bases, arm sales, training, et cetera. We do not have to
compete with China head-to-head, dollar-for-dollar. We can
target where our investments are best made. I would not
characterize it the way you did about our strikes with
significant collateral damage. We do not do very many strikes
in Africa. They are limited to Al-Shabab areas in Somalia, and
we have very low collateral damage when we do those strikes. I
agree with your point, though. There is not a military solution
to any of these challenges on the African continent.
Senator Gillibrand. Right.
General Townsend. It is a whole-of-government approach that
will be necessary to solve these challenges.
Senator Gillibrand. I was encouraged by your commitment to
working with African Union security forces and other nations'
militaries, and I do appreciate the fact that we can fight
terrorism, but we have to actually stop the social problems at
the source. In your opinion, how can we increase cooperation
with the African standby force and the African Union Peace and
Security Council? Just to note, in your written statement, you
listed extreme poverty, more frequent and intense weather
events, and vulnerable and marginalized populations as issues
that are contributing to instability in the region and, as a
result, terrorism. These obviously sound like political
problems and potentially a vacuum that China will be happy to
fill with their own investments. So what are your thoughts on
this issue, and how do we confront China and make the territory
less fertile for Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs)?
General Townsend. Regarding the--confronting China here, I
think we can do that in a targeted way in certain selected
countries, and that way we can make our investments count for
more. You mentioned several partners--African partners. We work
with all of those partners to advance what we are doing. The
United States does not lead any activity. We work through
African partners first and international partners second, and
then you mentioned several political problems. I think our
administration strategy is the right one: lead with diplomacy,
follow with development, secure with defense.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Let me know
recognize via Webex, Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
you both for your service to our country. Let me begin with a
question for General Townsend.
General, the last time that I had an opportunity to visit
Djibouti, I noted that at that time, we had a chance to observe
the operations that the Chinese were doing with regard to the
creation of a naval base, or at least a port there at Djibouti.
Can you share with us the current status of the Chinese
operations in Djibouti right now with regard to their port and
what they are capable of doing with it?
General Townsend. Thank you, Senator. The Chinese base in
Djibouti is named Doraleh Port, or Doraleh Base. What they have
done in the last 2 years is completed a very large and capable
naval pier that has joined their base. This pier has the
capability to dock their largest ships to include the Chinese
aircraft carrier as well as nuclear submarines. Now, they are
finishing that pier now. They are applying the final coats of
paint to this thing. I expect that we will see increased
Chinese naval presence there. Their presence at Doraleh Base in
the past has been largely to secure and sustain their small
naval task force that operates in the Red Sea and the Gulf of
Aden. I anticipate now with this pier being recently completed,
they will increase their naval activity into Djibouti soon.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, General. General McKenzie, I
would like to visit with you with regard to the difference
between a conditions-based withdrawal and a withdrawal with a
date certain, and I recognize that your role here is to follow
the directions of the Commander-in-Chief. I respect that, and I
know that the President has made the decision to move from a
conditions-based withdrawal to a date-certain withdrawal. There
is a reason why I think many of us had talked about, and I
believe a number of the military officials in the past have
discussed the validity of a conditions-based withdrawal, while
at the same time recognizing that there is no real good answer
to the Afghanistan questions.
Respecting the President's ability to make and having to
make this decision, can you share with us a little bit about
some of the concerns that you have expressed with regard to the
ability of the existing Afghan national forces to be able to
respond to aggression by the Taliban, and what the impacts
could be in those areas that are not currently under Taliban
control with regard to the stability in those villages, those
communities, and the impact that could occur for women and
children in those regions?
General McKenzie. Senator, thank you. First of all, the
decision-making process was very inclusive. I had multiple
opportunities to make my views known, and I appreciate the
opportunity to have had those views known. I cannot share those
views with you in this forum, but I would just tell you that
the inclusion and the deliberate and methodical way that this
decision was approached was heartening for me, at least. I
would tell you that my concern about leaving with a date
certain is that after we withdraw, and we have talked about we
are going to go to zero means zero, that there will be no real
United States enablers in Afghanistan. My concern is the
ability of the Afghan military to hold the ground that they are
on now without the support that they have been used to for many
years, which we have weaned them off direct support--U.S. and
coalition soldiers being present with them on the ground to a
point where now it is intelligence, it is fire support. It is
the enabling things that actually give them an edge over the
Taliban. Now all that will be gone, so I am concerned about the
ability of the Afghan military to hold on after we leave, the
ability of the Afghan air force to fly, in particular, after we
remove the support for those aircraft. All of those things are
factors that will be worked out here in the next few months,
and we will get an opportunity to see how the Afghans do.
Your last point on conditions for women and children, and
women, in particular, and the strides--the great strides that
have been made in education and human rights in Afghanistan,
the levers that we have now will be reduced, but I believe
there will still be levers that we can apply, and those levers
will be principally diplomatic and economic because if the
Taliban or whatever future hybrid government exists in
Afghanistan wants to gain global recognition and receive some
form of international support, they are going to have to take
some actions that would tend to protect those groups. Again,
those are things we just cannot know right now.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, General. I most certainly
appreciate your responsible comments, and I understand that you
did have the ability to give input. I just simply think that it
is important for the American people to understand that the
repercussions of this are not going to be pretty, and that we
will see reports of atrocities in those areas as committed by
the Taliban if these Afghan national forces are not able to
hold their own without those United States supports that they
have become very dependent on. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator. Now, let me
recognize Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both
for your service and to the men and women under your command. I
do not need to tell either of you that the definition of
success in Afghanistan has changed over the 20 years that we
have been fighting wars in that part of the world. In October
2001, President Bush set the terms for victory in Afghanistan
as bringing al Qaeda to justice and ensuring that they could no
longer use Afghanistan as a base to launch terrorist attacks on
the United States. Coming right to the point, General Townsend,
public press reporting states that after a withdrawal from
Afghanistan, it would be a 4-hour flight for an MQ-9 to be on
station in Afghanistan to do a counterterrorism mission. My
question is, how does that compare to the flight to be on
station in Somalia, or Libya, or other places under your
command where countering terrorism is a similar mission?
General Townsend. Senator, we also have some pretty long
legs to get our ISR on station, although I do not believe 4
hours. Our transit times are more in the realm of 1 to 2 hours
one way. We spend 4 hours probably, on average, back and forth,
but not as long as you just described.
Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, would that length of
time enable effective counterterrorism in Afghanistan using the
kind of air resources that we have in General Townsend's
command?
General McKenzie. Senator, right now in Afghanistan, we
principally use MQ-9s and MQ-1s, and the newspaper story may
have said 4 hours. If we get out of Afghanistan, most likely
the transit time will be considerably longer than 4 hours to
get in, and I can talk about this in a closed session in a
little bit more detail. So I can, in fact, give the persistent
overhead coverage that is required. It will simply require far
more platforms operating at greater range in order to
accomplish that same mission that you can do with fewer
platforms because, as you know, the airplane has so long to
fly. You are either going to use that flight time either
getting to the objective or what you do on the objective. We
want to maximize what you can do on the objective. It will be
difficult.
Senator Blumenthal. I would like to hear, and probably it
should be in a closed setting with the chairman's and senator's
support, what specifically by way of counterterrorism can be
done, what the plans are to do it, because I think that is an
essential feature of our withdrawal. You said ``if,'' but it is
right now planned for September 11th, and I would like to know
what our preparations are.
General McKenzie. Sure, I will be happy to discuss that in
closed session.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. I think Senator Inhofe
alluded to this topic, but, as you know, there have been
various reports about attacks on American personnel, diplomats,
members of the intelligence community, perhaps even military,
some of it referred to as the Havana Syndrome, referring only
to those public reports. If there is any truth to those reports
about attacks on American personnel, don't you think the
American people deserve to know about it?
General McKenzie. Sir, I do, and I track that very--and I
can only speak, of course, to the U.S. Central Command area of
responsibility, and I can give you a little bit more
information in a closed session, but I have found no evidence
of those attacks in U.S. Central Command. But I can talk a
little bit more about it, and I would like to do so in a closed
session.
Senator Blumenthal. I would like to hear about it in closed
session, but I would also like for the American people to know
about it because I think they need and deserve to know about
it. General Townsend, do you have any comment?
General Townsend. Senator, we have not seen that phenomenon
in AFRICOM in any significant number; in fact, any number that
I am aware of.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. General McKenzie, what have
you seen by way of the Iranian support for proxies and their
attacks on United States personnel under your command, the
malign influence of Iran and their support for those kinds of
attacks on our personnel or our allies and partners?
General McKenzie. So I think, first of all, Iran is not
seeking state-on-state conflict with the United States right
now. I think they would like to see how the Biden
Administration's approach on Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) works out for them. At the same time, and this just
reflects the contradiction inherent in the way the Iranians
think about many of these problems, they want us out of places
like Iraq, and they are prepared to take kinetic activity,
which they believe they can disavow by their actors, their
proxies, acting on the ground to conduct low-level attacks
against us. Over last year, in 2020, the Iranians believed they
had a political solution to eject us from Iraq. That no longer
appears to be a viable way ahead for them, so we are seeing a
return to a more kinetic approach, and that has been manifested
here over the last few weeks as low-level attacks have begun to
crop up in Iraq, attacks that the Iranians would disavow
themselves from. We carefully look for attribution in these
attacks, and national leadership will eventually make a
decision on how to respond.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you both. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Now let me
recognize Senator Ernst, please.
Senate Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and, gentlemen, thank
you very much for your testimony today. I do want to take time
to thank you, your senior enlisted members, and all of the men
and women within your commands for their continued service to
our Nation. I will move into my questions, but what we are
doing today, we are obviously discussing the significant
challenges that both of you have within your commands. Our
national defense strategy is still targeted towards five very
real threats--China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and then, of
course, violent extremist groups--and four of those five
challenges operate in both of your AORs, and, of course, the
way that we operate and resource your AORs is very different.
But, General Townsend, I would like to start with you.
Within AFRICOM, we do have various pockets of activity, and
we do engage our special operations forces in those areas. The
Lake Chad Basin is a very volatile region, and there are a
number of those violent extremist organizations there, such as
ISIS, Boko Haram. They are operating within the region, and
they are exploiting, of course, the economy, the terrain, and
the vulnerable population there. What is the assessment of the
risk these various organizations pose to the U.S., and have we
allocated the proper resources necessary to defeat their
threats?
General Townsend. Thanks, Senator. You specifically
addressed the Lake Chad Basin, and there we see operations by
Boko Haram and ISIS West Africa. A couple of years ago, those
two organizations had joined in league with one another. They
have split in the last year or two, again, apart. My assessment
is that neither--although they caused tremendous problems there
for the countries that all adjoin in the Lake Chad Basin, which
is Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon--all come together right
there--they caused tremendous problems for them. It is my
assessment that neither Boko Haram nor ISIS-West Africa today
pose a significant threat to United States interests. That is
not true of other violent extremist organizations in Africa.
Senate Ernst. Mm-hmm. Thank you very much, General. How can
we help those countries in that area, be it military or other
resources available, through our Federal Government? There are
a few of those countries that do have significant resources
that could be exploited by China or Russia. What ways can we
further support that region, not just military, but other types
of supports?
General Townsend. Well, just exactly what you said along
the lines of not just military. So there--a whole-of-government
approach in that region would help. We have that now to some
degree. I think we can make that more robust. There is a
partnership between our Department of State and Department of
Defense to provide security assistance to those countries
there. We do that on a bilateral basis directly with those
countries. There is a Multinational Joint Task Force that
operates in the Lake Chad Basin region. It would not be hard to
increase some of our efforts there. I think what we see,
particularly with Nigeria, is they are struggling with that
particular threat in the Lake Chad Basin and northeast part of
their country.
Senate Ernst. All right. Thank you, General. General
McKenzie, it was my great honor just several days ago to spend
some time in the company of some truly extraordinary women, and
these women are Gold Star Wives, and many of them came from our
Special Operations Forces. We had an Air Guard member as well
as an Army Guard member, and part of the conversation obviously
flowed towards the close down of Afghanistan, the withdrawal of
troops, and, of course, what we would hope to see as the end to
the Global War on Terror. I have concerns about it. I have
concerns that we are conceding territory at a great loss of
lives, and so if you could indulge me, sir, and address these
extraordinary women and their families all across the United
States, and just let them know your thoughts and how we can
recognize the ultimate sacrifice that their husbands made, and
to please let them know that those sacrifices were not in vain.
General McKenzie. Senator, thank you, and certainly the
sacrifices have not been in vain, and particularly the family
members of those people who have gone forward to defend this
Nation and have died in so doing, are going to carry those
memories with them for the rest of their lives, and there is
nothing I can do to really make that better. But what I can
tell them is I believe we went to Afghanistan in a good cause,
and I believe we have, in fact, prevented attacks on the United
States from being generated from Afghanistan for over the last
20 years, and that was ultimately our base mission for being
there.
The long-term view for the War on Terror is this: it is not
going to be bloodless. The War on Terror is probably not going
to end. What we actually seek is the creation of local security
where the threats, as they arise, can be dealt with
indigenously by those countries themselves without a
significant U.S. presence there. We will see a test of that
hypothesis in Afghanistan and in the months ahead. We also
tested it in Iraq where it is moving towards success. We also
tested in Syria and in other places. Nothing will ever
compensate for the loss of a loved one, and I would not attempt
with any words I can say here to try to do that.
Senate Ernst. God bless you. Thank you so much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator Kaine,
please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair and Ranking Member
Inhofe, and thank you, Senator Ernst, for asking that question
to the witnesses who are before us today. We appreciate your
service. Just a comment. I think we have had a good discussion
about the big issue that is, you know, dominating our attention
right now--Afghanistan--and every concern that anyone I know
that has expressed about it is a very legitimate one. There are
a lot of concerns. I do support the President's decision, but
believe it was a decision made with no particularly wonderful
options out there on the table. I honor the 20 years of
service, 10 years to find and kill Bin Laden, and then 10 years
to train hundreds of thousands of Afghan security forces.
General McKenzie, as you mentioned, there will be a test of
that security apparatus to determine its efficiency to counter
the threat that the Taliban poses, and we will all be paying
attention in a significant way.
One thing I would like to just caution against is
sometimes, particularly in a military hearing, we will talk
about the state beginning on September 11th as a zero solution,
and it is true that the President's announced intention is a
zero solution with respect to military presence in Afghanistan,
except for that necessary to protect our embassy and, if
needed, for counterterrorism operations as they arise. But I
think it is important for the American public to know that it
is not a zero solution if you look at it from the whole-of-
government standpoint, because I think it is very likely that
the United States is going to continue to provide significant
security assistance to Afghanistan. It is highly likely that we
are going to provide significant assistance in the
humanitarian, economic, trade, development, and diplomacy
space.
So it is not a zero solution in terms of America's
partnership with Afghanistan. I would imagine that when we get
to a new status quo in terms of the relationship, the support
that we provide for our partner, Afghanistan, will be
significant and may be significantly greater than sort of the
support we provide to other nations. That remains to be seen,
and obviously the effect of that support is being tested, as
General McKenzie mentioned.
General McKenzie, you mentioned something about Afghans'
neighbors, and I wanted to just dig into that a little bit. You
indicated that while they have not all been helpful to the
United States, not by a long shot, and they have not
necessarily even done what we would hope they might do to
assist in Afghanistan, they do help with stability in
Afghanistan. They do not see instability there as furthering
their interests, and just quickly, I was looking at who
Afghanistan--the Afghan neighbors are. Afghanistan is bordered
by six countries: Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, China, and Iran. Very different nations, those six,
but can I just dig in a little bit with you, General McKenzie,
on that? As different as these nations are from each other, and
as different as they are in their relationships with the United
States, would you say that they all, for their own reasons,
would desire stability in Afghanistan and would feel threatened
by instability in Afghanistan?
General McKenzie. Senator, I would agree with you
completely. I think all, for their own reasons, and, as you
noted, those reasons are very different, they all want
stability in Afghanistan. The other thing some of them want,
too, is they recognize the vast natural resources that are
inherent in Afghanistan, and they seek access to that.
Senator Kaine. In terms of wanting stability, I would
imagine that they want stability, again, for their own reasons,
but some of the common reasons would be instability could lead
to unacceptable refugee flows into neighboring nations if that
is not managed, and instability could also lead to the
possibility of terrorist or other attacks in their own nations
if that is not managed correctly. Are those two of the reasons
that they want stability, and are there others why they would
want stability?
General McKenzie. Senator, I think those are the two
principal reasons, the movement of refugees across national
borders, and also the threat of exportation of ISIS or al
Qaeda's ideology, you know, from inside Afghanistan. I think
those are the two principal reasons.
Senator Kaine. In terms of those threats, the threat of
refugee flows and the threat of terrorist attacks, in many
ways, they have more of an existential connection to stability
in Afghanistan than the United States does, just because of
their proximity to Afghanistan. Is that not correct?
General McKenzie. Senator, I would agree.
Senator Kaine. All right. Thank you. Mr. Chair, I do not
have other questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Let me now
recognize via Webex, Senator Tillis.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding the hearing, and, gentlemen, thank you for being here
and for your years of service. General Townsend, I want to talk
a little bit about China. In your opening comments, you talked
about China's move, I think, in Djibouti as a power projection
platform. We know that there is even talk about an Atlantic
Coast naval base. How does this play out over the next several
years if they continue at their current pace, and what are the
real threats to our own national security as a result?
General Townsend. Thanks, Senator Tillis. So we know that
the Chinese desire a network of bases around the globe. How
that plays out in Africa is, first, with their base at Doraleh
in Djibouti. They have been working on a number of options to
get a base elsewhere in Africa, Tanzania--primarily on the east
coast--the Indian Ocean, and then they have placed a number of
bets down along the Atlantic coast. My concern is the greatest
along the Atlantic coast of Africa. This is probably--this is
the most significant threat, I think, from China would be to
gain a militarily useful naval facility on the Atlantic coast
of Africa, and by ``militarily useful,'' I mean something more
than a place that they can make port calls and get gas and
groceries. I am talking about a port where they can rearm with
munitions and repair naval vessels. They are working
aggressively to get that, but we have not seen any of that come
to fruition yet, and it is my number one global power
competition concern.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, General Townsend. General
McKenzie, with the withdrawal of troops in Afghanistan, we have
received, you know, various estimates of how that is going to
play out over the next year or so. I, for one, think that we
are going to run into--that Afghanistan is going to run into
serious problems after we completely withdraw our troops, but I
am primarily concerned with force protection as we withdraw
from the forward-operating bases and, ultimately, Kabul. What
are we doing? Are we just going exploit the resources we have
on the ground for force protection? Are we going to surge a bit
as we withdraw? Can you give me some sense and some confidence
that we are going to be able to do this with the full
expectation that the Taliban may take some shots at us on our
way out the door?
General McKenzie. Senator, first of all, we are prepared if
the Taliban want to take shots at us, today, or after 1 May, or
at any point during the withdrawal. The plan that we have
designed and that General Miller will begin execution of is
designed to come out with or without pressure from the Taliban,
and, yes, we will bring additional resources in in order to
protect the force as it comes out. That is normal in any kind
of disengagement operation. I do not want to go into the
details of those operations right now, but we will bring--we
will have additional capabilities, and I am confident that we
will be able and our coalition partners will be able, to
extract ourselves. We look every day, every hour at force
protection in Afghanistan. It has the complete, undivided
attention of General Miller and myself.
Senator Tillis. Well, I hope that any malign activities on
the part of the Taliban are met, and that you have the
authority to exact a cost for any of those. Hopefully there
will not be any, but I am afraid that we will probably see
some. General McKenzie, I also wanted to talk about the Abraham
Accords. Do you think the other countries that have come to the
Accords already, that it has been a positive thing, and what
other additional cooperation or participants in the Accords do
you think would be helpful as a check against Iran?
General McKenzie. Sir, I think the normalization of
relationships between Israel and her Arab neighbors is a
profound step forward. It represents really a new era in the
Middle East, and I think that is one of the things that Israel
coming into United States Central Command as part of a unified
command plan shift will also help. So I think, you know, we
have got to be patient. It will take time for this to happen,
but I would look over time for further nations to join in
normalization of relations with Israel, and I think that is a
net positive thing for the region.
Senator Tillis. The last question is, with the missile
attack or rocket attack out of Syria against Israel just this
week, is that potentially a part of a trend, or do you think
that maybe it was just a one-off activity?
General McKenzie. I think it reflects actually incompetence
in Syrian air defense where they were responding to Israeli
strikes on targets in Syria. They fired their missiles. The
missiles went ballistic, literally, and followed the parabolic
trajectory into Israel where they were intercepted. I do not
believe it was an intentional attack, but just rather lack of
capability on the part of the Syrian air defenders.
Senator Tillis. Okay. Thank you both. Thank you both,
gentlemen. Thank you for your service and your leadership.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tillis. Now let me
recognize Senator King via Webex.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There has been a lot
of discussion today about the September 11th date and the
calendar-based withdrawal. I think it is important to recall
that the prior Administration initiated a calendar-based
leaving--withdrawal from Afghanistan, and, in fact, that
calendar date is 1 week from tomorrow. So the current
Administration was, in a sense, boxed in by those negotiations
with the Taliban that took place last year, and which, by the
way, excluded the Afghan Government. General McKenzie, you used
a term earlier in your testimony, ``if a civil war ensues.'' Is
there not a civil war going on right at this very moment? There
is no doubt that a civil war is going on now and will continue.
Is there?
General McKenzie. Sorry. I am probably not the best person
to give you an answer to this. I would defer to the diplomats.
But we have a constituted-elected government in place in
Afghanistan, and so that we have a legal authority in place. So
I am not sure that I would refer to what is going on right now
as a civil war. Others might take a different view of that, but
I am not certain that I would refer to it in that way.
Senator King. It would not--you do not think the Taliban is
a viable insurgency that is fighting against the government and
the government's reach into the provinces?
General McKenzie. I think the Taliban certainly are
militarily very capable. I do not know how much of the actual
Afghan population they represent. Polling data would tell you
it is a very low percent if you subjected it to an honest
election, which I know would be very difficult to accomplish in
Afghanistan. But I would not confuse an insurgency, however
capable and lethal, with a civil war.
Senator King. Well, I will turn the question around. We
have been there 20 years. We have spent over $1 trillion, lost
lives, tens of thousands of injuries, incredible support to the
Afghan Government. Why has the Afghan Government not been able
to take hold? My understanding is, General, that the Taliban
controls more land today than they did last year, and more last
year than they did the year before. They are, in fact, winning.
Why can the Afghan Government not defend itself successfully?
General McKenzie. Sir, our principal objective in
Afghanistan has been, and will remain, to prevent al Qaeda and
ISIS from developing attacks against our Homeland and those are
of our allies.
Senator King. No, I understand that, General. That is not
my question. My question is, in your military judgment, why has
the Afghan Government not, with all the support that it has had
from us, been more successful in beating back the Taliban,
when, in fact, over the last dozen years or so, the Taliban has
been making steady gains?
General McKenzie. I believe that right now, a rough stasis
exists between the Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan
forces. The Taliban has access to offshore havens where they
are able to reconstitute where the Government of Afghanistan
cannot reach, and it is always very difficult in a
counterinsurgency to fight when your opponent has the ability
to do those things.
Senator King. Well, I understand that, but it just seems
like with all the advantages of the Afghan Government, I am
just puzzled as to why they have not--and you testified that
you thought they had the support of the majority of the
people--why they have not been able to be more successful.
General Townsend, we have talked a lot about the Chinese
activity in Africa. You talked about the purpose appears to be
both economic and military. My question is, do you discern any
backlash in these African countries where the Chinese have made
these big loans and big investments and now the bills are
coming due? Are the Africans having any second thoughts about
their engagement with the Chinese?
General Townsend. Thank you, Senator. Actually, we do see
some backlash. You know, you have heard of the famous debt trap
diplomacy that the Chinese have used. That has actually worked
against their efforts in a lot of African countries. Our
embassies have a very successful program where we now will
review any contracts. We have a standing offer to review any
contracts that these countries are going to undertake with
China to point out the inconsistencies, the potential pitfalls,
and the differences often we find between the host nation
language translation and the Chinese translation. I think this
is a great effort by our Department of State to help these
countries make informed decisions on their own.
We see backlash, and we see it in the military sphere.
Their equipment frequently breaks within a year or two. It is
sitting rusting at the--on the side of the airfield or the
port, and their training has been described to me by one
African leader as not much more useful than a Hollywood
demonstration. So we are starting to see some pushback by
African leaders on the Chinese.
Senator King. Well, I think one way to look at it, and I
have talked to leaders throughout Asia, is that we have allies;
China has customers. I think to the extent we can maintain
those relationships with those African countries in the long
run, I think they are going to prefer our model and our air
support. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Scott,
please.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman. Thank both of you for
your service and all the men and women under your command. Just
to follow up with General Townsend with what Senator King was
saying. What are you hearing from these leaders in these
African countries about how they are going to deal with the
debt that the Chinese have done or their relationship? Is there
much opposition to what China is doing right now?
General Townsend. I had an African leader tell me a
drowning man will reach for any hand, and so I think they are
faced with very difficult choices, many of these countries.
They have got extreme poverty. They have climate challenges,
food shortages. They want to advance their country for their
people. Many of them have challenges with violent extremist
organizations, and they need to secure their country, so they
will reach out to any offer. Frequently those offers are
fastest from China and Russia. We are slower to deliver, in
their estimation, and it is true, and we are more deliberate in
that way, and we have more strings attached than the Chinese
and the Russians. You know, our strings are related to good
behavior and things like that, democratic values, and the
Chinese and the Russians attach no such strings other than
loans--loan shark type of lending.
So they reach for whatever assistance they can get. They
constantly tell us we would prefer you to be our partner, and
many of them do that when they have the ability to do that. But
they also will take help from any source, and they will take
help from us and help from the Chinese and the Russians all at
the same time, and they will reassure us they can manage those
relationships, and we try to help them with that.
Senator Scott. So take the Chinese. Are they going to be
able to enforce the deals they have entered into in these
countries?
General Townsend. That is a great question, Senator, and I
do not know the answer to that. Probably best for the
Department of State.
Senator Scott. Okay. General Townsend, you know, Israel--it
seems like Israel's reputation and presence in Africa is
growing, and with the Abraham Accord, you would think it would
be a positive. So are you seeing Israel's involvement in Africa
growing at all?
General Townsend. We do see Israel. Israel has always been
involved in parts of Africa, mostly the northeast and along the
Red Sea. We are seeing Israel reach out across Africa in a
fairly positive way in most cases, and they are doing some arms
sales there. Quite frankly, I would rather see our African
partners buy Israeli drones than Chinese drones.
Senator Scott. Thank you. General McKenzie, how concerned
are you about the relationship that Iran is building with
China?
General McKenzie. I am very concerned about it. It is too
soon to tell, though, if this latest agreement is going to
mount into something or nothing at all. I think Iran is always
seeking opportunities to buy weapons, you know, and so I think
it is interesting, but I am not yet prepared to pass a judgment
on it.
Senator Scott. Are you seeing China's involvement grow--
continuing to grow militarily all across the area you are
responsible for?
General McKenzie. In Central Command, China's involvement
engagement is principally economic with the debt trap diplomacy
that General Townsend discussed in Africa. We see the same
thing across our region. You know, we should not forget that
China actually imports a significant fraction of their
hydrocarbons from the region, and through the Strait of Hormuz,
and from the Arabian Gulf, so they are going to be very
interested in the region. So I think right now what we are
seeing is the leading edge of a long-term Chinese plan to
firmly establish themselves in the region.
Senator Scott. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Now let me
recognize via Webex, Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
General McKenzie and General Townsend, for being here. So,
General McKenzie, President Biden recently announced his plans
to withdraw all United States Forces from Afghanistan no later
than September 11th, 2021. That is going to mark our longest
war ever, so I just want to review what has happened just over
the past decade and where we stand right now. General McKenzie,
is it true that the Taliban has more members today than it did
10 years ago?
General McKenzie. The Taliban has 50,000 or so members
today. I would have to come back to you on where that stands
compared to 10 years ago, Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]
Currently, the estimated strength of the Taliban is 60,000
to 80,000 full-time fighters. In 2011, the number of Taliban
fighters was estimated at 20,000 to 25,000. Taliban strength
has continued to increase from as low as 20,000 in 2011 to
60,000 in 2018, to as high as 85,000 as of March 2021.
Senator Warren. Well, actually, I think the number could be
as high as 85,000, according to the special inspector general
for Afghanistan reconstruction, and that is almost triple what
it was in 2011. You might want to go back and look at those
numbers. Does the Taliban control more of Afghanistan than it
did 10 years ago?
General McKenzie. Yes, it does, Senator.
Senator Warren. Yes, and does Pakistan or elements of the
Pakistani Government still provide support and sanctuary to the
Taliban?
General McKenzie. We believe that elements of the Taliban
are in Pakistan. Yes, Senator, we do.
Senator Warren. Is corruption in the Afghan Government
still endemic?
General McKenzie. The Afghan Government has corruption,
significant corruption.
Senator Warren. Yes, and after all this time and all this
work to prop up and support the Afghan Government, is it fair
to say that Afghans still have little trust in their government
and elections just as they did 10 years ago?
General McKenzie. Senator, I would defer to the Department
of State for a better commentary on that.
Senator Warren. All right. I think if you check their
commentary, they will say yes. The situation in Afghanistan has
not improved in the last 10 years, even with our troops
present, and it is clear there is little for us to be gained by
a continued United States presence there. I strongly support
President Biden's decision to withdraw U.S. troops. We should
have learned by now that a conditions-based withdrawal is just
a recipe for staying in Afghanistan forever. Defense officials
have come before this committee year after year to proclaim
that the United States has turned the corner in Afghanistan,
but all I see is a vicious cycle that damages our Nation's
reputation abroad and keeps our troops in harm's way, while
producing little tangible benefit for our security.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield the remainder of
my time.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Warren. Now let
me recognize Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
you for your service. General McKenzie, I appreciate our
discussion yesterday. Let me start with a big kind of picture
issue. You are in the Middle East, a lot of energy there. Does
it help or hurt the United States of America from a national
security and foreign policy perspective that we are now the
world's energy superpower, producing more natural gas than
Russia, more oil than Saudi Arabia? Does that help our national
security posture in the Middle East and other places in the
world?
General McKenzie. I would say--I would think that it helps
globally. It certainly helps in the CENTCOM region.
Senator Sullivan. So do you think it makes sense from a
perspective to just unilaterally start reducing the production
of American energy? It kills jobs, but I am talking about from
the national security perspective, to enable Saudi Arabia and
Russia to be bigger energy producers than us. Does that makes
sense, from your perspective, national security, your personal
opinion?
General McKenzie. Sir, I would--first, I would defer to
Commerce for a more informed opinion.
Senator Sullivan. I am asking as a----
General McKenzie.----I would say that it is not helpful to
the United States.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. You know, General, this is a
very difficult decision, controversial decision. Certainly I
wish the President would not have picked September 11th as some
kind of date to celebrate. It is not a good date in American
history. I think the Taliban is going to have a great
propaganda victory by saying 20 years ago there was a victory,
now there is a victory. I do not believe that it is a victory,
but I hope in the future that the President, Secretary of
Defense, even you do not use September 11th as some kind of
date we are celebrating here for 2021 on the withdrawal of
troops. You do not need to comment on that. I just think it is
baffling that somehow somebody in the White House thought that
was a good day to choose.
One thing that we are hearing, many of our bravest men and
women fought. Many died, sacrificed. You know, you start to
hear this mantra that, well, they--if we are pulling out, the
Taliban takeover, which is a distinct possibility, that these
sacrifices, particularly those who died, died in vain. You
know, I had the honor of serving as a staff officer to General
Abizaid for 1-and-a-half years when he was CENTCOM commander
many years ago. He said something once that really struck me.
He said, no American who has ever fought for freedom or the
defense of the national security of the United States has ever
died in vain. What would you say to the men and women who
fought in Afghanistan, wounded families who lost loved ones,
about their sacrifice, even though we are leaving?
General McKenzie. Senator, first of all, there is really
nothing I can say to replace the empty chair at the table, the
loss of a loved one, and I am very much humbled by recognizing
that. I cannot improve on what General Abizaid said. In many
ways, you know, to fight for freedom is not to give something
up in vain. I think it is--but I think it is a very--it is
still very hard on those people. As you know, I have been to
Afghanistan multiple times, as has General Townsend seated
beside me. My son has been to Afghanistan twice, so I am well
aware of the burden that has been placed on families of this
Nation to support our fight there.
Senator Sullivan. I just want to make sure our message to
these families, to the men and women who served, sacrificed,
some gave their lives, that it is not going to be your
sacrifice did not mean anything. I would agree with General
Abizaid. I hope that can be the statement from our military
leaders. No American who has ever fought for freedom in the
security of this Nation has died in vain, regardless of what
happens in Afghanistan in the next 2 to 3 years. Would you
agree with that?
General McKenzie. Senator, I would, certainly.
Senator Sullivan. Would you agree with that, General?
General Townsend. Senator, I would. Absolutely.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask one final question. General,
you are a Marine. You know honor, courage, and commitment is a
cornerstone of our ethos. Semper Fidelis. Do you believe
nations have honor?
General McKenzie. I do believe nations have honor.
Senator Sullivan. So one thing that I worry about, given
this decision, is that a lot of people who worked with our
military, their lives are going to be at risk. The women who
are now parliamentarian, their lives are going to be at risk if
the Taliban takes over, which I think is a distinct
possibility. I think we should be doing much more and planning
much more to try to protect those lives, maybe get them out of
Afghanistan if needed. Would you agree with that and if there
is a plan to do that? Well, what is the plan to do that right
now, and if there is not a plan, would you be able to execute a
plan if we were able to keep our word to people who sacrificed
and worked with us, who, now their lives are clearly going to
be at risk, to help them? Would that not help the honor of
America despite leaving?
General McKenzie. Senator, I know the Department of State
is looking at a variety of venues, the Special Immigrant Visa
Program, among others, you know, to potentially get people out.
We have the capability to do that if so directed.
Senator Sullivan. I certainly hope we look at doing that in
a big way. I think the idea of a year from now or a year-and-a-
half from now if the Taliban takes over, which I think is a
distinct possibility, and you have people who worked with our
troops who are lined up and shot or killed because they worked
with Americans, I think that would be a stain on our honor as a
Nation, and I hope that we are making plans to avoid that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator. Now let me recognize
Senator Rosen via Webex.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
Inhofe for holding this hearing, of course, and I would like to
thank Generals Townsend and McKenzie for testifying today, and,
of course, for their service to our country. I would like to
speak a little bit about maintaining Israel's Qualitative
Military Edge (QME) because for decades, maintaining Israel's
qualitative military edge has been a bipartisan American
foreign policy priority. It has been codified in law since
2008.
In recent years, the combination of Iran acquiring advanced
Russian and Chinese systems, transfers of arms to terrorist
groups, and an escalating weapons race in the region undermine
Israel's QME, and they pose a significant conventional threat
to the United States personnel. Just last night, a Syrian
surface-to-air missile exploded in Israel, demonstrating the
danger of advanced missiles proliferating through the region.
So, General McKenzie, what is your assessment of Israel's
current QME, and what must be done to maintain it? Do you view
the escalating arms race in the region as having a negative
impact on Israel's QME?
General McKenzie. Senator, you know, I am newly energized
to study the Israeli question because of the movement of Israel
into the Central Command under the recent Unified Command (UCP)
decision, although I have looked at it for several years at
United States Central Command. I am confident that we will be
able to preserve Israel's QME going forward, even considering
arms sales to various countries across the region. We should
also reflect that the arm sales to those countries across the
region at least partially reflects the increasing normalization
of ties between Israel and those nations. Nonetheless, I am
absolutely confident that we will be able to retain Israel's
military advantage.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I look forward to revisiting that
with you as you move forward. I would like to move next to the
MQ-9 production because the MQ-9 is remotely piloted aircraft.
It plays a critical role in supporting our current intelligence
surveillance and reconnaissance requirements. A key part of the
MQ-9's architecture is the mission at Nevada's Creech Air Force
Base. As force drawdowns in CENTCOM's area of responsibility
have reduced human intelligence availability, signals
intelligence capabilities become even more important. Despite
this, the prior Administration tried to cut MQ-9 production.
So, again, General McKenzie, last year you included additional
MQ-9 funding at the top of CENTCOM's unfunded priorities. So
how would additional MQ-9 aircraft support your ISR mission,
and what would be the impacts or the gaps in your ISR
capabilities if that production were to be suspended without a
follow-up plan?
General McKenzie. Senator, the MQ-9, MQ-1, and various
other platforms are critical platforms for us in Central
Command, particularly for use in the VEO fight. They give us
the persistent overhead coverage that we need to go through the
find, fix, and finish part of the equation. So we continue to
use them, particularly in Afghanistan, but also in Iraq and
Syria, and we have also found the MQ-9 to be valuable in use
against Iran. In the summer of 2019, the manipulation of ISR
assets in and around the Strait of Hormuz directly deflected
Iranian attack planning, so it is useful in a variety of venues
for us.
Senator, I also recognize there is a global demand for
these resources. Other combatant commands need them. My partner
here, General Townsend, needs them in Africa as well. It
remains an invaluable platform for us. I also recognize the
platform is not viable in a high-end fight, and there are parts
of CENTCOM that could become a high-end fight. There are parts
of CENTCOM that are not a high-end fight. The platform is going
to remain vital to us as we go forward, particularly as we pull
out of Afghanistan, and our ability to maintain persistent
overhead coverage will maybe possibly require additional MQ-9s
in order--because of the range of--range from the base to the
place where we will actually be looking. We may even need more
of them in Central Command dedicated to that particular task.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you. I appreciate that, and glad
to do our part in signals and reconnaissance intelligence, and
the MQ-9s certainly helps us meet those goals. Thank you. I
notice my time has just about expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much, Senator Rosen,
and there are several members that are endeavoring to get here,
and in order to allow them a fair opportunity, let me ask an
additional question or two, and Senator Inhofe joins us. In
fact, this is perfect timing because I can now introduce and
recognize Senator Kelly. Are you prepared, Senator?
Senator Kelly. I am always ready.
Chairman Reed. Always ready.
Senator Kelly. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, General
McKenzie, General Townsend, thank you for your testimony today.
So we have seen a range of Gray Zone engagement activities by
near peer competitors throughout Africa and the Middle East,
from China's pursuit of strategic partnerships with the
Iranians and attempts to use infrastructure loans of medical
supplies to gain favor on the African continent, to Russia's
efforts to establish a foothold in critical mineral extraction
and a presence on NATO's southern edge. The national defense
strategy speaks of the need to expand the competitive space.
With that in mind, I would like to get both of your thoughts on
how the U.S. should be engaging in this environment to build
relationships in each of these areas of responsibility with an
eye towards countering the opportunistic influence-seeking
behaviors by our competitors and discouraging any further
escalation. General Townsend?
General Townsend. Thanks, Senator. So you have correctly
pointed out that Russia and China are competing deliberately
and hard in Africa with the United States. I believe that they
are determined to win. China is determined to win that
competition. I am a little less concerned about Russia's
competition, although it is not helpful. I think they are
exploitative. They are self-interested. I think in many ways
the Russians can be their own worst enemies. I think they are
less of a longer-term concern to me than China is. China is a
concern today and longer term. They are a learning
organization. They are spending a lot of money in Africa. We do
not have to outspend them. What we have to do is figure out
where we need to out-compete them and how to do that, and how
to do that is a whole-of-government solution.
In my view, the first thing I am concerned about with
China, number one, is an Atlantic Coast naval base. Number two,
it is their activities in North Africa, and I can discuss that
more in a closed session. My third concern would be the
influence of Russia in Libya. As the Libyan national
government--there is a sort of forming up now. Maybe there is a
path forward there that is better. My fourth concern would be a
Libyan naval--or a Russian naval base in Sudan on the Red Sea.
So those are my top four global power competition concerns with
those competitors, and it is a whole-of-government approach I
think that will get us there. Most African partners want to
partner with us.
Senator Kelly. When you are thinking about China's desire
to have an Atlantic Coast naval base, where do you think the
most likely place is that they are exploring right now?
General Townsend. Senator, let me say this. They have
placed bets from Mauritania in the north to Namibia in the
south, and many countries in between. I would really rather dig
into those details in closed session.
Senator Kelly. Okay. Thank you. General McKenzie?
General McKenzie. Senator, when we talk about competition
against Russia and China in the gray space, clearly we need to
think globally, not just in the western Pacific and not just in
Europe. The principal tools that we use in Central Command
range from exercises with our partners. Everybody wants to
exercise with the United States, so we work those very hard
with all these partners. The other is International Military
Education and Training (IMET), bringing their officers and Non-
Commissioned Officers (NCOs) to the United States for
educational opportunities, extremely low-cost, extremely high
payoff. Everybody wants to go to a U.S. school if they can
have--a military school if they have--if they can have the
opportunity to do that.
Additionally, security cooperation. As Steve noted,
everybody wants our weapons. They would prefer to buy from us.
They accept the restrictions that we will place on those
weapons, but we have a variety of tools that we can employ, and
that is just in the military domain. On the whole-of-government
side, I would just call out, too, the economic aid that we can
offer and the work of USAID. All of those working in concert
with us give us significant advantages that we can apply
against Russia and China, particularly in the Central Command
AOR.
Senator Kelly. If we were able to expand those educational
opportunities for foreign, often, officers, but just military
personnel, is the demand--I mean, how significant is the demand
right now?
General McKenzie. The demand is--the demand far outpaces
supply. Far outpaces supply.
Senator Kelly. So we could double the----
General McKenzie. You could double, triple. You could
quadruple. You could do a lot of things. The problem really is
on our end. I mean, our institutions are good because they are
scoped in size, and we recognize that, but nonetheless, there
is enormous demand for these.
Senator Kelly. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Senator
Tuberville, please.
Senator Tuberville. Well, thank you very much. Very
quickly, thanks for being here today. General McKenzie, what is
the most important thing we can do to prevent a resurgence of
ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and are we doing enough?
General McKenzie. I think we are on track to do that. I
think the Iraqis are a lot better at fighting ISIS. We have
pulled back from accompanying them in the fight to high-level
advising. They can generally master the battlefield and protect
their own country, so I think we are in a good place. I think
we are in a good place in Iraq. In Syria, we work with our
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) partners to continue the fight
against ISIS remnants. They do not hold any ground. You know,
there are small, isolated groups of them that operate up and
down the Euphrates River, and we go after them pretty hard.
Because of that, they are unable to generate effective attack
plans against the United States or our allies.
Senator Tuberville. General Townsend, how will China's
growing influence in the region disrupt the United States'
abilities to impact long-term strategic goals?
General Townsend. Senator, I think our number one strategic
goal for Africa is to ensure that the United States has the
access and the strategic influence that we need in the future.
That is, I think, the number one concern I have for China's
activity in Africa is that they will try to maneuver us or box
us out of access and influence. I would say that we have an
edge still. As much money as they have invested and as many
activities that they are doing, we still have an edge in access
and influence.
An example I use is our rescue of an American citizen that
was held hostage in Nigeria just last October. In an hour's
notice, we asked seven countries for access to their country
for our armed forces to enter their country and do some
military activity. In many of these countries, this was done
over the phone with literally hours to give us an answer. All
seven said yes, and that is an example of the access and
influence the United States has today, and we need to work to
ensure we have that access and influence in the future, and not
all seven of those countries are what we would consider strong
and close partners, but they all said yes to that request.
Senator Tuberville. Excellent. Thank you. General McKenzie,
are there effective measures being taken today by CENTCOM to
address the individual displaced persons crisis along the
Syrian and Iraqi border? If so, how?
General McKenzie. Senator, I remain very concerned about
displaced persons in northeast Syria. It is not a military
problem. It is really a whole-of-government, and more than
that, it is actually an international problem. We have trained
the people that were in those camps--that is our
responsibility--and we prevent external actors from getting in
there and causing harm. Nonetheless, those camps are incubators
for radical ideology. We need to find a way to return,
particularly the children, but also the other members, back to
the countries that they came from, and that requires an
international effort, and I know the Department of State is
working very hard to make that--to make that happen. It is a
tough--it is an uphill sled, though, trying to make--trying to
achieve that. This is one of my most significant concerns, sir.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. General Townsend, as we
build relationships with African nations, such as Morocco and
Algeria, how does this strengthen our national security?
General Townsend. Both of those countries sit in a
geostrategically important part of Africa. They both have--
Morocco directly watches over the Strait of Gibraltar, and
Algeria is close enough to influence the Strait of Gibraltar in
the western Med. So from a geostrategic standpoint, we
absolutely need good working relations with those two
countries. Morocco is a very strong partner of the United
States, probably our number one African partner as far as
relationships go. They take great pride in their military being
equipped primarily with United States equipment and operating
at a standard that is equivalent to a NATO standard, so they
are very strong partner. Algeria has been--has had close ties
with Russia for decades. However, they have recently been
expressing a desire to increase their ties with the United
States, and we do have a good working relationship with Algeria
on issues of mutual concern.
Senator Tuberville. Do we sell Morocco a lot of arms and
equipment?
General Townsend. I am sorry?
Senator Tuberville. Do we sell Morocco a lot of arms and
equipment?
General Townsend. We do, and unlike a lot of African
partners, they purchase it all with their own money.
Senator Tuberville. Excellent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville, and now I
would like to recognize via Webex, Senator Hawley, please.
[No response.]
Chairman Reed. I know Senator Hawley is trying very quickly
to get either to Webex----
Senator Hawley. There we go. Can you hear me now, Mr.
Chairman?
Chairman Reed. I can, Senator. Please proceed.
Senator Hawley. Okay. Thank you. Thank you so much. Sorry.
I could not hear you there. Thank you, gentlemen, for being
here, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for being patient with me.
General McKenzie, let me start with you, if I could.
Secretary Austin said recently that the United States will be
able to maintain counterterrorism capabilities in the region
sufficient to ensure Afghanistan cannot become a safe haven for
terrorists who threaten our security. Again, that was Secretary
Austin. Can you just give me a sense, do you agree with the
Secretary's assessment that we can achieve our counterterrorism
objectives in Afghanistan even once we complete the drawdown
that President Biden has directed?
General McKenzie. Senator, I do agree with that assessment.
You know, we will rely on our defense in depth. The changes
that have been made to security here in the United States make
our Homeland a much harder target than it was in 2001.
Additionally, the re-basing that we will do across the theater
as we pull out of Afghanistan will give us the capability to go
back in as necessary to strike targets when they need to be
struck. I do not want to make it sound too easy. It is going to
be extremely difficult to do that. It is certainly possible to
do that, and we will have the forces that will allow us to
accomplish those tasks.
Senator Hawley. Thank you for that answer. I am glad to
hear that. What are some of the options, can you give us a
sense, that CENTCOM is evaluating for finding and neutralizing
targets in Afghanistan once we withdraw our forces?
General McKenzie. Sure. I would prefer to cover it in
detail perhaps in the closed session.
Senator Hawley. Sure.
General McKenzie. But just very broadly, I would tell you
that you always need a combination of--you want--the formula is
you have got to--you got to find them, you got to fix the
target, then you have to finish the target. So we tend to think
in those terms when we talk about the resources that we will
need. What you will need is the ability to bring persistent
overhead coverage in, probably from extended ranges, to still
loiter and take a look at areas that you want to further
examine. The reason you are going to need persistent coverage
is, if you plan to strike something, we are going to strike it
in full compliance with the law of armed conflict: low
collateral damage and the American way of war. So we are going
to make sure if we go after something, it is really what we
want to hit, and we are not going to kill innocent people
should that be necessary.
So we will do all that from extremely long range and it
will be a challenge, but we do have the capability to do it. We
have a number of ways to get to a fixed solution, ranging from
a precision strike at very long range to on-the-ground options
should those prove necessary. I would really prefer to talk a
little bit more about those in a closed session, sir.
Senator Hawley. Absolutely. Give me a sense, General, if
CENTCOM has done a similar analysis to identify ways that we
can achieve our counterterrorism objectives in Iraq, should we
withdraw our forces there.
General McKenzie. The logic is the same. We would certainly
be able to do that, and the logic would be the same.
Senator Hawley. Would you be willing in the appropriate
setting to share your findings with the Committee in terms of
the analysis you have done about how we might achieve that in
Iraq?
General McKenzie. Certainly. Of course, right now we do not
anticipate withdrawing from Iraq. In fact, we believe, as a
result of the strategic dialogue that was just completed in the
last 2 weeks, we will maintain a footprint in Iraq going
forward. But certainly, pending approval of the Secretary and
further--you know, and further approval by the Department, we
would be willing to do that.
Senator Hawley. Yeah, let me perhaps rephrase my question.
Has CENTCOM done a similar--you are doing this analysis now for
Afghanistan because of the President's order in terms of how we
can reposition there to achieve our counterterrorism
objectives. Has CENTCOM done a similar analysis for Iraq in the
event that our force posture there might change significantly?
General McKenzie. Senator, not vis-a-vis Iraq particularly,
although the logic of the argument, the logic of the capability
would be the same where there is a target against Afghanistan
or Iraq. So the work that we are doing right now would be
useful should that prove necessary at some contingent time in
the future as yet unplanned.
Senator Hawley. Do you anticipate doing an analysis for the
Iraq situation? The reason I am asking, General, it seems that
if we are going to have a meaningful discussion about our
continued military presence there, we are going to need to know
the options, what we can realistically hope to achieve should
we draw down or leave entirely.
General McKenzie. Sure. So right now we are not planning
for that in Iraq, is probably the best way to answer your
question. We could plan for it very rapidly if so directed,
but, again, I note that right now we do plan on maintaining a
presence in Iraq into the future, subject to agreements and
further discussions with the Government of Iraq.
Senator Hawley. Let me just ask you in the few seconds I
have remaining, General, DOD budgeted about $4 billion last
year for the Afghan Security Forces Fund. That is just short of
the amount that United States Indo-Pacific Command (PACOM)
needs for this year's installment of the Pacific Deterrence
Initiative. At the same time, there is strong reason to believe
that the Afghan security forces will be significantly reduced,
harmed, or just collapse when United States troops depart. Here
is my question. From a military standpoint, under what
conditions would you say that it is no longer advisable for DOD
to be investing this amount--these billions of dollars each
year in the Afghan security forces?
General McKenzie. Senator, that is a sort of a future
hypothetical question which I try to avoid answering, but I can
tell you this. If we do not provide them some support, they
certainly will collapse, and I think that is not in our best
interests.
Senator Hawley. Yeah. The reason--as you can probably
anticipate, the reason I am asking is I am concerned that we
will continue to pour resources into the security forces
without much return on investment when we need them. We need
those resources very badly in other theaters, particularly in
our pacing theater. I have had just about used up my time here,
I think. In fact, I am over my time. Thank you, General, for
being here. Thank you, General Townsend, as well. I will have
some additional questions for you in a written setting. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley. This concludes
the open session. Let me yield to Senator Inhofe for any
comments he might have.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah, I do. I want to make sure the staff,
anyone who is here, understands that we have a lot of questions
we want to ask in a closed session. That is going to take place
in 217. We have four votes coming up, so it is going to be very
convenient to be down there, run up and get our votes and come
back, so I would invite all of our members to come to that
closed session immediately.
Chairman Reed. Let me echo what Senator Inhofe said. In
fact, I was going to say that, but he----
Senator Inhofe.----Oh.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Reed. This is sort of ESP, I think. I do not know
what is going on. But, yes, we are going to adjourn immediately
to SVC-217. We will have a closed session. It will be people
coming in and out to vote, but there are many issues we want to
cover there. Gentleman, thank you for your testimony, thank you
for your service, and for those who serve in your commands.
The open hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
iran and reentering the joint comprehensive plan of action
1. Senator Hirono. General McKenzie, would rejoining the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) be a positive step in containing
Iran's nuclear ambitions?
General McKenzie. Our diplomats at the Department of State have the
lead for the nuclear talks currently underway in Vienna, working with
our Allies to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. The JCPOA
effectively constrained Iran's nuclear program by blocking all of
Tehran's potential pathways to a nuclear weapon and enabled robust
international monitoring of all aspects of Iran's nuclear program. An
agreement that verifiably restrains Iranian return to full nuclear
activities and strict compliance with its commitments under the deal
extends breakout timelines preventing an Iranian weapons in the U.S
national security interest.
2. Senator Hirono. General McKenzie, how does extending the nuclear
weapon production timeline support the United States' strategic
interests in the region?
General McKenzie. Iran's behavior remains the greatest, single
threat to security and stability in the region. Our diplomats are hard
at work with Allies to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. If
they are able to make progress in curtailing Iran's nuclear program,
particularly by extending Iran's breakout timeline, this would
depressurize the region by reducing the likelihood of the development
of a weapon of mass destruction and the chances for increased regional
conflict as a result of that acquisition.
3. Senator Hirono. General McKenzie, how does extending the nuclear
weapon production timeline support your ability to plan for
contingencies if Iran does attempt to build nuclear weapons?
General McKenzie. [Deleted.]
withdrawal of forces from afghanistan
4. Senator Hirono. General McKenzie, are you preparing contingency
plans to react if United States Forces are attacked by the Taliban
during the withdrawal?
General McKenzie. USCENTCOM has a plan in place, to include
carrier-based airpower, bombers, and other crisis response forces to
protect United States and coalition troops as we withdraw from
Afghanistan. We are confident we have the right capabilities in place
to defend our troops and respond to any attacks. We will maintain a
regional counterterrorism capacity, with a military and intelligence
assets in the region, that can counter the re-emergence of a terrorist
threat and deal with it if it does emerge. We will also hold the
Taliban accountable if they are not doing what they have committed to
do. Conducting counter-terrorism surveillance and suppression without a
``platform'' in Afghanistan is a lot harder, but it is not impossible.
5. Senator Hirono. General McKenzie, what role will United States
Central Command (CENTCOM) play in preventing violent extremist
organizations like al Qaeda and ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]
from regaining a foothold in Afghanistan after the withdrawal?
General McKenzie. The United States will conserve and sustain
regional counterterrorism capabilities with our international and
Afghan partners to prevent the emergence of terrorist networks that
could threaten the United States homeland. Furthermore, through
diplomatic efforts with Government of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan, the United States Government will hold the Taliban to its
commitments to ensure that al Qaeda or any other group never again can
use Afghanistan as a base of operations against the United States.
iran's presence in syria
6. Senator Hirono. General McKenzie, over the last several years
Iran has become increasingly involved in the conflict in Syria. What is
the current status of United States Forces in Syria?
General McKenzie. In Syria, approximately 900 United States
military personnel support the Counter Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS) mission from bases in northeastern Syria and At-Tanf Garrison, a
desert garrison located in southeastern Syria near the border with Iraq
and Jordan. We provide training and enabling support to vetted Syrian
groups and individuals, including the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in
the Eastern Syria Security Area. We have provided training to the SDF
on operational and tactical skills such as marksmanship, heavy weapon
employment, and mounted maneuver (vehicle operations). We also provide
intelligence and other enabling support to the SDF. We continue to
provide training and equipment to help increase SDF's capacity to
manage their detention facilities, holding approximately 10,000 ISIS
detainees.
7. Senator Hirono. General McKenzie, how are United States Forces
managing Iranian involvement in this conflict?
General McKenzie. [Deleted.]
8. Senator Hirono. General McKenzie, what conditions do you believe
need to be satisfied before the United States withdraws our remaining
forces from Syria?
General McKenzie. First, I would like to say that the United States
leaving Syria is a policy decision. For USCENTCOM, our mission is to
defeat Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Although ISIS no longer
holds territory, remnants of ISIS remain a threat and given the
opportunity, ISIS will reconstitute its capability to plan and attack
the homeland, our interest, and our Allies and partners. Our forces in
Syria provide vetted Syrian groups and individuals with the equipment,
training, and intelligence that they need to continue to counter the
ISIS threat. When our vetted partner forces, including the Syrian
Democratic Forces, are capable of dealing with this threat without our
support, then I would be satisfied that the military conditions have
been met for a withdrawal of our remaining forces.
population growth in africa
9. Senator Hirono. General Townsend, as noted in your posture
statement, the population of the African continent is growing rapidly
and has the potential to exacerbate the extreme poverty already present
on the continent, especially among younger generations who both make up
the majority of the population and are most vulnerable to recruitment
by violent extremist organizations. What steps is United States Africa
Command (AFRICOM) taking, in coordination with our interagency partners
and allies, to address recruitment efforts by violent extremist
organizations on the continent?
General Townsend. Africa's increasing youth population can be a
positive force for prosperity, innovation, and growth. Future
generations of young men and women should be viewed as our shared
responsibility to protect from the cruelties of al Shabaab, Boko Haram,
and ISIS. If left defenseless in unstable environments, African youth
are vulnerable to a wide range of malign actors, including criminal
networks, militias, and in some cases, violent extremist organizations
(VEOs). In many cases, VEOs specifically target young people and
forcibly kidnap or coerce them into their ranks.
To help African partners protect their youth, USAFRICOM works
closely with the interagency to improve security, stop the spread of
extremist ideologies, and stabilize regions affected by VEOs.
USAFRICOM, in conjunction with Allies and partners, degrades VEO
networks to create the environment for the Department of State and
USAID's stabilization and development activities to take root.
USAFRICOM, in close collaboration with USAID, conducts humanitarian
assistance to address underlying drivers of instability, working with
host governments to provide essential services and relieve acute
conditions. We share the premise with our interagency partners that
young people are more likely to work with security forces to stand up
to VEOs when they trust those security forces to protect them and have
hope for a brighter future. This is one of the key reasons why the
United States is often the security partner of choice in Africa, in
recognition of our core values versus malign alternatives.
10. Senator Hirono. General Townsend, are there any additional
authorities or initiatives that require Congress' help in this area?
General Townsend. USAFRICOM has supported officers from eleven
African partners to attend courses on countering VEO recruitment taught
by the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU). Increased funding
for such courses and other IMET funds would help address underlying
drivers of radicalization, USAFRICOM works to strengthen citizen
security by professionalizing partner forces through the Institutional
Capacity Building (ICB) Sec. 332 Authority in support of the Building
Partner Capacity Sec. 333 Authority. The Ministerial and Service level
ICB Lines of Effort strengthen the institutions shaping African
security sectors, and by extension, African security broadly.
Congress's continued support for these efforts would go far to ensure
African youth are free from the spectre of VEO recruitment. I would
also submit that addressing the risks of climate change in Africa can
further insulate fledging institutions from the strain of climate-
induced crises and VEO alternatives. The resumption and expansion of
the Defense Environmental International Cooperation Program, which lost
funding in 2020, would provide USAFRICOM with critical tools to reduce
the risk for Africa youth and citizens. When African youth are safe
from irregular threats attempting to recruit or coerce them into
service, they are free to pursue productive futures.
islamic state of iraq and syria in united states africa command
11. Senator Hirono. General Townsend, ISIS continues to develop a
foothold in North and East Africa and based on the recent attack in
Palma, Mozambique last month, it seems that ISIS is gaining ground in
southern Africa and across the continent. Can you provide an overview
of your assessment of ISIS in the AFRICOM area of operations?
General Townsend. ISIS branches and aspirants in Africa are mostly
on an upward trajectory. The two exceptions are in North Africa where
most of ISIS's affiliates have been largely degraded and are focused on
survival and in Horn of Africa where their presence is small and
competes with Al Shabaab. However, in West, East, and Central Africa,
ISIS branches are growing and expanding in under-governed areas,
exploiting poor economic conditions, ethnic competition, and weak
security forces. Mozambique is a prime example of this, where ISIS-
Mozambique, since its inception in 2017, has exponentially grown the
frequency and complexity of its attacks, and expanded its geographic
areas of operations into neighboring Tanzania and to the western LNG
sites in northern Mozambique. In West Africa, ISIS-West Africa is
ISIS's largest and most active province outside of Iraq and Syria, and
has consolidated control over its Lake Chad Basin safehaven. The group
has expelled Nigerian military and security forces and attacked Boko
Haram in these safehavens and has provided rudimentary governance and
social service to the local populace since at least early 2018. ISIS in
the Greater Sahara maintains a presence in Sahelien West Africa and
continues low-level attacks, but is still recovering from losses
sustained from French CT operations and conflict with al-Qaida
affiliates in the area. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a
previously anti-Uganda insurgent group rebranded itself and pledged
allegiance to ISIS in 2017, and attacks local security forces, UN
peacekeepers, NGOs, and local towns and villages. Along with the ISIS
Branch in Somalia, these groups are increasingly interconnected and are
fueling the growth and expansion of ISIS supporters in many sub-Saharan
Africa countries. Although all of these groups are focused locally in
their areas of operation, their attacks and ability to control
territory offer ISIS core fodder for their media releases and
propaganda, which allows ISIS to portray a successful and expanding
caliphate to its global support base despite setbacks in other areas of
the world.
12. Senator Hirono. General Townsend, how are you partnering with
nations across the continent to counter ISIS attacks and recruitment?
General Townsend. Senator, the bottom line up front is USAFRICOM is
not resourced to do very much to help partners to counter growing ISIS
attacks, and recruitment. Where we do try to help, USAFRICOM follows a
partner-centric approach to countering ISIS attacks and recruitment
across the continent. This is done primarily through a myriad of Title
10 and Title 22 capacity-building activities conducted in coordination
with the inter-agency. Specifically, force modernization and training
efforts with key African partners provide them with the tools and
knowledge necessary to confront ISIS on the battlefield. Military
intelligence capacity building also plays an important role helping
partners to understand how to obtain, verify, and analyze intelligence
and then appropriately use it in operational decision cycles. In doing
so, USAFRICOM and its components create sustainable entities, which do
not only anticipate and respond to security threats but aid in more
professional operations, grounded in doctrine.
USAFRICOM capacity building activities are important, but the long-
term fight with ISIS will not be won on the battlefield alone. Good
governance, economic opportunity, and human development in African
societies are antidotes to ISIS recruitment. To that end, USAFRICOM
plays a supporting role to USAID and Department of State ``3D''
Diplomacy, Development, and Defense activities. USAFRICOM also supports
many Department of State programs, such as the Global Peace Operations
Initiative (GPOI), the Partnership for Regional East Africa
Counterterrorism (PREACT), Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
(TSCTP), Africa Military Education Program (AMEP), and coordinates with
the Department of State to advance Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) on
the continent. These programs, among others, strengthen the ability of
our African partners to counter ISIS recruitment activities by
providing training on human rights and the rule of law.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
mq-9 production
13. Senator Rosen. General Townsend, how would additional MQ-9
aircraft support AFRICOM's intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) mission?
General Townsend. Additional ISR, manned or unmanned and preferably
SIGINT enabled and armed, is AFRICOM's number one unresourced unfunded
priority. Additional aircraft would meaningfully bolster USAFRICOM's
counter-violent extremist organization and strategic competition
missions by providing additional coverage in both space and time -
increasing our situational awareness of adversarial activities on the
continent. With vast distances between basing locations and operating
areas, MQ1/9s provide the essential range and long-endurance ISR
capability we require. Additional MQ1/9s would also fill a force
protection role, enabling increased DOD and DOS engagement
opportunities on the continent.
14. Senator Rosen. General Townsend, what would be the impacts of a
gap in ISR capabilities if MQ-9 production were to be suspended without
a follow-on plan?
General Townsend. Additional ISR, manned or unmanned and preferably
SIGINT enabled and armed, is AFRICOM's number one unresourced unfunded
priority. I don't know how suspending MQ-9 production would affect
USAFRICOM's allocation of ISR assets. The United States Air Force would
be better equipped to answer how a change in production would impact
their force offering to the Joint Force. If suspended production
resulted in reduced capacity, Joint Staff could potentially make
adjustments to the global allocation to USAFRICOM and other combatant
commands. A reduction in allocation to USAFRICOM would impact our
ability to address security concerns and provide force protection to
United States and partner forces during operations, engagements and
crisis response.
transfer of israel to united states central command
15. Senator Rosen. General McKenzie, how have Arab states under
CENTCOM's area of responsibilities that don't have diplomatic relations
with Israel responded to the transfer?
General McKenzie. USCENTCOM has noted no reactions from AOR states
to the Unified Command Plan change.
iranian aggression
16. Senator Rosen. General McKenzie, what are the impacts on
regional stability of this new agreement between China and Iran? Is
this merely a piece of paper or is it the beginning of significant
strategic relations between Beijing and Tehran?
General McKenzie. The China-Iran 25-year agreement provides a non-
binding framework for Chinese investment in Iranian infrastructure in
return for guaranteed Iranian oil sales at a discount and increased
military cooperation. High-level Chinese diplomatic visits to key Gulf
partners, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and
Bahrain suggest Beijing will seek to continue balancing its regional
relationships while avoiding potentially destabilizing actions such as
certain arms sales to Iran. While the agreement signals China's intent
to continue strengthening ties with Iran, China has publicly downplayed
its significance. This agreement signifies a significant change for
Iran, in light of the potential for increased oil sales and closer
Iranian-Chinese relations across a broad spectrum. Tehran likely
believes the deal will ensure reliable revenue and set the stage for
future additional trade agreements.
17. Senator Rosen. General McKenzie, how is CENTCOM proactively
protecting our Forces and diplomats from the threat to United States
and coalition forces posed by Iranian-aligned militia groups?
General McKenzie. We continually conduct cross-discipline terrorism
threat assessments, strategic threat analysis, and planning and
integration to mitigate threats. This detailed assessment and planning
process enables commanders to deploy and employ various methods of
active defense such as counter rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM)
systems and counter unmanned aircraft systems (CUAS) systems. We also
employ passive defense methods such as structured hardening and
camouflaging. These active and passive defense measures protect United
States & coalition forces and diplomats from potential attacks by
Iranian-aligned militia groups.
18. Senator Rosen. General McKenzie, how is CENTCOM working with
our regional partners to deter Iranian aggression, including by
stopping transfers of conventional arms to terrorist groups like Hamas
and Hezbollah and ensuring freedom of navigation in the region's
waterways?
General McKenzie. Starting in 2019, after several incidents in
which freedom of navigation was threatened by Iran and Iran backed
militia groups, USCENTCOM partnered with regional and extra-regional
Allies and partners to establish the International Maritime Security
Construct. This construct allows nations to provide maritime forces to
patrol and stand watch to ensure freedom of navigation in the Strait of
Hormuz, the Arabian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, and in the vicinity of the
Bab al-Mandeb Strait. To counter transfers of conventional arms to
terrorist groups and militias, we are working with the interagency,
Allies, and partners, to conduct operations to stop the transfer of
lethal aid to Iranian proxies and partners. Specific actions include
intelligence gathering and subsequent interdiction of weapons
shipments. The recent seizure of a large weapons cache by the USS
Monterey is a recent example of these types of operations.
political stability of jordan
19. Senator Rosen. General McKenzie, what military risk do we
assume with Jordan if political instability in the country escalates?
General McKenzie. Escalation of political instability in Jordan
could impede the Department's efforts to strengthen the Jordan Armed
Forces (JAF) while imposing risk to operations to defeat Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and counter violent extremist organizations
(VEO). USCENTCOM requires a balanced, tailored force presence and
basing network across the Middle East. Jordan is a key partner,
providing access to several bases, ports, and airspace while
facilitating the Department's operational reach. The JAF remains
committed to the defeat ISIS Coalition, providing air, ground, and
special operations force capabilities. Any degradation to the
Department's access to Jordan or to the JAF's capacity and will would
therefore have a lasting effect on regional stability.
20. Senator Rosen. General McKenzie, what are the implications for
our national security interests?
General McKenzie. President Biden, in his April 7 call with King
Abdullah II, emphasized the importance of the King's leadership to the
United States and the region. If Jordan were to become politically
unstable it could effectively threaten a key partner of our defeat
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria campaign. Political instability in
Jordan could therefore result in the Jordan Armed Forces directing
their attention away from their efforts to defeat ISIS.
21. Senator Rosen. General McKenzie, can you explain how the recent
defense agreement with Jordan, which was made public last month,
benefits our military posture?
General McKenzie. The Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA)
supplements the 1996 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and codifies
additional rights, privileges and immunities for United States Forces,
such as access to and use of facilities, tax exemptions, and freedom of
movement, that greatly benefit our military posture in Jordan. The DCA
also enables the United States to make investments in military
construction projects to support joint military efforts to defeat ISIS
and to pursue mutual goals of regional stability and counterterrorism.
iron union
22. Senator Rosen. General McKenzie, can you provide an update on
the Iron Union exercise between the United States and the United Arab
Emirates?
General McKenzie. Field Training Exercise (FTX) IRON UNION 14 was
held in the United Arab Emirates 28 Jan-5 Feb 2021 with one United
States mechanized infantry company and one United Arab Emirates Land
Forces Company. All exercise objectives were met, strengthening the
relationship between the two nations, enhancing interoperability,
improving partner capacities and promoting regional security. Despite
the great results from this event, it is the last FTX to be planned,
with future iterations shifting instead to a computer-based Command
Post Exercise due to reduction in forces and funding provided to
USCENTCOM.
23. Senator Rosen. General McKenzie, the Emirati ambassador has
suggested that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) might invite the Israel
Defense Forces (IDF) to a future iteration of the Iron Union exercise.
Do you believe it would be a good thing to begin to build a more
unified and capable American, Arab, and Israeli coalition to push back
on aggression from Tehran?
General McKenzie. The participation of Israel Defense Forces in
future exercises with other regional partners in the USCENTCOM Area of
Responsibility would certainly be a positive step towards regional
stability. While there are benefits to keeping some exercises as
bilateral events only, efforts to further normalize relationships among
all USCENTCOM partners would benefit everyone involved, enhance
regional stability, and send a strong signal to potential adversaries.
Increasing the number, scope or scale of any exercise events will not
be achievable without a corresponding increase in funding and resources
available.
24. Senator Rosen. General McKenzie, would you welcome an Emirati
invitation to the IDF to join the next Iron Union Exercise?
General McKenzie. USCENTCOM welcomes any effort to enhance regional
relationships and expand U.S. interoperability with our partners in the
area of responsibility, and to increase bilateral cooperation between
each of those partners. While including Israel in Exercise IRON UNION
is one option, there are also benefits to maintaining some exercises as
bilateral events. I am looking at all options to try to include Israel
in events like this and will discuss with our regional partners their
objectives and desires as well.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
great power competition
25. Senator Blackburn. General Townsend, and General McKenzie, are
you aware of the Chinese and/or Russian disinformation operations being
propagated within your area of responsibility, and if so is this a
pervasive issue?
General Townsend. Chinese disinformation is all over Africa, and
Beijing is spreading it via both official and unofficial channels.
We've seen Chinese ambassadors try to obscure the origins of COVID-19,
for instance, saying in interviews it didn't actually originate in
China. China also operates more than 60 Confucius Centers across the
continent. You might go to one to learn Mandarin, but it comes with a
helping of propaganda. Finally, Chinese media companies, like Star
Times, which broadcasts in more than 30 countries, will make pro-China
content, dub it into a local African language, distribute it for free,
present it as factual journalism, and frequently, fund its publication.
As for Russia, its influence operations are also pervasive across
the USAFRICOM AOR, most prominently through the organization of Russian
oligarch Yevginy Prigozhin. Prigozhin's network has interfered with
African elections in Zimbabwe, Madagascar, and South Africa. A
Prigozhin-linked influence operation based in Ghana and Nigeria
targeted the 2020 United States election. In Libya, Prigozhin's network
took over television studios and a newspaper to push Russian-approved
narratives. Influence efforts in Mali, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and
Mozambique have criticized French foreign policy, made claims of a
fictitious coup attempt, and promoted Russian COVID-19 vaccines. These
influence campaigns also targeted African diaspora populations in
Europe.
General McKenzie. Yes. Russian and Chinese disinformation is
pervasive throughout the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). Both
Russian and Chinese operatives seek to shape the information
environment to undermine United States relations in all 21 AOR states,
using diplomatic engagements and social/traditional media to question
United States reliability. Moscow and Beijing tend to prioritize
efforts in countries in which they have military and economic strategic
interests and deem to be in their respective spheres of influence (such
as Central and South Asia). While the efficacy of these efforts varies,
disinformation is a key component of Russian and Chinese strategic
competition strategy.
26. Senator Blackburn. General Townsend, compared to what we spend
in Iraq, for example, how do the modest expenditures we make for
AFRICOM counter the influences of China and Russia in ways that impact
the average American?
General Townsend. There are approximately 232,000 Americans living
and working in Africa every single day. These Americans represent a
significant counterbalance to the 1.1 million Chinese in Africa
advancing China's ambitious agenda for the continent. Given the vast
natural resources and incredible growth potential in the population of
Africa, 1.7 billion by 2030, the United States can ill-afford to ignore
the economic opportunity in Africa.
USAFRICOM's modest expenditures are focused on exposing China and
Russia's malign efforts to undermine sovereignty, forcing African
countries into disadvantageous agreements, and extracting resources
from Africa with little benefit for Africans.
Countries free of Russian and Chinese malign influence create
opportunities for United States businesses to compete in a rules-based
system, as part of a free international order. By extension, businesses
bound by legal regulations, including the many United States companies
doing business in Africa, have a chance to offer their services in a
fair and open process. The current efforts underway in Africa are the
barest minimum that the United States can do to preserve the option to
play in the economic future of Africa.
27. Senator Blackburn. General Townsend, what would be the impact
if Moscow does establish a port in northern Africa?
General Townsend. Establishing a military port facility in North
Africa is one of Russia's long-term strategic goals. A dual-use
civilian/military port or exclusive naval facility would represent a
significant leap in Russia's level of access and influence in the
region. It would also be a major advancement in Russia's strategic
effort to be seen as a global power with NATO as their primary
opponent. A Russian port increases the Russian Navy's logistical
support in the Mediterranean, improves intelligence collection of
United States and NATO forces in Europe and Africa, and reduces their
reliance on port calls. This is vital to Russia as a means to avoid
sanctions on access to European ports following their annexation of
Crimea. Guaranteed access to naval facilities simplifies the logistics
of Russia's routine naval deployments through the Mediterranean.
A Russian port facility and consequent increase in Russian Naval
Assets poses a direct threat to United States and NATO forces by
improving Russia's ability to monitor and threaten the Mediterranean,
especially maritime approaches to Syria, the Black Sea and the Suez
Canal, as well as the Straits of Gibraltar and Straits of Sicily. A
Russian port in Libya complicates both United States military support
to diplomatic relations in that country and personnel recovery and
crisis response across the continent. Direct Russian access to Libyan
oil complicates United States economic diplomacy and disrupts critical
access and influence in North Africa. While a base in North Africa
would be exposed and isolated in a conflict with Russia, it widens the
problems of potential contested logistics in any war plan dependent on
the Suez Canal as a strategic line of communication. Finally, USAFRICOM
is as concerned, or more concerned, about a Chinese naval facility in
North or West Africa as we are a Russian facility.
iran
28. Senator Blackburn. General McKenzie, with respect to Iran and
competition within this proxy force grey zone environment, where could
we be more effective and what enabling capabilities or authorities do
you require?
General McKenzie. [Deleted.]
29. Senator Blackburn. General McKenzie, Israel has accused Iran of
providing the Hezbollah militia with precision-guided missile
production facilities. Is this true, and if so what can the Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF) do to prevent Iran from providing Hezbollah with
this capability?
General McKenzie. [Deleted.]
somalia
30. Senator Blackburn. General Townsend, how important to the
counter-ISIS and counter-al-Shabaab fight is maintaining our political
influence in Somalia?
General Townsend. Maintaining political influence in Somalia is
decisive to the CVEO fight against al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia.
Political influence enables United States interagency efforts that
ensure the Somalia Security Forces remain an apolitical, professional
force. If the Somali National Army becomes politicized or devolves into
militias, the fight against VEO adversaries fails. Regional instability
provides the fertile ground for terrorist activity with U.S. Homeland
aspirations. If security forces are distracted with internal political
conflicts, VEOs will fill the void. Additionally, CVEO strategies that
rely solely on kinetic targeting are unable to address underlying
drivers of violent extremism in Somalia. USAFRICOM builds United States
political influence in Somalia through its contribution to a whole-of-
government approach to CVEO. Maintaining this influence is necessary to
ensure the Federal Government of Somalia can move forward. As stated in
President Biden's inaugural address and within the Interim National
Security Strategic Guidance, ``we will only succeed in advancing
American interests and upholding our universal values by working in
common cause with our closest allies and partners.''
31. Senator Blackburn. General Townsend, how have your
counterterror operations been impacted by the reduction in United
States troops on the ground in Mogadishu and has al-Shabaab's activity
changed as a result?
General Townsend. Al-Shabaab operations were already on an upward
trajectory as the United States began its repositioning in December
2020 and continues on that trend according to academic database data
and high profile incidents in Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab assassinations of
government and security force officials in 2021 are at the highest
levels ever, and as of May, the group has conducted 6 VBIED attacks in
Mogadishu equaling last year's total number of VBIEDs. Al-Shabaab
publically celebrated the departure of United States troops from
Somalia and is using the opportunity to enhance their global
reputation, increase recruitment, and extend control into new regions
in central Somalia, all of which may have long-term impacts.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022 AND
THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 10, 2021
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
Manchin, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer,
Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott,
Blackburn, Hawley, and Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. I would like to call this hearing to order.
The Committee meets today to receive testimony on the
President's Defense Budget Request for fiscal year 2022.
Witnesses this morning are Secretary Lloyd Austin,
Secretary of Defense; Mr. Michael McCord, Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller); and General Mark Milley, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. I welcome each of you and thank you for
your service and willingness to appear before us today.
Two weeks ago, President Biden released his Defense Budget
Request for fiscal year 2022, with a top line of $715 billion.
The request focuses on several key areas: defeating COVID-19,
prioritizing China as the pacing challenge, addressing advanced
and persistent threats, innovating and modernizing the
Department of Defense (DOD), and tackling the climate crisis.
The President's Defense Budget Request is a starting point
for Congress, and must always be viewed in the broader context
of the national security and fiscal challenges we face. It is
important that we ensure we have the right strategies and
resources to keep the American people safe now and in the
future, with a keen eye toward evolving threats around the
globe.
I am pleased to see that this budget request places a
priority on taking care of the men and women who serve in
uniform and the civilians who serve alongside them in the
Department, by including an across-the-board pay raise for
military and civilian personnel of 2.7 percent. While this pay
raise is required by law for military personnel, too often DOD
civilians have been overlooked. This increase in civilian pay
sends an important message to the workforce and begins to
reverse years of pay freezes and benefit cuts.
Notably, the budget request includes $112 billion in
research, development, test, and evaluation funds, the largest
ever requested in this area. This includes significant funding
for modernization areas such as microelectronics, artificial
intelligence, hypersonic missiles, and 5G. Building our
strength in these areas will be critical to the modernization
of our national security.
But as the recent SolarWinds, Microsoft Exchange, and
Colonial Pipeline server breaches painfully illustrated, our
traditional ``perimeter-based'' cyber defenses are simply
inadequate to deal with sophisticated adversaries that are
clearly advantaged in the cyber domain. I hope our witnesses
will expand on what activities DOD is taking to accelerate and
expand our cybersecurity and what resources are needed to
accomplish them.
With regard to the President's transition strategy in
Afghanistan, the budget request includes $3.3 billion for the
Afghan Security Forces Fund. This will ensure our continued
support for the sustainment, infrastructure, equipment, and
training requirements for Afghan security personnel. I ask that
our witnesses update the Committee on this transition.
Last year, this Committee led the way in establishing the
Pacific Deterrence Initiative, or PDI, to serve as a means for
improving the capabilities, design, and posture of our joint
forces in the Indo-Pacific region. The PDI was intended to
strengthen the presence and resiliency of our armed forces;
improve logistics and maintenance capabilities; support
exercises, training, experimentation, and innovation for the
joint force; and build the defense and security capabilities
and cooperation of allies and partners. I am concerned that the
Department's budget request takes a heavily platform-centric
approach to PDI, and I look forward to working collaboratively
with the Department of Defense leadership to more appropriately
align resources in the DOD budget with our intent for PDI.
Similarly, the budget request proposes an $800 million
reduction to the European Deterrence Initiative, the EDI. The
Initiative, which was also established by this Committee, has
seen budget decreases for the past 3 years. The Department has
suggested that this is part of ``transitioning to a steady
state'' in the European Command AOR [area of responsibility]. I
would ask that our witnesses further explain the reasoning
behind the reduced EDI budget, and specifically, whether you
believe this level of investment in infrastructure, force
posture, and capabilities is sufficient to deter Russian
aggression.
With regard to our nuclear strategy, I understand that the
budget request before us supports important steps toward
nuclear modernization. Our allies and partners depend on the
United States nuclear umbrella, and modernization of our
strategic forces is needed to reassure them of our
dependability. One thing I think everyone would agree on, and
often gets lost in the discussion, is the fact that arms
control and the modernization of our nuclear forces are
inherently linked together. Even as we modernize, we should
seek ways to promote strategic stability, like the extension of
the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] agreement and
follow-on talks to cover new strategic weapons and further
nuclear stockpiles.
Lastly, I would note that fiscal year 2022 is the first
year in 10 years that we will not be constrained by the Budget
Control Act. Eliminating arbitrary spending caps means that
every department's budget can, and should, be argued on its
merits. Taxpayers should not have to pay for programs or
systems that are wasteful or ineffective, and Congress must not
shirk its responsibilities to get rid of outdated systems in
favor of more advanced, effective, new technologies and
capabilities. Belt-tightening in any department, particularly
defense, is always a challenge, but it is also an opportunity
to evaluate what is necessary and what drives innovation. The
Department has taken the first difficult step in proposing $2.8
billion worth of divestments and retirements of platforms, and
I will work with my colleagues to evaluate these proposals and
make hard but necessary choices.
Finally, as we progress through this legislative year, the
Committee will tackle many important policy issues, none bigger
than how we prevent and prosecute sexual assault and harassment
in the ranks. Change is coming to the Department and the
military services. More than anything, cultural change within
the force is critical to reducing the number of sexual assaults
and related offenses. The President directed a review earlier
this year, and I know the Deptartment has been hard at work. I
look forward to receiving the administration's recommendations
to incorporate into the Committee's important work on this
issue.
Again, I thank the witnesses for their participation today,
and I look forward to their testimonies.
Now let me now recognize the ranking member, Senator
Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would
like to thank all three of our witnesses for dedicating their
lives to securing our Nation. Secretary Austin told us, along
with nearly every witness who has come before this Committee,
China is our pacing threat. It is a global, long-term
competition, and it is across every arena of the national
power, but the military balance of power concerns me most.
In 2018, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) gave us a
blueprint for pushing back on China. The bipartisan NDS
Commission said that 3 to 5 percent real growth was needed to
implement that strategy. It does not look like we are going to
get that. Since then, the threats have gotten worse. The
administration gave us a budget that cuts spending when we need
real growth. They want the military to do more on climate
change and pandemic response, more mission, but with fewer
resources.
We have been asking our military to do too much with too
little for too long. President Biden's budget cuts would make
it even harder. It barely treads water while we face all these
threats. These budget cuts shift aircraft, munitions, and more.
We have nearly $25 billion of unfunded priorities. These are
not wish lists. These are risk lists. The budget cuts aircraft
procurement by 20 percent, backslides on Army readiness, and
starves Navy shipbuilding. This budget forces our military
leaders to choose between being ready for today's fight or the
fight of the future.
The Chinese military leaders, they are not making that
choice. On Tuesday, I read in the press about the memo by
Acting Secretary of the Navy on next year's budget. He says the
Navy must choose between modernizing ships, subs, and aircraft.
Does anyone think the Chinese have to make that decision?
The Chinese defense budget has grown by 450 percent since
2001. They added $200 billion in the last decade, while we cut
$400 billion. So we are behind in some of the areas and we are
falling behind in some of the other areas, and as a result I am
worried deterrence will fail. Maybe today or 5 years or 10
years. When it does, the cost will be much higher than any
investment we could be making today to prevent that. We are not
making hard choices. We are making bad choices and short-
sighted choices.
The administration tells us that the Pentagon budget is cut
because of fiscal realities, but they are spending trillions of
taxpayer dollars on everything else under the sun. We all
agree, and even the administration agrees, that a strong
military improves all other tools of national power. I just
cannot understand this short-sighted underfunding of our
troops. We make a sacred compact with our servicemembers. We
tell them we will take care of them and their families, and we
do that very well. We also tell them that we will give them the
tools that are necessary to defend the Nation and come home
safely, but we are not holding up our end of the bargain with
this proposed budget. We are failing to give them the resources
they need to implement that strategy, and, Mr. Chairman, we
need to do better.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Secretary Austin, please.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LLOYD J. AUSTIN III, SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE
Secretary Austin. Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
Inhofe, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you
for the opportunity to testify today about the President's
budget request for fiscal year 2022.
I am pleased to appear before you alongside General Milley,
whose advice and counsel has been crucial to us as we developed
our budget, and as we continue to defend this nation, which is
our chief responsibility and my top priority. I am also glad to
be joined by our Comptroller and our Chief Financial Officer
(CFO), Mr. Mike McCord.
Let me say at the outset that I believe that our budget
requests will help us match resources to strategy, strategy to
policy, and policy to the will of the American people. Informed
by the President's Interim National Security Guidance and my
own message to the force, it funds the right mix of
capabilities that we need most to defend this nation, now and
in the future. It invests in hypersonic weapons, artificial
intelligence, microelectronics, 5G technology, space-based
systems, shipbuilding, and nuclear modernization, to name a
few. In fact, this budget asks you to approve nearly $28
billion to modernize our nuclear triad, and $112 billion for
research, development, test, and evaluation, the largest
research and development (R&D) request ever put forth by this
Department.
Our request also gives us the flexibility to divest
ourselves of systems and platform that no longer adequately
meet our needs, including older ships, aircraft, and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms
that demand more maintenance, upkeep, and risk than we can
afford.
As you know, we have commissioned a Global Posture Review
and a new National Defense Strategy which will further inform
and guide our resource decisions.
The Department must be ready to meet and keep pace with our
competitors, and if necessary, to fight and win the next war,
and not the last one. That is why this budget stays true to our
focus on matching the pacing challenge that we clearly see from
the People's Republic of China, to include more than $5 billion
for the Pacific Defense Initiative. I would just add that our
China task force has also completed its work, and yesterday I
issued an internal directive kicking off several Department-
wide efforts that will, among other things, help bolster our
deterrence against the People's Republic of China (PRC) and
revitalize our network of regional allies and partners and
accelerate the development of cutting-edge capabilities and new
operational concepts.
However, we recognize that China is not our only challenge.
Our budget also includes $617 million to counter the damaging
effects of climate change and additional funds to prepare for
future challenges like another pandemic. It also helps us
counter the belligerence that we face from Russia, especially
in the cyber realm. You will see more than $10 billion here
devoted to cybersecurity, cyberspace operations, and cyber
research and development.
With this emphasis on space, missile defense, and more
sophisticated sensors, our budget will also help us counter the
increasing ballistic missile capabilities of nations like North
Korea and Iran. It funds a troop presence and counterterrorism
capabilities in the Middle East and South Asia to meet the
threats posed not only by Iran but also by terrorist networks
like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al Qaeda,
and in Africa like those posed by Al-Shabaab.
I am also confident that this budget will help us maintain
the integrated deterrent capability and global posture
necessary to back up the hard work of our diplomats and
demonstrate our resolve in leadership all over the world,
alongside our allies and partners.
I know that Afghanistan remains at the top of all of our
minds, and today I can report that the retrograde remains on
pace. We have accomplished the mission for which our troops
were sent to Afghanistan 20 years ago, and I am very proud of
the men and women who made it possible and of those who gave
their lives for this mission. I am also deeply grateful to the
families of our servicemembers who have endured as much, as
they sent their sons and daughters and husbands and wives into
battle.
We will now transition to a new bilateral relationship with
our Afghan partners, one that continues to help them meet their
responsibilities to their citizens, but one that will not
require a United States footprint larger than what is necessary
to protect our diplomats. That is one reason why we are asking
to move overseas contingency operations funding inside the
budget. This will give us and you greater transparency,
accountability, and predictability in the budgeting process.
This is the right thing to do, and frankly, it is overdue.
Now taking care of our people is also the right thing to
do. Our budget request increases funding to support in- home
care and support, which has become increasingly important
during the pandemic. We will also be seeking funds to improve
military base pay, retention bonuses, and other incentives that
will help us attract and retain the best talent, and we will be
working hard to combat challenges that make service in the
ranks more difficult for the men and women of the Department,
from getting a better handle on the extent to which we
experience extremist behavior to combating sexual assault and
harassment.
As you know, my first directive as Secretary of Defense,
issued on my first full day in the office, was to Service
leadership about sexual assault. I made it clear then, and I
still believe that we must not be afraid to try new approaches
and to change our minds so that we can truly and fully address
the scourge of sexual assault in our force. Clearly what we
have been doing has not been working, and one assault is too
many. The numbers of sexual assaults are still too high, and
the confidence in our system is still too low.
The Independent Review Commission that we established has
provided me with an initial set of recommendations, starting
around the issue of accountability, and this line of effort is
focused on how these crimes are investigated and prosecuted. I
shared these recommendations with General Milley and the
civilian military leaders of the Service branches, and I am
carefully reviewing the feedback that they provided me.
There will be additional recommendations coming to us from
the IRC on prevention, culture, and victim support, and I look
forward to receiving them as well, and making my full
recommendation to the President later this month. As I have
said before, what we are doing is not working, and we need to
fix it. I want to be sure that whatever changes to the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) that I recommend to the
President, and ultimately to this Committee, that they are
scoped to the problem that we are trying to solve and have a
clear way forward on implementation and ultimately restore the
confidence of the force and the system. You have my commitment
to that and my commitment to working expeditiously as you
consider legislative proposals. So whatever changes we make, I
believe we need to focus on effective implementation and
resourcing, and I know I will need your help.
Chairman Reed, Members of this Committee, we field the
greatest military in human history, made up of the finest men
and women who have ever donned the cloth of their nation. We
also enjoy a civilian workforce deeply committed to every
mission that they take on, and for all the things that we know
we need to do better, no adversary can match the quality of our
people. I am immensely proud of them and humbled to be of
service to them, and privileged to be able to serve again with
them and their families. I know the values they espouse and the
oath that they took, I know what they are capable of, and I
believe I have a very good sense of what they need to do their
jobs, and I can assure you that President's Budget request for
fiscal year 2022 fulfills that obligation.
I look forward to answering your questions, and thank you
for the steadfast support that you continue to provide to the
Department of Defense, and for all the efforts that you make
very day to ensure that we remain ready to defend this nation.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Austin follows:]
Prepared Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III
introduction
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, distinguished Members of the
Committee: thank you for the opportunity to testify in support of the
President's Budget request for fiscal year 2022.
On behalf of myself, Deputy Secretary Hicks, the leadership of the
Department of Defense, and the men and women of our Department and
their families, let me also thank you for your continued support and
partnership as we work to address the threats facing the United States
of America today, and build the force that can address the challenges
of tomorrow. I also want to thank the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General Mark Milley, who is testifying alongside me and is a
critical partner in realizing the Department's priorities. I am also
pleased to be joined by our Comptroller and Chief Financial Officer,
Mr. Mike McCord.
The President's $715 billion defense budget request for fiscal year
2022 provides us with the capabilities we need most and drives
investment in efforts that will help us advance our three key
priorities: defending the Nation, taking care of our people, and
succeeding through teamwork.
Today, the Department of Defense stands ready to deter conflict in
any domain and, if necessary, to fight and win against any challenger.
Since becoming Secretary of Defense, I have met with many of our
service members and commanders in the field and have seen first-hand
the dedication of the men and women of our Department. I can assure you
that we continue to have the best joint fighting force on Earth and a
civilian workforce fully dedicated to the many critical missions we
face.
We must maintain and improve this advantage on land, at sea, in the
air, and in emerging domains, including space and cyberspace. I am
confident that the President's budget request helps us do that. The
request is driven by our recognition that our competitors--especially
China--continue to advance their capabilities. We must outpace those
advances to remain a credible deterrent to conflict around the world.
The President's Budget Request represents my commitment to matching
resources to strategy, strategy to policies, and policies to the will
of the American people. This budget also reflects difficult funding
decisions necessary to ensure that we have the right mix of
capabilities that we need most. We have proposed cuts to systems and
capabilities that no longer meet the challenges and requirements of the
Department, making room for more advanced programs that do. In making
these decisions, we were guided by the President's Interim National
Security Strategic Guidance and informed by a set of program reviews
conducted by the Department early in this Administration.
We are also undertaking a series of strategic reviews in the
Department to ensure that our global force posture, and our nuclear and
missile defense capabilities, are matched with the challenges that we
face and aligned with the priorities of the President. The Global
Posture Review will help inform my advice to the Commander-in-Chief
about how best to allocate our forces around the world to advance our
national interests, and our nuclear and missile defense reviews will
consider how we maintain our deterrent and defensive capabilities,
within and across domains.
I take very seriously the importance of being good stewards of
taxpayer dollars and ensuring that we are transparent and honest with
the American people about how their money is spent. This year, the
President's budget consolidates the Overseas Contingency Operations
funding and the base budget, raising transparency of direct war costs
to a level not seen in several years.
We are also working to address our audit responsibilities as
quickly and effectively as possible and move forward on reform to our
business operations. This is not just about finding and reapplying
savings to higher priorities, it is about improving organizational
performance and efficiency. The best advocates for reform are those
closest to the issues, so we will hold leaders appropriately
accountable for a management improvement agenda within their respective
components. Reform also requires a holistic approach--including
concepts of operation, organizations, personnel, training, and modern
systems--and must have a seat at the table in our deliberations over
Department programs and priorities.
The fiscal year 2022 budget also reflects the President's decision
to retrograde in Afghanistan, following 20 years of war in that
theater. We are profoundly grateful to our uniformed service members
and their families, and to our civilian workforce, who have served and
sacrificed so much through combat deployments in the defense of our
Nation since the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. We
are now engaged in a deliberate, safe, and orderly withdrawal from
Afghanistan following the President's decision.
Moving forward, we must continue to engage in a concerted effort to
recruit, retain, and develop the finest talent available for the
uniformed and civilian workforce, providing quality opportunities for
personal and professional growth, advancement, and leadership to those
in our charge.
We owe it to them to build an environment that is safe, welcoming,
and free of fear, harassment, or violence. That is why I have focused
some of my earliest efforts on addressing sexual assault and harassment
in the Department, identifying and addressing extremist behavior in the
ranks, and ensuring that everyone is given a fair and equitable
opportunity to serve this country.
But we cannot do this work alone. Whether it is defending the
Nation, building a force of the future, growing our talent, or building
an environment welcoming to all, we rely on teamwork that starts at the
senior-most levels of the Department, filters down into our workforce,
and extends across departments to our relationships with interagency
colleagues, Congress, and our allies and partners.
When called upon to protect and defend our Nation, the Department
of Defense will always answer, but diplomacy must be our first national
security tool of choice. That is why the President's Fiscal Year 2022
Budget helps fund a Department of Defense able to credibly back up the
hard work of our diplomats through our deterrent capabilities and our
force posture.
As we look outward to our global security interests, we are focused
on strengthening our relationships with our allies and partners. The
investments in this budget demonstrate that the United States will
continue to be a key guarantor of the peace, security, and the rules-
based world order that we have helped foster for the past seven
decades.
The fiscal year 2022 budget request ensures that we will remain the
best-trained and best-equipped military in the world and will have the
resources to defend the Nation, with the confidence to advance our
priorities and build and sustain the force we need now and in the years
ahead.
defending the nation
As the President has noted, the country finds itself at an
inflection point. The rapid pace of development of capabilities by our
competitors, and the changing character of conflict that comes with it,
mean that we can no longer do things the way we always have and sustain
our military edge.
China has invested heavily in new technologies, with a stated
intent to complete the modernization of its forces by 2035 and to field
a ``world-class military'' by 2049. Russia has shown that it is not
afraid to target the United States in contested domains like cyberspace
and still shows a continued interest in regional hegemony. Iran
continues to advance its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and to
support destabilizing proxy groups in the Middle East in an effort to
threaten its regional neighbors. We also face challenges from North
Korea, a country with the ambition to be capable of striking the United
States Homeland.
We will continue to address violent extremist and transnational
criminal organizations active in several theaters and to face
unexpected but challenging tests of our resolve like the deadly spread
of COVID-19. Climate change is a growing challenge, the effects of
which are driving regional conflicts and instability, even as extreme
weather caused by a changing planet threatens installations and
readiness.
As the character of conflict and competition changes and
accelerates, our strategic competitors have watched our efforts in
warzones over the last two decades, seeking to understand not only our
capabilities but also our will to defend our interests abroad. They are
watching us and learning from us.
I have asked the Department to think through our capabilities and
operational concepts and how we use cyber, space, and nuclear
capabilities to create a more credible and resilient deterrent against
our competitors, including China. What I have in mind are ways we can
better use the capabilities we already have, including by integrating
across domains, and determining the capabilities we need to address
potential future conflict.
This means investing in cutting edge technologies like artificial
intelligence and quantum computing. It also means ensuring that if an
adversary attacks one system or domain--in cyberspace or Global
Positioning System (GPS) satellites, for example--we are able and ready
to respond through appropriate and separate means in other domains, as
necessary.
This is going to take a culture shift in the Department because it
requires working across Military Services, domains, and regions in a
way that we have not done before. It also requires deeper integration
with our allies and partners, ensuring that their capabilities add
value in deterrence and in conflict.
The fiscal year 2022 budget request will help us achieve this new
vision of 21st-century deterrence, and we look forward to your support
and partnership to help get it right.
Regional Challenges
In the Indo-Pacific region, we are facing an increasingly assertive
People's Republic of China (PRC). Beijing's regional ambitions have
grown, as has its footprint around the world, drawing on significant
economic influence to encourage and, in some cases, coerce countries
into a deepening relationship with the PRC.
But China's ambitions are not only economic. It seeks to use its
influence to shift rules and norms in the region, erode democratic
values and human rights, and challenge a free and open Indo-Pacific
region. The President's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance
identifies China as the only global competitor capable of combining its
economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a
sustained challenge to the international order.
As the Department of Defense, our responsibility is to protect and
defend our interests in the Indo-Pacific region and to assure our
allies and partners of our commitment to our shared goals. That
requires keeping pace with the rapid military modernization of the
People's Liberation Army (PLA) and remaining sighted on the PLA's
advancements in the South and East China Seas, the Second Island Chain,
and beyond.
That is why I established the China Task Force early in my tenure.
The Task Force's mandate was to conduct a baseline assessment of
Department policies, programs, and processes on China-related matters
so that we might better meet the challenge posed by the PRC. The Task
Force has now completed its work. Based on its recommendations,
yesterday I issued internal guidance initiating major Department-wide
efforts to address China as the United States' number one pacing
challenge.
Even as we address China's growing military capability, we will
remain focused on North Korea. Pyongyang continues to develop its
nuclear and ballistic missile programs, posing an increasing threat to
regional allies and partners and with ambitions to be able to strike
the United States homeland. Leading with diplomacy, the United States
will continue to work to mitigate North Korea's destabilizing and
provocative behavior and maintain peace and stability on the Korean
Peninsula.
In Europe, I am focused on strengthening our relationships with our
allies and partners, bilaterally and in NATO. The Department will
ensure that we are postured to deter aggression from Russia or any
other power that seeks to challenge us in the region. Our alliance with
NATO remains ironclad, and our allies remain a force multiplier for
U.S. security around the world. We are encouraged that NATO defense
spending has increased for the seventh straight year, demonstrating
their commitment to the strength of the alliance. The fiscal year 2022
budget supports efforts to grow the capability and capacity of our
allies.
Over the past 20 years, much of our effort as a Department has been
focused on the threat posed by violent extremist organizations
operating out of parts of the Middle East and South Asia. We remain
committed to ensuring that no one launches an attack on the U.S.
homeland, and we will maintain the capability to protect the United
States and our interests in the region. That includes countering the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, al Qaeda, and associated terrorist
networks that pose ongoing threats to the United States.
Meanwhile, Iran remains a destabilizing force as it seeks to
advance its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, threaten freedom of
navigation, and support proxy terrorist and militia groups. We will
continue to maintain the capability to deter Iran in the Middle East.
We will also continue to support our partners in the region, including
by helping to ensure that Israel has the capability to defend itself
effectively and maintain its qualitative military edge.
In Afghanistan, the Department is working to conduct a deliberate,
orderly, and safe withdrawal, as directed by the President. This is an
important step in responsibly ending this two-decade-long conflict, and
it offers us an opportunity to redirect our resources toward strategic
competition.
In Africa, the Department is focused on sustaining and improving
the capabilities of our partners, particularly as we deter and disrupt
terrorist attacks by al-Shabaab. The group remains an active threat to
Somalis, their neighbors, our interests in Africa, and those of our
allies and partners. Our partner-centric strategy has always been at
the core of our counterterrorism mission, and we will continue to help
regional partners strengthen their capabilities to counter shared
threats. This is critical to stability and the opportunity for
political and economic development in East Africa.
To the north, the Department remains committed to preserving a free
and open Arctic region, which is why we undertake annual Arctic
exercises and operations, including with allies and partners, such as
ARCTIC EDGE, ICEX, and NORTHERN EDGE. These exercises provide valuable
experience and offer important lessons learned for conducting multi-
domain operations in the High North.
In the western hemisphere, our competitors seek to gain a foothold
through economic and security investment and cooperation. We remain
focused on building partner capacity and capability to ensure that the
United States remains the partner of choice and to address
transnational criminal and terrorist networks active in the region.
Additionally, the Department supports interagency efforts to
address the migration crisis. Although other departments and agencies
appropriately lead efforts to respond to this challenge, DOD supports
partner nations in addressing the security-related aspects of the root
causes of migration. This includes providing limited humanitarian and
medical assistance and participating in engagements to strengthen the
professionalism of Central American militaries and defense
institutions.
Here in the United States, our men and women in uniform have
supported our critical domestic missions. National Guard personnel
provide support to our fellow Americans, including at Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) mass vaccination sites. National Guard
personnel have also helped secure our national Capitol at various times
over the past year, and thousands more have helped secure State
capitals across the United States at the direction of State officials.
We also continue to support law enforcement operations on our southern
border by providing limited enabling capabilities. At the request of
the Department of Health and Human Services, we are supporting its
mission to shelter unaccompanied migrant children arriving at the
border.
COVID-19
Tackling COVID-19 has been one of my highest and most urgent
priorities. Since I became Secretary of Defense, the Department has
received almost 500 FEMA mission assignments and more than 65 requests
for assistance from other Federal departments and agencies. As of June
10, more than 4,700 Active Duty service members have deployed to 34
community vaccination centers in 28 States and territories.
Additionally, more than 32,000 National Guard personnel have deployed,
carrying out FEMA mission assignments issued to DOD to assist their
local communities.
In total, the Department has administered more than 17 million
vaccine doses to the American people, with some 4.9 million delivered
by Active Duty personnel and 12.2 million supported by the National
Guard. Within the Department, we have executed one of the most complex
vaccination programs in the world, vaccinating millions of service
members, beneficiaries, and Department personnel in 42 countries,
including multiple combat zones. Internally, the Department has
protected its force and families by administering over 3.6 million
vaccinations.
We are also making investments in the Defense Health Agency to
ensure that we have the resources needed for public-health surveillance
and force protection. We continue to review and update our force health
protection policies, and even as vaccinations increase, we remain
committed to testing, which will expand our genomic sequencing efforts
so that we can track variants and declining immunity.
I am tremendously proud of our men and women in uniform who stepped
up to join our whole-of-nation response. But this will not be the last
time our Nation and our world will face such a challenge. That is why
our budget request also funds programs that support biological threat
reduction, in cooperation with our global partners, emerging
infectious-disease surveillance, biosafety and biosecurity, and medical
countermeasure research and development.
Climate Change
We face a grave and growing climate crisis that is threatening our
missions, plans, and capabilities. From increasing competition in the
Arctic to mass migration in Africa and Central America, climate change
is contributing to instability and driving us to new missions.
At the same time, increasingly frequent extreme weather events
degrade force readiness and drain resources. Recent DOD budgets have
been forced to absorb recovery costs at battered bases such as Naval
Air Station Pensacola, among others. Our military installations, and
the mission-critical capabilities they support, must be made resilient
to climate-induced extreme weather.
Our mission objectives are aligned with our climate goals. The
Department is investing in projects and capabilities that mitigate the
impacts of climate change while improving the resilience of our
facilities and operations to a range of threats. Our budget request
also invests in initiatives to reduce operational energy demand to
enhance capability, improve freedom of action in contested logistical
environments, and reduce costs. Those investments are good for the
climate, and they are critical for the mission.
Additionally, this budget invests in power and energy research and
development to improve installation and platform energy performance and
optimize military capability. The Department can help lead by
leveraging its buying power to deploy technologies such as energy
storage and microgrids that support the mission while protecting the
climate.
The Climate Working Group is coordinating the Department's work
implementing the President's Executive Order on this crisis and
building up climate expertise within DOD. It will also track the
implementation of climate- and energy-related actions and progress
toward future goals.
Modernization and Innovation
One of our chief priorities is to drive innovation across the
Department and modernize our culture, people, systems, and processes to
meet our future needs. It is critical to nearly everything we do. Even
as we develop new capabilities, we will always adhere to our
international humanitarian law obligations in the use of new weapons of
war, as well as ensure the protection of civilians in all missions.
This budget supports our efforts to:
Modernize the nuclear Triad to maintain a strong and
effective strategic deterrent;
Make critical investments in advanced technologies such
as microelectronics, fifth-generation network (5G), and artificial
intelligence (AI);
Ensure access to precursors and key inputs by shoring up
our critical supply chains;
Accelerate investments in cutting-edge capabilities that
will define the future fight, such as hypersonics and long-range fires;
and
Advance our joint warfighting concepts and commit to
rapid experimentation and the fielding of emergent capabilities across
warfighting domains.
The nuclear Triad remains the bedrock of our national defense and
strategic deterrence, ensuring that no adversary believes it can employ
nuclear weapons against the United States or our allies without risking
devastating consequences.
But we must modernize our aging capabilities to ensure a credible
deterrent for the future. As we do, we will review ongoing programs to
assess their performance, schedule, risks, and projected costs. The
fiscal year 2022 budget invests in nuclear modernization efforts, and
the Department will always seek to balance the best capability with the
most cost-effective solution. We are also launching a nuclear posture
review to ensure that we have the right capabilities matched with the
national nuclear strategy.
Microelectronics enable many of today's capabilities, such as GPS,
radar, command and control, and communications. Advanced
microelectronics are key to nearly all of the Department's
modernization efforts, from AI and hypersonic weapons systems to 5G
wireless networks. The Department will continue to invest in programs
to secure U.S. microelectronics interests; reverse the erosion of
domestic innovation and supply; and establish a strong foundation for
the next generation of microelectronics technology for DOD
applications, while also sustaining current systems.
The U.S. military must also utilize the connectivity provided by 5G
to operate with the speed, precision, and efficiency required in the
future. Countries that master advanced communications technologies and
connectivity will have long-term military advantages; for example,
tomorrow's warfighters will be able to use local and expeditionary 5G
networks to move considerable amounts of data to connect distant
sensors and weapons into a dense, resilient battlefield network.
Similarly, the power of AI will help us modernize not only our
warfighting decisions but also our business processes. We must be able
to ingest, make sense of, and act on the vast amounts of information
available to our warfighters on the battlefield and our decision-makers
leading our Department. As I have said, we must understand faster,
decide faster, and act faster. We must do it all responsibly and at
scale.
To support many of these efforts, we recently launched the
Innovation Steering Group. This entity, chaired by the Under Secretary
of Defense for Research and Engineering, will advise me on science,
technology, and technological transition. It will also empower efforts
to make the changes to incentives, processes, and structures needed to
truly innovate.
However, our efforts are not just focused on buying the
capabilities of the future. We must fundamentally shift the way we
think and the way we do business. We have not yet made full use of our
most agile acquisition authorities, and we remain too risk-averse as a
Department to move decisively beyond the capabilities of today and
prepare for the future.
We also remain too reliant on critical minerals produced in or by
China. To shore up our critical supply chains, we must focus on
building our domestic production capabilities and growing our defense
industrial base. That is why I am establishing the Supply Chain Risk
Management Group, which will complement the work of the Industrial Base
Council, both of which are chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Sustainment.
Tomorrow's conflicts will be contests of speed within and across
domains of conflict. The President's budget request invests in the
development and testing of hypersonic strike capabilities, while
enhancing existing long-range strike weapons to bolster deterrence and
improve survivability and response timelines. Long-range fires provide
key offensive capabilities that are cost-effective and improve
deterrence. By enabling power projection from standoff ranges, the risk
to critical U.S. assets decreases while the defensive burden imposed on
the enemy increases.
The Department is also focused on developing enhanced joint
warfighting concepts; expanding experimentation and fielding; shifting
our budget and investment priorities to incentivize innovation; and
improving acquisition systems while making use of more flexible ones to
identify and deliver new capabilities at scale. These efforts will help
build a force that is more resilient and integrated and that ensures
decision advantage across all domains.
Domain Challenges
On land, the Army continues to invest in its six modernization
priorities: long-range precision fires, future vertical lift, next-
generation combat vehicle, air and missile defense, the network, and
soldier lethality. To sustain the required funding levels for the
development and procurement of next-generation capabilities, the Army
reduced resources for several platforms as well as missiles, munitions,
and conventional ammunition.
At sea, delivering all-domain naval power that can defend the
homeland, deter adversaries, control the seas, and project power ashore
in a conflict requires the Navy to balance current operational demands
with the need for modernization. Maintaining naval power is critical to
reassuring allies and signaling
U.S. resolve to potential adversaries. The budget request proposes
responsible investments in the Navy fleet. It also continues the
recapitalization of our strategic ballistic-missile submarine fleet and
invests in remotely-operated and autonomous systems and the next-
generation attack submarine program.
We also seek to divest of some platforms that do not contribute
effectively to power-projection needs. The fiscal year 2022 request
reflects a strong commitment to continued U.S. naval dominance,
including a properly sized and well-positioned defense industrial base.
The health of the defense industrial base continues to be fundamental
to achieving and sustaining our future fleet. Our shipbuilding and
supporting vendor base constitute a national security imperative that
must be steadily supported and grown to maintain a skilled workforce.
In the air domain, the Air Force will shift away from certain
platforms in favor of key weapons systems such as the F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter, the F-15EX Eagle II, and the Next Generation Air Dominance
aircraft to bolster the Air Force's ability to provide air superiority.
Meanwhile, we will drive down sustainment costs, the fleet's average
age, and inherent risk. At all times, we will work to ensure rigorous
oversight of maintenance costs of the F-35.
Additionally, Air Force investments in hypersonics, the Long-Range
Standoff Weapon, the B-21 Raider, and the Ground-Based Strategic
Deterrent will allow the Department to conduct global strike operations
with precise conventional and unconventional capabilities, delivered
from both standoff capabilities and penetrating platforms. Meanwhile,
the Navy is developing the ``Air Wing of the Future'' to deliver game-
changing lethality and survivability. These efforts include
transforming Carrier Air Wings with the addition of the F-35C, E-2D,
and CMV-22B aircraft and rapidly developing the MQ-25 Stingray.
Unfettered access to space and the freedom to maneuver there
enhances every aspect of American power and underwrites the design of
the joint force. Competitors including China and Russia are seeking to
challenge the United States' advantage in space by developing weapons
to deny or destroy U.S. space capabilities in conflict. The fiscal year
2022 budget request strengthens our ability to deliver flexible
capabilities and strategic options swiftly to outpace emerging threats
in space.
Priority areas in this budget include investment in a resilient
architecture of capabilities for missile warning and missile tracking;
modernization of all segments of GPS to ensure precision and
availability; development of cyber-resilient space command-and-control
capabilities that can integrate with Joint All-Domain Command and
Control; and investment in a broader base of domestic launch providers
to further ensure our access to space.
In cyberspace, the United States is facing increasingly aggressive
activity, including strategic campaigns by competitors, other nation-
states, and proxies seeking to undermine our national security and
democracy. The fiscal year 2022 budget invests in cybersecurity and
cyberspace activities that build on the goals in DOD's Cyber Strategy.
The Cyber Operations portion of the budget supports U.S. Cyber
Command's operational element, the Cyber Mission Force, which performs
cyberspace operations to defend the Nation, support the joint force,
and secure DOD infrastructure and networks.
The budget also enhances our cybersecurity by mitigating key cyber
deficiencies and strengthening our defensive capabilities to counter
malicious attempts to exploit U.S. technology. Ultimately, we seek to
improve joint force offensive capabilities to stay ahead of foreign
threats.
taking care of our people
The dedicated men and women who make up the Department of Defense
are the greatest strength and asset we have. That is why I have
prioritized growing our talent, building resilience and readiness in
the force, and ensuring appropriately accountable leadership as we
address tough workforce issues.
The fiscal year 2022 budget request prioritizes improvements to
recruiting, retention, training, and education, and support for
military spouses, caregivers, survivors, and dependents. We are also
intensely focused on ending sexual assault and harassment and
identifying and addressing extremist behavior in the Department, two of
my top priorities.
We have established the Deputy's Workforce Council, a senior-level
governance forum co-chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which is dedicated to
addressing the most pressing people management, personnel policy, and
total force requirements. This includes issues such as diversity,
equity, and inclusion; military healthcare and childcare; sexual
assault prevention and response; and more. This forum will ensure that
workforce issues remain a critical priority for Department leadership,
including the Secretaries of the Military Departments and our
commanders, and will help bring the same vision and disciplined
execution to workforce issues that the Department devotes to weapons
systems and budgeting.
Growing Our Talent
We accomplish our mission far better when we look to the full range
of talent that the United States has to offer. That means drawing on a
diversity of experiences and backgrounds, which will help drive
creative thinking and adaptation, innovation, and cultural
understanding. These will be vital to meet the complex challenges of
today and the future.
Longstanding, systemic barriers for historically marginalized and
underrepresented communities persist today. We must do all we can to
ensure that we recruit and retain talent from the broadest pool of
qualified, eligible candidates.
This spring, we updated the Department's policy on the open service
of transgender people in the military. We welcome the recruitment,
retention, and care of all qualified transgender individuals, and we
look forward to their continued service with honor and dignity. The new
policy reinforces that principle and also allows for a short
implementation period for the Military Departments and Services to
update their policies.
We also must continually grow and develop our workforce and create
new avenues for advancement to drive the promotion and retention of our
outstanding next-generation leaders. That requires thinking about our
critical skill sets with an eye to the future, in particular by
recruiting and training individuals in Science, Technology,
Engineering, Math, and advanced technologies.
Building Resilience and Readiness
In building a resilient and ready force, we must recognize the key
role that our military families play in supporting our personnel. The
health and well-being of our service members and their families are
inextricably linked to the readiness of our force, and we must do all
we can to take care of them.
The effects of COVID-19 have been especially tough for our military
families, putting a particular strain on those who have lost childcare
or civilian employment. The fiscal year 2022 budget expands our efforts
to provide high-quality childcare to our military families, and we
continue to provide virtual career support through Military OneSource.
The budget also addresses efforts related to our military
electronic health records, through which the Department is working to
implement needed modernization most effectively. We must get military
healthcare right for our service members and their families.
We will also remain focused on addressing suicide and mental health
issues in our joint force by enhancing services and support while
seeking to reduce the stigma around seeking help.
Ensuring Appropriately Accountable Leadership
We must provide our workforce with a safe, secure, and welcoming
environment that empowers them to do their best work and grow
personally and professionally. At the most basic level, that means
creating a workplace free of discrimination, hate, and harassment. It
also means guaranteeing swift and clear accountability to anyone who
does not live up to the highest standards of the Department.
Sexual assault and harassment have no place in our country and no
place in the Department of Defense. For too long, the Department's
leadership has tried to get a handle on this challenge, but we have not
made significant progress. One case of sexual assault or harassment is
too many, and we are losing the confidence of our junior enlisted
personnel and officers because we have yet to make significant progress
against this challenge.
That is why, at the direction of the President, I established a 90-
day Independent Review Commission (IRC) on sexual assault in the
military. The IRC is responsible for reviewing DOD policies and
processes related to sexual assault and harassment to determine where
we can improve as a Department.
The IRC will soon complete its work on all four lines of effort--
accountability, prevention, climate and culture, and victim care and
support. I recently received an initial set of recommendations from the
IRC Chair and provided the Department the opportunity to review those
recommendations. It is critically important that we get this right, and
I am grateful for congressional partnership as we seek to do that.
The vast majority of those who serve in uniform and their civilian
colleagues do so with great honor and integrity. But extremism in our
ranks can have an outsized impact on the Department, which will not be
tolerated. The Department is focused on rooting out extremist behavior,
and this fight is about our values, the Constitution, and the
obligations in the Oath of Office we swear to uphold.
Behavior that defies or degrades our core values erodes unit
cohesion as well as good order and discipline. It can also damage the
health, morale, and readiness of the workforce.
I have moved immediately to meet this problem head-on. On February
5, I directed that within 60 days, commanding officers and supervisors
at all levels conduct a one-day extremism stand-down to emphasize the
importance of the Oath of Office we take, and to give military members
and civilian employees the opportunity to participate in and continue
to have this important conversation.
On April 9, I further directed several immediate actions to combat
extremism, including reviews of what constitutes extremist activity,
training for transitioning service members who may be targeted by
extremist groups, and establishing the Countering Extremism Working
Group to develop long-term recommendations to ensure all those who
serve do so with honor and fealty to our values and our democracy. This
must be a sustained effort, embraced by Department leadership.
succeeding through teamwork
To accomplish anything we set out to do, the Department must
operate as a unified team. That requires that we build unity among our
leadership and ensure the right balance of civilian and military inputs
to our decision-making and Department processes. In the last four
months, we have made significant progress in rebuilding normal order in
the Department to safeguard civilian oversight of the military.
In particular, we have established several bodies aimed at
supporting the efforts of our Deputy's Management Action Group, the
Department's principal governance body for management actions,
including resource management and planning, programming, budgeting, and
execution.
We have also established the Deputy's Workforce Council to address
the Department's people management, personnel policy, and total force
requirements, and task forces and working groups on COVID-19, China,
climate change, and extremism.
Protecting the United States requires teamwork at every level:
state, local, tribal, territorial, and federal. It requires cooperation
with all who have a stake in our national security, including Congress,
private industry, civil society, and the American people.
Our work to combat COVID-19 is a prime example of our commitment to
working with our fellow Americans. Across the Executive Branch, DOD has
worked closely with the Department of Homeland Security, including
FEMA, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the State
Department in efforts to end the pandemic. We are also investing in the
defense industrial base to produce more personal protective equipment
and test kits. Across the Nation, we continue to work closely with the
Department of Health and Human Services and State, local, tribal and
territorial authorities to bring life-saving vaccines to the American
people. At all times, our support to the Nation is reliant on our
partnership with Congress, which plays an integral role in providing
the authorities, appropriations, and leadership necessary to have the
most effective Department of Defense.
As part of our efforts to build teamwork into all we do, and in
line with the President's intent, we are also leading with diplomacy,
our first national security tool of choice. I am committed to ensuring
that the Department of Defense continues to field a credible force able
to back up the hard work of our diplomats around the world. We are
working in lock-step with the State Department and other departments
and agencies, and I took my first trip as Secretary of Defense with
Secretary Blinken to reassure our allies and partners in the Indo-
Pacific region that this Administration is committed to our
relationships there. Secretary Blinken and I also traveled to Europe to
assure our allies and partners of our commitment to the region.
When I traveled to NATO Headquarters earlier this spring, I shared
a key message: we must consult together, decide together, and act
together. Global crises, such as the pandemic, climate change, and
economic downturns, present significant dangers that span our borders.
In many countries, internal strife, brought on by corruption,
inequality and polarization, and transnational threats, such as violent
extremism and criminal organizations, threaten stability around the
alliance's rim. In Afghanistan, we went in together and we will leave
together, after a substantial consultative effort. Meanwhile,
aggressive and coercive behaviors from emboldened strategic competitors
such as China and Russia reinforce the importance of collective
security.
conclusion
The challenges we face are many, but the Department stands ready to
defend the United States against any enemy, foreign or domestic, just
as we always have. We remain resolute in our commitment to protect the
Nation and will not shy away from any challenge.
The fiscal year 2022 budget will help us fulfill that
responsibility, and we are grateful for your support in working with us
as we build the Department of the future. We need your help.
We also remain grateful for the tremendous trust that the United
States places in our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, guardians, and
DOD civilian employees, all of whom will continue to defend our
democracy, our people, and our way of life. Thanks to them, we will
always operate from a position of strength. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Before I
recognize General Milley, since a quorum is present I would ask
the Committee to consider seven nominations, the nominations of
the Honorable Frank Kendall III to be Secretary of the Air
Force; the Honorable Heidi Shyu to be Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering; Ms. Susanna V. Blume to
be the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation,
Department of Defense; Ms. Jill M. Hruby to be Under Secretary
of Energy for Nuclear Security and Administrator, National
Nuclear Security Administration; Mr. Frank A. Rose to be
Principal Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear Security
Administration; Ms. Deborah G. Rosenblum to be Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological
Defense Programs; and Mr. Christopher P. Maier to be Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity
Conflict.
Is there a motion to favorably report these seven
nominations to the Senate?
Senator Inhofe. So moved.
Chairman Reed. Is there a second?
Senator Kaine. Second.
Chairman Reed. All in favor?
[Chorus of ayes.]
Chairman Reed. The motion carries. Thank you very much.
General Milley, your comments, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL MARK A. MILLEY, USA, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Milley. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe,
distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today, and it remains my
distinct honor and privilege to represent the soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, and guardians of the United States
Joint Force, the most capable military in the world. Our troops
are the best led, best equipped, and best trained force
anywhere. I want to personally thank Secretary Austin for his
steady leadership and wise guidance.
Your Joint Force is standing watch, protecting American
interests in all domains around the globe. Alongside our allies
and partners, American troops are currently training or
conducting combat operations or other operations in 165
countries to keep America safe. We are conducting major
exercises as we speak in Europe; we are monitoring the
demilitarized zone (DMZ) in Korea; we are conducting freedom of
navigation operations in the strategic waterways of the global
commons; we are sustaining operations in space, in cyberspace;
we are supporting our allies and partners in Africa, Asia, and
Europe; and we are patrolling the skies of the Middle East, and
as we speak our Joint Force is conducting a safe, responsible,
and deliberate strategic retrograde from Afghanistan in good
order, while ensuring continued support to the Afghan National
Security Forces.
The purpose of the United States military is simple. It is
to protect and defend the Constitution of the United States of
America against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and with
that comes two key tasks. Task one is to fight and win
America's wars, if necessary, and key task two is to prepare to
fight and win America's wars.
The United States military is a critical component of
national power, which in concert with our diplomatic efforts,
economic engine, and overriding hope of the American message
that will deter adversaries and preserve the peace. We are
prepared to fight, however, and fight and win, if those who
seek to attack the United States and our allies and partners
are undeterred. But force must always be a last resort when
other means of achieving our ends have been exhausted.
We are in an era of increased strategic competition. The
current strategic landscape is witnessing rapid change, and the
potential for increased threat to the peace and stability of
various regions, and indeed, for the world. States and non-
state actors are rapidly transforming technologically, and we
are bearing witness to a fundamental change in the character of
war. In particular, China is increasing its military capability
at a very serious and sustained rate, and we must ensure that
we retain our competitive and technological edge against this
pacing threat, as Secretary Austin has directed.
Readiness, modernization, and combat power are key to deter
war and maintain the peace, and equally important are the
combat multipliers of teamwork, cohesion, and well-led units.
We must resolve the issue of sexual assault and confront the
issue of extremism. Both are corrosive to the very essence of
what it means to be in the military, and they destroy cohesion,
they destroy teamwork, and they reduce combat power.
Additionally, we must continue to invest in leader
development and talent management required for the future
operating environment. Finally, we must continue to nurture and
sustain a key strategic source of our strength, which is our
network of many close allies and partners around the world.
The Joint Force appreciates the work that our elected
representatives do to ensure that we have the resources needed
to train, equip, and man the force in order to be ready. The
days of the Budget Control Act, as noted, are over, and
repeated, continuing resolutions which eroded readiness are
hopefully behind us for good.
The Joint Force will deliver modernization with this budget
of our armed forces and security to the people of the United
States at the fiscal year 2022 budget request of $715 billion.
While it is a modest increase from the enacted fiscal year 2021
budget, it is a significant commitment of treasure that the
American people have entrusted to us, and we will work
diligently to ensure it is spent prudently and in the best
interest of the Nation.
The Fiscal Year 2022 Presidential Budget is a result of
very hard choices, in a year in which the Nation has suffered
economic hardship due to COVID-19 pandemic. In alignment with
the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, this budget
delivers a ready, agile, and capable Joint Force that will
compete, deter, and win, across all domains, and which is
postured for continue dominance in the future.
This budget prioritizes nuclear modernization, long-range
fires, hypersonic technology, artificial intelligence,
shipbuilding, microelectronics, space, cyber, and 5G. These
investments, in concert with our recently developed joint
warfighting concept will pave the way for a Joint Force of the
future. The President's Budget 2022 budget request increases
the readiness of the force by developing the Joint Force of the
future, ensuring our people are our number one priority, and
positioning us to achieve through teamwork.
Many enemies, historically, have grossly underestimated the
United States and our people. They have underestimated our
national resolve. They have underestimated our capability, our
skill, and our combat power, and each, in the past, has made a
fatal choice, which ended in their enrollment in the dustbin of
history. The same will be true of any enemy that makes that
mistake today or tomorrow. We are ready now and will remain so
in the future, and we are also facing tough strategic choices,
and we are being increasingly challenged with very capable,
potential adversaries clearly acting in opposition to our
interests.
Consistent, predictable budgets, informed by the will of
the people, are critical to our Nation's defense, and the
passage of this budget in a timely way is important. The Fiscal
Year 2022 Presidential Budget strikes an appropriate balance
between preserving present readiness and future modernization.
It is a down payment on investments for the future, with a bias
toward the future operating environment.
It is now that we must set ourselves on a path to modernize
the Joint Force, and this budget contributes to doing that. Our
job, as your Joint Force, our contract with the American
people, is that we, the United States military, will be able to
fight and win when called upon. We will support and defend this
Constitution always and forever, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Milley follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Mark A. Milley, USA
introduction
It remains my distinct honor and privilege to represent the
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and guardians of the United States
Joint Forces-The most capable military in the world. Our troops are the
best led, best equipped, and best trained force anywhere. Alongside our
allies and partners, American soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and
guardians are currently standing watch in 165 countries and conducting
operations that keep Americans safe.
The United States Military is a critical component of national
power which in concert with our diplomatic efforts, economic engine and
overriding hope of the American message deters our adversaries and
preserves peace. We are prepared to fight and win if those who seek to
attack the United States and our allies and partners are undeterred.
The Joint Force appreciates the work that our elected
representatives do to ensure that we have the resources needed to
train, equip, and man the force in order to be ready. The days of the
Budget Control Act of 2011 and repeated continuing resolutions which
eroded readiness are hopefully behind us for good.
The Joint Force will deliver modernization of our armed forces and
security to the people of the United States at the fiscal year 2022
budget request of $715 billion. While it is a modest increase from the
enacted fiscal year 2021 budget, it is a significant commitment of
treasure that the people of the United States have entrusted to us and
we will work diligently to ensure it is spent prudently in the best
interest of the Nation. This fiscal year 2022 budget is the result of
hard choices in a year in which the Nation has suffered economic
hardship due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In alignment with the Interim
National Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG) this budget delivers a
ready, agile, and capable Joint Force that will compete, deter and win
across all domains and which is postured for continued dominance in the
future.
Consistent predictable budgets informed by the will of the American
people are critical to our Nation's defense. The passage of timely
budgets enables planning and prioritization.
strategic environment
The current strategic landscape is witnessing rapid change and
potential for increased threat to the peace and stability of various
regions and for the world.
China: is our #1 geostrategic security challenge. History is not
deterministic, war with China is not inevitable. China is clearly an
increasingly capable strategic competitor and we need to keep our
relationship at competition, not conflict. This is best done through
integrated deterrence where the United States remains militarily strong
relative to China and we retain military overmatch in all the various
domains of war. If we remain militarily superior to our adversary, then
conflict is less likely.
China is challenging the peaceful status quo in the Pacific, and is
intent on revising the global international order by midcentury. China
is conducting large-scale exercises in the region with an emphasis on
amphibious landing, joint fires, and maritime strike scenarios. These
actions threaten our allies and partners' autonomy, jeopardize freedom
of navigation, overflight and other lawful uses of the sea, and
compromise regional peace and stability. In short, China has and
continues to develop significant nuclear, space, cyber, land, air, and
maritime military capabilities.
Russia: retains a large nuclear capability to deter and threaten
the United States and our allies and partners. Russia has also
demonstrated the capability and will to conduct complex malicious cyber
activities targeting American protected digital infrastructure, both
military and commercial. Increasingly Russia uses irregular warfare and
mercenary contract support, along with regular troops, to conduct
aggressive operations, the most notable being illegal seizure of
Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula and the ongoing conflict in eastern
Ukraine. Its actions in Libya as well as Syria and elsewhere
demonstrate Moscow's relative flexibility, resourcefulness, and
opportunism.
North Korea: continues to enhance its ballistic missile capability
and possesses the technical capacity to present a real danger to the US
homeland as well as our allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific.
They show no signs of moderation in their focus on military capability
at the expense of their most vulnerable citizens and peace of the
Korean Peninsula.
Iran: The current irregular warfare conflict between Iran and its
neighbors threatens to push the Middle East into broader regional
instability. Through its funding of terrorist activities, and a proxy
army inside the borders of its neighbors, and through its ballistic
missile programs, Iran seeks to revise the regional order and balance
of power in Iran's favor.
Violent extremist organizations such as al Qaeda, ISIS, Al Shabaab,
and others continue to export their terror, destruction, and
destabilization. Until and unless the root causes of instability that
give rise to these types of groups are resolved, we will continue to
deal with their attacks to undermine legitimate governments worldwide.
The root causes can only be effectively addressed by including
governments of the region and we can best influence outcomes with
diplomatic, economic, information and stability efforts along with
train, advise, assist and intelligence sharing. Through coalition
efforts and in concert with the local governments affected by these
groups, we will continue to ensure they do not possess the capacity and
capability to exert their will.
As we move into the middle of the twenty first century, it is
imperative that we maintain our technological advantage over our
competitors. As the diffusion of military technology permeates the
globe, it will become increasingly difficult to maintain the advantage
that we've enjoyed for last seven decades.
This year's budget will adequately fund our department priorities,
with bias on the future while ensuring we continue to deter the
adversaries of today. The character of warfare is changing in a
fundamental way. How we fight, the weapons, doctrine, organizations and
leader development are all undergoing a transformation not seen in
scale and scope since the decades between World War I and World War II.
The current rapid and radical change in technology along with its
diffusive nature will provide decisive advantage to those nation states
that best master the convergence and capability in precisions
munitions, all domain sensors, all domain command and control,
robotics, hypersonics and artificial intelligence. Our collective
success or failure to adapt the United States military to this future
as a Nation is an increasingly challenging security environment.
Climate change presents a growing threat to U.S. national security
interests and defense objectives. The adverse impacts of climate change
are already being felt across the Joint Force in terms of increased
operational demands, adverse impacts on our installations and new
requirements for equipment and formations able to operate in a world
defined by climate change and as a contributing factor to regional
instability.
As we enter the third quarter of this fiscal year, it is imperative
that we finish the fight against COVID-19. The Joint Force has
contributed planning and logistics expertise during all phases of the
pandemic response and continues to assist with vaccination efforts. We
will continue to be able to provide equipment, personnel, and vaccine
deployment and development assistance when called upon to assist. We
all should be very proud of the conduct of our Joint Force and our
ability to continue to deploy and defend the interests of the United
States during this unprecedented global event as the pandemic has only
modestly impacted the Joint Force's readiness.
Our alliances and partnerships are key to maintaining the
international rules-based order that offer the best opportunities for
peace and prosperity for America and the globe. This budget allows us
to build our partners and allies capabilities, foster interoperability,
and strengthen relationships. Doing so allows us, our allies, and
partners to counter the coercion of our strategic competitors, the
malign activity of regional threats, and meet the varied security
challenges state and non-state actors, terrorism, climate change, and
pandemics or any other threat that may emerge. We are stronger when we
operate closely with our allies and partners.
readiness and modernization
The Joint Force is in a position where modernization is an
imperative. We must avoid the tyranny of the now at the expense of our
future. The United States as a nation has always had the advantage and
time to conduct a long build up prior to the beginning of hostilities.
The operating environment of the future will likely not afford us the
luxury of time to project force so having modernized forces in
sufficient size and readiness will be the key to sustaining deterrence
and maintaining the peace and if deterrence fails then fight and win.
The Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, National Defense
Strategy, and National Military Strategy discuss the re-emergence of
strategic competition and directs the Joint Force to develop the
capabilities and capacity to counter near-peer threats. Strategic
adversaries are accelerating military modernization; to maintain
military advantage, the Joint Force must adapt to the future operating
environment. It is imperative that we maintain US technological
advantage over our adversaries and improve the concepts and doctrine
which organize our conduct of warfare. In the fall of 2019, the
Secretary of Defense tasked the Joint Staff to develop a threat-
informed Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) to address strategic conflict.
The Joint Warfighting Concept will guide and revitalize how we
organize, train, and equip the Joint Force. It will constantly evolve
to help us shape our strategic environment and future operations. The
JWC is a multi-year effort to develop a comprehensive approach for
joint operations against future threats and provide a guide for future
force design and development. Supporting concepts to the JWC describe
key warfighting functions. They are fires, logistics, C2, and
information advantage. The Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2)
framework enables the holistic development and realization of the JWC
and Supporting Concepts. JADC2 today is beginning to deliver the
capability to sense, and act at speeds greater than our adversaries.
JADC2 uses data, artificial intelligence, machine learning and
predictive analytics to create decisive information advantage at all
echelons in the Joint Force.
Utilizing cloud-based networks and agile software development, our
modular open sourced systems will deliver the necessary strategic
operational advantage required within both competition and conflict.
Our JADC2 architecture is increasingly providing the attributes and
interfaces to transition to a data-centric force able to operate at
scale within multiple security levels and across all-domains and the
electro-magnetic spectrum.
We will also revise our leader development Joint Professional
Military Education to support the JWC. Specifically, we are increasing
the amount of JPME devoted to the study of the changing character of
war and both China and Russia as potential adversaries.
In addition to adapting our concepts, doctrine, training, and
military education, we must continue to invest in capabilities that
close gaps or sustain our advantage. Key investments in this budget are
nuclear modernization, long range fires, hypersonic technology,
shipbuilding, space and cyber.
Nuclear modernization: The nuclear triad has been the bedrock of
our strategic deterrent for decades. Together, the three legs of the
Triad allow us to hedge against geopolitical, technological,
operational and programmatic risks. Our Cold War era systems have been
extended beyond their original service lives and we must recapitalize
our nuclear enterprise. Modernization of our nuclear forces, weapons
complex, and requisite nuclear command, control, and communications
(NC3) capabilities are a high priority. The Department projects the
cost of modernization will peak at 7 percent of the DOD budget in 2029
before decreasing again. If these projections bear out, compared to
past modernization efforts, the cost would be significantly less as a
proportion of the overall DOD budget--the nuclear recapitalization in
the 1980s cost 10.6 percent at its peak and 17 percent in the early-
1960s.
Long range fires: provide key offensive capabilities that are both
cost-effective and cost-imposing means of improving deterrence. By
enabling power projection from standoff ranges, the risk to critical
U.S. assets decreases while the defensive burden imposed upon the enemy
increases. China has thousands of ground-launched theater-range
missiles in its arsenal that would be difficult for the United States
to counter given its current inventories. Investments in long range
missiles are a cost-effective strategy that improves our ability to
compete with China. Recent budget requests have enhanced the lethality
and resilience of the Joint Force by developing and expanding the long-
range fires portfolio. President's Budget 2022 funding is essential to
mitigate offensive fires capacity shortcomings, enhance operational
flexibility in multiple domains, and accelerate the transition of
hypersonic weapons from development to procurement and fielding.
President's Budget 2022 balances long-range fires investments between
both proven solutions and higher risk/high-payoff systems, such as
hypersonic fires.
Hypersonic technology: Hypersonics are a suite of capabilities that
provide transformational warfighting capability to our Joint Force. Our
competitors are investing in this capability and in order to provide
our Joint Force with the best possible technology we will need to
invest to defend the Nation, our allies and partners.
Legacy platform divestment: Continuing to purchase and maintain
legacy equipment takes needed defense dollars away from the acquisition
of systems that are needed for modernization. We need to divest select
legacy platform to ensure that every defense dollar spent on programs
and equipment that will be relevant in the next fight.
Shipbuilding: The industrial base continues to be the fundamental
enabler for achieving and sustaining the Navy's future fleet. Our
shipbuilding and supporting vendor base are a national security
capability that needs support to grow and maintain a skilled workforce.
The Fiscal Year 2022 President's Budget reflects the Administration's
strong commitment to continued American naval dominance, including a
properly sized and well-positioned industrial base to meet the demands
of our current and future defense needs. Commitment to the steady
acquisition profiles underlying our budget is key to ensure the
industrial base achieves the capability and capacity required to build
and maintain the Navy's future fleet. The conclusions from past force
structure analyses have been fully considered and simple ship count is
an incomplete metric, as it fails to fully capture the capability,
payload capacity, and employment of ship classes in the fleet. This
budget specifically procures warships and submarines with credible
combat power to deter China while continuing remotely operated ship
development and investing in the industrial base to support fleet
modernization and on time delivery of the Columbia class submarine.
Space: Space is essential to our way of life; space capabilities
are essential to our economy, quality of life, our exploration
initiatives, and our ability to wage war. Competitors are testing and
fielding space weapons that threaten not just our National interests
and advancements in space, but those of all nations that rely upon
space. Russia has recently tested both a ground-based anti-satellite
missile and an on-orbit anti-satellite weapon prototype which threatens
our space capabilities. In 2007, China destroyed a satellite to
demonstrate their anti-satellite capabilities and the resulting debris
will remain in orbit, threatening commercial, civil, and national
security satellites for more than a century. Left unsecured, our
capabilities in space may become strategic vulnerabilities.
Cyber: Adversaries continue to use operations in the cyber domain
as a means to compete with the U.S. and pursue a position of advantage
in crisis and conflict. Malign cyberspace actors increasingly exploit
supply chain vulnerabilities, such as commercial software, to gain
network access and conduct cyber operations against U.S. citizens,
organizations, and institutions. The low cost/barrier to entry and
anonymity that cyberspace provides make this domain a priority focus
for adversaries to asymmetrically compete without escalation.
Therefore, we must increase our ability to compete in cyberspace and
ensure all elements of informational power are integrated into
operations, activities, and efforts to deter our adversaries and
protect the U.S. Homeland. This requires DOD to invest in partners and
technology, building and maturing cyber operations and readiness,
reducing risk to weapon systems and critical infrastructure,
strengthening cybersecurity, and improving network resiliency.
advanced capabilities
The changing character of war necessitates that we continue to
modernize and innovate. We must be able to have clear linkage from
sensors to shooters in an advanced information environment with the
technology present to protect our warfighters, critical assets, and
homeland. Investment in ensuring reliable supplies of microelectronics,
advanced network technology such as 5G, and artificial intelligence
will ensure that we maintain our technological edge over our
adversaries. The current globally distributed supply chains present
vulnerabilities to the Joint Forces' ability to acquire necessary parts
and technology in the event of a crisis that either prevents the
manufacture, or shipping of material to our units in the field.
Advanced microelectronics are the key element in all of the
Department's modernization efforts, from Artificial Intelligence and
Hypersonic Weapon Systems to Fifth Generation Wireless Networks. High-
speed connectivity will transform the way militaries operate.
Tomorrow's warfighters will use local and expeditionary 5G networks to
move massive amounts of data to connect distant sensors and weapons
into a dense, resilient battlefield network. Communication networks are
fundamental to how the United States trains, plans, and engages
adversaries. The U.S. military must utilize the connectivity provided
by 5G to operate with the speed, precision, and efficiency necessary to
remain effective and survivable in the future.
U.S. Army: The Army faces an inflection point that requires
innovation, creativity, and entrepreneurship in the application of
combat power. The battlefield is increasingly faster, more lethal, and
more distributed. Overmatch will belong to the side that can make
better decisions faster. To meet emerging challenges, the Army is
transforming to provide the Joint Force with the speed, range, and
convergence of cutting edge technologies that will generate the
decision dominance and overmatch required to win the next fight. The
Army's materiel modernization transformation is based on the six
modernization priorities announced in 2018: Long Range Precision Fires,
Next Generation Combat Vehicle, Future Vertical Lift, the Army Network,
Air and Missile Defense, and Soldier Lethality. By 2035, the Army will
realize its vision of a multi-domain force. Decisive outcomes in war
are ultimately achieved on land where people live and maintaining a
capable land force in the United States Army is key to our overall
deterrence capability and national security.
U.S. Navy: America is a maritime nation. Our security and
prosperity are inextricably linked to the seas. To sustain America's
advantage at sea, we must deliver combat-ready forces to deter
aggression and keep the seas free and open. Deploying battle-ready
ships, submarines, and squadrons around the world--from the South China
Sea to the Arctic--deters aggression, reaffirms our commitment to
allies and partners, and keeps the seas open and free. Readiness
underpins our forward-engaged posture and touches all elements of the
Navy, from our shipyards and aviation depots to the steaming and flying
hours our Sailors use to hone their skills. This budget prioritizes a
fleet that is ready for combat over a larger fleet that is not ready to
fight.
U.S. Marine Corps: The Marine Corps is optimizing the force for
competition in the vast littoral regions of the globe by modernizing
the force for Strategic Competition. As codified in law, Marines serve
in cooperation with the Navy in the conduct of naval campaigns. As
international relations are defined more by periods of cooperation and
competition, the Marine Corps will focus on the competition phase
before conflict by generating a persistent reconnaissance force for the
Joint Force that has organic long-range, precision fires with mobility.
Thus far, they have fully invested in their modernization by divesting
of capabilities and capacities that no longer offer the best value for
a maritime force in the contact and blunt layer.
U.S. Air Force: Moving forward, the Air Force will prioritize its
resources to transform our equipment, support our airmen, and bolster
our core missions. To deter and defeat today's competitors and
tomorrow's adversaries, this budget continues to re-capitalize our Air
Force. The Air Force is retiring legacy platforms with a bias toward
the future, so that we can focus on aircraft that can penetrate high
end defenses. A cutting edge Air Force that is without peer is
fundamental to successful land or sea operations and is the key element
to maintaining deterrence and sustaining the force.
U.S. Space Force: The Space Force investments accelerate
modernization of the entire Joint Force. Space Force capabilities
underwrite, enhance, and enable Joint Force operations. The Space Force
protects U.S capabilities and freedom of operation outpacing actions of
our competitors.
Ongoing actions to fully resource the United States Space Force
(USSF) including transfer of the Space Development Agency (SDA) and
unit transfers from the Army and Navy, will enhance the USSF's ability
to organize, train, equip and present forces who can compete, deter and
if necessary prevail should war initiate in, or extend to space.
people first / people and families
People are our most important resource in the Joint Force. We must
ensure that we are doing all that we can do to take care of and guard
our most critical resource. Taking care of people is a critical
readiness issue, it decisively impacts unit cohesion, recruitment,
retention, and confidence in leadership. The Joint Force has been
working to rid our military from the scourge of sexual assault and
sexual harassment for years. We must do more to finally implement real
and lasting change. Sexual assault undermines our military values and
undercuts our ability to field a cohesive fighting force. Sexual
assault and harassment prevention, response and accountability are
leadership issues. We will hold DOD leaders at every level responsible
for building a safe environment for our people, guaranteeing anyone who
does not act within the highest standards of the Joint Force is held
accountable.
We will not tolerate actions that go against the fundamental
principles of the oath we share, including actions associated with
extremist ideologies. Extremism also destroys readiness because it
destroys cohesion. Extremism presents a complex and unique challenge to
DOD. We must meet this head-on, and place the highest importance on
treating all personnel with dignity and respect, in an environment free
from discrimination, harassment, and maltreatment. We must be ever
vigilant in our efforts to identify and counter extremist behavior
within our ranks.
We continuously earn the trust of our service members and their
families by ensuring that they continue to receive excellent quality of
life benefits. Our premier all-volunteer force will continue to be the
greatest in history only if we continuously affirm how much we value
the service that our military and civilian members provide their
country.
The Joint Force is committed to growing our talent and ensuring
that all who meet the requirements to serve are able to serve. The
Joint Force competes for the talent of America's youth along with every
other business, and organization who seeks our Nation's best and
brightest. Service to Nation is a worthwhile cause and we welcome all
who are eligible to serve. Despite our inclusive approach only 29
percent of today's youth are eligible for military Service without a
waiver. The Joint Force's objective is to field the most lethal and
combat effective fighting force in the world. We will continue to
support the accessions of all qualified people to all jobs and
positions within the Joint Force.
The Nation's largest employer-sponsored child care program supports
our Joint Force, with more than 27,000 staff members providing daily
care for more than 160,000 children aged birth to 12 years in
approximately 700 nationally-accredited child care centers. Taking care
of families is a holistic approach that ensures that our troops are
ready to fight because they know their families are well cared for.
Housing our forces is critical to ensure that our junior and most
vulnerable families are able to live in a healthy environment wherever
the Nation calls them to serve. Families don't raise their hand and
join the service. We as a nation owe it to our troops to ensure they
have what they need. The Military Housing Privatization Initiative
(MHPI) reform efforts are actions that will improve the tenant
experience, rebuilt tenant trust, and maintain MHPI housing project
financial viability. The MHPI Tenant Bill of Rights (BOR), issued in
February 2020, is a visible and important commitment in DOD's larger
effort to regain resident trust.
achieving through teamwork
We in the Joint Force are a team of teams. Sworn to support and
defend the constitution, teamwork is our watchword. There is no
daylight between the services when it comes to ensuring the security of
the American people. The Joint Force is a collective effort, and no
services ever fights alone.
Joint exercises with all services, allies and partners
participating are a key component to our warfighting readiness.
Ensuring that exercises such as Defender Pacific and Defender Europe
continue and that we fastidiously increase the number of participants
and complexity in these exercises will guarantee the best preparation
for war and a mechanism to demonstrate our commitment and resolve to
those who wish to question our friends and our capabilities.
conclusion
The United States Joint Force is a flexible and adaptable force
ready to deter, fight, and win our Nation's wars. The President's
Budget 2022 budget request increases the readiness of the force by
developing the Joint Force of the future, ensuring people are our
number one priority, and positioning us to achieve through teamwork.
America's network of allies and partners is a strategic source of
strength. Many enemies have grossly underestimated the United States
and the American people in the past. They've underestimated our
national resolve. They've underestimated our capability, our skill and
our combat power, and each made a fatal choice which ended with their
enrollment in the dustbin of history. The same will be true of any
enemy that makes that mistake today or tomorrow. We are ready now, and
will remain so in the future, we are also facing tough strategic
choices, and we are being increasingly challenged with very capable
potential adversaries, clearly acting in opposition of our interests.
Our job as your Joint Force, our contract with the American people is
that we, the United States military will always be ready to deter our
enemies and if deterrence fails then to fight and win.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Milley. I
understand Mr. McCord does not have a statement. Is that
correct? Thank you, Mr. McCord.
Secretary Austin, we are in the process of withdrawing our
combat forces, save for embassy protection personnel. It is
going rapidly. The projections, I think I have read, are
perhaps July we could have all forces out. I think also, too,
the Taliban are aware that if they would encroach upon our
forces that would not only delay our departure but re-engage us
in Active operations.
So the questions, I think, now are after the departure of
our forces, do you believe you have the appropriate authorities
and funding to continue to support the Afghan National Security
Forces and to conduct counterterrorism operations after the
transition?
Secretary Austin. Thank you, Chairman. As you know, what we
have said is that we intend to maintain a good and productive
relationship with the Afghans post our retrograde, and that
entails making sure that, with your support, we can continue to
provide funding for their military and support for the
government as well. I think that support is critical in
ensuring that the government retains the ability to function
and that their military remains intact. So, again, we will need
your support to be able to do that.
In terms of authorities, I do think that we have the
authorities that we need to be able to focus on a discrete set
of threats, and that threat is those threats that could conduct
operations against the United States of America that would
emanate from that space in Afghanistan. So our counter
terrorism (CT) threat is focused on al Qaeda, and we are
confident that we will have the authorities to continue
operations.
Chairman Reed. Are you also confident that given the
significant drawdown of personnel that you will be able to
effectively distribute the resources to the Afghan National
Army and other security institutions?
Secretary Austin. As you know, Senator, our plan is to keep
our embassy there, and hopefully as we continue to work with
the Afghan Government we will establish those capabilities and
procedures necessary to be able to effectively distribute funds
and track the movement of those funds and capabilities.
Chairman Reed. Well, at any point in your review, as the
situation develops and you feel you need additional
authorities, please do not hesitate to contact the Committee. I
think both myself and the ranking member would be very eager to
provide those authorities.
You mentioned in your opening statements the scourge of
sexual assault in the military and the ongoing efforts to
reform the UCMJ. The last time we did a major military reform,
in 2017, the Defense Bill required a 2-year implementation time
frame, and every bit of which was used. Critical to this
process is the fact that the President must republish the
Manual for Courts Martial and ensure that ongoing
investigations and prosecutions are not jeopardized by rushed
implementation.
When you forward the administration's recommendation, will
you include your assessments of the time, resources, and the
qualified personnel necessary to effectively implement those
changes?
Secretary Austin. We will, Chairman, and to your point, any
proposed change to the UCMJ is a very serious issue. We will
need adequate time to implement the change in a very
responsible way, and we will also need resources to make sure
that we can effectively implement it. We will need flexibility
to ensure that if there is something that needs to be adjusted
we can adjust.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Thank
you, General Milley and Mr. McCord. Senator Inhofe?
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Because of the
interest we have here I just have two brief questions. One,
General Milley, in 2018, you testified that it is hard to
compare the United States and Chinese defense budgets because
China's budget is very different, and for a better comparison
we need to make some adjustments, and we have done that, little
things like the cost of labor and all of that. But making those
adjustments is not easy, and that is why we required, in last
year's Defense Authorization Bill, that the Pentagon do a study
to try to make this comparison.
China and Russia combined probably spend more than we do. I
made that point in an op-ed piece last May. But I would ask
you, General Milley, the Chinese and Russian economies in
defense spending are unique, and given this, do you think that
their relative combined effort is similar to ours, and do you
think that they understate the spending that they are doing?
General Milley. Senator, both of our analyses, DOD's
analysis and the intelligence community's analysis of budgets
for both Russia and China are classified. At an unclassified
level I would tell you that, combined, the Russian and Chinese
budgets exceed our budgets, if all the cards are put on the
table. Both governments do not put all their cards on the table
when it comes to their budget. It is a very difficult thing to
discern, that which is being spent on their defense versus
other priorities.
With respect to China, they have put significant levels of
effort, of their economy, and, of course, their economy is
second only to ours, significant levels of resources into
building the Chinese military. The Chinese military, as we have
noted many times before, is on a significant increasing rise in
capability over the last 20 or 30 years, and they continue to
invest heavily in that.
Senator Inhofe. That is right. Secretary Austin, during
your confirmation hearing in January you said, and this is a
quote, you said, ``I see China, in particular, as a pacing
challenge for our Department,'' and that you need our help to
deter China. I am worried that if we underfund the military,
our military, we will undermine our alliances and weaken
deterrence.
In your opinion--well, me just state this. We have felt for
some time, and have said that when we countries, and it
happened that Senator Rounds and I went to six different
countries last week, and one of those was Romania. They
reminded us that we talked to them about 2 percent, they should
get 2 percent for defense spending, and they did that, and they
told us that they did that. Yet they are looking at us actually
reducing our funding, and I would just like to have you comment
on what kind of effect that might have to other countries too.
Secretary Austin. Well, thank you, Senator. I would say
that when you look at our overall contributions to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), we contribute a
substantial amount to the NATO effort, and we will continue to
do so going forward. I think the budget gives us the right mix
of capabilities and the flexibility to be very effective in our
efforts to deter China going forward, and Russia, or anyone
else who would want to take us on.
So I am confident that this budget will allow us to match
our resources to our strategy and our strategy to our policy.
Senator Inhofe. My concern has been that our insistence in
the previous administration, which I agreed with, that we reach
the 2 percent in these other countries, and they see that it
appears that our expectations are much less in this
administration.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe. Before
I recognize Senator Shaheen, we have a room reserved for a
closed session after this open session. So any questions that
the panel feels would be best addressed in a closed session, we
will retire there. If there are no such questions then we will
conclude with the open session.
Senator Shaheen, please.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
all three of you for your service to the country and for being
here this morning.
Secretary Austin, there is an interesting article in The
New York Times today that suggests that our plan in Afghanistan
is to not just provide for some sort of over-the-horizon troops
to address counterterrorism but that we might also be looking
at ways that we can provide air support to the Afghan forces if
they are in danger, or if we are in danger of losing Kabul or
another major city in the country. It also quotes Afghan
officials as saying that they have been told by their American
counterparts that the United States would stop any takeover of
a major city. Obviously, who knows what the source of that is.
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But can you tell me if we are, in fact--first of all, where
we are in our plans to develop an over-the-horizon CT force,
and if we are, in fact, contemplating any other actions in
support of the Afghan troops should the Taliban be in danger of
taking over Kabul?
Secretary Austin. Thank you, Senator. As you know, we
continue to provide support to the Afghan Security Forces as we
retrograde. Once we have completed our retrograde that will be
very difficult to do, because our capabilities will have
diminished in country.
I really will not speculate about any potential outcomes or
any potential future actions. I will just say that the
President has been clear that our mission in Afghanistan has
been accomplished and we are focused on retrograding our people
and equipment out. Again, going forward, in terms of our CT
efforts, those CT efforts will be focused on those elements
that can possibly conduct attacks against our homeland.
In terms of our efforts to establish over-the-horizon
capability, I would just point to the fact that as we have
retrograded a lot of our capability out of country we are doing
a lot of things over the horizon now. ISR is being flown from
the Gulf, a lot of our combat aircraft missions are being
conducted from platforms in the Gulf, and so we have the
capability now to do that. What we are looking for is the
ability to shorten the legs going forward by stationing some
capability in neighboring countries. That is still a work in
progress.
Senator Shaheen. So do you have a timetable for when that
plan might be completed?
Secretary Austin. I do not have a timetable. I will tell
you that we will move as quickly as we can, in conjunction with
State Department efforts.
Senator Shaheen. In talking with some of the women leaders
of Afghanistan in the last weeks, one of the things that they
have asked and said they thought was very important would be
for high-level American officials--the President, certainly you
as Secretary of Defense--to speak out against the Taliban's
attacks against women and girls in the country and to make it
clear that that is a violation of international norms of
behavior and human rights.
I would urge you to do that, along with other members of
the administration. I think that is the least we can do at this
point is to make a point of the violation of norms and human
rights that the Taliban are conducting in Afghanistan,
especially when it comes to women and girls.
I want to go on to another issue in my time that is left,
because one of the things you talked about in your opening
statement was the importance of taking care of our people. As
we know, one of the challenges that we are facing, not just
among DOD employees but intel agencies, at State, has been
attacks what has come to be known as the Havana Syndrome. The
National Academy of Science report that was released in
December calls these directed energy attacks.
It is my understanding that DOD is the department that is
taking the lead on treating individuals suffering from these
attacks. Can you tell us if that is the case, and if you have
the resources that you need to continue to do that, and then
what steps you are taking to protect DOD personnel from future
attacks.
Secretary Austin. Well, the health and welfare of our
people is of utmost importance to me, and we are working as one
element, a larger whole-of-government effort to really try to
determine the cause of these injuries, and also we are working
as hard and as fast as we can to expand our medical
capabilities. We have done that, expanded our capabilities to
treat traumatic brain injuries (TBI) and acquired brain injury
(ABI). We will have the ability to treat more people going
forward, but again, we will remain sighted on this and we are
working as a part of a whole-of-government effort.
Senator Shaheen. You factored that into your budget
request?
Secretary Austin. We did not ask for additional funds for
this specific, but we have sufficient funds to do what is
necessary.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Let me recognize
Senator Wicker, please.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary,
thank you for being with us today. We had a Seapower
Subcommittee hearing just this week, and the Navy's vice
admiral witness before that subcommittee said this, and I
quote: ``We have done many studies over the last 5 years that
say we need a larger Navy. The Navy we can afford now is
roughly 300 to 305 ships. So if we are going to pace the
adversary we need to have a bigger Navy.''
Mr. Secretary, did the vice admiral misspeak in saying
that?
Secretary Austin. What I would say, Senator, and, you know,
I think certainly we have the most capable and dominant navy in
the world, and it will continue to be so going forward. When
you talk about naval power, certainly size matters, but what
also matters is having the right mix of capabilities in the
force, and so our goal is to make sure that we maintain a
ready, capable, and sustainable force in the future.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Did the Navy vice admiral misspeak in
saying that we need a larger Navy? He said that two days ago in
testimony before the Seapower Subcommittee. Can you just answer
that?
Secretary Austin. What I will say, Senator, is that for
some time we have had a goal of a 355-ship Navy, and I think
that goal is a good goal to shoot at. So I think that is
probably what he is referencing.
Senator Wicker. This budget does not get us anywhere near
back on the path to do that. I also have concerns about the
Navy's plans for amphibious war ships. Last year, Congress
authorized, in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), a
multi-ship procurement bundle for three amphibious transport
dock (LPDs) and one landing helicopter assault (LHA). This
would result in a $700 million cost savings, and at that
hearing on Tuesday, Acting Secretary of the Navy for Research,
Development, and Acquisition testified that although the Navy
had reached a handshake agreement to execute the block buy, the
Department of Defense was unlikely to approve it.
Why does it make sense that knowing that we are going to
have to buy these amphibious ships, why does it make sense that
the Department of Defense might oppose saving the taxpayers
over $700 million by procuring the ships in a block buy?
Secretary Austin. As we said at the top, Senator, and you
well know, we are always faced with making tough choices, and
so as we looked at what we could do in this budget, and what
was best to do in this budget, we are making those choices.
Senator Wicker. All right. Well, let me just say this. This
is an inadequate defense budget, and I sit here, and while I
very much admire our Constitution and the fact that we have one
commander-in-chief, so the military members, no matter how many
stars they have on their shoulders, under our Constitution they
salute that commander-in-chief, and he appoints a Secretary of
Defense and he appoints Cabinet officials, and based on the
best advice that you and others give him, the commander-in-
chief makes the decision. The Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) that he appoints apparently has decided that we could do
just fine in a world where China is expanding in the Pacific,
where Hamas is still raining rockets down on Jerusalem, where
Russia is not quitting at all, and where we have just heard
that the combined budgets of Russia and China are greater than
ours, we have decided, based on what some budget crunchers in
OMB, and bean counters in OMB have decided that we ought to be
able to do, and that we can have massive increases in domestic
spending, but a cut in purchasing power for the national
defense budget.
Let me just say to my colleagues, the Constitution of the
United States also gives us the power of the purse, and while
we appreciate the suggestion by OMB budget crunchers, it is our
obligation to defend this nation, and this proposed budget does
not do so, in the two respects that I have mentioned, and in
the respect that the ranking member mentioned earlier on, and
it is incumbent on us to reverse this and to get our troops and
our Nation the national security budget that they need.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Let me recognize
Senator Gillibrand, please.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to
our witnesses for your service, your dedication, and your
integrity.
As you both know, I have been fighting against sexual
assault in the military for the last 8 years. I, along with now
66 co-sponsors on the legislation from the U.S. Senate, are
proposing that we draw a bright line at all serious crimes,
take them out of the chain of command. That one change, we
believe, will create more transparency, more accountability, a
higher professionalization, and will create less bias within
the system.
General Milley, I would like to ask you about your thoughts
on this proposal. It is my understanding that you are now open
to removing sexual assault and related crimes from the chain of
command. Can you please confirm that to the Committee today?
General Milley. Thank you, Senator, and thank you for your
leadership on this issue. I have said publicly before, and I
will say it here, I think that this issue has been out there
for quite a long time, and we, in uniform, generals and members
of the chain of command, et cetera, we have not successfully
moved the needle in resolving sexual assault. In addition to
that, I have some evidence, some studies, some anecdotal
evidence, that junior members of the chain of command, or
junior members in the military, primarily women, have lost
faith and confidence in our chain of command to resolve sexual
assault through the chain of command.
So I am very open-minded to some significant and
fundamental change in the area of sexual assault and sexual
harassment. What you mentioned was the bright line of all the
other--all felonies, for example. I think that requires some
detailed study before we completely overhaul the entire UCMJ.
But the focused area of sexual assault and sexual harassment,
completely open-minded to some very significant change, and I
think that is also true of most of the senior leaders in
uniform.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you very much, General. As you
and I discussed, in recent years we have seen some very
chilling statistics about bias in the military justice system
against people of color. Black servicemembers were at least
1.29 times, and as much as 2.16 times more likely to have
disciplinary action taken against them in the average year
across all branches, from 2006 to 2015.
These disparities largely do not improve, and in some cases
got worse, in the most recent years. As an example, the
December 2020 Air Force Inspector General's review found that
black servicemembers, quote, ``voiced a consistent lack of
confidence,'' end of quote, in Air Force discipline processes.
Three in five black servicemembers said they would not receive
the same benefit of the doubt as their white peers if they got
into trouble, and 1 in 3 said they believed the military
justice system is biased against them.
The problem, however, is even more chilling when you look
at military capital cases. One 2012 death penalty study found
that 41 percent of defendants were people of color, but 67
percent of those that actually received the death penalty were
people of color.
So the reason why we wrote our bill 8 years ago to draw
bright lines against all serious felonies, all serious crimes,
anything that carried more than a year of penalty, was not just
to professionalize the systems and remove bias against
survivors of sexual assault but also to remove biases across
the board and to professionalize the entire military justice
system. That is what all military experts in criminal justice
recommended, and it is what our allies actually did over the
last 40 years--the United Kingdom, Germany, Israel, Canada,
Netherlands, Australia.
As a result, we mirrored that in our legislation, and we
carve out all uniquely military crimes. So I would like to
know, General Milley, will you remain to have an open mind as
you review these statistics and this additional data before you
make your recommendation to the Committee?
General Milley. Totally, and I am very sincere. I have a
complete open mind on this. As I said up front in my opening
statement, the United States military has a singular purpose,
to support and defend the Constitution, and we have two tasks,
to fight and win our Nation's wars and to prepare to fight and
win our Nation's wars, and unit cohesion is a significant
contributor--in fact, it is probably the most important
contributor--to combat power. Sexual assault, sexual
harassment, any kind of deviance from any sort of good order
and discipline rips apart at that. Central to the concept is
also the commander's personal responsibility and accountability
for the good order and discipline of the unit, and they are
personally responsible for the cohesion.
So I am absolutely open-minded to suggestions to improve
the system, because what we want to do is fix the problem and
improve the combat power of the U.S. military.
Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Austin, we have also had the
benefit of having a conversation about these details, and I
would like to ask you the same question. Will you remain an
open mind as you look at new data about racial disparities as
well as the data you will receive from the panel that you
requested, advice on specifically sexual assaults and related
crimes? I ask that you remain an open mind as you look at the
full version of the details and facts that the DOD has compiled
over many years and the work of this Committee over the last 8
years.
Secretary Austin. Before I answer that, Senator Gillibrand,
just let me thank you for your incredible work that you have
done over the years on this issue, on the issue of sexual
assault and sexual harassment. Whatever changes occur going
forward will be largely due to your incredible dedication to
this issue. So on behalf of the Department of Defense, thank
you for what you have done.
As you know, Senator, first of all, yes, I always have an
open mind to solving any tough problem. But as you know, the
commission that the President tasked me to stand up, and has
stood up and provided me some initial recommendations, and
still owes me more recommendations, has been focused on the
issue of sexual assault and sexual harassment. Those are the
problems that we are trying to resolve and improve.
But yes, I always maintain an open mind with any tough
problem, but we are focused on the issue of sexual assault and
sexual harassment, and again, thank you for all the work that
you have done on this issue.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Secretary. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Now let me
recognize Senator Fischer, please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome,
gentlemen. I too want to thank you for your patriotism, your
years of service, and your years and years of caring for those
who serve with you in protecting this nation.
Secretary Austin, I appreciate the way the budget has
prioritized nuclear modernization and kept important programs
like the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), the Long
Range Stand Off Weapon (LRSO), and the Columbia-class submarine
on track. I am also happy to see it invest in the nuclear
command, control, and communications (NC3) and finally begin
moving forward on replacing the E-4B with survivable, airborne
operations center.
During your confirmation you talked about the need for a
review of our nuclear posture and modernization programs. Has
the Department begun a formal nuclear posture review, and when
do you expect it to be complete?
Secretary Austin. We have not begun that review yet,
Senator, but it will begin very shortly, and it will take us
several months to conduct the review.
Senator Fischer. Well, I think that review process is so
very important. These systems are the most important military
capabilities that we possess, and decisions about our nuclear
policies and programs must be considered in a thorough,
deliberative process that allows stakeholders from across the
Department of Defense, as well as other Federal agencies, like
the Department of Energy, and our allies to provide their input
so that decisions can be made with a full understanding of the
consequences. We cannot be careless about this.
Which is why I was very concerned to see a news story that
put forth a copy of the memo from the Acting Secretary of the
Navy, Thomas Harker, in which he directed the Navy to defund
the sea-launched cruise missile program. This memo was signed
June 4th. That is just one week after the Department of Defense
submitted a budget request that asked for $5 billion to
continue to study that concept, and the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) requested $10 million to conduct
its own assessment.
Based on what you just said, it seems like this decision
was made outside of any kind of posture review process. Is that
correct?
Secretary Austin. Senator, I have not seen the memo, but I
would say that, you know, all of us, all the Services and the
Department are, again, making tough choices in terms of what to
prioritize and where to accept risk. That memo has to be pre-
decisional because of where we are in the process, and so I do
not feel comfortable in commenting on his memo. I would just
say that again, I am committed to a posture review, to make
sure that we adequately analyze what our capabilities are, what
is needed in the future, that we maintain the right balance in
our nuclear forces, going forward.
Senator Fischer. So you were not consulted on that at all?
Secretary Austin. That is an internal department memo, I
believe, based upon what has been said.
Senator Fischer. General Milley, were the Joint Chiefs
consulted at all, to your knowledge?
General Milley. I am not familiar with the memo, nor was I
consulted, but as soon as we are done here I will go find that
memo and get consulted.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir. I find it very concerning
that an Acting Service Secretary, who has not been confirmed by
the Senate, is making a decision like this, outside of any
review process, without analysis or input from the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) policy, from nuclear matters,
the Joint Chiefs, or U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and
without taking to other agencies, or having, it seems, any
discussions with our allies.
I would also point out that the analysis of alternatives
for the missile is still ongoing, and so it would seem very,
very premature to reach any conclusions about it being
feasible, or infeasible.
I do think this is the right way to make decisions about
nuclear policy. Do you agree with that, Secretary Austin?
Secretary Austin. I do, Senator.
Senator Fischer. Should a decision like this be made
through that review process?
Secretary Austin. I have every confidence that it will be,
Senator.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. I hope you will follow up with
the Acting Secretary to make sure that it is a posture review
that makes a decision on this.
Does the Department still support the President's fiscal
year 2022 budget request for this program?
Secretary Austin. It does.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Happy to hear that. Thank you
again.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Now let me
recognize Senator Kelly, please.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to
Secretary McCord and Secretary Austin and General Milley for
being here today.
General Milley, this question is for you, and it is
specific to the A-10. I think you would agree that properly
balancing the need to sustain America's military with the need
to modernize is paramount to ensuring our adversaries are
unable to outpace the United States. Having the right equipment
available to our troops on the battlefield is critical, which
is why I am very concerned, very concerned by the proposed
divestment of 42 A-10 aircraft in the fiscal year 2022 budget.
As you know, the A-10 is a combat-proven asset that is
unmatched in its ability to provide close air support to troops
on the ground. The Air Force has not been able to establish a
convincing replacement to carry out this mission, and it has
not demonstrated a replacement that can match the A-10's cost
effectiveness.
Budget analysts have estimated a modest cost savings if the
A-10s are divested, but those savings are quite small when you
consider the scope of the Department's $715 billion budget. It
is critical that we consider the real costs of what we would be
trading away if we were to take this action before an
effective, close air support replacement is in place. American
troops rely on close air support in the most dire of
circumstances. The A-10 has saved the lives of many men and
women because of its unique capabilities. Everyone I speak to,
everyone, who has had experience with the A-10 in combat wants
that to be the plane that shows up when they are in trouble.
So when I think about the tradeoffs we would be making by
divesting, I just do not see that the risk has been properly
accounted for. I expect that you have had some of these same
conversations and experiences as you talk to our troops.
So, General, do you feel that we have adequately assessed
the risk that these retirements could pose for our troops on
the ground?
General Milley. Thanks, Senator, and as a ground soldier
who has been in a lot of firefights, I know exactly what you
are talking about with the A-10 or attack helicopters or any
other munitions delivered by air. It is a very, very important
capability, and personally I am a big fan of the A-10.
However, we are talking about 42 aircraft. We are still
going to have 239. We have got enough for five squadrons. What
we have to do--we, collectively, Congress, the Department of
Defense, we in uniform--we have got to recognize and begin to
shift toward the future operating environment and the changing
character of war, and we must shift the capabilities that are
going to be relevant, survivable, and effective against a Tier
1 adversary sometime in the future. This is a modest decrease
in the number of A-10s. I think it is an acceptable risk, and I
support the Air Force's recommendation.
Senator Kelly. So, General, we often think about these
things as, you know, what does day one of the war look like.
General Milley. Sure.
Senator Kelly. I am also concerned about future conflict on
day 30, 60, day 180, and in a former life I used to be a test
pilot. I have flown close air support missions myself in an
airplane that does not do the job well. I do not see another
airplane in our inventory--not the F-16, not the F-35--that can
do the mission like the A-10 can. When you combine the fact
that it is far superior in that role, and protects troops on
the ground when they need it the most, and at the same time is
cheap compared to the flight-hour cost of an F-35 or even an F-
16, and we do not have an airplane that can do this mission
like the A-10 can, and I am seriously concerned that if we go
down this road and we remove 42 airplanes from the inventory,
that if we wind up in a conflict, and we wind up at day 30, 60,
90, we are going to be regretful that we do not have that
platform.
So thank you, General, and I yield back the remainder of my
time.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Now let me
recognize Senator Cotton, please.
Senator Cotton. Mr. Secretary, I received, along with
Congressman Crenshaw, several hundred whistleblower complaints
about Pentagon extremist and diversity training. I want to
share just a small selection of what your own troops are
saying. Mr. Chairman, I have a longer list I would like to
submit for the record.
Chairman Reed. Without objection.
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Senator Cotton. Again, this is just a few examples. One
Marine told us that a military history training session was
replaced with mandatory training on police brutality, white
privilege, and systemic racism. He reported that several
officers are now leaving his unit, citing that training.
Another servicemember told that their unit was required to
read White Fragility by Robin DiAngelo, which claims--and this
is a quote--"white people raised in western society are
conditioned into a white supremacist world view.''
A member of the Special Operations community has told us
that they are being instructed that, quote, ``The U.S. Special
Operations community is racist.''
One Army officer related to us the words of his general
officer, who told him that the entire U.S. Army is racist.
A midshipman at the Naval Academy said classmates are
calling America a fundamentally racist place, and that this
sentiment is not contested by school administrator.
An airman told us their unit was forced into a racist
exercise called a ``privilege walk,'' where members of the wing
were ordered to separate themselves by race and gender in order
to stratify people based on their perceived privilege.
One African American officer disparagingly said, and I
quote, ``The Navy thinks my only value is as a black woman,''
and not the fact that she is a highly trained military
specialist.
Soldiers have come forward to tell us they are being forced
to watch videos about systemic racism, and documentaries that
rewrite America's history as a fundamentally racist and evil
nation.
One Space Force officer told me that two guardians left his
ranks in a short period of time. One was a young African
American who said that after the training she would never have
joined the military had she known that it was such a hotbed of
racism. The other was a white airman who said he did not sign
up to be indoctrinated, and filed separation paperwork.
Mr. Secretary, we are hearing reports of plummeting morale,
growing mistrust between the races and sexes, where none
existed just six months ago, and unexpected retirements and
separations based on these trainings alone. Again, these are
not my words. These are the words of your own troops.
So I want to ask a few simple but vital questions. Mr.
Secretary, do you believe that our military is a fundamentally
racist organization? Yes or no, please.
Secretary Austin. Well, I will not give you a yes or no
answer or that, sir, because it deserves more than a yes or no.
The military, like any organization, will have its challenges,
but I do not believe it is a fundamentally racist organization.
We----
Senator Cotton. Thank you. I am sorry to cut you off but
our time is limited. I think it is a pretty simple question. I
am glad that you agree it is not fundamentally racist.
Do you believe that any member of the military should be
treated differently based on their skin color and sex? Again,
yes or no will do.
Secretary Austin. Again, this question deserves more than a
yes or no answer. It is----
Senator Cotton. Mr. Secretary, I am sorry to cut you off.
Our time is limited. It is a very simple question. Should a
member of the organization you lead be treated differently, in
violation of the Constitution, I would add, based on their sex
or the color of their skin?
Secretary Austin. No, I do not believe that, and that why
we have diversity, equity, and inclusion focus in the military.
Senator Cotton. The military, for decades, has been one of
the institutions in this society where you are most likely to
get ahead based on your own performance, on your own merit,
irrespective of the color of your skin or where you came from
or who your parents were.
Secretary Austin. Sir, I absolutely agree with that, and I
am an example of that.
Senator Cotton. Your distinguished career----
Secretary Austin. But I would say that----
Senator Cotton. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Secretary, your career
is an excellent example of that, but I have more questions,
based on the reports we have seen.
The military has included the works of critical race
theories on its reading list by authors like Ibram Henry
Rogers, who now calls himself Ibram Kendi, and Robin DiAngelo.
Mr. Kendi has written, quote, ``The only remedy to past
discrimination is present discrimination. The only remedy to
present discrimination is future discrimination,'' end quote.
Do you agree with that proposition?
Secretary Austin. I have not read that and I do not--you
know, I certainly do not agree with what you just said, but----
Senator Cotton. Mr. Secretary----
Secretary Austin.--it is always important to have the full
context of anything that you are being asked to evaluate.
Senator Cotton. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that race and
sex should be the key factor when selecting combat leaders,
rather than, say, operational excellence, technical
proficiency, leadership, agility, and integrity?
Secretary Austin. I do not, Senator. I think what you just
said should be key components in making any selection.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. I am glad we agree on all this.
So let me just wrap up by saying this. If troops are subjected
to the kinds of training drawing on critical race concepts like
America and our military is inherently racist, or certain races
are inherently privileged, other races are inherently
victimized, given what you have said, should they report it up
their chain of command or to the inspector general or to other
appropriate channels?
Secretary Austin. Yes, they should. They have always had
that ability to do that, and I would recommend that in the
future. I would also say that diversity, equity, and inclusion
is important to this military now, and it will be important in
the future, and so we are going to make sure that our military
looks like America and that our leadership looks like what is
in the ranks of the military, and I appreciate your support on
that.
Senator Cotton. I agree with that, and like I said, the
military has always been one of the most diverse institutions
in our society, where you can get ahead irrespective of the
color of your skin or who your parents are or where you came
from. I am glad that we agree on that. This is not about
diversity, in general, though. This is about a very specific
kind of anti-American indoctrination that is seeping into some
parts of our military, based upon the whistleblower complaints
we have received.
Thank you. My time has expired.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. Let me recognize Senator Kaine,
please.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Secretary, I want to give you a chance
to explain the context. Senator Cotton asked you a question
about your own career, and you indicated that your career is an
indication that the military can be welcoming to all kinds of
people. But you were then going to explain the context of what
your own personal experience has shown you during your time in
the military, about why we need to take seriously these issues
of diversity and inclusion. The Senator had other questions,
but I would like to hear how you were going to answer that
question, giving the full context.
Secretary Austin. I think the leadership has a
responsibility to create a climate where--first of all, we
should be welcoming to everyone who can qualify and who is fit
to serve and who can maintain the standards. Secondly, you
know, we ought to look like the America that we support and
defend, and our senior leadership should look like what is in
the ranks. Where we have done a great job in recruiting very
highly qualified and capable people, I think we need to do a
bit better in terms of making sure that we are absolutely
inclusive and making sure that we create pathways, or pathways
are available for everybody that in the ranks to realize their
full potential.
That is what that diversity, equity, and inclusion is all
about. It is about cohesion. It is about making sure that we
remain the most effective and lethal fighting force in the
world, and we have been in the past and we will be in the
future.
Senator Kaine. When we move toward diversity in the
military it has always made us stronger. When President Truman
integrated the military it was not uniformly popular. In fact,
I believe his Secretary of the Army ended up resigning after
refusing to desegregate units about a year after the order.
But moves like that, where the military has often led
society in building cohesion, the military does it well. They
are not always immediately popular but they end up paying
dividends not just for the military but for American society.
It has to be done sensibly, carefully, by people who understand
it, but I applaud you and other leaders who are trying to do
that.
Let me now move to questions that have been asked about the
top line of the budget, and I have gotten some handouts from
folks who have not yet asked questions, and so I can see some
more questions on this are coming.
So, General Milley, if I recall you became head of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff in late 2018. Is that correct?
General Milley. 2019.
Senator Kaine. 2019.
General Milley. 1 October.
Senator Kaine. Were you involved in the discussions around
the submission of President Trump's fiscal year 2021 budget,
which came to this Committee in February of 2020?
General Milley. Sure. Absolutely.
Senator Kaine. So I guess I want to just compare the Biden
proposal, President Biden's proposal for defense to President
Trump's proposal. My argument is, to some of my colleagues who
are trying to attack the Biden budget, it is exactly what
President Trump proposed. President Trump gave us a future year
defense plan in February of 2020, and it called for a top line
of $721 billion for this year. Now President Biden has
submitted a top line of $715 billion.
So it would suggest that maybe the Trump budget projection
for this year was $6 billion higher than the Biden budget, but
that is actually not the case, because under the Trump
administration, there was a practice of taking money out of the
Pentagon budget for non-military emergencies. Over an 11-month
period, between March of 2019 and February of 2020, the Trump
administration took $10 billion out of the top line. That
straddled two fiscal years, so divided that in half--about $5
to $6 billion a year was taken out of the Pentagon's budget by
President Trump. So the difference between the $715 billion and
$721 billion is essentially erased, so long as President Biden
doesn't take money for non-military purposes.
I have asked the OMB director, I have asked everybody that
I know in the Biden White House, is it the intention of this
White House to take Pentagon dollars for non-military purposes,
and the answer to that is no. President Biden says if Congress
appropriates, I am going to respect the appropriation, and I am
not going to spirit monies out of the Pentagon and use them for
non-military emergencies.
So my belief is this is a budget that was essentially
identical to the budget that we would have seen under President
Trump, based upon the Trump numbers that were submitted to us
over a year ago. When those numbers were submitted to us, I did
not hear anyone on this Committee complain about President
Trump did not have a high enough top line. We ultimately
control what the number will be, but in terms of the difference
between the two administrations and their budget submissions to
this body, I would argue that they are identical. President
Biden has submitted a top line that is essentially identical to
what President Trump would have submitted, based upon the
documents they gave us a year ago.
With that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Kaine, and now
let me recognize Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
you for your service to our country. I would like to follow up
a little bit and continue the discussion that Senator Kaine has
begun, and that is with regard to the top line of the budget. I
do believe that this defense budget request, on the whole, is
moving in a very similar direction that we had before, with
regard to trying to follow through with the National Defense
Strategy, the NDS. I think, and I would like confirmation, and
I will begin with General Milley, that this particular budget
is focused on achieving the major goals that are found in the
NDS from 2017.
General Milley, could you share a little bit about, in
terms of what those major goals are and the priorities are in
the NDS that this particular budget is trying to achieve?
General Milley. Sure, Senator. The NDS, as it was written,
and that was under Secretary Mattis and I was, at that point,
Chief of Staff of the Army, and all the Joint Chiefs
participated in that, that is a rigorous document, it is well
thought out, and it stood the test of time. We all still use it
as a guiding light, and we are under a review with Secretary
Austin and we will see how that comes out, but there will be
modifications. The document is 4 or 5 years old now, so there
will be some modifications to that.
But it is still good, and the fundamentals of it emphasize
readiness, modernization, lethality, allies, partners,
irregular warfare. It calls out China, Russia, Iran, North
Korea, counterterrorism. So the main structures are more or
less still valid, and perhaps China is a little bit more
advanced now that they were, say, 5 years ago. So it is still a
fundamentally solid document.
But I would tell you, as I said in my opening statement,
the $715 billion budget requires hard choices in terms of
prioritization, but I think it adequately meets the needs in
terms of the priorities of the current, existing NDS and the
one that we are working on modify under Secretary Austin's
signature. So I am very comfortable that we can provide an
adequate defense of the United States of America with a $715
billion budget.
Senator Rounds. I understand the direction and the fact
that you have been involved in establishing and that your input
has been involved in the development of this budget. But I also
note that I think nuclear command and control upgrades are
critical, and would be recognized under this as well, would it
not?
General Milley. Yes, absolutely.
Senator Rounds. The continued development and modernization
of the nuclear triad would also be involved, would it not?
General Milley. Absolutely. In fact, we have said that the
recapitalization of the nuclear triad is the number one
priority in terms of the actual programs, programmatic
spending. It is critical that we have the air, sea, and land
components of that triad in order to maintain the security of
the United States going forward.
Senator Rounds. See, General, I think that the basic goals
of the NDS are represented within this. I do not disagree with
that. My concern that I will express is that it is based on
being able to handle those goals but also being able to
maintain and not expect the Members of the armed services to
continue to do the day-to-day operations if we have increases
in inflation, whether it be for fuel or for other supplies, for
health care, and so forth.
General, I think there were some very hard choices made,
and I guess my question to you, sir--and I do not intend this
to be a gotcha question--the hard choices that had to be made
in order to achieve the top-line goals of the NDS, where are
the reductions or the limitations that have to recognized when
we do have a very similar--in terms of the total number of
dollars--when we do expect that inflation will run perhaps
between 3 and 5 percent, and at the same time the NDS expected
to have, and in order to meet its goals, an ongoing increase of
between 3 and 5 percent over inflation, which clearly is not
reflected in the budget, and I know is not news to you, sir.
General Milley. Sure. I mean, you could do the numbers a
lot of different ways, and we have Mike McCord here, and he
knows it better than anyone else. But this budget is about $11
billion more than the fiscal year 2021 enacted budget. If you
factor in inflation, you normalize the dollars, it is more or
less flat, or I think it is 0.5 less, or something like that.
So it depends on which way you look at the numbers.
But in terms of the key capabilities, Senator Kelly
mentioned 42 A-10s getting divested. We had to make a choice
between buying two subs, one destroyer and a frigate versus two
destroyers, and things like that. So there are hard choices in
all of the domains, and this is my sixth budget. In every
single budget I have seen we are always making hard choices. We
always have unfunded asks (UFA) lists. We always have ways to
spend more money effectively for the defense of the country.
But in my professional opinion, a $715 billion budget, as long
as we are disciplined in its application and we adhere to the
priorities that we have established, will provide for the
defense of the United States.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, my time has
expired. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to our country.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Now let me
recognize Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I
want to discuss just for a moment one of those hard choices.
The top Navy unfunded priority is a destroyer that was
eliminated from the budget, that was already committed to under
the multiyear procurement. That has several problems, one
national security. These destroyer, guided missile (DDG)
destroyers are the workhorse of the Navy, eyes and ears around
the world, very important part of our assets. But it also sent
a shudder through the industrial base. It is unprecedented, in
my experience, that a multiyear has been breached, which would
actually cost the government money in penalties. I hope, Mr.
Secretary, that you and Admiral Michael Gilday can work with us
to restore that ship, because I think it has importance beyond
just the one ship. But the symbolism of breaking a multiyear
and also pulling back on our commitment to increasing the
capacity of the Navy is, I think, a very important priority.
That is not really a question. It is an entreaty to you to
work with us to try to find the funds to restore that ship and
restore the Navy's number one unfunded priority. Will you
commit to working with us on that?
Secretary Austin. Absolutely, Senator. We will do
everything we can to make sure that we maintain a good working
relationship with Congress, and I appreciate your tremendous
support throughout, and especially now. We want to make sure
that we maintain a ready, capable, and sustainable force. We
also want to make sure that the industrial base has the ability
to produce what we have asked them to produce. Current plans
are to buy that DDG in 2023.
Senator King. Thank you. The importance of the industrial
base--I live within 8 miles of the industrial base in Maine,
and the industrial base is not something you can just turn off
and on. It has got to be something that is sustained and
maintained over time.
Let me turn to a different topic. I believe one of the most
serious risks this country faces today is accidental conflict
with China, some kind of conflict in the South China Sea, the
Strait of Taiwan, and the danger of escalation from that
accidental conflict of some kind. It is concerning to me that
we do not seem to have an effective hotline, direct line,
whatever you want to call it, with China, officials at your
level and also at the Presidential level. I understand the
Chinese are reluctant about this, but I believe this should be
a national security priority. I looked up yesterday and I find
that Amazon has 11 copies of The Guns of August in Chinese, and
I think what I might do is buy those and send them to the
Politburo in Beijing, because this is a very clear and distinct
danger.
Do you agree with me that a better deconfliction link
between military-to-military and also government-to-government
with China would be an important mitigation of this risk?
Secretary Austin. I absolutely agree with you. As we look
at some of the aggressive behavior that we have witnessed from
China in the Indo-Pacific, you know, I am concerned about
something that could happen that could spark a crisis. I think
we need the ability to be able to talk with both our allies and
partners but also our adversaries, or potential adversaries. I
think there needs to be a direct line of communication, between
the military and also between government officials as well. So
I share your concern and I absolutely agree with you that this
is critical.
Senator King. Thank you. One other area that has come to my
attention. In fact, we had a hearing yesterday on missile
defense, and General Glen VanHerck said he had to pry the data
out of another agency. We had Goldwater-Nichols, which has
enabled joint operations. We do not necessarily have a joint
capability acquisition, particularly in the area of software. I
hope that we might work with you and General Milley and others
on how to rationalize, if you will, the joint acquisition of
things like software so that we do not have silos within the
military, that are analogous to the silos that we had pre-
Goldwater-Nichols. Is that something that you will be willing
to work with us on?
Secretary Austin. Absolutely. I think it is critical, and
you have my commitment to do so.
Senator King. General Milley, I am sorry I did not get my
questions to you but perhaps we will have a second round. Thank
you very much.
General Milley. I am okay with that Senator. Thank you very
much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Ernst,
please.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Chairman, and gentlemen, thank
you very much for being here today and for your continuing
service to our great United States of America.
Superior weapons personnel and technology ensure that we
won the 20th century, but of course, now our adversaries have
adapted their technologies, they have improved their operating
concepts, and they have expanded their challenges into the new
domains of cyber and space, and, in fact, President Biden has
stated, ``The world is at an inflection point with shifting
global dynamics and emerging crises that demand attention.''
We, of course, know that we face emboldened adversaries
such as Vladimir Putin in Russia and President Xi Jinping in
China. Both are actively seeking to disrupt a stable and
prosperous global order, and then, of course, we have other
actors like Iran and North Korea presenting their own
significant threats. As we are withdrawing from Afghanistan we
do not see the removal of terrorist threat. Instead, we see, as
the President has stated, the threat has become more dispersed,
metastasizing around the globe.
So of course we want to make sure that we are funding and
resourcing our troops appropriately, but going along with
taking care of our own troops is working with other allied
nations. Secretary Austin, in a March editorial the Washington
Post, you wrote about the importance of joint partnerships with
other nations, and called them force multipliers. I do agree
with you, Secretary. You wrote, ``It would be a huge strategic
error to neglect these relationships, and it is a wise use of
our time and resources to adapt and renew them, to ensure there
are as strong and effective as they can be.'' Yet, the
President's defense budget guts our partner nation joint
exercise budget compared to the pre-COVID levels by over 50
percent.
So how do you square your advocacy for improving our
interoperability with our NATO allies and theater partners
around the world with those proposed cuts?
Secretary Austin. Well, certainly with respect to NATO we
are encouraging the members of NATO to do more, to invest in
air defense and also to do more to contribute to NATO overall.
What we have been focused on is making sure that--you know,
you have heard me say that China is our pacing challenge, and
so we really weighted our main effort there to the Indo-Pacific
region, and you will note that my first trip overseas was out
to the region, along with Secretary Blinken, and we visited
South Korea, we visited Japan, and also made a visit to India
as well.
Again, we truly value the importance of strong
relationships with our allies and partners. I think there is a
great capacity that can be leveraged there, and so in some
areas those partnerships, while still strong, are not as strong
as they could possibly be, so we will remain focused on that.
Senator Ernst. I do hope so, Secretary. I think this is a
really important area to focus on, making sure that we are able
to leverage them and continue to use our allies as this force
multiplier.
Mr. Secretary, I also wanted to just make a brief
statement. I do appreciate that you have stated your commitment
to making changes to how the military handles and prevents
sexual assault, and I am concerned about the continued delay
that we continue to face, though. Certainly if any of our
adversaries were attacking members of our military, as we have
seen within our own ranks, members attacking other members
within our own ranks, if it had been an adversary we would have
responded immediately. We must respond immediately as well. So
I am encouraging both you and the chairman to continue to push
on this issue, to make sure we bring resolution and justice for
our members of the military, those very important survivors.
Just a brief statement, and I am sorry, General Milley, I
did not get to my questions for you either. Secretary McCord, I
will follow up with you later on the audit. But I do want to
echo concerns that were raised by Senator Fischer about the
Navy's intent, whether it was an interoffice memo, whatever it
was. I do also want to stress my concern that the Navy intends
to cancel development of the sea-launched nuclear cruise
missile. I think this is very, very concerning, especially
coming from an Acting Secretary that has yet to be confirmed,
and I hope that that is truly not reflective of the overall
attitude of the Department of Defense.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Secretary Austin. It is not, Senator, and as we said, we
will be true to our posture review and make sure that that
drives the process.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Now let me
recognize, via Webex, Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
being here today.
Secretary Austin, during your confirmation process you
disclosed that you were on the board of Raytheon Technologies,
one of the Nation's largest defense contractors, and that
caused me to ask you for some commitments about ethics issues
that you would face. Existing ethics laws already require some
commitments but they do not go nearly far enough. This matter a
lot because the Pentagon spends $360 billion every year on
goods and services provided by contractors, and those
contractors have a revolving door with the DOD.
So that is why I have introduced legislation to strengthen
ethics rules for all public officials. But it is also why I
asked you during your hearing to extend your recusal from
matters involving Raytheon for the duration of your government
service. I asked you to pledge not to seek a waiver of that
recusal, and to refrain from seeking compensation from a giant
defense contractor within 4 years of leaving government
service, and you agreed to make those commitments, and I want
you to know, I appreciate that. I think the American people
appreciate that too.
Secretary Austin, as I recall, you explained that you
voluntarily made these commitments because you think it is
important that the American people have concrete assurance so
that they never doubt that you are working for them and not for
giant defense contractors. Right?
Secretary Austin. Yes. That is true.
Senator Warren. Good, and I just want to say, I also asked
several Trump nominees to make the same commitments, and they
refused. You, by contrast, demonstrated considerable leadership
in making those commitments.
Now, since your confirmation, the Senate has confirmed five
additional nominees to go to work at the Pentagon. Not a single
one of them was on the board of a major defense contractor,
none of them reported that the bulk of their income came from
our most powerful contractors, and I appreciate that and I
supported all of their nominations.
But this Committee is now being asked to consider nominees
who do not meet that test, and in these cases, when nominees
report the vast majority of their income from major defense
contractors, either through direct employment or consulting, or
when they are on those companies' boards, I plan to ask
nominees to make the same voluntary ethics commitments that you
did during your confirmation.
So let me ask you, Secretary Austin. Do you agree that the
people working for you, who have similar or even more extensive
ties to industry, should be living up to the same ethics
commitments that you made? Do you think it is important that
the American people have confidence, as you put it, that these
Pentagon officials are working for the American people and not
for their former employers in the defense industry?
Secretary Austin. Well, Senator, you have heard me say, on
a number of occasions, that sound, ethical behavior is
important to us, important to me, and important to the
Department. I have every reason to believe that those who have
been nominated to serve will conduct themselves properly and
exercise sound, ethical behavior, and I am truly appreciative
of your support in getting our nominees confirmed as quickly as
possible. We absolutely need them on the team.
Senator Warren. Well, let me say, though, I recognize the
importance of filling these important Defense Department
positions, but I am asking for commitments that they are going
to avoid conflicts of interests, and I have laid out what they
are, and you have agreed to them. So the question I am asking
is whether you think that the people who are going to be
working for you who have these ties should make the same kind
of commitments that you make.
Secretary Austin. Senator, again, I believe that they will
conduct themselves appropriately. I have no concerns about
their ethical behavior. I think that they are committed to
doing the right things.
Senator Warren. Well, look. I appreciate that you do not
want to step into this, but this is what leadership is about. I
am still in conversation with the current nominees, where I
think these commitments are warranted, and I hope that we can
come to an understanding as their nominations progress. If we
can, I will support their nominations. But in these cases and
going forward, if nominees with significant ties to the defense
industry refuse to make the commitments you made, then I will
vote no in this Committee, on their nominations, and I will ask
for a roll call vote on the floor where I will vote no again.
So let me be clear. I am asking for these commitments, not
because I am challenging anyone's integrity but because I think
it is critical that the American people have total confidence
that our public officials are truly working for them and not
for the defense industry that has paid them so well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren. Let me recognize
Senator Tillis, please.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
gentlemen, for being here. I want to go back to the discussion
of the UCMJ and what is described as military sexual assault.
It is an area I am frustrated with. I have spent a lot of time
with Senator Gillibrand. But, Secretary Austin, I am concerned
that even when we have the discussion here people think we are
just talking about military sexual assault. But we are talking
about alleged crime that would have a sentence of over 1 year.
So that is a sweeping change to the UCMJ.
I am also concerned with some of the technical aspects that
have not been spelled out in the bill. It is more of a
framework. We have not seen the details. But one of the things
that I am most troubled by is the 6-month implementation time
frame. In your judgment, to the extent that you know the
details of Senator Gillibrand's proposal, is that even possible
to be implemented?
Secretary Austin. I don't know all of the specific details
of her proposed timeline. What I would tell you is--and I would
echo what I said to the chairman a couple of minutes ago, is
that any change that we make, Senator, I would hope that we
would be provided ample time to make sure that we properly and
appropriately implement these changes, because a change to the
UCMJ is a very significant issue in the military. We want to
make sure we get this right, and we will get it right if a
change is required.
Senator Tillis. General Milley, do you think maybe taking
crimes that could be barracks larceny out of the chain of
command is a good idea, and would put us in a position where
good order and discipline on the part of the command would be
undermined?
General Milley. As I mentioned to Senator Gillibrand before
and some others earlier, I think the commander is essential to
maintaining good order and discipline in the military. We are a
military that is built to fight. The UCMJ is there to support
combat power. At the same time, cohesion is critical, and I am
very, very open to significant change in the area of sexual
assault and sexual harassment. When we get beyond that, at this
point my position is I need to study it more. I am open-minded,
but I think we would be really--it needs a lot of due diligence
before we bundle all the 1-year felonies and take them away
from the commander. So I think it is right to study it further.
Senator Tillis. General Austin, I think you have heard from
some of us about the need for a timely report back on the
commission findings and the DOD recommendations. With the mark-
up coming up next month, I think it is very important that we
get that feedback if it is to have any impact on what may
likely be in the National Defense Authorization (NDA) mark.
Secretary Austin. You are right, Senator, and I understand
your sense of urgency. I share that sense of urgency. As you
know, the Independent Review Commission is still evaluating the
other three lines of effort, that include prevention, victim
care, and also climate. I will get those shortly, and when I do
I will make my recommendations to the President, and those
recommendations will be based upon what I get from the IRC,
plus my consultations with the leadership of the Services.
Senator Tillis. Thank you. Jumping to budget matters, the
immediate response force--I know you know; you have spent some
quality time, you and General Milley, down at Fort Bragg--it
was deployed back in 2019, after the Iranian-backed Hezbollah
attacked our embassy in Iraq. The reports that I have got on
the ground there is the folks from the 82nd Airborne that would
be a part of the response spent pretty much the day going over
what you all know is a big complex, getting ready to do it, at
the expense of briefings and preparation.
The strategic deployment complex is not yet even on the
unfunded priorities list. Why is that?
Secretary Austin. I will look into that, Senator. I do not
know why the Army has not put that on their unfunded
requirements list, but I am sure that the Army's choice is
based upon the input they have gotten from the 18th Airborne
corps commander and others. But I will engage the Army on that.
Senator Tillis. I will submit a question for the record,
because I am concerned that in an instance where we may have to
once again send out an immediate response deployment request
that they are not the best prepared that they could be for it.
I would like to get that reported back, and I will submit other
questions for the record.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tillis. Senator Hirono,
please.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have had a
number of opportunities, Secretary Austin, to raise my concerns
about the fact that Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii (HDR-H), the
missile defense radar for Hawaii, has been zeroed out over the
last two fiscal year requests, and so in response to some of my
concerns raised about the fact that there is no funding
requested for this radar, which was told to us that it was
going to be very important as part of our system to protect
Hawaii, I am told that under the current situation, currently
protected against today's threats, that is the response I have
gotten, Secretary Austin.
But what we are looking at is we need to protect against
future threats, i.e., 2025 threats. So I am going to want to
have further discussions with you and your team as to what the
projected dangers are, going to 2025. I recognize that Hawaii
is protected under today's threat but not necessarily 2025, and
that was the time frame in which this radar was determined to
be necessary for our national security. So I do not want to get
into further discussion with you on the explanation as to why
it was zeroed out.
Let me move on to support for the Pacific Deterrence
Initiative. The PDI was enacted last year to ensure that DOD
prioritizes and invests in an often overlooked but critical
components of joint readiness. In fact, with regard to the PDI,
the previous commander of INDOPACOM, Admiral Philip Davidson,
identified five areas of focus in the PDI. One, the Joint Force
technology; two, force design and posture; three, strengthen
allies and partners; four, exercises, experimentation, and
implementation; and five, logistics and security enablers.
Looking at your budget request, though, I do not see
requested items in the five areas that Admiral Davidson had
identified as being supportive of the PDI, and, in fact, your
request identifies platforms like a Navy destroyer, fleet
oiler, and items related to the F-35 aircraft as PDI
investments.
So I would like to know, why is the vast majority of
funding identified to support PDI unrelated to the lines of
effort outlined in the United States Indo-Pacific Command
(INDOPACOM) Section 1251 report?
Secretary Austin. Senator, let me say, off the top, that
our intent was to align our PDI investment with congressional
intent, and so my staff is currently working with the Committee
to clarify and adjust any perceived misalignments, and, in
fact, make sure that we answer any and all questions, and so we
will continue to work that.
As you know, we have dedicated some $5.1 billion to PDI,
and again, our intent was to align our investments with
congressional intent.
I will go further to say that a great deal of the
Department's budget is invested in capabilities and activities
that concentrate on deterring China, and I would further say
that I am committed to working with the Committee to making
sure that we get it right and answer the needs of the commander
out in PACOM.
Senator Hirono. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate that commitment
toward aligning to congressional intent with what the combatant
commanders are requesting, and I think that alignment needs to
be much better. For example, the DOD is only partially funding
INDOPACOM's top three priorities that are important to
deterring China, since you mentioned that just now.
Moving on to the importance of military construction, and
funding, of course, is very critical to what we need to be
doing. I have had conversations with your team regarding the
need for a shipyard modernization and infrastructure support
for that, including a new dry dock for Hawaii. Now I know that
there is a request for dry docks in Portsmouth, and there is
money also for saltwater purification system in Norfolk. This
is in front of requested funding to move the dry dock for
Hawaii along.
I would request that you take a look at that. It is very
clear that the dry dock in Hawaii is very necessary for the
Hawaii Pearl Harbor shipyard to be able to take care of the
Virginia-class submarines that are there. We have no capacity
to do that right now, and so that dry dock needs to be moved
along. So I request that you look at the funding request to see
whether you can move the appropriation request for the dry dock
in Hawaii along.
My time is up, but I hope that you will continue to discuss
that particular concern with us and address my concern.
Secretary Austin. I understand, Senator, and we are
committed to making sure that we maintain the ability to
maintain and sustain our force, and so I will take a look at
that.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Let me now
recognize Senator Cramer, and also alert all of my colleagues
there will be two votes beginning at 11:30, and also I believe
the panel sought a break around that time. So in talking with
the ranking member we will figure out a strategy to accomplish
all those objectives.
Senator Cramer, please.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to all of
you for your service and for being here. Good to see you.
I want to start, Secretary Austin, by following up from an
answer that you gave to Senator Shaheen earlier about further
support for the Afghan forces, and you specifically mentioned
ISR support from the GCC, and I am wondering if you could tell
me specifically what kind of ISR support that is, what system.
Secretary Austin. Certainly we are flying our MQ-9s from
there, and essentially the vast majority of ISR is being
provided from other places outside of Afghanistan. You know, as
we have retrograded we have had to make sure we protect our key
platforms and systems there.
Senator Cramer. Are Global Hawk Block 30s part of that?
Secretary Austin. That is correct, yes.
Senator Cramer. You realize the Block 30s are slated for
retirement in this budget? You and I have had this discussion
before. I am concerned about the lack of a bridge between where
we are today and where we are going to get to eventually with
new systems. You have tough choices, and we have heard all
about the difficult priorities you have to set. But I remain
concerned about the retirement of Block 30s prematurely, to
benefit our combatant commanders everywhere, but I think the
Afghan stand presents a rather unique example of the threat.
With that, General Milley, could I ask you, are the
combatant commanders getting all of the ISR support that they
need, in every theater?
General Milley. I would tell you that as Chief of Staff for
the Army for 4 years and Chairman for almost 2, no combatant
commander has ever gotten all the ISR they wanted. It is one of
those commodities that is a high demand all the time, and no
one is completely ever satisfied. Every commander wants perfect
knowledge, and that is what ISR does is feed you with
knowledge. But we are never going to get enough ISR to fill all
the demand.
Having said that, it is all a function of risk. It is all a
function of where you take risk, what your priority is, are you
going to support the main effort, and what do you for the
supporting effort, and so on and so forth. In this budget, I
think that we are adequately funding ISR as we go forward, for
the main effort relative to China, and with respect to the
Block 30s and the MQ-9s, again, it has to do with relevance and
pivoting to the future. This budget biases future operating
environment, change in the character of war, and against the
pacing threat of China. That is not to say we are going to stop
everything with respect to A-10s or MQ-9s or some of these
systems. We have got to make that turn.
Senator Cramer. So since we are on the topic, if you could
list the top three threats to America's national security, in
order, what would they be?
General Milley. From a military standpoint, strictly
military standpoint, I think China is the number one military
threat as we go forward, but I also knowledge that Russia is a
considerable great power competitor, and those two, in the NDS,
and in the current strategic environment, from a military
perspective. There are many, many threats, but from a military
perspective I put those two up there.
Senator Cramer. I understand. One of the things I want to
get at, because I think it was just yesterday President Biden
announced, when he announced America is back, in Europe, to
military men and women Air Force in the United Kingdom, that
according to the military leaders that the number one threat
facing America's national security is climate change. Six weeks
ago today, the European Union Parliament, speaking of NATO and
allies which are a prominent part of your testimony in this
budget, EU Parliament passed a resolution, 569-67, urging the
EU institutions and member states to do everything they can to
stop the completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Three weeks
ago today, President Biden lifted the sanctions on completing
the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.
I am just kind of wondering--that flies in the face both of
America's back and it flies in the face of building NATO
alliances, rebuilding, as the budget document states--I am not
sure which ones we lost--but I know that there are at least
eight European union allies, including Ukraine, who strongly
oppose Nord Stream 2 for national security reasons, and certain
from climate change standpoint. If climate change is the number
one threat facing America's national security, allowing Nord
Stream 2 to be built is not good for the climate.
So I have some great concerns, and I think we ought to get
them straightened out. I do not know, for the life of me, how
completing Nord Stream 2 helps our alliance with the European
Union, other than maybe with the current Chancellor of Germany.
General Milley. Senator, if I could just----
Senator Cramer. Please.
General Milley.--make a comment on your piece about
threats. Climate change is a threat. Climate change has
significant impact on military operations, and we have to take
it into consideration. Climate change is going to impact
natural resources, for example. It is going to impact increased
instability in various parts of the world. It is going to
impact migrations and so on. In addition to that, we have
infrastructure challenges here at home--witness some of our
hurricanes. So climate change does impact.
But the President is looking at it at a much broader angle
than I am. I am looking at it from a strictly military
standpoint, and from a strictly military standpoint I am
putting China-Russia up there. That is not, however, in
conflict with the acknowledgement that climate change or
infrastructure or education systems--national security has a
broad angle to it. I am looking at from a strictly military
standpoint.
Senator Cramer. I just think it is peculiar that the
President would go to another continent and tell our
servicemembers there that the number one threat is climate
change, albeit a threat.
My time has expired. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Cramer.
In collaboration with the ranking member, and at the
request of the panel to take a short break at this time, I
would move to recess for 10 minutes. It also would allow people
to go to the vote, which has just been called, and so with that
I would ask for a 10-minute recess.
[Recess.]
Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing back to order after
the short recess, and recognize Senator Blumenthal for his
questions.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary, Chairman Milley, for your extraordinary service, and
thank you for being here today.
I have been very concerned about the ship that apparently
has been sent from Iran to Venezuela. Apparently two Iranian
vessels are believed to be carrying arms intended to transfer
to Venezuela. As you know, these ships are thought to be
carrying weapons that would fulfill a deal that Iran and
Venezuela made a year ago. We do not know the types of weapons,
at least as far as I know. There were reports that Venezuela
was considering purchasing missiles from Iran, including long-
range ones. Commercial satellite imagery of one of the ships
shows fast-attack boats loaded on the deck, but it is still
unclear whether those boats were aboard when the ships began
their journey.
I was pleased to see that a senior administration official
stated that delivery of these weapons would be a, quote,
``provocative act and understood as a threat to our partners in
the western hemisphere,'' end quote, and that the United States
would reserve the right to take appropriate measures, quote,
``in coordination with our partners to deter the transit or
delivery of such weapons.''
Secretary Austin, allowing this ship to dock seems
significant to me on many different levels. It would be the
first time that Iranian vessels have made such a transit, and
the precedent of allowing Iran to provide weapons to the region
causes me grave concern. Do you share that concern, and how
would such delivery effect the region, in your view?
Secretary Austin. Well, Senator, thanks for the question. I
am absolutely concerned about the proliferation of weapons, any
type of weapons, in our neighborhood, and so I share your
concern.
Senator Blumenthal. Can you tell me whether the
administration knows exactly what is on those Iranian vessels?
Secretary Austin. I would like to take that conversation,
either that question for the record or we could take that
conversation is another forum.
Senator Blumenthal. I would be glad to do it in another
setting. Have you had any communication with your colleagues in
other nations in this hemisphere?
Secretary Austin. I have not had any discussions with any
other nations in our hemisphere on this issue.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you, on the topic of white
supremacy and violent extremism, which you and I have discussed
both in your confirmation hearings and privately, I understand
that there will be a task force report. Can you tell us when
that report will be released?
Secretary Austin. I am sorry, Senator. I did not quite hear
the question.
Senator Blumenthal. Can you provide an update as to the
status of the extremism task force that you announced recently
and when this Committee can expect to be briefed on the
results?
Secretary Austin. As you recall, Senator, early on in my
tenure I asked the force to conduct a brief standdown to
discuss the issue of extremism in our ranks, and let me preface
what I am going to say by saying that, you know, I am totally
convinced that 99 percent of our troops are focused on the
right things and doing the right things and embracing the right
values each and every day. But as I may have mentioned to you
earlier, I believe that small numbers can have an outsized
effect regarding this issue.
So we did gain some insights from the standdown, and it was
a great opportunity for leaders to have discussions with other
leaders, and leaders to have discussions with subordinates, and
talk about those behaviors, and we are focused on behaviors,
those behaviors that are not supported by the values that we
embrace.
In addition to that, we stood up a counter-extremism
working group which routinely monitors our efforts across the
Department in terms of what we are doing to make sure that we
counter extremism or extremist behaviors. They are refining our
policies and also gaining a better understanding of the
complete challenge. Certainly, you know, I can have the
leadership of that working group come to brief you, upon
request, or any time you want.
Senator Blumenthal. I would very much appreciate that, Mr.
Secretary, and I applaud the efforts that you are making
against that probably less than 1 percent, as you said, 99
percent. But I think it is an even more overwhelming majority
who adhere to the basic values and are dedicated patriots, and
the focus on that less than 1 percent is well warranted,
because they may have an outsized effect. So I would welcome an
opportunity to learn more from the task force whenever it is
appropriate to do so. I will be in touch with your office, if
that is okay.
Secretary Austin. I would absolutely agree with you,
Senator, that it is less than 1 percent. We will gain better
insights, and also equip our force with better policies and
definitions.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator
Blackburn, please.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I
appreciate that you all are here today.
Secretary Austin, I want to come to you on the issue of
nuclear deterrence. When you went through your confirmation
hearing we had a discussion about that, and in your advance
policy questions you had made a statement, and I am quoting
you, ``The tipping point where we must simultaneously overhaul
these forces is now here.'' That was your comment in reference
to nuclear deterrence. While we are looking at this budget that
is before us, we see that modernization is fully funded. But
then when you look at deferred maintenance, you see that it
cuts hundreds of millions of dollars from the enacted level,
the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA's)
deferred maintenance budget.
So we know that more than half of the NNSA facilities are
over 40 years old. Thirty percent date back to the 1940s. So to
me, this sounds like we are at a tipping point when we discuss
these facilities. So was that deferred maintenance cut
coordinated with DOD, and realistically, what effect will it
have on the ability of the NSNA to meet the DOD requirements?
Secretary Austin. To my knowledge it was not coordinated
with DOD, and what I would say to you though, Senator, is that
it is very important to me and to our Department to make sure
that we work with the Department of Energy to ensure that we
achieve our common goal of maintaining a robust nuclear
deterrent. You have my commitment to make sure that I remain
engaged with the Department of Energy (DOE) to make sure that
the right things are happening in this regard.
Senator Blackburn. Okay. Then let me ask it like this. What
are the consequences that happen if we do not modernize and
bring this infrastructure, maintain this infrastructure?
Secretary Austin. You have head me say before, Senator,
that, you know, I am absolutely committed to the modernization
of the triad, and you know that we have dedicated $28 billion
in this 2022 budget to that effort. Maintenance is also
important, and again, with respect to NNSA, we will remain
engaged with DOE to make sure that the right things are
happening and gain a better understanding of what DOE's
objectives are.
Senator Blackburn. Well, you all frequently will say that
infrastructure is a part of what you need to retain talent, and
I would expect that the enterprise's invaluable workforce, as
they are, as we look at 21st century warfare, that it is
difficult for them to continue to work in dilapidated and
sometimes unsafe conditions. And I would assume that that is a
concern to you also.
Secretary Austin. It absolutely is a concern, both for what
the issues that DOD controls and also, you know, I am sure it
is a concern for all the things that DOE is responsible for as
well.
Senator Blackburn. Senator Fischer brought up to you the
action of the Acting Secretary of the Navy cancelling the
nuclear sea-launched cruise missile. So why was this decision
made before completion of the nuclear posture review?
Secretary Austin. Again, Senator, I have not seen the memo,
but like the Chairman, I will see it very shortly after this
hearing. As I understand the purpose of that memo was to issue
some guidance for planning and evaluation to the Navy. But
again, I am committed to conducting a nuclear posture review
that we talked about earlier, and that will be conducted, and
that will drive our activities going forward.
Senator Blackburn. Well, I think that memo sent a message
we did not want to send to Russia and China, when it comes to
great power competition.
I did appreciate the Department being on pace to fully fund
the PDI, and the concern is the number one PDI ask was the Guam
defense system to be fully funded at $350 million. But when you
look through this, the funding totals for the defense of Guam
procurement and the Guam defense development line items in the
budget was $118.3 million, and that is less than half of the
money that is required for this, which is the number one
unfunded priority, if you will.
So I would like to hear you speak to that. You know, we
know that these fusion centers are vitally important. I have
done a good bit of work on these multilateral fusion centers,
and they serve a critical function of really enhancing our
intelligence, our information, our logistical coordination.
Future fusion centers are the commanders' number 11 unfunded
priorities. These fusion centers also support investments in
mission partner environments, the number 2 unfunded priority.
So it seems like we have got a pattern that is going there, and
I would love for you to address it. I know I am over and there
are other waiting for questions, and I would be happy to take
that response in writing.
Secretary Austin. We will most certainly get it to you,
Senator. Thank you very much.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blackburn. Let me
recognize Senator Peters, please.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and each of our
witnesses here today, thank you for your service, and thank you
for being here today.
But I want to start first by saying how disappointed--and I
will just say, actually, quite angry--at a recent decision made
by the Air Force to not award Selfridge Air National Guard Base
the F-35 international training mission, and my feelings are
based on the data and the criteria that was presented by each
of the installations that competed as well as what the Air
Force put forward. It is clear, from my review of that, and
others, that Selfridge was clearly the superior choice in the
matter, and this is clearly a problem that, as we have seen
before with the Air Force, as all of you know, the GAO is now
investigating strategic basing decisions being made by the Air
Force over the last few years. Without question this Committee,
this body, needs to retain confidence that the choices made by
the U.S. Air Force are based on data and based on criteria and
not at a whim, or whatever may be behind it.
So my question for you, Secretary Austin, is, do I have
your commitment that you will review the Air Force's F-35
international training mission decision and we will have an
opportunity to talk about that?
Secretary Austin. You do have my commitment that I will
review it, as I do all of those types of decisions over time,
and I would also offer to have the Air Force come in and brief
you on their decision. Air Force typically uses a very detailed
process to make those kinds of decisions, and I would offer
that politics has no place in this decision-making process,
this type of decision-making process. and so, if you desire for
the Air Force to come and do a lay-down for you, I am sure that
they will be willing to do that.
Senator Peters. Well, I appreciate that. I have had some of
those discussions already, but to make sure that the process is
indeed an objective process, it is critically important there
is full transparency so that we can see not only how Selfridge
ranked, based on that data and the criteria, but also how the
one that was selected also ranked, so there could be a true
objective comparison of that criteria. We tend to just get one
side and not hear the other side. I want to make sure that all
of our questions are asked. That is something I assume you
would certainly support.
Secretary Austin. Thanks, Senator. My guidance and
requirement is that we always try to be as transparent as
possible.
Senator Peters. I appreciate that. While I understand the
fiscal year 2022 budget continues to fund per- and
polyfluoralkyl substances PFAS remediation, the reality is that
the funding requested is not anywhere close to being sufficient
to address the contamination that we continue to find in
Michigan, and unfortunately hundreds of other sites all across
the country. The price tag to address (PFAS) contamination
comes on top of what is already a staggering backlog of
environmental remediation needs facing the Department.
This is why I have joined my fellow Armed Services
Committee members in introducing legislation to expedite
cleanup of some of the most contaminated sites and why I will
continue to work to implement clear and enforceable standards
to guide those.
So Secretary Austin, how does the Department's budget
address the management challenge presented by these literally
forever chemicals? I know this is not a problem that we are
going to be able to solve in a year or, quite frankly, even in
the next decade. But the longer we wait to address these toxic
contaminations, the higher the eventual cost is to our
servicemembers, to our communities, and, quite frankly, to the
U.S. taxpayers.
Secretary Austin. Yeah. As you know there are provisions in
this budget to address remediation for contaminated sites, and,
this will extend obviously well beyond this budget. You have my
commitment to continue to work this going forward.
I just recently met with Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) Administrator a couple of weeks ago to focus on this and
a couple of other issues. It was a very good meeting. We
committed to working together and making sure that we met the
standards of remediation and we had good procedures for
remediation.
This is a significant challenge to our country, as you
pointed out. You know, DOD is an element of a larger challenge.
Obviously, we are not the only source of this contaminant. But
I would tell you that DOD is committed to doing its part to
remediating whatever damage has been done in every part of this
country where we have contributed to this.
Senator Peters. Well, thank you, Secretary Austin. I
appreciate your attention to both of the matters that I raised,
and I look forward to working with you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters. Senator Sullivan,
please.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen,
thank you for your service. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. General
Milley, you know how much respect I have for both of you. You
have a hard job, especially coming here to defend a budget you
probably do not like or did not support internally, but you
have got to do it, and that is tough job.
But let me just mention, budgets are a reflection of an
administration's priorities. Take a look at this chart. I
handed this chart out to you as well, this chart here. The
Biden administration, in its $6 trillion budget blowout,
clearly prioritizes defense and homeland security dead last.
Dead last. If you look at in terms of inflation adjusted it is
actually a cut.
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Now I think a lot of us here, Democrats and Republicans,
think national security should be prioritized first, not last.
I think you gentlemen probably believe that. But importantly,
how can we tell the troops that you are leading that we are
prioritizing their mission, which is defending America, when it
is clear that the Biden administration's prioritization of
their mission is last, a declining defense budget when almost
every other agency in the Federal Government is getting a
massive, double-digit increase?
Mr. Secretary, do you want to try to take that one on
first?
Secretary Austin. Thanks, Senator. What I will tell our
troops, and what I have told them and will continue to tell
them, is that I truly believe that the President's budget gives
us the flexibility to go after the right mix of capabilities to
defend the Nation and to deter aggression.
Senator Sullivan. No, I mean, I understand that. I have
been watching the hearing. I get it. I am just talking about
the--and again, it is tough question for you because you are
not in charge of these other agencies like OMB and the White
House is. But they are clearly not prioritizing the military
and national defense relative to any other agency at all. I
mean, look at this chart. They are putting the national
security mission dead last in terms of the prioritization of
budgets. How do we tell our troops that, hey, we are putting
you first?
Secretary Austin. Our troops are always first. They are
first now and they will always be first going forward. Again, I
do believe that we have what we need to go after the right
capabilities.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. There has been a lot of focus,
Senator Cramer talked about this issue of climate change.
Clearly our country needs to address this issue. This is a big
issue in Alaska. I am always puzzled, though, how our military
is task-organized to do this. You know, I had the honor of
serving with you at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). General
Milley, we overlapped briefly in Afghanistan. I do not think in
any of my military service I heard climate change as a phrase
mentioned once. I heard the Taliban, Iraq, Iran, improvised
explosive devices.
Nevertheless, Mr. Secretary, in your opening statement you
mentioned climate change 15 times and lethality twice, which I
think is a bit of a mismatch.
I was just in South Korea and Taiwan. You guys also
mentioned China is our pacing threat. Let me ask a simple
question that relates to these two priorities. What is a more
immediate threat to our national security interests that DOD
has the capability of responding to, particularly in the Asia-
Pacific, a Chinese communist invasion of Taiwan or the
challenge of climate change? I think it is a pretty simple
question. I think it is actually a really simple answer.
Mr. Secretary, do you have a comment on that?
Secretary Austin. Well, first, I do not recall mentioning
climate change 15 times. I will go back and do my word count.
Senator Sullivan. I think it was in your written statement.
Secretary Austin. Okay, and let me also be clear, Senator,
that lethality is important. This is the most lethal force that
has ever occupied the planet, and it will remain so going
forward. That is what we remain focused on in the Department of
Defense, defending this nation, and we will go after the
capabilities required to do that.
Senator Sullivan. So Taiwan invasion by the Chinese
Communist Party or climate change? I think it is very simple.
What is the most immediate threat DOD can respond to?
Secretary Austin. The most significant military threat that
we are focused on, and you have heard me say this probably 100
times, Senator, is China. It is our pacing challenge, and that
is what we have asked you, a number of times, to help us
resource our efforts on that challenge, and I appreciate what
you have done thus far, and I know that you will continue to
help us going forward.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask one final question. Sorry, Mr.
Chairman. It is related to that. I have another chart here. It
shows that our budget increases or decreases relative to the
Chinese. The Chinese have dramatically and consistently
increased their defense budget annually by at least 6 percent,
sometimes as much as 13 percent. We have increased ours, during
the Trump administration, when the Republicans controlled the
Senate. You see during the Biden administration, Obama-Biden,
it was dramatically cut. Now we are looking at cuts again.
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What message does this chart send to China and our allies
in the region, and can we sustain our declining comparative
advantage over China, militarily, if these trends continue?
This both for the Secretary and General Milley.
Secretary Austin. Well, a message that I am concerned about
is the message that we send to the world, and that is that we
are going to continue to go after the capabilities and develop
the operational concepts to be able to deter anyone who would
venture to take on the United States of America. So we will
have the capabilities necessary to defend this nation.
Senator Sullivan. General?
General Milley. So, Senator, a couple of things. I want to
go back and make two points on the budget piece, explaining it
to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, guardians out there.
We are getting $715 billion if this is passed. That is a lot of
money. That is 50 percent of the entire President's budget.
That is 1 out of every 2 dollars in the discretionary spending
of the Federal Government. That is not a small amount of
change. The increases that you show on your chart, those are
factually correct, but relative to the whole and in context, we
are getting a lot of money. So that is the first thing.
The second thing is relative to climate change. Paragraph
one of every operations order I have ever seen for 41
consecutive years says enemy situation to include weather and
terrain. We always consider weather, and climate change is
weather at the strategic level. It has military impact. We are
not going to change climate change. The Department of Defense
is not going to change climate change. But we must consider it
in on our strategic calculations, all the time, because it is
going to increase instability overseas and it has impact on our
infrastructure here. So climate change is real.
The military threat is China, as the Secretary just said,
is the pacing threat. We are calculating all of our
calculations relative to that as the pacing threat, and others
are second in nature.
The third piece, relative to the China versus U.S.
spending. This is a disturbing trend--there is no question
about it--with respect to China. They have made a major
economic investment in developing their military. It has been
going on for 20 or 30 years. The gaps that used to exist, say
20, 30 years ago, were like this. Today they are like that, and
the Chinese have a deliberate plan to be a global challenger to
the United States of America, militarily, by mid-century. Now
we have got to continue strong investments in our military, and
I think this budget, for this year, is an adequate investment
right now. We have to set the conditions, though, to pivot to
the future character of war with the pacing threat of China.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Let me now
recognize, via Webex, Senator Duckworth.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,
gentlemen. Thank you so much for being here today. Thank you
for your service to our country.
While responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, natural
disasters and civil unrest, or seamlessly integrating with the
Joint Forces and overseas operations, the National Guard and
Reserve component continues to answer the call. Over the past
20 years, the high demand for Reserve component forces has
necessitated a shift from a strategic Reserve to an operational
force. In fact, last June, over 120,000 National Guard troops
were mobilized, more than at any time since World War II.
In short, our Nation relies on our Reserve component
forces, the Reserves and the National Guard, to defend the
United States and fulfill the DOD's national security
responsibilities. However, even though the National Guard and
Reserves are serving in critical capacities and in dangerous
duty assignments, they are not receiving the same pay and
benefits as their Active Duty counterparts. The complexity of
the current slate of duty statuses adds unnecessary confusion
to activating Reserve component forces. The disparity in pay
and benefits between different duty statuses can also
incentivize manipulating orders to minimize the servicemembers'
access to benefits.
I believe duty status reform is necessary to ensure the
National Guard and Reserve forces receive equal pay and access
to the health care and educational benefits they deserve for
the work that they do. Bottom line: servicemembers doing the
same job in the same place should not earn different pay and
benefits based on their duty statuses.
General Milley, could you please update me on the DOD's
plans to address Reserve component duty status reform, and when
do you anticipate releasing your findings?
General Milley. Thanks, Senator. As part of the Joint
Force, Active Duty, Reserve, and National Guard, it is a total
force, and we have a commitment to ensure that we have
appropriate and fair pay and benefits given to our National
Guard troops and our reservists. That reform effort is
underway. We are reviewing that. I cannot give you the exact
date of when we will have that to you, but we are working it,
and we are working it very hard, and we are working it with
both the National Guard Bureau and each of the Services. But we
do recognize the need to ensure that it is evenly applied in
terms of pay and benefits to the soldiers in the Reserve
component, or the troops in the Reserve component.
Senator Duckworth. Well, will you also commit to making
sure that whatever the reform proposal is that is appropriated
shaped to eliminate orders manipulation and current pay and
benefit disparities?
General Milley. Sure. Absolutely. You know, our commitment
is to ensure that everyone who wears the cloth of our Nation,
whether they are Active, Guard, or Reserve, no matter where
they are, are treated equally in all respects, to include pay
and benefits. I commit that to you and I will get you the
answer on the exact date of when the reform proposals are due
in.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Secretary Austin, Reserve
component servicemembers are required to maintain the same
proficiency in certain critical skill sets as their Active
component counterparts, even though they do not necessarily put
on the uniform every day. This is especially true for pilots,
for example. They only received incentive pay at a fraction of
the amount of Active servicemembers.
I believe every servicemember, whether Active or Reserve,
deserve to be fairly compensated for maintaining mission-
essential skills. The RAND Corporation has shown that incentive
pay can help improve retention and is far more cost effective
than training new servicemembers to replace those who separate.
As we continue to strengthen our National Guard and Reserve
forces, we must retain our talented servicemembers. That is why
I introduced the bipartisan National Guard and Reserve
Incentive Pay Parity Act, to help ensure that Reserve component
servicemembers in high-skill roles are compensated at the same
rates as they Active Duty counterparts.
Secretary Austin, will you commit to exploring options such
as the Incentive Pay Parity Act, to help improve retention,
especially of those servicemembers with critical skills?
Secretary Austin. I will, Senator, and for all the reasons
that General Milley mentioned, our Guard and Reserve have done
amazing work. The skill sets that you are talking about in many
cases are warfighting or combat-related skills, and so it is
absolutely important that they are proficient, and they should
receive the same proficiency pay.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I have one final question I
will submit for the record, but it has to do with modernization
efforts to continue across the Joint Force, and wanting to know
whether DOD and the military services are factoring in program
performance into decisions about how to prioritize budget
requests to adequately resource successful programs such as
future vertical lift. But I will submit that for the record.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Duckworth. Let me
recognize Senator Scott.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman. First off, I want to
thank each of you for your willingness to serve. You have very
significant roles for our country. Probably the most important
thing we can be doing is making sure we defend our freedoms.
Would any of you disagree that when you are thinking about
Communist China you are thinking about a party that either
wants world domination or, in the worst case, wants to
absolutely control the Indo-Pacific?
Secretary Austin. I do believe that their goal is to
control the Indo-Pacific, and I also believe that they desire
to be the dominant to preeminent country in the world, and so I
think they are working towards that end.
Senator Scott. So would you all disagree that their goal is
to eventually take back Taiwan, a great American ally? You
wouldn't disagree with that, right?
Secretary Austin. I would not disagree with the point that
they have a goal of eventually uniting Taiwan with China.
Senator Scott. That would be whether they do it voluntarily
or involuntarily, through the military.
Do you all believe that we are going to just continue to
see more surveillance by the Communist Party of China of
American citizens and our allies around the world? We are
seeing more surveillance all the time. You agree with that,
right?
Secretary Austin. I mean, it stands to reason that whatever
level of surveillance that is ongoing now will continue, and
quite possibly increase going forward.
Senator Scott. So if you look at this, you saw what Senator
Sullivan brought up. You saw the fact that year after year they
are investing more in their military. Their goal is to have an
economy bigger than ours, and you seem to agree that if they
have an economy bigger than ours they are going to increase
their defense spending. As General Milley says, it is getting
closer and closer.
If China is able to pull this off, then our opportunities
all over the world, opportunities of American citizens and our
way of life, is going to change, right? If they can do fulfill
their goals, then our opportunities will be diminished. Would
you all agree with that?
Secretary Austin. You know, I would describe our
relationship with China currently as one of competition. Again,
you have mentioned that they desire to be the preeminent
country on the planet, and that is, in fact, the case. Their
mid- to long-term goal is to do that. They look to compete with
us, not only militarily but across a spectrum of activity. What
you see us doing, the military and in other sectors in our
government, is making sure that we remain competitive,
economically, making sure that we are developing the best--we
continue to develop the best scientists in the world, and we do
the most comprehensive research. So it is a competition across
a broad spectrum of activity.
Senator Scott. So if you follow through the reasoning, if
China wants to be either Indo-Pacific or world dominant, if
they build an economy bigger than ours, if they continue to
out-invest us in the military, which they are, at least growing
faster than we are, then what are you all doing to, one, inform
American citizens of the risk, because, you know, we all do a
budget based on what the American citizens believe the priority
is--that is how we elect our elected leaders. So what are you
all doing to, one, inform the public of the risk of Communist
China, and ensure them that we have the budget we need to make
sure that in 5 or 10 or 15 years we are not sitting here,
saying we wish we would have done more, we all saw this threat
but we didn't do enough about it?
Secretary Austin. Yeah, just about every time you hear me
speak, Senator, I know you probably grow tired of me taking
about the competition with China. But that is my focus. My
number one focus is to defend this nation and protect our
interests. Our pacing challenge is, and will continue to be,
China. Again, we are going after the capabilities that can
match the operational concepts that we are putting into play
and allow us to be not only competitive but actually dominant
in this competition.
So that is what the Department of Defense is doing, and I
think you see activity across the entire government that is
focused on making sure that we not only can compete with China
but maintain our edge with respect to China.
Senator Scott. Do you think it is important that in your
role that you inform the American public of the risk of
Communist China so everybody will be more focused on making
sure we have the military budget we need?
Secretary Austin. We do so, routinely, and we will continue
to do that, Senator Scott.
Senator Scott. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Scott. Let me
recognize Senator Rosen, please.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
Inhofe, for holding this hearing. I would like to thank the
witnesses for your service to our great nation. Thank you for
being here today.
Right before the break, Senator Cramer was talking to you
about our ISR requirements and his concerns, and I am concerned
as well about the MQ-9. So, Secretary Austin, the MQ-9 Reaper,
I do not have to tell you, it is critical to supporting our
current intelligence, surveillance, and recognizance
requirements. A key part of the MQ-9 architecture is the
mission at Nevada's Creech Air Force Base. Last year, CENTCOM
Commander, General Kenneth McKenzie, included additional MQ-9
funding at the top of his unfunded priorities, and in April he
told this Committee of the MQ-9's importance and his need for
more of them, not fewer.
The Air Force today still lacks the ISR capacity to meet
combatant commanders' requirements contained in the 2018
National Defense Strategy. Despite this, the Department has
previously proposed cutting this platform, their most cost
effective, without a program of record to replace it, which
would further risk widening the ISR capability gap that General
Milley talked about.
So Secretary Austin, what is the Department's plan for the
MQ-9, and given its importance, cost effectiveness, and the
requirement for combatant commanders for more ISR assets, why
has the Air Force cut funding for this program without a
program of record to replace it?
Secretary Austin. Well, thank you, Senator. I think you
heard General Milley talk earlier about the way combatant
commanders view ISR, having been a combatant commander in a
former life. I can tell you I agree with him. There is never
enough ISR--I will always want more.
The Air Force has committed to taking off a number of lines
of ISR, but they are not reducing the tails, the aircraft, that
go with those lines. What they are doing is making sure that
they upgrade and modernize their aircraft, where possible, and
so that they can network the aircraft better. So the number of
tails is not being reduced. The number of lines is being
reduced slightly.
Senator Rosen. So can you get to us some information about
that so we know what the program of record will be going
forward and how it can impact us?
Secretary Austin. Absolutely.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that.
I would like to move on to talking a little bit about
Iranian aggression, how we combat that, because Iranian-backed
militias, of course, are increasingly targeting United States
installations, our servicemembers in Iraq, via rocket and drone
attacks. Iran continues to be the world's leading state sponsor
of terrorism, a threat to the United States allied interests
all across the world, be its ballistic missile program, its
support for terrorist proxies like Hezbollah, Hamas,
kata'ibltezbollah (KH), Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), and many
others.
According to a recently released annual threat assessment
of the United States Intelligence Committee, and I quote,
``Iran-supported Iraqi Shia militias will continue to pose the
primary threat to U.S. personnel in Iraq.''
So to Secretary Austin and General Milley, with the
constant threat to the United States and coalition forces in
the Middle East posed by Iran and Iran-backed militia groups,
what are we doing to counter them, and how are we proactively
protecting our forces and personnel? Do we have what we need to
do that and prevent them, prevent these militias and terrorists
from targeting our U.S. troops in the region?
Secretary Austin. Yeah. We certainly continue to demand
that Iran cease its malicious behavior in the region, in terms
of its support of the Iranian-backed Shia militia groups, and
we demand that they cease providing them modernized equipment
so that they can conduct these kinds of attacks. We are doing
everything within our power and our capability to make sure
that our troops that are forward deployed have adequate
protection. We are engaging the Iraqi leadership to make sure
that the Iraqi leadership does what is necessary to help
protect our citizens, who are there to help the Iraqi
Government.
General Milley. So I would say, in addition to everything
the Secretary said, is think offense/defense. So in terms of
defense, the force protection of the force, the disposition of
exactly where they are at, how many they are at, what the
hardening of those sites, we are doing all of those measures.
In addition to that, we have air defense capabilities--SeaRAMs,
counter-rocket and mortar, and counter-unmanned aircraft
systems that were put in place. Those have been proven quite
effective, actually, against some of the Shia militia groups'
capabilities. We are going to continue to reinforce all of
that.
On the offense side, I will not discuss it here but I can
discuss it in some detail in a classified session as to what we
can do, what we are prepared to do, and what we have already
done. All of that in combination we think is mitigating the
risk. It certainly does not reduce it to zero. It is a
dangerous environment. We all recognize that. But we have got
to continue to work by, with, and through the Iraqi Government,
because they are the first line of defense for the protection
of our forces in their country.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I just want to be sure that we
have assets on the ground to defend American installations in
Iraq and Syria----
General Milley. We do.
Senator Rosen.--and other places in the Middle East.
General Milley. We absolutely do.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator Hawley,
please.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the
witnesses for being here. Thank you for your service, as
always.
Mr. Secretary, if I could just start with you. I asked you
earlier this year if you agreed with the National Defense
Strategy assessment that the U.S. military needs to be
postured, and here is the quote, ``to deter and prevent a fait
accompli by an agile, opportunistic adversary.'' You responded
to me in writing, which I appreciated, and I appreciated the
response you gave, which was, you said, and I am quoting you
now, ``Yes, I agree with the Commission's finding. A combat-
credible, forward deterrent posture is instrumental to our
ability to deter, and if necessary, deny a fait accompli
scenario.'' I assume you still agree with that.
Secretary Austin. I do, Senator.
Senator Hawley. Very good, and would you also agree then, I
assume that this would apply to our ability to maintain the
ability to defeat a Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan. Is
that accurate?
Secretary Austin. That is accurate, Senator. I think nobody
wants to see a unilateral change of the status quo with respect
to Taiwan. You have heard us say that we are committed to
helping Taiwan defend itself, in accordance with the Taiwan
Relations Act, the three communiques, and the six assurances.
Our position has not changed in that regard, and we will
continue to help them develop the capability.
Senator Hawley. General Milley, if I could just get you on
this as well. Would you agree that the United States should
maintain its ability to defeat a Chinese fait accompli against
Taiwan, if necessary?
General Milley. I absolutely would, but, Senator, frankly,
I am not sure what a Chinese fait accompli in Taiwan is. If you
are talking about a military invasion of Taiwan, crossing the
straits, the Taiwan Straits, with a sizeable military force to
seize an island the size of Taiwan against the military that
they have and with the population that they have, that is an
extraordinarily complex and difficult operation. Even against
an unopposed force that is a very hard thing to do. But I can
assure you that we have the capabilities if there were
political decisions made in accordance with the Taiwan
Relations Act and so on. But we do have military capabilities.
Senator Hawley. To defeat such an attempted invasion is
what you are saying, General Milley.
General Milley. Yes.
Senator Hawley. Got it. Good. Would you agree, Mr.
Secretary, if I can just come back to you, would you agree that
we need to be, when we think about deterring China, that we
need to be as focused on deterring China in the next 3, 5, 7
years as we are 10 to 15 years from now? I am asking this--the
context for this is we have heard now from the outgoing United
States Pacific Command (PACOM) Commander, from the incoming
PACOM Commander, we just heard earlier this week from the
former Deputy National Security Advisor that China is
increasingly aggressive and that the window to deter that
aggression may be shorter than we had thought.
So thus my question. Would you agree that we need to be
focused on deterring them in the short to medium term, 3, 5, 7
years, including the longer term?
Secretary Austin. We do, and I would say that those two
issues are not mutually exclusive, Senator. As you know, they
complement each other. While we are developing a future
capability, we certainly have to bridge to that capability, and
that is absolutely our focus.
Senator Hawley. Great. Great.
General Milley. Senator----
Senator Hawley. Yeah, General.
General Milley.--I would say the key here is deterrence. We
are in a condition of strategic great power competition. It
needs to stay at competition, and deterrence is key to prevent
it from going from competition to incident or competition to
war.
Senator Hawley. Yeah, very good. I am glad you mentioned
that, and if I could just follow up on that, General. The
adversary, the competitor in this case, China, knowing that we
have the ability to deter them, we have the ability to do what
you said a minute ago, which is if they should choose military
aggression, we have the ability, should we choose, to deny that
aggression, that is important for deterrence, is it not, them
knowing we have the capability?
General Milley. Yeah. I mean, in simple terms, I mean,
deterrence is actually a very complex thing, but in simple
terms you have to have the capability, your opponent has to
know you have the capability, you have got to communicate that
capability to your opponent and he has to know it, you have to
communicate your will to use it, if necessary, and both actors
have to be rational. If all of those components are there, in
simple terms, you will be able to achieve a state of
deterrence. Thus far, it is achieved.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you for that.
Mr. Secretary, let me just ask you in this context then
about the Department's request for the Pacific Deterrence
Initiative. In your request you include, if I understand it
correctly, $23 million for force design and posture
improvements, out of the $2.2 billion that is required. I am
trying to understand how providing our forces in the Pacific
with just 1 percent of the funding they need for posture
improvements to support those combat-credible, forward
deterrent posture that we are talking about, how can we do that
and say that we are going to maintain the ability to deter or
deny a fait accompli?
Secretary Austin. Yeah. So Senator, I would flag for you
just a couple of issues. The first issue is that, as I said
earlier, that our intent is to make sure that with respect to
the PDI investment that we meet the congressional intent, and
we believe we have invested in a number of things that meets
that intent, and we will meet with your staff and explain where
the investments are, to make sure that the language is not
confusing.
The second thing is we have invested $5.1 billion in the
PDI.
The third thing I would flag for you is that, you know,
much of what we are investing in, in terms of capability is
really focused on our efforts to counter the challenge
presented by China. I would also say that when we speak of
deterrence, we are not talking about just air, land, and sea.
We are talking about using every capability across all domains,
to include cyber and space. We are talking about integrating
the capabilities of our allies, which I believe is very, very
important. We are talking about using every lever that the
United States Government has available to it to, in fact,
effect that deterrence.
Senator Hawley. Thank you very much. I have got some more
questions for you on this, Mr. Secretary. I will follow up with
you in writing. But I appreciate the opportunity to engage with
you on it. Thank you, General.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley. Senator
Tuberville, please.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
being here today.
Chairman Reed. Put your microphone on, please.
Senator Tuberville. Hello. Hello. Does that work? Good.
Thank you. I thought mine was worn out after this long day, Mr.
Secretary.
I want to take a little different angle here. I have been a
team-builder all my life, and I am on the Veterans' Affairs
Committee, and I have been talking my first 6 months here with
recruiters out in the field for the military. I am huge
military person, military brat, and I grew up in a military
family. We talk about missiles and bombs and ships, and you
have got to have all of those. But if we do not have the
people, the best people we can possibly get, we are going to be
in trouble. It is like winning a football game--the best
players win games. There is no doubt the same thing within the
military, and we have always had a strong military.
I hear a lot of comments about, ``Why should I get in the
military? They did not look out for the people in Iraq and
Afghanistan on the burn pits.'' Gentlemen, we have got a huge
problem. We are getting ready to spend hundreds and hundreds
and hundreds of billions of dollars for veterans that have gone
over and breathed that smoke and chemicals and all those
things. We have got to make better decisions than that. You
know, all that money we are going to get ready to spend, you
know, it could have gone to you guys, to defense. But to me it
is going to be hard to recruit good people, the best people.
I hear all this extremism stuff, and again, I have dealt
with people all my life. You know, you don't have to like each
other to be on the team. A lot of my players could not stand
other guys on the team. You know, they just had personality
conflicts. But at the end of the day, you have got to learn
respect. You have got to earn the trust and dedication and all
that from your teammates. I mean, you have got to learn that,
and so I just hate for us to get off on this tangent of the
people that we have in the military.
Now in football, for instance, it is your coaches, when you
bring players in you have got to build a team. You have got to
bring them together. Same thing in the military. You have got
lieutenants, captains, drill sergeants, corporals, all those.
Everybody's responsibility is to bring that team together. The
things that I am hearing and seeing in the military bases I
have been going to the last six months, and talking to
recruiters, we are going to have a tough time. Then we have got
to face the people in big tech of taking the best and
brightest, because cyber is one of the things that we have
really got to get into in the military and continue to grow and
to build in all of our technology.
You know, that being said, I just want to make sure that we
understand, you know, that when we talk about all this
equipment and budget and all that--and I understand, we have
got to have that. But if we do not have the people it does not
make any difference.
We had the Selective Service here a few months ago. They
sat right here and they told us that if we had a draft today we
would have 35 million people that we could draft from, 35
million. Only 450,000 of those 35 million are eligible to be in
the military, for one form or another. That is not enough. That
is not enough. We cannot build a killing machine, which is what
our military is--you can say anything else. We have got to be
able to kill the enemy when they come at us, and so that is
just something I have watched and listened, I have been on the
road talking, and I want us to have the best military in the
world, and we probably do. I want us to fund the best military,
but we have got to fund our young men and women that are going
to get in the military, and they have got to want to come in.
They have got to want to be there. They have got to want to be
there for the simple fact that they want to fight for the best
country on the face of the earth.
Just one question I have got for you, Secretary Austin. I
wrote you a letter, me and Senators Wicker and Cramer, and our
concern was disturbing, about training materials coming from
our military. Let me be clear. Like you, we want to see good
order and discipline in the ranks, for our military to remain
the nonpartisan institution that Americans trust more than any
other. But what emerged from some of the Services revealed is a
disappointing partisan slant and a poorly defined First
Amendment rights for military members.
This year we have seen multiple senior military leaders, in
uniform, from official DOD channels, criticize individual
members of the press. That ain't got nothing to do with the
military. To me, you have just got to go about your business.
We have seen the National Guard march on elected officials
here, just down from this building. We ask you to provide a
report on what steps your office will take to reprimand
officers who inappropriately engage in partisan behavior to
ensure that the standdown training materials comply with the
guidance issued by your office. We asked for that report no
later than May 7th, and we still have not gotten it. I know you
have been busy, but we would just like to know, you know, the
steps that we are going to take to clamp down on people that do
not deserve to be in our military.
I did not want to get up here and rant, but I have been a
recruiter all my life, and we have got to be able to recruit
people, to spend this money that we are going to appropriate
you in the right way, because we are in dire straits. Secretary
Austin, could I get that commitment?
Secretary Austin. You certainly have that commitment, and I
would also like to offer a thought on what you just said,
Senator, and thanks for your continued support of our great
military. Again, you have heard me say this a couple of times
today. I do not want our force, or anybody else in this
country, to be confused. It is the most lethal organization on
the face of the planet, and it will remain so, and it will
remain the most cohesive organization on the face of the
planet.
You know, when I came in as the Secretary of Defense, I
issued guidance to the force, and that guidance included three
things. My focus is on defending this nation and protecting our
interests, the second thing is taking care of our people, and
the third thing is teamwork. Like you I have put a couple of
teams together too, and I have employed those teams into
combat, and I have watched these youngsters do amazing things,
in support of their country and in support of each other. It is
unbelievable.
I have a pretty good feel in terms of what it takes to
create that kind of cohesion, and cohesion is what is most
important to me, just like it is to you, Senator. I know you
absolutely understand that, and you have demonstrated that you
understand that with some tremendous success over the years.
Regarding the burn pits, you know, the welfare of our
veterans is foremost in my mind. I mean, that is something that
me and the Chairman both really care about. I would tell you
that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Secretary Denis
McDonough, shares that concern. He and I worked together
closely on a number of issues, and we have vowed to make sure
that we do not lose our veterans as a transition from Active
Duty to retirement or get out of the military and go do
something else.
I have inhaled those fumes from burn pits. The Chairman has
inhaled those fumes from burn pits. We know it is important to
take care of our troops, and you have our commitment to remain
focused on that.
But I would also say that this is not just the Army's
problem. It is not just the military's problem. This is the
issue for the United States of America. These are our troops,
and we are going to do everything we can to take care of them,
and I know that all the great resourcers and authorizers that
are in this room share that same commitment, and we have felt
that commitment going forward. I know that it is the reason
that you asked that question.
But the question you have is, are we committed to it?
Senator, I am absolutely committed to making sure that we do
what we can to ensure that this issue is addressed, and I know
that Secretary McDonough is working this issue very hard, as
well.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you for your service.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Tuberville.
This is the second round. I will recognize Senator King,
who will ask one question, and he will also preside and
conclude the hearing, and then he will recognize Senator
Sullivan for one question. I would ask both the questions and
the responses be as concise and eloquent as they have been all
morning. Thank you very much.
Senator King. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First,
just a very brief observation. There has been a lot of talk
about budgets and comparisons of budgets and budgets with
China. I yield to no one in terms of my determination to
successfully compete with China on all fronts. I would point
out, though, even though they have had significant increases
lately, their budget this year is still less than one-third of
ours. I think that is important just to have that context,
because we have been talking about growth, but they were
showing significant growth from a much lower base.
General Milley, I am gravely concerned about the men and
women in Afghanistan who support and aided our troops, and that
we are not moving fast enough to be sure that they are brought
to safety. I think this is an essential moral commitment of
this country, and also a practical one. If we leave these
people to the tender mercies of the Taliban, I do not know who
is ever going to cooperate and help us again in another
setting.
So I hope that both the Pentagon, the White House, and all
the agencies of the U.S. Government are committed to this as an
urgent priority, an urgent priority, and that if we cannot
repatriate all of these people to this country that we at least
make arrangements to get them safely out of Afghanistan. Can
you give me your thoughts on that, please?
General Milley. Well, Senator, first I think the President,
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, myself, others,
have all commented on the importance of making sure that we
keep faith with those that have supported us over the last two
decades in Afghanistan, and that clearly is our intent, and we
will do that.
In terms of specific actions, Department of State has the
lead on the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program and some other
programs with respect to those Afghans that have supported us.
That planning is working through the system right now. But I
can commit to you that it is my belief that the United States
Government will do what is necessary in order to ensure the
safety and protection of those that have been working with us
for two decades.
Senator King. Thank you. The term ``working through the
system'' is what gives me some concern.
General Milley. Sure. I understand.
Senator King. This is an absolutely urgent priority over
the next 6 to 8 weeks, I would say, as our troops draw down. So
I appreciate your commitment on that.
Mr. Secretary, I assume you will make absolutely the same
commitment?
Secretary Austin. You are correct, Senator. This is very
important to us, and we are pushing as hard as we can on our
end to move as fast as we can. I know Secretary Anthony Blinken
has asked for an increase in authorizations in terms of numbers
to move into the SIV process, and I would ask your support in
providing that authorization. Again, anything that you can do
to expand our current capabilities in terms of authorizations
would be very, very much appreciated.
Senator King. I am sure the Members of this Committee will
work to that end, and look forward to working with you.
Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I share your
views, and I know most of the Members of the Committee do, on
keeping faith with those who supported us in Afghanistan.
Gentlemen, I appreciate you running the gauntlet today. It is
an important element of our constitutional oversight
responsibilities.
I have one final question. A growing and critical area of
great power competition with Russia, certainly, but also with
China is our strategy interests in the Arctic. Mr. Secretary,
as you know, and General, each of the military services, in
some ways prompted by this Committee, have now published an
Arctic strategy. I think all of us view this as a positive
development. Both of you, during your confirmation hearings,
had committed to focus on this area of our national security,
to fully resources each of the Service Arctic strategies.
Deputy Secretary Kathleen Hicks, through her confirmation
process, did the same.
In a Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing yesterday I had
the chance to ask General VanHerck, who is the United States
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) Commander, in his role as the
designated advocate for Artic capabilities, how he saw each of
the Services implementing their respective strategies in the
President's new budget submission. He told me that DOD
resourcing for the various Service Arctic strategies was,
quote, ``inching along'' but that DOD, quote, ``did not move
the ball very far down the field with the fiscal year 2022
budget.''
So I want to ask both of you, do you share this view, and
how can we work to fully resource the Service strategies that
have been out, the DOD strategies that have been put out in
this important area of great power competition?
Secretary Austin. Thank you, Senator. You know, when we
talked before, I indicated to you that the Arctic and Arctic
strategy was important to me, and that has not changed. It
remains so.
As you know, we are working on developing our National
Defense Strategy overall, and also working through to refine
our force posture globally. As we develop that National Defense
Strategy, certainly the Arctic will be an area that we will
take into consideration and make sure that we have the right
emphasis, the right focus, and that strategy will drive our
resourcing.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. General Milley, do you have a
view?
General Milley. Yeah, absolutely. We are committed to the
Arctic strategy, and, you know, this whole issue with the
Arctic is a classic example of the strategic military impact of
climate change. As the snowcaps melt, the ice packs melt, it is
exposing further resources. The Russians and Chinese are
realizing that, so they are clearly trying to exploit some of
that. We are going to see increased, not decreased, great power
competition in the Arctic over time, and we do need to
resource, full resource the Arctic strategy.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Thank you. I would like to associate myself
with Senator Sullivan's questions on the Arctic. It is an
incredibly important strategic area. I appreciate your
commitments.
With no further questions, and I understand the decision
has been made not to go to an additional closed session, so I
want to thank our witnesses for their testimony today, for your
forthrightness, for the information that you have shared, and
most of all, for your service to our country.
With that this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Gary Peters
defense community infrastructure program
1. Senator Peters. Secretary Austin, as co-chair of the Defense
Communities Caucus, I was pleased to see Defense Community
Infrastructure Program (DCIP) included in the budget request. As you
know too well, our installations are no longer islands unto themselves
and recent events like the pipeline disruption and severe winter storms
make obvious the need for resilient and secure infrastructure,
especially for our military bases. The DCIP program was specifically
designed to provide you with tools to address these issues, while
leveraging state and local dollars. Do you believe that the Department
of Defense (DOD) is adequately using this program?
Secretary Austin. Yes, the Department is using the Defense
Community Infrastructure Program (DCIP) to competitively select
projects that address deficiencies in community infrastructure,
supportive of a military installation, in order to enhance military
value, installation resiliency, and family quality of life. In fiscal
year 2020, the DOD awarded sixteen grants totaling $49.8 million, and
each of these projects is on schedule to start physical construction
activities by the end of September 2021. DCIP is also on schedule to
execute its fiscal year 2021 budget of $60 million. The proposal
submission deadline for the fiscal year 2021 DCIP Federal Funding
Opportunity closed on July 12, 2021, and submitted proposals are in the
process of being screened, evaluated, scored, and ranked. Selected
proposers will be contacted and offered the opportunity to submit a
grant application.
2. Senator Peters. Secretary Austin and General Milley, are you
putting enough emphasis on working with defense communities to address
critical issues facing our military today?
Secretary Austin. The Department continues to build partnerships
with our defense communities that are crucial to the viability,
resiliency, and sustainability of our local installations, missions,
and defense industrial base. Often, the same issues confronting our
military (including but not limited to energy resiliency, public
services, cybersecurity, and encroachment) are also challenging to our
civilian neighbors and require a ``whole of community'' approach to
solve. We welcome opportunities to broaden these partnerships that
underpin the quality of life and well-being of our servicemembers and
their families.
General Milley. I recognize the value in equipping municipalities
and cooperatives, the smallest elements of local government, with the
tools necessary to enable successful defense of the homeland. I fully
support the Secretary's Defense Community Infrastructure Program
(DCIP), which is designed to address deficiencies in community
infrastructure, supportive of a military installation, in order to
enhance military value, installation resilience, and military family
quality of life.
3. Senator Peters. Secretary Austin and General Milley, while
studying how cyber-originating disruptions can impact force projection,
the Army Cyber Institute's Jack Voltaic Project developed a software-
based framework for local governments to rehearse their cyber incident
response capabilities. Do you see value in equipping municipalities
with solutions like this through a DCIP-like process?
Secretary Austin. This software, while still in development, has
potential for use by non-DOD entities. We will engage our Federal
partners, who have the lead in coordinating with these entities, to
consider whether it would be complementary to their ongoing efforts to
improve energy and cyber resilience.
General Milley. Providing communities programs like JACK VOLTAIC
through a Defense Critical Infrastructure Program-like process is
important not only to the communities involved but also to maintaining
our national security. Events like the ransomware attack on Colonial
Pipeline continue to demonstrate how interconnected our society is and
how an attack on critical systems can impact our day-to-day lives. The
ability to wargame these scenarios, identify weaknesses in our policies
and procedures, and create solutions is vital to everyone. We believe
that JACK VOLTAIC is a step in helping to improve our communities', and
by extension, our Nation's resilience.
The Joint Staff recognizes the value in equipping municipalities
and cooperatives, the smallest elements of local government, with the
tools necessary to enable successful defense of the homeland. Building
capacity to protect the homeland and enable a quick response from the
Nation's defensive forces requires a multi-layered approach that
considers authorities and the importance of other Government
Departments in reaching solutions. The Defense Critical Infrastructure
Program (DCIP) represents a successful process to support local
initiatives and can provide a blueprint.
dod support to the department of homeland security
4. Senator Peters. Secretary Austin and Secretary McCord, in
February 2021, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a
report titled ``Southwest Border Security'' (GAO-21-356) which found
that DOD developed unreliable cost estimates for its support to the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) at the southwest border. Since
DOD is currently considering a request from DHS to extend the
military's border mission, I am concerned DOD could inadvertently adopt
the previous flawed estimate process. How are you factoring the border
mission into the defense budget?
Secretary Austin. Other than specified exceptions such as support
for counterdrug activities and activities to counter transnational
organized crime pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Sec. 284, the Department of
Defense (DOD) does not program and budget for support of other Federal
departments and agencies, including DOD support of the DHS border
security mission.
DOD support of the DHS border security mission is provided in
accordance with Chapter 15 of Title 10, U.S. Code, and Section 1059 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law
114-92), as amended. DOD support provided pursuant to Chapter 15 is
required to be on a reimbursable basis. However, Chapter 15 authorizes
the Secretary of Defense to waive reimbursement if certain criteria are
met, including if providing the support would result in a benefit to
the DOD element or National Guard personnel providing the support that
is substantially equivalent to that which otherwise would be obtained
from military training. In such circumstances, training funds may be
made available to fund such DOD support.
Reimbursement is not required for DOD support provided pursuant to
Section 1059.
DOD appreciates--and shares--the GAO's interest in ensuring well-
documented cost estimates are used when assessing DHS requests for
assistance. Rather than use best practices designed for the acquisition
process, as recommended by the GAO, DOD cost estimates for operational
support are developed using the Contingency Operations Support Tool
(COST) model. Informed by prior year actual cost data, DOD cost
estimates have steadily improved. Armed with cost estimate data from
fiscal years 2018 to 2021, the cost estimate for DOD support in fiscal
year 2022 and, if necessary, future years, will be much more accurate.
Secretary McCord. Other than specified exceptions such as support
for counterdrug activities and activities to counter transnational
organized crime pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Sec. 284, the Department of
Defense does not program and budget for support of other Federal
departments and agencies, including DOD support of the DHS border
security mission.
DOD support of the DHS border security mission is provided in
accordance with Chapter 15 of Title 10, U.S. Code, and Section 1059 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law
114-92), as amended. DOD support provided pursuant to Chapter 15 is
required to be on a reimbursable basis. However, Chapter 15 authorizes
the Secretary of Defense to waive reimbursement if certain criteria are
met, including if providing the support would result in a benefit to
the DOD element or National Guard personnel providing the support that
is substantially equivalent to that which otherwise would be obtained
from military training. In such circumstances, training funds may be
made available to fund such DOD support.
Reimbursement is not required for DOD support provided pursuant to
Section 1059.
DOD appreciates--and shares--the GAO's interest in ensuring well-
documented cost estimates are used when assessing DHS requests for
assistance. Rather than use best practices designed for the acquisition
process, as recommended by the GAO, DOD cost estimates for operational
support are developed using the Contingency Operations Support Tool
(COST) model. Informed by prior year actual cost data, DOD cost
estimates have steadily improved. Armed with cost estimate data from
fiscal years 2018-2021, the cost estimate for DOD support in fiscal
year 2022 and, if necessary, future years, will be much more accurate.
5. Senator Peters. Secretary Austin and General Milley, how does
the southwest border mission affect the readiness of the participating
units?
Secretary Austin. There is a manageable impact on readiness.
Participating units continue to maintain high levels of readiness, as
continually assessed by the Military Services. Nonetheless, DOD
continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) to address DHS capability and capacity gaps and, thereby, to
reduce DHS reliance on DOD support to secure the southern border of the
United States.
General Milley. There has been negligible impact on the unit
readiness of forces participating in the southwest border mission. Over
fiscal year 2020 to 2021, the majority of units have seen no change or
increase to their pre-deployed readiness levels. Reserve Component (RC)
personnel have benefited from valuable military training by gaining
valuable experience from deploying to austere environments and being
afforded the opportunity to exercise ground, aviation, and intelligence
support of the interagency in a relatively-benign real-world
environment under the command and control of U.S. Northern Command.
The Joint Staff and the Services work diligently to mitigate
training and warfighting readiness concerns in the Global Force
Management process. During this process, the Joint Staff coordinates
with Force Providers to source the southwest border with qualified
units and personnel whose support has the least impact on the Services,
and ultimately, Joint Force operational readiness.
irregular warfare
6. Senator Peters. Secretary Austin, will the forthcoming National
Defense Strategy still aim to institutionalize irregular warfare?
Secretary Austin. Yes. The Department of Defense will continue to
institutionalize irregular warfare across the entire Joint Force, an
effort that is in alignment with emerging strategic guidance including
the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance. The Department has
also published a comprehensive implementation plan. Our adversaries use
indirect and asymmetric strategies in an attempt to erode our strengths
and pursue their strategic interests. Irregular warfare provides
valuable ways for us to shape conditions prior to conflict and maintain
an integrated approach to deterrence alongside our high-end
capabilities and the efforts of our allies and partners.
7. Senator Peters. General Milley, a March 2021 article in Joint
Force Quarterly by Heather M. Bothwell titled ``Gray is the New Black:
A Framework to Counter Gray Zone Conflicts'' contends that current
doctrine inadequately addresses gray zone conflicts. How does the joint
force plan a campaign against revisionist states that employ gray zone
strategies?
General Milley. The Joint Force operates across the continuum of
conflict and requires a whole-of-government approach to synchronize all
our instruments of national power.
Currently under development, the Joint Concept for Competing will
deliver a structured approach and expand the intellectual aperture for
how the Joint Force will synchronize with other USG departments and
agencies across the ``gray zone'' in pursuit of national interests.
Secondly, the Department continues to institutionalize our
understanding of irregular warfare across the Joint Force. By relooking
how irregular warfare is defined, taught, planned, and capabilities
thereof are developed, our military is better positioned to contend in
the ``gray zone.''
These two efforts are fundamental to allowing the Joint Force to
campaign plan against adversaries who have adopted irregular
methodologies to challenge our interests.
avoiding miscalculation
8. Senator Peters. Secretary Austin, as we strive to maintain an
edge in conventional deterrence for ourselves and our partners in the
Indo-Pacific, the possibility of miscalculation increases. Secretary
Mark Esper convened a Crisis Communications Working Group with the
Chinese People's Liberation Army. Is that something you plan to
continue?
Secretary Austin. Yes. Our aim is to hold the Crisis Communication
Working Group as an annual event.
united states-israel operations technology working group
9. Senator Peters. Secretary Austin, section 1299m of the William
M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2021 (Public Law 116-283) authorized the Secretary of Defense to
establish, under the United States vice chairman of the United States-
Israel Defense Acquisition Advisory Group, a working group to address
operations and technology matters. This effort will help to ensure that
the United States and its allies remain at the cutting edge of
technological development. Have you taken steps to create this working
group?
Secretary Austin. Our allies and partners are a force multiplier
and one of the greatest strategic assets we have in protecting our
Nation. To this end, the Department works closely with Israel's
Ministry of Defense (IMOD) to advance collaborative defense research,
development, test, and evaluation of operationally-required weapons
systems to increase the lethality of Warfighters in the United States
and Israel. I support the intent of this provision. As such, the IMOD
and the Department are developing the terms of reference for such a
group for discussion at the Undersecretary (Acquisition and
Sustainment)-led United States-Israel Defense Acquisition Advisory
Group meeting.
armenia and azerbaijan
10. Senator Peters. General Milley, during the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict, Azerbaijan's drone fleet highlighted the vulnerabilities of
sophisticated weapons systems. Has this affected how you prioritize
counter-unmanned aerial systems' capabilities in U.S. European Command?
General Milley. Small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) technology
trends are dramatically transforming making them less expensive,
easier, and increasingly capable weapons in the hands of state actors,
non-state actors, and criminals not only in USEUCOM but across the
globe.
I am encouraged by how our new Directed Energy C-sUAS systems are
performing in CENTCOM and AFRICOM and we will make appropriate
allocation of assets based on our worldwide assessment of the threat.
The Department currently has capabilities to mitigate and/or defeat
the current generation of sUAS but recognize that advances in
artificial intelligence/machine learning will increase the challenges
posed by sUAS with regards to swarming and other advanced techniques.
18 November 2019, the Secretary of Defense designated the Secretary
of the Army as the DOD Executive Agent for Counter-sUAS (C-sUAS),
Groups 1, 2, and 3. US technology to counter the sUAS threat continues
to improve. DOD establishing the Joint small-Counter UAS Office to
consolidate, coordinate, and expedite new capabilities in our C-sUAS
portfolio is a critical step in tackling this threat.
11. Senator Peters. Secretary Austin, is DOD able to confirm
reports of abuse against Armenian prisoners of war currently being
detained by Azerbaijan?
Secretary Austin. DOD is aware of, but has not confirmed, reports
of abuse against Armenian detainees currently held by Azerbaijan. The
United States has called on Azerbaijan to respect its obligation under
international law to ensure the humane treatment of all detainees in
its custody, and has called for the release of all remaining Armenian
detainees as soon as possible.
tricare
12. Senator Peters. Secretary Austin, the Department has taken
significant steps to keep costs down, but for several years we have
known that one subset of Tricare beneficiaries - those who rely on
brand name maintenance medications - face department imposed barriers
when it comes to convenience and choice of where to access these needed
prescriptions. Due to current Defense Health Agency (DHA) policy, and
how they ask for certain rebates, Tricare beneficiaries who rely on
these drugs are forbidden from picking up their prescriptions at a
local, in-network pharmacy following their first (up to second) fill.
At such point, they're forced to use a military treatment facility
(MTF) or mail order. This also applies to Tricare retirees. In my home
State of Michigan, access to MTFs with a pharmacy is extremely limited
- as a matter of geography that leaves many of my constituents in a
tough spot with no other option than to receive drugs by mail order.
The current system offers them little flexibility and limited access to
pharmacist care. We've been working in a bipartisan manner for several
years to try and fix this problem. In fact, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 includes optional pilot language
on this issue. We want to make it easier for military families and
retirees to access the medications they need. Do we have your support
in this endeavor?
Secretary Austin. The pharmacy pilot language in the NDAA for
fiscal year 2021 directed that the pilot should be executed if the
total costs of the pilot for beneficiaries to receive all medications
at retail pharmacies would not exceed the overall total costs to the
Department for beneficiaries receiving those same medications through
the TRICARE mail order program. We have explored the costs of this
pilot, and an independent analysis comparing the costs for this retail
pharmacy pilot to the costs for the same medications through mail order
showed that total costs to the Department for this pilot exceed the
costs for the same medications at mail order by 13.4 percent, or $132M,
with only a 25 percent beneficiary participation rate. Based on the
results of the cost analysis, the Department has decided not to proceed
with this pilot. However, we recognize how critical optimization of the
TRICARE pharmacy benefit is and we are exploring how to leverage
commercial best practices that promote patient safety, maximize access
to covered medications, and deliver high levels of beneficiary
satisfaction. This work continues.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tammy Duckworth
factoring program performance for budget prioritization
13. Senator Duckworth. Secretary Austin, it's absolutely critical
that DOD leverage best practices to achieve its modernization efforts
efficiently and deliver high-quality systems to our warfighters on-
time, on-budget and in alignment with the 2018 National Defense
Strategy and the 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance. I
remain encouraged by the Army's Future Vertical Lift Family of Systems,
an example of the Department of Defense's ability to leverage the
streamlined middle tier of acquisitions pathway to quickly generate
highly competitive options at relatively little risk to the government
and the American taxpayer. As modernization efforts continue across the
joint force, are DOD and the military services factoring program
performance into decisions about how to prioritize budget requests to
adequately resource successful programs, such as Future Vertical Lift,
and sustain their momentum?
Secretary Austin. The Department's annual Program Budget Review
process evaluates programs on many factors, including current
performance metrics such as cost, schedule, and technical maturity. In
addition, every program is evaluated for support to the National
Defense Strategy to ensure programs prioritized for funding are both
cost effective and aligned to our strategic requirements.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
mq-9
14. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, during the hearing, you
mentioned that the Air Force is reducing the number of MQ-9 lines but
not the number of tails. I'm curious why there is any reduction at all
when the Air Force today still lacks the intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance capacity to meet Combatant Commanders' requirements
contained in the 2018 National Defense Strategy. Can you elaborate and
provide specific information detailing the impact of reducing the
number of lines on the number of MQ-9 aircraft the Air Force will
operate?
Secretary Austin. In fiscal year 2022, the Air Force requested a
reduction in combat lines. This reduction is less than 10 percent of
the current force presentation (4 of 60) and does not equate to
reduction in aircraft inventory. No tails will be divested and no
squadrons will be reduced. We will continue to work with Combatant
Commands to ensure daily intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance,
and strike capability requirements are fulfilled. Concurrently, we
intend to continue development of future ISR platforms that can
penetrate inside contested environments, persist in these locations,
and be able to connect and share data in the advanced battle management
system.
15. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, can you also please expand on
what this reduction strategy is and whether there is soon to be a
program of record to replace the MQ-9?
Secretary Austin. Starting with the 2018 NDS, and continuing with
the March 2021 interim NSS, Services are directed to prioritize
investments in capabilities needed in a peer conflict. The MQ-9 has
very limited capabilities in contested environments.
In fiscal year 2022, the Air Force requested a reduction in combat
lines. This reduction is less than 10 percent of the current force
presentation (4 of 60) and does not equate to reduction in aircraft
inventory. No tails will be divested and no squadrons will be reduced.
While the MQ-9 provides significant utility today, it was not
designed for operation in a future highly-contested environment.
Modifying the MQ-9 force presentation is about balancing near and long-
term risk. Continued ISR modernization efforts seek to provide future
warfighters the ability to access data and information at a moment's
notice. Future systems must be able to penetrate inside contested
environments, persist in these locations, and be able to connect and
share data in the advanced battle management system.
The Department can offer more details on replacement ISR programs
in a classified setting.
cybersecurity
16. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, you have noted DOD's continued
challenges to address competitive requirements for certain key skill
areas, such as those in the cyber and science, technology, engineering,
and mathematics fields. Could a civilian cyber reserve corps of
cybersecurity professionals with prior government or military service
be of value to the national security enterprise as a means of
supplementing existing agency personnel with additional cyber capacity
expertise?
Secretary Austin. The Department's demand signal for more
technically skilled personnel will continue to increase, and DOD will
continue to compete for technical talent with the private sector. DOD
excels at developing technically trained personnel and is able to
retain those personnel in the Services' reserve components, which help
the Department fulfill its cyber missions. To the extent that retired
or separated personnel wish to serve in other civilian capacities,
their cyber skills can certainly be applied to the Nation's broader
cybersecurity challenges. A civilian cyber reserve corps would,
however, support such missions under civil authorities.
If called to support civil authorities in a major incident, a
civilian cyber reserve corps could potentially relieve pressure on the
Department from being asked to provide that civil support potentially
at the expense of performing Title 10 mission. In such a scenario where
a civilian reserve corps were available, the Department could remain
focused on its core missions.
Congress directed a study in Section 1730 of the fiscal year 2021
NDAA to evaluate non-traditional cyber support to DOD, which is
currently underway. The findings of that study will inform our
understanding of alternative cyber support models.
continued support for the afghans
17. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, what is the plan for an
enduring counterterrorism strategy that will be able to address and
counter the influence of violent extremist organizations, which
directly supports the stability of the Afghan Government?
Secretary Austin. During the 28 September 2021 Senate Armed
Services Committee hearing, Secretary Austin testified as follows:
Over-the-horizon counterterrorism operations are difficult but
absolutely possible, and the intelligence that supports them comes from
a variety of sources, not just U.S. boots on the ground. We recognize
that transnational terrorists will migrate towards ungoverned spaces.
We are also committed to not allowing Al-Qaeda to regenerate and be
able to export terror from Afghanistan to the United States of America.
We will do everything within our power to make sure that does not
happen.
18. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, will we establish or build up
an existing presence elsewhere in the region to continue
counterterrorism operations?
Secretary Austin. During the 28 September 2021 Senate Armed
Services Committee hearing, Secretary Austin testified as follows: In
terms of military tools, we have the ability to offer a range of
options depending on the President's objectives.
Additional details regarding discussions to enhance our regional
presence were addressed during the closed session.
19. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, what will U.S. assistance to
Afghanistan look like after withdrawal?
Secretary Austin. During the 28 September 2021 Senate Armed
Services Committee hearing, Secretary Austin testified as follows:
Our servicemembers and civilians face a new mission: helping Afghan
evacuees move on to new lives in new places. I know that you share my
profound gratitude and respect for their service, courage, and
professionalism.
20. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, looking ahead, have we
established any agreements to fly United States air assets from
neighboring countries such as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, or Turkmenistan
in order to provide the Afghans with air support?
Secretary Austin. Additional information regarding regional basing
agreements was addressed by Secretary Austin during the closed session
of the 28 September 2021 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing.
21. Senator Rosen. General Milley, how much military equipment will
be turned over to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces?
General Milley. The Department of Defense has identified over $300
million in equipment and structures to be transferred to the Afghan
Government via the Foreign Excess Property and Foreign Excess Real
Property Programs. In addition, DOD has transferred a small amount of
military equipment to the Afghan Government either as excess defense
articles (EDA) or as sales from stock using the Afghanistan Security
Forces Fund. This included 35 EDA MRAPs, 15 other EDA military
vehicles, about $4 million of ammunition, several hundred small arms
and small quantities of other items.
22. Senator Rosen. General Milley, is there logistical support in
place or plans to maintain that equipment, which is currently the
responsibility of either Coalition Forces or contractors?
General Milley. The new Defense Security Cooperation Management
Office for Afghanistan (DSCMO-A), which replaced the Combined Security
Transition Command--Afghanistan (CSTC-A), has been established to
continue the management of security assistance to Afghanistan. This
includes advice and direct assistance to ensure proper maintenance for
all donated military equipment to Afghanistan's National Defense and
Security Forces. (ANDSF).
north atlantic treaty organization forces
23. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, is there a plan for North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces to continue supporting
Afghan Security Forces after the United States withdrawal? If so, what
will that support look like in the fight to counter violent extremist
organizations once we leave?
Secretary Austin. During the 28 September 2021 Senate Armed
Services Committee hearing, Secretary Austin testified as follows: As I
engage my counterparts, they are very willing to work with us. They
have been very thankful that we helped them evacuate their people.
24. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, given the upcoming withdrawal
and pending any future deterioration in Afghanistan's security
situation, what is the threshold for re-establishing a NATO presence or
involvement with the Afghan Security Forces in Afghanistan, should it
be necessary?
Secretary Austin. During the 28 September 2021 Senate Armed
Services Committee hearing, Secretary Austin testified as follows: I do
not think it is preordained that we are going to have to return to
Afghanistan. We are committed to not allowing Al Qaeda to regenerate
and be able to export terror from Afghanistan to the United States of
America.
countering adversaries
25. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, what have we seen regarding
the status of women in territories where the Taliban has retained
control or has already overthrown the Afghan Government?
Secretary Austin. During the 28 September 2021 Senate Armed
Services Committee hearing, Secretary Austin testified as follows: I
share the concerns of Members of this Committee regarding the status of
women and girls in Afghanistan. We will have to work to use economic
levers and also international pressure to hold the Taliban accountable.
26. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, what can we expect of the
progress that has been made over these past 20 years once we withdraw,
and how can we mitigate this?
Secretary Austin. During the 28 September 2021 Senate Armed
Services Committee hearing, Secretary Austin testified as follows: We
provided the Afghan military with equipment and aircraft and the skills
to use them. Over the years, they often fought bravely. Tens of
thousands of Afghan soldiers and police officers died. But in the end,
we couldn't provide them with the will to win. As a veteran of that
war, I am personally reckoning with all of that. But I hope that we do
not allow a debate about how this war ended to cloud our pride in the
way that our people fought it. They prevented another 9/11, they showed
extraordinary courage and compassion in the war's last days, and they
made lasting progress in Afghanistan that the Taliban will find
difficult to reverse and that the international community should work
hard to preserve.
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
afghanistan savings
27. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Austin, in your testimony you wrote:
``In Afghanistan, the Department is working to conduct a deliberate,
orderly, and safe withdrawal, as directed by the President. This is an
important step in responsibly ending this two-decade-long conflict, and
it offers us an opportunity to redirect our resources toward strategic
competition.'' General Kenneth McKenzie testified to the Committee that
to accomplish the mission from over the horizon that: ``The ranges will
be greater. The resources will be greater. The risks will all be
greater . . . '' This week, Acting Air Force Secretary John Roth said
the Air Force budgeted for $10 billion in unspecified U.S. Central
Command needs to deal with post-withdrawal missions. Your testimony
about redirecting resources, an implied savings, seems to directly
contradict what the combatant commander believes and what the Air Force
is being required to execute. Approximately how much do your budget
experts believe will be saved due to the withdrawal from Afghanistan
and over what timeframe?
Secretary Austin. Please reference the table below from DOD
Comptroller. When compared to the fiscal year 2021 enacted funding
levels, the Department of Defense's fiscal year 2022 savings related to
the Afghanistan withdrawal is approximately 8$9.4 billion comprised of
$-4.0 billion in reduced Operation FREEDOM's SENTINEL direct war costs
(mostly Afghanistan in-country costs) and from $-5.4 billion in reduced
enduring requirements (mostly in-theater support costs) related to the
withdrawal. The timeframe for the estimated savings is for fiscal year
2022 only.
The Department reinvested not only the Afghanistan withdrawal
related savings of $9.4 billion, but the entire savings of $11.8
billion, as noted below, in decreased direct war and enduring theater
requirements towards weapon system modernization and readiness in the
fiscal year 2022 President's Budget request.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Related to
Operation/Activity 2021 2022 Delta Afghanistan
Enacted Request Withdrawal
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operation FREEDOM'S SENTINEL (OFS) Direct War Costs 12.9 8.9 -4.0 -4.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR) Direct War Costs 7.0 5.4 -1.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Enduring Theater Requirements and Related Missions* 29.5 24.1 -5.4 -5.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) and Ukraine Security 4.5 3.7 -0.8
Assistance Initiative
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GRAND TOTAL 53.9 42.1 -11.8 -9.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Related missions include OSS, CT Ops, OEF-HOA, etc.
The Air Forces' fiscal year 2022 budget submission amount of $10.1
billion includes Operation Inherent Resolve, $1.6 billion; European
Deterrence Initiative, $0.7 billion; and Operation Freedom's Sentinel,
$7.8 billion of which $0.7 billion is direct war requirements and $7.1
billion is enduring requirements.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
fort bragg military construction
28. Senator Tillis. Secretary Austin and General Milley, as you are
aware, the Immediate Response Forces (IFR) is the Nation's rapid
response force, which is comprised of paratroopers from one of the 82nd
Airborne Division's brigade combat teams and should be able to rapidly
deploy within 18 hours. For the first time since 1989, the response
force received rapid deployment orders on New Year's Eve 2019,
following the Iran-supported Hezbollah militia attacks on the American
embassy in Iraq. However, as paratroopers prepared for the deployment,
they spent most of the day traveling across Fort Bragg from location to
location gathering equipment instead of spending their limited time on
briefings or preparing for the mission. Compounding this issue is that
conventional forces at Fort Bragg have only been supported with a
single military construction (MILCON) project since 2010, compared to
the numerous MILCON projects that have supported special operations
units at the same base. It is irresponsible of Congress, and I would
argue of the Department of Defense and Army, to require the IFR to
perform its duties if we are not going to provide the necessary support
facilities to ensure mission success and soldier safety. While it is
currently not on the unfunded priority list, do I have your commitment
that you will support our IFR warfighters by placing their request for
a strategic deployment complex and a tactical equipment maintenance
facility on this year's list of unfunded priorities?
Secretary Austin. According to departmental analysis, the Strategic
Deployment Complex and the Tactical Equipment Maintenance Facility
projects supporting the Immediate Response Force lack sufficient design
status to be placed on the fiscal year 2022 Unfunded Priority List
(UPL). While they do not met the 35 percent-design threshold required
to be considered for the fiscal year 2022 UPL list. These projects may
meet the design threshold to compete in a later budget cycle, and will
be considered for inclusion in a future funding request.
General Milley. For President's Budget 2022, the Department will
continue to evaluate the feasibility of the strategic deployment
complex and tactical equipment maintenance facility moving forward,
while the Army prioritized Soldier Barracks and Child Development
Centers in their unfunded priority list.
29. Senator Tillis. Secretary Austin and General Milley, taking it
a step further, if the IFR is essential to the Department's ability to
rapidly support America's national security in emergent crises, why is
it not part of the DOD's requested budget? If it is not essential, as
it would appear based on the budget and unfunded priority list, why
have it?
Secretary Austin. The Immediate Response Force is an essential
asset to the Department's ability to rapidly support America's national
security in emergent crises. Army needs regularly exceed available
resources. Based on departmental analysis, this project has not cleared
the planning and design phase, it is not executable in fiscal year
2022.
General Milley. Forces within the Immediate Response Force (IRF)
are manned, trained, and equipped to respond with short notice when
called upon. Funding for the IRF is part of each Services' base budget
request.
The IRF is a key capability of the Department of Defense's Global
Force Management (GFM) framework. The IRF, consisting of wide ranging
abilities from every Service, provides ready forces for proactive and
scalable Joint Force employment whenever called upon.
readiness and risk
30. Senator Tillis. General Milley, in Defense News at the end of
last month you stated that the fiscal year 2022 DOD Budget ``strikes an
appropriate balance between preserving present readiness and future
modernization.'' I would argue that today our DOD is unable to meet
present readiness requirements whether it be with personnel, ground
vehicles, aircraft, ships, and infrastructure. For example, the V-22
Osprey, which has been in operational service since 2006 and is flown
by three services, still fails to meet fleet-wide mission capable
readiness rate set by the Defense Department. With that said, how do
you envision we preserve current readiness, which we are not doing
right now, with a budget that does not keep up with inflation and
reduces spending on present readiness capabilities?
General Milley. President's Budget 2022 invests $122.1 billion in
Readiness, a $1.2 billion increase over fiscal year 2021. We are also
looking at readiness differently than in past years. For example, the
budget improves maintenance data analytics and parts availability,
which will enable military and civilian maintainers to repair ships,
aircraft, and brigades in shipyards, hangars, & depots with greater
agility.
Further, the SECDEF-directed 1-to-3 deploy-to-dwell ratio coupled
with the Afghanistan retrograde allows for a flexible reallocation of
the Joint Force and increases in our readiness posture.
While specific challenges remain, tools such as the Directed
Readiness process aid the Department in balancing near term readiness
with the need to modernize the force.
31. Senator Tillis. General Milley, in your testimony to the House
Appropriations Committee, you noted that this budget is geared toward
2030 or 2035. I'm concerned about the many years until we build the
perfect military. What sort of risks are we taking in the near- to mid-
term?
General Milley. The fiscal year 2022 presidential budget strikes an
appropriate balance between preserving present readiness and future
modernization. It's a down payment on investments of the future, with a
bias toward the future operating environment.
Advanced technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence, 5G,
Hypersonics, etc, will change the character of war. As such, the
Department is investing $112 billion (more than any previous budget
request) in Research, Development, Testing & Evaluation.
President's Budget 2022 directs a $25.7 billion investment in 11
key enabling technologies critical to building a more lethal force,
that is capable of competing in a peer conflict. This is a $1.6 billion
increase over fiscal year 2021 enacted levels.
President's Budget 2022 increases funding in:
Space (+$2.6 billion from fiscal year 2021)
Long Range Fires (+$1.4 billion from fiscal year 2021)
RDT&E (+$5.6 billion from fiscal year 2021)
Nuclear Enterprises / NC3 (+$2.6 billion from fiscal year
2021)
Cyber (+$0.4 billion from fiscal year 2021)
Readiness (+$1.2 billion from fiscal year 2021)
32. Senator Tillis. Secretary Austin and General Milley, this
budget takes risk in the near term with the promise of a better future
force. The history of military conflict tells us that states will often
undertake military aggression when they view their relative advantage
as maximized. Do you worry that this investment strategy plays into
that dynamic?
Secretary Austin. The Department is continually preparing the Joint
Force for an immediate contingency, a potential near- to mid-term
conflict, largely using today's extant force, and for a future
conflict, where today's emerging technology will be critical. The
President's Fiscal Year 2022 Budget strikes an appropriate balance of
readiness, force structure, and modernization investments across these
timeframes, in order to dissuade any potential adversaries from
opportunism in the near, medium, and long-term.
With respect to a future conflict, the President's Fiscal Year 2022
Budget emphasizes longer-term modernization, including by investing in
the Defense Industrial Base. The Department is also focused on making
it easier for industry to work with the Department, increasing DOD's
access to commercial innovation and creating opportunities for job
growth in fields such as advanced manufacturing. This approach will
help ensure the U.S. Joint Force maintains a competitive edge in key
domains and warfighting functions, such as in space, 6th generation air
power, cyber, undersea warfare, and long-range fires.
General Milley. As the key tasks of the Joint Force are 1) to fight
and win, and 2) to be prepared to fight and win, we are focusing our
efforts to adapt to the changing character of warfare. Modernization
and readiness prioritization, as reflected in this budget submission,
support the Joint Force's ability to adapt to this evolving
environment.
biological threat reduction program
33. Senator Tillis. Secretary Austin, the Biological Threat
Reduction Program finds and fights emerging global diseases that can
threaten U.S. troops and, ultimately, the world's population. In fact,
the Pentagon program funded a lab in Thailand that detected in January
2020 the first case of novel coronavirus outside China. Your budget
wants the program's fiscal 2022 budget to be set at $124 million--or 45
percent lower than the current level, according to the your budget
justification documents. I am baffled and extremely concerned with this
as the world begins to emerge from the COVID-19 Pandemic. If anything,
you as a Department, and we as a country should be fully invested in
this program to facilitate the detection, minimize the spread, and
quickly respond to future pathogens. Based on the 600,000 American
COVID-19 deaths, how can the DOD justify cutting the funding for this
program in half?
Secretary Austin. Countering biological threats, whether from
biological weapons or a naturally-occurring pathogen of security
concern, is an important mission. The DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction
(CTR) program continues to deliver impressive results through
investment in foreign partner capabilities to prevent, detect, and
report biological threat events. It is one, but not the only, program
that the Department uses to address to biological threats. Moreover,
DOD is not the U.S. Government's only Department or Agency with this
mission.
The DOD countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD) enterprise
requires balanced investment across the WMD threat spectrum. For fiscal
year 2022, the Department requested $239.8 million for the DOD CTR
program, which includes $124 million for biological threat reduction
activities. This funding level is similar to program's fiscal year 2021
request, and aligns with validated, prioritized requirements. DOD
decisions on DOD CTR program investments are based on several factors
including, but not limited to, presence of a WMD threat as well as
partner nation will and ability to sustain DOD-provided capabilities.
To maximize threat reduction outcomes, DOD also partners with
multilateral bodies and allied nations conducting similar work.
34. Senator Tillis. Secretary Austin, is this a good example of
where we're making bad choices simply because DOD's topline is
artificially low?
Secretary Austin. No. The DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
Program has been and continues to be aligned to achieve the program's
mission: reduce WMD threats to U.S. interests. The DOD CTR Program is
one part of a broader, coordinated, whole-of-government and
international effort to reduce these threats and improve global health
security, with a specific DOD-focus on protecting the Joint Force and
reducing risks to the homeland and our partner nations. The fiscal year
2022 budget request represents the amount the DOD CTR Program can
effectively spend to fulfill its targeted mission with partner
countries willing and able to sustain these investments and
capabilities and deliver high-priority threat reduction return on
investments.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
ted stevens center for arctic security studies
35. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin, you approved the
establishment of the sixth DOD Regional Center, the Ted Stevens Center
for Arctic Security Studies, on June 3, 2021 to bring increased focus
and cooperation on topics pertinent to the unique challenges and
security concerns related to the Arctic region. As of June 10, 2021,
DOD is able to begin actions to stand up the center. You delegated
final site selection authority to Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, Dr. Colin Kahl. It is my understanding that Dr. Kahl is
considering sites in Alaska, Colorado, and the National Capital Region.
The DOD Plan to Establish a Regional Center for Security Studies for
the Artic--Report to Congress for fiscal year 2021, lists three
criteria for site selection: proximity of a location to other academic
institutions that study security implications with respect to the
Arctic region; the proximity of a location to the designated lead for
Arctic affairs of the U.S. Northern Command; and the proximity of a
location to a central hub of assigned Arctic-focused Armed Forces so as
to suitable advance relevant professional development skills unique to
the Arctic region. Alaska is the only location that satisfies these
criteria. Will you commit to having Dr. Kahl update my office on site
selection progress, including how each of these criteria are weighted?
Secretary Austin. Yes, I will commit the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy to provide updates to your office as the Department works
through defining the site selection process it will use, including the
criteria identified in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
for fiscal year 2021 and the operational, logistical, and
participation-related factors identified by the DOD.
36. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin, once a final decision is
made on the location of the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security
Studies, will you commit to having Dr. Kahl provide my office a brief
on what locations were considered, how they scored on their respective
evaluations, and what the execution timeline is?
Secretary Austin. On 17 November 2021, the Department announced
that it had identified Anchorage, Alaska as the sole candidate city to
host the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies, the Department
of Defense Regional Center for the Arctic. The Department will continue
to work through the Department of the Air Force Strategic Basing
process to evaluate facilities within Anchorage to finalize the site
selection. Once a final decision is made, I will commit to having the
Department brief your office on the locations that were considered and
the anticipated execution timeline.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kevin Cramer
presentation of defense budget materials
37. Senator Cramer. Secretary Austin, the Fiscal Year 2021 National
Defense Authorization Act Senate Report (S. Rpt. 116-236) included
language that said ``The Committee additionally directs that the
amounts and shares for each military service or department reported
pursuant to this direction shall not include amounts that are not
directly related to the budgets of each service or department, such as
funding that is subsequently redirected to general defense-wide needs
or for other national security purposes.'' But this year's Office of
the Secretary of Defense's Roll Out Brief did not differentiate the
amount of topline budget a service received versus what they could
control. Why wasn't this Senate report language executed?
Secretary Austin. There are classified reasons why the budget
presentation exists in its current form. The Comptroller takes care to
avoid inadvertently exposing classified information to the public and
continues to provide the annual classified budget extract report along
with the President's Budget submission to the Committees in order to
present a complete, classified picture to Congress. The Department was
unable to provide the display requested by the Congress for the fiscal
year 2022 Budget Request without adversely affecting
counterintelligence, but is considering several options to do so in the
future.
38. Senator Cramer. Secretary McCord, broken out by service, how
much ``pass-through'' money was put under each service's topline
budget?
Secretary McCord. The amounts of ``pass-though'' money for each
Service are classified and were provided in the annual classified
budget extract report that accompanied the Fiscal Year 2022 President's
Budget submission to the committees. A similar classified budget
extract report will be provided for the Fiscal Year 2023 President's
Budget submission. I understand that the classification issues involved
here can hinder a full understanding of the defense budget structure by
the public.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
the threat of a fait accompli
39. Senator Hawley. General Milley, the Defense Science Board
assessed the following in June 2018: ``Russia and China have each
developed theories of victory that differ in important respects, but
that have in common this idea of exploiting asymmetries in space and
time and asymmetries in stakes. In particular, once it is clear that
armed conflict is inevitable, they will attempt to achieve a decisive
outcome very quickly, presenting the U.S. and its allies with a fait
accompli. They will then seek to demonstrate that the U.S. and its
allies will incur significant costs in seeking to reverse that
outcome.'' Do you agree with the Defense Science Board's assessment?
General Milley. Yes. Asymmetry in space and time just means that
adversaries are very close to the fight and can get there fast. During
a crisis and as conflict begins, adversaries will work tirelessly in
the information environment, communicating to the international
community, to their own people, and to our citizens in an attempt to
convince the world that their military coercion is just and reasonable,
and that the outcome matters more to them than it does to us. This
narrative will be coupled with operational concepts explicitly designed
to make it difficult and costly for our military to move into the
region. Adversaries' theories of victory explicitly attempt to win
without fighting. This combat without (direct) conflict aims to cripple
the Joint Force before it ever leaves the homeland. If they are
unsuccessful in that effort, they plan to contest our global logistical
enterprise so that our units are degraded by the time they reach the
battlefield. Finally, they will demonstrate that the stakes in such a
conflict are considerably higher with nuclear posturing and potentially
threatening nuclear escalation if the conflict does not go their way.
40. Senator Hawley. General Milley, the National Defense Strategy
Commission found in November 2018 that ``successfully competing in
Europe and the Indo-Pacific region, while also managing escalation
dynamics, requires positioning substantial capability forward . . . to
deter and prevent a fait accompli by an agile, opportunistic
adversary.'' Do you agree with this finding by the National Defense
Strategy Commission?
General Milley. Yes. Fait accompli attacks typically occur
relatively close to an adversaries' homeland. This may require the
Joint Force to rapidly project power far from the U.S. Homeland to
counter them. However, we have to offset adversary positional advantage
with a variety of forward forces that are credible, lethal, and can
maneuver decisively to prevent a fait accompli in the manner of our
choosing.
The Joint Force, along with its Allies and Partners, can deter and
prevail against an attempted fait accompli with forward postured
forces, as well as through rotational and periodic deployments of units
with unique capabilities across all domains. The Joint Force's Dynamic
Force Employment attempts to anticipate adversary actions and support
U.S. interests with agility akin to or greater than that of our
adversaries. The Joint Force supports Allied and Partner resistance to
adversary coercion/aggression and prevents fait accomplish by
supplementing them with complementary U.S. capabilities and working
together toward high levels of interoperability--in planning and
operations. The Department supports these actions through security
cooperation initiatives including foreign military sales, bilateral and
multilateral exercises, and joint/combined training.
I would add that our definition of what is `forward' should expand
as well, occurring not just in the land sea, and air domains, but also
engaging in space and cyberspace, and through the electromagnetic
spectrum. Our effective forward presence, exercises, and operations,
backed by additional combat credible forces at home and superior power
projection capacity enables the Joint Force to militarily compete and
prevent successful fait accompli attacks in support of national
interests.
41. Senator Hawley. General Milley, the National Defense Strategy
Commission also found that ``the United States must develop new
operational concepts to achieve strategic advantage, including by
addressing the ability of aggressive regimes to achieve a fait accompli
against states on their periphery.'' Do you agree with this finding by
the National Defense Strategy Commission?
General Milley. Yes. Adversaries are working hard to modernize
their forces in ways that they believe can to deter the United States
from intervening and if necessary, defeat the U.S. military so they can
achieve their regional goals. New joint operational concepts are
designed to work across competition and war--a distinction our
adversaries do not recognize. New operational concepts will improve our
ability to convince adversaries that military coercion short of war
will not have the desired effect, while also ensuring that we have the
military advantages needed to defeat adversary aggression when it
occurs. Just as important, new operational concepts will support
broader national efforts to convince adversaries that they cannot
succeed. But the Joint Force cannot do this alone. We need to better
synchronize the Joint Force with other USG departments and agencies to
leverage all the instruments of national power against our adversaries'
fait accompli strategies.
42. Senator Hawley. General Milley, you wrote the foreword for the
December 2018 Army publication titled, ``The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain
Operations 2028.'' This publication states that ``Army forces must
demonstrate four capabilities in competition to deter the adversary,''
the first of which is the ``[a]bility to immediately deny a fait
accompli attack.'' Do you agree with the assessment in this document
that Army forces must be able to ``immediately deny a fait accompli''
in order to demonstrate a credible deterrent?
General Milley. Yes. Denying the adversary operational success on
short timelines can be a critical component in a campaign to defeat a
fait accompli attack. Joint warfare is team warfare and each of the
Services--to include the Army--have important roles to play in the
mission to deter and defeat a fait accompli attack. Credible deterrence
happens when we have a military that, every day, convinces the
adversary that it can disrupt the success of any initial attack, while
preventing the adversary from consolidating its advances and
establishing an effective defense.
43. Senator Hawley. General Milley, the Department of Defense's
2019 ``Indo-Pacific Strategy Report'' stated, ``If our competitors
decide to advance their interests through force, they are likely to
enjoy a local military advantage at the onset of conflict. In a fait
accompli scenario, competitors would seek to employ their capabilities
quickly to achieve limited objectives and forestall a response from the
United States, and its allies and partners. DOD initiatives on force
employment, crisis response, force and concept development, and
collaboration with allies and partners are aimed to help address this
critical challenge.'' Do you agree with the Department's assessment in
the ``Indo-Pacific Strategy Report'' that a ``fait accompli scenario''
is a ``critical challenge''?
General Milley. Yes. The U.S. military underwrites the global
commitments our Nation has made to both defending allies and partners
under threat from adversary coercion, but also the rules-based
international order that that reflects our interests and values
globally. As the PRC adapts its forces in a bid to more effectively
coerce its neighbors and deter the U.S. from engaging in the region,
the Joint Force also needs to adapt its combat capabilities. This
includes improvements in how we operate closely and in concert with
Allies and partners to ensure that the PRC cannot quickly, cheaply, or
easily advance their aims through military force.
44. Senator Hawley. General Milley, the Tri-Service Maritime
Strategy released by the United States Navy, United States Marine
Corps, and United States Coast Guard in December 2020 stated, ``In the
event of conflict, China and Russia will likely attempt to seize
territory before the United States and its allies can mount an
effective response--leading to a fait accompli. Each supports this
approach through investments in counter-intervention networks. Each
seeks to shift the burden of escalation by reinforcing annexed
territory with long-range precision-strike weapons and make a military
response to an invasion seem disproportionately costly.'' Do you agree
with this assessment by Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard leadership?
General Milley. Yes. Adversaries have invested heavily in counter-
intervention networks--sometimes referred to as ``anti-access, area
denial'' capabilities. Basically, this means that adversaries are
applying new long range precision weapons and other advanced
capabilities to widen their defensive perimeter such that it holds the
Joint Force at bay and allows their own operations to proceed without
effective interference. They intend that their counter-intervention
networks are so dense and comprehensive that the U.S. will be forced
with a difficult choice about whether to commit the U.S. military in a
presumably costly campaign to roll the adversary back.
45. Senator Hawley. General Milley, Chief of Staff of the Army
General James McConville released Chief of Staff Paper #1, ``Army
Multi-Domain Transformation,'' in March 2021. In this document, he
states, ``Our adversaries will attempt to achieve their strategic goals
without fighting, or to seize their objectives quickly as a fait
accompli.'' Do you agree with General McConville's assessment?
General Milley. Yes. Adversaries would prefer that they achieve
their objectives--and that the United States loses--without having to
fight at all. For this reason, adversaries work tirelessly to develop
advantages early. They take coercive actions against neighbors that
they believe are effective but still remain below thresholds that might
trigger a U.S. military response. Failing that, adversaries aim to move
quickly and decisively to avoid a longer and potentially riskier
conflict and convince the U.S. that attempting to reverse their
military seizure would be costlier than our Nation is willing to bear.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tommy Tuberville
nuclear policy
46. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Austin, there are reports that
the Acting Secretary of the Navy would cancel a new Nuclear Sea
Launched Cruise Missile after submission of the fiscal year 2022
budget, and before a Nuclear Posture Review. Will you commit to
postponing that decision until after the findings of the Nuclear
Posture Review have been delivered to this body?
Secretary Austin. The sea-launched cruise missile--nuclear (SLCM-N)
program will be examined during the upcoming U.S. Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR). As you know, the fiscal year 2022 budget request included
a small amount of funding to evaluate the next steps for a potential
nuclear sea-launched cruise missile program as proposed by the 2018
Nuclear Posture Review. The upcoming review of U.S. nuclear posture and
policy will re-examine if a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile is
necessary for our national defense strategy.
afghanistan
47. Senator Tuberville. General Milley, after 20 years we are
leaving Afghanistan and with it, one of the world's largest airbases,
Bagram Airfield. Is there any United States military aircraft that
Bagram Airfield cannot accommodate?
General Milley. At the height of our military operations in
Afghanistan, Bagram Airfield could accommodate the largest aircraft in
the United States inventory. As we prepare the airfield for the
departure of U.S. Forces and the handover to the ANDSF, we have ceased
the manning and contracts for the radar approach system and air traffic
control. In addition, we can no longer ensure the upkeep of instrument
approach systems. Collectively, these changes will limit the airfield
to Visual Flight Rules (VFR), causing our aircraft to operate in `fair
weather' conditions only.
48. Senator Tuberville. General Milley, would you agree that an air
base within 500 miles of both the Iranian and Chinese borders could be
strategically invaluable?
General Milley. An airbase located within 500 miles of both the
Iranian and Chinese borders could provide strategic advantage. However,
that advantage is only relevant within the overall framework of US
policy and strategy. Our ability to militarily support US national
security policy priorities will not be significantly curtailed by the
absence of such an air base.
49. Senator Tuberville. General Milley, what is the feasibility of
retaining Bagram Airfield as a United States base?
General Milley. President Biden has directed the withdrawal of
United States Forces from Afghanistan by September 11. The withdrawal
will include the transfer of Bagram Airfield to Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces.
extremism
50. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Austin, during the hearing, one
of my colleagues claimed that 1 percent of those in the military are
likely white supremacists. That would suggest that 35,000 members of
the military might be white supremacists. Do you think this is
accurate? Explain your answer.
Secretary Austin. I believe that the vast majority of
servicemembers, civilians, and contractors in DOD honor their oath to
support and defend the U.S. Constitution, and these individuals perform
their duties with integrity. However, as we have seen, the actions of a
few can have an outsized impact--which is why the Department of Defense
prohibits extremist activity such as the use of unlawful force or
violence to achieve goals that are discriminating in nature.
51. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Austin, do you believe that
accusations like the one above hinders the enlistment of minorities or
white members? Explain your answer.
Secretary Austin. As stated previously, I believe the vast majority
of servicemembers, civilians, and contractors in DOD honor their oath
to support and defend the U.S. Constitution, and perform their duties
with integrity.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL EAR 2022 AND THE
FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, JUNE 15, 2021
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
ARMY POSTURE
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Rosen, Kelly,
Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan,
Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, and Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. The Committee meets today to receive
testimony on the President's Defense Budget Request for the
Army for fiscal year 2022. Our witnesses this morning are
Christine Wormuth, Secretary of the Army, and General James
McConville, Chief of Staff of the Army. Thank you both for your
service and willingness to appear before us today. I would
also, on behalf of myself and my colleague, the Ranking Member,
wish the Army a happy birthday. It turned 246 years old
yesterday, and we were in it long before its 246th anniversary,
so happy birthday.
President Biden's Defense Budget Request for fiscal year
2022 includes approximately $172.7 billion in funding for the
Army, a reduction of $3.6 billion from the fiscal year 2021
enacted budget. The Army's request focuses on taking care of
its people, maintaining and enhancing military readiness, and
innovating and modernizing, but it does so in the face of these
significant reductions. Budget briefings indicate that the Army
budget decreased while the budgets of the Air Force and Navy
increased, primarily because of the focus on China as our
pacing threat, and the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan.
The Army has thus prepared a tightly crafted budget that
prioritizes modernization efforts over procurement and military
construction. With that in mind, I am interested in hearing
about the Army's view of the mission globally, especially in
the INDOPACOM [United States Indo-Pacific Command] theater, now
and in the future. Further, we would like to understand the
risk the Army is assuming with current funding projections.
The Army's most valuable asset has always been its people.
This budget request would increase funding for military
personnel by $1.2 billion and support a total force of just
over one million soldiers. It also includes adjustments for
retirement compensation reform, recruiting and retention
incentives, and an across-the-board pay raise for military and
civilian personnel of 2.7 percent, an important message to the
workforce that begins to reverse years of pay freezes and
benefit cuts on our civilian personnel.
The Army must continue to improve its readiness in the
context of long-term strategic competition. The Army's ongoing
focus on large training exercises, including the Defender
series in Europe and the Pacific, and its leadership in the
Project Convergence series, demonstrate progress in the right
direction. These large-scale events not only test system
capabilities and exercise critical skill sets to include
mobilization and deployment of the force, they also facilitate
joint and coalition training, reflecting how we would fight in
future operations. The Army has also introduced the Regionally
Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model, or ReARMM, to
synchronize all Army components across regions and provide
predictability to the formations within the service: regular
Army, National Guard, and Army Reserves. This effort has great
promise, and I would ask our witnesses to elaborate on how the
budget request supports ReARMM and the Army's other important
readiness exercises and efforts.
The Army's budget request includes an overall decrease in
research, development, testing, and evaluation, RDT&E, but
makes important increases in several cutting-edge technology
areas. To remain competitive with China and Russia, it is
critical that we continue to invest in these emerging
technologies which will define future battlefields across all
domains. The Army specifically has been pursuing modernization
in the areas of long-range precision fires, air and missile
defense, soldier lethality, next-generation combat vehicles,
future vertical lift, and the communications network. These are
ambitious and far-sighted objectives, but we must acknowledge
that the Army has historically struggled to effectively
modernize.
The establishment of Army Futures Command, and the
associated reorganization of related commands, injected
tremendous energy into modernization efforts, and Congress has
provided the Army with wide latitude to make programmatic and
structural changes. Secretary Wormuth, General McConville, I
would ask that you update the Committee on the Army's
modernization and RDT&E efforts and what resources are needed
to effectively continue them.
Finally, as I said at the opening, the Army is
fundamentally about people. In previous hearings before this
Committee, you have both committed to the Army being a ``People
First'' organization, not just for soldiers, but their
families, Army civilians, and veterans. For too long, issues
such as racism, extremism, sexual harassment, and sexual
assault have, in too many instances, gone unchecked. As we
progress through this legislative year, the Committee will
tackle many important policy issues, including how we prevent
and prosecute sexual assault and harassment in the ranks. More
than anything, cultural change within the force is critical to
reducing the number of sexual assaults and related offenses.
The President directed a review earlier this year, and I know
the Department and the Army have been hard at work. I plan to
incorporate the administration's recommendations into the mark
and look forward to debate and votes on the issue.
Again, I thank the witnesses for their participation today,
and I look forward to their testimonies.
Now let me now recognize the Ranking Member, Senator
Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Reed. Ms.
Wormuth and General McConville, thank you for being here today
and for all the great contributions you have made for our
safety in this country. I also want to recognize the 246th
birthday. I will not tell you what the first birthday in the
United States Army was that I celebrated. Well, yes, I will. It
was the 172nd. I imagine it would have been a happier birthday
had the Army fared better in the President's Fiscal Year 2022
Budget Request.
As I have often said, the world is the most dangerous place
that I have experienced certainly in my lifetime, and we face a
wide range of adversaries, the most dangerous of which are an
increasingly aggressive China and belligerent Russia. At the
same time, we must contend with rogue nations like Iran and
North Korea, as well as violent extremist organizations.
Our strategic competitors have gone to school on the
American way of war, and they are rapidly modernizing their
militaries to exploit our vulnerabilities. China and Russia
combined are spending more to modernize their militaries than
we are. This is something that we have not been able to say
before.
This request is a cut to defense, and the Army is bearing
the brunt of it. This seems to always be the case every time an
administration tries to cut defense, and yet, every time we cut
the Army, we end up reversing those cuts soon after. It is a
shortsighted approach that fails to recognize the strategic
value the Army provides.
With this budget, the Army's top line decreases by $4
billion from the previous year, putting at risk the gains in
readiness made after we hit rock bottom in 2017.
Procurement funding decreases $4.2 billion, a debilitating
11 percent cut, and military construction is cut by 15 percent.
As we watch our strategic competitors make unprecedented
investments in modernization, cuts like this just do not make
sense.
So I look forward to understanding from our witnesses the
impact of these cuts on the readiness and modernization of the
Army, and how it could risk the Army's ability to accomplish
assigned tasks from the National Defense Strategy. Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much, Senator Inhofe,
and let me now recognize the Secretary of the Army, Secretary
Wormuth. Madam?
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTINE E. WORMUTH, SECRETARY OF
THE ARMY
Secretary Wormuth. Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
Inhofe, and distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you
for your continued support for our Army and our people. It is a
distinct privilege to appear before you today. I would like to
take a moment to thank General McConville for his lifetime of
service to the Army and to our Nation. He is a great partner
and we are off to a running start.
I am honored to be serving as Secretary of the Army and to
be working with Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks
once again. I thank them for their continued leadership.
As I have stepped into the role, all of 3 weeks, I am
impressed but not surprised to see the state of the Army and
the professionalism, hard work, and continued sacrifice of our
soldiers and leaders that make up the world's greatest land
fighting force. I would like to highlight a few key
observations on the state of our Army as I see them today.
First, the Army must continue to heavily invest in the
development of its people. People are the strength of our Army.
We are steadily working to enhance our force structure, build
inclusive leadership, and invest in quality-of-life
initiatives. Like my predecessors, I can assure you that the
character, culture, and climate within our formations, at every
installation, will reflect a continued focus on placing people
first. The harmful behaviors of sexual assault and harassment,
racism, and extremism cannot and will not be tolerated.
We will purposefully work to stem the tide of suicides. Our
responsibility is to ensure every soldier and civilian has the
right leadership policies and resources to be safe and
successful among their teams so that they can continue to be
successful in our Nation's defense.
Second, the Army is now a leader in new technology. From
our Army Futures Command to the cross-functional teams to the
Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office on down to
fielding the next-generation soldier equipment for individual
unit members, the Army is prototyping and experimenting with
new capabilities and concepts. The Army is at the forefront of
developing and fielding new technology in counter-UAS, directed
energy, hypersonic weapons, next-generation assured positioning
navigation and timing devices, pushing software coding to the
edge, and in many other areas.
Third, the Army is opening doors in the Indo-Pacific,
Europe, and beyond. The Army can be relied upon to engage with
our allies, foster partnerships, maintain deterrence, and set
conditions for success prior to, or while engaging in conflict.
Deterrence requires boots on the ground, and the DOD
[Department of Defense] must be present to succeed in crises.
The Army is recognized around the world as an enduring,
reliable partner that can directly contribute by bringing
resources, training, and expertise. Our partnerships can lay
the groundwork for access and cooperation in contingencies.
Fourth, the next fight will be an all-domain conflict.
Future conflict will be in and across all domains with ground
forces to secure terrain, penetrate defenses, and achieve
objectives. The Army's transformation is directly aimed at
supporting joint warfighting that will depend on joint all-
domain command control, expeditionary joint logistics, and
joint maneuver across domains. As the Army continues to
modernize, we will maintain our overmatch against near-peer
adversaries, helping make future conflict less likely by
ensuring the costs to our adversaries outweigh the benefits.
Finally, the Army's readiness gains in modernization
procurement requirements must be prioritized to continue. The
Army recognized years ago the need to modernize concepts and
capabilities to sharpen our global competitive edge. Working in
close coordination with you and Congress, we established a
deliberate, achievable path to deliver a ready, modernized
Army. Significant progress has been made, but success can only
be assured through future and continued transformation. The
Army has already made, and will continue to make tough
decisions to ensure the best use of the resources we have to
adapt to and to stay ahead of the capabilities of our
adversaries, whether they are near-peer nations or newly
emerging threats. The Army will also compete successfully below
the threshold of conflict.
The President's Budget will help us to care for our people,
maintain and enhance military readiness, and innovate and
modernize. With your continued support we will pivot to next-
generation capabilities to assure we can win now and in the
future.
From what I have seen our Army is in great shape, but we
have important work ahead. I want to use this window of
opportunity to make certain that the Army will continue to
provide modernized and ready forces capable of responding
globally. I join General McConville in striving to ensure we
provide the Army with the resources it needs to succeed. I know
General McConville is eager to share his thoughts with you as
well, and I look forward to your questions and our continued
partnership. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Madam Secretary. General
McConville, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES P. McCONVILLE, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE ARMY
General McConville. Well, I would like to thank the
Secretary for leading our Army during this critical time.
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, distinguished Members of
the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today
and for your continued support to the Army and our people, our
soldiers, our families, our civilians, and our Soldiers for
Life, our retirees, and veterans.
The Army currently has 485,000 Active Duty soldiers and a
little more than 1 million in the total force. That is roughly
the same size Army that we had on 9/11. Army soldiers are
presently supporting combatant commanders around the world in
more than 140 countries. They form the most lethal and decisive
land force in the world, and they stand ready to fight and win
the Nation's wars as part of the Joint Force. I could not be
more proud of each and every one of them.
Since last October, the Army's priorities have been people,
readiness, and modernization, making us well aligned with the
emerging national security guidance. Putting people first means
recruiting and retaining the best talent our Nation has to
offer, maximizing their potential, and taking care of them. We
are building a culture of cohesive teams that are highly
trained, disciplined, and fit, where everyone is treated with
dignity and respect. That is who we prevent the harmful
behaviors that hurt our soldiers and break trust with the
American people, these being sexual assault and harassment,
acts of racism and extremism, and death by suicide.
All three of my children, two sons and a daughter, plus my
son-in-law, are currently serving in the Army.
Providing a safe and secure environment for our soldiers is
not only my responsibility as the Chief of Staff of the Army,
it is also a deeply held personal commitment. We win through
our people, the best fighting forces in the world, to ensure
that soldiers and their units are masters of their craft. This
is why we are shifting to a foundational readiness model that
prioritizes training at the company level and below first. The
Army has rebuilt a high level of readiness with the support of
Congress, but that readiness level is fragile. We must sustain
that high level of readiness while continuing our most
comprehensive transformation and modernization efforts in over
40 years. That is the only way we will maintain our overmatch
against near-peer competitors and would-be adversaries.
This year we are turning our multi-domain operations
concepts into real doctrine. We are not only developing but we
are delivering our six modernization priorities, including our
31+4 signature systems. With new doctrine, organizations, and
equipment, the Army is offering multiple options to our
combatant commanders and multiple dilemmas to our competitors
and adversaries. We are doing so alongside our sister services
and alongside our allies and partners. The U.S. Army never
fights alone. We are the strongest land force in the world, and
a great source of that strength comes from our allies and
partners. As a people-based organization, we are uniquely
qualified to foster these relationships.
Thank you for your continued support to America's sons and
daughters in uniform. I look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Wormuth and
General McConville follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by The Honorable Christine E. Wormuth and
General James P. McConville
evolved priorities
America's Army remains prepared to compete globally and fight and
win the Nation's wars as a member of the Joint Force. As demonstrated
repeatedly over the past year, we also remain the Nation's principal
response force to protect our country and communities in the face of
unexpected crises. We thank Congress for the consistent, predictable,
and sustained funding you have provided. This funding enabled us to
deliver a ready Army that responded promptly and superbly to a dynamic
and unpredictable security environment, like the COVID-19 pandemic,
Middle East tensions, civil unrest, cyberattacks, and south-west border
mission. Our priorities are well aligned with the Interim National
Security Strategic Guidance: investing in people, sustaining readiness,
divesting of legacy systems to reinvest in cutting edge technologies
and capabilities, mitigating the impact of climate change, and
strengthening our alliances and partnerships.
Last October, the Army evolved its priorities to people, readiness,
and modernization. This evolution reflects the achievements of a multi-
year effort to rebuild readiness and accelerate modernization. Six
years ago, we recognized that readiness had declined precipitously
after years of reduced funding, uncertain budgets, and deferred
modernization. We also recognized the need for new concepts,
capabilities, and posture to compete aggressively in the Indo-Pacific
and Europe. With your support, we rebuilt tactical readiness in our
units and built strategic readiness in our power projection
infrastructure. We deliberately executed internal reforms over the last
four years by realigning over $35 billion within the Army budget to
self-fund modernization priorities in support of joint all-domain
operations.
Thanks to your continued support for Army modernization, we are
successfully pivoting from the incremental improvements of the past to
fulfilling the robust Army Modernization Strategy that Congress
prescribed in the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act. Because of
this strategy, and new Congressional authorities to streamline the
acquisitions process, we are already beginning to field new systems in
long-range precision fires, air and missile defense, and soldier
lethality, with more on the way in next generation combat vehicles,
future vertical lift, and the Army network. With these modernization
capabilities, we are able to deliver multi-domain concepts,
capabilities, and formations that will give the Joint Force
asymmetric, all-domain advantages against near-peer potential
adversaries. Our gains are real, but fragile. With Congressional
support, we established a deliberate achievable path to deliver a ready
and modernized Army by 2028 and a transformed multi-domain Army by
2035. However, sustaining today's readiness and modernizing for
tomorrow's readiness is only possible through your timely, adequate,
predictable, and sustained funding.
strategic environment
A dynamic global security landscape continues to challenge our
Nation. These challenges include: (1) borderless threats, like COVID,
cyber, violent extremism, and climate change; (2) the global siege on
democracy to include an increasingly contested information environment;
and (3) the changing distribution of global power that draws new lines
and value propositions for many of our allies and partners. These
challenges require an agile, ready, modern, and multi-domain Army that
works alongside strong allies and partners. Strategic competitors and
regional actors are testing American norms, institutions, and
alliances. China, our pacing threat, increases its global
assertiveness, while Russia increases its disruptive behavior. Threats
from Iran, North Korea, and violent extremism and terrorism remain.
While America's Army maintains a tenuous overmatch, it is fleeting.
Future conflicts will manifest at longer range, across all domains, and
at much greater speed, both physically and cognitively.
Climate change is altering the Army's operational environment and
adding new mission demands; mitigating these effects has been an
ongoing priority for the Army for several years. Climate change impacts
Army installations globally and opens the Arctic as a new geographic
theater for competition. The Army must consider alternative energy
sources, improved energy storage, fuel-efficient design, more robust
power distribution, and new technologies, such as weather pattern and
terrain stability modeling to better inform operations.
The Army must also contend with threats from within. The harmful
behaviors of sexual assault, sexual harassment, racism, and extremism
hurt Soldiers and break trust with the American people. The Army is
working diligently to solidify a culture of cohesion and intervention
to protect our Soldiers, not only from the deliberate fratricide of
these behaviors, but from the invisible danger of mental and behavioral
health issues, and other stressors that can increase the risk of
suicide.
people first
Listening to Soldiers led to our very deliberate decision to re-
align our priorities. The Army's number one priority is now people. Our
people are our Soldiers from the Active, Guard, and Reserve components,
Army families, Army civilians, and retiree and veteran Soldiers for
Life. At every echelon, the Army must promote and build cohesive teams
(1) that are highly trained, disciplined, and fit, (2) that are ready
to fight and win, and (3) in which each person is treated with dignity
and respect. Cohesive teams are the foundation of all our people
initiatives and how the Army can best sustain readiness and transform
for the future. Three critical enablers from the 2019 Army People
Strategy continue to set conditions for putting people first: Army
Culture, Quality of Life initiatives, and a 21st Century Talent
Management System.
Army Culture
Last December, the Army stood up the People First Task Force to
address and implement the 70 Fort Hood Independent Review Committee
recommendations, with the understanding that the issues identified are
not unique to a single installation. Army leaders are stewards of a
special bond of trust and confidence with the American people. We held
accountable those leaders deemed to have broken that trust. We have
fundamentally transformed our command selection process in order to
improve the way we choose future leaders to assume positions with the
most influence over Soldiers. We are piloting independent climate
assessment teams of subject matter experts to identify unit climate
trends early and respond before systemic problems emerge. We are
listening to our people to learn and lead better. We conducted 96
listening sessions across 14 locations in addition to a special
``Solarium'' conference that asked junior- and mid-career leaders to
develop solutions. The Army is now working to change policies and
aspects of Army culture that impede prevention and response to harmful
behaviors. The first policy change introduced ``absent--unknown'', an
additional duty status code which affords missing Soldiers oversight
not present in ``Absent Without Leave (AWOL).''
``This is My Squad'' is the foundational principle for Army
culture. This initiative, led by the Sergeant Major of the Army,
promotes cohesion by encouraging Soldiers to better know those around
them, develop greater compassion, and intervene early to protect
others. Implementation actions include increased non-commissioned
officer professional military education, redistribution of experienced
leaders, and better reception processes for integrating new Soldiers at
each installation and unit.
Project Inclusion is a holistic effort to improve diversity,
equity, and inclusion across the force. As of March of this year, the
Army had conducted 83 Project Inclusion listening sessions with over
4,700 attendees. Separately, the Army reviewed its policy on official
photos and removed official photos from all promotion boards. The Army
later redacted race, ethnicity, and gender data from Soldier Record
Briefs in accordance with the Secretary of Defense's direction. The
Army is building relationships with influencers in diverse cities and
communities to better acquire, develop, employ, and retain the best
talent across the entire Nation.
Quality of Life (QoL) Initiatives
Putting people first also means creating a duty and installation
environment that allows Soldiers to thrive. The Army continues to
prioritize the QoL focus areas identified in 2019. The COVID era only
reinforced how essential each of those initiatives is to the well-being
and readiness of our Soldiers and their families.
Housing and Barracks. We continue executing the Army Housing
Campaign Plan to shape policies, procedures, and processes at every
echelon. The Army implemented 14 of the 18 tenets of the Tenant Bill of
Rights in its Residential Communities Initiatives (RCI) projects. We
expect the remaining four (common tenant lease, 7-year maintenance
history, dispute resolution and rent segregation) to be available at
the majority of installations with privatized housing by June 1, 2021.
We implemented mechanisms that hold privatized companies accountable to
residents for proper maintenance and customer service, hired additional
personnel to provide quality assurance oversight, and implemented 100
percent change of occupancy inspections and quality assurance checks.
To address environmental hazards (mold and lead), we developed
educational materials, a response registry, and policies for
habitability and displaced residents. Through the RCI, we are
committing over $1.8 billion and reinvesting another $1 billion to
improve residential housing. Additionally, the Army is projected to
invest over $10 billion in the next 10 years, in both Restoration &
Modernization and Military Construction funds, which will renovate or
replace more than 1,200 barracks for all components and eliminate sub-
standard barracks.
Healthcare. Army Medicine is partnering with the Defense Health
Agency to deliver the best care for our beneficiaries across our
installations. We are focusing on readiness as the Military Health
System reforms. We will emphasize operationally oriented training,
modernized capabilities, and innovative operational concepts. We are
grateful to Congress for increases in Health Professional Officer
special pay caps. This necessary investment ensures Army Medicine can
recruit and retain the best quality healthcare professionals for the
sustainability of the force.
Childcare. Childcare professionals serve on the front line of the
Army's response to the COVID-19 pandemic as they allow mission
essential personnel to maintain Army readiness. The Army has a multi-
pronged strategy to maintain, and in some cases, increase access to
care. With continued Congressional support, we plan to build 21
additional Child Development Centers by fiscal year 2030, adding
approximately 4,000 spaces. We appreciate Congressional support for the
three centers funded in fiscal year 2021, two in Hawaii and one in
Alaska. We continue to invest in these professionals, adjusting
compensation to recruit and retain quality staff. We are incentivizing
the family child care program, like a $1,000 bonus for new providers
and for families that stay in the program after a move. We implemented
revised DOD priorities for childcare to grant more access to military
families. Finally, we continue to invest in fee assistance to buy down
the cost of off-post care when on-post care is unavailable.
Spouse Employment. With the support of Congress, the Army continues
to make improvements in spouse employment. The Army reimburses up to
$1,000 for professional licensing and certification in a new state,
with Army Emergency Relief offering an additional $2,500. We thank
Congress for its efforts to bolster the support of individual states in
granting reciprocity. We streamlined the Home-Based Business
application and approval system, improved policies for military spouse
hiring preference, strengthened the Employment Readiness Program, and
made the transfer of non-appropriated fund employees between
installations easier. We continue to work with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) to promote workforce development
scholarships, improve state license reciprocity and professional
license compacts, and reduce overseas employment barriers.
Permanent Change of Station (PCS) Moves. Soldiers are now receiving
PCS orders an average of 120 days before their report date, an
improvement of 30 to 90 days. Families can now claim 100 percent of
their costs for reimbursement when conducting a personally procured
move. Our development and launch of the ``Army PCS Move'' app and
automation of several business processes, including the Smart Voucher
program, are helping families research, book movers, track progress,
and file claims, expediting reimbursement. Though COVID-19 heavily
impacted last summer's peak PCS season, we still executed over 70,000
moves with a 95 percent satisfaction rate.
21st Century Talent Management System
The Army continues to refine and implement its 21st Century Talent
Management System in order to effectively acquire, develop, employ, and
retain talent. We are maximizing the potential of each Soldier. We are
evolving our marketing and recruiting with initiatives like Army Hiring
Days and the ``What's Your Warrior?'' campaign to bring in the best
talent from across the country, including cities and communities with
populations who may be unfamiliar with the opportunities military
service affords. This year the Army launched cutting-edge digital
talent initiatives. Our Army Artificial Intelligence Center partners
with Carnegie Mellon University to grow data engineers and data
technicians, while our Software Factory leverages the extraordinary
existing talent in our Army to grow coders to solve Army problems.
At the heart of the Army's 21st Century Talent Management System
are new approaches, systems, and processes that leverage deep data
about unit needs and Soldier knowledge, skills, behaviors, and
preferences. The Integrated Personnel and Pay System--Army (IPPS-A) is
on track to go live across all three components by the end of this
calendar year. Release 2 is complete, having brought IPPS-A to the Army
National Guard across 54 states and territories. Release 3, currently
in testing, will integrate the Active and Reserve forces and complete
the Army's transition to a single system across all components capable
of identifying needed talent and managing Soldier careers from
accession to transition.
Talent management starts with having the right Army leaders at the
battalion and brigade-level. These are the Army's most consequential
leadership positions in terms of affecting retention and attrition. In
the biggest change to the Army's command selection process in fifty
years, the Army now uses a Commander Assessment Program to select
future battalion and brigade commanders, as well as command sergeants
major. This intensive five-day program evaluates individuals for their
temperament, cognitive fitness, physical health, and leadership skills.
We are also expanding to build a system to assess and select our Army
Acquisition Corps civilians at the same echelons. We are putting the
right people in the right place at the right time to remain ready
today.
ready today
The Army stands ready today to compete globally and fight and win
the Nation's wars in support of the Joint Force. This is only because
we recognized six years ago that readiness had declined precipitously
after three years of reduced funding and uncertain budgets. Since then,
and funding from Congress, we rebuilt tactical readiness and built
strategic readiness. However, readiness is fragile. We require
continued support to maintain it, in order to reliably meet the needs
of combatant commands without overstressing our people.
People are the Army's most important weapon system. The Army
represents 25 percent of the Defense Budget, 35 percent of the Active
Force, and 45 percent of the Active and Reserve forces, but meets over
half of global demands. Today, the Total Army supports the Joint Force
by supplying Soldiers to combatant commanders in more than 140
countries. Over 69,000 Soldiers are in the Indo-Pacific, including over
25,000 forward deployed on the Korean peninsula. Over 30,000 soldiers
are in Europe supporting NATO and the European Deterrence Initiative,
including the forward command post of our newly reactivated V Corps. We
remain dedicated to our counterterrorism and train, advise, assist
missions, providing over 21,000 soldiers in support of the U.S. Central
Command theater. In our Nation's Capital this year, over 26,000
National Guard soldiers mobilized from 28 states to assist with medical
evacuation, communications, security, logistics and safety support.
Last year, we executed 64 brigade-equivalent deployments and moved 45
thousand pieces of equipment through 55 ports of embarkation/
debarkation in support of worldwide missions.
This past year highlighted the need for the Army to defend the
Nation at home as well as abroad. In response, the Army continually
demonstrated its capability and capacity to provide timely and
effective support in crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic expanded the Army's
existing mission set as DOD's leader in protecting the warfighter from
biological threats and investigating infectious diseases that threaten
public health. Since last March, Army scientists, medical
professionals, engineers, and logisticians from all components have
deployed nationwide to aid COVID prevention and response efforts. For
its vaccine development and distribution initiative, America turned to
an Army logistician to lead operations. Our National Guard and Reserve
units across America supported both neighbor and nation in an
unprecedented level of mobilization, not only for COVID support, but in
response to civil unrest, hurricanes, and wildfires, all while
continuing to train for wartime missions.
In 2020, the Army demonstrated strategic readiness through its
series of DEFENDER exercises, despite the constraints of a pandemic
environment. Strategic readiness involves installation capabilities to
mobilize, train, and deploy formations and then sustain them from the
Homeland. DEFENDER-Pacific 2020 witnessed the deployment of combat
credible forces across the breadth of the Indo-Pacific theater from
Guam and Palau to the Aleutian Island chain and mainland Alaska. Under
the command and control of U.S. Army Pacific, combined joint forces
executed strategic readiness operations that included cargo delivery,
forcible entry operations, rapid infiltration of High Mobility
Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), operational maneuver of Army
watercraft, and fighter combat patrols. DEFENDER-Europe 2021 is
currently underway with over 30,000 multinational forces from 27
nations conducting nearly simultaneous operations across 30 training
areas. This year's exercise will incorporate Security Force Assistance
Brigades, the Army's new V Corps, and U.S. Air Force and
Navy assets. DEFENDER-Europe 21 is led by the Army's newly
consolidated United States Army Europe and Africa Command.
The foundation of Army readiness is our people. The Army is moving
to a foundational readiness model that prioritizes the training of
individuals and small units at the company level and below. The best
combat units in the world ensure their individuals and small units are
masters of their craft. To foster individual readiness, the Army is
also investing in holistic health and fitness. We continue to study the
impact of the Army Combat Fitness Test in accordance with Congressional
guidance in order to better connect individual fitness with combat
readiness. A solid foundation of readiness enables unit agility and
provides the greatest return on an investment of limited time and
resources. We will continue to use the combat training centers to bring
these highly trained, disciplined, and fit teams together for large-
scale collective training that validates the combat effectiveness of
our battalions and brigades.
The Army must balance the continuous demand for current readiness
from combatant command requirements with the imperative to secure
future readiness, all without overly stressing our people or our
equipment. To this end, the Army developed, tested, and rehearsed a new
unit lifecycle model that will go into effect October 2021: the
Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model (ReARMM). ReARMM
will harmonize historically conflicting Army priorities. It will take
care of people by reducing operational tempo and maximizing
predictability and stability to commanders, Soldiers, and families.
ReARMM will sustain readiness by carving out dedicated windows for
building readiness at echelon while aligning units with primary regions
and functions. Regional alignment provides units deep wells of
knowledge on the terrain, culture, and people where their units are
most likely to operate. Joint force commanders also gain by leveraging
habitual, trusted relationships between Army formations and Allies and
partners. Finally, ReARMM will facilitate modernization by giving units
dedicated windows to integrate new equipment, reorganize formations,
and train on new doctrine. Adopting this model transitions the Army
from small, incremental, evolutionary modernization of platforms to
large-step modernization of our formations.
army modernization--transforming for tomorrow
The Army faces an inflection point that requires innovation,
creativity, and entrepreneurship in the application of combat power.
The battlefield is increasingly faster, more lethal, and more
distributed. Overmatch will belong to the side that can make better
decisions faster. To meet emerging challenges, the Army is transforming
to provide the Joint Force with the speed, range, and convergence of
cutting edge technologies that will generate the decision dominance and
overmatch required to win the next fight. We are leading the way in
developing and fielding advanced technology in support of the Joint
Force.
The Army's materiel modernization transformation--what we fight
with--is based on the six modernization priorities announced in 2018:
Long Range Precision Fires, Next Generation Combat Vehicle, Future
Vertical Lift, the Army Network, Air and Missile Defense, and Soldier
Lethality. The Army's conceptual transformation--how we fight--begins
with our Multi-Domain Operations concept, which we are currently
turning into doctrine. The Army is using Project Convergence, our
campaign of learning and annual capstone event, to shape future
concepts and capabilities. By 2035, the Army will realize its vision of
a multi-domain force.
The Army is committed to seeing our signature materiel
modernization efforts through to completion. Many are coming on line
according to, or ahead of, our accelerated development schedule and
being delivered to our Soldiers. Through continuous reform efforts, we
have been able to redirect scarce resources to these key modernization
efforts; however, we could not achieve this without Congressional
support and authorities. Army Futures Command is providing
unprecedented unity of effort across the modernization enterprise,
having changed our business model and culture through public-private
partnerships and a focus on Soldier-centered design. This allows us to
gain immediate operator feedback, accelerating the development process
and ensuring new systems are effective in operational environments.
These reforms, combined with early experimentation through Project
Convergence, are paying significant dividends. Judicious use of Middle
Tier Acquisition and Other Transaction Authorities enable progress from
characteristics to fielded capabilities in as short as three years,
versus the five to seven years it took just to prescribe requirements
in the past.
Long Range Precision Fires
Long range precision fires provide the capability to penetrate
Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) environments, suppress air defenses and
strike maritime targets at range from land, and establish our own A2/AD
capability to open windows of opportunity for the Joint Force to
exploit. In 2019, OSD directed the Army to develop a ground based long-
range hypersonic weapon. In fiscal year 2023, the Army will field the
first Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) firing battery. The Army is
also developing a ground-launched, Mid-Range Capability that will
complement the LRHW and the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM)
capabilities. The PrSM is on schedule to conduct its maximum range test
in 3QFY21 and deliver 30 missiles in fiscal year 2023. It will provide
greater range, lethality, and survivability at a lower cost per shot
than ATACMS. The Extended Range Cannon Artillery remains on schedule
for delivery in fiscal year 2023. It will establish overmatch against
peer adversaries in the close and deep operational maneuver areas with
an extended range out to 70km.
Next Generation Combat Vehicle
Next generation combat vehicles will increase the firepower, speed,
and survivability of land forces, allowing them to maneuver into
positions of advantage in the future operational environment. After
rebaselining the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) program last
year, the Army issued the final request for proposal for the concept
design phase on December 18, 2020. OMFV is an example of how our new
acquisitions process enabled the Army to learn early and recover before
programs become too big to fail. The Robotic Combat Vehicle (RCV)
effort envisions an unmanned platform that provides decisive mobility,
lethality, survivability, and increased situational awareness to
formations. RCV will undergo increasingly rigorous experiments and
capability demonstrations with a decision to procure by fiscal year
2024. The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) is an adaptable and more
survivable multi-variant vehicle that replaces the 1960s era M113
Family of Vehicles. Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF) is an armored
combat vehicle that will provide, large caliber, long-range direct
fires in support of Infantry Brigade Combat Teams. The first unit
equipped with MPF will be in fiscal year 2025.
Future Vertical Lift
Future Vertical Lift platforms and technologies increase the
maneuverability, range, endurance, lethality, and survivability of Army
aircraft, providing joint commanders with increased operational reach
and effectiveness against near-peer competitors. Our new acquisitions
process has put the onus on industry to innovate and invest early,
allowing the Army to ``fly before we buy.'' The Future Armed
Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) closes the gap left by retirement of the
Vietnam-era Kiowa. Two prototypes will fly in fiscal year 2023 followed
by a year-long flight demonstration. The Future Long Range Assault
Aircraft (FLRAA) will replace the UH60 Blackhawk with increased speed,
range, payload, and endurance. We expect initial FLRAA prototypes in
fiscal year 2025. Future vertical lift will leverage advances in
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) technology to develop Air Launched
Effects (ALE) with a wide array of payloads and extended communication
mesh networks with a fielding plan in fiscal year 2024.
Army Network
The Army network modernization underpins Project Convergence as the
Army's contribution to Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control.
It provides necessary information technology (IT) infrastructure to
link the right sensors to the right shooters through the appropriate
command and control node. In fiscal year 2021, we will field more than
150 units with new technologies while simultaneously developing the
next capability set of equipment. The Army is also modernizing current
Global Position System (GPS) receivers to meet current and emerging
threats by providing the Joint Force with advanced assured precision,
navigation and timing (APNT) systems. Included are modernized receivers
that meet congressional mandates to transition to M-code GPS and
integrate alternative APNT technologies for our ground combat
platforms, dismounted Soldiers, precision weapons and munitions, and
aviation systems. We are fielding the first generation mounted APNT
systems to our forward deployed formations with a second generation
ready not later than fiscal year 2023. Additionally, the Army continues
to invest in space-based technologies that close operational gaps in
deep sensing and targeting activities. We are coordinating with
partners in the Intelligence Community and private industry to enhance
Army access to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) space-based sensing and link with
national-level capabilities to provide tactical-level sensor to shooter
capability to combat formations.
Air and Missile Defense
Air and missile defense capabilities defend the Joint Force,
allies, and partners against manned and unmanned air and missile
threats. The Army's integrated air and missile defense capabilities
will protect joint forces from adversary aircraft, missiles, and drones
to protect the force and enable operations. This includes both theater
systems and tactical / short-range air defense like the Maneuver-Short
Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) which defeats aerial threats to the
maneuver force with a mix of kinetic capabilities. The Rapid
Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office (RCCTO) is developing a
Directed Energy (DE) M-SHORAD variant that utilizes a 50kW class laser.
We will field four DE prototypes for experimentation and further
development. Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) will defend
fixed and semi-fixed assets primarily against cruise missiles and
Unmanned Aircraft Systems as well as fixed and rotary wing aircraft.
Based on the authorization in the 2021 NDAA, the Army is currently
preparing two Iron Dome batteries for operational deployment at the end
of fiscal year 2022. This spring the Army will conduct a shoot-off to
inform our decision on the enduring IFPC solution. RCCTO is also
working on two IFPC variants, a High Energy Laser (HEL) and a High-
Powered Microwave (HPM). The IFPC-HEL uses a 300kW-class HEL to defeat
Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (RAM) threats and is on track for
demonstration. The IFPC-High-Powered Microwave is being developed with
the Air Force to produce the Tactical High Power Microwave Operational
Responder (THOR) in fiscal year 2021 with a prototype expected in
fiscal year 2024. The Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command
System (IBCS) initial operational capability is 3QFY22 with fielding.
IBCS is a revolutionary command-and-control system that streamlines
sensor to shooter linkages for air and missile defense engagements--and
once fielded with enable optimized employment of the Patriot force.
This enhanced tracking system delivers an unambiguous view of the
operating environment, allowing commanders and air defenders to make
critical decisions within seconds. The Lower-Tier Air and Missile
Defense Sensor (LTAMDS) will deliver the next generation sensor that
leverages the capabilities of the Patriot Missile Segment Enhanced
(MSE) interceptor and is fully integrated into IBCS.
Soldier Lethality
Soldier Lethality improvements to weapons, sensors, body armor, and
training will deliver decision dominance and overmatch at the level
where it matters most-, allowing individual Soldiers to quickly
understand and react to emerging situations. With ReARMM, we are
incorporating Guard and Reserve units into the fielding schedule much
earlier and more broadly than in past modernization efforts. The Army
seeks continued Congressional support for the rapid prototyping,
development, and procurement of the Next Generation Squad Weapon (NGSW)
Rifle and Automatic Rifle, Enhanced Night Vision Goggles (ENVG),
Integrated Visual Augmentation System (IVAS)--Heads-Up Display (HUD)
3.0, and the Synthetic Training Environment (STE). By 1QFY22, we'll
equip the first unit with IVAS. In 4QFY22, we will equip the first unit
with the Next Gen Squad Weapon Rifle and Automatic Rifle, as well as
General Purpose Ammo. STE efforts that complement IVAS include the
Squad Immersive Virtual Trainer (as part of IVAS) and the STE
Information System that includes: One World Terrain, Training
Simulation Software, and Training Management Tools.
In addition to our six priorities, the Army understands the need
for considerable investment in long-term research to deliver science
and technology solutions. The Army is aligning its laboratories towards
modernization and partnering with over 250 research institutions. The
Army's priority research areas are: disruptive energetics, Radio
Frequency (RF) electronic materials, quantum research, hypersonic
flight, artificial intelligence, autonomy, synthetic biology, material
by design, and advanced manufacturing.
The Army is also investing in deep sensing and analysis to provide
intelligence support to long range precision fires and commanders'
situational awareness during Joint All-Domain Operations. We will
continue to drive intelligence modernization by acquiring capabilities
and capacities across the Space, Aerial, Terrestrial, and Foundation
Layers nested with and in support of the Army's six modernization
priorities.
We will continue to leverage the Intelligence Community (IC), other
Services', and commercial partner enterprise-level Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance collection programs to provide timely,
accurate, and relevant intelligence to support Army targeting efforts
and enhance commanders' decision making.
The Army is not just modernizing concepts and materiel. We require
continued budget support to modernize infrastructure and execute
workload in our Organic Industrial Base (OIB) of depots, arsenals, and
ammunition plants, along with our power projection and Mobilization
Force Generation Installations to better project power from and into
contested environments. We must be able to address the risk of new and
emerging cyber, information, and physical threats that can thwart our
ability to project power by disrupting installation operational
capabilities and the supply chains supporting our forces, whether from
malign actors or nature. Our installations must be resilient to
disruption and modernized in support of the modernized Army force. The
Army is investing significant time and resources to mitigate the
effects of climate change on our installations. We are establishing
energy and water resilience, efficiency, and affordability across our
installation enterprise. In the past five years, energy programs,
partnerships and initiatives recognized a cost avoidance or savings of
more than 14 percent, every installation has added a full-time energy
manager position, and 16 of 26 Army OIB depots, arsenals and ammunition
plants have transitioned from fossil fuels to clean energy
alternatives. We are also partnering with private industry to implement
energy and utility savings contracts that maximize the latest
technology to drive efficiency and reduced costs, with 99 agreements
currently in execution.
The Army is also not modernizing in a vacuum, but in partnership
with our sister Services. We have completed two Army-Air Force
Warfighter Talks and one Army-Air Force-Navy joint session to ensure
the Army's Project Convergence initiatives remains synchronized with
the Air Force's Advanced Battle Management System and the Navy's
Project Overmatch to meet the unique needs of each Service. As we work
to stand-up a Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) in Europe later this year,
our Indo-Pacific aligned MDTF continues to synchronize effects with the
Joint Force during multiple exercises. The MDTF's All-Domain Operations
Center enables Joint training, to include hosting
Carrier Strike Group-3 for the Navy's Fleet Synthetic Training--
Joint exercise and connecting to the Navy's Continuous Training
Environment network. During INDOPACOM's Pacific Fury 21, the MDTF
validated its ability to virtually synchronize long range fires and
effects with the Joint Force. The MDTF will participate in
USINDOPACOM's upcoming Northern Edge and Joint All Domain Command and
Control (JADC2) Simulation Experiment (SIMEX) in May before rotating
into the Indo-Pacific later this summer to participate in joint
exercises with PACAF, PACFLT, and MARFORPAC.
strengthening alliances and partnerships
America does not fight alone. Alliances and partnerships are among
the greatest sources of our military strength. This global landpower
network is DOD's foundation for competition, creating inroads and
maneuver space for Joint and whole-of-government strategic engagement.
As a people organization, the Army is uniquely qualified to maintain
and expand this vital network, especially given that partner militaries
and their senior leaders are predominately land force-centric. Our
roadmap for building and strengthening relationships spans a range of
activities that include military and key leader engagements, education
and training programs such as the Department of State's International
Military Education and Training (IMET) and International Professional
Military Education (IPME), security assistance through Title 22 Foreign
Military Sales, and advise and assist capabilities. Boots on the ground
deter would-be adversaries, and small, scalable engagements with our
Allies and partners open doors to the access and presence we need to
compete effectively. The Army's new Security Force Assistance Brigades
(SFAB) demonstrate our commitment to alliances and partnerships and our
capability to compete.
Last year we completed the activation of all six SFABs, five in the
Regular Army and one in the Army National Guard. Since then, 5th SFAB
has already completed missions with multiple partners across the Indo-
Pacific theater, including elements of the Thai, Indonesian, and Indian
armies. Later this year, many of those partners will join their
American counterparts in combined exercises at the National Training
Center. Engagements such as these are vital, not only for
interoperability, but in recognition that Cold War-era exclusive
allegiance to a single great power no longer exists. Many if not all of
our allies and partners maintain concurrent relationships with both the
United States and our competitors and potential adversaries. We cannot
take for granted these relationships and the vital access and presence
they provide us.
closing
The men and women of the United States Army are the greatest
Soldiers in the world. The Army is cultivating cohesive teams,
maximizing talent, sustaining tactical and strategic readiness,
progressing through our greatest transformation in over 40 years, and
strengthening our alliances and partnerships. We are leading the way in
developing and fielding high technology for the Joint Force. We are
opening operational and strategic doors in the Indo-Pacific and Europe.
We are succeeding through calibrating our force posture around the
globe to assure our partners and deter would-be adversaries, and we
need your continued support. With timely, adequate, predictable, and
sustained funding, we will remain ready to fight and win our Nation's
wars--now and into the future.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, General McConville. As I
mentioned in my opening statement, and as is obvious to all,
the focus on Chinese as the pacing threat is taking a lot of
your attention and time. Also with the decision to withdraw
from Afghanistan that is adding additional, I think, emphasis
to the Indo-Pacific region.
Secretary Wormuth, with your policy and strategy expertise,
what do you see is the appropriate role of the Army in Indo-
Pacific?
Secretary Wormuth. Thank you, Chairman. I think there are a
number of roles for the Army in the INDOPACOM AOR [area of
responsiblity] across the full spectrum of competition, if you
will. First, I think the Army is uniquely well positioned to
serve our Nation in the competition phase. You know, many of
the chiefs of defense in the countries in Asia are actually
Army generals, and so they are particularly interested in
partnerships with our Army, and I know General McConville has
seen that in his many visits with his counterparts.
We can use those relationships to increase our alliances
and partnerships to deepen our relationships with those
countries so that, as I said in my opening statement, in a time
potentially where tensions are rising, we may be able to
leverage those positive relationships for access that can be
very helpful, and we are doing that with things like our
Security Force Assistance Brigades, with elements of our multi-
domain task force that right now is working out of JBLM [Joint
Base Lewis-McCord] in Washington, and that we are going to
build on in the future.
Then moving up the spectrum of competition into conflict,
the Army, particularly with the modernization programs we are
pursuing, can do a number of things: provide long-range
precision fires, again through the numerous programs we have
there to go after maritime and air targets. We can provide a
layered air defense, which will help us in terms of the anti-
access and area denial capabilities we face there. We are
pursuing making sure we have a survivable, resilient network,
which we know we are going to need given the counter-space
capabilities that we face.
So I think, again, as part of the Joint Force, the Army can
be very, very useful in terms of bringing options to the
combatant commander in INDOPACOM.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
General McConville, how do the Army modernization efforts
complement and support the strategy that the Secretary just
talked about?
General McConville. Yes, Chairman. As we take a look at our
modernization priorities, what they provide us is speed, they
provide us range, and they provide us this concept of
convergence, when we bring together all the Army's systems and
the joint systems and the future, even our allies' and
partners' systems, and that gives us the decision dominance
that we need, and quite frankly, the overmatch we need to deter
competitors and potential adversaries. I would argue that we
get deterrence through strength. That strength comes from a
strong Joint Force working together, and it comes from strong
allies and partners, and we have strong allies and partners, as
the Secretary said, in the region.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Madam Secretary, you
just returned from Fort Hood. Senator Inhofe and I went there
in the wake of the serious situations that developed there.
There are many factors involved, but obviously command climate,
leadership engagement--one of the more disconcerting comments
that I heard was from a sergeant major, saying that the troops
do not trust the commanders and the commanders do not know the
troops. That might be a function of constant deployments and
constant activity, but still it cannot be tolerated.
Can you give us your comments and observations about the
positive changes that you have made and will make?
Secretary Wormuth. Certainly. We are very focused on
building cohesive teams down to the lowest level. So we have
launched the This is My Squad initiative, and the Sergeant
Major of the Army is our point man on that effort. We are, as
you know, completely redesigning the SHARP [Sexual Harassment
Assault Response and Prevention] program. We are also
restructuring our Criminal Investigative Division so that,
among other things, we will have more experienced investigators
to handle these kinds of special victim crimes.
I want to share--well, one other thing I will touch on
before I share just an observation. A very important piece we
have also undertaken is the Command Assessment Program that
really is revolutionizing how we are selecting future leaders,
and takes into account their past performance on command
climate. But I did a sensing session with soldiers, myself
alone in the room, and one of the things I heard strongly was
they feel that their commanders do care. I think they think
their commanders have a lot of things on their plate that makes
it hard for them to have time to care, but there was a sense of
caring that was very clear.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Senator Inhofe, please.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all,
let's get another shot at the Army budget cuts. As I stated in
my opening remarks, the Army bears the brunt of the
disappointing President's Budget Request that prioritizes a
domestic agenda over national defense. I am reminded also of
the amendment that I had on there for parity between defense
and non-defense. I will have to go back and check, but I think
this is the first time in 10 years or so that we have actually
come out and said parity is not something that is going to be
pursued, and that is the first time the statement has been made
in a recorded vote.
General McConville, please describe the impact--I will give
you another shot at the same thing that you were just now
talking about--and the risk of these cuts on the Army's ability
to modernize the force for competition, and if necessary, if it
should become necessary, conflict with China and Russia, and to
fulfill its obligation to the other combatant commanders, which
they would have to do at the same time. Talk about capacity.
Where do we stand with that now?
General McConville. Well, Senator, as I said in my opening
statement, the end strength of the United States Army is
485,000 on the Active and a little over 1 million when it comes
to the total force. That is the same size Army that we had
right before 9/11. As we all know, we go to war with the Army
we have, and we had to grow that Army during the conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq, and so we have frozen that end strength
at 485,000. Would we like to have a bigger Army, depending on
the strategy? Absolutely. But with the budget we have we are
trying to bring forward the best Army that can fight tonight
and win.
But also what I would argue, more importantly in the
future, as we watch our strategic competitors continue to
improve their capabilities, the budget gives us the most
efficient capability when it comes to readiness. If we are
going to send forces into harm's way they have got to be ready.
As the Secretary talked about, we are focusing on the squad,
platoon, and company level, to make sure that all those
soldiers are ready to go.
Then we have to modernize the Army. I would argue every 40
years the Army has to transform. It did in 1940, right before
World War II, it did in 1980, when I came in the Army. Most of
the weapons we are using are 1980 vintage, and quite frankly, I
think in 2020 we must do the same. So we have done all we can
with the Secretary and myself to protect the modernization of
the Army, and we believe we must do that. I have outlined in my
unfunded requirement letter to you those unfunded requirements
that were not met within the budget.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah. Well, in general, I am the first to
admit, with the budget that we have, you guys are just doing
great. We do not have an adequate budget. That is the problem
that we have. Let's look into the future of the cuts. It always
seems like when the administration wants to cut defense it goes
after the Army first, and when President Obama reduced defense
he cut the Army's base budget by $70 billion and cut end
strength by nearly 90,000. So that was a problem that we were
dealing with at that time. These cuts left the Army with only
one brigade combat team at the highest level of readiness. It
took nearly half a decade, and $100 billion of additional
funding to fix it.
Now, Secretary Wormuth, while we the Army has worked hard
in this request to preserve end strength and limit reductions
to its highest modernization priorities, would this be possible
with additional budget cuts the next year and the year after
that? We all tend to look at where we are today, and I am
concerned right now, with the trends that are out there, where
we are going to be with budget cuts in the near future. What do
you think?
Secretary Wormuth. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. As you know,
Secretary Austin has undertaken both a new national defense
strategy review as well as a global posture review, and we, of
course, in the Army, are participating in both of those
efforts. I think it will be very important in terms of looking
to the future to look at how that new strategy is developed and
what it requires the Army to do. I would agree with you
certainly that we are in a very, very tough international
security environment. There is no shortage of threats.
So I think as General McConville and I go forward into
future POM [program objective memorandum] builds we are going
to have to be looking carefully at what does the strategy call
upon us to do, what do we think are the current demands from
combatant commanders, and can we meet those current demands
while also protecting our modernization efforts, which is going
to be critical? Particularly having seen everything we are
doing at Fort Hood, and again, the challenge of taking care of
our people while also meeting current mission requirements, I
think we are having set end strength at 485,000, we are still
under stress, particularly in certain areas like air defense,
as you know. So we are going to be strong advocates going into
the future budget discussions.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah. Well, I do not have any doubt of
that, and I know that you are fully aware of the problems that
exist if we have reductions, which a lot of people, including
myself, are concerned with. So I appreciate the fact that we
have the two of you at the helm at this given time, but it is
going to take more resources.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Senator Shaheen,
please.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Secretary Wormuth and General
McConville, for being here this morning and for your service.
The National Guard plays a critical role both in adding to
the total force of the Army but also in the welfare of each of
our states. I do not know how New Hampshire could have gotten
through the last year and a half with the pandemic without the
National Guard. We had the highest percentage of our force
structure per capita activated in response to the Guard, and it
has come to my attention that there was a recent letter sent by
members of the Florida, California, and Texas congressional
delegations to the Secretary of Defense that requested larger
Guard end strength levels in line with the per capita size of
their states. For a small state like New Hampshire, that is
especially troubling to think about what that means for the
future.
So can you talk about how we strike the balance between the
needs of those large states and small states that have our
Guard both working on state missions but are also being
activated for the national missions as well?
Secretary Wormuth. Certainly, Senator Shaheen, and I would
ask General McConville to expand on this. When it comes to
looking at the National Guard, first I want to agree that they
have done a fantastic job all around the country this year. It
has really been incredible, whether it has been helping us
respond to COVID, natural disasters, or securing the Capitol
here more recently.
We need to look at both what the overseas requirements are
for the National Guard and how they fit into our contingency
plans around the world, whether it is Europe or in Asia. That
is part of what we think about when it comes to looking at the
size. But we also, of course, look at their support to civil
authorities here at home, and try to look at that very
holistically. That is something we look at each year as we go
through our total Army analysis, and I think, you know, we
would want to look carefully at making adjustments,
particularly significant adjustments.
But, General McConville, you may want to add to that.
General McConville. I think the Secretary--you know, one
thing that I do want to say about the National Guard, this has
been the year of the Army National Guard. I could not be more
proud of what they have done in their communities. They have
been there. They have been all over the place. I just could not
be more proud of them, and I think, Senator, it comes to
balance. We have big states and we have little states. What we
want to do is work with each of the states, make sure we know
what their requirements are. As we transform the Army, we are
working very closely with their leadership. You know, we have
certain states that would like to have certain type units that
are more beneficial for how they operate within their state,
but also the type of people that want to serve in the Army,
there are some states that have better opportunities than
others.
So as the Secretary said, we need to work very, very
closely with them, with you all, and come forward with what the
Army looks like, what the National Guard, what the total force
looks like in the future.
Senator Shaheen. So we should not expect to see an
announcement any time soon that will dramatically cut the size
of small states' Guard forces to the benefit of large states?
Secretary Wormuth. Senator, I would not expect--you should
not expect to see that. Again, if we are going to make
adjustments to the distribution of Guard force around the
country, that is something that the Chief and I are going to
want to look at carefully.
Senator Shaheen. Consult with Congress, I assume.
Secretary Wormuth. Absolutely.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Secretary Wormuth, in your
opening statement you talked about future conflicts being all-
domain conflicts. Do you see hybrid warfare as an all-domain
conflict?
Secretary Wormuth. Senator, I think certainly hybrid
conflict or gray zone conflict, as some people refer to it, can
take place in multiple domains. So, for example, you may have
the little green men that we saw that Russia put into Ukraine--
--
Senator Shaheen. That we are still seeing in Ukraine.
Secretary Wormuth. Correct, while at the same time you see
cyber warfare and information operations, for example. So I do
think that hybrid or gray zone conflict can be multi-domain.
Senator Shaheen. Well, where I am going with this is
concern about how we are preparing to respond to that kind of
hybrid or gray zone warfare, because so far we have not been as
successful as I would like to see us. So how do we address
that, going forward, as we are looking at preparing our Army?
Secretary Wormuth. I think we do need to do more in that
area, and I would anticipate that that is something, again,
that in the strategy review it is going to be looked at,
because I think we need to build out our thinking about how to
operate effectively in that zone. In particular, in the Army,
we first of all had been investing for some time now in
additional cyber capabilities, for example. We have been paying
attention to cybersecurity but also building out or cyber
protection teams and doing a lot of work with Army Cyber
Command.
We also see, in the Multi-Domain Task Force formation an
information operations capability, an electronic warfare
capability, and those are the kinds of capabilities I think
that we can bring to bear in gray zone situations. We, of
course, also have Special Forces, who can go back to the more
traditional unconventional warfare that was sort of some of
their roots in the Cold War.
So those are, I think, all things that the Army can do, but
again, the Chief may want to add.
General McConville. So I think you make a very important
point, and I think we find ourselves at an inflection point
right now. Over the last 20 years we were really focused on
irregular warfare, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism. We have
to be ready for gray zone, hybrid, but really being contested
in what we call every single domain. So, we are going to be
contested in cyber, and then the question becomes is that
conflict or how does that work? We are going to be contested
with a lot of type of systems that we use, all the way back to
the United States, and so we are preparing for that.
The second thing is the information influence operations
are going to change the way we operate in the future. I would
argue, in some cases, information advantage may be more
important than even the type of operations that are going on on
the ground. We go back to some of the, ``Sun Tzu'', winning
without fighting. You can do that, in some cases, with
information operations. Our competitors are not constrained the
way they operate in that sphere, and we have to take that very
seriously when it comes to cyber information operations and
some of the other domains, and we are preparing our forces and
our troops to be able to operate in that environment.
Senator Shaheen. I could not agree more, having just come
back from Europe where they are very concerned about those
operations in Russia.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Ernst,
please.
Senator Ernst. Thank you both very much for coming to the
Committee this morning and for testifying in front of us, and
most certainly and most importantly, for your service to our
great United States.
I appreciate the efforts that you are truly making to put
our people first. I think that is extremely important. But you
also must meet mission requirements, modernize the force, and
adapt to the new challenges and threats that we see presented
before us. As we withdraw from Afghanistan, which will be a
significant emotional event for those that have been involved
in actions there, as well as their families, I want to commend
the force very much and thank them for their service, and your
leadership, for the tremendous efforts and accomplishments that
we have seen in that theater of operations. For 20 years, the
Army, along with our Joint Force, our allies and partners, have
kept those threats at bay and away from our Homeland.
So now, of course, the Army does face new challenges, and I
am very concerned about this administration's budget as it
comes to meeting the needs of the Army. So, Madam Secretary,
the Army is executing its modernization strategy, per the 2018
NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], You state that the
gains you have made are real, but fragile, and I agree.
As the only service that is facing real budget cuts this
year, how do you intend to keep the gains that you have made?
Secretary Wormuth. Senator Ernst, I think to preserve the
gains that we have made we are going to have to balance
multiple dimensions of the Army, inside of its budget. First we
are going to have to continue to seek, wherever we can,
efficiencies and reforms. As you know, my predecessors and
General McConville have done a few cycles of what was called
``night court'' to be able to identify funding that we could
move internally. We have, the big fish have been fished out of
that pond. At this point there are more small fish and minnows
left there. But we need to keep seeking those efficiencies
where we can.
I think we need to work with the Secretary and the
combatant commanders to really scrub our current operational
requirements, to see if we can find places where we may be able
to take pressure off of the Army. Then I think we will have to
look carefully at how we make sure, with the resources that we
have, that we continue to put people first but really protect
those modernization programs. We are playing the long game now,
and we have some time to be able to pursue our modernization
program. But we really need to keep that, I think, front and
center, because our soldiers are our most important asset and
they need those new capabilities, those new next-generation
weapons systems to be able to execute their missions in the
future.
So we are going to have to look very carefully across the
whole budget, going forward.
Senator Ernst. Yes, and I think this will be a very
delicate balance as we move forward.
So both for you, Secretary, and for you, General
McConville, as well, the budget significantly reduces the R&D
[research & development] funding, meaning that development,
experimentation, and advancement as we are modernizing our
force will be hamstrung, even as we are facing continuing
evolving threats. So as we are making that balance, you have
mentioned the unfunded requests that have gone forward, how
would you prioritize, if you could today, if we had unlimited
dollars to send your direction, what would those priorities be,
and why?
General McConville. Senator, one of the things on the
research and development--and I will come back to priorities--
is we have aligned about 74 percent of our science and
technology against the 31+4 systems. We have really moved
everything we can do.
So as far as priorities, we have some installation
priorities. We often talk about what would be the top
priorities. We have some people priorities right now that we
would like to finish. We have barracks, we have housing, we
have some child development centers that are all in there. It
is about people first, and we would like to get those
completed. They are in the unfunded requirements.
We also have what we call ``enduring systems.'' We have
focused on the 31+4, the modernization systems, but we also
have Abrams tanks, we have Paladin howitzers, we have Apache
helicopters, we have Black Hawks, we have other weapons systems
that are going to be here enduring, that we need to modernize
our forces, we need to modernize the National Guard with, so
they have the forces when they go off to conflict. Those
systems are going to be around for the next 20, 30, 40 years,
and so we are improving them, and as the new systems come on,
some of those systems will be divest and some will not. Those
are where the priorities are, at least for the Army.
Senator Ernst. Thank you very much. I think that is an
important point is that while we are seeking to modernize the
force, we do have legacy systems as well that will need to be
maintained until we see the realization of modernization.
So again, thank you both very much for your service. Trying
times for all of us. We certainly are here to support. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator Hirono,
please.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Wormuth,
first of all congratulations on your well-deserved
confirmation.
Let me start with, we have all acknowledged the importance
of sensing our allies, and so what unique tools is the Army
investing in to enable joint interoperability with our allies,
and what can the Army do to further strengthen U.S. military
relations with our allies and partners in the region? I am
talking about, in particular, within the Indo-Pacific region.
Secretary Wormuth. I understand, Senator Hirono. It is very
nice to see you in person, and thank you for your well wishes.
A few things in terms of interoperability with our
partners. First of all, again, many of the countries in the
INDOPACOM AOR are led by chiefs of defense who come from their
armies. So one thing that we have that I think helps us build
our alliances and partnerships is those army-to-army
relationships. They very much want to train with us, to
exercise with us, to learn from us, and in many cases, purchase
our various weapons systems. So those are all things that we
can build on. Those exercises are part of what helps us with
building interoperability.
We are moving, with our Project Convergence campaign of
learning, that started last year and was largely Army centric,
this year it will be a joint undertaking, but we are building
towards bringing together some of our allies and partners from
the INDOPACOM AOR to be able to work with us and experiment
with us and look at using prototypes. So we also are working to
try to bring our allies and partners in on the ground floor of
developing these new, joint warfighting concepts.
Senator Hirono. I think the mil-to-mil relationships have
always been the area where we have strong alliances, and would
you acknowledge also that diplomacy plays a major part in all
of this?
Secretary Wormuth. Absolutely, and frankly, my own view is
that to make the kind of progress that we would like to see,
particularly in terms of access and being able to have more
presence in the region that has to be led by our diplomats. The
Department of Defense, the Department of State, the White
House, we all need to work together, and frankly, we need to
work with our agencies that have economic and trade
responsibilities as well. But I think we need to have a whole-
of-government approach to really help us get to where we want
to be in that region.
Senator Hirono. I agree. So moving on, on the issue of
sexual assault and harassment, Secretary Wormuth and General
McConville, for a number of years now senior DOD leaders have
briefed us, basically from my seat countless times, on the need
to eliminate the scourge of sexual violence in the military. To
the credit of the DOD and the military, yes, a number of
attempts have been made, but we still are confronted with the
scourge, and, in fact, the Fort Hood report that came out at
the end of last year described the installation as having, ``a
permissive environment for sexual assault,'' where junior
enlisted personnel did not trust the chain of command. I think
you mentioned that there is a need to increase trust in the
military, and it is not just in the sexual assault situation,
of course, but in other instances.
So for both of you, do you think moving sexual harassment
investigations, for example, outside the immediate chain of
command would help to restore trust in the system?
Secretary Wormuth. Senator Hirono, I had the opportunity to
go and visit Fort Hood last week and see first-hand, frankly, a
lot of the steps that the Army is taking, at that installation
in particular, to try to really get after the command climate
issues. I think where we are really going to see results in
terms of driving down the prevalence of sexual harassment and
sexual assault is through prevention. So I am very interested
in seeing things like the redesign of our SHARP program, doing
This is My Squad initiative that really tries to bring leaders
taking care of our soldiers down to the lowest level.
That said, accountability is an important piece of the
issue as well and I think can play a role. I am open-minded to
looking at how best to do that. I think increasing the
specialization of our folks responsible for prosecuting these
kinds of crimes would be beneficial, and I am open to looking
at this, and have been asked to be a part of the conversation
with Secretary Austin on this matter.
Senator Hirono. Mr. Chairman, if I could just do one short
follow-up.
Chairman Reed. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Hirono. So I mentioned sexual harassment because
right now that is not a separate charge under UCMJ [Uniform
code of Military Justice], and I do have a bill to move in that
direction. I certainly welcome your support of that, and yes,
we want to move toward prevention. But there will be an effort
to remove the prosecutorial discretion on investigations and
prosecutions out of the chain of command. There will be an
effort to do that relating to sexual-related offenses. I
mentioned that because that is the direction that I think we
need to go.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Cotton,
please.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both
for your appearance.
Secretary Wormuth, when you were here for your confirmation
hearing you agreed with me that the Army University Press
should not remove the term ``Union Army'' from its
publications. Have you had a chance to address that issue yet?
Secretary Wormuth. Senator Cotton, I apologize. I have not
had the chance to address that yet, given that I have been here
3 weeks, but as I said to you in my hearing, I will look into
that and talk to the folks at Army University Press.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. I understand it has been a short
time and you have got a lot of other pressing issues, but as I
said then and I will say again, if it was good enough for U.S.
Grant, I think it is good enough for our troopers today.
For both Secretary and General McConville I want to speak
to you about the nearly decade-long effort to replace the Army
Physical Fitness Test with the Army Combat Fitness Test, to
test our soldiers on physical fitness that is a bit more
applicable to the tasks on the battlefield, and also to make it
gender neutral. There are reports of further Combat Fitness
Test redesigns and changing standards associated with the test
have made for a somewhat confusing story and heated debate. Can
you clarify for us the obstacles that are currently facing the
Combat Fitness Test, whether it will remain gender neutral and
how the Army is seeking to implement the test now?
Secretary Wormuth. Certainly, Senator, and again, I would
ask General McConville to build on my answer. But first of all
it is very important that we have our soldiers be physically
fit for a demanding environment on the future battlefield, and
one of the reasons that the Army has pursued the ACFT [Army
Combat Fitness Test] is to try to raise our overall fitness
level while reducing injuries. So that was the impetus.
We are continuing to look at how to finalize the design for
the ACFT. We are continuing to have gender-neutral standards.
We have made some changes, as you know, moving from the leg
tuck to making the plank an option. But we are waiting for the
results of a study from RAND that has been required by
Congress, and we are not going to make any final decisions
about the test until we have the results of that and we can
understand how the test is going to both improve our fitness
but also potentially what it might do in terms of our ability
to recruit specialized skills like cyber and doctors and things
of that nature. But why don't I let the Chief build.
Senator Cotton. General?
General McConville. I think the science behind the Army
Combat Fitness Test is really about reducing injuries. As we
have taken a look at the Army Physical Fitness Test over the--
in fact, I was there when it was implemented, I hate to say, it
was 40 years ago, and it is time to transform that test, to
take advantage of the capabilities we have today. As we take a
look at it, as the Secretary said, we are examining the impact
on the force. I took it last week, for the record. I think it
is a good test. What we want to do is move forward in
implementation, based on the study. I think it is going to have
a more fit force, which is something that we need as we move in
the future.
Senator Cotton. Do you want to share you score, for the
record?
General McConville. Four hundred seventy-eight, for the
record.
Senator Cotton. That is good. I am sure all your joes
around are going to try to beat that now.
General, are you committed, as well, to maintaining gender
neutrality on the test?
General McConville. I am.
Senator Cotton. Is there any consideration to pegging
scores towards branch or MOS [military occupational specialty]?
General McConville. Well, I think the future, at least if I
could make a recommendation in the future, is as we move to
more of a talent management model in the Army, if you are an
airborne ranger, which is a fitness type organization, if you
are in the 101st Airborne Division or the 82nd, I would say
from talent management you want people with a certain level of
physical fitness. If you are doing something else, you are a
neurosurgeon, you might be more concerned with that person that
can operate at a Level VI level than, you know, lead the
battalion in PT.
So I think what we want to get to--at least I do--is move
away from an Industrial Age personnel management system to a
21st century talent management system where we recruit people,
we select people, and we, quite frankly, promote people based
on the knowledge, skills, behaviors that they have within their
specialized area. But we still want a certain level of fitness
in the Army.
Senator Cotton. Yeah. I think the Army needs to consider
that. You know, loading a round into a tank gun or a Howitzer
has to be done, whether you are a man or a woman.
General McConville. That is right.
Senator Cotton. It requires a certain level of physical
fitness. But that is a different level of physical fitness than
it takes to be a flight surgeon or to be a cybersecurity
specialist.
One last question for you, General. In the last decade, I
think maybe when you were Vice Chief, the Army stood up the
Security Force Assistance Brigades.
General McConville. Yes.
Senator Cotton. They were primarily active in Afghanistan.
Now that we will be out of Afghanistan in a few weeks and our
national security strategy has postured towards competition
against near-peer rivals like China and Russia, what do you see
as the future of those SFABs [Security Force Assistance
Brigades], and what role are they going to play for the Army in
the future?
General McConville. They are in tremendous demand. You
know, the question was what are you doing in Indo-Pacific. The
5th Security Force Assistance Brigade is active. They are
employed. They are building partner and allies capacity and
capability, and quite frankly, they are one of the hottest
items that are out in each combatant commanders, providing
great options to professionalizing the force within these
countries. As we talked about, we are getting our strength, not
only from having a strong military but through our allies and
partners, and they are instrumental in doing that, and they are
building tremendous relationships for us right now, as we
speak.
So each of the Security Force Assistance Brigades is
oriented to a combatant commander and they are using them very
well.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, General. Thank you, Secretary.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Kelly, if
you are ready, you could be recognized.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate
you having this hearing today. Thank you to Secretary Wormuth
and General McConville.
Secretary Wormuth, Arizona is home to some of the Army's
most capable test ranges, like Fort Huachuca's Electronic
Proving Ground and the Yuma Proving Ground. Both installations
play an important role in the mission of our Army Futures
Command and also an important role for DEVCOM [Development
Command].
At Yuma alone, 30 percent of the workload is dedicated to
DEVCOM developmental testing. Yuma is also the host of Project
Convergence, a critical modernization project designed to
further integrate the Army into the Joint Force and test the
effectiveness of concepts and equipment that will prepare us
for future conflicts.
The defense contractor workforce at these ranges works
side-by-side with uniformed and civilian personnel to execute
the mission. Now I am concerned by reductions in funding for
these range support functions. Electronic Proving Grounds at
Fort Huachuca and Yuma Proving Ground is seeing some of these
funding reductions.
These are premier testing sites for the advanced systems
that will modernize America's Army. It is critical that we
invest not only in programs but in range infrastructure--it is
often the thing that is left out--but also investing in the
workforce that allows us to make leaps in technology, providing
our soldiers with the best equipment to meet the challenges of
tomorrow.
Secretary Wormuth, what would be the risks involved in
decreasing funding for test range support, including for the
government and contractor workforce, at a time when
modernization is a top priority of the Army?
Secretary Wormuth. Thank you, Senator Kelly. As you
mentioned, Arizona, and Yuma, is going to be the host for
Project Convergence. Has been. I am excited to go out there
this fall and see the next Project Convergence, which we are
scaling up.
To your question, given the budget that the Army has, we
have made some difficult choices. But we have done everything
we can to protect our modernization programs and the testing
facilities and ranges that we believe are needed to support
those programs, as well as the contractors to support that kind
of testing. That said, I have not yet been able to come out to
Yuma and Fort Huachuca, and would welcome doing that in the
future and talking with you about your concerns, because again,
it is very important that we preserve adequate ranges to do the
kind of testing that we need for the future. So this is
something I would be happy to work with you on and have a
dialogue about.
Senator Kelly. I appreciate that. I would love to visit
with you at Fort Huachuca, at Yuma Proving Ground. If we are
going to stay ahead of our adversaries, we are going to do it
by out-innovating them, and to innovating our near-peer
adversaries we need to test the equipment. So we need ranges
and test centers that can support those functions.
General, for the past 20 years the Army has focused efforts
and resources on conflicts in the Middle East. At the same
time, our adversaries were focused on outpacing us through
military modernization efforts. Modernization is critical to
staying ahead of our adversaries, and when done effectively can
function as a deterrent. We know that future wars will look
different than current conflicts, and the Army will need to use
resources and equipment efficiently across a range of domains
to meet tomorrow's challenges.
Knowing the important role that basic research plays, are
you concerned about the decreases to Army science and
technology funding, and is there a plan to reinvest in this
area for future years?
General McConville. As we take a look at the budget we are
always concerned about making cuts, and what the Secretary and
myself have to do is we have to look across the portfolio and
determine what are the must-must-dos. For science and
technology, we have reoriented our resources so they are
focused on our top priorities. I think it is like 71 or 72
percent of our research and development, our science and
technology dollars are focused on delivering the 31+4 top
systems. Could we use more money in those other areas?
Absolutely. But the Secretary and myself have got to make tough
decisions, and those tough decisions are based on the
priorities we need to be effective in the future.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, General, and thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Kelly. Let me
now recognize Senator Blackburn.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam
Secretary, just a quick question for you. Kingsport, Tennessee,
has the Holston Ammunition facility, and it is a main supplier
of explosive materials to the Department of Defense, and
Holston is on the Army's unfunded priorities list, along with
similar facilities there in Virginia, Missouri, Pennsylvania,
and Iowa. Total request for modernization is $40 million. And
these are basically World War II-era facilities, and we need
that money for modernization of these facilities. So I would
call this to your attention, and I would ask that you commit to
me that you will work on this, to modernize these facilities.
Secretary Wormuth. Thank you, Senator Blackburn. It is nice
to see you in person, first of all.
As General McConville developed the unfunded requirements
list, those are obviously things that we would like to have if
we had additional funding, and we have tried to give you a
sense of how we would prioritize them. As the Chief just said,
with the resources we have had we have had to make difficult
choices, but certainly going forward I would commit to you to
look into the ammunition facilities there and try for myself,
develop a better idea of how it fits in with other places in
the country that provide similar capabilities to us.
Senator Blackburn. I think it is appropriate that we review
that but that we make certain we have modernized these
facilities, because they are a part of our supply chain, if you
will.
General, good to see you. There are a lot of people from
Fort Campbell that fondly remember your and Ms. McConville's
time on post, and so we thank you for that.
O&M [Operations and Maintenance] cuts and our concerns that
are around these, given the aviation mishaps that have
occurred, not only with the Guard but also with the 160th SOAR
[Special Operations Aviation Regiment], and I know that you are
very familiar with these incidences. So talk to me a little bit
about how we are going to get in behind this equipment. I know
that you have heard, I have heard it from some of our men and
women, where they get the order to make it work when they are
doing maintenance and repair or find a way to get to yes. We
want to be smart. Sometimes shortcuts do not serve us well, and
our men and women in uniform deserve to know that when they get
into that equipment that that equipment is going to allow them
to fulfill their mission.
General McConville. First of all, Senator, thank you, and I
have got a special place in heart for Fort Campbell, and I have
two kids serving there, and it is very special. You make a
great point on Army aviation. Pilots have to have the flying
hours to train. They have to have that, and our maintainers
have to have the time to maintain those aircraft, and they have
to have the resources. As we pressurize the budget, as we push
on these type things, we start--especially with trends, as the
Secretary talked about. I worry about trends, because trends
start moving you in a certain direction, and you slowly start
taking away things, just a few less hours, a few more this, a
few more those type things, and then you find out you have some
very serious concerns.
So I am concerned about that. I am committed to making sure
that our units have the flying hours that they need to be
proficient, and really more than proficient, that they can do
their job in combat, and I am committed to making sure that
they are getting the parts and they have the expertise to
maintain those aircraft.
Senator Blackburn. Well, and as you know, I went to bat
more than once to get dollars for those flying hours and to
make certain that those were there.
I have got additional questions for each of you, but my
time is going to be running out. I will submit these to
writing. General, I am going to come to you with a question on
end strength as it relates to this budget. I am very concerned
about the impact that that is having on our military personnel
and their families, the uncertainty that that has inserted into
their lives.
So I thank each of you for your time and your service, and
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blackburn. Let me now
recognize Senator Blumenthal, please.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both
for being here this morning. Thank you for your service.
I do not know whether you have seen the report by the
Associated Press on weapons belonging to all of the military
services that have been lost or stolen, and apparently have
been unaccounted for. I hope you have. I commend it to you.
This report is absolutely blood-curdling. The idea that
pistols, assault weapons, grenade launchers are missing from
armories of the United States military because they have been
lost or stolen, without any apparent account, without any
reporting to Congress or to the FBI [Federal Bureau of
Investigation] or to the agency, Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms, that may have jurisdiction as well, is just
incredibly alarming and astonishing. I would like to get from
both of you what you know about it and your commitment that you
will, in fact, investigate these reports.
Secretary Wormuth. Senator, I did see that report in the
press, and certainly we take this situation very, very
seriously. You know, we train our soldiers to maintain
accountability of their weapons. That is a basic skill and
responsibility that we expect from our soldiers. My
understanding is that the cases of weapons from any branch of
the services being unaccounted for and getting into the hands
of civilians is likely to be a small number, but particularly
given these reports I commit to you that this is something that
we will look into and certainly make sure we have situational
awareness of that situation in the Army.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, this is a public report, and
1,900 firearms is not exactly a small number. Apparently, a
substantial number are used in crimes, have been recovered at
crime scenes, which is really mind-boggling and blood-curdling.
I would like to know whether you will commit, as the Pentagon
used to do, sharing annual updates about lost or stolen
firearms with Congress, whether you will resume that regular
reporting?
Secretary Wormuth. Senator, again, we do take these reports
very seriously, and I absolutely commit to you to look into
this and share what we know, and get back to you on that.
Senator Blumenthal. I do not mean to interrupt, and I
apologize, but will you commit to reporting to Congress, as was
the practice?
Secretary Wormuth. Senator, I think what I can commit to is
we can share with you everything we in the Army understand
about our weapons.
Senator Blumenthal. Will you support a reporting
requirements, generally, to the Department of Defense?
Secretary Wormuth. I think we would be open to a reporting
requirement.
Senator Blumenthal. This report says that the Army and the
Air Force could not answer basic questions about missing
weapons. It says also, ``The Army sought to suppress
information on missing weapons and gave misleading numbers that
contradict internal memos.'' Will you report back to us about
that claim?
Secretary Wormuth. Senator, I would be happy to look into
how we have handled this issue.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you know whether it is true?
Secretary Wormuth. I do not, Senator. I do now know what
our past practice, going back years, has been on this matter.
Senator Blumenthal. The report says, further, the AP
[Associated Press] began asking the Army for details on missing
weapons in 2011, and filed a formal request a year later for
records of guns listed as missing, lost, stolen, or recovered.
Apparently the reports quote an official as saying, ``You are
dealing with millions of weapons, but we are supposed to have
100 percent recon, right? We are not allowed a discrepancy on
that, but there is so much room for discrepancy,'' which
indicates to me that there is systemic failure at every level,
a failure to keep track of the weapons, a failure to report up
the chain, a failure to report to Congress, a failure to report
to law enforcement. Do you disagree?
Secretary Wormuth. Senator, I am not, again, familiar with
the details of the story so I do not want to speculate. You
know, I do not want to characterize how the Army has handled it
to date without having the facts. But I would certainly commit
to collecting the facts and continuing to talk with you about
this important issue.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Well, I really appreciate
it, and I know that you are new to the job. Welcome to your
first Committee hearing. Sorry to hit you with this topic, but
I think you will agree with me that it is profoundly important
that the military keep track of stolen or missing weapons. I
hope we can agree on that.
Secretary Wormuth. Of course.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator
Hawley, please.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Madam
Secretary, General McConville, thank you for being here. Thank
you for your service.
Let me just start with one of our priorities in Missouri,
which is to ensure that all of our servicemembers have the best
possible quality of life. One of the challenges that we are
facing in Missouri, at Fort Leonard Wood, is to make sure that
the homes that were built there in the 1960s that are overdue
for replacement get replaced in a timely fashion, and that we
are able to provide quality housing. So could you just give us
an update on what the Army is doing to facilitate replacements
for these homes? Madam Secretary, we will start with you.
General, you can add as you see fit.
Secretary Wormuth. Certainly, Senator. Thank you. General
McConville probably can speak to the details at Fort Leonard
Wood better than I. But as you know, we have reorganized how we
are dealing with privatized housing, to basically make a four-
star general responsible, and we meet now weekly to go over the
family housing at each of our major installations. We now have
37 out of 44 installations that have privatized housing have
fully implemented the Tenant Bill of Rights. We expect to have
the other 7 compliant with the Tenant Bill of Rights by the end
of July. So this is something that we are working on very, very
hard.
I would ask General McConville to speak directly to the
Fort Leonard Wood installation.
General McConville. Yeah, just from a priority standpoint,
the reason we came out with people is our number one priority
was that kind of drives for the resources, and then within the
people portfolio, housing in the number one priority. A couple
of things that we have been working, as the Secretary talked
about, is we have privatized housing. We are putting billions
of dollars back into that. Probably about 25 percent of our
housing right now needs to be fixed. Some of that is
privatized, and we are working with the privatized housing, and
they have raised money to put additional money to improve that
housing.
The Army housing that the Army owns, which is about 10 to
15 percent--we had historical housing. It was not historical
housing. It was old housing, and to me ``old'' is not
``historical.'' You know, you have a 100-year-old house that
needs to be fixed, and for a while there we were trying to fix
it at historical rates, put old windows back that looked like
old windows, those type of things. So we have got an exception
to that so we are putting more money into that. We are also
putting additional funds into housing to get after that,
because we want quality housing.
I will need to come back to you on precisely what we are
doing there, and we will come back to you on that.
Senator Hawley. Great. Thank you very much. Thanks to both
of you. Thank you, General. We will follow up with you on that.
Let's shift to our pacing theater, if we could. General,
you released the Chief of Staff of the Army Paper Number 1 this
past March. One of the things the paper said that caught my
attention, and I am quoting you here, ``Our adversaries will
attempt to achieve their strategic goals without fighting or to
seize their objectives quickly as a fait accompli.'' I want to
commend you for highlighting that scenario in the paper.
Along those lines, give us a sense of how you see the
Army's long-range precision fires and their enablers being able
to help deter or, if we have to, defeat a Chinese fait accompli
in Taiwan.
General McConville. Yeah, I think when we talk about long-
range precision fires, and when you think about the threats
that we could face, as far as deterrence, many of our strategic
competitors have set up what we call an anti-access air denial
capability within integrated air and missile defense
capabilities. So you need something that can penetrate that and
suppress that. By having land-based, long-range fires you start
to provide options to the COCOM [combatant command] commander
to do that. Part of our portfolio and the long-range precision
fires is also having a land-based, anti-ship capability, so
then again, you have the ability to hold competitive ships at
risk. They all come together to give that combatant commander
multiple options, and really to present multiple dilemmas to
those who may be wishing us harm, and then by doing that and
having those capabilities 24/7, you can deter certain types of
behavior from a strength standpoint.
Senator Hawley. Let me just ask you, as a follow-up to
that, TRADOC's [Training and Doctrine Command] December 2018
publication, which was called ``The Army Multi-Domain
Operations in 2028,'' stated that the Army must demonstrate the
ability to immediately deny a fait accompli in order to deter
an adversary like China. You still agree with that, I assume?
General McConville. I do.
Senator Hawley. Along those same lines, Madam Secretary,
when you and I visited last month you highlighted--and I
thought this was really good--one of the things you said was
that China would like to pull off a fait accompli because it
would be much harder for us to dislodge them from Taiwan than
to stop them from getting to Taiwan in the first place. Can you
just elaborate on that? I thought that was such a crystal-clear
explanation of the dangers of the fait accompli scenario. So
can you just elaborate on that a little bit?
Secretary Wormuth. Yes, Senator. Happy to do that. You
know, essentially given the anti-access area denial
capabilities that China now possesses, if they are able to
achieve a lodgment on Taiwan, we will not have the kind of air
superiority, for example, that we have had in things like the
Gulf War in the last 20 years. It will be much harder to
essentially eject Chinese forces from Taiwan once they land
there than it would be to stop them coming across the straits
to begin with.
Now I am not saying it is impossible to dislodge them, but
it will be a tougher fight. So my own view is we want to
develop the kinds of capabilities that we are pursuing in the
Army, along with the rest of the Joint Force, to basically
present a sufficiently strong deterrent force to make the
Chinese continue to think twice, year after year, about whether
they want to actually undertake that amphibious landing.
Senator Hawley. Very good. My time has expired. General, I
wanted to ask you about the PACOM's [Pacific Command] 1251
report and what that means for the Army's posture in that
region, so I will give that to you as a question for the
record, and I will follow up with you about the Fort Leonard
Wood.
Thank you both very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley. Now let me now
recognize, via Webex, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
Wormuth, you and I have talked about the scourge of sexual
violence in the military at length, and you understand that for
the last 8 years this Committee has been trying to have a vote
on a bright line to take out all serious crimes from the chain
of command, to create a more professional system, to create an
unbiased system, to create a system where our trained military
prosecutors can make the first judgment about whether a case
should go to trial.
As you know, about 3 percent of commanders have the right
to make this decision about whether a case should go to court
martial. So if the prosecutor decides a case should not go
forward it will go back to that 3 percent of commanders, who
then will have the opportunity to do a summary, a court
martial, or a special court martial, or charge a related or a
lesser crime, and get NJP [non-judicial punishment].
So given this, I would like your assessment of whether this
is a recommendation that you will support, number one. I know
in your written testimony you intend to take all 70
recommendations from the Fort Hood Independent Review
Commission, which, as you know, suggests taking sexual assault
out of the chain of command and creating an independent SHARP
program. So you have already said you support that.
What is your assessment of a bright line on all serious
crimes, and as part of your analysis I would like you to
consider the data that has been developed by the military and
the report by Protect Our Defenders that showed that black and
brown servicemembers are up to 2.5 times more likely to be
punished for serious crimes than their white counterparts? So I
would like you to talk a little bit about how you see reforming
the military justice system so that it is fair, unbiased, and
guarantees civil rights and civil liberties for all
servicemembers.
Secretary Wormuth. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand, and thank
you, first of all, for your leadership on this issue. You have
been working on this issue for years. It is a problem that we
all want to solve, that I know all senior leaders and all
leaders in the Army want to solve, so I appreciate everything
you have done.
A few thoughts. As I said earlier with Senator Hirono, I do
think that focusing on prevention, and doing more on the
prevention side, is, I think, where we will really see more
success in reducing the prevalence of sexual harassment and
sexual assault in our military. But accountability is
important. I think----
Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Wormuth, can you speak to why
you think prevention is the panacea here? Because we have
passed over a dozen laws to implement prevention measure, and
the GAO [Government Accountability Office] reviewed all the
laws we have passed on prevention and what they found was that
more than 30 recommendations and prior works, specifically
related to DOD's effort to prevent sexual assault and address
the needs of certain populations in the sexual assault
prevention and response efforts. What they found that a lot of
the recommendations and laws that we passed just have not been
implemented.
So what change do you imagine would have to happen for the
command and the DOD to take the prevention measures seriously,
given that we have given you 8 years of prevention measures and
they are not being implemented?
Secretary Wormuth. Senator, first, I do not think
prevention is a panacea. I think we have to pursue this problem
across a spectrum, from prevention to accountability. So I want
to be clear on that.
I think really what we have to focus on is pushing
responsibility for a positive command climate, caring for our
soldiers down to the lowest level possible, and that is what we
are trying to do through the This Is My Squad initiative,
through the redesign of our SHARP program, and also through,
frankly, selecting our leaders, looking more closely at their
previous command climate performance. So making sure the people
we put in charge are people who have been able to create
positive command climates. I think all of that will be helpful,
and that is something we are going to have to work hard on, and
work hard on year after year after year, not just sort of when
there is a crisis and then we become complacent.
Senator Gillibrand. But do you not think that actually
prosecuting sexual assailants who are predators, who are often
recidivists, and putting them in jail would also prevent
crimes, since we have many examples of sexual assaulters who
were not prosecuted in the first instance and went on to not
only assault others, including children as one of the most
recent examples. Don't you think it would be far better to
actually treat these cases appropriately and put sexual
predators in jail?
Secretary Wormuth. We do absolutely have to hold
perpetrators and predators accountable, and it is for that
reason that one of the things I think makes a lot of sense is
increasing the specialization of the individuals in the Army
and in the military writ large, who prosecute these cases. You
know, I think one of the recommendations that we have seen is
to basically help both our investigators and our prosecutors
build more specialization in special victims crimes, and given
the complexity and sensitive nature of those kinds of crimes,
that is something that I am open-minded to and think would be
beneficial for us.
Senator Gillibrand. Will you review, for this Committee,
the issues of racial disparity and the recommendations that by
giving the decision-making to trained prosecutors you can also
eliminate bias with regard to racism?
Secretary Wormuth. Senator, what I have been focused on in
my time in the job so far has been specifically the sexual
harassment and sexual assault set of crimes. So that is where I
have been focused. It is clear that there are disparities in
our justice system for people of color. I have not been able to
look into that in depth, but my initial assessment of this
issue, or I should say my initial sense of this issue is that
some of those disparities may be happening more on the
investigation side of the ledger rather than on the prosecution
side. But this is something I would want to study further.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Now let me
now recognize Senator Tuberville.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both
for being here today. General, in your family service, you have
got all of your kids in the military. That's awesome.
I am a people person. You had your budget cut, and we need
things to fight with. But the number one thing we need is
people. With the cuts, how do we address pay and pay raises for
our troops? With this inflation rising every day 5 percent, it
looks like there is no stop to it. Number one, how do we
recruit, and how do we pay our troops with the cuts that we are
having? Both of you.
Secretary Wormuth. Senator Tuberville, good to see you. Why
don't I start. I would say on the recruiting side, it is a
tough environment. As you said, we are competing against all
sorts of companies that are starting to increase their wages
and so on. We are trying to bring in 61,000 soldiers this year.
We think we are on track for that. But we are sending out a
large number of recruiters to really showcase all of the things
that the Army can offer to people all around the country who
want to join. As part of that, in the President's Budget 2022
we have a 2.7 percent pay increase for our soldiers, and that
is a pretty good pay increase. I think we looked carefully at
that issue. We also have, as you know, our Tuition Assistance
Program, which is very popular with soldiers.
So we really try to use a range of the things that we do to
be able to bring in the quality best and brightest that we need
in the Army every year, to keep us healthy and at the size that
we need.
General, do you want to build on that?
General McConville. Yeah, thank you, and, I am very
thankful that our soldiers and our civilians got a pay raise
this year, and we are very appreciative of that, and we think
that is extremely important. But as the Secretary said, we are
in a war for talent, with young men and women. The advantage we
have in the Army, and we have to continue to work this, is they
want purpose in their life and they want to belong to a team,
and we can do both for them. Once we get them in we have to
compete for their talents and make sure that we are putting
them in a place where we are taking full advantage of their
talents. We are actually being fairly successful at that.
We wake up every day making sure we can maintain the all-
volunteer force. We want a force where there is no harmful
behaviors, so parents are looking at us, and hey, this is a
good place that I want to send my kids, and this is a great
place to get ahead, for working class people. They can go to
school and get an education, they get discipline, and all those
wonderful things. So that is what we are doing, Senator.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Speaking of recruiting, Secretary, you probably did not have
anything to do with this, but last month the Army released an
animated marketing campaign titled ``The Calling"--I am sure
you are familiar with +that--which was aimed at reaching the
Generation Z audience with its storylines. This campaign cost
approximately $4 million to produce. The campaign received so
many negative comments, the Army took the comments section
down.
The Army should seek to recruit the best and brightest to
protect our country, regardless of their background, because it
is the generals' the captains' and the lieutenants' jobs, once
they get there, to build them into a fighting force. My staff
has asked for performance metrics on the campaign. Can I get
your commitment that we will be given a thorough briefing on
quantitative measures?
Secretary Wormuth. Senator, we would be happy to brief you
on the campaign, and what we know about how well it has
performed. I would also just like to emphasize that as the
general said, we are in a war for talent. We are trying to
reach young people around America, all across the country, from
all sorts of different backgrounds. We are trying to recruit
Generation Z and those younger than them, and the days of Super
Bowl ads maybe have been replaced by YouTube and other things.
So part of what we are doing is trying to also figure out
which innovative recruiting techniques is most successful and
resonates with all sorts of folks around the country. But I
would be happy to come back and brief you on the campaign, at
your convenience.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. It is important that we get
the best, because they do not make a lot, and as the general
said here, we are fighting big tech, you are fighting people
that are going to be paying a lot more money. I have got
buddies in the Army, been in there for a long time, and they
struggle, them and their families, as a lot of people across
this country struggle, especially with the times that we are in
right now. We have just got to take care of our people first,
because that is our life blood. We were talking to the
Selective Service not too long ago. We discussed this. Thirty-
five million people are eligible for the draft and only 450,000
eligible to serve in our military. That is scary. That is
really scary. So we have got to do everything possible to sell
the point that the military is somewhere that they can come,
get a great education, get a great life, raise their families,
and be great Americans.
Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Let me now
recognize Senator King, please.
Senator King. Madam Secretary, my first piece of advice is
don't talk about Super Bowl ads not working to a former
football coach.
Secretary Wormuth. Good point.
Senator King. I want to welcome you to the Committee and
congratulate you on your nomination and confirmation.
Page 4 of the charts that you gave us, I am a little
confused, and I want to get to the terminology to really get a
fix on how this budget really works. OCO [Overseas Contingency
Operations] seems to have disappeared. OCO was a significant
part of the budget over the last 4 or 5 years. It is not in
your chart. There is a little dotted line, but you talk about
direct war costs and enduring costs of about $18 billion. Is
that what we used to call OCO? General, you are nodding.
Secretary Wormuth. Essentially, yes, Senator King. I think
there has been a debate, as you undoubtedly know, for years,
about trying to ensure we were providing sufficient
transparency into the budget.
Senator King. Listen, I agree. I have always been skeptical
of OCO as a kind of slush up and down. So what you are really
proposing is a higher base budget with less OCO, and I presume
part of it, OCO last year was about $24 billion, under your
formulation it is about--what we are thinking of as OCO, direct
war and enduring costs, $18 billion. Does that reflect, in some
measure, the reduction of costs in Afghanistan, for example?
Secretary Wormuth. There is a small reduction in costs
associated with our retrograde out of Afghanistan, Senator, but
I do not believe it is a large one.
Senator King. Okay. Hopefully we are going to have a little
more transparent budget in the future, where OCO, the
expenditures on war costs are part of the budget. Is that
correct?
Secretary Wormuth. That is the goal, yes.
Senator King. Okay. Thank you. General McConville, you used
the word ``convergence'' in one of the answers to your
question, in terms of joint operability. One of your colleagues
the other day said he had to pry data out of one of the other
service branches. We have got joint operations. That was
Goldwater-Nichols. My sense is, however, we need more in the
way of joint compatibility of software and capability
acquisition. Is that a sensible thing to be talking about?
General McConville. Absolutely, Senator, and one of the
things that we have done, and I have done it in conjunction
with the other service chiefs, is we have stood up what we call
the Joint Systems Integration Lab at Aberdeen. Because the
future of convergence is really the ability to pass data from
system to system, and to do it in a contested environment. If
you want to pass an F-35 to some type of weapons system on the
ground or some type of sensor, what that allows us to do is go
up there, figure out how to move that data, test it, and then
we go out into Yuma and do Project Convergence in the dirt. You
have already got a way to do that.
Senator King. But this is sort of the 21st century version
of the phones not talking to each other in Grenada, where we
could not communicate.
General McConville. Well, I think what we are doing,
Senator, is making sure that we can pass data between all the
different types of systems we have in the joint system. That is
what the intent is, and then next year we go to make sure we
can do it with our allies and partners.
Senator King. I look forward to working with you on that,
because I think that is a very important point going forward.
Missile defense and deterrence. Iron Dome appears to be a
very effective system as it has been operating in Israel. It
has saved a lot of lives. We were involved in the development
of Iron Dome. Are we taking advantage of that capability, and
is that something----
General McConville. Yes, Senator. As I think you know, we
have two batteries right now. We are going through the process
of training our soldiers on that. That is the interim program,
and what we are working with them and some others is how does
that fit into our integrated air and missile defense system. We
want to be able to pass data from all the different systems.
The future is you have multiple sensors, and you have multiple
shooters, and you use an integrated battle command system for
integrated air and missile defense. It will take the
information from the different sensors, it will pick the right
shooter, and then you get the most efficient capability when it
comes to protecting forces against air threats.
Senator King. So we are back to convergence of data and
software.
General McConville. Yes, we are, Senator.
Senator King. My final question is, my concern is defense
against hypersonics. That strikes me as a significant strategic
challenge for this country. Is this something that is in your
area, with the Army, or is this again a joint enterprise,
because certainly the Navy has to worry about hypersonics?
General McConville. Well, we are all concerned about that,
and I think we could take that in a different form with the
Missile Defense Agency and talk through, probably in another
forum, where we are on that, Senator.
Senator King. Fine. Thank you. Thank you both. Thank you
for your service. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King, and now let me now
recognize, via Webex, Senator Rosen.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman Reed, of course
Ranking Member Inhofe. I really appreciate you holding this
hearing, and I would love to thank the witnesses for testifying
today and for their service.
I would like to speak a little bit about Hawthorne Army
Depot which is located in Nevada. So Secretary Wormuth,
Nevada's Hawthorne Army Depot, it is the world's largest--the
world's largest--ammunition depot and demilitarization
facility. The depot stores and demilitarizes munitions, it
ensures munitions readiness for DOD, amongst other things. It
also supports the Services by hosting military training. It has
very unique terrain. All throughout Nevada we have, with the
Air Force Nevada Test and Training Range and, of course, up in
northern Nevada Fallon Naval Air Station. So we have unique
Afghanistan-like terrain throughout Nevada.
In 2005, there were attempts to close Hawthorne, but it is
mission critical, and again, it is the world's largest
ammunition depot. I am grateful that its closure did not come
to fruition. So given Hawthorne's contributions to our national
security, will you commit to working with me to ensure that the
depot continues its important work serving our warfighters?
Secretary Wormuth. Senator, I would be happy to work with
you on making sure that we continue to keep the capabilities at
Hawthorne that we need. It sounds like they offer a variety of
capabilities to our Army, and I would look forward to gaining a
more in-depth understanding of Hawthorne, and again, making
sure that it fits into future Army requirements.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I would like to move on to a
little bit of tactical cybersecurity, because, of course,
Senator King brought that up. We are going to have convergence
of data, of software, hardware, software, firmware, all of it.
Multiple points of vulnerability. Every time we add something
on we can create a new stress point or a new access point.
So, General McConville, in recent years Army Cyber Command,
you have been fielding units to enhance our ground commanders'
tactical cyber capabilities, such as intelligence, information,
cyber, electronic warfare, and space detachment and the 915th
Cyber Warfare Battalion. So, General McConville, what are the
Army's plans for the growth of this mission, and in which
theaters do you see the Army employing these cyber units? Is it
something that you envision for the Indo-Pacific with our NATO
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies, or possibly in
Iraq, Syria, or Afghanistan? I am just curious how you see it
expanding.
General McConville. Well, Senator, right now, when you talk
about--we have to use an acronym, but it is I2CEWS which is
intelligence, information, cyber, electronic warfare, and
space. We are standing up the new multi-domain task force that
has that capability at Joint Base Lewis-McChord with the focus
on the Indo-Pacific. The second multi-domain task force is
being stood up inside of Europe, and we are looking at third
for the Pacific, and we are in the process of developing that
also.
We see this capability as extremely important for the
future. We see, in the competition space, in the crisis space,
the notion that we are going to have to have these type of
capabilities, and we are in the processing of standing those
organizations up and bringing them to fruition.
Senator Rosen. Well, I would like to build on that, because
how do you envision retaining these high-skilled cyber soldiers
when NCOs [Non-Commissioned Officer], warrants, and even
officers can find more lucrative and more balance work-life
opportunities in cybersecurity jobs in the private sector? So
you not only have to grow up your staff, train them, retrain
them, and upskill them--there is always new technology,
obviously--but how are you going to keep the people you have?
General McConville. Well, I think that is a great question.
With some of the people that are willing to stay in the Army,
sometimes they surprise me. I was just down at the software
factory at Austin, Texas, and we just stood this up because we
are going to need people with these types of capabilities.
There is a specialist, an E-4 down there, that, quite frankly,
was a medic in our Army, and when we put out a call for coders
he answered the call and he is probably one of the best in the
Army, and the other people in that organization that have
master's and Ph.D.'s recognize him as one of the very, very
best we have.
So we have got to have a talent management path for him and
for others like him that they may become warrant officers or
they may become incentivized, based on their level of
experience. What we find is, if we can give them a good wage,
and have them doing what they want to do, they will stay in the
Army and they really like the mission that they have. Even
though they could go outside and probably make a little more
money, they really appreciate the mission. That is the feedback
I get from the cyber operators that we have within Cyber
Command.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you. I hope that we can help
you. Senator Blackburn and I introduced a Civilian
Cybersecurity Reserve Act to help you with a Civilian Cyber
Reserve Corps, and so I look forward to working with you on
that soon. Thank you.
General McConville. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator Sullivan,
please.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate
the witnesses being here. Thanks for your service.
Last week I shared this chart with Secretary Austin and
General Milley on the prioritization of the Biden
administration with regard to our military, and asked them the
question, how do you tell our troops that you are prioritized
when you clearly are not? If you can see this--and I will make
sure you have a copy for the record--almost every Federal
agency in the U.S. Government is getting double-digit increases
with inflation, which is now, unfortunately, creeping up to 5
percent. The U.S. military budget, homeland security budget is
actually getting decreased. I find it completely unacceptable.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
I asked the two leaders of the Pentagon, how do you tell
the troops that you are prioritizing our military? They tried
to answer. It was a tough question, because I am sure that they
probably did not like the budget that they had to come to the
Hill and defend.
Madam Secretary and General, digging deeper, the Army--I
mean, you guys are getting gutted. Let's call it like it is.
Madam Secretary, in your confirmation hearing you told this
Committee you do not want the Army to be the bill-payer for
everybody else. You are the bill-payer right now, 4 percent
cuts without inflation, with inflation you are almost double-
digit numbers. This is like 2015, when the Obama-Biden
administration was trying to cut 40,000 troops from the U.S.
Army, Active Duty. They did it.
How do you explain this to your forces? This is tough on
you. I know you did not like this. I know you did not like
being the bill-payer, but you are. How are you telling your
troops right now that the U.S. Army is prioritized, and why do
you think you are taking it on the chin, in terms of your
budget? Madam Secretary, I will start with you.
Secretary Wormuth. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. I think
what I tell our soldiers when I talk with them is that I am
confident that at the budget we have we are able to----
Senator Sullivan. Is this the budget you wanted?
Secretary Wormuth. Certainly, I think----
Senator Sullivan. Almost 10 percent cut in the Army, with
inflation.
Secretary Wormuth.--I would certainly welcome additional
funds. Having seen, for example, you know, barracks at Fort
Hood, I would absolutely welcome additional funds.
Senator Sullivan. General, is this the Army you advocated
for? Sorry to interrupt.
General McConville. Well, Senator, I did----
Senator Sullivan. This is a huge issue. It is not getting
nearly enough attention.
General McConville. Yeah.
Senator Sullivan. The Biden administration is blowing out
the Federal Government, $6 trillion in spending. Okay? But with
regard to the U.S. Army they are saying, ``Sorry, guys, ladies.
You are getting nothing.'' So this is a real problem. General?
General McConville. No, I just--I said I laid out our
requirements. We have our budget and we have our unfunded
requirements that I sent a letter to this Committee and all the
other committees that lay out, if we can get additional money
that is where we want to put it, and we would like to get that
additional money.
Senator Sullivan. Well, I am going to advocate strongly for
additional money for the U.S. Army. I think this is dangerous,
and I think it is clear that the Biden administration does not
prioritize the military, but it really does not prioritize the
Army.
Let me ask, you know, a lot of your testimony--I have been
watching it all morning--talks about tough choices. I agree
with you, you have tough choices. General, you have done a
phenomenal job, your leadership, on addressing what is a huge
challenge with the U.S. Army in Alaska. In the last 5 years we
have had 32 suicides. You know, we have only had 41--and every
death is horrible--combat deaths in Afghanistan in the same
time frame. I just want to get your commitment that when you
make tough choices, the work you are doing on addressing
suicide, in one of the most important places in the country, my
state, is not going to be one of these tough choices that you
leave on the cutting room floor, because the Biden
administration will not fund the damn Army. Can I get your
commitment on that? Lives are at stake.
General McConville. Absolutely. It is about people first,
Senator. You have my full commitment on that.
Senator Sullivan. Madam Secretary?
Secretary Wormuth. Yes. Yes, you have my commitment as
well.
Senator Sullivan. Let me finally ask, can I just get a
quick update? I know, Madam Secretary, you committed to meet,
you and General McConville, to brief me on the Arctic plan from
the Army. We are getting mixed messages. Secretary of Defense,
in his confirmation hearing, said he was going to fully
resource Arctic strategies of all the Services. General Milley
said the same last week at the hearing. But General VanHerck,
in his hearing last week, he mentioned that the DOD budget,
this budget, is inching along, did not move the ball very far
down the field in terms of military Arctic strategy, and as you
know, as NORTHCOM [Northern Command] Commander he is the
advocate.
Can I just get an update from the two of you on that
strategy, which I think you have done a great job on, and I
look forward to the briefing I am going to be getting from both
of you here in the next couple of weeks.
Secretary Wormuth. Senator Sullivan, we have resourced, in
this year's budget, the strategy, the Arctic strategy that the
Army put forward to you, and I have not lost track of my
commitment to come and brief you, so I am looking forward to
doing that as well. I do not know if General McConville has
anything else to add.
General McConville. I think, Senator, you and I talked
about the strategy is focused on being able to operate in the
Arctic, which is a little different than operating from Alaska.
We are putting that together. We will have more of an
operational command up there. You tend to have an
administrative command right now, but as you take a look at the
fact that you are going to want to compete up there, we are
taking a look. We have talked about the type of organizations
we will put in there. We have got some more coordination to do,
but we have a vision of where we want to go, and that is funded
in the resources we have right now. There is some other
collaboration that needs to be done on the type of units. We
have a Stryker brigade up there, and as we take a look at what
the future of that brigade looks like, that may change, and
that is where we are having discussions right now.
Senator Sullivan. Good. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Senator Kaine,
please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I want to continue
along the lines of my colleague, Senator Sullivan, on budget
issues, and I think the key is this Committee has to make a
decision. The President has given us a budget and we have to
make a decision about what we think is right. But I want to dig
into this question of the Biden administration proposal and is
it a ``cut.'' I am looking at a document, and it is the FYDP
[Future Years Defense Program] that the Trump administration
sent to us last year in April, April 2020. Page 195, table 616,
this was the Trump administration's proposal for Army funding.
Fiscal year 2021 it was $177 billion. But in this table, the
Trump administration predicted, their projection was that in
fiscal year 2022 they were going to make the Army undergo a 10
percent cut. I am looking at this table and it shows fiscal
year 2021 $177 billion, but they project that the Army was
going to drop to $164 billion in fiscal year 2022. That was the
Trump administration's plan that they submitted to Congress
last April.
The Biden administration did not follow the Trump plan for
$164 billion. My understanding, and I think I am correct, is
that the top line that is now before us is $173 billion. Am I
right about the top line in the President's Budget, that it is
$173 billion, not $164 billion?
Secretary Wormuth. Yes, Senator. That is right.
Senator Kaine. At what point in your budget deliberations
did you switch from the Trump-era projection of $164 billion to
the dollar amount that was submitted in the President's Budget
of $173 billion?
Secretary Wormuth. Senator Kaine, I think I am going to
have to let General McConville speak to that because I was not
yet the Secretary during the budget deliberations.
General McConville. Yes, Senator. As far as the budget
discussions, I was not aware, as far as we were planning
through the process, on how that was going to play out, what
was enduring OCO, what was OCO, and all those type things. So I
cannot give you a good answer to that but I will take a look
and come back to you.
Senator Kaine. Yeah, I would like to ask that for the
record, and, Mr. Chair, if I could, I would like to submit the
FYDP that was submitted to us last April 2020, for the record.
Chairman Reed. Without objection.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix.]
Senator Kaine. Because I think what it shows is that
contrary--again, the question of what is the right dollar level
for the Army is a very legitimate one, and we may well decide,
as a committee, that the President's request is not sufficient.
I have done that before and I may do it again. But if I am
thinking about who is proposing to cut, I am sure glad that
President Biden recommended a $173 billion top line instead of
$164 billion top line, which was suggested by the FYDP that the
Trump administration gave us over a year ago.
That is the only questions that I have, Mr. Chair, and I
will yield time back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Kaine, and I
believe that we have concluded all of our colleagues who wished
to speak. At this point let me thank the Secretary for her
comments and General McConville for your comments, both of you
for your extraordinary service. With that I will call the
hearing adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
integrated visual augmentation solution radios
1. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, in
the fiscal year 2022 budget request, the Army appears to request that
funds intended for IVAS radios be transferred from the IVAS funding
line to the Handheld, Manpack and Small Form Fit (HMS) line. This is a
new program and new start in fiscal year 2022. Can you ensure that the
funding requested will support a full and open competition and
procurement process for the IVAS radios?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Procurement of the single
channel IVAS radios is not a new program start. The Fiscal Year 2022
President's Budget Request outlined the intent to manage the IVAS
radios within the HMS program. The single channel radio (IVAS)
requirement will be executed through a January 2021 approved Middle
Tier of Acquisition (MTA) Rapid Fielding pathway. An Other Transaction
Agreement (OTA) Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ)
contract was awarded on 25 March 2021. The program office will continue
to utilize competitively awarded contracts using best value source
selection procedures.
enhanced night vision goggle-binocular (envg-b)
2. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, the
fiscal year 2022 request for ENVG-B is approximately $218 million,
however, according to last year's budget justification documents, the
projected budget request for ENVG-B procurement in fiscal year 2023
would be about $6 million. That is a significant cut to a program that
is being fielded and receiving positive feedback. Does the Army still
plan to request $6 million in procurement for ENVG-B in fiscal year
2023 or will that number be revised?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army will consider an
appropriate revision to the Army's fiscal year 2023 budget request for
the ENVG-B in order to prioritize resources in accordance with the
National Defense Strategy and our Modernization Priorities. Following
the Night Vision Modernization Strategy, the Army is initially focusing
on the IVAS, which is expected to be the night vision device of choice
for our Close Combat Force Soldiers, while the ENVG-B systems will be
used by the Close Area Combat Force units. While the ENVG-B has
received very positive feedback and is a leap forward from older night
vision devices (such as the PVS-14), it does not necessarily provide
overmatch against current and future adversaries.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
army multi-domain transformation and the indo-pacific
3. Senator Hirono. General McConville, the Army's #1 modernization
priority is long-range precision fires--including missiles you're
planning to base in the Western Pacific--can you provide a general
status update on the progress of getting allies and partners in the
Region to agree to host these weapon systems?
General McConville. Rather than seeking permanent basing, the Army
(with United States Army Pacific in the lead) is prioritizing the
necessary agreements and infrastructure to ensure rotational access for
Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF) and other Army capabilities inside
the first island chain during competition. At this time, the Army is
not seeking permanent basing of LRPF in the Western Pacific, but it is
seeking the necessary access to posture LRPF in competition and for
contingency.
army's hawaii infrastructure readiness initiative (hiri)
4. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, I'm
concerned about the Army's long-term effort to modernize installations
in Hawaii through MILCON, known generally as the Hawaii Infrastructure
Readiness Initiative--the only two projects funded in this year's
budget are for the West Loch ammunition storage annex and a veterinary
treatment facility at Pearl Harbor. Three other projects--an Aviation
Operations Building and a Rotary Wing Parking Apron at Wheeler Army
Airfield and a Command and Control Facility at Fort Shafter--are on
your unfunded requirements list. Given the Army's focus on supporting
the joint force to deter China in the Pacific, why aren't these three
high risk MILCON projects that you identified on your unfunded
requirements list in the base budget request?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army is concerned
about the condition of its infrastructure in Hawaii and the impacts
that substandard facilities have on readiness and Soldier quality of
life. The Army must balance these requirements against all
requirements, across all installations, in support of quality of life,
readiness, and modernization. The Army intends to address the Rotary
Wing Parking Apron, the Aviation Operations Building, and the final
increment for the Command and Control Facility in future budget cycles
if they are not authorized and appropriated in this budget.
renewal of training land leases
5. Senator Hirono. General McConville, the Army is negotiating
renewals for several training area land leases in Hawaii that are set
to expire in 2029, including the Pohakuloa Training Area (PTA), which
is critical for joint and partner nation readiness. It's important for
the Army to conduct respectful engagement with local community leaders,
especially the Native Hawaiian population. Is the Army Corps of
Engineers' plan to stand up a Training Lands Retention Office by August
of this year to work with the local community still on track?
General McConville. Yes, the plan to stand up a Training Lands
Retention office is on track and a program manager is expected to be
hired by the end of August. This employee will work directly for the
U.S. Army Pacific, Director of Training, as well as working in close
partnership with both U.S. Army Hawaii and the U.S. Army Garrison
Hawaii to accomplish program objectives. The position will enable a
close working relationship with the local community.
army multi-domain task force
6. Senator Hirono. General McConville, the Army's Multi-Domain Task
Force (MDTF) is focused on defeating an enemy's anti-access/area denial
capabilities. Is the Army still planning to stand up additional MDTFs
beyond the one at Joint Base Lewis McCord in Washington State, and if
so, where will they be located?
General McConville. The Secretary of Defense announced in April
that the Army will activate the second MDTF in Germany in September
2021. We are reviewing options for additional MDTFs, including added
support for USINDOPACOM. However, given competing demands and available
force structure, the Army has not yet made final decisions on where and
when to grow additional MDTFs.
7. Senator Hirono. General McConville, what steps is the Army
taking to ensure the MDTFs can work closely with our allies and
partners?
General McConville. The Army has incrementally introduced MDTF
concepts and capabilities with select countries interested in multi-
domain operations. We are also initiating a Capability Gap Analysis to
identify which Joint and Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) capabilities and
linkages are required to integrate MDO with our allies and partners.
In the Indo-Pacific, United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) shapes
force design and employment concepts. USARPAC and the Headquarters,
Department of the Army will incorporate MDTF concepts with select
allies and partner countries through Indo-Pacific Pathways exercises,
joint exercises, concept development, and wargaming.
In Europe, the Army will activate a MDTF in mid-September 2021.
This capability has received significant interest from allies and
partners. As MDTF-Europe comes on-line, U.S. Army Europe-Africa
(USAREUR-AF) will engage with specific allies and partners to refine
region-specific requirements.
8. Senator Hirono. General McConville, what additional MILCON
projects do you anticipate being necessary to support the establishment
of future MDTFs?
General McConville. In the immediate term, no additional MILCON
projects are necessary. The Army is using Operations and Maintenance
(O&M) Restoration and Modernization (R&M) funds to adapt existing
facilities to meet experimental or interim stationing of MDTFs. The
Army will evaluate several stationing alternatives before making
permanent stationing decisions in accordance with applicable laws and
regulations. The Army is also conducting a facility Requirements
Analysis to scope future MILCON submissions. Once the evaluation of
permanent stationing alternatives (pursuant to NEPA and Army
Regulations) is complete, the Army will be in a better position to
identify and request future MILCON projects.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
department of army budget change from fiscal year 2021 fydp projection
to fiscal year 2022
9. Senator Kaine. Secretary Wormuth, when did the Army begin to
plan to a top line budget of $173 billion for fiscal year 2022?
Secretary Wormuth. The Army conducted concurrent planning for
different top lines throughout the POM 22 build in fiscal year 2020;
however, it was not until the second quarter of fiscal year 2021 that
the Army received specific guidance of a $173 billion top line. At this
time the Army began deliberate planning based on that number.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Gary C. Peters
stryker
10. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, the
Stryker combat vehicle has proven itself to be one of the Army's most
versatile platforms and continues to expand its missions beyond its
core function as an infantry carrier. For example, Stryker was selected
as the platform for critical fielding of urgently needed short-range
air defense systems using both traditional missiles and cannon, as well
as cutting-edge technology lasers. Stryker is also the platform for the
Army's next generation of Electronic Warfare and Signals Intelligence
systems and mobile command posts outside the Stryker Brigade
formations. The key to being able to perform these expanded missions is
the Army's decision in 2018 to upgrade to the newest Stryker A1
configuration that provides more engine and electrical power, a digital
network, and a much heavier suspension. Does the pace of modernization
outlined in your budget request reflect the Stryker's expanding
missions?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Yes, it does. The
modernization efforts for the Stryker portfolio represent the Army's
commitment to preparing Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT) to fight
and win in a dynamic and complex operational environment. All aspects
of the Army's budget request are nested and synchronized to develop a
modern force capable of meeting worldwide contingencies. The lethality
upgrades for the Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station- Javelin, the
Medium Caliber Weapon System, and the Anti-Tank Guided Missiles Vehicle
prepare the SBCT to meet its expanding mission set on the future
battlefield. These upgrades will yield six DVHA1-equipped, very
capable, and lethal, SBCTs by the end of fiscal year 2030.
The Army budget request also accelerates funding for the SBCT's
Stryker platform to incorporate the Terrestrial Layered System (TLS),
which integrates Electronic Warfare, Signals Intelligence, and Cyber
Warfare at the tactical edge of battle. We are funding four and one
half SBCT sets of TLS between fiscal year 2021 and fiscal year 2022.
Additionally, the Army is funding 96 Mobile Short Range Air Defense (M-
SHORAD) integrated Stryker vehicles in fiscal year 2021 and fiscal year
2022 to defend Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) against manned and
unmanned aircraft systems.
11. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, I am
concerned that a planned effort to test two Active Protection Systems
(APS) on the Stryker continues to be delayed and is listed in the
Army's unfunded requirements list. How would not funding this testing
impact the procurement of an APS for Strykers?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The $21 million unfunded
requirements list request would support multiple efforts. Specifically,
$16 million is required to complete Phase 2 Iron Fist Light Decoupled
(IF-LD) Urgent Materiel Release (UMR) documentation on the Bradley
Fighting Vehicle (BFV) and $5 million is required to execute Limited
Characterization (LC) of two Hard-Kill (HK) Active Protection System
(APS) solutions informing the APS requirement on the Stryker vehicle.
If the $16 million for BFV is not resourced, then logistic product
development and verification, engineering change proposal release,
vehicle software updates, and the UMR will not be completed. This will
result in a day-for-day slip in procurement and fielding of a hard kill
capability in support of the Directed Requirement. If the $5 million
for LC is not resourced, the Army will be unable to determine if either
HK APS solutions meet the specifications, or if integration of either
system onto a Stryker platform is feasible without the performance data
captured during the characterization effort. Therefore, the Army will
be unable to proceed with the planned procurement of a HK APS solution
for Stryker if the unfunded requirement is not resourced.
m-1 abrams
12. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, the
Abrams Main Battle Tank as currently upgraded to the M1A2 SEPV3
configuration remains the world's best tank and is the backbone of the
Army's most powerful formation, the Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT).
I am concerned to see a 30 percent reduction in ``version 3'' upgrades
when Russia is another year closer to fielding and exporting the T-14
Armata. What is affected by the 30 percent reduction reflected in the
budget request?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The 30 percent reduction
will reduce Abrams production from one ABCT per year to three fourths
of an ABCT per year and will reduce the number of brigade field
modifications from two BCTs to one BCT in fiscal year 2022. The
reduction in funding is due to the significant amount of funding placed
in Abrams production over the past four years, the necessity to fund
other critical Army modernization priorities, and the reduction in the
Army's fiscal year 2022 budget.
13. Senator Peters. General McConville, is this an acceptable level
of risk?
General McConville. The production at three fourths of an ABCT per
year places Abrams at a moderate programmatic risk (which can be
mitigated through Foreign Military Sales) and a low operational risk
due to the significant amount of Abrams M1A2SEPv3 production in past
years. As the Army is modernizing tanks at a faster rate than the rest
of the combat vehicles in the ABCT, this allows the ability to focus on
other critical Army modernization priorities.
critical infrastructure
14. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, as
co-Chair of the Defense Communities Caucus, I believe the Defense
Community Infrastructure Program (DCIP) to be invaluable. But at the
same time, I believe it could do more to strengthen communities'
critical infrastructure to prevent cyber-driven disruptions that impact
force projection and readiness. While studying how cyber-originating
disruptions can impact force projection, the Army Cyber Institute's
Jack Voltaic Project developed a software-based framework for local
governments to rehearse their cyber incident response capabilities. Do
you see merit in equipping municipalities with solutions like this
through a DCIP-like process?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Yes, providing
communities programs like Jack Voltaic through a Defense Critical
Infrastructure Program-like process is important. This is true not only
to the communities involved, but also to maintain our national
security. To help local governments prepare for potential crises, Jack
Voltaic was created to bring the whole-of-community together. This
program ensures industry and the national security enterprise, as well
as federal, state, and local governments are brought together in an
unclassified exercise environment to understand the challenges for
communities, to develop incident response plans, and to them capture
lessons learned. The ultimate goal of this program is to develop an
exportable framework that communities throughout the United States can
use to run an exercise for themselves and to ensure DOD preparedness
for Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) requests.
Past efforts illuminated cyber response challenges for financial
institutions in New York City; addressing attacks against multiple
infrastructure sectors after a hurricane in Houston; city-wide cyber
responses in eight locations, as well as disruption of Army force
projection via highways, railroads, and the ports of Savannah and
Charleston. The Jack Voltaic planning tools show great potential
through a DCIP-like process, both to exercise the cyber resilience of
communities near military bases, but also for the Army to exercise
force projection with critical infrastructure owners and operators.
This software framework is at an initial operating capability, but
needs additional development and testing before wider distribution.
15. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, will
you explore ways to translate the institute's work into something
useable for communities?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army Cyber Institute
(ACI) has already begun the work needed for communities to conduct
independent Jack Voltaic-like events. Currently, ACI has issued grants
to universities for development of exercise planning tools that will
allow communities to create their own scenarios, conduct their own
exercises, and share data and lessons learned among various
communities. The work is expected to be fully operational and ready to
transfer to communities in fiscal year 2023, depending on future
funding.
professional development
16. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth, the budget request shows a
significant reduction in Army Tuition assistance, citing an
``anticipated reduction of intake rates'' into the program. Will this
translate to less funds available to soldiers pursuing off-duty
civilian education (e.g., lowering $4,000 limit per fiscal year)?
Secretary Wormuth. The Army Cyber Institute (ACI) has already begun
the work needed for communities to conduct independent Jack Voltaic-
like events. Currently, ACI has issued grants to universities for
development of exercise planning tools that will allow communities to
create their own scenarios, conduct their own exercises, and share data
and lessons learned among various communities. The work is expected to
be fully operational and ready to transfer to communities in fiscal
year 2023, depending on future funding.
17. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth, is the reduction in any way
related to the current problems stemming from the transition to
ArmyIgnitED from GoArmyEd?
Secretary Wormuth. No, the current challenge with bringing
ArmyIgnitED fully online is unrelated to the President's Budget
Request. ArmyIgnitED replaces the outdated legacy system and supports
participation by allowing Soldiers to request tuition assistance
through an automated process.
18. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth, when will the ArmyIgnitED-
related problems be resolved?
Secretary Wormuth. ArmyIgnitED opened, Army-wide, for tuition
assistance enrollments on July 19, 2021. The transition to ArmyIgnitED
continues to progress as technical issues are resolved. Soldiers are
able to use ArmyIgnitED for those educational institutions that have
uploaded their institutional degree files into the system. Currently,
there are 92 schools with successful integration into the ArmyIgnitED
platform. Soldiers will continue to gain greater access to the
ArmyIgnitED platform as more educational institutions successfully
enter into the system. As an interim measure, while schools continue to
enter into the system, the direct enrollment option with educational
institutions through an exception to policy is still available should
any Soldier be unable to enroll through ArmyIgnitED. The Army will
continue working with those participating schools who have not yet
uploaded their institutional degree files as well as with our Soldiers
who need to use the exception to policy process to enroll.
multi-domain task force
19. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, the
Multi-Domain Task Force is the organizational centerpiece for Army
modernization, yet its Intelligence, Information, Cyber, Electronic
Warfare, and Space (I2CEWS) Detachment and the All-Domain Operations
Center are on the list of unfunded requirements. As these are relevant
in competition, crisis, and conflict, why are they not in the base
budget?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army's fiscal year
2022 budget request reflected the Army's highest priorities.
Recognizing the importance of the Multi-Domain Task Force, the Army
would welcome an opportunity to accelerate the Intelligence,
Information, Cyber, Electronic Warfare, and Space (I2CEWS) Detachment
and the All-Domain Operations Center requirements in fiscal year 2022,
if additional funding is available.
ampv
20. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, the
Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) is listed by the Army as one of
its 31+4 key modernization programs but received a cut in funding of
over $500 million from last year's budget position and there is no
Unfunded Requirement listed for AMPV in the Army's request.
Additionally, the budget exhibits highlight that this funding will be
used for non-production activities and not actually procure any
vehicles in fiscal year 2022. The Public Affairs Officer for the PEO
who owns AMPV published a statement that identified the reason for the
cut and that the program was re-baselined to support moving the Full
Rate Production (FRP) decision to fiscal year 2023; however, by not
including the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) in the Army's budget
exhibits, this Committee is unable to validate that the PAOs statement
is true and whether AMPV actually remains a priority for the Army. When
will this Committee see the FYDP for AMPV?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. I understand that the
Department of Defense intends to submit a fiscal year 2023 FYDP during
the Fiscal Year 2023 President's Budget submission next year. That
decision will be informed by the National Defense Strategy review
process.
The single year budget was submitted because the transitioning
administration was developing its policies and strategic guidance
necessary to inform the out-year budget plans. For the last two
Presidential transition year budgets, for fiscal year 2010 and fiscal
year 2018, DOD only submitted the next year Fiscal Year President's
Budget.
21. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, AMPV
is the only Next Generation Combat Vehicle in production. Is it still a
priority?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Yes, the Armored Multi-
Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) is managed by the Next Generation Combat Vehicle
(NGCV) Cross-Functional Team (CFT) and is included in the Army's 31+4
modernization priorities. Additionally, the Optionally Manned Fighting
Vehicle is in development and is fully funded in fiscal year 2022. It
is scheduled to begin replacing the Bradley Fighting Vehicle no earlier
than fiscal year 2029.
22. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, the
Army and contractor have highlighted significant investments made for
this program to include the first ever use of robotic welding on combat
vehicles. Given our soldiers are currently using a Vietnam era vehicle,
will Full Rate Production still occur at a rate to support the
investments made for this program, which the Committee understands is
at least 1 brigade set per year?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army remains fully
committed to divesting the Vietnam-era M113 family of vehicles from our
ABCTs as quickly as fiscally possible. For the Armored Multi-Purpose
Vehicle (AMPV), the Army awarded four Low Rate Initial Production
(LRIP) contracts for three and half Armored Brigade Combat Teams'
(ABCTs) worth of AMPVs (or 457 vehicles), and those are being produced
and will begin fielding in fiscal year 2023. The Army elected to re-
baseline the AMPV program last winter to provide the vendor more time
to establish the production line and not because of any change in
priority. AMPV remains an extremely important Army modernization
effort. The next contract and the first Full-Rate Production (FRP)
contract under this re-baseline is scheduled for fiscal year 2023.
tactical electrification
23. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth, during your confirmation
hearing you testified that electrification of combat and tactical
vehicles, as well as associated battery technology development would be
focus areas for you if confirmed in order to better understand how
deeply the Army could pursue tactical electrification noting
operational benefits in fuel efficiencies and overall power management.
The Administration has also placed emphasis in supporting the
transition of the commercial automotive fleet to all-electric fleets
through recent Executive Orders. As such, please provide more details
on:
The Army's near and long term strategy for tactical
electrification.
Secretary Wormuth. In the near term, we are partnering with U.S.
industry through multiple initiatives to share knowledge and to learn
from our collective investments. We are also investing in the
technologies required to reduce our dependence on fossil fuels,
including power storage, rapid recharging, and integration of new
capabilities into existing systems. Progress to date has
demonstrated the potential for smarter use of power to improve
mileage of our tactical wheeled vehicle fleets and the potential for
hybrid power options to fulfill some of our vehicle power requirements.
Fully electric options for our heaviest combat platforms are not
currently feasible with existing and emerging technologies.
The Futures and Concepts Center of U.S. Army Futures Command is
developing a long-term electrification strategy for the Army. It is
informed by national policy and strategies, industry plans and
progress, and military requirements to implement the defense strategy.
The strategy will describe the future Modernized Army Energy Ecosystem
and identify ways and means to achieve it.
How you are working with commercial industry to leverage
the significant levels of internal research and development investment
being made by automotive companies?
Secretary Wormuth. Our Ground Vehicle Systems Center (GVSC) within
U.S. Army Futures Command's Development Command (DEVCOM) is co-located
with the commercial automotive industry in southeastern Michigan. The
GVSC leverages its proximity to automotive technical centers through
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) with many of
these automotive partners to leverage commercial efforts and
investments in areas such as electrification. To date, we have
established 11 CRADAs and Test Service Agreements with automotive
Original Equipment Manufacturers and suppliers of electrification
components. Additionally, the GVSC has hosted five electrification
forums attended by dozens of companies working in electrification to
share information on the Army's unique operational environment and to
gain their input on our electrification plans and architecture. These
forums allow the GVSC to share the Army's electrification needs and
challenges with commercial industry partners. The GVSC has an
established track record of working with America's research
universities and leveraging groups such as the Automotive Research
Center (ARC), partnering with 15 industry organizations and 9
universities from around the country. These collaborative efforts
between the Army and the commercial automotive sector are informing
future vehicle requirements.
Finally, the Army Applications Laboratory (AAL) in Austin, Texas,
is working with the automotive sector nationwide to find industry
solutions in relevant areas, such as the mobile charging infrastructure
needed to support future military electric systems. As part of this
effort, the Army has received technical input and solutions from over
70 different non-traditional partners, ensuring that commercial best
practices are being leveraged to address the unique military challenges
with vehicle electrification.
electric light reconnaissance vehicle (elrv)
24. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth, regarding the electric light
reconnaissance vehicle (eLRV) program, I understand the Army has an
identified unfunded requirement in fiscal year 2022 of $5.6 million and
that if left unfulfilled could significantly impact the Army's ability
to award up to 4 other transaction agreements to initiate this critical
program. What steps are you taking internally to ensure this program
remains on schedule?
Secretary Wormuth. The Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request reflects the
Army's best effort to balance allocated funding against our
requirements while assuming the least anticipated risk. The electric
Light Reconnaissance Vehicle (eLRV) program was not funded in our
budget request. If additional resources become available, we will
consider funding the eLRV to avoid a one-year slip in its program.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tammy Duckworth
factoring program performance for budget prioritization
25. Senator Duckworth. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville,
DOD, particularly the Army, must leverage best practices to make sure
our Nation delivers high-quality systems to our warfighters on-time . .
on-budget . . . in alignment with the National Defense Strategy and
Interim National Security Strategic Guidance. I'm encouraged by our
progress to date in key programs, like Future Vertical Lift, or FVL.
The Army's embrace of a streamlined--so-called, ``middle tier of
acquisition'' pathway--is proving effective in efficiently generating
highly competitive options, while minimizing program failure risk to
the government and the American taxpayer. Secretary Wormuth, can you
address how the Army is factoring program performance to prioritize
budget requests, especially in regard to doubling down on proven
programs that work, such as FVL?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Program performance is
just one factor that is considered for budget priority. Programs are
prioritized based on the importance of the capability gap they are
filling and the timeframe in which that gap must be closed.
For instance, Long Range Precision Fires is the Army's number one
acquisition priority because we are currently outranged by our near
peer competitors, and we need to close that gap as soon as possible.
Other gaps may not need to be closed as quickly, so they fall lower in
priority and can be developed and procured at a slower rate. This frees
up budget for higher priority programs. Programs that have a poor
performance record, on the other hand, typically result in lower budget
priority and offer an opportunity to shift funding within the budget,
across the Future Year's Defense Program, because underperforming
programs typically cannot execute their full budget due to program
delays.
We are, however, very proud of the combined Army teams' approach to
the FVL programs, including their responsible use of new procurement
and acquisition authorities granted by Congress, the focus at all
echelons on affordability, and the continued emphasis on stable and
achievable requirements.
26. Senator Duckworth. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville,
another aspect of FVL that warrants a compliment is the Army's
discipline in making sure the service implements a ``modular open
systems architecture'' approach to maximize the Army's flexibility in
managing operation and support costs over the program's lifecycle.
Actively avoiding vendor lock-in is absolutely vital to enable DOD to
provide warfighters with cutting-edge technology, while lowering
overall costs through competition. Secretary Wormuth, as the Army
continues to embrace modular open systems architecture in the FVL
family of systems, will you commit to working with me to make sure this
acquisition best practice is adopted and replicated across all
Services?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army is committed to
Modular Open Systems Architecture (MOSA) as a warfighting imperative
and has developed policy and implementation guidance to apply and
certify the appropriate level of MOSA implementation in all Army
programs. Accordingly, each of the Army Program Executive Officers
(PEOs) have written MOSA guidance specific to their portfolio of
programs. PEO Aviation has established a MOSA Transformation Office to
ensure a disciplined approach to MOSA. It is currently identifying
lessons learned in applying MOSA to Future Vertical Lift (FVL) and
across the entire aviation portfolio of programs.
The Army is actively engaging with industry to identify means to
enhance competition, avoid vendor lock-in, accelerate and streamline
technology insertion, and reduce support costs over a program's
lifecycle. The Army is also an active participant in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) Modular Open Systems Working Group and the
associated Tiger Teams, where best practices are identified,
established, and shared across the Services. We will continue to work
with OSD to assist in the adoption and implementation of MOSA across
the Department of Defense.
balancing modernization efforts with readiness investments in the indo-
pacific region
27. Senator Duckworth. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville,
I've been encouraged to see expanding roles for organizations such as
the 5th Security Force Assistance Brigade and the National Guard's
State Partnership Program. Forging long-standing relationships with
SFABs and Guard units gives international partners a more local view of
the U.S. in a way that presents a unique diplomatic opportunity, in
addition to building partner military capabilities and
interoperability. Bottom-line: enhancing relationships increases
deterrence and opens doors to the access and presence we need to
compete in the region. General McConville, how does the Army properly
balance the need to invest in modernization with resourcing critical
readiness and mil-to-mil initiatives with our partners and allies,
particularly in the Indo-Pacific Region?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army seeks to balance
investment in modernization with resourcing critical readiness and mil-
to-mil initiatives with our partners and allies, particularly in the
Indo-Pacific Region, through a series of detailed analytic processes
that consider requirements, funding, and risk across all programs. Army
leadership uses these processes to ensure investments are balanced
across all portfolios based on the National Defense Strategy and other
service requirements, including the Indo-Pacific region. The Army
continues to evaluate, contribute and invest in readiness and
capabilities that support the Army's efforts in the Indo-Pacific region
to build partnerships and allies.
For example, the Army instituted a new unit lifecycle model--ReARMM
(Regionally Aligned Readiness & Modernization Model)--to generate ready
forces for SECDEF validated requirements, which include exercises and
engagements with our allies and partners, while allocating force
elements to undergo deliberate modernization. ReARMM maximizes
readiness while allowing the Army to continue its modernization. This
model provides predictability to units and commanders and better aligns
the many moving parts required to modernize a combat formation while
simultaneously allowing the Army to program the right units to support
exercises and mil-to-mil engagements.
28. Senator Duckworth. General McConville, will you commit to
exploring opportunities to expand the National Guard State Partnership
Program in the Indo-Pacific to sustain presence and build partner
nation capacity?
General McConville. Yes. I fully support the National Guard's State
Partnership Program. The State Partnership Program is one of our
strongest tools for building partnership capacity and we continue to
grow the program by two to three partners per year throughout the
world. As the Pacific Defense Initiative is established, the
USINDOPACOM Area of Responsibility will receive significant attention.
We look forward to adding to the current 13 partnerships within the
Indo-Pacific, which are critical to maintaining relationships in the
region and avoiding conflict with China.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
reserve components & new army fitness test
29. Senator Rosen. General McConville, the Reserve Components face
their own set of challenges as citizen soldiers, with two careers to
manage and without access to the day-to-day services available to
active duty troops on military installations. One such challenge will
be the transition to the Army Combat Fitness Test (ACFT). While active
duty soldiers will have ACFT equipment at their everyday place of work,
Reserve Component soldiers will not, no matter how much equipment is
fielded to Reserve/Guard units. These soldiers are not at their units
every day to train on the equipment. This will require Reserve
Component soldiers to have to pay for, and have access to, specialized
gym equipment in order to train for the ACFT, whereas every soldier can
train for the current Army Physical Fitness Test from their own home.
How does the Army plan to address this disparity as they implement the
ACFT?
General McConville. The Army Reserve Components will continue to
lead by example in ACFT implementation. The efforts by the Reserve
Components ensure that no Soldier has to pay out of pocket in order to
prepare for and then pass the ACFT. The ARNG has fielded 15,854
complete sets of ACFT testing equipment to over 1,400 cities and towns
across all 54 States and Territories. This equipment is distributed to
maximize Soldier access and is dispersed in a manner to provide at
least one full lane of equipment for every 21 Soldiers assigned, which
aggregates to nearly six lanes of equipment per ARNG facility. The Army
Reserve has placed 8,020 sets of equipment in the field for Soldiers to
use. Army Reserve analysis indicates 84 percent of USAR Soldiers have
homes of record within 25 miles of an equipment facility. An additional
13 percent are within 50 miles.
Furthermore, Master Fitness Trainers are expertly advising and
coaching Reserve Component Soldiers to train for the ACFT utilizing
dozens of exercises that can be accomplished with only body weight,
with simple equipment, or with the equipment Soldiers typically have on
hand. All of these exercises are illustrated in the Army Training
Publication 7.22.02, ``Holistic Health and Fitness Drills and
Exercises.'' The identified exercises in this reference allow Reserve
Component Soldiers to train for the ACFT despite geographic dispersion
or limited access to DOD fitness facilities, though all Reserve
Component Soldiers have access to Department of Defense gyms and
equipment. Finally, an additional 5,000 lanes of equipment are being
distributed by TRADOC across the country to recruiting stations, ROTC
schools/universities, and other TRADOC posts.
Lastly, the ARNG reports that 21 States are currently piloting
Holistic Health and Fitness initiatives and partnership programs with
access rights to equipment and facilities, such as YMCAs, schools, and
community centers that will specifically enable ACFT training.
iron dome
30. Senator Rosen. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, I
applaud the Army's decision to acquire two Iron Dome batteries and its
successful integration of Iron Dome components as part of the Indirect
Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) program. Despite the ongoing rocket
attacks against U.S. Forces and facilities in Iraq showing gaps in the
U.S.'s ability to defend against rocket attacks, the Army has
eliminated having the current ability to defend against rocket attacks
as a criteria in the IFPC selection, only requiring the future ability
to have such a capability. This raises concerns about leaving our
forces unprotected against these threats that adversaries are already
using against the United States and allies like Israel. Why has the
Army eliminated counter-rocket capabilities from being a requirement in
the IFPC program?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army has not
eliminated counter-rocket capabilities as a requirement in the IFPC
Increment 2 program. The enduring IFPC Increment 2 system will be fully
integrated into the Army's Integrated Air and Missile Defense
architecture to defeat not only cruise missiles, as directed in the
Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, but also rockets,
artillery, mortars, and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS).
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
army decision to eliminate malaria drug and vaccine research
31. Senator Wicker. Secretary Wormuth, Senator Durbin and I
recently sent a group letter to the Secretary of Defense regarding the
elimination of the malaria vaccine and drug research program at Walter
Reed Army Institute of Research. We remain concerned with the
Department's decisions over recent years to precipitously decrease and
even eliminate funding for malaria research, particularly in light of
increased drug-resistant malaria in Asia and insecticide resistance in
Africa. Malaria remains the number one infectious disease threat to
United States servicemembers abroad in those AORs.
As a Nation, we have learned during this pandemic that a lack of
health readiness can come at an enormous cost to American life and
treasure. Understanding the ability for an infectious disease such as
malaria to disrupt mission readiness and the likelihood of continued
future deployments to the AFRICOM and PACOM AORS, how will you ensure
previous investments in malaria at the Walter Reed Army Institute of
Research, the world's premier research center for malaria, continued to
be leveraged?
Secretary Wormuth. The U.S. Army Medical Research and Development
Command (MRDC), a subordinate command of U.S. Army Futures Command, is
committed to preserving internal expertise and capabilities that are
essential to research and development of medical countermeasures to
protect military personnel. MRDC and the Walter Reed Army Institute of
Research (WRAIR) focus on scientific core competencies that are broadly
applicable across a range of pathogens threatening the health and
readiness of military personnel. As infectious disease threats emerge
and evolve within the operational environment, MRDC and WRAIR will
pivot those competencies towards the highest priority threats, focusing
investments on threats that do not receive attention or funding from
inter-agency partners, non-governmental organizations, or industry.
Malaria research and development will continue to have a high level
of interest and support from inter-agency partners, academia, non-
governmental organizations, and international bodies. The MRDC recently
delivered two Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved drugs for
malaria prevention and treatment, respectively: Tafenoquine and
Artesunate. Tafenoquine can prevent malaria infection from all species
of malaria and is a new option for malaria prevention that will
increase in importance as resistance to standard of care therapies
grows. Artesunate is the only FDA-approved treatment for severe malaria
in the United States and is a critical capability to save lives.
unfunded requirements lists
32. Senator Wicker. Secretary Wormuth, the MATES' repair is a
National Guard priority that gets absorbed into the larger Army
Unfunded Requirements List. Secretary Wormuth, would providing separate
Unfunded Lists better communicate priorities specific to the Army and
the Army National Guard?
Secretary Wormuth. The Army National Guard (ARNG) currently
integrates UFR requests within a Total Army concept. This ensures the
ARNG UFRs nest with the Army's priorities of improving the quality of
life of our Soldiers and Families, modernizing our facilities and
equipment, and increasing readiness of the force.
afghanistan special immigrant visa (siv) program
33. Senator Wicker. Secretary Wormuth, as United States troops
continue to execute the withdrawal from Afghanistan, I am concerned
about the safety of our Afghan partners who assisted United States and
coalition forces in the country. The Special Immigrant Visa (SIV)
program provides a path for these individuals and their families, but
delays and quota limits may jeopardize the lives of these persons.
Secretary Wormuth, please describe what the Army is doing to ensure the
safety of our Afghan partners as we depart the country, both in support
of the SIV program and through other means.
Secretary Wormuth. The Army is fully integrated into Department of
Defense planning efforts that support the State Department and the
whole-of-government approach to ensuring the safety of our Afghan
partners as military operations come to a close in Afghanistan. To that
end, the Army has established a specific team to assist with prudent
planning efforts.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
fort bragg military construction
34. Senator Tillis. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, as
you are aware, the Immediate Response Forces (IFR) is the Nation's
rapid response force, which is comprised of paratroopers from one of
the 82nd Airborne Division's brigade combat teams and should be able to
rapidly deploy within 18 hours. For the first time since 1989, the
response force received rapid deployment orders on New Year's Eve 2019,
following the Iran-supported Hezbollah militia attacks on the American
embassy in Iraq. However, as paratroopers prepared for the deployment,
they spent most of the day traveling across Fort Bragg from location to
location gathering equipment instead of spending their limited time on
briefings or preparing for the mission. Compounding this issue is that
conventional forces at Fort Bragg have only been supported with a
single MILCON project since 2010, compared to the numerous MILCON
projects that have supported special operations units at the same base.
It is irresponsible of Congress, and I would argue of the Army, to
require the IFR to perform its duties if we are not going to provide
the necessary support facilities to ensure mission success and soldier
safety. While it is currently not on the unfunded priority list, do I
have your commitment that you will support our IFR warfighters by
placing their request for a strategic deployment complex and a tactical
equipment maintenance facility on this year's list of unfunded
priorities?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. At this time, the
Strategic Deployment Complex and the Tactical Equipment Maintenance
Facility projects lack sufficient design status. As a result, they do
not meet the 35 percent-design threshold required for inclusion in the
fiscal year 2022 CSA MILCON unfinanced requirement (UFR) list. These
projects are expected to meet the design threshold to compete in a
later budget cycle.
35. Senator Tillis. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville,
taking it a step further, if the IFR is essential to the Department's
ability to rapidly support America's national security in emergent
crises, why is it not part of the Army's requested budget? If it is not
essential, as it would appear based on the budget and unfunded priority
list, why have it?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Immediate Response
Force (IRF) is essential to the Department's ability to rapidly ensure
America's national security in emergent crises. The Army continues to
develop Military Construction, Restoration, and Modernization projects
to improve the efficiency of deployment operations in support of the
IRF, while taking into account the Army's facility requirements
worldwide to support unit readiness and Soldier quality of life.
future vertical lift
36. Senator Tillis. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, the
Army's Future Vertical Lift (FVL) modernization program consists of two
distinct aircraft, each designed to accomplish different missions in
the Army's future force. They are the Future Long Range Assault
Aircraft (FLRAA) program, designed to replace the Blackhawk and the
Future Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) designed to fill the void
left by the retirement of the Army's armed scout aircraft. The Army has
budgeted $181m between fiscal year 2019 and fiscal year 2021, and
Congress has added $185m during the same period. The Army suggests that
this program is its number 3 modernization initiative (out of 6) and
the total funding is between number 5 and 6 in total dollars over the
FYDP. Additionally, the Army has awarded two competitive prototypes for
each variant, both to Bell Helicopter and LM/Sikorsky. The Future
Vertical Lift program is considered the furthest along of all the
projects under the CFTs, and Futures Command. The FLRAA program, in
particular, is the one major program that is actually flying. This is
not a ``paper'' program, and thus represents the ``Poster Child'' for a
successful acquisition program coming out of Futures Command. The
existing vertical lift fleet, according to CSIS, lacks the necessary
speed, range, endurance, survivability, and lethality to compete in the
Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) environment. The U.S. Army FVL program
seeks to modernize the vertical lift fleet by delivering the most
modern, versatile, and lethal power projection platform to insure
success on the modern battlefield. There have been recent articles in
the press (believed to be pushed by those opposing FVL) which have been
critical for the Army's requirement for speed. The Army has pushed back
aggressively citing the need for speed and range to increase lethality
and allow the Army to achieve a more lethal force in the Great Power
Competition, and Indo-Pacific Theater. General McConville, the Army has
consistently discussed the need for speed and range, as well as
survivability when it comes to the future vertical lift aircraft. Could
you explain to this Committee why speed and range are so critical to
the Future Long Range Assault Aircraft and how this new technology will
allow the Army to leverage FLRAA as a power projection platform?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. FLRAA is the next
generation of affordable vertical lift, including both assault and
intra-theater aeromedical evacuation (MEDEVAC) aircraft. It will be
both effective and decisive in the lower tier of the air domain.
The fundamental capability of FLRAA is its reach and the power
projection it provides in the increasingly dangerous and complex multi-
domain operations environment. FLRAA will compel enemy forces to
respond to multiple dilemmas with its ability to move and converge
ground forces through decentralized operations over extended distances.
FLRAA will expand the reach of ground forces to conduct air assault
missions across the battlespace, reducing enemy reaction time and
freedom of action.
Importantly. FRLAA will remain survivable with the use of Air
Launched Effects (ALE) and integration with other maneuver forces and
long-range fires, all enabled by the network. Additionally, the cost
per effect for FLRAA to insert two infantry battalions in one period of
darkness is comparable to the cost of twice as many UH-60s to achieve
the same effect.
37. Senator Tillis. General McConville, how will this capability
assist the Army with its strategy in the Indo-Pacific Theater and in
the Great Power Competition?
General McConville. The Future Vertical Lift (FVL) ecosystem is
poised to provide Multi-Doman capabilities for Joint Force threat
penetration at the outset of large-scale conflict using
transformational speed, range, and the ability to converge Army and
Joint sensors and shooters to enable decision dominance. In addition,
FVL will provide overmatch capability and capacity to out-tempo the
enemy at all Army echelons to win the close fight.
China's investment in creating a dense network of anti-access/area-
denial (A2/AD) capabilities throughout the Pacific island chains
presents a complex problem. It inhibits U.S. power projection, erodes
joint freedom of maneuver, and ultimately diminishes credible
deterrence.
Dominating in the lower tier of the air domain, the FVL ecosystem
provides a unique advantage against A2/AD systems, such as Integrated
Air Defense Systems (IADS), enemy long-range fires, and threat command
and control systems. Hidden by surface clutter while operating at lower
altitudes, FVL outmatches radar and observation with the standoff and
swarming capability of its Air Launched Effects (ALE) with Electronic
Warfare (EW) and lethal strike capabilities. Joint force aircraft and
follow-on maneuver forces can exploit this penetration to destroy other
critical targets once FVL destroys or neutralizes the IADS barrier.
38. Senator Tillis. General McConville, is the Future Vertical Lift
program fully resourced, across the FYDP for both the FLRAA and FARA
programs, both Research and Development funding and Procurement
funding? What are the amounts of funding, through the FYDP? And in
which year will Congress see funding requested for procurement dollars?
General McConville. We do not yet know how much funding will be
allocated to the Army each year beyond fiscal year 2022, so we are not
able to state that both FLRAA and FARA are fully resourced across the
FYDP. Fiscal year 2030 remains our target for equipping the first unit.
Both the FARA and FLRAA programs are actively utilizing in-process
feedback from our industry partners to inform data driven discussion,
government cost models, and decisions on future resourcing
requirements.
The FARA and FLRAA analyses, demonstrations and risk reduction, and
prototyping efforts will help us ensure informed future budgets; we are
committed to keeping Congress informed on these efforts at each
juncture. Procurement requirements will align to support the Army's
First Unit Equipped target of fiscal year 2030 and will be informed by
the vendors' performance through developmental test activities.
short-range reconnaissance program
39. Senator Tillis. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, it is
my understanding that the Army's Short-Range Reconnaissance program was
the driver behind the development of the ``Blue Small Unmanned Aircraft
Systems.'' Am I correct in the assumption that the five Blue drones
that have undergone a down-select for consideration are 100 percent
made in the USA?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army's RQ-28A Short
Range Reconnaissance (SRR) program is separate and distinct from Blue
Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Blue sUAS) managed by the Defense
Innovation Unit (DIU). The Army's SRR program provided access to Army
contracts that were utilized by DIU to evaluate the first batch of the
Blue sUAS aircraft. Specifically for SRR, the RQ-28A is not
manufactured completely in the United States. However, it is compliant
with Section 848 of the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization
Act, which restricts all Department of Defense UAS critical components
from being manufactured in specific countries.
army ground vehicles
40. Senator Tillis. Secretary Wormuth, during the hearing General
McConville clearly identified the need to modernize and transform the
Army for any future fight against a strategic peer competitor like
China and stated that ``most of the weapon systems we're using are 1980
vintage''. Regarding the Army's acquisition strategy for the Joint
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program, which the Army plans to
recomplete as a ``build to print'' competition and is the only tactical
wheeled vehicle competition planned through 2028, I'm concerned about
whether this current ``build to print'' strategy is setting the right
conditions for modernization of the Army's TWV fleets, specifically the
JLTV program, which is currently planned to be in the fleet through
2040. What other alternative acquisition strategies have you considered
as part of the JLTV competitive acquisition strategy to ensure the JLTV
remains relevant and not effectively buying more of the same capability
that is technically better designed for the previous conflicts in Iraq
and Afghanistan?
Secretary Wormuth. The Army conducted research and considered
multiple strategies, which focused on how much industry would be asked
to invest and the capabilities, risk, and the life cycle cost
implications of these decisions. The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
(JLTV) acquisition strategy was selected to leverage an already capable
platform, and through focused design upgrades and competition, it
brings new capabilities to Soldiers and Marines. The JLTV Follow-On
Contract is based upon a new variant of the family of vehicles, which
includes several technology insertions in the areas of powertrain,
electrical architecture, noise reduction, and stowage. The pending
competition also includes significant incentives for competitors to
propose additional technology enhancements in the areas of fuel
efficiency, corrosion, upgrade of vehicle architecture, and driver
assist capabilities, while keeping the cost of the JLTV affordable.
These technology advances on a proven system, which currently has
growth and modularity capability in weight, power, and available kits,
make the JLTV the optimal platform for the light tactical vehicle
mission in a Multi-Domain Operational environment.
41. Senator Tillis. Secretary Wormuth, the Army's infantry squad
vehicle (ISV) is planned to enter full rate production in September and
despite this being a new capability to address an operational need for
infantry brigade combat teams for enhanced tactical mobility the
program had its funding reduced by 10 percent in the fiscal year 2022
budget request, effectively keeping production rates well below minimum
sustaining rates of production. Recognizing the budget request was
submitted without a future year's defense program, could you provide us
with more insight into the long term acquisition strategy for the ISV
program to include whether the Army plans to procure the authorized
objective of 2,065? It's my understanding the Army is currently
reviewing the light tactical vehicle fleet mix for infantry brigade
combat teams to include JLTV, HMMWVs, and ISVs. What is the status of
this review and when can we expect to see details?
Secretary Wormuth. The plan for the Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV)
was to procure 11 Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) sets, or 649
vehicles, with funding ending in fiscal year 2024. The Tactical Wheeled
Vehicle Study is ongoing, and it will inform the right mix of light
tactical vehicles in the IBCT. That study will inform Army decisions on
future procurement of light tactical vehicles for the IBCT and the Army
expects to have the results later this year.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
cold-weather all-terrain vehicle
42. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, the
Cold-Weather, All-Terrain Vehicle (CATV) is not on the Army's ``31 plus
4'' modernization list. As I understand it, two firms were recently
selected to build CATV prototypes that would replace the obsolete Small
Unit Support Vehicles, which enable mobility for Arctic operations. Can
you provide an update on this program, including when it will achieve
initial operational capability?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Cold Weather All-
Terrain Vehicle (CATV) program awarded Other Transaction Authority
agreements to two vendors in April 2021 for the prototype phase. Each
vendor delivered two vehicles in June 2021. The Army will perform
testing of the vehicles at Cold Regions Testing Center, FT Greely, AK.
Successful completion of the testing of these prototypes will determine
eligibility to compete for a production contract.
A production award is targeted for the fourth quarter of fiscal
year 2022, with the first unit equipped with five vehicles in the
fourth quarter of fiscal year 2023 to United States Army Northern
Warfare Training Center, FT Wainwright, AK. At this point, the Army
intends to protect programmed funding for this important modernization
effort, as it is necessary to divest the Small Unit Support Vehicles
(SUSV), which are reaching obsolescence.
arctic brigade combat teams
43. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, the
Army Arctic strategy calls for the transformation of the Alaskan-based
BCTs into Arctic BCTs to ``recapture our cold-weather dominance.'' Part
of my understanding of this transformation is that it requires a shift
away from Infantry Carrier Vehicles, or Strykers, to a vehicle that
provides better mobility in Arctic terrain. What is the status of the
Army's transformation effort?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army is finalizing
options and timelines to transform the Alaska-based Stryker Brigade
Combat Team (SBCT) into a more arctic-capable formation. We expect to
announce the options being assessed in early fiscal year 2022. Ground
mobility requirements in arctic terrain could be provided by the Cold
Weather All-Terrain Vehicle (CATV). The CATV will replace the aging
Small Unit Support Vehicle (SUSV). The CATV program is in the prototype
phase, with vehicles from two vendors conducting testing at the Cold
Regions Testing Center at Fort Greely, Alaska. Our current timelines
project a production award by the end of fiscal year 2022, and first
unit equipped by the end of fiscal year 2023.
44. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville,
what is the timeline for 1-25 and 4-25 BCTs to convert to Arctic BCTs?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army is reviewing
options for the conversion of force structure to Arctic-capable
formations. Once approved, those conversions will follow the Total Army
Analysis (TAA) timeline with announcements typically in the first
quarter of the fiscal year. The decision will be followed with a
synchronization of resources (personnel, training, and equipment)
required for the conversions.
arctic multi-domain task force
45. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, it
is my understanding that the Army will create an Arctic Multi-Domain
Task Force (MDTF) in Alaska. It will consist of several units currently
assigned to 1-25 and 4-25 in addition to newly assigned units. Which
long-range precision fires systems will this unit field and will they
undergo Arctic testing before fielding?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army is currently
exploring options for different capabilities to place within the
planned MDTFs depending on location and mission. The options are being
validated through testing and experimentation, which will inform the
types of long-range fire precision systems the Army will station in
MDTFs both within the continental United States and outside the
continental United States.
46. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, it
is my understanding that the Arctic MDTF will include long-range
precision fires that the Army wants to operate along Alaska's vast
coastline for extended periods of time to create anti-access/area
denial networks. Is the Army considering how civilian and military
infrastructure will impact Arctic Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF)
operations along Alaska's coastline?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army is exploring
multiple force structure options to support the newly published Arctic
Strategy. As those options are developed, we will consider the impacts
from civilian and military infrastructure.
army multi-domain transformation
47. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, the
``Army Multi-Domain Transformation'' document calls for long-range,
land-based missiles on West Pacific islands to threaten targets deep
within China's Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) defenses. That document
also emphasizes the Army's role as an inside force, operating within
adversary A2/AD networks. The fiscal year 2022 budget indicates the
Army either failed to establish a compelling narrative about its
usefulness in the Pacific or the Department of Defense did not find the
Army's INDOPACOM plans credible. If defense budget cuts continue, how
will the Army modernize to deter and defeat potential peer or near-peer
adversaries while simultaneously maintaining readiness levels for
inside forces?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Faced with potential
downward budgetary pressure, the Army must strike a difficult balance
between meeting the demands of current operations while preparing for
the future. To accomplish this, the Army can and will achieve the
balance between People, Readiness, and Modernization needed to field
the future force. We will use the Regionally Aligned Readiness and
Modernization Model (ReARMM) to align units regionally to meet current
Joint Force demand while preparing the force for the future. We must
satisfy operational demand while modernizing for pacing and emergent
threats. Detailed modeling and simulation has shown us that we must
modernize or risk defeat in the future against near peer adversaries.
We have cut our legacy and enduring programs significantly in order to
fund our Modernization Priorities, accepting as much risk as possible
in those programs. Future budget reductions will likely cause the Army
to reduce funding to our top six Army modernization priorities to
protect our People First initiatives and to protect Readiness. The Army
will pursue a resourcing strategy, which is fully aligned with the
national security strategic guidance, and we will provide the very best
Army we can within our budget.
To do this, we must sustain the readiness that we have worked so
hard to rebuild over the past several years, while reprioritizing
funding to invest in critical capabilities. Long Range Precision Fires
(LRPF) remains the Army's number one modernization priority. LRPF is
absolutely critical to defeating China's Anti-Access/Areal Denial
capability. To deter and win, we must also be capable and prepared for
the close fight with capabilities such as Future Vertical Lift and the
best equipped Soldiers in the world. The Joint Force and INDOPACOM have
asked for, and will depend on, Army LRPF in support of their
operational plans, along with other capabilities such as logistics,
intelligence and prepositions stocks.
anti-ship missiles
48. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, the
``Army Multi-Domain Transformation'' document calls for long-range,
land-based missiles on West Pacific islands to threaten targets deep
within China's Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) defenses. If these
capabilities include anti-ship missiles, how is the Army coordinating
with the Navy and Marine Corps to execute sea denial missions?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army's on-going
coordination with the USN and USMC includes training, capability
development, and mission planning. The Army coordinates for Soldier
training on
USN weapon systems in support of the Long Range Fires Battalions.
This training includes firing procedures, command and control, and
missile handling.
Army coordination with the USMC includes USN weapons training,
sharing weapon capability development, and refining digital C2 and
communications common to both services. Additionally, the Army and USMC
hold a semi-annual programmatic Army/Marine Corps Board that focuses on
capability development within the long range fires portfolio to ensure
we were maximizing resources and reducing redundancies.
air defense
49. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, how
is the Army coordinating with the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force to
deploy integrated air defense capabilities to protect the Joint Force
from China and Russia's prodigious land-attack and anti-ship missile
arsenals?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Integrated Air and
Missile Defense (IAMD) is an inherently joint mission, which requires a
number of offensive and defensive capabilities from all services to
effectively protect the Joint Force and enable our freedom of action.
At the theater level, the Army directly supports Regional Combatant
Commanders in carrying out their responsibility to synchronize and
coordinate the planning, resourcing, and execution of IAMD operations
with other sister-service elements. The Army does this through its
regionally aligned Army Air and Missile Defense Commands (AAMDC).
Specific to China and Russia, the 94th AAMDC is located in, and
supports, the INDOPACOM theater and the 10th AAMDC is located in, and
supports, the European theater. Additionally, the 32nd AAMDC is
stationed in Texas, but it maintains a forward deployed element in
support of CENTCOM's IAMD operations. The 263rd AAMDC is located in
South Carolina and directly supports NORTHCOM and the homeland IAMD
mission.
In addition to this operationally focused support to the Combatant
Commanders, the Army provides strategic IAMD planning and coordination
support in collaboration with our sister-services. Specifically, the
Army is directly involved in IAMD planning, which includes past and
current missile defense reviews, multi-service strategies for air base
defense against missile threats, the defense of Guam, and the
development of joint service IAMD doctrine, as well as multi-service
IAMD tactics, techniques, and procedures.
The Army's highest AMD modernization priority is the Integrated Air
and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS). IBCS will provide the
Army with the necessary mission command network to integrate not only
the Army's IAMD system, but also the other Service's IAMD capabilities
to enable more efficient and effective target detection and
prosecution. IBCS IAMD interoperability with the Joint Services is a
key component of the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2)
experiments Project Convergence 21, the Orange Flag demonstration
series, and other JADC2 events.
logistics
50. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, if
competition with China turns into conflict, how is the Army planning to
move its inside forces within Chinese A2/AD networks?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army and the Joint
Force must successfully maneuver across all domains inside the first
island chain to win critical first battles in a conflict with the
People's Republic of China (PRC). In competition, Army forces postured
inside the first island chain are well within the PRC's Anti-Access/
Area Denial (A2/AD) and long-range fires zones. Army Forces are key to
enabling distributed networks and protecting the Joint Force during
crisis and conflict through Integrated Air and Missile Defense and
other means. Army forces, distributed and dispersed across the region,
pose multiple dilemmas to the PRC. Distributed Army forces also provide
options to the Joint Force Commander to increase the speed of decision
making and the physical range of when and where to apply military force
across the theater.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
ammunition facilities
51. Senator Blackburn. General McConville, what specific resources
or authorities will it require to fully modernize Holston Army
Ammunition Plant so that its outdated infrastructure no longer
represents a single point of failure in the defense enterprise?
General McConville. The Army is currently developing its resourcing
strategy beyond fiscal year 2022 as part of a holistic 15-year Organic
Industrial Base (OIB) Modernization Strategy that will encompass its 23
government-owned and government-operated (GOGO) and government-owned
and contractor-operated (GOCO) depots, arsenals, and ammunition
facilities. We anticipate the initial results of our analysis to be
available next year.
This strategy is critical to preparing the OIB to support multi-
domain operations in large scale combat operations, and it will inform
the fiscal year 2023 budget request to include the necessary
infrastructure investments required to modernize Holston Army
Ammunition Plant over the Future Years Defense Plan FYDP. In fiscal
year 2020 and fiscal year 2021, the Army received approximately $600
million to continue safety improvements, RDX expansion, infrastructure
upgrades, environmental improvements, and cybersecurity solutions.
Continuing to modernize Holston will reduce the likelihood of
production interruptions or catastrophic failures, and improve worker
safety.
army end strength
52. Senator Blackburn. General McConville, the Army's fiscal year
2022 end strength proposal reduces the collective force by
approximately 1,700 Soldiers. What are your primary concerns looking at
the operational commitments you are simultaneously being asked to
source?
General McConville. My primary concerns are operational tempo
(dwell and deployment) on our Soldiers and units as well as having the
necessary structure to stand up new organizations like the Multi-Domain
Task Forces (MDTF).
53. Senator Blackburn. General McConville, what sort of unforeseen
impacts and risk associated with end strength reduction are you trying
to anticipate? (i.e. safety, retention, family stress, and force
preservation issues)
General McConville. End strength reductions will limit the Army's
ability to meet unforecasted requirements, while maintaining
modernization timelines, planned rotational deployments, and
reorganizing for multi-domain and large scale combat after two decades
of war against Violent Extremist
Organizations (VEO's). In fiscal year 2021, the Army responded to
multiple unforecasted requirements to include hurricane recovery,
wildfires, the treatment of COVID patients and administration of COVID
vaccines, the security of the Southwest border, efforts to counter
Iranian aggression, the support of civilian law enforcement in the
National Capital Region, and the support of the Afghanistan retrograde.
We reasonably expect fiscal year 2022 unforecasted emergent
requirements to remain commensurate with fiscal year 2021. Reduced Army
end strength limits our capacity to respond to emergencies while
transforming without trading critical aspects of modernization or other
planned activities in support of the Combatant Commands.
future capabilities
54. Senator Blackburn. General McConville, in October 2019 you
affirmed your support for Admiral Davidson's request for two Multi-
Domain Task Forces (MDTFs) in INDOPACOM. Is that still a priority, and
if so, how long do you anticipate it will take to source Admiral
Aquilino with the additional MDTF he needs?
General McConville. The Army continues reviewing options for
additional MDTFs beyond the second deployment recently announced for
Europe; these options include added support for USINDOPACOM. The third
MDTF, if we can resource it, is earmarked for the Pacific region. We
are working with INDOPACOM and U.S. Army Pacific to determine location
and timing; however, given competing demands and available force
structure, the Army has not yet made those decisions. If we do, we
anticipate having the ability to activate an additional MDTF as early
as fiscal year 2023.
55. Senator Blackburn. General McConville, would a higher topline
increase the speed at which you could resource and deploy the
additional MDTF to INDOPACOM?
General McConville. A topline increase in fiscal year 2022 could
enable the Army to increase the speed at which we resource and deploy
the MDTF to an extent. Resourcing the MDTF is the number one priority
on the Army's Unfunded Requirements List for fiscal year 2022. Funding
the $2.5 million unfunded requirement would allow the MDTF to take full
advantage of advances in digital warfare, autonomous robotics, and
artificial intelligence to maintain digital overmatch against near-peer
adversaries and non-state actors by shortening kill chains, providing a
persistent capability, and enabling freedom of maneuver. It would
provide the MDTF the ability to securely deploy computing resources on-
demand to networked users around the globe.
Additional topline resourcing would not likely increase the speed
at which we are developing other capabilities critical to the MDTF,
such as Long Range Hypersonic Weapons, the Mid-Range Capability or the
Precision Strike Missile, nor would it increase the speed at which we
can build and train on them.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
army housing at fort leonard wood
56. Senator Hawley. General McConville, one of our priorities in
Missouri is ensuring that all of our servicemembers enjoy the best
quality of life possible. One of the challenges we're facing is that
many of the homes at Fort Leonard Wood in Missouri were built in the
1960s and are long overdue for replacement. What is the Army doing to
facilitate replacements for these homes, so we can ensure all
servicemembers in Missouri can continue to enjoy the highest standards
of living?
General McConville. The Army's number one priority is our people,
and we are committed to providing a quality of life that allows
Soldiers and their Families to thrive. Privatization of the family
housing at Fort Leonard Wood occurred in March 2005; Balfour Beatty
Communities (BBC) is the Managing Member of the Fort Leonard Wood
privatized housing company. Sharing your concern about the age of the
housing inventory, the Army has conceptually approved BBC's five-year
development plan for Fort Leonard Wood that includes the demolition and
replacement with new construction of 59 legacy (built in 1957-1962)
family housing units using existing project funds. In addition, the
Army is supporting BBC's endeavor to obtain additional private sector
financing to fund additional new development at top priority locations,
including Fort Leonard Wood. The additional financing is anticipated in
Fall 2021. These additional funds are expected to fund the demolition
of more legacy housing units and their replacement with new
construction housing in numbers that are still being determined at Fort
Leonard Wood and other top priority locations.
army's role in the indo-pacific theater
57. Senator Hawley. General McConville, combat-credible forward
postured forces in the Indo-Pacific are critical to deterring Chinese
aggression. How do you see the posture investments requested in
INDOPACOM's 1251 report supporting the Army's efforts to bolster its
own forward deterrent posture in the Pacific?
General McConville. The Army is focused on improving and expanding
our rotational force posture inside the first island chain to deter
People's Republic of China (PRC) military aggression by denying their
ability to conduct military operations at will. Improved posture will
result in a stronger deterrent capability, which will also support a
rapid transition to crisis or conflict. Our posture investments are in
support of the Joint Force and aligned with United States Indo-Pacific
Command's (USINDOPACOM's) 1251 Report.
As an example, USINDOPACOM's request of land-based anti-ship
capabilities will increase conventional deterrence of the PRC. The
Army's additional posture priorities within the first and second island
chains support this requirement and seek to establish a forward Joint
and Combined defense in depth. The Army's dispersed and innovative
posture efforts provide support in accordance with the USINDOPACOM 1251
Report, and we will continue to pursue a forward deterrent posture as
opportunities arise through continuous engagement.
58. Senator Hawley. General McConville, how does the Army plan to
use partnership-building exercises such as Pacific Defender and Pacific
Pathways to strengthen our relationships and access across the Indo-
Pacific region, and how are you thinking about building on these
initiatives in the future?
General McConville. Partnership-building exercises strengthen
relationships, increase interoperability, and contribute to a Land
Power Network for collective defense and security. Through exercises,
operations, and activities, the Army expands access, presence, and
influence that contribute to the development of lasting cooperation and
codified agreements.
These agreements serve several functions. First, they demonstrate
the steadfast commitment of the U.S. to a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Second, they allow the United States to actively compete in the region
during peacetime, countering People's Republic of China (PRC) malign
activities and coercion. Third, they enable incremental progress toward
long-term agreements that guarantee U.S. access to key terrain during
crisis and contingency. For additional context, in fiscal year 2022 and
beyond, ``Indo-Pacific Pathways'' is the new name that replaces
``Pacific Defender'' and ``Pacific Pathways.''
59. Senator Hawley. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville,
President Biden said all United States Forces will be withdrawn from
Afghanistan by September 1st. How will our departure from Afghanistan
help the Army refocus attention and resources on the Indo-Pacific and
China, in particular?
Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army will remain
committed to supporting the security of the United States Embassy in
Kabul. Reduced operational demands will allow the Army to focus on a
number of ongoing efforts to include Army force modernization
initiatives and improvements to force readiness to better compete with
China. This reduction will also increase the forces available for
employment in the Indo-Pacific to compete against China or to shape an
emergent crisis.
60. Senator Hawley. General McConville, the Army deploys an armor
brigade to Europe every year to help deter Russian aggression. Outside
of units already assigned to conduct partner exercises, should the Army
consider deploying a Brigade Combat Team to the Indo-Pacific theater in
the same fashion as EUCOM?
General McConville. With the existing Army Immediate Response Force
(IRF) construct as part of the Joint Contingency Response Force (CRF),
there is potential for the Dynamic Force Employment of Army
capabilities through Indo-Pacific Pathways. Like in Europe, a short
episodic presence would reassure allies and demonstrate the ability to
project power at a time and place of our choosing. It would also
provide the Army opportunities to learn from deploying a large Army
element into a contested archipelagic environment, which would be very
different from the past 20 years of deploying large Army forces into a
continental, largely uncontested environment. For context, since 2015,
the Army has deployed a Brigade Combat Team to South Korea annually.
61. Senator Hawley. General McConville, what message do you believe
this would send the Chinese and our allies and partners in the region?
General McConville. Deployment of a large ground combat force into
the region would send a clear signal of U.S. resolve to ensure a free
and open Indo-Pacific, as well as a willingness to defend our own
interests and those of our allies and partners.
sexual assault response coordinators
62. Senator Hawley. General McConville, Sexual Assault Response
Coordinators are the first-line responders that victims of military
sexual assault rely on for medical, legal, and other support. But the
Fort Hood Independent Review Committee found that these professionals
often lack the staffing, resources, and training they need not only to
be effective for victims, but also to support one another and take care
of themselves. Do you think improving recruitment, retention,
education, and support for SARCs would help them to be as effective as
possible?
General McConville. The Army's Sexual Harassment/Assault Response
and Prevention (SHARP) program includes 630 full-time Brigade-level/
equivalent and installation SHARP professionals, 50 SHARP Program
Managers, and four Assistant Program Managers across the Army
enterprise. These professionals are some of the most highly-trained
advocates in the Department of Defense. The Army has continued to make
improvements to their recruitment, training, education, and support.
In terms of training and education, all full-time Army Sexual
Assault Response Coordinators (SARCs) and Victim Advocates (VAs) must
attend a 6-week resident SARC/VA Career Course at the U.S. Army SHARP
Academy at Fort Leavenworth, KS. The Army SHARP Academy curriculum
exceeds the minimum training requirement for victim advocacy set by the
National Organization for Victim Assistance (NOVA) and fully prepares
the SARCs and VAs for their roles and responsibilities. The curriculum
includes competency-based assessments and training on self-care, a
topic that is reinforced through continuous education and outreach
activities.
In order to enhance recruitment and retention of the most qualified
individuals to serve in these sensitive positions, the Army published
guidance in February of 2021 that included specific incentives for
military personnel serving in SARC or VA positions. In addition, the
Army is transitioning to a more centralized screening, selection, and
assignment process for military personnel in full-time SHARP positions.
This transition will enable improved benefits and career management
similar to military Equal Opportunity Advisors.
Lastly, understanding these positions are potentially high strain
and can result in vicarious trauma, the Army Resilience Directorate
offers website training for self-care to personnel in this field. This
training teaches personnel how to overcome some of these stresses they
are exposed to while advocating for a victim of sexual harassment or
sexual assault. In addition, during the annual Program Improvement
Forum, SHARP professionals are provided training with techniques to
better care for themselves, underscoring the importance of this
necessary practice in providing advocacy to others.
APPENDIX
ARMY FISCAL YEAR 2022 BUDGET OVERVIEW
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022 AND
THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 17, 2021
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
AIR FORCE POSTURE
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Manchin,
Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton,
Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Blackburn,
Hawley, and Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. The Committee meets today to receive
testimony on the plans and programs of the Department of the
Air Force in review of the fiscal year 2022 President's Defense
Budget Request.
I would like to welcome our witnesses, Mr. John Roth,
Acting Secretary of the Air Force; General Charles Brown, Chief
of Staff of the Air Force; and General John Raymond, Chief of
Space Operations. We are grateful to you for your service, and
the service of all the men and women of the Air Force and Space
Force, and to their families for their continued support.
I want to note that is the first appearance of both General
Brown and General Raymond at an Air Force posture hearing. We
all look forward to working with you as leaders of the Air
Force and the Space Force.
President Biden's defense budget request for fiscal year
2022 includes approximately $173.3 billion in funding for the
Department of the Air Force, a 3.26 percent increase from the
fiscal year 2021 enacted budget. In preparing this budget
request, the Air Force faced difficult decisions in balancing
the need to modernize and keep technological advantage over
near-peer competitors against the need to support ongoing
operations around the world. The budget request before us tries
to maintain that balance by increasing funding to address
readiness concerns while also funding technologies for the
future fight and modernizing our strategic deterrent
capability.
This year, the Air Force is again proposing to retire and
realign a number of aircraft systems to free up resources for
implementing General Brown's strategic vision of ``Accelerate
Change or Lose.'' General Brown, I am interested in hearing
more this morning on the programs that have received increased
emphasis under your vision.
The budget request would also reduce or alter the force
structure for A-10's, F-16's, F-15's, C-130's, KC-135's, KC-
10's, Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System
(JSTARS) aircraft, and Global Hawk remotely piloted aircraft.
Any Air Force proposal of this sort deserves our careful
consideration. I hope the witnesses will provide the Committee
with the reasoning for the proposed retirements and
realignments within this budget request and assure us that any
decisions are well thought-out. I also recognize that Congress
has made divestment decisions difficult at times.
I am also interested in hearing about your continued
efforts to improve shortfalls within the remotely piloted
aircraft operator community, and how the Air Force has
addressed shortfalls within the larger pilot community and
maintenance personnel.
One of the primary reasons Congress established the Space
Force was to consolidate the numerous space activities in the
Department of Defense (DOD). General Raymond, this is your
first posture hearing, but you are a familiar face to this
Committee. I would like to know how you are growing the Space
Force and normalizing operations within the larger Department
of Defense, including progress on the merging of the Space
Development Agency into the Space Force by October 1, 2022.
With regard to space warfighting capabilities, I will also want
to know how you are progressing in your role as the lead force
design architect for the Defense Department's satellite
constellations.
Finally, now that the Space Force is standing up, it is
important to present a trained force with material capabilities
to the combatant commands. One of the capabilities for the
combatant commands now under discussion is tactical space
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). This is a
new operating domain for DOD, and I would ask the witnesses to
discuss what resources they believe are needed to ensure its
success.
Acting Secretary Roth, General Brown, and General Raymond,
thank you again for appearing before our Committee and I look
forward to your testimony.
Now let me turn to the Ranking Member, Senator Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Ross,
General Brown, and General Raymond, thank you for being here
today and for all of your work.
The current National Defense Strategy directs our Nation's
military to be prepared to deter and, if necessary, defeat our
peer adversaries, including Russia and China. For the Air Force
and the Space Force to meet that requirement they have got to
properly man and train and equip to win both air and space.
Given this budget, I fear this is going to be a very difficult,
if not an impossible thing to do. I think we are going to have
to improve upon this budget.
At the end of the Obama administration, the Air Force was
at a historic low in readiness and size. Less than 10 percent
of combat squadrons were ready to deploy, and even fewer were
prepared for a peer fight.
We began to improve readiness over the past 4 years and
started to really get after the modernization concern that we
all have, and I am concerned that with this year's budget it
does not look like we are going to have the resources to get
these things done.
In previous administrations--and I am talking about
Barrett, Wilson, Goldfein--the Air Force leadership, they had
told us that the Department of the Air Force was too small, too
old to do what the Nation asked to have done. Almost half of
our aircraft fleet is beyond its service life. Our satellite
programs were built for peacetime. Now that was all from the
previous administration.
China and Russia--just this last week we had General
Milley, who said that China and Russia combined are already
spending more to modernize their force than we do, and it
shows. China will have more stealth fighters than we will in
the Western Pacific by 2025. So we are getting reports now that
do not look good at all.
All the independent studies show that the Air Force needs
to grow and modernize. This budget does not do either one.
Procurement actually decreases by almost 15 percent. We keep
divesting but we do not turn around and follow with
investments. Nearly all of these bad choices were caused by a
budget that cuts the defense instead of the achieved 3 to 5
percent we have been talking about now since 2018. It just does
not do that.
So our airmen, our space guardians deserve better than
that, and we look forward to getting our questions responded to
and to getting some ideas from the experts who are here today
as to how we are going to handle these shortfalls that we
believe we have.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe, and
again, gentlemen, welcome to the Committee. First let me thank
Secretary Roth for stepping into the breach and continuing to
move forward with the Department of the Air Force. Thank you
sir very much.
General Raymond, Congress created the Space Force in the
Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) with
the intent to consolidate space activities within the
Department of Defense. What role should the combatant commands
play in designing the elements of Space Force capability? What
contact or communication or coordination do you envision?
General Raymond. Yes, sir. We have a very close, as you
would expect, a very close partnership with the combatant
command. The combatant command is the joint requirements--they
come up with the joint requirements. Our job then is to
organize, train, and equip and provide capabilities to meet
those joint requirements. But the relationship that we enjoy
today is seamless.
Chairman Reed. Do you believe that the warfighter should
have the ability to set the force design or architecture of DOD
satellite constellations?
General Raymond. I think how we go about meeting those
requirements is a service function, and, in fact, that is one
of the reasons why I think we established the Space Force. This
Committee and other committees have long said that there were
65 different organizations that had a role in space
acquisition, and I think there are 30-something different
organizations that had a role in force design.
My view is that is one of the main reasons why we
established the Space Force, to drive unity of effort across
the Department. We work very closely to meet those joint
requirements, but the force design work is service business,
and we are already making great strides towards that end.
Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much, and not only is
my time expired but my timing has been off considerably.
Senator Inhofe. I did not say anything.
Chairman Reed. You gentlemen should have the privilege of
making your opening statements. So let me recognize the
Secretary for his opening statement, and then General Brown and
General Raymond. Apologies to all my colleagues.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN P. ROTH, ACTING SECRETARY OF
THE AIR FORCE
Mr. Roth. Thank you very much, Chairman Reed, Ranking
Member Inhofe, and the Members of the Committee. It is, in
fact, a pleasure to be here today.
I am also honored to have General Brown and General Raymond
join me in representing the nearly 700,000 airmen and guardians
that defend our Nation. We are thankful for your consistent and
persistent support over the years, which has enabled us build
the world's greatest air and space force.
As an integrated force, our airmen and guardians stand
ready, willing, and able to meet responsibilities to our Nation
and continue defending the high ground. From 300 feet to 300
miles off the ground, we protect the Homeland, we project
power, and we defend democracy.
The long-term strategic competition with China and Russia
demands we focus on the capabilities we need to invest in today
in order to win tomorrow. Our Nation's competitive strategic
advantage relies on air and space superiority, which is
underpinned by rapid technological advancement and the
extension of space as a warfighting domain.
In line with Secretary Austin's priorities to defend the
Nation, take care of our people, and succeed through teamwork,
our fiscal year 2022 budget is the beginning of a journey to
the air and space forces of 2030. It builds the capabilities
that allow the Department to modernize while continuing to meet
national security objectives and defend the high ground.
Specifically, we are committed to investing in: (1)
empowering airmen and guardians, (2) capability-focused
modernization, (3) connecting us to the Joint Force, and (4)
expanding partnerships.
First, our airmen and guardians remain the heart of our
ability to deter and, if necessary, defeat our competitors. We
are transforming our talent management systems to ensure we
develop and train leaders with the competence, character, and
skills required to win high-end fights, and we remain devoted
to recruiting and retaining a diverse corps of multi-capable,
innovative talent to outmaneuver our adversaries, today and in
the future.
We owe it to our force to provide them with the environment
where all can thrive. That is why we are directing critical
resources to rid our ranks of any corrosive elements and
injustices that degrade our ability to provide a lethal, ready
force.
Second, to remain the world's greatest Air and Space Force,
we must look to the future through a lens of capability-focused
modernization. Evidenced by nuclear modernization and the next-
generation air dominance platforms, our digital acquisition
approach revolutionizes how we design and field capabilities to
the warfighters. Moving forward, we will expand on these
digital revolutions while also investing in Next Generation
Space Systems that are resilient and defensive. Space is no
longer a benign domain. Our U.S. Space Force is purpose-built
to deter and protect free access to space.
Third, combatant commanders require an agile military that
operates seamlessly across all domains at both speed and scale.
That is why we continue to invest in capabilities like the
Advanced Battle Management System, our contribution to Joint,
All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2), which will connect
every sensor to every shooter across all domains.
Likewise, access to, and freedom of action in space is
central to connecting us to the Joint Force. In its second
year, the U.S. Space Force is laser-focused on integration.
Investments in space capabilities increase the effectiveness of
all operations across all domains. The result is a U.S.
military that is better connected, better informed, faster, and
more precise.
Finally, the U.S. Air and Space Forces do not fight alone.
We benefit from the expertise and capabilities of our sister
services and coalition forces as well as from a whole-of-
government, commercial industry, and academia. We will continue
to invest in enduring relationships while expanding new
partnerships to transform how we fight future wars.
Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting us to
testify. I look forward to your support and am confident that
with your help the Air and Space Forces will be armed with the
capabilities necessary to protect our Nation and defend the
high ground.
We welcome your questions, and I ask that this opening
statement be entered into the record.
Chairman Reed. Without objection, the opening statement
will be in the record.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Roth, General Brown,
and General Raymond follows:]
Prepared Statement by The Honorable John P. Roth, General Charles Q.
Brown, Jr., and General John W. Raymond
The Department of the Air Force
The Air and Space Forces unite under the Department of the Air
Force and are inextricably linked in defense of the crucial high
ground, integral to the stability of the global security landscape.
Under civilian leadership, the Department's nearly 700,000 airmen and
guardians provide independent and integrated options to national
leaders while defending democracy, an ideal that President Biden said,
``holds the key to freedom, prosperity, peace, and dignity.'' The
Department of the Air Force enhances the peaceful instruments of
diplomacy, sustains instruments of deterrence that check the spread of
conflict, and ensures credible consequences for aggression.
Today more than ever, we and our national security partners must be
bold. The challenges are many: the People's Republic of China, the
Russian Federation, contested domains old and new, the vulnerabilities
of proliferated technology and weapons, climate change, a global
pandemic and its aftermath, the accumulated results of past budget
priorities and decisions, and corrosive, difficult human issues like
extremism, sexual assault/harassment, suicide, and disparate treatment
of others. We must think and act differently. We no longer have the
luxury of time to evolve into what we need to be . . . we must harness
this unique moment together taking action to change. We simply cannot
maintain status quo.
Given China's exponential pace of weapons development and extensive
marshalling of government and industry, we do not have the leeway to
simply maintain our current approach. China is on track to exceed our
capacity, so it is our obligation to act with a sense of urgency. China
poses challenges unlike any other in our Nation's history. We must be
clear-eyed about these threats and our response to them. We recognize
the need for change AND must create the capacity for that change. We
must substantially improve our understanding of China and the Indo-
Pacific region and prioritize the threats accordingly. We cannot afford
to keep prioritizing near-term operational posture and today's force
structure at the expense of modernization and investment.
This Department is particularly suited for these challenges. We own
the high ground with air and space today, but it becomes more contested
every day. We cannot allow the erosion of our advantages in this
crucial high ground in competition now or in a future conflict. The
speed, reach, and responsiveness of the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Space
Force reinforce all instruments of national power and norms of
responsible behavior. We can see, sense, and strike targets near and
far, and provide global warning, networks, and independent options in
space. We provide global strike and effects that can hold any target at
risk within 24 hours--this is not conceptual or theoretical, it is
reality. Global strike requires a unique fusion of intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, logistics, access, and speed that only
the Air and Space Forces provide at a moment's notice. Our ability to
rapidly eliminate threats anywhere in the world is a consequence of our
inherent global persistence and reach, not necessarily dependent upon
pre-positioning or forward basing. We have been exceptional at this,
and until now we have also been unmatched.
The Department of the Air Force requires a modernized force that is
relevant today and long into the future. We are hard at work designing
our future force. We must invest in the cutting-edge technologies and
capabilities that are critical to securing our military advantage in
the future--this includes updating our two legs of the Nation's nuclear
triad, and our nuclear command, control, and communications systems.
Enabling our military advantage in the long term means we need to shift
away from legacy platforms and weapons systems that are decreasing in
relevance today and will be irrelevant in the future--our aircraft
fleet is 30 years old on average, and 44 percent are beyond their
designed service life. Maintaining our aging weapon systems is costly
now and, without change, will mortgage our future. We must also create
decision superiority by delivering information and capabilities to
decision makers at all echelons through a ``military internet of
things.'' A critical step includes accelerating command and control
infrastructure by investing in the Advanced Battle Management System
(ABMS)--a vital contribution by the Department of the Air Force to
Joint All-Domain Command and Control. We must methodically and
immediately move out on tough decisions in order to compete.
Similarly, we must revise the Space Force's force design to be
resilient against a significantly increasing threat. We must continue
to innovate, adapt and diversify capabilities to meet the threats that
challenge America's access and maneuverability in space and that of our
allies and partners. As we advance space defense, we must
simultaneously work with stakeholders across the Department of Defense,
the whole-of-government, our allies and partners, and commercial
industry to integrate and streamline spacepower efforts. Only then will
America be able to fully leverage what we have built over the last
year.
The Air Force and Space Force have been on the leading edge of
technology since their inception. By embracing novel authorities such
as middle-tier of acquisition authorities, and innovative approaches
such as agile software development, modular open systems approach, and
digital engineering, we will stay on the cutting edge. We intend to
capitalize on future investments in modeling and synthetic simulation
environments to ensure both joint warfighters and operational platforms
are ready.
As outlined in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, we
are ``committed to realizing and defending the democratic values at the
heart of the American way of life.'' Outpacing threats in tomorrow's
complex global security landscape requires innovative thinking and
modern investments. We recognize the need for change in order to
protect the American way of life. This budget lays out a plan to
modernize our military capabilities, and will allow U.S. diplomats to
negotiate from a position of strength.
empowered airmen and guardians
America's airmen and guardians conduct combat operations, channel
innovation, and conquer adversity around the globe all day, every day.
We know that airmen and guardians are our greatest and most precious
resource. While weapons systems and tactics inevitably change, our
airmen and guardians remain the core of our ability to deter and, if
necessary, defeat our competitors. We need multi-capable professionals
who bring diverse ideas, leverage digital tools, and outmaneuver and
out think our adversaries. Our airmen and guardians have committed to
service and taken oaths pledging their lives to the protection of our
Constitution. And while we are working to provide the best environment
possible as we recruit, train, retain, and leverage our strategic
advantage--our people.
As a Department, we are working to increase diversity and
inclusion, build and fortify resiliency, support our families, and
develop empowered airmen and guardians. We must ensure a culture of
dignity and respect. We must ensure our people have both high quality
of service and high quality of life. This starts with ensuring Air
Force and Space Force leaders represent the Nation and our Core Values.
Our Nation's defenders must be empowered, resilient, agile, innovative,
well-led and clear on how much they are valued.
Diversity
A diverse and inclusive force is a warfighting imperative. The
Department of the Air Force must attract, recruit, and retain talented
Americans from all backgrounds to leverage diverse ideas and
experiences. By harnessing airmen's and guardians' diverse experiences,
geographic and socioeconomic backgrounds, cultural knowledge, and
language abilities, we possess an asymmetric advantage over our
competitors.
To sustain our lethality and credibility, our force must be truly
inclusive and reflect the best of the diverse society we serve. This
includes removing barriers to service--from reviewing our accession and
assessment tools and career development, to expanding outreach to
underrepresented minorities through diversity recruiting and increasing
scholarships at minority-serving institutions. It will also include
modernizing how we develop airmen and guardians, transforming our
personnel and talent management systems, and championing a culture of
support and inclusion for all airmen, guardians, and their families.
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
Sexual assault is a crime that undermines force lethality,
readiness, and mission success. The Department of the Air Force is
committed to eradicating sexual assault using effective, research-based
prevention. These efforts utilize assessment tools to identify those at
high risk for unethical behavior, equip all leaders with information
and goals to reduce assault risk factors, educate the force on
intervention skills, and promote positive unit culture to eradicate
sexual assault. When sexual assault does occur, the Department is
dedicated to supporting victims and prosecuting those who would harm
others through the chain of command and Uniform Code of Military
Justice.
Suicide and Personal Violence Prevention
The prevention of suicide and interpersonal violence remains a
difficult challenge. To reduce the incidence of suicide, the Department
of the Air Force is undertaking a leadership-driven public-health
approach informed by data and analysis while partnering with academia,
industry, and our sister Services to include diverse ideas and
perspectives.
The Department of the Air Force is also committed to eliminating
interpersonal violence in any form. Domestic violence, child
maltreatment, workplace violence, and sexual assault negatively impact
victims, families, units, mission effectiveness, and the Department as
a whole. We are dedicated to a strategy that leverages the latest
science, implements best practices, and incorporates feedback from our
members. Should these acts of violence occur despite our prevention
efforts, we are committed to providing victims the necessary care and
holding perpetrators accountable.
Quality of Life
We owe our airmen and guardians the best quality of life possible.
We must continue work to improve all the professional and personal
aspects of life for each of our airmen and guardians, and their
families. It includes professional development, housing, child care
programs, healthcare, education, and spousal employment, among many
others. We are integrating the availability of quality housing, health
care, occupational licensing reciprocity, and school caliber into our
strategic basing criteria--ensuring our families have the best support
possible. The Department is committed to continuing these worthy
efforts. Our airmen and guardians deserve nothing less.
a department of the air force for 2030
As the Department of Air Force prepares to celebrate 75 years of
service to our great Nation, the Air Force is transforming itself to
address the challenges of near-peer adversaries while the newest branch
of the U.S. Armed Forces--the Space Force--is creating and integrating
a Service purposely built to compete, deter, and win in the space
domain. Both Services, and the entire Department of the Air Force, are
dedicated to protecting the Homeland and democracy around the globe. We
must modernize and integrate to meet the challenges posed by great
power competition, climate change, cybersecurity, fiscal constraints,
and worldwide pandemics. With Congress's support, we will maintain our
dominance of the high ground, and we will ensure the American way of
life for generations to come.
United States Air Force
vision for change--america's air force for 2030
America fights as a joint team, and the U.S. Air Force is the only
Service that can meet our Nation's adversaries with mass, speed,
agility and survivability on near-immediate timelines. The Air Force
sees, senses, and communicates globally. The Air Force monitors our
adversaries' movements, deploys forces en masse, deters competitors,
and strikes enemies without warning. No one else can do it. Without the
Air Force, the joint force loses. Only with a modernized and ready Air
Force is the joint team--and our Nation--secure.
The American Homeland is no longer a sanctuary. Our citizens face
threats from a variety of actors in both the physical and digital
arenas. Competitors, especially the China and Russia, continue
aggressive efforts to negate our long-standing warfighting advantages
while challenging America's interests and geopolitical position. While
the Nation was focused on countering violent extremist organizations,
great power competitors focused on the American way of war. They
studied, resourced, and introduced systems specifically designed to
defeat Air Force capabilities that have strengthened the joint force
for a generation. That is why the Air Force must accelerate change now,
so we can protect the American way of life in 2030 and for decades to
come. Simply put, if we do not change, we risk losing. We risk losing
in great power competition, we risk losing in a high-end fight, and we
risk losing quality airmen and families.
The President clearly stated that diplomacy is our primary means of
engaging with the world: it must be our first tool of choice. The
President likewise recognizes that our decisions and actions must come
from a position of strength. The Air Force offers safe, secure, and
effective nuclear deterrence, which strengthens national policies. It
is also important to recognize that air dominance is not an American
birthright. The Air Force is pivotal to deterring these aggressors and
bolstering our allies and partners. America remains committed to
freedom of the commons to support maintaining the rules-based
international order around the globe. Control of the air and enabling
domains ensures that the joint force has full freedom of maneuver.
The diversity of our airmen is both a tactical and strategic
advantage. We are committed to recruiting and retaining the best of
America. While the COVID-19 pandemic provided new challenges to our
force, we remain devoted to caring for airmen. Suicide and sexual
assault persist as challenges that we are tackling head-on. Likewise
family support programs are vital to our resiliency as a Service. A
diverse and inclusive Air Force helps us out-innovate adversaries today
and overcome challenges tomorrow. And, we know that each airman--Active
Duty, guard, reserve, and civilian, no matter their background--took an
oath to defend the Nation for all Americans.
Airmen in the near future are more likely to fight in highly-
contested environments. These complex, all-domain conflicts will result
in combat attrition rates and risks to the Homeland that are more akin
to World War II than the uncontested environments to which we have
become accustomed. Given our ability to project power from afar,
independent of forward access or lengthy prepositioning timelines,
Airmen will be the first to respond to many emerging crises. In any
scenario, the Air Force plays a unique and integral role to our
collective deterrence and joint warfighting credibility. We must
accelerate change to meet the challenges our Nation faces. This
requires a relevant, modern force based on cutting-edge capabilities
that will survive in future conflicts and shifting away from legacy
platforms that are increasingly irrelevant.
The Air Force is expected to provide enduring airpower capabilities
irrespective of the threat encountered, the technology utilized, or the
budget provided. The core missions of airpower--air superiority; global
strike; rapid global mobility; command and control; and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance--provide unequivocal advantage to the
joint force. Only the Air Force provides air superiority, global
strike, and rapid global mobility for the Nation. Without these
missions, the Homeland is unprotected and America cannot project power
around the globe. We are innovating and advancing our competencies with
innovative capabilities such as the Advanced Battle Management System,
which will increase commanders' decision advantage. Moreover, new
approaches to our core missions enhance the joint force and answer the
challenges posed by great power competitors.
The Air Force's future force design recognizes the need for change
and the range of threats to the Nation, our allies, and partners. In
2021, we identified three key capability development areas for
investment: connect the joint force, generate combat power, and conduct
logistics under attack. Moving forward we will prioritize the resources
that will allow us to continue to make investments in these areas, with
more to come. Additionally, the Air Force will prioritize within its
resources, affordable, analytically defensible, force structure and
system capability proposals. Through partnership with Congress, the Air
Force will prioritize resources to guard the foundations of national
freedom and independence for America and our allies.
air superiority
Combat power, regardless of Service, often depends on the Air
Force's ability to deliver air superiority. Our competitors have
fielded air forces, radar systems, and missiles that can attack our
territory, bases, forces, and allies and partners, or defend against
our military actions. Our job is to stop them through control of the
air. To do this, we build understanding of the air situation and then
use the right mix of capability and capacity to control the air while
creating windows of air superiority--no matter the threat. As we stay
ahead of our competitors, the Air Force needs flexible systems and
agile design processes to field new capabilities at speed.
Current platforms will not fully support tomorrow's demands. Airmen
are deliberately balancing today's readiness risk with capability
modernization. Remaining ahead of adversaries who are committed to
negating our technological edge requires investment in advanced
capabilities. Likewise, access to domestic airspace allows us to train
in realistic environments, which is essential to developing and
maintaining these advanced capabilities. Near-peer competitors are
challenging our capability to command the air. We must take action now
to ensure the joint force's success tomorrow.
Future Air Superiority Capability
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is the cornerstone of our future
fighter force and air superiority. Achieving air superiority in a
future fight is strongly dependent on full-spectrum dominance. The F-35
and its 5th-generation capabilities are part of our fighter force
design that outpaces key competitors. The Air Force is fully committed
to the F-35 and needs it to be capable, available, and affordable. As
we continue to receive the F-35 into the Air Force and increase our
capability, it is important to manage our F-35 fleet in an intelligent
and deliberate way to ensure we remain ready to deter adversaries,
support our international allies and partners, and meet our Nation's
security commitments worldwide.
The Air Force cannot successfully fight tomorrow's conflicts with
yesterday's weapons. Our adversaries recognize that full-spectrum
dominance is a national strength. As a direct result, competitors are
investing to overtake our current warfighting advantage in the air.
Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) ensures we maintain air
superiority in the future by introducing game-changing technology that
includes digital engineering, open mission systems architecture, and
agile software. NGAD is not a single platform--it is a capability
focused on fielding capabilities to mitigate identified capability
gaps, not on creating a ``next-generation'' aircraft. The capabilities
NGAD provides will ensure survivability, lethality, and persistence
while seamlessly integrating with the Advanced Battle Management System
via a mix of manned, unmanned, and even optionally-manned aircraft
along with advanced stand-off weapons.
We will complement NGAD and currently fielded 5th-generation
fighters such as the F-22 and F-35 with the F-15EX. Acquiring this re-
designed aircraft allows us to shore up our fighter force while driving
down sustainment costs, our fleet's average age, and inherent risk. By
leveraging our partners' investments in the F-15 platform, the Air
Force is efficiently fielding a familiar aircraft with proven tactics.
It also boasts an open mission software system, which allows us to
easily update the computer and avionics software.
global strike
Global strike is critical to our national power and an enduring
airpower capability. Regardless of the aircraft, weapon, or system
employed, we must maintain the capability to attack at a time and place
of our choosing. As China and Russia develop new weapons and defenses,
we must modernize and develop capabilities to maintain a competitive
advantage. Both nuclear and conventional strike must be integrated to
compete against these near-peer adversaries. Air Force strike
operations are precise, and these effects are delivered through
standoff capabilities as well as penetrating platforms.
Nuclear deterrence allows the Nation to negotiate from a position
of power. A credible, capable, and safe nuclear deterrent provides the
United States and our allies with an umbrella of protection while
discouraging the use of nuclear weapons by all nations. Likewise, a
strong nuclear strike capability deters conflict.
For precise, conventional attack capabilities to succeed, they must
be capable of penetrating highly-contested environments. To maintain
our advantage, the Air Force requires capabilities that incorporate
domain awareness, full-spectrum survivability, extended range, and
sufficient payload. It is vital that our capabilities keep pace as
threats evolve. By leveraging human-machine learning, the right mix of
manned and unmanned systems, and agile design processes, our global
strike capabilities will provide responsiveness, precision,
flexibility, connectedness, and integration across the joint force.
The United States Air Force has the unique ability to sense, see,
and strike any target, anywhere, at any time, nearly instantaneously,
from anywhere in the world. On a daily basis, one aspect of these
capabilities is on full display as our bomber task forces execute
training scenarios with our allies and partners. It is no secret that
potential adversaries closely monitor global activity--these maneuvers
make adversaries think twice about conducting malign activities while
reassuring our allies and partners.
The Air Force's global strike capabilities have the range, speed,
and flexibility required in a conflict and are far less as dependent on
pre-positioning or forward-basing. A continued investment in
modernization efforts to our bomber and tanker fleets will ensure our
long-range capability for the future. Additionally, a renewed emphasis
into air base defense, along with Agile Combat Employment and Joint
All-Domain Command and Control concepts will ensure the United States
maintains the worlds' greatest military asymmetric advantage well into
the future.
Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD)
The Nation requires a fully modernized nuclear triad and supporting
infrastructure to maintain our nuclear deterrence capability.
Deterrence operates in peacetime, through the gray zone, worldwide,
across all domains, and into conflict. And, deterrence requires all
three legs for a responsive nuclear triad. By not maintaining a
reliable U.S. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force, we risk
deterrence erosion against not one, but two strategic nuclear
adversaries. This is too high of a risk to our Nation's security. Our
ICBMs have provided a highly reliable and secure deterrent capability
since 1959. Delaying their modernization for the last two decades
necessitates a comprehensive weapon replacement.
The Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), the ICBM replacement,
capitalizes on the strengths of a land-based triad component that is
survivable, efficient, and geographically dispersed, while replacing
aging components and addressing asset attrition along with the ICBM
force's declining infrastructure.
B-21 Raider
Our bomber force constitutes the second critical leg of our
Nation's nuclear triad and the B-21 Raider aircraft will be the
backbone of our future bomber force. The B-21 will possess the range,
access, and payload to penetrate the most highly-contested threat
environments and hold any target around the globe at risk. This new
bomber will provide the capabilities to deter and, if needed, win in
high-end, near-peer conflicts. And with bombers as the most flexible
leg of the nuclear triad, the B-21 underscore our national security.
This aircraft will support combatant commanders across the range of
military operations as both a nuclear and conventional bomber.
Over the past 3 years, the B-21 program accelerated from design to
physical manufacturing of aircraft. While building test aircraft, the
program is scaling manufacturing infrastructure and capacity across the
industrial supply base. In parallel, B-21 beddown preparations continue
on-track to support the Nation's newest bomber aircraft projected
arrival in the mid-2020s.
Long-Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO)
The Air Launched Cruise Missile is nearly 30 years beyond its
intended design life and faces evolving threats and availability
challenges. Recapitalization of these missiles via the Long-Range
Standoff Weapon (LRSO) is vital to our nuclear deterrence capability.
As our competitors improve their air defense systems, our stand-off
delivery capability diminishes. In order to maximize our capabilities,
the Nation requires a modernized bomber fleet and the LRSO. This
weapon's ability to penetrate contested airspace and survive
adversaries' defenses holds targets at risk and is a cost-effective way
to modernize the nuclear triad. Additionally, bombers armed with LRSO
provide a recallable and re-targetable capability which can hold any
target at risk--it is both a visible and tailorable deterrent.
Hypersonics
The Air Force is also investing heavily in hypersonic weapons. This
cutting-edge technology increases the Nation's rapid strike
capabilities. By leveraging hypersonic weapons' improved
maneuverability, America will have additional response options to deter
adversaries and reassure allies. An operational hypersonic air-launched
weapon enables the United States to hold fixed, high-value, and time-
sensitive targets at risk in contested environments from stand-off
distances. To that end, the Air Force is developing the Air Launched
Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) using the middle tier of acquisition rapid
prototyping authority. ARRW is on track to be the Nation's first
operational hypersonic weapon. Hypersonics--and global strike as a
whole--enable diplomacy by strengthening the negotiating position of
the United States.
rapid global mobility
The Air Force capability that most directly, and physically,
supports both the Air Force and our joint teammates is rapid global
mobility. Airmen conduct Rapid Global Mobility operations to project
and sustain combat power by moving personnel, material, fuel, and
supplies across the globe, in and through permissive and contested
threat environments on short timelines. The combination of speed,
range, flexibility, and responsiveness is what differentiates air
mobility operations from other forms of transport and is critical to
multi-modal operations contributing to a higher pace for Joint All-
Domain Operations. As threats evolve and the United States can no
longer operate from well-established fixed bases, rapid global mobility
is the lynchpin to persistent logistics, and we are examining unique
ways to utilize mobility aircraft.
Air Refueling
Air refueling, one segment of rapid global mobility, is
foundational to worldwide power projection. The ability to extend the
range and persistence of air platforms provides a decisive advantage
and deterrent against adversaries. To maintain our air refueling edge,
the Air Force must continue investment in the KC-46 while moving beyond
legacy KC-10 and KC-135 aircraft. The inability to phase the divesture
of the legacy tanker fleet shackles funding and manpower resources and
hampers the fielding of the more capable KC-46 at the rate required to
support combatant commanders. This negatively impacts air refueling
capacity and tanker advancement. Offsets from legacy tanker divestment
in both funding and manpower are critical to the success of the KC-46
and air refueling as a whole.
Emerging Logistics
Every 4.2 minutes a mobility aircraft takes off from an airfield
somewhere in the world. This is a unique opportunity as mobility
aircraft are envisioned as critical nodes in the Advanced Battle
Management System framework. Mobility platforms of all types can act as
sensor nodes, inputting information into the sensing grid and
increasing a commander's decision advantage. At the same time, we are
exploring novel approaches to logistics through Agility Prime, which is
developing electric vertical takeoff-and-landing vehicles (eVTOL). This
innovative program will help us rapidly move small numbers of personnel
and equipment around a battlefield and quickly rise to respond to
emerging challenges such as isolated servicemembers. We are also
training airmen and developing concepts and practices that allow for
dispersed, defendable, and mobile logistics networks. We are
establishing agreements with allies and partners that provide access,
and the ability to expand access, to key aerial ports, seaports,
storage nodes, and associated connections.
command and control (c2)
Inherent to outthinking adversaries is the ability to command and
control (C2) the joint force. Combatant commanders require an agile
military that operates seamlessly across domain boundaries at both
speed and scale. The Air Force's current C2 structure is based on a
Cold War-era design that is vulnerable and slow--a roadblock to the
goal of rapid and agile decision making. The enemy can easily target
our C2 structure's centralized nodes with both kinetic and non-kinetic
means. C2 must be resilient to attack, responsive to rapid changes,
integrated across all domains, and secure from exploitation. This core
mission allows the joint force to create an advantage by converging
units and capabilities at a time and place of our choosing.
Achieving decision advantage for combatant commanders requires both
sensors to gather data and a C2 network to translate and share data
across the joint force. Real-time dissemination of actionable
information, aided by artificial intelligence and machine learning,
allows joint warfighting across all domains at a pace faster than our
competitors. This speed matters to the decision maker and the
warfighter. And, with the proliferation of technology, future
warfighters will have the ability to observe, orient, decide and act
within minutes--as opposed to hours and days.
Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS)
A critical step towards accelerating command and control
architecture is the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS)--the
Department of the Air Force's contribution to Joint All-Domain Command
and Control. As a new approach towards information sharing and decision
management, ABMS enables compressed decision making and converging
effects without domain or geographic boundaries. As a family of
capabilities--versus a single system--ABMS creates a digital
environment capable of increasing awareness, creating greater
understanding, and enabling superior decision making--all of which is
critical to prevailing in future conflicts.
As a simple analogy, ABMS strengthens decisions by channeling
necessary information and capabilities through a ``military internet of
things.'' This internet, designed with digital standards, is being
purpose-built to deliver critical capabilities to the joint force
including secure processing, connectivity, data management,
applications, sensor integration, and effects integration. ABMS helps
overcome the Cold War-roadblock of vulnerable command and control
nodes. For instance, by transforming from a small number of air
operations centers to a ``military internet of things,'' ABMS allows
for agile, distributed, and mobile capabilities able to execute mission
command even when fractured by an enemy attack.
ABMS's infrastructure is critical to ensuring the joint force
connects sensors to shooters with machine-to-machine precision and
speed while increasing commanders' awareness. And just like the
development of the internet, ABMS is being built across multiple fiscal
years. Fiscal year 2020 and fiscal year 2021 have focused on exploring
how we can best connect sensors and shooters while building
partnerships with our industry partners. Moving forward, the Air Force
will prioritize resources to allow the continued building of ABMS's
digital network environment and infrastructure. By prioritizing the
resources to support ABMS investment, the Air Force will be able to
initiate replacement of human-in-the-loop data transfer processes with
machine-to-machine data exchanges allowing for delivery of multi-domain
secure processing and data management, connectivity, and applications
that synchronize sensors and networks. In turn, the joint force is
enabled to make decisions faster than the adversary is able to respond.
Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3)
Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) systems act as
the central nervous system of our nuclear deterrent. They link the
President and national leaders to the nuclear force--all day, every
day, under all conditions, without fail. Without NC3, we cannot
effectively command and control nuclear forces. And without effective
command and control of nuclear forces, we cannot deter adversaries.
Previously, electromagnetic pulses posed the greatest challenge to
our NC3 networks. Now, electronic warfare, cyber-attack, and threats
from space all provide challenges to key nodes and systems. Russia,
while embracing a doctrine of nuclear escalation in conventional
conflict, is nearly complete with its recent full range of nuclear
modernization efforts. Equally concerning is China's pursuit of new
nuclear capabilities tailored to achieve its national security
objectives while also modernizing its conventional military.
As we modernize our portion of the nuclear triad, we must also
modernize our NC3. The Air Force is pursuing communication capability
enhancements with respect to our bomber force and Ground Based
Strategic Deterrent so they will be fully integrated into our current
NC3 systems and has flexibility to adapt as NC3 systems are modernized.
Moreover, we understand that the strategic environment evolves and is
increasingly dynamic. Our NC3 architectures and modernization plans
will be adaptable, look beyond the near-term, and integrate with the
Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS). While ABMS will enable
conventional forces, it will also enable nuclear forces with rapid,
multi-path transmissions that will transform NC3 from a Cold War-era
relic into a C2 network operating at speeds our adversaries cannot
match.
Successfully executing command and control across the joint force
requires information. A major avenue for that information is the Air
Force's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (isr)
The Air Force conducts intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) missions to analyze, inform, and provide joint
force commanders with the knowledge needed to achieve decision
advantage. This ISR sensing grid consists of a robust multi-layered
network of sensors, platforms, people, devices, and services with the
goal of delivering a holistic, accurate, predictive, and timely
characterization of the operating environment. This network is
interoperable with the joint force, the intelligence community, allies,
and partners. Domain awareness is underpinned by automation,
connectivity and analysis; is rooted in intelligence; and is critical
to the future of warfare. In that future, ISR underpins the Advanced
Battle Management System (ABMS) architecture and allows joint force
commanders to achieve an accurate, real-time understanding of the
environment. This understanding accelerates decision making,
effectively conducts command and control, and achieves decision
advantage ahead of competitors.
Future ISR capabilities must be survivable against high-end threats
while leveraging forward-looking investments in command and control
capabilities--including emerging technology like artificial
intelligence--to present decision-ready information faster than our
adversaries' capabilities. The Air Force's current ISR systems are
viable in a counter-insurgency war, but may not effectively contribute
in tomorrow's competitive environment. Without investment in additional
capabilities necessary for the high-end fight, we will be reliant on
ISR platforms that will be ineffective in highly-contested and denied
environments. As a result, we risk fighting blind.
Survivable, Relevant Platforms
ISR platforms play a critical and continuous role in supporting a
range of military operations. The most important role of intelligence
in military operations is to provide analysis of key aspects of the
operating environment to facilitate timely military decisions. Current
ISR platforms have been able to accomplish this task with relative ease
because they operated in uncontested and low-threat environments where
the United States enjoys superiority across all domains of warfare.
Such freedom of action will not be the case in the future. Future
threats will challenge the ability of legacy ISR platforms to
successfully execute their missions.
In the near future, ISR platforms will feed critical data through
the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS), which in turn will
present near real-time information to joint force decision makers.
Future airborne ISR platforms will need to survive and operate in a
more challenging environment. Ongoing modernization efforts will focus
on a family of platforms that are effective, resilient, and survivable
against technologically-advanced threats, and able to pass data to
necessary networks at machine speed. In our discussions going forward,
we will steer away from platform-centric conversations and focus
instead on the capabilities needed to inform joint force operations.
Our adversaries are already fielding technologies that will hold
our legacy platforms at risk to support the range of military
operations in a future high-end fight, and the technological evolution
will continue to accelerate. In order to keep pace ahead of emerging
threats, we must work with the combatant commands to assess the demand
signal on current fleets and where acceptable risk can be taken so the
Air Force can accelerate modernization. Legacy ISR platforms, once
considered irreplaceable to operations, are often unable to survive or
deliver needed capabilities on competition-relevant timelines. These
legacy platforms must be phased out, with resources used to invest in
modern and relevant systems. Working together, we must take calculated
risk now in order to reduce the greater future risk.
For instance, the RQ-4 Block 30 Global Hawk was crucial to the ISR
requirements of yesterday and today. However, this platform cannot
compete in a contested environment. And tomorrow's conflicts will be
contested. Moving beyond this platform allows us to bring the ISR
enterprise into the digital-age by using sensing grids and fielding
advanced technology that includes penetrating ISR platforms. The Air
Force will continue to pursue the Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA RQ-4 Block 30
divestment waiver in order to repurpose the RQ-4 Block 30 funds for
penetrating ISR capability. Overall, intelligence collection will
transition to a family of systems that includes non-traditional assets,
sensors in all domains, commercial platforms, and a hybrid force of
5th- and 6th-generation capabilities.
A comprehensive investment strategy that the Air Force is bringing
forward synchronizes divestment of legacy platforms, takes calculated
risk in upgrading existing platforms, and introduces the next-
generation ISR family of systems that will feed into ABMS.
new approaches
The Air Force's core missions encompass both enduring capabilities
unique to our Service and some capabilities shared with the joint
force. Airmen are rapidly iterating and innovating improvements to all
core missions. These new approaches to airpower overcome today's
roadblocks and focus on tomorrow's great power challenges. Both
technology and operational concepts benefit from our airmen's
perspectives. Every day, airmen increase the agility, speed,
resilience, and lethality of our contributions to the joint force.
Force Generation Model
The Air Force is also re-examining how we present forces to
combatant commanders. The core missions of the Air Force continue to be
in constant demand around the world. And because many of the
capabilities we provide are exclusive to our Service, our forces have
been under strain for two decades. This strain negatively impacts
readiness and our ability to modernize.
Preparing for near-peer adversaries, the Air Force is implementing
a new force generation model focused on building and sustaining long-
term, high-end readiness. Our goal is to more effectively articulate
readiness impacts and capacity limits, and instill discipline into the
system. Our new, simplified model, realigns the Air Force with the
Joint Staff's three phase model, is easily understood by combatant
commanders, builds towards sustainable readiness, and balances current
operations with the training necessary for future full-spectrum combat
operations.
Agile Combat Employment (ACE)
The Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) not only connects
sensors and shooters but also enhances persistent logistics by sensing
the threat landscape and material environment. Persistent logistics,
with the inherent ability to posture, sense, and respond, is the
warfighting answer to the key operational problem of logistics under
attack and enables Agile Combat Employment (ACE). ACE is the ability to
quickly disperse & cluster forces to a cooperative security location
and conduct operations across all domains with minimal disruption,
while maintaining operational flexibility. This new method of operating
will allow the United States to confuse the enemy and strike at a time
and place of our choosing with minimal risk. The ability of ACE to
sustain combat operations through persistent logistics has already been
validated through multiple exercises across both the Pacific and
European theaters.
ACE requires technological advances like ABMS, novel equipment, and
innovative airmen. Our airmen are tackling ACE, and the larger
challenge of persistent logistics, by adapting techniques previously
associated with special operators. Our commanders support these efforts
by encouraging critical thinking skills and driving decision making to
the lowest levels--in many cases our youngest frontline supervisors.
These empowered airmen are innovating new approaches to projecting
combat power across the globe.
Base and Critical Infrastructure Defense
The Department's infrastructure defense efforts are currently
focused on directed energy research, development, test and evaluation;
counter-small UAS; and investments in cruise missile defense. In the
coming years, we will steadily increase investment of critical
infrastructure defense measures to meet the challenges of the future
fight, ACE, and logistics under attack.
As China and Russia develop weapons that challenge our superiority
in the air, they are also making strides that hold our bases at risk.
While the Air Force will mitigate some risk through persistent
logistics, the security of our air bases is essential to conducting
combat operations. Like other aspects of combat operations, base
defense is inherently joint. And just as the joint force is dependent
on the Air Force to execute our core missions, the Air Force must
leverage our sister Services for base defense.
If future expeditionary and permanent air bases are not protected
from attack, the Air Force will be challenged to conduct combat
operations. Without the Air Force's air superiority, the joint force is
at risk of attack from the air for the first time since the Korean War.
The Air Force acknowledges that this is a joint problem that requires a
joint solution, which is why we have allocated experimental funding to
explore and develop directed energy and kinetic and non-kinetic base
defense options. Looking forward, the Air Force will prioritize
resources that will allow it to continue prototyping the ability to
detect, track, identify, and mitigate small unmanned aircraft system
threats. Proper base defense encompasses significant decisions with
far-reaching impacts--we must get this right.
Infrastructure
We project power, generate readiness, test new platforms, train to
support joint operations, and provide safe and healthy communities for
our families at our bases. As the joint force becomes increasingly
dependent on an integrated battle network, installations also serve as
key nodes in enabling mission success around the world. The readiness
and resiliency of installations is a matter of strategic importance to
ensure the Air Force can always provide combat capability. Changing
climate and severe weather events are a continual threat to our
installations, and we have seen first-hand the impacts climate and
severe weather have on our installations.
The Air Force views installation resilience as the capability of a
base to project combat power by protecting against, responding to, and
recovering from deliberate, accidental, or naturally occurring events
that impede operations. We are taking a deliberate, holistic approach
to installation resilience through Department of the Air Force's
Installation Energy Strategic Plan. This includes improving the
resiliency of our energy, cyber, infrastructure, and response options.
america's air force for 2030
This year we celebrate America's 245th birthday and next year the
Air Force celebrates its 75th anniversary. Throughout our history, the
Nation prospered because of our willingness to adapt and evolve, to
adjust course when the situation dictates. Democracy is not a
birthright, and neither is air dominance. And although airpower is our
great comparative advantage, tomorrow's competitive environment
requires that we accelerate change or lose.
Tomorrow's battlespace will be shaped by human talent, climate
change, constricting budgetary resources, and challenges posed by great
powers. The Air Force and its core missions stand ready to exploit the
air domain, provide nuclear deterrence, and underwrite the national
security America expects and requires. By working with Congress, we
will protect the Homeland and defend democratic ideals. Moving forward,
the Air Force will prioritize its resources so it is able to adapt our
equipment, support our airmen, and bolster our core missions. We must
continue to adjust course and overcome situational challenges so
America maintains its airpower advantage.
America cannot wait to modernize the Air Force any longer, not 1
year, 1 month, or 1 week. To deter and defeat today's competitors and
tomorrow's adversaries, we must re-capitalize our Air Force and we must
do it now . . . the call to accelerate change or lose is not
hyperbole--it is a requirement.
UNITED STATES SPACE FORCE
securing an enduring advantage
The United States is a space-faring nation. We have long understood
that our Nation is strongest economically, militarily, and
diplomatically when we have access to, and freedom to operate in,
space. Unfortunately, potential adversaries have taken note of the
United States' reliance on space, and this vital national interest can
no longer be taken for granted; it must be secured. The rapid
advancements of potential adversaries to threaten U.S. freedom of
operation in space must be countered with immediate improvements to our
space defense architecture and capabilities.
Competitors like China and Russia are challenging America's
advantage in space by aggressively developing weapons to deny or
destroy U.S. space capabilities in conflict. Both China and Russia have
mobile ground-based laser and electronic warfare systems capable of
jamming and blinding our satellite systems. China has invested in
satellite grappling technologies, like the Shijian-17 satellite's
robotic arm, which could be used in future conflicts. Russia has tested
an on-orbit system that has released a projectile designed to destroy
U.S. satellites in low-Earth orbit.
The United States would prefer that conflict not begin in or extend
to space. Our goal is to deter conflict in space from happening and
from spilling over into other domains, and the best way to do so is
from a position of strength. We are prepared to protect U.S. interests
today and we are moving fast to ensure we can deter in the future, but
our ability to deter conflict hinges on demonstrating both capability
and resolve. Over-classification of existing systems threatens this
ability, and we are developing a reveal and conceal strategy to ensure
we can compete, deter, and win in this contested domain.
The Space Force was established to protect U.S. investments and
freedom of operation in space, provide space capabilities to the
Nation, the joint force, sister Services, the intelligence community,
and our allies and partners. The Space Force is designed to be lean,
agile, and innovative in order to move at speed and compete in the vast
domain of space. Our small size also makes us the ideal pathfinder to
validate new structures and approaches that can provide benefit across
the joint force. While our budget is roughly two percent of the
Department of Defense's request, the capabilities we deliver underwrite
the force design of the entire joint force. Space capabilities have
become a cornerstone of deterrence, not just in space, but in every
domain. Without space, our forces abroad, security at home, and allies
everywhere are at much greater risk. If we lose in space, America
loses.
We spent the first year inventing the Space Force, with an
organizational design that reflects the character of our operating
environment and the nature of conflict that is likely to manifest. A
headquarters and Field Command structure aligns complementary functions
and streamlines command authority in the deliberate pursuit of speed
and agility. Our first field command, Space Operations Command, stood
up in October 2020 as the primary space forces provider to the
combatant commands. We will establish the remaining two field commands
before the end of 2021: Space Systems Command will develop, acquire,
and field operationally relevant and resilient space capabilities in
resilient and defendable architectures, and Space Training and
Readiness Command will develop tactics, a testing enterprise, doctrine,
advanced warfare training, and a dedicated cadre of warfighting
professionals. We have already transferred space missions, billets, and
monetary resources from 23 Air Force units to the Space Force, and we
are preparing to merge operations, acquisition, and sustainment for
some space systems currently distributed across the Army, Navy, and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, including the Space Development
Agency beginning next year.
In our second year, we are aggressively integrating the Service
into the fabric of national and international security by collaborating
across the Department of Defense, interagency, commercial industry, and
our allies and partners. As the Space Force creates independent
military options for decision makers, we are preparing a force
presentation model to optimize integration and delivery of space
capability to the joint force. We are working to streamline acquisition
processes to increase decision speed and expedite capability
development, creating an integrated test enterprise, and doing the
analytical and developmental work to create the most effective and
efficient force design for the domain to bring unity of effort across
the department. Lastly, we have initiated planning for a National Space
Intelligence Center to provide scientific and technical intelligence as
well as foundational space intelligence to the Service and the
intelligence community. These initiatives make us more resilient and
competitive, and they will put us in a better position to sustain
continuing advantage.
developing and caring for guardians
The character of operations and aspects of potential conflict in
space are fundamentally different from the military art of terrestrial
domains. Vast distances and speeds, potential for first-mover
advantage, and unique operating environment demand experts that are
familiar with these physical characteristics. As in all other domains,
guardians must stay ahead of adversaries to give joint commanders and
national civilian leadership new space-based security options. This
requires a dramatic change in how we attract, recruit, develop, train,
and retain talent.
We are committed to ensuring that the guardians reflect the diverse
character of the United States--it is a national security imperative.
Diversity gives us the perspective and skills to meet the challenges of
our security environment and ensures we can bring our Nation's best
talent to bear on the hardest problems. In order to meet these goals,
we must work hard to address tough issues like sexual assault,
extremism, and discrimination within the force; solving these problems
is essential to building a Service that ensures talented people of all
genders, orientations, races, ethnicities, and beliefs are included and
empowered to reach their full potential.
Guardian Strategy
To win the battle for talent, we have created a Human Capital
Office to develop a new strategy for unified talent management for all
guardians, in pursuit of an inclusive and team-centric culture. Our
small size creates the opportunity and the mandate for a tailored
approach to caring for and developing our guardians from accessions to
retirement and beyond.
This ``Guardian Strategy'' will lead digital enablement by creating
a digital cadre, an optimized data infrastructure, increased process
automation, and new digital platforms. Using interviews and other
assessment tools as well as focusing our Reserve Officer Training Corps
presence at select universities will support both diversity efforts and
needs for space related research and technical grounding. We look to
develop and employ talent by taking a competency-based development
approach, mandating more robust feedback systems, and creating
potential-based promotion assessments with sequenced talent management
boards. In our first year, professional development opportunities and
promotion rates have increased significantly; we must reinforce
systemic change to make this an enduring effect.
The Space Force is developing its own officer and enlisted
professional military education (PME) programs to fit within the
broader concepts of the Guardian Strategy to ensure that all members
are career-long learners, and that learning directly relates to the
success of their current and future duties. Space Force PME will focus
on the development of space-minded warfighters who are credible and
effective in multi-domain warfare and the joint environment. We have
already expanded space curricula at Airman Leadership School; stood up
a Space Force Non-Commissioned Officer Leadership Academy; expanded the
Schriever Space Scholars Program at Air University; and created the
West Fellowship for Senior Developmental Education. Finally, we are
taking a proactive approach featuring teams at the unit level to
strengthen social, physical, and mental attributes to energize personal
and organizational resiliency. As the Space Force takes care of
guardians and their families, it must prepare them to defend our
Nation. Space Force talent must be deliberately managed by well-
positioned human resources mission partners in the field commands and
headquarters office to support both military and civilian guardians.
Training and Doctrine
We have completely redesigned our space training and doctrine
across all space operations competencies, beginning with publication
last year of a foundational doctrine document. Our training has
elevated from basic operation of space systems to threat- and target-
based advanced space warfare training. Guardian training and doctrine
focuses on seven core competency areas, through advanced training and
education: orbital warfare, space electromagnetic warfare, space battle
management, space access and sustainment, military intelligence, cyber
operations, and engineering and acquisition. Our shift in training and
doctrine must be complementary to our capabilities and reflect the
reality of our current and future missions. Additionally, Space
Training and Readiness Command is bringing together training and
doctrine to support our tactics, strategies, and theories of victory.
value of partnerships
An independent Service focused on space has already provided
greatly expanded opportunities for partnerships with civil and
commercial space organizations within the United States and with allies
and partners around the world. Working through the Department of
Defense, close cooperation with the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration and the Department of State has ensured a unified U.S.
voice in discussions about responsible behavior in space with foreign
governments. Similarly, through the Department of Defense, we continue
to work hand in hand with the Department of Commerce on shared
interests including space traffic management, positioning, navigation,
and timing programs, applications, and efforts to maintain the space
industrial base. We are working to expand cooperation with commercial
partners using both traditional and innovative development pathways;
seeking means for tighter fusion to take advantage of the enthusiasm
and energy in the commercial space sector.
Internationally, our partnerships have historically been built
around one-way data sharing agreements with a small number of
countries. As the proliferation and importance of space capabilities
increases around the world, we are fostering greater cooperation with
international partners across the board. For example, a hosted payload
agreement with the government of Norway will save us more than $900
million and helped us get capability on orbit 2 years faster. We are
also working with NATO to further integrate space capabilities and
knowledge in that alliance, including the stand-up of the first NATO
Space Operations Center within NATO Air Command. Cooperation with
allies and partners, on both capability development and operations,
continues to provide opportunities to decrease cost and increase speed
and innovation.
creating a digital service
Founded in the Information Age, the Space Force was ``born
digital.'' We are harnessing modern era advancements and tools to
accelerate innovation and ensure our military advantages in, to, and
from space. Under the leadership of the newly established Technology
and Innovation Office, the Space Force focuses on partnering with U.S.
Government, science and technology industries, and academia to build a
digital Service to support Space Force missions and business
operations.
Digital Headquarters
Leaders at every echelon of the force require access to data and
analytics in order to make informed decisions with speed and precision.
A new data analytic environment and automation tools will streamline
headquarter processes, enable seamless data sharing, increase decision
space, and accelerate warfighting outcomes. Digital transformation is
occurring in operational readiness, talent management (recruiting and
onboarding), programming and budgeting, and capability development. In
capability development, digital models will enhance analyses of
alternatives, iterate requirements decomposition, improve cost
estimation fidelity, and ultimately accelerate the planning,
coordination, and development of optimum solutions to meet critical
warfighter needs.
Digital Operations
Commanders and unit-level guardians are empowered to innovate
inside their mission operations, explore novel concepts for space
domain awareness, Joint All-Domain Command and Control, collaborate
with small business innovators, and align innovation efforts for
transition into operations. This effort includes partnerships with the
Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, industry, and academia to advance
use of artificial intelligence applications and research.
Digital Workforce
Continuous transformation requires digitally-fluent military and
civilian guardians. Therefore, we are funding software-coding training
for military and civilian personnel and leveraging Department-wide
digital training efforts to improve digital literacy using industry-
leading commercial courseware. To achieve the goal of a digital
workforce we must cultivate our collective digital acumen, develop an
expert cadre of ``Supra Coders,'' and equip and empower them to apply
agile software practices, use artificial intelligence, and data
science. Finally, we must place them strategically across the force to
unleash their talent and energy toward inventive, innovative solutions
in operations and acquisition.
accelerating capability design, decision, & delivery
The Space Force must modernize its architecture to survive and
execute spacepower missions in a contested domain and do so at speed.
To this end, the Space Force is engaged in an end-to-end transformation
of organizations and processes to accelerate delivery of operationally-
relevant capabilities. Consistent with our effort to become a ``Digital
Service,'' we will exploit our digital engineering systems as a
backbone to connect multiple processes and accelerate capability
development activities from analysis to integration, decision, and
acquisition.
Integrated Analysis for Optimal Design
The Space Warfighting Analysis Center (SWAC), currently aligned
under the Space Operations Command, is leading analysis, modeling,
wargaming, and experimentation to generate new operational concepts and
force design options for the Department of Defense. The SWAC integrates
domain expertise with unique analytic tools, datasets, and intelligence
to develop operational architecture options to fulfill space missions.
By driving unity of effort, we reduce cost, duplication of effort, and
increase our speed of decision and action
Digital Engineering to Better Inform Requirements
Rather than static reports, the SWAC's design options are digital
models, which enable testing of proposed capabilities through
simulation in an environment that accurately reflects fast evolving
threats and the space domain. The Space Force Strategy and Resources
Office (SRO) integrates SWAC's design options with the appropriate
processes to develop Service capability and programmatic options for
presentation to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and Deputy's
Management Action Group. The SRO also ensures digital models generate
required data artifacts to inform oversight; Planning, Programming,
Budgeting, and Execution; and acquisition actions.
Streamlined Governance for Timely Decisions
In order to support the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Space Acquisition and Integration, who will eventually have Service
Acquisition Executive (SAE) authority and chair the Space Force
Acquisition Council (SAC), the Space Force has established a supporting
Program Integration Council (PIC). As a collaborative interagency
leadership council, the PIC facilitates cooperation and deconfliction
between National Security Space Enterprise stakeholders and ensures
planning, alignment, execution, delivery, and optimization of
capabilities across all space mission areas. Streamlined coordination
across the enterprise via the PIC and SAC improves collaboration and
better enables timely decisions by the SAE. The Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration is an essential
element of this approach and we look forward to implementing this
congressionally-directed change as quickly as permitted by law.
Consolidated Space Acquisition Enterprise for Agility
Finally, in the summer of 2021 the Space Force will stand up the
Space Systems Command (SSC) to provide for cooperation across space
acquisition within the Department of the Air Force. Initially comprised
of the former Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) and the Service's
launch enterprise, SSC will also have a limited administrative support
relationship with the Space Rapid Capabilities Office (SpRCO) and--as
of the beginning of fiscal year 2023, per statute--the Space
Development Agency (SDA). By aligning three organizations with a
pedigree in traditional acquisition, disruptive acquisition, and
commercial acquisition, the Department of the Air Force can access
best-of-breed solutions. Because SSC acquirers will receive digital
models with traceable requirements, Program Managers and Program
Executive Officers will be equipped to make faster, more agile
decisions and trades. In addition, the space acquisition enterprise
will continue to improve both commercial and allied integration.
missile warning and missile tracking
Strategic and theater missile warning and missile tracking
capabilities provide indications and warning to protect the Homeland,
joint forces and allies abroad. The evolution of threats to on-orbit
systems force us to re-think both how we protect and defend our
strategic assets, and how future strategic capabilities should be
designed to mitigate threats. The Space Force is partnering with
combatant commands, the Missile Defense Agency, National Reconnaissance
Office, and the Space Development Agency to design and build a
resilient missile warning architecture for the collective defense of
our Nation, joint force, and allies.
Next-Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR)
We are designing and developing the future architecture for missile
warning and missile tracking. Next-Generation Overhead Persistent
Infrared (OPIR) will succeed the current Space Based Infrared System
(SBIRS) and will provide increased missile warning, missile defense,
battlespace awareness, and technical intelligence capabilities with
resiliency and defensive features to counter emerging threats.
The ground system for Next-Gen OPIR, also known as Future
Operationally Resilient Ground Evolution (FORGE), migrates satellite
command and control to the Space Force's Enterprise Ground Services,
modernizes Mission Data Processing to implement an open framework, and
upgrades Relay Ground Stations to meet United States Space Command's
operational requirements. We are using Middle Tier Acquisition
authorities to rapidly prototype solutions. This pathfinder approach
delivers the first resilient geosynchronous satellite and associated
ground system in fiscal year 2025 and the first polar satellite in
fiscal year 2028.
positioning, navigation, and timing
The Global Positioning System (GPS) remains the ``gold standard''
for positioning, navigation, and timing for the United States and the
world. GPS underpins the global economy and our way of war. Adversaries
have long recognized our dependence on GPS and have proliferated
technologies to degrade, deny, and spoof GPS signals for civil and
military users. We are pursuing modernization efforts across the entire
GPS architecture to include upgrades in space, ground, and user
segments. The Space Force's future GPS architecture provides more
robust positioning, navigation, and timing to the joint force, ensuring
at least one technical generation advantage over any adversary.
GPS Space Segment
The Space Force is pursuing significant satellite enhancements to
our GPS constellation, including higher-power military signals, new
civilian signals, upgraded nuclear detection system payloads, and
hosted search-and-rescue payloads. GPS Block III features improved
signal strength and accuracy, increased anti-jam power, and a longer
expected design life. The next block of GPS, GPS Block IIIF-- available
for launch in fiscal year 2026--will deliver regional military-code
protection, a higher power signal in a given geographic area of
operation to boost anti-jam capabilities for contested environments.
GPS Operational Control Segment Next (OCX)
Operational Control Segment Next (OCX) will develop and field a
modernized ground system required for the command and control of GPS
satellites. The OCX program is on track to meet current Acquisition
Program Baseline cost and schedule milestones. OCX provides expandable,
robust information assurance architecture to significantly improve
cyber resiliency, enabling the latest military and civilian GPS
signals, improving cyber protection, and allowing the system to evolve
to combat emerging threats. We have completed product test, are
currently progressing through segment integration, and will transition
to operations in fiscal year 2022.
Military Global Positioning System User Equipment (MGUE)
Military GPS User Equipment (MGUE) will modernize user equipment to
enable precision fires, safe navigation, and time coordination across
multiple platforms in GPS-degraded environments. Military-code receiver
cards embedded in weapon systems enable cyber-secure, anti-jam, and
anti-spoof precision, navigation, and timing for the joint force and
our partners. MGUE Increment one (1) completed developmental testing of
the Army and Marine Corps lead platforms in fiscal year 2020. MGUE
efforts support finalization of card design, testing, and integration
with Navy and Air Force lead platforms. MGUE Increment two (2)
leverages the MGUE Increment one (1) technology to the maximum extent
while addressing the production of M-Code integrated circuits far into
the future.
command and control (c2)
Our top priority is to develop a Joint All-Domain Command and
Control System to ensure United States Space Command and their joint
and coalition warfighting partners have the capability they require to
command and control in a contested domain. We have made considerable
gains this year, fully integrated in, and helping lead, the Advanced
Battle Management System (ABMS) effort. In recognition that legacy
space command and control capabilities are insufficient for us to
prevail in future conflict, we have prioritized the delivery of space
command and control capabilities using a development, security, and
operations (DevSecOps) approach to acquisitions. Leveraging the agile
approaches of commercial software developers, we are rapidly developing
cyber-resilient capabilities that enhance U.S., allied, and partner
nation operational-level space warfighting capabilities against the
adversary.
The initiatives below build and sustain the infrastructure required
to connect sensors to shooters using machine-to-machine planning and
tasking of warfighting capabilities.
Unified Data Library (UDL)
The Space Force built and delivered the Unified Data Library (UDL),
a cloud-based, cyber-accredited, multi-classification data store that
facilitates universal data access and serves as the foundational
element of the ABMS data architecture in partnership with the Air
Force. UDL provides all-domain secure Space Domain Awareness (SDA) data
sharing from all Services and sensors to support space-focused Battle
Management and Command and Control; it is also extensible to fit the
needs of Joint All-Domain Command and Control. This effort adds long-
term access to a wide variety of space domain awareness data sources
including commercial, allies, and academia. The UDL creates unified,
agile procurement of commercial products to bolster Combined Space
Operations Center and National Space Defense Center operations.
Additionally, it protects satellite tracking data by seamlessly
integrating defensive cyber operations.
Space C2 Open Architecture Operational Prototype (SCOOP)
The Space Force has also delivered the Space C2 Open Architecture
Operational Prototype (SCOOP) program, a modern cloud architecture that
is connected to 40 sites nationwide. Leveraging the Department of the
Air Force's prior work on open architecture standards, SCOOP delivers a
command and control capability for our most pressing needs, with the
ability to connect into other domains, and serves as the foundation of
our next generation C2 capability.
Space Domain Awareness (SDA)
Space Domain Awareness (SDA) is the cornerstone of our ability to
command and control warfighting capabilities. The Space Force budget
invests in new terrestrial radars, optical sensors, and space-based
capabilities and commercial partnerships to increase the quantity and
quality of space observations. A robust SDA architecture improves our
indications and warnings, ensures freedom of action in space, and
enables joint and coalition options to defend critical space
capabilities. Additionally, investments in secure connectivity and data
sharing tools improve our collective understanding of our adversaries'
capabilities and intent.
Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications
As part of Department of Defense's efforts to modernize the nuclear
triad, the Space Force will provide and modernize the space and mission
control segments for worldwide, secure, jam-resistant, and survivable
communications. We are pursuing digital development efforts for the
future disaggregated strategic and tactical satellite communications
systems to meet emerging threats in the 2030-timeframe. Evolved
Strategic SATCOM will continue the strategic mission of the Advanced
Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite program with improved on-
board resilience features, upgraded satellite capabilities, and
cybersecurity features. We are leveraging rapid prototyping
demonstrations to speed the delivery of the space segment to meet the
warfighter need date in 2032.
Space System Prototype Transition (SSPT)
Space System Prototype Transition (SSPT) is a portfolio of programs
that rapidly advance next-generation space capabilities to the
warfighter at the speed of relevance. The portfolio leverages the
commercial industrial base and demonstrates common defense through
partnerships to enhance resiliency. One example is the development and
integration of space domain awareness payloads on two Japanese Quasi-
Zenith Satellite System spacecraft. The hosted payloads will increase
sensor diversity and enable space surveillance and event detection over
USINDOPACOM in the geosynchronous orbit regime.
Transition to Enterprise Ground System (EGS)
Enterprise Ground System (EGS) will enable the transition from a
family of legacy stovepiped satellite C2 systems to an improved, open,
resilient, and common platform. The effort funds modernized system
interfaces, virtualization, and the translation of mission applications
to ensure rapid response to emerging threats and integration of new
capabilities. We continue to develop a Minimum Viable Product for
foundational services and infrastructure to provide an initial
Enterprise Capability. EGS will integrate multiple new mission partners
within the Space Warfighting Construct & Missile Warning mission
threads, scale multiple services for existing mission partners, and
integrate them at one or more of three EGS locations. Continued
investment provides foundational services and infrastructure to deliver
enterprise-wide command and control services to all Space Force
satellite programs. We are on track to deliver a fully integrated
system by 2028.
assured access to space
National Security Space Launch (NSSL) provides assured access to
space for the Nation's most critical warfighting and intelligence
capabilities. To meet the full set of National Security Space
requirements, we must continue to competitively invest in domestic
launch providers' development of new launch systems. The Space Force,
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration have a coordinated strategy to certify new
entrants to launch payloads, and continue to work with different launch
providers to reliably meet our national requirements. The Space Force
recently completed a 5-year strategy to bolster a commercially
competitive market and transition to domestic launch systems by
awarding the NSSL Phase Two procurement contract.
Leveraging this strategy, we are pursuing five National Security
Space Launches to deliver warfighting capabilities on time. Following
the outcomes of our Phase Two launch procurement strategy, we will
continue to engage with industry partners regarding emerging launch
requirements and technologies to invest in continued assured access to
space.
National Security Space Launch (NSSL) Enabling Investments
We are investing in multiple public-private partnerships to develop
enabling technologies for future space access, mobility, and logistics.
Targeted investments in orbital transfer, on-orbit servicing, digital
engineering, and novel on-orbit propulsion technologies will increase
U.S. access and freedom to operate in space. We will continue to invest
in providers of domestic launch services enabling our transition from
non-allied space launch engines to domestic rocket propulsion systems.
We will also continue technical maturation, risk reduction, and public-
private partnership investment to expand domestic and cost-effective
solutions for assured access to space. Additionally, the Space Force's
research and development standards must reflect both the mission areas
and the threat environment. The Space Force is building a more
defensible and resilient space defense architecture by disaggregating
on-orbit capabilities. We are building agile and threat responsive
systems to complicate targeting. Additionally, we are building
redundancy and resiliency countermeasures into the spacecraft and
payload designs of our systems.
way forward
Congress established the Space Force to ensure freedom of action
for the United States in, from, and to space. This Department of the
Air Force Posture Statement builds on fiscal year 2021 efforts in
strengthening our ability to deliver flexible capabilities and
strategic options at operationally relevant speeds to outpace emerging
and dynamic threats. The Service's streamlined and integrated
organizational design also creates new military options with the joint
force, inter-agencies, industry, and our partners and allies. We are
eager to work with Congress to build a common understanding of both the
strategy and the investments needed to secure our Nation's vital
interests.
Chairman Reed. General Brown, do you have a statement,
please?
STATEMENT OF GENERAL CHARLES Q. BROWN, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE AIR FORCE
General Brown. Good morning, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
Inhofe, and distinguished Members of this Committee. I am
humbled to serve as the Nation's 22nd Air Force Chief of Staff
and to represent 689,000 total force airmen serving today. Your
support for them and their families is greatly appreciated. It
is an honor to be up here before you to day with Acting
Secretary Roth and my fellow service chief and long-time
friend, General Jay Raymond.
As a general officer, I have spent the last decade-plus in
positions overseas and/or supporting operations in the Middle
East, Europe, Africa, and most recently the Indo-Pacific. With
this context, I have been able to look at the Air Force from
varied perspectives, and I personally have seen the reemergence
of the strategic competition and how the character of war has
changed. The strategic environment has rapidly evolved. We have
not changed fast enough to keep pace.
The People's Republic of China has recognized modern
warfare as a contest among systems, not individual units or
platforms. Accordingly, Secretary Austin has prioritized China
as our pacing threat. Meanwhile, Russia continues to modernize
its armed forces, increasing the capability of its missiles,
strike aircraft, warships, artillery systems, and nuclear
weapons.
Competition and future warfare will be conducted across all
domains simultaneously. It will be a transregional and global
undertaking with complex actions and actors intertwined. To
account for these changes, our Nation, our Air Force must
change faster than we have been. If we continue on a path of
incremental change, our advantage erodes, and losing becomes a
distinct possibility.
The Air Force recently updated our mission statement, to
fly, fight, and win--airpower anytime, anywhere. To execute
this mission, now and into the future, we must transition our
Air Force and our operational concepts from today to tomorrow,
and we must do so much faster. That is why I wrote ``Accelerate
Change or Lose,'' to call attention to the changes in the
strategic environment, because the mix of capabilities that our
Air Force has now, that were good enough yesterday, that are
good enough today, will likely fail tomorrow. Our future Air
Force must be agile, resilient, and connected, with the ability
to generate near-instantaneous effects anytime, anywhere. Not
just sometime, in some places, but anytime, anywhere.
Our Air Force is the only service that provides our joint
teammates, allies, and partners the assurance of air
superiority, the advantage of global strike, and the agility
and rapid mobility through a range of capabilities most
requested by today's combatant commanders. Additionally, the
Air Force ISR and command and control capabilities provide the
ability to sense, make sense, and act.
But while our past and current capabilities have sufficed
for the last three decades, they will not effectively perform
in tomorrow's highly contested environment. To address these
challenges that will endanger our national security of
tomorrow, the transition to the future Air Force design must
start today.
Finally, we have a foundational responsibility to our
airmen and their families. I remain focused on ensuring we are
ready and that we have the tools, infrastructure, and talent
management systems to provide the environment where all can
reach their full potential. The future Air Force design
advances our core missions and new approaches to warfighting
that will holistically support every combatant commander and
benefit every service chief. Investing in your Air Force is an
investment in the Joint Forces.
Ladies and gentlemen, the bottom line is simple. We must
modernize for the future and focus on capabilities that
maintain our advantage, both today and tomorrow. For decades,
we have collaborated with the Congress and our industry
partners to modernize for the future. Now to fulfill our
responsibility to ensure our national security, we must be
willing to change, to make the tough choices required to
deliberately transform our Air Force to the future force we
need to compete, deter, and win. We have done it before, and I
am confident together we can do it again.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and I look
forward to your questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Brown. General
Raymond, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN W. RAYMOND, USSF, CHIEF OF SPACE
OPERATIONS
General Raymond. Good morning, Chairman Reed, Ranking
Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of this Committee. It
is an absolute honor to appear before you today with Secretary
Roth, the Acting Secretary of the Air Force, and General C.Q.
Brown, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and a long-time
friend and teammate. On behalf of the guardians stationed
worldwide, let me begin by thanking you for the continued
leadership and strong support that you have provided to the
United States Space Force (USSF) .
The United States is a spacefaring nation. We have long
understood that our Nation is strongest, economically,
diplomatically, and militarily, when we have access to and
freedom to maneuver in space. For the past three decades, we
have been able to take that access and freedom to maneuver for
granted.
Unfortunately, as the National Defense Strategy and the
newer Interim National Security Strategy identified, this is no
longer the case. Both China, our pacing threat, and Russia are
doing two things to eliminate the lead that the United States
currently enjoys. First, they are rapidly developing their own
space capabilities to provide them the advantages that we
currently enjoy. Second, they are building weapons systems
specifically designed to deny our access to space and the
advantages that that provides. These threats include robust
jamming of the global positioning system (GPS) and
communications satellites; directed energy systems that can
blind, disrupt, or damage our satellites; anti-satellite
weapons, both in space and launched from the ground, that are
designed to destroy U.S. satellites; and cyber capabilities
that can deny our access to the domain.
Thankfully, with the strong support of Congress, especially
this Committee, the United States seized on the opportunity to
make needed changes to stay ahead of that growing threat by
establishing the United States Space Force. This leadership is
resonating globally and is already delivering results for our
Nation.
We have slashed bureaucracy at every level in order to
empower our guardians to move at speed and to increase the
accountability necessary to operate in this domain. We have put
together a forward-leaning human capital strategy, allowing us
to build a more highly-trained, educated, and developed
warfighting force, while taking care of our guardians and their
families throughout their careers. We wrote our first doctrine
to clearly articulate the independent value of space power to
joint and coalition forces, and this importance is fully
captured in the Department's new joint warfighting construct
that is being developed.
Our international partnerships are stronger, with many of
our partner nations following our lead and elevating space in
their own militaries. We have created a new end-to-end
capability development process from force design and
requirements to acquisition and testing, enabled by a digital
thread to move at speed while driving unity of effort across
the Department. We have rejected stovepipes by actively working
with the Joint Force, other government agencies, and industry
to compete, deter, and win at an affordable cost.
The Space Force cannot and will not tolerate business as
usual. Our demanding mission and lean force demand nothing less
than a new standard. This budget reflects the shift of many
Department of Defense space activities into the Space Force,
yet we remain only 2.5 percent of the overall Department of
Defense budget. We are committed to stretching every dollar to
its limit to buy as much capability as possible for our Nation.
Our Joint Force does not close on its warfighting requirements
without space. Space is the force multiplier we must continue
to invest in so that we can compete, deter, and win, and
without it we risk losing.
This fiscal year 2022 budget balances the need to protect
capabilities we have on orbit now while shifting and
modernizing to a more defendable architecture in the future. It
is an investment that provides assured space capabilities to
our sister services, our Nation, and our joint coalition
partners. These demanding tasks could not have been possible
without sustained support from Congress, and for that I thank
you. We cannot afford to lose space.
I am absolutely honored and humbled to serve as the first
Chief of Space Operations and to have the opportunity to serve
side-by-side with the incredible guardians that I am privileged
to lead. It is because of them that our Nation enjoys the
benefits of space today, and it is because of them, America's
sons and daughters, that we will compete, deter, and win in the
future.
I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Raymond, and
thank you all, gentlemen, for your testimony and service.
Since I had a chance to unleash a few questions out of
order, let me ask one question to General Brown and then yield
and recognize Senator Inhofe.
General Brown, Section 139 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for fiscal year 2021 requires the Secretary
of Defense to certify that the retirement of the U-2 or Global
Hawks will not denigrate the capability of combatant commanders
to carry out their missions. Has the Secretary of Defense made
such a determination that would allow you to retire 20 Global
Hawk aircraft in this fiscal year 2022 budget?
General Brown. Chairman, we are actually in the process of
working through that waiver. I personally have sat down with
the Deputy Secretary of Defense to discuss the waiver package.
I do not know exactly what the status is with the Secretary of
Defense, but we are on the path to get that waiver approved.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Since I have had my
question time, let me recognize Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. No, feel free to go ahead and take more.
All right. General Brown, first of all thank you for the
discussion that we had in my office. I appreciate that very
much, and I really learned a lot as to what we are really
trying to get to. As I mentioned, China will have more stealth
fighters in the Western Pacific than us in 2025. That is just
one of the consequences of our very low number of aircraft
procurements since 1990, and we can get into the discussion. I
hate to keep comparing. My fear for what might be happening to
that F-35, with what has happened and did happen back in about
2004 with the F-22. The only reason I keep bringing that up, I
am about the only one around here old enough to remember that.
So we want to make sure that we profit from the mistakes we
made back at that time.
We need the total capability that we have, for the stress
on the airmen, and to that point Mr. Kendall testified at his
confirmation hearing to be Secretary of the Air Force, that the
way to bring down sustainment costs is to procure more F-35's.
So, General Brown, I was surprised that no F-35's were on
your unfunded priority list, and quite often I think we had 48,
I believe it was, in the budget, and at time we used that same
number before, 48 new F-35's. But we have also been having F-
35's on our commitment for our unfunded priority list, and they
were not.
So I would kind of like to know, first of all, I am sure
there is some reason that we did not have more on our unfunded
list this time as we have in the past, and then some kind of a
statement as to your commitment as to the F-35 being the
cornerstone of the Air Force. Now that is not just for us on
this Committee. That is for our allies that are out there,
because they are depending on that, because there is not
another game in town.
Do you have any response as to why we did not have unfunded
F-35's in this last budget?
General Brown. Chairman Inhofe, I appreciate the
conversation as well and I appreciate the opportunity to share
with you, and with the Committee as well, as I have said
publicly.
The F-35 is the cornerstone of our fighter fleet. Right now
it is the second-largest of our fighter fleets inside the
United States Air Force. At the same time, it is a very capable
platform, and in watching the mission capable rates, the
mission capable rates for the F-35 are on par with the rest of
our fighter fleet. So not only for the United States Air Force
but also for our allies and partners, and I personally engage
with many of our allies and partners that are flying the F-35,
and I know they feel the same way about the F-35.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, but I am just saying that you can not
say it enough, because they have a big investment, a lot to
rely on, on that vehicle. And so I think it serves a good
purpose to remind them that yes, that is our cornerstone, it
will remain that way, and we are going to increase that fleet.
General Raymond, we discussed this also in our meeting. One
of the main reasons we created the Space Force was to focus the
Department efforts in space. It seems to me, and I suspect I am
not the only member up here on this dais that is a little
confused in terms of what are we trying to--what is our goal
right now? I know there are some things that we have done that
we are going to be leaving with the services, some will be
transferred over to Space Force. I am not exactly sure.
First of all, what is going to be transferred over, and
then, secondly, what would be our timing on this, and what
would it look like at the end? In the remainder of my time,
just another 40 seconds, any comments about that? What is this
supposed to look like, and when would we anticipate the signs
are, therefore, to end that transformation that is taking place
now?
General Raymond. Yes, thanks for the question, sir and I
appreciated the opportunity to meet with you yesterday.
We are driving unity of effort across the Department. As
you said in your question, I think that is one of the reasons
why we stood up the Space Force. We have come to agreement with
the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force on what missions should
transfer over, and I appreciate the close partnerships that we
have enjoyed with all three of those services.
We are going to begin bringing those capabilities over this
year, and it is largely capabilities that the other services
operated in space, and we will bring those over. What we wanted
to be careful, though, is that we did not break the other
services as we stood up at Space Force. We did that work
initially with the Air Force over the last year. We have
brought all the mission sets from the Air Force now into the
Space Force, and beginning in this fiscal year we will begin
the transfer of Army and Navy capabilities into the force as
well, to unite those efforts under one service.
Senator Inhofe. When would you anticipate that those
expectations would be met?
General Raymond. Sir, that begins this year, and will bleed
over into next year to finalize it. But over the next two
fiscal years we will complete that shifting of capabilities
from those other services.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much, General. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Senator Shaheen,
please.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, and Acting Secretary Roth,
General Brown, and General Raymond, thank you all for being
here this morning.
General Brown, I would like to begin with you, and I am
sure you will not be surprised to know that I want to talk
about the KC-46, because we had the opportunity, back in
February, to fly with airmen from the Pease Air National Guard
Base. It was really impressive to see how proficient they were
getting with the new aircraft, and I understand that is
happening across the country.
What I understand the Air Mobility Command has said is that
units like the 157th Air Refueling Wing will begin taking on
operational taskings from United States Transportation Command
(TRANSCOM) this summer. When do you expect that to begin? Do
you have a date?
General Brown. Thank you for the question, and I also
appreciate the opportunity to go with you on the KC-46 and meet
with our guardsmen from New Hampshire.
It will be this summer. I do not have a specific date but I
can get back to you on that. But actually, the KC-46 capability
release, to be able to refuel, to be able to use those that
have KC-46's that are already mission capable, the New
Hampshire Air National Guard will be at the top of the list of
one of the units that will be asked to help support.
Senator Shaheen. I am really pleased to hear that. Thank
you. Can you talk about how investments in this 2022 budget are
going to help to meet the goal of full operational status for
the KC-46's, and how will it, or will it, address the remote
vision system, and what is the update on making that
operational, what the status is of that.
General Brown. So in this particular budget as we continue
to pursue and procure KC-46's, the 46 has been delivered here
just this past week and we will continue on that path.
On the remote vision system, we are making great progress
there with the Air Force engineers and with the Boeing
engineers, to bring that capability, and it is staying on track
to deliver fiscal year 2023 time frame. The other aspect of
this is, as we discussed, is the ability to retire some of our
KC-10's and KC-135's frees up the airmen that we are going to
train to fly the KC-46's that are coming off the line, and so
working all those in concert will be important to ensure we
have the capability from the KC-46.
Senator Shaheen. Well, great. I am really pleased to hear
that, and we are looking forward to having those folks who have
been transferred out of New Hampshire back, to be able to fly
all those missions.
General Raymond, this week National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) Administrator Bill Nelson testified
before the Commerce, Justice, and Science Appropriations
Subcommittee, which I chair, and he talked about the need for
the United States to continue to lead the world in outer space,
and as we saw, China sending two astronauts into space this
week, it really resonates that we have competition. He also
talked about the importance of landing the next humans on the
moon, and that being done by the United States, not by China or
Russia.
So can you talk about how leadership in the civilian
space--no pun intended--factors into your decision-making as
you are looking at the decisions you are making for the Space
Force, and how do you coordinate, or do you coordinate your
investments with NASA, since many of those overlap as we are
looking at what we are doing in space?
General Raymond. Yes, ma'am. It is a great question. I have
had the opportunity now, on two occasions over the last week,
to talk to new Administrator Nelson, former Senator Nelson, a
great man, and we are lucky to have him as the Administrator.
We work very closely with NASA. We send people to NASA to
be astronauts. We partner with them on launch. We partner with
them on developing norms of behavior. We partner with them on
developing training capabilities. In fact, NASA had some
capabilities that they developed back in the Apollo days, and
we said rather than having us build our own thing, why don't we
just take that and modify it? So we have done it.
So I am very pleased with the partnership that we enjoy. We
both rely on the same defense industrial base. We also have
strong partnerships with commercial. We also partner with
partners, and NASA has a very broad set of partners. We are in
the partnership-building business, and that relationship really
allows us to help develop our partners as well.
So I am very grateful for the partnership in NASA and look
forward to working very closely with Senator Nelson, now
Administrator Nelson, in the future.
Senator Shaheen. Do you agree with his analysis that it is
going to be really important for the United States to lead in
the next lunar landing?
General Raymond. I absolutely agree that it is important
that the United States lead in all aspects of space. It is
critical. It underpins every instrument of national power.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Let me call upon
Senator Fischer, via Webex.
Senator Fischer. Welcome to all the members of the panel
today.
Secretary Roth and General Brown, I appreciate the strong
support this budget shows toward nuclear modernization,
including critical programs like the Ground Based Strategic
Deterrent (GBSD) and the Long Range Stand Off Weapon (LRSO). I
am also happy to see the Air Force moving forward with the
Survivable Airborne Operations Center as a replacement to the
E-4B. This was something that the Air Force studied for a long
time, and it is gratifying to see action begin to happen here.
General Brown, let me say again how much I appreciate you
traveling with me and a number of other Senators to Minot,
North Dakota, and also to United States Strategic Command
(STRATCOM) earlier this year. Very briefly, sir, do you
continue to believe that the GBSD program is essential?
General Brown. Senator, I appreciate the question, and most
definitely. The program has been on track. It is essential to
our strategic deterrence. It supports every one of our
Operating Plans (OPLANs). [Inaudible] the foundation of our
OPLANs to provide our nuclear deterrent. So it is very
important to our security, and I appreciated the opportunity to
engage with you on that topic when we had a chance to visit
both STRATCOM and Minot.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Another vital component to our
modernization effort involves extending the life of the B-52
through 2050, and equipping the plane's new engines is central
to this effort. This budget requests significant additional
resources in fiscal year 2023 for re-engining, and I am
concerned that some people have portrayed this as an increase,
as reflecting a 50 percent cost growth in this program.
Secretary Roth, that is not an accurate statement by those
people, is it?
Mr. Roth. No, it is not. We just recently approved the
program, total program costs about $11 billion. That was a 9
percent increase over the previous estimate, and all that was
an update to the estimate. Based on some of the virtual
prototyping that had taken place in the program, a reassessment
of the requirement, a look at the complexity of the integration
of a commercial engine into the aging platform that the B-52
is, and a look at the current price of the industrial base and
the realities of buying from the current industrial base.
So again, back to your question, it was a 9 percent
increase in the total acquisition cost.
Chairman Reed. Senator Fischer, there seems to be an
interruption in your signal.
We will restore communication with Senator Fischer, but at
this time I would like to ask Senator King if he would prepare
his questions.
Senator King. Thank you. It is always daunting to
substitute for Senator Fischer.
General Brown, I am concerned about readiness and aircraft
availability. There was a Government Accountability Office
(GAO) report in the winter of 2020 that indicated various
numbers for various airplanes, ranging from 70 percent down to
52 percent, sometimes even the 40 percent range. How do we
improve that? That just strikes me as unacceptable. I do not
know the comparable figures for the private sector, but my
sense is if Delta Airlines had a 70 percent availability for
their aircraft they would be out of business. Is it parts? Is
it maintenance personnel? Is it intellectual property so that
we can make our own parts? What are the bottlenecks on
availability?
General Brown. Senator, I appreciate the question, and like
you I am concerned to make sure that we have the readiness that
is required to support the combatant commanders, but also to
ensure that our airmen are fully trained and capable to support
our national security requirements.
One of the key factors that impacts our readiness is our
weapons system sustainment, but I also look at the age, the
average age of our fleet, which is about 28 years, in addition
to about 40 percent or more of our fleet is past designed
service life. So our focus on not only sustaining the current
capability with our weapons systems sustainment investment, but
at the same time being able to modernize. What we are finding
is that our aircraft now, over the past 2 decades, are breaking
about a third more, taking about 10 percent longer to fix. We
have the right manpower from a maintenance perspective, but
they are young. What I mean by that is we plussed up manpower
there just several years ago. A lot of them are what we call at
our entry level, and we are building that experience at the
same time we are operating some older platforms.
Senator King. But my understanding is part of the problem
is parts availability, it can take ages to get parts from the
manufacturer. Are we developing programs where we can build our
own parts? I foresee a day where every depot has a 3D printer
and we have the intellectual property as part of the purchase
of the airframe in order to be able to make our own parts, so
that we do not have to be at the mercy of the original
equipment manufacturer (OEM).
General Brown. Senator, we are doing that, and the intent
is to do as much as we can with some of the 3D printing,
particularly as we look at some of our older platforms, where
we have diminishing supply from our vendors, because some of
those vendors do not exist anymore. So taking opportunities to
advance in our technology with the 3D printing is exactly one
of the things we are working on.
Senator King. Well, I hope that in future acquisitions part
of the deal is always to purchase the intellectual property, so
that we can make our own parts and not be dependent upon the
supply chain.
General Brown. That is exactly our approach, is we do our
digital acquisition approach and be able to have not only
access to the intellectual property but also using open-mission
systems and agile software to be able to redesign very quickly,
or adjust quickly, and print like you described.
Senator King. Let me ask a question that Senator Fischer
might have wanted to ask. Have you done a cost analysis of the
new GBSD versus life-extension for Minuteman-III over a long
period of time? What is the difference in cost?
General Brown. Well, to date the difference in cost is $38
billion. It is $38 billion cheaper to do GBSD than to life-
extend the Minuteman-III.
Senator King. In addition to a cost savings, you are
gaining a new generation of technology. Is that correct?
General Brown. Exactly. For our nuclear portfolio, it needs
to be safe, secure, reliable, and deter the threat, and with
the GBSD it will be more safe, more secure, more reliable, and
better deterrence against a threat, with a very capable system.
Senator King. General Raymond, you mentioned unity of
effort in your testimony. You are trying to coordinate the work
within the development of the Space Force. Can you expand on
that for a few minutes--actually, for 39 seconds?
General Raymond. For 39 seconds? Yes, sir. I will be happy
to. It is good to see you, and thanks for traveling with me to
Colorado. As we showed you out there----
Senator King. Did you get your driver's license, John?
General Raymond. I did. Thank you. As I showed you out
there, sir, we have made great progress in developing a
strategy and then architecting and designing the force to meet
that strategy. That is driving unity of effort across Missile
Defense Agency (MDA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO),
Space Development Agency, the Space and Missile Systems Center.
For the first time in my career we have got all five working
towards a common vision now and a common architecture. That is
the value of standing up this service, and that is going well.
On the requirements side, the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC) just signed a memo that says the Space Force is
going to be the lead integrator for requirements for this space
across the Department, and so that is another big steps that is
in close partnership with that force design work.
Then, finally, and I know I have got the red light [points
to timer], on the acquisition side, we are driving unity of
effort as we have designed our space systems command to bring
disruptive innovators and align them with our more traditional
partners, to have competition and go fast.
Senator King. Well, I appreciate that, and I am out of time
but I do--and perhaps I will submit a question for the record
on the issue of joint capability acquisition, software, for
example. We have Goldwater-Nichols for joint operation. I am
concerned that we have got software being purchased all over
the Defense Department that may be duplicative and may even be
incompatible. So I will be submitting that question to you and
the Secretary.
Thank you all very much for your service.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Let me now
recognize, via Webex, Senator Wicker, please.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Well, thank you very much, and I
would have been happy to defer to Senator Fischer to finish her
questions, but here we go.
I understand Senator Shaheen has already asked about the
KC-46. But let me just say I appreciate the progress that is
being made. But KC-135's continue to perform a majority of
refueling missions. Last year's NDAA prohibited the Air Force
from retiring the KC-135's until after fiscal year 2023. The
budget submission includes plans to retire 18 KC-135's, and, of
course, the Legislative branch will eventually make the
decision there.
But I am concerned that the Air Force wants to move KC-
135's to a backup inventory. I remain concerned about this, and
it seems to me that your decision is budget driven rather than
needs driven. If you had a higher top line, General, would you
be forced to make this decision to retire 18 KC-135's, in a
reversal of the clear language of the NDAA?
General Brown. Senator, I appreciate the question. I really
do believe that I would actually probably continue on the same
path we are today, to transition from our aging KC-135 to the
newer KC-46. That is to balance where we are headed as an Air
Force, to transition to the future. In addition to that, the
manpower in our airmen that operate and maintain those KC-135's
are the same airmen that operate and maintain our KC-46's, and
so I have got to have the ability to, as we bring KC-46's
online, to send them to training. Because it is not a flip of a
switch, and have them transition to this newer platform.
It will be a balance, and so right now we are on the path
to have 179 KC-46's and still have 300 KC-135's in our
inventory to meet the requirements laid out by the United
States Transportation Command.
Senator Wicker. If you had more money, you still would make
the very same decision?
General Brown. Well, if I had more money I would actually
reconsider. What I would also do is, actually, I am not so sure
I would put it into tankers, because of all the other
requirements we have as an Air Force. That is where the
analysis that I have been working very hard with our staff on,
to ensure that any decision we make is thought through very
carefully, we have the analysis to back it up, because with a
degree in engineering I am all about the facts and the numbers.
That is what I actually do. I would not commit to you whether I
would put it into tankers but I would take a hard look at
tankers but also other capabilities that the United States Air
Force requires.
Senator Wicker. Well, we are prepared to take a hard look,
in this Committee, too. Just with regard to training aircraft,
I understand that a plan is being finalized to retire the T-1
training aircraft, currently used to support specialized
Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT), and the Air Force intends
to move to an increased reliance on simulator training. General
Brown, what is the Air Force's plan for the future of the T-1
training fleet? In a recent forum, retired Air Force General
James Holmes commented that there is no substitute for live
training. That make sense to me. Are you concerned about the
possible impacts that overreliance on simulator training could
have on the quality of the new Air Force UPT graduates?
General Brown. When I look at our UPT and our training
there is a combination of things I am actually looking at. One
is the T-1 and how we are looking at the T-1 here in this
budget but also to the future of how long we keep it into the
Air Force. It is also a balance of being able to use some of
the technology of some of our simulators as well as using live
flying, because you have got to be able to do some of both.
What I have seen, really, throughout my career, is the
increasing capability of our simulators to make it more
realistic. But there is nothing like hearing that engine noise,
smelling that JP-8, and actually being airborne, and so we have
to do a combination of both and ensure we get the best training
for our pilots.
Senator Wicker. Well, does the current plan contain enough
of that actual in-the-cockpit training?
General Brown. Senator, I believe it does, and this is
something that I do pay very close attention to, as I work with
Air Education and Training Command, to talk to them about some
of the initiatives we have, to ensure not only the production
numbers but also the quality of our students when they graduate
from pilot training.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Well, my time is about to expire. I
will submit a question to you, General Brown, about an article
written under the pseudonym of Ned Stark, concerning a call for
senior officer reform in the Air Force, an insider's
perspective on the promotion process in the Air Force. I will
submit that to you for the record, sir, and thank you all for
your service.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. We are trying to
re-establish connection with Senator Fischer. Once we do we
will recognize her in order, to finish her questioning. But at
this time let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Gillibrand,
please.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, I can
attest the internet is down in the Senate right now, so I am
using my phone.
I am very excited, for Secretary Roth and General Brown, to
hear that the Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station (NFARS), one of
my state's best defense equities, is a candidate for hosting
the KC-46A Pegasus reserve component. In addition to the Air
Station's strategic location, and that it possesses much of the
needed equipment, the community around NFARS is one of the best
in the country, that supports servicemembers, their families,
and has an economy, amenities, and services, including health
care and affordable housing, that allows for this to be a very
strategic location.
Will you be looking at these types of issues as you make
your decision about where to locate, and to what extent do
considerations made by the Air Force include economic,
educational, and health care options for spouses and
dependents?
Mr. Roth. As you may be familiar, we have what we call a
strategic basing process, that is very analytically based, and
uses a series of criteria, that include an assessment of the
individual communities in terms of kinds of the educational
opportunities, the opportunities for spouse employment, and
those kinds of things. So it is part of our strategic basing
process and criteria, and will be used across the board for all
our basing decisions.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. On the issues of sexual
assault in the military, it is something obviously this
Committee has been looking at for the last 8 years, and I
personally have been focused on trying to create reforms that I
believe can begin to get at this scourge. One of the main
reforms that we have settled on over the last 8 years is
drawing a bright line at all serious crimes and taking those
crimes out of the chain of command.
The reason why there is a bright line at serious crimes is
because this is what our allies did--the U.K., Israel, Canada,
Australia, Netherlands, Germany--for defendants' rights. They
thought if you could have a less biased system, a more
professionalized system, a more highly trained system, and
certainly have the decision-maker not know the perpetrator or
the plaintiff, that it would be able to be a fairer, more just
system. So they did it for defendants' rights.
This reform is something that 66 Senators now believe is
the right way to improve our military justice system so that
justice is possible, through professionalization and through
making sure that there is no bias.
This will help our military in two ways. One, I believe it
will mean more cases will go to trial, sexual assault cases,
and I believe that the right cases will be chosen, and so they
might end in conviction, since we have a very low conviction
rate right now.
Second, there has been a lot of talk the last few years
about racial bias in the criminal justice system, in the
military system, and that black----
Chairman Reed. We are having, obviously, technical
difficulties. I am told that the internet in Russell Building
is down, and that, again, when we restore communication with
Senator Gillibrand we will allow her to finish her questioning,
along with others.
But at this point let me call on Senator Rounds, please.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, gentlemen,
let me begin by just saying thank you for your literally
decades of service to our country.
General Brown, an issue this Committee consistently hears
about, from the combatant commanders, is the lack of ISR
capability. I understand this budget proposal asks to retire a
number of JSTARS, along with some RQ-4's. I would like to hear
your thoughts on how the Air Force will continue to meet the
ISR requirements while you retire a portion of your existing
ISR fleet, recognizing that right now we are not able to meet
the demands of the combatant commanders today. Then I guess I
would ask, also, as a follow-up on that, I understand the Air
Force is no longer requesting to procure additional MQ-9
aircraft. Does the Air Force plan to divest these valuable
assets in the near future as well?
General Brown. Senator, I appreciate your question, and one
of the things from the United States Air Force is the demand
signal from combatant commanders for ISR from the Air Force far
exceeds the capacity that we do have. So there is a great
appetite for what the Air Force provides.
Part of that is how we balance risks between the United
States Air Force and the combatant commanders. That is the
dialogue I have with the combatant commanders. The aspect I
look at, as we move to the future, is we have got to ensure
that ISR is persistent, connected, and survivable. We have
persistence today, not as connected as I want to be, and not as
survivable as I think we need to be as we look to the future.
As I work with the combatant commanders it is how we make
that transition. At the same time, how do we look at moving
information, because it is really about the information to make
decisions, versus a platform. Now I am thinking about terabytes
of data that we move through other means, like Advanced Battle
Management System. So it is a combination of those that we work
together.
On the MQ-9, we are not procuring MQ-9's but we are going
to still have MQ-9's in our inventory until the middle of the
next decade. We still have deliveries that will occur into
fiscal years 2024 and 2025. The MQ-9's that we do have, we are
going to modernize to make them more resilient and connected,
like I just described, and those upgrades will occur on the MQ-
9's that we do have, and they will be in the inventory until
about 2035 or so.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir. Just continuing on, General
Brown, reviewing the Air Force's budget requests I am concerned
with the decreasing flying hours that are indicated, by about
7.5 percent. I am curious about your opinion about how this is
going to impact how we can safely train pilots, and ultimately
enabling the service to meet the National Defense Strategy
objectives. I know there have been several reports in the press
already where there has been a question as to whether or not
these airmen are able to have access to aircraft and the
numbers needed to maintain the proficiency right now. How do we
add into that an anticipated 7.5 percent reduction in the
budget for that?
General Brown. Part of that 7.5 percent reduction was
actually us going back and doing the analysis on under-
execution of our flying hour program, going back to fiscal year
2019. We made some adjustments in fiscal year 2020, realizing
that COVID--in 2021--COVID has impacted what we really
executed, and so what we are really trying to do is normalize
and get closer to our actual execution.
The balance of that is also to ensure that we have the
right amount of training and flying hours to be able to execute
and train our airmen, by using that funding that we take out of
the flying hour, to ensure we actually have the availability of
aircraft to match up with the flying hour program.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, General.
Secretary Roth, bomber inventory continues to be stressed,
and the retirement of 17 B-1B's, while understandably
necessary, depletes an already undersized and critical force.
Are there any further planned cuts to the bomber force before
adding significant numbers of the operational B-21's to the
inventory?
Mr. Roth. The answer is what we are going to do is manage
the transition from the current force of bombers that we have
to the ultimate bomber inventory that we will have, that will
be dependent on the B-21 and B-52. So we will manage that in a
conditions-based, events-based kind of manner, that as B-21's
come online we will then start retiring B-1's and B-2's. We
will not get ahead of our headlights on that. We will ensure
that the B-21 is delivering on time and on schedule as we go
forward.
The 17 B-1's that were identified this year were the oldest
and most expensive to repair B-1's, that, to a large extent,
were not flying anyway. That is where we are now, and we will
stay there for a while, and then what we are going to look
forward to is as the B-21 delivers we will start retiring B-
1's, and B-2's.
Senator Rounds. Just a confirmation that it is your
understanding that the B-21 is on time and on budget.
Mr. Roth. To date it is an exemplary acquisition program.
It has met every significant milestone to date. The first
flight we anticipate is in fiscal year 2022, so the first
airplane will actually get off the ground next year.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds. There appears to
be a disruption of telecommunication services around the
Capitol, so would urge all of our colleagues to come in person
to ask their questions. That would expedite the hearing
immensely.
With that let me recognize Senator Hirono, please.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Roth,
last year it was announced that the Hawaii Air National Guard
had been selected to have one of four national offensive space
control squadrons. I understand that the Hawaii Air National
Guard is in the process of establishing the 293rd Space Control
Squad based on the Pacific Missile Range facility on Kauai.
Mr. Secretary, I know that you are working with the
National Guard Bureau on a plan to add a reserve component to
the Space Force. What is the status of this plan?
Mr. Roth. Yes. We have been working on that plan over the
last year or so, and that plan has been sent to the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of Defense, for his
approval. So as soon as we can schedule a session with the
Secretary of Defense we plan to go through that with them, and
then we will work with both the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, ultimately probably the Office of Management and
Budget, and will be forwarding a proposal, based on the
Secretary of Defense's decision.
Senator Hirono. So in terms of the status of a plan, then,
would you envision it within this fiscal year, or next, that
this plan would be in place?
Mr. Roth. We actually hope it is imminent. I can have the
Space Chief jump in here too and give you more details. We are
hoping it is imminent. You know, we have done what we have to
do, and so we are working with the Secretary's staff to get
something we would anticipate this summer.
Senator Hirono. ``Imminent'' is good right now. For General
Raymond. Could you envision a missile tracking system in space
replacing ground-based radars like Homeland Defense Radar-
Hawaii (HDR-H)? If so, what is the timeline for these
satellites coming online?
General Raymond. Yes, ma'am, first of all, we are doing
work right now to design that, and we have united the entire
Department towards that end, including the Missile Defense
Agency, the Space Development Agency, Space and Missile Systems
Center, and others. We are doing that force design work as we
speak, and then we will begin to program for that this next
budget, this shift. But to do that mission effectively, you
have to do that from space. It provides the coverage and the
ability to do that critical mission.
Senator Hirono. So are you saying that this kind of
tracking system in space will replace the planned HDR-H, which,
by the way, I and other members have concerns that that is not
even in the President's budget this year.
General Raymond. We are not looking to replace--it is kind
of a dual path. Like today in missile warning, we have
satellites that are on orbit and we also have missile warning
radars, and so it requires both.
Senator Hirono. Just so I can be clear then, you are saying
it is not necessary to replace the ground-based defense radars
but it could be in addition to. Is that what you just said?
General Raymond. Yes, ma'am. The space capabilities that we
have today, for example, the missile warning detect launches
immediately upon launch, and then as the missiles fly they go
through radar paths. It requires really both of those assets to
be able to do that well.
Senator Hirono. Okay. Based on your response I continue to
have concerns that HDR-H is not in the budget.
For Secretary Roth, I note in your testimony a commitment
to diversity, which, of course, I applaud. Do you have a matrix
for determining whether your efforts to removing barriers to
service, as you note in your testimony, are, in fact, resulting
in a more diverse Air Force?
Mr. Roth. Yeah. We actually have a data-driven process. We
have established an Office of Diversity and Inclusion. The head
of that office is a direct report to the Secretary. So there
has been a plan outlined. We have something, for example,
called the Barrier Working Group, and other kinds of groups
that are looking at doing climate kinds of surveys and doing
analysis on some of the trends in both the hiring trends and
the promotion trends and those kinds of things.
We have an overall process that includes education, that
includes training, it includes additional guidance to hiring
panels and the like, as well. So again, our attempt is to do
focused, data-driven kinds of initiatives to try to get at
improving our posture overall.
Senator Hirono. Does this mean that you can already provide
us with information as to how you are doing on the diversity
front?
Mr. Roth. Let me get back to you. Let me check and see, in
terms of--because, to some extent, the office--in defense of
the office, it was just stood up this year. But we have some
climate survey results from previous surveys that we have done.
So we will work with your folks, if that is okay, and we will
get with you and show you what we have.
Senator Hirono. I am glad that this is happening, because
having an intention to diversify does not mean anything unless
you actually do those kinds of things that will result in
diversity.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have some other questions for
the record.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Cotton,
please.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
gentlemen, for your appearance today.
General Brown, as Congress considers this year's budget
requests, and the Department of Defense's top line budget, it
has become increasingly clear that the Services cannot rely on
budget increases to acquire the capabilities the Nation will
require in the future unless Congress takes action to change
the President's Budget. If not, though, the Services will need
to find money inside their existing budgets.
I understand that retiring certain older aircraft is
critical to finding these funds to invest in what the Air Force
seeks for the future, like F-35's, KC-46's, the Advanced Battle
Management System, B-21's, and a new ground-based
intercontinental missile. Can you please describe some of the
risks that the Air Force will have to accept if it is not able
to pursue those planned retirements of older aircraft?
General Brown. Sure, Senator. I appreciate the question. I
would categorize the risk in really four categories:
modernization, manpower, maintenance, and operational.
On modernization, what it would do is really force us to
continue to operate today's equipment and not be able to meet
the requirements I expect from future combatant commanders.
On manpower, from a manpower standpoint, the airmen that we
have today, that are tied up in some of these older platforms
or legacy platforms, are the same airmen I am going to require
to operate the newer platforms. So I have to be able to balance
and train them to be ready to execute.
On the maintenance, what I see is our sustainment costs
continue to go up, and as those sustainment costs go up it
actually then decreases our buying power, to be able to use
that money to purchase new equipment, and as you have that new
equipment, it is a bit easier to maintain and sustain as we go
forward.
Then last is on operational. There are impacts for
readiness, based on aircraft availability, for example. I also
think about our airmen and our joint teammates that we put at
risk with capabilities that may not meet up against the threat.
The last is really the risk to our national security
objectives, when you pull it all together, what the Air Force
provides with our joint teammates to make sure that we do the
things that the Nation has asked us to do.
Senator Cotton. Those are all worrisome risks, I would
agree. I think we should be mindful as a committee, too, about
those risks, before we try to maintain some of these aircraft
in the fleet, if it is time for them to go or we pursue future
aircraft, occasionally for parochial reasons.
Is it also fair, General Brown, to say that some of the
money you hope to save by these retirements is going to be
spent on systems or weapons that we cannot discuss in this open
forum?
General Brown. That is correct, and I would be more than
happy to come back in a classified forum to share some of those
details.
Senator Cotton. I know what they are. You do not have to
come back to me.
I want to make a point, though, here, that I think every
system the Air Force hopes to retire is a system that flies
openly, that we know about, that is in their local communities,
and that can cause some political friction with Congress. Some
of things we have talked about, we all know about and talk
about openly, like the F-35 or the B-21, but some of them we
can not, and that is hard for Senators and Congressmen to
explain to our voters back home sometimes, especially if
certain states or districts are going to lose an aircraft. I
just think that we need to be mindful that there is a lot the
Air Force needs to do in its classified setting, and that we
may not always be able to explain that publicly, but the
American people should keep that in mind, that you are doing a
lot of work behind the scenes to keep this country safe as
well.
General Brown, the Air Force is heavily invested in both
the B-21 and the Long-Range Standoff weapon. Do you agree that
both of these programs are required in their own right but also
as a supportive and complementary system to each other?
General Brown. I do, very much so.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Thank you. General Raymond, my time
is almost up. I would like to discuss with you, at some point,
the circumstances with Lieutenant Colonel Matt Lohmeier's
relief out in the 11th Space Warning Squadron, if you will
follow up with my office so we could have a conversation.
Secretary Roth, I think you probably will not be appearing
before the Committee anymore any time soon, at least as one of
the longest-serving officials in the Department of Defense. I
want to thank you for many decades of service to our country,
and should you come back as an expert in the private sector at
some point in the future, I do not want to hear what we always
hear from Bob Gates when we bring him back, which is--he is
telling the biggest lie in Washington--"It is a pleasure to be
back in front of the Committee.''
[Laughter.]
Senator Cotton. But thank you very much for many, many
years of dedicated service at the Department of Defense.
Mr. Roth. Thank you, Senator, for your kind words.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Now we have
restored communication with Senator Gillibrand. Let me
recognize her for the remaining minutes of her questioning.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, Secretary
Roth, I just wanted to conclude the point I was making, that
this idea of a bright line begins to restore two concerns we
have with the military justice system: bias against survivors
of sexual assault and bias against black and brown
servicemembers, for both plaintiffs' rights and defendants'
rights, and to mirror the reforms of our allies, that they have
done over the last 40 years.
So I wanted to know what your take on this was, whether you
have looked at this data in detail, what you think the current
status of affairs is with regard to the Air Force, and what you
hope to accomplish.
Mr. Roth. Yes. Obviously we have looked at it and we have
discussed it, and we are aware of the legislation that is
working its way through the Senate. We are also aware of
legislation in the House, and I think, as you are aware, we
have an Independent Review Commission inside the Pentagon who
is also coming up with a series of recommendations. Our
commitment to all of you is we will work with you. We have some
concerns, in terms of some of the breadth of what is being
addressed, and we also have some process concerns.
But we agree there is a problem there. We need to fix it.
What we are doing today is not working, and so we will work
with everybody to find a way forward here, and arrive at what
is best for the airmen and the guardians in the force.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Secretary Roth and General
Raymond, you did address this issue of the Space National
Guard, and you discussed it already today, but I wanted to know
what your perspective is on that and what you hope to create
with a reserve component, and whether you think that might be
able to address some of our recruiting challenges and our
retention challenges for that best talent in the country.
Mr. Roth. Yes. Perhaps I should defer to the Space Chief.
But from my perspective, there are two elements to that. There
are the reserves and then there is the National Guard, and
there is some nuanced differences in how we approach that. But
I think with the Space Force we have a unique opportunity here
for a new Space Force, a relatively small Space Force, to do
things that are innovative and creative, that will move us
forward, and might provide us kind of a pilot for what we could
do with a larger force as well.
General Raymond. Ma'am, it is a centerpiece to our human
capital strategy. I think it will help enable exactly the
things that you highlighted. I would welcome the opportunity,
since the red light is on, to come discuss this with you in
great detail. I am excited about where we have landed on this,
and I think it is going to be very beneficial to our service
and to the Guard and reserves as well.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Let me
recognize Senator Ernst, please.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and gentlemen, thank
you for appearing in front of the Committee today. We certainly
appreciate your great service to our Nation.
I would like to start, obviously we have addressed the
issue of operating in a budgetary environment that is very
constrained, and with that comes certain challenges. But
through those challenges I think it is up to us to find some
opportunity.
Secretary Roth, Congress had granted DOD middle-tier
acquisition authority, the 804 authorities, to save some time
and money on acquisition programs. As I understand it, this
particular authority is being used at least in the B-52 engine
program.
So could we hear from you a little bit about some of the
lessons learned, if that is effective, how that program is
working with the use of the 804 authorities?
Mr. Roth. Well, for us, I mean, the criticism of DOD
acquisition, Air Force acquisition, specifically is that it is
too bureaucratic, it is too slow, it is not agile enough, all
those kinds of things. We look at the mid-tier acquisition
initiative, Section 804, as an opportunity to be more agile, to
be quicker, to be more responsive, more dependence on
prototyping, more dependence on tailoring acquisition to
individual programs, more emphasis on delegating management of
programs down to the lowest level possible, rather than trying
to run everything from the Pentagon.
We are actually very interested and excited about what that
could bring to the table across the board, and so we have, I
guess, for lack of a better word, bought in across the board in
terms of doing that.
So the B-52 re-engining program is an example. We plan to
use it, for example, for the A-10 re-winging program. For two
major programs, two or three major programs that are in our
modernization program. The Next Generation Air Dominance
program, the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent program, and the
B-21 are all examples where we are using that kind of an
approach married up with digital engineering, the digital
trinity, in terms of open systems architecture and agile
software, and the like.
Going along with that is some rigorous metrics that have to
be put in place. Just because we are going fast does not mean
we should not have any discipline and we should not be watching
these. But it also offers us opportunities to shift gears and
go in a different direction if what we are doing is not
working.
Senator Ernst. No, that is fantastic, and I appreciate
that. My next question was going to be, can you give other
examples where this is working, and so thank you for laying
that out for us. Again, I think it is important that we
understand, operating in this type of environment, that we need
to find other ways of doing business, not to drop the standard
but simply to find ways where we can save time and hopefully
some dollars.
General Brown, I want to thank you again for traveling to
Minot and Offutt, as Senator Fischer had stated. It was a
phenomenal trip for many of us to witness our two branches of
the nuclear triad. But I would like to address the National
Guard for just a moment.
The President and the Secretary of Defense have both raised
some alarm about the rising challenges that we see from some of
our near-peer adversaries, primarily China and Russia, and, of
course, a lot of dispersed terrorist threats around the globe.
We have really been stretching our force to meet those
challenges, and the Air Guard has seen its busiest year since
World War II. The demand signal continues to increase, and the
Air Guard is mobilizing with increasing frequency, both at
home, domestically in the United States, as well as abroad.
The President's Budget does slash the Air National Guard
training and component budgets, along with cuts to paid drill
and individual training days, with the expectation that
contingency mobilizations are on the path to pre-9/11 levels.
What evidence do you have that would indicate the Air National
Guard's usage reductions will go to pre-9/11 levels?
General Brown. One of the things that we are going doing
inside the United States Air Force is our force generation
model, new force generation model that actually can better
predict how we are going to actually deploy our forces, and at
the same time put some discipline about how we execute. The Air
Force and the Air Guard gets called on a lot. We have a lot of
flexibility, as I said in my opening statement, to do air
power, any time they work, and because of that we get called on
quite often.
One of the things we are working with, both on the Active
but also with the Reserve components, is to ensure we lay out a
more disciplined process of how we actually execute and
contribute that air power to support our combatant commanders.
That will give us a more predictable tempo that gets to pre-9/
11 levels, as well as the ability to train and maintain a level
of readiness.
Senator Ernst. Okay. I appreciate that, and should we not
return to this pre-9/11 op-tempo level then we certainly need
to know that. We want to make sure that are supporting those
reserve and National Guard forces.
So again, gentlemen, thank you so much for your time and
your commitment to our great United States. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator Tillis, if
you are ready, you are recognized.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Chairman Reed. Thank you,
gentlemen, for being here, and Secretary Roth, I want to
associate myself with my colleague, Senator Cotton, on your
service and wish you the best.
I know you all are working in an environment where if we
could wave a wand and give you all the money to fund the
unfunded priority list and move some others up that you would
welcome it, but you are not working in that environment right
now. I know a couple of my colleagues talked about the KC-46A
and the problems that we are continuing to have with the boom
system. So I want to talk a little bit about the operational
impact.
I know you are trying to balance some of the cost savings
and deployment of future systems against meeting your mission,
but just going down this list, if you have this information,
how many KC-46A air-to-air refueling missions are being sourced
outside the contiguous United States (OCONUS)?
General Brown. I do not have an exact number for you,
Senator, but we can get that for you. But we are using the KC-
46 on a day-to-day basis to support particularly our training
missions, to refuel, to get our pilots their currency and our
brand-new pilots up to speed on their refueling.
Senator Tillis. I have got a series of questions that you
can maybe report back for the record, a similar question for
the KC-10 air-to-air refueling mission.
One of the concerns that I have, I think it was the Air
Force and TRANSCOM had previously stated that more than 25,000
hours of air refueling missions are not being supported
annually, with the KC-46 not being fully operational. So we
will submit a series of questions on that, because we just want
to get it right. I am not here to preserve an old platform if
you have full confidence in the future one, but the gap is what
I am concerned about and the mission requirements, and
potentially the training impacts, by not being able to train
the way that they would fight, based on current capabilities.
General Raymond, I think at one point, I know we have
talked about, in the space domain, the need for identification
and attribution activities of our adversaries. I think at one
point you also mentioned the concept of the need to punch back
or retribution. You have got 2.4 percent of the total DOD
budget. Number one, is retribution a part of your planning
process, and number two, how do you manage that with a
relatively small percentage of the overall budget?
General Raymond. Thank you for the question. First of all,
in this budget we invest in our ability to characterize, as you
mentioned in your question. We invest in what we call space
domain awareness, to have an understanding of what is going on
in that domain and to be able to characterize it. Just like any
other warfighting commander, the U.S. Space Command Commander
must have an opportunity to have the ability to understand what
is going on in that domain.
The second big area is, he has to have the ability to
command and control, so we are focusing on commanding and
controlling as well.
Where we are really focusing on in this budget is four big
priorities. One is you have to be able to defend what you have.
Two, we have to shift. We have to modernize to a more
defendable architecture. Three, you have to develop the ability
to impose costs, warfighting capability. Fourth, you have to
look at what other new missions should go to space. We are
really working to balance all four of those priorities. I think
space is central to our ability to deter, and that space can
help amplify the deterrence messaging and change the deterrence
calculus of an adversary, in both denying benefits and imposing
costs, and that is what we are balancing.
Senator Tillis. I do not know whose lane this is in. I
could assume maybe several different agencies. But we have had
reports about the amount of space debris or space junk that we
had out there. We had a report about a month ago of the
International Space Station (ISS) being hit. Is that a part of
your planning process, and is there budget allocated for that
purpose?
General Raymond. Yes, sir. We act as the space traffic
control for the world, the United States does. We catalog or
track about 30,000 objects. We provide all the conjunction
assessment, if you will, warning if two things are going to
collide, and then U.S. Space Command does all that notification
to keep things from hitting the ISS and other satellites. That
is becoming a full-time job, because of the increased
congestion that is going on and the increased number of objects
that are launching into space.
Space domain awareness is critical to the warfighter. Space
traffic control or space traffic management is something that
needs to be shifted to another organization to free up U.S.
Space Command and our operators that operate all those systems
and doing the critical space domain awareness work that they
need to do for our national security.
Senator Tillis. Thank you. Secretary Roth, I am kind of
curious of your perspective. Senator Gillibrand asked some
questions about the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
proposals that are coming through. There are some on military
sexual assault but there is a larger proposal that would
dramatically change the shift out of the command. Have you
reviewed the commission report? I am saying this to everybody
who is coming here that is part of the DOD, we need your
feedback soon. We are about a month away from doing an NDAA
markup that could have a sweeping change that may have some
operational challenges and others.
I am over time but I would like to just send a message to
Secretary Austin and all of the leadership, who I understand is
in the process of vetting it. We need your feedback pretty
quickly or it will not weigh into the decisions we are going to
be making about a month from now. So I will just leave that as
a statement rather than expect you to respond.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tillis. Let me recognize
Senator Cramer, please.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to all
of you for being here. Since Senator Tillis just ended with
that, let me just add my voice to the same admonition.
As you might imagine, General Brown, thank you for being
here and thank you for going to Minot, I listened very
attentively to your answers to Senator Reed about the
retirement of Global Hawk 30's and the waiver. But I also
noticed that in the modernization plan presented to the House
Armed Services Committee, the Block 40 now is being slated for
retirement beginning in 2025. Do we now consider the Block 40 a
sunset system?
General Brown. Not at the moment, Senator, and part of our
process as well is we want to make sure we have a good
transition. As we build the plan and as we have had a chance to
talk about it, we look at the classified system we are bringing
on. What I do not want to do is actually leave a gap. So it is
balance between our planning factors for the Block 40 and the
classified system we are going to bring on, to make sure that
we have a smooth transition going forward.
Senator Cramer. I have appreciated your great attention to
the details of that with me.
Secretary Roth, the Office of t he Secretary of Defense
(OSD) reported that the Air Force's budget is $212.8 billion.
How much of that $212.8 billion does the Secretary of the Air
Force actually control?
Mr. Roth. $174 billion. $39 billion is what has been
referred to frequently as the pass-through.
Senator Cramer. Can we do something about a more
transparent budgeting system that does not give this view that
the Air Force is getting a whole bunch of money that they
really do not control?
Mr. Roth. Yeah. We are actually working with the Office of
the Secretary of Defense to see if there are some things that
could be done. There are classified reasons why that exists,
and so we need to make sure that we do not uncover things that
ought not be uncovered. But we are working with our colleagues
on the Secretary of Defense's staff to see if there are some
ways to do that.
I will say, when we come out with the budget and we do our
budget briefings, come brief you and others here on the
oversight committees, we immediately identify what we call the
``blue budget,'' which is the $174 billion, and all our
conversations from that day on is about the $174 billion.
But I take your point, and we are, in fact, discussing what
is in the art of the doable with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense.
Senator Cramer. Well, and I think your answering that
question that way, in this forum, is part of the process, so I
thank you for that.
General Raymond, I really appreciate all the efforts that
you have put in, in this last year and a half, really from day
one, in how to involve universities in providing not only
technological assistance but obviously a well-educated and
hopefully prepared workforce, in many cases, for you to
succeed. I was really happen to see that University of North
Dakota faculty made a recent visit to Cavalier, to the radar
station, and if Molly does not get you ND Today, she can have
my copy to read all about it. It was very cool, and I really
appreciate it.
But now that you have had these 18 months, do you think
that Space Force's outreach and involvement with universities
is where it needs to be, and what can we do to strengthen you
in that regard?
General Raymond. Yes, sir, and I think it is where it needs
to be. We have developed a University Partnership Program. It
is focused on doing research together, developing people
together, recruiting talent together. This first year we are
going to have universities that are part of that University
Partnership Program, and we look to expand that in the future.
I think it is going to provide us great advantage, and we
appreciate very much the University of North Dakota's
partnership with us.
Senator Cramer. Well, and as always, let us know how we can
be helpful.
General Brown, I do have some concerns about the cuts in
the fiscal year 2022 funding for the MH-139, and it is slated
to replace, of course, our very aging UH-1 helicopters in
Minot. I am told the delay is because of a delay in FAA
certification. But unless you think the aircraft is not going
to achieve its certification, why would we stop paying for it
and building it, because we have seen other aircraft that have
had those same FAA delays but did not have a pause in
production. So I am kind of concerned about that. Is it really
necessary? I do not know if you have ever flown in a UH-1 in
Minot in the winter, but it is very unpleasant, and we would
like to be able to keep that on track.
So do you have an explanation, other than the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) certification?
General Brown. Well, it is FAA certification, and the
aircraft is a commercially-derived platform that we are putting
military equipment on, which drives the additional
certification. So we ran into an issue in part of the testing.
So we are continuing testing on other parts of the aircraft
besides the defensive system, that was causing some issues.
What we want to do is ensure we aligned our money with the
delivery. The delivery delay is, I believe, just several
months, is what we expect going forward. So we want to keep our
focus on it, and we want to make sure that, as you said, flying
a UH-1 in Minot in the winter is probably not what we want to
continue to do, which is why we want to get the MH-139 on
track.
Senator Cramer. Thank you. Thank you all again for your
service.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cramer. Now let me
recognize Senator Warren, via Webex, please.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
for being here today.
General Brown, I had the opportunity to discuss the
strategic basing process at Mr. Kendall's nomination hearing,
and I would like to be able to do the same with you this
morning. This is the formal process the Air Force uses to
decide where to station new aircraft, like the F-35 or the KC-
46.
The Air Force has gone to admirable lengths to ensure that
when it is choosing installations for these aircraft issues
like the quality of education available near a base, and
licensure reciprocity are a big part of the consideration. This
is, of course, important because the quality of schools
available for their children and the ability of spouses to
obtain jobs and sustain careers are critical issues that
impacted servicemembers' quality of life.
So, General, can you commit to ensuring that the quality of
education and licensing reciprocity are indeed factors in the
strategic basing process?
General Brown. Yes, Senator, they are.
Senator Warren. Good. I just want to hear that. You know,
these issues are part of base selection criteria for a reason,
and they matter a lot to the servicemembers who do so much for
our country.
One thing that is not formally considered during part of
the process is the effects of climate change and extreme
weather. A 2019 Pentagon analysis found that of all the
services, the Air Force's base infrastructure is most at risk
for climate change threats, such as recurrent flooding,
drought, desertification, wildfires, and thawing permafrost.
Do you think it is worth making that another factor in the
strategic basing decision-making process?
General Brown. One of the areas we do look at is
installation resiliency and how we take a look at not only the
location but its capability and what kind of things we would
have to do to make sure that that base or that location will be
operationally relevant, as well as to ensure it can support the
mission. As we look at that, we want to make sure that we do
not put ourselves in a situation selecting a location that is
going to be impacted by extreme weather or other things and the
base locations are not well prepared.
Senator Warren. So just to make sure I am understanding,
you are saying yes, that we should take into account the
climate change threat and the impact it could have on military
operations.
General Brown. That is one of the factors we do look at,
the location, but we also look at the operational mission, and
as you mentioned earlier also the education, the community,
spousal licensure as well.
Senator Warren. As one of the conditions. That is what I
care about, and while we are on the subject of climate change,
there is no way to address the climate crisis without
confronting DOD's role as the largest consumer of fossil fuel
on the planet, and the Air Force is obviously a big contributor
to this, given the number of aircraft it flies.
General Brown, what is the Air Force's progress,
researching and developing new engine technologies that will
decrease your dependency on fossil fuel and reduce emissions
without sacrificing capability?
General Brown. Well, one of the things we talked about a
little earlier today is the re-engining of the B-52, and that
is one area that is going to save us about 30 percent of its
fuel consumption from what it does today. The other aspect that
we also take a look at is advancing technology with our
simulators, the ability to do some of our training in
simulators, particularly from some of our more complicated and
high-end things that we do not want our adversaries to see and
be able to take those into a simulation environment, which then
saves us on fuel. So it is a balance of those as well as the
technology, engine technology, we look at as well.
Senator Warren. Okay, and what I am hearing you say is
about reducing consumption, which I very much appreciate. But I
hope that you are prioritizing research and development as well
in the engine technology and how to reduce reliance on carbon-
based fuels. That will help make sure that the Air Force
remains flexible and agile for the future and reduce dependency
on potentially vulnerable fossil fuel supply chains.
So I look forward to working with you and the incoming
Secretary to help make this technology a reality.
General Brown. Well, thank you, Senator. One thing I would
highlight is our Agility Prime that we have been using to--it
has been called a flying car, but that uses mostly electrical
power, and it is an aspect we are also taking a look at of how
we do that for logistics and other opportunities versus using
the fossil fuels.
Senator Warren. Well, that is the whole point. Let's invest
in that research and development (R&D) and get this up and
running. Our entire world is depending on it.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren. Let me now
recognize Senator Scott, please.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman. I thank each of you for
your service. I want to thank each of you for the benefit of
the men and women who defend the freedom of this country.
First, can you all agree that it looks like we are facing
increased threats around the world? You all would say that,
wouldn't you?
General Brown. Yes, Senator.
Senator Scott. We would all agree that Communist China is
investing in building up their military, with one goal, is to
actually compete with us.
General Brown. Yes.
Senator Scott. As they build their economy, do you see any
reason that they are going to slow down their investments?
General Brown. I don't.
Senator Scott. So given knowing what Communist China is
doing, do you all believe that the Air Force today is prepared
to defend this country but also to help our allies, like
Taiwan?
General Brown. I believe we are prepared but I still think,
as you just described, as the Chinese advance their capability,
the United States Air Force needs to do the same, which is why
I particularly am pushing on being able to modernize our
capability to make sure that we are a credible deterrent, so
you do not have a conflict in the Indo-Pacific.
Senator Scott. So I think, both for General Brown and Mr.
Roth, as we have had these hearings, a lot of people on our
Committee have expressed a lot of concern about the President's
defense budget, his proposed defense budget, especially when
you look at it as compared to other agencies, how he wants to
spend the money.
So we have had a pretty good defense budget for the last
few years, but do you really believe that this budget is going
to give you the resources you need to be able to deter the
actions of China, Russia, and other threats around the world?
Mr. Roth. The short answer is yes, we are challenged. We
need to get on with it, and in particular that is why we are
emphasizing investing in future technologies. We need to take
some reasonable risks today in order to make sure that we keep
pace with the Chinese. Our concern is the pace in which they
are modernizing. They seem to be quicker than we are. They have
amped up their spending, and so as a number of us have said, we
need to move out smartly. We need to accelerate. We need to buy
things smarter, quicker, and more agile. So the answer is I
think this budget provides a reasonable risk going forward, but
we need to keep on that pace.
Senator Scott. General Brown?
General Brown. I mean, I feel the same way the Secretary
just described. That is exactly why I wrote ``Accelerate Change
or Lose,'' is if we do not pick up our pace, there is the
distinct possibility of losing, and losing our advantage, at
the least. It is important that we take a hard look at the
budget. You know, ideally it puts pressure on us, but we have
got to be smarter within the budget we do have, regardless of
what the number might be.
Senator Scott. Thank you. General Raymond, does the
President's budget allow you to develop and deploy the force
you need, because clearly the threats in space are not
decreasing. They are clearly increasing.
General Raymond. Yes, sir. The President's budget does, and
this budget reflects a $2 billion increase in national security
space, about $1 billion of that is shifting existing
capabilities and resources from services into the Space Force,
and then about $1 billion in new growth, focused on protecting
and defending. I am very comfortable that I can protect and
defend today, but that superiority gap is shrinking fast. One
of the reasons why we established the Space Force was to move
out at speed, drive unity of effort, reduce costs, and be able
to stay ahead of that threat, and that is our main focus.
Senator Scott. Thank you. Do you all believe that we are
ahead of the Russians and the Chinese in developing hypersonic
weapons?
General Brown. Thank you. I have asked the same question of
our intel, and the aspect, I believe, is that we are--there are
areas that we are ahead, but their testing is probably a little
more advanced in numbers than we are. So this is again, this is
an area that I am focused on. As a matter of fact, in this
budget we have money to buy 12 hypersonic munitions by the end
of fiscal year 2022. So we have got to continue to put pressure
on ourselves to provide that capability as well.
Senator Scott. Do you believe that is enough?
General Brown. Well, I want to balance it against the
threat, and so at the rate that I see that our adversary is
going, we need to make sure that we continue to build out our
capability. But it doesn't necessarily have to be symmetric. I
think there are aspects of using asymmetric capability as well.
But having some hypersonic capability to go against our
adversaries will be important.
Senator Scott. Do you think the American public realizes
the threat of Communist China and what their goals are?
General Brown. I do not. I would say, just based on my time
as the Pacific Air Force Commander, and how much I learned in
the 2 years I was out there, and where I sit today, the
advancing capability of the Chinese is something that we all
should be thinking about.
Senator Scott. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Let me now
recognize, via Webex, Senator Rosen.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking
Member Inhofe, for holding this hearing. I would also like to
thank the witnesses for their service, and, of course, for
being here.
Today I would like to talk a little bit about, of course,
Nevada, and Nevada's Air National Guard's 152nd Airlift Wing in
Reno. It flies legacy C-130's in some of the hottest
temperatures. You can just look at the weather report today. I
do not have to tell you what is happening all out on the West
Coast. They fly in the highest elevations, the most challenging
mountainous environments of any C-130 unit. Integral to their
mission is flying the Modular Airborne Firefighting System, the
MAFS. They supply those in support of the U.S. Forest Service.
We know wildfire season is just upon us.
Upgrading the Nevada Air National Guard C-130 H fleet with
C-130J's would have a substantial impact on their readiness and
firefighting capabilities, in Nevada and the western United
States, where every year we are plagued by devastating fires.
I was therefore discouraged that the Air Force was not
considering MAFS when evaluating base candidates for the C-
130J, and even more disappointed when Reno was not selected.
Ensuring that the Air National Guard is ready to assist and
respond to these emergencies, it should be a priority for the
Air Force as you consider where to base more capable aircraft.
So Acting Secretary Roth, can you explain to me this
decision not to consider MAFS when conducting your base
evaluation, particularly in the West Coast where more fires,
our open terrain, our longer distances to travel, we have in
any other region in the Lower 48?
Mr. Roth. Senator, we will take a look at that. I mean,
your point is well taken. It is not part of our core criteria
that we use in selecting the base. My commitment to you is we
will work with you and see if there are ways that we can give
that some consideration going forward.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that. General Brown,
can I get a commitment that MAFS will be part of the basing
criteria in the future rounds of C-130J recapitalization?
Again, all I have to do is point to weather reports today
around the West Coast and around the country to see what is
happening, and then understanding what Nevada does and what we
are responsible for, we really need your commitment that Reno
will be considered, given its need, its mission, its
capabilities, and existing infrastructure to host the aircraft.
General Brown. Senator, you have my commitment to have that
considered as one of the criteria as we look at forward basing
decisions.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I would like again, General
Brown, to talk to you a little bit about the Air Force and its
Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR), the land withdrawal that
you have requested for Nevada Test and Training Range. You
requested a 300,000-acre expansion of the Nevada Test and
Training Range within the Desert National Wildlife Refuge in
order to modernize the range. You also asked for primary
jurisdiction over the 800,000 acres of land currently shared
with the refuge. The fiscal year 2021 NDAA renewed your
existing withdrawal of almost 3 million acres of public land,
and Senator Cortez Masto and I offered mandates on
intergovernmental executive committees between the Air Force,
U.S. Fish and Wildlife, and other allies and partners, to be
sure that we are taking everything into consideration.
So, General Brown, as the Air Force pursues modernization
of the range, can you commit to setting up our
intergovernmental committees and can you commit to exchanging
information with all the collaborating state, local, and Tribal
governments, along with our relevant environmental stakeholders
on any proposals to withdraw Nevada's public lands?
General Brown. Senator, you have my commitment, and I will
tell you, since our last conversation about a month ago we have
already had some of the interagency committee meetings to work
towards the intergovernmental executive committee. That first
needs to occur here in the next couple of months. But I am
committed to work with you and other entities to work on the
Nevada Test and Training Range, to ensure we are paying
attention to all the equities of all the interested parties.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that. I will just
make a note that up in northern Nevada, in Fallon, the Navy has
already scheduled those meetings, and so I hope it would be
sooner than the next few months, as soon as possible.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Let me now
recognize Senator Sullivan, please.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate
the great work that all the panelists are doing.
You know, I listen to some of my colleagues, and some of my
Democratic colleagues continue to make this narrative that
climate change is somehow an issue that is a bigger threat than
China or Russia, that the military has something to do with.
Let me just ask, you mentioned basing locations in your
exchange with Senator Warren. General Brown, you mentioned some
climate change. Do you actually take into account strategic
location for basing locations as well?
General Brown. Senator, we do.
Senator Sullivan. Good. Is that a pretty high priority?
General Brown. Strategic location and operational mission
requirements are high on the list, and it carries most of the
weight in our decision-making for strategic basing.
Senator Sullivan. That is what I would assume.
Do you remember the father of the Air Force, Billy
Mitchell? Do you remember what he called the most strategic
place in the world?
General Brown. I do, and you remind me often. It is Alaska.
Senator Sullivan. Oh, okay. I am just checking. So that is
pretty strategic. Just checking.
If DOD stopped using any fossil fuels, like today, forever,
how much do you think that would reduce global greenhouse gas
emissions?
I will just give you the answer. It would not.
So your mission is to fight and win wars, kill people, yes?
Sometimes we have to say that. So I think it is really
important to just stay focused on lethality. A lot of times you
are getting pushed to do climate change, trying to fix climate
change. The Department of Defense is not going to fix climate
change. So that is what most people believe. I just want you to
hear it from Senators who care about the real mission of the
Department of Defense, which is to fight and win our Nation's
wars, not somehow be the lead agency fighting climate change.
It is not your role. You are not capable of doing it. I know
you get pressured from the other side to do it all the time,
including the President, and I think it is nuts. So stay
focused.
Can I get your commitment to stay focused on your number
one mission? What is your number one mission?
General Brown. The number one mission for the Air Force is
to fly, fight, and win, provide air power, anytime, anywhere.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you, General. That is a
great mission.
Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC), and Senator
Rosen was just talking about the Nevada Testing Range. I, too,
am very concerned about the reduction in the Department of
Defense's budget. But as you know, prioritizing that kind of
high-end training and fighting, particularly fifth-gen, remains
important. Can I get your commitment to prioritize and
accelerate the investments in JPARC and the Nevada Testing
Range--I think JPARC is about ten times bigger--to achieve the
Threat Matrix Level 4 capability that I know you are very
interested in, even though you are starting to see declining
budgets?
General Brown. Senator, you do have my commitment, and as
you described, JPARC and the Nevada Testing and Training Range
are the two ranges we have for the United States Air Force that
we are looking to get to Threat Level 4, and another six that
would be Threat Level 3. We have a strategy to be able to do
that for both the Nevada Testing and Training Range and the
JPARC.
Senator Sullivan. So I have a commitment--thank you on
that--I have a commitment from the incoming Secretary, and I
know we are going to do it together--you, me, and him--on the
KC-46, the global basing decisions on our new tankers. You and
I talked about this for over years.
So can I get your commitment when he gets confirmed to work
with me and this Committee just on the new strategy that the
Air Force has put forward on that? It has been a moving target,
as you know, but it is an important issue for me and the
country?
General Brown. Senator, you have my commitment.
Senator Sullivan. What about the issue of the E-3? How are
we looking at the replacement? You may have seen this big, big
Russian exercise last fall where they actually had, I think it
was either five or six Bear bomber runs in the Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ) of Alaska, where we had to go
scramble six different sections of F-22's to go intercept these
simultaneous incursions into our airspace by the Russians. It
was unbelievable, the biggest one ever. As you know, there were
no Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) up there. That
was a really tough mission. Our great pilots in Alaska did it
well, but they did it with no AWACS capability, which is tough.
What are we looking at in terms of the AWACS replacement,
and how quickly do you think we can get that going?
General Brown. There are a couple of things we are looking
at, reference the AWACS. One is some modernization aspects of
the AWACS, at the same time looking at advanced technologies to
do airborne moving target indication from other capabilities.
That technology is not quite there, so we are going to have to
take a look at some type of gap, and we are looking at a
handful of platforms that may have that capability to bridge to
the newer technology. That is not necessarily in this budget
cycle but it is something that I am looking at, internal to the
Air Force.
Senator Sullivan. Is the E-7 one of those that you are
looking at?
General Brown. E-7 is one of those candidates. It is
actually flown by the Royal Australian Air Force. The Royal Air
Force from the U.K. is also purchasing. It is a capable
platform. I have actually personally flown on it. So it is one
of those that I am considering.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you, gentlemen, and, Mr.
Chairman, I will have additional questions for the record.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Sullivan. Let
me now recognize Senator Kelly, please.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Sullivan
was just speaking of lethality and fighting and winning, which
I too find incredibly important. So, General Brown, I want to
discuss, just for a minute here, one of the most lethal
aircraft in your inventory, the A-10 Warthog. We have spoken
before about my serious concerns with the Air Force's proposed
retirement of more than 40 A-10 aircraft in this year's budget,
and as you know, I feel it would be a mistake to retire these
combat-tested, combat-proven aircraft when we do not have a
viable replacement to effectively conduct close-air support for
our troops.
In addition to my disagreement with the Air Force's
attempts to divest A-10's, I see some concerns with the plans
to sustain the fleet the Air Force proposes to keep, and this
is a real concern, because we all agree that A-10's are going
to continue to support our warfighters into the 2030s.
Last year, the Air Force budget request indicated a
requirement for $100 million in fiscal year 2022, and $100
million again in fiscal year 2023 to support the A-10 wing
replacement program. Critical element, as we know, of
sustaining the fleet. So I have to say I am concerned about the
incredibly low amount of funding, just $44,000 budgeted for the
A-10 wing replacement program in this year's request.
So, General, why has the Air Force not followed through on
using the money it requested in fiscal year 2021, that Congress
appropriated for wing replacements last year, and is the Air
Force seeking to reprogram fiscal year 2021 funds?
General Brown. Senator, we are not going to reprogram
fiscal year 2021 funds. We are fully committed to the rewing of
the A-10's as it was laid out in the budget. We are able to
execute that over multiple years. By the end of this fiscal
year we should be about 50 percent done, and we are going to
continue on the path to upgrade those wings, as laid out in the
budget and as we committed to.
Senator Kelly. Can you clarify the $44,000 request for A-10
rewinging in this year's request?
General Brown. I do not have those details with me here
today, but I will get back to you with more information on it.
Senator Kelly. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, General. I
appreciate it.
General Raymond, in the remaining time here, great to see
you again, General. I would like to touch on the security of
U.S. assets in space. You know, many Americans think of space
distant place, but the ability for us to operate unhindered in
space, it is a matter of national security. As Russia and China
aggressively advance their space programs and develop
capabilities that aim to disrupt or destroy United States space
assets, it is critical that we are able to adapt to secure our
systems and deter aggression. The Department's statement for
this hearing affirms that both China and Russia have mobile
ground-based laser systems and electronic warfare systems
capable of jamming and blinding our satellite systems.
General Raymond, in your estimation, how good is our
current understanding of threats to our satellite systems and
our space architecture?
General Raymond. I think we have a really good
understanding of the threats. They have been pretty visible.
Both China and Russia have developed a full spectrum, the ones
that you mentioned and also on-orbit, anti-satellite weapons,
missiles that can launch from the ground and destroy
satellites. There is a full spectrum out there. We have a good
understanding of the threats. The work that we are now doing is
to shift our architecture to a more defendable architecture,
because the architecture that we have today was built for a
different domain.
Senator Kelly. Do you feel that our defense and
intelligence communities are working well enough together on
this issue?
General Raymond. I do. In fact, one of the benefits of
standing up the Space Force is that we are now going to stand
up a National Space Intelligence Center that is going to be co-
located with the National Air and Space Intelligence Center,
and that is going to sharpen the focus on foundational intel.
We still have a lot of work to do on that, both foundational
and operational, but I am very comfortable that the
intelligence community is focused on this.
The other thing that we have done, after establishing the
Space Force, we became the 18th member of the Intelligence
Community (IC), which also gives us a stronger seat at the
table to get the intelligence requirements that we need.
Senator Kelly. Well, thank you, General. I am convinced
that the only way we are going to stay ahead of our near-peer
adversaries is by innovation, and one of the domains that we
are really good at is space, and we just have to continue to
move forward, out-innovate our adversaries, but also make sure
we can protect the assets that we have.
General Raymond. I could not agree more. Thanks.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, General.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Kelly. Let me
now recognize Senator Blackburn, please.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
to each of you for being here today.
Being a Tennessean, I think you would each expect me to
talk about Arnold Engineering and Development Complex, the
AEDC, there in Tennessee. It really is the crown jewel of the
Air Force testing infrastructure. You have got 68 wind tunnels
there, you have got engine test cells that are there, arc
heaters, space testing chambers. It is vital to the test work
that has been mentioned here today. It is vital to hypersonics.
The way we get ahead in hypersonics is we have testing.
So, General Brown, when we are looking at these facilities
we are very concerned about upkeep and about maintenance. The
state of that infrastructure is posing a critical risk to
continuing this testing mission for high-priority items like
hypersonic development. So talk a little bit about the
importance--what is the priority with you, where does it stand
when it comes to risk of not modernizing this structure, how
does this affect retention and recruiting, what are you looking
at this year for preventive maintenance? Because whether it is
some of our AV's or hypersonics, Arnold is an important
component.
General Brown. As you described, very important work that
occurs there to advance our capability in hypersonics, and so
the United States Air Force works with the OSD Test and
Resource Management Center that helps drive the investment on
places like Arnold, in particular. As the Air Force Chief of
Staff, with our staff, is working very closely with them to
outline the requirements to upkeep the capabilities there, not
only for hypersonics but the future capabilities that might
come our way as well.
I think a key aspect of this is in order to retain that
great capability, of the minds that work there, is we have got
to have the right infrastructure and tools there. So it is the
combination of that investment that helps us to be able to do
that. I do not have details but I will be able to get you
details.
Senator Blackburn. Let me ask you about, because I think
one element important to this is the ground test asset board.
So speak to that a minute, and I would like to have you commit
to work to stand up that asset board, because we need to make
certain that all resources are available to maintain facilities
like Arnold.
General Brown. That ground asset test board is internal to
the Air Force Test Center, and it is something that I will
commit to look at how we might broaden that beyond just the
Test Center but broader within the Air Force.
Senator Blackburn. Okay, and also, the 2 percent Plant
Replacement Value (PRV), reaching that and having budgets
sufficient to reach that 2 percent, there is concern over that
because your unfunded priority list is to the tune of $320
million. So where are you on having sufficient budget to reach
that?
General Brown. The combination of the budget we have, plus
the $320 million that we have in the unfunded priority list
will get us to that 2 percent.
Senator Blackburn. That does get you to the 2 percent.
General Brown. Yes, ma'am, it does.
Senator Blackburn. Okay. Even though you are not
reprogramming funds.
General Brown. That is correct.
Senator Blackburn. Okay. All right.
General Raymond, we were pleased to see you make a trip to
Vanderbilt University. We thank you for that. We do believe
that the projects that are being done there in the partnership
programs are vitally important. Involving the warfighter, the
front-line warfighter is important. Having this collaboration
with academia on cyber and electronics R&D we think is vital.
My hope is that you are going to continue to keep these
programs robust and work to recruit talent for these
technologies.
General Raymond. Absolutely. I agree. Not only did I visit
Vanderbilt, I also visited Tennessee State. I also had the
opportunity to talk to the Tennessee Science, Technology,
Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) Initiatives group. I think
there are about 500 elementary school and high school teachers.
It was a great visit. We are eager to partner on the University
Partnership Program and research consortiums that we have had.
In Vanderbilt, I was very impressed with what I saw.
Senator Blackburn. As you are aware, if you visited with
the STEM Consortium, we have not only our elementary schools
and middle schools but also groups like Boy Scouts are now
starting STEM Scouts and programs of that nature to encourage
our young people to consider STEM, and certainly our military
is a great opportunity for them to consider.
General Raymond. Ma'am, after that visit I had a gentleman
that worked in the studio where I did the session with the STEM
Innovation Network. He just joined the Space Force. So we are
excited to recruit, and we are excited to have him on the team.
Senator Blackburn. There you go, and we are so pleased to
have Space Force with the Huntsville present, which is in our
region. I know that Senator Tuberville is going to talk with
you about that. So thank you all so much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blackburn. Senator
Hawley, please.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks too to the
witnesses. Thank you for being here. Thank you for your
service.
Mr. Secretary, if I could just start with you. Rosecrans
Air National Guard Base in my home state is home to the
Advanced Airlift Tactics Training Center, which offers training
courses, not just to U.S. airlift units but also to our allies
and partners, something I think not a lot of people know.
Give me a sense of how you see the Center's work
contributing to the Air Force's broader efforts to strengthen
those relationships with allies and partners.
Mr. Roth. As you noted, it does, in fact, make a
significant contribution, and at this point we do not have any
intent to change the current mission.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you for that. General
Brown and General Raymond, let me shift now to our pacing
theater and our pacing threat, which you have been getting a
lot of questions on today, which I am glad to hear about.
Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks have both
testified before this Committee that the United States has got
to maintain its ability to deny a Chinese fait accompli against
Taiwan. I am a broken record on this subject, and I am not
going to disappoint here today. So do you agree with that
testimony that we must maintain that ability to defeat the
Chinese fait accompli? Go ahead, General Brown.
General Brown. I do.
Senator Hawley. Great. General Raymond?
General Raymond. I do.
Senator Hawley. General Brown, there are a few ways we can
think about denying a fait accompli in a Taiwan scenario. Most
of them involve sinking or disabling key elements of the
Chinese fleet in a relatively short period of time. How would
you envision the Air Force executing or supporting this kind of
a sea denial mission?
General Brown. Well, the first thing you have got to have
in order to be able to execute the sea denial mission is a
level of air superiority. So I think that is important that is
the aspect of our Next-Generation Air Dominance fighter, so we
can actually get our bombers in, because you have a defensive
threat from China to get too close to where that maritime
capability might be that you are trying to sink. To get our
bombers in, and then also the ability to actually have the
awareness of where things are, and that goes into joint, all-
domain command and control, and the Air Force's contribution to
that is the Advanced Battle Management System. It is how we
move the data around between not just internal to the Air Force
but within our joint partners, to be able to do that. Then the
last is actually having the weaponry to go with that, and so
Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) is one of those. It is
very focused on this particular mission set, but it is also
working with the rest of the joint team as we bring that.
Then the last piece of this is logistics. In order to
maintain that campaign we have got to be able to do the
logistics, and be able to do it under attack. So, it is
connecting the Joint Force, generating the combat power, and
being able to execute the logistics under attack in support of
the complete joint team from the Air Force, supporting both our
Navy friends and our allies and partners as well.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you for that. You
mentioned LRASM. Let me ask you about it. The Air Force
requested funding for just five LRASMs last year, if I am not
mistaken. This year, I think zeroed out, so no LRASM request.
Give me a sense of why this is. Why are we cutting funding for
anti-ship missiles, given how important it is, as you just
stated, for our sea denial capability?
General Brown. Well, part of this is actually how we
balance out not just sea denial but other capabilities that we
have for missions, and hypersonics, the conversation we just
had, is high on that list for us, to be able to do that. But we
will continue to look at LRASM as we bring that on with other
capabilities as well, for advanced weapons.
Senator Hawley. Got it. Yes, I am concerned by the cuts
there in what I think is a pretty key capability. You mentioned
JADC2. Let me just ask you about that, General, while I have
you. Can you describe the progress that has been made on the
JADC2 over the last year and what your goals are for it, this
coming year?
General Brown. Sir, the JADC2 is more of the Joint Staff
piece to drive between the services, the Air Force's Advanced
Battle Management System. Over the course of the past couple of
budget cycles we have been really focused on demonstrations and
evaluations. We have gone through that part and now it is about
delivering capability. The first step in that is a capability,
one, to put that capability on the KC-46, to be able to connect
with our fifth-gen capability and expand our node. Underlying
that, though, is the digital infrastructure to move all that
information I talked about just a minute or two ago. So that is
important on how we do that.
The last--and I will not say last, but one of the other
areas is our collaboration with the other services, with the
Army in their Project Convergence, the Navy on their Project
Overmatch, and the dialogue we have had together. Because if we
cannot move information between the services we will not be
able to do the maritime scenario that you just described. So it
is important that we work very closely together to be able to
have that capability.
Then I would also offer, with the Space Force, because a
lot of that information moves through space. So I am very
connected to General Raymond as well, to ensure we are able to
make sure we are able to communicate and move information for
decision-makers.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you. Let me ask you about,
briefly here, in my remaining time, the modernization agenda
that the Air Force has embarked upon, General. The
modernization agenda is focused on the early to mid 2030s, but
this Committee has heard testimony, repeatedly and recently,
that a Chinese potential assault on Taiwan or other contingency
could happen much sooner than that. It could happen as early as
the late 2020s, 2027, for instance.
Give us a sense of what the Air Force is doing to ensure
that it is able to help on defeating that fait accompli
scenario that we were talking about in the next 5 to 7 years,
even as you pursue this necessary modernization that is going
to take you out to 10 or 15 years from now.
General Brown. Well, Senator, as I said in my opening
statement, that transition needs to start today. If we do not
start today, we will not be ready 5 to 6 years from now, or 10
to 15 years from now. I lay out 10 to 15 years from now so we
can actually have something to put a goal on, but we have got
to make that transition, to provide that capability, and we
have got to do it much faster. This is why the Middle Tier
Acquisition authorities are so important to allow us to move
much faster, in collaboration with Congress, this particular
Congress, and with our industry partners, we have got to move
faster. If things were to happen, to accelerate, we have got to
be able to accelerate as well.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you very much. Thank you,
gentlemen, all of you, for your service. I will have a few
additional questions for you, for the record.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley. Let me recognize
Senator Tuberville, please.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The great
thing about being last is everybody has already asked you
questions, so I just want to ask a couple of things.
General Raymond, two things that I think that are most
important in anything that we do is people and education. We
talked today about you going around to universities and all
that. I would like all three of you to maybe just chime in on
this.
Our biggest threat is going to be in space in the very,
very near future, if it is not today. Do we need a Space
Academy, where we can have specialized skills and training? I
have spoken at every academy in our country, leadership and
organization. I am very proud of them. I just hope that we
are--you know, we have got great institutions in this country,
but I think we need something maybe to just specialize with
space.
General Raymond. I think one of the things, as an
independent service you have to develop your own people. On the
officer side, we only bring in about 300 or so folks a year. I
am very comfortable that the Air Force Academy is developing
those people for us. In fact 2 years ago, before the Space
Force stood up, we only got 30 cadets out of the Academy. The
first year, last year, out of the Academy we received 86. This
year, 118. So we are coming up on almost a half, a little less
than half of our total population is coming from the Academy,
and the talent that we are getting is really top-tier talent,
including a Rhodes scholar.
The Academy has a strong astro program, they have got a
strong space program. I am very comfortable to that they are
producing the officers that we need to come in the Space Force,
and they are doing really good work.
Senator Tuberville. Do you think we need something for
contractors, future, not in military, for space?
General Raymond. Yeah, I think, Senator, there is great
excitement going around the country about space, and it is in
all three sectors. You have NASA going back to the moon and
then on to Mars. You have got commercial space sector that is
really alive and well and flourishing, and then you have the
national security space sector.
What we are seeing, and what I am seeing as you go around
to the schools is that there is an increased amount of folks
that are applying for space-related STEM degrees, which is
important. I think it is going to pay great dividends for our
Nation. What we are trying to do with our University
Partnership Program is partner with those folks and then
attract them to come into the space program. I have talked to
Administrator Nelson. I would really like to partner with them
as well. I think there is great opportunity here for the youth
of America.
Senator Tuberville. You know, I am excited about going
around to high schools, as I have all my life, and even the
last few years in campaigning for this job I have got today,
and we are seeing a lot of robotics courses being taught in
high schools now. We are really advancing, and I think that is
going to be the key to our survival, to be honest with you, is
the education of our kids. Of course, they are all into
computers and technology, and I just hope we are doing enough
and planning on that for the future, because I do not want us
to get to a point where we hit a wall and we do not have enough
people trained for the future in space. But thank you for that.
General Brown, I know one of your first acts as Chief was
to honor General Charles McGee, and Alabama is proud to host
the Red Tails and the 187th Fighter Wing down at Dannelly
Field. In the very near future, within 2 years, we are getting
the opportunity to have transitioned in 20 F-35's, and we are
excited about that. I just want your commitment to stay with us
on that, and we want to see red tails on all those planes. I
was there the other day, and I think it is going to be huge for
recruiting in the future of having 20 F-35's there. A lot of
young kids are kind of recognized with the red tails, and we
have done a good job of that. We just need to keep it going. So
can I get your commitment to continue with the Red Tails and
the things that we do at Dannelly Field?
General Brown. Senator, you have my commitment, and great
legacy from the Tuskegee Airmen there at Dannelly and there in
Alabama with the Tuskegee Institute as well.
Senator Tuberville. Well, thank you very much. Thank you
for your service, guys. Thanks for being here today.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Now we are
trying to connect with Senator Duckworth via Webex. There may
be some technical difficulties, but Senator Duckworth, you are
recognized.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I logged out
and logged back in so it seems to be working now.
Chairman Reed. Very good.
Senator Duckworth. Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for
being here today, and thank you for your service to our
country.
As the Air Force modernizes its platforms to meet the
demand of future conflict, particularly the possibility of a
contested logistics environment in the Indo-Pacific region, we
must consider the evolution of our air mobility and other
combat support functions, in addition to our combat
capabilities. Bottom line, without combat-credible air mobility
we do not have a combat-credible deterrent.
General Brown, will you ensure that the Air Force addresses
the gap in advanced air mobility capabilities suitable for
distributed warfare in the Indo-Pacific, and when do you think
the Air Force can deliver a plan for the future of air
mobility, beyond the C-130, to Congress?
General Brown. Senator, you do have my commitment, and this
is an area we are looking at, particularly through the aspect
of Agility Prime and other techniques to be able to logistics
under attack. That planning process is in its very early stages
and so I probably cannot commit to you today on when we would
actually be able to present a plan to Congress. But what I
would like to be able to do is continue to work with you and
this Committee to work through a process to answer that
particular question, not only in the capability but also the
timeline of when we would be able to provide some more
information on a study and some other techniques, and the
technology to be able to look at how we do mobility,
particularly in the Indo-Pacific.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I am going to take you up on
that. Thank you very much. You know, modernization is critical,
but it must be balanced against present-day readiness
requirements that are necessary to respond to emerging crises.
I am actually pretty alarmed that the Air Force plans to
continue C-130 divestment from the Guard and reserve. It has
not created a plan to replace the C-130 itself. Eliminating
enduring platforms without even beginning to design their
replacement I think is a huge gamble. Is it wise to wager our
National Guard and reserves' operational capability and
capacity and risk creating a huge gap that undermines our
ability to respond to new emergencies? I mean, after all, over
half the Air Force tactical and mobility airlift resides in the
reserve components.
I truly believe that C-130 divestiture will limit the Joint
Force's ability to meet the challenges outlined in the 2018
National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the Interim National
Security Strategic Guidance, as well as the reserve components'
ability to complete their domestic missions, which have only
increased in recent years.
That is why I fear that we must not divest the C-130
aircraft in our reserve components without first ensuring that
we retain the critical airlift capability and capacity that
gives our commanders the operational flexibility to respond
when called, both overseas and here at home. While I understand
that the Air Force has difficult decisions to make in how it
manages its budget, and I understand about the increasing costs
of maintaining old aircraft, I flew the oldest Black Hawk in
the entire Army inventory, the fourth off the production line,
so I understand the challenges of that. I have, however, heard
from my TAG [The Adjutant General] about how concerned he is
that the Illinois National Guard will not be able to fulfill
its duties to Illinois and to the country if there are further
C-130 divestments without replacement platforms.
During his confirmation hearing, Mr. Kendall, the
President's nominee to lead the Air Force, committed to working
with governors and adjutants general of states with reserve
component C-130 wings to ensure that they can fulfill their
domestic missions and the Air Force's divestment plans do not
eliminate C-130 capacity that is needed to deliver the air
mobility our Nation has come to rely upon.
General Brown, will you make the same commitment as Mr.
Kendall?
General Brown. Senator, I will, and as a matter of fact,
one of the areas that I am focused on is every time I travel to
any one of the states, one of my goals is to either meet with
or communicate, ahead or during the trip, with the TAGs for
each of the states, to talk about where the Air Force is
headed. So you do have my commitment.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Another asset that is really
important to our combat credibility are the KC-135's, and the
Air Force plans to divest 18 KC-135's and 14 KC-10 tankers in
fiscal year 2022 to support the KC-46 program. This budget
significantly reduces aerial refueling capacity. Could you
please outline the risks we are accepting in the short term,
and is the KC-46 program appropriately funded to accelerate its
fielding to close this gap?
General Brown. Well, one thing I will tell you about the
KC-46 is that it does have the capability to do a good majority
of missions, to include air refueling, aeromedical, as well as
cargo movement. What we are working very closely with the
United States TRANSCOM on is an interim capability release to
provide the KC-46 for day-to-day mission taskings that will
allow for it to be able to support the retirement of our KC-
10's and KC-135's. I have had great conversations with General
Lyons most recently as about 6 weeks ago on this very topic,
and we are both on agreement that the path we have right now on
the KC-46 versus the KC-135 and KC-10 retirements are suitable
to support his requirements.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I am out of time but I would
love to be updated on the Air Force's progress in fielding the
KC-46 and to be provided early notification to myself, and to
the Committee, actually, if any issues arise that may further
delay the program or otherwise increase gaps in our overall
aerial refueling capability, and we take this after the
hearing. Thank you.
General Brown. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Duckworth. Thank you very
much. Gentlemen, again thank you for your testimony. Thank you
for your dedicated service over many years. I also want to
thank you for opening up your schedule for a possible closed
session after this session, but I do not think there were any
issues that have come up within the context of this hearing
that cannot be resolved by an individual contact with the
relevant Senator. Because of that we will not have a closed
session.
I thank you very much for your, again, service, and
Secretary Roth, thank you. You have done a superb job, not only
in this tenure as Acting Secretary but for years as a stalwart
in the Department of Defense. Thank you very, very much, sir.
General Raymond. Thank you very much, Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Gentlemen, with that I will adjourn the
hearing.
[Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
pease air national guard base ramp space
1. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Roth and General Brown, in early May,
the 157th Air Refueling Wing out of Pease Air National Guard Base in
New Hampshire, responded to a short notice request to support the
transfer of 12 Marine F/A-18s traveling to U.S. Central Command. The
157th provided 6 KC-46s to refuel the F/A-18s en route and Pease
provided ramp space for 6 F/A-18s that were forced to make an unplanned
maintenance stop during the refueling. Not only is that an example of
the outstanding work of the 157th and the importance of the KC-46 for
real-world missions, but it also emphasizes the importance of Pease as
a strategic location. Will you commit to working with me on a plan to
invest in Pease's infrastructure to ensure it can continue to perform
the missions needed to meet commanders' requirements?
Secretary Roth and General Brown. We recognize the importance of
the 157th Air Refueling Wing and Pease Air National Guard Base in New
Hampshire as a strategic location. Since 2010, the ANG has invested in
excess of $138 million in the infrastructure of Pease, including $55
million to ensure the installation is capable of supporting KC-46
mission requirements. This includes facility construction, hangar
upgrades, maintenance and storage space, aircraft hydrant refueling
capabilities and significant ramp improvements. This effort continues
as emerging mission requirements are identified and validated for
future MILCON/SRM consideration. The DAF will continue to work with the
ANG and the unit to support mission requirements, and will be happy to
discuss our plans with you as appropriate.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
small businesses
2. Senator Hirono. Secretary Roth, by partnering with AFWERX, the
Air Force has recently awarded Small Business Innovation Research
(SBIR) contracts that include technology research and development
projects ranging from artificial intelligence to supply chain security.
These types of initiatives coupled with the Air Force's annual Tech
Warrior Exercise help small businesses bring much needed technological
advancements into the Department. How is the Air Force removing
barriers to entry for small businesses to access both SBIR contracts
and other small business initiatives?
Secretary Roth. The Department of the Air Force established a new
``Open Topic'' solicitation where any domestic small business may
submit a concept it believes can benefit Air Force and/or Space Force
missions.
AFWERX has since contracted with 1,433 companies, greater than 75
percent of which are new to the DAF SBIR/STTR program.
AFWERX Spark sponsors collider events designed to educate industry
and academia on DAF requirements and capabilities. Collider events
remove barriers for small businesses through better understanding of
DAF user requirements, informing refinement of technology proposals and
accelerating solutions.
3. Senator Hirono. Secretary Roth, what is the Air Force doing to
overcome the dreaded ``valley of death,'' the gap between product's
development and the product being funded as a program of record?
Secretary Roth. The Department of the Air Force delivers technology
to the warfighter through the AFRL Technology Transfer and Transition
Office, innovation organizations such as AFWERX, and Vanguard programs,
which are designed for rapid transition of remarkable new capabilities
that hold promise for providing significant battlefield advantage.
The Department of the Air Force employs prototyping and
experimentation in rapid acquisition pathways to achieve smarter and
faster programs, shorten the requirement process, and move capabilities
to warfighters more quickly.
The greatest limitation for programs exiting the valley of death is
the lack of funds to continue programs. Early stage technology and
prototyping is much cheaper than development and production.
4. Senator Hirono. Secretary Roth, how can we get these advanced
technologies brought into the Department of Defense (DOD) faster?
Secretary Roth. The Department of the Air Force rebalanced the
science and technology portfolio to emphasize a reduction in the time
required to develop and deliver new transformational capabilities,
while maintaining a strong enduring and enabling technology portfolio.
DAF Vanguard programs partner technologists, operators, and
acquisition professionals at project inception, and gain corporate
commitment to mature and rapidly transition technology.
AFWERX employs a partnership strategy with private sector companies
to accelerate the technology development timeline and ensure commercial
commitment.
AFWERX launched the Prime program with the specific purpose of
overcoming the ``Valley of Death'' in collaboration with commercial
investors to accelerate emerging technologies. Agility Prime, the first
of these programs, is accelerating electric vertical takeoff and
landing aircraft development.
The Department of the Air Force employs prototyping and
experimentation to speed up the requirements and fielding process by
enabling the understanding of how specific technologies can provide a
competitive advantage, as well as to address the associated acquisition
risks and costs.
Despite these efforts, funding limitations are the greatest
obstacle to transitioning technologies of interest. Early stage
development is inexpensive--allowing the science and technology
community to fund many more technologies than the DAF can afford to
take into production and fielding.
delivery of the kc-46
5. Senator Hirono. General Brown, in last year's National Defense
Authorization Act, Congress set limits on the number of KC-135 and KC-
10 refueling aircraft the Air Force could retire over the next three
years as a result of acquisition delays and capability limitations the
new KC-46 replacement aircraft is still experiencing. Has the Air Force
made any progress on speeding up the delivery of additional KC-46
aircraft?
General Brown. The KC-46A fixed price contract provides the
Government with very limited visibility into Boeing's manufacturing
processes. The recent impacts to Boeing's aircraft delivery schedule
appear to come from the COVID pandemic and manufacturing quality
assurance/control issues. The Air Force and the Defense Contract
Management Agency are exploring available corrective options with our
Federal Aviation Administration partners to help Boeing improve its
rate of production and meet their delivery schedule. The Government
retains the right to employ withholds or progress payment reductions if
they deem that is the best mechanism to drive improvement in overall
aircraft quality.
6. Senator Hirono. General Brown, what is the timeline for
correcting the KC-46's problem with refueling planes in different
lighting conditions?
General Brown. The Air Force is working with Boeing to resolve the
problems with refueling planes in different lighting conditions as part
of the Remote Vision System 2.0 effort. The Air Force expects the
Remote Vision System 2.0 will be ready to begin fleet retrofit in
fiscal year 2024.
7. Senator Hirono. General Brown, your opening statement mentions
the importance of divesting from the legacy KC-135 and KC-10 aircraft
quickly because it ``hampers the fielding of the more capable KC-46''--
but how does that position square with the ongoing capability issues
the newer KC-46 is still experiencing?
General Brown. We continue to work closely with Boeing on the
Remote Visual System 2.0 fix and feel confident they will have a
retrofit solution in the fiscal year 2023/fiscal year 2024 timeframe.
We have worked carefully with USTRANSCOM to ensure we can deliver
the needed air refueling capacity while we develop the KC-46 enterprise
and work through deficiencies in the platform.
The KC-46 is currently providing operational and training missions
throughout the world. It can already refuel several platforms, move
cargo and conduct aeromedical evacuation missions with some
restrictions. DAF is implementing a conditions-based approach to
operationalize the KC-46 for USTRANSCOM use prior to full operational
capability declaration.
pilot shortage
8. Senator Hirono. General Brown, the Air Force has been
experiencing significant shortfalls in both pilots and aircraft
maintainers in recent years. What steps are you taking to address the
pilot and aircraft maintainer shortage?
General Brown. While the USAF is experiencing unprecedented high
retention rates in both the Enlisted and Officer Corps, the aggregate
success may mask areas where we have retention challenges like pilots
and aircraft maintainers. In response to these continued challenges, we
continue to offer targeted monetary incentives such as Selective
Retention and Aviation Bonuses as well as non-monetary strategies
focused on Quality of Life and Quality of Service.
Focusing on pilots specifically, the Air Force strategy is twofold:
1) sustainably produce at least 1,500 pilots per year; 2) improve long-
term retention of pilots through a combination of policies, incentives
and actions. This strategy centers on increasing pilot production
capacity to meet our annual production requirement of 1,500 pilots year
after year allowing all three Air Components the necessary number of
pilots to meet their line pilot demand. Sustaining this production
level over ten years will restore Company Grade Officer health as well
as line pilot inventory health. The Air Force could expand production
faster but it would create unnecessary and possibly, unmanageable
challenges with training, absorbing and maintaining the force.
Production of at least 1,500 pilots per year balances our need to
reduce the shortfall at a manageable pace.
We expect we will produce between 1,500 and 1,600 pilots per year
by fiscal year 23 through several key initiatives. These include: UPT
2.5, Accelerated Path to Wings (a T-1 only path to wings), Helicopter
Training Next (a Rotary Wing Only Path to Wings), Improving Contact
Simulator Instructor manning and compensation, Remote Simulator
Instruction and the use of Aviation Schools (Alternate Path to Wings)
as well as credit for civilian flight experience (Civil Path to Wings).
The USAF also instituted an aircraft maintenance retention strategy
that has successfully contributed to the current 100 percent fill rate
for our funded maintenance billets. This four-step retention strategy
focuses on building and maintaining the right skill levels and
specialties within its enlisted maintenance workforce. It focuses on
cyclical evaluation of historical retention trends; on-going review and
adjustments to retention goals by skill level and maintenance
specialty; clear understanding of retention rates necessary to attain
those goals; and establishment of metrics needed to track performance
against those goals. Keeping maintenance manning and retention high
relies on being able to coordinate timing for aircraft divestment with
arrivals of new weapons system (F-35, KC-46, B-21, NGAD). Without the
ability to repurpose our maintenance manning and retention levels will
be put at risk again.
9. Senator Hirono. General Brown, what efforts are you taking to
recruit, retain, and remove barriers for a more diverse force, and in
particular, what steps you are taking to diversify the pool of pilots
serving in the Air Force?
General Brown. Air Education and Training Command is responsible
for recruiting the Air Force we need with an emphasis on Rated
Diversity. Pilot retention, to include potential culture or bias
problems impacting under-represented groups, is a focus area for the
Air Force. The Service has leveraged a body of work that includes
studies, advanced data analytics, and surveys to better understand all
the factors impacting the quality of life and service for our pilots.
The most recent studies (e.g., RAND 2018) have explored historic
challenges in recruiting a diverse pilot force by focusing on
understanding demographic differences in pilot training attrition. This
study, coupled with additional advanced analysis, resulted in a re-
assessment of the Pilot Candidate Selection Model (PCSM). Specific
actions targeted at improving pilot retention include decreasing
administrative burdens for pilots within operational squadrons,
broadening height range to allow for a larger pool of candidates
(specifically women), developing gender-specific flight duty uniforms,
and modernizing other dress and appearance rules.
missile warning and tracking
10. Senator Hirono. General Raymond, the threat from North Korean
ballistic missiles and the cutting edge hypersonic weapons that China
and Russia are fielding is an ongoing concern, especially in Hawaii.
The Space Force is collaborating with other DOD partners, including the
Missile Defense Agency, on the Next Generation Overhead Persistent
Infrared missile warning and tracking system--what can you tell me
about your progress on this system?
General Raymond. In the face of existing and emerging threats,
notably China, the USSF must continue to adapt space systems to a more
mission-capable and defendable architecture. The USSF continues to
successfully work with the Missile Defense Agency and the Space
Development Agency to plan for and deliver Overhead Persistent Infrared
(OPIR) capabilities focused on advanced threats. In the interim, the
USSF is designing and developing the next generation of strategically
survivable space-based Missile Warning OPIR platforms. The Next-Gen
OPIR Block 0 architecture will provide more sensitive and more
resilient Missile Warning capabilities to maintain an advantage over
our adversaries.
The Next-Gen OPIR Block 0 program continues to make progress
against an aggressive development schedule. Since initiation, the
program has met all design milestones on time to support the
warfighter's Initial Launch Capability requirement in fiscal year 2025.
The ground system continues to develop the framework and applications
required to operate the satellites, process the infrared data, and
disseminate Missile Warning messages to National Command Authorities,
the Joint Warfighter, and Allied nations.
Finally, to better detect and track advanced maneuvering missile
targets, such as hypersonic weapons that China and Russia are fielding,
the USSF, in collaboration with other stakeholders across the
Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community, has completed a
force design study for the Missile Warning and Missile Tracking mission
areas. When the design work is complete, the acquisition community will
develop a strategy and timeline to rapidly deliver the required
capability to orbit.
11. Senator Hirono. General Raymond, the Space Force has awarded an
``other transaction authority'' (OTA) contract to determine whether
sensors for the Next-Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared satellites
can effectively detect and track ballistic missiles. When are the
results of this OTA expected?
General Raymond. In May 2021, the U.S. Space Force awarded Other
Transaction Authority (OTA) contracts to Millennium Space Systems and
Raytheon Technologies through Space and Missile Systems Center's Space
Enterprise Consortium. The U.S. Space Force's Missile Track Custody
prototype effort will examine Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR)
sensor capability from Medium Earth Orbit through ground simulation.
This effort complements Space Development Agency's and Missile Defense
Agency's planned on-orbit demonstrations in Low Earth Orbit and informs
USSF architecture feasibility studies.
The Missile Track Custody effort includes an 18-month base period
of performance. During this time, the contractors will advance their
concepts to Critical Design Review-maturity and deliver functioning
Engineering Development Units to validate sensor designs. Additionally,
the contractors will deliver Digital Engineering models which will
reduce integration risk and support Missile Track Custody requirements
development.
12. Senator Hirono. General Raymond, does the Space Force have a
projected timeline for when satellites will be a viable addition to the
constellation of radars to track ballistic missiles?
General Raymond. It is important to note the Space Force currently
operates a Missile Warning architecture that detects and tracks
ballistic missiles. These systems provide an ``unblinking eye'' capable
of warning the Joint warfighter and our Allies of an impending missile
attack. However, to better detect and track advanced maneuvering
missile targets which emit reduced infrared signatures, the U.S. Space
Force, in collaboration with other stakeholders across the Department
of Defense and the Intelligence Community, has completed a force design
study for the Missile Warning and Missile Tracking mission areas. When
the design work is complete, the acquisition community will develop a
strategy and timeline to rapidly deliver the required capability to
orbit.
13. Senator Hirono. General Raymond, can persistent overhead
satellites eliminate the need for ground based radar systems for
detecting and tracking ballistic missiles?
General Raymond. Current and future planned space-based overhead
persistent infrared (OPIR) systems do not eliminate a need for ground
based radar (GBR) systems to detect and track ballistic missiles today.
OPIR and GBR systems are both required to provide accurate, timely and
unambiguous warning and attack assessment of air, missile and space
threats. Space-based OPIR systems will detect a missile launch first
and cue the GBRs to improve our missile warning capability.
Additionally, current OPIR satellites do not track cold objects in
space.
Given the speed and nature of advancing threats, as well as the
technologies and operational concepts used to detect and warn against
those threats, it is premature to assess how missile warning and
tracking will be provided in the future, and when, if ever, transition
to a different approach would occur.
14. Senator Hirono. General Raymond, how is the Space Force
planning to protect critical intelligence, missile warning and
tracking, and communications satellites in space from emerging Chinese
and Russian threats?
General Raymond. The Space Force strategy for protecting critical
satellites has three components: resilient architectures, ready
guardians, and robust partnerships.
First, the Space Force continues to field systems with
architectural resiliency. This includes fielding satellites with
enhanced hardening and resiliency, fortifying ground and communication
infrastructure, deploying proliferated constellations, and increasing
our ability to rapidly reconstitute our capabilities. Resilient
architectures reduce the likelihood and severity of a successful
attack. The Space Force can also use non-technical means, such as
maneuvering satellites to help protect from certain types of attacks.
The Space Force is developing guardians prepared to defeat Russian
and Chinese threats. This requires warfighting focused intelligence,
tactics, exercises, and training programs. Space Training and Readiness
Command will consolidate all of these functions under a single
commander who is solely focused on developing combat-ready guardians.
Finally, the Space Force continues to reinforce a safe and secure
space environment by sharing data, forming partnerships with
interagency, commercial, and international partners. This creates an
environment where adversaries who would threaten U.S. satellites will
find themselves entrenched against a diverse collection of partners
committed to a safe and secure orbital environment.
We can address this more fully at higher classification levels.
future fighter mix
15. Senator Hirono. General Brown, in February you launched a study
into the service's future fighter jet force mix. After reviewing your
budget request, it appears the Air Force is planning to focus research
funds on a Next Generation Air Dominance aircraft while complementing
the existing F-22 and F-35 fleets with more F-35s and the F-15EX. What
steps is the Air Force taking to ensure the F-35's operational testing
is not further delayed beyond 2022?
General Brown. The Air Force continues to fully fund F-35 test and
the fiscal year 2022 President's Budget request commits $1.05 billion
to research, development, test & evaluation.
The Air Force will continue to work with the Joint Program Office
to finalize the Joint Simulation Environment (JSE) schedule to complete
initial operational test & evaluation and inform the new Acquisition
Program Baseline. This updated schedule will be presented to the
Defense Acquisition Executive in August 2021.
The Air Force will also continue to work with the JPO to explore
opportunities to streamline and accelerate test activities wherever
possible.
16. Senator Hirono. General Brown, what is the timeline for
procurement of the Next Generation Air Dominance aircraft and how will
it fit in the Air Force's future fighter mix over the next two decades?
General Brown. The Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) capability
is currently in the Research and Development phase. NGAD will take time
to fully develop and field.
NGAD will provide Survivability, Lethality, and Persistence across
the entire range of military operations--seamless integration with
ABMS--a mix of manned, unmanned, and even optionally manned aircraft
and advanced stand-off weapons.
NGAD fits into the future fleet as a complementary capability to F-
15EX, F-35, and F-16.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus King
all domain capability development
17. Senator King. General Brown and General Raymond, please
describe your priority obstacles within the Department of Defense and
the interagency that your services encounter when trying to develop
Joint All Domain capabilities. Please specifically address obstacles
regarding software development, data sharing and integration, network
integration, risk management frameworks, Joint All Domain Command and
Control, artificial intelligence, joint development environments, and
cloud-based systems.
General Brown. Many years of stove piped and rapid development of
niche capabilities has challenged the DOD's ability to enable globally
integrated operations. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) is focused on the
Department of the Air Force's role in Joint All-Domain Operations. The
Air Force has published Air Force Doctrine AFDP 3-99 titled Department
of the Air Force Role in Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO), which also
addresses Joint All-Domain Command and Control a key piece to Joint All
Domain Operations.
As the USAF shifts from a network-centric to a data-centric
enterprise, seeking to build information advantage as a key enabler to
JADC2, data sharing is vital. It will require changes in how the USAF
characterizes, secures, transports, stores, and exchanges data. Though
theater-specific conditions will dictate tailored solutions, a common
framework between the USAF and its partners is needed. Disparate, patch
worked, ``bolted on'' data sharing policies, standards, and technology
are a hindrance; in order to excel in competition and conflict moving
forward, unity and cohesion of effort is a requirement.
As we develop Joint All Domain capabilities, we also have to
remember that allies and partners will be integral to our success. It's
not good enough to somehow bolt them onto our networks when a conflict
begins--we need to include them from the beginning. This means that as
we develop architectures and standards, we need to overcome some of our
own instincts to over-classify our work so that we can include allies
and partners from the start.
As we move into the Joint All Domain future, we also need to
develop the Joint doctrine, policy, structures, training, and our
people to fully realize these capabilities. Using new technology in old
ways will not deliver decision superiority on its own.
General Raymond. The USSF is fundamentally focused on creating a
modern, data-driven enterprise to achieve mission success in the space-
domain and as a key contributor to joint multi-domain, interagency and
joint warfighting success. In pursuit of Joint All-Domain capabilities,
the USSF has encountered general challenges and obstacles within the
DOD and across the interagency that include system complexity, limited
personnel resources, and competing priorities. Coordination,
communication, and cooperation are essential to address these in
committed pursuit of true Joint All-Domain operations. Data sharing is
vital to this effort within the USSF and across our joint, interagency,
industry, academia, and international partners. As the first Service to
be born-digital, we are providing several space and cyber domain
capabilities, including the Unified Data Library, as a key contribution
for all domain Command and Control (C2) capabilities. Additionally, we
are focused on developing and refining space and Joint doctrine,
policy, process, governance, tools, structures, training, and culture
to fully realize the full potential of a Joint All-Domain future.
The USSF has encountered several specific challenges or obstacles
in developing Joint All Domain capabilities. Software development is
still constrained by competing demand for government and industry
personnel and the time it takes to increase capacity. Data sharing and
integration remain an immense system of systems challenge exacerbated
by legacy DOD systems, the breadth of domain-specific demands, and
service-specific Command and Control approaches. Network integration is
a challenge given the diverse array of mission objectives, operational
requirements, and interfaces. Although risk management frameworks
differ, significant progress has been made to incorporate operational
risk perspective in this area. Joint development environments are being
fielded, but as of yet lack the overarching force design to drive
enterprise changes. Cloud-based systems remain essential, but are
challenged by security concerns, disparate Zero Trust implementations,
and integration issues in a federated approach.
The USSF is addressing some of these challenges via people,
policies, tools and partnerships to reduce obstacles in developing
Joint capabilities. Within our authorities, the Space Force is raising
the digital literacy of our workforce through Digital University to
better understand and manage the latest technologies like cloud-based
systems, artificial intelligence and software development and shift
from a risk-averse to a more risk-informed culture.
We also continue to partner within the Department of the Air Force
on common challenges.
The Department is working to shift from a network-centric to data-
centric enterprise in order to build information advantages and advance
data sharing.
At the end of the day, the Space Force must create a lean digital
workforce that is supported by culture and processes we often see in
cyber-secure focused industry. We will continue to work with Joint,
interagency, coalition, industry and academia partners to resolve
issues and develop solutions.
18. Senator King. General Brown and General Raymond, would the Air
Force and the Space Force be willing to work with Congress in reducing
some of these obstacles, possibly by developing Goldwater-Nichols like
reforms for Joint All Domain capability development, data sharing and
integration, and network integration across the DOD and interagency?
General Brown. We are always seeking ways to work with Congress in
delivering better capabilities to the warfighter and streamlining our
capability development process to accelerate change.
Within DOD, the services are closely coordinating through the Joint
All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) Cross Functional Team, led by
the Joint Staff, to pursue JADC2 capability development, data sharing
and integration, and network integration. This effort includes joint
capability development across the entire range of capabilities through
a Joint All Domain Command and Control Implementation Plan.
In recognition that data sharing underpins our Joint All Domain
capabilities going forward, we've also been working across the DOD and
interagency on a series of high-level Data Summits to focus the efforts
of our team.
On 20 July 2020, this group met at U.S. Special Operations Command
to develop our DOD Reference Architecture 3.0 which will set common
standards to ensure integration. In early August 2020, our cross-DOD
and interagency data sharing and network integration teams will meet to
further develop the DOD Reference Architecture 3.0. Our Department of
the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office, Chief Architect Office, Chief
Data Officer's team, and other experts will participate to ensure a
high level of integration.
General Raymond. Yes. The USSF is willing to work with Congress to
efficiently, affordably, and responsively deliver better capabilities
to the Space and Joint warfighters while streamlining our capability
development, data sharing, and systems integration processes to
accelerate change and ensure national security success.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
mq-9
19. Senator Rosen. General Brown, last week, Secretary Austin told
me during the DOD Posture hearing that the Air Force is reducing the
number of MQ-9 lines, but not the number of tails. I'm curious why
there is any reduction at all when the Air Force today still lacks the
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capacity to meet
Combatant Commanders' requirements contained in the 2018 National
Defense Strategy. Can you please expand on what this reduction strategy
is and whether there is soon to be a next generation program of record
to replace the MQ-9?
General Brown. In fiscal year 2022 the Air Force is only requesting
a reduction in combat lines. This reduction is less than 10 percent of
the current force presentation (4 of 60) and does not equate to
reduction in aircraft inventory; no tails will be divested, no
reduction in personnel, and no reduced squadrons. By keeping 60 combat
lines, and not modifying the way the MQ-9 fleet is utilized, the
platform will become more vulnerable and irrelevant, even in low-end
conflicts.
The Air Force remains committed to providing MQ-9 intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike capability to Combatant
Commands and will continue to offer MQ-9 capability to CENTCOM for the
foreseeable future.
While the MQ-9 provides utility today, it was not designed for
operation in a future highly-contested environment. Modifying the MQ-9
force presentation is about balancing near and long-term risk.
The Air Force is looking at multiple systems that can replace the
capacity and capability currently filled by the MQ-9. Continued
modernization efforts seek to provide future warfighters the ability to
access data and information at a moment's notice. Our systems must be
able to penetrate contested areas and survive and the MQ-9, as we know
it today, simply cannot.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Kelly
amraam program
The fiscal year 2022 request for AMRAAM production includes a
significant reduction to the planned quantity for the Air Force and
zero fiscal year 2022 funding for Navy production. The basis for these
reductions was the previous schedule delay on the Form, Fit, and
Function Refresh (F3R) cut-in for the next version of AMRAAM. It is my
understanding that following the re-plan with the Air Force, the
development program is meeting its schedule milestones. More than 850
employees in Arizona work on this program today, and I want to ensure
we don't inadvertently cause a production break of this critical air
dominance capability.
20. Senator Kelly. Secretary Roth and General Brown, the Air Force
awarded Lot 34 (fiscal year 2020 funding) this spring, and plans to
award Lot 35 (fiscal year 2021 funding) in July 2021, and Lot 36
(fiscal year 2022 funding) in July 2022. What is the confidence level
of the Air Force on the F3R recovery--is it moving in the right
direction?
Secretary Roth and General Brown. Yes, the program is progressing
in the right direction. Due to hardware integration issues, the AMRAAM
Form, Fit, Function, Refresh (F3R) program experienced a 13 month
schedule slip. Since then, Raytheon Missiles & Defense (RMD) achieved a
number of significant milestones and implemented a detailed plan to
maintain schedule to the completion of the program. Additionally, RMD
has demonstrated improvement in forecasting remaining work while
burning down a backlog of tasks that were behind. This gives the
government high-confidence in RMD's ability to meet its Functional
Configuration Audit, a major milestone for the program, by January
2023. The program's critical path is holding steady and the program is
confident in RMD's ability to execute the fiscal year 2022 budget.
21. Senator Kelly. Secretary Roth and General Brown, how will the
Air Force and Navy ensure stable AMRAAM production across production
lots planned for fiscal year 2021 to fiscal year 2022 without fiscal
year 2022 Navy production funding? Please provide details on how prior
year funding will be utilized to stabilize production rates.
Secretary Roth and General Brown. While the Air Force and the Navy
pursued different funding approaches to address the F3R impacts to
future production lots, both are intended to stabilize AMRAAM
production quantities across Lot 34, Lot 35, and Lot 36. The Air Force
chose to decrease AMRAAM procurement funding across fiscal year 2020,
fiscal year 2021, and fiscal year 2022, while the Navy's approach was
to zero-out fiscal year 2022 and carry over fiscal year 2021 funds to
support both Lot 35 and Lot 36 procurement. It is imperative that the
fiscal year 2021 Navy funding remains intact to execute this strategy
and keep the production line above minimum sustainment rates. The
services will continue to coordinate with each other and communicate
with Congress to ensure these funding profiles are protected.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger Wicker
air force officer promotions
22. Senator Wicker. General Brown and General Raymond, several
years ago an anonymous Air Force Colonel writing under the pseudonym of
Ned Stark published an article, ``A Call for Senior Officer Reform in
the Air Force: An Insider's Perspective,'' which criticized the
service's officer promotion process. I think the grade of O-3 is too
early to identify individuals as future general officers. This system
could result in promoting below standard O-4s, O-5s, and O-6s to the
general officer ranks. Do you believe the Air Force's current
evaluation and promotion system best meets the needs of both the
service and the individuals?
General Brown. While the current Air Force talent management system
has served us well, like all processes we utilize it is constantly
evolving to improve and meet future developmental requirements. As a
result, the Air Force has been overhauling its talent management system
with a focus on ensuring we produce airmen capable of executing future
Air Force missions as envisioned in the National Defense Strategy. This
includes building leaders with the key Airmen Leadership Qualities
(ALQs) we believe will be essential for success in the future fight
like smart risk taking, innovation, leading inclusively and others. To
set this course, the AF published 10 ALQs which form the foundation of
new officer and enlisted evaluation systems currently under
development. We also transformed the single Line of the Air Force
promotion category into six developmentally focused categories adding
agility for officer development and career progression. In 2020, we
transitioned away from below the promotion zone consideration where we
selected some officers ahead of their peers based on demonstrated and
future promotion potential. This transition now allows officers'
greater space for in-grade development and building deeper leadership
skills and experience through less rigid career tracks. While not
directly related, the Air Force certainly talked with and partnered
with Colonel Jason Lamb, ``Ned Stark,'' on many of the reforms we are
undertaking to ensure our future leaders are just as capable as those
we've been developing.
General Raymond. The Air Force has an excellent system it is
building upon and evolving to meet its needs; however, the Space Force
is much smaller and requires a more individualized talent management
system. Until the Space Force is able to field the new system described
in the Guardian Ideal, we will continue to use the Air Force system
with some policy differences based in our unique Service requirements.
We anticipate fielding our new developmental feedback process,
appraisal system, and approach toward promotions before the end of
fiscal year 2023. Mr. Jason Lamb, who wrote the referenced essay under
the pseudonym Cole Ned Stark, was a principal author of the Guardian
Ideal and is fully involved in its implementation as our Talent
Strategist.
23. Senator Wicker. General Brown and General Raymond, what, if
anything, are the Air Force and Space Force doing to address the issues
raised in the article?
General Brown. While the current Air Force Talent management system
has served us well, like all processes we utilize it is constantly
evolving to improve and meet future developmental requirements. As a
result, the Air Force has been overhauling its talent management system
with a focus on ensuring we produce airmen capable of executing future
Air Force missions as envisioned in the National Defense Strategy. This
includes building leaders with the key Airmen Leadership Qualities
(ALQs) we believe will be essential for success in the future fight
like smart risk taking, innovation, leading inclusively and others. To
set this course, the AF published 10 ALQs which form the foundation of
new officer and enlisted evaluation systems currently under
development. We also transformed the single Line of the Air Force
promotion category into six developmentally focused categories adding
agility for officer development and career progression. In 2020, we
transitioned away from below the promotion zone consideration where we
selected some officers ahead of their peers based on demonstrated and
future promotion potential. This transition now allows officers'
greater space for in-grade development and building deeper leadership
skills and experience through less rigid career tracks. While not
directly related, the Air Force certainly talked with and partnered
with Cole Jason Lamb, ``Ned Stark,'' on many of the reforms we are
undertaking to ensure our future leaders are just as capable as those
we've been developing.
General Raymond. The Space Force is building upon the excellent
work by the Air Force to expand the type and quantity of information
available to the promotion board to help inform promotion
recommendations. The approach that we outline in the Guardian Ideal has
three primary components: performance appraisal, behavioral and
competency assessments, and situational judgment testing. Performance
management science and cutting edge approaches in the private sector
have demonstrated that this will provide us better informed and data-
driven assessments of who is best prepared for promotion. All of these
tools are based on where a person is in the here and now, including the
propensity for success, and not based on a record of performance
largely based on past performance. The Department of the Air Force is
one team who remain committed to developing our members and promoting
the best candidates.
training aircraft (t-1)
24. Senator Wicker. General Brown, I understand that a plan is
being finalized to retire the T-1 training aircraft currently used to
support Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training (SUPT), and the Air
Force intends to move to an increased reliance on simulator training.
What is the Air Force's plan for the future of the T-1 training fleet?
General Brown. Over the last few years the Air Force has been
analyzing better ways to train aircrews, to better prepare our pilots
for the modern platforms now entering service (F-35, KC-46, MH-139, B-
21, etc.).
The Air Force plans to transition away from some of the T-1
capacity in the coming years and will increase use of simulators and
other Virtual Reality training devices. This new training program and
syllabi are still in development.
space force firing
25. Senator Wicker. General Raymond, last month the firing of Space
Force commander Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Lohmeier was widely
publicized. According to a spokesman from the Space Force, he was fired
due to comments he made in a podcast criticizing aspects of diversity
training as being based in Marxism and discriminatory critical race
theory. Regarding the firing, does it concern you that we may be
stifling independent thinking and healthy self-critique within the
ranks?
General Raymond. The specifics of Lieutenant Colonial Lohmeier's
relief from Command are currently under review, and it would be
improper for me to comment on the specifics of his case. However,
independent thinking, self-assessment, and debate are encouraged in
both the Air Force and Space Force.
critical race theory
26. Senator Wicker. Secretary Roth, last month I sent a letter to
Secretary of Defense Austin expressing my concerns about possible
political motivations behind this action. servicemembers are prohibited
from participating in public broadcasts like a podcast if they do so as
an advocate for partisan causes. If, in criticizing critical race
theory, Lieutenant Colonel Lohmeier's comments were found to be
partisan, it follows that the Department recognizes critical race
theory as reflecting one side of a partisan debate, and if that is the
case, it would be inappropriate for the Department to actively promote
critical race theory through training initiatives at any level. Is it
the Department of the Air Force's position that publicly opposing
critical race theory represents prohibited partisan activity for
servicemembers?
Secretary Roth. The Department of the Air Force has not taken the
position that publicly opposing critical race theory represents
prohibited partisan activity for servicemembers. Lieutenant Colonial
Lohmeier was relieved because a superior competent authority lost trust
and confidence in his ability to command. Command is a privilege, not a
right. Our Department of the Air Force Inspector General is conducting
a comprehensive investigation which we will share with Congress when
complete.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
kc-10 & aerial refueling
27. Senator Tillis. Secretary Roth and General Brown, the KC-46A
Pegasus aircraft has yet to achieve full rate production and lacks a
remote visual system that is fully functional during all light levels.
Moreover, a KC-46 carries only 2,000lbs more transferable fuel than a
KC-135 and carries 140,000lbs less than a KC-10. In an effort to reduce
cost at the risk of mission failure, the Air Force seeks to retire
legacy aircraft with fully functional and approved fuel transfer
systems; specifically, KC-10s. In your opinion, are cost savings more
important than strategic mission success? Put differently, should a
legacy platform with proven, capable systems be maintained and utilized
over a future system that has yet to meet primary mission requirements?
Secretary Roth and General Brown. Cost savings are not the reason
the Air Force is transferring to the KC-46. The KC-46 will be a more
reliable capability that ensures refueling capacity well into the
future.
Also, the KC-46 provides capabilities the KC-10 cannot. These
include capabilities for aeromedical evacuation, cargo missions, and
its advanced communication system will extend ABMS to the edge of the
battlespace. The KC-10 cannot be retrofitted to provide these
capabilities in a platform with increased survivability, self-
protection, and situational awareness required to compete, deter, and
win in complex security environments.
28. Senator Tillis. Secretary Roth and General Brown, how many KC-
46A air-to-air refueling missions are being sourced outside the
continental United States in support of operational sorties (i.e. not
training sorties)?
Secretary Roth and General Brown. The following numbers reflect the
number of OCONUS sorties flown for each of the last few years. It
includes regular component AMC tails only (not Air National Guard
(ANG), Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC), Air Education & Training
Command (AETC), United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), Pacific Air
Forces (PACAF), Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), or Air Force Special
Operations Command (AFSOC)) that either took off or landed outside of
the United States:
Calendar Year 2018: 0 OCONUS KC-46 sorties
Calendar Year 2019: 25 OCONUS KC-46 sorties
Calendar Year 2020: 123 OCONUS KC-46 sorties
Calendar Year 2021: 83 OCONUS KC-46 sorties (thru 31 May)
29. Senator Tillis. Secretary Roth and General Brown, how Many KC-
10 air-to-air refueling missions are being sourced outside the
continental United States in support of operational sorties (i.e. not
training sorties)?
Secretary Roth and General Brown. The following numbers reflect the
number of OCONUS sorties flown for each of the last few years. It
includes regular component AMC tails only (not ANG, AFRC, AETC, USAFE,
PACAF, AFMC, or AFSOC) that either took off or landed (or both) outside
of the United States:
Calendar Year 2018: 4,319 OCONUS KC-10 sorties
Calendar Year 2019: 4,546 OCONUS KC-10 sorties
Calendar Year 2020: 2,927 OCONUS KC-10 sorties
Calendar Year 2021: 983 OCONUS KC-10 sorties (thru 31 May)
30. Senator Tillis. Secretary Roth and General Brown, how important
is it that ``warfighters train like they fight'' and prepare for future
deployments by tanking from platforms that they will encounter overseas
and in combat?
Secretary Roth and General Brown. As Moody Suiter stated in the
1960's in response to combat losses in Vietnam, if we give our aircrew
their first 10 combat sorties in a training environment, their
survivability in combat will improve exponentially.
This concept applies across all elements of Air Force Operations
and training. Our Aircrews must have training on all expected tankers
before deploying. The capability to train like we fight is critically
important. I think the Air Force has the right sight picture and is
incorporating this concept into training appropriately.
31. Senator Tillis. Secretary Roth and General Brown, the Air Force
and U.S. Transportation Command have previously stated that more than
25,000 hours of aerial refueling missions are not being supported
annually. Given that the KC-46 is still not fully operational, and the
Air Force has already begun retiring some of the KC-10 fleet, I assume
that there is still a significant shortfall in Air Force's aerial
refueling capacity. What is the current shortfall? How does this impact
training for aircrews and tanker availability for combatant commands?
Secretary Roth and General Brown. In April 2020, The Secretary of
the Air Force provided the Congress with a report titled, ``Fiscal Year
2020 NDAA Contractor-Operated Aerial Refueling Aircraft.'' That
reported extrapolated ``as many as 30,000 hours of aerial refueling
missions are not being supported annually.'' That assessment resonates
with the Joint Force's appetite for aerial refueling. However, requests
for air refueling capability vary in criticality and are often
unconstrained by resources. That said, the air refueling fleet remains
stressed. USTRANSCOM manages the tension between available resources
and requests for capability in order to prevent mission failure.
The transition to the KC-46 created an air refueling capacity
bathtub, meaning the air refueling enterprise is at a low point in
available capacity. However, acceptance of the KC-46 will ameliorate
this capacity low point. Additionally, as forces withdraw from
Southwest Asia, air refueling demands also decrease. As recently as
2017, USTRANSCOM supported 70 air refueling aircraft deployed to
CENTCOM. By 2022, this will drop to about 35 aircraft. Additionally,
the KC-46 crew ratio is higher across the Total Force when compared to
both the KC-135 and about the same as the KC-10. When fully delivered
and manned in 2029, roughly 160 more air refueling crews across the
Total Force will exist, providing 10 percent more taskable aircraft on
a daily basis than we had in 2019, before any aircraft were retired.
While we have a shortfall today, the trajectory is improving over time
and will accelerate as the KC-46 reaches full operational capability.
USTRANSCOM's top priority is warfighting readiness and ensuring our
component commands are capable of supporting their wartime missions. As
such, training for a high-end fight is an absolute necessity. As
operational activity decreased in Southwest Asia, a greater focus
across the entire Mobility Air Force, including air refueling forces,
shifted to full-spectrum readiness.
Since 2015, the average daily number of global air refueling
missions was 139, and by the end of 2020, the average dropped to 100.
This created opportunity for aircrews to conduct necessary high-end
training. Tanker crew training is certainly necessary, but receiver
pilot training presents a priority in order to maintain their combat
edge.
While the number of tasked air refueling missions was about 100 a
day in 2020, USTRANSCOM committed an additional 68 aircraft to receiver
training. Looking to the future, air refueling workload is balanced
with expected capacity, especially with the relief gained through use
of the KC-46 interim capability release that can support many non-
deployed and lower priority missions, freeing up fully capable KC-10
and KC-135 units to provide necessary support and refocus on training.
32. Senator Tillis. Secretary Roth and General Brown, last year
General Lyons testified before this Committee that the KC-10 and KC-135
legacy tanker retirements proposed in fiscal year 2021 would ``create a
capacity bathtub with significant impacts to combatant command daily
competition and wartime missions, and negatively impact senior leader
decision space for mobilization when confronted with a crisis.''
Congress prevented some, but not all, of these retirements in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021. Given that the
KC-46 is still not fully operational, and aerial refueling requirements
have presumably either increased or remained the same, would you
support efforts to increase tanker capacity in order to meet aircrew
training and daily combatant commander operational requirements?
Secretary Roth and General Brown. Reduced refueling requirements as
a result of withdrawal from Afghanistan provides us a window for
modernization of the force while also incurring minimal operational
risk.
USTRANSCOM has confirmed that, with planned divestments, the Air
Force will continue to have sufficient air refueling capacity to meet
global Joint Force demands during the transition to a fully operational
KC-46. No additional air refueling capacity is needed beyond the PB22
position to meet aircrew training and daily Combatant Command
requirements.
33. Senator Tillis. Secretary Roth and General Brown, I have
serious concerns regarding the Air Force's desire to retire a
significant number of legacy tankers prior to the KC-46 becoming fully
operational. I am particularly concerned by the potential loss of the
KC-10, which provides significantly more fuel offload than both the KC-
135 and the KC-46. I understand that the KC-10 fleet has many more
years left in terms of potential service life, and am concerned that
prematurely retiring such a strategic asset would result in a loss of
warfighter capability that cannot be regained for many years to come.
Please describe the importance of the KC-10 to the Air Force's aerial
refueling capability, and the potential impact to missions for Air
Force, Navy, and Marine Corps pilots and aircrews if we cut additional
KC-10s.
Secretary Roth and General Brown. The KC-10 has been a great
aircraft, providing strategic air-refueling and airlift capabilities
over the last 34 years; however, they are expensive to maintain. In
order to ensure global reach for the Joint Force and air refueling
capabilities that can generate combat power in austere and contested
environments of the future, the Department of the Air Force is retiring
the KC-10, certifying and fielding the KC-46, and maintaining upgraded
KC-135s.
We do not have the manpower and resources for future Tanker
capability unless we divest KC-10s in the near-term. Our operators and
maintainers are a fixed resource and cannot fully operate and maintain
two sets of tanker aircraft at fully operational capable levels.
34. Senator Tillis. Secretary Roth and General Brown, I understand
that, although the KC-46 has been cleared to conduct some aerial
refueling missions, the aircraft will not be considered to be fully
operational until major deficiencies such as the Remote Visual System
are resolved, which likely won't be until 2023 at the earliest. I was
surprised to learn that, despite this non- or semi-operational status,
the KC-46s being delivered are being coded into the Primary Mission
Aircraft Inventory (PMAI). Please explain why these aircraft are given
the same inventory status as fully operational KC-10s or KC-135s.
Secretary Roth and General Brown. Primary Mission Aircraft
Inventory (PMAI) is the correct designation for KC-46s that are being
assigned to a unit, since the other categories (training, development,
and special missions) are not applicable.
The Department of the Air Force and Boeing are on a path to correct
remaining performance Category-I deficiencies as soon as 2023/2024, but
the KC-46, consistent with operational restrictions, is currently
demonstrating limited operational capability to conduct air refueling.
The Air Force plans a conditions-based approach to leverage existing
and planned KC-46 capability to provide predictable and sustainable
tanker capacity through daily operational missions prior to Initial
Operational Capability (IOC) declaration, lessening the tasks on the
KC-135 and KC-10.
35. Senator Tillis. Secretary Roth and General Brown, I understand
that there have been conversations regarding possible uses for KC-10
aircraft prior to being fully retired and sent to the boneyard. I
understand that one option is to provide the aircraft to industry,
either through sale or as Government Furnished Equipment, for use in a
commercial air refueling program. I understand that the Navy and Marine
Corps have been successfully utilizing a commercial air refueling
program for the last 20+ years. What is the status of those
discussions? Shouldn't KC-10 retirements be halted until a decision is
made on commercial air refueling? More generally, do you believe the
Air Force should be pursuing a commercial air refueling program to
address current and future aerial refueling shortfalls?
Secretary Roth and General Brown. The Air Force is currently
completing an internal Commercial Aerial Refueling Study focusing on
how daily tanker requirements are met within the force structure
dictated by the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2020
(MCRS-20). If it is determined that additional tankers, crews, or
flying hours are needed, then the Commercial Aerial Refueling Study
will describe and evaluate sources to supply the additional need.
However, the Air Force plans to continue KC-10 retirements since
manpower and resources are needed to transition to the KC-46.
KC-10 retirements should not be halted until a decision is made on
commercial air refueling. In coordination with USTRANSCOM, we have
developed a sustainable way forward that maintains sufficient air
refueling requirements as we bridge to the KC-46; for example, the Air
Force's Interim Capability Release (ICR) process makes KC-46 capacity
available for limited USTRANSCOM tasking.
36. Senator Tillis. Secretary Roth and General Brown, the Air Force
just issued a press release stating, ``the Air Force is seeking
companies that have the capability to deliver approximately 140-160
Commercial Derivative Tanker Aircraft--at a rate of 12 to 15 per year--
to supplement the Air Force Tanker Aircraft fleet at the end of KC-46A
production, and bridge the gap to the next Tanker recapitalization
phase. The Commercial Derivative Aircraft must be operational by
2029.'' This while at the same time the Air Force is seeking to retire
30+ tankers, all of which would otherwise be operational in 2029. The
KC-10, in particular, is well short of its end of service life. There
are no recent, public service life estimates, but a Federation of
American Scientists report from 1999, which has been cited regularly,
projected 2043. A 2019 War on the Rocks article says the KC-10s are at
only about 40 percent of their expected lifespan, which would put the
service life well past 2050. It would appear that the Air Force does
not expect the KC-46 to have a sufficient lifecycle to last until the
next generation tanker (KC-Z) is fielded. If this is the case, and you
have assets like the KC-10 that have more than 20 years left of usable
service, why divest of fully operational tankers, like the KC-10, that
can ``bridge the gap'' until the KC-Z is operational? From a monetary
lens, is this a fiscally responsible use of tax payer dollars?
Secretary Roth and General Brown. The KC-10 has been a great
aircraft, providing strategic air-refueling and airlift capabilities
over the last 34 years; however, they are expensive to maintain.
Maintaining the KC-10 fleet beyond the current divestiture plan
increases demand for spare parts. Not right-sizing the fleet could
jeopardize the planned resources for parts repair efforts to maintain a
safe and air worthy FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) certified
fleet.
In order to ensure global reach for the Joint Force and air
refueling capabilities that can generate combat power in austere and
contested environments of the future, the Department of the Air Force
is retiring the KC-10, certifying and fielding the KC-46, and
maintaining upgraded KC-135s.
USTRANSCOM concurs with the Department of the Air Force's decision
to divest the KC-10 in order to facilitate the fielding of a fully
operational KC-46 weapon system.
f-35 joint strike fighter
During his nomination hearing to be Secretary of the Air Force,
Frank Kendall stated the F-35 is ``the best tactical aircraft of its
type in the world, and will be for quite some time.'' In response to
Senators' questions regarding F-35 costs, Mr. Kendall said, ``the key
to keeping the cost down in an air fleet is getting the numbers up.
There's a very strong correlation between the size of the fleet and the
cost to sustain that fleet. So if there were one thing that I think
would drive cost down overall, it's continue to buy.''
37. Senator Tillis. General Brown, the Air Force's fiscal year 2022
budget request included 12 less F-35 aircraft than were appropriated by
Congress for fiscal year 2021, and the Air Force's Fiscal Year 2022
Unfunded Priorities List (UPL) did not include any additional F-35s.
Further, the Air Force's fiscal year 2022 budget request for Advanced
Procurement (AP) suggests the Air Force plans to procure no more than
43 F-35s per year beginning in fiscal year 2023. Do you disagree with
Mr. Kendall's view that continuing to grow and mature the F-35 fleet at
a rate consistent with Full Rate Production (FRP) can help manage costs
and increase aircraft availability?
General Brown. The Air Force must have the right mix of
capabilities in the right capacity to ensure combat readiness for today
and tomorrow. We need Block 4 F-35 modernization, enabled by Technical
Refresh-3 (TR-3) hardware, on competition-relevant timelines to ensure
continued F-35 relevance against China or Russia.
Generally, a larger fleet drives reduced sustainment costs per
aircraft but the Air Force must weigh overall sustainment costs against
the potential for increased retrofit costs and development costs for a
fleet with multiple configurations.
Procuring additional aircraft before Block 4/TR-3 ``cuts into''
production, drives a retrofit bill, and is therefore not desired. As a
cornerstone capability, the Air Force must retain the F-35's mission
contribution, even if this requires offsets from within the program.
38. Senator Tillis. General Brown, how does the Air Force plan to
mitigate cost and aircraft availability challenges if it continues down
the path of procuring less F-35As per year than originally planned for
Full Rate Production?
General Brown. The Air Force must have the right mix of
capabilities in the right capacity to ensure combat readiness for today
and tomorrow. We need Block 4 F-35 modernization, enabled by Technical
Refresh-3 (TR-3) hardware, on competition-relevant timelines to ensure
continued F-35 relevance against China or Russia.
Generally, a larger fleet drives reduced sustainment costs per
aircraft but the Air Force must weigh overall sustainment costs against
the potential for increased retrofit costs and development costs for a
fleet with multiple configurations.
Procuring additional aircraft before Block 4/TR-3 ``cuts into''
production, drives a retrofit bill, and is therefore not desired. As a
cornerstone capability, the Air Force must retain the F-35's mission
contribution, even if this requires offsets from within the program.
39. Senator Tillis. General Brown, the Air Force has been procuring
F-35s at a rate nearing Full Rate Production for the past several
years. Air Force leaders have testified that F-35s coming off the
production line today have the best ``break rate'' in the Air Force.
Recently publicized data showed F-35 as having the best ``Mission
Capable'' rate out of all Air Force fighter fleets in 2020. Despite
these significant achievements, the Air Force's fiscal year 2022 budget
proposes reducing F-35 annual procurement below last year's
appropriated level, while purchasing additional 4th generation fighters
that have not been produced at rates for the Air Force in roughly 20+
years. As the Air Force tries to mitigate a fighter shortfall, how does
this revised acquisition plan not add additional risk? How does the Air
Force plan to mitigate this risk?
General Brown. The Air Force is investing in a future fighter force
needed to ensure air superiority for the Joint Force against any
adversary. This includes a focus on investments to create a
complementary combination of higher end and lower end fighters that
provide the affordable capabilities and capacity needed to achieve NDS
objectives.
The current fighter force path is unaffordable in both the near and
long term due to increasing operating costs of 5th gen aircraft and
rising modernization costs of an aging legacy fleet.
By reducing the number of types of fighter aircraft in the
inventory from seven to four over the next 15-20 years will allow the
Air Force to focus investments on capabilities needed to win (NGAD, F-
15EX, F-35, F-16).
40. Senator Tillis. General Brown, recent Air Force messaging on
the F-35 program has been inconsistent and at times conflicted with
feedback Congress has received from Combatant Commanders, other
services, and international customers. Does the Air Force understand
that by slowing F-35 procurement, it will inevitably increase
procurement costs, decrease aircraft availability, and discourage
further international involvement? If unchanged, I am deeply concerned
the Air Force could put F-35 on a path similar to F-22 and be left
without any advanced fighter fleet going forward.
General Brown. The AF is continuing to modernize the F-22 to remain
capable against improving adversaries, and there are no plans to retire
it in the near-term. Results from the TACAIR study will be a force
structure recommendation for a capable and affordable force structure
with sufficient capacity to provide air superiority and global strike
to the Joint Force.
The Air Force is absolutely not backing away from the F-35. In
fact, the majority of the fighters we are procuring in our budget are
F-35. Also, there is currently a delivery delay for full Block 4
capability (6-18 months; 2026 delivery). A slight slowing of F-35
procurement ensures we do not increase the number of aircraft requiring
retrofit to achieve full Block 4 capability.
Air Force fighters average 29 years of age, and that is reflected
in our readiness and fiscal challenges. We need to buy as many fighters
as possible to recapitalize the force, we just need to approach
procurement smartly.
41. Senator Tillis. General Brown, you have previously stated that
the U.S. Air Force is committed to the F-35 program and that it is the
``cornerstone'' of the Air Force's tactical fighter fleet. Can you
confirm for the Committee that the U.S. Air Force remains committed to
the F-35 program? How is F-35 the ``cornerstone'' of the fighter fleet
and what important capabilities does it provide the Air Force?
General Brown. The F-35 is a cornerstone capability for several
reasons, first of which being it is the majority of the fighters we are
procuring in our budget are F-35.
Additionally, the F-35 is the only western fifth-generation
aircraft currently in mass production; it provides the U.S. and our
closest allies and partners with potent combat power.
If called upon to fight a peer adversary today in a highly
contested environment, the F-22 and F-35 would provide a potent one-two
punch as part of a joint or coalition team. In the future, our Next
Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) platform will be an even-more
formidable teammate for the F-35 in that environment.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
joint pacific alaska range complex (jparc) modernization
42. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Roth and General Brown, in response
to a question for the record concerning the interdependence of range
modernization and readiness, the USINDOPACOM commander, Admiral
Aquilino, stated, ``Modernizing our ranges . . . will allow the joint
force to train against an evolving threat and technologically advanced
opponent with our allies and partners.'' I could not agree more. In
March of 2020, the Department of the Air Force submitted a report to
the congressional defense committees concerning range modernization for
the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) and the Nevada Test and
Training Range (NTTR). The report identified JPARC and NTTR as the only
two major training ranges the Air Force would modernize to Threat
Matrix Level 4--or near peer--capability. The report also stated it
would complete such modernization efforts by fiscal year 2026. Does the
President's budget submission keep the Air Force on track to complete
this modernization effort by fiscal year 2026?
Secretary Roth and General Brown. Most of the infrastructure
required for Level 4, including versions 1 and 2 of the Advanced Radar
Threat Systems (ARTS), will be in place at these two ranges by fiscal
year 2026. The final step to achieving Level 4 is fielding the ARTS v3.
This is a reprioritization from the original plan that was based on the
ARTS v4. The ARTS v3 will provide significantly greater capability and
is projected to field in the fiscal year 2030 FYDP (as late as fiscal
year 2032).
AF funds are being allocated to Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex
(JPARC) modernization as part of the Combat Training Ranges (CTR)
funding. These capabilities will be deployed first to the Nellis Test
and Training Range (NTTR) and JPARC--the only two AF ranges planned for
Level 4 (near-peer) capability.
JPARC is currently scheduled to receive four medium-range ARTS V2s
($64.8 million) (2 each projected to be delivered in fiscal year 2023
and fiscal year 2024), two long-range ARTS V1s ($81.1 million) (1 each
projected to be delivered in fiscal year 2024 and fiscal year 2025),
along with Radar Signal Emulators (RSEs) ($41.8 million).
The plan includes funding for development of high-fidelity
surrogate targets matching simulated threat systems to stress 5th
Generation sensor fusion capabilities.
Live Mission Operations Capability (LMOC) will be installed at
JPARC ($4 million). Effort will deliver a common hardware and software
platform called ``War Room'' to each training location, links each site
via a Live Mission Operations Network (LMON), and fields a Multi-Level
Security (MLS) architecture that enables LMOC to connect all live
training systems.
e-3 modernization
43. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Roth and General Brown, as you know
the E-3 Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft is a
vital piece of air combat command and control and essentially serves as
the long-range eyes and ears for our air forces. In fact, the E-3
helped the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) intercept
over 60 aircraft off the coast of Alaska last year--the most since the
Cold War. This aircraft uses early 1970s technology and an airframe
designed in the late 1950s. In February 2021, the Pacific Air Forces
Commander, General Wilsbach, spoke at the Aerospace Warfare Symposium
and advocated for the Air Force to procure the E-7 Wedgetail to replace
the E-3, which is getting ``harder and harder to get airborne.'' How
does the Air Force plan to modernize the E-3 platform to keep it
effective against near-peer competitors into the 2030s?
Secretary Roth and General Brown. Current E-3 upgrade programs such
as the navigation and 40/45 computer processing modifications do not
provide the capabilities that enable the aircraft to keep up with next
generation airborne moving target indication ("AMTI") and battle
management requirements. The future AMTI platform must be able to sense
and share data both on and off board systems across multiple frequency
spectrums. Although there is promising future AMTI technologies that
could someday potentially operate without a hosted airborne platform,
these future concepts will not be ready before the end of service of
the E-3 platform. A very near-term decision is needed for a bridging
capability for an AMTI platform moving forward.
44. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Roth and General Brown, is
procuring the E-7 platform that the Royal Australian Air Force operates
a viable option? What capabilities does that aircraft provide that the
E-3 does not?
Secretary Roth General Brown. The Air Force is exploring the
viability of acquiring the E-7 which is used by both the Royal
Australian Air Force and the United Kingdom's Royal Air Force. At the
forefront of the Service's evaluation is the E-7's enhanced
capability(s) and assessing the aircraft's suitability to meet existing
and future Air Moving Target Indicator (AMTI) and Battle Management
requirements. In comparison to the E-3, the E-7 offers a superior radar
capability with a modern Multirole Electronically Scanned Array (MESA)
radar capable of staring at sectors of interest and closing the kill
chain on small and fast targets. Based upon early assessments, the E-7
could provide capability closing both near and mid-range AMTI gaps
while also providing wide-area surveillance and integrated fire control
at the tactical edge. Additionally, the E-7 also presents a potential
opportunity for cost savings in operations, maintenance, and fuel
costs.
arctic strategy resourcing
45. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Roth and General Brown, in July 21,
2021, the Department of the Air Force published its Arctic strategy,
which Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks committed to fully
resource. In last week's Department of Defense posture hearing,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Milley reaffirmed the
need to ``fully resource the Arctic strategy.'' In a Strategic Forces
Subcommittee hearing last week, General VanHerck, the U.S. Northern
Command Commander and designated advocate for Arctic capabilities,
testified that DOD resourcing for the various service Arctic
strategies, to include the Department of the Air Force, was ``inching
along'' but that the Department ``didn't move the ball very far down
the field'' with the fiscal year 2022 budget. General VanHerck's
observation is very discouraging and somewhat alarming given the
increased competition in the region. Do you share General VanHerck's
view that the implementation of the Air Force's Arctic strategy is too
slow? If so, how do you plan on accelerating implementation of Air
Force Arctic strategy?
Secretary Roth and General Brown. The Air and Space Forces have
made significant strides on implementation across the strategy's four
lines of effort: Domain Vigilance, Power Projection, Cooperation, and
Preparation. Over the past year, we have been researching new
technology like over the horizon radar and space assets to detect
incoming threats and working hand in hand with Canada to co-develop a
data sharing system. Additionally, the Space Force is developing
public-private partnerships to bring much needed satellite
communications to the Arctic which can be used by both civilians and
joint force alike by the end of this year. In recognition of the role
Alaska plays in global power projection, the Air Force is also on track
to deliver the majority of F-35s to Alaska by the end of year.
Meanwhile, we are investing hundreds of millions to modernize the Joint
Pacific Alaska Range Complex to provide realistic training for these
advanced aircraft. Understanding the environment is also a priority;
while we work to mitigate the impact of climate change induced coastal
erosion and permafrost thaw on our infrastructure, we are enhancing our
weather forecasting to better predict storms and space weather that are
unique to the region. While much progress has been made, we will
continue our implementation efforts to achieve the objectives of the
DAF Arctic Strategy.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
arnold engineering development complex
46. Senator Blackburn. General Brown, Arnold Engineering
Development Complex operates with WWII-era infrastructure. Do you
assess these aging facilities and the backlog of projects awaiting
testing to be national security risks?
General Brown. We do recognize the test infrastructure's age as a
causal factor regarding the backlog of projects to be tested and that
these projects are vital to national security. Our challenge is that we
must modernize and restore this equipment at the same time we are using
it to execute test programs. Using planned down time and robust
scheduling procedures we continue to prioritize use of the facilities
for the highest priority projects in order to minimize delays to those
weapon systems with the most impact to National security.
47. Senator Blackburn. General Brown, are we at a point where
expanding our throughput capacity and modernizing our testing equipment
and infrastructure would provide long run RTD&E cost savings and
opportunity costs in terms of time?
General Brown. Expanding our throughput capacity and modernizing
test equipment and infrastructure would no doubt assist us in meeting
our mission requirements on shorter timelines and would provide RDT&E
cost savings. The Air Force in conjunction with the Department's OSD
Test Resource Management Center (TRMC) is aggressively working to
address aging test infrastructure. Currently, OSD TRMC, the
Department's hypersonic investment lead, is funding in fiscal year 2022
a new high temperature aeroshell test materials facility at Arnold
Engineering Development Complex.
48. Senator Blackburn. General Brown, do you believe modern, safe
facilities to be a key element of retention? Are investment in our
people's workspace a signal of how much we value their efforts?
General Brown. We value all airmen and invest in them in a variety
of ways to include salary, health benefits, continuing education,
proper equipment, and safe workspaces. While we cannot specifically tie
facilities to retention, overall the Air Force continues to experience
historic retention rates, reaching a 20-year high in 2020 likely due to
COVID and the economy. While motivation for retention is difficult to
quantify, retention and exit surveys indicate job security, assignment
choices, unit climate & leadership, and spouse employment are key
retention elements. Finally, we continually look for ways to offer
increased quality of life, quality of service, and career flexibility
in order to attract, assess, develop and retain the airmen we need.
49. Senator Blackburn. General Brown, what obstructions exist that
would preclude an expeditious standing up of the Ground Test Asset
Board in consultation with Congress? What additional authorities or
resources will this effort require?
General Brown. The Ground Test Asset Board (GTAB) is an Air Force
Flight Test Center (AFTC) only concept not yet fully approved for use.
GTAB will be an AFTC communication tool to quickly educate Air Force
leadership on the unique nature and critical path that these AFTC
facilities occupy for transitioning programs to the battlefield. Given
the concept status of GTAB it will be developed to operational status
by AFTC in a prudent expeditious manner. No additional authorities or
resources are required.
50. Senator Blackburn. General Brown, do you believe that the
current budget is sufficient to reach a 2 percent Plant Replacement
Value given the Facility, Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization
account is underfunded, appearing on the Air Force's Unfunded Priority
List at $320 million?
General Brown. The fiscal year 2022 President's Budget request for
the Facility, Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization account would
bring the DAF to 1.91 percent of the Plant Replacement Value. The $320
million on the DAF UPL will bring the Department to 2 percent of the
Plant Replacement Value.
mq-9 reapers
51. Senator Blackburn. General Brown, what is your view on the role
of the large, existing fleet of flexible and highly reliable MQ-9
Reapers in Great Power Competition?
General Brown. While the MQ-9 provides utility today, it was not
designed for operation in a future highly-contested environment.
Modifying the MQ-9 force presentation is about balancing near and long-
term risk.
In fiscal year 2022 the Air Force is only requesting a reduction in
combat lines. This reduction is less than 10 percent of the current
force presentation (4 of 60) and does not equate to reduction in
aircraft inventory; no tails will be divested and no squadrons will be
reduced. Additionally, the Air Force is requesting funding in our
fiscal year 2022 budget towards the completion of studies, analysis,
and concept exploration to determine a capability that better aligns
with National Defense Strategy objectives for near peer competition in
the future.
The Air Force remains committed to providing MQ-9 intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike capability to Combatant
Commands and will continue to ensure daily requirements are fulfilled.
Concurrently, we intend to continue development of future ISR platforms
that can penetrate inside contested environments, persist in these
locations, and be able to connect and share data in the advanced battle
management system. The MQ-9, as we know it today, simply cannot
accomplish these tasks.
The Department can offer more details pertaining to replacement ISR
programs in a classified setting.
52. Senator Blackburn. General Brown, what would be the value of
layering redundancy into our MQ-9 Command and Control architecture--
specifically, moving MQ-9 command/return links to a commercial low
Earth orbit constellation?
General Brown. The Department of the Air Force is looking at
multiple options to provide layered redundancy for the MQ-9 Command and
Control (C2) architecture.
A low-earth-orbit (LEO) construct could provide resilience in
global C2 structure by leveraging a commercial, cost-effective network
that would be shared across the entirety of DOD, thereby providing an
opportunity for communication and cost efficiencies beyond just the MQ-
9.
The reduced latency, increased data rates, and numbers of
satellites proliferated across a LEO constellation also allows for a
more flexible employment framework that might provide benefits the Air
Force is exploring for the MQ-9.
53. Senator Blackburn. General Brown, How do you intend to leverage
Air Force ISR, to include the rapidly developing Air National Guard
Cyber ISR Enterprise in the increasingly critical cyber domain?
General Brown. The Department of the Air Force is fully committed
to utilizing current and evolving Air Force ISR and the total force
capabilities in the cyber domain. Through organically owned Air Force
capabilities and those ISR and Cyber Airmen presented to USCYBERCOM's
Cyber Mission Force, the Air Force continues to leverage the critical
skills found in our total force ISR and Cyber Enterprises to achieve
Joint All Domain Operations.
guard and reserve
54. Senator Blackburn. General Raymond, can we expect to see
movement toward a Space National Guard?
General Brown. The DAF has completed a report required by the 2021
National Defense Authorization Act detailing how to best organize the
Reserve component within the Space Force. We anticipate delivery to
Congress after OSD and OMB coordination is complete.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
afghanistan
55. Senator Hawley. General Brown, do you have a sense of the
resources that our withdrawal from Afghanistan will free up for the Air
Force?
General Brown. Not at this time. Afghanistan is a very fluid and
dynamic situation in which the Secretary of Defense will make final
determination on force posture with in the CENTCOM Area of
Responsibility.
Once Air Force resources are redeployed, post Afghanistan
withdrawal, we intend to recover, reconstitute, re-posture, and
modernize those resources to build readiness and capacity in alignment
with National Security/National Defense Strategies.
56. Senator Hawley. General Brown, how is the Air Force planning to
reallocate those resources freed up by our withdrawal from Afghanistan
toward the Indo-Pacific and China?
General Brown. The global reallocation of forces is a part of the
Joint Staff led Global Force Management process for Secretary of
Defense decision.
Within the global reallocation process, the Air Force intends to
recover, reconstitute, re-posture, and modernize post Afghanistan
withdrawal resources towards building readiness and capacity in
alignment with National Strategy.
Forces will be reallocated as directed by the Secretary of Defense.
f-15ex
57. Senator Hawley. General Brown, the Air Force has requested 12
additional F-15EXs on its Unfunded Priorities List this year. How does
the F-15EX--and the 12 additional aircraft you've requested, in
particular--help the Air Force reorient toward strategic competition
with China?
General Brown. The F-15EX serves as a replacement for the aging
single role F-15C and reduces near and mid-term risk by increasing the
Air Force's 4th Generation Air to Air capacity as well as Air to
Surface capability. There are several ways in which the aircraft
improves the Air Force and Joint Force's ability to compete with and
deter China. The aircraft provides the greatest payload capacity of any
air superiority fighter and provides the most effective enhancement and
enabler of the Air Force's 5th Generation Fleet. The F-15EX will also
provide superior sensing, range, and payload in support of Critical
Infrastructure Defense. The aircraft also improves the Air Force's
ability to utilize long range weapons in a potential conflict with a
near peer adversary. The F-15EX serves as a replacement for the aging
single role F-15C and reduces near and mid-term risk by increasing the
Air Force's 4th Generation Air to Air capacity as well as Air to
Surface capability. There are several ways in which the aircraft
improves the Air Force and Joint Force's ability to compete with and
deter China. The aircraft provides the greatest payload capacity of any
air superiority fighter and provides the most effective enhancement and
enabler of the Air Force's 5th Generation Fleet. The F-15EX will also
provide superior sensing, range, and payload in support of Critical
Infrastructure Defense. The aircraft also improves the Air Force's
ability to utilize long range weapons in a potential conflict with a
near peer adversary.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022 AND
THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, JUNE 22, 2021
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
NAVY POSTURE
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
Manchin, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer,
Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott,
Blackburn, and Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. I would like to call the hearing to order.
The Committee meets today to receive testimony on the plans
and programs of the Department of the Navy in review of the
President's Fiscal Year 2022 Defense Budget Request. I would
like to welcome our witnesses, Acting Secretary of the Navy,
Thomas Harker; Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Michael
Gilday; and Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David
Berger. We are grateful for your service, for the service of
the men and women under your command, and for the support of
all Navy and Marine families.
The administration's defense budget request for fiscal year
2022 includes approximately $211.7 billion in funding for the
Department of the Navy, an increase of $3.7 billion from the
fiscal year 2021 enacted budget. As the leaders of the Navy and
Marine Corps, you face significant challenges as you strive to
balance the need to support ongoing operations and sustain
readiness alongside the need to modernize and sharpen the
technological edge that is so critical to our military success.
I would welcome an update from all of our witnesses on how they
are balancing new concept implementation with the procurement
of new systems and the upgrade of existing platforms, all while
meeting current operational needs.
Our naval forces are maintaining extremely high operations
tempo across all areas. Demand is overwhelming for attack
submarines, air and missile defense cruisers, destroyers, and
strike fighter inventories. The Navy is now in its 8th year of
operating with fewer than the legally required 11 aircraft
carriers. The USS Gerald Ford is listed in the Navy inventory,
but that carrier is more than 6 years behind schedule and not
yet ready to deploy. While the Ford has been playing an
important role in training aviators by conducting carrier
qualification operations, she will not be ready to deploy for
several more months. However, I am glad to see that the Ford
has begun conducting full ship shock trials, an important step
in the process for ensuring she is ready to engage in
unrestricted operations.
Looming on the horizon during the next decade, the Navy
will also need to buy new Columbia-class ballistic missile
submarines to replace the Ohio-class fleet. This is an
expensive undertaking on a very tight schedule, and I trust the
Navy is making every effort to keep this program on track, and
I would ask for our witnesses to give an update.
The Navy is using tools such as multiyear procurement
authority to conduct its modernization programs more
efficiently. Congress has approved multiyear procurement
authority for both attack submarines and Aegis destroyers.
These vessels represent the largest inventory shortfall against
the goals of the 2016 Force Structure Assessment, with the
actual Navy fleet 15 boats below the attack submarine goal and
14 below the goal for destroyers.
With that in mind, I am concerned that the Navy is breaking
faith with Congress by submitting a budget that would break the
multiyear contract for the DDG-51 destroyers. I understand that
the number one item on the CNO's Unfunded Priority List is a
second Aegis destroyer in fiscal year 2022. The Navy took a
similar approach in fiscal year 2021 by asking for only one
Virginia-class submarine, and then making the submarine the
number one item on its Unfunded Priority List. That year, the
second submarine was merely an option on the underlying
multiyear contract, but in this case the absence of the second
destroyer in the fiscal year 2022 budget would violate the
terms of the current destroyer multiyear procurement contract.
I would appreciate an explanation of this decision, and
assurances that such actions of cutting a ship only to put it
on the Unfunded Priority List is not a trend.
The Marine Corps is restructuring around two concepts:
Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment and
Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations. The key element of
these concepts is a more flexible amphibious force that can
support a broader naval fight once ashore. Rather than simply
acting as a landing force, the Marine Corps hopes to help
control the sea and air around them in support of the Navy. To
accomplish this, the Marine Corps is prioritizing modernization
of its ground vehicles, including partnership with the Army on
the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, or JLTV, to replace the
Humvee, and targeted investments in the High Mobility Artillery
Rocket System, or HIMARS, to provide Marines with ground-based
indirect fire support. In addition, programs like the
Amphibious Combat Vehicle, Ground-Based Anti-Ship Missiles, and
Long Range Precision Fires will provide critical modernization,
increased force protection, and enhanced lethality to marines.
General Berger, while this restructuring has been ongoing for
many months, due to COVID you have not really had an
opportunity to explain it to a wide audience, and I invite you
to do so at this hearing.
Finally, 2016, Admiral Richardson released a force
structure assessment that identified a new force structure
goal, a fleet of 355 ships. Last year, we received, from
Secretary Esper, what was portrayed as an updated assessment,
which called for expanding the goal for the Navy fleet to
include between 400 and 500 ships, with roughly 100 of these
vessels unmanned.
I would like to know how the Navy intends to maintain a
fleet of 355 ships, or even 400 to 500 ships, when it is
frankly unable to maintain the current fleet of 294 ships on a
consistent schedule. Deferred ship maintenance, reduced
steaming and flying hours, and cancelled training and
deployments have created serious readiness problems within the
Navy. We remember too well the collisions of the McCain and
Fitzgerald and the loss of life that resulted. So I am
interested in hearing about the progress the Navy is making in
continuing to implement changes that will ensure such incidents
will not happen in the future.
Again, I want to thank the witnesses for appearing today,
and I look forward to their testimonies.
Now let me recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all of the
witnesses for being here and for the great job they are doing.
As we have said before, this is a lousy budget, but it is not
the fault of these three people who are here today. They do not
have a choice. They are doing what they are ordered to do, and
I do not like it, and not many Members of this Committee like
it, because this budget does not keep up with inflation, much
less the 3 to 5 percent--if you read the book [National Defense
Strategy (NDS) Commission Report--Providing for the Common
Defense], this is what we go by, and we have since 2018, it is
very clear where we should be today. Our increases in the
military should be between 3 and 5 percent. It has been here,
and we have talked about this for a long period of time. We are
there and we are not doing it.
So the budget like this sends China and our other potential
adversaries the wrong messages, they are not willing to do what
it takes to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners.
That is the message that they are getting from us.
We should be worried about China for a multitude of
reasons, but looking just at their navy, they passed our fleet
size target of 355 ships last year, and will reach the 460
ships by 2030. They are on schedule to do that. That is an
increase of 105 ships in 10 years. Meanwhile, this budget
supports, at best, the status quo U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.
Our Navy is under 300 ships today, and there is no growth. In
fact, while China is growing its fleet, our Navy is struggling
to avoid shrinking, because right now that is what it is, along
with the rest of the military.
It is an unacceptable situation because our military is not
being given the resources it needs. As I have said, this budget
makes bad choices, not hard choices. For example, Admiral
Gilday was forced to cut the destroyer, not because he does not
need it and does not want it. He wants it, but he is forced to
cut it. He did not have a choice.
The budget also proposes to inactivate 15 ships, 10 of
which have more years of service left. It buys 6 fewer F-35C
Joint Strike Fighters than required, divests all 12 patrol
craft, cuts Navy and Marine Corps munitions by roughly 10
percent. As bad as this budget is, I am concerned about next
year, that it will be worse.
Secretary Harker, on June 4, you directed the Navy to
defund nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles and prioritize the
modernization of aircraft and ships. You had to make a choice
between aircraft, ships, and submarines. China does not have to
make a choice between aircraft, ships, and submarines.
So we have got a lot of work to do. We have got a problem,
and I think we all understand this.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe. Mr.
Secretary, your testimony, please.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE THOMAS W. HARKER, ACTING SECRETARY
OF THE NAVY
Mr. Harker. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe,
distinguished Members of this Committee, thank you for your
bipartisan efforts on behalf of the sailors, marines, and
civilians in the Department of the Navy. I am honored to be
here with General Berger and Admiral Gilday. I support their
efforts to build a more integrated, all-domain naval force
through the NAV (navigation) Plan and Force Design 2030.
In order to move those plans forward within existing
resources, we have had to make some very hard choices in this
budget. But that is exactly what the American people expect us
to do. Every dollar is a strategic asset that must be maximized
to stay ahead of the pacing threat of China, and many other
challenges facing our fleet and our union. Every investment
must be done in a balanced and sustainable manner to ensure we
maintain the readiness of our current fleet while building the
capacity and capability we will need in the future.
The cost of readiness is increasing. Maintenance costs have
grown at a rate that is 2.5 percent above inflation. Personnel
costs are also growing at a rate greater than inflation. This
growth squeezes the rest of the budget. In order to maintain
our readiness, we have had to delay some of our planned ship
purchases to future years. In order to invest in a superior
future for us, we had to divest of less capable assets. These
were not easy choices.
In order to ensure future availability and readiness of our
fleet, we are prioritizing investments in our physical
infrastructure, including full commitment to the Shipyard
Infrastructure Optimization Program. I have visited all four of
our public shipyards, as well as most of the private shipyards
and other commercial facilities. It has been an inspiration to
shake the hands of the men and women who are building and
maintaining our fleet and to speak with every level of labor
and management about the issues they face and the need for
consistency in funding and demand. That is why we are
increasing the capability and resiliency of these century-old
installations, increasing the size and capability of our dry
docks, and equipping our 40,000-person workforce with the tools
they need to maintain our new, more lethal assets.
To ensure our resources reach the warfighters who need
them, we are demanding rigorous self-assessment and responsive
accountability, in every part of our enterprise, through the
Performance To Plan initiative. This effort has improved
readiness of our strike fighters and is being rolled out
successfully across the fleets.
As good stewards, we are on the right path towards
obtaining an audit opinion for the Navy and Marine Corps
general funds and the Department's working capital fund. We are
the only Military Department that has eliminated audit material
weaknesses--three in the Navy, one in the Marine Corps--and are
leading the way on this critical effort inside the Department.
This has enabled us to improve cybersecurity in our business
systems. Since 2017, the Marine Corps has closed 41 out of 110
IT [information technology] findings, 17 of which were
cybersecurity related. We are also increasing investment in the
Department's oversight functions while maximizing the return on
our investment in the performance audit process.
Effective use and management of data is key to our digital
transformation and will change how we fight and win at every
level. This requires the modernization of our information
technology infrastructure, which is a critical warfighting
priority for the Department.
We are prioritizing the mental health of our force,
speaking out at a senior level about the benefits of counseling
and the availability of counselors, chaplains, and other
professionals. We appreciate the Committee's attention to this
vital issue and your support in providing additional mental
health support to our sailors and marines in our forward
operational units.
We are fighting the scourge of sexual harassment and sexual
assault through efforts like the The Watch List, a tool that
uses Navy and Marine Corps data to alert commanders to
conditions in their units that may lead to these toxic
behaviors. We are increasing investment in this area, focusing
on the prevention of, and response to, sexual harassment and
assault. In this fiscal year 2022 budget we have added over 200
personnel across the Navy and Marine Corps focused on
prevention. The majority of these personnel will be placed at
Navy and Marine Corps installations, working with sailors and
marines. We are also adding an additional 80 sexual assault
response coordinators for the Marine Corps, as well as 18 Navy
criminal investigative service personnel dedicated to sexual
assault prevention and response.
We look forward to the findings of Secretary Austin's 90-
day Independent Review Commission and are committed to making
meaningful and lasting progress on this issue.
Around the world and around the clock, the sailors,
marines, and civilians of our integrated force stand the watch
and execute the mission. On behalf of each of them and their
families, thank you for your time and dedicated oversight. I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Harker follows:]
Prepared Statement by The Honorable Thomas Harker
introduction
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, distinguished Members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the posture of the
Department of the Navy (DON). I appreciate the hard work of the Members
and Staff of this Committee to ensure funding stability and principled
oversight for every sailor and marine now standing watch around the
world.
The reemergence of long-term strategic competition from China and
Russia is spurring a period of rapid transformation in the global
security environment. The disruptions related to the COVID-19 pandemic
underscore the need for agility and distributed readiness. Climate
change is accelerating, and its impact on both our planet and force
will continue to grow as significant weather events threaten our
infrastructure, and the arctic opens to unprecedented activity.
In a world more interconnected and interdependent than ever before,
a fully integrated and forward maneuverable Navy-Marine Corps Team has
never been more important to the security of our Nation and the
preservation of the rules-based international order. We must protect
our Nation, our allies and partners, and our global interests, while
also leading on the urgent issues facing our personnel and planet, from
the mental and physical health care needs of our people, to the scourge
of sexual assault and harassment, to the need for diversity and
inclusion at every echelon, to the ongoing threat of climate change.
General Berger, Admiral Gilday, and I stand united in our resolve
to ensure your DON will be ready for the global challenges before us
with the personnel, platforms, and technology to secure vital sea
lanes, stand together with our allies, and protect the United States of
America.
defend the nation
The President's Budget submission for fiscal year 2022 (PB22)
reflects hard choices to divest of less capable platforms and systems
to invest in a powerful and superior future force. Throughout the
budget process and in all aspects of capability acquisition, design,
construction, and deployment, we must balance the urgent readiness
needs of our force today with investments in the future force and
effective business process reforms in order to ensure our sailors and
marines are always ready to fight and win in any clime or place.
Force Posture
The presence and availability of naval forces must always reflect
the strategic needs of the Nation, providing effective options for the
President and Secretary of Defense to counter every challenge. To
ensure preparedness, the DON provides maximum operational flexibility
through warfighting concepts including Distributed Maritime Operations,
Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment, and Expeditionary
Advanced Base Operations, ensuring continual overmatch and flexibility
in the battle space.
Secretary Austin has identified China as the pacing threat for our
military forces, and we will continue to position our integrated global
maritime force to lead in the Indo-Pacific. But ours is a global force
with global responsibilities, including increased Russian presence in
the Atlantic, terrorism and instability in the Arabian Gulf, an
increasingly blue arctic, a global need for agile and ready Marine
forces to respond to the unexpected in every domain, and the constant
threat of cyberattacks to our force, support infrastructure, industrial
base, and supply chain.
The DON fiscal year 2022 budget request delivers ready maritime
forces through sustained investment and performance improvement,
developing more lethal, networked capabilities and concepts, closely
integrated between the services and with our joint force and government
partners. Within limited resources, we will field the right platforms
and capability to maintain freedom of the seas, support international
law, and stand by our allies as we continue to fly, sail and operate
wherever international law allows.
That spirit is reflected in the guidance put forth by our services.
I support Admiral Gilday's Navigation Plan, which refocuses our
integrated all-domain naval power on the core functions of sea control
and power projection we need to compete and win. It places a high
priority on a more lethal and better connected fleet to project power
from blue water, to the littorals, to the shoreline and beyond.
The guidance centers on four lines of effort:
Deliver a More Ready Fleet. Deliver a Navy that is
organized, trained, and equipped to deploy forward and win in day-to-
day competition, in crisis, and in conflict.
Deliver a More Lethal, Better-Connected Fleet. Deliver a
Navy capable of projecting synchronized lethal and non-lethal effects
across all domains.
Deliver a Larger, Hybrid Fleet. Grow a larger, hybrid
fleet of manned and unmanned platforms--under, on, and above the sea--
that meets the strategic and operational demands of our force.
Develop a Seasoned Team of Naval Warriors. Develop a
dominant naval force that can outthink and outfight any adversary.
To meet the forward maneuverable force requirements of the Joint
Force long into the future, the Marine Corps has put into motion an
aggressive modernization of the Service. I support General Berger's
Force Design 2030, which is not simply an improvement on its existing
form and function. It is a transformational effort rooted in the
anticipated challenges of the future operating environment. Building on
the cooperative efforts of all of our sea services, the Marine Corps is
reinvigorating the Fleet Marine Forces within existing resource
constraints as an indispensable element to global maritime operations.
The goal of Force Design 2030 is to provide a Marine expeditionary
assets that will:
Successfully compete with peer adversaries in the
maritime gray zone
Deter, and if required, fight and win in support of naval
campaigns
Facilitate sea denial and sea control
Win the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance
competition
Persist inside actively contested spaces
Be capable of ``rapidly sensing, making sense of, and
acting upon information'' inside an adversary's weapon engagement zone.
Across both services and throughout the DON, we are executing force
designs centered on Naval Expeditionary force deployment, giving us a
sustainable edge and a resilient capability to deliver the integrated
all-domain naval power required by the Joint Force. We are investing in
the readiness of the integration-ready platforms to ensure continued
freedom of action throughout the maritime domain, from amphibious and
ground element equipment, to agile warships and submarines, to dominant
aircraft carriers and air wings. Successful implementation of the
concepts within the Navigation Plan and Force Design 2030 will be
pursued through a unified, integrated effort at every echelon.
Maintain the Edge
We greatly appreciate the Committee's efforts to ensure funding
stability and predictability over the past several years. This has
given our force the agility and flexibility needed to address emerging
threats, to invest in critical future capabilities for our integrated
naval force, while shifting away from less beneficial spending.
The DON is building on this foundation by aggressively pursuing
better readiness, lethality, and capabilities in those areas of
warfighting technology showing the greatest promise of delivering non-
linear warfighting advantages. From artificial intelligence and cyber
weapons to unmanned platforms and directed energy, we are on the cusp
of technological breakthroughs that will define future conflict. Our
future force will be defined by our decisions today.
We will continue to invest in key naval capabilities to control the
seas and project power in every domain. We will field a resilient,
networked, and dispersed fleet, connected through the Naval Operational
Architecture to provide decision advantage in contested environments.
We will continue to invest in advanced technologies such as long range
hypersonic and directed energy capabilities to ensure maximum reach,
survivability and decision space for our forces.
Our number one shipbuilding priority remains resourcing Columbia
SSBN for on-track delivery in order to ensure the future strength of
the most survivable leg of our Nation's nuclear triad. We are also
advancing our asymmetric undersea attack advantage through the Tactical
Submarine Evolution Plan, including follow-on Blocks VI and VII of the
Virginia-class, and the SSN(X) program. We are advancing battle force
shipbuilding programs such as the Constellation-class frigate and the
Gerald R. Ford-class carriers, as well as enhancing our fleet
capabilities through additional battle force ships.
We are also extending the reach of our warriors from the sea with
the addition of sea-based platforms such as USS Miguel Keith, our third
Expeditionary Sea Base, which was commissioned on May 8th. To ensure
our Marines maintain their edge, we will continue to invest in key
Marine Corps development programs that support the Marine Corps Force
Design concept, such as the Ground Based Anti-Ship Missile, Ground
Based Air Defense, Medium Altitude-Long Endurance Unmanned Aerial
System, Long Range Unmanned Surface Vessel, and the Light Amphibious
Warship. These enhance the ability of Marines to maneuver and deter
competitors within range of enemy weapon systems.
Targeted investments in key emerging technologies and capabilities
will enhance and sustain amphibious battlefield maneuverability ashore
and superiority at sea, with the support of properly resourced
facilities, infrastructure, and systems to sustain our frontline
forces.
Continual Readiness
Hard experience has shown long term readiness cannot be sustainably
achieved through ``can do'' and ``make do'' improvisation. Our front
line personnel may be determined, adaptive, and skillful enough to get
the job done in the face of equipment shortfalls and intense battle
rhythms, but relying on their adaptability is no substitute for genuine
fleet readiness. We owe it to the sailors and marines out in the fleet
to make sure they always have the tools they need to do the dangerous
jobs we ask of them.
The changes generated from the Readiness Reform and Oversight
Council (RROC) and other introspective efforts have enabled us to
improve readiness, training, and maintenance processes at every level.
For example, we've implemented a uniform readiness assessment and
certification process that must be followed before a ship can be
certified to return to the fleet. We have also increased opportunities
for shipboard certification and skills enhancement, while adjusting
manning schedules to maximize safety and improve quality of life and
professional effectiveness for our personnel while underway. These and
many other changes will result in a better prepared and equipped force.
We continue to build on our efforts to increase availability,
improve maintenance, and maximize throughput, by making targeted shore
investments designed to increase fleet readiness. The Navy's four
public shipyards--Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard,
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility, and
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility--are
critical infrastructure elements of America's national defense. In
order to improve naval maintenance production capacity at these
facilities, the DON is fully committed to the Shipyard Infrastructure
Optimization Program (SIOP), comprising three primary focus areas: dry
dock recapitalization, facility layout and optimization, and capital
equipment and modernization. The DON is dedicating the resources and
oversight necessary to ensure the required maintenance is completed
across all shipyards as quickly as possible, and has established a
Program Office (PMS-555) to ensure integration of all elements of the
plan.
Building on the successful Naval Aviation Enterprise efforts to
meet Strike Fighter aircraft availability goals for both the Navy and
Marine Corps, we are targeting greater aviation readiness across the
force, incorporating commercial best practices to improve performance.
Through the Performance to Plan initiative we're using data driven
decision making to enable to remove the root causes of maintenance
delays as well as operational mishaps. This data-driven approach is
based on a ``Get Real, Get Better'' approach, demanding rigorous self-
assessment, strong characterization of current performance, and
detailed analysis backed by accountability and the opportunity to
implement needed improvements.
We appreciate the Committee's interest in ensuring our Naval forces
have the right facilities to train, fight, and win, even as various
demands on the land, sea, and air reduce the available area for
military training. Specifically, we are grateful for the Committee's
continued attention to the urgent need to expand the Fallon Training
Range Complex, which is necessary to the readiness of every Naval
Aviator and Navy SEAL. We are listening to the interests of Tribal
governments, environmental organizations, and the local community, as
well as our counterparts across the Federal Government, and are
committed to finding a favorable solution for everyone involved.
Combat Climate Change
The United States Navy and Marine Corps recognize the reality of
global climate change, our responsibility to mitigate our contribution
to it, and our need to prepare for its short and long-term effects. As
we grapple with the effects of climate change on maritime operations
around the globe, the DON must continue to lead and find ways to go
farther, both in substantially reducing our impact on climate change
and building a force that is resilient to its potential effects.
We must adapt our infrastructure for the coming changes with
initiative and problem solving throughout the DON. In the past few
months I have visited and recognized several Marine Corps and Navy
installations that have demonstrated leadership in climate resiliency,
environmental stewardship, and sustainable development. These
facilities include Parris Island, Naval Base San Diego, Marine Corps
Air Base Camp Pendleton, and Naval Base Point Loma. We will continue to
invest in vehicles, infrastructure, and technology that increase our
resiliency and efficiency, as we pursue the use and availability of
alternative fuels. The DON is determined to lead from the front against
the threat of climate change.
take care of our people
The greatest source of readiness and strength for our force will
always be the people who wear the uniform and comprise our civilian
workforce, as well as the families that serve alongside them. We are
committed to ensuring our sailors, marines, and civilians are trained
and equipped to execute the mission and return home safely, and that
their families are provided with the housing, medical attention, and
education they deserve.
Building the Future Force
To maintain a Fleet prepared to fight and win in long term
strategic competition, we continue to evaluate and improve our
capability to attract, retain, and develop a talented and diverse
workforce. In the context of an intense competition for talent in our
country, and in light of the rapidly evolving tactical and technical
landscape, we are modernizing and enhancing our entire talent
management approach to succeed.
We are continuously identifying opportunities for personnel to
develop their leadership skills throughout the ranks, promoting equal
opportunity in every aspect of our force. The DON is investing in the
training, education, and professional development of our officers,
enlisted personnel, and civilian teammates with special emphasis on
partnerships with civilian institutions to enhance educational
opportunities for our junior sailors and marines.
Eliminate Toxic Behaviors
It is a personal priority for all three of us to build a climate of
trust, respect and inclusion throughout our force. A major focus of
that effort must be on recognizing and stopping destructive behaviors
early and consistently, so leaders at every level can take appropriate
and effective actions.
We remain determined to eliminate sexual assault, sexual
harassment, and gender discrimination from every part of our force.
These behaviors are a betrayal of those who have stepped forward to
serve in uniform. We will continue to work with this Committee to share
best practices and ideas, relentlessly pursuing a future where no
sailor, marine, or civilian teammate ever has to fear for their own
safety while protecting us all.
To assist leaders in this effort, we have developed The Watch List:
Top Five Signals of Risk for Sexual Assault, a research-driven tool
that used Navy and Marine Corps data to identify five of the key
destructive behaviors that increase risk for sexual assault. These
include sexual harassment, gender discrimination, lack of
responsibility and intervention, lack of respect and cohesion, and
workplace hostility behaviors. We have promulgated The Watch List
throughout the Navy and Marine Corps and are actively working to
develop tools that will provide operational commanders data on their
units so they can take action to prevent incidents.
We are actively engaged in rooting out extremism throughout our
force. In coordination with efforts across the joint force, the DON has
conducted ``Extremism Stand Downs'' at every echelon. This process
sparked important conversations and made the position of our leadership
and force clear to every sailor, marine, and civilian in the DON, and
we will continue to build on these efforts.
Trust is at the heart of all our warriors do. Extremist ideologies
are a strategic threat to that trust and have no place within the Navy
and Marine Corps. We will persistently focus on this problem, and
appreciate this Committee's partnership and involvement in this
critical effort.
As leaders we must do all in our power to ensure that our people
feel respected and valued. We cannot and will not tolerate
discrimination or racism of any kind. Our core values and oath demand
that we critically examine all of our policies and practices to remove
inequity and unconscious bias.
Promote Mental Health
Mental health is a critical aspect of our readiness as a force--and
our responsibility to our warriors and their families. We have made it
a priority to ensure the ready availability of mental health
professionals, chaplains, family counselors and other support
professionals when our people are in need--or when they see the need in
others.
I know from personal experience how helpful counseling can be
during both personal and professional struggles. That's why as part of
our recognition of May as Mental Health Awareness Month, I launched a
series of videos encouraging leaders throughout the DON to share their
personal stories of seeking and receiving counseling and help. I also
emphasized this point to our newest officers at the US Naval Academy
Commissioning Ceremony, and will continue promoting mental health care
throughout the force. We have to remove the stigma and start the
conversation, particularly as our warriors and their families contend
with the added stressors related to COVID-19.
The DON is committed to ensuring the health, safety, and well-being
for all members within our military community. The loss of any sailor,
marine or civilian to suicide is one too many. The DON offers a variety
of suicide prevention efforts, encouraging positive help-seeking
behaviors, eliminating stigma, and increasing visibility and access to
critical resources. We are constantly revisiting and revising the
portfolio to meet the needs of our people, and have increased our
investment in this area.
Take Care of Our People
We are reforming operating procedures and promotion practices to
reward initiative, applied problem solving, and innovative thinking at
every level. A top priority as we evaluate personnel practices are the
needs and challenges of military families, particularly dual service
families. Senior leaders are also taking a personal and hands-on
approach to ensure enduring excellence in housing, dependent education,
and other quality of life concerns for our military families.
Through a combination of non-monetary, quality of life, and
customer service programs, we are increasing our responsiveness to the
needs of the individual warfighters and their families, making
continued service a viable and attractive option. We are expanding
opportunities for civilians with prior service through the Targeted
Reentry Program. We are also expanding avenues for personnel to learn,
operate, and innovate with partners from the private sector, across the
joint force, and alongside our allies.
Defeat COVID-19
With consistent personal and fleet discipline and continued
refinement of best practices, we have ensured a robust, proactive, and
coordinated COVID-19 response across the DON. We are preventing and
containing outbreaks with minimal impact on fleet readiness, and are
doing everything in our power to get the vaccine out to our sailors,
marines and civilians as quickly and effectively as possible.
The DON is also working with the Federal Emergency Management
Agency to assist local, state, and Tribal governments in the overall
vaccination effort of the Nation, building on the proactive
contributions to the urgent medical and security needs of the American
civilian population, including the deployment of COMFORT and MERCY to
our Nation's two most populous cities, and the deployment of medical
personnel to facilities in communities across the country.
Like all Americans, the Navy and Marine Corps have adjusted to this
global pandemic, from addressing outbreaks aboard ships, to changes in
recruitment and training, to supporting our military families through
extended deployments and virtual leaning. We have invested significant
resources to upgrade the Navy and Marine Corps intranet to improve
functionality and to enable telework for our military and civilian
workforce.
The Navy and Marine Corps continue to operate under Force Health
Protection measures to protect marines, sailors, civilians,
contractors, and our military families. Across the DON, we've
implemented flexibilities to help minimize risk to military personnel
and their families, respond to evolving situations, and ensure the
readiness of our force. We continue to use active testing protocols to
detect asymptomatic COVID-19 positive personnel, contain outbreaks
aboard vessels, and conduct surveillance to detect and treat the
disease as early as possible.
We will not relent in these critical measures. We are well
positioned to emerge stronger than ever, as the pandemic has forced us
to rethink and refine our recruitment, training, and personnel
movements across the DON, as well as our shipyard operations,
deployments, and maintenance schedules, with efficiencies and
applications of technology that can continue to benefit our operations
and throughput long after COVID-19 is in our wake.
succeed through teamwork
A dominant naval force is central to the effective execution of our
strategic goals. We must be ready at all times to execute as one
integrated naval force--Navy and Marine Corps seamlessly linked at
every level--with common logistics, infrastructure, practices and
support networks--executing a fleet-wide emphasis on resilient and
combat ready forces. These integrated connections must extend beyond
the DON as well, encompassing our vital partners across the joint force
and the whole-of-government, as well as our industry partners,
shipyards, and allies and partners around the world.
Trust and Collaboration
Leaders throughout the DON are actively engaged with the joint
force and the whole-of-government to meet the maritime challenges that
face our Nation. One key initiative of this collaboration is the Tri-
Service Maritime Strategy, Advantage at Sea. This is was truly
collaborative maritime strategic planning effort led jointly by all
three of our Nation's sea services--Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast
Guard. In order to execute these goals, Admiral Gilday, General Berger,
Admiral Schultz and I are working together in order to promote
integration, communication, and collaboration as a warfighting
priority. There can be no daylight between us as we strengthen the
integrated all-domain Naval power of the United States.
Operationalizing the Audit
In my previous roles as Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Financial Management and Comptroller, and while Performing the Duties
of Comptroller for the Department of Defense, I saw first-hand the
importance of effective, transparent examination and oversight, and I
witnessed the direct relationship of accountable financial controls to
our frontline strength. In my current role as Acting Secretary of the
Navy, I am determined to strengthen this process in order to provide
our Congressional oversight partners with complete visibility and
accountability for every dime.
Central to this effort is building on the findings of our financial
statement audit process, and improving that process moving forward. As
I've emphasized to senior leaders across the Navy and Marine Corps, the
audit is Commander's business. Accurate inventory, proper resource
allocation, redundancy elimination are all directly connected to our
end strength.
We are on the right path towards obtaining an audit opinion for the
Navy and Marine Corps general funds, and the DON working capital fund.
We have a detailed roadmap that will guide our effort, placing a strong
emphasis on budgetary reform, including receipt, distribution,
execution, and monitoring.
The President's Budget 2022 increases investment in DON oversight
functions. In addition to our work on the financial statement audit, we
are looking at ways to increase effective oversight going forward,
removing redundancy and duplication of effort in every part of our
enterprise through the performance audit process. I have met with
leaders across the government and the DOD to discuss audit planning and
understand areas of high risk, and am incorporating that feedback into
the fiscal year 2022 audit priorities direction provided to the Naval
Audit Service and our internal control program under the Federal
Managers Financial Integrity Act and OMB Circular A-123. Our top
priority is to ensure that our oversight capabilities and capacity is
as efficient and effective as possible in order to keep our promise to
the American taxpayer and the warriors on the frontline.
Sustaining Maritime Information Superiority
Leaders in every functional unit and discipline have been directed
to set business systems modernization on an integrated path that is
sufficiently resourced and supported across the DON. We are using data
driven decision-making to achieve tangible savings while consistently
working to become more effective and more efficient.
Modernization of our information technology infrastructure is a
critical warfighting priority for the DON. Effective use and management
of data is key to our digital transformation, and will change how we
will fight and win at every level. We are consolidating legacy systems
and will have moved from ten financial systems to three by the end of
this fiscal year. I have established top-down performance management
efforts, driven by data, to ensure the cyber resilience and strength of
our defense business and warfighting networks.
As an information age naval force, every DON warfighting function
and mission area is dependent on data and information to rapidly inform
decision-making throughout the entire competition to conflict
continuum. The dependency on secure and reliable IT has grown
exponentially over the last decade and is critical to maintaining a
competitive warfighting advantage. Simply put, information is combat
power.
In order to generate and sustain that power, the DON is building on
the findings of our Cybersecurity Readiness Review with an Information
Superiority Vision, detailing how the Navy and Marine Corps will:
Modernize our infrastructure to bring the DON to parity
with industry, move data and information from anywhere to anywhere
securely.
Innovate and leverage emerging technology including 5G
and Artificial Intelligence to drive capability outcomes for
competitive advantage at speed.
Defend forward with robust information protection
regardless of where data resides.
Through Operation Flank Speed, the DON is shifting enterprise
collaboration and productivity services to an enduring cloud-based
Microsoft Office 365 solution which will provide world-class security
and collaboration tools to improve productivity across our distributed
workforce.
This initiative will modernize our infrastructure to a more cloud-
enabled, performant, and defendable network allowing data and
information to move from anywhere to anywhere securely. It will also
improve our overall cyber readiness posture by implementing key Zero-
Trust-Architecture principles; securing devices and endpoints,
establishing identity and user privileges, and introducing content and
data rights management.
The Marine Corps has now completed the transition of all users to
Microsoft Office 365, and I have directed the transition of over
470,000 users in the Navy no later than December 31, 2021. Flank Speed
will create the capabilities needed to increase Naval lethality and our
ability to fight and win.
Failure to invest now will result in this effort now would further
delay much needed improvements to our core technology infrastructure
and leave the workforce without a sustained follow-on capability once
the DOD-provided Commercial Virtual Remote capability is sunset in June
2021, extending our reliance on outdated, duplicative and less secure
legacy IT systems that cost more and deliver less, further eroding
DON's competitive warfighting advantage.
Strengthen Relationships with Stakeholders
Working alongside our vital industry partners, we are aligning our
efforts to produce the right platforms and capabilities for the
warfighter, and ensure maximum availability and throughput from design
to production to maintenance.
We're working closely with our partners and suppliers in the
defense industrial base to ensure the continued viability of the
crucial businesses and infrastructure needed to ensure our ships,
aircraft, and ground equipment are available when needed for the
defense of our Nation, both during the current COVID-19 challenge and
long into the future. A robust, resilient, and nimble industrial base
and supply chain is critical to the long term strength of our Navy and
Marine Corps. Funding predictability and long term planning are key
elements in ensuring the efficiency of our acquisitions and maintenance
processes in partnership with a supply chain calibrated to deliver
maximum value to the taxpayer and warfighter.
At our public shipyards, the DON took aggressive steps at the start
of the COVID-19 pandemic to implement and require safety measures to
protect the personnel, civilians, contractors, and families. These
steps have included maximum telework opportunities for shipyard
employees, administrative leave for high-risk individuals unable to
telework, altered shifts to maximize social distancing, sanitization
and hand-washing stations throughout the shipyard, cloth face coverings
and face shields for the workforce, and screening checks at all
workplace entry points.
Global Engagement
We cannot meet the global challenges our Nation faces alone.
Readiness requires presence and rapid capabilities in every part of the
world, as well as specialized and localized knowledge to handle
evolving and challenging situations. The strategic maritime defense
partnerships we maintain today with our partners and allies extend the
reach and power of our force. They underscore the importance of
cooperation and coordination in maintaining the rules-based
international order that enables so much of our global prosperity and
security.
Our personnel regularly train and operate alongside their foreign
counterparts, test the interoperability of our systems, and build our
collective readiness on the front lines of great power competition.
Operational exercises, international port calls, joint Marine force
training, and other interactions generate the personal contact that
builds understanding, respect, and trust across national and functional
lines. Our sailors, marines and civilian personnel know that through
their service they are front-line diplomats for our Nation. Their
professionalism and dedication promotes the connections that strengthen
our collective security and cultivate shared ideals that send the
message that the United States is a friend worth having.
conclusion
Our sailors, marines, and civilian teammates will always be our
greatest source of strength in a challenging and changing world. On
behalf of each of these brave patriots and the families that serve at
their side, I once again thank the leadership and membership of this
Committee for your attention, interest, and ongoing commitment to the
defense of the United States of America. It is an honor to work with
each of you, and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Admiral
Gilday, please.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MICHAEL M. GILDAY, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS
Admiral Gilday. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe,
distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today alongside Secretary Harker and
General Berger. I am thankful for the enduring support that
this Committee provides the greatest navy in the world.
I do believe this hearing comes at a critical time for our
country. The competition at sea is intensifying. China and
Russia are rapidly mobilizing their militaries, attempting to
undermine our alliances and degrading the free and the open
order. The Chinese battle force is the largest in the world,
and it is growing. Backed by a robust industrial base and the
biggest shipbuilding infrastructure in the world, they command
a modern fleet of surface combatants, submarines, aircraft
carriers, amphibious assault ships, and next-generation
fighters.
Furthermore, they are strengthening their space
capabilities and stockpiling an arsenal of long-range missiles
to hold us and our allies and partners at risk. China is
deliberately modernizing for the 21st century, and is building
all-domain capabilities to rival our own.
Make no mistake. Our fleet can control the seas in conflict
and project power ashore today, but we will be increasingly
challenged to do so in the future unless hard choices are made.
The results of analysis over the past 5 years, inside and
outside the Pentagon, have been consistent and they have been
clear--America needs a larger, more capable fleet. Importantly,
our latest study gave us the headlights not only for the size
but also for the composition of that force. We need to
transition away from older, less capable platforms and deliver
the platforms and systems that provide overmatch. At the same
time, we need to grow.
However, our Navy faces the task right now of
recapitalizing our strategic nuclear deterrent, something we
have not done in 40 years, and we are making a once-in-a-
century investment in our public shipyards--long overdue--while
preserving our current readiness so the fleet can confidently
operate forward and be relevant.
Nearly 70 percent of the ships that we have today we will
have a decade from now. We have to take care of the ships that
we own, but the price tag on that readiness is rising. Over the
past two decades, manpower, operations, and maintenance costs,
which make up almost 60 percent of our budget, have grown at a
rate, as the Secretary mentioned, 2.5 percent above the rate of
inflation. Meanwhile, the Navy's buying power is less than it
was in 2010. Back then we had 288 ships. Today we have 296.
Given these factors, if the Navy's top line remains flat or if
it goes down, the size of our fleet will definitely shrink.
Nevertheless, we are determined to deliver the most ready,
the most capable, and the most lethal Navy we can with the
budget that we are given. To do this, we are improving
maintenance in our shipyards and aviation depots, we are
ensuring our ships are properly manned, that our magazines are
filled with ammunition, spare parts are in our storerooms, and
our sailors are getting the steaming days and the flying hours
that they need to hone their skills.
We are working hard on a more robust, resilient network
infrastructure as part of JADC2 [Joint All-Domain Command and
Control]. We are investing in long-range precision fires like
hypersonics and Tactical Tomahawk, and we are developing
directed energy systems to improve fleet survivability.
Our eye is on the larger hybrid fleet. The investments in
our shipbuilding account reflect the rigorous analysis we
conducted last year as well as the needs of our combatant
commanders, who are determined to build affordable capacity,
which includes a deliberate approach to uncrewed vessels. We
are making sure that every sailor can outthink and outfight any
adversary by scaling our 21st century training framework, and
also our live virtual constructive training.
Senators, the average age of the Chinese fleet is 11 years.
Ours is 21. It is time to move decisively and field the future
Navy. We must modernize now, in this decade, or we will risk
falling behind. We need to keep a forward posture that
maintains America's safety and prosperity.
I am extremely proud of our sailors, our Navy civilians,
and our families who sustained a historic, high OPTEMPO
[Operational Tempo] in the midst of this pandemic. They are the
source of our strength, as are the patriots in our shipyards
and our aircraft depots, and our partners in industry,
companies large and small, who keep the production lines
moving.
Again, I am grateful for this Committee's support to the
Navy and the Marine Corps team. I look forward to answering
your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Gilday follows:]
Prepared Statement by Admiral Michael M. Gilday
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, distinguished Members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the
posture of the United States Navy. Moreover, on behalf of all our
sailors, Navy civilians, and their families, thank you for your
continued leadership and support. With the funding provided by Congress
these last several years, we are building back our readiness,
strengthening our advantages at sea, and keeping our fleet deployed
forward where it matters.
This hearing comes at a critical time for our country. Multiple
nations are working to undermine the free and open rules-based
international system that has benefited so many for so long. Our rivals
are rapidly modernizing their militaries to erode our advantages. The
COVID-19 pandemic threatens the health and livelihood of our people.
Climate change puts our coast lines at risk with rising seas levels and
more severe weather. And the maritime environment--a vital source of
our Nation's prosperity and protection--has become increasingly
contested. America's Navy is ready to meet these challenges. As we have
done since our founding, we will set sail to defend our Nation, take
care of our people, and succeed through teamwork.
The President has made it clear--America stands at an inflection
point. The choices we make today will have a dramatic impact on the
future of our Nation. The very nature of the free and open
international system is threatened. To defend our Nation, safeguard
economic opportunity, and secure the blessings of liberty for years to
come, we must renew our enduring advantages and work in concert with
our allies and partners to secure the rules-based order at sea.
america is a maritime nation--our people depend on the freedom of the
seas
The United States Navy--alongside the Marine Corps and Coast
Guard--provides a unique, enduring advantage to the American people.
Since our Nation was founded, Americans have relied on the seas for
prosperity and protection. For 245 years, our Navy has deployed forward
to ensure safe passage for our commerce and to keep fights far from our
shores. Since the end of World War II, we have sailed with like-minded
navies to build and sustain the open, rules-based international system
at sea. Together, we have provided stability, deterred great power war,
and ushered in prosperity for billions across the world.
Over time, our reliance on the seas has only grown. Today, 90
percent of global trade by volume travels by sea, facilitating $3.7
trillion in U.S. commerce annually and supporting 31 million American
jobs. Ninety-five percent of global internet traffic travels along
undersea cables, fueling our digital economy and accounting for $10
trillion of financial transactions every day. The free flow of
commerce--both physical and digital--cannot be taken for granted. It
relies on the rules-based international system at sea and unimpeded
access to markets through open waterways. Even minor disruptions can
have extraordinary impacts. The recent grounding of the container ship
Ever Given in the Suez Canal, which delayed hundreds of ships and cost
the global economy an estimated $9.6 billion per day, highlights the
importance of predictable passage through the world's strategic
waterways. If a rival nation attempted to control passage through the
South China Sea--a strategic location where $208 billion of U.S.
commerce flows annually--the impact to the global economy would be
extremely costly.
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Meanwhile, the competition for offshore resources such as
aquaculture, energy, and rare-earth minerals is increasing across the
globe. Currently, 93 percent of the world's fishing stocks are
overexploited, threatening a major protein source for 3.3 billion
people. Several nations have deployed distant water fishing fleets and
expanded the use of maritime militias in their quest to maintain their
lucrative fishing industries. Additionally, many nations are
increasingly looking to maritime sources of energy and mineral wealth.
The global oil and gas industry, which generates an estimated $3.3
trillion in annual revenue, is turning toward energy exploration along
the seafloor to extract untapped reserves. With trillions of dollars in
raw resources awaiting discovery on the unmapped ocean floor, states
and multinational companies are racing to develop capabilities for
deep-sea mining.
The world's oceans have always been a wellspring of wealth and
prosperity. Today, and in the years ahead, they pose an increased risk
of competition turning into conflict.
the growing challenge to the united states and the open international
system
Despite benefiting from free and open seas for decades, the
People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia are currently working to
undermine the rules-based international system at sea. Both are
attempting to control access to key waters and the resources that lie
within these waters, inhibiting freedom of the seas and overflight.
Both are intimidating their neighbors and attempting to enforce
unlawful claims with the threat of force. Both are expanding
sophisticated networks of sensors and long-range weapons to hold
important waterways at risk. Both are leveraging offensive cyber
tactics to advance their competitive advantage, illegitimately
obtaining U.S. intellectual property to close research and development
gaps and disrupt our industrial base And both are attempting to replace
the free and open international system with a more unilateral and self-
serving one by turning incremental gains from their malign actions into
long-term advantages--such as militarizing contested features in the
South China Sea or illegally annexing the Crimean peninsula.
The PRC's and Russia's revisionist approaches at sea threaten
United States interests, undermine alliances and partnerships, and
degrade the free and open international order. Moreover, the PRC's and
Russia's aggressive naval growth and modernization are eroding United
States military advantages. Unchecked, these trends will leave the Navy
unprepared to ensure our advantage at sea and protect national
interests within the next decade.
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The PRC--our pacing challenge--is carrying out a strategy aimed at
the heart of America's maritime power. They are deliberately working to
erode maritime governance, inhibit freedom of the seas and overflight,
deter our engagement in regional disputes, and displace the United
States as the partner of choice across the world. To achieve its
strategic goals, the PRC has rapidly grown its Navy from 262 to 350
ships. Today, their fleet includes modern surface combatants,
submarines, aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, and polar
icebreakers. Expanding their robust naval force with a hundreds of
Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels, they routinely harass
neighbors to exert pressure at a level below traditional armed
conflict. They have built the world's largest missile force to target
regional waters in an attempt to intimidate others. They have
strengthened all dimensions of military power to contest the United
States from the seafloor to space and in the information domain. Under
the One Belt, One Road Initiative, they are extending their maritime
infrastructure across the globe through aggressive investments,
particularly in ports, to control access to critical waterways.
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As our United States Indo-Pacific Commander recently stated, the
greatest danger for America and our allies is the erosion of our
conventional deterrence with respect to the PRC. Absent a convincing
conventional deterrent, the PRC will continue to take action to
undermine the free and open conditions at sea upon which our citizens
rely. While the PRC is expanding its influence across the globe, this
challenge is most acutely present in the Indo-Pacific, including the
East and South China Seas and increasingly in the Indian Ocean. History
shows that a strong U.S. Navy provides a stabilizing influence across
the world, assists in peaceful maritime dispute resolution, and expands
economic opportunities for the American people. The future will prove
no different.
u.s. navy--deployed forward to defend america and our allies and
protect the freedom of the seas
The U.S. Navy is responding to the challenges to our free and open
international system by demonstrating our global reach, enforcing
common principles, sustaining the conditions that enable shared
prosperity, strengthening our alliances and partnerships, and
modernizing our fleet to control the seas in conflict and project power
in contested environments. Today, over 42,000 sailors are deployed on
111 ships and submarines to preserve freedom of the seas, deter
conflict, and keep America and our allies safe. Together with the
Marine Corps and Coast Guard, our Navy is delivering integrated all-
domain naval power across the globe. And we are doing this in the midst
of a global pandemic.
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Even with many parts of the world shut down in response to COVID-
19, the worldwide demand for naval forces required us to maintain a
high operational tempo, which included eight major Carrier Strike Group
and Expeditionary Strike Group deployments in fiscal year 2020. Since I
appeared before you last year, the Navy has continued to steam and fly
from the Arctic Circle to the Cape of Good Hope and from the Caribbean
to the South China Sea. Our hospital ships provided relief to American
communities; we executed underway training events for deployment
certification; and we conducted exercises as part of the Joint Force
and alongside our allies and partners. Our ability to sustain a forward
posture rests on the individual commitments of over 600,000 sailors and
Navy civilians and their families. Their adaptive spirit and commitment
to COVID-19 protocols kept the force healthy and our ships at sea.
The pandemic taught us a great deal about operating in a
challenging environment. Our entire force learned how to adapt as we
iterated and honed our COVID-19 Standardized Operational Guidance. Our
logistics teams learned what it means to sustain our fleet with limited
means. Our information technology workforce quickly scaled virtual
private network licenses and supported the roll-out of virtual and
remote environments to keep us connected. Our dedicated, patriotic
shipyard and aviation depot workforce adapted to our COVID-19
protocols, came to work, and got our ships and aircraft back to sea.
And we learned how brittle portions of our defense industrial base
could be if not postured appropriately. We took every opportunity to
learn throughout this dynamic year--and shared those lessons with our
allies and partners--to improve the resiliency of our Navy in the years
ahead.
We certainly did not address the challenges of continued maritime
operations during this pandemic alone. Our broader Navy team--which
includes Congress, industry, research institutions and laboratories,
and our international allies and partners--overcame so much to design,
build, and sustain our fleet through this pandemic. We cannot thank all
of you enough. As our Nation--and the world--emerges from this
pandemic, we will continue to face the daunting challenge posed by
long-term competition with the PRC and Russia. And we will need your
support, now more than ever, as we modernize and recapitalize the Navy
to sustain our enduring advantage at sea.
timeless roles of sea control and power projection
American security and prosperity is underpinned by the U.S. Navy's
ability to control the seas and project power ashore in conflict. The
world would be a less prosperous, more dangerous place if the seas were
not open and free for the benefit of all. Every day, combat-credible
naval forces operate forward to reassure our allies and partners,
confront malign behavior, and deter potential adversaries from
escalating into conflict. We preserve a stable and secure global
maritime environment and advance prosperity through transit, trade, and
the lawful pursuit of natural resources. Our ability to carry out these
essential functions comes from our ability to credibly control the seas
and project power ashore in conflict. These missions are timeless.
Controlling the seas protects friendly shipping, provides the Joint
Force and our allies freedom to maneuver, and denies the use of the
seas to our adversaries. In the past, sea control required us to fight
our adversaries on, under, and above the sea. Now, in our digital age,
it requires us to also fight in space, cyberspace, and across the
electromagnetic spectrum. In short, modern sea control demands the all-
domain power of our Navy and Joint Force.
America also needs a Navy that can influence events ashore. This
starts with deterring nuclear attack against our Nation with our
ballistic missile submarines--the most survivable leg of the nuclear
triad. Projecting power and influence from the seas is vital to
deterring aggression and resolving crises on acceptable terms to the
United States. Our Navy must field capabilities in all domains--
employing information warfare, cyber capabilities, special operations,
and a host of conventional weapons launched from on, under, and above
the sea--to convince our rivals they have no viable means of achieving
their objectives through force. Our sea control and power projection
capabilities, alongside our strategic deterrent, provide America and
our allies their surest guarantee of peace. If the Navy fails to
deliver a fleet that can control the seas and project power, our Nation
will lack the conventional deterrent needed to protect America and our
allies and expand economic opportunities for the American people.
While America's need for sea control and power projection
capabilities has not changed over time, how we operate and what we
operate with is changing. Emerging technologies have expanded modern
fights at sea into all domains. Ubiquitous and persistent sensors,
advanced battle networks, and long range weapons have made contested
spaces more lethal. Advances in artificial intelligence have increased
the importance of achieving decision superiority in combat.
Additionally, autonomous systems have shown promise for an effective
and affordable way for us to fight and win in contested spaces. These
technologies offer clear advantages to the militaries that integrate
them first. America cannot afford to fall behind.
Meanwhile, our fleet is adapting to operate in new ways. To
preserve and promote the rules-based order, we are taking a more
assertive posture in daily operations. We are challenging excessive
maritime claims by sailing and flying wherever international law allows
and expanding our decision advantage by persistently monitoring
activities at sea to expose malign behavior that undermines the rules-
based order. Our cyber teams are actively defending our networks and
projecting power in the cyber domain to maintain a tactical advantage
against our rivals. Furthermore, we are dynamically deploying our
forces forward to deter our rivals from making incremental gains and to
work alongside our allies and partners to keep the seas free and open.
Should deterrence fail, our Navy stands ready to confront
aggression and decisively win a fight. Using concepts such as the Joint
Warfighting Concept and Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), we will
mass sea- and shore-based fires from distributed forces. By maneuvering
distributed forces across all domains, we will complicate adversary
targeting, exploit uncertainty, and achieve surprise. Controlling the
seas by constraining or destroying adversary fleets will enable freedom
of movement at sea and power projection ashore. Working with the Joint
Force and our allies and partners, Navy submarines, aircraft, and
surface ships will launch massed volleys of networked weapons to
overwhelm adversary defenses and compel a termination of conflict on
favorable terms. Delivering an all-domain fleet that is capable of
effectively executing these concepts is vital to maintaining a credible
conventional deterrent with respect to the PRC and Russia.
delivering all-domain naval power
To deliver the all-domain naval power America needs, our Navy must
evolve our capabilities and grow our capacity. The Navy--working in
close collaboration with the Joint Force--has studied, identified, and
prioritized the future capabilities we need to execute our evolving
warfighting concepts and maintain a credible deterrent with respect to
the PRC. The PRC has invested heavily in anti-access capabilities. In
conflict, they will seek to contest all domains and hold our forces at
risk with sophisticated networks of sensors and a large number of long-
range, precision weapons. To effectively deter the PRC as part of the
Joint Force, our fleet must be imbued with distributed weapons of
increasing range and speed, more magazine depth, more mobility, more
stealth and deception, and more sustainability. This requires a
deliberate adjustment to our naval force structure.
Based upon multiple rigorous, threat informed assessments conducted
over the past five years--both inside and outside the Navy--it is my
best military advice that America needs a larger Navy to counter the
People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) that is growing in both capability
and capacity. To fill critical Joint Force demands, the Navy requires
greater numbers of submarines, smaller and more numerous surface
combatants, more lethal offensive capabilities, a host of integrated
unmanned platforms--under, on, and above the seas--and a modern
strategic deterrent. We also need a robust network infrastructure to
link our distributed forces together and resilient logistics to sustain
them. In short, a balanced, hybrid fleet of manned and unmanned
platforms is the most effective and affordable way to meet the security
demands of our Nation.
Analysis has also confirmed that numbers are not the only factor--
the composition and combat effectiveness of our fleet matters more.
Naval power is not a function of ship numbers alone, nor is it simply a
result of the lethal systems employed from those ships. It comes from
the concepts that shape how we fight and the means to maintain, train,
and equip our forces to win in combat. And it fundamentally comes from
developing sailors--the true source of our naval power--who can
outthink and outfight and adversary.
Within the scope of the President's Fiscal Year 22 Budget request,
we are maximizing our Navy's contribution to the Joint Force. We are
prioritizing a fleet that is ready for combat over a larger fleet that
is not ready to fight. We are divesting of legacy assets that do not
bring sufficient lethality to the fight and investing in next-
generation platforms and systems that close critical Joint capability
gaps. Meanwhile, we are prioritizing the training and education needed
to prepare our sailors to outthink and outfight any adversary. And we
are using every dollar we can to sustainably grow the fleet. As we
prepare our fleet for long-term competition with the PRC, we are
focused on key objectives in the following areas--readiness,
capabilities, capacity, and our sailors.
readiness
To sustain America's advantage at sea, we must deliver combat-ready
forces to deter aggression and keep the seas free and open. Deploying
battle-ready ships, submarines, and squadrons around the world--from
the South China Sea to the Arctic--deters aggression, reaffirms our
commitment to allies and partners, and keeps the seas open and free.
Readiness underpins our forward-engaged posture and touches all
elements of the Navy, from our shipyards and aviation depots to the
steaming and flying hours our sailors use to hone their skills. With
nearly 70 percent of the fleet we will have in 2030 already in service
today, affordably sustaining our ships and aircraft is vital to meeting
future demands. This is why President's Budget 2022 places such an
emphasis on critical components of our Navy's readiness.
Our force is in a higher state of readiness today than prior to
2017 with a healthier surge force, improved shipboard manning, better
training for our crews, and improved parts availability. Increased
funding, combined with cultural reforms throughout the fleet, have
arrested the decline in our readiness and put us on a path to recovery.
Still, we have much work to do.
Deploying combat-ready forces starts with taking expert care of our
platforms. To this end, we are using data-driven reforms to improve
maintenance processes, increase operational availability, and save
taxpayer dollars. We have seen tremendous success with these methods in
our aviation community. For years our F/A-18 aircraft were stuck at a
55 percent mission capable rate. At the time, we assumed only an
increase in inputs--aircraft, manpower, or parts--could raise the
number of ready jets available to our pilots. However, in fiscal year
2019 we shifted our focus to cultural reform and used the power of
data-analytics to raise our F/A-18E/F mission capable rate to 80
percent--a rate we have continued to maintain throughout all of fiscal
year 2020 and into fiscal year 2021. With higher numbers of aircraft
available, our aircrew are more ready to fly and fight than at any
point over the last decade.
We are now applying a similar approach to improving ship
maintenance. On-time private shipyard surface ship availability
completion rates rose from 37 percent in fiscal year 2019 to 67 percent
in fiscal year 2020. Meanwhile, public shipyards reduced maintenance
delay days by over 75 percent from fiscal year 2019 to fiscal year
2020. To generate these gains, we modified contracting strategies,
increased dry dock capacity, and optimized facility and pier layouts.
We improved planning and adjusted maintenance durations to better align
workload with shipyard capacity. We also leveraged authorities provided
by Congress, such as the three year ``Other Procurement, Navy'' pilot
program, to increase flexibility and stabilize demand for our shipyard
workforces.
Unfortunately, COVID-19 impacted our recent ship depot maintenance
gains--as the need to protect our people caused delays in on-time
completion of ship maintenance. Half of our maintenance availabilities
in both public and private shipyards are trending late due to workforce
capacity reductions. To mitigate further impacts in our private
shipyards, we accelerated awards of contract options and improved the
cash positions of the industrial base. For our public shipyards, we
mobilized over 1,300 skilled Navy Reserve sailors, increased overtime
usage, and rebalanced future workloads to address these delays. These
efforts have stemmed the disruption COVID-19 caused to our shipyard
maintenance and will mitigate work spilling over into fiscal year 2022.
We are methodically and safely returning to normal operating
conditions. Though some delays will continue to persist until the
shipyards return to full strength, the production workforce in both
public and private shipyards is returning to pre-pandemic levels.
Sustaining our advantage at sea requires us to make targeted
investments in critical infrastructure. This includes ensuring our
worldwide constellation of bases are postured to sustain and support
our fleet at sea. Of particular importance are critical elements of our
national defense industrial base such as our public shipyards and
aviation depots. Our Shipyard Infrastructure and Optimization Program
(SIOP) provides a strategic roadmap for necessary investments in dry-
docks, capital equipment, and optimizing the layout of these vital
national assets. We have already broken ground on a perimeter floodwall
at Norfolk Naval Shipyard, and are building a new lock system at
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard with many more projects on the horizon. We
are also recapitalizing our aviation depot infrastructure. Through our
Naval Aviation Fleet Infrastructure Optimization Plan (FIOP), we are
developing a 10-year Master Plan that provides our aviation depots the
capacity to sustain and modernize our aircraft, engines, components,
and support equipment. Meanwhile, we are also transforming our Navy
enterprise shore network infrastructure into a secure, resilient
digital platform.
Sustaining our advantage also requires us to master all-domain
fleet operations. To credibly deter aggression, we must integrate the
all-domain power of the Navy with the Joint Force and our allies and
partners. This starts with providing our sailors adequate ranges to
train for the high-end fight. The speed and scale of a potential fight
for control of the seas has changed. The size of our premier Carrier
Air Wing and SEAL training center--the Fallon Range Training Complex
(FRTC)--is no longer sufficient. Within existing capacity, our sailors
cannot sufficiently train with longer-range weapons or practice the
tactics and techniques they will need to employ against a near-peer
threat. We will continue to work with Congress, tribal leadership,
local communities, and key stakeholders in the year ahead to modernize
the FRTC and ensure our sailors have the infrastructure they need to
train to win in combat.
Mastering all-domain fleet operations also requires a rigorous
learning campaign. We are conducting a series of fleet battle problems,
wargames, and exercises to refine our concepts and capabilities. For
example, we recently conducted our most complex exercise to date
involving unmanned systems, which brought unmanned surface vessels and
aircraft under the control of a Zumwalt-class destroyer--the USS
Michael Monsoor (DDG-1001). This summer we will conduct Large Scale
Exercise 2021--bringing together our fleets from across the globe to
test out key components of our DMO concept. Overall, our campaign of
experimentation and learning prepares our sailors for high-end
warfighting and drives updated joint concepts, fleet requirements, and
future naval capabilities.
Sustaining our advantage at sea depends on developing, training,
and fielding battle ready surface force crews. As of the end of 2020,
we have fully implemented all 111 Comprehensive Review/ Strategic
Readiness Review recommendations. Over 1,700 junior officers have now
graduated from our new Junior Officer of the Deck course with training
aligned to International Maritime Organization's standards. We are
broadening the use of instructor-led virtual reality training through
the construction of two Mariner Skills Training Centers and the
modernization of our Integrated Navigation Seamanship and Ship handling
Trainers. With the support of Congress, we are investing in and
employing meaningful reforms in how we man our surface fleet, train our
crews, schedule and execute workups and deployments, and how we equip
and maintain the surface force.
We will continue to invest in these key priorities and drive
maximum efficiency from every dollar to deliver the naval power America
needs. We are currently meeting operational demands while adapting to
protect our sailors and their families. But readiness recovery remains
a long game and will require sustained funding over time to fully
recover.
capabilities
To sustain America's advantage at sea, we must deliver a more
lethal and better connected fleet. The fight at sea is evolving
rapidly. Emerging technologies have expanded into all domains and made
contested spaces more lethal. Artificial intelligence and machine
learning, autonomy, quantum computing, additive manufacturing, and new
communications technologies are transforming the maritime environment.
These changes emphasize the need for the Navy to develop sea control
and power projection capabilities at speed and scale. That means more
lethality, more survivability, better combat logistics, and a resilient
network that connects command and control nodes, platforms, weapons,
and sensors all together.
President's Budget 2022 prioritizes capabilities that amplify the
fleet's ability to disperse and project synchronized lethal and non-
lethal effects from multiple axes and in all domains. To achieve this
vision, we are developing a Naval Operational Architecture (NOA) that
integrates with Joint All-Domain Command and Control. The NOA is a
collection of networks, infrastructure, data, and analytic tools that
connects our distributed forces and provides decision advantage. Beyond
recapitalization of our undersea nuclear deterrent, there is no higher
development priority. We launched Task Force Overmatch this past
October to align resources and expertise from across our force to field
the NOA by the middle of this decade.
Developing longer-range, higher-speed weapons--such as hypersonic
missiles--will give our warfighters the competitive advantage they
need. Hypersonic missiles change the risk calculus for our rivals by
providing a non-nuclear sea-based prompt, global strike capability. We
are working in close partnership with the Army to deliver a truly-
joint, conventional hypersonic weapon across land and sea-based
platforms. We conducted a successful test of our common hypersonic
glide body in March 2020, which keeps our Conventional Prompt Strike
program on-track to field this game changing capability by the mid-to-
late 2020s. President's Budget 2022 signals our strong support for
developing this vital joint capability.
Our adversaries are attempting to deter us with massive numbers of
sea- and shore-based missiles. To complicate their ability to
understand the potential battlespace, we are investing in Counter-
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence,
Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting systems. Our response also
includes fielding an inexhaustible directed-energy system that
accurately and reliably defeats anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). The
High Energy Laser Counter ASCM Project is expediting the development of
critical technologies to protect our ships from the cruise missile
threat. At the same time, we are pursuing other directed energy
initiatives in parallel--such as the 150 kilowatt class laser weapon
system--to accelerate learning and fielding of this critical
capability. The recent demonstration onboard USS Portland showed how we
can disable an unmanned aerial vehicle using directed energy. We will
continue to invest in laser technology and non-kinetic defensive
systems to increase fleet survivability while maintaining free magazine
space for our offensive weapons.
Our logistics enterprise and strategic sealift capacity are also
vital to sustaining our advantage at sea and keeping the Joint Force
operating forward. Accordingly, we are modernizing networks and
communication and navigation systems of our Combat Logistics Force to
best posture this aging fleet to operate in a contested environment. We
are also investing in increased fuel distribution capacity as well as
improvements in our expeditionary rearm capabilities and resuscitative
care surgery systems. Specific to the Sealift Fleet, which provides
inter-theater lift capability to the Joint Force, we have accelerated
recapitalization, leveraging a ``buy used'' strategy to replace our
least ready vessels, and invested in service life extension for the net
effect of increased readiness. We are grateful for Congress's
authorization to affordably revitalize our Sealift Fleet with used
vessels. We are moving ahead with purchasing two used ships in 2021 and
five used vessels in President's Budget 2022, signaling our continued
support for this approach. We will continue to work with Congress to
efficiently recapitalize this critical capability in the years ahead
and request that Congress remove remaining obstacles to used ship
procurement. Our longer-term plan is to construct new vessels to
replace prepositioned vessels in the Maritime Prepositioning Force as
those ships begin to reach expected service life at the end of this
decade.
Pivoting toward the future and resourcing needed capabilities--
especially in the Indo-Pacific region--requires tough choices. To
invest in the next-generation capabilities we need to meet the
challenge of near-peer competitors, we need to divest of our legacy
capabilities that no longer bring sufficient lethality to the fight. We
will work transparently with Congress to make these critical divestment
decisions and free up resources to modernize the fleet.
capacity
To sustain America's advantage at sea, we must field a larger,
hybrid fleet that is designed for sea control and power projection. To
provide a credible conventional deterrent in peace and win in war, we
need to sustainably generate cost-effective platforms and mature
unmanned systems. This transition will increase the capacity of the
fleet, expand our ability to distribute our forces, and rebalance the
fleet away from exquisite, manpower-intensive platforms and toward
smaller, less-expensive ones. By growing a hybrid fleet--on, above, and
below the seas--we will ensure our success across the continuum of day-
to-day competition, crisis, and conflict.
As we design and build a larger, hybrid-fleet, our number one
acquisition priority remains delivering the Columbia-class ballistic
missile submarine on time. No mission is more important to our Nation
than providing a secure and reliable strategic nuclear deterrent. Our
ballistic missile submarines are the most survivable portion of our
nuclear triad and provide an assured response to any strategic nuclear
attack on the United States. With our Ohio-class submarines nearing the
end of their service life, we cannot afford to get behind in delivering
on the Columbia program. The first submarine is starting construction
this year with the second boat on-track for procurement in fiscal year
2024. We will continue to drive affordability, technology development,
and integration efforts to ensure the program remains on schedule and
our ballistic missile submarines remain on patrol in the decades ahead.
Meanwhile, our future fleet places a premium on expanding our
undersea advantage. During conflict, sea control and sea denial from
beneath the waves are among our Navy's core advantages--we cannot
afford to yield any ground to our competitors. We are now planning to
construct the tenth Block V Virginia-class submarine with a Virginia
Payload Module (VPM). President's Budget 2022 underscores our sustained
support for procuring two Virginia-class submarines per year.
Sustainable production of the Virginia-class submarine, in addition to
the development of a follow-on attack submarine program, is key to
sustaining our undersea advantage in the years ahead.
As we shift our focus toward smaller platforms that can operate in
a more dispersed manner, there is a clear need to rapidly incorporate
unmanned systems into our fleet architecture. They expand our
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance advantage, add depth to
our missile magazines, enhance fleet survivability, and provide more
risk-worthy vessels to operate inside the weapons engagement zone of
any adversary. In other words, they give our operational commanders
flexible and effective options to maneuver within a contested
environment. The Navy is taking a deliberate approach to developing
unmanned systems through our Unmanned Campaign Framework. Our framework
lays out an overarching vision on how we intend to produce tested and
proven systems at scale, as well as develop the core technologies
required to successfully integrate unmanned systems on, below, and
above the sea. By the end of this decade, our sailors must have a high
degree of confidence and skill operating alongside proven unmanned
platforms. The combined capability of manned and unmanned systems will
provide our operational forces the advantage we need in a future fight.
Nuclear powered aircraft carriers are the most survivable and
versatile airfields in the world. For decades to come, they will remain
a cornerstone of the Navy's forward presence, sea control, and power
projection capabilities. USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) represents a
generational leap in the aircraft carrier's capacity to project power.
Over the past year, Ford has been underway, executing over 7,100 total
launches and recoveries with the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System
and Advanced Arresting Gear. Additionally, over 30,000 pounds of
ordnance has been moved, loaded and expended by embarked F/A-18
aircraft using Advanced Weapons Elevators (AWEs). Seven of Ford's AWEs
have completed certification and the remaining four are on track to
certify by this summer. We expect Ford to be cleared for blue water
operations later this year and ready for employment in 2022.
The striking power of our Carrier Air Wing is vital to controlling
the seas and projecting power in a high-end fight, and the adaptability
of the air wing keeps our carriers relevant for 50-plus years of life.
The air wing of today is currently transforming with the addition of
the F-35C, the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, and the CMV-22B Osprey.
President's Budget 2022 increases our F-35 inventory to get the fleet
closer to a fourth generation and fifth generation fighter mix. Carrier
Air Wing TWO--which includes the first operational F-35C squadron--is
currently undergoing pre-deployment training and will deploy later this
year. Meanwhile, we are rapidly developing the MQ-25 Stingray--the Air
Wing's first unmanned platform--to extend the striking range of our
fleet. And we are laying the groundwork for the highly networked air
wing of the future--a 6th generation family of systems that leverages
manned-unmanned teaming--which will deliver overwhelming firepower in
contested spaces in the years ahead. Delivering a 6th generation family
of systems is vital to keeping pace with PRC fighter development and
sustaining our advantage over the seas. America cannot afford to fall
behind.
We are also going through a surface combatant reset on ship design
and construction to provide the next enduring hull forms for small and
large surface combatants. Our surface combatant inventory is aging with
limited options for future upgrades. At the same time, our future fleet
design places an emphasis on greater numbers of small surface
combatants. The Constellation-class frigate is a versatile, multi-
mission platform capable of supporting day-to-day operations and the
high-end fight. We began cutting steel on Constellation this year, and
we are excited to incorporate this ship into the fleet in 2026.
Meanwhile, the future large surface combatant (DDG(X)) will bring the
space, weight, and power needed to incorporate future capabilities for
the high-end fight such as high power lasers, long-range strike, and
sensor growth. Together, both ship classes will bring more lethality,
more survivability, more endurance, and more self-sufficiency to the
fleet.
We are not just building better ships--we are building ships
better. The Navy is mindful of past shipbuilding efforts that did not
perform to plan, which is why we are moving ahead in ways that
deliberately reduce risk. Early and sustained industry involvement,
robust land based testing, and focused design maturity are foundational
to our shipbuilding approach. We appreciate the strong support from
Congress in fiscal year 2021. Delivering ships on time, on budget, and
within performance targets is our priority.
sailors
To sustain America's advantage at sea, we must recruit, develop,
and retain a seasoned team of naval warriors. The strength of our naval
power depends on the strength of our sailors--active and reserve,
uniformed and civilian. In the long-term strategic competition we face
today, every sailor must be able to outthink and outfight any
adversary. Our Navy must remain the best trained, finest educated, and
most ready maritime force in the world. We recognize the strength we
gain from a diverse force and our actively pursuing combat-minded
sailors with varied backgrounds, experiences, and thought to build up
our readiness and resilience. As we take care of our sailors, we will
accelerate their development and harness their talents to keep America
safe and prosperous.
As we modernize our fleet, we are modernizing our talent management
systems to better recruit, train, retain, and support our sailors. We
achieved our accession goal of 39,600 new Active Duty sailors in fiscal
year 2020 to further improve afloat manning and filled operational
billets to their highest point in six years. President's Budget 2022
makes a slight reduction in our end-strength with the divestment of
legacy ships. However, the demand for a highly trained, diverse force
has not abated. We are grateful to Congress for the generous pay raises
and personnel reforms. The Navy is leveraging both--alongside our
talent management initiatives--to better recruit and retain our
incredibly talented force. Meanwhile, we continue to transform our
MyNavyHR infrastructure to rapidly deliver services to our sailors and
families at a reduced cost. This includes the DOD-leading mobile
applications that help with the challenge of military moves and finding
childcare or housing and the MyNavy Career Centers which proved vital
during the COVID-19 pandemic.
We are continuing to cultivate a culture of excellence across the
fleet, which builds resilience and strengthens our Navy's enduring
standards of professional competence and personal character. Over the
past year, our culture of excellence campaign has strengthened the
signature behaviors that define our service to prevent the occurrence
of destructive behaviors--such as sexual harassment or discrimination.
At the same time, we have maintained a resolute focus on preventing the
scourge of sexual assault within our ranks. President's Budget 2022
increases our civilian Sexual Assault Prevention and Response workforce
to provide greater support for our sailors and drive down investigation
timelines. Overall, we are providing more training, more tools, and
more resources so every sailor receives the support they need.
We are also actively building a workforce that represents the full
diversity of America and the strength it brings. Task Force One Navy
(TF1N) was launched last year to analyze and evaluate issues in our
military that detract from Navy cohesiveness and readiness. The task
force released their report in January 2021 and highlighted 56
recommendations that will elevate a culture of diversity, equity, and
inclusion throughout the fleet. Respect and the promise of opportunity
are core to our Navy, and we are committed to implementing TF1N reforms
and ridding discrimination, sexism, and other forms of structural
biases from our ranks.
Without a doubt, the vast majority of sailors in the U.S. Navy
serve every day with honor, character, and integrity. However, we
cannot be under any illusions that extremist behaviors do not exist in
our Navy. As directed by the Secretary of Defense, each command across
the fleet conducted a stand down to address extremism within our ranks.
Racism, injustice, indignity, and disrespect keeps us from reaching our
potential--an inclusive, respectful, professional fighting force that
answers the Nation's call with unparalleled readiness and lethality.
The stand down was only a starting point; this will be an ongoing
fight. We are committed to eliminating extremist behavior and all of
its corrosive effects on our fighting force.
The intellectual investments we make in each sailor provide a key
advantage over our rivals. To strengthen our advantage in this area, we
are aligning the curriculum and research of the Navy's education
enterprise to deliver warfighting advantage in our operations at sea
and in how we design, deliver, and generate our forces. Additionally,
the Naval Community College is on track to provide our sailors
opportunities for education in fields that strengthen the service.
Maintaining educational relationships with our international partners
through exchanges and scholarships remains a priority for us to deepen
enduring relationships and broaden understanding between likeminded
navies.
To ensure our sailors are ready for any challenge on the horizon,
we are scaling Ready Relevant Learning (RRL) and Live, Virtual,
Constructive (LVC) training. RRL provides the right training, at the
right time, in the right way for our sailors. It replaces ``one-and-
done'' classroom training events with career-long learning continuums
through a mix of in-classroom instruction and modern training methods.
LVC technology blends the intensity of underway operation with high-
fidelity synthetic training, allowing our sailors to master high-end
tactics in secure and controllable conditions. Our force will always
fall back to their baseline under the stress of combat--RRL and LVC
will raise their baseline.
conclusion
Let there be no doubt--America is a maritime nation. Our security
and prosperity are inextricably linked to the seas. For 245 years--in
both calm and rough waters--your Navy has stood the watch to protect
our homeland, preserve the freedom of the seas, and defend our way of
life. For generations, we have provided a bulwark against aggression
and have underwritten the international order that led to an
unprecedented era of peace and prosperity. Now that order is under
threat.
As the President stated, we are at an inflection point. The PRC's
rapid military growth and aggressive behavior at sea has put it on a
trajectory that will challenge our maritime advantage in the years
ahead. Our naval forces--and the American people--must maintain a
clear-eyed resolve to compete, deter, and--if necessary--defeat our
rivals, while accelerating the development of a larger and more lethal
future fleet. We must do so while integrating more closely with the
Marine Corps and Coast Guard to generate integrated all-domain naval
Power. Only by working as a team and taking care of our people will we
be able to defend the Nation in the years ahead. We must move
deliberately, but also with speed. Our actions this decade will shape
the maritime balance of power for the rest of this century.
On behalf of more than 600,000 active and reserve sailors and Navy
civilians, thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify today. I
am grateful to this Committee, and to all of your colleagues in
Congress, for your steadfast commitment to the Navy. We look forward to
sailing alongside you to sustain our advantage at sea.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral Gilday. General
Berger, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID H. BERGER, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE
MARINE CORPS
General Berger. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
distinguished Members of the Committee, over the past couple of
years, since becoming Commandant, I have come to better
understand and appreciate the bipartisan support of this
Committee, which is critical to creating and sustaining the
force that we have today but also to build the force that we
are going to need for the future.
Now I realize, as we all do, that there are competing
national priorities that you have to wrestle with, and that
certainly puts pressure on defense budgets. But I am also
confident that you have a clear view of the severity of the
security environment around us.
As the Secretary mentioned, the competition with China and
Russia is increasing and it is accelerating, and your military
is going to need more advanced capabilities in order to
effectively compete, to reassure our allies and partners, and
to effectively deter war.
Force Design 2030 is the Marine Corp's answer to creating
the cutting-edge capabilities that will better enable the fleet
and the Joint Force to deter, to compete, and to respond with
ready forces to any crisis, anywhere on the globe. To be clear,
force design is the centerpiece of a broader, systemic
modernization effort, as the Chairman pointed out, across the
Marine Corps, one that improves more than just our equipment
and our warfighting formations, but also our personnel systems,
our training systems, and our family programs as well.
We are roughly 2 years into this modernization effort, and
I feel I owe this Committee an update. While we do not have
sufficient time this morning to address every detail, I do want
to touch on three areas that are key.
First, we have improved the operational reach and the
efficacy of our naval expeditionary forces, and this includes
the Marine Expeditionary Units, the MEUs, which remain the
crown jewel of the force. Beginning last year, we started our
transition to a mixed capability of long-range ship and ground-
based unmanned aerial systems, including the MQ-9 Reaper. This
will significantly expand the organic ISR [Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] capabilities, and it will
enable us to support both naval and joint operations, including
anti-submarine warfare.
We have also initiated a partnership with industry to
develop a future autonomous, long-range, unmanned surface
vessel. That is going to extend the reach of our MEUs. That
vessel will give us a new tool for maritime gray zone
competition, and it will help in thickening the C5ISR [Command,
Control, Communications, Computers, Combat Systems,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] network, as we
call it, and it will help us in conventional deterrence, naval
deterrence, using loitering munitions.
Lastly, we are aggressively pursuing organic precision
fires for our infantry, also with loitering munitions, and we
will make a final decision on vendors this year.
Second, we have made significant advancements across our
training and education enterprise. In the past 16 months, we
released the first new doctrine we published in 20 years,
actually two publications, one on learning and one on
competing. We have also significantly advanced the intellectual
framework for some of our future operating concepts. Earlier
this year, we published a tentative manual for Expeditionary
Advanced Base Operations, and we will use that to inform our
exercises, our experimentation, and our training.
We have significantly expanded the resources we tie to
wargaming and to experimentation. Last month, down in Quantico,
Virginia, we broke ground on a new, state-of-the-art war-gaming
center that we will use in the future.
Finally, we have dramatically enhanced both the quality and
the duration of training for our infantry marines. Infantry
training is now 50 percent longer, and we added new modules to
increase lethality.
Third, we have taken some important initial steps to
improve our personnel system and our policies. To continue
attracting the highest quality men and women into our Marine
Corps, we raised both the AFQT [Armed Forces Qualification
Test] standards for enlistment and the ASVAB [Armed Services
Vocational Aptitude Battery] requirements for the infantry. Our
enlisted performance evaluation system was antiquated. It was
subjective. It was completely manual. We have now replaced that
system with a cloud-based system, where marines are evaluated
now based on clearly defined, objective standards that are
under their control, and they can see across the force.
We revised our retention policies. Now qualified marines
can re-enlist a full year early, and I have delegated two
commanders in the field the authority to re-enlist qualified
marines on the spot.
Recognizing the strong connection between the health of our
force and the support of our families, we revised out parental
leave policies. Now they include adoptive and same-sex parents,
and I will continue to push for expanded maternity leave for
all marines. While it may seem like a modest accomplishment to
some this year, we updated our maternity uniforms to improve
both their utility and their professional appearance.
So while I am encouraged by the progress of Force Design,
as well as our other modernization initiatives, I am not
satisfied with the pace of change. We must move faster. To
accelerate our programs, we, as a service, need to do a better
job of explaining the details of Force Design 2030 to members
and to your staffs, and that is my responsibility as your
Commandant.
Last week, I offered to the House Armed Service Committee
that I would be willing to testify on Force Design before the
full committee, as well as the Appropriations Committee, if
committee chairs would find that valuable, and I make the same
offer here, Chairman.
It is critical that we build a shared understanding about
where your Marine Corps is headed and why, and how your support
is absolutely essential to our success. Equally important I
believe is explaining how we are going to pay for it all.
During a recent speech at the Ronald Reagan Institute,
Chairman Reed noted that belt-tightening, in any department, is
always a challenge, but it also provides an opportunity to
evaluate what is necessary, and I agree. In today's challenging
budget environment, the Marine Corps has pursued a cost-neutral
approach for the last 2 years to Force Design. We have self-
funded our modernization. To ensure the success of this
approach, I will ask your support for reducing the total
procurement of some platforms, commensurate with the current
reduction in our end strength. The fact is, today's Marine
Corps is significantly smaller than it was 10 to 12 years ago,
almost 24,000 marines smaller, and we simply will not need as
many ground vehicles, will not need as many aircraft as we did
when the initial procurement decisions were made a decade ago.
It is simple math.
So with the reductions outlined in our Force Design report
I believe we will have sufficient resources to create the
modern capabilities required for competition, for deterrence,
and for crisis response, without a further reduction in our end
strength.
I welcome the opportunity to work with this Committee, and
I look forward to your questions, both in this hearing and in
the weeks that follow. Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Berger follows:]
Prepared Statement by General David H. Berger
introduction
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of
this Committee, thank you for this opportunity to present the annual
report on the Marine Corps. More importantly, thank you for your
continued support and leadership over this challenging year. I believe
strongly that major change in existing force structure and ways of
doing business are needed in this era of renewed great power
competition. The strategic environment the Marine Corps and joint force
operate in has changed, as has the domestic context as a result of the
ongoing COVID-19 and related relief measures. We must therefore make
appropriate adjustments to our investment plans to ensure a proper
return on the taxpayers' investment. The promotion and sustainment of
the Marine Corps that our Nation and fleets will need in 2030 and
beyond requires your continued active support.
Since testifying last year, our Nation has engaged in a long
overdue conversation on race and social justice sparked by several
visible incidents of institutional racism, and perhaps more
importantly--how to remedy the inequities of the present. As with all
other Americans, I--and every other marine--have acknowledged these
challenges, and will continue to do our part to overcome them once and
for all. While confronting issues of inequality, we have simultaneously
endured the adverse consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Like
millions of others, marines and their families across the country and
globe suffered the consequences of isolation, closure of our public
schools, and increased childcare demands; and like those millions of
other Americans, marines made the necessary sacrifices to stop the
spread. I am proud of every one of those marines with their collective
leadership and of their ability to rapidly adapt and lead by example.
Our Nation witnessed a small but violent minority attempt to
subvert the rule of law through an overt act of violent coercion on
January 6, 2021. Like most every other American, I was shocked by this
attack on our democracy. I was even more dismayed to learn that some of
those engaged in that attack had previously served in the military--to
include the United States Marine Corps. Thankfully, we as a nation and
military have done as we always do--learned, endured, and grown
stronger. We have and will continue to actively work to identify
recruits and marines who hold extremist views and we look forward to
participating in the Secretary of Defense's new Countering Extremism
Working Group to develop additional methods of keeping extremists from
within our ranks.
Over the past year, I have continued to communicate my
understanding of the future demands of naval expeditionary warfare and
maritime gray zone competition. Related to the future of naval
campaigns, I have articulated a case for change to reinforce and expand
existing naval warfighting advantages and create future strategic
advantages. It is abundantly clear that a future operating environment
characterized by a maturing and proliferating precision strike regime
will place heavy demands on our Nation's Naval Services. We are not yet
organized, trained, equipped, or postured to meet those demands and
support fleet operations. This is no longer a controversial assertion
as it was when my predecessor first uttered it. The vast majority of
defense professionals--including the Members of the bipartisan Future
of Defense Task Force--perceive the same challenges I do in the
emerging operating environment, as well as the urgent need for real
innovation and rapid change in response. Although there is an ongoing,
healthy debate about how and what we should change across the Armed
Services, there are very few lining up to defend the status quo. We
must continue to discuss these changes, but defense professionals have
almost unanimously acknowledged that real change is required--and soon.
Though some things require substantial change, we should be clear
to acknowledge those foundational tenets which remain as relevant and
operationally suitable today as they have been over the previous 70
years. In 1952, Members of Congress noted the Marine Corps ``can
prevent the growth of potentially large conflagrations by prompt and
vigorous action during their incipient stages. The nation's shock
troops must be the most ready when the Nation is least ready . . . to
provide a balanced force-in-readiness for a naval campaign and, at the
same time, a ground and air striking force ready to suppress or contain
international disturbances short of large-scale war . . .'' This role
as the Nation's force-in-readiness, prepared to create strategic
advantage via its ability to be quickest to respond to either crisis or
conflict, and prepared to both prevent and contain conflict below the
threshold of traditional armed conflict remains as valid today as it
was when first articulated.
personnel and talent management
None of our Force Design 2030 aspirations are possible without
addressing the people within our ranks. As Secretary Austin
highlighted, ``our most critical asset . . . is our people.'' I believe
this is even more relevant within the Marine Corps. Marines are the
heart and soul of the Corps. Almost all of your 225,000 marines serve
honorably every day, representing the very best of our country and your
constituencies. No institution, however, is without flaws. As I noted
last year, malignant individuals and small malignant subcultures
continue to exist within your Marine Corps. In this era of profound
ideological division within our Nation, some individual marines
regrettably bring with them, or fall victim to while in service,
misogynistic, racist, and homophobic/transphobic ideologies driven by
hate, fear, and ignorance. While I have instituted even more rigorous
policies than previously existed to ensure we identify such individuals
during enlistment and accession screening, I remain committed to
identifying and holding accountable any marine unable to uphold our
core values and to adhere to our unapologetically high standards. This
is what you should expect from me, and you will get it.
Within the context of the larger national conversation on race,
social justice, and equality, it became clear to me early in my
Commandancy that there were symbols and behaviors within our Corps that
challenged the cohesion and unity essential to military effectiveness.
The Confederate Battle flag stood out as one such symbol. I am not a
historian and do not take a position as to the true meaning of this
ancient banner, but some in today's world have rallied around the
colors of that defeated rebellion to foster division and hate. As a
result, I prohibited its display aboard all Marine Corps installations
beginning last spring. My primary responsibility is to prepare marines
to fight and win in combat, and we cannot tolerate artificial division
driving wedges among your marines--especially ones so easy to identify
and remove. I will do everything within my authority to remove any
obstacle preventing equality and cohesion. Signs or symbols that
support or endorse hatred, ignorance, or injustice have no place in our
Corps.
While these acknowledgements of past prejudice are good first
steps, we must do more than simply look over our shoulders at the past.
We must acknowledge the real bias and obstacles in the system today. We
must promote and retain the very best marines; however, it is clear to
me that a degree of structural racism and sexism exists within our
current system. We must create a system of structural equality that
ensures all marines--of all backgrounds--are able to use their best
talents to solve the problems we soon will face. The diversity of
thought and actions each marine brings will help us find more creative
and innovative solutions to these future challenges. We must actively
work to retain and grow this diversity of thought through a more
diverse group of talented individuals, while at the same time
protecting against extremism.
Over the past decade and in close coordination with Congress, we've
prioritized the prevention of sexual harassment and sexual assault as
well as dedicated tremendous effort into providing the appropriate
response to these criminal acts. I am convinced of the linkage between
sexual harassment and sexual assault, thus we will continue to make
every effort to eliminate both from our ranks with your continued
assistance. We have increased the number of Victim Legal Counselors
dedicated to supporting sexual assault victims over the past 12 months.
However, all of these efforts are dedicated to the response after a
tragic event has occurred. We must do better at the prevention in order
to stop sexual assault and sexual harassment before they occur.
Although we conduct regular training aimed at preventing this from
happening, we are still working to overcome unhealthy attitudes and
behaviors recruits arrive with to Recruit Training. We must develop
practices that identify those negative behaviors before they turn into
heinous acts and prevent such behaviors from occurring in the first
place.
Improving the capabilities and proficiencies of the individual
marine necessitates we must also have the very best senior leaders for
those marines. I am humbled to serve alongside the General Officers and
Flag Officers within the Department of the Navy. But even one instance
of misconduct or misbehavior within our General Officer ranks is too
many. Over the past decade, the Marine Corps has selected several
officers for promotion to brigadier general who subsequently failed to
be confirmed by the Senate. This is unacceptable. Over the coming
months, I will announce several major policy changes related to talent
management to include how we screen and select our commanders and most
senior leaders. We are currently reviewing the efficacy of implementing
a 360-degree review for all lieutenant colonels and colonels eligible
for command selection and all colonels eligible for selection to
brigadier general, to help ensure we identify the absolute best who
have earned the trust and respect of juniors, peers, and seniors alike.
In addition to these issues related to screening, I remain concerned at
the absence of Black officers within the senior ranks of our aviation
enterprise and specifically within the ranks of our fixed-wing pilots,
as well as the paucity of female general officers. We are currently
studying both issues, and will share the results of those studies once
completed.
As you are aware, we cannot create new senior leaders in a day. If
we are to correct our gap in diversity at the senior ranks, we must
also address diversity at accessions. The largest single source of
commissioning within the Marine Corps is the U. S. Naval Academy,
accounting for nearly 20 percent of officer commissions each year. A
recently released study identified that almost 75 percent of the
nominations to our service academies were given to white students. The
diversity of this population has a direct impact on what leaders are
available for selection to our senior ranks.
It is not enough that we recruit and train the very best. Once
marines have joined our ranks, we must nurture and incentivize them
along their individual journeys through a modern talent management
system flexible enough to account for changing career interests and
common life choices over time. Without such a system, we will
increasingly struggle to retain the very best people in an ever more
competitive marketplace. Our one-size-fits-all, industrial-era approach
that treats individuals as interchangeable cogs within a larger machine
does not appropriately incentivize the most talented individuals to
remain in service. We are currently reviewing policy options that will
offer marines greater flexibility when it comes to tour lengths based
on an individual's circumstances--most notably when a marine has a
child entering or completing high school. Our marines must not be
forced to choose between being good parents or being good marines.
Those sterling goals must be compatible. I remain committed to
improving the lives of our marines as they become parents and we are
looking into ways that would prevent them from having to choose between
the newborn and continued service as a marine. I truly desire a Marine
Corps known for being the best within the joint force for our treatment
of new parents and families--and not just our warfighting prowess.
It is a well-known issue that the Marine Corps is struggling to
recruit and retain Americans possessing the crucial science,
technology, engineering, and mathematical skills and competencies
required for the future. Technology companies present exciting and
challenging opportunities for software developers, cyber professionals,
and engineers. We must offer opportunities that allow someone to choose
both service and professional reward. In addition, we must do a better
job targeting the application of our NROTC scholarships to these
individuals, as well as explore new possibilities with Historically
Black Colleges and Universities to satisfy these shortfalls.
The military services--including your Marine Corps--continue to
lose the competition with the civilian airline industry for pilots and
maintainers, even with the adverse impacts of COVID-19 on the airline
industry. We are not maintaining sufficient numbers of naval aviators
and F-35 maintainers to sustain either our existing inventory of
aircraft or aircraft programmed for the years to come. Within our F-35
community, we have a shortfall of both pilots and maintainers. I am
concerned that if we do not remedy these shortfalls in the very near
future, we may be in a situation in which we are directed by Congress
to procure aircraft for which we have insufficient pilots and
maintainers.
training and education
A key element of our larger force design transformation is our need
to adopt an information age approach to training and education that
produces better leaders and warfighters more effectively and
efficiently. The essence of this approach is to focus on identifying,
developing, and sustaining the unique talents of individual marines,
not turning out MOS-shaped cogs to fit MOS-shaped slots in a machine.
Better warfighters in an era of exponential change means adaptive,
critical thinkers who are also tactical and operational masters of
their profession. Among many implications of this shift will be higher
expectations and intellectual standards for marines, especially
commissioned officers, at every stage of their selection for and
attendance at formal schools. We still need standardized training and
education to set a baseline and inculcate our core Service values and
ethos, but there are significant aspects of entry-level training that
must be adapted. Much of our current understanding of future
warfighting requirements, associated concepts, and force design point
to a more highly trained force from the entry-level onward. We need to
change how we train and educate as well. We have known for a long time
that rote repetition and even ``perfect practice'' against static,
unresisting targets is only the barest beginning of mastery. Consistent
opportunities to make tactical and operational decisions against a
thinking enemy must be a critical part of our curricula at all levels.
This kind of force-on-force wargaming and training must stand on a
solid foundation of military history and theory--games, simulations,
and exercises are necessary, but not sufficient. We will develop that
foundation in school, but sustain it by rigorous, accountable, self-
directed effort. We must address the question of ``standards''
transparently and head-on to create the force we desire, and to create
the force we advertise. In an initial step to creating a philosophy and
culture of a learning organization, last year I signed the first all-
new service doctrine since 1998; MCDP 7 Learning was released in
February and MCDP 1-4 Competing in December. In addition to releasing
new doctrine, we have elevated command of our Training and Education
Command to a three-star general, equal to all other Deputy Commandants,
and are in the process of re-establishing a robust Futures Directorate.
Achieving diversity of thought requires fixing our entry-level
instruction to allow every new recruit and officer candidate the same
opportunity to master these skills without it impeding their future
career opportunities. Not every young man or woman who joins our ranks
grew up participating in activities relevant to individual battlefield
skills such as marksmanship, orienteering, water survival, or technical
skills. As a matter of longstanding practice, however, we continue to
assess potential at the very earliest stages of our recruit and officer
training programs based on performance in precisely those skills. There
is no doubt of the continuing importance of these military basics, but
we cannot expect every new marine to master those individual skills
with the same amount of in-service instruction, regardless of previous
experience. A new recruit who has never touched a rifle cannot be
expected to master marksmanship in the same amount of time as a recruit
who grew up handling rifles regularly, and a marine who never learned
to swim should not compete unaided for job placement with a marine who
grew up as a competitive swimmer. In effect, we penalize marines who
fail to master these basic skills because they did not start with the
same knowledge or skill base. While holding the line on the standard of
basic competencies that define a marine, our entry-level training must
provide the instruction necessary for every recruit and officer
candidate to achieve mastery in basic skills, regardless of how much
time it takes.
The COVID-19 pandemic brought new challenges and opportunities to
your Marine Corps. During the entire time, your force-in-readiness
continued recruiting, training, operating, and deploying around the
globe. Although we did not stop any of our activities, we did learn
many lessons from the pandemic that we can continue to use going
forward to make a more resilient and capable force. We devised new
methods of virtually connecting with potential recruits and with our
force, internally. For entry-level training, we spread out recruits
while they slept and installed more handwashing stations, which has
virtually eliminated the inevitable illness that the new recruits will
pass around as they come in from all over the country. A key factor in
this success has been the level of discipline instilled by small unit
leaders which prevented any significant outbreaks and kept marines
healthy. Your marines continue to serve their communities by
establishing Federal COVID-19 vaccine sites in local communities in
support of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. As President Biden
highlighted, we don't have enough people to provide vaccination shots--
put the shots in people's arms--so marines are filling in this
immediate shortfall.
gender integrated training
The Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA directed the Marine Corps to integrate
training at both Marine Corps Recruit Depots Parris Island and San
Diego. Since the signing of the law, we have trained multiple
integrated companies at MCRD Parris Island. In February, the recruits
of Lima Company were the first gender-integrated company at MCRD San
Diego in the installation's 100-year existence. To train the first
females at MCRD San Diego, we graduated the first gender-integrated
class at Drill Instructor School in San Diego in December and relocated
female drill instructors from MCRD Parris Island. We will take the
lessons learned from this company as well as a concurrent study to
identify the requirements needed to fulfill the 2020 NDAA within the
prescribed timelines. However, as I have publicly stated several times,
we will prioritize options that provide the best training and most
efficient use of resources to ensure marines graduating from boot camp
are ready for the rigors of service in an elite organization during
challenging times.
force design
Shortly after I testified before this Committee in the spring of
2020, I published the Force Design 2030 report. Force Design 2030 is
how your Marine Corps is changing its trajectory to create advantage
for the fleets and joint force in both maritime gray zone competition
and more traditional conflict. Although we need new capabilities to
deter adversaries, we must fundamentally change how we think about
armed conflict. We can no longer view warfare through the binary lens
of war and peace, but should recognize the existence of a cyclical
continuum of competition that occurs every day and involves all
elements of national power. Historically, the military viewed
maintaining the peace as deterring war through denial or by punishment.
Force Design 2030 offers a third option in addition to those two that
will counter strategies below the threshold of armed-conflict by
winning the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance competition and
facilitating deterrence by detection.
At its core, Force Design 2030 is a campaign of learning. Through
wargames, analysis, and limited experimentation, it has become clear
the joint force needs a capability that operates persistently and with
maximum organic mobility and dispersion to compete and deter in the
contact and blunt layers. The vulnerability of large fixed bases and
shore-based infrastructure to long-range precision strike, combined
with the impracticality of defending such infrastructure from the
pacing threat's emerging capabilities at any politically-feasible level
of resourcing and regional posture, necessitates that the stand-in
force be able to perform these functions from a strictly expeditionary
and highly mobile and resilient naval posture. This refined analysis
and understanding is what is driving our Force Design 2030 to support
concepts like Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), as well as
informing the recently released Tentative Manual on Expeditionary
Advanced Based Operations. We will continue to refine and update the
Tentative Manual with the lessons learned from our FMF experimentation.
In the near future, we will release our latest concept--Stand-In
Forces.
Much as our 29th Commandant codified maneuver warfare in our
principal doctrine MCDP-1 Warfighting to instill a maneuver warfare
mindset into every marine, I felt it necessary to codify how we compete
every day around the globe. We recently released a doctrinal
publication entitled Competing to instill a competitive mindset into
every marine, whether above or below the threshold of armed conflict.
Marines--and the military as a whole--must be aware that every action
or inaction has an effect on reassuring our partners and allies and
deterring our competitors. All that we do, from our force laydown, to
the activity at each location, to the equipment we buy, signals our
commitment to reassure and deter. In a globally connected operating
environment, we no longer have the luxury of maintaining a binary
combat or garrison mindset; our posture and mindset must be one of
continuous competition.
naval expeditionary stand-in forces
Expeditionary advanced bases are a platform for small, mission-
tailored groups of marines to distribute and hide in plain sight with
the assistance of advanced camouflage, cover, concealment, detection,
and deception (C3D2) capabilities against a competitor who is seeking
to locate our forces. Expeditionary advanced bases will enable the
convergence of capabilities from multiple domains and create the
virtues of mass without concentration. The Marine Littoral Regiment
(MLR)--the base unit for our future force--will provide fleet and joint
force commanders with persistent, survivable forces that will enable
the generation of effects within areas that our adversaries hope to
deny to us through their integrated systems of anti-access and area-
denial capabilities. In terms of hardware, marine capabilities will
include anti-ship Naval Strike Missiles (NSM) loaded on the unmanned
Remotely Operated Ground Unit Expeditionary (ROGUE) Fires; self-
sustainment and mobility with the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW); and,
long-loiter aerial reconnaissance in an expeditionary environment with
the Medium Altitude, Long Endurance (MALE) Group 5 unmanned aerial
systems (UAS). Future infantry units operating within the MLR construct
will be equipped with organic precision fires to include loitering
munitions. The MLRs will be networked with our F-35 capabilities,
providing a further layer of combat credibility and sensing. In the
future, these forces could employ more advanced munitions such as
Tomahawk Land Attack Munitions (TLAM), Maritime Strike Tomahawks (MST),
SM-6 containerized anti-ship missiles; and a wide array of unmanned or
optionally manned systems to enhance deterrence. Without these long-
range precision fires, the MLRs will not be suitable to support the
fleets and will lack the ability to influence the vast maritime area
your Marine Corps must do.
In the even more critical human domain, these capabilities will
encompass the necessary training and education to produce leaders who
understand how to deter competitors and provide civilian leadership
strategic options across a wider spectrum. The MLRs will offer
deterrence by detection through constant surveillance of the
competitor, complicating their decision-making calculus if they attempt
fait accompli gambits, and doing so while networked into the larger
architecture of naval and joint command, control, computers,
communications, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and
tracking (C5ISR-T) articulated in the Joint All-Domain Command and
Control (JADC2) concept and previous discussions on Mosaic Warfare.
With global sensors becoming ubiquitous, the value of
reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance or scouting and counter-
scouting will increase. Force Design 2030 offers civilian leaders
strategic options to identify, deter, and hold accountable competitors
challenging U.S. interests or infringing on international norms at any
point on the globe. It creates advantage by providing uniformed and
civilian leadership with a force capable of denying key maritime
terrain to an adversary or to force a change in decision calculus and
facilitate de-escalation. Those naval expeditionary forces will also be
capable of rapidly sensing, making sense, and acting upon information
from inside the enemy's weapon engagement zone (WEZ) in support of the
fleet and larger joint force, further complicating adversary decision
calculus. These stand-in forces will be able to support anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) efforts and help sanitize key maritime straits, thus
expanding our strategic undersea warfare advantage. Your Marine Corps
is transforming into a force capable of competing and winning the
hider/finder competition by proliferating sensors to detect adversary
presence, employing advanced C3D2 for resilience, and maintaining a
lethal array of long-range precision fires to prosecute targets at a
time and place of our choosing--whether ashore or afloat or in the air.
Stand-in forces will simultaneously satisfy traditional requirements
from the fleet and combatant commanders for a modern, resilient crisis
response force capable of responding across the range of military
operations. And, as noted in the most recent testimony by the
Commander, USINDOPACOM, these stand-in expeditionary forces are further
required as the forward leading-edge to any strategic defense in the
Indo-Pacific and any maritime defense-in-depth.
From our continued wargaming and experimentation, we have learned
much about the utility of multi-domain reconnaissance. As a result,
over the coming months a new marine reconnaissance enterprise will
consolidate disparate elements of existing organizations within a
structure capable of generating a coherent, persistent, forward-
presence focused on key maritime terrain that is vital to U.S. national
security interests. The next step will be the development of our Mobile
Reconnaissance framework which will deliver expanded all-domain
capabilities to our naval expeditionary forces and fleets via a
combination of Marine Commandos, manned and unmanned surface platforms
to include the Long-Range, Unmanned Surface Vessels (LRUSV) and small
boats, manned and unmanned ground Ultra-Light Tactical Vehicles (ULTV),
unmanned aerial systems, and unmanned subsurface vehicles. As with
other force design efforts, these forces will be fully capable of
networking with our 5th generation F-35 capabilities as well as
connecting with the larger joint architecture. In addition to offering
continuous surveillance in the contact layer, the MLR increases
lethality, disbursement, mobility, and survivability in a way that our
current stable of large, expensive, high-signature platforms cannot
match to deter and counter aggression in critical regions. The MLRs
will provide a unique expeditionary advanced base capability, but they
will not be the sole definition of the FMF as our Marine Expeditionary
Units will remain our ``crown jewel.'' Your Marine Corps can compete,
deter, and win as part of a naval expeditionary force operating in
international waters and with light footprints ashore on the territory
of local allies and partners. It does not require the sustained
presence of heavy ground forces or the regular deployment of large,
land-based aviation elements. These unique capabilities make the Marine
Corps the ideal choice for a force-in-readiness that serves as the
backbone of the contact layer because our forces can cooperate with
allied and partnered nations without burdening their local
infrastructure, whether for steady-state operations or disaster
response operations. Additionally, the sensing elements of the FMF
coupled with lethality are key attributes in preventing conflict.
posture
Twenty-first century strategic competition requires a new posture
to deter modern threats. Our current force posture is strikingly
similar to the one designed coming out of the Korean War. That posture
was designed to deter and confront a Soviet threat that consisted of
strategic bombers and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. Over the
last two decades, our strategic competitors took note of our strengths
and designed forces specifically to counter them. We must now adjust
our posture against the pacing threat of China due to its ability to
hold our fleet at stand-off ranges and prevent significant force
projections. This does not mean abandoning our forward position of
advantage, but rather adopting a more robust and resilient forward-
deployed posture as described in testimony by Admiral Davidson as part
of a larger defense-in-depth.
Marine forces working with Navy ships must occupy space within the
contested first and second island chains in the Indo-Pacific with the
ability to effectively operate in all domains. Guam remains one of our
most important strategic locations as it is US territory located
closest to contested maritime regions. In order to effectively deter by
detection, our forces must be within sensor and striking range to
impose cost on the adversary through their allocation of limited C5ISR-
T assets or determining that the cost is too high to attempt anything
that would cross the line of established international laws and norms.
However, while Guam remains a strategically important location within
our larger defense-in-depth, we must not ignore the potential impacts
to it due to the adverse effects of climate change. We must take the
necessary steps to protect Guam and the strategic advantage it
provides.
Our posture includes more than the laydown of our forces around the
world, it also must include what our forces are doing in those
locations. As Secretary Austin has told us, ``our success will depend
on how closely we work with our friends around the world to secure our
common interests and promote our shared values.'' Marines regularly
conduct training with allies and partners globally. This training is
beneficial to building trusting relationships and interoperability.
These relationships are not--and should not be--one way, in that US
Forces tell partners and allies how to operate. We can learn from other
nations as much as we can teach. For example, the Japanese Amphibious
Rapid Deployment Brigade may have used the U. S. Marine Corps as an
example in its development, but we have much to learn from them based
on how quickly they designed, assembled, tested, and operationalized
the brigade. Our commitment to working with allies and partners creates
a mutually beneficial relationship for our military organizations while
simultaneously signaling our resolve to competitors. Initiatives like
the Pacific Deterrence and the European Deterrence are so important in
supporting our posture.
competition and risk
Some critics of our Force Design 2030 suggest that non-stealthy
platforms such as the LAW, LPD-17 class amphibious ship, and the
current Group 5 UAS are operationally unsuitable for high-end
warfighting. This critique's foundational assumption is that our
decades-old stealth technology or military-standard naval architecture
will be overcome with technological countermeasures and that stealth
technologies will become affordable enough to proliferate the operating
environment in large quantities. Survivability under such conditions is
likely to prove far more a matter of quantity, dispersion, signature
management, and distributed lethality than of being able to avoid
technical detection or defend against all threats. We must view
survivability in terms of the entire system--the entire system must be
able to survive long enough to accomplish the mission vice an
individual platform. The expeditionary system of platforms our marines
employ--and the networks they operate on--must be capable of competing
and deterring below the level of armed conflict as well as fight at the
high-end to reassure our partners and allies as well as demonstrate a
credible capability to a would-be adversary. For example, while not a
part of the currently envisioned program, LAWs operating in plain sight
with containerized missiles could effectively compete and deter. Such a
reimagining of the program could involve greater costs, so we will have
to study the benefits and make resource informed decisions about
tradeoffs in capabilities and capacity. Traditional amphibious ships,
such as the LPD-17s, possessing tactical advantages derived from well-
decks will confound adversaries and force them to consume resources
attempting to positively identify those capabilities loaded inside--
whether unmanned surface vessels, unmanned underwater vessels, or more
traditional capabilities. Long-endurance Group 5 UAS, like the MQ-9,
also provides the persistent presence necessary to win the hider /
finder competition for the fleet. Additionally, a proven platform like
the MQ-9 supports quickly learning the platform through the experience
of the US Air Force while continuing adaptation and innovation over
time as we procure the future system.
If competition expands from opening volleys or punishment strikes
to large-scale conflict, the Fleet Marine Force offers the Joint Force
Commander a persistent stand-in force capable of conducting
reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, and targeting in the blunt
layer. A stand-in force with the ability to support allies and partners
while striking the adversary with long range precision fires, 5th
generation short take-off and vertical landing aircraft, and a host of
electronic warfare options combined with the mobility of the Amphibious
Combat Vehicle (ACV), LAW, and unmanned surface and undersea vehicles
provides a survivable option to buy time for the remainder of the joint
force to bring war-winning capabilities.
logistics and resilience
Sustaining the force we are developing now becomes even more
critical in the years ahead. The relative ease with which we have been
able to project power into the Middle East over the last few decades
has lulled us into a false sense of security. As a result, we have
optimized service logistics efforts to support requirements without
regard to the threat actions that could disrupt them. My predecessor
said ``we are going to have to fight to get to the fight.'' I will take
that a step further by saying we will have to fight to sustain our
warfighting efforts over time. The Joint Logistics Enterprise must
connect our emerging operational concepts at the tactical edge all the
way back to the defense industrial base. We have been an end user of
the system, but that needs to change. We must develop new methods for
the Naval Force to enable broader joint force sustainment efforts. On a
day-to-day basis, today's distributed force strains our systems to the
limits. This will only get more challenging considering the dynamic,
evolving threats that competitors can apply against our supply chains,
manufacturing bases, and global sustainment network.
Based on anticipated funding levels and the additional budget
uncertainty that has been introduced by the COVID-19 response, we must
clearly consider risk as we move forward. Our force design efforts for
the future will provide the context necessary to make the difficult
choices for our installations and logistics enterprise. We can no
longer accept the inefficiencies inherent in legacy bureaucratic
processes nor accept incremental improvements. In order for our
installations and logistics organizations to change effectively, we
must better understand the implications that Force Design 2030 will
have on the FMF across multiple time horizons so we can resource our
installations and logistics enterprise appropriately. In coordination
with partners both inside and outside the service, we will evolve our
organization to meet the future FMF's operational requirements in the
air, on land, and at sea while continuing to provide world-class
support to the force today. This may require a change in the existing
command relationships between the bases and stations and the forces
they support. I will keep the Committee fully informed of any such
changes as our understanding evolves.
Finally, in an effort to modernize our bases and stations in a
manner commensurate with our overall force design, we are experimenting
with advanced force protection systems enabled by artificial
intelligence at several of our installations. This capability is
promising and may provide the service an opportunity to greatly enhance
the protection of our installations while drastically cutting personnel
costs.
major defense acquisition programs
I have always operated under the assumption that evidence, wargame
findings, modeling and simulations, and my own best military advice as
Commandant would persuade people across the defense enterprise and
within Congress that we need change now. While I remain convinced that
this assumption remains valid and look forward to a continued dialogue
with the Committee, we have more work to do to persuade key audiences
of the merits of our desired changes. Congressional support for Ground
Based Anti-Ship Missiles (GBASM); LRUSV; Medium Altitude, Long
Endurance UAS; and I believe that Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) will
be essential to our modernization efforts. We will continue to work
with the Congress to demonstrate the importance of a rapid acquisition
of these critical capabilities. I have repeatedly asked for
Congressional support to change legacy programs that are no longer
operationally relevant or have become cost prohibitive, as well as
support for new initiatives that create a relative warfighting
advantage. This is the kind of agility we will need going forward in
order to sustain that warfighting advantage.
Based on my understanding of the strategic challenges before us and
my desire to remain the best steward of taxpayer dollars, I am
convinced that we must be willing to critically assess the scope of
current Programs of Record for our Major Defense Acquisition Programs
(MDAP). As we reduce the end strength of the Marine Corps in order to
internally fund our modernization, each MDAP must be reevaluated for
capacity and sustainability. We will need the continued support of
Congress to re-scope any program that exceeds our requirement or is
unaffordable to procure, man, and sustain.
In addition, we should acknowledge that up to three quarters of a
weapon system's cost occurs in sustainment-- the operational and
maintenance upkeep after the initial acquisition. With the new
procurement of large weapon systems like the F-35B/C, CH-53K, MV-22,
JLTV, and ACV--to name but a few--we should be prepared to modify
programs of records to ensure affordability and viability throughout
the entire lifecycle of each program. Prioritizing high-end platforms
without resourcing the supplies and infrastructure needed to sustain
its operational capability is fundamentally irresponsible; the result
would be a hollow force.
With every dollar we expend to upgrade a legacy platform that is no
longer survivable against a peer competitor, we are slowing our rate of
transformation. Our competitors no longer wait to see what America does
and follow suit; they have embarked on their own trajectory, which
currently outpaces ours. Our Force Design 2030 addresses this problem
by forcing the competitor to adapt to us through the tactical,
operational, and strategic challenges a truly modern force presents.
This does create domestic dilemmas as we are forced to transition from
legacy platforms built in certain districts to modern and relevant
equipment that may be built elsewhere. However, if we are to succeed in
this great power competition, we must make those difficult choices. I
remain confident that this can occur in a responsible and balanced way,
without creating winners and losers, and look forward to discussions
with each of you on a way ahead that satisfies shared interests.
The Marine Corps remains constrained by an acquisition process that
tries to eliminate risk--risk poorly defined as uncertainty. We must
recognize that incrementally better versions of the current Marine
Corps is not going to be enough for real great power competition. As
noted in the House Armed Services Committee's Future of Defense Task
Force Report 2020, our acquisition process is too sluggish to work
effectively at scale with many technology companies, as they need to
innovate and compete daily to survive in their dynamic industry. With
the rapid transition we need to make over the next decade, we must be
willing to incur some short-term risk to better prepare and compete in
the future. The ability to prototype new technologies, then
aggressively experiment and exercise with prototype equipment to
understand its full capability on the battlefield is paramount. Lastly,
I agree with the Report's recommendation that we need a process that
better bridges the ``valley of death'' to transition critical prototype
equipment into full-scale fielding without taking years through the
traditional planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process.
readiness and strategic advantage
As we build a more capable and lethal force, we must also take into
consideration the readiness of that force. Since 2017, the Marine Corps
has significantly increased the availability of forces to Combatant
Commanders based on the generous funding of Congress. As marines deploy
forward in support of operational requirements, they buy down today's
risk by deterring competitors from violating international norms while
assuring allies and partners of the strength of our commitments.
However, the mere availability of those marines does not equal
readiness to compete in the maritime gray zone, nor does it create
strategic advantage to deter or defeat rapidly evolving threats. It is
time for us to embrace a more sophisticated and balanced understanding
of military readiness and cease using availability as the primary
metric in our readiness evaluations. This antiquated model is hugely
consumptive and forces us to spend limited resources ensuring the
availability of platforms designated for retirement and replacement.
This also applies to equipment that we are attempting to transition to
more modern capabilities. For example, every dollar spent to make a 4th
generation aircraft that has exceeded its intended service life is a
dollar that cannot be spent to accelerate the fielding of 5th
generation very low-observable aircraft and advanced UAS. We must
invest in future capabilities that create, maintain, and expand
warfighting advantage to ensure a ready force tomorrow that maintains
its ability to compete and deter.
During the most recent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan,
Armenian ground forces that we would have labeled ready based on
availability, were easily targeted and destroyed by Azerbaijani forces
employing elements of a precision strike regime to include swarms of
loitering munitions and lethal unmanned systems. While Armenia's tanks
and infantry fighting vehicles were available, they were not
operationally suitable, thus not ready for the conflict. As our
competitors continue to expand their capabilities, we will soon find
ourselves outmatched unless we change our readiness framework. To do
so, we should embrace a new readiness paradigm in which availability
ranks behind generating a relative warfighting advantage. A ready
capability in the future must be one that is both available when we
need it and creates a strategic warfighting advantage against a
specific threat in great power competition and conflict.
A ready force that creates a strategic advantage over the pacing
threat must be organized to generate faster decision cycles against the
enemy. A large part of our Force Design 2030 efforts is aimed at
developing the right capabilities for the future force, but just as
important is devising the correct organizational model to employ those
capabilities. I do not support creating more or larger headquarters
organizations to accommodate the larger quantities of data coming in as
I feel this will only slow the decision-making process. I'm also not
committed to organizations that we have employed in the past if they
don't work to fulfill our future requirements. In addition to right-
sizing our FMF, I've also directed an ongoing assessment to reduce 15
percent of our personnel across Headquarters Marine Corps to generate
savings that we can reinvest into our warfighting capabilities without
losing the institutional processes necessary to support an adaptable
force.
Your Marine Corps, and the Naval Service as a whole, have a proven
record when it comes to driving change. Both the People's Republic of
China and Russia modernized their militaries over the past decade based
on what they assessed as our strengths and our competitive warfighting
advantages. They adapted their operational and strategic approaches to
counter us and now we must modernize in order to remedy shortfalls and
drive the next cycle of change. Simply making our legacy platforms
better or more of them available will not force our competitors to
change course, nor will it create the strategic advantage required. I
concur with the Air Force Chief of Staff General CQ Brown: we must
accelerate change or lose.
One way we can accelerate change is by seeking a more nuanced
understanding of readiness as it applies to each service or even common
force elements within each service, and to ask--how many forces-in-
readiness can we collectively afford? A critical factor of
understanding readiness is identifying when a joint force will need a
capability in accordance with a detailed mobilization plan. The Marine
Corps--as well as other critical elements of the joint force--will
always be at the front of the timelines because we are the force who is
present before conflict and deters an adversary's early escalation.
Serving as the foundational element of our persistent contact layer
allows time for the joint force to mobilize and surge the war winning
capabilities of the other services. However, without your marines
forward deployed to tamp back the aggressor and create decision space,
the joint force will not have the time and opportunity to deploy.
fleet design and naval integration
Thus far, my comments have focused on issues germane to my role as
Commandant of the Marine Corps--to organize, train, and equip Marine
Corps forces in support of the Fleets and Combatant Commanders. Please
now allow me to share a few thoughts with you as one of the three
senior naval officials testifying before you and also as a member of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. My experience and role as a senior Naval
officer requires that I share my best military advice in the ongoing
fleet design conversation. One thing is clear: serious naval
professionals both in and out of service agree that the status quo
fleet will not provide the strategic advantages required in an era of
great power competition, and must change.
I would like to state for the record my thanks to the CNO and his
OPNAV staff for their continued support redesigning the fleet and the
amphibious / naval expeditionary portion of it without reservation or
hesitation in support of our shared understanding of the operational
dilemmas created by peer adversaries. The CNO is leading a major change
in future fleet design and I wish to acknowledge that for the record,
and formally communicate my support. I agree with the CNO that the Navy
does not need to be ``reimagined'' or ``reinvented,'' and neither does
the Marine Corps for that matter. However, as the CNO has noted, how we
perform our core roles and functions of deterrence, maritime security,
power projection, and sea control must change--just as it has many
times in the past.
Being physically present within the area of responsibility is no
longer evidence of success, and we should no longer think presence
somehow produces deterrence in and of itself. For naval presence to
deter competitors, physical positioning must create real strategic
advantage. The specific capabilities present must provide a competitive
warfighting advantage against specific peer threats and do so in a
resource neutral manner. Dispersing large numbers of militarized
fishing vessels with a nuclear aircraft carrier may result in the
temporary absence of those adversary vessels in key maritime terrain,
but it comes at a fiscally prohibitive cost, not to mention the
operational cost of not having that warfighting capability postured to
project power via its carrier air wing. However, having a robust
inventory of submarines, frigates, light amphibious warships, and
networked unmanned or optionally manned surface vessels--or even T-AGOS
and military sealift vessels--operating in the same region would
provide a competitive warfighting advantage without resource
prohibitive operating costs. Such a fleet would further reinforce our
strategic advantages in undersea warfare through their modern ASW
capabilities and our advantages in naval expeditionary warfare. The
process of redesigning the fleet will not be an easy or inexpensive,
nor will it be accomplished quickly, but it can be done with your
continued oversight and support. I wish to thank the Secretary, the
CNO, and the Members of this Committee for their continued commitment
to the construction and sustainment of our ships necessary to support
amphibious operations.
Not that long ago, the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) that comprised
the Navy ships for the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) consisted of
five ships with a combined gross tonnage of approximately 73,000
tonnes. Today, our standard three ship ARG/MEUs operate in a
distributed manner from platforms with a combined gross tonnage of
approximately 86,000 tonnes. As with many other systems and
capabilities across the joint force, our ARG/MEU has become smaller yet
heavier, while simultaneously being asked to be more agile. Distributed
Maritime Operations is not only the future of naval operations, but in
reality--the present. As we modernize our marine forces as part of our
force design efforts, we must also modernize the ARG/MEU. We have seen
the great value of disaggregating the ARG/MEU with each individual ship
conducting its own mission within the same Area of Operational
Responsibility for a Combatant Commander. Greater numbers of smaller
ships would allow us to disaggregate for a greater number of mission
sets while maintaining the ability to reassemble into a large force
with expansive mission sets. Defining our future operational concept
will also help drive us to better understand what we need from LXX--or
the next class of amphibious ships. We know they will need to be
smaller, faster, more lethal, and better networked, but we don't yet
know to what degree we need these characteristics. As we continue our
analysis with the Navy, we know that they must be affordable so that we
can purchase and maintain the number of ships we need to operate
globally. Therefore, our requirements will be matched to a program that
is affordable and sustainable over the long-term.
Finally, I wish to state my support for the observations,
positions, and conclusions articulated by Admiral Davidson in his most
recent testimony. The vision he articulated for a strategic defense to
include a defense-in-depth with naval expeditionary forces postured
forward and west of the international dateline is one I share, and have
attempted to communicate as often as possible over the previous 22
months. I share his conclusion that highly lethal and distributable
expeditionary forces than can generate the effects of mass without the
liabilities of concentration are of the highest utility, and am doing
everything possible to create such forces via my force design efforts
with the Marine Littoral Regiment.
conclusion
The American people expect us to be our own toughest critics, and
we are. We have significant strides to make in the near future, but I
know the leadership and support of this Congress will help us to
revolutionize our approach to competition and conflict. I pledge to
keep you informed and involved in the transformation of your Marine
Corps. The American people are counting on their Marines, Navy, and
joint force to maintain our ideals and way of life now and into the
future. The dustbin of history is crammed with once successful
militaries, businesses, and organizations that recognized the world was
changing and attempted to meet that change through merely incremental
improvements in existing ways of doing business. Despite their previous
successes, these institutions failed in the new environment because
they could not make the fundamental changes necessary to remain on top.
We are now in the midst of just such a period of change, and we will
need all the help and support of this Congress to ensure we continue
our long history of successful innovation and adaptation.
While our aspirations and expectations are great, I am certain that
you expect nothing less from your Marine Corps. With your continued
support, we shall succeed. We will achieve our goals of transformation,
both in our culture and warfighting capability, to best support the
naval campaign and the joint force.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Berger.
Secretary Harker, would you give us some insight as to why
the Navy chose to cancel the DDG-51 multiyear procurement, the
second ship, and then add it as your first unfunded priority?
Mr. Harker. Thank you, Senator. That was the most difficult
choice that we faced this year. As we looked at trying to
balance readiness, capability, and capacity, taking that DDG
out of the budget was the most difficult choice that we faced,
and it was something that we wish we could have afforded. After
visiting both shipyards where we build DDG-51's, I have the
utmost confidence in those shipyards' ability to deliver
another DDG-51 if we had been able to afford it in the budget,
but it was unfortunately a challenge for us.
Chairmgian Reed. Thank you. Admiral Gilday, we frequently
sort of focus on the number of ships as the most important
metric, but it seems to me there are other factors, for
example, communications, concealment of vessels, operational
readiness of vessels, where you can have a 500-ship fleet with
only 100 able to sail. Then now, with the ability to match
autonomous vehicles to manned vessels, unmanned autonomous
vehicles, is this notion of a fixed number of ships consistent
with actual operational needs?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, I would like to answer your question
in three parts. First of all, with respect to numbers, it is
one metric, and if we are going to fight as a distributed for
against a military as robust as China, as an example, we are
going to need a bigger Navy. I believe the analysis has been
consistent in that regard since 2016. However, I do think this
is really all about capabilities, and joint capabilities in
terms of what the Navy brings to the fight for the Joint Force.
So one of the things that I think that the analysis that we
did last year was particularly helpful is not only talking
about the size of the fleet, as you mentioned, but most
importantly, the composition of the fleet, submarines being
right at the top of the list in terms of--you hinted at this--
in terms of concealment, right, in terms of our most survivable
strike platform, where we have overmatch right now against any
adversary, and we want to maintain that.
Aircraft carriers, the most survivable airfields in the
world, quite a platform. The USS Enterprise, which was our
first nuclear-powered carrier and was around for 50 years, had
59 different type series aircraft that flew off the deck of
that aircraft carrier. There is incredible flexibility here,
particularly, sir, as you hinted at uncrewed or unmanned in the
future. Our shipbuilding plan begins to touch at that, and we
are on a very deliberate path, some of it based on the feedback
from this Committee that we solve two key problems with respect
to unmanned before we make a decision to come to you for money
to scale. The first is the reliability of those platforms at
sea, that they can sustain themselves, be self-sustaining at
sea for long periods of time, and the second is the ability to
be able to command and control them with a high degree of
confidence, and so, sir, I hope I have touched on your point
adequately.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Admiral.
General Berger, the Littoral Operation and Contested
Environment Doctrine, the Expeditionary Advanced Base
Operations, essentially what you are talking about, as I sense
it, is a widely distributed environment for marines, that they
would be separated in relatively small detachments across a
broad area. Is that a fair estimate?
General Berger. I would say so, sir.
Chairman Reed. So that raises the issue of how do you
supply logistic support to widely dispersed elements in
contested environments.
General Berger. I would agree with that. We have not had
our supply chains challenged since World War II. We have had
assured supply lines for 70 years, said another way. We have to
focus now on tactical, operational, strategic logistics. If we
don't, then we will have the very best capabilities that we
can't sustain forward, and we are not going to allow that to
happen. Logistics is a key. Within the Marine Corps we view it
as our pacing function right now.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. I have been informed
that a quorum is present, and since a quorum is now present--
excuse me, before I recognize Senator Inhofe--I ask the
Committee to consider a list of 2,932 pending military
nominations. Of these nominations, one nominations is one day
short of the Committee's requirement that nominations be in
committee for 7 days before we report them out. No objection
has been raised to this nomination, and I recommend the
Committee waive the 7-day rule in order to permit the
confirmation of the nomination of this officer before the
Senate recesses for the Fourth of July recess.
In addition, since a quorum is now present, I ask the
Committee to consider five civilian nominations plus the list
of 2,932 pending military nominations. First I ask the
Committee to consider the nominations of Honorable Caroline D.
Krass, to be General Counsel of the Department of Defense; Ms.
Gina Ortiz Jones, to be Under Secretary of the Air Force; Dr.
Ely S. Ratner, to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-
Pacific Security Affairs, Ms. Shawn G. Skelly, to be Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Readiness; and Ms. Meredith A. Berger,
to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy,
Installations, and Environment.
Is there a motion to report the military nominations and
the five civilian nominations?
Senator Inhofe. So moved.
Chairman Reed. Is there a second?
Senator Shaheen. Second.
Chairman Reed. All in favor, please say aye.
[Chorus of ayes.]
[The list of nominations considered and approved by the
Committee follows:]
Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
Which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on June 22, 2021.
1. In the Army there are 22 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Ramie K. Barfuss) (Reference No. 293)
2. In the Army there are 63 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Eric P. Ahnfeldt) (Reference No. 294)
3. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade
of lieutenant colonel (Anthony N. Sama) (Reference No. 320)
4. In the Navy Reserve there are 3 appointments to the
grade of rear admiral (list begins with Robert T. Clark)
(Reference No. 343)
5. RADM(lh) Eileen H. Laubacher, USNR to be rear admiral
(Reference No. 344)
6. Capt. David R. Storr, USN to be rear admiral (lower
half) (Reference No. 462)
7. Capt. Michael J. Schwerin, USN to be rear admiral
(lower half) (Reference No. 463)
8. In the Navy there are 4 appointments to the grade of
rear admiral (lower half) (list begins with Bradly D. Dunham)
(Reference No. 464)
9. Capt. Dennis E. Collins, USN to be rear admiral (lower
half) (Reference No. 465)
10. In the Navy there are 7 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Patricia H. Ajoy) (Reference No. 516)
11. In the Navy there are 4 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Robin C. Cherrett) (Reference No.
517)
12. In the Navy there are 7 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Joseph B. Harrison II) (Reference No.
518)
13. In the Navy there are 8 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Taylor R. Forester) (Reference No.
519)
14. In the Navy there are 10 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with David B. Damato) (Reference No. 520)
15. In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Roy L. Henkle) (Reference No. 521)
16. In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Steven J. Dwyer) (Reference No. 522)
17. In the Navy there are 195 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Thomas P. Abbott) (Reference No. 523)
18. In the Navy there are 9 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Daniele Braham) (Reference No. 524)
19. In the Navy there are 4 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Shawn G. Gallaher) (Reference No.
525)
20. In the Navy there are 19 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Michael P. Aiena) (Reference No. 526)
21. In the Navy there are 10 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Josh A. Cassada) (Reference No. 527)
22. In the Navy there are 5 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Kevin D. Bittle) (Reference No. 528)
23. In the Navy there are 3 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Jodie K. Cornell) (Reference No. 529)
24. In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Jeffrey N. Dugard) (Reference No.
530)
25. In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Kenneth O. Allison, Jr.) (Reference
No. 531)
26. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade
of lieutenant colonel (Whit A. Collins) (Reference No. 583)
27. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade
of major (Timothy E. Holland) (Reference No. 584)
28. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade
of lieutenant colonel (Karl J. Vogel) (Reference No. 585)
29. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade
of lieutenant colonel (Nicholas R. Reynolds) (Reference No.
586)
30. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
grade of colonel (Christopher A. Blanco) (Reference No. 587)
31. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of
major (Curt C. Lane) (Reference No. 588)
32. In the Army there are 15 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with David P. Curlin) (Reference No. 589)
33. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
grade of colonel (Michael R. Bean) (Reference No. 590)
34. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
grade of colonel (Daniel J. Meyers) (Reference No. 591)
35. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
grade of colonel (James M. McKnight III) (Reference No. 592)
36. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
grade of colonel (Craig P. Lanigan) (Reference No. 593)
37. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
grade of colonel (Lisa M. Kopczynski) (Reference No. 594)
38. In the Army Reserve there are 6 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Toby J. Alkire) (Reference
No. 595)
39. In the Army Reserve there are 55 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Jeremy C. Abrams) (Reference
No. 596)
40. In the Army Reserve there are 211 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Donna M. Alexander)
(Reference No. 597)
41. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Anthony C. Bonfiglio) (Reference No. 598)
42. In the Army Reserve there are 185 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with David A. Acosta) (Reference
No. 599)
43. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the
grade of lieutenant colonel (Joseph L. Gill II) (Reference No.
600)
44. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant commander (Anne C. Mooser) (Reference No. 601)
45. In the Space Force there are 765 appointments to the
grade of colonel and below (list begins with Heather J.
Anderson) (Reference No. 602)
46. In the Army there are 3 appointments to the grade of
brigadier general (list begins with Alison C. Martin)
(Reference No. 611)
47. In the Army there are 3 appointments to the grade of
brigadier general (list begins with Eugene D. Cox) (Reference
No. 612)
48. MG Jonathan P. Braga, USA to be lieutenant general and
Commanding General, US Army Special Operations Command
(Reference No. 623)
49. MG Antonio A. Aguto, Jr., USA to be lieutenant general
and Commanding General, First United States Army (Reference No.
624)
50. MG Stuart W. Risch, USA to be lieutenant general and
Judge Advocate General, US Army (Reference No. 626)
51. MG David J. Furness, USMC to be lieutenant general and
Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations,
Headquarters, US Marine Corps (Reference No. 627)
52. MG Matthew G. Glavy, USMC to be lieutenant general and
Deputy Commandant for Information, Headquarters, US Marine
Corps (Reference No. 628)
53. MG Paul A. Chamberlain, USA to be lieutenant general
and Military Deputy for Budget, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller)
(Reference No. 646)
54. COL Haldane B. Lamberton, ARNG to be brigadier general
(Reference No. 648)
55. COL Joseph A. Dinonno, ARNG to be brigadier general
(Reference No. 649)
56. In the Army Reserve there are 23 appointments to the
grade of major general (list begins with Michael N. Adame)
(Reference No. 650)
57. In the Army Reserve there are 2 appointments to the
grade of major general (list begins with Robert A. Boyette)
(Reference No. 651)
58. BG Michael J. Garshak, ARNG to be major general
(Reference No. 652)
59. BG Damian K. Waddell, ARNG to be major general
(Reference No. 653)
60. COL Mark G. Alessia, to be brigadier general
(Reference No. 654)
61. COL Rose P. Keravuori, USAR to be brigadier general
(Reference No. 655)
62. BG Mark T. Simerly, USA to be major general (Reference
No. 656)
63. In the Army Reserve there are 6 appointments to the
grade of brigadier general (list begins with Christopher A.
Holland) (Reference No. 657)
64. In the Army Reserve there are 86 appointments to the
grade of brigadier general (list begins with Derek L. Adams)
(Reference No. 658)
65. Vice Admiral William R. Merz, USN to be vice admiral
and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans and
Strategy, N3/N5, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
(Reference No. 660)
66. Rear Admiral Francis D. Morley, USN to be vice admiral
and Deputy Principal Military Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) (Reference No.
662)
67. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade
of colonel (Jeannette M. Watterson) (Reference No. 663)
68. In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
grade of colonel (Jason O. Allen) (Reference No. 664)
69. In the Air Force Reserve there are 113 appointments to
the grade of colonel (list begins with Connie Irene Armstrong)
(Reference No. 665)
70. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
grade of colonel (David R. Evans) (Reference No. 666)
71. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
grade of colonel (Nicollette D. Dennis) (Reference No. 667)
72. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Waldo D. Galan) (Reference No. 668)
73. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
grade of colonel (Roger W. Dodson) (Reference No. 669)
74. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Chase D. Crabtree)
(Reference No. 670)
75. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
grade of colonel (Donald A. Vacha) (Reference No. 671)
76. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
grade of colonel (Michael E. Lane) (Reference No. 672)
77. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
grade of colonel (Timothy J. Redhair) (Reference No. 673)
78. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Bryce E. Livingston)
(Reference No. 674)
79. In the Army there are 22 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Maria I. Bruton) (Reference No. 675)
80. In the Army there are 33 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Ryan S. Bible) (Reference No. 676)
81. In the Army there are 6 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Avery J. Carney) (Reference No. 677)
82. In the Army there are 3 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Robin L. Burke) (Reference No. 678)
83. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of
major (Brenton A. Arihood) (Reference No. 679)
84. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
grade of colonel (Tracy R. Norman) (Reference No. 680)
85. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the
grade of lieutenant colonel (Jaclyn N. Urso) (Reference No.
681)
86. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the
grade of colonel (Paul J. Goguen) (Reference No. 682)
87. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the
grade of major (Benjamin E. Barr) (Reference No. 683)
88. In the Navy there are 12 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Kelly L. Bryne) (Reference No. 684)
89. In the Navy there are 25 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with John A. Allen) (Reference No. 685)
90. In the Navy there are 29 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Jordan M. Adler) (Reference No.
686)
91. In the Navy there are 29 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Kyle C. Backman) (Reference No.
687)
92. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of
commander (Ashley S. M. McAbee) (Reference No. 688)
93. In the Navy there are 14 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Antonio Barcelos, Jr.) (Reference
No. 689)
94. In the Navy there are 9 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Christopher M. Anctil) (Reference
No. 690)
95. In the Navy there are 19 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Jemar R. Ballesteros) (Reference
No. 691)
96. In the Navy there are 514 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Marco A. Acosta) (Reference No.
692)
97. In the Navy there are 36 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Sung H. Ahn) (Reference No. 693)
98. In the Navy there are 14 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Drew R. Barker) (Reference No. 694)
99. In the Navy there are 11 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Miguel A. Bernal, Jr.) (Reference
No. 695)
100. In the Navy there are 7 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Richard S. Chernitzer) (Reference
No. 696)
101. In the Navy there are 16 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Jason K. Bruce) (Reference No. 697)
102. In the Navy there are 16 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Sylvester C. Adamah) (Reference No.
698)
103. In the Navy Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
grade of captain (Patrick L. German) (Reference No. 699)
104. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant commander (Andrew S. Foor) (Reference No. 700)
105. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of
commander (Kevin M. Bacon) (Reference No. 701)
106. In the Navy there are 10 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Abdeslam Bousalham) (Reference No.
702)
107. In the Navy there are 17 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Chabonnie R. Alexander) (Reference
No. 703)
108. In the Navy there are 50 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Michael J. Arnold) (Reference No.
704)
109. In the Navy there are 20 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Casey J. Burns) (Reference No. 705)
110. In the Navy there are 19 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Timothy D. Barnes) (Reference No.
706)
111. In the Navy there are 7 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Derek Butler) (Reference No. 707)
112. In the Navy there are 21 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Accursia A. Baldassano) (Reference
No. 708)
113. In the Navy there are 27 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Anthony P. Bannister) (Reference No.
709)
114. In the Navy there are 12 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Jennifer D. Bowden) (Reference No.
710)
115. In the Space Force there are 20 appointments to the
grade of colonel and below (list begins with Edward G.
Ferguson) (Reference No. 711)
116. In the Space Force there are 3 appointments to the
grade of colonel and below (list begins with James J. Watson)
(Reference No. 712)
117. LTG Edwin J. Deedrick, Jr., USA to be lieutenant
general and United States Military Representative to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee (Reference
No.721)
TOTAL: 2,932
Chairman Reed. The ayes have it. Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe, you are recognized.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all,
before asking a question I am going to ask Admiral Gilday to
share with the Committee what happened last Friday and the
significance of that.
Admiral Gilday. Last Friday we conducted our first shock
trial on the USS Gerald R. Ford. The 2016 NDAA requires that
those shock tests be conducted--it is a series of three tests
over the next couple of months--before we operationally deploy
that vessel. Our intent, Senator, is to deploy that vessel in
2022, and right now we remain on track to do so.
Senator Inhofe. Are the catapults--how many elevators are
working?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, right now we have accepted 7 of 11
elevators. I expect that we will accept two by early fall and
the remaining two by the end of the year. After the shock
trials the ship will go into a maintenance availability, we
will finish up those last two elevators, and then we will get
her out to deploy in 2022.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. We have heard a lot of things. As I
recall, the deployment date would have been 2017, initially,
and a lot of people have reasons to believe that there is
justification for a lot of the stalls. I don't agree with that,
but I certainly agree with you, that you believe that is going
to happen. I hope you are right, and we have had a lot of
problems with that particular piece of equipment and it has
been very, very expensive.
So, anyway, Admiral Gilday, as I said in my opening
statement we have a 355-or-more ship goal. Yet this budget is
only enough for a status quo 300-ship Navy. I hope we can get
the money needed to build the Navy. I know none of the three of
you agree--you won't say it but I will say it--you are not
getting an adequate budget. I can say it and you can't. But
anyway, we are going to do everything that we can to try to
make this happen. Cutting a new destroyer, retiring ten ships
early, fewer F-35C's, these do not seem to be strategic choices
but rather last-minute, haphazard cuts.
So anyway, that is what we are faced with right now. We
have often said the world is the most dangerous right now of
any period in my lifetime, and since release of 2018 National
Defense Strategy, the threats have only gotten worse. In fact,
the NDS Commission said that we need 3 to 5 percent real
growth--this is overall, not just the Navy--this particular
year, and obviously that is not going to happen. It is going to
be something less than a break even, of 1.6 percent, I believe.
So Admiral Gilday and General Berger, if I were to ask you
who in the Department of Defense is best positioned to set
forth structure requirements for the Navy and the Marine Corps,
I think it is the CNO and the Commandant, and I think you would
agree with me. The difference is I can say it and you can't.
But nonetheless, we do have serious problems that we are facing
right now. Your list of unfunded requirements amounts to $9.3
billion. This amount shows the difference of between 3 to 5
percent increase instead of 1.6 percent decrease makes in
developing a defense budget. Some call this, the things that we
are asking for right now, a wish list. I do not call them a
wish list. I call them a risk list. We have to remind
ourselves--and you folks, the three of you, know this better
than anyone--that it is the risk that takes lives, and we are,
I believe, in an unacceptable are.
So we are going to do the best that we can to increase and
to develop a budget that we can be proud of, and you will be an
important part of that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe. Senator
Shaheen, please.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, and thank you to each of you
for your testimony this morning and for your service to the
country.
Admiral Gilday, I would like to begin with you, and I
appreciated our call last week. You said in your opening
statement that we are making a once-in-a-century investment in
our public shipyards, and there is no doubt that the
investments through the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization
Plan (SIOP) are really important.
At the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, where we are the first to
get those investments, we have seen significant cost overrun in
the multi-mission dry dock project, which has to be done if we
are going to ensure that our submarines are able to be
maintained and ready when they are needed. So when we talked,
you discussed two major causes for that overrun, as I recall.
One was the increased cost of supplies, because of the
pandemic, but the other one was sort of inaccurate estimates by
those who were making projections for what the costs of the
project would be.
So can you talk about whether that is accurate. Are those
the two major costs? What else might be contributing to those
overruns, what we are going to do about it, and where are we
going to get the money to make sure that that project stays on
time?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am, I do think that is accurate. In
terms of raw material we saw significant growth in cost for
lumber, for cement, and for steel, and that has been pretty
steady through the pandemic, although it is beginning to level
off now. I think construction companies have had the same
challenges.
The initial estimate was done 2 years ago, and so that was
a factor. The second, I think more importantly, was the
complexity of that work. What we have learned from that--and I
had a discussion with Senator Hirono recently, as we look to a
multi-mission dry dock in Hawaii--is that we are now bringing
in industry before we make the estimates, so that we have
better-informed idea of the complexity of the job.
As an example, at Portsmouth it makes more sense for the
contractor to do the foundational work, the fabrication, and
then to ship it down to the site, rather than to do it in the
shipyard.
It is my number one unfunded priority on the list. It came
in about the same--that estimate, or the estimate in the
bidding process, and we are still in that sensitive bidding
acquisition time frame right now. I put it on my unfunded list
because it is vitally important that we keep the progress of
that project on pace for the first Virginia-class availability
in 2026.
So, ma'am, I ask the Committee's support on that unfunded
item, but nevertheless, I am committed to keeping that project
on track, for the very reason I just mentioned.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. If it is not on track we
are not going to have the dry dock capacity that we need. Is
that correct?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am, that is a correct statement.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. There is an article--and I
don't know, maybe this is for you, Secretary Harker--there is
an article in Bloomberg this morning. The headline is the
``U.S. Navy's deadliest new sub are hobbled by spare parts
woes,'' and it goes on to talk about how the Navy has swapped
more than 1,600 parts among its new Virginia-class submarines
since 2013, to ease maintenance bottlenecks.
Can you talk to why that is occurring? I would just put it
in the context of, in fiscal year 2020 NDAA this Committee put
in language raising concern about the supply chain and the
potential for this kind of shortfalls, and we encouraged--and I
am quoting from the language--"we encouraged the Navy to better
communicate the capability of their submarine forecasting
model. The Committee also encourages the Navy to communicate
needs in a timely fashion, and encourages the Secretary of
Defense to support shipbuilding industrial base initiatives to
maintain readiness and a strong submarine industrial base.''
It appears that that encouragement has not made much
difference. We still have this problem. So can you talk to what
the Navy is doing about it?
Mr. Harker. Yes, ma'am. The Navy is aware that there are
some challenges with some of the Virginia-class supply chain.
There are parts on the Virginia-class that we thought were
going to be a life-of-the-submarine parts, and they are failing
more quickly than we had originally envisioned, and so we have
to go back in and find alternate sources for those parts, and
they are not something that----
Senator Shaheen. I am sorry to interrupt, but can you talk
about why that is happening? Why are they failing faster than
we anticipated? Were our estimates bad? Are there problems with
how they are being fabricated? What is going on?
Mr. Harker. I will have to get back with you on that,
ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. I would ask, Mr. Chairman, that they
report back to the Committee on exactly what is causing that
shortfall. That would be very helpful, I think.
Chairman Reed. I would ask that the Secretary and the CNO
report back promptly.
Mr. Harker. Yes, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Senator Wicker, please.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,
before I begin my questions I would like to put two letters in
the record, a letter from me, dated June 16, 2021, to General
Berger, and his response to me, dated June 21, 2021. I would
like that they be entered into the record.
Chairman Reed. Without objection.
[The letters follow:]
Senator Wicker. General Berger, thank you for your service.
You have been in the military now for over 40 years. Is that
correct?
General Berger. That is correct, sir.
Senator Wicker. Well, I appreciate your service and I
appreciate you giving us straight advice.
Now during House Seapower Subcommittee hearing last week,
Lieutenant General Eric Smith testified that a joint Navy and
Marine Corps study determined that the requirement for
traditional amphibious ships is 31, including 10 big-decks and
21 LSD/LPDs. Is that your assessment also?
General Berger. It is, sir.
Senator Wicker. As a matter of fact, you stated that in the
letter that you sent to me only yesterday. Is that correct?
General Berger. That is correct, sir.
Senator Wicker. I am disappointed, shocked, in fact, that
the so-called 30-year Shipbuilding Plan released last Friday
calls for a range of 16 to 19 LPDs. It seems to me that the
Office of Secretary of Defense has some bureaucrats in there
that are taking over the Pentagon requirements and putting
armchair opinions on warfighting above those of the men and
women, like you, with decades of experience in uniform.
Now let's do the math. Based on the current amphibious
ships under construction, and the most recent decommissioning
planning guide as provided by the Navy, by the end of fiscal
year 2023, the Navy will have a total of 21 LSD/LPDs instead of
the 21 LSD/LPDs that you say we need.
Move ahead then to 2025. Based on this same guidance, the
Navy will have only 17 LSD/LPDs. This falls short, of course,
of the 21 that you and General Smith have said we need.
Then based on the current ships under contract, once all of
the legacy LSDs have been decommissioned, the Navy will have
only 15 LPDs. Of course, this falls short of the 21 that we are
being told by the greatest experts that we rely on is a
requirement.
Now this Committee, last year, and the Congress of the
United States, passed, and it was signed into law by the
President of the United States, the NDAA, and section 124
provided the Navy with a mechanism to procure two more LPDs to
fill this gap. If OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense]
executes this authority it would save the taxpayers over $700
million.
General Berger, you have a need for more LPDs. Does the
amphibious ship authority provided you in section 124 help you
meet your warfighting requirement?
General Berger. It would do both parts which you mentioned,
Senator. It would meet a warfighting requirement and it would
save an estimate of $722 million. Correct.
Senator Wicker. You know, I appreciate you being honest and
speaking truth to this Committee and to the Congress, and I
would just say, in response--I do not have time to engage
Acting Secretary Harker in this--but basically the regretful
answer that was given today of, ``it sure was hard not to make
that decision to do this multiple ship procurement but we just
could not afford it,'' the fact is we could not afford it
because somebody in the Office of Management and Budget sent
word to the Pentagon that they were not going to give you
enough money. I totally agree with Senator Inhofe that we need
to reverse this.
I would point out to my colleagues what the Chief of Naval
Operations has told us today. Numbers are an important metric,
and clearly in response to what the Chairman asked, they are
not the only metric, but they are an important metric. We also
were told, by our leading sailor in the country, if we are
going to meet the challenge, we are going to need a bigger
Navy.
I just say to the people here on the dais, and our
witnesses today, who are doing the best they can, we have an
obligation, under the constitution, to defend the United States
of America and to provide the numbers and financing to do that.
I totally agree with those on both sides of the dais that this
is a crying need that we have to meet.
I yield back, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker. Senator
Gillibrand, please.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all
for being here and for your sacrifice and service.
As you know, I have been working on this issue of trying to
reduce sexual assault in the military and to try to create a
military justice system that is worthy of the sacrifice our men
and women make. Through the work with a number of people on
this Committee we have put together legislation that now has 66
co-sponsors, and that legislation essentially says that for all
serious crimes, except for uniquely military crimes, that the
decision about whether to prosecute will be taken out of the
chain of command and given to trained military prosecutors.
We believe that that one change will professionalize
military justice. We also think that one change will change the
view of both survivors and defendants, that the system is less
biased, because it will be a review by the most highly trained
individuals, who do not necessarily know the plaintiff or the
defendant. We think it cures two defects in the military
justice system today. The first is how it handles sexual
assault cases--very few are going to trial and even less are
ending in conviction; it was about 20,000 cases estimated by
the DOD [Department of Defense] in the last couple of years,
and in the last 3 years approximately 200 have ended in
conviction. So each year--we are just not getting better.
We also have data, over the last 4 years, developed by the
DOD, that shows there is racial bias, that, in fact, if you are
a black servicemember you are more likely to be punished. In
the Navy, for example, the average of the last several years,
the last 15 years, is you are 1.4 times more likely to be
punished in the Navy, and in the Marines you are up to 2.61
times more likely to have a general court martial. So this is
data that the DOD has collected.
So we believe this one change could change how the justice
system is perceived. Many survivors of sexual assault do not
believe that justice is possible in the current system, and
among black servicemembers I think 60 percent do not believe
that they will have a fighting chance, or the same chance as a
white servicemember to get justice.
So I would like to know, for each of you, what is your
perspective on this issue. Do you remain open-minded on what
solutions would be the best to handle this? As you know, this
Committee has studied this issue for a decade. We have passed
nearly 250 reforms to improve the military justice system, as a
Committee, all of which have been supported by the Department
of Defense. Unfortunately, none of them have moved the ball and
none of them have instilled confidence in the system.
So I would like to know if you have an open mind in
reviewing this data and information as we begin to try to end
the scourge of sexual assault and try to remove bias within the
military justice system, and each of you can answer.
Mr. Harker. So, ma'am, I will start. For me, I definitely
have an open mind. We have invested a significant amount of
money in this current year budget to increase the size of both
the prevention and the response side for this important issue,
and it something that we believe is important for us to change.
Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, I am definite open to an evidence-
based approach to the best way to get after this. I have seen
much of the data, not all of it, with respect to the racial
inequities that you pointed out.
I think the key problem to solve with respect to sexual
assault is one of trust, and I think that if servicemembers do
not trust the system that we have in place then I think that it
is a readiness problem for us, because we have victims that are
not going to report, they are not going to receive treatment,
and then we have perpetrators that essentially are not going to
receive due process. So I am, ma'am, open to new ways of
looking at getting after it.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Admiral?
General Berger. I would also remain open-minded, as you
point out. I think we have the same goals that you highlight.
We have to reduce the number of sexual assaults. We have to
restore the trust between victims and their chain of command.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
General Berger. Third, we have to retain the authority of
commanders to do what they need to do in combat. So I think the
objectives are the same.
Senator Gillibrand. I agree.
Secretary Harker, the Navy has created a military justice
track. My understanding is that it has been in practice for the
last 10 to 15 years. My understanding is that there are
currently 95 military justice litigation career track
practitioners, 80 percent of whom are in designated litigation
billets at any given time, and half of those are prosecutors.
Have you had a problem of being able to fill those roles,
and in your opinion, has this program created a more
professional military justice system? Would you recommend it to
other branches?
Mr. Harker. Ma'am, based on my limited experience I do not
think we have had any problem in filing those roles, and it has
been effective. I think it is something that would be useful
for others to consider, and it is part of what is being
considered, as the Secretary looks at all the various options
during his independent review.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Let me now
recognize Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. Admiral Gilday, I want to talk
about your choice to include books like ``How to be an Anti-
Racist'' and ``The New Jim Crow'' in your professional reading
list. We discussed this last week in our phone call. Normally I
would not disclose that conversation, but you said the exact
same thing in front of the Armed Services Committee in the
House last week, which I found deeply disappointing. When you
are asked questions about this, you characterized it as a
criticism of sailors for being weak. That is a straw man. It is
not a criticism of sailors being weak. It is a criticism of
your decision to include these books on your professional
reading list, which ensigns and sailors across your service
take very seriously.
So I just want to give you a sampling of some of the things
that are included in books like that, the notion that
capitalism is essentially racist, and racism is essentially
capitalist. That the only remedy for past discrimination is
present discrimination. The only remedy for present
discrimination is future discrimination. That some individuals,
by virtue of his or her race, are inherently oppressive, or
privileged, while others are victimized or oppressed. That
individuals can bear some kind of collective responsibility or
collective guilt for the actions committed by members of his or
her race.
Admiral Gilday, how did these books get on your reading
list?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, I chose a variety of books. There are
over 50 books in my reading list, to give our sailors a wide
range of information from which I hope they can make facts-
based decisions on both their ability to look outwardly at
potential aggressors like China and Russia, as well as looking
inwardly and being honest with ourselves in area that we need
to improve.
In talking to sailors over the past year, it is clearly
obvious, to me and others, that the murder of George Floyd and
the events surrounding that, the discussions in this country
about racism, which go back for years and years and years, are
still a painful part of our culture, and that talking about
them, understanding them, is the best approach, and that
offering books like Kendi's for people to read--and they do not
have to agree with every assertion that Kendi makes.
I do not accept every assertion that Kendi makes, and I
would not think that all sailors would as well. But they need
to be exposed to it, so that they are making facts-based--we
need critical thinkers in the Navy and throughout the military,
in our enlisted force, again, who not only think outwardly but
inwardly, so that they make objective, hopefully objective
facts-based decisions, or draw conclusions in a world that it
is increasingly more difficult to get an unbiased view at a
really tough problem. Even if they are looking at things on
social media, artificial intelligence associated with those
platforms feeds them more of whatever they tend to look at. I
am offering them one book among 53 as a different perspective.
Senator Cotton. Yes, I agree there is a lot of information
like that on social media and in our culture, and you are
saying, as the senior leader of the Navy, that you want 18-
year-old sailors and 22-year-old ensigns to read a book that
asserts that capitalism is essentially racist. Do you agree
that capitalism is essentially racist?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, with all due respect, I am not going
to engage without understanding the context of statements like
that. But these are the same sailors----
Senator Cotton. Admiral, I am sorry, our time is very
limited here. I know you said this in the House Armed Service
Committee last week. In what context could the claim that
capitalism is essentially racist possibly be something with
which you would agree?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, I would have to go back to the book to
take a look at that, but again, this comes down to trusting
sailors who are running nuclear power plants on submarines at
hundreds of feet under the water, under the polar ice cap, that
are maintaining the highest, the most complicated and complex
jets in the world. We put them in harm's way every day. Sir, I
believe that we can trust them to read books like that and to
draw reasonable conclusions.
Senator Cotton. Well, it not just a matter of trusting. It
is a matter of how they spend their time, and you, as the Chief
of Naval Operations, are suggesting, in your professional
reading list, that it is a worthwhile endeavor for our sailors
and ensigns to spend their time reading books like these, as
opposed to, say, books on maritime strategy or basic seafaring
skills, which also are included on your list. But there are
plenty that are not included on your list that I think could
also benefit them. I mean, the Navy has had genuine cultural
problems now for many years, whether it is the McCain and the
Fitzgerald having collisions in the Western Pacific, the
Bonhomme Richard catching fire in port, the Fat Leonard
scandal, a Navy SEAL team being recalled from Iraq because of a
breakdown in basic military order, a patrol boat in the Persian
Gulf surrendering to what is a little more than Iranian fishing
boat. The Navy has had some genuine cultural problems and drift
and lack of focus that it needs to address. Assigning books
like these and encouraging your sailors to take the time to do
so is not a way for the Navy to regain its focus, Admiral.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator
Blumenthal, please.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
your service and for being here today. I want to begin, Admiral
Gilday, I know from your visit to Connecticut, Electric Boat
Dynamics, the boat yard there, that you are a strong believer
in our submarine program. I was pleased to see that the Navy
has requested two Virginia-class submarines in the fiscal year
2022 budget proposal and has exercised the option to build a
tenth Virginia-class submarine, recognizing how important this
amazing technology is to our national defense. I am hopeful
that you continue to strongly support this program.
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. Consistently the analysis that we
have done, the wargaming, the exercises, the deep analysis that
the Pentagon, and analysis inside and outside the Pentagon has
placed a high value on attack submarines with respect to
survivability and lethality as our Nation's best strike
platform.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. On June 15, just days ago,
the Associated Press reported that the United States military
has had losses of 1,900 lost or stolen weapons over the past
decade. This staggering number is probably only a fraction of
the total. It included assault rifles, fully automatic machine
guns, armor-piercing grenade launchers. Some of these weapons
have been found in connection with crimes committed with them.
I hope you agree that this kind of lost or stolen weapon has to
be stopped.
Can you tell me how many weapons, similar to the ones I
have mentioned, have been lost or stolen from the Navy or
Marine Corps armories in the last 10 years?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, based on the initial results of the
investigation that is ongoing it is about 240 weapons for the
Navy. I am interested in learning deeper, as our investigation
continues along with the other services to find out what laps
in accounting led to those losses. Some of them might have been
training losses, but specifically the root cause so that we can
get after it and correct it.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you have a number for the Marine
Corps, General Berger?
General Berger. Sir, I do not want to give you an
inaccurate number, but I will get you that number. If 10 years
is the horizon you are looking at, we will get you that
accurate number.
[The information referred to follows:]
General Berger. After an extensive review of 10 years of
data (as of 3 Aug 2021), the Marine Corps has 31 weapons for
which we cannot account. The numbers that had been reported by
the media around the time of this hearing included combat
losses and weapons destroyed or lost as the result of mishaps.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Can you tell me, perhaps
both you, Admiral, and General, what is the system for the Navy
and the Marine Corps tracking and accounting for conventional
arms, ammunition, and explosives that may be lost or stolen?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, I can say with a high degree of
certainty it is done at the individual unit level. So in the
case of the Navy specifically, at each ship. I cannot speak
with a high degree of specificity of the tracking beyond. When
a weapon is lost, there are reports that are made, there are
investigations that are done, but how that is tracked in the
aggregate I do not have a good answer for you at the moment,
sir.
Mr. Harker. So sir, if I could add in, this is something
that is actually looked at during our financial statement audit
every year. Our independent public accountants that work for
the Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
go out and do inventory testing on the accuracy of our
inventory around our small arms or ammunition, that type of
thing. So it is something that is tested annual. Both the Navy
and the Marine Corps have done better than our peers in the
Army and Air Force, and it is something that we do take very
seriously.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. I would like to follow up on
that area, but in the remaining time that I have I wanted to
ask about a study that was released yesterday. Brown
University's Cost of War Project reported that the number of
veterans and servicemembers who have died by suicide since
September 11, 2001, is more than quadruple the number who died
in the wars during this same period. The study estimates that
7,057 servicemembers have been killed in post-9/11 war
operations while 30,177 Active Duty servicemembers and veterans
have died by suicide. Quadruple. That is really an astonishing
number.
It goes on to say the average suicide rate for post-9/11
veterans between 18 to 34 was 32.3 per 100,000, between 2005
and 2017, but it rose to 45.9 per 100,000 in 2018. That is
about 2.5 times the rate in the general population.
There is no way that we can adequately address this topic
this morning, but I would like an explanation from everyone on
this panel as to what you think the causes are for this
phenomenon, which is so deeply concerning, and what we can do
about it. I know this topic has been a longstanding issue for
all the services, and I think that it has to be raised to a
much higher priority than it has been given so far.
Mr. Harker. Yes, sir. This is something that we are
investing significantly in, in this year's budget. We are
putting $22 million towards mental health. Our fiscal year 2021
amount was $21 million. We are more than doubling that going
into this current budget cycle, because we believe that
embedding mental health practitioners at the front, with
sailors and marines, is probably the best way to get at this.
We are also increasing the number of chaplains and the number
of clergy members that are there to provide support as well.
So this is something that we take very seriously, and we
have been working to both destigmatize getting treatment as
well as providing additional services for our sailors and
marines.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. I would just suggest that
more of the same is not going to work. It has to be a
reinventing, a re-energizing, a re-imagining of how mental
health is addressed in the military. But again, I am no expert,
and I really welcome a thorough study and action. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator
Rounds, please.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, let me
begin by just saying thank you for your service to our country,
at a time like this, in which we are looking at a budget which,
to me, appears to be a little bit on the disingenuous side. I
would like to just point out one item with regard to previous
contracts, and then Acting Secretary Harker, I would like to
have your response.
The Navy's overall shipbuilding budget--and, by the way, I
come from South Dakota where we do not build ships, but I care
deeply about making sure that we have a consistency in our
national defense--the Navy's overall shipbuilding budget
decreased in this budget by $700 million, from $23.4 billion to
$22.6 billion, but the budget includes purchase of one Arleigh
Burke-class destroyer. Previously, it had been planned to
purchase two. In fact, the Government has already agreed to
purchase just the one. In this particular case it would breach
a contract that the Government had previously agreed to with
Ingalls Shipbuilding and General Dynamics Bath Ironworks back
in 2018. At that time, the Government had agreed to buy one
destroyer from each shipyard per year, including fiscal year
2022. Now a second Arleigh Burke destroyer at $1.6 billion is
at the top now of the Navy's Unfunded Requirement List,
recognizing that there was already a contract in place and that
we are trying to rebuild a supply chain and trying to at least
get some consistency so that these shipyards are maintained.
What is the logic in a budget which has an unfunded request
attached to it when you already have a contract that says that
you have agreed to purchase two instead of one?
Mr. Harker. Sir, that was our biggest regret going through
this budget process.
Senator Rounds. I am sorry. Could you say that again?
Mr. Harker. That was our biggest regret going through this
budget process was that we could not fit that destroyer into
our budget. As we looked at the balance between readiness and
the cost of operations, maintenance, and personnel going up,
and the challenge with new capacity, and then also maintaining
the current capacity, we just could not afford to put that
destroyer into the budget.
Senator Rounds. Admiral Gilday, naval fighter aircraft are
among our most important front-line weapons systems in
confronting China, and this budget proposal cuts their
procurement by 15.6 percent. Now as the Navy cuts its number of
operational F/A-18's from 150 to a proposed 50--and I recognize
that the year in which we achieved 50 has not yet been
released--how do we fill the gap which is created in readiness,
especially considering that the Navy has only requested, this
year, 20 F-35C's instead of what had been anticipated, at least
as last year, 26. So we are going down in the number of fifth-
gen aircraft that we are purchasing. At the same time, we are
anticipating that our fourth-gen aircraft, Hornets, we are
talking about decreasing them from 150 to 50 operational units.
How does that jive?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, the Navy's goal is to have a mix of
fourth- and fifth-gen, and we will be at five squadrons that
have that mix by 2025. Right now we have over 500--543, I
think--Super Hornets, and that number goes above 600 when we
complete the latest procurement and delivery that was in the
2021 budget.
So what we are doing with the Block 4's, our older Block
4's, is we are actually increasing the life on those jets by 5
or 6 years. We are upgrading the computer systems on them and
upgrading their range, with respect to fuel. With the fifth-
gen, one of the regrets is the number that we are purchasing
this year. However, on my Unfunded List I have five more. I am
a believer in the fifth-gen aircraft. I am believer in the mix.
Consistently the studies and the wargaming that we have done
has shown that that fourth- and fifth-gen mix is a winner in
the battle space.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I have got some
other questions but I will leave them for the record at this
time. My time is expiring.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rounds. Senator
Hirono, please.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I begin I
would like to state, for the record, Secretary Harker and
Admiral Gilday, I remain concerned about the safety of the fuel
tanks at Red Hill facility, especially after the recent release
of 1,000 gallons of fuel. It is imperative that the Navy is
transparent on this issue and provides open and frequent
information to Congress and the public, because, of course,
people on Oahu are very concerned about contamination of their
drinking water due to these situations that occur at Red Hill.
So I expect that you share my concern.
Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Hirono. That is fine. Thank you. I also would like
to note that I support efforts to more effectively prevent
sexual assault and harassment in the military and the changes
to the UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice] that will get us
to that point, and, of course, I very much thank Senator
Gillibrand for her leadership.
I would like to get to the shipyard modernization issues
that Senator Shaheen mentioned. I share her concerns. So for
Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, I would like to get you
both on the record that construction of a new dry dock at Pearl
Harbor will begin in fiscal year 2023. Why is that important?
Because you have--well, I have been told that it will take 5
years for this dry dock to be built, and that is about the time
frame--that is the time frame when the new Virginia-class
submarine is delivered.
So can I get your commitment, because the concern is that
with the kind of cost overruns that are already happening at
Portsmouth, you know, I want to make sure that Pearl Harbor
will be timely addressed?
Mr. Harker. Yes, ma'am. We are committed to the Shipyard
Infrastructure Optimization Plan, especially all the
improvements at Pearl Harbor. Pearl Harbor Navy Shipyard was
the first one that I ever visited in my tenure, and I am very
committed to improving.
Senator Hirono. The timing of it, of course, is really
important, so Admiral Gilday?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am. It honestly is at the top of
our priority list as we go into the fiscal year 2023 budget
bill for MilCon [Military Construction]. I think, as I
mentioned earlier, we are about to have a conference with
industry out in Hawaii early next month, to get a better
understanding of the scope, the estimate. We think right now
that that project is probably in the 6- to 7-year time frame,
based on the phasing. But we would like to get rolling as soon
as possible on that effort.
Senator Hirono. Yes, because the timing of that dry dock
has to be pretty much in conjunction with the delivery of the
Virginia-class submarine.
Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. I am glad that you are meeting
with industry, because one of the explanations of what is
happening at Portsmouth is that you did not really deal with
the complexity of the work. So I am glad that is definitely a
lesson learned. We do not want to see the kind of cost overruns
at Pearl Harbor that we are seeing at Portsmouth.
It is my understanding, Secretary Harker, that Secretary
Hicks has ordered 11 missile interceptors transferred from
research and development for deployment on Navy ships in the
Pacific after a test to simulate an attack at Hawaii by North
Korea in November indicated that they could stop an ICBM
[markupistic Missile]. Although current sensors were adequate
to intercept this one shot, we know from MDA [Missile Defense
Agency] and CAPE [Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation] that
current sensors will not be adequate for the future
capabilities of our adversaries.
Won't these ship-based interceptors need a more advanced
radar to combat future capabilities such as HOR-H [Homeland
Defense Radar-Hawaii]?
Mr. Harker. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Hirono. Secretary Harker?
Mr. Harker. While I am not an expert in all of the MDA
pieces, I do understand the need for that.
Senator Hirono. For HDR-Hawaii?
Mr. Harker. Yes. I understand the requirement.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. You probably know that I am very
concerned about the fact that there is no funding for HDR-
Hawaii in this year's budget, and we need to keep this project
going if we are going to be prepared for a scenario where our
adversaries, particularly North Korea, will be developing their
capabilities.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Let me recognize
Senator Tillis, please.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
you for being here, and General Berger, thank you for the time
that we spent at breakfast a few weeks ago.
Secretary Harker, I would like to start maybe with just a
general statement, I do not expect you to respond to it, but on
the subject of military sexual assault, and really more of a
broad-based change to the UCMJ. I think it is very important
for the service Secretaries and those are vetting the
commission report to get us information as quickly as possible.
Now we are less than 3 weeks away from beginning the NDAA
markup. The only thing we have now is something that I have
heard from the DOD, that they have expressed concerns with the
scope and the technical challenges of a 6-month implementation,
but we really have to get the leaders over in the DOD to get us
information quickly, or it is simply not going to be considered
before you may have entirely new framework foisted upon you.
But I do want to ask you all, Admiral Gilday and Secretary
Harker, about Fleet Readiness Center (FRC) East. I know General
Berger went down there and visited recently. A lot of the
underlying facilities were established about the same time
Buddy Holly was top in the charts, and they are antiquated
facilities. It is like a Rubik's Cube when you are moving
equipment around to actually do servicing, and so much so that
I think Lockheed Martin is talking about, or considering their
own depot maintenance facility. There are over 4,000 people
that are employed down there. They are doing great work. We
have done work like getting the money for the security fencing
down there, securing in fiscal year 2018 the lift fan facility
funding. But these projects are not online yet, and I do not
even think the lift fan facility is under contract.
So am I reading it right, that FRC East is still considered
to be an important part of airframe maintenance? They do
airframe maintenance for several lines of service, and
certainly they are a key for the B variant for the Joint Strike
Fighter. What should I read in some of these projects shifting
to the right or not moving ahead?
Mr. Harker. It definitely an important base for us and an
important place where we do depot maintenance. I think the----
Chairman Reed. Microphone, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Harker.--something that is tied to the funding
constraints when you need to fit things into the budget.
Senator Tillis. Admiral Gilday, anything to add?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. Similar to the SIOP for
shipyards, we have the FIOP [Fleet Infrastructure Organization
Plan] for fleet repair facilities, and we just started that
effort and we are prioritizing those projects. I owe you a
better answer, sir, and will come back with what the potential
timelines look like, and, of course, how they might play out as
we get into the 2023 budget bill.
Senator Tillis. Yes, I understand you all have got
competing priorities and limited funds, so I understand. But we
will be submitting for the record some of the specific projects
that are required now in a matter of less than 2 years that
have not even started. So we know that things are going to
shift to the right, so I would like to get an update on those.
I will not run through the details here but will submit them
for the record.
I also want to ask you a question about personnel
shortfalls, for Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday. The
Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report on
crew fatigue in the surface force that found crew shortfalls
were worse than previously reported. GAO reported that until
recently the Navy measured shortfalls based on the number of
funded positions rather than the number actually required for
the safe operation of a vessel. The study also found
inconsistent implementation of fatigue management measures.
So how are you working to ensure a safe and adequately
crewed surface for our sailors? What are we going to do
differently? I know you are new into the role, so looking back,
what do we need to do differently, or looking forward, what are
we going to do differently?
Mr. Harker. So the report, we are still working on our
response to the report, but I think some of the things we have
done is we have shifted how we track things from, as you said,
the number of funded billets to the actual number of required
billets. So that is something that we have shifted as we track
and measure things going forward. We have also increased the
number of billets on our seagoing for ships and invested in
filling those billets and improve the fill ratio.
Admiral Gilday. Sir, for the past 3\1/2\ years we have
increased our sailors at sea by 23,000. We have more sailors at
sea today than we had in 2014.
The gaps that we see right now in the data that I look at
is less than 5 percent of our billets at sea are gaps. That is
not satisfactory. It needs to be zero. What led to this effort
to fund all those billets, and why it is so important goes
right back to what we learned from those collisions in 2017. So
it is a priority for us.
The Secretary said, in the beginning, in terms of
prioritizing current readiness as our top priority, that gets
right to manning, equipping, and training the force at adequate
levels.
Senator Tillis. Thank you. General Berger, I am out of time
but I will be submitting a few questions that have more to do
with some of your strategy and the future of the Marine Corps,
right-sizing. But thank you all for your service, and I look
forward to speaking with you individually.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tillis. Now let me now
recognize Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair and Ranking Member
Inhofe. Admiral Gilday, I was going to ask other questions but
I am sort of inspired to follow up a little bit, from Senator
Cotton, on your reading list, because when I saw that there was
controversy about it I pulled up the reading list. Mr. Chair, I
would like to introduce the CNO's 2021 reading list into the
record.
Chairman Reed. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Kaine. So as I look at it there are 53 books on the
reading list, which would probably be, you know, tens of
thousands of pages, and I read your intro statement about the
Navy history, beginning with every ship would have 37 books on
it that would be recommended to sailors. This is a voluntary
reading list to basically train leaders, and I think the motto
that you used to kind of summarize this is ``Read well to lead
well.'' Isn't that right?
Admiral Gilday. Yes sir, it is.
Senator Kaine. As I look at the list, it is a pretty
remarkably broad category of books. There are books about naval
history. There are books about particular naval operations,
SEAL Team Six. There are books about particular weapons
systems, like autonomous aerial or marine vehicles or robotics
or the use of artificial intelligence. There is a lot about
kind of, you know, naval history and weapons systems, a lot
about strategy. A lot of the books are about sort of individual
leadership traits, maybe specifically to the military, officers
eat last. But also a lot of book that are not military at all
that are really about leadership traits, as I look at the list.
There are book that tackle contemporary issues in society,
like racism or the second-class status that many women have
perceived throughout history, and those seem to be designed to
make people maybe put themselves in somebody else's shoes, to
think about somebody else. Those do not seem that controversial
to me. There is nothing in the intro to the reading list where
you are saying, you know, ``I agree with every assertion made
in each of these 53 books,'' and the list is not offered as any
kind of mandate or, you know, thought direction. You are just
wanting people to make sure that they consider broadly both
strategy and history and the perspectives as others as they
tackle the important and patriotic task of being military
leaders. Isn't that right?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir, and if I could say, on the
booking question by a gentleman named Kendi, the reason why
that is on the list is because we stood up a task force called
Task Force One Navy, after George Floyd's murder, and that
essentially came down to conversations in small groups, at
every command in the Navy, so that people could tell their
story, courageously come forward and tell their stories.
So Kendi tells his story as a black American growing up and
the challenges that he faced, but he is also very self-
critical. I do not agree with every assertion that Kendi makes
and every conclusion he draws, but I did find it to be a very
helpful read, particularly in light of those conversations that
we were having, and that is why I put it on the recommended
list. I know that some question that choice, but it really does
get to critical thinking, as I spoke to earlier, in a day and
age where it is really difficult sometimes to get right to the
facts and for people to make value judgments.
Senator Kaine. You even have a book on the list that I
thought was an interesting one. I can't remember the title but
it was about how to talk about difficult subjects in a really
easy way. So it is kind of like you can't talk about that at
work, how to talk about race, politics, and religion. Because
in many workplaces those can be divisive, and they are divisive
if you do not talk about them or they are divisive if you talk
about them in the wrong way----
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
Senator Kaine.--in a military composed of the entire cross-
spectrum of American society. It is good to be able to talk
about tough issues and talk about them in a way where people
are respectful and listen to one another. Isn't that true?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir, and so back to the conversations
we were having, specifically on ships, some people needed to
understand how to get the ball rolling, how to introduce these
conversations in a way that were not controversial or
provocative but in a useful kind of way, to learn from each
other. We think it has been helpful. We are trying to continue
it, and, sir, thanks for deepening the discussion on this.
Senator Kaine. Yes, deepening the discussion. One of your
books is called Deep Thinking. It is by Gary Kasparov, and it
is about how human creativity is even more powerful than the
most advanced automation or computers.
So, you know, look, the military has got to defend this
country, and even though depends, to some degree, on platforms,
it still depends most on people, and not people working in
their own little sphere and not connected to others, but people
working in groups. If people are going to work in groups in a
diverse society there are going to be a lot of people in the
group who are not exactly like them, and books that help you
understand others' perspective, hey, even books that make you
feel uncomfortable. My favorite book is the Bible, but I don't
like ``the last shall come first and the first shall come
last.'' That makes me a little bit uncomfortable, I am not sure
there is good book, a really good book, in the history of the
written word that has not made some people uncomfortable, and a
book that just made everybody feel completely comfortable, I am
not sure it lands on any great books list at all.
So I do not discourage you from what you are trying to do,
to enable people to read broadly and then see the world through
each other's perspectives, so that they can work better
together as unit to defend the Nation.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Let me recognize
Senator Cramer, please.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and leave it to
Senator Kaine to change the topic completely, but I can't
resist.
In these times that we are going through, where it is
difficult to start a discussion, to your point and your
reference to scripture, I am reminded that scripture tells us--
it doesn't tell us to be careful. Well, it tells us to be
careful how we treat people, but it also tells us to stop being
offended so easily. I think part of the problem--and, Admiral,
I admire you for wanting to enhance critical thinking, but to
have critical thinking you have to have critical conversations,
and so, anyway, good work. I applaud you for it, and I will
leave it at that. But you never know what is going to on in
SASC, right guys?
But back to the other topics--and thank you all for being
here and for your service, of course. When we talk about the
goal of 460 ships, the Chinese goal of 460 ships by 2030, we
are not even really considering their militia or the Coast
Guard, which it is my understanding basically doubles that
number of assets available to them.
If we had to forcibly maintain freedom of navigation to
locations like South Korea or Taiwan or any number of others,
how much of an additional problem are the militia assets and
the Coast Guard assets? I will start with you, Admiral.
Admiral Gilday. Sir, I think they are problem just in terms
of numbers, but what we have in our favor, besides a pretty
robust, forward-deployed force we have, are really strong
networks of allies and partners, and that network is growing.
The Brits, their first carrier in a generation, is now headed
over to the Western Pacific. We work very closely with the
French, with the South Koreans, with Japanese, with the
Australians, with the Canadians, and the list goes on and on.
We are sailing with them, operating with them every day, and I
think that is something that China does not have, and they wish
they did.
We really do value it. I just had the Dutch CNO over for
dinner the other night. I will meet with another head of Navy
next week. I was just in Denmark, and I was in Toulon, France,
with both the First Sea Lord from the Royal Navy and also the
Chief of Navy from the French Navy, and those partnerships are
just key.
Senator Cramer. Great reminders. Secretary, did you want to
add anything to that, or just agree?
Mr. Harker. I am sorry. I missed the question.
Senator Cramer. Did you want to add anything to what the
Admiral was saying, or just agree?
Mr. Harker. No, sir. I believe that we have the power and
credibility to deter our enemies over there.
Senator Cramer. So where I want to go next, and this may be
a little less conventional, and this is real important back
home. So here I come from this agricultural state in the middle
of the North American continent, right, and we are talking to
Navy guys.
But in 2020, United States agricultural exports to the
Pacific included $11.7 billion to Japan, $7.7 billion to South
Korea, $3.4 billion to Vietnam, $3.3 billion to Taiwan, $3.2
billion to the Philippines, and $2.8 billion to Indonesia, and
on and on it goes, obviously. A lot of hungry people. A lot of
hungry people out in the Pacific that like what we grow in
places like North Dakota and throughout our country.
In this 2030 scenario, could we guarantee we would have
shipping access to all or any of these important trading
partners?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, I think that is the crux of the issue
with respect to how our investment----
Senator King. Admiral, can you get a little closer to the
mic, please?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, that is the crux of our investment
strategy, to make sure that we can keep the Navy forward and be
relevant. So at any given day we have got about a third of the
Navy at sea. We think that is what we need, and not only
training but also deployed, to have that presence forward, to
maintain those open sea lanes and keep that trade flowing.
We saw what happened in the Suez recently. That should be a
lesson for all of us, that at a cost of $9 billion a day, it
does not take much to upset global trade through those key
chokepoints.
Senator Cramer. Well, and to your point you made to the
previous question regarding the important partnerships,
obviously we have to always be reminded of that, because when
you look at just the volume, as you said, the assets that they
have, the shipyards that they have, both commercial and naval,
obviously it can be a little bit overwhelming.
Anyway, getting off on the reading list tangent cost me a
little bit of time, but it was all worth it. Thank you, all.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cramer. Senator King,
please.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think the most
telling chart in the presentation that you gave us this morning
is on page six. It is the Department of Navy total obligation
authority, and the telling line is the yellow line, which is
``constant dollars.'' What it shows is that we are actually
either flat or slightly below--you saw me trying to figure it
out here--we are slightly below the level of expenditure for
the Navy as in 2010.
Admiral, the strategic challenge to this country has
changed dramatically since 2010, has it not?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. It certainly has. I would agree
with that.
Senator King. It has changed from the global war on terror
to near-peer competition, particularly with China and Russia,
which is a more conventional kind of adversarial challenge. Is
that correct?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir, but the only thing I would add is
that the character of conflict is changing as well, with our
focus on space and cyber as well as the conventional domains.
Senator King. But still, the point is it is difficult to
argue that a flat budget, since 2010 to today, given the rise
of the Chinese Navy, for example, it seems to me that is tough
to justify, and I know that these were not your decisions.
I want to go back to something Senator Rounds asked, about
the DDG. Just let's get it on the record. If that multiyear
contract is breached, the Government will have to pay a $33
million penalty. Is that not correct, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Harker. Yes, sir, it is.
Senator King. You have told me, both in the hearing today
and previously, that this was the toughest decision that you
had to face. The point I want to make about this is not only
the lack of the destroyer but the impact that this decision has
on the industrial base, not only in the immediate future, in
terms of how many people do you need to build the ships, but
also the principle of breaking a multiyear I would argue sends
a shudder through the industrial base, in terms of their
investment. If they are going to make major, $100 million
investments in shipbuilding capacity, and also in training of
new shipbuilders, they have to have some confidence that there
is a stream of demand coming.
Mr. Secretary, you understand that, I am sure.
Mr. Harker. I do. Yes, sir.
Senator King. Admiral, you saw it at Bath Iron Works, the
number of people that they are hiring and the problem of the
cliff, in terms of future production. Now I understand you
cannot guarantee ships into the indefinite future, but you
understand the impact of the sort of chilling effect that the
breaching of the multiyear might have on investment and on
workforce.
Admiral Gilday. Absolutely, sir, and if I take a look at,
as an example, the Columbia-class, we know we are going to
build X amount of submarines. So that gives those companies a
clear set of headlights in terms of where are we going, so that
they can make infrastructure investments with a high degree of
confidence. We saw what happened in Bath, with the Zumwalts,
when we only built 3 and we thought we were going to build 30,
and they made significant investments that never panned out,
and so it is not lost on me, the significant negative impact on
the industrial base with decisions like this, sir.
Senator King. Well, and the problem is, as you know I live
near Bath, you cannot turn the industrial base off and on. If
it goes down, you are talking about welders going somewhere
else, and in this economy they are going to go somewhere else,
and so I think that is the national security challenge involved
here.
The other piece that is the challenge of this budget is--
this has occurred to me for a long time. We are having a total
rebuild of our nuclear deterrent capacity at the same time as a
100-year rebuild of our depot maintenance capacity, and the
problem, those are two sort of one-time expenditures that are
sort of varying or altering what would otherwise be a normal
budget. I call them the pig in the python of the Navy budget.
There is bulge that we are having to deal with, and that is
constraining everything else. Mr. Secretary, is that true?
Mr. Harker. Yes, sir. It has given us unprecedented
challenges to try to recapitalize the Columbia as well as the
shipyards and grow the Navy.
Senator King. But I think we should look on these as sort
of one-time events rather than business as usual, because we
are not going to recapitalize the strategic deterrent every 5
years, and we are not going to recapitalize the shipyards.
Final point is on the DDG(X) planning. We talked about the
Ford today. We had a full hearing on the Ford a couple of years
ago, and one of the principal things that we learned from that
hearing was don't do R&D while you are building the ship,
because the catapult and the elevator were both new, and here
we are still dealing with the elevators.
So I hope, to both of you, that you will work with the
shipyards to minimize what I call the first ship premium. The
more fully developed the plans and requirements are before the
contracts are bid, the better you are going to do in terms of
price and performance on those ships. That is just based on
what we have seen in the past.
Admiral, I hope that you are going to follow a course of
working with the shipyards and having the engineering as
complete as possible before we force these shipyards to bid
with considerable risk built in.
Admiral Gilday. Sir, that is the plan. In fact, we are
talking to both Bath and Ingalls right now, all stakeholders in
the same room as we talk about the design of that ship. So
similar to what we did when we went from, let's say, the
Ticonderoga-class cruiser to the Arleigh Burke destroyer, we
are changing the hull, right, but the combat system is going to
remain the same. So to the point you made about Ford, we are
not looking for a build where we are going to have to pull off
successive miracles to get a ship to sea on time.
Senator King. Thank you very much for your service, all of
you. Thank you, General Berger.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Let me now
recognize Senator Sullivan, please.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen,
thank you for your testimony today and your service to our
Nation.
Look, I want to agree with Senator Inhofe here. There is a
lot of discussion about difficult choices, and you are up here
and you cannot admit it but you do not like this budget. We
know that. I do not like this budget. This is not difficult
choices. This is bad choices.
If you look at where the Biden administration is
prioritizing our military, it is dead last, that and homeland
Security. After inflation it is actually cut. Every other
agency gets a double-digit increase, but for the military and
defense of our Nation it is dead last.
[The information referred to follows:]
Now this is a very bipartisan Committee, and I want to
thank the Chairman, because I think he is doing a great job. I
want to thank my friend, Angus King, because I also think he is
doing it. But I am going to ask my colleagues, particularly my
Democratic colleagues, for help, for help--let's see the one on
China--because at the national Democratic level, whether it
Chuck Schumer and Bernie Sanders, with their Defend the
Pentagon amendment last year to the NDAA, that was 14 percent
across-the-board cuts, for that budget, or what we are doing
with competing with China. That shows China increasing its
defense budget about, on average, 10 percent a year over the
last decade. We have decreased it, Obama-Biden, 25 percent
cuts--25 percent cuts, second term. That is just crazy.
[The information referred to follows:]
We tried to rebuild it when the Republicans were in power.
Now we are cutting again. We cannot do this. We cannot do this.
So my colleagues, I am asking, help us. That is the trend.
So let me just ask, Admiral, General Berger, if these
trends continue--I am not going to ask you to comment on the
budget, but Admiral, I was very appreciative of your statement,
if the Navy's top line remains flat, the fleet will decrease,
but we need a larger, more capable fleet. If these trends
continue, flat, or actually this is a declining military
budget--again, if you are Department of Education you get a 40
percent increase to your budget. You guys get a 4 percent cut.
If these trends continue, what will this do, specifically
Admiral and General, to our ability to compete against China,
in the long term? I am not asking for you to comment on this
budget. I am asking you, declining budgets, what will that do.
Sir?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, it is going to cause us to make some
difficult choices in terms of priorities, and it will be that
tension between current day, current readiness, and
modernization, and making tough choices in terms of where the--
--
Senator Sullivan. But more directly, if we are--sorry to
interrupt--if we have declining budgets, which the Biden
administration clearly wants, okay. That is what they do. No
offense to my national Democratic--not the ones here. Not the
ones here on this Committee, but overall, go look at the
chairman of the Budget Committee right now. He wants a 25
percent cut to the U.S. military, Bernie Sanders. Our ability
to compete with China will be dramatically diminished, won't
it?
Admiral Gilday. So I think that chiefs have been consistent
about our best advice is a 3 to 5 percent growth profile would
put us in a place where we think we need to be to both compete,
deter, and win, if it comes to a conflict.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. General, do you have a view on
this? Again, if the trends continue. I am not asking you to
comment on today's budget. I know it is difficult for you as
the witness because you do not like this budget. I know you do
not like this budget. I cannot stand this budget. But what do
you think, General?
General Berger. What has to remain consistent is the notion
of a pacing threat, as you highlight, Senator. That means they
are moving, we are moving. The trends continue, as you point
out. If they continue to invest at the rate that they are
going, and we do not maintain pace with that, then we will
widen a gap, in other words, increase the risk strategically to
our country.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask one more specific thing, and
it is really a joint thing between the Navy and the Marine
Corps. General Berger, again, I really appreciate all you are
doing on the force design and your very strategic and
innovative thinking with regard to the Marines. What sea denial
capability does the Marine Corps currently have, and what
capabilities will Naval Strike Missile and Tactical Tomahawk
give the Marine Corps? Admiral, to you, how important is it to
you that the Marine Corps be able to conduct these sea denial
missions to support the Navy? This is a really integrated
element of your strategy. It is Marine Corps and Navy. I think
a lot of people--I know the Congress cut this last year, and I
think it was a mistake. Do the two of you have a view on that?
General Berger. Today we have a very limited capability. I
mean, you could probably, on one hand, less than four or five
of the capabilities that contribute directly to sea denial. We
need a ground-based, anti-ship capability so that we can lock
down certain, especially key choke points that the fleet
commander, the Joint Force commander need to control. The anti-
ship missile, the NMESIS [Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship
Interdiction System], the Naval Strike Missile, and the larger,
longer-range, the Maritime Strike Tomahawk, those give us the
ability to control straits, to lock down an area that the fleet
commander needs to control.
Admiral Gilday. Sir, I agree with the Commandant, and I
think that the analysis that we have done and we have
presented, it requires a different mix of both traditional
battle force ships but also new amphibious ships and combat
logistics ships in order to yield more combat power in a
distributed way. We understand how we think we need to fight in
the future, and the plan that we have presented, the analysis
that we have done, I think puts us on a path to yield the kind
of power that you introduced and the Commandant followed up on.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Senator Warren
is recognized via Webex.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
for being here today.
Admiral Gilday, I would like to address the Navy's efforts
on predicting more fuel-efficient engines for the surface
fleet. One of these technologies is the Hybrid Electric Drive,
the HED, system, which uses an electric motor to improve the
ship's overall fuel efficiency, consuming less fuel and
lowering its total costs.
A GAO report in November 2020 detailed how the Navy had
decided to suspend the HED program and pursue a different
research effort, the Propulsion Derived Ship Service, PDSS. The
report also stated that the Navy did not fully assess the costs
and benefits or complete the testing of the HED system before
making its decision, and could not provide any information on
why it is necessary to suspend the HED program in order to
pursue the PDSS research effort.
So Admiral Gilday, after spending over $100 million of
taxpayer money on the development, purchase, and upgrade of six
HED systems, would you say that the Navy made the right
decision in suspending the HED program?
Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, I am familiar with the report, but I
really need to go back and take a look at the conclusions and
then the recommendations, and I would like to come back to you
with the details.
Senator Warren. Well, can you say something about what
factors went into the decision for suspending the HED system?
Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, I cannot with a degree of
specificity that I think this topic deserves.
Senator Warren. Well, Admiral, the GAO report mentioned
that the system requires little maintenance, per the commanding
officer and crew of the USS Truxtun and senior Navy engineers.
Also, according to the Navy's January 2020 report to Congress,
the system was designed for low-speed operations which comprise
more than a third of a typical DDG's operating profile.
So the report I am reading, it does not match up with the
conclusion here. So it is my understanding that the PDSS is
still in its infancy stages, with quite a lot of time before it
reaches full operational capability. Is that correct, Admiral?
Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, I do not mean to be evasive. I just
really need to dig into that report more deeply and get briefed
on it. I am committed to come back here with a thorough answer
to your questions.
Senator Warren. All right, and one of the questions I am
going to ask you about is whether or not the money dedicated to
the HED system is going to the PDSS system, or if it is
something else here.
You know, I am glad that the Navy is prioritizing research
and development on fuel-efficient ship engines, and that it
thinks that there are even better technologies that can
outperform the HED. But I am really concerned that abandoning a
good system now in favor of a better but not yet close to an
operationally ready system is a good idea. It is critical that
investments in improving fuel-efficient ship engines be made
reliably and with transparency. You know, these technologies
ensure that the Navy remains flexible and agile for the future
and reduces its dependency on a potentially vulnerable fossil
fuel supply chain, and that it builds public trust in how money
is being spent.
So I am going to look forward to hearing more from you on
these questions. I really want to understand where the Navy is
on this.
Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Warren. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren. If Senator Scott
is ready he could be recognized.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chair Reed.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott.
Senator Scott. I want to thank you for your service and
what you do every day.
I guess the first question is, do we all agree that we are
facing increasing threats from our adversaries all across the
world?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
Mr. Harker. Yes, sir.
Senator Scott. Do we have any feeling that Communist China
is going to slow down in building up their military and doing
everything they can to cause us problems in the Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Gilday. No, sir. There is no indication they are
slowing down.
Senator Scott. Do you believe that as they build their
economy they are going to continue to invest--Communist China
will continue to invest more and more into their military?
Admiral Gilday. I think that is one of the projected ways
forward, sir, that their funding lines would continue to trend
upward.
Senator Scott. So if we believe all that, if you look at
these budget numbers we are seeing, as Senator Sullivan has
pointed out, and when you look at inflation, we are seeing less
money invested in military. We are not even staying up with
inflation. How does that make any sense? How can we believe
that we can do our job if we are not even going to stay up with
even inflation in defense?
Admiral Gilday. I will just say that I am grateful for the
top line that the Navy has, and I am committed to making every
dollar count so that we are fielding the best force that we
possibly can. So I think that that is my responsibility, is to
take the top line that we have and to field the best force that
we can, the most ready and the most capable and the most
lethal. That is how I am proceeding with respect to how we are
investing our money.
Senator Scott. You are not defending whether it is the
right number or not. You are just saying, ``I got stuck with
this number and so I am going to--whatever I get stuck with, I
will do my best.''
Admiral Gilday. Sir, that is what I have to do. My way
forward has to be budget informed, and I have a responsibility
to make sure that the force that is out there today, that I am
serving not only the Nation well but I am serving the sailors
that are on those ships, that they have what they need to be a
credible fighting force. I think we can do that.
Senator Scott. So everything I read, Admiral, is that when
the United States plays war game scenarios in the Indo-Pacific,
especially over Taiwan, we lose. Is that the war games you have
played, or do you have a different view that what we----
Admiral Gilday. No. Sir, I have a different view. It
depends on the game. It depends on the approach. Those war
games, even the ones where we get beat, we learn a whole lot in
terms of honing our skills, our concepts, and giving a better
understanding of what we need to win, with respect to kit.
Senator Scott. Do you believe that we have the Navy that is
going to deter Communist China from invading Taiwan today?
Admiral Gilday. I do. I do not think we are doing it alone.
I think we are doing it with allies and partners. But I think
we have a credible force forward right now.
Senator Scott. Thank you. General Berger, can you give us a
little bit more information on your re-envisioning of the
Marine Corps and what you are doing and how that is going to
help us deal with Communist China?
General Berger. Sir, the Marine Corps, for the past 20
years, largely has been in the Middle East, doing what the
Nation needed it to do, but going forward it needs to do
something different. To deter the PRC [People's Republic of
China], the PLAN [People's Liberation Army Navy], and to be
ready to respond to any crisis, we have to go back to our naval
roots. We have to become expeditionary once again. We have to
fit into a Joint Force, as CNO answered to your first question,
as a Joint Force that can work with our partners and allies, to
first prevent a crisis, but if there is one, be ready to
respond quickly.
Senator Scott. Do you believe today that your understanding
of--if you were involved in trying to deter or defend Taiwan, I
mean, defend, could you do it?
Admiral Gilday. That is a simple question to ask. As you
pointed out, sir, it is a very complicated one to answer,
because on different classification levels and different
scenarios the outcome is different.
Senator Scott. What do you personally believe? Do you
believe that we can defend Taiwan today?
Admiral Gilday. I believe we need a margin of error so that
it is not even close.
Senator Scott. Do you think that we have it?
Admiral Gilday. It depends. Conventionally, deterrence is
partly in the mind of the adversary. Do they believe we have
the capabilities and believe we have the will to use it? I can
answer the first one, not the second one.
Senator Scott. Do you think having a defense budget that
does not stay up with inflation that it gives them the belief
that we are committed?
Admiral Gilday. I think, back to the pacing part of a
pacing threat, there is a degree of strategic and operational
risk that we need to understand. The budget is part of that.
Senator Scott. Thank you, each of you. Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator Peters,
please.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
each of our witnesses for your service to our country.
Admiral, my question for you is, I would like to return to
the GAO report that Senator Tillis addressed earlier, and
specifically its finding on fatigue. Shifting away from optimal
manning process to better account for ship workload will
certainly help in the long run, but my question for you, sir,
is what are you doing now to combat fatigue in the fleet?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, making great gains to make sure that
everybody on ships gets 7, 8 hours of uninterrupted sleep a
night. That is a challenge. We have been learning a lot. We
have medical experts who are helping us design a program. We
are assessing that program. We just came out with a revised
instruction based on our assessment a few months ago. We
continue to learn, but I am confident they are on the right
track and we are committed to this, sir, again, tied to those
collisions in 2017.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Admiral.
General Berger, the Marine Corps just awarded a contract
for the Organic Precision Fires-Mounted system. This type of
investment in loitering munitions will certainly be a key to
ensure that the Marine Corps is properly equipped for those
fights in the future.
My question for you is, could you discuss how the fiscal
year 2022 budget actually reflects these modernization
priorities in unmanned system?
General Berger. Both in the air and on the surface, as you
highlight, we will triple the number of unmanned aerial
systems, aerial squadrons that we have, and they will be a mix
of those that collect, those that are lethal, those that
provide logistics, those that fuse information and move
information.
On the surface, to an earlier discussion, the Joint Light
Tactical Vehicle, for example, we are using it in a
configuration now with the Naval Strike Missile, where it is a
combination of manned and unmanned teaming, some vehicles
crewed, some uncrewed. That allows the tactical commander to
spread his forces out and pose the adversary a threat from
multiple vectors, which is what we need to be able to do.
Senator Peters. Right. General Berger, again, in April, the
Marine Corps Gazette, there was a story talking about the
Second Marine Information Group, and the commander offered
several recommendations for operating in the information
environment, focusing entirely on both individual and unit
mindsets. This certainly makes me wonder about the intangible
components of Force Design 2030. So could you talk to the
Committee a little bit about what you believe every marine
should know about information and how to operationalize it, as
well as what every commander should know?
General Berger. My assumption is that you are going to want
your Marine Corps and your Navy far forward. That is the best
chance you have to deter. That is the best chance you have to
respond to a crisis. If you are far forward, then you are
closest to the adversary, and what information goes back and
forth, what messages you are sending, what you are collecting
and moving within your force matters.
I think the Joint Force Commander, the combatant commander
that the CNO talked about earlier, is going to rely very
heavily on the Marine Corps and the Navy forward to paint a
picture of what is in front of them and to move that
information, and to call out an adversary's actions to make it
public.
Every marine then who is forward has to understand that as
lethal as we are, and we are very lethal, the information part
of that is extraordinarily important. We have to understand
that, that every individual becomes a cog in a bigger system of
what do they see in us, what do we see in them, how are we
trying to defeat their reconnaissance of us. What do they
understand about us?
So it is higher level of understanding for marines and
sailors, I think, forward, that has not been necessary in the
past, but will be critical moving forward.
Senator Peters. Right. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters. Senator
Tuberville, please.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you very much. Thank you for your
service.
Admiral, I want to revisit your statement that numbers
matter. China's navy is bigger, not only bigger but
geographically concentrated. Almost all PLA [People's
Liberation Army] Navy ships are in the South China Sea. Do you
believe the United States maintains naval superiority within
1,000 miles of China?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, right now we do. If we needed to
respond, we could, and we could respond with overwhelming
force, and then surge additional forces forward.
Senator Tuberville. Okay. General Berger, Iwo Jima, Midway,
Pearl Harbor--a fight in the Pacific falls on the Navy and the
Marine Corps. If we have conflict with China, our Nation will
look to you. But if this budget passes, the Marine Corps in
strength of fiscal year 2022 down by 2,700. You have worn the
cloth of this Nation for 40 years, and I know have the courage
to answer this question like a marine. Is it responsible to
shrink the Marine Corps as the Nation pivots into the Indo-
Pacific?
General Berger. When you say, just to clarify, sir,
``shrink the Marine Corps,'' are you talking about end
strength, just to make sure, the structure of the Marine Corps?
Senator Tuberville. Yes.
General Berger. I would trade size for quality if we have
to. I think all the service chiefs would like to never cut
their end strength, given an unrestricted, unlimited set of
resources. But that is not the world that we live in. So we
will reduce the end strength. We have reduced the end strength
in order to fund our own modernization for the future.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. You know, our military is
built on, obviously, recruitment, because we are a volunteer
military. I just do not want us to get into this extremism in
which we know we have problems in a lot of different areas. You
know, being a football coach for years I brought people in, and
they went my way or they went the other way, because you have
got to build a team.
But, you see things like, Admiral, in your department I
saw, on social media, we had a Pride flag on your social media
on an aircraft carrier. I have no problem with that because, I
had young men that were gay that played football for me. I
mean, you know, you take everybody, and this takes everybody in
the military. But we cannot separate. We cannot separate. To me
it is the bigger cause that all these young men and women fight
for our military. It is not individual sport. It is not golf.
It is football. I mean, we have got to build a team.
I have asked this same thing of Secretary Austin and the
others. We just need a commitment from everybody to kind of
calm down on all this so we can build a military that believes
in one thing--our country--and we believe in it together. If we
keep dividing our country we are going to continue to have
problems, and I think it is something we just need to all be
real careful of in the future. Because we have got the greatest
country on the face of this earth, and we do not want to
destroy it by individualizing and making individual sports out
of everything we do, especially the military--especially the
military.
So I just needed to make that statement. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you very much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Senator
Duckworth is recognized via Webex.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and as someone
who has served 23 years in our military I can tell you it is
one team, one fight, regardless of who is in the aircraft with
you. I would tell you that when I was bleeding to death in my
helicopter I did not ask what somebody's background was. I only
cared that they had an American flag on their shoulder and were
there to rescue me. So our military truly is united, and that
oath of office is what unites all of us.
Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for being here and thank
you for your service to our Nation. I am very courage to see
the development of unmanned naval platforms such as the MQ-25
aerial refueler, which will provide essential logistics support
to our maritime forces. The MQ-25 conducted the first-ever
aerial refueling between a manned aircraft and an unmanned
tanker on June 4, from MidAmerica Airport in my home state of
Illinois. It will be the world's first operational carrier-
based, unmanned aircraft providing aerial refueling and ISR
[Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] capabilities
for carrier strike groups. MQ-25 integration will extend the
range of our aircraft carriers and lay the foundation for all
future carrier-based unmanned systems.
Admiral Gilday, could you speak to the impact unmanned
programs such as the MQ-25 have on our ability to provide
essential logistics in contested environments and the
importance of continued investments in unmanned systems for the
Navy's future force design. In particular, how do you plan to
employ this capability to support our operational plans in the
Indo-Pacific region, where the tyranny of distance is something
we have already discussed? Thank you.
Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am. Thanks for the question. I
think that the impact of the MQ-25 and our experiences that we
have seen out at sea, and again, with the aerial refueling that
you mentioned 2 weeks ago, I think the effects are profound,
for not only the Navy but our military. It will change the
dynamic of the carrier air wing. You mentioned increased ISR
capability, increased range, increased lethality.
I also think it is going to change the way that we employ
the air wing, where you will have manned and unmanned operating
together. The MQ-25 is our first look at how we are going to do
that going into the 2030s. That particular platform we have a
high degree of confidence in right now, and that is only
growing day by day as we operate it.
So as we move forward, ma'am, what we are learning from the
MQ-25, we are not only applying that to other aerial vehicles
but we are also applying it to the work that we are doing in
unmanned surface platforms and unmanned undersea platforms as
well.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Admiral. I was pleased that
you released the Department of the Navy's Unmanned Campaign
Framework, which outlines a holistic approach to developing and
deploying unmanned systems and ensuring that individual
technologies can operate within a broader architecture of
networked warfighting systems. I believe unmanned systems will
play a key role in future distributed marine operations,
littoral operations in a contested environment and
expeditionary advanced-based operations.
However, these platforms will not provide maximum
capability for our forces if they are not fully integrated with
other important systems, and I am so glad to hear, in your
earlier answer, that you are integrating these systems in.
I do understand that you need to develop a manned/unmanned
teaming solution in order to effectively employ the MQ-25 in
some situations. Can you please just walk me through your plans
for this solution and what resources you might need to develop
this enabler, so we can get the most use out of an important
capability like the MQ-25?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am. So first of all, on a campaign
plan I would also like to mention that the Commandant, General
Berger, also signed that framework with me, so the Marine Corps
and the Navy are working, because we have to, hand in hand as
we proceed forward with unmanned.
So conceptually, ma'am, what we believed for some period of
time is that this would be a phased approach with respect to
unmanned, where, for a certain period of time, there needs to
be a man in the loop. So eventually we will have artificial
intelligence technology, machine learning that allows us to
continue to increase the amount of autonomy that we employ with
these vessels. But I think that we have to be smart about this
and understand that this is going to be a phased approach. But
there is still a lot of power there, even in a phased approach,
in a responsible way to keep a man in the loop as we leverage
the unmanned and uncrewed vessels.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I would like to chat a little
bit about the Indo-Pacific region. You know, I think we are
clear that our alliances and partnerships provide the United
States with a clear asymmetrical advantage against potential
adversaries. I know I am out of time. General Berger, I would
like to submit a question for the record to ask you really how
would the Marine Corps balance the need to invest in
modernization with resourcing critical readiness and mil-to-mil
initiatives with our partners and allies, particularly in the
Indo-Pacific region. I am talking specifically about building
trust and interoperability by actually have a presence in the
Indo-Pacific on the ground, in the region, to basically, bottom
line, enhance relationships and increase deterrence and open
doors, finding new friends, maybe not necessarily allies but
people who are just happy to have us there to enforce the rule
of law and international norms and behaviors. So I will submit
that for the record, and I hope that you will send me an
answer. Thank you, General Berger.
I am over time, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Duckworth. Senator
Blackburn, please.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Gilday,
I want to come to you, if I may. Naval Support Activity Mid-
South in Millington there in Tennessee, and, of course, we have
some of the best personnel there for Navy Recruiting Command
and Navy Personnel Command, and we are just so honored to have
them there and appreciative of the work that they do.
I want to talk with you a little bit about the newly
transformed model of recruiting, which you have really pushed
back and away from the legacy model, and where you had one
recruiter for every job. I like what you are doing with the
1,000 talent acquisition stations supported by 64 Talent
Acquisition and Onboard Centers, and 26 Navy talent acquisition
teams. I understand that this is fully operational now, in
2021, when your start date and your target date had been 2023.
So it is wonderful to see transformative change being
implemented and ahead of schedule, and the men and women that
have worked on that really deserve a lot of talent. So talk a
little bit about how this transformational model with basically
the three-person team, with the recruiter or the scout, the
assessor, and the onboarder, how that is working and how you
have implemented that.
Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, thanks for recognizing our teammates
out at Millington. Really a terrific group of innovators out
there.
I would say two things up front that allow us to take a
look at how we reimagine recruiting. One was the pandemic. We
were challenged with respect to face-to-face contact, and so we
began to rely on the digital that much more. We already had an
idea of how we were going to do this in terms of, as you
described, transforming the organization. Based on funding from
Congress, we were able to accelerate that by 3 years. We could
not have done that without the help of this Committee and
others. That is, I think, a real model for when Congress
believes that we are on the right track here and they allow us
to fund it, that we can make fundamental changes.
Under this new system, we have recruited 54,000 new sailors
into the Navy. We have met and exceeded our goals, even during
the pandemic. So it is relying on small teams that work
together very closely and also are leveraging social media and
the digital, as well as teams that compete out there where the
potential recruitable population hangs out, which is on the
gaming sites.
Senator Blackburn. All right. I want you to drill down a
little bit on two things. Number one is how this is helping you
get the skilled talent you need for 21st century warfare, and
second, how you have used bots and data to help target and to
be effective.
Admiral Gilday. So the data has allowed us to understand
where the recruitable population resides, not physically but
virtually, in cyberspace. When you think about the gaming
community, which is pretty big--I have sons that are in
college, and it is millions of young people that play these
games online. We have created Navy teams that are out there
playing and can answer people's questions when they have one.
We found, in particular, with respect to those that are
interested in the cyber field of study that I have to rely less
on them being a college graduate than the fact that they are a
good gamer or a good hacker, and just are interested in how
they can apply their skills in a place like the Navy, where
they can do some pretty exciting things, if they have the right
authorities to do so, and that is classified, but that gets
into a higher classification.
But we have been able to attract, as you mentioned, ma'am,
some really sophisticated and dedicated patriots into the Navy.
Senator Blackburn. I would assume utilizing that type,
artificial intelligence, you will be able to apply that to
things such as promotion boards, to eliminate bias and to----
Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am. That is good goal. I would just
say that I think it will take us some time to get there before
machines can make those kinds of, in some cases, subjective
judgment calls, whether it is on the battlefield or whether it
in a promotion board. But I certainly think that is in our
future, and that is the path that we are on.
Senator Blackburn. I appreciate that, and I commend you and
the team at Millington for the way forward on this.
General Berger, I am going to submit questions for you
dealing with China. Secretary Harker, I also have some
questions pertaining to China, and I will submit those for the
record.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blackburn. Senator Rosen,
please.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed and Ranking Member
Inhofe, for holding this hearing, and thank you so much for
your service and for being here today.
Of course, in Nevada we have our wonderful Fallon Naval Air
Station, and we are proud to host it. It is home to Top Gun,
our Nation's premier carrier air wing. It is home to the Navy
SEAL Training Center.
So last year the Navy requested an expansion of over
600,000 acres of Federal land and over 65,000 acres of non-
Federal land, which would expand Fallon Training Complex to
about 900,000 acres. Federal land managers currently allow
access to the public for much of the proposed expansion area
for grazing, for hunting, for mineral exploration, and
geothermal development, and the Navy's proposal would curtail
many of these activities, in addition to restricting Tribal
access to some of their most important cultural sites.
The fiscal year 2021 NDAA included a provision that Senator
Cortez Masto and I offered that mandates the creation of an
Intergovernmental Executive Committee, or IEC, to allow local,
state, and Tribal governments a public forum to collaborate
with the Navy to provide advice and exchange information. In
doing so, we hope we can support the Navy's modernization
requirements and keep up with all, of course, our current
emerging threats, technologies, while maintaining Nevada's
natural resources and cultural resources.
But the Navy sent over a legislative proposal to this
Committee almost identical to last year, unfortunately, and it
did not incorporate any of the suggested changes or feedback
from our local stakeholders. So, Admiral, I am really pleased
that you did your IEC right away, but why hasn't the Navy's
proposal been modified to incorporate some of these?
Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, I think for the very reasons that
you mentioned with respect to there are a number of
stakeholders involved here. As you know, we have had over 300
engagements with the Native American Tribes to try and work
through some of those difficulties. There are other
difficulties that may or may not coincide with the Tribes that
involve the county. There is also the state. There is also the
Department of the Interior.
So the IEC, we have had two meetings so far. The Walker
Paiute Tribe is a vice chair, as well as the County Commission
is also the vice chair. I think the way forward here that I am
optimistic about is we are now getting all the stakeholders in
the same room together, so that we can work through all of
these issues in a way that allows us, we hope, in the end, to
modernize the range. We have not done so since the mid 1980s.
We are two generations behind with respect to aircraft. We are
facing a problem now where if we do not modernize this range,
the first time F-35's will be able to employ their full
capability will be in combat.
We are building wind farms off the California coast that,
again, cut into our training range. We are running out of space
to train, but we are using, you know, for some years now,
precision weapons, GPS-guided weapons, with longer ranges, with
sophisticated aircraft, and we cannot train our pilots and our
air crews to their full capability.
So I, again, am very enthused, ma'am, by the IEC. A meeting
here next Monday, is the next one, tracking it very closely,
and, of course, I very much appreciate your support as we work
through this.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you. I look forward to working
on that with you and all the allies and partners. I want to
just quickly talk about the Fallon's B-19 range, because in
1959 the Navy did drop live, inert ordnance right outside of
there, speaking of the Walker River Paiute Tribe, and that is
nearly 6,000 of their acres where you dropped this ordnance,
and so it contaminated all of that.
Will you commit to working with me and the Nevada
delegation on ensuring that the Tribe is very fairly
compensated for this contamination?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am. You have my commitment.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I will submit this for the
record, but Senator Blackburn and I, she talked about the
skilled workforce. We actually have a bill called the Cyber
Security Reserve Act, to establish a civilian cyber reserve
corps, modeled after a recommendation from the National
Commission on Military, National, and Public Service report,
that will help in surge capacity and training, giving people
onramps to serve their government, like the other Reserve corps
do, and I look forward to talking with you about that in
another time. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator Kelly,
please.
Senator Kelly. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr.
Secretary, Admiral, General, thank you for joining us this
morning.
This past weekend I visited the U.S. Merchant Marine
Academy, a school that gave me the foundation to succeed in the
Navy and then later at NASA [National Aeronautics and Space
Administration] as an astronaut. While the Merchant Marine is
overseen by other committees, I want to acknowledge the
important contribution it makes to our total sealift
capability. This is critical, and in order to sustain our
forces we need to ensure robust and reliable sealift capacity.
Competition with China is increasing, and projecting power to
the Western Pacific (WESTPAC) places a demand on our sealift
capability that simply was not a factor in the Middle East.
Our witnesses mentioned earlier, and all of you indicated
in written testimony for this hearing, your concern about
threats to our supply chains and global sustainment networks.
General Berger, can you expand on any concerns you may have
about our sealift capability today and what more does the U.S.
need to do to ensure that we have a ready force of sufficient
capability?
General Berger. Like a lot of other people wearing a
uniform, the first time I got familiar with sealift capability
was 1991 in Saudi Arabia. Sailed them into Al Jubail port,
offloaded ships for probably 2, 2 1/2 weeks. That is where we
got our equipment from, and we flew from Contiguous United
States (CONUS) and linked up with our equipment there. That was
my first exposure to sealift. But that was assured. Sailing
those ships in and out of there, they were protected, they were
secured. Nobody was threatening those lines at all.
A very different picture, as you point out, from the Indo-
Pacific, where the Chinese Navy is stretching out, it is
gaining a marine and a naval force projection capability that
they have not had. They want to control the same straits that
we need to keep open. Sealift now becomes a major concern. In
other words, a handful of large ships with a lot of gear on
them now becomes vulnerable. We need to disperse that.
So I think military sealift, going forward, is not the same
variant as 1991, where there are three or four ships, or five
in a squadron, and they are loaded to the gills with equipment,
and you can sail into a secure port and offload it on your
timeline. That is not going to be the case.
Senator Kelly. Well, thank you. Admiral or Secretary
Harker, any additional comments on our sealift capability?
Mr. Harker. We definitely need to recapitalize our sealift
capability. We are working to do so, and it is something that
we believe strongly in investing in new ships, because that
gives us the biggest bang for our buck.
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. If I could just mention
something, or expound on something that General Berger
mentioned. I think that as the Department looks at this new
Joint Warfighting Concept and as we think about how we are
going to fight differently in the future, I think this is
exactly what the Commandant was getting to with respect to one
area would be sealift, in terms of the capacity that we need,
based on the way we are going to fight.
What the Navy is doing right now, we know that we are
behind on recapitalizing sealift, but Congress has given us
authorities to buy used sealift. So we have done the market
analysis and we are currently purchasing five additional ships,
nine total, about a tenth of the cost to build a new ship. So
we do some minor modifications in a U.S. shipyard that gives us
a Roll On/Roll Off (RO/RO) capability as an example.
Secondly, what we are doing in this budget, particularly,
we have got 16 additional life-extension plans for existing
sealift. We are not satisfied with where we are right now, sir,
but I think we are headed in the right direction with regard to
recapitalization and repair.
Senator Kelly. As you get those new ships, do you feel like
you can find the officers and crew to man them?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. One of the national treasures we
have is our Merchant Marine force, and they have been great.
Senator Kelly. Well, thank you, and I am willing to work
with you going forward on any further ideas on how we
strengthen that capability. It is critical to maintain these
supply lines. General, as you pointed out, it is much different
than what we dealt with in 1991, in the first Gulf War.
Thank you, and Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly.
Mr. Secretary, Admiral, General, thank you for your
testimony today and thank you for your service to the Nation
over many years, and please relay our thanks to the men and
women of the Navy and Marine Corps and their families.
With that I will adjourn the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 11:56 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
shipbuilding defense industrial base
1. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Harker, what policy initiatives or
funding investments are being implemented within the shipbuilding
defense industry to help stabilize the future of the industrial base
and to counter increased costs and other risks due to defense industry
gaps?
Secretary Harker. In an effort to create, maintain, protect and
restore the defense industrial base, the Navy is focused on investments
and efforts that safeguard, synchronize, and expand domestic
shipbuilding and ship sustainment supply chains. The shipbuilding
supply base faces an unprecedented set of challenges: resiliency
throughout a global pandemic; the decline of critical markets and
suppliers; aggressive industrial postures of peer and near-peer
competitor nations; and the loss of vital skills in the domestic
workforce. The overlap of external, macro-level pressures, and the net
effect of these factors, create the need and urgency to leverage
policy, authorities, and investments in the interest of national
defense.
Congressionally added supplier development funding, Defense
Production Act projects, and CARES Act investments have been critical
levers and authorities to expand product lines and capacity to de-risk
single sources in vulnerable and volatile shipbuilding market spaces.
Beginning in fiscal year 2011, these funding streams have injected
hundreds of millions of dollars into strategic supplier efforts to: (1)
maximize productive capacity of single/sole sources, and (2) develop
additional sources of supply to mitigate risk to the Navy enterprise.
Separately, over the last 18 months and throughout the pandemic, CARES
Act investments were targeted towards two focus areas: (1) ensuring the
continued viability of key, cross-platform vendors with the greatest
impact to the greatest number of Navy programs, and (2) sustaining
critical capability and capacity (both at the shipbuilder and heavy
machining and fabrication levels) to support the 30-Year Shipbuilding
Plan and Future Naval Force Structure goals.
In addition to infrastructure improvements, the Navy is focused on
building resilient, sustainable workforce pipelines that match the
investments being made into capability and capacity. In partnership
with OUSD/Acquisition and Sustainment, Industrial Base Analysis and
Sustainment office, there are several ongoing initiatives targeted at
long-term stability and predictability between Navy demand signal and
workforce/trades, particularly for critical skillsets in welding,
pipefitting, and specialized machining.
The Navy is taking a more forward-looking approach to maintenance
and modernization to provide stability to the industrial base,
including contracting strategies that align workload with industrial
base capacity. The Navy has been grouping ship maintenance and
modernization contracts to provide long-term predictability,
incentivize industry growth, and facilitate learning.
The Navy is also into its third year of the Shipyard Infrastructure
Optimization Program (SIOP). Fully executed, SIOP will provide much
needed recapitalization of CVN and SSN dry docks, new waterfront
production facilities, improved facility layout, modernized machinery
and support infrastructure that increase productivity and safety at the
four public shipyards. These improvements will help ensure the
efficient, timely and cost effective execution of scheduled maintenance
availabilities.
virginia-class submarine industrial base
2. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Harker, your testimony asserted that
the Virginia-class fast-attack submarines have parts that are failing
much sooner than expected. How is the Navy proactively identifying the
quantity of ``life-of-the-submarine'' parts that require replacement
and developing a sourcing strategy for the industrial base to prepare
for this new demand signal?
Secretary Harker. The Virginia-class submarine is still
comparatively a quite young class. The lead ship of the Virginia-class
submarines is still in its second major maintenance availability. As
the major availabilities have been completed some components identified
to last the life of the ship based on engineering analysis and testing
were subject to degradation modes (e.g. complex galvanic interactions)
that had not been predicted. The information collected on actual
material condition during major maintenance availabilities is being fed
back to the material modeling process and commercial suppliers to
improve the modeling/reliability and those lessons are being
incorporated into the next block procurement. This enables us to move
from reactive to proactive replacement and improve material
availability and sparing. Each availability provides an opportunity to
refine, adjust and improve our ability to accurately forecast the
required materials for maintenance availabilities.
3. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Harker, what is being done to
efficiently identify the source of this unexpected degradation to parts
that are not lasting for the lifetime of the submarine as expected?
Secretary Harker. The Navy is still learning about the long-term
reliability Virginia-class components. In fact, USS Virginia (SSN 774)
is just now completing its second major maintenance availability which
allows for additional information on component reliability.
Maintenance availabilities have identified that some components
intended to last the life of the ship, based on engineering analysis
and testing, were subject to degradation modes (e.g. complex galvanic
interactions) that were not predicted. This was due to more severe
temperature and moisture conditions than expected and operationally
evolving environments which did not extend similarly from commercial
applications for certain commercial off-the-shelf systems. The
information collected on actual material condition during major
maintenance availabilities is being incorporated into the material
modeling process and provided to commercial suppliers to improve future
reliability, and those lessons are being incorporated into the next
block procurement and parts planning processes.
4. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Harker, what impact will the
manufacturing limitations to replace and stock these parts, have on
upcoming Virginia-class maintenance schedules and the submarine fleet's
ability to execute operations and respond to national tasking?
Secretary Harker. [Deleted.]
5. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Harker, what steps are being taken to
make reliability improvements on the identified degraded parts for
later blocks of the Virginia-class submarine?
Secretary Harker. An organizational structure and team has been
established to focus on in-service submarine reliability issues and
solutions. The Navy's Reliability, Availability, Maintainability (RAM)
-Integrated Product Team (IPT) is analyzing the reliability of over 70
systems and individual parts using data-driven models and tools. The
RAM IPT has investigated root causes and began implementing solutions
such as; improved fleet training, more robust component designs, better
troubleshooting procedures, maintenance plan improvements, and improved
onboard component stocking and design. These improvements are planned
to be incorporated into Columbia-class and future Virginia-class Block
V/VI contracts. Additionally, the Navy's Reliability Control Board
facilitates prioritization of reliability issues based upon feedback
from the Fleet. The RAM IPT and RCB initiatives have resulted in
redesigns to improve reliability with solutions already fielded in the
fleet:
Impressed Current Cathodic Protection Non-pressure Hull
Penetrators--Installation process difficult/susceptible to damage.
Redesigned to simplify installation/improved reliability.
CO2 Scrubber Compressor--Reliability lower than predicted
due to unexpected operating environment. Redesigned compressor to
improve reliability.
Turbine Generator Magnetic Bearing--Earlier than
anticipated failures. Several redesigned components to mitigate root
cause of bearing failure.
Vertical Launch System Outboard Cables--Early failures
observed on Block I/II. Cable connector redesigned to address observed
failure modes.
Capstan Outboard Cables--Corroded connectors resulted in
failures earlier than expected. Redesigned cable and minimized
connectors to improve reliability.
Outboard Cable Failures--Cables and connectors failed due
to corrosion. Redesigned connectors to include coatings resulting in
better reliability and resistance to flooding.
small business and innovation research program (sbir)
6. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Harker, the SBIR program is a
competitive acquisition process that provides the Department with vast
authority to transition innovative technologies. Can you share how the
Department of the Navy is using the SBIR program to advance
modernization priorities across all warfare domains?
Secretary Harker. The Department of the Navy (DON) recognizes the
cutting edge work that is conducted by our small business partners and
continues to view small businesses as vital to meeting the needs of
Sailors and Marines, both today and in the future. Modernization is a
long-standing priority of the DON Small Business Innovation Research
(SBIR)/Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs. Advancing
modernization priorities through these programs starts with a topic
that represents the needs of the Fleet and Force, for which innovative
solutions are sought from domestic start-ups and small businesses. The
DON SBIR/STTR topic development process ensures alignment of all topics
with the National Defense Strategy (NDS), including modernization
priorities, and captures input from seven DON Systems Commands
representing needs across all warfare domains.
Since fiscal year 2020 the DON SBIR/STTR programs have tracked
modernization as a category entitled ``Modernize Key Capabilities'' to
identify NDS alignment. Currently, 134 topics are categorized as
modernization priorities (40 percent of all topics since fiscal year
2020), from which the Program has awarded 406 Phase I contracts valued
at over $60 million to small businesses to prove the feasibility of
their innovative modernization solutions. To date, 52 of these Phase I
awardees successfully have competed for and received Phase II contract
awards to continue the development and testing of prototype technology.
The value of these Phase II contracts is $21 million and growing.
Prior to fiscal year 2020, at least 78 topics had a direct impact
on advancing modernization priorities, with the oldest topic dating
back to fiscal year 2083. Collectively, these topics resulted in 182
Phase I awards valued at $19 million and 101 Phase II awards valued at
$117 million. At the completion of Phase II, DON Program Executive
Offices, labs, and Warfare Centers used Phase III authority to
successfully commercialize 16 of these projects to advance
modernization priorities. Phase III non-SBIR/STTR funding for these
projects exceeds $222 million.
DON SBIR/STTR topic N05-149 is an example of how these programs
have succeeded in advancing DON's modernization efforts. The objective
of the topic was to use artificial intelligence (AI) to provide an
operator with solutions to reduce manning. Specifically, the topic
requested innovative solutions applicable to the evaluation of data
sets used to process decision-making in the Ocean Battlespace
Environment (e.g., littoral waters). This topic desired: exploration of
using AI within the decision-making process; development of algorithms
based on structural and human behavioral models, and heuristic
inference rule sets, as well as numerical algorithms; evaluation of
data sets used to process a decision; and incorporation of AI within
the surface and subsurface tactical and operational decision process.
Three small businesses received Phase I awards valued at a total of
$299,000 and, at the end of Phase I, all three small businesses
received Phase II awards valued at a total of $9.2 million. These same
three small firms have received multiple Phase III contract awards
totaling more than $49.2 million.
The DON SBIR/STTR programs have five objectives to deliver
capability to our acquisition programs and the Fleet and Force. These
objectives are: (1) stimulate technological innovation; (2) meet
federal research & development (R&D) needs; (3) foster and encourage
participation in innovation and entrepreneurship by women and socially
or economically disadvantaged persons; (4) increase private sector
commercialization of innovations derived from federal R&D funding; (5)
and foster technology transfer through cooperative R&D between small
businesses and research institutions. The DON SBIR/STTR programs are
critical to meeting these objectives and advancing modernization
priorities across all warfare domains.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
shipyard modernization
7. Senator Hirono. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, while I've
been supportive of the Navy's Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan
(SIOP), I'm concerned about the timeline, cost overruns, and the
capability, even with these upgrades, of maintaining a future larger
fleet. I'd like to get you both on the record that construction of the
new drydock at Pearl Harbor will begin in fiscal year 2023.
Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday. The Navy has prioritized the
construction requirement for Dry Dock 3 at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard
and Intermediate Maintenance Facility (P-209). In support of a contract
award, the Navy must complete environmental impact studies and planning
and design efforts. Construction is planned to be completed to support
the submarine class maintenance plan.
8. Senator Hirono. Admiral Gilday, I'm concerned that even after
the upgrades to the four public shipyards, we're going to barely meet
maintenance demands for the current fleet of 296 ships, let alone a
future larger fleet of potentially 355 ships or more. How is the Navy
planning to meet the demands of a larger fleet in the future?
Admiral Gilday. The shipyard maintenance enterprise is transforming
how the shipyards do business to create more production capacity and
improve productivity to deliver submarines and aircraft carriers out of
maintenance availabilities on-time. Naval Sustainment Systems--
Shipyards (NSS-SY) is an all-shipyards, all-hands effort that deploys
industry and government best practices across the four public shipyards
to eliminate variability, increase throughput and improve production
efficiencies. NSS-SY seeks to identify methods for rapid development in
these areas, test these methods and, if successful, share these methods
across all four shipyards.
NSS-SY is challenging Navy leadership at the highest levels to
identify and collaborate on solutions to Navy-wide problems that have
the greatest impacts on the shipyards. Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEA) created the NAVSEA Transformation Office (NTO), led by the
Commander, NAVSEA, to oversee the NSS-SY effort using nine pillars for
success--planning, engineering, material, waterfront operations,
shipyard resourcing, shipyard infrastructure, inside shop, fleet
operations, and information technology. Each pillar has a flag officer
or SES leading the efforts. Pillar leads are focused on executing those
changes that, ultimately, allow our mechanics at the waterfront and on
the shop floor to do their job with maximum efficiency and minimal
interruption..
The Navy is also into its third year of the Shipyard Infrastructure
Optimization Program (SIOP). Fully executed, SIOP will deliver required
dry dock repairs and upgrades to support both current and future
classes of ships, optimize workflow within the shipyards through
significant changes to their physical layout, and recapitalize obsolete
capital equipment with modern machines that will increase productivity
and safety. The program is currently working a comprehensive plan on
the feasibility and ability to accelerate SIOP implementation.
Combined, SIOP and NSS-SY will fundamentally shift how the Navy
plans and executes major submarine and aircraft carrier maintenance
availabilities to dramatically improve their on-time delivery to the
Fleet today and into the future.
amphibious warship acquisition and availability
9. Senator Hirono. Secretary Harker, last year the Navy received
Congressional authority to make a block buy of four amphibious ships
that would save the taxpayers $750 million dollars, but this year's
budget doesn't execute that authority. These ships provide a
competitive advantage, particularly in the Pacific, and I am concerned
about amphibious ship availability, especially given the loss to fire
last summer of the USS Bonhomme Richard. Why is the Navy not taking
advantage of the cost savings efforts Congress provided it in last
year's National Defense Authorization Act?
Secretary Harker. The Department of Defense supports smart
acquisition strategies and is committed to achieving best value
possible. Traditional amphibious ship requirements are undergoing
analysis to ensure a balance between operational requirements and
fiscal constraints. The Department is reviewing the plan for the
procurement of LPDs and LHAs closely and will pursue a responsible plan
for the timely procurement of these platforms.
10. Senator Hirono. General Berger, how does the burning of the USS
Bonhomme Richard and the decision to not execute the block buy impact
the Marine Corps' ability to deter Chinese aggression in the Indo-
Pacific?
General Berger. USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) was decommissioned in
April 2021, after 22 years of service, due to a fire which occurred on
12 July 2020. The unplanned decommissioning of LHD 6 resulted in the
loss of a Joint Strike Fighter capable Amphibious Assault Ship as the
cornerstone of the Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit
(ARG/MEU). The loss pressured other LHD/ LHA ships to meet Global Force
Management deployments and affected maintenance and modernization
schedules.
Short-term impacts to ARG/MEU generation are mitigated by
accelerating the USS Tripoli (LHA 7) Post Delivery Test and Trials
period to prepare, and certify, the ship for deployment in fiscal year
2022.
Long-term impacts to the LHD/LHA inventory cannot be mitigated
without future procurement of additional ships. LHA 9 is estimated to
start construction in fiscal year 2023. When the Department is certain
it will procure specific vessels on a particular timeframe, block-buy
contracts can be a valuable tool to reduce costs and delivery delays
and support the industrial base with a clear demand signal. However,
the Department is still reviewing amphibious ship requirements, and
committing to a block-buy is premature at this time until inventory
objectives are established. The Marine Corps appreciates your support
for these ships in future budget requests.
11. Senator Hirono. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, has the
investigation into the burning of the USS Bonhomme Richard completed
and if so, what are the results?
Secretary Harker. and Admiral Gilday. The investigation remains
open. All substantive investigative activity is complete. The
investigation is pending an Article 32 hearing. The convening authority
is Commander 3rd Fleet.
12. Senator Hirono. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, how does
the Navy intend to replace the gap in amphibious ship availability that
was created by the burning of the USS Bonhomme Richard?
Secretary Harker. and Admiral Gilday. The decommissioning of USS
Bonhomme Richard resulted in the loss of her fiscal year 2022
deployment and fiscal year 2023 sustainment/surge availability period.
Prior to the fire, the Navy was tasked to maintain the prescribed
Amphibious Readiness Group Immediate Response Force as outlined by the
Secretary of Defense (SecDef). To maintain that posture, the following
actions have been taken:
USS Tripoli (LHA 7) schedule was accelerated to take the
place of USS Bonhomme Richard.
USS Makin Island (LHD 8) schedule accelerated to mitigate
the USS Tripoli schedule change, resulting in a de-scoped maintenance
period to meet the new timeline.
USS Essex (LHD 2) fiscal year 2021 deployment was delayed
in order to better align with rotational requirements.
The Navy's planned mitigations meet all requirements as outlined by
the SecDef. Additionally, we continue to support the LHA program. In
addition to USS Tripoli's delivery to the fleet in fiscal year 2020,
USS Bougainville (LHA 8) is under construction and scheduled to deliver
in fiscal year 2025.
virginia-class attack submarine procurement issues
13. Senator Hirono. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, the
private shipyards are currently running 12-18 months behind delivery
dates for the Block IV Virginia-class attack submarines. It appears
this has led to increasing the cost estimates for Block IV boats yet to
be delivered, cost and schedule increases for all of the future larger
Block V boats, and potentially cost increases for the boats in the
Columbia strategic missile program. What is wrong with the attack
submarine production programs?
Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday. Submarine industrial base
performance remains challenged in achieving steady state delivery of
two boats per year. Improving this performance is essential for
Virginia-class (VCS) Block IV schedule recovery, VCS Block V
foundational success, and concurrent Columbia-class construction. The
Navy continues to closely monitor labor hours and schedule performance
and is working to address the negative impact of COVID-19 on supply
base performance, production schedules, and planned staffing growth.
14. Senator Hirono. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, what are
the private shipyards proposing to solve the problems?
Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday. The Navy has completed a
detailed assessment of the integrated VCS and Columbia-class schedules
to ensure an achievable plan supporting Columbia as the #1 Navy
acquisition priority. We are working with the private shipyards to make
improvements in on-time and quality material delivery, and are taking
steps to address production cadence and cost performance, such as
shifting work between shipyards to better manage labor and footprint
constraints, and increasing the quantity of strategically outsourced
components and hours to the supplier base, allowing the shipbuilders to
focus more on their core work. The Department is also updating and
enhancing detailed VCS production schedules with an Enterprise
perspective to ensure integration yard-wide with construction and
maintenance activities, facility usage, and strategic outsourcing to
avoid resource conflicts.
15. Senator Hirono. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, what steps
is the Navy planning to take to get the cost overruns and schedule
delays back under control?
Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday. The Navy has completed a
detailed assessment of the integrated VCS and Columbia-class schedules
and is working to ensure an achievable plan to deliver to a schedule
and cadence of two VCS per year in accordance with Congressional
authorizations and appropriations. By taking steps to improve the
governance structure and align the Enterprise Business Strategy on key
issues and assumptions, the Department will ensure that starting
construction on the next VCS will not adversely impact Columbia. The
Navy has implemented Construction Readiness Reviews , quarterly cost
and schedule reviews, and monthly executive leadership reviews to
ensure alignment between programs and quickly address challenges.
issues with spare parts availability for the virginia-class attack
submarine
16. Senator Hirono. Admiral Gilday, according to recent news
reports, the Navy has swapped out over 1,600 parts among its Virginia-
class attack subs since 2013 to avoid maintenance bottlenecks as
components that were supposed to last for decades wear out sooner than
anticipated--adding extra workload to an already stressed system and
additional risk that the parts could be damaged during the extra steps.
I'm concerned the Navy is not investing enough in maintenance, supply
chains, and shipyard infrastructure--what can you tell me about the
efforts to mitigate the shortage in spare parts for the Virginia-class
subs?
Admiral Gilday. Beginning in 2017, to mitigate the shortage in
spare parts for the Virginia-class, the Navy implemented a new process
that leverages all adjacent business processes in order to produce a
robust and highly credible material forecast for Virginia-class
submarine depot level maintenance. The improved material analytics and
forecasting will improve overall material requirements identification,
ordering, and parts availability.
Additionally, the Navy's various stakeholders including Naval Sea
Systems Command (NAVSEA), Naval Supply Systems Command Weapons Systems
Support (NAVSUP WSS), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), In Service
Engineering Agents (ISEAs), and Technical Authorities are working
together through root cause analysis to identify potential short and
long term issues and corrective actions for cannibalizations (swapping
parts between hulls) to improve submarine fleet support and operational
availability. One long term solution set is for cannibalizations to be
included in the material forecasting process for submarine
availabilities. Additionally, NAVSEA and stakeholders are submitting
candidates for potential provisioning adjustments, based on the current
demand and stakeholder determined essentiality/criticality of each
item.
17. Senator Hirono. Admiral Gilday, has the Navy conducted a root
cause analysis to determine why many of these components are wearing
out sooner than anticipated?
Admiral Gilday. Yes. As a result of the Navy's root cause analysis,
an organizational structure and team has been put in place to focus on
in-service submarine reliability issues and solutions. The Navy's
Reliability, Availability, Maintainability (RAM) Integrated Product
Team (IPT) is analyzing the reliability of over 70 systems and
individual parts using data-driven models and tools. The RAM IPT has
investigated root causes and identified solutions such as: improved
fleet training, more robust component designs, better troubleshooting
procedures, maintenance plan improvements, and improved onboard
component stocking and design improvements, which are planned for
incorporation into Columbia-class and the next block of Virginia-class
submarines. Additionally, the Navy's Reliability Control Board
facilitates prioritization of reliability issues based upon feedback
from the Fleet.
issues with submarine maintenance at private shipyards
18. Senator Hirono. Admiral Gilday, the Navy has turned to private
shipyards in recent years to assist with ongoing maintenance delays for
our attack submarines which are usually serviced at our four public
shipyards. Can you give me a progress update on the expected completion
of the maintenance availabilities for several of the Los Angeles-class
boats currently at Newport News Shipbuilding (USS Helena, USS Columbus,
and USS Boise)?
Admiral Gilday. The following is the status of current private yard
submarine maintenance schedules:
USS Helena's (SSN 725) Dry-Docking Selected Restricted
Availability is underway and projected to complete in October 2021 with
a total duration of approximately 48 months.
USS Columbus (SSN 762) is undergoing an Engineered
Overhaul (EOH) and after rebaselining the availability we expect
deliver in September 2021; which has exceed its previously planned
duration of 60 months.
USS Boise (SSN 764) began a ``smart start'' for its EOH
in May 2020, ahead of its planned fiscal year 2022 official start. The
availability duration and end date is subject to negotiation as part of
the contract award.
19. Senator Hirono. Admiral Gilday, why is the maintenance backlog
occurring at Newport News Shipbuilding?
Admiral Gilday. Both nuclear-qualified private shipyards have
experienced challenges in re-building their repair capabilities.
HII-NNS is currently coming through its efforts to re-instate the
requisite processes, policies, procedures, and skills required to
properly execute complex submarines maintenance availabilities.
Shortfalls in SUBSAFE maintenance processes, policies, procedures, and
skills at HII-NNS contributed to the Helena and Columbus delays and
have directly impacted all availabilities in planning and execution.
20. Senator Hirono. Admiral Gilday, what steps is the Navy taking
to ensure in the future these delays at private shipyard submarine
availabilities are eliminated?
Admiral Gilday. Background: Between fiscal years 2015-2018, NAVSEA
awarded four submarine maintenance availability contracts to the two
nuclear qualified Private Shipyards, including one Interim Dry Docking
(USS Montpelier (SSN 765)), one Docking Selected Restricted
Availability (USS Helena (SSN 725)), and two Engineered Overhauls (USS
Columbus (SSN 762) and USS Boise (SSN 764)). These contracts were
structured primarily as Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) Level of Effort
(LOE) with a Firm Fixed Price (FFP) contract line item number (CLIN)
for execution services in support of the CPFF CLINs. The Navy based its
use of FFP CLINs for execution services on the reasonable definite
nature of the execution service requirements, under which the
contracting officer could establish a fair and reasonable price at the
outset. Issues arose during performance under this contract structure
largely related to uncertainty as to the vessels' conditions at the
time of contract award. This led to increased costs and duration, and
revealed separate understandings of the FFP scope and its relation to
the CPFF LOE scope. To better align the contracts to the Navy's
schedule and quality objectives, the Navy and contractor agreed to
restructure the FFP CLINs to CPFF LOE CLINs and link the contractor's
fee/profit objectives to incentives that require engineering, material,
and production value stream improvements and schedule adherence on the
USS Helena and USS Columbus availabilities. To achieve these same
objectives, the Navy and contractor agreed to utilize a Cost Plus
Incentive Fee (CPIF) completion contract with incentives on USS Boise
execution work.
Way Ahead: The Navy is taking a new approach to submarine
maintenance availability contracts based on lessons learned from recent
submarine availabilities and incorporating best practices from the
Aircraft Carrier Refueling Complex Overhauls (RCOHs) accomplished by
the Private Shipyards, including the following.
Eliminating FFP CLINs from submarine maintenance
availability contracts;
Splitting planning phase (CPFF LOE) from execution phase
(CPIF Completion);
Managing LOE tasking strictly with Technical
Instructions;
Awarding longer planning durations (20 months);
Invoking proven Public Shipyard processes into Private
Shipyard planning contracts to improve contractor performance (e.g.
Resource Loaded Integrated Master Schedule, Task Group Instruction
(TGI) development, Integrated Project Team Development (IPTD)
curricula, and performance metrics)
Invoking and incentivizing Cost Data Sheet (CDS) mutual
agreement process to align contractor schedules and proposals with
government/contractor mutually agreed to scope of work;
Conducting planning product reviews by the Navy;
Positioning retired Public Shipyard Subject Matter
Experts on-site; and
Instituting EVMS within the execution contract.
The USS Hartford (SSN 768) EOH is the first availability to start
on this new path. The Navy awarded the planning contract in August
2020. The Navy will not realize the benefits of this new approach fully
until the availabilities incorporating this new approach are completed.
21. Senator Hirono. Admiral Gilday, my understanding is Newport
News Shipbuilding has told the Navy that attempting to prepare for or
to be servicing three submarines at once is too many to handle at any
given time. Is that accurate?
Admiral Gilday. The Navy, while unaware of any specific statements
Newport News Shipbuilding may have made regarding their submarine fleet
in-service repair capacity, agrees with that assessment.
22. Senator Hirono. Admiral Gilday, a March 2021 Congressional
Budget Office Report stated required maintenance for submarines is
projected to exceed the capacity of the Navy's shipyards in 25 of the
next 30 years. Beyond the SIOP, which is focused on the Navy's public
shipyards, what steps is the Navy taking to increase submarine repair
capacity/efficiency at private shipyards?
Admiral Gilday. Navy continues to help our private industry
partners improve their processes, policies, procedures and skills for
the on-going and upcoming availabilities--USS Helena (SSN 725) Docking
Selected Restricted Availability, USS Columbus (SSN 762) Engineered
Overhaul (EOH), USS Boise (SSN 764) EOH, and USS Hartford (SSN 768)
EOH.
In addition to placing submarine maintenance subject matter experts
on site at both HII-NNS and GDEB, Navy has converted the Columbus EOH
to a CPFF/LOE with special incentives, awarded the Hartford smart start
contract, and continues to develop both the Boise and Hartford EOH CPIF
contracts, both expected to be awarded in fiscal year 2022.
These efforts align private industry and Navy's desired outcomes
while incentivizing high quality and on time completion of our valuable
Fleet assets.
acquisition of light amphibious warships (laws)
23. Senator Hirono. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, I know the
Navy and Marine Corps are planning to procure approximately 30 vessels
of a new class, the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW), to support
Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations to deter Chinese aggression in
the Indo-Pacific. What will be your acquisition strategy for acquiring
the Light Amphibious Warship?
Admiral Gilday. The Navy has aggressively developed requirements
and has an approved Acquisition Strategy / Acquisition Plan in support
of a 2023 procurement and a 2026 delivery of the first Light Amphibious
Warship (LAW). The LAW Acquisition Plan is to award two contracts, one
for Concept Studies/ Preliminary Design (CS/PD) followed by a Detailed
Design and Construction (DD&C) contract for the lead ship. The Navy
awarded the CS/PD contract in June 2021. The DD&C contract will be a
full and open competition with the Request for Proposal scheduled for
release in 2nd quarter of fiscal year 2022 and an expected award in
early fiscal year 2023. The first contract will include the lead ship
with options for up to eight follow ships. The strategy procurement of
the remaining ships of the class is still being evaluated by the Navy.
General Berger. The Navy is conducting an Analysis of Alternatives
and will commence with Concept Studies and Preliminary Design to
evaluate a new medium intra-theater amphibious ship. Studies will
primarily focus on commercial designs tailored for military application
to enable maneuver and mobility for our integrated naval forces
conducting Distributed Maritime Operations. The Department is driving
towards a lead ship contract award in fiscal year 2023 that will
support the Marine Corps' future Marine Littoral Regiments in the Indo-
Pacific region. The Light Amphibious Warship is complementary to
traditional large amphibious ships; both types of ships are required to
deliver Marine Corps forces to expeditionary locations.
The current requirement, after a deliberate analysis process, is 35
LAWs and would support three future Marine Littoral Regiments. Within
the constraints of the current fiscal reality, we will work together
with the Navy to prioritize the acquisition strategy to provide the
Naval Expeditionary Force with the best value in platform capability
and capacity.
24. Senator Hirono. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, will you be
following a methodical approach, paying adequate attention to good
systems engineering principles to ensure the propulsion plant and
electrical generators are reliable before construction to avoid some of
the pitfalls of previous classes of ships like the LCS?
Admiral Gilday. The LAW design will adhere to best practices and
systems engineering principles and will follow all of the rigorous
Naval Sea Systems Command Design Review processes. The vessel design,
based on existing parent designs, will leverage mature commercial
technologies with proven reliability. To validate equipment reliability
prior to construction, the program plans to leverage efforts regarding
propulsion plant and electrical generation system component reliability
from other programs such as the Medium/Large Unmanned Surface Vessel
(USV) programs. To that end, the Navy has already initiated a study to
identify opportunities for LAW to exploit on-going efforts for a Land
Base Test Site (LBTS) for the Medium/Large USV programs. Additionally,
LAW system specifications will be written to drive the vessel design
towards simple but effective systems that minimize required maintenance
and are designed for ease of maintainability.
General Berger. Yes, sound systems engineering principles and a
methodical approach will be used for the acquisition of Light
Amphibious Warships (LAWs). The Marine Corps works in concert with the
Navy on amphibious ship requirements.
budget request only includes one destroyer
25. Senator Hirono. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 set as policy a
355-ship Navy--right now, we have 296 ships. Looking at this year's
budget, the Navy's topline only increased by 2 percent, with most of
that going to the Marine Corps. Only 8 new ships are budgeted out of
the 12 ships that were expected. Most impactful was one less destroyer
than originally planned as part of a multi-year contract meant to save
taxpayer money--in fact, by breaking the contract, we'll have to pay a
$33 million dollar penalty. Given our strategic shift to the Pacific
and the importance of the Navy in deterring the rising threat of China,
how did the Department come to the decision to cut the second
destroyer?
Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday. Destroyers play an important
role in the Navy's capability and capacity to deter China. As we
developed the fiscal year 2022 budget, we had to balance our
investments across readiness, capability, and capacity and it was a
very difficult funding decision to not include the second destroyer in
fiscal year 2022 due to affordability. Our goal remains to field the
best, most capable, and most lethal fleet we can within the limits of
available resources.
26. Senator Hirono. Secretary Harker, I am very disappointed that
the Department has submitted a budget that would call for breaking the
terms of the multiyear procurement of the Aegis destroyers. From your
perspective, what kind of message does breaking multi-year contracts
send to our industrial base and do you think actions like this
incentivize Congress to provide the Department the authority to enter
into multi-year contracts moving forward?
Secretary Harker. The Navy has been using multi-year procurement
(MYP) authority with the support of Congress to efficiently procure DDG
51 destroyers in quantities that support stable production and a
healthy industrial base. Over the course of the fiscal year 2018-2022
MYP, the Navy will procure a total of 11 Flight III DDGs, more than the
original ten ship procurement. The Navy continues to support the use of
MYP contracts for procuring DDG 51 class ships.
sexual assault and harassment
27. Senator Hirono. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, eliminating
the scourge of sexual misconduct within the ranks is a top priority--
I've been a vocal supporter of removing the chain of command from the
court-martial decision-making process in cases of sexual assault and
sexual harassment because I think it will increase victim trust and
remove perceived conflicts of interest. How do you view these
proposals?
Admiral Gilday. The Secretary of Defense directed the Department of
Defense to work with Congress to amend the UCMJ to remove prosecution
of sexual assaults, domestic violence, and related crimes from the
chain of command and create dedicated offices within each military
department to handle the prosecution of these special crimes. The Navy
and the Marine Corps are fully committed to working towards the
successful implementation of these efforts and the additional reforms
from the Secretary's initiatives following the 90-day Independent
Review Commission's recommendations on sexual assault and sexual
harassment. As the Secretary has stated, creating enduring change will
require a comprehensive approach across multiple lines of effort, and
these changes must be well-designed for successful implementation. It
is imperative that we have a military justice system that is effective,
trustworthy and fair, and one that functions in an operational and
forward deployed environment.
General Berger. The Secretary of Defense directed the Department of
Defense to work with Congress to amend the UCMJ to remove prosecution
of sexual assaults, domestic violence, and related crimes from the
chain of command and create dedicated offices within each military
department to handle the prosecution of these special crimes. The Navy
and the Marine Corps are fully committed to working towards the
successful implementation of these efforts and the additional reforms
from the Secretary's initiatives following the 90-day Independent
Review Commission's recommendations on sexual assault and sexual
harassment. As the Secretary has stated, creating enduring change will
require a comprehensive approach across multiple lines of effort, and
these changes must be well-designed for successful implementation. It
is imperative that we have a military justice system that is effective,
trustworthy and fair, and one that functions in an operational and
forward deployed environment.
28. Senator Hirono. Secretary Harker, I was happy to see the
Department of the Navy request more money in the President's Budget for
sexual assault prevention this year--what steps is the Navy taking on
the prevention front and how are you communicating to your sailors and
marines on this important issue?
Secretary Harker. The Department of the Navy (DON) is further
growing our capacity to address prevention through the establishment of
a dedicated prevention workforce and increasing civilian staff at the
Headquarters level to improve oversight of the efforts of the Navy and
Marine Corps.
Integrated Prevention Specialists will lead and support strategic
prevention efforts at both the Headquarters and Service levels,
including embedded within deployed and afloat units. This workforce
will address cross-cutting prevention and will enhance primary
prevention strategy and capability across thefleet.
The prevention workforce's role is reducing negative behaviors and
supporting higher-risk populations through assessing for needed
training enhancements, and promoting skill-building in healthy
professional and personal relationships. Establishing a dedicated
integrated prevention workforce was a key recommendation of the
Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment
in the Military, and the DON's efforts were already underway.
The DON engages sailors and marines in prevention efforts through
training and leadership development initiatives, and will work to
incorporate prevention strategies, skill-building, and prevention
throughout the military career cycle. In addition, the DON has
developed and disseminated tools to command to increase leader
ownership for recognizing and addressing emerging negative behaviors.
For example, in April 2021 the DON launched The Watch List: Top 5
Signals of Risk for Sexual Assault. This evidence-driven tool promotes
unit-level engagement, increasing awareness of behaviors and attitudes
that indicate when marines and sailors are at higher risk for sexual
assault. This fall, we will roll out realistic training scenarios and
resources to support first-line leaders and their teams in practicing
how to best respond when faced with emerging negative behaviors.
diversity and inclusion
29. Senator Hirono. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, I was
happy to see the establishment of Task Force One Navy following the
murder of George Floyd last year--in the military, it's especially
important to enhance diversity and foster a culture of inclusion in the
ranks. Following the results of Task Force One Navy, what steps is the
Navy taking to bolster diversity within the senior ranks?
Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday. The Department of the Navy
(DON) is committed to attracting, recruiting, retaining, and developing
a pipeline of diverse military talent. We continue to review and revise
our policies to better support our workforce and advance our diversity
initiatives.
While the U.S. Navy is implementing the strategy to operationalize
the Task Force One Navy (TF1N) final report recommendations, the DON
has established a team, led by a Diversity, Equity and Inclusions
(DE&I) Highly Qualified Expert, to build on the TF1N framework, and
develop our strategic vision, Implementation Strategy, Governance and
organizational structure for an enterprise DE&I program. The focus is
to create an enduring and measurable program that champions signature
leadership behaviors with linkage to culture and in alignment with OSD.
The DON DE&I framework will leverage a number of indicators within
our talent management systems to establish demographic trend analysis
to more effectively address diversity issues throughout the entire
human capital pipeline.
gender integration at marine corps boot camp
30. Senator Hirono. General Berger, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 required the Marine Corps to
integrate boot camps on the East and West coast by 2025 and 2028,
respectively--this is an important step in my opinion to ensure women
are viewed equally from the outset in their Marine Corps careers. What
can you tell me about the progress of this effort and specifically,
whether the Marine Corps is integrating these units down to the platoon
level?
General Berger. The Marine Corps is on track to meet the timelines
associated with Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA). The Marine Corps is using a proven model that adheres to 10 USC
8431 and maximizes unit cohesion, accountability, equity, diversity,
and sustainability for both the recruits and drill instructors.
The service has a 5 year Integration Build Plan. In fiscal year
2022, MCRD SD will execute three sequential iterations of integrated
recruit training followed by 12 iterations in fiscal year 2023. By the
end of fiscal year 2024, MCRD SD will achieve initial operational
capable (IOC), defined as training companies manned, training
approximately 50 percent of all female accessions, but will still
require externally sourced experienced female DIs. By the end of fiscal
year 2026, MCRD SD will achieve Fully Operational Capable, defined as
self-sustaining and not requiring external experienced female DIs. MCRD
Parris Island will achieve the NDAA 2020 requirements in fiscal year
2024.
The Marine Corps is integrating genders at the company level,
however, it is not integrating genders within platoons and below.
Mandating platoon-level gender integration at recruit training will be
to the detriment of female Marines during the critical entry-level
transformation process. In the career force, it will significantly
reduce billet opportunities as compared to their male counterparts. A
detailed explanation has previously been provided to Congress.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Gary Peters
education
31. Senator Peters. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, in 2019,
Acting Secretary Modly began implementing parts of the Education for
Seapower (E4S) initiative by breaking ground on the Naval Community
College (USNCC) and hiring John Kroeger to serve as the Department's
first Chief Learning Officer (CLO). USNCC has since begun its first
pilot program and projects growth for fiscal year 2022--this is good
news--but other aspects of E4S appear to have languished. The budget
request notes that ``[a]s Naval Leadership seeks to address the balance
between future force structure, current readiness requirements, and
warfighter development, a reexamination of the Navy Education for
Seapower strategy has been undertaken.'' Please detail this
reexamination, to include its timeline and projected completion, as
well as the process by which it is assessing E4S.
Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday. The Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) (OASN (M&RA))
began a reexamination of the Department of the Navy (DON) Education for
Seapower (E4S) Strategy 2020 in May 2021. The initial review indicated
that we needed to update our education strategy to provide clear
guidance for naval education. On June 30, 2021, OASN (M&RA) convened a
working group of stakeholders from throughout the DON to review and
provide recommendations to update the E4S Strategy. The working group
is examining the overall strategy, including its education objectives,
implementation plan, and clarity. The working group will provide ASN
(M&RA) with a draft naval education strategy by October 2021.
32. Senator Peters. Secretary Harker, the CLO position was created
to lead and unify all Navy and Marine Corps formal education programs.
Given that it has been vacant for a year, is its purpose no longer a
priority for the Department?
Secretary Harker. Education remains a priority for the Department.
The Department of the Navy has made great progress in enhancing
education opportunities and programs since the Education for Seapower
initiative began in 2019. I assigned the responsibility for all naval
education to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve
Affairs) (ASN (M&RA)) in November 2020, which includes responsibilities
previously delegated to the Chief Learning Officer. I work closely with
ASN (M&RA) to continue the Department's efforts to improve and
modernize Navy and Marine Corps education programs.
33. Senator Peters. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, the
Department's budget request decreases funding for tuition assistance,
citing its ``reexamination of the Navy Education for Seapower
strategy.'' Please expand on this rationale.
Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday. To improve Sailor and Marine
education opportunities, the Navy is implementing a consistent 18
credit hour limit per Sailor and Marine, per year, for the tuition
assistance (TA) program beginning in fiscal year 2022, consistent with
Department of Defense policy and guidance. TA usage and required
funding continues to be monitored, as we implement this policy.
Accordingly, the Services have specific eligibility criteria to manage
available TA funds.
talent management
34. Senator Peters. Admiral Gilday, in an article titled ``Use
Sailors' Hidden Skills'' from the June 2021 issue of Proceedings, Petty
Officer 1st Class Michael Amenti argues that the Navy can do better to
leverage Sailors' skills and abilities unrelated to their ratings. Do
you share this view, and if so, how are you setting the conditions for
this approach in policy and in practice amongst commands?
Admiral Gilday. Navy agrees with the author's assessment that we
have ``the best sailors in the world, and its leaders should recognize
and use every ounce of their potential.'' As alluded to by the author,
since 2015, we have been on a journey to bring our talent management
processes, policies, and programs into the 21st century by enabling
better ``talent to task'' matching at scale, greater career
flexibility, modernized and portable training delivery, and incentives
(monetary and non-monetary), which keep pace with market forces.
One of these initiatives is Ready Relevant Learning (RRL) which
fundamentally changes the way our Sailors train, transforming
industrial-era, conveyer-belt training into a modern, proactive system
by providing Sailors with the right training, at the right time, to
maximize their ability to operate across the spectrum of strategic
competition and ultimately prevail in a high-end fight. Through a
career-long learning continuum, RRL delivers training at the most
appropriate time in a Sailor's career, while providing a detailed
learning roadmap for every Navy career, covering technical,
professional, and leadership training that is tightly linked to needs
of the Fleet.
Additionally, we are improving Fleet readiness and manning through
better distribution of talent. We continue to expand our Talent
Marketplace, creating a modern, flexible, and transparent assignment
process that better balances a Sailor's assignment, location, talents,
and advancement opportunities with Navy's mission and operational
needs.
Accordingly, MyNavy Assignment (MNA) has replaced the Career
Management System-Interactive Detailing and delivers a modern interface
and user-friendly experience for our Sailors with expanded visibility
into jobs. This includes ready access to features such as Sailor
Resume, Job Bookmarking, the Sailor Application Lifecycle Tracker,
enhanced Projected Rotation Date modification request routing, and
associated incentives for a particular job.
Finally, in 2018, we introduced Advancement-to-Position (A2P) as a
pilot program to incentivize service in priority or hard-to-fill
billets across the Fleet by linking service in the position to
advancement to the next paygrade. We permanently established the
journeyman-level A2P (E-6 positions), which allows qualified E-5s to
fill priority E-6 positions identified within MNA and receive a
permanent advancement incentive.
We understand that there is intense competition for talent in our
country, and in light of rapidly evolving tactical and technical
landscapes, we are modernizing and enhancing our entire talent
management approach to increase Fleet readiness and lethality to win at
long term strategic competition.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tammy Duckworth
building partnerships in the indo-pacific region
35. Senator Duckworth. General Berger, our alliances and
partnerships provide the United States with a clear asymmetric
advantage against potential adversaries. However, we cannot build trust
and interoperability with our maritime allies and partners from a
distance. Nor can we contest malign activities without having a
presence on the ground in the region. Bottom-line: enhancing
relationships increases deterrence and opens doors to the access we
need to compete in the region. But as we prioritize resources for
modernization, we risk underinvesting in opportunities to build
military to military relationships in the region.
General Berger, how will the Marine Corps balance the need to
invest in modernization with resourcing critical readiness and mil-to-
mil initiatives with our partners and allies, particularly in the Indo-
Pacific Region?
General Berger. The Fiscal Year 2022 President's Budget continues
to prioritize Force Design innovations as the way forward in
modernizing and training the Marine Corps for the future fight while at
the same time maintaining a high level of readiness as the Nation's
crisis response force. A key component of our ability to persist and
operate forward is maintaining close military to military relationships
with our partners and allies--particularly in the Indo-Pacific region.
In our PB22 submission we have balanced the requirements of readiness
and mil to mil engagement with investments in the future.
A critical element of this budgetary balancing continues to be the
divestment of legacy capabilities that do not meet future requirements
and reallocating resources into capabilities needed to build
expeditionary naval power in support of the joint force. fiscal year
2022 reform initiatives generated $1.4B from policy reforms, direct
divestment, and business process/system improvements to reallocate into
Force Design initiatives that modernize and increase the lethality of
the Marine Corps, supporting readiness both now and in the future.
Investments include long range precision fires, advanced command,
control and sensing capabilities as well as unmanned systems.
We have also ensured continued investment in our Fleet Marine
Forces in the Indo-Pacific Region. This investment includes the
development of permanent capabilities on Guam and continued presence in
Australia, Korea and Japan. We continue to deepen relationships with
the armed forces of the Philippines, France, Thailand, Singapore,
Malaysia, Indonesia and New Zealand. Additionally, we are developing
new opportunities with Vietnam. Indo-Pacific theater training exercises
such as IRON FIST, VALIANT MARK, RIMPAC, KAMANDAG, SSANG YONG and
TALISMAN SABRE continue our current efforts to strengthen our network
of allies and partners. We have also successfully deployed a full
squadron of F-35Bs aboard HMS Queen Elizabeth II on her maiden voyage
to the Indo-Pacific theater, an important demonstration of power
projection and interoperability with a key ally.
A critical enabler to our forward presence, exercise participation,
and partnership development is organic lift aboard amphibious shipping.
This is a joint capability that enables Littoral Operations in a
Contested Environment, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO),
and Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO). The EABO and DMO are keys to
effective integrated deterrence and to creating a competitive advantage
over our pacing threat.
Our persistent forward presence in the Indo-Pacific region, along
with Force Design modernization investment, increases interoperability
and further builds partner capabilities.
Together, these efforts are critical to maintaining our role as the
Nation's naval expeditionary force-in-readiness and the leading edge of
the joint force.
indo-pacific force posture
36. Senator Duckworth. General Berger, what additional resources
are needed to ensure the Marine Corps has the right balance of
dispersed and distributed forces in the Indo-Pacific to work with our
allies and partners and deter potential adversaries?
General Berger. In addition to Marine programs, the Marine Corps'
success of ground modernization is also predicated on Navy shipbuilding
programs. The vast Indo-Pacific region is ideally suited for naval
expeditionary forces persistently operating forward to assure allies
and partners and deter malign behavior from China. Amphibious warfare
ships allow the United States to position forces forward in
international waters with Marines poised and ready to conduct a wide
range of missions supporting the fleet commander's campaign and
national interests. Authorizing and appropriating amphibious ships in
future budget requests will ensure we have the right ships available
for operational tasking in a distributed maritime environment.
Littoral maneuver, the ability to move at will throughout the
littoral archipelago, is a key capability for our employment
objectives. Through analytic rigor, the Navy and Marine Corps
determined that building the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) is the best
solution to this maneuver gap. The LAW, which is a new class of
warship, will complement existing traditional amphibious warships and
provide added surface mobility and survivability for Marine Corps
forces. These functions will be critical to the Marine Corps' ability
to operate and sustain itself in austere intra-theater locations across
remote beaches. Funding for this program is in the Navy's research,
development, test, and evaluation appropriation before transitioning to
the first ship award.
Additionally, the fiscal year 2022 budget includes three of the
Marine Corps' top investments. These investments are in support of the
initial operations capability of the new 3d Marine Littoral Regiment
(MLR) in fiscal year 2023. For example, the Marine Corps' highest
priority is the Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System
(NMESIS) and its anti-ship missile capability. Eight of the systems in
the fiscal year 2022 budget request will form the first anti-ship
missile capability for the Marine Corps. This capability provides the
Marine Expeditionary Force's kinetic fires to hold adversaries at risk
and supports the stand-in forces ability to persist within an
adversary's weapon engagement zone (WEZ).
The aircraft requested in the fiscal year 2022 budget are critical
enablers of Marine Corps' units. The six MQ-9A Extended Range in the
budget request will provide communication data relay and improve
overall command and control. The six KC-130J in the budget request
provide the needed air mobility for the Indo-Pacific region. These
NMESIS anti-ship missile capabilities and aircraft will deliver initial
capabilities to the Fleet in fiscal year 2023 or shortly thereafter. We
appreciate your support of these programs in the fiscal year 2022
budget request and future requests, as we build out the capacities of
these units.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator James Inhofe
virtual training methods
37. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Gilday, from the recent U.S. Indo-
Pacific Command Pacific Deterrence Initiative report to this Committee
as well as public statements by Navy flag officers, we understand there
is a need for a realistic training environment to prepare our
warfighters to win decisively in a peer or near-peer fight. Fielding a
Live-Virtual-Constructive (LVC) training solution that enables our
aviation, land and maritime teams to conduct training that is secure
and interoperable across the Department of Defense and with Coalition
partners seems to be a priority, but I am concerned about how long it
will take the Navy to field LVC.
With continued successful development, what is the Navy's plan to
accelerate the fielding of this game changing LVC air combat training
capability?
Admiral Gilday. DoN and USAF remain committed to TCTS II/P6 and
plan to incorporate additional LVC air combat training and LVC testing
capabilities, such as those being demonstrated this summer and fall,
into the Program of Record as the most adaptable and executable path
forward. The complex LVC environment must not only ultimately provide
high end training across multiple platforms, domains, and services, but
must also have ties to the flight test environment to enable affordable
development of future capabilities needed to outpace our adversaries.
The DoN and USAF will collaborate on the necessary requirements,
infrastructures, and investments.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger Wicker
aircraft carriers
38. Senator Wicker. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, the Navy's
Shipbuilding Plan, published last week, identifies a target range for
aircraft carriers as between 9 and 11. The current legal requirement
for carriers remains 11. The carrier fleet is struggling to meet
today's operational requirements even with 11 carriers. In February,
the USS Nimitz returned home from a 321 day deployment--the longest
ship deployment since the Vietnam era. The USS Ronald Reagan has had to
abandon her station in the Western Pacific, a strategic priority area,
to transit to the Middle East in order to support the troop withdrawal
from Afghanistan. When it arrives, the Reagan will relieve the USS
Dwight D. Eisenhower, which deployed in February after just returning
from a seven month deployment last August. What analysis supports
reduction in requirements for aircraft carriers when the Navy is
struggling to meet current demands?
Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday. Navy's Long Range Plan for the
Construction of Naval Vessels provides the objective inventory for
naval vessels out to the distant future. It is not intended to
communicate a reduction in requirements, but to highlight a potential
range, given the long time horizon covered by the plan and the number
of factors that can ultimately impact ship counts.
The Navy continues to meet requirements for 11 nuclear powered
aircraft carriers (CVNs) in support of title 10 requirements. Nuclear
powered carriers (CVNs) and carrier air wings (CVWs) are the Joint
Force's most survivable and adaptable aviation basing option. They
provide sea control and power projection in contested battlespace,
offering a uniquely valuable combination of maneuver, operational
reach, volume of fires, sustainability and organic sensors.
The recent Future Naval Force Study effort--led by the Deputy
Secretary of Defense and supported by tri-chair leadership from the
Department of the Navy, Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense's Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (OSD CAPE)--
found that in order to maintain dominance, the United States needs a
naval force that is balanced and can strike targets from the undersea,
surface, air and land domains.
As stated in the shipbuilding plan, the Navy--working closely with
the OSD CAPE--continues to assess naval force structure options
consistent with Interim National Security Strategic Guidance and
designed to maximize the maritime contribution to the Joint Force. The
outcomes of this analytic work will provide key insights in describing
the future objective battle force.
39. Senator Wicker. Admiral Gilday, why did the Navy choose to send
the USS Ronald Reagan, the forward deployed 7th Fleet aircraft carrier,
to the Middle East?
Admiral Gilday. A Carrier Strike Group (CSG) was requested by
United States Central Command in support of the Afghanistan Retrograde
mission. After providing the Secretary of Defense with the options and
associated risks, he determined that USS Ronald Reagan was the right
asset to execute this important mission.
40. Senator Wicker. Admiral Gilday, as USS Ronald Reagan covers the
troop withdrawal in Afghanistan, is there an aircraft carrier available
in the Western Pacific?
Admiral Gilday. While there is not a CVN currently operating in the
Western Pacific, RRN could be rapidly redeployed if the circumstances
or situation in the Western Pacific were to change. Additionally, the
CARL VINSON CSG is scheduled to arrive in the Western Pacific in mid-
August and could be accelerated if required.
shipyards
41. Senator Wicker. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, Senators
Kaine, Shaheen, King, Collins, and I introduced the SHIPYARD Act, which
would provide $25 billion in funding to the Nation's Navy shipyard
infrastructure in order to repair and modernize these facilities. With
strong bipartisan support, we hope to help the Navy address what the
GAO described as the Navy's ``primary readiness challenge.'' If this
legislation passed, how would the Navy invest these funds to improve
shipyard infrastructure, both public and private?
Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday. Public Shipyards: The
Department of the Navy Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program
(SIOP) defines investments necessary to improve America's public
shipyards by modernizing and upgrading their outdated facilities. If
additional funds were made available via the SHIPYARD Act, the Navy
would be able to accelerate Phase II and Phase III of the SIOP
implementation strategy for public dry dock recapitalization, including
optimized placement of new maintenance facilities and major equipment
replacement at each public shipyard to support nuclear powered
submarine and carrier requirements.
Private Shipyards New Construction and Ship Repair: The Navy is
supportive of increasing maintenance and construction capacity at the
Nation's private shipyards. If the SHIPYARD Act were to provide funds
for use at private shipyards, the Navy would work collaboratively with
private industry to determine the most effective way to implement those
funds to improve facilities and infrastructure at our industry
partner's shipyards.
42. Senator Wicker. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, how would
these shipyard investments impact Navy readiness?
Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday. Investments in America's
shipyards that modernize and upgrade outdated facilities will provide
the Navy the opportunity to improve maintenance efficiency, reduce
availability durations, and return ships to the fleet on time.
transferring aegis ashore to the army
43. Senator Wicker. Admiral Gilday, the Army serves as the
Department of Defense's executive agent for theater integrated air and
missile defense. Based on public statements, I understand that Navy
leadership has been exploring options to transfer responsibility for
the Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense program, which currently has
sites located in Romania and Poland. Are the Army and Navy developing a
plan to transfer responsibilities for Aegis Ashore, and if so, what is
the status of these discussions?
Admiral Gilday. Per the CNO's 2021 NAVPLAN, the Navy's strategic
direction includes divesting of non-core Navy missions like Aegis
Ashore in order to remain ahead of competitors. Transferring shore-
based Ballistic Missile Defense sites to ground forces enables Sailors
to focus on their core missions at sea and frees up resources to
increase lethality. The transfer of Aegis Ashore to a ground-based
service is being addressed within the Department.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
naval aircraft readiness
44. Senator Rounds. Admiral Gilday, according to the fiscal year
2022 budget request, the Navy plans to retire 55 F/A-18 A-D Hornets in
fiscal year 2022 and to retire all F/A-18 A-D Hornets by fiscal year
2024. Meanwhile, the Navy has also requested just 20 F-35Cs this year,
after acquiring 26 in fiscal year 2021. Admiral, can you articulate the
operational risk the Navy may be assuming by executing this
divestiture, while simultaneously requesting cuts to F-35C procurement
in fiscal year 2022? Is procurement of 5 additional F-35Cs, which
appears in your unfunded request list, the best way to mitigate this
operational risk?
Admiral Gilday. The Navy began divesting of 55 F/A-18 A-D Hornets
in fiscal year 2021. The remaining 33 F/A-18 A-D Hornets, which are
flown by the Navy Reserves and NAWDC, will be divested in fiscal year
2022. All 55 F/A-18A-D Hornets are non-combat coded aircraft and
therefore do not incur any operational risk.
The DON procurement of F-35Cs in fiscal year 2021 was 26 total (10
F-35Cs for USMC and 11 F-35Cs for USN with a Congressional add of 5 F-
35C to procure 26 F-35Cs). The USMC procurement plan remained
consistent in support of the squadron transition roadmap with a
procurement reduction from 10 F-35Cs in fiscal year 2021 to 5 F-35Cs in
fiscal year 2022. The USN procurement plan also remained consistent
from the fiscal year 2021 to the fiscal year 2022 budget request, with
an increase in procurement from 11 F-35Cs in fiscal year 2021 to 15 F-
35Cs in fiscal year 2022. The request for an additional 5 F-35Cs for
the USN is needed to mitigate operational risk.
cyber
45. Senator Rounds. General Berger, I had a phenomenal opportunity
to visit with the Marines from Marine Forces Cyber last week at U.S.
Cyber Command. I was impressed with the offensive and defensive
capabilities they are bringing to the fight. Can you briefly discuss
the capabilities the Marines bring to the cyber fight and how the
fiscal year 2022 budget request will shape the Marine Forces Cyber
operations of the future?
General Berger. The Commander MARFORCYBER (CDRMARFORCYBER) commands
both MARFORCYBER and Marine Forces Space (MARFORSPACE). MARFORCYBER and
MARFORSPACE are delegated authorities by U.S. Cyberspace Command
(USCYBERCOM) and U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) that support service
level requirements. MARFORCYBER/SPACE exercises both Title 10 and 50
authorities while organizationally aligned to plan, direct, and provide
intelligence operations, full-spectrum cyberspace, and space
operational support to the respective Combatant Commands (CCMD). Major
subordinate commands (MSC) include Marine Corps Cyberspace Operations
Group (MCCOG), Marine Corps Cyberspace Warfare Group (MCCWYG), and
Joint Forces Headquarters Marines Cyber (JFHQ-C(M)).
Collectively, MARFORCYBER/SPACE conduct operations in the
information environment (OIE), secure the homeland from cyberspace
aggression; secure, operate, and defend the Department of Defense
Information Network (DODIN); advance national interests; and deliver
capabilities and effects for the Joint Force. MARFORCYBER/SPACE
capabilities directly align to the National Defense Strategy (NDS):
Invest in space and cyberspace warfighting domains
Provide more lethal, resilient and rapidly innovating
forces
Increase speed and reach
Incorporate new technologies
Support the Global Operating Model
Invest in command, control, communications, computers,
cyber-defense, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C5ISR)
from the tactical to strategic levels
Organize for innovation
The relationship between space and cyberspace is unique in that
many space operations depend on cyberspace, and a critical portion of
cyberspace can only be provided via space operations. MARFORCYBER
provides on-demand capabilities to support CCMDs with the ability to
impact objectives through the application of cyberspace capabilities
and effects across the globe in all warfighting domains. MARFORCYBER
utilizes a range of tools to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance,
collect and analyze data, improve situational awareness, execute the
targeting cycle, and assure command and control across the spectrum of
competition. Simultaneously, MARFORCYBER enables the warfighter through
protecting and hardening our own networks. The current capabilities of
MARFORSPACE are growing rapidly along with our joint partners and will
ensure that the Marine Corps contributes effective forces that enable
space dominance.
How will the fiscal year 2022 budget request shape the Marine
Forces Cyber operations of the future?
Fiscal year 2022 is a pivotal year for MARFORCYBER/SPACE. The funds
provided in this and future years' budgets are critical to maintaining
the tactical and strategic edge over our competitors.
CDRMARFORCYBER has released a fiscal year 2022 Campaign Plan that
will train and set the conditions for MARFORCYBER/SPACE personnel to
respond to major contingencies and achieve the information advantage in
conflict. Initiatives include naval integration, contingency planning,
development of domestic and international partnerships, and
participation in global exercises. This is in support of USMC Force
Design 2030 Initiatives that modernize the force for the INDOPACOM AOR.
The fiscal year 2022 Budget is critical to achieving MARFORCYBER's
fiscal year 2022 Campaign Plan (CP) objectives and maintaining momentum
in each of the associated lines of effort (LOEs): Information Maneuver,
Defense-in-Depth, Assured C2, and Space Operationalization.
MARFORCYBER/SPACE enable the service to secure, operate, and defend
the Marine Corps Enterprise Network (MCEN) while fielding new
capabilities to make critical networks resilient and responsive to
operational needs. During fiscal year 2022, resources are dedicated to
the deployed MCEN (D-MCEN) project that will consolidate networks and
security to ensure greater capability at the tactical edge. Resources
will be applied through a variety of initiatives that include, but are
not limited to:
Mission focused cyber hardening and mission assurance
programs
Improvement of operational architectures through various
optimization and secure cloud migration programs
Artificial intelligence, machine learning, and automation
Defensive cyber tool and capability development
Data sharing and analytics that support offensive and
defensiveness cyberspace operations, OIE, and Joint Forces
In order to maintain relevance in a highly technical and rapidly
evolving domain, any future funding and resources will be applied to
operations, activities, and investments (OAI) such as:
Pacing adversarial threats and enhancing integrated
deterrence capabilities
Invest in capability development and force modernization
Preempt, disrupt, and counter adversaries in and through
the OIE
Set conditions to rapidly respond to armed conflict
Refine C2 and enhance readiness
Enhance the service's ability to deliver long-range
precision kinetic and non-kinetic fires
Secure, operate, defend, optimize, and modernize the
Marine Corps portion of DODIN
Protect critical infrastructure
Invest in people (Active Duty, Reserve, and Civilian)
Enhance training to transform human capital
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
distributed stovl operations
46. Senator Tillis. General Berger, the Marine Corps continues to
build upon past experience with distributed operations with Short Take-
Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) aircraft. Military exercises like the
2017 operations in Yap and Palau with MV-22B Ospreys and AV-8B Harriers
from the USS America showcase this. As the Marine Corps transitions its
primary STOVL fighter to the F-35B, exercises must continue that put
this new aircraft in similar conditions. In this effort, what role do
distributed STOVL operations play in the broader transformation efforts
of the Marine Corps?
General Berger. Conducting operations in the contested environment
that is the Indo-Pacific region requires us to continue the
expeditionary nature on which the Marine Corps has built its legacy.
Investment in the F-35B underpins our efforts as we pursue a more
agile, lethal aviation force. The F-35B's STOVL capability affords the
combatant commander an additional flexibility of 5th generation combat
power, not feasible with conventional fixed-wing platforms. This STOVL
capability further develops our globally deployable Naval Expeditionary
Force. As we continue to tailor our combat power offering to the Joint
Force, we are exploring options for the proper complement of MV-22s and
F-35s employed from the ARG/MEU. We have recently completed the
academic rigor validating the inclusion of 10 F-35s in the Aviation
Combat Element aboard the LHA and are continuing experimentation
efforts, most notably as a 20-plane complement of F-35Bs aboard an
America Class LHA in spring of 2022. As we prepare ourselves to serve
as the stand-in force, we are constrained by the realities of limited
conventional airfields throughout the first and second island chains.
Our STOVL capability further challenges the adversary's ability to
counter the force due to the inherent ability to rapidly employ from
austere and expeditionary, shore and ship based environments. In order
to sustain this force throughout the contact and blunt phases, it is
imperative that we maximize the utility of the STOVL assets in our
inventory.
47. Senator Tillis. General Berger, how does the budget support or
not support distributed STOVL operations with different or additional
hardware, training, and logistics? What can we do to assist the Marine
Corps in this transformative effort?
General Berger. The PB22 budget request continues support of the
USMC TACAIR transition and inherent distributed STOVL operations
capabilities. The procurement of 17 F-35B aircraft will support the
transition and stand-up of three F-35B squadrons in the fiscal year
2023 to fiscal year 2025 timeframe, including our 1st of 5 squadrons
based in Cherry Point, NC. Below-the-line requirements are fully
supported and critical to preventing exacerbation of the existing
Peculiar Ground Support Equipment (PGSE) gap. We have asked for
specific support on the USMC Unfunded Priority List (UPL) for
additional PGSE to address this gap, and are currently mitigating its
effects through cross-decking or ``sharing'' of PGSE among units. This
has strained the readiness and availability of F-35 support equipment,
which in turn threatens the Marine Corps' ability to effectively train
to and perform distributed operations.
Additionally, modernization modifications supported in the budget
request will enable the upgrade of lower Low Rate Initial Production
(LRIP) aircraft to the TR-3 configuration, which enables the broad
future F-35 capabilities required for all F-35 mission sets including
facilitation of distributed operations. Continued Congressional support
of the USMC budget request is crucial to maintaining the TACAIR
transition timeline and delivering USMC F-35 capabilities critical to
Force Design 2030.
assault support capacity
48. Senator Tillis. General Berger, in the face of contested
logistics in the Pacific theater, how is the Marine Corps revamping or
evolving its concept of operations and will that have any impact on the
CH-53K requirements or program?
General Berger. The Marine Corps' new document, ``A Concept for
Stand-in Forces'' guides how the Marine Corps will operate in the Indo-
Pacific region and other parts of globe defined by the littorals. EABO
is a form of expeditionary warfare that involves the employment of
mobile, low-signature, persistent, and relatively easy to maintain and
sustain naval expeditionary forces. These forces will operate from
austere, temporary locations, ashore or inshore, within a contested or
potentially contested maritime area to conduct sea denial, support sea
control, or enable fleet sustainment.
The CH-53K will enable the mobility needed to operate in these
environments. More specifically, it will greatly reduce the reliance of
Marines within the littorals on external mobility support. The Marine
Corps is committed to the CH-53K program and is evaluating its quantity
requirements. The CH-53K provides a greater payload than any current or
emerging rotorcraft, both at sea level and high altitude conditions, at
greater ranges to support the rapid transition of Joint and Coalition
forces from contact to blunt layer activities in a contested
environment. Its purpose based capabilities provide for the resupply of
the stand-in force from within and outside of the enemy's weapons
engagement zone (WEZ). The CH-53K is the most capable and survivable
assault support aircraft that enables the rapid deployment, movement
and resupply of stand-in forces within a contested Indo-Pacific region.
49. Senator Tillis. General Berger, do you foresee the MV-22B and
CH-53K as being survivable within the envisioned Marine Corps concept
of employment?
General Berger. Yes, provided the required investments in
modernization and survivability are supported and continue to advance.
The MV-22B and CH-53K are currently being configured with a common
Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) suite that provides a reprogrammable
radar and missile warning system, attacking missile declaration, sector
direction finding, laser detection, and self-protection capability. The
digitization of communications, along with spectrum diversity, sensor
modernization and netting, and the coupling with appropriate counter
measures significantly increases the ability to operate in contested
environments, through a multi-layered approach to the challenges.
Combined with modernization investments of survivability equipment,
proven assault support tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in
preparation for, and response to an enemy threat, will continue to
advance through the integration of kinetic and non-kinetic fires to
assist with freedom of maneuver both in and outside the enemy's weapons
engagement zone. Those TTPs use a multipronged approach to identify,
avoid, and communicate a threat throughout the battlespace; using
aircraft designed and equipped with maximum vulnerability reduction
features, robust and redundant systems, designed to provide
survivability protection to provide the ability to fly home should they
sustain combat damage.
50. Senator Tillis. General Berger, in a distributed environment,
it would appear that organic lift capabilities would be a necessary
requirement. Moreover, given the austere nature of this environment and
potentially limited space, it would also seem that vertical take-off
and landing capabilities would be needed. How does the Marine Corps
seek to fill these requirements with adequate resources given a
reduction in overall medium- and heavy-lift assets?
General Berger. The Marine Corps is committed to continuing to
invest in its fixed-wing and rotary-wing programs, while balancing the
needs of the overall force. While enhancing the lethality of the Force,
Force Design modernization efforts are also reducing the overall end
strength of the Marine Corps. The reduction in medium- and heavy-lift
aircraft will take into account the smaller structure of the Marine
Corps to right size the Assault Support requirements needed. Though the
force is reducing total numbers, medium- and heavy-lift assault support
is prioritized to MARFORPAC reflected in the force laydown of four West
Coast CH-53 squadrons, five West Coast MV-22 squadrons, two Hawaii MV-
22 squadrons, and two Okinawa, Japan based MV-22 squadrons. Marine
Corps assault support is regionally aligned to support Force Design
2030.
In the Marine Corps assault support portfolio, the development and
fielding of the CH-53K maximizes work effectiveness and efficiency,
ultimately improving overall reliability and decreasing operating and
support costs in comparison to the CH-53E, which is facing parts
obsolescence issues as a legacy platform. In addition to an increase in
heavy lift performance, the CH-53K reduces operational risk as a modern
fly by wire helicopter with greater safety, survivability, and
reliability capable of integrating into the current battlefield and
taking advantage of future technologies, such as manned/unmanned
teaming and MAGTF digital interoperability.
air wing composition
51. Senator Tillis. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, given the
recent force design decisions as well as the focus on manned/unmanned
pairing, how is the Marine Corps thinking about meeting their
conventional carrier fighter squadron requirements with the F-35C? Do
you foresee making any changes?
Admiral Gilday. The Marine Corps is committed to meeting our
conventional carrier fighter squadron requirements. The Marine Corps
has continued to procure F-35Cs with the intent of equipping our four
F-35C squadrons, meeting the conventional carrier requirement. In early
July of this year, Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314, out of Miramar,
California was the first Marine squadron to be declared fully
operational capable.
We do not foresee any changes to our carrier fighter squadron
requirement.
General Berger. The Marine Corps is committed to meeting our
conventional carrier fighter squadron requirements. The Marine Corps
has continued to procure F-35Cs with the intent of equipping our four
F-35C squadrons, meeting the conventional carrier requirement. In early
July of this year, Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314, out of Miramar,
California was the first Marine squadron to be declared fully
operational capable. We do not foresee any changes to our carrier
fighter squadron requirement.
52. Senator Tillis. Admiral Gilday, how are the Navy and Marine
Corps looking to integrate unmanned aircraft into the fleet and what is
the goal for the ratio of manned and unmanned aircraft?
Admiral Gilday. Given our adversaries' abilities to strike with
increasing range, precision, and lethality, we must reduce exposure of
our Marines wherever possible and correspondingly increase our reliance
on unmanned systems. These platforms and payloads will be pivotal on
the future battlefield. The ability to flood an adversary's decision-
making and targeting processes with an array of low signature,
affordable, and risk-worthy platforms in the air, as well as on the
ground and on the surface, will greatly expand the survivability and
capabilities of Marines operating within the adversary's weapon
engagement zones. For two decades, the Marine Corps has relied on
unmanned aerial systems to provide reconnaissance for our ground
forces, and the Marine Corps will continue this investment in the
future.
The Marine Corps is investing in a new group 5 capability UAS, and
the identified materiel solution is the MQ-9A Extended Range. This UAS
platform will fulfill a primary mission of communication and data relay
with an additional airborne early warning capability. This will provide
deployed Marine Corps and Joint Force units with persistent tactical
maritime Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and command and
control gateways. The MQ-9A Extended Range is also a critical enabler
to the Naval force in building an alternate Precision, Navigation, and
Timing network.
The Marine Corps seeks to procure six MQ-9A Extended Range systems
in fiscal year 2022, and a total of 18 systems over the next several
years, to form three UAS squadrons. The Marine Corps will leverage an
existing Air Force system and two current Marine Corps assets in
USCENTCOM to reduce risk, while providing advanced capabilities to the
Marine Corps and overall joint warfighting enterprise.
In addition to the MQ-9A Extended Range, the Marine Corps continues
to develop and experiment with a family of UAS with a variety of plug-
and-play payloads. These systems will give ground combat units organic
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) assets
capable of supporting long-range precision kinetic and non-kinetic
fires, both afloat and ashore. This includes conducting extended user
evaluations with industry leading systems to include the UAV V-BAT and
the Stalker UAS to inform requirements for the Ground Combat Element.
long-range fires
53. Senator Tillis. General Berger, the Marine Corps has requested
funds for a ground-launched version of the Tomahawk cruise missile. In
addition to being a physically large weapon, the Tomahawk has a pretty
extensive range that would allow Marine forces to engage targets across
a theater. How does the Marine Corps envision integrating those assets
with existing Marine command and control and with some of the higher-
level joint command and control structures within the theater?
General Berger. The Marine Corps Long Range Fires (LRF) program,
which is developing the capability to launch Tomahawk missiles from
ground-based launchers, will also field the fire control hardware and
software to enable the Marine weapons to be integrated into existing
Joint/Naval command, control and communications systems. The LRF
program will support joint targeting, mission planning, and the
execution of precision strikes. These systems form architectures and
support the processes that enable the situational awareness, planning,
coordination, and control that is necessary to employ this weapon
system over extensive ranges.
54. Senator Tillis. General Berger, would these weapons directly
support Marines forward? The broader joint force? How would those
decisions be made?
General Berger. The Marine Corps will operationally assign Tomahawk
missile-capable Long Range Fires units to a Marine Expeditionary Force
as a general support, long-range, lethal capability available for
National Command Authority and Geographic Combatant Commander tasking.
These assets would be employed in the same manner as other naval
Tomahawk missiles, providing an alternate method of employing highly
effective missile systems against a variety of targets in the land and
maritime domains.
55. Senator Tillis. General Berger, what can this Committee do to
assist in your acquisition of this capability?
General Berger. The Marine Corps respectfully requests that
Congress supports the President's Budget request for fiscal year 2022.
Additionally, the Marine Corps submitted an unfunded priority list
(UPL), and the third item was Tomahawk missiles for this Long Range
Fires capability. The Marine Corps appreciates your continued support
and is on track to begin delivering the capability in fiscal year 2024.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
icebreakers
56. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, in
Secretary Harker's prepared testimony, he described the Tri-Service
Maritime Strategy, Advantage at Sea, as a ``truly collaborative
maritime strategic planning effort led jointly by all three of our
Nation's sea services--Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.'' He also
stated that, ``[i]n order to execute these goals, Admiral Gilday,
General Berger, Admiral Schultz and I are working together in order to
promote integration, communication, and collaboration as a warfighting
priority,'' and that ``[t]here can be no daylight between us as we
strengthen the integrated all-domain Naval power of the United
States.'' In the past few years, one issue has demonstrated a lot of
daylight between the Navy and the Coast Guard--icebreakers. The Navy's
Arctic Strategy says the ``United States Naval forces must operate more
assertively across the Arctic Region to prevail in day-to-day
competition.'' The Russians have over 40 icebreakers, the Chinese have
three, and the United States has 1.5. How can the U.S. Navy operate
more assertively in the Arctic without icebreakers?
Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday. While the Navy strongly
supports the national need for icebreaking capability and capacity, and
supports the Coast Guard's recapitalization of their polar icebreaking
fleet, the Navy already operates extensively in the Arctic. Our
submarines have routinely operated in the Arctic since 1958, and we had
near continuous surface ship operations in the High North from April-
November 2020. Additionally, we regularly participate in Arctic and
High North exercises such as Northern Edge in May 2021.
57. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, do you
see collaboration with the Coast Guard on icebreaker acquisition as
aligned with the precepts outlined in the Tri-Service Maritime
Strategy?
Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday. Yes, the Navy's collaboration
with the Coast Guard on icebreaker acquisition are in alignment with
the Tri-Service Strategy, specifically the precepts of day-to-day
competition in the polar region and integrated All-Domain Naval Power.
This partnership allows the Navy to leverage the Coast Guard's mission
focus and unique expertise operating in the polar region, while the
Coast Guard utilizes the Navy's proficiency in ship acquisition and
program management.
sea denial
58. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Gilday, you have described the
purpose of Marine Corps expeditionary advanced bases as supporting sea
denial and sea control. An essential component of the Marine Corps'
ability to conduct the sea denial mission is anti-ship missiles,
including the Naval Strike Missile and Maritime Strike Tomahawk. These
missiles are #1 and #3 on the Marine Corps' unfunded priorities list.
The Marine Corps, in General Berger's estimation, has almost no sea
denial capability or capacity currently. How does inadequate Marine
Corps sea denial capability and capacity impact fleet operations
against the pacing threat?
Admiral Gilday. The Marine Corps recognizes that their sea denial
capability gap negatively impacts distributed naval operations and is
taking action to rapidly close the gap. The Marine Corps is developing
a ground-based, anti-ship missile (GBASM) capability. The first
iteration of this GBASM capability is the Navy/Marine Expeditionary
Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), which fires the Naval Strike
Missile. It will be introduced to the Fleet in fiscal year 2024.
Today, the Navy is shouldering the burden of sea denial from our
air, surface and subsurface platforms. As the Marine Corps' sea denial
capacity grows, directly supporting the Navy's sea denial and sea
control missions, it will reduce some of that burden on Navy platforms
and potentially free those assets to conduct other missions.
marine corps systems at sea
59. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, you have testified to
Congress and written about the need for Marines to be more than
passengers on Navy ships as they transit to the fight. In the last few
years, Marine Corps systems such as the Light Amphibious Vehicle and
Light Marine Air Defense Integrated System have augmented organic
defensive capabilities on amphibious ships transiting through maritime
chokepoints. Has the Marine Corps conducted any tests or experiments
operating any of its land-based systems--including Ground-Based Anti-
Ship Missile, air defense, or counter-UAS--from aboard ships?
General Berger. Yes, the Marine Corps has tested and employed
offensive and defensive capabilities onboard Navy ships. The Marine
Corps has employed L-MADIS aboard Navy ships with both East- and West-
Coast Marine Expeditionary Units for the past four years. These
capabilities were highlighted in July 2019 when Marines from the 11th
Marine Expeditionary Unit onboard the USS Boxer successfully jammed an
Iranian UAS during transit through the Straits of Hormuz.
Additionally, Marines successfully tested the High Mobility
Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) from the flight deck of the San
Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS Anchorage (LPD 23)
during Dawn Blitz 2017. During this test while at sea, the HIMARS
engaged a land-based target at a range of 70 kilometers. The Ground-
Based, Anti-Ship Missile (GBASM) capability is in the early stages of
testing and has yet to be tested on a Navy ship.
navy-marine corps integration in ship design
60. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, both of
you have spoken at length about increased integration, coordination,
and cooperation between the Navy and Marine Corps. As part of the
requirements and ship design process, is the Department of the Navy
considering how existing or planned Marine Corps systems can be
integrated into and operated from Navy ships to augment organic
offensive and defensive capabilities?
Admiral Gilday. The Navy is committed to improving the overall
lethality and survivability of our amphibious force. We continue to
explore concepts to improve our defensive and offensive capability, as
well as improved C2 through continued development of systems such as
the Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S). We are also
supporting Fleet and USMC studies, war games, and experiments to
develop new capabilities through science and technology efforts.
Finally, we are initiating a Capabilities Based Assessment to start
development of the LPD Flight II replacement.
General Berger. The Marine Corps works in concert with the Navy to
ensure that Marine Corps systems are integrated into Navy ships. While
on board, the Marine Expeditionary Unit's Air Combat Element
contributes to the defense of the amphibious task force. For example,
the Marine Corps' F-35B aircraft provide long-range maritime domain
awareness and strike capabilities. Rotary wing H-1 aircraft track
surface, subsurface, and airborne threats using Digital Interoperable
networks to cue and engage as necessary, and MV-22B tiltrotor aircraft
integrate with the ship's defensive networks to provide classified and
unclassified data.
The Marine Corps is an integral and active participant in the Naval
Tactical Grid efforts to ensure that Marine Corps forces afloat and
ashore can connect and share data with Navy platforms. One initiative
to gain greater interoperability is the Navy's implementation of Common
Aviation Command and Control System Afloat on Navy amphibious ships.
This system, which will share a common software baseline with the
Marine Corps variant, is integrated with the Navy's Consolidated Afloat
Network and Enterprise System to leverage Joint Strike Fighter, Link
16, fires, and situational awareness data while Marines are embarked.
The first installation of Common Aviation Command and Control System
Afloat took place in August 2019 on USS America (LHA-6) and was
subsequently installed on three other LHD/LHA ships. Additional
installations on LHD/LHA and LPD amphibious ships are scheduled for
fiscal year 2022.
As another example of Marines supporting the ship's defensive
capabilities, the Marine Corps has employed Light-Marine Air Defense
Integrated System (L-MADIS) onboard Navy ships with both east- and
west-coast Marine Expeditionary Units for the past four years. This was
highlighted in July 2019 when Marines from the 11th Marine
Expeditionary Unit onboard the USS Boxer successfully jammed an Iranian
UAS during transit through the Straits of Hormuz.
force design 2030
61. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, what is your vision of the
Reserve component's role in Force Design 2030?
General Berger. The Marine Corps Reserve, as part of the single
integrated Total Force, remains a vital contributor to the warfighting
capability and capacity of the Naval Service. The Marine Corps is
committed to sustaining a relevant and capable Reserve Force.
The Marine Corps Reserve is focused not only on integrating with
the Active component across the competition continuum, including
conflict, but also on providing specialized and general-purpose
conventional forces to II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) in response
to global contingencies. Further, the Marine Corps Reserve is uniquely
postured to partner with the Navy's 4th Fleet in USSOUTHCOM. This
partnership will generate opportunities to first develop and then
employ unique talent and skillsets that will contribute to a campaign
of maritime competition, as we enhance global maritime interoperability
with our partners and allies.
While Force Design focuses on meeting maritime and joint service
requirements against the pacing threat, II MEF and Marine Forces
Reserve (MARFORRES) remain ``service-retained forces'' tasked as the
Service's offering for global crisis and contingency response. Given
the challenging resourcing environment, service-retained forces may not
require the same capabilities that the Service's primary mission
compels for III and I MEF forces. Accordingly, II MEF will be the
pacing MEF for MARFORRES resourcing, capabilities, and requirements.
MARFORRES will also continue to provide capabilities within INDOPACOM
through the Service's unit deployment program, as required in support
of III MEF.
Finally, experimentation and innovation efforts are vital to the
Service's Force Design initiatives. Within the Reserve component, there
are marines who have unique skillsets developed in academia or the
commercial sector that will be essential for strategic competition.
This diverse talent can be leveraged to advance innovation for the
Naval Services. We will identify and invest in proven Marines who have
an aptitude and desire to gain new, complex warfighting skills. These
Marines will represent some of our most vital warfighting capabilities
and capacity as they develop enhanced skillsets through continued
service in the Marine Corps Reserve.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
competing with china
62. Senator Blackburn. General Berger, you have said ``We must
continue to seek the affordable and plentiful at the expense of the
exquisite.'' How does the concept of ``the affordable and plentiful at
the expense of the exquisite and few'' translate into your envisioned
force laydown within U.S. Indo-Pacific Command?
General Berger. The Marine Corps is building a ready, globally-
employed, naval force that relies on organic lift--not strategic lift.
It is dynamic and postured forward in competition and ready to
transition rapidly to conflict, and back again. Our new Marine Littoral
Regiments (MLRs) will be organized, trained, and equipped to support
sea denial and sea control operations within actively contested
maritime spaces as part of a modernized III Marine Expeditionary Force
(III MEF). The MLR is a smaller, more agile, and low-signature force,
yet is more lethal with longer range precision fires, as compared to
those of legacy Marine infantry regiments. III MEF and the Navy's 7th
Fleet will support the future MLRs with significant additional
capabilities and equipment, including an integrated communication and
sensor architecture, aviation assets (MQ-9A, F-35, KC-130J, MV-22, and
CH-53K), maritime mobility and maneuver (Light Amphibious Warships and
traditional amphibious warships).
In addition to the MLR, the Marine Corps will still operate its
Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) in concert with the Navy's Amphibious
Ready Groups (ARGs). The MEU/ARG will continue to provide the Nation
with a global crisis response capability. The MEUs crisis response
capability was recently demonstrated when Marines from the 24th MEU
were dynamically re-tasked from operations in the North Arabian Gulf to
support the evacuation mission in Afghanistan.
III MEF, in conjunction with 7th Fleet, will exercise and operate
with our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. This forward posture
will provide operational and strategic depth to the Joint and multi-
national force. III MEF as a stand-in force, will operate in a
distributed manner complicating an adversary's decision-making
calculus. III MEF will leverage the MLR and organic assets to establish
a network of expeditionary advanced bases designed to project credible
anti-access/area denial capabilities against a peer adversary in a
littoral fight.
The approach of ``the affordable and plentiful'' supports our
concepts for Stand-in Forces and Expeditionary Advanced Base
Operations. Stand-in Forces are forward-postured, steady state forces
operating in contested areas within an adversary's weapon engagement
zone (WEZ). By being able to transition rapidly from competition to
conflict creates a strategic advantage for the joint force. We envision
these forces being able to establish and conduct expeditionary advanced
base operations (EABO). EABO is a form of expeditionary warfare that
calls for naval expeditionary forces operating from a series of
austere, temporary locations ashore or inshore with a contested
maritime area. To be successful, these stand-in forces need to be
small, lethal, low signature and mobile. A force with these attributes
will be allowed to remain positioned to achieve desired operational
effects while complicating adversary efforts to find and target them.
For stand-in forces to conduct EABO they require a variety of
options, such as future amphibious ships, unmanned platforms, and other
smaller more lethal and more agile platforms.
63. Senator Blackburn. General Berger, how can our force laydown in
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command reduce dependence on concentrated,
vulnerable, and expensive forward infrastructure and platforms?
General Berger. The Marine Corps is in close coordination with the
Navy as we continue to develop concepts of operations and capabilities
for distributed lethality. In steady-state, forward-deployed forces
demonstrate our commitment to our allies and partners, providing
combat-ready forces in theater, and building ally and partner
capability through bilateral and multilateral exercises. The Marine
Corps, as the Stand-In Force, will be forward-postured, steady-state
forces operating in contested areas--capable of transitioning rapidly
from competition to crisis to conflict and back again to create a
strategic advantage. These operations must be carried out in close
partnership with host nations and partners.
The Stand-In Forces are expeditionary in nature, with small
footprints and fewer infrastructure requirements, which makes them less
burdensome on host nations than are larger U.S. formations.
These expeditionary capabilities are reliant on ready lift
collocated with operating forces. Forward stationed and rotational
forces support partner and ally readiness, bolstering their ability to
resist coercion and malign activities, while contributing to a free and
open Indo-Pacific. Our forward forces' engagements with regional
partners during competition improves Joint Force access, basing, and
overflight prior to a potential crisis. While we may conduct limited
operations from legacy bases in crisis and conflict, our expeditionary
nature and organic lift will ensure we can rapidly distribute lethal
forces to continue to operate wherever required.
64. Senator Blackburn. General Berger, as we look at the Marine
Corps' role in Great Power Competition, what unique capabilities can
you currently provide or are on pace to provide, that will enable us to
compete and win within the ``Grey Zone''?
General Berger. The Marine Corps possesses, or over the next
several years, will field advanced capabilities in long range precision
fires, resilient communications, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance platforms, and in influencing organizations--all to
deter conflict and win within the competition continuum. In the fiscal
year 2022 budget request, the Marine Corps requested funding for the
MQ-9A Extended Range unmanned aerial system (UAS), which will assist in
communications data relay and overall maritime domain awareness.
Additionally, the Marine Corps requested funding for the Navy/Marine
Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), which will be able to
strike ships, holding adversary assets at risk and contributing to the
Navy's sea denial mission. Advanced capabilities such as these along
with the capabilities provided by organizations like the Marine
Information Group, (MIG), will provide exploitable advantages in
competition, while enhancing lethality should competition turn to
conflict. These capabilities are on schedule for fielding by fiscal
year 2024 and will be critical enablers to Naval and Joint Forces in
contested maritime environments.
The Marine Corps modernization efforts are ultimately enabling the
establishment and implementation of what the Marine Corps refers to as
the Stand-in Force concept, or SIF concept. The SIF concept dictates
that Marines perform three essential functions; find and track
adversary threats inside a given area, remain difficult to find to a
potential adversary, and if armed conflict begins, use knowledge of the
adversary to help the fleet or other elements of the joint force attack
quickly and effectively. These enduring functions of the SIF, combined
with Marines' forward posture and modernized capabilities, yield two
primary benefits. First, it supports deterrence through approaches such
as ``deterrence by detection.'' Second, in the event deterrence fails
and armed conflict occurs, winning the reconnaissance fight allows the
fleet to attack effectively first and seize the initiative. The concept
is being refined and is expected to be implemented across the Indo-
Pacific region in the near future.
65. Senator Blackburn. General Berger, as the future operating
concept of the force would necessitate, what coordination has been
done--with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and the Department of State--to
identify where our expeditionary basing locations would be, where our
stand-in forces would bed down, and what sort of weapons systems are
tolerable for our regional partners to be hosting on their home turf?
General Berger. The Marine Corps continues to coordinate its global
posture through the Global Posture Executive Council (GPEC), which
includes OSD, State Department, Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, and
Service participants. This past summer, we supported the Global Posture
Review, and we continue to provide details that will shape OSD's final
report and support OSD and State Department policy recommendations. We
continue to discuss with OSD to support coordinated efforts across the
DOD and enable effective State Department and Inter-Agency engagement.
The Department of State, in particular, is a pivotal partner, based
on the essential coordination with friendly nations on which the Marine
Corps Concept for Stand-In Forces is based. All parts of the U.S.
presence need to speak with one voice in engagements with those
nations. As the Stand-In Force, Marines will often be operating from
host nations' sovereign littorals, which will necessitate true
partnerships and a common cause for deterrence outcomes. Today, the
U.S. forward defensive posture in the western Pacific is enabled by
strong alliances and partnerships built on shared values and interests.
For Stand-In Forces to be effective, this must continue.
nuclear sea-launched cruise missile
66. Senator Blackburn. Secretary Harker, why was the decision to
cancel the Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missile made prior to the
Nuclear Posture Review?
Secretary Harker. As part of the Department of Defense (DOD)
programming and budgeting process, Services make many early assumptions
to help shape the Service's input into the broader DOD budget request.
These assumptions are further refined throughout the budgeting process
in a collaborative process with the Office of the Secretary of Defense
and DOD stakeholders. Internal planning guidance deferred programmatic
decisions until later in the budget process so as to be informed by the
on-going 2021 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which is reviewing all
strategic weapons systems. The Department of the Navy is committed to
fully funding the validated requirements as outlined by the NPR and as
directed by the Administration.
67. Senator Blackburn. Secretary Harker, regardless of what you may
have previously published with respect to defunding the Nuclear Sea-
Launched Cruise Missile, do you believe that is a strategically
relevant weapon system?
Secretary Harker. The requirement to pursue a Sea Launched Cruise
Missile-Nuclear (SLCM-N) originated with the 2018 Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR). The Navy completed its Analysis of Alternatives earlier
this year, and included funding in the fiscal year 2022 President's
Budget to support the start of the program. The Department of Defense
is now conducting a new 2021 NPR and I understand that the SLCM-N
capability is being discussed as part of that review. The Navy will
support the results of the 2021 NPR.
artificial intelligence in personnel decisions
68. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Gilday, on a surface level, do you
see Artificial Intelligence providing an advantage to the career
monitor population in terms of slating Sailors and Naval Officers for
future assignments?
Admiral Gilday. Advanced computing technology, such as machine
learning or Artificial Intelligence (AI), could increase efficiencies
and automate processes when developing assignment slates. While AI may
not always account for the nuances or other special cases for each
service member, Navy is exploring new initiatives to better support the
slating of enlisted and officer assignments.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
the threat of the fait accompli
69. Senator Hawley. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, the Tri-
Service Maritime Strategy says, ``In the event of conflict, China . . .
will likely attempt to seize territory before the United States and its
allies can mount an effective response--leading to a fait accompli.''
Can you explain why the Tri-Service Maritime Strategy highlights the
threat of a Chinese fait accompli?
Admiral Gilday. In a fait accompli scenario the People's Republic
of China (PRC) will likely attempt to rapidly seize territory before
the United States and its allies can mount an effective response and
then quickly reinforce its lodgment with long-range fires to deter any
future response. We highlight this in the Tri-Service Maritime Strategy
because it is likely that China would do this in initiating military
action in the Western Pacific, which poses a serious challenge to the
Naval Service.
A fait accompli scenario reinforces the need for the Naval Service
to maintain a combat credible presence in the Western Pacific to
respond with little warning in the event the PRC takes overt military
action in violation of international law. A core tenet of the Tri-
Service Maritime Strategy is the need for the Naval Service to continue
operating forward to deter coercive behavior and conventional
aggression as well as to reassure allies and partners.
General Berger. Senator, as America's expeditionary force in
readiness, and with clear guidance that China is our pacing threat, we
have an obligation to think through what China's likely courses of
action are during competition or conflict. We have clear evidence that
China's preferred option is to make their desired objectives an
accomplished fact (a fait accompli) by moving rapidly before we, our
allies, and partners can react, thus forcing us to either accept new
conditions on the ground or escalate. Military history is replete with
examples where aggressors employed this gambit with both successful and
unsuccessful outcomes. In many of the most likely crisis scenarios,
China and Russia enjoy the advantage of proximity, while the United
States must address numerous challenges (time, space, mass, critical
infrastructure) to project military power within the contested region.
This positional advantage, therefore, must elevate the possibility of
adversary fait accompli strategies within our contingency planning
scenarios. As a result, the fait accompli threat needs to be at the
forefront of our minds as we build the Force Design 2030 force.
70. Senator Hawley. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, I've asked
Secretary Austin, Deputy Secretary Hicks, and nearly every other
defense leader who has come before this Committee if the United States
should maintain its ability to defeat a Chinese fait accompli against
Taiwan. They have all responded in the affirmative. Do you agree that
we need to maintain this capability?
Admiral Gilday. The United States has a serious commitment to
preserving peace and security in the Western Pacific, including
encouraging the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues and ensuring
that Taiwan can defend itself from China. We stand behind this
commitment and believe it would be a serious mistake for China to
threaten the status quo of peace and stability across the Taiwan
Strait. If China threatens that status quo, the United States Navy can
provide a credible force to defeat the PRC invasion against Taiwan. To
sustain America's advantage at sea, the Navy will deliver combat-ready
forces to deter aggression and keep the seas free and open. Maintaining
our ability to deploy battle-ready ships, submarines, and squadrons
around the Western Pacific ensures the credibility of our commitments
to our allies and partners in the region.
General Berger. Senator, I stand with my fellow Service Chiefs, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary in affirming our
commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act which includes maintaining
our capacity to resist all forms of coercion that would jeopardize the
security of the people of Taiwan.
As outlined in the Tri-Service Maritime Strategy, our capacity to
deter military aggression by China against Taiwan, alongside the
capabilities of our allies and partners, includes:
Operating forward deters coercive behavior and
conventional aggression. We cannot contest malign activities without
being present. Our force generation models must ensure we have
sufficient combat-credible naval forces available to deter aggression,
preempt a fait accompli, and win in conflict, all backed up by rapid
surge capability and capacity.
Contested seas require a renewed emphasis on sea control.
Denying our adversaries' use of the seas thwarts their direct wartime
objectives and disrupts their efforts to threaten our allies and the
American homeland from the maritime domain. We must increase our
emphasis on controlling the seas in conflict to provide joint and
allied forces with the freedom of maneuver to attack adversary forces
and impose costs globally.
Maintaining advantage at sea requires modernization. In
persistently surveilled, contested environments, agile naval forces
offer dynamic and flexible options from which to project combat power.
We must maintain our advantage at sea with new platforms, new thinking,
and new technologies that enhance distributed naval operations while
developing our people and culture to meet the challenges of a complex
security environment.
Given the geography of the Indo-Pacific and China's rapidly
advancing long-range precision fires capabilities, the Navy and the
joint force will need a stand-in force that can operate persistently
within these weapons engagement zones and provide `deterrence by
detection'. The Marine Corps will be that force.
Our Corps' Force Design 2030 transformation focuses on how the
Marine Corps maintains its status as the Nation's premier expeditionary
force in readiness while purposely building stand-in forces capable of
assurance and deterrence in the Pacific and other areas. We will be a
stand-in force within the adversary's weapons engagement zone that is
light, mobile, widely distributed, and that operates from diverse
maritime platforms. By delivering mission-critical capabilities from
expeditionary advanced bases, Marines will provide more vectors of
attack to deter and ultimately defeat enemy aggression. Not only will
the Marines possess formidable organic fires capable of denying key
maritime terrain because of our forward presence, but we will also be a
linchpin in the kill chain for naval and joint fires by performing
reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance.
For more than a decade, the Marine Corps has been planning and
executing actions for a military build-out across the Pacific Region
via the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) to sustain warfighting
capabilities and to achieve force posture realignments, including
necessary training range development, the identification of unit and
installation facility requirements, programming and budgeting, and
supporting establishment requirements necessary to set the theater for
an increasingly competitive environment. Continued congressional
funding of Marine Corps Force Design 2030 and DPRI initiatives is vital
to creating the military capabilities, geographic positioning, and
critical infrastructure necessary to prevent a fait accompli in the
Indo-Pacific.
long-range precision fires
71. Senator Hawley. General Berger, the Marine Corps has included
Naval Strike Missiles and Tactical Tomahawks at the top of its Unfunded
Priorities List. How will these systems and their enablers help us deny
a Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan, and why is it so important that
we field them as quickly as possible?
General Berger. When forward deployed inside the adversary's
weapons engagement zone, these weapon systems will provide the Marine
Corps, Integrated Naval Force, and Joint Force with a Stand-In Force
capable of conducting sea denial, thus affecting an adversary's plan.
Denying a specific area can present a forward edge behind which the
U.S. fleet can maneuver, or prevent an adversary from using key straits
or chokepoints, such as the Taiwan Strait. Area denial can also channel
an adversary into areas in which U.S. Forces enjoy a relative
advantage.
Ground-based launchers add a new type of threat against a peer
adversary, stress different surveillance and offensive systems, are
hard to detect and track in a cluttered ground environment, and add a
significant level of persistence and depth to existing anti-ship
capabilities. The range, persistence, survivability and lethality of
these weapon systems will deny the adversary key maritime maneuver
space, and limit their deployment options and avenues of approach for
amphibious forces. The Naval Strike Missile-equipped medium-range
missile battery is a critical element of the Marine Littoral Regiment
(MLR). As such, the first battery will be fielded to support the 3d MLR
beginning in fiscal year 2023. The first Tomahawk Missile-capable long-
range missile battery is on schedule to begin fielding in 2024.
fleet architecture
72. Senator Hawley. The Navy is required by law to maintain not
less than 11 aircraft carriers. It's not clear, though, that money
spent on 11 carriers is money best spent. It seems just as likely, for
instance, that we should use that money to grow our undersea forces or
invest in other capabilities that are optimized for blunting a Chinese
offensive in the initial period of war.
Admiral Gilday, how do you assess the opportunity costs associated
with maintaining an 11-carrier fleet as opposed to a 10- or 8-carrier
fleet, if reducing the number of carriers would allow you to invest
more in these other capabilities?
Admiral Gilday. The U.S. Navy Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) with
their associated Surface Combatants, Large-deck, Nuclear-powered
Aircraft Carriers (CVN) and Carrier Air Wings (CVW) represent the
eleven most survivable and lethal airfields in the world. The CSG
continues to be the preeminent power projection force with its ability
to produce long range kinetic and non-kinetic effects from the sea
without the need for foreign basing rights. The current and future CSG
constitutes a robust mix of sustainability, survivability and lethality
with massed firepower and influence in a time of great power
competition. The CSG is a key component to Distributed Maritime
Operations (DMO) and offers Combatant Commanders rapid and decisive
response options across the entire spectrum of military operations in
an increasingly complex global landscape.
The CVN enables the CSG to operate without replenishment for weeks
at a time, due to its Nuclear power plant, aviation fuel capacity,
weapons storage, and organic repair capabilities. Coupled with the
CVN's maneuverability, the CSG can operate undetected while creating
significant uncertainty, greatly complicating adversary targeting. The
CSG's layered defenses starting with the offensive fire power from the
mix of fifth and fourth generation aircraft from the CVW integrated
with the Destroyer and Cruiser escorts allows the CSG to survive and
operate inside threat ASCM ranges.
With 11 CVNs we are able to employ CSGs, the Department of
Defense's most visible asset for power projection and deterrence, to
meet Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) directed presence.
CSG presence has a direct effect on the decisions of malign actors in
any theater and is our most viable military option in the great power
competition. Any reduction in the number of CVNs, and associated CSGs,
will have a commensurate decrement in our ability to project power
around the globe, with the loss of associated deterrent value. The
airpower resident within a CSG facilitates numerous naval missions;
reducing the number of CVNs would have a corresponding negative impact
on those alternate missions as well.
global force management
73. Senator Hawley. Admiral Gilday, there has been a substantial
increase in Requests for Forces from the Combatant Commanders in recent
years. How has this increase impacted the Navy's ability to improve
readiness and invest in the modernization that we so badly need to keep
pace with China?
Admiral Gilday. Combatant Commander Requests for Forces continue to
outpace Navy's ability to meet Secretary of Defense-approved presence
requirements given our current force structure. For example, four
recent Carrier Strike Group deployments were extended to support U.S.
Central Command, resulting in additional incremental costs of over $200
million. While the inherent flexibility built into the Optimized Fleet
Response Plan readiness production construct has enabled us to meet
this increased demand, continued deployment extensions will have
significant, longer-term costs and readiness impacts. Unplanned costs
require reprioritization of readiness resources (i.e. personnel, spare
parts, and ordnance) and modernization funds, typically resulting in
reductions to non-deployed flying hours and deferred parts and
maintenance. This degrades the readiness of our next-to-deploy forces.
Unplanned schedule changes often require ship maintenance
availabilities to be deferred or cancelled, degrading material
condition and impacting future availability planning and on time
performance. Ensuring that platforms complete required maintenance and
modernization availabilities on time is essential for the long term
health of the force and generating future readiness. Additionally,
unplanned schedule changes, including deployment extensions, negatively
impact the quality of life for our Sailors and their families, which
may result in reduced retention.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022 AND
THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 24, 2021
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
ON ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:00 a.m., in
Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Gillibrand,
Kaine, King, Warren, Manchin, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, and
Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. I would like to call the hearing to order.
The Committee meets today to receive testimony on the
Department of Energy's atomic energy defense programs in review
of the fiscal year 2022 President's defense budget request. I
would like to welcome our witnesses, Secretary of Energy
Jennifer Granholm and Acting Administrator of the National
Nuclear Security Administration, Dr. Charles Verdon. Thank you
for joining us. I also want to thank the workforce for their
service to the Nation.
The fiscal year 2022 budget request for the defense
functions of the Department of Energy is $27.9 billion. This
figure accounts for about 60 percent of the Department of
Energy's overall $46.2 billion request. Having the Secretary of
Energy appear before us underscores the importance that this
Committee places on oversight of the Department of Defense
activities, which span from maintaining our nuclear stockpile
to cleaning up former Cold War defense production sites in
order to meet binding commitments between the Federal
Government and the communities and states they reside in.
Within this $27.9 billion defense proposal, the National
Nuclear Security Administration, or NNSA, is requesting $19.74
billion, or a 0.5 percent increase over last year's level of
$19.73 billion. While the fiscal year 2022 budget is flat, I
would note that the amount for environmental cleanup increased
by 6.4 percent to a total of $6.8 billion.
Madam Secretary, given this flat NNSA budget there will be
tradeoffs within the remaining budget to meet ongoing DOD
requirements. I would like to know what these offsets are and
what impacts they will have. Our analysis shows that
maintenance of long-term engineering and science programs
decreased 4.4 percent. Funds for infrastructure and operations,
particularly safety, decreased by 12.3 percent. There is a view
that there are carryover monies in infrastructure that can be
spent in these areas, but this Committee has too often found
that using carryover funding simply pushes today's important
infrastructure problems to subsequent years, where they
inevitably grow in magnitude.
With respect to DOD requirements, I would appreciate an
update on how the NNSA is working with the Nuclear Weapons
Council. The Committee spent considerable time last year
ensuring the relationship between the Department of Energy, the
NNSA, and the Nuclear Weapons Council was on the right footing.
I will want to know your views on this matter, as it is an
important issue.
The NNSA has also experienced its highest workload since
the 1980s, as it manages five major warhead programs while
rebuilding nuclear infrastructure that is original to the
Manhattan Project of 70 years ago, and I am interested in how
NNSA is managing this workload and the status of modernization
of the facilities.
I would also ask that our witnesses share how the NNSA is
meeting the requirement for plutonium pit production. This
administration has endorsed a two-site solution for producing
pits at Los Alamos and rebuilding the abandoned mixed oxide
facility at the Savannah River site. I would like to know what
issues you see in the coming year for both sites with respect
to cost and meeting production requirements.
Finally, Madam Secretary, I hope you will update us on your
efforts to continue cleaning up former Defense production
sites, particularly at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation. As you
are aware, the Hanford site has 55 million gallons of
radioactive waste stored in 177 underground tanks, some of
which are leaking. Although your Department is starting
operations to remove the first 40 percent of low-activity
radioactive waste from these tanks, which accounts for 90
percent of the waste, at present there is no plan to remove the
high-activity radioactive waste in the tanks. I would ask you
share how you are working with the State of Washington on a
plan to remove this highly radioactive waste.
Again, I want to thank our witnesses for appearing today
and for their distinguished service to the Nation in so many
different ways.
Now let me recognize the ranking member, Senator Inhofe,
please.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Over the past few
years one of the Committee's top priorities has been ensuring
that we rebuild our U.S. nuclear deterrent, the cornerstone of
our national security. We have talked together, and I think we
are all in agreement on that.
I think Secretary Austin said it well when he told us,
quote, ``The U.S. nuclear weapons have been extended far beyond
their original services lives, and the tipping point where we
must simultaneously overhaul these facilities is now here. It
is actually beyond here.
If we are serious about meeting that growing and
underappreciated threat posed by China and Russia, we need to
be honest about the resources needed to do so, and repair these
resources, which we will talk about in a minute.
Unfortunately, the administration's fiscal year 2022 DOD
budget cuts spending when we need real growth. We simply cannot
compete if our budgets do not support our strategy. Strategy by
starvation is a recipe for disaster.
We have that same problem with this year's NNSA budget. For
the first time since 2013--this is significant--for the first
time since 2013, the NNSA request has shrunk from the previous
year, mostly because of a $500 million cut to NNSA deferred
maintenance efforts. Deferred maintenance is kind of a less-
than-courageous way of doing something without being caught. I
think we all understand that.
If this were the result of real progress in modernizing our
nuclear weapons stockpile, that would be one thing. But that is
not the case here. We are still trying to recover from decades
of underinvestment. We must rebuild our aging nuclear forces.
I cannot understand why the administration is cutting NNSA
funding while pushing for trillions of dollars in spending in
so many other areas, less critical areas, such as so-called
``green energy'' subsidies. Almost a third of NNSA's facilities
date back to World War II, and we have buildings where chunks
of the concrete fall from the ceiling on workers below. We need
to do better for the people who care for our nuclear
enterprise.
By contrast, our adversaries clearly prioritize their
nuclear programs. They understand their value. Our lack of
focus on nuclear weapons puts us in danger of falling even
farther behind, and puts our Nation at risk, and we cannot
allow this to happen.
So I look forward to your testimony of these two great
witnesses. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe. Madam
Secretary, you are recognized, please.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JENNIFER M. GRANHOLM, SECRETARY OF
ENERGY
Secretary Granholm. Thank you so much, Chairman Reed and
Ranking Member Inhofe and Members of the Committee. It is a
privilege to be before you on behalf of the Department of
Energy as the Nation's 16th Energy Secretary. I am unspeakably
honored to be entrusted with the responsibility of enhancing
America's security through nuclear defense, nonproliferation,
and environmental efforts, in addition to leading the
Department's efforts to support the breakthrough scientific
discoveries at our 17 National Labs and to deploy those
breakthroughs at scale to create jobs for the American people.
As we endeavor to build America's clean energy future we
know the Department's nuclear security mission is essential to
ensuring that future is safe and secure. It is a core focus of
our daily work, and I recognize that the Senate Armed Services
Committee has always demonstrated bipartisan commitment to this
mission. I applaud your ability to consistently work together
on such serious matters and your continued support for the
Department's efforts around deterrence and on proliferation and
environmental management, which, of course, together make up
nearly three-quarters of the Department of Energy's budget.
We know full well that as long as nuclear weapons exist the
United States must maintain the safety, security, and
effectiveness of our Nation's nuclear stockpile. We have to
make sure that the U.S. Navy has the nuclear propulsion that
they need to carry out their important operations, and we must
also advance nuclear nonproliferation intentionally, and we
have to do it internationally. We have to address the threat of
nuclear terrorism, we have to mitigate the environmental harm
from our nuclear program, and to those ends, I am pleased to
report that since I have taken office the Department and the
NNSA have reinforced a strong working relationship,
prioritizing collaboration and communication, while respecting
NNSA's semi-autonomous status.
Here I do want to thank our colleagues at the NNSA, and in
particular Acting Under Secretary Dr. Charlie Verdon, who is
here and whose incredible vast experience and expertise has
been invaluable to our nuclear security mission. I want to
thank this Committee for having advanced Dr. Jill Hruby and
Frank Rose to the next level, and hopefully the Senate can
follow your lead, given the importance of this mission.
Working together with NNSA and DOE, we have reached several
notable milestones over the last 5 months, and that includes
our support for diplomatic efforts to successfully extend the
New START nuclear arms control treaty with Russia, and our
progress around the Los Alamos plutonium pit production
project, which is now underway, and which will produce 30 war-
reserved plutonium pits per year to meet our national security
needs. We have also moved forward on a series of upgrades that
are essential to the Nation's nuclear deterrent, and our work
is further facilitated by our exceptional partnership with the
Department of Defense. You will be glad to know, I hope, that
DOE and NNSA and DOD are engaging in high-level coordination,
and we are in lockstep around our mutual goal of ensuring that
the U.S. nuclear deterrent is fully funded and properly
managed.
I will note also that we are fully aligned with the
Department of Defense regarding the budget for this next fiscal
year, which meets DOD requirements. I am fully committed to
working in close cooperation and coordination with the Defense
Department on the future budget requirements.
The budget proposal before you would allow us to make
substantial progress in five areas. One, it would sustain
funding for NNSA in support of the agency's longstanding
nuclear modernization efforts. Second, it would support our
weapons account activities, and that means allowing us to keep
the Nation's stockpile and infrastructure in line with DOD
requirements. Third, it will enhance our Office of Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation, so that we can ramp up our work to
prevent state and nonstate actors from achieving their
ambitions around nuclear weapons. Fourth, it provides the
resources needed to support the U.S. Navy with militarily
effective nuclear propulsion plants, and ensure they are safe
and reliable and long-lived operation. Fifth, importantly, it
would allow our Office of Environmental Management to advance
our commitments to the communities that have supported national
defense programs and nuclear research and facilitating
continued progress along all 16 of our cleanup sites.
Before I close I do want to acknowledge that we know,
following the attacks on the grid and on the pipeline, with
SolarWinds and the Colonial Pipeline, that we face this
national security imperative to harden our critical
infrastructure against these evolving cyber threats as well.
So I am humbled by the opportunity to lead the Department
of Energy in this moment, and I am happy to discuss our
priorities and our goals with this Committee, and answer any
questions that you may have.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Granholm and Dr.
Verdon follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Secretary of Energy Jennifer Granholm and
Acting Under Secretary for Nuclear Security Charles Verdon
It is a privilege to serve as the 16th Secretary of Energy and have
the responsibility of leading the Department in enhancing America's
nuclear security through defense, nonproliferation, and environmental
efforts. As long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States must
maintain the safety, security, and effectiveness of the nuclear weapons
stockpile through the application of unparalleled science, technology,
engineering, and manufacturing. The Department also works to prevent
nuclear weapon proliferation and reduce the threat of nuclear and
radiological terrorism by leveraging the unique expertise of our
federal and nuclear security enterprise workforce. In addition, the
Department provides the U.S. Navy with militarily effective nuclear
propulsion plants and ensures their safe, reliable, and long-lived
operation. Finally, we must complete the safe cleanup of the
environmental legacy brought about from decades of nuclear weapons
development and government-sponsored nuclear energy research. The
Department stands ready to support the President in meeting all these
missions. To meet these challenges, DOE must uphold our values,
revitalize our nuclear security enterprise, and ensure the
environmentally sound and safe cleanup of legacy nuclear sites,
particularly in disadvantaged communities. I am committed to investing
in the kinds of science and technology that will help us today,
tomorrow, and well into the future so the United States will always
have a qualitative edge over its adversaries. I am proud to lead the
more than 100,000 dedicated federal and DOE contractor employees
working every day to find solutions to our most pressing national
security, scientific, energy, cybersecurity, and climate change
challenges.
As I noted in my confirmation hearing, I am focused on three
missions as the Secretary of Energy--first, the security of the United
States through the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
nuclear stockpile, nuclear nonproliferation, and naval nuclear
propulsion missions, and the Environmental Management (EM) program's
clean-up of our Cold War legacy sites. Second, supporting the amazing
scientific work being done at the DOE's 17 National Labs and other
facilities across the country, including on climate change and
emissions reductions. Third, taking that research to scale and
deploying it to create jobs for Americans. As Secretary, I am
responsible for what happens at NNSA, and that includes making sure
NNSA is properly resourced to execute its mission. Since I have been in
the position, the Department and NNSA have reinforced a strong and
collaborative working relationship that protects NNSA's semi-autonomous
status while also ensuring that we are able to best leverage the
different skills sets and expertise across the Department.
nnsa fiscal year 2022 budget overview
DOE's NNSA is committed to supporting the President's Interim
National Security Strategic Guidance. The President's Fiscal Year 2022
Budget Request reflects the U.S. commitment to maintain a safe, secure,
and effective nuclear weapons stockpile, reduce global nuclear threats,
and provide the U.S. Navy's submarines and aircraft carriers with
militarily effective nuclear propulsion. NNSA is on track to modernize
the nuclear stockpile with our life extension and alteration programs;
make substantial progress on maintaining, repairing, and recapitalizing
NNSA's deteriorating infrastructure; provide policy and technical
leadership to address all aspects of the nuclear threat reduction
mission; and deliver nuclear propulsion that meets the U.S. Navy's
operational requirements.
The President's Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request of $19.7 billion
for NNSA, an increase of $10.8 million, or 0.1 percent over the fiscal
year 2021 enacted level. \1\ This request would enable NNSA to execute
its long-standing nuclear modernization efforts, begun under the Obama-
Biden Administration, while this Administration undertakes its formal
review of efforts to modernize our nuclear deterrent, to include
Department of Defense delivery platforms, the nuclear weapons required
for those platforms, and the NNSA infrastructure needed to produce and
maintain those weapons. This will preserve space for future policy
decisions related to nuclear modernization, and nuclear
nonproliferation and counterterrorism, as the Administration adjusts to
the changing international threats facing America. Russia, China, and
our adversaries should make no mistake--America will do whatever is
necessary to deter our enemies and provide security in our strategic
relationships with allies and partners.
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\1\ The fiscal year 2021 Enacted level does not include the
mandated transfer of $91 million from Naval Reactors to Nuclear Energy
for the operation of the Advanced Test Reactor.
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The U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile is currently safe, secure, and
militarily effective. However, the legacy stockpile systems are aging,
and NNSA's production infrastructure has atrophied considerably.
America must invest in the weapons and infrastructure modernization
programs to provide the capabilities needed to ensure the deterrent's
viability into the future. Future American political leaders will not
have the weapons and infrastructure in place to support the nuclear
arsenal unless we reestablish that capability now.
As we advance the important work of modernizing our Nation's
nuclear deterrent and the infrastructure that supports that mission, it
is also important that the Department continues to collaborate with the
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) as it has successfully
done for decades. I am happy to report that DOE and DNFSB are
developing a bilateral memorandum of understanding (MOU) to serve as a
foundation for mutual communication, transparency, and information
sharing. The completion of this MOU, which we expect to occur this
year, will be an important tool for our continued collaboration.
weapons activities
The fiscal year 2022 budget request for the Department's Weapons
Activities account is $15.5 billion, an increase of $139.3 million, or
0.9 percent, over fiscal year 2021 enacted levels. This budget request
supports the Administration's goals to modernize the Nation's nuclear
weapons stockpile and infrastructure to meet DOD deterrent
requirements. Included in this request is funding for activities of
NNSA's Office of Defense Programs which, in coordination with the
Department of Defense (DOD), has maintained the effectiveness of the
nuclear deterrent for almost 30 years without the need for additional
nuclear explosive testing. In fiscal year 2021, the science-based
Stockpile Stewardship Program allowed the Secretaries of Energy and
Defense to certify to the President for the 25th consecutive year the
nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe, secure, and militarily
effective. This remarkable scientific achievement is made possible
through the expertise of NNSA's world-class scientists, engineers, and
technicians, and prior investments made in the necessary infrastructure
and tools.
stockpile management
For Stockpile Management, the fiscal year 2022 budget request is
$4.6 billion, an increase of $342.4 million, or 8.0 percent, over the
fiscal year 2021 enacted level.
NNSA is requesting $771.7 million in fiscal year 2022 for the B61-
12 Life Extension Program (LEP), which consolidates four variants of
the B61 gravity bomb and improves the safety and security of a weapon
that entered service in 1966. The B61-12 LEP is currently in Phase 6.5
and has achieved first production on most of its components and will
achieve the system's first production unit (FPU) in the first quarter
of fiscal year 2022.
NNSA is requesting $207.2 million in fiscal year 2022 for the W88
Alteration (Alt) 370, which supports the sea-based leg of the nuclear
triad. The W88 Alt 370 is currently in Phase 6.5 and currently on track
with a system FPU date in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2021.
Nearly all major components have completed their respective FPUs.
NNSA is requesting $1.1 billion in fiscal year 2022 for the W80-4
LEP, which is currently in Phase 6.3, Development Engineering. The W80-
4 LEP supports the U.S. Air Force Long Range Standoff (LRSO) program.
Fiscal year 2022 will see a planned ramp-up of production development
and design activities as the program transitions to Phase 6.4,
Production Engineering.
NNSA is requesting $691.0 million in fiscal year 2022 for the W87-1
Modification Program, which will replace the aging W78-0 warhead. NNSA
has planned first production in fiscal year 2030 to support fielding on
the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent ballistic missile system in the
Mk21A reentry vehicle. The program will deploy new technologies that
improve safety, security, and manufacturability. Efforts in fiscal year
2022 will focus on completion of the Weapon Design and Cost Report, an
independent cost estimate, and entry into Phase 6.3.
The W93/Mk7 is a new program of record authorized by Congress in
fiscal year 2021 to meet DOD requirements. Starting the W93 program in
fiscal year 2021 ensured the development of the warhead coordinated
with the Navy's Mk7 aeroshell program. The W93 will incorporate modern
technologies to improve safety, security, and flexibility to address
future threats, and will be designed for ease of manufacturing,
maintenance, and certification. All the key nuclear components will be
based on previously tested nuclear designs and will not require
underground nuclear explosive testing to certify. NNSA is requesting
$72.0 million in fiscal year 2022 for the program, an increase of $19.0
million, or 35.8 percent above the fiscal year 2021 enacted level.
Fiscal year 2022 will focus on completion of Phase 1 activities and
entry into Phase 2, Feasibility Study and Design Options.
production modernization
The Production Modernization program focuses on the production
capabilities of nuclear weapons components critical to weapon
performance, including primaries, secondaries, radiation cases, and
non-nuclear components. For Production Modernization, the fiscal year
2022 budget request is $2.9 billion, an increase of $363.1 million, or
14.3 percent over the fiscal year 2021 enacted level. Included in this
request is funding for activities that support the Primary Capability
Modernization, Secondary Capability Modernization, and Non-Nuclear
Component Modernization programs.
Primary Capability Modernization includes the plutonium program and
the high explosives and energetics programs. NNSA urgently needs to
recapitalize our plutonium pit production fabrication capabilities to
support our weapons modernization programs. High explosive and
energetic materials are required for every weapon system in the
stockpile and are also under increasing demand.
NNSA's priority infrastructure need is re-establishing a modestly
sized production capacity for plutonium pits. The fiscal year 2022
budget request of $1.7 billion includes funding for plutonium
operations and the plutonium pit production projects at Los Alamos
National Laboratory (LANL) and Savannah River Site (SRS). At LANL, the
Los Alamos Plutonium Pit Production Project advanced in the Critical
Decision (CD) process from Critical Decision (CD)-0 to CD-1
(Alternative Selection and Cost Range), in April 2021. At Savannah
River, the Department is working toward CD-1 by this summer. This two-
site approach is necessary to re-establish the Nation's ability to
produce plutonium pits in support of defense requirements, and to
provide needed resilience against unplanned outages.
Secondary Capability Modernization includes our Uranium, Depleted
Uranium, Lithium, Tritium, and Domestic Uranium Enrichment programs.
The fiscal year 2022 budget request of $488.1 million for Secondary
Capability Modernization is a $31.1 million, or 6.8 percent, increase
over the fiscal year 2021 enacted budget. All these programs support
the nuclear stockpile and face infrastructure and lapsed capability
concerns. Major construction investments to address these
infrastructure concerns are funded within the Infrastructure and
Operations program. For example, NNSA is continuing its progress on the
Uranium Processing Facility (UPF), which, when completed, will be one
of the largest investments in Tennessee and one of the largest
construction projects across the nuclear security enterprise since the
Manhattan Project. UPF construction will support 2,500 good-paying jobs
in 2022 and 1,100 jobs in 2023. NNSA is also working with its partners
to increase production of tritium and is in the early phases of
designing the Tritium Finishing Facility (TFF), to replace a 1950s-era
facility. The United States no longer maintains a lithium purification
capability and relies on material recycling as its main source, which
will be exhausted soon. These operations currently take place in a
World War II-era building well beyond its design life, putting both
operators and processing at risk. NNSA plans to modernize lithium
purification and processing operations in a new Lithium Processing
Facility (LPF) built to modern standards.
Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization includes programs to modernize
production of non-nuclear components for multiple weapon systems. Non-
nuclear components are a significant portion of the costs for the
warhead modernization programs due to the number of parts, their
complexity, and the testing required to ensure they will continue to
function over their required 20-to-30-year lifetimes.
This ongoing modernization of NNSA's production infrastructure is
advancing at a critical time. As the Commander of U.S. Strategic
Command, Admiral Charles Richard, has testified, ``We simply cannot
continue to indefinitely life extend Cold War leftover systems...and
successfully carryout our national strategy. A particular concern is
the aging nuclear weapons stockpile and supporting infrastructure and
we can reach a point where no amount of money will adequately mitigate
the operational risks the Nation will face due to infrastructure and
human talent capability losses.'' Put another way: time is money.
Continued recapitalization is imperative, otherwise there will be a
point at which no amount of money will be able to mitigate the
operational risks and losses to infrastructure capabilities that
accrued over time.
stockpile research, technology, and engineering
The fiscal year 2022 budget request for Stockpile Research,
Technology, and Engineering (SRT&E) is $2.7 billion, a decrease of
$123.1 million, or 4.4 percent below the fiscal year 2021 enacted
levels. The decrease reflects a rebalancing of efforts within NNSA to
focus on near-term priorities to support the stockpile. SRT&E will
continue to focus on the implementation of the Enhanced Capabilities
for Subcritical Experiments (ECSE) and various activities in
preparation to accept and operate NNSA's first Exascale high
performance computing system in 2023. Both capabilities provide data in
support of the W80-4 LEP requirements and the W87-1 modification. SRT&E
provides the data and tools that underpin science-based stockpile
decisions, including the knowledge and expertise needed to maintain
confidence in the nuclear stockpile without the need for additional
underground nuclear explosive testing.
ECSE will produce experimental data to enable the assessment of the
current stockpile and the certification of the future stockpile without
the need to return to explosive nuclear testing. This capability is
needed to help underpin confidence in the W80-4 LEP, W87-1
Modification, and future warhead acquisition programs. NNSA is
requesting $215.6 million in fiscal year 2022 for the program, the same
as the fiscal year 2021 enacted level.
The Exascale Computing Initiative (ECI) will provide NNSA with
next-generation simulation capabilities to support weapons design,
warhead assessment and certification, and continued development of the
science needed to support the nuclear stockpile over the long-term.
NNSA remains on track to accept and operate NNSA's first Exascale high
performance computing system for program use in 2023.
The Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) program provides high energy
density (HED) science capabilities and expertise to provide the data
needed to advance warhead performance and production science, and to
inform design choices for warhead acquisition programs. In addition,
activities like the pursuit of ignition provide not only important
scientific understanding, but a unique training environment for the
workforce. NNSA is requesting $529.0 million in fiscal year 2022 for
the program, a decrease of $46.0 million or 8.0 percent, from the
fiscal year 2021 enacted level. The decrease reflects a decision to
rebalance priorities within the SRT&E portfolio. These programs, along
with our advanced computing and simulation, technology maturation,
academic programs, and other SRT&E missions are essential to
maintaining our confidence in the stockpile.
Every year, NNSA provides grants and cooperative agreements with
top universities across the country. Programs such as the Stewardship
Science Academic Alliances Program and the Minority Serving Institution
Partnership Program (MSIPP) facilitate in recruiting the next
generation of scientists and engineers for our nuclear security
enterprise, and conducting cutting-edge science in national security
and nonproliferation. In support of the President's effort to eliminate
inequities in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (STEM),
MSIPP's mission is to create and foster a sustainable STEM-pipeline
that prepares a diverse workforce of world class talent through
strategic partnerships between Historically Black Colleges and
Universities, Tribal Colleges and Universities, and other Minority
Serving Institutions and the nuclear security enterprise.
infrastructure and operations
Infrastructure is the foundation that supports all NNSA missions.
Modern, efficient, sustainable, and resilient infrastructure is needed
for the nuclear deterrent, nonproliferation, counterterrorism,
emergency response, leading-edge research, and solving the climate
crisis. The deterioration of facilities built during the Manhattan
Project and Cold War eras threatens NNSA's ability to execute its
mission. Today, the average age of NNSA's facilities is 47 years old
and of the agency's $116 billion worth of real property infrastructure,
nearly 60 percent is beyond its design life and half of all facilities
are in poor condition. NNSA's infrastructure includes, among other
things, office buildings, light laboratories, emergency operations
centers, fire houses, roads, utilities, and the specialized equipment
used to support our missions.
The fiscal year 2022 budget request for Infrastructure and
Operations is $3.6 billion, a decrease of $497 million, or 12.2 percent
below the fiscal year 2021 enacted level. The decrease largely results
from the completion of construction projects in fiscal year 2021, the
prioritization of funding for programmatic plutonium construction
funded within Production Modernization, the beginning of the ramp down
of funding for the Uranium Processing Facility project, and the use of
carryover balances to fund work within the Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research Replacement project.
NNSA infrastructure must be resilient and provide the capabilities
and capacities for executing its vital national security missions. This
requires an array of complementary strategies, including minor and
major construction projects, short-term leasing, purchases, and timely
disposition of excess facilities. In partnership with the EM program,
DOE is strategically demolishing high-risk excess facilities such as
the former Biology Complex at Y-12. Its removal enhances safety and
clears land for NNSA missions at the site. We must modernize and
upgrade antiquated infrastructure and address safety and programmatic
risks through strategic, risk-informed investments that directly
support our nuclear weapons and nonproliferation programs.
NNSA is continuing its progress on the Uranium Processing Facility
(UPF), which, when completed, will be one of the largest investments in
Tennessee and one of the largest construction projects across the
nuclear security enterprise since the Manhattan Project. UPF
construction will support 2,500 good-paying jobs in 2022 and 1,100 jobs
in 2023. NNSA is also in the early phases of designing the Tritium
Finishing Facility (TFF). The United States no longer maintains a
lithium purification capability and relies on material recycling as its
main source. The current Program of Record provides sufficient lithium
supply through 2035. These operations currently take place in a World
War II-era building well beyond its design life, putting both operators
and processing at risk. NNSA plans to modernize lithium purification
and processing operations in a new Lithium Processing Facility (LPF)
built to modern standards.
Also, key are the personnel needed to safely and securely operate
and maintain NNSA facilities. As NNSA mission scope increases, so does
the demand for personnel to support new facilities and capabilities
being brought on-line. Many of these sites across the complex will
require additional staff to support moving to 24/7 operations. These
individuals are essential to minimizing unplanned outages and to
supporting safe and secure operations, particularly in high hazard
operations.
defense nuclear security efforts
The Office of Defense Nuclear Security's (DNS) primary mission is
protecting the facilities, people, and assets that are critical to
achieving NNSA's important national security missions. DNS's fiscal
year 2022 budget request is $847.6 million, an increase of $58.6
million, or 7.4 percent, over the fiscal year 2021 enacted amount. NNSA
is making key investments to recapitalize aging physical security
infrastructure through the Security Infrastructure Revitalization
Program. Growth across the nuclear security enterprise, including
plutonium pit production efforts, has led to increased security
requirements. To mitigate the threat from unmanned aircraft systems
(UAS), DNS is installing counter UAS systems at Y-12, the Pantex Plant,
and the Nevada National Security Site.
defense nuclear nonproliferation
NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) is critical
to implementing the President's call to ``lock down fissile and
radiological materials around the world.'' The fiscal year 2022 budget
request for the DNN account is $2.3 billion, an increase of $4.0
million, or 0.2 percent, over the fiscal year 2021 enacted level. \2\
DNN works worldwide with our international partners to prevent state
and non-state actors from developing nuclear weapons or acquiring
weapons-usable
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\2\ The fiscal year 2022 amount does not include the proposed
cancellation of $330 million of prior year balances from the Mixed
Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility project.
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nuclear or radiological materials, equipment, technology, and
expertise. Around the globe, DNN has eliminated the need for weapons-
usable material at over 100 civilian sites and removed over 7,200
kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium from almost 50
countries, achieving a permanent reduction in these threats from these
materials. DNN's unique capabilities are critical to America's national
security and welfare: from promoting and supporting International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements internationally; to
supporting diplomatic arms control efforts such as the successfully
extended New START treaty with Russia; to partnering with United States
industry to support non-HEU based production of the vital medical
isotope molybdenum-99, which is used in 40,000 procedures every day in
the United States.
nuclear terrorism and incident response
The fiscal year 2022 request for the Nuclear Counterterrorism and
Incident Response (NCTIR) Program is $370.8 million, a decrease of $6.7
million, or 1.8 percent below, the fiscal year 2021 enacted level. The
fiscal year 2022 request is lower due to the transfer of management
responsibility and authority for IT and Cyber services and solutions
for the Emergency Communications Network from NCTIR to NNSA's Office
for Information Management.
NCTIR includes two subprograms: Emergency Operations (EO) and
Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation (CTCP).
EO provides the structure and processes the Department uses to
prevent, prepare for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all-
hazards emergencies that threaten life and property. In addition, EO
provides the framework for building, assessing, and improving
organizational resilience to ensure uninterrupted performance and
delivery of the Department's Essential Functions under the Presidential
Policy Directive 40, Executive Order 13961, the National Nuclear
Security Act, and the National Response and Planning Frameworks.
CTCP provides capabilities to counter and respond to nuclear
incidents and accidents worldwide. The foundation of NNSA's diverse
missions is an unparalleled command of nuclear science, which is
harnessed to understand and contend with global nuclear threats. CTCP's
expertise influences a wide range of policies to keep nuclear material
beyond the reach of non-state actors, including security standards for
the storage and transport of such material. The office shares knowledge
of nuclear and radiological threats with federal, state, local, tribal
governments, and international partners by conducting training,
exercises, and information exchanges to strengthen emergency
preparedness and response. CTCP also develops tools to impede the
efforts of proliferant states to obtain nuclear capabilities.
CTCP manages the Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST), a cadre of
on-call technical specialists who are trained and equipped to respond
to all manner of nuclear events. Notable NEST capabilities include
mobile teams that can search for nuclear devices and technical
personnel whose knowledge of nuclear weapons is used to characterize
and defeat such threats. NEST features nuclear forensics capabilities
to identify the origin of nuclear material outside of regulatory
control or used in a threat device. These capabilities constitute an
important element of the U.S. deterrence strategy, by allowing the
United States to credibly threaten retaliation against any state that
facilitates an act of nuclear terrorism.
naval reactors
The Office of Naval Reactors remains at the forefront of
technological developments in naval nuclear propulsion by advancing new
technologies and improvements in naval reactor performance. This
preeminence provides the U.S. Navy with a commanding edge in naval
warfighting capabilities. Naval Reactors has given the United States
unmatched reach with an unparalleled record of over 169 million miles
safely steamed on nuclear power and over 7,300 reactor-years of
operation.
The fiscal year 2022 budget for Naval Reactors is $1.9 billion, an
increase of $182.7 million, or 10.8 percent, over the fiscal year 2021
enacted level. \3\ The budget request supports Naval Reactors' three
major projects--the Columbia-class reactor plant development, the
refueling overhaul of a research and training reactor in New York, and
the construction of the Naval Spent Fuel Handling Facility in Idaho.
Naval Reactors is committed to supporting the operational nuclear
fleet, continuing research and development efforts for future
generations of nuclear-powered warships, and making progress on both
the recapitalization of laboratory facilities and the environmental
remediation of legacy responsibilities.
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\3\ The fiscal year 2021 Enacted level does not include the
mandated transfer of $91 million from Naval Reactors to Nuclear Energy
for the operation of the Advanced Test Reactor. The fiscal year 2022
amount does not include the proposed cancellation of $6 million of
prior year balances.
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new era of progress for environmental management mission
As important as the missions of today and tomorrow are, the Cold
War left an indelible mark on America. It is the mission of the Office
of Environmental Management (EM) is to address the legacy of nuclear
weapons development and government-sponsored nuclear energy research
that has played a significant role in domestic security and prosperity.
As the largest environmental cleanup program in the world, EM plays
a key role in the Department's overarching mission to protect the
planet. The Department's fiscal year 2022 budget request of $7.6
billion will help EM continue to make progress in fulfilling the
government's responsibility to clean up the environment in communities
that supported nuclear weapons programs and government-sponsored
nuclear energy research.
Building on past success, the EM program is entering a new era of
cleanup accomplishments. The fiscal year 2022 request supports a ramp
up in EM's ability to tackle tank waste--one of the Department's
largest environmental challenges and financial liabilities. The request
will also enable continued progress in infrastructure improvements at
the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant and support an increased rate of waste
shipments from across the EM program. In addition, EM will continue to
advance facility demolition and risk reduction projects across the
program.
The fiscal year 2022 request includes $6.8 billion for defense
environmental cleanup activities, which covers most major EM sites. The
request of $1.5 billion for the Office of River Protection will enable
EM to remain on track to initiate tank waste treatment at the Hanford
site by the end of 2023 through the Direct Feed Low Activity Waste
(DFLAW) approach. In fiscal year 2022, EM expects to achieve a
significant milestone in the start of tank waste treatment through the
initiation of operations at the Tank-Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) unit,
which is necessary to prepare waste for DFLAW treatment. Also at
Hanford, the request of $1.0 billion for the Richland Operations Office
will support continued risk reduction activities at Hanford's Central
Plateau and along the Columbia River corridor, including remediation
activities at Building 324 and the transfer of cesium and strontium
capsules to dry storage.
At the Savannah River Site, the request of $1.7 billion will help
EM accelerate tank waste treatment through operation of the Salt Waste
Processing Facility and the Defense Waste Processing Facility. The
request will also continue operations and maintain a high state of
readiness for H Canyon, the only chemical separations facility
remaining in operation in the United States. At the Idaho Cleanup
Project, the request of $381 million will continue advancing the
Integrated Waste Treatment Unit (IWTU) toward hot operations. This
facility is necessary to address the last remaining tank waste at the
Idaho National Laboratory. In addition, exhumation of buried waste and
treatment of transuranic waste sludge will complete, allowing the site
to proceed with closure of the Radioactive Waste Management Complex.
The request also supports key modernization and infrastructure
recapitalization priorities at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP).
Specifically, the request of $437 million will help ensure WIPP is
equipped to meet the needs of the national transuranic waste disposal
mission by enabling transportation activities from multiple locations
required for sustained operations of up to 14 shipments per week.
EM's fiscal year 2022 budget also facilitates the Department's
broader national security and scientific research missions. The request
includes $436 million in defense environmental cleanup funding for Oak
Ridge, which will enable EM to continue cleanup operations at the Oak
Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Y-12 National Security Complex
excess facilities. The request enables EM to advance progress on
several near-term priorities at Oak Ridge including the disposition of
the remaining uranium-233 inventory at ORNL, addressing transuranic
debris and sludges, and continuing design of the On Site Waste Disposal
Facility.
At the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the request of $333.5
million will support EM initiating deactivation and decommissioning
(D&D) work at the Ion Beam Facility, along with remediation activities
at the DP-Road site, groundwater treatment and transuranic waste
shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. The request also includes
$35 million to support continued D&D efforts for excess facilities at
the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
As the Department enters this new era of cleanup progress, EM is
working to build a workforce for the future that promotes diversity and
inclusion. That includes high-quality jobs in environmental cleanup
where workers from all backgrounds can make a living and make a
difference. The budget request includes a significant boost in funding
to expand the Minority Serving Institutions partnership program to a
new EM STEM Manufacturing and Cybersecurity Consortium. This program
will be primarily focused on Historically Black Colleges and
Universities and other Minority Serving Institutions with research
specialties needed to advance the EM mission.
EM's fiscal year 2022 request reflects a planning approach that
will boost the Department's ability to complete its clean up mission.
EM is prepared to put these resources to work to enhance environmental
protections and remediate sites so they can be transitioned to future
uses in local communities that helped the Nation win the Cold War and
maintain peace for decades. As we do, the Department will work hand-in-
hand with workers, unions, Tribal Nations, local communities, and
Congress to plan for this next era of cleanup.
enhancing cybersecurity
As you all are aware, a ransomware attack happened on May 7th that
led to the shutdown of the Colonial Pipeline Company's largest fuel
pipeline on the East Coast. The White House asked the Department of
Energy to coordinate a whole-of-government effort to ensure that the
company had the resources necessary to resume operations as quickly and
safely as possible, while moving fuel supplies to impacted areas by
other means. This incident was a stark reminder of the imperative to
harden the Nation's critical infrastructure against these serious and
growing cyber threats.
As the Sector Risk Management Agency for cybersecurity in the
Energy Sector, the Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and
Emergency Response, or CESER, leads the Department's efforts to
safeguard the Nation's critical energy infrastructure against growing
and evolving cyber threats and attacks. CESER works closely with the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and public and
private sector partners to strengthen the energy sector's risk
management capabilities and enhance sector-wide situational awareness
and threat analysis. The Office is advancing policies, technologies,
and risk management tools that will increase the visibility of physical
and cyber threats in the operational technology environment, mature the
cybersecurity supply chain, and support exercises and partnerships with
states and other organizations. Earlier this year, DOE and CISA
announced a partnership with the electricity sector to develop the 100-
day Industrial Control Systems Cyber Initiative. The initiative will
strengthen the security of electricity critical systems and increase
the visibility of the systems that control the Nation's utility
operations. Ultimately, the initiative will help pave the way for
efforts to secure critical infrastructure in other sectors.
In the current threat environment, the Department cannot afford to
neglect its cybersecurity capabilities, which serve as frontline assets
that protect the information, systems, and networks necessary to
execute its mission. Information Technology and Cybersecurity enable
every element of DOE/NNSA's missions. To meet future requirements, the
Department must modernize its outdated and legacy technology.
The Office of the Chief Information Officer leads the Department's
efforts to modernize and improve cybersecurity defenses to protect
federal systems and information at our national laboratories, power
marketing administrations, plants, sites and headquarters.
Additionally, we remain focused on strengthening our ability to respond
and recover from cybersecurity incidents when they occur.
The Department is targeting cybersecurity investments on lessons
learned from recent cybersecurity attacks and implementing the
Executive Order to Improve the Nation's Cybersecurity, including:
Accelerating the movement to a zero-trust security model
and secure cloud services;
Securing the software supply chain; and
Improving cybersecurity threat hunting and response in
both information technology and operational technology.
I can assure you that cybersecurity will remain a top priority for
the Department, and these investments will posture DOE to defend
against an ever-evolving landscape of cyber threats.
conclusion
DOE is charged with the truly unique and awesome responsibilities
of advancing national security through the application of science.
NNSA's weapons activities, nonproliferation, and naval reactors
programs are essential to promoting America's national security and
keeping our people safe. By applying the highest environmental
standards and the best that new technology has to offer, DOE can ensure
that science is harnessed to bolster America's national security, keep
our edge in research and technology, and build an economy that reflects
what we value most--our people. We are mindful of the resources
entrusted for these vital missions and greatly appreciate the ongoing
support of this Committee and Congress.
Chairman Reed. Well, thank you, Madam Secretary. Dr.
Verdon, do you have a statement?
Dr. Verdon. No, sir. Not at this time.
Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much. Let me begin with
the Secretary. Once again, thank you for your service in so
many ways to the Nation. I deeply appreciate it.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, last year the
Committee spent a great deal of time trying to iron out the
relationship with the Department of Defense and the Nuclear
Weapons Council, and from your perspective, is that process
working now? Are we getting a full, integrated conclusion from
both Defense and Energy?
Secretary Granholm. I am happy to say that it is, sir. It
is very intentional. We are absolutely working hand-in- glove
and are coordinated in our goals, our approach, and in the
budget.
Chairman Reed. Well, thank you, Madam Secretary.
Dr. Verdon, plutonium facility construction costs are about
$20,000 to $25,000 per square foot, on average, based on what
you have been doing out at Los Alamos. In 2018, you performed
an engineering study in which Los Alamos originally proposed a
modular 25 [sic]-square-foot building to be built next to their
plutonium facility, at roughly $5 billion, and early the
Nuclear Weapons Council approved this approach.
That was one approach, but the administration is firmly
committed now to two facilities, one in Savannah and one in Los
Alamos. But the facility in Savannah's cost growth has gone
from $4.6 billion to $11 billion. I wonder, looking at the
metric of square feet and what you have done in Los Alamos, are
you considering applying the same type of production to
Savannah to lower costs, or alternatives to try to lower costs?
Dr. Verdon. Sir, we are looking at--the original cost of
$4.2 was really a top-down estimate. The present cost we have
now are the first time the subject matter experts have actually
built a bottoms-up cost. So, you know, the costs are actually
comparable now to the Los Alamos project also. So there is
quite a bit of consistency between the two.
But we still find that the two-site solution is the most
schedule- and cost-efficient way for us to reach the 80 pits a
year, because as you mentioned, to do 80 pits at one site would
require a whole new facility to be built, which would add years
and quite a bit of money to build that facility. We are finding
that the approach that we are using for MOX and Los Alamos are
very consistent, and all of the latest information we have,
which is basically the best we have had since we started this,
still indicates that this is the best path to reach the 80 pits
per year that the DOD has identified.
Chairman Reed. So roughly the square foot cost at Savannah
will be equivalent to the cost at Los Alamos?
Dr. Verdon. It look a little different from the point that
the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility-4 actually has a lot of the
infrastructure already in the building, where the MOX facility,
we will have to install a lot of the environmental equipment
that is already present at Los Alamos, we will be installing
it. So when you take that into account it would look more, but
it is going to be, effectively, if you try to neutralize all
that they are very consistent. In fact, we utilized the
information that we obtained from installing the equipment for
1 to 10 pits already at Los Alamos to inform the costs of both
sites.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. Let me ask another question, Dr.
Verdon. NNSA has been directed by the Nuclear Weapons Council
to begin exploratory studies of submarine warhead to be sealed
in the mid-2030s, and my understanding is that this effort is
being undertaken with the United Kingdom. Can you, in this open
session, describe what activity we will be participating with
in the United Kingdom, and the necessity for this weapon
system?
Dr. Verdon. Well, the necessity, I would say you would have
to speak to the STRATCOM Commander for that, because he sets
those requirements. But our work with the United Kingdom, which
is an independent development of their warhead, we tried to
synergistically leverage each other's abilities to make sure
that we have the highest confidence that both systems will
work. Where they integrate is more back into, again, the Navy,
so Admiral Wolfe, when it comes to integrating on the missile.
So that is why it is necessary for us to work closely together
to make sure that both what we build for the United States and
what they build for their country will function correctly on
the missiles, which are common.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Again, Madam Secretary,
Dr. Verdon, thank you very much.
With that I would recognize the ranking member for his
questions. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Okay, that is good. Thank you. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman. We are putting this exhibit up. I know you have
both seen it, and you are very familiar with it. But we want to
make sure it is in view of the camera and make sure that
everyone understands what we are trying to say here.
Last summer, the previous NNSA administrator testified that
more than a third of the NNSA's facilities are over 60 years
old. We know that, and we have heard that, and that is a
problem.
Secretary Granholm, I would first ask you, have you
personally seen and witnessed and toured these facilities?
Secretary Granholm. No, I have not yet because of the COVID
restrictions, but I look forward to doing so.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. I knew that was your answer, and I
know that is right, and you and I talked about this so I wanted
to ask you on the record. Will you personally do that?
Secretary Granholm. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. That is good. That is good. When our
adversaries are rapidly building up their nuclear arsenals, why
would be cutting the funding of our basic facility maintenance?
Now everybody knows that during the last administration
there was a problem, a relational problem, between your
predecessor and me and some of the others up here. I want to
make sure that we all want to do the same thing, and from our
conversations I believe that we do, and I am looking forward to
a great relationship, unlike the previous administration's
relationship with me.
Dr. Verdon, you are an expert. In the past year's NNSA,
official stated that they need real sustained growth every year
to keep the nuclear modernization on track. How will flat or
reduced budget affect the NNSA ability to meet the DOD
requirements over time, should that be the case? Would you
expand on that a little bit, on what would be the effect if we
failed to come up with the right approach to this?
Dr. Verdon. Yes, sir. So when we put the 2022 request
together we took a hard look at all of the requirements as we
understood them, and, you know, given to them by the Department
of Defense and what we had to do to meet those requirements. We
did the best risk balancing that we could across the complex.
We ensured that the warheads got the funding that they
absolutely needed, that the major facility modernizations got
the funding that they absolutely needed.
In the area of infrastructure and operations, what we
looked at there that was one of the areas during the COVID
pandemic that we actually had to do some slowdowns. We
recognize that we will have higher than usual carryovers in
those areas. So that is why we reduced some of the requests
that we originally were thinking about. We reduced them in
recognition of the fact that we just could not put the number
of people necessary within the square footage to get the work
accomplished in a safe and effective manner.
So that was one of the reasons we lowered the request from
some initials, was just the realization that COVID had a larger
impact in that area. But again, we think we can accomplish--you
know, we are working with the sites, that we can accomplish all
of the work required to keep the infrastructure moving forward.
As I say, all the major facility modernizations are supported,
and so that was a lot of the thinking.
Then the other important area in the infrastructure
modernization that looks like an artificial downturn is that
the uranium processing facility is at its highest funding in
fiscal year 2021, and it is beginning its natural roll-off in
fiscal year 2022. So that almost accounts for $100 million or
more of the reduction in fiscal year 2022, is just that natural
roll-off that is beginning at the uranium processing facility.
I think the important message is we believe we can
accomplish, with the budget request as presented, all of the
key things that we have to do in fiscal year 2022.
Senator Inhofe. Dr. Verdon, it is understandable some of
the things that we had to go through during the pandemic, and
we do understand that, and we understand the results of that.
But now we are out of that and we are on our way, and would you
agree with the statements that I made about our adversaries,
what they have been doing, and the necessity for us to get back
in the game?
Dr. Verdon. Yes, I agree. I mean, your pictures are worth
1,000 words. We have a lot of infrastructure work to do, and as
I say, we kept a major focus on the modernization because that,
in some sense, is deferred maintenance as well. Some of the
buildings, the faster we can replace them, the better off we
are, instead of putting money to try to keep old buildings
functioning.
Senator Inhofe. In your background, have you ever seen more
deplorable conditions than we are witnessing here?
Dr. Verdon. Some of those buildings, they are eye- opening
to go through them, and that is some of the challenges we face
is still trying to keep them functioning. The sites are
commended for still accomplishing the work in some of those
facilities.
Senator Inhofe. Well, I thank both of you, and thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Let me recognize
Senator Kaine, please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you to the chair and ranking member,
and thank you to the witnesses for your service, and especially
Governor Granholm and I served together as governors, and it is
a real treat to see you here before the Committee.
A concern that I had in the previous administration was a
policy that is known as Part 810 authorizations, when the
United States--Part 810 describes a process by which the United
States vets and then approves the transfers of sensitive
nuclear technology to other nations. It had long been the
practice of administrations of both parties that when Part 810
agreements were reached, and limited transfers of sensitive
nuclear technology to other nations was allowed, that the
administrations would notify Congress of that fact.
The Part 810 process involves DOE and other agencies,
looking at the request for the transfer of nuclear technology,
and it involves signoff by a number of agencies, including the
DOE.
During the past administration, there began to be a
practice which I believe was unprecedented, of the U.S.
Government doing transfers of sensitive nuclear information to
other nations, and in particular, to Saudi Arabia, without
Congress being notified. At a hearing, I believe it was 2 years
ago, when we had Secretary Kerry before us, I asked him about
such transfers, and in particular were transfers being made to
Saudi Arabia, and in extreme particularity, were we
transferring nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia after the
assassination by the Saudi Arabian Government of Virginia
resident and Washington Post journalist, Jamal Khashoggi.
I was not given an answer about that at the hearing. I was
promised information about it, and it took a very, very long
time for me to finally get the information from the
administration, and I give credit, actually Senator Jim Risch,
then chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
eventually helped me get this information.
But what I was hoping, Madam Secretary, is that you would
commit to us that the Biden administration would return to past
practice, and when there is a decision made by the
administration to transfer sensitive nuclear technology to
other nations that Congress be informed of that. It does not
seem to be too much to ask for the SAS Committee, the Intel
Committee, the Foreign Relations Committee, and others to know
if we are transferring sensitive nuclear technology to other
nations.
So just a bottom-line question, could you tell us that you
will return to past practice and keep Congress informed when
Part 810 authorizations are being utilized to transfer nuclear
technology to other nations?
Secretary Granholm. Yes, Senator. You have my word.
Senator Kaine. Thank you. Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine, and now let me
recognize Senator Rounds, please. Excuse me, Senator Rounds,
but Senator Fischer is on Webex. Senator Fischer via Webex,
please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Verdon, what
lessons do you think we can learn from our recent experience
with pit production? I know this has been an objective since
Rocky Flats closed in 1989. It was part of President Obama's
modernization commitment that he made with the New START
Treaty. But CMRR was cancelled in 2012, and NSA did not begin
its analysis of alternatives for follow-up options until 2016.
That analysis failed to select a preferred alternative. It was
followed by a subsequent engineering analysis, and finally,
after 2 years of study, NNSA selected its current approach,
which we are now discovering is not going to make the deadline
for production.
Clearly the challenge we faced was underestimated.
[Inaudible] about having time to spare they were wrong. What do
we do differently to make sure that this does not happen again?
Dr. Verdon. Thank you for the question. It is a very good
question that we are actually working very hard on. We are
trying to follow a very rigorous process for when we identify
requirements to when we actually commit to doing the actual
construction. What we are finding is we have to find a way to
improve the fidelity of the information we have earlier in the
project, because, you know, we are pushing through on the pit
production, and when we achieved Critical Decision 1 that is
only 30 percent design complete. Critical Decision 2 is when we
get to 90 percent design complete.
What we are trying to figure out is how to get more of that
information up front without committing the country yet to a
final decision and making sure that we bring to the country all
of the right options still. So we are trying to walk that fine
line of how to improve the fidelity of the information, and the
costing information, scheduling information earlier, but
literally what we are finding is takes doing the detailed
design work, because all of these facilities are unique, one-
of-a-kind. That is both good news and bad news. It is good news
that there are not too many of these around the world, and it
is rougher news from the point of view that they are not
commodity, they are not off the shelf. Each one is unique.
But we are working and we recognize it is an area where we
have to improve on how to bring higher fidelity information
earlier into the process rather than later, which is how we are
doing it right now, as we improve the fidelity as we go along.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much. Madam Secretary, I
know this predates your tenure, but you are in a position to
apply the lessons learned and ensure that we do not repeat
these mistakes. So I would also like to hear your views on
this.
Secretary Granholm. Well, I obviously defer to the
expertise of the gentleman to my left, because his knowledge
and his management of the production and the time frame and the
estimates are well grounded in his experience. I just have to
say that, you know, as the Energy Secretary, the relationship
between NNSA and DoE and the sharing of information like this
has been incredibly important for me, just as a starting
matter, but also the pledge to continue to work closely with
NNSA, in my learning of the production challenges, the estimate
challenges, the managerial challenges, the personnel
recruitment issues that NNSA is experiencing, which is
reflected across society, frankly.
Senator Fischer. Very good. Good to hear. Thank you.
Also, Secretary Granholm, Section 179 of Title 10 requires
that the Nuclear Weapons Council, to make certification
regarding the adequacy of NNSA's budget, the certification is
required to be submitted with the budget, and that was released
on May 28th, but this Committee has still not received it. I
understand the budget process this year is irregular, but let
me ask you this. We have DOE and NNSA, have they begun
discussions with members of the Nuclear Weapons Council about
next year's budget, so that the Council is in a position to
provide a certification when it is submitted to Congress, as
required?
Secretary Granholm. Oh yes. We have been in lots of
discussions with the Council about the budget that you are
considering. I believe they are going to be certifying that
budget, and clearly we will continue those conversations going
into the next year after this.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator Rosen
must preside, so I want to thank Senator King for yielding.
Senator Rosen, you are recognized.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Senator King, and thank you,
Chairman Reed and Ranking Member Inhofe, and I appreciate both
your service and being here today.
I want to quickly talk about the Nevada National Security
Site and our infrastructure needs, because when I last visited
there I saw the ongoing construction project at the U1a
facility for enhanced capabilities for the subcritical
experiments that we do there, the ECSE. I am excited that
Nevada National Security Site was going to house the most
capability weapons radiographic system in the world.
So Dr. Verdon, could you provide us with an update on the
upgrade to the ECSE facility at the U1a complex and tell us how
the new facility will improve our Stockpile Stewardship
Program's scientific capabilities, including a very important
understanding of plutonium?
Dr. Verdon. Yes. We are moving forward, as you say, with
the ECSE, which is really two parts. One is actually the
construction of the underground facility, which is moving
forward and is meeting all of their objectives, and the
development of the radiographic equipment, which is also making
progress on schedule. So the project is one of our highest-
focused areas and the labs and sites are working very hard to
make sure that that is met.
Yes, it will be a world-class facility when completed, and
it will give us information that we just have not had access to
since we did nuclear tests. So this is a key technological
advancement in that regard, and will actually decrease the
technical need to ever return to testing once we complete this
facility.
Senator Rosen. Now that you have said that I am awfully
concerned that the President's budget request proposes an 11
percent cut to the Nevada National Security Site. So how is
that going to impact the critical mission that we are going to
have, that we have there, ongoing and into the future, and
maintain our superiority?
Dr. Verdon. Yes, so the funding to all the critical, you
know, the high-priority areas has been maintained. There are a
few areas that we completed projects and we rolled them off.
But there are others that are going to be starting soon. But
all of the major projects, like utility upgrades and the ECSE
and other activities have all been funded at the requisite and
required levels.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I would like to move on to you,
Secretary Granholm, and talk a little bit about the plutonium
removal. In fall of 2018, the Department of Energy secretly--
secretly--shipped one half a metric ton of weapons-grade
plutonium from South Carolina to the Nevada National Security
Site. As part of an effort to restore trust with the people of
Nevada, NNSA committed to begin that removal of the material no
later than 2021, completing the removal by 2026.
Can you provide us with an update on the plan to remove the
plutonium, and I do understand that one-half metric ton of this
plutonium will be used for pit production activities at Los
Alamos, and so I know it is critical that it gets there,
Secretary.
Secretary Granholm. Yes. The commitment that we made with
the state stands. We will remove, and continue to remove that
plutonium, consistent with that agreement.
Senator Rosen. Dr. Verdon, can you--if you cannot do it
now, can you provide to the Committee in writing an update on
the status of Los Alamos achieving their 30 pits per year, and
how this does rely on the materials being transported from the
Nevada National Security Site?
Dr. Verdon. We will be happy to do so.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Granholm. The Department of Energy's National
Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) remains committed to
remove the weapon-grade plutonium shipped from South Carolina
in 2018 and currently staged at the Nevada National Security
Site (NNSS). This effort is crucial to support Los Alamos
National Laboratory's (LANL) mission to produce 30 plutonium
pits per year (ppy) beginning in the year 2026. Pursuant to a
U.S. District Court order, DOE/NNSA was required to remove one
metric ton of plutonium from South Carolina by 2019. The one-
half metric ton of weapon-grade plutonium that was shipped from
South Carolina to Nevada before November 2018 is material that
will be utilized to meet NNSA's pit manufacturing objectives at
LANL. DOE/NNSA committed to commence removal of this material
from Nevada beginning in calendar year 2021 and to complete
removal by the end of calendar year 2026. DOE/NNSA remains on
track and committed to meeting the agreement regarding removal
of this plutonium from Nevada.
Dr. Verdon. Department of Defense (DOD) objectives and
federal law require reestablishing the capability to produce no
fewer than 80 war reserve plutonium ppy. In 2018, the Nuclear
Weapons Council (NWC) endorsed the NNSA two-site strategy for
pit production. This includes expanding existing capabilities
at LANL's Plutonium Facility (PF-4) to produce no fewer than 30
ppy at LANL during 2026. Work to implement 30 ppy production
capacity at LANL is progressing. The Los Alamos Plutonium Pit
Production Project (LAP4) to install the equipment and
infrastructure necessary to meet LANL's pit production mission
objectives achieved Critical Decision-1, Approve Alternate
Selection and Cost Range, in April 2021 and work continues to
finalize the project design in support of CD-2, Approve
Performance Baseline. Concurrently, under the auspices of the
joint Pit Product Realization Team, LANL continues to produce a
series of pits to prove-in and qualify manufacturing processes
and enable production of the first war reserve plutonium pit in
2023. The weapon-grade plutonium currently staged at the Nevada
National Security Site (NNSS) is in the process of being moved
to LANL to support this element of NNSA's pit production
mission. Plutonium removal from NNSS began in 2021 and will be
completed by the end of 2026.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, and the last question I have is
about radioactive waste shipments, because in 2019, Nevada
learned that the Department of Energy had been shipping
incorrectly labeled low-level radioactive waste from the Y-12
facility in Oakridge to the Nevada National Security Site. This
waste was, in fact, mixed, low-level radioactive waste, which
violated the waste acceptance criteria for NNSS.
Currently, NNSS lacks waste verification equipment to
verify that waste received for disposal meets the acceptance
criteria. This technology and additional personnel are critical
if we are able to do our job. Over 1 million cubic feet of low-
level radioactive mixed waste may come to us for disposal each
year.
Secretary Granholm, would you support funding for waste
verification technology at the NNSS to ensure that the site is
receiving and disposing the proper waste and avoiding further
mislabeled shipments?
Secretary Granholm. Yes. I am assuming that Dr. Verdon
would agree that that is important.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, and I yield back. I have 10
seconds. I am going to preside. Thank you again for allowing me
to----
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Let me now
recognize Senator Rounds, please.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to say
Governor Granholm, but Secretary Granholm, it is good to see
you again. It is. I think the governor title is probably a
better title, but nonetheless, welcome.
Secretary Granholm. Thank you.
Senator Rounds. Dr. Verdon, thank you for your service, and
we appreciate you being here in front of us today. I have got a
series of questions, but I want to focus back on, and come back
to where Senator Fischer was leading to begin with, with regard
to the budget. But I want to lead into it by visiting with Dr.
Verdon for just a few minutes, concerning the infrastructure
issues.
I would like to begin by just simply asking how confident
are you that the infrastructure in place to support the nuclear
modernization efforts and the programs planned over the next
few decades, whether or not the infrastructure will be able to
handle those necessary programs, as planned. The reason why I
am asking it in this way is because it is pretty clear that the
infrastructure that we have got right now, and I think what
Senator Inhofe has shared, is that we have got some pretty
serious infrastructure problems.
In fact, the NNSA's own fiscal year 2021 Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Plan states that a number of key
facilities do not meet modern safety standards and require
significantly increased investments to maintain. The plan
further states that the infrastructure issues may very well
impact stockpile maintenance and warhead deliveries.
This is simply not acceptable, and with that I would like
your opinion on whether or not we actually have it in place and
whether or not we are doing enough to bring it up to speed.
Dr. Verdon. We have used the DOD requirements to actually
drive the priority of which we are attacking the
infrastructure. So all of the large facility, or facility
infrastructure requests have been prioritized, all with meeting
the DOD requirements and worker safety in mind.
We recognize that there is--you know, as I think I have
said many times, the complex has truly atrophied. The pictures
showed that. We recognize we cannot do it all at once, so we
have prioritized it based on personnel safety and the weapons
that we need to deliver to the DOD. We are keeping those
priorities and moving to address them all, and working
diligently on those facilities that we will not be able to
wholesale replace, to make sure that their maintenance is kept
up to speed.
Senator Rounds. Here is the second part of this, though.
Naturally, we are also concerned about the recent announcement
concerning NNSA's ability to produce plutonium pits. Both
statute, specifically 50 U.S.C. 2538a and STRATCOM, require
that NNSA produce no less than 30 plutonium pits per year by
2026, and 80 plutonium pits per year by 2030. Can you explain
why you are unable to meet this statutory requirement, and
also, what do we need to do, as Congress, to be able to help
you meet that goal, that directive, that mandate?
Dr. Verdon. So again, the two-site solution is the approach
that we still think is a viable one for the 80 pits per year.
What we identified--we still have confidence of being to meet
the 30 pits per year by 2026 at Los Alamos. What the detailed
analysis showed is when we started the work on the Savannah
River site, what the detailed analysis showed is as we actually
started to do the design work that the amount of equipment we
needed in there, the amount of people we needed in there, we
just could not get them in, all done at the same time, to meet
the 2030 objective.
What we do believe is if we can meet it between 2032 and
2035, that is what the next phase of the Savannah River project
will look at, is defining better what that time frame is. But
it was just basically more detailed information, more detailed
analysis to identify that vendors could not potentially provide
the equipment we needed on the right time frame, we could not
get enough people in the building to do the work, you know,
faster.
Senator Rounds. Dr. Verdon, I am going to run out of time,
but I just want to make this point. The Nuclear Weapons Council
has not certified the NNSA budget, as I think Senator Fischer
was getting at, which was supposed to be done by the end of
June. They pushed the deadline to the end of July. Now there is
a reason why they have not done that yet.
Now this particular council, just for the benefit of folks
watching this, this Nuclear Weapons Council consists of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary
of Defense for Research and Engineering, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, the STRATCOM Commander, the NNSA
Administrator. Clearly there is an issue, and I am suggesting--
and this is the reason, Secretary Granholm, that I think you
need to be able to participate in this directly--apparently the
budget--and I think there is a reason why they are not
certifying the budget at this point and have delayed it at
least 30 days--I am questioning whether or not the budget
adequately responds to the immediate needs that are being
pointed out by the deficiencies in infrastructure and the
inability to produce plutonium pits based on what is directed
by STRATCOM and by statute.
I know I am out of time, but just a quick, brief response,
if the Chairman would allow it.
Chairman Reed. Yes, please. A quick response.
Secretary Granholm. You want that to me? It is my
understanding that--and, of course, you have not seen the
documentation yet--but that we are all in sync, and that it
will be certified. But again, you have got to get your
documents in front of you. I also understand that there will
be, as you know, a nuclear posture review in August, and in the
first year of any administration, or at least the past couple
of administrations, there is the out-funding, the policy
associated with that nuclear posture review is not reflected in
the budget, and there we wanted to have some conversations
about that. Understandably, we all want to make sure that we
have the requirements met in the out years as well.
So I think--and again, you will have to get the document
from them, but I think we are in sync, and I think there will
be a certification.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Senator King,
please.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Granholm,
the bedrock of this nation's national defense strategy is
deterrence, and we are going through a once-in- a-generation,
perhaps once in two or three generations modernization of our
deterrent capability--Columbia submarine, B-21, ground-based
strategic deterrent, returning to pit production, upgrading of
warheads, and nuclear command and control.
In your view, if we failed to do that, if we back off of
that mission of upgrading those elements of our nuclear
deterrent, does that diminish the deterrence that affects the
calculus of our adversaries?
Secretary Granholm. Yes.
Senator King. That is exactly the answer that I believe is
also the case. Deterrence is in the mind of the adversary, and
if they perceive that we have allowed our nuclear deterrent
capability to degrade, that in itself, will it not diminish the
effectiveness of deterrence?
Secretary Granholm. Absolutely. As Secretary Austin has
said, nuclear deterrence should be the number one priority.
Senator King. The best conflict is the one that does not
occur.
Secretary Granholm. Exactly.
Senator King. The best way to have that occasion is for our
adversaries to understand that we are serious, and that part of
that is committing the resources necessary to establish the
capability of the deterrence.
Turning a moment--and this is not strictly NNSA related but
it is certainly in this area--is the role of cyber and the
danger of cyber in our nuclear enterprise, as well as across
the government. CESER is one of the subagencies of the
Department of Energy. I would like your commitment that this is
an agency that will be emphasized, supported, and there is some
discussion about whether it should be an assistant secretary or
a professional. But the important thing is that this, I
believe, is one of the most important initiatives within the
Department of Energy, and will you commit to your full and
enthusiastic support of their mission?
Secretary Granholm. Not only will I commit to the full and
enthusiastic support, I agree with you 100 percent that it must
be elevated, and elevated, in my mind, means that we have to
make sure that we have professional staff. I want to make it a
directorate that will have the ability to ensure that
professionals are running it. It is an emergency response
organization, and you need professionals who are running it
regardless of administration.
Unfortunately, and you and I have discussed this, and I
know this is question and I am happy to have further
conversations, if there is an appointee, often there are long
gaps in the leadership, and because these issues, cyberattacks,
are relentless, gaps in leadership make it very difficult to
run an effective organization. Since CESER was created, the
leader of CESER has been unseated, no leader for exactly half
of the time.
So we want to make sure that there is consistent, strong,
professional leadership, and I want to elevate it to be a
directorate, and make sure that it has the resources that it
needs.
Senator King. We will continue to discuss that issue, but
the important thing is the emphasis on the significant role.
Let me ask another couple of cyber questions. One is, part
of nuclear modernization has to be what they call C3--
communications, command, and control. That has got to be cyber
protected, to the nth degree. Do you agree that that is part of
the nuclear modernization challenge?
Secretary Granholm. Yes.
Senator King. I am sorry?
Secretary Granholm. Yes.
Senator King. Thank you. The other piece is the cyber
protection within your agency. I hope you will be brutal in
testing, pen testing, and really working the cyber protection
within the agency. The Federal Government is notorious for
being cyber vulnerable, and one of the only ways to protect
against that is individual desktop cyber hygiene. So I hope
that you will test your employees to be sure that they are not
responding to phishing emails, that they are not clicking on
attachments that they shouldn't. It seems mundane, but 85 or 90
percent of cyberattacks could be prevented by just
straightforward, simple cyber hygiene at the desktop. I want
you to appoint somebody whose job it is to expose
vulnerabilities within the Department.
Secretary Granholm. Yes. We have actually appointed a new
CIO, and this is exactly what we are focused on.
Senator King. The final question. Deterrence does not work
with nonstate actors. That is where nonproliferation comes in,
and we have to be concerned into the future about nonstate
actors getting a hold of nuclear materials, and so it is
critical that your Department works closely with the
intelligence community, with the entire nonproliferation
governmental structure, because, as I say, our whole strategy
rests upon deterrence, but deterrence does not work for a half-
dozen people who are perfectly willing to die to bring a
nuclear weapon into New York Harbor.
So please commit to me that you are going to remain
committed and keep your eye on nonproliferation, because that
has got to be part of our strategy.
Secretary Granholm. Absolutely.
Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Tuberville,
please.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman. Thanks for being here today.
Secretary Granholm, in January the DOD issued an order
prohibiting utilities at military facilities from acquiring,
importing, transferring, or installing specified bulk power
system equipment from China. What was the rationale behind that
order?
Secretary Granholm. The rationale behind the order
initially, that the Trump administration provided, was, of
course, to make sure that our system is protected from
equipment that might be containing cyber malware from our
adversaries. A very solid rationale. When it was issued, we
received a lot of feedback from the utilities saying it was
overly broad and it needed to be addressed more with a scalpel
rather than an axe.
We will be following up on this. We have issued a Request
for Information from the utilities and others, to make sure
that it is crafted in a way that achieves the goal. But the
goal is the right goal.
Senator Tuberville. Does this cover critical civilian
facilities too?
Secretary Granholm. Yes.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. In 2015, it was reported
that the DOE planned to sign a 10-year agreement to build a
molten salt reactor with China. What is the status of that
agreement?
Secretary Granholm. I am going to get back to you on that.
Senator Tuberville. Okay. Thank you. You know, they give
all these explanations over the years, that China is no longer
a developing nation. I think they have proven that they are a
little bit past that. They are rapidly growing their military
and nuclear capabilities. So I would love to hear from you on
that. Thank you.
You know, a recent Hill article says the DOE is destroying
an important piece of our Cold War nuclear programs, Uranium
233. Have you read the 2008 IG report that cites that U233 is
vital to our national interest? Have you read that?
Secretary Granholm. I have not read the report.
Senator Tuberville. Okay. Thank you.
Chairman Reed, I would like permission to submit this
report to the record, please.
Chairman Reed. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix.]
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Just one other question.
U233 costs the U.S. billions to create and store, billions, and
as we speak we are destroying U233. We are going to eventually
need it, and we are spending more money than is imaginable.
There is not a lot of it. It is stored. In your answer, why
would we destroy something that eventually is going to be that
valuable to this country?
Secretary Granholm. I would ask whether Dr. Verdon has a
response to this, but I would say----
Senator Tuberville. Doctor, do you want to weigh in on
this?
Dr. Verdon. Actually, no. I would have to look into that as
well.
Senator Tuberville. Okay. Well, thank you.
Secretary Granholm. But I will say this, if I might. It is
important that the United States provide the means for its own
use, and there has been talk of a uranium stockpile, which this
Congress funded last year, which has carried over. We are, this
month, sending out a Request for Information about the creation
of a U.S.-based uranium stockpile.
Senator Tuberville. You know, I just hope we are not
allowing--and helping China in any way. We should not be doing
that, especially when it comes to nuclear. I have got another
article, too, from The Hill on U233, Mr. Chairman, I would like
to submit too.
Chairman Reed. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Tuberville. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you
both. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Tuberville. Now
let me now recognize, via Webex, Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
our witnesses for being here today.
I would like to talk about the NNSA's out-of-control
spending on the nuclear weapons systems. NNSA has a habit of
overpromising on development timelines and underestimating on
costs. This has resulted in projects costing taxpayers billions
of dollars more than originally anticipated, and finishing up
the job years behind schedule.
Just recently, NNSA's budget request estimated that the
high end of the cost range for pit production at Savannah River
could be as much $11.1 billion. That is 2.5 times the original
projection of $4.6 billion. On top of that, NNSA has now pushed
back its goal of producing 80 plutonium pits per year from 2030
to 2035. This is just the latest NNSA project that has gone
over budget and behind schedule.
So Administrator Verdon, let me ask you, do you think these
ballooning costs and delays are acceptable?
Dr. Verdon. Again, to me it is basically, what we are
trying to do is actually more in line with what you are asking
for. We are actually trying to be more rigorous in our costing
and schedule estimates, and that is what we have brought
forward. You may not have been on earlier on. The original
estimate for Savannah River was a top-down estimate. It was the
first that anybody even thought of. So it was not ever viewed
as a really detailed budget estimate. The one we just announced
is the first detailed budget and schedule estimate for that
facility, and that----
Senator Warren. You know. Okay, let me stop you there. The
problem I am talking about, I use the example of Savannah River
because it is 2.5 times past what was originally budgeted, and
it is now 5 years longer to get it done. But it is not the only
one.
NNSA is anticipating a $505 billion in nuclear weapons
spending over the next 25 years, over $100 billion more than
what it planned to spend previously. So the question I have is
this is not just one off. How can Congress or taxpayers feel
confident that NNSA's cost estimates are anyplace close to
accurate?
Dr. Verdon. So again, we are trying to learn lessons from
the past as quickly as we can. In fact, of all of the major
construction projects we have done in the recent years, 75
percent of them have actually come in at or under costs that
was projected for them. So I do think as an organization we are
learning. But what we are also identifying, and as we are
getting new requirements, new requirements also drive up the
costs, you know, the apparent costs, because we are getting
additional new requirements into the program. So we have to
look at that in total. But we are trying to learn hard from the
past and improve as we go forward, and I think we are making
progress in that area.
Senator Warren. Well, I would sure like to see the
progress, because, you know, if this had only happened once or
twice, that programs ran into issues, I would feel differently
about this. These issues are chronic. They have a long and
well-documented history. A 2010 GAO report concluded, and I am
going to quote it, that ``DOE did not have a cost-estimating
policy and that cost-estimating guidance it had developed in
the 1990s remained in effect but was out of date.'' That is
over 11 years ago.
I just want to hear you talk about how things have really
changed, and maybe the best way to do that is just tell me some
of the steps that NNSA can take right now, or is taking right
now to improve its cost estimates and to ensure that these
projects stay on schedule.
Dr. Verdon. Again, I think the Department and NNSA together
have put in a very rigorous capital acquisition project, you
know, management scheme, that we are following very rigorously.
We are using OMB and GAO best practices and guidance. If you
take something like uranium processing facility, which is
almost a decade-long project, $6.5 billion, it is on budget.
So as I say, we are seeing successes. We are not perfect
yet. We recognize that. But we are striving to work to improve
as we go forward, and I say, I am learning from the past, and
we are moving forward to improve, and I see metrics that show
that we are improving. I think with working with the Department
we have come up with a very rigorous process to manage these
large capital acquisition projects, in an effort to improve.
Senator Warren. I hope that is the case. You know, these
wildly inaccurate cost estimates are unacceptable, and we
cannot just accept them as the norm, especially as we are
trying to plot out trillions of dollars in unnecessarily
modernizing our nuclear arsenals. These cost overruns erode
public faith in government spending and jeopardize other
important NNSA projects like nonproliferation and
counterterrorism efforts.
Look, I do not think it is outrageous to expect that
taxpayer dollars we invest be spent intelligently and
responsibly, and I think it is long past time for NNSA to get
its house in order on this. I hear you when you say that those
procedures are underway, but I want to see the results on this.
These are taxpayer dollars and taxpayer time that is at risk
here.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren. Let me now
recognize Senator Ernst, please.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you,
Secretary Granholm and Dr. Verdon, for being here today.
Of course, effective transition to the ground-based
strategic deterrent will require a plan to safely and
efficiently dismantle, dispose, and demilitarize the current
ICBM fleet. If you could--and I apologize for missing the first
part of this--but if you could please walk us through what
progress is actually being made and what challenges you are
facing with the disposition planning for the Minuteman III.
Dr. Verdon. So we are not responsible for the missile--that
would be the Air Force--but for the warheads that are on the
missile, roughly half of them will transition off of the
Minuteman III onto the GBSD. The ones that will not transition,
the material associated with those warheads, when authorized,
will be disassembled and stored safely and securely, as we have
done in the past, with the material that composes those
warheads.
Senator Ernst. So you do not foresee any issues then with
that disposition.
Dr. Verdon. No.
Senator Ernst. That is good, and then also, of course, DOD,
DOE, and NNSA, they all have a stake in the development of the
nuclear cores that are supporting our weapons systems and our
nuclear Navy. What is the assessment of the capability and
ability of our domestic supply and production chains to produce
these nuclear cores?
Dr. Verdon. By cores--I am sorry, for clarification--by
cores you are referring to the pits, that we call the pits? Is
that what you mean by the core, or the whole weapon?
Senator Ernst. The whole weapon.
Dr. Verdon. So we are working very diligently to make sure
we have a supply chain. I think we are working very closely
with the Department and the Department of Defense in
reestablishing more domestic supplies of some of the materials
that we need, so we are recognizing that that is a key area
that we have to work on.
But we are reestablishing, or we have established and we
continue to work to make sure that we have the correct
infrastructure to support what we need to do.
Senator Ernst. Dr. Verdon, is there a role that you would
see at the Federal Government level or with Congress in making
sure that we can procure what is necessary domestically?
Dr. Verdon. You know, we do not have a definitive answer
yet, but I believe there will be some materials for which the
economic--you know, trying to get industry to restart some of
the, you know, domestically, will be a challenge that we may
need help in the future. There are certain materials we use
that we have to rely on external sources for, that bringing
them back onshore may present a challenge for the future that
we certainly would potentially need help in doing so.
Senator Ernst. What would some of those concerns that we
have with external sources, where would those sources be
located?
Dr. Verdon. I will say sensitive countries.
Senator Ernst. Okay. Thank you. I appreciate your time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Ernst. Let me
now recognize Senator Kelly, please.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Secretary
Granholm, great to see you again, and Dr. Verdon, great to have
a University of Arizona Wildcat testifying.
Secretary Granholm, cyberattacks, malware, ransomware
attacks have been increasing. Yesterday we had a closed
Cybersecurity Subcommittee hearing on some of the details of
these recent attacks. It is an issue that impacts us all, from
small businesses, large business, government agencies, secure
networks in our national security agencies. It is a big concern
of mine.
The recent Colonial Pipeline cyberattack underscored the
vulnerability of America's physical infrastructure and the
impact that even a single attack can have on the Nation. So I
am pleased to see the increased focus on cybersecurity in the
fiscal year 2022 budget request, a 42 percent increase from
last year's funding.
Secretary Granholm, if Congress funds this increase, what
efforts will the Department of Energy undertake to ensure that
America's energy networks are secured against malware,
ransomware, and other types of cyberattacks?
Secretary Granholm. Thank you for asking the question. As
we have seen, the Colonial Pipeline incident made it clear that
the fact that we do not have standards on pipelines, cyber
standards on pipelines, like we do on the electricity sector,
suggests a major whole. So working internally--now the
Department of Energy and CESER is the sector risk manager for
the energy sector--working in partnership with CISA, who is
over in the Department of Homeland Security, and the TSA that
has responsibility over pipelines, we want to make sure that
our efforts, and this increase in funding, ensures a
collaborative, cohesive whole response inside of government, on
the energy side, which is obviously where our focus is.
We want to make sure that the Executive order that the
President issued regarding cyber, and including the notion of
Energy Star ratings for software, so that we all, inside the
Federal Government, are purchasing supplies, software, that we
know are the best, that have the highest standards, that make
us secure. Those efforts inside of DOE are going to require
additional resources, hence some of that increase, so both on
personnel, as well as coordination, as well as helping develop
standards, as well as implementing those standards inside of
the Department are all what CESER is working on.
Senator Kelly. Then also part of this, you know, is the
sharing of information, and the President had Executive Order
14028, that talked about this, and really discussed removing
barriers to cyber threat, information- sharing with the private
sector. So information that would go from government agencies
to private sector to benefit all Americans, and this could
enhance our national security, but being able to gather real-
time information about active threats and effectively
communicate to others at risk in private industry, we see that
this can help deter and prevent cyberattacks on our country's
energy network.
So can you address any barriers that currently exist to
communication between the Department of Energy and private
sector regarding cyberattacks?
Secretary Granholm. Yeah. I mean, CESER's communications
with the electricity sector are excellent. We are embedded in
the Council, we work with them closely. It is a great example
of what the steps are that have to happen. In that Executive
order, the President, for example, required that pipelines
notify the government if they have been the victim of
cyberattack or ransomware attack. That was not required before.
So what CESER wants to do is to elevate the visibility, the
transparency between what is happening in the private sector
and the information flow to the government. So one example of
that is technology that has been developed at one of our
national labs, PNNL. It is called CRISP. It was one example of
technology that was attached to the electricity sector that
would give us visibility into the systems, so that if there
were a bad actor we would know about it, our intelligence
community would know about it, and we would be able to engage
in defensive strategies. We do not have that on the pipeline
sector, and so that is the kind of visibility that is needed on
the full panoply of the infrastructure associated with energy.
Senator Kelly. And beyond even infrastructure, I just want
to point out that it would benefit all of us if we could do a
much better job sharing this information from the private
sector to the public sector, so our law enforcement agencies,
Department of Justice, FBI knows what is going on in the
private sector. We were discussing this yesterday. How can we
improve that flow of information? Often, you know, companies--
and I understand their rationale for this--don't always want
this information to get out there, so we need to explore
options to maybe keep this somewhat private at some level. What
we are discussing today is the information that goes from
government to private industry. So we have got to do a better
job. This is just going to continue, and in my view, accelerate
and get worse.
Thank you, and Mr. Chairman, I want to submit just a couple
of questions for the record to Dr. Verdon. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Quite all right. Without objection. Let me
now recognize, via Webex, Senator Blackburn.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
to our witnesses. I want to talk a little bit about our NNSA
facilities. We have mentioned this in several of our hearings.
Most of these are over 40 years old. Some are more than 75
years old that go back to the Manhattan Project. These
facilities present numerous single points of failure.
So to understand the gravity of the situation, I would like
for each witness to provide a specific example of a potential
consequence to the stability of the U.S. nuclear enterprise, if
it must continue to rely on this aging infrastructure, and talk
a little bit about how this is a budgetary issue, how this is a
personnel issue, and how this a national security issue,
because if any facilities experience operational shutdowns,
warhead deliveries may be affected.
So let's start with that and look at this deferred
maintenance around these facilities, and talk about how you are
going to deal with this in this budget. Secretary Granholm, we
will start with you.
Secretary Granholm. Yes, thank you for the question,
Senator, and I know Dr. Verdon can speak with great
specificity, but I think your point about if we do not
modernize, if we do not have the deterrent capability, then we
put our Nation at risk. Bottom line. So we have to be able to
modernize the warheads, and in order to do that we have to have
facilities that will allow for that modernization to occur. So
it is a national security issue, obviously.
It is also, I would say, an opportunity for the U.S. to
continue to build up its manufacturing backbone inside of the
United States. So the issue that Senator Ernst began to raise,
and I think Senator Tuberville, you were suggesting as well, is
to bring and make sure that we have the capabilities for our
own defense here in the United States without having to rely
upon others.
So from an economic point of view, from a national security
point of view, we have to do this. It will require budgetary
commitment--I know that was a third part of your question--and
we want to make sure that we do this in a thoughtful and
responsible way, to make sure that we meet the defense
requirements, and do so in a way that manages, and are stewards
of the taxpayer dollars as well.
Dr. Verdon. I would just add that I agree with your
statements. I think, you know, uranium processing facility at
the Y-12 is one of the key examples of that, that we are trying
to get, eventually be able to get programmatic work out of a
70-year-old building that was built during the Manhattan
Project, that we are critically dependent on now. That is the
approach we have taken to our whole approach of replacing a lot
of these old facilities is identifying what those are key, that
if we were to lose them would really cause the strategic
commander a great deal of difficulty operationally, and those
are our priorities to focus. The uranium processing facility is
one. The lithium processing facility proposed in starting to be
designed at Y-12. There are a number of them that we have
worked very hard to identify which one of those would really be
instrumental to get done as quickly as possible, and that has
been the focus of the program. Those that we can risk mitigate
out longer--we have delayed them, just, you know, to make sure
that we can, workload level as well as cash flow level.
But your point is well taken. I agree with the Secretary
that we are reaching--we have reached a tipping point. We have
to do this. Otherwise there will be consequences to the
operations.
Senator Blackburn. Dr. Verdon, when you talk about
scheduling modernization for the key secondaries group, and the
capabilities that are there with enriched uranium, depleted
uranium, lithium, how does this lack of attention to meeting
the deferred maintenance backlog, what does that do and what
kind of challenge does that present to the secondaries, not
only in an economic manner but also with a personnel manner?
Dr. Verdon. Again, what we tried very hard to do is we have
prioritized the deferred maintenance we do. It is clearly
applied to those facilities that are most important for
workforce safety and programmatic deliverables. That is where
we applied the money first.
Then for a number of facilities, like at Y-12, which you
mentioned for the secondaries, they have reached the point to
where, again, we are working on replacing most of them because
we recognize that, you know, affectionately we say something
the paint is holding the building together.
Senator Blackburn. Yeah.
Dr. Verdon. Those are the ones that we prioritized to be
replaced, effectively as a different approach to deferred
maintenance, but we think it is the best approach, and for
those other areas we have prioritized the work to the highest-
priority buildings that we have on the sites.
So again, that is the approach we have taken, driven by DOD
deliverables and workforce and environmental safety.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Senator Blackburn, I assume you have
concluded your comments?
Senator Blackburn. Okay.
Chairman Reed. With respect to that I will now recognize,
via Webex, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
Granholm and Administrator Verdon, I was really pleased to see
in your written testimony you mentioned enhancing our
cybersecurity across the nuclear enterprise, especially in the
wake of the Colonial Pipeline hack, and the targeting of
another contractor that works for the government's nuclear
programs.
I listened with great interest to your responses to Senator
Kelly. But acknowledging that we are in an unclassified
setting, do you feel confident about DOE and NNSA's capacity to
handle the ever-growing cybersecurity threat from malicious
actors and adversaries, and where are the areas where Congress
can be helpful? I did hear you say you needed funding. I did
not know if you need authorities. How is your ability to
recruit and retain key personnel?
Secretary Granholm. Thank you for the question, Senator. I
think there is, right now, an administration effort on cyber,
where we are reviewing all of this. But I will say that it is
clear that there are gaps, not so much in our ability
internally to respond, but in our ability to seek what is
happening in the private sector.
So this will be a question, and I am sure Congress will
have to look at this, is there a way that the private sector
can, for example, on the pipeline side, step up to allow
themselves to allow the government to have some visibility into
the system, since the public relies upon their system? Is there
a requirement that would have Congress step in to say
something, or is this something that could be incentivized on a
voluntary basis? I think those are all worthy questions of
exploring. But what is not acceptable, I think is the status
quo. So penetrating the information flow from the private
sector and encouraging that to us and to the intelligence
community is a high priority.
Senator Gillibrand. I agree that the status quo is
unacceptable, and we are working on legislation within the
Intelligence Committee to address visibility into the private
sector, and least have mandatory reporting when private sector
has some intrusion. So we are working on authorities, and this
Committee will also be working on that to meet the needs, and I
welcome your advice and guidance on that.
Do you have the personnel that you need? We have talked a
lot about getting the best and brightest cyber personnel for
the entire services and intelligence services. We have debated
issues of whether we need, for example, a cyber academy,
similar to the service academies, where we can create civilian
workforce through something like a service academy, and for 4
years of your education you give back 4 years in the public
sector, such as working at Department of Energy or working at
NSA or CIA, or any other civilian branches that need the best
and brightest in cyber. Is that something that you think would
be useful for your ability to attract and retain some of the
best talent, as opposed to having them go to the private sector
immediately?
Secretary Granholm. Yeah, I think we would welcome a pool
of talented people. We are always trying to increase our
science, technology, engineering, and math pipeline, and if
there were a dedicated place where we could be able to ensure
that we would have some of that talent, and perhaps even once
they are in, recruit them for the long haul, that would be a
terrific gift to the Nation.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. One further question. I see
that there is some potential for artificial intelligence to
help bolster the security of our nuclear weapons systems, but I
also have significant concerns given our vulnerability. Again,
acknowledging that this is an unclassified setting, what
elements of our nuclear command, control, and communication,
would you feel more comfortable potentially having AI play a
role, and what elements do you believe should firmly remain
within the control of human beings?
Secretary Granholm. I am going to let Dr. Verdon respond to
that.
Dr. Verdon. Well, I think the bigger control, I think,
would be the bigger NC3. That is really a DOD requirement, and
they would be the ones that would have to answer that question
in detail.
With regards to ours and that kind of role, our
requirements, we are taking a hard look at that, and it is a
good question. We are taking a hard look at that, of how do we
make sure that parts which have to stay in human control do so,
and that which we can turn over to things like AI, we do, you
know, do carefully. But I think the bigger question of the
whole command and control that is really a DOD question for you
to address.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you so much, both of
you, for your service, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Hawley, please.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to the
witnesses for being here. Dr. Verdon, if I could just start
with you, I want to talk about the Kansas City National
Security Campus, something we are very proud of, my home state
of Missouri. Can you give us an update on the NNSA's efforts to
ensure that the Kansas City campus has the capacity, the
additional capacity it needs to meet production requirements in
the coming years?
Dr. Verdon. Yes, sir. So we are expanding the capacity, or
the footprint, if you like, for manufacturing and developing.
We are doing that right now through leasing, but in parallel we
are starting to work on what a long-term vision would be, what
would be the long-term commitment. So we are doing both. We are
trying to address the near-term needs, and that will give us
information about what size the long term may need to be, and
then we are looking at options for a consolidated campus as we
go forward into the future.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Secretary Granholm, let me ask
you to weigh in here. I did want to ask specifically about the
space that the campus needs, as well as more general support.
So can you comment on that as well, making sure that the campus
has the space that it is going to need?
Secretary Granholm. Yeah. As Dr. Verdon said, they are
looking at these short-term leases for the moment, but
expanding to create one consolidated place makes sense, and
supportive, obviously, of what the NNSA's needs are.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Dr. Verdon, the STRATCOM
Commander testified earlier this year, this is the quote, ``The
plutonium pit production is the biggest stockpile modernization
issue.'' Can you confirm that the NSA is still on track to
restore our ability to produce 80 plutonium pits per year by
2030?
Dr. Verdon. So we are, as we recently notified, we believe,
based on all of the input we have now, and having the ability
to work with the vendors and the construction, that we will not
be able to achieve the 50 pits a year by 2030. We believe that
the time frame for that will be somewhere in the range of 2032
to 2035. That is the next step find out as to what that range
would be.
We started to have the detailed discussions with actually
laying out the construction that was required, laying out the
work with the vendors that supply the equipment, and we found
that it did not look like it was possible to do it by 2030. So
right now we have identified 2032 to 2035, and the next step is
to fine-tune those dates.
Senator Hawley. So we are looking at, I think you said 50,
50 pits per year by 2032 to 2035?
Dr. Verdon. So, sorry. But we are still very optimistic
that we will achieve the 30 pits a year at Los Alamos by 2026.
So that still is on target.
Senator Hawley. But 50 pits a year, now you are hoping, in
the 2032 to 2035 time range, is what you are saying.
Let me ask you, in that context, about China. Madam
Secretary, Admiral Richard has testified recently that China is
well ahead of the pace to double their stockpile by the end of
this decade. I can only say I think that those efforts are
deeply, deeply concerning, and speaks to the need to modernize
our own nuclear deterrent.
Do you agree that plutonium pit production is absolutely
foundational to our nuclear deterrent, and will you prioritize
ensuring that we are able to stay on schedule? It sounds like
the schedule is already slipping. Will you prioritize getting
back on schedule to ensure our efforts to restore this key
capability?
Secretary Granholm. I do and I will.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Dr. Verdon, the NNSA's budget
request this year includes several increases in the Production
Modernization Account, I noticed. Some of those increases
relate to plutonium pit certification activities. Can you say
something more about that, what those certification activities
entail, and why you requested the increase?
Dr. Verdon. Yes. So to build a pit is not just putting the
equipment in. It is actually then having the laboratory that
designs that pit, saying that what was built meets
requirements. What is what we call certification. So it is
those activities which involve, you know, small-scale testing,
large-scale testing, to make sure that what the equipment and
the people have built meets requirements and could be put into
the stockpile. That is the certification effort.
Senator Hawley. Got it. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley. I understand that
Senator Inhofe has no additional questions. I want to thank the
witnesses, Secretary Granholm and Dr. Verdon, for your
thoughtful and important testimony today, and with that I would
call the hearing adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 10:27 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark E. Kelly
nnsa future workforce
1. Senator Kelly. Dr. Verdon, we're blessed to have world-class
higher education programs in Arizona that are training the next
generation of technology and security leaders. This pipeline is
critical for our national security workforce, especially for agencies
like NNSA, which are faced with the reality of an expert, yet aging,
workforce. The fiscal year 2022 budget request includes $96 million for
Academic Alliances, like the Minority Serving Institution Partnership
Program, which the University of Arizona participates in today.
How will investment in these and other programs help to recruit and
retain the highly-technical talent we need to provide for America's
nuclear security? How is NNSA actively seeking talent and partnering
with universities across the Nation to develop the necessary talent for
the future?
Dr. Verdon. NNSA has implemented multiple university programs to
develop, recruit, and retain high-quality individuals. Currently NNSA
sponsors dozens of university programs designed to help meet current
and future challenges in the nuclear security enterprise (NSE). The
programs are strategically linked to succession-planning efforts to
develop, recruit, and retain highly qualified and diverse talent across
the NSE. Investment in these programs will help provide the next
generation with opportunities to acquire the experience and expert
judgment needed to sustain the NSE and provide valuable basic and
applied research to NNSA's missions.
NNSA actively seeks talent through partnering with academic
institutions across the Nation including Minority Serving Institutions
(MSIs). NNSA's Minority Serving Institutions Partnership Program
(MSIPP) and the related Tribal Education Partnership Program (TEPP)
work directly with MSIs and National Laboratories and plants to build
diverse and sustainable science, technology, engineering, and
mathematics (STEM) career pipelines to prepare NNSA's next-generation
technical workforce. MSIPP aligns investments in university capacity
and workforce development with DOE/NNSA mission areas to develop the
needed skills and talent for DOE/NNSA's enduring technical workforce
and to enhance research and education capacity at MSIs. MSIPP builds a
network of NSE-ready students through enrichment activities from K-12
to the post-doctoral level. Through MSI-NSE lab/plant consortia
partnerships, students are provided with internship opportunities
across the NSE in direct alignment with their academic disciplines and
exposed to cutting-edge research and activities in their relevant
fields. The internships afford students the opportunity to make
significant and immediate contributions to the enterprise.
Capacity building through curriculum and infrastructure has led to
the creation of new and advanced nuclear security enterprise related
curricula. As a result of MSIPP, in fiscal year 2020 there were 485
undergraduate and graduate college and university students supported
through the program; 146 faculty professional development and 92 K-12
outreach activities completed; 277 new MSIPP-type courses and labs;
eight new degree programs and nine new program certificates; 600
professional development activities; 162 student internships; and 20
students were hired into the NSE. NNSA and NNSA's Management and
Operation (M&Os) contractors are also sponsoring an MSIPP virtual
career day fair on September 15th with 73 confirmed MSIPP institutions.
A key MSIPP consortium is the Partnership for Proactive
Cybersecurity Training (PACT), led by the University of Arizona. PACT
addresses current and future cybersecurity research challenges, while
educating and training a next generation of cybersecurity workforce.
Cybersecurity is a critical area of interest for the enterprise and
PACT provides an essential pipeline to help the NSE maintain that core
cybersecurity capability. This is just one of 17 consortia that NNSA
partners with to develop the necessary talent for the future.
Another program, the NNSA Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP),
recruits, hires, and retains the next generation of talented, high-
potential graduate-level professionals who will continue to contribute
to the NNSA mission. NGFP has become a robust talent succession
pipeline for the NSE, and Arizona State is one of our university
partners helping to bring top talent into the enterprise. For over 25-
years, the program has produced over 600 Federally sponsored graduates,
and over 85 percent of alumni have accepted positions with ties to the
national security sector. Since fiscal year 2015, 45 percent of the
graduates (306 individuals) have accepted Federal employment with NNSA.
The Stewardship Science Academic Alliances Program (SSAA)
emphasizes academic research in technical areas of fundamental research
and development that are relevant to NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship
Program mission. The Centers of Excellence activities supported by SSAA
maintain the pillars of technical peer expertise while individual
investigator grants develop breadth in each field of research relevant
to NNSA. Both provide students with training and development that align
with the needs of the NSE. SSAA funding supports research at
approximately 80 universities, including training of more than 350
undergraduate, graduate students, and post-doctoral researchers each
year. The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation University Consortia for
Nuclear Nonproliferation program funds are awarded to three university
consortia, with a fourth consortium focused on nuclear forensics
planned for fiscal year 2022. The consortia are structured to encourage
direct engagement of university students at NNSA laboratories for
graduate research. Nearly 500 degrees, including 177 Ph.Ds., have been
awarded through the consortia, resulting in more than 140 new career
placements in the DOE/NNSA's national laboratories. These are just a
few examples of how NNSA is actively seeking talent for the NSE.
nnsa future workforce
2. Senator Kelly. Dr. Verdon, what challenges and obstacles does
the organization face in recruiting the needed talent for NNSA to
sustain and maintain America's nuclear arsenal and other critical
activities?
Dr. Verdon. Meeting NNSA's growing mission requirements mandates an
aggressive, external hiring strategy. With a renewed focus on
recruitment in multiple cities to support all program areas, NNSA has
worked to close its staffing shortfall to meet mission growth and
commitments. NNSA's expanding and challenging national security
missions require it to recruit, train, and retain a highly skilled
Federal employee workforce. Challenges the organization faces in
recruiting the talent needed for NNSA to sustain and maintain America's
nuclear arsenal and other critical activities include: 1) laboratory
locations in areas that have high costs of living, are remote, or both;
2) the need to compete with private industry and other government
agencies for a limited pool of high-caliber talent; and 3) many NNSA
positions require security clearances which can be lengthy and/or
difficult to obtain for some elements of our civilian labor workforce.
Based on OPM guidance, NNSA is allowed to provide
recruitment and retention bonuses that would otherwise not be
authorized, for two hard-to-fill NNSA locations: Livermore Field Office
(LFO) in Northern California and Los Alamos Field Office (LAFO) just
north of Albuquerque, New Mexico.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is uniquely situated
in the midst of the Nation's information technology hub, and the lure
of working for a major technology entity for our workforce is very
real. LFO leadership is constantly recruiting as Federal employees and
contract partners are pulled away to the private sector with increased
pay and exorbitant sign-on bonuses. Moreover, the high cost of living
associated with residing in the local area of LLNL makes government
employment less attractive.
LAFO's recruitment and sustainment efforts are hampered by both the
remoteness of the Lab's location and the high cost of living associated
with the local area. The attractiveness of employment elsewhere -
including at the Sandia National Laboratories and a competitive job
market in the Albuquerque, NM metro area, just an hour and a half south
of LANL, complicates recruitment and retention for LANL leadership.
OPM has also identified three critical occupational
series that are more challenging to recruit for: certified contracting
professionals, information technology professionals, and cyber security
professionals.
NNSA's Office of Acquisition and Project Management requires a
cadre of seasoned contract specialists with cradle-to-grave acquisition
experience to assist with providing agile procurement solutions. The
consistent need for contracting professionals across the whole-of-
government and within the private sector has created a lack of
available resources across the spectrum of employment opportunities.
NNSA faces recruitment and retention challenges across the spectrum
of the information technology and cyber security professions. These two
occupational specialties are in demand across the Federal Government
and within the private sector. NNSA competes with the whole-of-
government for a limited pool of available IT and cyber security
professionals, which impacts recruitment and retention in this critical
occupational series.
nnsa technology investments
3. Senator Kelly. Dr. Verdon, you have said that the fiscal year
2022 budget request will enable the National Nuclear Security
Administration's Office of Naval Reactors to advance new technologies
and improve reactor performance. This innovation is part of what
provides the U.S. Navy with an edge over our adversaries.
What are some of NNSA's target areas for technology innovation in
the upcoming fiscal year and can you expand on how this funding would
support them?
Dr. Verdon. Naval Reactors Development (NRD) funds the development
of advances in the unique nuclear propulsion technical capability that
the Navy relies on to operate, build, and maintain nuclear-powered
ships. Included in this line is funding that enables the Naval Nuclear
Propulsion Program to manage operations of the current fleet, perform
analysis of current reactor performance, and support construction of
nuclear-powered warships. The fiscal year 2022 budget request also
increases investment in the research and development of new
technologies, including those intended to support the Navy timeline for
SSN(X). Investment in mid- to long-term advanced research and
development has been deferred over the past decade to support major
recapitalization efforts across the Program.
The increase in NRD in fiscal year 2022 will support the following
efforts:
Performing cutting-edge research to develop new
technologies and manufacturing methods that significantly improve the
capability, effectiveness, performance, and cost of future naval
nuclear propulsion plants to maintain our strategic maritime
superiority. Examples include added focus on:
Advanced instrumentation and control technology and
equipment: Current digital control and power management equipment is
becoming obsolete and will need to be replaced. Naval Reactors is
working with commercial industry on replacements that take up less
space, run cooler and with less power, enable more effective use of
electrical power in the ship, are more secure against cyber-attack,
costs less and can efficiently acquire and process a broad range of
plant data.
Plant Data and Automation: Advanced sensors, artificial
intelligence, and data analytics are being pursued to automate current
manual data collection, and process that data into information that
gives the operator a clearer picture of plant status, with goals to
simplify operation, enable confident condition-based maintenance,
increase ship operational availability and ease the burden on our
sailors.
Core manufacturing development: Naval Reactors has
started an effort to change how we manufacture reactor cores, with
technology that promises to provide a more capable reactor for the next
ship, while also allowing that reactor to be smaller and cost less. The
new approach employs advanced, high precision robotics and machine
learning methods for automated in-process inspection that can quickly
find and correct potential production process issues much earlier than
is possible today, reducing our fabrication costs and risks.
Component manufacturing technologies: Naval Reactors
sees practical potential for using certain advanced manufacturing
approaches in building major plant components. These advanced
capabilities include hot-isostatic pressing and metal additive
manufacturing, and based on industry experience, promise to deliver
propulsion plant components at reduced cost and schedule, in addition
to enabling performance-enhancing designs with unique or complex
geometries. These advanced manufacturing approaches can supplement, or
in some cases replace, traditional forging and casting methods, some of
which have changed little since WWII.
Developing technology for reactor plant components that
will provide substantial improvements in quieting capability and
performance for future submarines. There is real potential to make a
meaningful improvement to submarine stealth. Achieving an improvement
involves work in reactor technology areas using existing specialized
laboratory test facilities and state of the art flow and heat transfer
computer methods, as well as targeted improvements to key reactor plant
components.
Recapitalizing facilities and equipment for inspecting
and characterizing naval spent nuclear fuel; efforts that have the
potential to provide increased operating capability of nuclear
submarines and aircraft carriers.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tommy H. Tuberville
nuclear energy
4. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Granholm, would you agree nuclear
energy is essential to the long-term goal of plentiful power and carbon
reduction? Please explain your answer in detail.
Secretary Granholm. Yes, I agree that nuclear energy is essential
to the long-term goal of plentiful power and carbon reduction. To reach
our ambitious goals of a 50 to 52 percent reduction in our carbon
emissions in 2030, 100 percent clean electricity by 2035, and a net-
zero economy by 2050, we will need to use every single clean energy
tool available. Our existing nuclear power plants, as well as new
advanced nuclear designs will play crucial roles in helping us meet
these goals.
nuclear reactors
5. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Granholm, please provide an
overview of recent developments in advanced reactors, many of which are
reincarnated from the heyday of nuclear design in the 1960s and 1970s.
How many are being developed in the private sector?
Secretary Granholm. Current innovative advanced reactor designs
that are under development have the potential to offer significant
benefits versus existing and past technologies, including possible
lower costs, enhanced safety and security, greater resource
utilization, and simpler operating regimes. The Office of Nuclear
Energy's (NE) Advanced Reactor Technologies (ART) program supports
innovative reactor concepts including fast reactors, molten salt
reactors (MSR), high temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGR), and
microreactors.
Fast Reactors can utilize many coolants including liquid sodium,
liquid lead, gas, and molten salts. Recent advancements in fast reactor
technology have focused on reducing capital costs, enhancing safety,
and improving operational flexibility.
Modular HTGRs under development today use low-enriched uranium and
a relatively low-powered core to enable passive heat removal. This
combination of fuel and core design prevents the core from melting even
under the most severe accident conditions. It also allows the coolant
to be safely heated to much higher temperatures suitable for supporting
energy-intensive processes that currently rely on fossil fuels, such as
hydrogen production, desalination, district heating, petroleum
refining, and ammonia production. Over the past decade, the advanced
gas reactor (AGR) program has refined fuel fabrication expertise and
improved the fuel performance of tri-structural isotropic (TRISO) fuel
for use in commercial HTGRs. TRISO fuel exhibits very low particle
failure rates during irradiation, and remarkable durability under
severe accident conditions. Additionally, advances in materials
development and qualification, such as the recent qualification of
Alloy 617, enables HTGRs to potentially support higher efficiency base-
load electricity generation and broader cogeneration and high-
temperature process heat markets. Alloy 617 can be deployed in reactor
environments up to 954 degrees Celsius (C), which is an increase of 180
degrees C over previously accepted alloys.
Some recent MSR concepts are being designed to use chloride salts,
which are more economical and readily available than salts used in
early MSR designs. Early MSRs also were liquid fueled but a new MSR
variant known as the Fluoride salt-cooled High Temperature Reactor
(FHR) can utilize the robust solid TRISO fuel form being developed for
high temperature reactors. Further, FHRs can operate at high
temperatures and can potentially support higher efficiency electricity
generation and process heat applications.
Microreactors are a cross-cutting category of very small reactors
that may utilize any of the coolants currently under development by
advanced reactor designers and supported by NE. Microreactors offer
unique features such as high energy reliability, simplicity of reactor
control and safety design, factory fabrication, and transportability by
truck, rail, or aircraft. These features may provide a reliable and
economic power production alternative for remote, off-grid communities
and may provide reliable, secure, and transportable power and process
heat options for defense applications.
Recognizing the promise of advanced reactor designs, dozens of
United States companies are working on advanced nuclear reactor designs
for a wide array of capabilities to meet the energy needs of the
future.
6.Senator Tuberville. Secretary Granholm, is it possible for
civilian reactors to potentially create more fuel than they consume?
e.g., all fast-neutron reactors can technically be designed to operate
as ``breeder'' reactors, and when using U-233, both fast and slow-
neutron reactors can run as breeders.
Secretary Granholm. Yes, fast reactors can be designed to breed
fissile material in the reactor core and produce fissionable material
when operated in conjunction with a reprocessing/recycling facility in
a closed fuel cycle, as is done in some foreign fast reactor programs.
As noted, when using uranium-233, both fast and slow-neutron reactors
can breed fissile material. In all uranium and thorium fuels, new
fissile isotopes are created in the reactor environment. Both existing
and advanced reactors take advantage of this conversion and subsequent
fissions that have the performance benefit of extending fuel burnup.
The favorable neutron balance in fast reactors at high uranium loading
can create fissile isotopes more quickly than they are consumed by
fission. The rate of fissile isotope production is highly dependent on
the reactor fuel loading, with flexibility to ``breed'' or burn the
fissile inventory.
Most U.S. advanced fast reactor concepts are being designed to be
net consumers (burners) of fissile material. Fast burner reactors can
be used to support waste management missions by consuming nuclear
waste. However, the commercial infrastructure to support reprocessing/
recycling does not exist in the United States today; hence, U.S. fast
reactor developers are planning on a once-through fuel cycle supporting
their reactors and are targeting high efficiency base-load electricity
generation and process heat markets.
7. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Granholm, one of the reactors that
DOE has chosen for demonstration--the Natrium reactor design by GE-
Hitachi and Terrapower--is a fast-neutron reactor. Do you believe it
could produce more fuel than it consumes?
Secretary Granholm. The Natrium reactor is a sodium fast-spectrum
reactor (SFR) design. SFRs could be designed to breed fissile material
in the reactor core and produce fissionable material when operated in
conjunction with a reprocessing facility in a closed fuel cycle, as is
done in some foreign SFR programs. However, due to a lack of commercial
reprocessing infrastructure in the United States, the designers of the
Natrium reactor decided to design Natrium to produce less fuel than it
consumes and operate with an open fuel cycle.
8. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Granholm, depending on the
residence time of the fuel in the reactor and the nature of the
chemical processing, any excess fuel produced by a reactor can
potentially be weapons-grade material. What steps does the DOE foresee
are necessary to ensure that we can adequately safeguard the
production, storage, and movement of such nuclear fuel in a future
where advanced reactors are more prevalent?
Secretary Granholm. The Department is confident that the management
of spent nuclear fuel from existing reactors and that expected from the
proposed advanced reactors is and will be done in a responsible manner
that protects the environment, the workers, and the public. Consistent
with this, the Department understands that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) ensures safeguards and security (S&S) of these
reactors and their spent nuclear fuel by regulating licensees'
accounting systems for nuclear materials and security programs. The
Department further understands that NRC regulations require the
licensee to maintain a nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A)
program that tracks and verifies special nuclear material (SNM) that is
on site. The MC&A regulations ensure that the information collected by
the licensee about SNM is accurate, authentic, and sufficiently
detailed to enable a licensee to maintain current knowledge of its SNM
and manage its program for securing and protecting SNM. The MC&A
program, together with physical protection of facilities and
information security requirements, make up the primary elements of the
NRC's SNM safeguards program. The NRC regulates light water reactors
and has the responsibility to ensure advanced reactors are equally
secure and protected as they are developed and deployed. The Department
funds S&S research and development to ensure that improved technologies
and approaches that strengthen safeguards and security are available to
licensees, and to help implement them all to meet NRC requirements in
the most efficient and cost-effective manner.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) serves as an
intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical co-operation in
the peaceful use of nuclear technology and nuclear power worldwide. The
programs of the IAEA encourage the development of the peaceful
applications of nuclear energy, science and technology, provide
international safeguards against misuse of nuclear technology and
nuclear materials, and promote nuclear safety and nuclear security
standards and their implementation. The National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) announced the rollout of U.S. Nuclear Nexus
(http://www.anl.gov/nuclear-nexus), a tool designed to foster timely
connections between NNSA and the U.S. nuclear industry on the global
deployment of advanced nuclear technology on August 17, 2021. Nexus
will act as a single point of access for NNSA and DOE National
Laboratory recommendations, training, tools, and other relevant
technical expertise and guidance on nonproliferation.
nuclear waste
9. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Granholm, since the government
already owns civilian nuclear waste, does it make sense for the Federal
Government, or in other words, the American people, to own all nuclear
fuel and by extension any fuel created inside reactors and create a
leasing program whereby civilian reactors can acquire such fuel?
Secretary Granholm. The Federal Government does not currently own
the vast majority of the Nation's civilian spent nuclear fuel but
instead is obligated to accept and dispose of such material pursuant to
the Standard Contract that section 302(a) of the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act authorizes DOE to enter into with the owners of civilian reactors.
Specifically, due to the lack of any viable existing disposal or
storage options, DOE has been unable to take title to any spent nuclear
fuel pursuant to the Standard Contract. However, assuming DOE were able
to take title to civilian spent nuclear fuel, there are no existing or
planned commercial reprocessing facilities in the U.S., which could
extract enriched uranium and plutonium from the spent nuclear fuel for
fabrication into usable nuclear fuel. Moreover, section 53 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 generally prohibits DOE from leasing special
nuclear material, including nuclear fuel, to anyone who possesses or
operates an NRC-licensed utilization facility, including a civilian
reactor. In addition, as a general matter, section 3112 of the USEC
Privatization Act imposes limits on the authority of DOE to provide
source and special nuclear material, including nuclear fuel, to
civilian reactors in competition with the commercial sector.
DOE believes the commercial sector has the capacity and expertise
to supply nuclear fuel to both the domestic and international markets
and can better respond to market conditions than DOE. DOE is playing,
and should continue to play, an important role in maintaining the
viability and competitiveness of the American nuclear industry by
supporting efforts to develop advanced nuclear fuel forms and improved
technology for production, conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication.
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